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Practical Wisdom and Moral Imagination in Sense and Sensibility

There is no single virtue more important to Aristotle’s ethical theory than the intellectual virtue of phronesis, or practical wisdom. Yet for all its importance, it is not easy to make sense of this virtue, either in Aristotle’s own writings or in virtue ethics more generally. Insofar as Aristotle defines it, he does so opaquely, saying it is “a state grasping the truth, involving reason, concerned with action about things that are good or bad for a human being.”1 Practical wisdom is a form of knowledge aimed fundamentally at acting well. It requires both a general understanding of what is worthwhile in human life and the ability to act in ways that reflect that understanding.2 My goal in this paper is to explore the latter aspect of practical wisdom in its application to ordinary social behavior. The circumstances that will interest me here are often thought to be the domain of manners or decorum, rather than morals proper. Although no one who takes Hume seriously can deny the moral significance of manners, the relationship between one’s inner state of character and how that character is expressed in seemingly mundane behavior has received insufficient attention from moral philosophers.3 In such a task, there can be few better places to begin than with Jane Austen, whose novels reveal the intricacies of ordinary moral behavior with extraordinary acumen. I shall use Austen’s Sense and Sensibility to examine the skill associated with knowing how to behave rightly in the sense we associate with propriety or decorum. This skill is essential to pleasant social life, and hence, on the Aristotelian view, to human flourishing. Yet it is often lacking, even among those who have sound moral principles and good hearts. Well-meaning people frequently say or do what is inappropriate.