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Washington's view of the Sino‐Soviet split, 1961–63: From puzzled prudence to bold experimentation

The intelligence community figured importantly in the Kennedy administration's handling of the Sino‐Soviet split. Moving in tandem with a hardening policy perception about the reality of the split, intelligence analysts gave confidence to administration officials as the latter sought to come to grips with momentous shifts in strategic international alignments. Three stages are discernible. While scoring a success in charting the Sino‐Soviet rupture, Kennedy's intelligence advisers initially shied away from ascribing permanence to the rift. Divisions of opinion, bureaucratic caution, cognitive inertia, and Sherman Kent's orthodox views about the advisory role of intelligence combined to produce this reticence. During 1962, the advent of China watchers to government contributed to greater conviction that the split was irreversible. The Sino‐Indian Border War and the Cuban Missile Crisis culminated official Washington's tendency to both view the split a fait accompli and regard Moscow as less menacing than Beijing. A key figure in shaping this approach was Ray Cline, the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence.