{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.014977973568281937, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0, 'mean_word_length': 6.282051282051282, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Corporate Governance of Financial Corporations

This chapter critically discusses the relevance of conventional corporate governance paradigms for financial corporations, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis. Many banks that had apparently good systems of corporate governance according to conventional standards were financially impaired and criticised for having engaged in unchecked excessive risk-taking. Post-crisis reforms, especially those relating to regulation in the United Kingdom and the European Union, took the approach of directly regulating aspects of bank corporate governance including board responsibility, internal control functions, and bankers’ remuneration. However, these approaches are not extended to the general corporate sector as there are unique financial and incentive structures at financial corporations justifying such approaches, and the regulated financial corporations pose issues of systemic risk and public interest. The distinct regulatory regimes however still sit uneasily with conventional norms of shareholder-centred corporate governance, and this issue remains unresolved.