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Status, Deviance, and Sanctions

Sociologists and social psychologists have frequently observed that the amount of status a deviant possesses has an important bearing on the group's responses to his deviance. Some have argued that high status protects one from sanctions for deviance (Blau, 1960; Homans, 1961; Hollander, 1958; Verba, 1961). Others have suggested the contrary, that high status makes one more vulnerable to sanctions; the higher one's status the more closely scrutinized is his behavior and the less leeway permitted him (Homans, 1950; Sherif and Sherif, 1956). Presumably high status does not always enable one to get away with deviance nor does it always make one more vulnerable to sanctions, but we lack systematic research on the conditions under which each set of observations applies. This is a serious gap in our understanding of the process of social control. If it is useful to know that groups have norms and the violation of these norms tends to produce sanctions, it is no less useful to understand the conditions under which sanctions are not applied and the conditions affecting the severity of sanctions. The theory presented below attempts to reconcile the apparently contradictory findings on the severity of sanctions applied to high status deviants-minimal or nonexistent sometimes, most severe at other times-in terms of a single concept, expectations.