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Imbalance Pricing Methodology in Belgium: Implications for Industrial Consumers

The imbalance settlement procedure is an important part of the electricity system. A financial incentive ensures that Balance Responsible Parties (BRPs) help to balance the grid. A European Guideline on Electricity Balancing (EBGL) strives at implementing a full single imbalance pricing methodology for imbalance markets in Europe. In this work the implications on industrial consumers are investigated. It is shown that when a single imbalance pricing methodology is implemented, no financial incentives exists to keep a balanced position in the BRP portfolio. Over or under nomination is shown to be only interesting when a significant difference exists between the imbalance price and the electricity sourcing price. Under the EBGL guideline it is strived at to value electricity as close-to-real-time as possible, sourcing electricity on the Day Ahead Market (DAM) would thus result in only minor differences to the imbalances prices. The recent updated rules on the Belgian imbalance settlement procedure incentivise even more the real-time steering of power to support the overall SI. It is discussed that only specific industrial processes are able to valorise their flexibility in an imbalance market with such a single imbalance pricing methodology. Others are only fit to be scheduled and not controlled in real-time.