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Clarifications of the Descriptive/Normative Distinction in Dubljević and Racine's “The ADC of Moral Judgment”

a distinct, separate process from the intuitions described earlier). In conclusion, the ADCmodel offers an exciting opportunity to test the interactions between agency, deeds, and consequences not only in normal subjects but also in neurological patients where dissociation of the influence of each factor in different patient groups can add validity to psychological theories regarding moral judgments. Existing evidence from patients argues against a separation of agency from deeds and suggests instead that deontological rules inherently involve determinations of intentional states of agents. Character virtues might contribute, along with current intentions of the agent and the severity of the deed, toward the heuristic of “moral goodness” and blameworthiness of the agent based on predictions of future social behavior, separate from consequentialist intuitions, which focus on the action and subsequent causative effects but not on the agents themselves. Further empirical data from both patients and normal subjects is needed to determine the validity of such an approach.