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Methodology in the Philosophy of Linguistics

Both Louise Antony (‘Meta-Linguistics: Methodology and Ontology in Devitt’s Ignorance of Language’) and Paul Pietroski (‘Think of the Children’) are committed to a Chomskian perspective on linguistics. My book, Ignorance of Language [2006a], argues for fourteen theses, seven ‘major conclusions’ and seven ‘tentative proposals’, many of which are, or at least seem to be, decidedly unChomskian. Antony’s paper is largely a trenchant criticism of my methodology. Pietroski’s paper is also critical of that methodology. I aim to show, in part II, how misguided these criticisms are. But I also want to return the favour. So, throughout this paper, I aim to expose the methodological flaws of my critics. There is a pattern to Chomskian criticisms of Ignorance. The pattern is one of misrepresentation, ex cathedra pronouncements, relentlessly uncharitable readings, and a wearingly impolite tone. Papers by John Collins [2007, 2008a,b], Peter Slezak [2007], and Barry Smith [2006] are paradigms; for responses, see Devitt [2006c, 2007, 2008a,b]. Antony’s paper is another paradigm. Pietroski’s is unusual in its civility. The main focus of these critics, including Antony and Pietroski, has been on the book’s first major conclusion: ‘Linguistics is not part of psychology’ [40]. I later called this ‘the linguistic conception’ of linguistics/grammars. It stands in contrast to the Chomskian ‘psychological conception’ [2006c: 571]. I shall defend the linguistic conception in part I.