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DUCKING FOR COVER : MERGERS IN RESPONSE TO TRADE LIBERALIZATION

This paper employs industry-level data to confirm that merger activity increases as a result of exposure to trade liberalization. Despite the conflicting theoretical conjectures, it is established that merger activity increases in industries that have been subject to trade liberalization. The effect of liberalization on merger activity occurs rather quickly and dissipates after a few years. Additionally, it is established that exposure to trade liberalization raises merger activity across the board – even in cases where no apparent relationship between the merging firms exists. This finding questions the traditional notions that liberalization-induced mergers are motivated by scale economies or market power considerations.