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Kant and the Defeat of Egoism: Schopenhauerian Concerns and Some Reappraisals and Rejoinders

In his work, On the Basis of Morality (Über die Grundlage der Moral),1 Arthur Schopenhauer criticised Kant’s foundation for morals because, in Schopenhauer’s view, the categorical imperative, in the final analysis, was an empty concept which was anything but categorical in character. Indeed, on his long journey towards the moral theology, Kant reintroduced hypothetical aspects into his ethical system (through the postulates of God, immortality and freedom, though especially the latter two). The promise of reward or fear of punishment associated with the first two postulates, for Schopenhauer, reintroduced selfish, i.e. egoistic motives the absence of which, for him, was the only mark of an action of true moral worth.2 Contrary to Schopenhauer’s basic thesis and similar criticisms levied at Kant in the past two centuries, this paper seeks to illustrate that Kant, by and large, did not allow egoism back into the moral equation of his ethical system, despite there being passages in his works which might suggest otherwise. Indeed, although so many commentators have sought to suggest that Schopenhauer allowed no possibility of true happiness at all, the paper shall furthermore contend that the moral systems of Kant and Schopenhauer, though different in many ways, both share one fundamental aim. Despite Kant’s emphasis upon duty and Schopenhauer’s upon compassion (as their respective foundational principles), I suggest that both viewed the truly moral act as being one from which egoism is absent and plays no major part in the motivation of the act. Here I seek, also, to argue that both men clearly made a clear distinction between legitimate self-interest and overt egoism.