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What Doesn’t Kill us Makes us Stronger: An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Policy

We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under conditions of Bertrand competition with differentiated products. This model is then used to analyse the effects of ”Leniency Policy” on the cartel. We find that in some market situations introducing Leniency Policy causes the cartel to cease to be viable and competition results. However, in other cases the policy only serves to raise cartel prices and profits. This latter result seems to occur in precisely those circumstances where cartels are most damaging.