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Court of Appeal

The appellant had been convicted, in November 1999, of six counts of rape of his daughter J. The counts arose from allegations by the daughter of repeated sexual abuse by the appellant from 1995 to August 1998. Leave to appeal was granted on application to the Full Court, on the grounds of (1) the judge's directions on the degree of penetration required for 'sexual intercourse' for the purposes of rape; (2) the judge's directions on the status of various items of hearsay evidence; and (3) the use by the jury of transcripts of the video interviews of the complainant, which comprised most of her evidence-in-chief. It was also argued on appeal that the hearsay evidence and the expressions of opinion and belief associated with it should never have been admitted in evidence in the first place.