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Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity

Perennial philosophical questions tend, from time to time, to cluster around generic themes, which reflect the philosophical curiosity of an era. Normativity seems to be one such theme when it comes to contemporary enquiries in practical philosophy. And yet, despite agreement on the focus, there is large diversity of opinion as to the scope and content of normativity. Roughly speaking, the various approaches can be grouped into two main streams. There are those who view normativity as expressing an ideal aspect: it is the property associated with all those standards that more or less prescribe how we should lead our lives. And there are those who take normativity to characterise our interaction with our (social and natural) environment, where interaction is taken to imply a reflective activity, that is, activity that unfolds in response to standards of judging, acting and feeling. Action that is reflective in this manner is standardly opposed to a reflex or mere reaction to stimuli from the environment. Joseph Raz, notwithstanding the details of his view, may be safely positioned within the second grouping of perspectives. Normativity, in his view, demarcates at the most fundamental level our position in the world and underwrites the different facets of our cognitive, practical and emotional negotiations with our environment.1 In a series of papers, which are due to be published as a book in December (2011) 2(2) Jurisprudence 329–331