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Duqu: Analysis, Detection, and Lessons Learned

In September 2011, a European company sought our help to investigate a security incident that happened in their IT system. During the investigation, we discovered a new malware that was unknown to all mainstream anti-virus products, however, it showed striking similarities to the infamous Stuxnet worm. We named the new malware Duqu, and we carried out its first analysis. Our findings led to the hypothesis that Duqu was probably created by the same people who developed Stuxnet, but with a different purpose: unlike Stuxnet whose mission was to attack industrial equipment, Duqu is an information stealer rootkit. Nevertheless, both pieces of malware have a modular structure, and they can be re-configured remotely from a Command and Control server to include virtually any kind of functionality. In this paper, we present an abridged version of our initial Duqu analysis, which is available in a longer format as a technical report. We also describe the Duqu detector toolkit, a set of heuristic tools that we developed to detect Duqu and its variants. Finally, we discuss a number of issues that we learned, observed, or identified during our Duqu analysis project concerning the problems of preventing, detecting, and handling targeted malware attacks; we believe that solving these issues represents a great challenge to the system