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Stop the Presses! Media freedom in authoritarian regimes: A case study of Ben Ali’s Tunisia

ABSTRACT Why did Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali introduce greater freedom of the press when he took power in Tunisia in 1987 only to start clawing back these new freedoms two years later? The article presents a general theory of such cases, arguing that dictators who face both powerful rivals within their governments and threats of social unrest are more likely than other authoritarian rulers to reduce restrictions on the news media. Freedom of the press acts as a commitment device, bolstering the credibility of the concessions that dictators in such circumstances—frequently new dictators—often promise to opposition groups. The article tests the theory on the case of Tunisia during Ben Ali’s first five years in office, from 1987 to 1992, detailing the threats he faced from inside and outside his government, and how he used press freedom to consolidate power while containing social unrest. Finally, the study shows how unforeseen political developments upended the bargain between Ben Ali and the opposition, leading to the end of Tunisia’s brief experiment with press freedom.