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2 Undermining Strong Physicalism : Multiple Realizability

A key problem in contemporary philosophy of mind is the conflict between two viewpoints: On the one hand, there seems to be a convincing argument against strong physicalism, i.e. the view that mental states or properties can be identified with certain physical states or properties (e.g. brain states); this is the argument from multiple realizability. On the other hand, there is a certain line of reasoning, based on causal considerations, which seems to show that mental properties must be identical with physical properties: this is the exclusion argument. This tension, and how to best resolve it, is the topic of this paper.