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Political Systems in Canada and Other Western Democracies Charles Burton and Jiang Peng, eds. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1995, pp. vi, 198

ity in their advocacy of flexible exchange rates as the key to international economic stability. As all good books do, Webb's work raises some questions for further study and analysis. The options available for middle-to-small economic powers such as Canada appear very limited. How much autonomy, if any, do such states retain in defining domestic macro-economic objectives in the late 1990s? What importance do domestic political arrangements make to the overall likelihood of direct coordination? Webb hints at the impact of stalemate in the US separation-of-powers system and at the importance of the policy autonomy of the Deutsche Bundesbank. More work could be done on making domestic political institutions an integral part of the analysis. Finally, almost in passing, Webb remarks that behind the increased capital mobility are a set of private actors whose power has increased dramatically: international banks and transnational corporations. Are there any arrangements for policy coordination between nation-states that would allow governments to define a political agenda distinct from that preferred by these economic powers? Webb's review of attempts at direct coordination by governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s leaves virtually no room for optimism about such governmental autonomy.