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Reframing the action and perception dissociation in DF: haptics matters, but how?

Goodale and Milner's (1992) "vision-for-action" and "vision-for-perception" account of the division of labor between the dorsal and ventral "streams" has come to dominate contemporary views of the functional roles of these two pathways. Nevertheless, some lines of evidence for the model remain controversial. Recently, Thomas Schenk reexamined visual form agnosic patient DF's spared anticipatory grip scaling to object size, one of the principal empirical pillars of the model. Based on this new evidence, Schenk rejects the original interpretation of DF's spared ability that was based on segregated processing of object size and argues that DF's spared grip scaling relies on haptic feedback to calibrate visual egocentric cues that relate the posture of the hand to the visible edges of the goal-object. However, a careful consideration of the tasks that Schenk employed reveals some problems with his claim. We suspect that the core issues of this controversy will require a closer examination of the role that cognition plays in the operation of the dorsal and ventral streams in healthy controls and in patient DF.