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Military Power and the Capabilities-Utility Gap: Lessons of the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War

In recent years, an emerging pattern in the use of military force has become apparent: though the capability gap between advanced powers and non-state and insurgent actors has increased, the efficacy of achieving strategic goals with this power has decreased. To name a few, the United States, Israel, and Ethiopia have used overwhelming military power to achieve their goals in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Somalia. Yet, in each case, the result has been an inability to restore order, remove insurgent or terrorist forces, and establish responsive governments. What explains the inability of these stronger states to transform their power into outcomes? This paper explores this capability-increase/result-decrease dynamic and address its causes.Using George Kennan’s analytic framework of flaws in execution versus flaws in concept, we examine whether the inability to achieve these strategic goals with military force is a function of poor execution or inherent limits on hard, preponderant power. To the extent it is the former, this portends a focus on military reform and tactical adjustment, whereas if the latter, it suggests the need to rely more heavily on other forms of coercive diplomacy. We test these competing explanations using a representative case: Israeli’s use of force against Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Providing a net assessment of short, medium and long-term effects of the war, we find that though the Israeli Defense Forces did achieve limited successes, its inability to inflict long-term damage on Hezbollah decreased its overall level of deterrence vis-a-vis non-state actors. Using empirical data on combat operations as well as extensive accounts of the Israeli leadership’s decision-making processes, we conclude that though the IDF could have improved its operations on the margins, the Israeli leadership’s failure to consider Hezbollah’s response and international constraints complicating conflict escalation ultimately prevented Israel from achieving its goals of weakening Hezbollah and re-establishing its deterrent. These constraints, including international public opinion and the difficulty in waging a restricted war against an unrestricted enemy, are not limited to the Israeli case, but are rather key characteristics of many recent asymmetric military operations. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings, focusing on the need to re-balance the use of force and diplomacy to achieve strategic goals.