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AND THE ARGUMENT FROM NO COMMON CONTENT

often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. I do not experience the table by experiencing something else over and above the table and its facing surface. I see the facing surface of the table directly. This, of course, is the view of na¨ıve realism. And it seems as good a starting point as any for further theorizing about the nature of perception. Some disjunctivists have suggested that to do proper justice to the above thought, we need to suppose that the objects we perceive are components of the contents of our perceptual experiences in veridical cases. This supposition is supported further by the simple observation that if I see an object, it must look some way to me. But if an object looks some way to me, then intuitively it must be experienced as being some way. And how can the object be experienced as being some way unless the object itself figures in the content of the experience, assuming that experience is representational at all? A third related consideration is that in cases of illusion, the perceived object appears other than it is. In such cases, intuitively, the perceptual experience is inaccurate. 1 And it is so precisely because the object is not as it appears to be. This strongly suggests that, at least in those cases where there is a perceived object, a perceptual experience has a content into which the perceived object enters along with its apparent properties. 2 The experience, then, is accurate if and only if the object has those apparent properties. Once it is acknowledged that the content of visual experience is singular in veridical cases, it must also be acknowledged that in cases of hallucination, the content (if there is one) is not singular. 3 For in these cases, there is no object with