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Is conceptual analysis only an inquiry into rules for the use of concepts?

“Does what is said make sense?” or “Is what is said nonsense?” This is the criterion employed by those influenced by Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus view that the rules or conventions for the use of expressions determine what it makes sense to say. It drives what most in theoretical psychology take conceptual analysis to be—the clarification of existing grammar, viz., rules for the use of concepts, and the provision of grammatical insights—for these apparently determine what does and what does not make sense. Yet this seems odd in ways which I highlight. Perhaps some of us continue to miss the Wittgensteinian point, but a more complex account of conceptual analysis unfolds from the anomalies in Hacker’s approach.