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The basic law and the limits of toleration

Germany's Basic Law is claimed to represent a liberal‐democratic constitution. This article seeks to examine whether a constitution that permits the prohibition of parties (Art. 21.2 GG) and the suspension of individual rights (Art. 18 GG) deserves this label. The examination is based on the analytical framework provided by the liberal concept of toleration. For toleration to be a meaningful concept within liberal theory, it has to imply certain limits. The author concludes that the main purpose of Arts. 21.2 and 18 GG is to serve as a reminder of these limits of toleration while the practice of the Federal Constitutional Court reflects the liberal constraints on enforcing the limits of toleration.