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Sole Representatives in War and Peace: The Case of Sri Lanka’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

ABSTRACT This paper examines the hitherto unexplored subject of nonstate rebels seeking the status of sole representatives. Why do nonstate armed groups seek the status of sole representatives?, What strategies do they employ to achieve the status of sole representatives?, Is the status merely symbolic, or does it fetch tangible benefits? These research questions are explored by treating Sri Lanka’s LTTE as a case study. Primary and secondary data formed the basis of the analysis. The LTTE used three strategies to achieve a hegemonic disposition within the Tamil community. They are: (1) elimination of rival groups, (2) incorporation of some groups, and (3) battlefield efficacy. The rebels used the claim of sole representation to ensure bilateral talks with the government, get the ban on it lifted, and control the proposed interim administrative structure. The strategy worked to a certain extent, but at least partially contributed to its downfall in 2009.