{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.023768115942028985, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0052173913043478265, 'mean_word_length': 5.7009708737864075, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Retirement, Pensions and Justice: A Philosophical Analysis Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. By Mark Hyde and Rory Shand. €46. 148 pages.

Mark Hyde and Rory Shand’s book is a remarkably original and interesting admixture of two fields of study that do not often intersect: retirement pension design and political theory. Their starting point is a solid commitment to liberal theory, and their objective is to trace the most appropriate foundations for justifying retirement pension schemes that are both fair and efficient. The result is an inquiry into liberal normative justifications for pension designs within public policy analysis. The book has five chapters, the first being the introduction, the last, the conclusion. After singling out the primacy of liberty in their analysis, the introduction outlines each chapter’s mechanical structure: libertarian and utilitarian interpretations of the principles under consideration are pooled under the wide umbrella of classical liberalism, whilst prioritarian and luck egalitarian perspectives represent the liberal egalitarian camp. The following three chapters each analyse a relevant standard of consideration for pension design: need (Chapter 2), desert (Chapter 3) and citizenship (Chapter 4). Need and desert correspond respectively to the first two traditional pillars of pension schemes, functioning as their underlying justifications. A general liberal understanding of citizenship is deployed to tie together this exploration. Hyde and Shand open Chapter 2 with a definition of need as “the ‘minimum threshold’ of resources and opportunities that are necessary for agents to function optimally in a social context” (pp. 27–28). Classical liberals, narrowed down to libertarians and utilitarians, view the satisfaction of need as a voluntary concern tied inextricably to the ability to exercise one’s freedom. Egalitarian liberals, on the other hand, endorse a considerable level of state support in satisfying need and hence improving the circumstances of liberty. Rawls and Dworkin (prioritarian and luck egalitarian, respectively) are inevitably introduced before appropriate pension designs are considered under the assessment criteria of access, adequacy and sustainability. Hyde and Shand conclude with a general endorsement of a universal citizen’s pension on account of being the most efficient available mechanism to provide for basic needs for all retirees, especially those closer to a minimum standard of living. Chapter 3 tackles economic desert. Contrasting positions within liberalism are acknowledged, and a split is considered between prioritarians and luck egalitarians on the topic of agent responsibility. Hyde and Shand endorse a broadly luck egalitarian stance when assessing various existing pension designs under the criteria of security, inclusiveness, and fittingness and then, accordingly, identify three priorities: neutralizing brute luck, optimizing option luck, and ensuring consistency of treatment. A defined benefit scheme is proposed, which could be complemented by state-provided remuneration along the lines of a contribution rate for unpaid domestic work. Penultimately, the place of citizenship within the literature on social security is brought to light. The authors then explore their chosen perspectives: libertarian, utilitarian, a Rawlsian understanding of citizenship (the amalgamation of political, civil and property rights), and a luck egalitarian