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A European Doppelstaat?

The constitutional reform debate is not the only open-ended process muddying the future of the European Union. The full effects, in particular, of eastern enlargement on the contours and internal dynamics of the EU after 2004 remain dimly perceived. But in Eastern Europe itself, partly under the influence of nationalistpopulist politicians, a clear but unappealing picture of an enlarged EU has begun to crystallize. Fears of being marginalized inflame worries of a last-minute decision to block enlargement. But the same fears also fuel concern that the postcommunist applicant countries will, indeed, accede to the EU as expected, but under especially unfavorable or unfair terms. The new Europolity, according to this perhaps alarmist line of thought, will be a dual state, with the new wave of entrants being treated like second-class citizens whose interests are handled just as cavalierly after entry as before. This distressing image corresponds more or less to Hubert Védrine’s nightmare of an EU made up of concentric circles: “ce serait l’Enfer de Dante à l’envers, avec les privilégiés au centre et les laissés-pour-compte à la périphérie, sans esprit de changement.” Such a two-tier EU, if it comes about, may service the material interests of myopic Western constituencies with good access to Brussels. But it may also inadvertently undermine the security interests of Western Europe as a whole by politically destabilizing the EU’s eastern flank.