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Nuclear comes home to roost

Nonproliferation analysts have debated whether current export controls could better address the risk of LIS proliferation. At a 1999 science and security conference at Fudan University in Shanghai, David Daniels, then a Harvard graduate student in physics, concluded, "The current international system is able to safeguard a declared LIS facility, but it is not able to timely detect the diversion of significant amounts of uranium to a LIS facility." However, this international system "may prevent the construction of new plants through appropriate export controls." In contrast, Erickson's paper warned that advanced technologies could "outflank" export controls in "nations with moderate-size economies during the first decades of the twenty-first century." To combat these possibilities, Erickson recommends creating a comprehensive map of proliferation that would require "more labor-intensive" research on the "training, work ex-