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Strategy-Proof Spectrum Allocation Among Multiple Operators in Wireless Networks

The exponentially increasing demand for data necessitates efficient spectrum allocation among operators in wireless networks. In this paper, we address the spectrum allocation problem among non-cooperative operators via auctions. The classical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) approach provides the framework for a strategy-proof and social welfare maximizing auction. However, the VCG mechanism has high computational complexity, which makes it infeasible for practical implementation. In this work, we propose sealed bid auction mechanisms for spectrum allocation, which are computationally tractable. These can be used for spectrum allocation by performing auctions at shorter intervals to cater to the dynamic load variation in the network. We establish that the proposed algorithm is strategy-proof for the uniform demand scenario. Furthermore, for non-uniform demand, we propose an algorithm that satisfies weak strategy-proofness. Here, we also consider non-linear increase in the marginal valuations with demand. Simulation results are also presented to exhibit the performance comparison of the proposed algorithms with VCG and other existing mechanisms.