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Working Norms and Practices of the Soviet Elite in Leningrad during the late Stalinist Period

The study of the history of Leningrad of Stalin’s period was subjected to a rigid ideological impact, which is why, for a long time, it was examined selectively, in accordance with strict party attitudes. For the reason of the decades-long process of rehabilitation of the victims of the “Leningrad affair”, there were no approaches in the scholarship to assessing normative and extreme everyday life in the corps of Leningrad state cadres. The article aims to present the research of the Soviet elite working norms and practices in 1945–1950. The main attention is paid to the political biographies of the Chairmen of Leningrad Local Government. The research is based on the oral history and the emotionology methods, documents from St. Petersburg, Moscow and Crimean archives. The generation of Leningrad leading cadres came to the state positions in the late 1930s, after the repressions of the “Great Terror”. Members of the Soviet elite underwent testing of their professional skills during World War II and the siege of Leningrad; directed the accelerated postwar recovery of the national economy. In the late 1940s, they became the victims of the so-called “Leningrad affair”. Understanding normative working routine and. and everyday life under crisis involves identifying and analyzing feelings and associated behavior. Analysis of everyday life involves identification of events and processes that recur in the personal and professional life of Soviet nomenclature workers. Understanding extreme everyday life involves identification and analysis of feelings and associated behavior in extreme conditions (such as conflicts, fabricated criminal cases, arrests, etc).


Introduction
This study presents an analysis of the daily working reality of the Soviet elite in Leningrad Region in 1945-1950. This problem will be considered in terms of its political, social and emotional aspects. The political context will be used to provide more clarity as to the operation of the local governments (Soviets) during the period under question, and offer some insights into the causes of the Leningrad Affair. By analysing the social component, we will be able to deepen our understanding of the social roles and statuses of the Leningrad officials during the Stalinist period as well as the aims and nature of their working contacts. Finally, by investigating emotional norms and standards we will be able to characterise members of the Soviet elite as individuals with human virtues and human weaknesses. Many researchers believe that most feelings are socially and culturally conditioned 1 . This is particularly true of the elevated ("high") emotions experienced by Soviet top officials: their boundless loyalty to "the Father of the Nations", their love of Leningrad, their camaraderie, and their pride in work achievements. "Low" emotions, primarily fear, are less markedly modulated by social relations and can be used to explain the motives of political acts and work behaviour.

Historiography and sources
The daily working routine of the Soviet elite in Leningrad Region in 1945-1950 is a subject largely overlooked by historians. There are two principal reasons for this omission. Firstly, studies focusing on the Stalinist period tend to gravitate towards political rather than social history due to the complex, controversial nature of political reality of that time on the domestic and international scene. Secondly, legal, political and moral rehabilitation of the Leningrad Affair victims, which has spanned several decades, made research on the personalities as well as the state and political activities of the defendants a tacit taboo.
Studies by international researchers (primarily British and American) relating to the post-war history of Leningrad, and human resource policies of the Stalinist era appeared long before this field was first explored by Russian historians. Foreign publications were unaffected by censorship restrictions and taboos 2 . Although their critical assessments of Stalin's policy and the Soviet system carry the indelible stamp of the Cold War ideology, these publications were also largely free from stereotypes and personal preferences, which often confound the real picture of historical events.
Increased interest in the biographies of the politicians that ran Leningrad during World War II and the post-war period emerged in the late 1980s as part of broader research pursuits centred on the Leningrad Affair, which were initially supervised by the Communist Party 3 . The 1980s saw a number of newspaper publications which analysed the causes for repressions, and shared biographical data about the key defendants 4 . Some attempts were made to provide a comprehensive picture of the activities of Leningrad government and Communist leaders in connection with the Leningrad Affair 5 .
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a number of studies were conducted which looked at members of the party and governmental apparatus as a social class 6 . Another valuable source is memoirs by the children of the top local and national government officials of the 1940s. These publications were motivated by the legitimate desire on the part of the officials' families to understand the causes of the tragic events of the past by relying on a range of sources including personal reminiscences and impressions 7 .
The contemporary vision of the political role played by the Leningrad leaders, a vision based on newly discovered historical sources, found its reflection in works by Russian researchers 8 . The publications analyse the functioning of the Soviet elite by looking at the activities conducted under the leadership of Leningrad governmental and party officials.
Before finally being quenched in the early 21 st century, this "hunger for research" unfortunately gave rise to multiple low-quality publications where dramatic effect on the readers had priority over accurate historical analysis; many of these publications were founded on an extremely limited number of historical sources, sometimes grossly misinterpreted 13 . Possible ideological bias, combined with hyperbolic ideas resulted in factbending claims and sensationalism 14 .
