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Bargaining for Justice: The Origins of Adjudicatory Institutions in Latin America

Why adjudicatory systems take the institutional form they do? I argue that the creation of adjudicatory institutions depends on the extent of, and the balance of forces in, the constitution-making process. The number of changes to adjudicatory institutions is likely to be higher when new constitutions are enacted than when existing constitutions are amended. But whether those changes empower adjudicatory institutions depends on the bargaining among political groups in a multilateral constitution-making process. Strong constitutional adjudication systems, independent judicial councils, and autonomous prosecutorial organs are more likely to be created as products of such bargains because these institutions help solving commitment problems, reduce the stakes in future electoral battles, and protect minorities. I find empirical support for these hypotheses based on an original dataset on constitutions and amendments produced by eighteen Latin American countries from 1950 to 2002.