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Tocqueville, Collingwood, History and Extending the Moral Community

No one in the English-speaking world has done more to establish the autonomy and validity of history as a form of knowledge, integral to our self-understanding, both individually and collectively, and to our understanding of others, whether they are distant in time and mental outlook, or contemporary but nevertheless different, than R. G. Collingwood. Indeed, it has recently been said that he set the agenda for all Anglophone post-war discussion of problems in the philosophy of history. This is a somewhat modest assessment of his impact because it ignores the extent to which he also had a profound influence on the intellectual giants of the continental hermeneutic tradition, Bultmann, Gadamer, Pannenberg, Lonergan and Ricoeur. In this article I explore the extent to which Collingwood advances our understanding of the process by which the moral community can be extended to embrace common principles such as fundamental human rights, while respecting human differences and cultural identities quite different from our own. I argue that in addressing these questions he explicitly rejected relativism, without subscribing to the Hegelian notion of an objective rationality.