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Game for government and forestry enterprise of the supervision and management behaviors

At present, the contradictory conflict exists between government and forestry enterprise in forestry management objectives. This paper studies the effect of the supervision cost and punishment on the game behaviors between government and forestry enterprise. Four types of game were studied in this paper, including complete information static game, complete information dynamic game, incomplete information static game and incomplete information dynamic game. The results indicated that the Nash equilibrium of complete information static game is related to the income and punishment of forestry enterprise to take illegal management and the loss and supervising cost of government. Under complete information dynamic condition, the game player who firstly takes strategies has disadvantage. The game result of incomplete information static game is same to that of complete information static game. Under incomplete information dynamic condition, forestry enterprise trends to take illegal strategies. This paper proposed that government should construct the encouraging and supervising mechanisms and further perfect the forestry cutting rights, forestry resources information and supervising systems.