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Institutions, Practices and Moral Rules

This paper has two central aims. The first is to show that moral rules are necessarily non-constitutive rules, hence that they are (a species of) regulative rules. The non-constitutive, regulative character of moral rules will be inferred from the nature of constitutive rules (C-rules) and regulative rules (R-rules), respectively, as these are currently understood in the literature; e.g., in John Rawls's 'Two Concepts of Rules' and John Searle's Speech Acts.' The concept of a C-rule, as I employ the term, is the same as the concept of a 'practice rule' in Rawls's terminology; but as I have elsewhere pointed out,2 Rawls's 'summary rules' are only one species of regulative rules in Searle's and my usage. Secondly, and closely connected with my preceding thesis, the paper aims to show-or at least to pave the way eventually to showing-that with regard to institutions and practices, hence institutional acts, it is impossible logically to derive 'ought' (in an important sense of the word) from 'is', as e.g., John Searle has attempted to do in the case of promising. The question of whether 'ought' can be, in some way, derived from 'is' in the case of 'natural' actions, will be left for future consideration. In order to realize the foregoing aims, it is necessary to begin by distinguishing some main types of conventional activities, as well as by distinguishing conventional actions or activities as a