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Toward an Ethics of Responsibility

Responsibility is not a new topic in moral enquiry. It has a firm place in the traditions foremost of English-speaking moral philosophy and theological ethics. The ordinary notion of responsibility in connection with the theory of free will and necessity is often discussed.' As a current definition of this kind of responsibility we can take the one proposed by Richard Swinburne: "An agent is held to be morally responsible for what he does intentionally, for what he chooses to do; for doing certain actions he is praiseworthy, for doing other actions he is blameworthy."2 There is still ongoing debate on the question whether such a notion of moral responsibility is compatible or incompatible with a deterministic understanding of human action.3 Most symposia and debates on responsibility have concentrated on the correlation of responsibility and freedom and have argued that responsibility is absent in the case of inevitability. Some contributors try to differentiate responsibility from virtue in such a way that they distinguish a responsible action from a virtuous character.4 Many efforts have been undertaken to discern moral responsibility from causal responsibility, on the one hand, and liability for punishment, on the other hand.5 We came to distinguish between the normal situation of role responsibility and the exceptional situation of vicarious responsibility or-