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Gaming the state: consequences of contracting out state building in Afghanistan

The operation of a vibrant illicit economy and government corruption are widely acknowledged as obstacles to the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, massive influxes of money tied to the international efforts have led to ‘legal’ corruption that similarly obstructs state consolidation and peace. This paper considers the various ways in which Afghan entrepreneurs have learned to ‘game the state’ by taking advantage of donor and especially US procurement systems since 2001. The conceptual framework and evidence suggests that designing ways to limit corruption arising from the state-building process is key to improving the long-run prospects for post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan and similar states where rapid and steep increases in foreign aid and associated contracts create fertile ground for malfeasance.