{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02203863625018719, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0035940697848549892, 'mean_word_length': 4.881826189078097, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Introduction

This book is not about Brexit, or what the impact of Brexit may be on East Asia, but an analyis of the changing state of relations between Europe and North East Asia at a time when the post-war liberal world order is under threat, not least from the contest for supremacy between the USA and China. The contributors, who have considerable first-hand experience of the region as either academics or policy makers, broadly conclude that the most likely outcome is a modified, but messier, world order. While the EU has the opportunity to help shape this, it is unlikely to do so, and will continue to react to events, rather than influence them. This will be even more the case for the UK, whose influence and standing in East Asia will be reduced now that it is outside the EU.


Michael Reilly and Chun-Yi Lee
We should start this book with a caveat and explanation: it is not about Brexit, or even what the impact of Brexit may be on East Asia. Both topics have already been covered, Brexit itself exhaustively, and its implications for East Asia in a previous volume of one of the co-editors. 1 A title such as Europe, East Asia and the rise of China, or perhaps Europe, China and the USA might have been equally appropriate. Nor is it primarily about trade, even though both during and after the 2016 referendum debate in the UK, Brexit was often portrayed as an opportunity for the country to 'free itself' from the rest of Europe and trade freely with the rest of the world as if this had somehow not been possible previously.
It is also too early to say what the long-term impact and consequences of Brexit will be-in years to come, as historians look back at the aftermath of the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020, US foreign policy after President Donald Trump or Chinese influence and expansionism in East Asia under Xi Jinping, Brexit may merit little more than a footnote. Substitute 'Brexit' by 'Xi Jinping', or 'Chinese assertiveness' or 'Donald Trump' or 'the rise of populism' and much of the analysis presented here would require little, if any, change. However, at the time of writing Brexit has happened, even if the future relationship between the UK and its erstwhile partners remains to be settled, whereas the other subjects remain very much in progress. For better or worse, Brexit forms a clear point on which to place analysis of the changing state of relations between Europe and East Asia, North-East Asia more specifically.
It is common to see these overwhelmingly in commercial terms. British Government ministers have certainly done so, both during the Brexit referendum debate and subsequently. The British Government's 'Global Britain' strapline reflected this, even if it was more ingenious than persuasive, in the words of one of our contributors. Nevertheless, setting aside Brexit-related rhetoric, since the end of the Korean War in 1953, commercial interests have been to the fore in European relations with the countries of East Asia. From the late 1950s, the region as a whole embarked on more than five decades of almost continuous rapid economic growth, led first by Japan, then the 'four tigers' of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, and since the turn of the century by China. With four, geographically small, exceptions-Brunei, Hong Kong, Macao and Timor-Leste-by the early 1970s the formerly extensive colonies of European powers in the region, embracing Malaysia, Indonesia and Indo-China, had all achieved independence. With no security interests of any note to defend, it is perhaps not surprising that European countries therefore saw the region overwhelmingly in terms of the commercial opportunities it offered, while the often painful process of de-colonisation served as a warning to them to avoid being drawn into the Vietnam War.
Occasionally, they cooperated in the face of common challenges to their commercial interests, most clearly in the 1970s and 1980s as they sought to protect domestic industries from the full force of Asian competition, notably in the textile, electronics and automotive sectors. More usually, they competed fiercely between themselves to win business for their 'national champions' in the region or, more recently, to secure inward investment from it. At least one influential European think tank has criticised European states for fighting among themselves for Chinese contracts and finance, prioritising these over broader foreign policy interests. Meanwhile, the post-Brexit British Government has shown it pays scarcely any more attention to American concerns in this respect. 2 For good measure, when European countries have acted together on non-commercial matters in their relations with East Asia, their interventions have not infrequently been failures, or worse, counterproductive, as Rod Wye argues in Chapter 3. Undoubtedly, the biggest such failure in recent years was the abortive plan to lift the Arms Embargo on China in 2005. Advocates of lifting the embargo argued that it was an unnecessary irritant in the burgeoning relationship with China and that lifting it would be of only symbolic importance, as exports would continue to be circumscribed by existing export license regulations. They suggested replacing it by a strengthened European Union (EU) code of conduct providing greater clarity over what arms sales could be permitted.
