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The Determinants of Military Budgets: The Japanese Case

National government budgets, in particular those for military functions and organizations, surely are staple items in analyses of international security and conflict. A large and increasingly sophisticated literature on this subject has emerged in the U.S. (as examined by Zinnes, 1976; Moll and Luebbert, 1980; Russett, 1983). Much of it has concentrated on the U.S. case and in particular on the behavior of actors at various points in the budget setting process (Crecine, 1969; Crecine and Fischer, 1973; Majeski, 1983, 1985; Marra, 1985; Ostrom, 1978; Stromberg, 1970). This literature has emphasized a complex mix of organizational roles; external developments, particularly in terms of military aspirations and threats from the Soviet Union; and domestic politicaleconomic constraints. Another stream of work has emphasized incrementalism both as a way of describing the relations between current and past budgets and as a decision-making strategy (Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky, 1966; Gist, 1974). Serious pursuit of this line of thinking requires disaggregation of military budgets by programs as well as by stages in the decision process. Nevertheless, the literature seems to have two things in common: an emphasis on the U.S. and the desire for point prediction of budget levels. We shall concentrate here on a far different national case-that of Japan-with the primary intention of sorting out the merits of alterna-