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Outside the Battlefield

What increases warring parties’ ability to reach a negotiated settlement? In this study, I answer this question by examining the political environment a government and rebel group leadership internally encounter during a peace process. I disaggregate in-group dynamics of governments and rebels into their respective political elements that either grant autonomy or create constraints for resolution, namely, their constituencies and elites. I argue that willingness to end fighting does not always translate into the ability to make concessions. Although battlefield-related indicators may increase the likelihood of negotiations, it is internal cohesion that increases combatants’ credibility as bargaining partners and improves the likelihood of settlement. To test these arguments, I introduce original data on negotiations for internal conflict-dyad-years between 1980 and 2005. Findings using two-stage censored probit models demonstrate that war-weariness increases willingness for negotiations whereas internal consensus creates opportunity for settlement.