With hindsight, what was so striking about discussion of the proposal was the near-total failure on the part of European foreign ministries generally to consider the likely reaction in other countries. That matters reached this stage was widely seen as a reflection of the EU's lack of strategic interest in or understanding of North-East Asia, its member states seeing the region only in terms of commercial opportunities which, cynics would say, lay behind the proposal to lift the embargo in the first place. Only after this near debacle did the EU attempt to bring greater coherence to its East Asian strategy, agreeing in the second half of 2005 common guidelines 'designed to provide a broad orientation for the EU's approach to East Asia, across the full range of its activities'. 3 Against this background, the countries of East Asia have not infrequently viewed the European Union and its members with a mixture of wariness, irritation and frustration: Europe offers none of the security guarantees provided by the USA, and while fears of 'Fortress Europe' that surrounded the creation of the Single Market in 1986 may have diminished over time, the EU is still often seen as protectionist, while European 'preaching' on human rights or other values has frequently been seen as heavy-handed, or unwelcome interference in countries' domestic affairs.
For all these reservations, the outcome of the 2016 referendum, in which the UK electorate chose by a narrow majority to leave the EU, still came as a shock to most East Asian countries. China's Global Times newspaper was perhaps most outspoken in its reaction, but also very probably spoke for other countries in the region with its headline of Britain steps backward as the EU faces decline once the result was known. It felt the outcome signalled a more general decline in Europe and would make it easier for the USA to influence European foreign policy decisions, to China's disadvantage. 4 Four years later, the rest of the world has largely moved on from the referendum shock, often because of bigger shocks or uncertainties since, which pose more direct threats to their own interests. For East Asia, the first of these came less than five months after the Brexit referendum. Donald Trump's election as the 45th president of the USA heralded a very different approach to US foreign policy, in which he seemed as ready to castigate allies such as Japan or EU states as he did adversaries with whom, by contrast, he often sought to cultivate a warmer relationship, as exemplified by his meetings with North Korea's Kim Jong-un. Given his unpredictable attitude and failure to win re-election in 2020, the Global Times ' fears about increased American influence over European foreign policy now seem over-stated.
Notwithstanding Trump's on-off relationship with Kim, however, his foreign policy will undoubtedly be best remembered for antagonism towards China, initially over trade, then increasingly over technological supremacy, as touched on by Robyn Klingler-Vidra and Yu Ching Kuo in Chapter 8, and exacerbated still further by his war of words in 2020 over blame for the Covid-19 coronavirus pandemic. The increasingly acrimonious dispute sucked in other countries in the region, none more than Taiwan, which is increasingly like the proverbial shrimp caught between two whales in this growing contest for supremacy. This is all the more so as Hong Kong finds itself falling ever further under the direct control of Beijing. Still, other countries in the region also have to factor into their policy-making the increasingly assertive behaviour of China under Xi Jinping. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all have security guarantees of one form or another from the USA, yet look to China as their leading trading partner, while also facing security challenges or threats from it. Potential problems for them arising from Brexit were therefore of a decided second-order category, even before the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic.
In these circumstances, the countries of the region could be forgiven for overlooking their relations with the EU and its members. While EU states may not provide the 'hard' security guarantees of the USA, however, they do not lack clout and influence of their own, nor is this inconsequential: two of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are European, as are four of the members of the G7-plus the EU which is a member in its own right although not formally counted as one-and trade and investment with the countries of the EU are of major importance to East Asia. Furthermore, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan share with the EU an adherence to democratic principles, respect for human rights and a belief in the rule of law.
Given the background of wider global uncertainty, it can only be natural for the countries of East Asia to be assessing the likely future of their relationships with the EU following the UK's departure from it and what role, if any, the UK itself might play in their future relations. There are many within the UK, in its government especially, who argue that no longer bound by the supposed constraints of EU membership, the country will have a freer hand to pursue its own interests in East Asia. Cynics within the EU would doubtless argue that EU membership has rarely hindered the UK from pursuing its own interests, even when these might have been to the detriment of wider European policy. They can point to several recent examples of the UK's dealings with China in support of their case, although Tim Summers suggests in Chapter 4 that British policy towards China is also shifting. 5 Equally, there are those within the EU who see the UK's departure from the bloc as an opportunity. Shorn of a heavyweight, influential but, in their eyes, frequently disruptive and arguably mercantilist member, the EU should be freer to pursue a more openly values-based diplomacy towards the region than has hitherto been the case.
