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THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SUPREME COURT POWER IN BRITAIN'S REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 erected an institutional ‘firewall’ designed to substantially insulate the courts of the United Kingdom from undue political interference. Nevertheless, the new Supreme Court, its enhanced independence in recruitment and decision-making under the Act notwithstanding, have above all insisted on maintaining a deferential stance towards parliament, leaving to the people's elected representatives the ‘last word’ in defining the most fundamental legal norms. This article seeks to explain this counter-intuitive phenomenon by examining certain pressures that parliament and the electorate can place on the Court, from which the Act as it currently stands has not protected it.