{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.017101710171017102, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.619047619047619, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Board Structure and the Performance of Australian Listed Investment Companies

This study examines the relationship between board structure and performance of Australian listed investment companies (LICs hereafter). With lower fees and simplified taxation over other managed funds, LICs provide a useful investment vehicle. LICs differ from other companies as their customers and investors are the same and fund management functions are often outsourced. LIC boards, in turn, are tasked with monitoring duties and determining service fees for fund managers. Agency problems are likely as fund managers’ desire larger fees (and fund size) whereas LIC shareholders seek higher return. Whilst the nature of agency issues therefore differs from ordinary companies, the prior Australian LIC literature is limited. We document a significant relationship between director tenure and LIC performance. Specifically, we find director tenure to be negatively associated with LIC performance. Board busyness and independence increases LIC expense ratios whilst board size is negatively associated with market to book value.