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Precommitment Regimes for Intervention

This chapter presents and justifies an alternative to a democratic coalition for authorizing humanitarian military intervention: a precommitment regime whereby a democratic, legitimate government at serious risk for being violently overthrown or that is vulnerable to a resurgence of ethno-national violence could enter into a contract with a state or coalition of states that would pre-authorize intervention under certain circumstances. Such a precommitment contract would be revocable at will by that government or any legitimate successor government. The details of the precommitment contract are spelled out and the case is made that such an arrangement is feasible and that it has the advantage of being an exercise of state sovereignty rather than a violation of it. This chapter is a modified version of a previously published paper co-authored with Robert O. Keohane.