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Congress and War Powers: Symbolism and Nondecisions in the Struggle for Influence

ABSTRACT This article focuses on war powers issues during the Clinton presidency to test the theory of nondecision-making as developed by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and Lukes (1974). The first section clarifies key theoretical concepts (mobilization of bias and barrier I and barrier II nondecisions) and argues that war powers issues constitute “key issues” in Bachrach and Baratz's terms, thus permitting the formulation of falsifiable nondecision hypotheses. The second section presents four in-depth case studies of troop deployment conflicts from the Clinton administration: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The third section analyzes the evidence from the four Clinton era cases, revealing a preponderance of nondecisions and essentially symbolic nonbinding resolutions (Edelman 1967; Hinckley 1994). The third section also identifies four mechanisms for deflecting challenges to the prevailing distribution of power (Bachrach and Baratz 1970, 44–48) and shows how all four were employed to deflect challenges to presidential primacy in the various Clinton cases. Following Oppenheimer (1974), the concluding section will offer an expanded vocabulary for classifying various forms of nondecision-making.