{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.01565217391304348, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.857142857142857, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Procedural Support for Cooperative Negotiations: Theoretical Design and Practical Implementation

We discuss the theoretical design of algorithms for solving distributional con- icts within groups. We consider an algorithm to be procedural if the implementation of the outcome requires the participation of the players, or if it can even be conducted by the players themselves without computational assistance. We compare two procedures for multilateral problems of fair division; both establish envy-freeness, given the possibility of monetary compensations between players.