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Selfdetermination in philosophy and factical life. Some considerations about an early Heidegger lecture

The main focus of this article is the methodological problem of the selfdetermination of the philosophy according to the phenomenological analysis carried out by Heidegger in one of the lectures of his early period (the so called Früh Freiburger Vorlesungen). The general frame of the current paper implies a hermeneutical thesis according to which the relevance of the well-known “factical life” is not solely thematic but mainly methodological. This function explains why these “phenomenological exercises” are some sort of genetical enquiries. In consequence, the specific aim of this article is, on the one hand, to show that the problem of the selfdetermination of the philosophy is the document of the more basic problem of the possibility of access to the intentional structures as such. On the other hand, this implies that the facticity as the primary horizon of comprehension constitutes in deed a redrawing of the intentional structure, in such a way that it is avoided the paradoxical consequences of the reflexive-intuitive model of access to one self and makes a relevant issue to the philosophy the problematic character of the intentionality itself.