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The Enabling Model of Rights

The belief that state welfare programmes are justified because they enable many people to do what they could not otherwise have done is attractive. This article examines the claim that this belief flows logically from a particular account of what it means to have a right to do something. This enabling model of rights holds that rights can be violated in two ways: by interfering with people doing something they have a right to do and depriving the right-holders of the resources actually needed to do what they have a right to do. Having certain rights to do things can justify state action designed to provide people with the resources that enable them to do what they could not otherwise have done. However attractive this model of rights might be, it is unable to accommodate the possibility that an individual can have the right to do something which is the morally wrong thing to do.