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A Critique of Models of Religious Experience

The Edwards and Lowis (this issue) critique and revision of the Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis (1993) model of religious experience is critiqued on the following major grounds: (a) It fails to circumscribe the topic adequately and relies on extreme cases and exceptional figures (e.g., Moses, Siddhartha) to illustrate religious experience while failing to consider seriously the appropriateness and effect of using such extreme examplars; (b) it fails to sufficiently accommodate more ordinary religious experiences of ordinary people and children; (c) it fails to account for empirical evidence indicating that many religious experiences do not have stage-like qualities, are not preceded by any moral tension or existential crisis, and are not resolved with any "new vision" or lasting impact; (d) it fails to consider the hermeneutic complexities of narrative epistemology within the individuals who recreate and report on their experiences and the psychologists who strive to interpret and understand those experiences; and (e) it fails to address whether this is a model of religious experience or development. In light of these and other deficiencies, the Edwards and Lowis model suffers from limited phenomenological adequacy, though it should be noted that the model's predecessor (Batson et al., 1993) shared these shortcomings.