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Hard to Follow: Small States and the Franco-German Relationship

ABSTRACT Franco-German leadership may be necessary for European integration, but it is insufficient. Other countries also have to follow. Sometimes they refuse. Examples include the Dutch rejection of the 1962 Fouchet Plan and the efforts by the new Hanseatic League to block implementation of the 2018 Meseberg Declaration. The opposition of Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden to the Franco-German recovery programme during the Covid-19 pandemic may be a third. Importantly, these are not moments of intergovernmental bargaining, with posturing leading to give-and-take that results in a negotiated compromise; they are moments where small states simply reject the plans the French and Germans put forward. This choice is puzzling. The smaller countries are more dependent upon the rest of Europe than the rest of Europe is on them. Not only do they have an important stake in the success of the European project, but this dependence makes them vulnerable to the threat of exclusion. Hence, France and Germany should be able to exercise the kind of go-it-alone power that will drag the smaller countries along (Gruber 2000, Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational Institutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press). This paper explores two explanations for small state intransigence, one centred on political instability and the other on the politics of shared beliefs.