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UN Peace Operations

The primary aim of this chapter is to explain the apparent paradox of increasing Chinese support and involvement even as UN peace operations have become more complex, dangerous, and intrusive. The argument explores why Beijing moved from a position of hostility to UN operations in the Maoist era to one of constructive if still cautious engagement. It then establishes how the building of a positive image and reputation through involvement in UN peace operations has proven useful to the more active presentation of its core beliefs about the role of such activity in generating peace and security, before assessing the extent to which its ideas contradict or complement some of the central recommendations offered in the major reports that the UN has commissioned on this topic and that will be referenced in the opening sections of this chapter. A final section concentrates on Beijing’s decision to augment further the UN’s capacity to carry out peace operations, particularly after 2015, before exploring some of the consequences, actual and potential, that have come in the wake of that decision.