{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.026970954356846474, 'fraction_numerical': 0.006816834617664493, 'mean_word_length': 4.879790940766551, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
International Phenomenological Society Infallibilism and Gettier ' s Legacy

Infallibilism is the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false. In this essay we assess three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism, arguments that do not depend on a prior commitment to some substantive theory of warrant. Three premises, one from each argument, are most significant: (1) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved; (2) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief; (3) if a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. We argue that each of these is either false or no more plausible than its denial. Along the way, we offer a solution to the Gettier Problem that is compatible with fallibilism. Mere true belief is not knowledge. Warrant is that, whatever precisely it is, (enough of which) makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. We will call the view that a belief cannot be at once warranted and false ‘infallibilism’ and we will call the view that a belief can be at once warranted and false ‘fallibilism’. One might argue for infallibilism in the following way: the property of being warranted is identical with a certain property described and defended by a particular substantive theory of warrant; a belief cannot have that property unless it is true; so a belief cannot be at once warranted and false—warrant entails truth. This sort of argument for infallibilism requires one to buy into whatever particular substantive theory of warrant is put forward in the first premise. Infallibilists would be better advised to argue for infallibilism in a way that did not require one to affirm some substantive theory of warrant, in a way that was compelling independently of any commitment to a substantive theory—a nonpartisan argument for infallibilism if you will. Infallibilists have done this. We have identified three nonpartisan arguments for infallibilism in the recent literature. Here are their first premises, respectively: • If a belief can be at once warranted and false, then the Gettier Problem cannot be solved. • If a belief can be at once warranted and false, then its warrant can be transferred to an accidentally true belief. • If a belief can be at once warranted and false, then it can be warranted and accidentally true. Add to each the denial of the consequent, and infallibilism follows. We accept the second premise of each argument; however, each of the three first premises is either false or no more plausible than its denial. If we are right, then infallibilists laudably imbued with the spirit of nonpartisanship must look elsewhere to meet their nonpartisan aims. 1. The First Nonpartisan Argument: the Gettier Problem and Infallibilism The first nonpartisan argument goes like this: 1 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3. We’ll let the parenthetical qualification remain implicit throughout. 2 These words have other uses, but there are no more apt terms and there is some precedence for our use. See Trenton Merricks, "Warrant Entails Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995), and "More on Warrant's Entailing Truth," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997).