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Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East , vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995). Pp. 303.

and welfare programs and defense purchases. In Jordan and Yemen, the repatriation of workers and population transfers have created more substantial economic challenges. Faour examines the political reforms undertaken in Arab states during the past decade before considering the prospects for future democratic expansion (Chap. 3). He concludes that the increased post-crisis U.S. influence is unlikely to bolster the position of regional pro-democracy popular forces in the near future and that, by and large, government-instituted political "changes have created merely a facade of democracy" in what remain essentially authoritarian political systems (p. 36). The case studies in this section (with the exception of Saudi Arabia) primarily provide a pre-1990 historical political review that only marginally considers actual and potential political changes, at both the popular and the government levels, brought about by the Gulf crisis. In considering the "Decline of Pan-Arabism and Rise of Islamism" (chap. 4), Faour notes that both the end of the Cold War and the onset of the Gulf crisis served to strengthen national identities and weaken transnational ideologies in the Arab world. At the same time, the Gulf crisis has furthered the growing popular influence of politicized Islam in several countries, including Egypt and Algeria. In Chapter 5, "Atomization of the Arab Regional System," Faour describes the changes in alliance, the reduction in the influence and role of regional blocs and organizations, and the increase in interstate territorial and resource-based tensions that have occurred in the Arab world since 1990. He concludes that "relations among Arab states continue to be heavily influenced by their wartime positions" (p. 81), and that the changing regional policies and positions of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria will have important consequences for shaping future interArab relations. The final chapter examines the challenges of popular legitimacy that face Arab regimes as well as post-1991 Arab-Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. Faour believes that "the war has created more problems than it has solved," leaving the Arab world "more dependent on external assistance and more inclined toward internal belligerence" (pp. 99-100). The Arab World after Desert Storm contributes to the growing literature examining the postGulf crisis Arab world. Its thematic structure, case studies, and incorporation of relevant historical overviews make it a suitable supplementary work for a college-level audience. Overall, Faour strikes an effective balance between macro-oriented overviews and representative case studies. However, given the complexity and significance of the subject matter, this reader would have preferred more comprehensive case studies, especially a greater concentration on the post1991 period, in the chapters dealing with democratic political reform and popular Islamic movements (chaps. 3 and 4, respectively). A more systematic discussion of the impact of U.S. influence and policies on inter-Arab relations in Chapter 5 would also have been useful.