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A Little Lift in the Iron Curtain: Emigration Restrictions and the Stability of Closed Regimes

How does emigration impact authoritarian stability when emigration is restricted? I argue that emigration restrictions require citizens to go through an arduous process to obtain exit visas. Because this process is prohibitively costly for all but the most persistent emigration-seekers, it allows the regime to identify potential troublemakers. This improves stability because some troublemakers leave, while others are targeted with repression and co-optation. Yet, letting some people out creates new demand for future emigration, which undermines stability. Exploiting an involuntary emigration reform in the former German Democratic Republic that forced the country to issue more exit visas, I show that the resulting emigration wave reduced participation in the 1989 revolution. A causal mediation analysis reveals that some of the negative effect of emigration on protest was offset by heightened demand for future emigration. The paper contributes to scholarship on autocratic stability and provides a rare insight into closed autocracies.