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A Fault Resistant AES via Input-Output Differential Tables with DPA Awareness

Nowadays, hardware-based AES faces more than one type of Side-Channel-Attacks (SCA), such as the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack and the Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attack. However, most of the current DFA-resistant implementations of AES only focus on resisting the DFA attack but with minimal concurrent considerations on their DPA resistance capability. In this paper, we propose a fault resistant AES with DPA awareness. First, we evaluate the DPA resistance for different implementation architectures of AES before the implementation with S-Box over GF(24)2 is selected. Second, we evaluate the DPA resistance for different fault detection architectures before the concurrent fault detection method is selected. Third, we propose a novel fault resistant technique for AES using input-output differential tables over GF(24)2. We have performed tests based on Partial Guessing Entropy (PGE) to evaluate the DPA resistance for the existing DFA-resistant designs and our proposed design. Experimental results prove that our design has a slower convergence speed (around 33%) with a 100% fault coverage rate and less area than the existing countermeasure designs for fault injection. Results also show that the fault detection designs weaken their DPA resistance, which indicates the importance of co-design of DFA and DPA to achieve less power information leakage.