{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.015873015873015872, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.087719298245614, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The agency problem, investment decision, and optimal financial structure

This article constructs a real options model in which a firm has a privileged right to exercise an irreversible investment project with a stochastic payoff. Supposing that the investment costs are fully sunk, a firm that exercises the investment option after debt is in place will then choose a better state to exercise this option as it issues more bonds. This debt-overhang phenomenon, however, benefits the firm since waiting is itself valuable. Accordingly, the firm will both exercise the investment option later and issue more bonds as compared with a firm that issues bonds upon exercising the investment option.