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Anorexia Nervosa and Refusal of Naso-Gastric Treatment: A Response to Heather Draper

Imposing artificial feeding on people with anorexia nervosa may be unethical. This seems to be Heather Draper's suggestion in her article, 'Anorexia Nervosa and Respecting a Refusal of Life-Prolonging Therapy: A Limited Justification.' Although this is an important point, I shall show that the arguments supporting this point are flawed. Draper should have made a brave claim: she should have claimed that people with anorexia nervosa, who competently decide not to be artificially fed, should be respected because everybody is entitled to exercise their autonomy, not only 'in the middle' of their life, but also at the end of it, or when their own life is at stake, because autonomy also extends to the most difficult moments of our life, and, ultimately, 'stretches [...] far out into the distance' at the end of it. I explain why Draper should have made the brave claim, and why she has not made it. I conclude that a defence of people's entitlement to competently refuse artificial feeding cannot rest upon the arguments developed by Draper. Whether or not we should respect competent refusal of artificial feeding depends on the normative strength that we are ready to ascribe to the principle of autonomy, to the moral relevance that we ascribe to the circumstances in which a person's autonomy is exercised, and, perhaps, eventually, on our sense of compassion.