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Redness, Reality, and Relationalism: Reply to Gert and Allen

Although there is much on which Gert and I disagree, we are united in taking seriously as a constraint on theories of color ontology (as many have not) the significant variation in the way visual systems respond to one and the same color stimulus under different circumstances. Furthermore, we agree that much of this variation is blameless in the sense that (at least in many cases) no one variant should be theoretically distinguished from all the others as being uniquely veridical. That said, we disagree about the scope of application of such considerations about perceptual variation with respect to color, and about what conclusions should be drawn from them. With respect to scope, I urge in RR that instances of perceptual variation arise in what appears to be a structurally identical form in intrapersonal cases (a single visual system responds differently to a single object in different perceptual conditions), interpersonal cases (the visual systems of different