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How Should States Own? Heinisch v. Germany and the Emergence of Human Rights-Sensitive State Ownership Function

State ownership is thriving. Emerging economies are extending their growing economic power outward through sovereign wealth funds. State-owned multinationals have become top sources of foreign direct investment. Bailouts have recreated powerful state ownership structures in regions where private ownership has traditionally prevailed. The state is back � in shareholder capacity. Approaching the rise of state ownership from a human rights perspective, this article submits that a new conceptualization of state ownership function is emerging. State ownership provides a strong link connecting corporate actions with the international human rights system. Yet the conventional methods used to integrate state ownership in human rights treaty bodies� discretion seem unable to grasp the changing economic role of governments in the global economy. The article suggests that the notion of the �public shareholder�, introduced by the European Court of Human Rights in Heinisch v. Germany (2011), provides a useful lens for interrogating how states should govern the human rights performance of corporations through ownership. When exposed to the recent practice of a range of United Nations treaty bodies, internationalizing state ownership activity becomes framed in human rights terms. In this vision, the whole ownership function becomes a site for turning companies in the state�s portfolio into responsible corporate citizens who take the impact of human rights seriously. Specifically, treaty bodies should advise states to seek human rights governance through private mechanisms in the capacity of the shareholder. In the process, human rights� checks and balances should constitute a counterweight for market-based initiatives that regulate state activity in the capacity of the shareholder.