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The Evidential Status of Intuitions

An intuition is an intellectual seeming, and this chapter argues that intuitions have evidential status. That claim is defended against objections: that an “intuition” is just a psychological fact about a person, that it merely reveals a lack of imagination, that it is already a tacit theory rather than a datum, that intuitions are malleable, and that they vary across communities. There is a further question of how intuitions might be shown to be reliable indicators of truth; this question is misguided, as it presupposes a competing epistemological theory that is rejected here. On the positive side, intuitions justify by way of what Goodman called reflective equilibrium. That method too has incurred objections, over and above those mentioned above, but they are deferred until Chapter 8.