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The Problem of Moral Obligation

This chapter looks at the issue of the normative significance of moral requirements in the first-person perspective of deliberation. Moral conclusions are customarily treated as considerations that matter within an agent's practical decision-making. That a course of action would be impermissible, for instance, or morally the right thing to do, are conclusions that appear to have direct relevance for practical deliberation, which agents who are reasoning correctly will take appropriately into account in planning their future activities. The philosophical problem in this area is often understood to be the problem of making sense of the reason-giving force of morality. That is, an account of moral rightness or permissibility should shed light on the standing of these considerations as reasons for action, which count for and against actions in the first-person perspective of agency. However, this conventional understanding seriously underdescribes the challenge that faces a philosophical account of morality.