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Explaining the Collapse of Communism in Poland: Strategic Misperceptions and Unanticipated Outcomes

The Polish communist party did not get what it bargained for at the Round Table in the spring of 1989; its negotiators did not envisage that the Round Table process would result in the collapse of communist power. While there was a range of opinions within the PUWP elite about their strategic goals, a number of key players both sought and offered incremental and controlled institutional change as a quid pro quo for Solidarity's support for economic reform. The PUWP precipitated its own collapse by making strategic calculations based on misperceived assessments of the party's electoral support, and by ignoring expert advice on elections. Its choice of a majoritarian electoral law was just one mistake in a matrix of decisions over institutional choices that produced outcomes that the PUWP had not sought nor foreseen. Relying on the establishment of a powerful presidency to retain power, the party's negotiators failed to see that the institution offered to secure the opposition's agreement to the presidency - a freely elected Senate - would in fact produce an unanticipated and unwelcome outcome. The PUWP's strategic misperception precipitated electoral defeat and its own eventual dissolution.