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Communal Violence and Property Rights

In this examination of communal violence (intrastate armed conflict between two non-state groups), we examine the relationship between one aspect of state institutional strength—property rights protection (PRP) - and inequality between social groups. Using a contest success function model, we build in an assumption that increasing PRP reduces the effectiveness of appropriative effort, generally increasing the equilibrium allocation of productive effort. In addition, PRP is modeled as potentially biased in favor of one group, creating inequality between social groups. Adding this to the model produces a non-monotonic result with respect to increasing PRP. Specifically, if a society has a moderate level of PRP but some degree of bias away from equity, an increase in PRP can result in either a decrease or an increase in total appropriative effort. Thus, simply increasing PRP without addressing equity issues can increase the level of conflict in the society. We argue that this has implications for international organizations that encourage state governments to focus on strengthening property rights institutions without addressing the more sensitive issue of inequality.