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India-Myanmar Relations and the Management of Transnational Militant Threats

Militant groups hiding in Myanmar launch cross-border attacks into India, killing soldiers and civilians. The Indian Army has responded by launching cross-border military incursions into Burmese territory. After decades of trial and failure to curb the militants, a reciprocated spirit of cooperation for the first time seems to characterize India and Myanmar’s joint efforts in fighting them. This article analyses the evolution of these efforts and argues that a sum of dovetailing drivers have created space for enhancing countermilitancy cooperation in an ambivalent and distrustful relationship. Central elements are an overall improvement in bilateral relations, India’s need to counter China’s growing influence in its neighbourhood, Myanmar’s urge to diversify its benefactors, the urgency of stabilizing India’s northeast, Myanmar’s domestic security calculations, as well as a large untapped economic cooperation potential. Despite increasing countermilitancy cooperation, difficult challenges remain as Myanmar has ceasefire agreements with India-hostile militants residing on its territory. The relationship is caught in a complex interstate order in a mix of conflict and cooperation, between the use of extraterritorial force and its acceptance. Acknowledgements I would like to thank my mentor Magnus Petersson, supervisors Kristian Berg-Harpviken and Øyvind Østerud, and Lars Tore Flåten and other colleagues at the Centre for Asian Security Studies for their valuable comments and support. I am sincerely grateful to the anonymous referees and the JSS editors. This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/ vol11/iss2/5 73 Journal of Strategic Security © 2018 ISSN: 1944-0464 eISSN: 1944-0472 JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC SECURITY V O L U M E 1 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1673 I S S U E 2 S U M M E R 2 0 1 8 SAIRA H. BASIT Centre for Asian Security Studies, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies sbasit@ifs.mil.no


INTRODUCTION
What are the drivers behind the upsurge in Indo-Burmese countermilitancy cooperation after decades of disengagement? The areas along the 1,643 km India-Myanmar border have since the 1950s been a scene of ethno-nationalist-driven, low-intensity conflict, deteriorating the state-tostate relationship. Cooperation in fighting transnational militant groups and Burmese attempts at curbing India-hostile militants for decades has been lukewarm, at best. Their relationship has despite periodical and partial upswings been characterized by disengagement and distrust, even hostility. 1 In early 2017, Indian Assamese police forces assessed that 2,500 Indian militants were residing in sanctuaries in Myanmar. 2 A further complicating matter is that the Burmese have a ceasefire agreement with militants that actively launch cross-border attacks into Indian Territory, and once were a shared security threat. India, on its side, no longer seems to host anti-Burmese militants.
Despite this severe and continuing challenge, in recent years a spirit of cooperation has appeared as a more prominent feature in Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation for the first time. In the past decade, the two states have signed comprehensive cooperative agreements on intelligence, border patrolling, as well as initiated exchange programs and joint exercises on counter-militancy. 3 Grounded partly in a growing literature seeking to explain militant impacts on interstate relations and existing literature on India-Myanmar relations, this article furthers expectations regarding the drivers of increased Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation. Examining the drivers of enhanced cooperation in an ambivalent interstate relationship despite resilient militancy and a long conflict provides nuances significant for understanding the complicated dynamics of the regional great power-small power Indo-Burmese relations. It throws light on the impact of militancy on a complex interstate order in a mix of conflict and cooperation.
The following section generates assumptions about the drivers of countermilitancy cooperation, before providing a status of counter-militancy cooperation in the Indo-Burmese dyad. This is followed by an explanation of the cooperation, and finally, a conclusion. Therefore, understanding the nature of the interstate relationship is of the essence. In doing this, it is essential to note the power imbalance in relations. India has a nuclear capacity and in recent years has emerged as a regional great power. Myanmar is a small power struggling with its national security and economy. This may regulate how the host state and target state relate to one another in the context of militancy and impact the use of force and the acceptance of such.
