{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.015246015246015246, 'fraction_numerical': 0.002772002772002772, 'mean_word_length': 5.53393665158371, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
A Probabilistic Justification of the Combining Calculus under the Uniform Scheduler Assumption

The combining calculus [MSK07] provides a framework for analyzing the information flow of multi-threaded programs. The calculus incorporates so called plug-in rules for integrating several previously existing analysis techniques. By applying a plug-in rule to a subprogram, one decides to analyze this subprogram with the given analysis technique, and not with the rules of the combining calculus. The novelty of the combining calculus was that one can analyze the information flow security of a given program by using multiple analysis techniques in combination. It was demonstrated that this flexibility leads to a more precise analysis, allowing one to successfully verify the security of some programs that cannot be verified with any of the existing analysis techniques in isolation. In [MSK07], the soundness of the combining calculus is proved for a possibilistic characterization of information flow security. This characterization assumes a purely nondeterministic scheduling of concurrent threads. In this report, we demonstrate that the combining calculus is also sound for a probabilistic characterization of security that assumes a uniform scheduler. This result further increases the confidence in the combining calculus as a reliable and flexible tool for formally analyzing the information flow security of multi-threaded programs.