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India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs. Frankel Francine R.. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 232. $7.50.)

methods. Apart from one disagreement over the autonomy of Proletcult which reflected important differences about the relationship of bourgeois to proletarian culture, there were no serious conflicts of principle between Lenin and the Narkompros leaders. Lenin was more deeply concerned than they with creating an orderly administrative structure out of the anarchy which constantly threatened to engulf the Commissariat. But he consistently sided with Narkompros when it was attacked, defending its policies against pressures brought by the technical lobby which sought to replace broad general education with early specialization and to subordinate educational policy to the immediate tasks of economic reconstruction. Other studies have documented the progressive defeat of early revolutionary ideals both in education and in other realms. The failure of Narkompros to enlist popular participation and local initiative in education through a system of educational Soviets and the restoration of centralized bureaucratic control brought to nought the efforts of a generation of educational reformers, including Krupskaya herself. The partial abandonment of genuinely polytechnical education and the concessions to early specialization diluted earlier commitments. The consequences of the New Economic Policy were particularly serious for Narkompros, for the general retrenchment in governmental activity entailed the withdrawal of central financial responsibility for the educational budget, and therefore a loss of control over the implementation of a uniform educational program. The loss of central subsidies also resulted in the reintroduction of fees at all levels of the educational system, a defeat, however temporary, for efforts to achieve free and compulsory universal education. While the author chronicles these defeats in some detail, she also draws attention to small triumphs. In the midst of political chaos and general poverty, she argues, it was no small achievement to have maintained a policy of tolerance in the arts—defending the cultural heritage of the past along with opportunities for the vociferous avant-garde—nor to have respected the independence of science, nor to have defended the principle of universal general education despite concessions in practice. State subsidies for the arts and sciences necessarily entailed state supervision, for the central problem was patronage rather than freedom. But Lunacharsky, and Lenin with him, are credited with resisting pressures to use this power to interfere or to intimidate. This balance sheet of achievements and disappointments implicitly suggests that the general economic situation and the personal roles and values of key figures are the decisive explanatory factors. It reflects the absence of a broader analytical framework for examining the interaction of conflicting pressures and priorities in the context of the developing decision-making institutions, and for evaluating the outcomes from this perspective. The study is nonetheless a most welcome contribution to the literature of the early Soviet period, and offers rich materials for more theoretical and comparative analyses of social and political change.