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Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice. The Case of South African Gold Mining Finance, 1886-1914

In Economic Imperialism in Theory and Practice, Robert Kubicek promises to test the three major economic theories of imperialism by probing the financial history of South Africa's gold mining industry between 1886 and 1914. Kubicek points out that this industry has been a central case in the debate on imperialism, and yet little is known about the relationship between European capitalism, the development of the gold mines, and imperialism generally. He proposes to fill this gap by examining statistics and trends in overseas investment in the gold industry and the behavior of the different mining group controllers. This is a laudable goal, but unfortunately not one the author fully realizes. Although the book contains much valuable data on the financial maneuverings of European investors and the Rand gold mine controllers, this data is only superficially related to the theories in question. Support for Hobson's belief in "the international scope of the mine controllers activities" (p. 200) can hardly be considered a new idea. More to the point, Kubicek glosses over the question of European capital surplus as the driving force behind imperial expansion. Nor does the book shed much light on the Hilderfing-Lenin theory of monopoly finance capital. By focusing on the period 1900-1914, when competition between the mining groups was at its height, the book ignores the long-run trend towards monopoly capitalism on the Rand, and its implications for imprialist theory. Kubicek's assessment of the peripheralist argument is even more ambiguous. He insists that the South African gold magnates were primarily absentee controllers, strongly influenced by the demands of Europe's capital markets rather than the aspirations of South African settlers. And yet, at the same time Kubicek admits tht the Corner House financiers "featured prominently in local politics" (p. 203). He assumes that the mine controllers opposed the South African War because of their international capital base, and yet he ignores capital's ability to cross national lines. Neither German nor French capitalists pulled their capital out of the mines after the war to any significant degree. Indeed, the Rothschilds became deeply involved in schemes to allow Chinese laborers on the Rand to finish their contracts, and in 1908 the Deutsche Bank even attempted to buy into the Rand electricity supply industry. What reversals did occur seem to have had more to do with the irregular profits of Rand gold mining than with the nature of the government in charge. To further buttress his argument against the peripheralists, Kubicek concludes that capitalism on the South African Rand was "in competition if not in conflict