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THE PLA ’ S EVOLVING CAMPAIGN DOCTRINE AND STRATEGIES

China’s military planners like to claim that in overall terms, the PLA is technologically inferior if compared with its potential adversaries. Such inferiority will continue in the foreseeable future, even though the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made some progress in modernizing its weaponry in recent years. On the other hand, the strategic principles of the PLA have undergone a major shift since the mid-1980s. Eschewing the traditional emphasis on “victory through inferiority over superiority (yilue shengyou),” one new principle stresses “victory through superiority over inferiority (yiyou shenglue).”2 The contradiction between the technological inferiority of the PLA and the requirement of the PLA to achieve superiority over potential adversaries begs an important question: What are the PLA’s strategies that may turn PLA absolute inferiority to local and temporary superiority?