{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.012867647058823529, 'fraction_numerical': 0.016544117647058824, 'mean_word_length': 4.983516483516484, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Constraints on Rational Theory Choice

In a recent article, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational enterprise. In this article, I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to sidestep this argument. In doing so, I present a new argument in favour of voluntarism of the type favoured by van Fraassen. I then show how such a view of scientific rationality gives a precise interpretation of what Thomas Kuhn thought. 1 Introduction 2 Okasha’s Argument 3 Rationality Can Be Silent 4 Arrow Undermined 5 The Informational-Basis Escape 6 Theory Choice at the Level of the Individual Scientist 7 Kuhn Vindicated 8 Trade-offs and Partial Commensurability 9 Conclusion 1 Introduction 2 Okasha’s Argument 3 Rationality Can Be Silent 4 Arrow Undermined 5 The Informational-Basis Escape 6 Theory Choice at the Level of the Individual Scientist 7 Kuhn Vindicated 8 Trade-offs and Partial Commensurability 9 Conclusion