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Means, Ends, and Persons: The Meaning and Psychological Dimensions of Kant's Humanity Formula, by Robert Audi

Audi seeks to develop an ethics of conduct that focuses on treating persons as ends and not as mere means. While this approach has its roots in Kant’s ethics, Audi seeks to develop it independently of Kant. We treat others merely as a means when we treat them as having only an instrumental value as a means to our end and we are not disposed to treat them differently. For example, I stop to ask a person for directions. I treat her, like a map, only as an instrument to my end. But after fulfilling her role as a means, she starts to choke. If I am disposed to help her, I have used her solely as a means. If I am not so disposed, I have used her merely as a means. This is prima facie wrong, since I thereby treat the good of this person as having only an instrumental worth. We treat others as ends by caring about their good for its own sake in act, motive, and manner. When a mother feeds her baby out of love and with care, she treats her baby as an end. Whereas a mother who feeds her baby hurriedly, in order to get some quiet, fails to treat her baby as an end, since she performs the right act-type but her motive and manner are instrumental. Failing to treat others as an end is not, however, always prima facie wrong. Two points of difference with Kant are worth noting. First, Kant focuses on treating persons as rational agents whose possible consent must always be sought. In contrast, Audi focuses on treating persons as having an objective good about which we should care. While for Audi a person’s consent plays an important part in determining a person’s good, it does not completely determine this in the way that it does for (some) Kantians. This raises problems for Audi in regards to paternalism, problems that Kantians can avoid. Second, Kantians focus on respect for dignity as a rational motive on which we can (if we are rational) always act. Audi, in contrast, relies on motives that may or may not be present, such as love for others. When we lack such motives we can’t treat others as ends, and so for Audi moral worth is not the ever-present possibility that it is for Kantians.