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Addressing the Gaps-Promise and Performance, Synthesis and Purity, Large-N and Small-N: A Response to Moore

In his recent Review Essay, "Synthesis v. Purity and Large-N Studies: How Might We Assess the Gap between Promise and Performance?," Will Moore explores the large issues concerning the gap between the promise and performance of international human rights norms and institutions, the trade-offs between theoretical synthesis and purity, and the utility of large-N statistical analysis. I am naturally flattered and honored that my new book, Protecting Human Rights (2005a), features as a lens through which Moore centers his examination. And, I am in agreement with most of what Moore has to say with direct reference to the book. Indeed, who could possibly object to having his or her book described as a landmark study, as having high quality statistical work that sets a new standard, and as having a model specification that cannot be ignored in future research in this field? Moore also appears convinced by the general inference that international human rights instruments have a significant but limited impact on the actual human rights practices of states--a finding which is conditioned by larger processes of democratization, development, and global interdependence. Where Moore and I do differ, however, is on the degree to which different theories at the domestic and international level can be synthesized and on the overall utility of large-N statistical analysis for establishing substantive inferences that may be useful for policy advice and action to be taken by human rights practitioners. My brief response to Moore's essay addresses these two concerns in turn. My own intellectual formation was borne of a quest to move beyond what Gabriel Almond (1990) called the "separate tables" of political science and to confront political puzzles using the insights provided by different theories. I have thus been heavily influenced by Mark Lichbach's (1997) attempt to unify rational, structural, and cultural perspectives at the domestic level through Talcott Parson's idea of the "socially embedded unit act," where any understanding of individual choice must take into account the social structures and ideational environment in which individuals make such choices. Having been engaged in comparative research for many years, Protecting Human Rights provided an extra theoretical challenge in looking at state action in a similar fashion. Indeed, it seemed largely unhelpful to view state action in some kind of vacuum, where ideas and structures had no bearing. In this way, Wendt's (1999) attempt to unify the material and ideational theories of international relations and Ruggie's (1982) notion of "embedded liberalism" proved particularly attractive in trying to explain the overall growth and effectiveness of the international human rights regime. The international human rights regime presents a significant puzzle for political science, since the human rights community has "constructed" the regime through the vehicle of inter-state treaty instruments in order to constrain the actions of states towards their own citizens (Donnelly 1999). This notion of constrained state action applies to the international and national levels of analysis since norms articulated at the international level and their accompanying (albeit weak) structures for enforcement are meant to limit state action at the domestic level. Moore claims that my attempt to synthesize large theoretical literatures from comparative politics, international relations, and international law to address this puzzle ultimately fails to specify the causal mechanisms at work that may explain the exact ways in which state action is constrained. He claims further that, at best, my attempt is a useful insight for why we might expect the international human rights regime to matter for the actual protection of human rights. He is correct in identifying the absence of causal mechanisms, which in part is a function of the nature of the analysis (and the way in which I circumscribe the study so as to make it manageable). …