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Light-Handed Charity Regulation: Its Effect on Reporting Practice in New Zealand

Internationally, there has been a steady increase in the number of countries instigating charity regulation. While the Charity Commission for England and Wales was established by the Charitable Trusts Acts of 1853, since 2005 the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator, Charity Commission for Northern Ireland and the Singaporean Charity Council were established almost contemporaneously with New Zealand’s Charities Commission. In other countries (such as Canada and the United States) tax authorities register and monitor charitable activity leading to a perception that charities need regulation if the donating public's trust and confidence is to increase.Public interest theory suggests that regulation increases organisational transparency through reducing information asymmetry, protects (or encourages) a competitive market, leading to a distribution of resources which is in the public interest (Gaffikin, 2005). While these arguments are commonly used to call for regulation in the private (for profit) sphere, nonetheless they may explain the increase in the number of bodies regulating charities internationally.Notwithstanding a need for regulation, the cost of complying with these regimes is often an issue, especially for small and medium-sized charities and therefore regulator tend to take a light-handed approach to small and medium charities' information provision (for example, Hind, 2011; Morgan, 2010a). Responding to the call by Hyndman and McDonnell (2009) for research into charities regulation, its rationale and operation, this paper ascertains the impact of a light-handed enforcement regime on small and medium charities' reporting. In so doing, it analyses the General Purpose Financial Reporting (GPFR) practices of a selection of 300 small and medium-sized charities registered with the New Zealand Charities Commission against the Charities Act requirements and hence the rationale for this regulator. It uses this analysis to predict how the regulator's activities