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Information Salience and Mispricing in Housing

Making the purchase price fully salient to consumers has been shown to affect demand and equilibrium prices in various markets. Using a setting where part of the home acquisition price is in the form of nonsalient debt, we show this can happen in housing—a market where a typical household makes its largest acquisition. A regulation that made the debt and the total price salient for homebuyers eliminated a large mispricing caused by consumers’ inattention to the debt before the regulation. An average homebuyer would lose about $13,300 by acquiring a dwelling with one-standard deviation ($51,000)-higher debt, but this is nearly eliminated after the regulation. To shed light on the underlying channels, we use administrative data and show that young, financially inexperienced, and first-time homebuyers used to overpay the most. The results are not driven by rational channels based on liquidity constraints and adverse selection. Our findings imply that making all-inclusive house price and mortgage features salient at the time of advertising the sale can help avoid unintentional borrowing. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.