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Engaging a State that Resists Sanctions Pressure: US Policy toward China, 1992−1994

Why did President Bill Clinton, while having linked human rights to China’s most-favoured-nation (MFN) status in 1993, delink the two issues in 1994, despite the fact that China had not improved its human rights record? This article explains Clinton’s linkage-delinkage policy reversal in terms of ‘strategic co-constitution’. After Tiananmen, Washington was concerned about China’s human rights abuses, arms proliferation and unfair trade practices. During 1992−3, Clinton initiated a ‘strategic social construction’ process that translated human rights into the linkage policy. Clinton stressed that a humane, democratic China would neither proliferate weapons nor engage in unfair trade practices. In 1994, however, a pro-MFN coalition persuaded Clinton that open trade could better advance US security, economic and human rights interests in China. Framing their rhetoric in ways that resonated with the exiting US concerns over China, pro-MFN actors led a strategic social construction process that redefined Clinton’s China policy toward engagement.