Second, a driver that can lead to change in an interstate relationship is a third-party state. Balancing against China, an increasingly assertive regional and global great power and India's rival, is the primary factor scholars ascribe to the overall empowerment of the India-Myanmar relationship. The China factor is central and feeds into the countermilitancy cooperation both in a contextual and direct sense. Although transnational militancy has been a threat since the colonial period, fighting it is now strategically more important for New Delhi as China's involvement in the neighborhood is increasing in light of its Belt and Road Initiative unveiled in 2013. To counter growing Chinese influence, India in 2014 launched the Act East policy aiming to gain more influence and connectivity with ASEAN 6 states and beyond. In Act East, India's regional security role was a heavier component compared to its predecessor, the Look East policy. 7 There are also other external actors influencing Indo-Burmese relations, such as India's archrival and neighbor Pakistan.
Pakistan plays a critical role for India's security, and its close alliance Fourth, economic cooperation in the relationship may regulate the impact of militancy, and more so if the economic cooperation is of a strategic nature. 10 In addition to existing economic interests, this article also takes the potential for expanding such cooperation. Because of growing Indian economic power and assertiveness, combined with a reaction to Beijing's regional investments through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, New Delhi has launched a countering Act East policy. Act East includes an economic corridor eastwards with Myanmar as its gateway. Naypyidaw's opening to foreign investors, and, ironically, the recent condemnation by the international community of the minority Muslim Rohingya's exodus and massacre, has increasingly allowed this development.
These new dynamics have created, in sum, a new strategic environment for India and Myanmar, aligned their interests, and generated incentives for seeking costly and sensitive interstate counter-militancy cooperation despite continuous conflict-inflicting transnational militancy. 11 The two states have so far landed somewhere between fixing and managing the problem. The militants are sub or extra-national groups that use or threaten to use violence in order to fulfil separatist or ideological ambitions. The main militant group studied in this article, NSCN-K, strives for its own independent state consisting of both Indian and Burmese territory. The militants hide across borders, launch cross-border attacks, or target domestic landmarks, infrastructure, or people that are important to the target or host state. They may have friendly or hostile relations to the host state, or the host state may lack capacity to control them, and they may enjoy third-party sponsorship.

Journal of Strategic
Transnational militancy, referring to militant actions that affect both India Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 joint efforts did not stop cross-border militant attacks from Burmese territory into India. Nonetheless, the security situation did improve in the following years. 18 A significant factor in this improvement was India and Myanmar's ceasefire agreements with several militant groups.
India is believed to have supplied Myanmar with transport helicopters, armored personnel carriers, light guns, and tanks for countering militancy during the 2000s. 19 Furthermore, intending to simplify movement for hill tribes residing in the border areas, India's Home Ministry and the government of Myanmar introduced a limited visa-free movement regime in the border areas in 2010, meaning, "local nationals of both sides can stay in the other country for three days within 16 km on either side." 20 According to Lionel M. Beehner, the agreement implies that India can pursue Indian rebels into Burmese territory. 21 What it also signifies is free roaming for militants. Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh stated that it "is misused by militants and criminals who smuggle weapons, narcotics, contraband goods, and Fake Indian Currency Notes. Taking advantage of the free-movement regime occasionally they, in other words the militants, enter India, commit crimes, and escape to their relatively safer hide-outs." 22 In recent years, counter-militancy cooperation has made unmatched progress. In 2015, the two countries agreed on more coordinated security arrangements, allowing for enhanced patrolling coordination and crossborder intelligence sharing. 23 In addition, the Indian Army trains Burmese soldiers in counter-militancy. 24  While India has increased its presence in its northeast and successfully established deals with many militants, other groups -such as the NSCN-K, the United Liberation Front of Asom-Independent (ULFA-I), and the Coordination Committee (CorCom)-remain active. They allegedly hide in Burmese territory and conduct cross-border strikes targeting Indian soldiers, particularly in the Indian provinces of Manipur and Nagaland.
