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Taking Directors Seriously: A Silver Bullet for Triggering the Creditors’ Interest Duty—Part II

Directors of solvent companies owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders qua the company. If a company becomes technically insolvent, the duty switches to the company’s creditors. This is uncontroversial. However, the duty is also said to switch some point before, i.e., in the ‘vicinity of insolvency’. Therefore, directors must be able to make decisions which do not prejudice shareholders, in a way that is free from exposure to claims by creditors. This uncertainty stems from the case law, where the rules of company law have been confused with the policies underlying insolvency law. The two bodies should be considered separately despite their interrelationship in practice. Doing so reveals the proper and fair function of the duty. Its application should be limited to cases of technical insolvency only. While special cases may be made for irresponsible or negligent risktaking by directors, this should be the exception – not the rule. This article is the second of two parts examining this issue, focussing on the current trigger for the duty and exploring possible solutions.
Company law, insolvency law, directors’ duties, fiduciary duties, agency costs