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The distribution of terms: a defense of the traditional doctrine

This doctrine has been criticized in several ways. Geach [2] and Barker [1] have attacked Keynes's formulation directly, while Katz and Martinich [4] propose to replace Keynes's criterion with another, quite different, criterion. It is the purpose of this note to defend Keynes against the criticisms of Geach and Barker, and to show that the criterion of Katz and Martinich presupposes Keynes's. The objection that Geach raises is that there are two semantical relations that a term has according to the statement of the rule of distribution, namely, that of denoting and that of referring. Thus, 'man' always denotes each and every man, but refers to some men only in one context (when it is not distributed) and in another refers to all men (when it is distributed). The problem is the semantical relation of referring, and how it is to be distinguished from denoting. "The whole doctrine hinges on this distinction, but neither Keynes's nor any later exposition tells us what this distinction is" ([2], p. 6). Since the notion of "referring" remains unexplained, the doctrine of distribution is worthless, and