The late 20 th century saw an increasing interest in the history of everyday culture in Russia. However, research on everyday phenomena had been conducted within individual research disciplines at least since the second half of the 19 th century. Everyday culture receives in-depth theoretical treatment in works by M. V. Lukov 17 . One of the most noteworthy studies of everyday reality of the Soviet people was undertaken by I. B. Orlov 18 .
The past two decades have seen an upsurge in research projects focusing on the everyday life of the Soviet people, their work and leisure (E. Iu. Zubkova, N. B. Lebina, A. N. Chistikov, V. L. Piankevich, F. K. Iarmolich) 19 .
A valuable contribution to our knowledge of domestic and work reality of the Soviet elite between the 1930s and early 1950s was made by T. N. Nikanorova 20 . Following the approaches practiced by British and American historians, her dissertation refers to a set of documents issued by the disciplinary Communist Party Control Commission (KPK)an agency the author boldly compares with the closed "class court". The cases of Communists that had lost political trust were first heard by the KPK, which was entitled to decide whether formal prosecution was required. T. N. Nikanorova focuses much of her work on KPK documents, often reading them as decent but not fully reliable sources 21 .
The dissertation includes a section focusing specifically on the "Leningrad affair". T. N. Nikonorova points to possible economic abuses on the part of the leadership of Leningrad as the major reasons for fabricating "the Leningrad Affair". To confirm her hypothesis, she provides statistical data on the non-targeted expenses in 1946-1949: on banquets, gifts, furniture 22 . However, as a result of a detailed analysis, the researcher comes to the conclusion that although certain abuses did take place, their interpretation by investigators and KPK supervisors was biased and opportunistic 23 .
History of emotions, or emotiology, is considered to have emerged in the 20 th century although trends of the "inward turn" were visible in academic discourse in the mid-19 th century or even earlier. International publications that appeared over the past 35-plus years have shaped history of emotions as an independent area of historical research 24 . Nevertheless, emotiological studies of Soviet history remain quite scarce 25 .
The majority of studied personalities did not have the opportunity to write memoirs due to the political repressions of late Stalinism. That is why, the autobiographies from archive personal files, public speeches and communiques are used as ego-documents in the article. However, "…today the history of emotions uses almost all kinds of sources that historians have at their disposal…" 26 . For this reason, the source base has been expanded by normative documents and institutional records supplemented by sources of personal origin, including oral narratives (based on interviews given by relatives), audio records and photographs from archives in St. Petersburg, Moscow and the Crimean Republic.

Norms of work behaviour
Sociocultural norms are standards of socially approved and expected behaviour which help to ensure social stability of a given cultural or political system. Norms are commonly classified into two varieties: formal ("written"), set out in regulatory documents, and informal ("unwritten"), grounded in traditions and customs. Compliance with formal norms is ensured through the law enforcement system; adherence to unwritten norms is regulated by social practices (approval or disapproval).
Formalized norms of working behaviour for top Soviet officials and Communist Party members in the USSR over the 1930s and 1940s were determined by the 1936 Constitution 27 , the Programme and Charter of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of the Soviet Union (VKP(b)), the Short Course on party history and regulatory documents issued by the VKP (b) Central Committee 28 .
Occupational and governmental discipline encompassed ("sobliudenie trudovoi i gosudarstvennoi distsipliny"), firstly, compliance with the established institutional regulations and continual professional growth, and secondly, the ability to resolve key issues of local economic and cultural development accurately and on a timely basis 33 as well as to duly implement the Communist Party's policy and the resolutions made by the party bodies 34 . The seniority principle governing relations between officials was a mandatory expression of occupational and governmental discipline.
Respect for seniority was also required by the principle of democratic centralism ("printsip demokraticheskogo tsentralizma") from heads of municipal and district councils; it involved executing resolutions of the USSR Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers, as well as compliance with the 1936 Constitution 35 .
Criticism and self-criticism ("kritika i samokritika"), regarded as the most important instrument for improving the quality of party and governmental work, implied the detection of errors and deficiencies in the work of institutions, organizations or individuals leading to corrective measures and problem elimination 36 ; any mistakes had to be openly and honestly admitted by the culprits 37 . Criticism and self-criticism served as an instrument of control over the work of the party and political elite as well as over the whole Soviet people. Critique by one's colleagues at party meetings could lead to tragic consequences: the person so criticized could lose their job or party membership and often face trial, not to mention moral distress during the collective discussion of their "mistakes". The accused would normally resort to self-criticism: they were expected to show remorse, "come clean", explain the causes of their moral degradation, and promise to atone for their misdemeanour.
