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Reexamining Military Acquisition Reform: Are We There Yet?

Abstract : The Department of Defense (DoD) has a long history of seeking improvements in the way it goes about buying new weapon systems. In the past two decades alone, DoD has mounted two distinct movements that each carried the title "Acquisition Reform" (AR).' In the 1980s, reform efforts focused on reducing "waste, fraud, and abuse" in the system. In the 1990s, the emphasis shifted toward trying to make the acquisition process more responsive, effective, and efficient i.e., "faster, better, cheaper." Initiatives launched in the 1990s to support the latter goals included legislative changes to allow for more streamlined procurements, reductions in internal paperwork and required reviews, greater use of commercial practices, and expanded attempts to use the private sector to do more of the jobs traditionally done by government. DoD also sought ways to make it easier and more attractive for companies that previously had never worked for the DoD to begin pursuing military contracts; this was seen as a way to allow the military to tap into the expanded creativity and innovative prowess in developing and applying new technology that had come to the fore in the private sector, particularly in the 1990s.