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Declared Choice: Citizen Strategies and Dual Commitment Problems in Clientelism

Scholars tend to view clientelism exclusively from the elite perspective, and thus fail to recognize the extent to which citizens act strategically. The elite-centric perspective also leads scholars to underestimate how opportunistic defection threatens citizens in clientelist linkages, when elite promises are not credible. A sharp distinction should be made between (1) prospective clientelist strategies, involving promises of post-election benefits, and (2) retrospective clientelist strategies, involving only pre-election benefits. Retrospective clientelism involves only a citizen commitment problem. By contrast, prospective clientelism involves a dual commitment problem - involving both citizens and elites - that is frequently overlooked. This paper introduces a form of prospective clientelism observed in Northeast Brazil, which I term “declared choice”. Even with ballot secrecy, a voter may choose to declare her support publicly before an election. If her declared choice wins, the voter may be favored. But if her declared choice loses, the voter may be disfavored. The voter may also choose to remain undeclared, a less risky strategy. This paper explores declared choice, focusing on voter strategies and dual commitment problems.