{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.020578778135048232, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 5.706896551724138, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Options and Challenges of a Resilience-Based, Network-Focused Port Security Grant Program

Abstract The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) allocates federal funding to maritime critical infrastructure and key resources (MCIKR) to reduce terrorist attack risk. The PSGP currently emphasizes protecting against attacks, before they happen. However, for the last several years the trend in critical infrastructure risk analysis has been resilience. Resilience often includes examining how a system can restore after a disruption, as opposed to only examining how to prevent disruptions. Accordingly, PSGP policy has evolved to emphasize resilience but with no clear guidance on how to implement a resilience-based approach. This paper therefore discusses considerations to help PSGP stakeholders. First it explains why MCIKR should be modeled as components of supply chains. It then explains why the current mathematical theory underpinning the PSGP is insufficient for a resilience-based, network-focused PSGP. This paper then explores risk-based and network interdiction theories and modeling options that could be leveraged to support allocation of PSGP grants in order to influence supply chain resilience. It proposes a conceptual solution that leverages principles from both approaches, and offers definitions of quantifiable resilience. This proposed solution allows the quantification of deterrence effects of resilience-based grant allocations. Finally, it offers specific recommendations for PSGP stakeholders.