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Heidegger and the ‘Cartesian Brainwash’—Towards a Non-Individualistic Account of ‘Dasein’

Intentionality is usually taken to be a kind of solitary object-representation in the mind of individuals. To choose intentionality as a starting point of philosophical analysis therefore necessarily seems to lead to a rather undersocialized picture of our cognition and agency. It is a widely held opinion that it takes a radical "paradigm-shift" to correct this picture, a shift from intentionality to communication, 1 from representation to discursive practices,2 from the analysis of how mental phenomena "refer" to the world to the analysis of the normative social practices and institutions that make utterances count as expressions of intentions such as beliefs or plans for action. The paradigm shift in question is sometimes called the "intersubjectivist tum". This commendable correction of the under-socialized intentionalist picture of the mind, however, comes at a price. By reducing the ontological question of what there is to the question of the normative practices and institutions within which something counts as something, "Intersubjectivism" loses sight of the "objective side" of the problem the concept of intentionality is meant to solve. If our mind is not to be understood without taking notice of the social customs, norms, and institutions, it seems no less important to be aware of the fact that we criterially measure our cognitive or practical intentions not only by social propriety, but also by objective truth or instrumental success. Whereas the former is a question of social normativity, the latter is not. Put simply, social normativity thus does not account for all of our cognitive competence. In view of this dissatisfying alternative between an under-socialized and an over-socialized concept of mind, I find recent attempts not to discard intentionality but to accommodate sociality within a revised and widened theory of intentionality especially appealing. If we take intentionality to be a kind of solitary object-representation in the mind of individuals, this is the effect of what Annette Baier calls the "Cartesian Brainwash", the lasting effect of which can be seen even in current theories of "collective intentionality", "we-intentions", or "shared cooperative activity". Against all evidence, most of these theories try to stick to the assumptions of methodological individualismfor fear that intentions that are not intentions of single individuals must be intentions of some kind of a single "group mind" over and above the individual minds.