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The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in South Korean Corporate Governance: Some Empirical Evidence

South Korea, one of East Asia's most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the" chaebol" and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea's corporate governance system have been blamed for the country's economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for "good" corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea's financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country's corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; "chaebol's" accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the "chaebol's" activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002.