{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.022007042253521125, 'fraction_numerical': 0.014084507042253521, 'mean_word_length': 5.112903225806452, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Containment, Coup d’État, and the Covert War in Vietnam

This chapter investigates how and why presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson escalated America's role in Vietnam and the role that America's covert operations in North and South Vietnam between 1954 and 1964 played in that process. It argues that U.S. leaders launched these operations in an effort to pave the way for an honorable withdrawal from the region. Paradoxically, however, the missions had precisely the opposite effect of their intentions. To explore this situation further, the chapter proceeds in four parts. First comes a discussion of case selection and alternative explanations. Next is an analysis of the emergence of the containment strategy in Southeast Asia and America's escalating involvement in Vietnam. The third details how top-level U.S. policymakers debated launching regime changes against North and South Vietnam at five key points between 1954 and 1963. Finally, the chapter concludes by investigating why policymakers preferred to conduct these operations covertly and why the United States later limited its efforts to overthrow Ho Chi Minh.