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Autocratic Responses to Revolutionary Threats

Revolution can only occur when a sufficient number of citizens coordinate, reaching a critical threshold or “tipping point.” To prevent coordination and thus deter revolution, autocrats can use domestic measures (cooptation, repression) and diversionary foreign policy. We develop a global games model of revolutionary threats that incorporates both types of policy instruments. We provide conditions under which domestic and foreign policies serve as substitutes or complements, and the consequences for collective action problems and the likelihood of revolution. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the relationship between revolutionary threats and policy responses may be non-monotonic, whereby smaller threats provide stronger incentives for autocrats to pursue preemption. We argue that this insight helps to resolve contradictory findings in the empirical literature.