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Estrutura de controle das companhias brasileiras de capital aberto

This paper analyzes the control structure of Brazilian public companies at the end of 1998. We show a high degree of ownership concentration. Even when there is no majority shareholder, the largest one owns a significant portion of the voting capital, and the company is, on average, controlled by its three largest shareholders. We also conclude that the utilization of pyramid structures does not appear to be an effort to avoid the one share-one vote rule in Brazilian companies.