{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.011995637949836423, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.375, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The doctrine of substituted judgment in medical decision making.


 The judicial use of the doctrine of substituted judgment for incompetent persons entails basing the decision on the action the incompetent would choose if competent. The author briefly reviews court decisions employing this doctrine to permit withholding or withdrawing life sustaining or prolonging treatment (the Spring, Saikewicz, and Quinlan cases). Lowy finds no objection to applying substituted judgment to the never competent or to the once competent for whom there is insufficient knowledge of their preferences. She objects to the unrestricted application of substituted judgment where there is sufficient information about the now incompetent person. She hypothesizes a situation in which the now incompetent person appears to be satisfied with a present quality of life which would have been unacceptable to the person's competent self.
