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Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth

This chapter is one of Zagzebski’s papers on the problem of what makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief, otherwise known as the value problem. I distinguish four ways a belief can possess value by its relation to the good of truth: (i) a belief can have value because truth is its consequence; (ii) a belief can have teleological value in the Aristotelian sense if truth is a necessary component of a good natural end; (iii) a belief can be valuable in that truth is its aim; and (iv) a belief can be good in virtue of arising from a good motive—namely, valuing truth or disvaluing falsehood. She argues that the fourth way is superior to the first three in explaining what makes knowledge better than mere true belief.