In keeping with the principle of contact with the working masses ("printsip sviazi s trudiashchimisia massami"), governmental officials were expected to listen to workers, identify their needs, educate the working class and learn from it 38 .Soviet officials had to be extremely open and approachable, without a "veneer of bureaucracy" 39 .
Let us now pause to consider the unwritten norms applicable to the ruling elite of the Soviet period. The political system that formed in the USSR shortly before World War II (in the late 1930s) operated under the sole leadership of Joseph Stalin, who remained Secretary of the VKP (b) Central Committee in 1934-1952. Historians have described this power structure as authoritarian or neopatrimonial 40  system created by Stalin towards the end of 1930s where all key political decisions on the national level remained his personal prerogative. Apart from official documents, Stalin's "political will", which set the standards for work behaviour among the top governmental officials, was articulated through dictums, notes and even toasts.
Stalin himself was seen as a role model for holders of governmental and party offices. His outward modesty and asceticism remained one of the principal unwritten behavioural norms which mirrored Stalin's own way of life with its disapproval of luxury and extravagance. Stalin imposed irregular work schedules on his subordinates: "This lifestyle, which was not particularly healthy and often involved work at night hours… was forced on almost the whole of the Communist and governmental apparatus across the country…" 41 Soviet officials were supposed to stand by for a responsible governmental assignment at all times, even in their country houses (dachas) telephone sets (vertushki) for the secure government communication were installed 42 .
Governmental and Communist Party officials received considerable material privileges and incentives from the state, enjoying a higher level of comfort compared to rankand-file Soviet citizens: they could take advantage of spacious apartments and cosy country houses filled with well-designed furniture (paid for by the state) in addition to having access to better food supplies and medical services. Officials were entitled to one or more chauffeured cars; many had household staff such as a cook or a housekeeper.
After Stalin's cult of personality was firmly established, party comradeship emerged as a social norm in the USSR: the very term "comrade" (tovarishch), once used to refer to party associates and fellow-thinkers, became a universal form of address to any non-imprisoned person irrespective of their social standing. The absence of this prefix from official documents or newspaper publications usually signalled that the person in question had fallen outside of the Soviet normative field and been politically discredited 43 .
Unwritten norms also included love of comrade Stalin as well as faith in his infallibility, wisdom and justice.

Work-related practices
The Leningrad City Council and the Leningrad Region Council were the supreme bodies of the Soviet power in Leningrad and Leningrad Region. Within the framework of the Soviet system, these two institutions were both typical and exceptional: local government maintained direct links with the RSFSR Council of Ministers in Moscow. In practice, it meant that Leningrad had considerable advantages in industrial development, housing construction and public utility improvement as well as in a number of other areas 44 . In terms of status, Leningrad governmental and party institutions were more similar to their Moscow counterparts than to regional organizations. Following an unwritten arrangement, governmental agencies invariably played a subordinate role to party structures: the Soviets handed over a significant part of their powers to the Communist Party, limiting themselves to economic and managerial functions. Non-members of the Communist Party had no chance of ever occupying leading positions in the government during the Stalinist period. Party membership was awarded at the suggestion of the party cell and always required an extensive approval process. Candidate members had to go through a lengthy trial period during which the candidate's ideological and moral qualities were carefully assessed, and references were sought from their previous employers.
The Party membership card opened many doors for social, professional and personal growth: "If you want to be a boss, you have to become a Communist" 45 . Party members were given priority treatment when it came to education, including tertiary-level: the best universities in the country had to keep slots open for Communists. Young people that previously had no opportunity to complete a course of secondary education could prepare for the higher education institution by enrolling at so-called workers' faculties 46 . Young Communists with university degrees were regarded as highly eligible for top governmental positions and were given a fast track up the career ladder.
Despite the proclaimed transparency and democratic character of the Soviet election system, a reputable Communist had to be put forward for a responsible position by influential senior officials. Ranging from direct appointments to recommendations and approvals, the nomination practice (vydvizhenie) became widespread from the 1920s onwards and remained the single most important condition in the recruitment of governmental and Communist cadre 47 , The choice of the candidacy depended on a number of factors, including family background (working class or peasant), ideology (hesitancies in following the party line, involvement in political opposition or repressions, military captivity 48 ), and political activities (track record; prior elected offices).
