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Naturalism, Pragmatism, and Design

Philosophical naturalists maintain that philosophy is continuous with science, that philosophically acceptable standards of knowledge, justification, and explanation are in some sense commensurable with the corresponding scientific standards (Post 1995). Yet naturalists continue to disagree about what, exactly, it means to say that philosophy and science are “continuous.” Here I will argue that a pragmatic approach can shed valuable light on this question. Some naturalists (e.g., W. V. O. Quine [1969], Paul Churchland [1979], and Patricia Churchland [1987]) suggest that philosophical concepts can be eliminated in favor of scientific concepts and that philosophy can be made a “chapter” of natural science. While this is a provocative and interesting proposal, it would replace the normative dimension of philosophical inquiry with a purely descriptive investigation into how, in fact, we do reason about the true, the good, and the beautiful. This approach thus appears to commit the naturalistic fallacy from the very beginning (see Kim 1994, Putnam 1982, Bonjour 1994). Other naturalists (e.g., Alvin Goldman [1986] and Hilary Kornblith [1993]) distinguish elimination from reduction and argue that philosophical concepts can be reduced to scientific concepts. On this view, philosophical concepts might be shown to supervene on natural concepts that can then be investigated using scientific methods and