In recent years, Bangladesh and Bhutan have largely ceased to function as a safe haven for India-hostile militants, and Bhutan has a comprehensive security agreement with India. 27 The consequence is that non-signatory militant groups increasingly depend on cross-border sanctuaries on Burmese territory for survival, and allegedly also on Chinese territory. 28 Applying terrorist tactics, the militants launch cross-border attacks on the Indian Army and civilians. Naypyidaw's 2012 ceasefire agreement with NSCN-K limits Burmese security force presence in the group 's territory. 29 This access to extraterritorial sanctuary has secured the effectiveness of the militants and limited India's room for maneuver in securing its strategically important northeast. 30 The challenge is amplified by the fact that, for the Burmese, the cost of curbing the India-hostile militants is likely lower than the benefit. Myanmar has more severe security challenges involving separatist militants on its borders with China and Thailand. The Tatmadaw has conducted cross-border raids into Thai territory and urged China to stop harboring Myanmar-hostile militants, which have added much tension in these relations. 31 The Indian government and the NSCN-K called off their ceasefire agreement in 2015. 32 In June the same year, the Indian army executed a military hot pursuit into Burmese territory, allegedly killing tens of Naga militants in their camps. It is believed that the incursion was in response to militants' killing of 18 Indian soldiers in a cross-border strike. The authorities in Myanmar initially denied that the cross-border operation ever took place. This is an expected reaction considering the immense importance for any nation of securing national sovereignty, and specifically pertinent for nations with several power centers such as Myanmar. 33 This type of signaling is seen for instance, in Pakistan's denial of Indian cross-border surgical strikes and Iranian cross-border hot pursuits, both following transnational militancy. In addition, admittedly, the Burmese government did have a ceasefire agreement with the NSCN-K. 34 In December 2017, Indian Army Chief Bipin Rawat controversially confirmed that Indian troops had crossed the border into Burmese territory. His statements were not welcomed at a time when the Indian government was seeking a solution around deporting Muslim Rohingya refugees who had fled massacre from Myanmar's Rakhine state. 35 Beehner describes the Indian cross-border incursion as a permissive hot pursuit, with the Burmese leadership denying tacit acceptance. 36 The Indians followed up with a high-level delegation to Myanmar, but failed to formalize an agreement allowing military action on Burmese territory. 37 Their counterparts in Myanmar referred to the constitution's article 42b: "No foreign troops shall be permitted to be deployed in the territory of the Union." 38 According to the Hindu, the Indians were in 2017 considering asking Myanmar to revoke its ceasefire agreement with NSCN-K, as it, among other militant groups, was involved in "anti-India" activities in the border areas. 39 However, it does not seem any progress was made on the matter, despite the threat.
A high-standing official from India's ruling party BJP supports Beehner's argument on the permissive hot pursuit. According to the official, it is likely that India did carry out incursions into Myanmar's territory, although denied by both states. Moreover, "what is important is that if this is a fact, India did not carry out these specific-target incursions without consent from Myanmar's government. Although much points to the aftermath of India's cross-border strike as a case of pragmatic acceptance, it is only rational to not totally dismiss the option that there was no acceptance from the Burmese side and that continuing cooperation was the result of a 'rescue mission' by the Indian high-level delegation that travelled to Naypyidaw shortly after. Regardless of whether the acceptance was pragmatic or forced, as it did not lead to higher levels of conflict, it illustrates a nuance between cooperation and conflict in interstate relations. The following section further examines what has made cooperation possible despite the highly conflict-inflicting factor of resilient transnational militancy and even breaches of sovereignty.

THE DRIVERS OF INDO-BURMESE COUNTER-MILITANCY COOPERATION
The following section focus on the four categories of drivers: The nature of the interstate relationship; the relations with third-party states; perceptions of the security threat; and economic cooperation.
