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Socratic Euporia and Aporia in the Lysis

Abstract In the Lysis Socrates deals with the problem of what is a friend and what is friendship. After giving an introduction and a synopsis of the Lysis in section one, I explain, in section two, Socrates’ view that a true friend is “what is akin” or “what is belonging to oneself” (oikeion) which is what is taken from oneself and discovered in another person. When this happens among two persons, they become friends to each other. The content of what is akin is either a good characteristic or ways or form of the soul. Friendship is the desire for what is akin. In section three I show that Socrates remains in aporia while he faces several problems. Unless he is able to answer such problems, he will not be truly confident about what is a friend. In section four I deal with and refute Penner’s and Rowe’s view that a true friend means wisdom. In section five I examine the view of friendship which occurs among people who share common deficit. As a conclusion, in section six, I reflect on the significance of my interpretation and the role of the Lysis in Plato’s philosophy.