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Reply to Discussants on “The Need for Restricting the Probabilistic Analysis in Risk Assessments to Variability”

First, I would like to thank the four discussants for their detailed, thoughtful, and constructive comments on my article. I would also like to acknowledge the journal for stimulating the debate on the topic addressed by inviting four distinguished scholars to comment on the article. The subject matter raised is certainly important as it relates to the scientific basis and the key building blocks of the risk analysis discipline. In my opinion, foundational issues of risk analysis have been given too little attention in the literature. The present discussion demonstrates in a good way the need for further reflections and dialogue. If the reader looks carefully at the four comments, and compares these with my article and this reply, he/she will observe that there are huge differences in terminology, interpretations, perspectives, and views on the issues discussed. This is typical for scientific work, but perhaps more prominent in risk analysis than in other areas as our discipline is young and relates to many other disciplines. In my view, the main aim of the discussion is not to obtain consensus but to clarify and strengthen the rationale for the different theories and perspectives. My article was a response to the common view that probability theory provides the methods appropriate for assessing and propagating random variability (aleatory uncertainty), but not for assessing and propagating epistemic uncertainties and ignorance. I do not agree with this view. I argue that the subjectivist approach to risk analysis (i.e., the approach based on subjective probabilities) also provides a scientifically sound and useful perspective for assessing and propagating epistemic uncertainties and ignorance. This also seems to be the view of John Garrick and Warner North. Garrick refers to the so-called probability of frequency approach that is based on the use of subjective probabilities to express epis-