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Monitoring Research in the Context of CTBT Negotiations and Networks

Abstract : Since the last Phillips Laboratory conference there has been substantial progress at the Geneva Negotiations in the United Nations Conference on Disarmament on the subject of which types of detecting networks will be implemented as part of an international monitoring system (IMS), used to monitor a CTBT. At the present time the United States is supporting the deployment of 4 networks, seismic, radio nuclide, hydroacoustic, and infrasonic. In addition the US is supporting a strong on-site inspection regime, mandatory baseline notifications of the locations and blasting practices of mines which detonate explosions above some yield, and voluntary transparency measures such as calibration experiments and mine monitoring. In this paper I will first briefly discuss the nature of these networks and practices, and discuss how they fit together to help the international community to deny an evader an opportunity to test. I then plan to step back and briefly discuss how the geophysical research community in the US can make a contribution to the CTBT.