However, the wider world, East Asia especially, is hardly standing by patiently waiting to see how the EU and UK manage their future relationship. The American-led, liberal world order created in the aftermath of the Second World War is under threat, less so now, perhaps, from an isolationist and unpredictable American president, but from a rising and increasingly assertive China, which under Xi Jinping appears increasingly eager to reshape the order more to its liking. Not surprisingly, China's neighbours, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan especially, view this with concern, increasingly worried that they may be forced to choose sides in their hitherto carefully managed relationships with China and the USA. How the EU, and to a lesser extent the UK, will respond thus becomes of greater interest to them. Will the countries of the EU continue to prioritise their commercial relations with China? Moreover, will the UK, especially, further irritate its usually steadfast ally in Washington in its quest for commercial advantage in Beijing, or will the EU seek to shore up or revitalise the current world order? How the EU responds will influence decisions taken in Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei and Beijing too.
In November 2019, academics and former policy-makers with extensive involvement in East Asia came together under the auspices of Nottingham University's Taiwan Studies Programme to discuss and examine these issues and to consider what relations with East Asia will look like for both the EU and UK in the post-Brexit world. This book is the outcome of their deliberations. Contributors were invited because of their experience or professional knowledge, and to represent as broad a range of views as possible, not on the basis of their individual views on the merits or otherwise of Brexit. They were asked to take this as the starting point or catalyst for a potential broader change in relations as part of wider changes in the world order, rather than to consider the impact or outcome of Brexit per se on those relationships. Although trade perspectives were not explicitly excluded, given that these have been the focus of much of the work to date on post-Brexit relations, contributors were asked to consider diplomatic and security perspectives, as well as wider issues such as the possible impact on educational and research links.
One of the depressing aspects of the Brexit debate-and sadly increasingly prevalent elsewhere too-has been the way in which objectivity has increasingly been supplanted by ideology in policy-making. In many areas, not just trade policy, a grasp of key policy issues seems to count for less than ideological zeal. Given this, there will doubtless be some who will rush to dismiss the broad findings and conclusions here as too pessimistic. The contributors were asked to make their assessments as far as possible based on how they saw reactions from within the region, however, not from within the UK or within the EU. The findings also reflect the three years of indecision and policy hiatus within the UK that followed the referendum, which inevitably influenced the views of others.
The following chapter, by Richard Higgott, encapsulates this apparent pessimism, painting a gloomy picture of the current state of the liberal world order. He sees this as decaying and parlous, arguing that the American-led order is over and that the successful development of a new world order that is driven by cooperation and consensus, rather than conflict, is far from assured, especially given the growing conflict between the USA and China, which he sees as the key players in shaping this future order. He worries about the current febrile state of relations between the two, which he sees in turn as one of the key obstacles inhibiting the prospects for the reform of the world order. Pessimistic it may be, but developments since the chapter was first drafted-for example, President Trump's decision in April 2020 to suspend US financial contributions to the World Health Organisation (WHO) in response to its alleged failings in responding to the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, or China's imposition of a draconian national security law on Hong Kong two months later-surely reinforce his argument.
Higgott then considers what role the EU might play in shaping the world order after Brexit. He sees Brexit as a symptom of the dilemmas of the current order, not as a determinant. Now that it is out of the EU, the role of the UK as a major international player will become increasingly irrelevant. It will remain secured by its formal presence as a member of the Security Council, the G7 and G20 and other ancillary international institutions, but its ability to influence and affect the debate over the structure of the world order will be greatly diminished.
If his analysis risks being dismissed as typical of a disappointed 'Remainer' or frustrated European intellectual, Higgott himself would argue that his aim was primarily to stimulate discussion and consideration of the issues rather than risk seeing a new order emerge almost by default-a risk surely, given the current (autumn 2020) lack of consistency or clarity in American policy. In Higgott's eyes, such a new order would be led by China; unless that is, the EU can work with like-minded countries such as Japan to replace or shore up American leadership.
This broad view is supported by Rod Wye in Chapter 3, who sees it as a consequence of President Trump's 'America first' policy, which has opened up opportunities for China to put itself forward. Furthermore, while Higgott calls for the EU to show a lead and create a 'Third Way' in global leadership-neither China, nor the USA-Wye cogently sets out the limitations to this. He argues that European countries have tacitly encouraged China's new global assertiveness, not least through their poor track record in dealing with it on sensitive issues, where the EU not infrequently ends by extracting the worst outcome, not the best. He cites human rights, the Arms Embargo, Market Economy Status in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and latterly the role of Chinese company Huawei in supplying 5G telephone technology as examples. These examples have depressingly similar elements, namely the ease with which European consensus can be broken up and how the lure of commercial advantage with China tends to subvert positions of principle.
Robyn Klingler-Vidra and Yu Ching Kuo consider the 'Huawei factor' further in Chapter 8, but the company's investment in the UK's telecommunications industry could be seen in Wye's analysis as a metaphor for the UK's wider relations in the post-Brexit era. Now that it has left the EU, the UK no longer needs to be bound by the EU's value and models, so would a future UK Government allow human rights, a constant issue in the EU's dealings with China, to impede relations? In contrast to the fears expressed by the Global Times editorial writer in 2016, mentioned above, Wye concludes that the UK's departure from the EU is unlikely to have any significant bearing on China's relations with either. While he agrees with Higgott that there is scope for the EU to be more engaged, the ease with which European consensus on dealing with China is broken (or the difficulty of reaching a consensus) leads him to think that any changes of substance will be limited. Too often, he argues, European policy has been opportunistic or ad hoc. The contrast with EU solidarity in handling Brexit negotiations is intriguing-could this yet be a model for the bloc in handling its wider foreign policy objectives?
Of greater significance in Wye's view than Brexit, or the rise of China, is that increasingly EU member states, and the UK outside it, along with Asian states such as Japan and South Korea, are going to be forced to choose between China and the USA in their relationships, a choice that most would prefer not to have to make.
The theme of the contest between the powers (USA, EU and China) is continued in Chapter 4 by Bob Wang. In contrast to Higgott, however, and perhaps not surprisingly from an experienced former US diplomat, Wang does not argue for a 'Third Way'. Instead, he directly addresses Wye's question of 'What side are you on?' He argues that China's policies are now threatening the fundamental values of the liberal international order and that the EU, the UK and USA must work together to prevent this, and do more to support democracies and promote universal human rights in the face of China's growing threat to the maintenance of these values.
Higgott's frustrations with the 'America First' transactionalism of Donald Trump are not ignored by Wang, who recognises that a rebuilding of trust in trans-Atlantic relations is a necessary precursor to a more collaborative approach in facing China. Nor do most European countries share with the USA the same 'very immediate and tangible' concerns over China's regional ambitions. And like Wye, he recognises the difficulty of getting the EU to act in concert towards China. Wang's suggested approach, therefore, is to create discrete 'coalitions of likeminded' to tackle the specific challenges posed by China on a standalone basis. These could start by working with human rights NGOs to document and publicise more widely China's human rights violations, to raise public awareness and highlight deteriorating human rights conditions in China for the world to see. Senior US and European officials also need to speak out publicly against Beijing's increasingly repressive measures at home, as well as express support for democracies and the individual rights and freedoms of people around the world, including in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Wang's policy recommendation-more cooperation between the USA and EU-may be the opposite of Higgott's 'Third Way' but the underlying premise of both is the same: the trans-Atlantic relationship needs to be repaired, and the onus must be on the USA to do this. In this regard, his recommendations might almost serve as a manifesto for the incoming Biden administration in Washington.
Significantly, neither Higgott, nor Wye, nor Wang see any distinct role for the UK in the formulation of a new approach, whether it be Higgott's 'Third Way' or Wang's return to trans-Atlantic cooperation. All see any role for the UK as essentially a supporting one, in whatever approach might emerge. Prudently, all steer clear of suggesting whether post-Brexit the UK will stick with its European neighbours in a separate policy approach or cleave to the USA.
On paper at least, another option is open to the UK: that of eschewing both its main security ally and its former partners and aligning itself more closely with China. It is not a facetious suggestion. At the time this was written in the summer of 2020, relations between the two were decidedly cool, following China's imposition of the National Security Law on Hong Kong and the British Government's reversal of its earlier decision to allow the limited use of equipment from China's Huawei in the rollout of its 5G telephone infrastructure. In these circumstances, it is easy to forget that in recent years the UK was willing to risk the ire of the USA in its enthusiasm to be the first Western country to join China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and again in its initial willingness to accept a role for Huawei. And in marked contrast to Germany, which has continued to take high profile political refugees from China, notably Liu Xia, widow of imprisoned Nobel laureate Liu Xiaobo, and two young Hong Kong activists, Ray Wong and Alan Li, British Chancellor of the Exchequer (finance minister) George Osborne pointedly visited the sensitive region of Xinjiang in 2013, shortly after a Chinese court had sentenced the moderate Uighur academic Ilham Tohti to life imprisonment for advocating peaceful dialogue between Uighurs and Han Chinese.
