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Respect for Persons and Public Justification

In explaining Fichte’s analysis of moral relations, Stephen Darwall points to the centrality of “the summons.” In making a moral claim, Darwall observes, I issue an RSVP: I address the agency of the other, expecting uptake or rebuttal given her perspective. Moral demands are not simply proclamations (“You must!”), or ultimatums (“Do it or else!”), but engagements with the reasons of others. 1 Thus understood, the very idea of moral relations involves interpersonal justification. By addressing oneself to the reasons of the other, the moral summons seeks to determine the action of the other through her own rational will. “The summons is to someone as a free agent ... so in being aware of it, the summoned is aware of herself as thus regarded.”2 In this way moral relations are deeply informed by dignity and respect. I respect the other by engaging with her as a free rational agent while, at the same time, I assert my own dignity by claiming that she must honor what she owes to me according to the authoritative norms that mediate our relations.3 I assume in this essay that a summons with these characteristics must be one based on the shared rules of a publicly justified social morality. As I have explained elsewhere, a rule R is a part of a publicly justified social morality obtaining in a group G when (i) each person in G endorses R as a moral grounds for a summons; (ii) each person in G has normative expectations that others expect him to act on R when summoned (so each believes that others believe that R grounds a summons); (iii) each person in G expects the overwhelming majority to act on R. 4 When these conditions are met the members of G understand R as a rule that actually mediates their various moral viewpoints and so provides the basis for interpersonal moral claims that respect each as a free and equal moral person. Thus only in a society whose rules of social morality are publicly justified 3⁄4 can be endorsed by all 3⁄4 can a system of mutual demands be fully reconciled with respect for each as a reasoning moral agent.