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Iran's Post-Cold War Policy in the Persian Gulf

The Islamic Republic of Iran is often portrayed as the main source of instability and the leading purchaser of weapons in the Persian Gulf. As a messianic imperialist, we are told, Iran has tactically and deceptively sugar-coated its policy in the Persian Gulf by claiming to co-operate with other countries in the region.' In this paper, I debunk such assessments. I argue, instead, that Iran's Gulf policy has recently become moderate and pragmatic in orientation, in large part because of Tehran's belated recognition that it cannot radically alter the region's political landscape. Thus, exporting the Islamic revolution is no longer Iran's main goal. In desperate need of higher oil revenues to finance the reconstruction of its war-ravaged economy, Iran is primarily interested in regional stability, co-operation with the other Gulf countries, and protection of its national interests. Nor is Iran the main purchaser of weapons in the region. In fact, even though Tehran is determined to modernize its military, Iran has spent less on its armed forces and weaponry