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Theory for the Working Sociologist

departure from the standard focus among analysts on post-1960 trends). The authors find evidence that nonvoting can be categorized into four periods. The first period (from 1920 to 1944) is characterized by low nonvoting and driven by uncertainties over new social programs, the Great Depression, and the rise of radio technology. The second period (from 1946 to 1972) also witnessed low rates of nonvoting. However, the drivers of uncertainty during this period are different from the first period. Economic growth, the Civil Rights movement, the Vietnam War, and television technology came together to create a broadbased sense of insecurity over the future. The third period (from 1974 to 1990) saw a dramatic increase in nonvoting. As national scandals and international crises retreated from the national conscience, uncertainty over the future ebbed, and a general malaise set in. The fourth and final period (from 1992 to 2012) witnessed a return to low levels of nonvoting. In this period, internet technology—along with economic restructuring, globalization, and party polarization— created new uncertainties that propelled individuals to the voting booths. A common theme in these chapters is how historical forces have combined in different ways to either increase or decrease uncertainty within the population. For example, international conflict does not always produce uncertainty. Instead, it can produce uncertainty, and whether it does depends on the presence of other conditions, such as new technologies that ‘‘bring the war home.’’ Similarly, institutional change and conflict can create uncertainty at certain points in time (as they did with the women’s suffrage and civil rights movements), but not others (as with youth voting in the 1970s). Also relevant is how Ragsdale and Rusk conceptualize uncertainty in historically contingent terms—some periods are calm only by comparison to the periods that come before them. Without Watergate, the Iran Contra scandal might have been more disconcerting and might have convinced more people to vote. By contrast, without Vietnam, the Iraq War might not have seemed as indeterminate and might not have convinced people to head to the voting booth. Overall, The American Nonvoter is impressive. It enters a research area—the study of voter turnout—that has been a focus of political analysts for decades and manages to make a strong contribution, in both theoretical and empirical terms. The proposition that uncertainty—rather than habits, pocketbooks, political parties, or college degrees— drives individuals to vote is novel and compelling. It provides scholars with a new way to look at old questions and lays the groundwork for future scholarship to glean additional insights into the causes of voter turnout. The focus on voter turnout from 1920 to 2012 is also important. By expanding the scope of study to include elections prior to 1960, Ragsdale and Rusk deftly show that the low turnout levels that correspond to the ‘‘post-1960 turnout decline’’ were actually deviations from a more general pattern of robust turnout levels and that recent elections have more in common with the elections of the 1950s and 1960s than elections of the 1970s and 1980s. The American Nonvoter is also timely. Over the past few years, individuals in the United States and other affluent democracies have been forced to come to terms with the rise of nationalist social movements. These movements have become more popular, and several right-wing political parties have adopted their messages. While it remains unclear what will happen to these movements, The American Nonvoter suggests more individuals will help decide their electoral fate.