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Four Condorcet-Hare Hybrid Methods for Single-Winner Elections

This paper examines four single-winner election methods, denoted here as Woodall, Benham, Smith-AV, and Tideman, that all make use of both Condorcet’s pairwise comparison principle and Hare’s elimination and reallocation principle used in the alternative vote. These methods have many significant properties in common, including Smith efficiency and relatively strong resistance to strategic manipulation, though they differ with regard to the minor properties of ‘Smith-IIA’ and ‘mono-add-plump’.