{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.013878180416345412, 'fraction_numerical': 0.01233616037008481, 'mean_word_length': 5.037209302325581, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
The Bank of Greece and the Management of the Inter-War Crisis, 1929-1940: Changing the Central Banking Paradigm

The Bank of Greece was established as a central banking institution just one year before the crash of the New York Stock Exchange in order to guarantee monetary stability as a prerequisite for Greece’s borrowing at the international markets. Its infancy was inevitably linked to the Inter-War economic turmoil and the changing policy frameworks from open commodity markets and capital mobility to autarky and limited capital flows. It was also affected by the failure of the gold exchange standard to act as a comprehensive post-War international monetary system. This paper sets the issue of the Bank of Greece’s response to the changing economic and institutional conditions during the crisis decade of the 1930s. The argument is that the policy framework followed by the Bank can be explained in the context of a changing central banking model that characterized its operation. In this transformation, except international influences on domestic economy, the banking environment which accompanied the implementation of this model in Greece during the 1930s had a crucial role to play. The argument is supported by a critical assessment of the Minutes of the Bank’s General Council.