Following the assassination of Sergei Kirov in 1934 and the subsequent mass repressions, many leading positions in Leningrad fell vacant. Kirov was succeeded as the First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional and City Party Committees by Andrei Zhdanov, a politician nurtured by Stalin. Having been transferred to Leningrad from Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod), he "… had no knowledge of the human resources available in Leningrad at that time" 49 and created his team from young Communists with working class or peasant backgrounds and low-level management experience, who had originated from other regions across the USSR. "…It often happened in those days; some people were reluctant even to accept those appointments… However, refusing was not an option… there were factories to develop… there was a real need in experts…" 50 Some of the key figures that joined the Soviet ruling elite during that period were: P. S. Popkov In the wake of the war, the Leningrad government faced the difficult task of ensuring fast recovery of the devastated local economy. The Executive Committee of the Leningrad City Council was headed by Petr Popkov, appointed its Chairman in 1939. Nicknamed "the Gypsy" 58 by other Lengorsoviet members because of his dark hair and skin, Popkov was frequently described as an outgoing, friendly, and democratic person with an upbeat sense of humour 59 .
The graphological analysis 60 of Popkov's signature shows him to be a thorough and determined individual; the letters slant markedly to the right, which is commonly seen in extroverted and outgoing natures; the broad horizontal lines are typical of enthusiastic people, while the sharp angles indicate an ambitious character ( fig.1). The years of running the besieged, war-stricken city transformed the young nominee into a strict and competent professional; the brisk, critical manner in which Popkov presided over the sessions of the Lengorsoviet's Executive Committee makes a good point in case 61 . However, despite his superior position and vast experience of public presentations, Popkov sometimes failed to express his thoughts clearly -a feature Zhdanov caustically described as "definitely not it" ("tipichnoe ne to") 62 . According to an implicit arrangement, Popkov represented Leningrad at formal events and functions during that period 63 ; his imposing and pleasant appearance ("Popkov was very good-looking" 64 ) may have had as much a role to play here as his high official status ( fig. 2).
Popkov's official postwar speeches are full of pride in Leningrad and the economic successes achieved under his control ("tangible positive outcomes", "successfully and ahead of schedule", "considerable achievements" 65 ). His love of Leningrad also manifests itself in his reports: "Our city's streets and avenues are growing more beautiful and convenient by the day" 66 , "…labour towards a better life in Leningrad…" 67 . Local patriotism was typical among the Leningrad wartime governmental and party elite: "During the war, local patriotism was promoted by Moscow nationwide. In Leningrad, however, it developed on a more fertile soil, shaping the core of regional identity" 68 ; this very attitude was used as a basis for allegations of separatism during the Leningrad Affair.
In 1944, Petr Lazutin was appointed Deputy Chair of the Leningrad City Executive Committee; unlike his boss, Lazutin was unsmiling, modest, serious and taciturn, always absorbed in his work 69 ( fig. 3).
According to their contemporaries, the Chairman and his deputy maintained a good working relationship and even visited each other's homes together with their families 70 . Their colleagues and relatives jocularly nicknamed them Peter I and Peter II 71 , like Russian emperors of the 18 th century. Lazutin's signature betrays a perfectionist and determined character. The austere, balanced geometry of his handwriting signals psychological balance and strong willpower. The vertical lines predominating in the signature are mainly typical of introverted personalities avoiding excessive display of emotions ( fig. 4).
In 1938, the post of the Chairman of the Leningrad Regional Executive Committee was entrusted to Nikolai Soloviev, a blunt, decisive man, who demanded a lot from the others and even more from himself 72 . Soloviev ranked as the third most important official in Leningrad after the First Secretaries of the Leningrad Oblast and Leningrad City Party Committees (after Kuznetsov and Popkov).
The national government highly valued Soloviev's contribution to the revival of local agriculture. In February 1946, the chairman of the Leningrad Oblast Executive Committee received a Traveling Red Banner from the Sovnarkom in recognition of the excellent performance of Leningrad Oblast in the 1945 agricultural competition among the oblasts, krais and republics of the Soviet Union 73 . Soloviev also presented a detailed analysis of the goals of post-war economic recovery and the development of agriculture in a series of reports 74 .
