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IN DEFENCE OF TRANSMISSION

Abstract According to transmission theories of testimony, a listener's belief in a speaker's testimony can be supported by the speaker's justification for what she says. The most powerful objection to transmission theories is Jennifer Lackey's persistent believer case. I argue that important features about the epistemology of testimony reveal how transmission theories can account for Lackey's case. Specifically, I argue that transmission theorists should hold that transmission happens only if a listener believes a speaker's testimony based on the presumption that the speaker has justification for what she says. If this does not happen in the persistent believer case, then the case is no counterexample to transmission. If this does happen in the persistent believer case, then there is an available framework for rejecting the idea that the listener's belief is in fact justified.