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A comparative investigation of metadiscursive clarifying devices in the abortion discourse of the U.S. Supreme Court

Based on previous research that identified metadiscursive clarifiers as a means of discursive control and subversion, this study investigates the use of the devices in the abortion discourse of the U.S. Supreme court. It examines four sub-genres of judicial opinion (majority opinions, dissents, regular concurrences, and special concurrences) and their contribution to the development of this area of law. The quantitative analysis reveals that the separate opinions contained significantly more clarifying devices than the majority opinions. This represented a missed opportunity for majority writers to control positions asserted in separate opinions. More qualitatively oriented analysis shows the use of the devices as reflecting the nature of the sub-genres examined: regular concurrence writers used clarifiers to support the majority opinion; special concurrence and dissent writers both used clarifiers to attack the majority opinion. The analysis also reveals that clarifiers often reveal prescient tensions within the law; positions expressed with the use of the devices often became majority positions in subsequent cases.