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Foreword: Responding to the Threat

Since the profound shock waves generated by the events of 11 September (‘9/11’), governments and the public have essentially been reacting to threats and acts of terrorism. Whether there is the promulgation of a new color-coded threat level or a call for a global response to the latest acts of carnage, the mass audience often rides an emotional roller coaster characterized by chronic unstated fears of what could happen or by anger and intimidation after a particularly massive or graphic incident of terrorism. Governments in turn reflect the public mood and engage in heated rhetoric and establish commissions addressing what should have been done to prevent the carnage. In the cycle of underand over-reaction, the official focus is primarily on ‘crisis management’, ‘consequence management’, and other techniques that address the response to incidents and these often take precedence over the need to develop long-term policies associated with strategies against adversaries who have long-term and often violent political and criminal agendas. Internationally, regionally and domestically, and locally, authorities are primarily concerned with either ‘putting out fires’ or taking the precautions necessary to prevent an immediate threat. The focus on measures to counter a current threat is, of course, vital but until the often-fragmented counterterrorism community is engaged in strategic assessment and adopts a ‘look over the horizon mentality’, governments will essentially pursue short-term tactical reactions to what is ultimately a long-term, offensive, strategic threat. Such an assessment is not a luxury that can only take place in the relative quiet of academia. It is imperative that, despite the daily pressures policy makers and those in the operational arena face, they engage in a longer-term evaluation of future trends in line with the changing nature of terrorism and, more specifically, the intentions, capabilities and goals of those who have taken the initiative in their assault on the civil order. A failure to take the long-term offensive will continue to place authorities in an often ad hoc defensive and reactive position based on short-term requirements instead of long-term vision. The editor of this volume has brought together an impressive group of contributors with academic, policy and operational experience. Each one