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Double Auction Mechanisms on Markovian Networks

This paper studies the double auction (DA) mechanism in Ma and Li (2011) for a class of exchange economies. We extend their results to more general cases where sellers and buyers each form a complex time non-homogeneous Markovian chain, as specified in Ram et al. (2009), in the communication of their private information. A numerical example is also provided. Both bubbles and crashes are observed in the example, consistent with results of our theorems. Our example and theoretical results provide new evidence that a DA mechanism, widely utilized in real exchange markets, may contribute to the excess volatility identified in Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981).