Rebuilding the local economy, severely affected by the war, was a daunting task: the pressure for a faster pace of economic growth as well as the tight control on the part of the USSR government and the VKP(b) Central Committee created a tense working atmosphere. The children of Soviet and Communist officials often described their fathers as extremely busy: "I rarely saw my father -he didn't come home until very late" 75 , "…the only way I remember him is at work… he was always busy writing something, even at weekends; his study was completely crowded with papers; he smoked a lot… he never took any holidays" 76 . One would be justified in thinking that this lifestyle offered a sure 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 From the personal conversation of Garmash P. with M. M. Maksimenko (1947-1952 -   path towards emotional burnout 77 . However, children of the Leningrad governmental officials remember them as active and passionately committed to their work 78 . The Leningrad leaders were not in the slightest degree armchair politicians. Active involvement in solving work problems, some of them highly complex, became de rigueur among the Leningrad government during World War II and the siege. Leningrad leaders of the post-war period undertook numerous public duties, attending countless official events and meeting with workers. In 1945-1946, Popkov successfully performed representative functions in keeping with the Stalinist principle of contact with the working masses. Lazutin's daughter, Natalia, provides the following account of her father's work in the aftermath of the war: "My dad loved Leningrad and its residents; he wanted to do as much as possible to revive the city and its industry as well as to improve the quality of life here …" 79 ( fig. 5). Soloviev's daughter, Clara, remembered that after his new appointment to Crimea her father never used a car to travel to work; he would always go on foot and resented spending too much time in his office -a habit he acquired in Leningrad 80 .
In the years following World War II, many of Leningrad's top officials were promoted in recognition of their selfless labour during the war and siege. In 1946, Popkov and Soloviev were elected deputies of the 2 nd Supreme Soviet ( Popkov's less successful colleagues often doubted his management capabilities and continued to seek consultancy from their ex-boss Kuznetsov, who was appointed head of the Communist Party Personnel Directorate in Central Committee structures in 1946. "…I was repeatedly bypassed as they thought I had no knowledge of party work. Then they would report to me saying 'Comrade Kuznetsov recommends it' , " Popkov remembered bitterly 83 .
On 26 February 1946 Lazutin was appointed Chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee 84 . He accepted his new appointment with satisfaction 85 , seeing it as a well-deserved reward for his achievements and professional qualities. Rumour had it that Lazutin's candidacy was even considered for the position of the Minister of Food Industry 86 ; however, the appointment never materialized -much to the delight of Lazutin, who was unwilling to relocate to Moscow.
In 1947, Lazutin delivered a speech at a rally held in commemoration of Moscow's 800 th anniversary 87 . The surviving audio record provides some useful material for the analysis of his rhetorical skills and emotional state during the address. The opening part of his speech is deliberately reserved and business-like. However, several slips of the tongue and the gradually rising volume of his voice betray the speaker's intensity of feeling. Lazutin's speech emphasizes the contribution Russians made to the country's history and is punctuated by phrases "Russian people", "Russian lands" and "the Russian nation" 88 .
References to Russianness and the Russian people were a common vein in speeches made by Leningrad politicians of the post-war period, who may have been inspired by Stalin's famous toast (pronounced during the celebratory reception held in the Kremlin in May 1945) praising the outstanding historical significance of the Russian nation in the development of the country. The "Leningraders" may have interpreted this statement as a new vector of the Stalinist ideological policy. The post-war years also saw Zhdanov initiate a discussion among the official circles concerning the possible opening of a RSFSR bureau of the VKP(b) Central Committee, with headquarters in Leningrad. The project rested on a solid foundation: Russia was the only constituent republic of the USSR which had no party organization of its own.
Lazutin concludes his speech with a peroration: "Long live great Stalin, the leader and teacher of the Soviet people" 89 . The public exhibition of love for Stalin was more than just an accepted norm -it was required by the political system. This love was in fact a symbiosis of reverence and fear of losing Stalin's political trust; the latter could have far-reaching consequences ranging from a "warning" to the suspension of party membership 90 .   Ibid. F. 1728. Op. 1. D. 196640. L. 1. 85 Interview conducted by the author with N. P. Sivtsova (Lazutina). 86 Ibid. 87 Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv fonodokumentov // RGAF. F. 1. Op. 1. Ed. khr. 81(5). 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 For more information about the hierarchy of USSR Party punishment see: Cohn E. The high title of a communist: Postwar Party discipline and the values of the soviet regime. Dekalb, 2015. P. 33-41. After the war, Lazutin was granted a personal audience with Stalin 91 : the successes of the Leningrad industry were remarkable, the urge to showcase them too strong to resist 92 . The meeting, however, did not come up to the expectations. "Comrade Stalin said, 'You are not doing enough to develop the fuel base' ", Lazutin himself remembered. "I replied that we had issued a memorandum addressing this problem…" 93 1946 also brought a promotion to Soloviev, who was elected First Secretary of the Crimean Communist Party Organization on 30-31 July 1946 in Simferopol 94 ( fig. 6).
