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BRAD WRAY Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology

Brad Wray revisits Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in light of Kuhn’s later essays to offer a novel reading of Kuhn’s account as a ‘evolutionary social epistemology’ and, in so doing, provides a useful overview of the interpretive debates surrounding Kuhn’s work, defends Kuhn successfully against critics, and suggests interesting future directions for sociology and philosophy of science. Wray starts by summarizing three common criticisms of Kuhn’s account in Structure: (i) the various scientific changes that Kuhn regards as ‘revolutionary’ are not aptly grouped into one class; (ii) these changes are not different in kind from ‘normal science’; and (iii) the bivalent distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ is inadequate for understanding the variety of changes occurring in science. Proponents of the first criticism include McMullin ([1993]) and Bird ([2000]], who argue that not all of the changes Kuhn identifies as ‘revolutionary’ affected scientists and scientific practice to the same degree, and Andersen et al. ([2006]) who argue that some scientific changes are ‘local’ and that there are grades of ‘revolution’ and of ‘incommensurability’ accompanying scientific change. Proponents of the second and third include McMullin ([1993]), Popper ([1970/72]), Toulmin ([1970/72]), Bird ([2000]), and Mayr ([2004]), who either deny that there are any changes in science which are properly termed ‘revolutionary’ (Toulmin) or argue that ‘normal science’ and ‘revolutionary science’ lie on a continuum (McMullin, Popper, Bird, Mayr). Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 64 (2013), 659–664