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Frames and the Man: Rethinking the President's Power to Shape News Coverage in the Post-Cold War Era

As scholars of mass communication pondered over the last 40 years why American news coverage of foreign policy took the form it did, one clear point of consensus emerged: Journalists were heavily dependent on public officials to supply the raw material for the news, and this dependency transferred a large amount of control over news framing to the very officials that journalists sought to hold accountable. Two main theories were developed to account for this apparent lack of journalistic autonomy. The first explained that elites tended to express solidarity over first principles in matters of foreign policy regardless of minor disagreements over how those principles should be acted upon (the hegemony model, associated with the work of Hallin and Chomsky, among others). The second proposed that critical news coverage of governmental actions would tend to appear only in those rare moments when officials in Washington were publicly and vocally divided on core issues (the indexing model, associated with the work of Bennett and others). However, the world in which these standard theories were developed has undergone dramatic change, and the assumptions on which they were premised no longer can be taken for granted. With the demise of the Cold War paradigm for interpreting U.S. actions abroad, officials and citizens today are more divided on first principles than they used to be. Iournalists have become more critical in their reporting of foreign policy, and elite dissensus is no longer required for triggering oppositional framings of American actions overseas. Moreover, neither the hegemony nor the indexing account leave much room for independent influence by public opinion, which seems today an important resource for silencing elite opposition to the president's use of American power abroad.