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UNIVERSAL CAPACITY TO GENERALISE LEGAL PRINCIPLES BY COMBINING REASON, LOGIC, MORALS AND THEIR COUNTERPARTS

Abstract This paper addresses a generalisation of legal principles through people's cognitive capacities. Although these principles are apparently formed by combining logic, reason and morals, their counterparts are also present. Only this combination does truly represent an everyday tool for evaluation and implementation of legislation. If the greatest advantage of the clearly stated laws and reasons is legitimacy of public power, legislators must satisfy public compliance with law not through state's power but through people's judgements. The latter are formed ex automata, regardless of what legislators prescribe as law or what they think is rational. Formal laws must have the inner and outer consistency with the main public values, principles, and people's affections as well as reflections. The legitimacy of legal principles is based on their being accepted as a platform of (ir)rational relations on which the legal orders run.