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Public to Private Takeovers and the Market for Corporate Control

This paper investigates the extent to which firms going private have different characteristics from other acquired firms. We find the firms going private have higher board shareholdings and higher institutional shareholdings. In addition, they have poorer growth prospects and experience more takeover speculation. However, there is no evidence that they have different internal governance structures, have higher free cash flow or spend different amounts on capital projects. It was also found that the premiums received by shareholders in firms going private were lower than those received by shareholders of other acquired firms. We also find novel evidence of private activity designed to ensure that a bid to take a firm private is successful. Overall the results offer stronger support for the financial incentive hypothesis rather than for the financial realignment hypothesis.