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Are Industrial Policy and Corporatism Compatible?

ABSTRACT As intense international competition along with rapidly changing product markets and technology have come to dominate the economic environment for firms, industries, and nations, government pursuit of a coordinated, proactive industrial policy has increasingly been viewed as a key to national economic success. Owing largely to its utility in generating consensus-formation, corporatist concertation has been suggested by a number of commentators as an ideal mechanism for implementing industrial policies. However, the legitimacy of corporatism as a mode of interest intermediation rests on the capacity of interest group representatives to win benefits for all their members, while industrial policy decisions are by nature selective or discriminatory. This feature of industrial policy casts doubts upon its compatibility with corporatism. The postwar policy-making experiences of Japan, Sweden, and West Germany support this skepticism.