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The Management of Corporate Enterprises in a Transitional Economy

The socioeconomic status of Russia continues to deteriorate. According to detailed data from RF Goskomstat, the 1998 GDP was 2.7 trillion rubles in current prices, which was 4.6 percent less than 1997. Goods production was just 39.3 percent of GDP. The volume of goods and services output of the base sectors declined by 3.7 percent compared to the first quarter of 1998, and unemployment exceeded 12 percent of the economically active population. What is the principal reason for such a prolonged (almost ten-year) decline? The time is long gone for explaining it on the basis of purely transformational reasons. The economy of Russia is evidently becoming a distinctive kind of "economy of decline," with the corresponding norms of behavior of economic agents, their views of the future, expectations, and mutual relations with each other. Taking root in the economy instead of "institutions of economic growth" are "institutions of economic decline"—corrupt, criminal methods of resolving conflicts, shadow relations, barter forms of settlement, loss of confidence in the state, an orientation "exclusively for oneself in the struggle for survival, and the like. We cannot get off this track without answering a fundamental question—what specific economic agents form and maintain these types of economic existence?