{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02286902286902287, 'fraction_numerical': 0.001386001386001386, 'mean_word_length': 5.389380530973451, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Copyrightable functions and patentable speech

by features that defy classification within established legal doctrines. In particular, areas of the law that rely on distinctions between the “functional” and the “expressive” have found software problematic. In this article, I briefly describe the areas of law in which this problem is most pressing, sketch how these problems have migrated across legal domains, and indicate the path legal controversy attending software seems likely to take, especially in patent law. The picture that emerges is one of continuing legal controversy regarding software within the law of copyright, patent, and free speech, as well as a blurring among these areas as they are stretched to accommodate this chimeric technology. For more than 20 years, copyright has been the primary mode of intellectual property protection for software in the U.S. and in much of the rest of the world. Copyright covers original works of authorship, including literary works, dramatic works, audiovisual works, musical compositions, audio recordings, pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, choreographic works, and even architectural works. A copyright arises whenever original expression is fixed for some substantial duration in a tangible medium of expression. This act of fixing original expression gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute copies of the work, as well as to adapt, publicly