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Review: Nicholas Rescher, Plausible Reasoning. An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Plausibilistic Inference

to be a "quasi-universal" disposition. The having of <j> nomically entails the having of tj/ iff (Vx)(4>?x D (ip/4>)x). A counterfactual of the form "if it had been that <£x, then it would have been that i/rx " is taken to be true iff x has the dispositional property (il>/<f>). In the final chapter the author argues that a "conceptualistic" approach to necessity and possibility is the only viable one. It is maintained that any careful analysis of the meaning of modal notions ultimately requires the introduction of mental capacities. Consider a dispositional property. We characterize it in terms of what an individual that exemplifies it would do in certain non-actual circumstances. This characterization introduces a kind of hypothetical consideration which, the author feels, can be explicated only in mentalistic terms. An analysis of "what would happen if" must ultimately be given in terms of what it is possible for a mind to conceive. Talk about possibility can thus be reduced to talk about the actual capabilities of actual minds. Against this one could argue that there is an important sense in which at least some modal notions are mind independent. To say e.g. that x is water soluble is to predicate a property of x. It is true that this property is often characterized by talk about what x would do if placed in water. It does not follow from this, however, that the predicated property is "mind dependent." It does not follow that the truth-conditions for 'x is water soluble' must contain a reference to mental capacities. Two final points. As indicated, properties play a fundamental role in the proposed theory. Unfortunately there is very little discussion of, for example, the problems surrounding the individuation of properties. Since supernumeraries are individuated via their properties, this omission is an important one. The author's use of the phrase 'mere possibility' is inconsistent. Initially a mere possibility is a possibility involving a supernumerary. In the last chapter a mere possibility covers any possible but non-actual entity. Although not a serious error, this does lead to some easily avoidable confusion.