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Grounding the Domains of Reasons

ABSTRACT A good account of normative reasons should explain not only what makes practical and epistemic reasons a unified kind of thing, but also why practical and epistemic reasons are substantively different kinds of reasons that underlie significant categories of normative assessment and exhibit different weighing behaviours. I argue that a disjunctive account of normative reasons, according to which practical and epistemic reasons have very different grounds (what I call the Different Source View), can do both of these jobs, unlike some prominent unified alternative accounts. And the viability of this view has significant implications for metanormative theorizing: it implies that the answer to certain metanormative questions may differ between the practical and epistemic domains.