Tim Summers shows in Chapter 5 that the likelihood of such an approach is probably remote. He identifies three broad schools of thought about how Brexit might affect UK-China bilateral relations: first, that Brexit is an opportunity for Britain to develop deeper ties with China, in particular, to benefit from economic opportunities, including through a free trade agreement (FTA); second, that after Brexit the UK will no longer have the policy options given by EU membership, such as the ability to engage in multilayered policy, the safety in numbers on difficult issues and the stronger lobbying clout that the EU enjoys. It will, therefore, be weaker and more vulnerable to Chinese lobbying on political issues, especially given the likely desire for Chinese investment or British access to its market; and third that the impact of Brexit is neutral, with policy towards China shaped mainly by structural trends, especially its rise, by the attitudes of 'like-minded' countries, including former EU partners, and by the preferences of British politicians and the domestic debate about China. (It is surely relevant in this context that Canada and Australia, two countries with which the UK has aligned itself on foreign policy statements since its departure from the EU, have both experienced the unacceptable face of Chinese diplomatic behaviour in recent months, with arbitrary trade embargos and citizens taken hostage).
Summers considers these scenarios in the context of China's muchpublicised 'Belt and Road Initiative' or BRI, and the commercial opportunities this supposedly offers. With so much uncertainty surrounding British foreign policy-making since the Brexit referendum, his conclusion is, not surprisingly, tentative and cautious. Nevertheless, it should still provide some reassurance to policy-makers outside China, for he argues that Britain's policy towards China is likely to continue to be driven primarily by developments in China itself and the way these are interpreted in the UK. On its own, Brexit is unlikely to have a significant impact on this. With relations cooling since-especially as concern has grown in the British government over Chinese moves on Hong Kong-it seems quite possible, even likely, that the 'golden era' in bilateral relations, which characterised the period of transition from David Cameron to Theresa May as prime minister in London, will prove to have been both transient and something of an aberration in otherwise customarily cool relations.
With the USA and China increasingly engaged in a battle for supremacy, and the position of both the EU and post-Brexit UK still to be defined, it is easy to overlook China's neighbours, none more so than Japan. Yet Japan is the world's third-largest economy and has gone through its own difficulties in its relations with the USA, albeit largely confined to the economic and financial sphere. Today, few Americans recall the controversy that surrounded Sony's purchase of Columbia Pictures for $3.4 billion in October 1989, or Mitsubishi's acquisition of a controlling share in New York's iconic Rockefeller Center the following month. 6 These investments came near the peak of the bubble in Japanese asset prices following the Plaza Accord of 1985. The bubble burst soon after, to be followed by Japan's 'Lost Decade' of deflation and low or no growth. 7 Arguably, this experience has left Japan more sensitive to the stability of the global economic and trading system and the consequential risks to it from them, as David Warren explains in Chapter 6. Like Wang, Warren is a former senior diplomat, in his case a one-time British ambassador to Japan, and therefore writes from personal experience acquired over many years when he explains the impact of the 2016 referendum on bilateral relations, particularly on the close trade and investment relationship that had developed over the past 30 years. He points out that Japan-like China and the USA under President Obama-had made no secret of its preference to see the UK remain within the EU. Japanese concerns were driven very much by fears about the impact of Brexit on the considerable Japanese investment in the British economy since the advent of the European Single Market. The scale of this investment meant Japan stood to lose more from Brexit than did any other country in East Asia. Japanese fears went beyond this, however, with concerns too about the potential impact on the global economic system.
Despite this, Warren argues that Japan's response to Brexit is mainly pragmatic. He says the country will remain committed to its 'strategic partnership' with the UK but will want to take all appropriate measures to guard against any negative impact on the multilateral trading and global economic systems, on collective global security through any weakening or unbalancing of the European voice in this area, or on the ability of the global community to uphold shared values. Japan attaches high importance to global stability, it remains concerned about Brexit as a destabilising force, and it will support all attempts to manage the process so as to avoid this.
