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Combating Jamming in Wireless Networks: A Bayesian Game with Jammer’s Channel Uncertainty

Due to the shared and open-access nature of the wireless medium, wireless networks are vulnerable to jamming attacks. In this paper we study the problem of resource assigning in a single carrier communication system, where a user is communicating with a destination in the presence of a jammer. The jammer’s channel to the destination is assumed flat fading, and its gain is known in probabilistic terms. In particular, the jammer’s channel gain could take any value out of a finite set, with an a priori known probability. We model the problem in a Bayesian jamming game framework with utility the user throughput. We prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, and derive the equilibrium strategies in closed form. Our theoretical results, also supported by simulations, suggest that the Nash strategy is more sensitive to varying a priori probabilities, as compared to the Stackelberg strategy.