{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.01263157894736842, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0007017543859649122, 'mean_word_length': 5.394618834080718, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
SECRECY IN PRETRIAL DISCOVERY: HOW NON-RENDERING COURTS SHOULD TREAT PRIOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS IN SUBSEQUENT LITIGATIONS

Simply put, the issue that presents itself, at the
heart of this Article is what weight, if any, should a non-rendering court
accord the protective orders emanating from pending, settled and dismissed
cases in other courts? This Article adds a special tone to the already loud
voices on protective-order modification, arguing principally that absolute
deference to the issuing court is a leeway for duplicative discovery that
places an unfair burden on litigants, a consequence that diminishes sound
judicial administration and the Rule-1 objectives. This Article will advance
the policy argument that excessive deference to the issuing court is an
invitation for absolute insulation of the party insisting on it to decline
cooperation in subsequent litigations, which
has the potential for engendering further secrecy of bad products and conducts
at the expense of public safety. This article will assess the justifications
and criticisms underpinning the idea of deference to the issuing court to
modify and vacate its orders, emphasizing the validity of those justifications
and criticisms and the prospect for meaningful balance to cater for necessary
practicalities and the legitimate interests of litigants while allowing
subsequent parties to benefit from civil discovery in substantial ways.





