{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.01653486700215672, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 4.568, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
On Social Reasoning in Multi-Agent Systems

This work presents the core notions of a social reasoning mechanism, based on dependence theory. This model 
enables an agent to reason about the others, in particular to calculate his dependence relations and dependence 
situations. An agent is said to be dependent on another if the latter can help/prevent him to achieve one of his goals. 
We consider our social reasoning mechanism as an essential building block for the design of really autonomous 
artificial agents, which are immersed in an open multi-agent world. By open, we mean that agents may enter or 
leave the society at any moment. In such systems, as the organization of the agents can not be conceived at design 
time, the cooperative problem solving paradigm is based on dynamic coalition formation. In this context, agents 
must be able to adapt themselves to dynamically changing conditions, by evaluating at execution time if their 
goals are achievable and if their plans are feasible. As we do not suppose that agents are benevolent, our model 
proposes a criterion to evaluate which partners are more susceptible to accept a proposition of coalition. Finally, 
as in these kind of systems agents usually do not have a complete and correct representation of each other, our 
model helps them to detect an agency level inconsistency and to choose a context to be maintained.