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Epistocracy or Democracy

The case for epistocracy rests on the assumption that identifiable experts tend to be better truth trackers than the electorate. The case is typically weak because large numbers of only minimally competent voters are difficult to beat and unbiased experts are hard to identify in advance. Sample calculations demonstrate that enfranchising more voters is often epistemically advantageous, even if additional voters are less competent. To deal with less-competent voters, it has been suggested that votes be weighted by competence. This strategy works, but the effects tend to be limited. Looking from the perspective of the Best Responder Corollary (Chapter 5), there are reasons why smaller groups can beat larger groups and vice versa, depending on which group faces a more truth-conducive decision problem. A final argument in favour of universal franchise is that voters learn from experience and thereby improve their competence.