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Efficiency of mass privatization and government-led restructuring : Owner vs . seller effects on performance of companies in Slovenia

A new approach for studying the key policy choice in transitional economies between rapid mass privatization and continued state ownership with gradual privatization is developed by separating the owner and the seller effects on performance of companies. It is proposed that companies temporary owned by mass privatization institutions should be compared with non-privatized companies and companies sold by mass privatization institution with companies privatized by the government in a standard way. For Slovenia, we demonstrate that mass privatization institutions are better temporary owners and better sellers to strategic investors than the government and its institutions. Companies owned/sold by mass privatization institutions experience better economic performance in comparison to companies owned/sold by the government. Both static and dynamic versions of TFP model were studied, with simultaneity and heterogeneity problems explicitly controlled for using Sys-GMM approach to panel data. The issue of simultaneity between company performance and chosen privatization methods as well as the panel selection bias were explicitly controlled for using the Heckman two-step method.