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Grazing the State and Local Fiscal Commons

The literature on the tragedy of the commons is voluminous, and application to the fiscal commons is well established. In this article, we extend this application by examining the effects of the distribution of state and local governments’ tax liability on budgetary outcomes. Different tax structures yield vastly different contributions from members of the polity, but all members may influence the draw from the fiscal commons through the political process. We find that when the tax burden is heavier for taxpayers at the top of the income distribution and lighter for taxpayers at the bottom of the income distribution, state and local government expenditures grow, and governments spend more on social welfare. However, we do not find a link between the distribution of tax liability and debt.