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Book Review: Blue Water Patriots: The American Revolution Afloat

Schumann and Schweizer valiantly attempt the hopeless task of telling in 300 pages the political, diplomatic and military history of one of history's most complex wars. To write a definitive history would require at least 1000 pages, several decades of research and the genius of an Albert Sorel, Richard Pares or Michael Roberts, titans who come along once a generation. At best we can hope for partial treatments like Fred Anderson's Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate ofEmpire in British North America, 1754-1766 (New York, 2000), which is reliable only for North America, or Franz A.J. Szabo's The Seven Years War in Europe, 1756-1763 (Harlow, 2008) which concentrates on Europe. Even Richard Waddington's magisterial La Guerre de sept ans: Histoire diplomatique et militaire (5 vols., Paris, 1899-1914) shortchanges the naval and colonial aspects of the war. In the interim we have this book, which is a good introduction for the general reader and will stimulate scholarly debate. Schweizer is one of the world's leading experts on Prussian-British relations, while Schumann's recent PhD thesis covers British war strategy from 1754 to 1761. Not unexpectedly, the present book is strongest on Prussia, good on Britain and Hanover, not bad on Austria, Russia and North America, unsympathetic and unreliable on France, and cursory on Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and South America. It is better on armies than navies, stronger on government budgets than on trade. The authors have done a massive amount of archival research but fail to cite obvious published sources. One example concerns William Mildmay, a key figure in the failure of Britain and France to avoid war. They use the Mildmay Papers at the William L. Clements Library in Ann Arbor but do not cite the late Enid Robbie's definitive biography, The Forgotten Commissioner: Sir William Mildmay and the AngloFrench Commission of 1750-1755 (East Lansing, MI, 2003). Such neglect of secondary sources repeatedly leads the authors to re-invent the wheel, not always successfully. Another problem is organization, which may have been the publisher's choice as the book is part of a series. Rather than being strictly chronological, it is organized topically with chapters on the origins of the war, military campaigns, financing, domestic politics and diplomacy. This makes it hard to find a unifying theme and requires the reader to move back and forth in time. Moreover, its short length precludes detailing the personalities of major leaders. It lacks maps and a good index, inexcusable failings given its outrageous price. Yet despite its shortcomings the book has many redeeming features. The authors are disciplined enough to keep to their story, avoid wasting space criticizing other historians and never resort to jargon. In both content and length it is therefore quite accessible to readers who might avoid a more detailed study. As a short and readable survey of an important topic, it nicely fills a niche which hitherto has been neglected.