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Two Meanings of ‘Attribute’ in Spinoza

Abstract: I argue that there are two meanings of ‘attribute’ for Spinoza. It can refer to 1) an essential feature of substance, or 2) a perception by the infinite intellect of such a feature. I put this forth as a reading of Spinoza’s definition of ‘attribute’ (E1d4), which is notoriously framed in terms of the perceptions of the intellect. The primary benefit of this reading is that it provides a uniquely powerful and much-needed answer to the puzzle of how the mentalistic character of E1d4 is consistent with a so-called ‘objectivist’ picture of Spinoza’s metaphysics and epistemology.