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Representing the Unrepresentable: Making Law Anyway?

Abstract “Representation crisis” is certainly an expression that is too imprecise, clichéd and all-embracing: of little use. However, we have to recognize that the theatrical and literary experiments that shook the classical notion of representation in the twentieth century have been fruitful, not only in the arts, but also in terms of their repercussions in the human sciences. Law is no exception to this. On the contrary, its eminently representative nature benefits from being examined in the mirror of the critical experiments provided by fiction. This is, in a very condensed form, the initial postulate that will underpin our hypothesis, which will consist in showing the usefulness of investigating the notion of representation in law through art and literary theory, as well as through examples drawn from concrete theatrical and fictional works, owing to the light theatre and fiction can shed on the fragile balance, the “representational” razor, on which the law rests.