{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.014257939079714841, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.251012145748988, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
A Comparative Study on the Independence and Collaboration among the Public Purchasing Auction Participants

This paper establishes a simulate reality contract model of the purchaser’s and the purchasing agent’s as well as the bid supplier’s expected revenues, and discusses the two kinds of behavior choices of the three parties participating in public purchasing auction from the actual status of public procurement agency fees, that is the independently action and the collaborate with each other. It is found that the contracts of the three parties' expected revenues participating in public purchasing auction are non-incentive compatible. Further, the collaborative actions of the three parties in participating public procurement auction are studied. Under the conditions of the cooperation between the purchaser and the purchasing agent as well as the successful supplier, and they share the collusion gains equally, the expected revenues of the three are studied respectively. It is found that their expected revenues are all increased, and the increased revenues of the purchasing agent are higher than that of the purchaser and the winning supplier. In the case of collusion between the purchaser and the purchasing agent as well as all the bid suppliers, the expected revenues of all the collusion participants are studied. It is found that all the collusion participants’ revenues have improved. It is found that the revenues of all the collusion participants are improved. And the procurement price of collusion is no upper limit.