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Hypnosis can not be fully nor reliably excluded from the courtroom.

Abstract Because hypnosis has the potential to irrevocably alter cognition, perception, and recall, and to increase an eyewitness' subjective certitude, many jurisdictions have excluded all posthypnotic testimony from the courtroom. Because “hypnotic” elements pervade the phenomena and transactions of everyday living, this process can only exclude procedures deliberately labeled as “hypnosis.” This pseudosolution side-steps a greater issue, yet unresolved: how the courts should deal with altered volition, cognition, perception, and recall that occur outside the hypnotist's consulting room. These spontaneous hypnotic-like states are amplified by the experience of psychological trauma, common in the aftermath of violent crime and terror. Rather than per se exclusion, courts are advised to scrutinize all testimony for its “hypnotic” influences, and judge accordingly. Suggested criteria for exclusion in a particular case include: (1) hypnosis must be a separable state, (2) hypnosis must be the dominant source...