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Social epistemic inequalities, redundancy and epistemic reliability in governance

In this paper I argue that social epistemic inequalities, exemplified by
 expert structures and their introduction into various social and political
 processes, may be a collective epistemic virtue only if they are discovered
 under the conditions of free possibility of redundant disagreement. In the
 first part of the paper, following Snjezana Prijic Samarzija?s work in
 Democracy and Truth, I explicate the epistemic value of social epistemic
 inequalities, and address the epistemic defectiveness of both the complete
 social disregard for any expertize (flat epistemology) and the rule of
 experts. In the second part of the paper, I argue that social epistemic
 inequalities governing a large and complex population of epistemically
 suboptimal agents may be a collective epistemic virtue, reflective of
 discovery of epistemically reliable processes, if they can be contested and,
 in principle, withstand redundant disagreement.