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THE STRUCTURE OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS : EVIDENCE FROM AUTO DEALERSHIPS 1

We present an initial analysis of a rich dataset on incentive contracts, performance, organizational policies, and behavioral indicators from auto dealerships. We first provide a description of the form of actual incentive contracts. We then analyze the determinants of objective and discretionary bonuses. We highlight the importance of properties of the performance measure for the bonus placed on it. We examine evidence for multitask incentives, trying to discern if bonuses are used to rebalance incentives and reduce distortions from other bonuses. Similarly we examine the determinants and uses of subjective performance evaluations. Finally, we provide some evidence on the relationship between decentralization and provision of objective and subjective incentives.