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Counterinsurgency Scorecard Update: Afghanistan in Early 2015 Relative to Insurgencies Since World War Ii

Abstract : The RAND report Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies used detailed case studies of 71 insurgencies worldwide since World War II to identify correlates of success in counterinsurgency(COIN). One of the core findings of that effort was that historical governments scores on a scorecard of 15 good factors or practices minus 11 bad factors or practices corresponded with the outcomes of all of the 59 core cases considered.1 Those outcomes were either COIN win,which included cases in which the government unambiguously prevailed and cases in which the government had the better of a mixed outcome, or COIN loss, cases in which the insurgents clearly prevailed or had the better of a mixed outcome. Cases in which COIN forces were able to maximize the presence of good factors and minimize the presence of bad factors resulted in COIN force success. Specifically, cases with a good-minus-bad score of +2 or greater were always won by the government, and cases with a good-minus-bad score of 1 or lower were always won by the insurgents.2 The research found that all successful COIN forces have a scorecard score of at least +2 and that all successful COIN campaigns realized three specific factors: the disruption of tangible support to the insurgents, the demonstration of commitment and motivation on the part of both the government and COIN forces, and flexibility and adaptability on the part of COIN forces. The current research effort involved conducting an expert elicitation exercise to complete the scorecard for operations in Afghanistan as of early 2015 (when Afghan security forces were unambiguously the primary counterinsurgent actor, with some residual support from international partners). It is the third in a series of similar exercises to the scorecard for Afghanistan, with the previous two exercises completed in 2011 and 2013.3