{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.018975332068311195, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 4.733695652173913, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Moral Dilemmas and ‘Ought and Ought Not’

Although common sense and literature support the possibility of moral dilemmas, many traditional and contemporary philosophers deny this possibility because of several arguments. Probably the strongest argument against the possibility of moral dilemmas can be called the argument from ought and ought not. Various versions of this argument have been presented by McConnell, Hare, and Conee. Its basic form can be outlined as follows. If any agent is in any moral dilemma, then that agent ought to adopt each of two alternatives but cannot adopt both. If any agent ought to adopt any alternative, but that agent cannot adopt that alternative together with another alternative, then that agent ought not not to adopt that other alternative. Therefore, if any agent is in any moral dilemma, then that agent both ought and ought not to adopt each alternative. It is not possible that any agent both ought and ought not to adopt any alternative. Therefore, it is not possible for any agent to be in any moral dilemma.