{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02012578616352201, 'fraction_numerical': 0.015723270440251572, 'mean_word_length': 4.582456140350877, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
II. The Big Player: The United States

When seeking to understand airpower within the NATO Alliance, the United States must be the starting point for any discussion. The US possesses a greater combat air capability than the rest of NATO put together. The US Air Force is by far the largest within the Alliance, and the US Navy operates what would be the second-largest air force. The discrepancy in capability between the US and other Allies is already far greater than mere platform numbers or budgetary comparisons would suggest. The critical enablers that allow a modern air campaign to be conducted – tankers, strategic and penetrating ISTAR assets, C2 and network infrastructure, munitions stocks and more – are overwhelmingly provided by the US. For example, in 2014, the proportion of AAR tankers provided by the US compared to the remainder of NATO was 9:1. While 17 of 28 (61%) of the NATO member states operated fast jets which draw on AAR, only nine (32%) had a national tanker capability. In this context, the fact that the US Air Force is aiming to increase from its current front line strength of 312 squadrons to 386 squadrons by 2030, in order to fulfil what it sees as the mission sets implied by the latest National Security Strategy, is a powerful reminder of the increasing quantitative gap between the US and other NATO air forces. This significant expansion plan is underpinned by an attempt to change the narrative around how the US government perceives military spending in an era of great power competition. As the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force General David L