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Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction , by G. Russell. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, xv + 232 pp

Hughes's own explicit intentions, her account of aesthetic reflection supports not so much the picture of a mutual cooperation between the faculties, but a far more authoritarian model — that of the imagination's hegemony. Notwithstanding its shortcomings, Hughes's book remains an important contribution to the field. Particularly valuable is Hughes's insight that aesthetic experience not only reveals the subjective conditions for cognition, but also points towards the cognitive suitability of empirical objects themselves. The claim that a beautiful object somehow exemplifies the fit between mind and world captures a crucial aspect of Kant's aesthetic theory, namely, the much overlooked view that aesthetic experience, despite its non-cognitive status, supports our cognitive efforts. In drawing attention to this view, Hughes's book will hopefully stimulate a renewed discussion of the import aesthetics makes to Kant's epistemology.