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The Concept of Aggression in International Law. By Thomas Ann Van Wynen and Thomas A. J. Jr. (Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1972). Pp. 92. $6.95.)

The Concept of Aggression in International Law. By Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. (Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1972). Pp. 92. $6.95.) This volume traces the history of attempts to define aggression in international law by national actors and implicitly reveals the problems of determining specific norms of behavior in global politics. While the book is a worthy documentation of these efforts and does provide useful material for studying the dilemmas of international norm construction, the authors do not utilize the information they present to develop a framework for understanding the problems of developing legal norms of international political behavior, leaving this task to other scholars. The first chapter briefly describes the arguments for and against legally defining such behaviors, including disagreements in the literature about which kind of definition might be most useful. Arguments against definition include: (1) Agreement would not be possible; (2) national actors use formal attempts to define aggression as propaganda forums; (3) any agreement would be artificial, bringing violations that would weaken the symbolic power of international law; (4) a definition would advise actors on how legally to commit aggression; (5) since technology might provide new means of committing aggression, any legal definition of the behavior would soon become obsolete. The case for defining aggression argues that definitions clearly restrict the behavior of national actors. Despite the ambiguities present in a definition, the possibility of being labeled a wrongdoer would inhibit the commission of acts that could be labeled aggression. The authors clearly favor this argument, and it has considerable support in the social science literature. Since the perceived social cost of behavior is a major determinant of the behavior, actors tend not to behave in ways that may be considered illegitimate. While a clear legal definition of aggression may inhibit aggressive acts due to social cost, however, violations will occur if the perceived reward (e.g., perceived national interest involved) is greater than the perceived cost. Such violations might serve to reduce the power and status of legal norms, weakening the structure of international law itself. The important consideration is under what conditions will national behavior be restricted by legal definitions? To answer this question would require a thorough analysis of the political structure and climate of the global political system and of the political and diplomatic culture operating in international interactions (e.g., Walbek, "The Global Public Political Culture," Peace Research Reviews, V, No. 2, Nov. 1973). Unfortunately, the authors do not link their discussion to the political context and hence, do not help us assess the potential restrictive power of a legal definition of aggression.