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Hume on What There Is

This paper argues that a neglected, in fact a barely noticed, concept in 
Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature plays a crucial role in understanding 
his philosophy. The crucial concept arises in connection with the difficulty 
that Hume encounters in referring to the “external world.” Indeed, as Quine 
observes concerning Hume, if all that can be thought are our own ideas and 
impressions (viz. perceptions), then it is unclear how we can possibly think of 
objects that are not our own ideas and impressions. Hume writes: The farthest we can go toward a conception of external objects, when supposed 
specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of 
them, without pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking, 
we do not suppose them specifically different; only attribute to them different 
relations, connections and durations (Hume, 17401, 1, 2, 6.19, 20 p. 49). The first purpose of this paper is to 
explain what Hume means by “relative ideas.” The second purpose is to explain 
their importance in Hume’s ontology, that is, his understanding of what there 
is. The third purpose is to consider Quine’s argument against Hume in his 
seminal paper “On What There Is.” Finally, the fourth purpose of the paper is 
to assess the role of relative ideas and in particular the relative idea of 
external existence in Hume’s ontology.