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Self-Awareness and the Subject-Object

This chapter discusses various interpretations of self-awareness, including its meaning as the beginning and culmination of Mind-Only’s phenomenological analysis. It also discusses the ways this notion has been criticized as simply another conceptual construct. Self-awareness can refer to an intransitive cognition and an intrinsic property of all awarenesses. It can also take the form of an objective or absolute idealism, as a metaphysical claim. Self-awareness has an important place in the Yogācāra tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and it functions as a precondition for knowledge. Some Tibetans like Śākya Chokden took up this trajectory of Buddhist epistemology to affirm self-awareness as ultimate gnosis, the ultimate source of knowledge. In contrast, Tsongkhapa followed Candrakīrti in denying self-awareness. He did not build his Buddhist system upon this kind of epistemology or phenomenology. Rather, his system is driven by the critical ontology of Madhyamaka.