It is believed that Soloviev was nominated for this elevated position by Kuznetsov (the Central Committee secretary), with whom Soloviev had maintained close working contacts since his previous assignment in Leningrad. As Soloviev wrote in his autobiography, "From 1935 onwards, my work was personally monitored and supervised by Comrade A. A. Kuznetsov" 95 . On 16 July 1946 Soloviev was succeeded as the Chairman of the Leningrad Regional Executive Committee by Ilya Kharitonov, former Secretary of the Leningrad City Committee of the Communist Party 96 . His daughter, Ella, describes her father as active, hardworking, kind and considerate 97 (fig. 7).
The newly appointed heads of the Leningrad City and Regional Councils had to oversee the restoration of the shattered local economy in accordance with the 4 th Five-Year Plan for 1946-1950approved in March 1946 .
Following Zhdanov's death in August 1948, the Leningrad group was deprived of its protector and patron. The rift that formed among the used-to-be associates made them even more vulnerable to political competitors like L. P. Beria and G. M. Malenkov. Hidden conflicts emerged between Popkov and A. A. Kuznetsov, between Popkov and   Zhdanov's main protégé, Kuznetsov claimed to his patron's position as the ideological leader of the Leningrad Communist Organization. In his turn, Popkov, who had been suffering from covert sabotage at work, suggested that Nikolai Voznesensky, Head of the State Planning Committee, should be a more appropriate "unofficial leader" (chief) of Leningrad 99 . This move can be regarded as an ill-conceived attempt at political intrigue with the aim to find a new patron, instead of Zhdanov. Voznesensky rejected the proposal. As a result, Popkov "…began to focus on Kuznetsov again. I did not want this, but had focused on Kuznetsov completely" 100 . Popkov's rash move received a radical interpretation in the run-up to the Leningrad Affair.
The formal cause for launching investigation as part of the Leningrad Affair was an anonymous report filed to the Central Committee shortly after the 10 th Leningrad regional and 8 th Leningrad city Party conference, held in December 1948, where the members of Committees had to be elected 101 . A tally commission member informed the Central Committee that the election returns had been rigged: although the winners were declared as elected by unanimous vote, four votes in fact had been cast against Popkov, two against Lazutin, with a small number of "against" votes received by Kapustin and the Second Secretary of the region Committee G. F. Badaev (the total number of votes cast for the winning candidates exceeded one thousand) 102 .
Another episode closely associated with the Leningrad Affair was the National Trade Fair organized by the Leningrad City Executive Committee on 10-20 January 1949. Attended by representatives of Kazakhstan, Georgia, the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and Belorussia, the National Trade Fair event was held in compliance with the Resolution of the Bureau of the USSR Council of Ministers "On Measures for Improving Trade" issued on 11 November 1948, which contained no provisions restricting participation of Union constituent and autonomous republics, national districts, krais or oblasts 103 .
The fabrication of the criminal "case" had started before 1949: "The politicians who were in the list of defendants felt that their work problems were carefully organized by someone…" 104 According to Popkov's colleague, who met him in Smolny shortly before Popkov was dismissed from his office, "The person seated at the desk where Kirov and Kuznetsov used to work looked like a very sick person. I was particularly struck by his shifty eyes and pathetic smile of a lost man pleading for condescension" 105 .
I. S. Kharitonov was the first to be removed from his post: in December 1948. Since that moment and until his arrest in November 1949, Kharitonov attended a course at the School for Secretaries of Regional VKP(b) Committees and Chairpersons of Regional Executive Committees. Referrals to such schools were frequently issued with the sole aim to sever and isolate the accused from their environment, and ultimately, to facilitate their arrest.
In 1948, Kharitonov was succeeded as the Chairman of Regional Executive Committee by Ivan Dmitriev, who used to be a school teacher in Luga prior to his party career 106 .
During the war, Dmitriev had headed the local VKP(b) Committee and coordinated the partisan movement in the Luzhsky District.
