{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.029076186970923814, 'fraction_numerical': 0.00736105999263894, 'mean_word_length': 5.163265306122449, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Commentary on "Normal Grief: Good or Bad? Health or Disease?"

Loretta Kopelman argues that "normal" grief is adaptive rather than nonmorally bad and hence best not considered a disease. If grief is not bad, then is it good? Adaptive, as Kopelman makes clear, is not synonymous with good. Clearly some individuals are able to transcend the pain of grief and bereavement to reach a new level of functioning or personal perception. This is commonly seen in individuals who survive a physical illness. Following a myocardial infarction, the hard-driving executive may reevaluate his priorities and begin to enjoy life in a different manner, but it would be wrong to suggest that the myocardial infarction was "good" for him. Some HIV patients report that their illness experience has brought out areas of support from family and friends which were previously unknown. Nevertheless, this deadly virus could never be considered "good." Kopelman's point, then, is that, in and of itself, grief may be adpative and, to this extent, good. On this model, failure to mourn may be as abnormal as prolonged or unresolved grief (Zisook and Schochter 1993). From a practical point of view, it is helpful to consider the various perspectives on grief (McHugh and Slavney 1983). Both Freud and Pollack viewed grief from the perspective of an individual's life history. This hermeneutic interpretation of subjective experience offers one explanation of how grief may be adaptive or maladaptive. It utilizes an introspective psychology linking meaningful associations with patients' narratives. A second and quite distinct perspective is that of the disease model. This attempts to develop reliable, identifiable syndromes as a basis for establishing the course, prognosis, and possible treatments for distinct diseases. In physical medicine, diseases may be further defined by biological correlates or even specific causes. Comparable disease concepts are more problematic in psychiatry, mostly because the boundaries of mental syndromes seem less circumscribed and more value laden, partly because well defined anatomical and physiological correlates have, in general, not yet been identified. To circumvent such difficulties, DSM-III, IH-R, and IV utilize the term disorder rather than disease (APA 1994). Engel and Hofer advocate viewing grief as a disease, not for reasons of general theory, but for the pragmatic reason that grief is best understood by the medical model (Engel 1961; Hofer 1984). This means, first, that syndromes must be reliably defined and demarcated from other disorders, such as depression. Second, the identification of such syndromes allows us to understand their course and eventual prognoses, as well as