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Public and private liquidity during crises times: evidence from Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to Greek banks

In a surprise move during a crisis, the ECB excluded Greek Government Bonds from the set of eligible collateral in monetary policy operations. In turn, Greek banks turned to Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to meet their funding needs. ELA replenished losses from all funding sources, consistent with its role as LOLR. However, in anticipation to a switch to ELA, banks reduced their interbank and corporate lending as a result of its higher cost and conditionality. Although multi-lender firms compensated for the associated credit crunch, single-lender firms that were not able to establish new lending relationships experienced a reduction in their exports.