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Parfit on the Irrelevance of Deontological Distinctions

This chapter concerns Derek Parfit’s discussion in his On What Matters, volume 3 of the irrelevance of deontological distinctions. Parfit begins by expressing his concern that morality will be undermined because practical reason, which tells us all things considered what to do, will often conflict with what we consider to be morally right. Unlike Sidgwick, Parfit does not begin by identifying morality with a part of impartial practical reason but rather with what he considers common sense deontology. Also, unlike Sidgwick, he thinks it is clear that sometimes self-interest (which provides some reason even impartially considered) is overridden by (other) impartial practical reasons (e.g., there is decisive reason to give one’s penny to save millions of other people). This chapter first considers how Parfit thinks one’s practical reason should reconcile concerns about self-sacrifice, pursuing the greater good, and morality. It then considers his use of case-based reasoning to undermine moral principles embodying such distinctions as harming versus not aiding, harming as a mere means versus as a side effect, and redirecting threats (as in the Trolley Problem) versus starting new ones.