First, in the India-Burma case one could argue that the dyad has ripened enough to forge counter-militancy cooperation. However, border and An implication is that the nature of the India-Myanmar relationship does not alone determine whether transnational militancy causes more conflict, cooperation, or both. However, it indicates the room for maneuver available to the two parts; close dyads have a better foundation for forging cooperation than troubled ones. The other way around, the presence of transnational militancy in a state-to-state relationship, may suggest-but not always-that it has conflict-prone characteristics.
Besides, whether the current Burmese provision of militant sanctuary is a result of lack of will or capacity remains somewhat unclear.
Second, the host and target states' foreign policies vis-à-vis third-party states, as well as the target state's perceptions of third-party involvement in transnational militancy, may serve as drivers for cooperation. This becomes particularly pertinent if the relation to third-party states is a matter of overarching strategy. India's strategically important Act East Policy, thought of as a counterweight to China's BRI, and implies increased Chinese interest in

Myanmar. If India does not succeed in curbing insurgency and unrest in
India's northeast, the Act East will remain unrealized. The more India in general can engage and cooperate with Myanmar, the more likely it is that India gains muscles as a competitor against China and moves closer to its overarching strategic aims. According to Gautam Sen, who has held a senior position in a northeast state government, unrest in Indian Nagaland has decreased. Despite this, the Indian central government has declared it a disturbed area, which has allowed for continued military presence. 48 As the situation between India and China has become increasingly tense in recent years, it is only to be expected that more security forces will be deployed in India's peripheries that are close to China.
Furthermore, a factor that has made India pick up speed is Myanmar's opening to the international community. This implies more international competition in Myanmar, and may contribute to explaining Modi's push for more cooperation with Naypyidaw at a time when the international community is threatening to pull out. Moreover, if a host state, after pressure from the target state, is likely to compel but fail in curbing the militants, the militants may grow stronger and the host state's capacity weaker: A so-called compellence dilemma.

Another incentive for India's interest in Myanmar is
This may again cause a deteriorated security situation for the target state.
In such cases, the target state may refrain from coercion and punishment of the host. 52 In addition, counter-militancy cooperation can serve to de-escalate crises in the form of, for instance, permissive hot pursuits. 53 Important to note is that target states' behavior vis-à-vis host states in the wake of transnational militancy can at times be explained by triadic deterrence, meaning that the target state applies threat and punishment against the host state in order to coerce it into curbing the hostile transnational militants. 54 Furthermore, and importantly, the agenda of the militants and the threat they pose to the host and target states is central in forming the incentives for counter-militancy cooperation. Cases where the militants also work against the interests of the host state indicate low capacity rather than lack of will of the host state to combat them. This point of departure is less intimidating than direct support where the host state, for instance, provides the militants with arms and training facilities. In addition, the principal conflict-inflicting problem of sanctuary as a condition for militant organization survival becomes a bit more approachable. The target state's perception of the host state's efforts in curbing the militants is also important. A total lack of interest from the host state in hindering What has changed is that India has become more assertive and willing to actively counter Chinese influence, and that Myanmar is increasingly the main base for the militants. Moreover, India has successfully expanded counter-militancy cooperation with Bhutan and Bangladesh, which are central to stability in the northeast. This may nurture the optimism concerning similar cooperation with Myanmar.
