{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02390710382513661, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.845794392523365, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Algorithmic Theories of Everything

We make the plausible assumption that the history of our universe is formally describable, and sampled from a formally describable probability distribution on the possible universe histories. To study the dramatic consequences for observers evolving within such a universe, we generalize the concepts of decidability, halting problem, Kolmogorov''s algorithmic complexity, and Solomonoff''s algorithmic probability. We describe objects more random than Chaitin''s halting probability of a Turing machine, show that there is a universal cumulatively enumerable measure (CEM) that dominates previous measures for inductive inference, prove that any CEM must assign low probabilities to universes without short enumerating programs, that any describable measure must assign low probabilities to universes without short descriptions, and several similar "Occam''s razor theorems." Then we discuss the most efficient way of computing all universes based on Levin''s optimal search algorithm, and make a natural resource-oriented postulate: the cumulative prior probability of all objects incomputable within time t by this optimal algorithm should be inversely proportional to t. We derive consequences for inductive inference, physics, and philosophy, predicting that whatever seems random is not, but in fact is computed by a short and fast algorithm which will probably halt before our universe is many times older than it is now.