{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.024193548387096774, 'fraction_numerical': 0.004032258064516129, 'mean_word_length': 5.406451612903226, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Why Was “Dissociation” Dissociated in Psychoanalysis?

We so often find that for our patients, experiences that are overwhelming and incomprehensible have been minimized, marginalized, denied, disavowed or dissociated. The most incomprehensible experience for our patients, and thus most likely to be dissociated, is having been abused by someone to whom they were strongly attached, such as a parent. As clinicians and scholars, we are vulnerable to the same defenses, and history has shown that many have grasped eagerly at alternative explanations both for patients’ reports of abuse and for the dissociative symptoms ensuing from such trauma. These rationalizations made it possible for many psychoanalysts to explain away memories of abuse as fantasy, thus relieving them of the need to acknowledge that memory for objective events can be dissociated. Although Freud never denied that child abuse was an appalling reality (Gay, 1989), ultimately, he could not embrace its alarming preva-