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Power and Policy in Transition (review)

Though primarily a battlefield history, Captain Shelby L. Stanton's The Rise and Fall ofan American Army: U.S. Ground Forces in Vietnam, 1965 1973 also addresses the link between domestic ideology and institutions and battlefield performance. His recountings of actual unit performance in combat reinforce Cohen's observations: The method by which the nation raised and replenished its forces determined the outcome on the battlefield far more than is commonly recognized. Like Cohen, Shelby reveals the detrimental effects of the individual rotation system on unit cohesion, leadership cadres, and fighting effectiveness. The various engagements documented herein are convincing evidence of the oft-heard observation that America did not fight in Vietnam for ten years, but one year ten times over. Given the nation's failure to mobilize reserves and the inequalities of the Selective Service System— all ordained by the nation's ideology and political institutions — the outlook was dim from the start. Cohen points to the successful but savage pacification program in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War as a model of how to wage limited war. Fought by a small elite army— 11,000 out of 14,000 volunteers were rejected— this campaign did not generate large-scale domestic protests despite opposition within the government and press establishment. As Cohen demonstrates, however, given present geopolitical requirements for a mass army and domestic concepts of volunteerism and egalitarianism, the small army optimal for such campaigns is not feasible.