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A Model of Menu Dependence in Voter Behavior

Let me summarize my argument so far. In spite of evidence of menu dependence in voter embedded in most formal models of voter behavior and empirical analyses that incorporate these models assume no such dependence. Most studies of electoral choice assume that voter assessment of any single party is independent of other parties in the race. The most commonly used model of issue voting – the proximity model – assumes that voter utility for a party depends only on the distance between the voter and that party. Figure 1 illustrates the implications of this assumption. The first panel of the figure presents an effectively uni-dimensional policy space with one voter and two parties equally distant from the voter. The proximity model predicts that the voter will randomize her vote choice between the two parties. In fact, any randomization rule the voter might employ is consistent with the proximity model. The second and third panels add a third party. Both dimensions are relevant now. In both panels of the figure the voter is equally distant from the three parties. The proximity model, then, is still consistent with any randomization rule the voter employs among the three. It does not distinguish between panels (b) and (c) – as long as the parties are equally distant from the voter, it treats the two maps of party dispersion the same. As I show below, incorporating outcome-oriented voting helps account for the differences between the two situations. Studies mentioned above address the violation of IIA via sophisticated statistical models and fit the data better than studies ignoring choice-set effects. Yet, even these analyses address the effect of menu dependence on aggregate outcomes only (such as vote share), or do not provide an explanation of what it is about voter behavior that violates IIA, except for, possibly, an omitted variable bias (Alvarez and Nagler, 1995). The literature does not provide a micro-foundation theory of menu dependence in voter behavior that is consistent with empirical evidence. The model proposed takes up this task. The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the logic of the model in a nutshell. The following section introduces the formal model itself, followed by comparative statics. The next section compares the model to the spatial and directional models, as well as to Iversen's leadership model that combines insights from the two. The next section brings institutions in and explores menu dependence …