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Dynamic spectrum leasing with user-determined traffic segmentation

In this paper, we consider the scenario where a secondary operator leases licensed spectrum from a spectrum owner and then serves its end users with both licensed and unlicensed bands. An end user can decide its traffic segmentation in terms of the percentage of its total amount of traffic demand transmitted via licensed and unlicensed band respectively. The optimal spectrum investment and pricing decision of the secondary operator is studied considering the user-determined traffic segmentation. We model and analyze the interactions among the spectrum owner, the secondary operator and the end users with Stackelberg game. By deriving optimal strategies for the three types of game players, we show that the end users can increase their utility by determining a proper traffic segmentation on the licensed and unlicensed band considering both the service price and the quality of service (QoS). Also the secondary operator and the spectrum owner can make more profit leveraging dynamic spectrum leasing.