{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.015917602996254682, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.179190751445087, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
III. THE LOGIC OF NUCLEAR RESTRAINT

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the broad conditions in which nuclear restraint at low numbers could contribute to international security, establishing the principles and definitions upon which more detailed policy implications are then developed in the next chapter. Until all nuclear-armed states are willing to agree to abolish their nuclear weapons together, nuclear restraint at low numbers may be the best way to minimise, as far as possible, the risks of nuclear conflict. If political circumstances between the major powers improve sufficiently, nuclear restraint at low numbers might one day provide a jumping-off point from which to move to nuclear abolition more rapidly, and with greater confidence than in a strictly time-bound framework. More likely, and perhaps for some decades, it could also provide a path through which those states which currently possess nuclear capabilities maintain a small arsenal, but within a framework that further restricts their role and reduces the potential for arms racing.