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Does the S & M Robot Feel Guilty ?  

Mark Phelan Lawrence University   Abstract: Philosophers of mind  typically group experiential  states  together  and  distinguish  these  from  intentional  states  on  the  basis  of  their  purportedly  obvious phenomenal  character.  Recently,  Sytsma  and Machery  (2010)  have  challenged  this  dichotomy  by  presenting  evidence  that  non‐ philosophers  do  not  classify  subjective  experiences  relative  to  a  state’s  phenomenological  character,  but  rather  by  its  valence.    However we  argue  that  S&M’s  results  do  not  speak  to  folk  beliefs  about  the  nature  of  experiential  states,  but  rather  to  folk  beliefs about the entity to which those  experiential states are attributed.  In two experiments, we demonstrate that  ordinary attributions of subjective experience (of smell and felt emotions) to  a  simple  robot  are  not  sensitive  to  valence,  but  instead  respond  to  the  functional  specifications  of  the  entity  to  which  they  are  attributed.  Furthermore, these  data  suggest  that  the folk  theory  of  mental  states may conform most closely with a teleofunctional account.  