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Strategic change in the Persian Gulf

Prior to the invasion of Iraq, all the states of the Persian Gulf had much to fear. Among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the prospect of a prolonged conflict carried the risks of diminished US credibility, a resurgence in the popularity of Saddam Hussein and social unrest. In fact, the smaller states of the northern and central Gulf have seen their strategic situations improve. They also stand to reap another important benefit - faster democratisation. Yet, despite the direct strategic advantages which the Iraq war has conferred on the Arab Gulf states, and the indirect benefits of political legitimisation and stability it has encouraged, there are still many dangers ahead.