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WHO IS REALLY PAYING FOR YOUR PARKING SPACE ? ESTIMATING THE MARGINAL IMPLICIT VALUE OF OFF-STREET PARKING SPACES FOR CONDOMINIUMS IN CENTRAL EDMONTON , CANADA By

Many large North American cities impose minimum parking space requirements on multi-family residential developments. There is concern that the high costs to developers of providing these spaces are raising housing prices in such complexes. Because there is not a well-developed formal market for parking places, this paper attempts to estimate the implicit price of parkade-style (aboveground or underground parking garages) parking spaces for condominiums located in central Edmonton, Canada. Using two real estate data sets, this paper employs the hedonic method and tests for the presence of heteroskedasticity and spatial autocorrelation, when possible. Based on the results for one data set, the marginal effect of an additional parkade-style parking space on the predicted condominium price was statistically significant but substantially less than the typical cost of supplying that space. Using the other data set, the number of parkade-style parking spaces variable was found to be statistically insignificant, which suggests that this attribute is not an important real housing price determinant and therefore that the marginal implicit value of parkade-style parking spaces is less than the substantial costs associated with providing such spaces. Overall, the results suggest that consumers of those spaces are receiving a large discount on bundled parkade-style parking spaces, meaning that if the retail price is increased due to the inclusion of additional parking spaces, the higher price does not fully reflect the cost to the developer of providing those parking spaces. Housing affordability, nonetheless, may still be adversely affected as developers, who are likely burdened with some of this indirect parking subsidy, may ultimately provide less housing to the market, thus leading to a higher market-clearing price. Therefore, this paper provides further empirical evidence towards the argument against the use of minimum parking requirements as they are likely to cause an oversupply of parking at multi-family residential developments. TABLE OF CONTENTS