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Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees

We examine determinants of non-executive employee stock options outstanding, grants, and exercises for 756 firms during 1994 to 1997. We find that firms use greater stock option compensation when facing capital requirements and financing constraints. Our results are also consistent with firms using options to attract certain types of employees, provide retention incentives, and create incentives to increase firm value. After controlling for economic determinants and stock returns, option exercises are greater (less) when the firm's stock price hits 52-week highs (lows), which confirms in a broad sample the psychological bias documented by Heath, Huddart, and Lang (1999).