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Shareholder value in an adverse environment: the German case

The German political economy has often been cited as a classical case of non-shareholder value orientation. Its productionist, long-term, consensus orientation has often been contrasted with the 'Anglo-Saxon approach'. The influence of shareholders who press for shareholder value and the importance of the equity market have traditionally been low. But there are signs of change. In this article we describe some of these changes and try to assess the dynamics of this change process. First we show that the limited role of the equity market for company financing and for private household savings still provides a very narrow base for a shareholder value economy in Germany. The central pillars of the German system of corporate governance - the dominating role of banks, the system of co-determination and the company centred management system - are not crumbling. Change in the direction of shareholder value is therefore limited.