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Markets, Transaction Costs and Institutions: Compensating for Nuclear Risk in Japan

This article explores the nature, role and effectiveness of compensation mechanisms in managing the political constraints to the siting or development of nuclear projects in Japan. Statistical analysis reveals that the relationship between compensation and income is a key dynamic characterising the history of the marketplace for nuclear facilities in Japan. The commodification and trading of risks for benefits is governed by a sophisticated institutional and policy framework which acts to lower the transaction costs of market exchange. The interaction between the market and the institutional dynamic has generated a curious pattern of both NIMBY ('not in my backyard') and YIMBY ('yes, in my backyard') responses to nuclear development in Japan.