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Behavioral Minimax Regret for Security Games and Its Application for UAV Planning

Research on Stackelberg Security Games (SSG) has recently shifted to green security domains, e.g., protecting wildlife from illegal poaching. Previous research on this topic has advocated the use of behavioral (bounded rationality) models of adversaries in SSG. As its first contribution, this paper, for the first time, provides validation of these behavioral models based on real-world data from a wildlife park. The paper’s next contribution is the first algorithm to handle payoff uncertainty – an important concern in green security domains – in the presence of such adversary behavioral models. Finally, given the availability of mobile sensors such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in green security domains, as our third contribution, we introduce new payoff elicitation strategies to strategically reduce uncertainty over multiple targets at a time.