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The Achievement and Cost of the British Convoy System, 1803–1815

The combination of British blockade and convoys has been seen as comfortably defeating Napoleon’s economic warfare strategy, principally his Continental System after 1807. Trade and military convoys were maintained and increased from 1803 and 1815, but this success came at a cost. Winter storms and ice were responsible for more warship and merchant ship losses than by enemy action. Shortages of skilled seamen caused considerable anxiety at the Admiralty. The greatest difficulties were the Danish attacks on convoys between 1809 and 1810 and those from America in 1812 and 1813, dangers which, fortunately for Britain, did not arrive simultaneously. The British naval and mercantile effort survived, but towards the end of the war it was a close-run thing.