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Competency of the mentally retarded to stand trial: new rules from the Supreme Court.

ONE of the continuing fallacies in the law of most American jurisdictions is the assumption that mental retardation and mental illness are the same thing for legal purposes. The fallacy is reinforced by the location in many states of retardation programs in state agencies for mental health operated by psychiatrists. An impressive and influential blow was struck for a more specific examination of legal issues in mental retardation in a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court. In Jackson vs. Indiana1 a retarded 27-year-old deaf mute was charged with two minor robberies. A question of his mental competency to . . .