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Litigant Self-Representation I: The Fate of Defendants Who Represent Themselves in Court

The Supreme Court of the United States held in Indiana v. Edwards (2008) that states may limit the self-representation rights of criminal defendants with mental illness when such persons are incapable of acting effectively as their own counsel. This article—the first of two by the authors on this topic—reviews the ramifications of the Edwards decision in terms of the fate of criminal defendants who are allowed to represent themselves in court, and substantiates the need to develop operational schemata that courts, attorneys, and forensic mental health experts can utilize in assessing relevant competencies.