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Who Wrote Nietzsche’s Autobiography?

In contemporary discussions of practical reasoning and moral theory, unity of agency receives, at any rate within the analytic tradition, a worshipful deference that ought to be uncharacteristic of philosophy. For instance, it is argued that whenever there is a choice to be made, a unified agent must be on hand, and so arguments about practical reasoning may treat unity of agency as a starting point; or again, a properly assembled agent is unified, and so unity is something that you can demand of an agent in something like the way you can demand of a house that it have no holes in the roof; or yet again, freedom of the will has been analyzed as a form of practical unity, making agential unity an indispensible precondition for what is thought to