If Summers' conclusion suggests that Brexit is unlikely to lead to any major change in the UK's relations with China, nor presumably those of the EU, then Warren's analysis provides further balance to the pessimism of Higgott and reassurance to Wang. He suggests that Japan remains committed to the current world order and will make efforts to sustain this, engaging the UK, and presumably the EU too, to do so. This is a theme which is explored further by Michael Reilly in the final chapter.
Any decline in the current world order is likely to be of even greater concern to Taiwan than it is to Japan, given Taiwan's dependence on the USA for its security, arguably even for its very existence in the face of ever-growing pressure from China. Taiwan, therefore, finds itself on the front line of the growing contest for influence between the two, an issue considered by Corey Lee Bell and Andrew Yang in Chapter 7. Their argument is both intriguing and a counter to the-sometimes gloomy-assessments of some other contributors. They argue that far from being merely a sound bite or fanciful PR branding, the post-Brexit 'Global Britain' concept has seen rhetoric followed up by actions, in this case an increasing commitment to security operations in the western Pacific and South China Sea. Although the resources devoted to this have been modest, by acting in partnership with allies, notably Freedom of Navigation Operations in conjunction with the USA and France, and growing cooperation on defence and security matters with Japan, the overall impact is much greater.
While these activities neither involve Taiwan nor are directed at its defence, Bell and Yang argue that the increased security commitment and cooperation will be of benefit to it, not least because of the importance for it of open sea lanes through the South China Sea. While the USA has until now played a pivotal role in managing the cross-strait equilibrium, activity like this by its allies suggests that Wang's call in Chapter 4 for the 'liberal democracies' to do more to help Taiwan is already being heeded.
Bell and Yang also appear to recognise that there is little likelihood of a more explicit commitment to Taiwan's security by either the UK or the EU. Nevertheless, they suggest that more could be done without breaching any 'red lines' of Chinese (or British) sensitivities over the status of Taiwan, proposing that the UK and Taiwan should try to establish an institutionalised track-two security dialogue mechanism to encourage more regular and effective exchanges.
Notwithstanding justified concerns about the steady Chinese militarisation of the South China Sea, as Wang mentions, the battle for global supremacy is increasingly being fought in the field of technology. Nowhere is this better demonstrated at present than by American efforts to restrict the use of 5G telecommunications equipment produced by China's Huawei, and to prevent Huawei and other Chinese companies from using the latest American components. As the world's leading producer of ICT components, Taiwan finds itself in the middle of this battle. Its major companies such as TSMC are in an awkward position, dependent on both Chinese and American customers but also having offshored more and more of their production to China to benefit from the greater economies of scale possible there. As with Japan, the UK and the EU in the security and political field, they increasingly fear being asked to choose 'whose side are you on?' as Robyn Klingler-Vidra and Yu Ching Kuo explain in Chapter 8.
It is also a field in which European countries, by contrast, are primarily niche players. As reflected by Klingler-Vidra and Kuo, such a position could prove crucial, what with innovation being a crucial driver of productivity and growth, and a key arena where states can flex their international security muscle as Trump's embargo on Huawei demonstrates. However, there are some notable exceptions to this general position, none more so than UK-based, but now foreign-owned, Arm Holdings, that designs processors for 95% of the world's smartphones. Arm and other exceptions are sufficiently important to have generated a significant interdependence between Taiwan and Europe in the semiconductor industry. Klingler-Vidra and Kuo, therefore, examine what Brexit might mean for this interdependence.
British politicians should take some comfort from their conclusion on this point-although they do emphasise the importance of educational links between Europe, including the UK, and Asia in fomenting these links-something explored in more detail by Pei Hsi Susan Lin in the following chapter. And they do warn that uncertainties arising from Brexit in terms of access to talent, ability to do business, and short-term trade complications pose substantial risks to manufacturing and trade in what is a highly important, and globally organised, industry.
Perhaps not surprisingly, however, Klingler-Vidra and Kuo see the potential impact on the industry of the rumbling US-China conflict as being of greater import. They show that while the conflict has affected European companies in the sector, Arm Holdings included, it is Taiwanese companies, notably TSMC, who are on the metaphorical front line. Contrary to what might be assumed, and to some early expectations, however, they conclude that to date, far from having to choose sides, Taiwan's semiconductor industry appears to have benefited from the US-China trade dispute. Perhaps this comes from years of experience for Taiwan of having to balance itself between the USA and China. If so, it may suggest that the island will continue to do so and carefully avoid having to take sides if it can.
