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“One country, two systems” and its antagonists in Tibet and Taiwan

In turning the vast and diverse territory of the Qing Empire into a singular nation-state, Beijing has kept redefining its conception and institution of nationhood in response to challenges from the recalcitrant or not-yet-incorporated peripheral regions including Tibet, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Since 1949, Beijing has attempted to solve the Tibet and Taiwan questions with the institutional design of “one country, two systems.” This design, widely thought of as a 1980s invention, can in fact be dated back to the early 1950s with respect to Tibet. This design has been far from successful in Tibet and Taiwan. While the “one country, two systems” experiment in Tibet failed with the Lhasa uprising and the flight of the Dalai Lama in 1959, the proposal of “one country, two systems” lost its appeal and had become a taboo among politicians of all strips in Taiwan by the 21st century. In this article, we argue that the success of “one country, two systems” requires a very delicate balance and virtuous interaction between the political center in Beijing and the elite, as well as popular classes, in the periphery concerned. It can easily be jeopardized if the center tilts too much to the left or right.