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An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment

ONE Of the primary arguments for punishing individuals who commit crimes is that the threat of such punishment backed by the actual punishment of convicted offenders will deter criminal acts.1 It is our intention in this paper to analyze in some detail the deterrent effect of punishment by imprisonment. Specifically we employ a variant of the utility formulation suggested in our earlier article2 to develop a deterrence framework appropriate for studying choices involving possible imprisonment. Using this framework we are able to explain the relative deterrent effects of certainty and severity in punishment without imputing any special behavioral characteristics to the class of individuals who commit offences. In addition, we are able to examine the effect on the individual's willingness to engage in crime of changes in the individual's initial wealth and payoff to crime, as well as provide a straightforward explanation of plea bargaining.