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The Battle of Convoy BX-141

In January 1945 the end of the Second World War was near as Allied armies poised to invade the Third Reich. The last German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, the so-called "Battle of the Bulge," had failed and Allied bombers were devastating German cities and industries. At sea, while U-boats still lurked in the Atlantic they faced growing numbers of Allied ships and aircraft. The dislocations caused by bombing had so diminished oil supplies that Germany could only find fuel for its U-boats by siphoning the tanks of the few remaining surface warships.' Although it was only a matter of time before Germany collapsed, it was in this period that one of the deadliest convoy battles off Canada's east coast ensued. This clash demonstrated that despite more than five years of wartime experience and the bravery of the sailors of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the defence of Canada's most important Atlantic port was still in certain respects unsatisfactory. The RCN grew from a tiny force of six destroyers and five minesweepers in 1939 to a fleet of hundreds by 1945. These ships were manned by crews that had spent countless hours learning their new skills. Yet despite the size and growing expertise of the RCN, problems remained. One of the most serious was that training procedures were still rudimentary in advanced areas of naval warfare. As well, despite its size the RCN did not have enough ships to defend Halifax adequately, in part because it had sent the majority of its best-trained and equipped antisubmarine (ASW) escorts across the Atlantic. The gap was also a function of the extreme climatic and océanographie conditions off the port in winter. The attack on the Boston-to-Halifax (BX) convoy 141 underscores the state of the RCN near the end of the war, as well as the demanding nature of Nova Scotian waters. Three merchantmen in the convoy were torpedoed on 14 January 1945 southeast of Chebucto Head, just a dozen miles from the sanctuary of Halifax harbour. Their escort, which comprised local escort force ships and Support Escort Group (EG) 27, energetically attempted to destroy the predator, U1232. While they eventually drove off the U-boat, the damage was done. The escorts never detected their elusive opponent and the failure to destroy U-1232 caused considerable frustration to the ships' companies and authorities ashore. This daring attack was part of the German "inshore offensive" that began in the late summer of 1944. Prevented from employing wolfpack tactics by successful Allied countermeasures, U-boats resorted to "static" strategies, lurking around focal points for shipping, such as narrow channels and off busy ports, while awaiting an opportunity to ambush vessels and then to withdraw furtively. These tactics relied on stealth, skill and luck. The requirement for stealth, a result of overwhelming Allied ASW strength, was facilitated by the introduction of the schnorkel, which allowed U-boats to recharge their batteries and renew their air supplies without surfacing. Although its use resulted in barely tolerable conditions aboard submarines that were already cramped and uncomfortable, without it "static" tactics would have been impossible.