{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.03008595988538682, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 4.97008547008547, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Recent Work on Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology and Ethics

Abstract Each of these books presents itself as rescuing Nietzsche from misinterpretation. Thus, Leiter wants to prevent Nietzsche from being “moralized” (i. e., read in a way that makes him sound like a contemporary moral philosopher); Stern wants to prevent Nietzsche from being iron-manned (i. e., read in a way that assumes his arguments must be invulnerable to critique); Alfano wants to correct what he sees as a tendency to misrepresent Nietzsche’s central concerns; and Ridley claims writers have been misled when thinking about Nietzsche on action. Alfano’s book is, to my mind, the most successful at achieving its stated aims; while I point out some potential oversights and some areas that could benefit from further development, Alfano’s book is both novel and important. Leiter’s book is clearly written and presents the arguments in an admirably forthright manner, but some of its conclusions are vitiated by lapses and mischaracterizations. Stern gets Nietzsche’s basic view right, but does not probe it very deeply and is too quick to present Nietzsche as confused; I see the confusions as emanating less from Nietzsche’s texts and more from Stern’s reading of them. Ridley’s book is original and provocative, but I find the central claim - that Nietzsche endorses an expressive account of action - ultimately unconvincing.