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Decision Sharing and Expropriable Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory of First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB

In First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, the Court had to decide whether, under the terms of the National Labor Relations Act, a firm that closed a division had to bargain with employees whose jobs had been terminated. Recent advances in economic theory, which have broad applications in several areas besides labor law, offer a method for deciding such cases, in the absence of clear contract language about termination. Employees might have been induced to invest in a job, for example, by undergoing specialized training at their own expense. This training might have little or no value elsewhere. A part of the returns to such investments are called specific quasi-rents, and because the investments are of less use (produce lower rents) elsewhere, an employer might be able to expropriate the specific portion of the rents. By examining the facts of a particular case, a court or agency can ascertain whether employees have made such investments and the circumstances (e. g., inducements) surrounding the employees' (and employers') decisions. From this information, the court or agency can then decide whether employees should have a right to share in decisions about contract revisions in general, and about division closings in particular.