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Application of the Soviet Theory of "Deep Operation" During the 1939 Soviet-Japanese Military Conflict in Mongolia

Abstract : During the Interwar period, the Soviet theory of "deep operations" developed in parallel with Soviet armed forces organizational reform, their rearmament and preparation for the threats in response to challenges of the Interwar period. The determining factors that created favorable conditions for the emergence of theory were rearmament and reorganization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the combat experience of previous wars of the 20th century. However, Stalin's 1937-1940 repression impeded the development and application of the theory. including rearmament and preparation for current threats. At the same time in the Far East, a full-scale undeclared war developed between Japan and an alliance of China, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union. The 1939 war became the real battlefield for examining the Red Army, its capability to deploy combined joint forces, organize comprehensive combat and logistic support of its troops, and coordinate its efforts with the Mongolian People's Army. The 1939 military conflict in the Far East demonstrated the growth of the Soviet theory of the "deep operation" as well as the leadership talents of General Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov. This thesis explores aspects of the "deep operation" development and its application during the 1939 Soviet-Japanese military conflict in Mongolia.