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Ideology, Public Opinion, and Welfare Policy: Attitudes Toward Taxes and Spending in Industrialized Societies . By Richard M. Coughlin. (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Institute of International Studies, 1980. Pp. xvi + 195. $4.95, paper.)

Copper examines China's natural resources, ranging from basic grain production to up-todate energy capabilities. One of China's important resources, uranium, which is essential to nuclear development for both peaceful use and military purposes, is not discussed. Uranium deposits in China are reportedly ranked seventh in the world, behind the U.S.A., the USSR, South Africa, Canada, Zaire, and Czechoslovakia. Copper's statistics show clearly that, in terms of economic strength, China is still a backward country. In military power, the author finds that the number of military personnel (over 4 million, p. 75) and conventional weapons is of only relative significance. The lack of modern and sophisticated weapons, as all are aware, is the main weakness of the Chinese military power. But, if we take China's "defensive military policy" into consideration, we will see that China's secondranking military power is also determined by its defense policy. Copper discusses the well-organized and efficient Chinese political system but also asks whether the Chinese government is a totalitarian regime (p. 95). When we look at the turmoil during the Cultural Revolution that forced Beijing to recall all of its ambassadors, except one (Huang Hua in Egypt), for "consultation," we will have to acknowledge the fact that the Chinese government is still a centralized regime with not necessarily a stable leadership. Power struggles among factions are interpreted by the Chinese leaders as only the party and anti-party struggles, regardless of the fact that the previously purged "antiparty" faction has turned out to be the party leadership today. Copper rightly points out China's backwardness in the field of science and technology when compared with other powers. Undoubtedly, political campaigns and ideology present a serious obstacle to progress in the field (p. 136). Finally, Copper concludes that China can only be regarded as a second-ranking power and that she will not become the dominant power in Asia (p. 150). Two points can be raised here. First, the problem of overpopulation (pp. 23, 134) merits some elaboration. Recently, visiting scholars from China to the United States strongly indicate that overpopulation in China has entailed serious problems that certainly have slowed the economic growth. These problems include food, housing, employment, education, and even social unrest. They still appreciate economist Ma Yi-ch'u's "lost" warnings of overpopulation in the early 1950s. This dimension of evaluation can hardly be achieved by statistics. Second, it is hard to predict that China in the future "will not become the dominant power in Asia." If the definition of "dominance" means the Soviet domination of the Eastern European countries, China will not obtain such a power status. But if it means the U.S. influence over the American states in the West Hemisphere, China may reach it in Asia in the future provided that China enjoys a few decades of peace. The magnitude of China's relative power can be more accurately measured at that time. This book, nevertheless, is a fine and scholarly work. It is quite useful to students in the field.