Until negotiations between the UK and EU on the nature of the post-Brexit relationship started in earnest in early 2020, studies of the impact on specific economic sectors had been relatively few and concentrated mainly on the sectors thought most likely to be affected: finance, automotive, agriculture and fishing. As Pei Hsi Susan Lin explains in Chapter 9, most analysis of the impact on the education sector has followed a similar pattern to these studies, in that it appears exclusively to concern the involvement of UK universities with the EU, its member states and its market. By contrast, the impact of Brexit on the relationship of UK universities with East Asia has been barely discussed. Yet this is an important market for the UK's higher education sector, contributing almost as many students to British universities as the EU, but representing a significantly more important source of funding for them given their freedom to set their own fees for non-EU international students.
While the number of EU students is likely to fall as a result of Brexit, if only because they will no longer be eligible for the same fees charged home students, those from East Asia are likely to continue to rise. This increased dependency on East Asian students-especially those from China-is likely to have wide-ranging implications for the universities. Evidence suggests that these have not been thought through, including by the government. Hitherto, officials seem to have been all too willing to accept without question the assertion that overseas students spending time in the UK will return to their home countries infused with British 'values' and a respect for, and deeper understanding of, the country. The controversy in late May 2020 surrounding the alleged involvement of a high profile, Cambridge educated, Chinese TV journalist in the broadcasting of forced confessions inevitably casts doubt over such trite assumptions. 8 This dependency may also have consequences for the British Government's foreign policy towards the countries concerned, including China. Will the government be willing to criticise China, for example, and risk a backlash through falling student numbers?
In the final chapter, Michael Reilly considers some trade-related issues arising from the changing world order post-Brexit. He starts by showing how the free trade rhetoric of many 'Leavers' in the UK has failed to take account of the country's heavy dependence on foreign direct investment-as one contributor put it, recent British trade ministers have not shown a high level of policy literacy-but that it will ignore this at its peril as it seeks to develop new trading relationships, as experience with Japan has shown. More generally, the rhetoric also shows a failure to understand the complex nature of modern trade with its extensive and extended supply chains, the vulnerabilities of which have been highlighted first by President Trump's trade war with China and then by the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on global trade.
In contrast to the pessimism of Richard Higgott in Chapter 2 and his view that the shape of the world order is essentially a binary choice between American and Chinese leadership, with the former failing, Reilly shows that an alternative vision is possible. He explains how Japan has responded to the rise of American protectionism and isolationism under Donald Trump and his withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), not by reluctant acquiescence but by going ahead with a version of the TPP without the USA as a member, the Comprehensive Programme for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP. However, Japan has gone still further: it responded to Brexit by moving quickly to agree a free trade agreement with the EU, and has since proposed that this agreement could be incorporated into the CPTPP, thereby creating what would be the world's largest free trade area and supplanting, in effect, the World Trade Organisation. As with Taiwan's response to the rise of Chinese companies in advanced technology, this suggests that China's neighbours are alive to the new challenges they face, not just from China's rise but also from America's relative decline. The agreement of several Asian countries, including China, South Korea and Japan, on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade agreement as this volume was being finalised, surely reinforces this.
Far from a binary choice between the USA and China, a modified world order seems possible, even probable. It will be a messier one, in which the USA will no longer be able to take its supremacy for granted but also one in which China will face growing resistance to attempts to assert itself. The EU has an opportunity to help shape this modified order. However, as Rod Wye explains, in the absence of a consistent European strategy towards China-much less towards North-East Asia generallythe EU response is likely to remain ad hoc, and in consequence, it will continue to react to events rather than help shape and influence them.
The same is even more true of the UK. 'Leavers' can take comfort that the country will remain an important trading partner for the countries of East Asia. Nevertheless, it is far from being a strategic partner for them.
An increased security role might help it make up for a loss of influence within the EU, but that is unlikely to happen. Even before the impact of Covid-19, the UK was struggling to fund its existing security obligations and aspirations. East Asian countries would have preferred to see it remain inside the EU and exercise its influence there, not go it alone outside, where they expect both its voice and that of the EU to be weaker. Insofar as Brexit offered an opportunity to both the UK and EU to reassess their relations with East Asia, it is thus most likely to be a missed one. Concerns about the rise of China and the decline of the USA notwithstanding, future relations appear most likely to be more of the same.