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Surging into the Good War

This chapter details the thinking that eventually led to the surge. Obama’s patience waned while bureaucratic frictions and problems with the Karzai government continued to impede progress. U.S. departments and agencies continued to write and execute individual plans within bureaucratic silos, and there was no effort to develop with Afghan partners a coordinated strategy for the war or to address the misaligned aims and incentives. Additionally, the simultaneous announcement of a surge and withdrawal timeline limited both U.S. options and leverage.