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Zen and the Spiritual Exercises: Paths of Awakening and Transformation by Ruben L. F. Habito

the success lies in stopping the horrors. A principle of double effect, among other features, attempts to reconcile the killings soldiers commit in waging even wars against injustice. All this finds foundation, Prof. Biggar maintains, in a rich moral realism of objective, transcendent moral principles that takes not individual rights, but moral duties as fundamental. This natural law foundation, then, trumps current international law’s severe restrictions on the use of armed force in the face of evil or injustice, thereby justifying the armed intervention in Kosovo, for example. One might initially query resurrecting such early Christian thinking as anachronistic, given the radically changed characteristics of war and wars since the time of Aquinas or Grotius. For example, modern weaponry raises major issues about ‘‘collateral damage.’’ Thus, proportionality requirements for a justified war are addressed as the strongest appeal for pacifism. Prof. Biggar’s treatment of proportionality is a sensible, effective response to pacifists’ reliance on the idea. But it takes us to a view akin to that advanced long ago by Michael Walzer, in Just and Unjust Wars (Basic Books, 1977): incommensurable values and epistemic limitations preclude precise calculations about the costs and benefits of war. The doctrine of justified war advanced in this volume does exhibit some distinctive features. For example, the double-effect principle defended, so important to the morality of killings in war, oddly conflates intention and motive: ‘‘to intend something is not just to choose it, but also to want it.’’ Second, in the last chapter’s bold defense of the Iraq invasion, the argument is that a war of punishment against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was justified because his past atrocities established his character and for those who died at his hands. A just cause for war does not, then, require current or imminent injustices. Finally, again in defending the Iraq invasion, Professor Biggar maintains, with little argument, that the recourse to war is morally justified even if proportionality and success requirements are not satisfied. Such sample departures from standard just war theory show this series of essays expresses a distinctive view of morally justified war.