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Conventionalism in Constitutional Interpretation and the Place of Administrative Agencies

This essay considers judicial independence, both as a legal and constitutional feature, and how states should seek to protect it. This essay posits that judicial independence is a universal constitutional requirement at both the federal and state levels, examining these ideas in the context of interbranch review and federal expectations of state judicial review. Further, this essay examines the limits of judicial restraint—either reflexive deference to other branches’ political decision-making or shrinking from unpopular judgments that advance constitutional rights—as strategies to protect judicial independence. It concludes that a state judiciary’s most self-protective stance is one of principled adherence to the law.