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Conversations About Type : Privacy , Grammars and Taboos

We provide a model in which two strategic agents exchange verifiable information about their traits in order to determine if they have matching types, but the agents also have a preference to reveal as little information as possible if they do not match. For example entrepreneurs need to reveal their business concepts to venture capital firms to raise funding, and firms considering a merger need to reveal information to determine if the deal is profitable. Our main model focuses on multi-stage conversations about type in which agents use the dynamic nature of the conversation to screen out nonmatching types over time, thereby reducing the amount of information revealed to these types. While there are many equilibria of this game, we identify a unique sender-optimal equilibrium in which all senders prefer to reveal one trait at a time in increasing order of importance. We show that if the agents’ preferences for privacy are sufficiently strong, equilibria in which all types participate may fail to exist. In this case, there are equilibria in which certain traits are taboo and not discussed. We provide examples of equilibria with taboos and argue that traits that are rare and sensitive are more likely to be subject to taboos. Finally, we discuss extensions such as allowing nonverifiable messages, mediated conversations, alternate privacy preferences, and unstructured conversations.