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Implicit Contracts with Heterogeneous Labor

The formation of implicit contracts in labor markets with heterogeneous employees is studied. If layoffs occur, the firm finds it optimal to offer differing contracts to differing employees, with employees who place a higher priority on leisure accepting contracts with higher layoff probabilities. The firm can do so without violating the constraint that employees voluntarily sort themselves into these contracts. Under plausible assumptions, the contracts match the empirical observation that relatively low wage rates and high unemployment probabilities tend to be correlated. Finally, an average or composite wage rate varies over states of nature, calling into question the ability of implicit contracts models to account for the constant, representative wage rate often found in macroeconomic models.