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Japan's Public Policy Companies.

As Lins has carefully documented, Omoto was ideologically inconsistent, criticizing the status quo while supporting nationalistic goals, emphasizing a universal brotherhood of men while maintaining a chauvinistic ethnocentrism. Onisaburo had his missionaries in Europe preach the harmony of East and West, but by 1932 the Paris mission was abandoned and emphasis shifted to the Manchurian mission that supported the struggle of Asians against Europeans. The combination of traditional notions of social solidarity (or kyodotai) with bits and pieces of internationalist thought had curious results. The notion of a Japanese "family state system" as the basis for a world state system where all would live in spiritual harmony (instead of selfish materialism) eventually meant uncritical support for Japanese expansionism in Manchuria. Lins describes the involvement of other movements and figures (such as Kita Ikki) in Omoto affairs, comparing and contrasting Omoto with other movements of the time. One salient point is that Omoto favored an improvement of the familystate through inner purification and gradual change, rather than through violence and overtly revolutionary means. Omoto was also explicitly a mass movement, while some revolutionary groups were relatively small and sought immediate change "from above." Today, hindsight might lead us to conclude that Omoto was more of a support than a threat to the Japanese state of the 1920s and 1930s, but its suppression was meant to be a lesson to all groups—especially ultra-rightists—that they could not take the initiative in advocating radical change. Lins closes his work by comparing Omoto with the Chinese Taiping movement and the Korean Tonghak (later Chondogyo) movement, concluding that the term "nativistic" is more appropriate for Omoto than "chiliastic." He cautions the reader, however, not to assume that Western definitions of terms such as "nationalism" or "fascism" can be used in Japan without modification. Lins argues that most Japanese people had limited expectations of the modernization process, and were mobilized by blind faith in leaders who borrowed mythical and irrational elements. He concludes that "Die Entstehung der Omoto-Bewegung war eine Reaktion auf den Einbruch der westlichen Technologie in das Japan der Meiji-Zeit, der in den Lebensgewohnheiten des Volkes gewaltige Veranderungen bewirkte und fur breite Schichten schwere psychologische Anpassungs-probleme mit sich brachte" (The origin of Omoto was a reaction to the invasion of Meiji Japan by Western technology, which brought about massive changes in the lifelong habits of the populace and brought with it severe problems of adaptation for broad segments of society), p. 250. One need not find this "anomie" argument a sufficient interpretation for the rise of Omoto; there is enough raw material here for readers to reach their own conclusions about how Omoto arose and in what way it represents "radical Nationalism." The only unfortunate aspect of a work that is so thoroughly researched (and lists fourteen pages of bibliographical references) is that it features only a brief index of names and lacks a subject index.