{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.019895287958115182, 'fraction_numerical': 0.004188481675392671, 'mean_word_length': 5.167741935483871, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Making Mistakes About One's “True” Self

Anderson-Shaw, Baslet, and Villano (2010) have rightfully pointed out the need for a more systematic approach in diagnosing and communicating to patients the effects of diseases and treatments on their identities. Their paper is a promising step toward establishing a sensible framework that can address issues of identity that are particularly prominent in cases of brain neoplasms as well as dementia. However, it utilizes a generalized account of personal identity that is actually quite controversial. Indeed, a different approach to the three cases cited could yield the result that only one resulted in a significant alteration of the “true” self—while all three involve mistakes patients and/or their families were making about the self and identity. A robust diagnostic tool must therefore be sensitive to the variety of philosophical outlooks on identity that may be held by patients and their loved ones.