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Tim Mulgan, Purpose in the Universe: The Moral and Metaphysical Case for Ananthropocentric Purposivism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 435

Machery ran an experiment with two vignettes involving someone requesting the largest smoothie available (The Folk Concept of Intentional Action, 2008). In the first vignette, the customer is told that the largest smoothie is $1 more than it used to cost, and in the second vignette the customer is told that the largest smoothie is provided in a commemorative cup. In both vignettes, the customer responded that he did not care about paying $1 more/a commemorative cup respectively, but he just wanted the largest smoothie available and subsequently bought that smoothie. Most respondents said that in the first vignette, the customer intentionally paid one dollar more but most respondents said that in the second vignette, the customer did not intentionally obtain the commemorative cup. Pettit’s purported explanation of this difference would have to claim that paying one dollar more has lower counterfactual requirements than obtaining the commemorative cup. On this view, it is not enough to count as obtaining the commemorative cup for the customer to get the cup in the actual circumstances but instead they must get the cup in a range of actual and counterfactual circumstances. However, it is enough to spend the extra dollar in the actual circumstances for it to count as paying one dollar more. These differing counterfactual requirements are implausible and this casts significant doubt on Pettit’s explanation of the Knobe Effect. Even if my objections to Pettit’s views about doing evil and the Knobe Effect are sound, Pettit’s subsequent arguments in chapter 7 that demonstrate that his view about modally demanding goods can be adopted by consequentialists and non-consequentialists alike are unaffected. That said, Pettit favours a variant of consequentialism that does not explicitly guide agents’ behaviour except in exceptional circumstances. In normal circumstances agents should instead be guided by the aforementioned dispositions involved in the provision of modally demanding goods. This version of consequentialism is resilient to many of the standard objections because amongst other reasons it allows us to privilege those near and dear to us and it allows us to be motivated by the dispositions that are responsive to their needs, wishes and liberty. For this reason, while normative theorists of all stripes will benefit from this book, it is an especially important contribution to the consequentialist normative tradition.