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Book Review: Liberating Conscience: Feminist Explorations in Catholic Moral Theology

application. This has the advantage of "permitting recognition of new elements that may be morally relevant in certain cases, factors recognized by no theory yet developed" (9). As commonly shared human intuitions suggest, even slight differences in cases can sometimes make a large moral difference. Parts of this work suffer somewhat from overfamiliarity, as they do little more than restate the traditional cries of deontologists: the lightness of acts depends upon more than quantifiable outcomes; humans are not to be treated merely as means towards ends (however noble); and killing and 'letting die" are not uniformly morally equivalent. However, the final third of the book introduces much intriguing and original material, including a consideration of the relative merits of agent-relative, agent-focused, and victim-focused approaches to lifeand-death moral dilemmas. K. takes up these matters while evaluating the importance of prior agreements, prerogatives, personal sovereignty, special obligations, and supererogation. Should I stop to rescue a drowning person if it means breaking a luncheon date? Should the president of a nation expose herself to grave risk of death if it benefits someone else only marginally? Only by first considering such cases as these may we justify principles adequate to more general ethical practice. Within the context of her essential non-consequentialism, K. makes some noteworthy concessions to social utility, especially when she takes up concerns about the human rights of potential victims of threatening forces. Thus she proposes a quite balanced picture of the moral life, wisely refusing to collapse all arguments about preserving lives and other values to a single variable. One of the great strengths of this work is its recognition of the impossibility of measuring right actions on a single scale, whether that scale is the maintenance of human rights (understood as "trumps"), the maximization of happiness, or even the preservation of the greatest possible number of lives.