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Truthful double auction of spectrum trading for femtocell service provision

The femtocell has been considered as a promising technology to improve indoor mobile network coverage co-working with macrocell networks. However, lack of licensed spectrum limits the development of the femtocell service provision. A feasible solution is that a femtocell service provider (FSP) leases spectrum from the existing licensed spectrum holder, the macrocell service provider (MSP). Existing research focuses on the interaction between a single FSP and MSP. In this paper, we investigate a spectrum trading framework for multiple FSPs and MSPs. Under such a scenario, both FSPs and MSPs have to compete with their peers in the trading. To balance the revenue and the cost from the spectrum trading, an analysis is made on how to determine the acceptable spectrum trading prices and volumes for both MSPs and FSPs. To guarantee the fairness of the transaction, we introduce a truthful double auction mechanism for the spectrum trading between FSPs and MSPs, which compels them to report their bids or asks honestly according to their valuations. In particular, the truthfulness and other properties of the spectrum double auction have been proved. Finally, the numerical results illustrate how the acceptable spectrum trading prices and volumes are determined and also how the spectrum double auction mechanism works. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.