{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.030525720746184284, 'fraction_numerical': 0.0011305822498586771, 'mean_word_length': 5.298932384341637, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
What Is an Epistemic Perspective

In this paper I examine the opposed approaches to perspectivity found in A. W. Moore’s representationalist and Robert Brandom’s inferentialist approaches to mental content, and argue that despite their opposition, they share an underlying rejection of Kant’s distinction between intuitive and conceptual forms of representation. Then, drawing on Ronald Giere’s “model-theoretic” approach to science, I argue that something like the distinction between intuitive and conceptual representational genres should be reinstated, and that this move allows the nature and limits of the perspectival metaphor to be more clearly appreciated. he terms “perspective,” “point of view” or “viewpoint,” “standpoint,” “horizon,” etc., are commonly encountered in contemporary philosophical attempts to capture something about the way that knowledge about the world might be shaped, structured, or otherwise conditioned by factors relating to the knower rather than to that which is known about. Typically, such talk appears in the context of a dispute that has in many ways dominated epistemology and philosophy of science for the past two or three decades, the dispute between forms of perspectival anti-realism or relativism and their “realist” opponents. But despite the ubiquity of these terms, relatively little attention has been paid to these notions themselves. Such attention might, at least, shed light on exactly what is at issue in these disputes. The perspectival trope can be traced back at least as far as Leibniz’s “point de vue,”1 but Kant and his idealist and romantic successors, among whom we can count Nietzsche, probably provide the classical sources of this type of talk.2 If we take Henry Allison’s approach to Kant and focus T