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Regulating Human Enhancement: Things Can Only Get Better?

Is there any reason to object on moral grounds to technologies of human enhancement— for example, to enhanced intelligence, enhanced strength, enhanced height or sight, and the like? Famously, John Harris has argued that ‘not only are [such] enhancements permissible but ... in some cases there is a positive moral duty to enhance’.1 In a memorable passage, Harris relies on one of his favourite persuasive examples. Having observed that those readers who use spectacles are relying on an enhancement technology (albeit one that is restorative or corrective), Harris continues: