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The Failure of the Great Contract

The "high road" to the English Civil War, although not completely abandoned by historians, has become less traveled. In the last decade especially (although many of the seeds of revisionism were planted earlier) many historians have challenged once widely held tenets of early seventeenth-century parliamentary history. Conrad Russell set several of the most important themes when he argued, in an essay appearing in 1976, that "before 1640 Parliament was not powerful, and it did not contain an opposition." The House of Commons did not proceed from strength to strength in the parliaments of 1604-29; if anything, the House brought itself to the point of extinction. Only the outside intervention of the Scots in the late 1630s may have saved parliaments in England.1 Viewed in their own perspective and not merely as a prelude to an inevitable civil war, the parliaments of 1604-29 have yielded new themes