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Well-Functioning Daos and Moral Relativism

What are the nature and status of moral norms? And what makes individuals abide by them? These are central questions in metaethics. The first concerns the nature of the moral domain—for example, whether it exists independently of what individuals or groups think of it. The second concerns the bindingness or practical clout of moral norms—how individuals feel impelled to abide by them. In this article, I bring two distinct approaches to these questions into dialogue with one another. The first of these comes from David Velleman, as outlined in his Foundations for Moral Relativism (Velleman 2013; 2nd ed. 2015). He characterizes normativity as consisting of a human drive to understand and be understood, a drive to function as a person among others in one’s community and thereby be in communion with them. This drive impels communities of individuals to settle on ordinary ways of being—a set of shared action types or doables which allows for mutual interpretation (a prerequisite of social life). This functional view of morality explains how moral norms emerge in local and contingent ways while nevertheless being genuinely binding for members of their communities. If this view is correct, I argue, then it seems to have implications about the norms adopted by wellfunctioning moralities, which must encourage members to conserve their doables, to conform to them, and to interpret one another charitably. I explore these topics in the first sections of this article. Next, I argue that a similar approach can be found in classical Confucian texts, which describe a dao or guiding way of life that exemplifies many of the features that Velleman takes to be central to moralities in general. The Confucian conception of li (rites / ritual propriety / ritual decorum) is analogous to Velleman’s doables—a set of social norms and practices meant to enable individuals to converge on shared attitudes and to serve as vehicles for mutual interpretation. And, given their functional conceptions of morality, both Velleman and the Confucians seem unable to distinguish the domain of moral actions from social, religious, or aesthetic actions in any systematic or principled way. In an Epilogue, I consider how Confucians might respond to the parallels drawn between these approaches. I provide an error-theoretic account to