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Caught in the middle of the transatlantic security dilemma. Great Britain, the United States and Western European security, 1970–1973

The article investigates British attitudes towards transatlantic security through the analysis of the British approach to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Prevention of Nuclear War agreement, the debate on the burden-sharing question and the ill-fated ‘Year of Europe’ initiative. In a period of American disengagement from Western Europe and superpower condominium London attempted to play the role of the bridge between the United States and the European allies in order to defuse doubts and uncertainties which risked of undermining the very pillars of the transatlantic security structure. The British attempts achieved mixed results and eventually left London caught in the middle of the European and Atlantic dimension of its foreign policy.