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Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory

Many philosophers have been converted to causal decision theory by something like the following line of argument: Evidential decision theory endorses irrational courses of action in a range of examples and endorses "an irrational policy of managing the news" (Lewis 1981, 5). These are fatal problems for evidential decision theory. Causal decision theory delivers the right results in the troublesome examples and does not endorse this kind of irrational news-managing. So we should give up evidential decision theory and be causal decision theorists instead. Unfortunately, causal decision theory has its own family of prob lematic examples for which it endorses irrational courses of action and its own irrational policy that it is committed to endorsing. These are, I think, fatal problems for causal decision theory.