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U.S. Army's Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress

In what the Army describes as the " most significant Army restructuring in the past 50 years, " the Army intends to redesign its current 10 active duty division force to a 43 or 48 brigade-level unit of action or UA force by FY2007. The Army National Guard will also redesign its force structure in a similar fashion. While the Army cites the need for a more responsive, deployable, joint, and expeditionary force, others suggest that the primary reason for redesign is the ever increasing long term troop requirements to support the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The addition of up to 15 additional active duty and a yet to be finalized number of Army National Guard brigade-sized UAs could provide an additional force pool of deployable units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations. The Army has two other concurrent initiatives underway which it considers inextricably linked to its brigade-centric redesign — restructuring to create new " high demand " units and stabilizing the force. Both initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and personnel changes from FY2004-FY2009. Many experts believe that modular redesign, selective restructuring, and stabilizing of the Army are prudent actions that should provide the Army with additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their families. As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise, many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and reserve forces. While the Army has some specific planning and cost information for converting its combat forces, some analysts suggest that more needs to be done for support units of action both in the active Army and the reserves. This planning is considered crucial in light of evidence suggesting that the Army may have to contend with personnel and selected equipment shortages which could impede plans to build this new force. Some analysts and government officials also question the viability of the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) which is intended to be the focal point of the so-called Future Forces. The Army contends that the FCS will enable the UAs to be even more deployable, effective, lethal, and manpower efficient than current redesigned units of action. Restructuring and stability also raise a number of concerns. Some experts suggest that the Army will have to significantly change how …