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Wilfred Sellars: A Thomist Estimate

T WO SALIENT FEATURES of Sellars's philosophy are is conviction that, as he puts it, 'Science is the measre of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not ';1 and his opposition to what he calls 'the myth of the given '.2 I shall argue that these features are in fundamental conflict with one another, and, further, that the philosophy of Aquinas provides resources for a resolution of the problems which give rise to the conflict. Sellars has himself given an estimate of Thomism, which he treats with some respect, as making common cause with him in its repudiation of 'idealism', but which he ultimately finds wanting.3 A treatment of Sellars from the Thomist point of view may thus be not without interest. Sellars by no means capitulates to modern anti-metaphysical fashions; in fact his view of the role of philosophy has a refreshingly old-fashioned ring about it. 'The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated', he says, 'is to understand how things in the broadest sense of the term hang together in the broadest sense of the term.' 4 This could of course be heartily endorsed by any recalcitrant metaphysician, including the Thomist. What case is there for saying that a high veneration of science, as liable to tell us the truth about things, is in basic conflict with the view that ' the given ' is a myth? That there is some prima facie case is clear enough, when one considers the reasons for supposing that science is apt to tell us the truth about the matters with which it deals. Scientific method