{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.03295750216825672, 'fraction_numerical': 0.022549869904596703, 'mean_word_length': 6.167701863354037, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 1, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Continuation of Developmentalism across Administrations

In the 2010s, Korea continued its state-led developmentalism, including the Special Law for Parts and Materials and the New Growth Engine Promotion policy, across ideologically different governments. Korea’s state-led developmentalism was mainly realized through competitive politics within as well as outside the state, rather than by simple repetition of a developmental mindset or old institutional legacy. By exploring the industrial politics of three administrations—Roh Moo-hyun (2003–07), Lee Myung-bak (2008–12), and Park Geun-hye (2013–17), as well as the Moon administration (2017–present)—this chapter examines how the Korean state continued its developmentalism across ideologically different administrations. This chapter first studies why the Roh Moo-hyun administration continued with state-led developmentalism, rather than pursue the economic democratization proposed by the original supporters of Roh Moo-hyun. Then, it examines how Korean state-led developmentalism continues across ideologically different governments by focusing on competition and conflicts within the state.