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The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence to Understand Current Audience Reactions Against Controversial Speech

Pundits have recently used the term “heckler's veto” to describe instances in which vocal audiences seek to silence offensive or controversial speech by putting pressure on institutions that control the private forums that host the speech. The use of the term in these contexts, however, fails to take into account the jurisprudential nuances of the heckler's veto principle, as well as the principle's unique position within First Amendment theory. This article fills a void in mass communication law scholarship by examining the development of the heckler's veto principle in cases from the Supreme Court of the United States that discuss the persistent challenges that the heckler's veto principle presents and by analyzing the principle from the perspective of First Amendment theory. The purpose of these analyses is to distill the social values of tolerating extreme speech, and to apply those values to the governance of private forums of communication.