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The Edges and Boundaries of Biological Objects

There are many different kinds of biological objects: species, organisms, genes, ecosystems, developmental systems, populations, colonies, higher taxa, microbes, monophyletic groups, etc. Some of these objects are nested one within another, like lineages—though this nesting may be complex (Wimsatt 1976). Other objects cut across these hierarchies in interesting and informative ways, sometimes producing surprising functional patterns, e.g., niches, guilds, ecosystems, and units of conservation. Moreover, some of these hierarchies are genealogical while others not. Objects may also change from one into another, or even overlap by sharing parts, spatially or temporally. Making matters more complicated, the edges and boundaries of biological objects are rarely, if ever, sharp. It is often unclear when and where one biological object ends and another one begins in space and time. Biologists need to be able to individuate each kind of object from one another, and particular objects from others of the same kind. This task is ongoing, demanding revisions as new evidence and hypotheses are discovered or adopted. Furthermore, delimiting biological objects is often not determined by empirical facts alone; which facts are salient may depend on theoretical and conceptual context. This problem of individuation cannot be avoided for any researcher working in the biological sciences; it permeates the discipline. A dynamic conceptualization of the edges and boundaries of these objects is needed—one in which common problems are recognized across these sciences. A central problem in identifying biological objects is that which empirical facts are relevant in determining where and when a biological object begins and ends, or what its parts are is very opaque; conceptual or theoretical frameworks are typically used for guidance in making these determinations. The upshot is that disputes over individuating biological objects are often over conceptual issues. This can take many shapes, e.g., how a conceptual debate plays out may determine which facts count as relevant, or even what counts as a fact of matter at all. The concepts in dispute may be biological or may concern deep ontological commitments, e.g., over the nature of object-hood or vagueness. Regardless of the specifics, it should come as no surprise that the disciplinary boundaries separating biology and philosophy are themselves blurred in these matters. We would further argue that these conditions give rise to excellent philosophical work on and in biology, and so should be encouraged. It was in this spirit that we proposed the workshop “The Edges and Boundaries of Biological Objects.” Though delimitation of biological objects is a problem that cuts across the disciplines, there is no field of study, professional societies, journals, or regular meetings dedicated to its study (more on this below with regard to Elihu Gerson’s contribution). Nonetheless, our conviction has been that much might be learned from gathering researchers to examine this suite of issues as a central research task. One of our goals was to facilitate collaboration between researchers across disciplinary boundaries both in biology and philosophy, by highlighting shared conceptual issues across a range of biological cases— hopefully encouraging novel applications of techniques common in one field of study to similar problems in other fields. To that end, we designed the workshop around cases and objects, inviting at least one philosopher and one biologist in each instance. Topics included characters, character states, and homologies; microbes; immunology and infectious disease; taxa; DNA barcoding; origins, major evolutionary transitions and cultural evolution; ecosystems; paleontology and fossil birds; and populations. Bookending these sessions were a keynote address by Michael Ghiselin on the metaphysics of taxonomy and a session on Scientific Perspectives and the Value of Boundaries. Together, these topics comprised a useful way of approaching the individuation problem. Though within each field of biology particular problems and historically important examples may drive discussion, by extending the topics covered beyond a single field or kind of biological object, more general conceptual problems in individuation could be extracted. For example, background metaphysical commitments matter, and genuine disagreement over ontology is not uncommon— but this should not be confused with a straightforward