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The Crisis and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy After July 15

This article analyzes attempts to redirect foreign policy against multiple crises in Turkey that inhibit change. The gap between the country’s capabilities and resources and its regional and international commitments has overshadowed former success stories in Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) by casting an all-encompassing sense of siege, retreat, and isolation. The new narrative and guided political mobilization by government after July 15 in Turkey saw the redirection of foreign policy as a necessary response to the emerging situation, not an offshoot of failure in the previous era. A combination of efforts toward program change and problem/goal change characterized the leader-driven redirection in TFP. This article argues that despite the new narrative and authoritative control of the implementation of foreign policy, presumed redirection or recalibration is unlikely to happen in TFP in the post-July 15 era. There is not a solid plan for change and reform in foreign policy or in the state apparatus at large but rather only a rhetorical emphasis on such actions.