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The impact of corruption on FDI: is MENA an exception?

The eruption of the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt was ensued by deterioration in FDI inflows. Whether a new Middle East free of corruption accompanying previous dictatorships will offset the negative ramifications of the uprisings and enhance FDI in the long run remains debatable. Since the evidence on the causal relationship between corruption and FDI is inconclusive, this study attempts to take another step. The paper investigates the link between corruption and FDI flows to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and assesses whether or not corruption has more importance than other FDI determinants. By employing several panel settings with various econometric specifications on 21 MENA countries over the period 2003 to 2009, it is demonstrated that FDI varies positively with corruption. Additionally, FDI in MENA was found to vary positively with per capita income, openness, freedom and security of investments and negatively with the tax and homicide rates. Since corruption was not found to hinder FDI inflows, treating corruption should be based on sound legal procedures that infringe neither on the rights, freedom and security of FDI nor on the degree of openness and freedom of the economy, which are the real stimulants of FDI in MENA.