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The structure of the economic policy-making institutions in Korea and the strategic role of the Economic Planning Board (EPB)

This article seeks to analyze the institutional structure within which the Korean state has played the strategic developmental role, with a focus on its unique configuration of the economic policymaking institutions and the pattern of interactions it produced. After briefly describing the institutional characteristics of the economic policy-making in Korea with special reference to its strategic responses to the changing political-economic conditions, it analyzes why the Economic Planning Board (EPB) has occupied a preeminent place in the economic policy-making apparatus in Korea. Identifying the institutional autonomy and the consequent institutional flexibility as the key characteristics of the EPB, this article explains logically how the EPB has been strategically placed in selecting and changing economic policies at particular times and how the EPB has come to be viewed as the leading institution reflecting the politico-economic visions of the political leaders. While emphasizing the distinctive identity and competence of the EPB, this article warns against the recent tendency of the EPB to ever expand its jurisdiction and of the President to lodge a wide variety of operating responsibilities in the EPB. It finally suggests the ways in which the strategic role and distinctive competence of the EPB can be best preserved.