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Stable Allocations and the Practice of Market Design

This paper presents an overview of the significant contributions made by the two Nobel Prize winners of this year, viz., Lord Shapley and Galvin Roth. The broad area of their contributions deals with the challenges of allocation when price is not available and markets do not fulfil the conditions of perfect competition. Both the scholars have developed the concepts of stability in allocations and the approach of deferred-acceptance procedure in the context of market design. The combination of game theory, empirical observations and controlled experiments has led to the development of an empirical science with many important practical applications. Their theory has been found useful in many practical problems of allocations and assignments. This paper is the usual technical paper prepared by the Nobel Prize Committee summarising the contributions made by the Nobel awardees. It has been reproduced here with the academic objective of encouraging further research and discussions on the themes dealt with here.