On 15 February 1949 the Politburo issued the resolution "On Removal from Office of A. A. Kuznetsov,M. I. Rodionov,and P. S. Popkov" 107 . The names of the accused featured in the document without the prefix "comrades". Popkov was charged with anti-governmental activities relating to the National Trade Fair 108 , and with failing to ensure contacts between the Central Committee and Leningrad Party organization, bypassing the Central Committee and engaging in "profiteering schemes" facilitated by self-proclaimed Leningrad chiefs. On 22 February 1949, Popkov addressed the joint plenum of the Leningrad Regional and City VKP(b) Committees held with the aim to discuss the Politburo resolution. In keeping with the self-criticism principle, Popkov admitted supporting the plans to create a Communist Party of Russia in a bid to assist the Central Committee in its hard work 109 . Popkov faint-heartedly shifted the responsibility for the 1949 National Trade Fair to his ex-deputy: "All the talks were conducted by Comrade Lazutin behind the backs of the City Party Committee, and I knew nothing of what was going on" 110 .
Popkov also made a number of unpleasant comments targeted at Iakov Kapustin, mentioning his abuse of alcohol. Having completed his speech, Leningrad's highestranking politician, utterly demoralized and discredited in his colleagues' eyes, stepped awkwardly off the stage and took his seat among the audience rather than returning to the Presidium. The joint plenum released Popkov from his position and gave him a reprimand. Like many other demoted "Leningraders", he was sent to Party Courses run by the Central Committee.
The Politburo Resolution was disseminated among other Communist Party organizations. V. Simarzin, the Head of the Special Unit of the Crimean Regional Party Committee, describes Soloviev's reaction to the Resolution: "Soloviev opened the records of the Decree… the moment he got to the paragraph about the anti-Communist behaviour of Kuznetsov, Popkov, and Rodionov, he turned pale, became stiff and looked positively disorientated… he was agitated; he mentioned that he had had several conflicts with Kuznetsov back in Leningrad and heard Kuznetsov make rather indecent comments targeted at Beria; Soloviev also pointed out that he had been amazed to receive the news about Popkov's appointment to the post of the Leningrad City and Regional Committees… it was the first time I had seen Soloviev so unsettled" 111 .
On 16 June 1949 Lazutin, too, was relieved from his duties by the Politburo 112 . After removal from office, he did not lose heart, and said that he hoped to be given a new appointment in his home city of Alma-Ata 113 . The optimism he showed to his family and friends may have been less than genuine; Lazutin struggled to conceal his distress from his wife and daughter. A shrewd, experienced politician of the Stalinist school, Lazutin may have foreseen what lay ahead. The new chairman of the Leningrad City Executive Committee, Andrei Kuznetsov (appointed in June 1949) remained in this position for just over a year until July 1950 114 .
On 5 August 1949 Soloviev was summoned to Moscow, where he was officially removed from his post 115 . As his wife Vera remembered later, "on 4 August Nikolai unexpectedly called from Simferopol. He sounded nervous: 'I have been urgently summoned to the Central Committee. I am flying out tomorrow. How about meeting in Moscow?' Not suspecting anything serious, I said, 'I can't go right now: Clara [our daughter] has an exam in just a few days. Call me from Moscow, please. ' ' All right…' This was our last conversation" 116 .
In summer and autumn 1949, most officials accused as part of the Leningrad Affair were arrested; their apartments, where the families of the suspects still lived, were searched. A question haunting both popular and academic publications is whether the Leningrad leaders of the 1940s had really committed abuse of power, participated in corruption schemes? Were any of the repressions conducted during the Leningrad Affair justified, at least with regard to economic mismanagement? In struggling to answer this question, one should bear in mind that the sentence passed on 30 September 1950 by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court to the core group of the Leningrad Affair defendants 117 did not refer to any articles relating to economic crimes.
Although this issue remains outside the scope of our study, we need to acknowledge that banquets and gift-giving in Stalin's time used to be (and still remain) an unwritten norm of work practice, serving team-building and networking purposes. On the legislative level, Decree No.11 "On Prohibiting Allocation of Funds for Banquets" issued on 2 January 1945 by USSR Soviet of People's Commissars was aimed at restricting the banqueting campaign; however, dinner receptions held in Moscow by the USSR Government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1946-1949 sent an unequivocal message to Regional Communist organizations that banquets continued to remain the tacit norm 118 .
There is information about gift-giving and taking among the Leningrad state officials in 1946-1949. For example, when the First Secretary of the Leningrad City and Region Party Committees Popkov visited Pskov in 1949, "a celebratory dinner was given in his honour; he was also presented with two chests of apples and one chest of smelt at the expense of the local executive committee" 119 . However, there is no reason to suggest the significant scale of economic abuse during the postwar period. Such behavior was kind of unwritten norm throughout party organizations across the USSR.
