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Phantom Fracas: The 1968 American Sale of F-4 Aircraft to Israel

In a late November 1968 exchange of letters between Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs Paul Warnke and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin, the Johnson administration formally agreed to supply Israel with 50 F-4 Phantom aircraft.' Under the terms of the sale, the Israel Air Force (IAF) would also receive associated ordnance, spare parts, maintenance equipment and training. Six of the Phantoms would be specially configured to serve as reconnaissance platforms, though they would be capable of fulfilling standard combat missions as well. The first batch of aircraft would reach Israel in September 1969, according to an accelerated delivery schedule one that would not, however, interfere with Phantom production for American military forces.2 On both military and diplomatic grounds, the Phantom sale held great significance for Israel. Militarily speaking, the addition of this state-of-the-art aircraft to the Israeli order of battle massively upgraded the IAF's fighting power. Diplomatically speaking, the deal signalled an enhanced American commitment to Israel's security. Likewise, the sale had very important implications for American foreign policy. It meant that the United States had now chosen, in effect, to become Israel's principal arms supplier, a role that it had strenuously sought to avoid before the 1967 Six-Day War. Furthermore, at least insofar as concerned airpower, the United States had now also reconciled itself to providing Israel with better arms than those in the hands of its Arab opponents, another departure from past policy. Not every Johnson administration official necessarily viewed the Phantom sale as quite so consequential at the time, but they all nevertheless recognized that it could seriously affect America's standing in the Middle East by infuriating the Soviet Union and the Arab world. For this reason, the administration thought long and hard about its decision to sell the Phantom to Israel, meticulously weighing the potential benefits and potential costs of such a deal. Indeed, it took almost all of 1968 to make up its mind on the sale. Moreover, the administration's most senior foreign policy officials -