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A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries – CORRIGENDUM

If we introduce length as an additional variable, the correct way of thinking is to consider amendment frequency and constitutional rigidity together, because amendment procedures are engaged despite the fact that the constitution is “locked.” One might expect that the sum of amendment frequency and constitutional rigidity is more or less the same for different constitutional lengths, since one compensates for the other. Yet, Figure 3 shows a different picture, one of a very strong and significant positive relationship between length and the combination of constitutional rigidity and amendment frequency. We produced this figure by normalizing the two variables presented in Appendix B, to account for differences in scale in each of the two variables (both variables are positively related to length, but we wanted to ensure that one would not have higher significance than the other because of the units of measurement). As long as amendment frequency is highly dependent on length, even mildly negative slopes of constitutional rigidity (for another sample of countries, or with a different indicator of rigidity) would produce the same result. Later, we present a more rigorous explanation for this relationship.