Children of the Leningrad ruling elite frequently mentioned that they had grown in modest living conditions 120 . Investigators conducting searches in the defendants' apart-ments found that nearly all property items were with inventory numbers printed on them; personal belongings were mainly limited to books and state decorations.
The criminal investigation lasted for nearly a year, during which the accused were tortured, severely beaten, and subjected to extreme psychological coercion. On 30 September 1950 the main defendants including Popkov and Lazutin were sentenced to death, among the main six defendants, executed in Leningrad. Soloviev, Kharitonov and a number of other officials were shot down in Moscow between 28 and 31 October 1950. All of them had been sentenced to capital punishment under Article 58 of the USSR Criminal Code as traitors of the motherland, spies, and subversives. In November 1950, I. V. Dmitriev was also convicted during the Leningrad Affair and sentenced to 3,5 years of imprisonment.
Out of six top officials that ran Region in 1945-1950, Andrei Kuznetsov was the only one to avoid repressions. This may have been due to the fact that he did not maintain any close working contacts with the Leningrad ruling elite, remaining the director of the Izhora Works until 1949; alternatively, he may have been forced to cut a deal with the investigators… In 1950 he was given "a severe reprimand and warning" by the Central Control Commission, yet never had to stand trial.
Following Stalin's death, on 30 April 1954 the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court revoked the sentence passed on the Leningrad Affair as based on false accusations; the top governmental and Communist leaders featured in the case were rehabilitated, some of them posthumously.

Conclusions
The political context introduced in the study has enabled us to highlight and analyse the social and emotional aspects of the working routine of the Soviet elite. Candidates to responsible positions in the government and party structures in Leningrad, as in the whole USSR as well, were selected in strict compliance with the established requirements relating to the social background, party membership, track record, etc. Some of the appointments, however, were a matter of chance: one such example was the rise of Andrei Zhdanov, who had no trust in the older Leningrad cadre and preferred to build his team around young Communists with regional backgrounds.
The working practices of the government officials during the late Stalinist period did not always conform to rigid institutionalized norms. In some instances legally prohibited activities (e.g. banquets) were unofficially regarded as a norm. Although the list of "written" and "unwritten" norms presented in our study may be extended, it reflects the key requirements for top governmental officials which existed under the Stalinist system.
Adherence to established norms of work conduct was a standard associated with the social role of a Soviet official; some manifestations of this adherence could be partly performative (love of Stalin, enthusiasm), others -sincere (love of Leningrad). The "low" emotions associated with the work reality of the Soviet elite were dramatically manifested during the Leningrad Affair, and included fear of demotion and of loss of job and Party membership, fear for one's life and the wellbeing of one's family; apathy; enmity towards ex-colleagues; cowardice and treason. The study focuses on the emotional life of the Soviet elite both as part of the normal working routine and under crisis.
Can the Leningraders be said to have suffered for their post-war transgressions against the Stalinist norms of state discipline and respect for seniority? Hardly. The Leningrad Affair arose from the nation-wide power struggle. Some relatives of the Leningrad Affair victims are convinced that the case was primarily targeted against Alexei Kuznetsov, whom Stalin had named as his successor 121 . Howe ver, the close interaction and support that existed between Leningraders who later filled positions in local governments across the country were seen by Stalin's entourage as a threat to its might and influence as the national leader. It is possible that Kuznetsov's colleagues from Leningrad were prosecuted to inflate the political importance of the Leningrad Affair. The case had to send a clear signal to all party organizations nationwide: no political initiative ever goes unpunished 122 .
Despite Zhdanov's many personal shortcomings (including weakness, cowardice often ascribed to him, as well as his loss of contact with the common people), he succeeded in consolidating the Leningrad elite and became an indisputable authority. The working relations built under his leadership among the ruling elite of Leningrad during the dramatic times of World War II and the siege were based on trust, friendship and emotional bonds. By contrast, Kuznetsov failed to gain as much influence as Zhdanov among his Leningrad colleagues despite all his experience and achievements, not to mention Stalin's support. Other top officials valued his work qualities, yet refused to see him as an equal to their previous patron: "In their private conversations [governmental and Communist officials] could refer to 'Kuznetsov' or 'Popkov' , but they always said 'Comrade Zhdanov'; Zhdanov remained an unchallenged figure" 123 . After further career promotions and, more importantly, after Zhdanov's death, the personal ties among the former wartime comrades gradually waned due to undercover working and personal conflicts, and ultimately accelerated the fabrication of the Leningrad Affair, which had tragic consequences not only for the defendants and also for the whole Leningrad.