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Wittgenstein and the "Skeptical Paradoxes"

Saul Kripke (1982) reads out of Wittgenstein's later writings two skeptical paradoxes and a skeptical solution of each of them. A skeptical solution consists in " conceding that the sceptic's negative assertions are unanswer-able. Nevertheless our ordinary practice or belief is justified because— contrary appearances notwithstanding—it need not require the justification the sceptic has shown to be untenable " (p. 66). One paradox, discussed in chapters 1 and 2, is concerned with rule following, although Kripke notes on page 7 that it would apply equally well to all meaningful uses of language. The other paradox, discussed in the Postscript, is concerned with the ascription of mental states. I shall argue here that Wittgenstein intended no skeptical paradoxes or skeptical solutions; rather, he was attempting, successfully in my opinion, to clarify confusions which underlie the appearance of paradox. I shall refer only to the Wittgenstein of Philosophical Investigations (PI). There was sufficient evolution of his view from 1929 up to the writing of PI that it would be a mistake to interpret PI uncritically in the light of earlier writings (which, moreover, Wittgenstein did not choose to publish). 1 However, on the topics under discussion here, there is a clear doctrine in PI which does not essentially changed in subsequent writings, and I wish to consider only this. Unless otherwise stated, page references will be to Kripke's book and numbered section references to PI. 1 Kripke begins his discussion of the paradox concerning rule following with a quote from PI, section 201: This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made to accord with the rule. He writes that this is the paradox that he will develop (p. 7). The skeptical paradox, thus developed, is summed up on page 21: 198