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Ontology and Explanation in Historical Linguistics

Watkins has argued forcefully and effectively that metaphysical principles can play important, influential and critical roles in unifying theoretical developments within particular traditions of empirical research.’ This insight has now become commonplace in the philosophy and history of science. Lakatos has insisted on the importance of ’hard-core’ assumptions in guiding and setting limits to developments in scientific research programmes, while Kuhn has argued that empirical research almost always takes place within a framework of unquestioned ‘paradigmatic’ assumptions about the phenomena under investigation.2 2 Lakatos’ discussion of these matters is particularly clear. He has argued that the metaphysical principles which unify developments in a particular research programme can play both positive and negative roles in influencing the conduct of research. ‘Hard-core’ metaphysical principles can play a positive, heuristic role in a research programme by providing a schematic model of the phenomena under investigation-a model which empirical research clarifies and specifies, but does not articulate ex nihilo.3 And these principles can play a negative, critical role by ruling out ’a priori’ certain conceivable alternative models of the phenomena under investigation.4 4