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Prospects for a central Asian nuclear‐weapon‐free zone

The initiative for a Central Asian Nuclear-WeaponFree Zone (CAN WFZ) now appears to have come full circle. When it was first proposed in 1993, its realization appeared improbable, if not Utopian. Four years later, in 1997, when the five Central Asian presidents endorsed the concept in the Almaty Declaration, and the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution supporting it, the prospects for the establishment of a CANWFZ appeared solid. At the end of 2000, however, its prospects again look gloomy. Developments since 1999, including the increased importance of nuclear weapons in Russian national security policy and the resurgence of regional rivalries and insurgencies in the Central Asian region, have combined to place the establishment of a CANWFZ in serious doubt. Although the Central Asian states have negotiated almost all of a draft treaty establishing a CANWFZ, they have reached deadlock on a few remaining provisions regarding possible transit of nuclear weapons through the zone and the relationship of the CANWFZ treaty to other international agreements. The Central Asian states have made only minor progress on these issues in the past year, and the underlying conditions blocking further steps forward seem unlikely to change in the immediate future. As a result, a CANWFZ appears unlikely to be established soon. Nevertheless, one should not forget that the negotiations to establish some of the existing nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs) took many years to reach a successful conclusion. While recent progress has been slow, the Central Asian states show no sign of abandoning their effort to create a CANWFZ. If the political climate changes in important respects, the initiative may regain momentum. If the United States and Russia take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies, for example, it could simplify the negotiations. Continued efforts by international and non-governmental organizations to assist the Central Asian countries in dealing with the substantial legacy of the Soviet nuclear weapons program that they inherited may also move the initiative forward over the longer term. Increasing international cooperation on environmental security issues associated with nuclear weapons production could also provide an additional incentive to the Central Asian states to overcome the obstacles that are currently blocking progress toward a CANWFZ. Although this emphasis on the potential negative environmental effects of nuclear industry may cause other states with active nuclear programs concern, enhancing environmental security has long been one of the central