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Race and Racism in Russia

racial states and empire states share is the hidden and taken-for-granted assumption of white dominance. Jung asserts that the empire-state uses “methodological nationalism” to link the racial subordination of colonized peoples to noncolonized peoples’ dominance. He notes, for example, that “the racial subjection, colonial and noncolonial, and the fates of Blacks, American Indians, Mexicans, Chinese, Puerto Ricans, Filipinas/os, Samoans, Chamoru, and others were interlinked” (p. 79). Thus, he urges scholars to look beyond the “white-nonwhite relation of domination at a time within the borders of a nonexistent nation-state” (p. 80). Later, in chapter 4, he invites readers to incorporate the critical theories of race and racism to the sociology of immigration as he critiques “the racial unconscious of assimilation theories” (and by this he means both neoclassical assimilation theories and segmented assimilation theories). His argument with these theories is that both take the existence of “mainstream American society” as given and fail to engage in the possibility that significant changes can be made to structures of racial inequality and domination. He advocates instead for scholarly approaches that consider race when interrogating the politics of national belonging and formal citizenship. In the third and final part, “Denaturalizing Ignorance,” Jung offers two case studies and uses them as tools to illustrate the ignorance of the dominant ideology. (To Jung, whether this ignorance is willful or not is immaterial.) Chapter 5’s case is that of the 1924 massacre of Filipino sugar workers in Hawai’i, focusing on how the dominant groups legitimized the use of physical coercion. Combining Bourdieu’s theory of practice with Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness, Jung develops the notion of “symbolic coercion,” the dominant group’s tacit refusal to recognize subaltern dissent; Jung asserts that relations of domination entail asymmetrical doxa. In chapter 6, he develops the notion of “symbolic perversity”—a combination of conscious knowing and unconscious unknowing—as he critiques the New York Times’s failure to transparently report on Black/ White unemployment ratio, an important measure of racialized economic inequality. Jung’s work is utterly unsettling and bold. He urges sociologists to go beneath the surface of white supremacy to tap its source and denaturalize it ontologically and epistemologically. The critical theory of racism Jung proposes can amplify the voices of so many who remain largely unheard: the black poor, the incarcerated, Muslims, or unauthorized immigrants. Jung’s contribution is theoretically, methodologically, and empirically rich—he draws data from archives, media, oral history, and statistical sources—but its values also rest in its ability to broaden the scale and depth of the discussion on racial inequality.