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Pré cis of Self-Knowledge and Resentment

The term ‘privileged access’, on the lips and keyboards of philosophers, expresses an intuition that self-knowledge is unique among the knowledges human beings possess, unique in being somehow more direct and less prone to error than other kinds of knowledge such as, say, our knowledge of the physical world or of the mental states of others. These notions of ‘directness ‘ and ‘immunity to error’ do, of course, need to be made more precise and may need more qualification (and even revision) than is provided at the level of intuition. Those are the familiar tasks of the philosophical refinement of an intuition. But these tasks must nest in a more basic philosophical question, which is to consider, as with all intuitions, whether the intuition can be justified in the first place by philosophical argument or whether, on scrutiny, it should be discarded as insupportable. Self-Knowledge and Resentment addressed the intuition of privileged access in the limited domain of self-knowledge of intentional states, such as beliefs and desires. Its large conclusion, argued over five chapters, was that the intuition could be redeemed philosophically if we acknowledged in general, the close and integral relations between four different notions –value, agency, intentionality, and self-knowledge, and in particular the irreducibly normative nature both of human agency and of the intentional states of human agents. Without such an acknowledgement, it is more plausible and more honest to concede (to those who are skeptical of the soundness of the intuition) that self-knowledge is not distinct, except in matters of degree, from these other forms of knowledge. The book begins with a characterization of two properties of intentional states which amount to the special character of self-knowledge. 1) Transparency, a property possessed by first order intentional states