India has been seeking to seal the Indo-Burmese border without much success. There was no mutual agreement regarding the border until 1967, and it has since been semi-demarcated by boundary pillars. In 2013, India unsuccessfully attempted to build a 10 km border fence. 56 According to debates in the Indian parliament, the Indo-Burmese border issue was still unresolved as of March 2016. There were still unsettled boundary pillars and allegations of Burmese constructions on Indian Territory. 57 The Tatmadaw may experience additional unrest if it attempts to curb militants after signing the ceasefire agreement. The security gain may be higher in tacitly accepting that the Indians breach national sovereignty, then express anger towards them, than letting it turn into a less approachable or even intractable conflict. 58 Myanmar has a fluid relationship between its militant groups, private security forces, the civilian government, and the Tatmadaw. As Paul Staniland notes, in Myanmar "[t]here is extraordinary diversity in the rules of the game that structure interactions between state forces and non-state armed groups." 59 Myanmar's pragmatic acceptance of cross-border raids signals that it lacks capacity to fight the militants on its territory. Its lack of capacity and priorities that far overshadow India-hostile militants, as well In addition, the main agenda of NSCN-K, which has posed the most significant challenge in recent years, is to fight for an autonomous Naga state consisting of both Indian and Burmese territory. It has previously carried out attacks in both India and Myanmar. NSCN-K has been designated a terrorist organization by India. In essence, the group's original agenda implies that it poses a threat towards India and Myanmar, both target and host. However, the lack of safe hideouts decreases longterm survivability of transnational militants, which may lead to loose and complicated agreements between host states and militants. NSCN-K's original agenda may contribute to easing counter-militancy cooperation for the target state, but is complicated by Myanmar's ceasefire agreement with the group. As long as India views the Burmese sanctuary as a question of a lack of capacity to curb the militants, rather than will, it may serve as a driver of cooperation. become a severe challenge to existing or future economic interests that require a stabilized region. It may also happen that states take larger security risks to fulfil strategically important economic cooperation. Thus, a large economic cooperation potential in a state dyad may create room for counter-militancy cooperation, especially if the cooperation is of the strategic type. However, one idea that has been launched argues that the target state's micro-level economic-strategic interests may affect its macro-level interstate conflict behavior towards the host state in the aftermath of transnational militancy. 64 On the other hand, it may be just as beneficial for the target state to cooperate in order to reach its economic aims, depending on the character of the state dyad. The following paragraphs examine the economic cooperation potential in Indo-Burmese relations and influences counter-militancy cooperation.
Indo-Burmese relations house a great, untapped potential for mutually Large-scale foreign infrastructure projects in unsettled territory come with a security price tag, as also seen in China's economic expansion abroad. The strategic nature of the economic cooperation potential is a significant driver in Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation and, more importantly, the region will see no settlement without Burmese in curbing the militants, the problem will not go away and economic cooperation will remain limited.

CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the evolution of Indo-Burmese counter-militancy cooperation. Resilient transnational militancy challenges are a common source of conflict between states. Despite continuous transnational militancy in India and Burma's ambivalent relations, the two have been able to forge limited, but growing, counter-militancy cooperation.
A primary driver of increased counter-militancy cooperation is the overarching strategic aim of a more assertive India to counterbalance China's influence in its neighborhood. India is also worried that the Chinese are lending support to India-hostile militants in Myanmar, which may feed directly into New Delhi's wish to engage the Tatmadaw in advantageous but costly cooperation. Balancing against Chinese influence is partly done by introducing strategic economic projects in the region that are viable competitors to Chinese interests and BRI, and partly by making the stakes of cooperating with India higher for Myanmar through mutually beneficial strategic security and economic cooperation. The strategic end aims of the security and economic cooperation respectively are interlinked. They are also accomplished by supporting Myanmar at a time when few others are. The key to moving towards materialization of the Act East Policy is stabilizing India's northeast and Myanmar.
The target state's perceptions of the host state's capacity and efforts to curb the militants are central in furthering cooperation. In addition, extraterritorial militants cannot be curbed without cooperation of the host state. Either because of lack of will or capacity, Naypyidaw and the Tatmadaw are providing sanctuary to the militants that sustain transnational militancy -the success factor for transnational militants. By pragmatic acceptance of Indian hot pursuits across the border, they do signal lack of capacity rather than will. The perception that the host state lacks capacity is an enabler for counter-militancy cooperation. The fact that Naga militants in their primary aim of an autonomous state pose a threat to both India and Myanmar, eases cooperation and adds to the view that the Tatmadaw lacks capacity to curb the militants.
From an Indian perspective, engaging Myanmar, in combination with striking deals with militant groups, has till now proven to be the most