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In Lieu of Legislation

In the legislative process, presidents may negotiate with Congress or use unilateral action as a bargaining tool. When presidents issue a unilateral order during the legislative process, do these orders “preempt” or “support” legislation? We match unilateral orders with related legislative activity and find presidents are more likely to use unilateral orders to “preempt” legislation when the issue is on the president’s agenda or in the second half of their second terms but “support” legislation when of the same party as the bill sponsor. These findings suggest that presidents not only take advantage of Congressional incapacity but also exert unilateral power in support of legislation.