{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.012601927353595256, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.75, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Environmental feedback promotes the evolution of cooperation in the structured populations.

Environment plays a vital role in individual decision-making. In the game process, employing the strategy of the opponent who behaves better is nontrivial for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation, in that such a behavior may assist the player in achieving higher personal interests and more competitive superiorities. Enlightened by this thought, a coevolutionary model where the mechanisms of dynamic environment and preference selection are introduced in the networked prisoner's dilemma game is considered. Individual preference selection is introduced in the strategy update process to probe how the preferences of the latent strategy sources interfere with individual behaviors. The environment defined in the model is not only heterogeneous, but also evolves with the evolution of individual strategies. Through conducting large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we draw a conclusion that the introduction of evolutionary environment-related preference selection is an effective promoter of cooperation even under a severe temptation. Our exploration indicates that the coevolutionary model may have a practical significance and provide a new insight into the analysis of the origin of cooperation in structured populations for further research.