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George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950

When George C. Marshall, the organizer of victory as US Army Chief of Staff during World War II, became Secretary of State in January 1947, he faced not only a staggering array of serious foreign policy questions but also a US State Department rendered ineffective by neglect, maladministration and low morale. Soon after his arrival, Marshall asked George F. Kennan to head a new component in the Department's structure - the Policy Planning Staff. In this work, the author scrutinizes Kennan's subsequent influence over foreign policy-making during the crucial years from 1947 to 1950. Despite the amount of literature on the origins of the Cold War, this study casts new light on American foreign policy during the Truman administration, showing how policies actually came about. It covers the wider spectrum of discussion and decision within the State Department and beyond. Miscamble argues that American foreign policy from 1947 to 1950 was not simply a working out of a clearly delineated strategy of containment. Far from dictating policies, the "containment" doctrine was actually formed in a piecemeal and pragmatic manner.