{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.024675324675324677, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.119047619047619, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Desires and Reasons

This chapter explores subjectivism, the view that all reasons have their source in desire. It first rehearses two classic objections to subjectivism: it has implausible implications about which reasons people have, and about what good deliberation looks like. The chapter then offers some reasons to think that objectivism, especially when combined with desire-as-belief, can explain away the appeal of subjectivism. Most centrally, we should make a clear distinction between rational requirements and non-rational requirements, and then say that our desires make a difference only to what it is rational to do. The chapter ends by offering some reasons to doubt desire-based theories of wellbeing, which would also fit poorly with desire-as-belief.