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Agency Discretion or Statutory Direction: Decision Making at the U. S. International Trade Commission

SEVERAL papers in economics and political science journals have analyzed decision making of independent regulatory agencies, including the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).' Most authors have assumed that agencies have discretion in making decisions and have sought to determine whether this discretion is used to make decisions that can be explained by public choice concepts, such as the desires of current members of Congress. A major weakness of these papers is the failure to consider the extent to which agency decisions are based on the statutory requirements under which the agency operates. This article seeks to remedy this shortcoming by comparing models of