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Relations within «Triangle» USA – USSR – China at the End of Détente (1977–1980)

The period of détente is usually associated with a decrease of confrontation in US-Soviet relations, the signing of agreements on the limitation of strategic weapons and anti-missile defense systems and the development of trade and economic relations, scientific and cultural exchanges. Strengthening security in Europe is considered another facet of détente. From this perspective détente is viewed as an alternative to the Cold War, and the end of détente is seen as a missed opportunity to develop international relations in the direction of a secure world with working mechanisms for harmonizing the interests of both the great powers and other countries.The article deals with the history of relations in the triangle USA – USSR – China in 1977– 1980. The evolution of Washington’s foreign policy strategy and the inclusion to it policies towards the USSR and China in these years came at the background of pronounced Soviet– Chinese antagonism. In the first months there was no clear plan in the actions of the Carter administration, there was a sharp rivalry for influence on the president between individual political figures (first of all – S. Vance and Zb. Brzezinski). They proposed different scenarios of the development of the US–Soviet and US – China relations. Throughout the Carter presidency, the US used as much as possible the tensions between Moscow and Beijing. In the framework of tripartite relations, each of the sides consistently pursued its own course aimed at achieving unilateral benefits. There were no attempts to establish a trilateral dialogue with an agreed agenda. The processes of détente practically did not affect the complex of international problems that existed within the American – Soviet – Chinese triangle. Moreover, Washington’s use of the «Chinese card» prevented the reduction of tensions in American–Soviet relations and strengthened the Cold War logic and methods in the planning and implementation of US foreign policy.