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Constitutional responses to extremist political associations – ETA, Batasuna and democratic norms

Systems of representative democracy require that the electorate be given at regular intervals the opportunity to replace the party in government with a rival political association. In this context, the right of individuals to freedom of association permits the formation of competitor parties and prevents forms of state intervention that might otherwise privilege existing office holders and their political programmes. It follows then that restrictions on the right to political association are deserving of particularly close scrutiny. At the same time, liberal democratic constitutions usually insist that participants in electoral process manifest a level of commitment to core liberal democratic norms (such as the rule of law, toleration, the equal worth of each individual and the peaceful resolution of grievances). In the case of intolerant, extremist parties that would reject some/most of these norms, the state may invoke a range of defensive measures up to and including proscription in order to safeguard democracy. This paper takes as its focus the constitutional issues raised by the banning in Spain of Batasuna – the political wing of ETA. A legal challenge to the ban is currently before the European Court of Human Rights. Making reference to work of John Rawls, this paper considers whether the ban on Batasuna is justifiable in terms of liberal political theory, before analysing the extent to which proscription conforms to international human rights law and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence.