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The diffusion of military power: causes and consequences for international politics

also means that this mismatch may eventually lead to an ‘expectations-capability gap’, reproducing an idea that can be found in other areas of EU security or EU foreign policy. In a single expression advanced already in 2006 in an article published in Terrorism and Political Violence, Bures managed to find a good metaphor for illustrating all these dynamics. Five years later, the ‘paper tiger argument’ is again suggested together with the use of a question mark in the title but advances new dimensions in the deconstruction of that argument. Although not comparable with the measures adopted in the first years (2001 06) of EU counterterrorism policy, the period of 2006 11 witnessed relevant policy measures at the EU level and against that background the book portraits a more nuanced characterisation of EU counterterrorism policy. It is true that some pitfalls have not been overcome, and Bures argues that a close look to the four pillars of the 2005 EU counterterrorism strategy (prevent, protect, pursue and respond) still reveals a ‘weak’ or ‘weak to moderate’ general level of genuine contribution to the addedvalue provided by EU counterterrorism. But it is also true that the EU works with its own definition of terrorism (which is generally seen as a positive achievement), has developed a counterterrorism strategy, has introduced relevant judicial instruments and has observed increasing cooperation between agencies, confirming the idea that ‘at least in some areas of the fight against contemporary terrorism, building a secure European community is indeed the only viable option’ (p. 254). The ‘added-value’ factor is present in many of the analysis, including the ones on the EU Counterterrorism Coordinator (pp. 140 144) and on the implications of the Lisbon Treaty (pp. 243 244). As an academic exercise, it would then be interesting to see some of the conclusions advanced in this book framed by theoretical settings that could shed light on the reasons underlying some decisions (by the EU or the member states) and bring more consistency to the general picture. To different cases Bures either uses different approaches or in other cases does not provide theoretical grounding at all. The option for an empirical analysis is clear and the work is genuinely policy oriented, but a consistent and systematic use of theoretical tools would provide an added value to the assessment of such a challenging policy field and enrich the analysis. The fact remains, though, that this book breaks new grounds in the field of EU security studies and clearly stands out among the literature on European and EU counterterrorism.