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Bank resolution in the UK: creating a culture of early intervention

Since the collapse of Northern Rock in 2008 the UK authorities have constructed a state-of-the-art resolution framework for dealing with failing banks comprising both a Special Resolution Regime and a Proactive Intervention Framework. Whilst the design of the SRR has been examined, how the resolution framework will function in practice has to be analysed in detail. This paper will examine the ambiguity that exists surrounding when a firm should be placed into resolution, along with the discretion regarding the operation of the resolution framework that has been placed into the hands of the new microprudential regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority. It will argue that these issues have the potential to fatally undermine the framework's ability to protect both public funds and financial stability in the UK from the impact of bank failure.