{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.01426220515633571, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 6.152941176470589, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
IPO Signaling Theory: A Revisit

The theoretical model in this study predicts signaling and non-signaling equilibriums can coexist within perfectly competitive stock markets, with signaling evident in larger IPO proceeds. Introduction of market incompleteness into the theoretical framework demonstrates signaling is evident in better post IPO price support, equivalently evident in less negative or more positive post IPO price drift. Within context of markets that are incomplete, separating signaling equilibriums are shown not to be amenable to assumptions of valuation uncertainty. Separating signaling equilibriums constitute, however, dominant equilibriums within context of presence of information asymmetry between issuers and investors. In presence of frictions within product markets, assumptions of information asymmetry within incomplete stock markets generate separating or mixed signaling equilibriums. A distinguishing feature of the signaling framework in relation to prior work is a departure from a priori categorization of IPO parameters as signals of quality. This abstraction nonetheless, the signaling framework endogenously generates distributions of IPO underpricing as sufficient statistics for identification of signaling equilibriums. The theoretical model predicts characterization of IPO underpricing as "money left on the table" during IPOs is theoretically appropriate only within context of mixed signaling equilibriums. Given mixed signaling equilibriums imply presence of market frictions within product markets, IPO issuers act rationally whenever they "leave money on the table" during IPOs. Study predictions, obtained endogenously without recourse to underpricing as a signal of quality, constitute significant departures from and improvements on prior models of IPO signaling theory.