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Interim Measures in EU Competition Cases: Origins, Evolution and Implications for Digital Markets

Interim measures are among the most powerful and intrusive enforcement tools that are available to competition authorities in the EU. Pending the outcome of investigations, they can be used to ensure that effective competition is maintained and irreparable damage averted. The paper explores the origins and evolution of interim measures in EU competition law cases and draws lessons on the future use of this tool in the context of digital markets. It argues that the recent revival of interim measures in Broadcom may ultimately displace the European Commission’s increased reliance on Article 9, Regulation 1/2003 commitment decisions for a supposedly swift resolution of complex cases. Interim measures may be more suitable than commitment decisions in digital markets with network effects, where there is a serious risk that a competition law infringement will have an irreversible impact on competition and the market structure. But, as the paper argues, their use may be hampered by the significant constraints imposed by EU Courts on the ability of the Commission to adopt interim relief.