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‘An Embarrassment to the Congresses?’: The Silencing of Chief Albert Luthuli and the Production of ANC History

2007 was the ‘Year of Luthuli’ in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Throughout the year, events commemorating the 1967 death of the former President-General of the ANC celebrated his life and contribution to the liberation of South Africa. A year later, during the presidential succession battle various politicians paid tribute to Luthuli, positioning themselves as heirs to his political and moral legacy. Celebrated as a ‘founding father’ of South Africa's modern democratic state, who had led the ANC during some of the most dramatic events in its history and as Africa's first Nobel Peace Prize winner, Luthuli's name conjures awe and respect. Unsurprisingly, Luthuli has been assigned a prominent place in the process of nationalist myth making. This article is inspired by Michel Rolph Trouillot's, Silencing the Past: Power and Production of History (1995) and highlights the contrast between the present lionisation of Luthuli as a nationalist founding figure and the effective silencing of his stance on the shift to violence soon after the launch of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) in December 1961. I argue that a silence in the archives is not primarily a result of poor health or the banning orders imposed on Luthuli, but rather of his embarrassingly persistent espousal of non-violent methods that led to his marginalisation as a leader of the ANC in the early 1960s. An examination of Luthuli's columns in the Golden City Post reveals that he argued against a turn to violence before and after the ANC's decision to prepare for the armed struggle and MK's launch. Luthuli's continued public advocacy of only non-violent methods discomfited many of his contemporaries. Consequently, his ability to lead the liberation movement was compromised and diminished significantly from 1961 until his death six years later. Narratives by former MK operatives affirm Luthuli's prescience regarding the strategic ineffectiveness of violence. Finally, the article demonstrates the inaccuracy of the self-justifying portrayals of Luthuli as a supporter of the armed struggle by both nationalist historians and politicians.