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Control and Campaigns

Between December 1950 and July 1951, the PLA helped the PAVN establish four more divisions by rearming and training them in China, including the 316th, 320th, and 325th Infantry Divisions and 351st Heavy (Artillery/Engineering) Division. By the summer of 1951, the PAVN had 200,000 regular troops. Chapter 4 reveals that the Viet Minh high command did not intend to remain in the remote, less-populated mountainous region with a backward economy after their victory in the Border Campaign. Instead, they were ready to move south from the border region into the Red River Delta, the rice bowl of North Vietnam. Ignoring Chinese warnings, Giap planned a “general counteroffensive” for the final victory in 1950–1951. This chapter examines his three offensive campaigns at Vinh Yen, Mao Khe, and the Day River, from December 1950 through June 1951, and explores the disagreements and miscalculations made by the Chinese advisors.