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Abstraction and Representational Capacity in Computational Structures

Michael Weisberg’s book Simulation and Similarity argued that although mathematical models are sometimes described in narrative form, they are best understood as interpreted mathematical structures. But how can a mathematical structure be causal, as many models described in narrative seem to be? This chapter argues that models with apparently narrative form are actually computational structures. It explores this suggestion in detail, examining what computational structure consists of, the resources it offers modelers, and why attempting to re-describe computational models as imaginary concrete systems fails even more dramatically than it does for mathematical models.