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Linking Cooperative Arrangements and Economic Development Strategies: An Institutional Collection Action Framework

The main purpose of this paper is to examine if cooperative arrangements among local governments explain the tendency for local governments to adopt certain types of economic development strategies. We take our clues from the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework by highlighting the elements of competition and cooperation in economic development strategies. The general hypothesis is that when local governments decide to cooperate, they are acting strategically to improve their economic competitiveness. The general hypothesis is that when local governments decide to cooperate, they are acting strategically to improve their economic competitiveness. We utilize a series of binary regressions with data collected from a survey of local development officials in 206 cities located in twelve metropolitan areas in the United States. The results provide partial support for our general propositions. We found cooperation has no effect on “go it alone” tax incentive strategies but a positive effect on the use of capital intensive strategies that are crucial for enhancing regional competiveness.