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The limits of thresholds: silica and the politics of science, 1935 to 1990.

Since the 1930s threshold limit values have been presented as an objectively established measure of US industrial safety. However, there have been important questions raised regarding the adequacy of these thresholds for protecting workers from silicosis. This paper explores the historical debates over silica threshold limit values and the intense political negotiation that accompanied their establishment. In the 1930s and early 1940s, a coalition of business, public health, insurance, and political interests formed in response to a widely perceived "silicosis crisis." Part of the resulting program aimed at containing the crisis was the establishment of threshold limit values. Yet silicosis cases continued to be documented. By the 1960s these cases had become the basis for a number of revisions to the thresholds. In the 1970s, following a National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health recommendation to lower the threshold limit value for silica and to eliminate sand as an abrasive in blasting, industry fought attempts to make the existing values more stringent. This paper traces the process by which threshold limit values became part of a compromise between the health of workers and the economic interests of industry.