{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.01691542288557214, 'fraction_numerical': 0.007960199004975124, 'mean_word_length': 5.171779141104294, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Officers of the US Army Venture into Research, 1840–60

Abstract The engineering skills taught at the West Point military academy in the mid-nineteenth century left officers of the US Army’s scientific corps ill-prepared for the research they would undertake when assigned to design large cast-iron cannon and control of floods on the Mississippi River. They succeeded where close observation and qualitative reasoning sufficed; had difficulty where the necessary principles in mechanics, hydrology and geology were not yet in textbooks; and lacked adequate means of testing their designs. Massive amounts of partially analysed data in their reports obscured critical omissions. The river research led to flood control with a levees-only scheme that proved difficult to revise even after disastrous floods. The iron research delayed adoption of steel artillery. A few 20-inch bore cannon were successfully cast for coast defence but could neither be loaded nor trained rapidly enough to be useful weapons.