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Preliminary Analysis of Unprotected Transients in the VTR

Abstract The Versatile Test Reactor (VTR) is a fast spectrum test reactor currently being developed in the United States under the direction of the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy. Safety analysis of the conceptual VTR design is being performed using the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 fast reactor safety analysis code with a model representing the reactor core, primary and intermediate heat transport systems, reactor vessel auxiliary cooling system, and reactor protection system. The system’s response and safety performance has been evaluated for a wide spectrum of event initiators and accident sequences. This paper focuses on the results for several unprotected transient scenarios where the reactor protection system is assumed to fail to take any action. Even without the reactor protection system, the strong reactivity feedback response of the core reduces power to safe levels matching the available heat rejection. In the station blackout transient, the primary heat transport system is able to transition quickly and effectively to natural circulation. At the current stage of design, transient simulation results for the VTR indicate that large safety margins exist for many event initiators, including the unprotected transients presented in this paper.