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GUEST EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

This special issue of the IJPS focuses on intentionality, the problem of the ‘aboutness’ of our mental states and occurrence, of our beliefs, desires, hopes, perceptions, actions, etc. The current discussion of intentionality emerged historically with Franz Brentano whose groundbreaking work in descriptive psychology inspired both the so called Continental philosophy (certainly, phenomenology) and recent analytic philosophy (beginning with Roderick M. Chisholm). In keeping with the tradition of the IJPS the papers in this Special Issue approach intentionality from a number of different philosophical perspectives. The topic of intentionality is one that both unites and divides the different traditions. The issue of whether intentionality can be naturalized has been a major topic in analytical philosophy of mind, whereas this issue has often been assumed settled in the negative by authors working in the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology. Hence Merleau-Ponty writes in Phenomenology of Perception (1945): “How significance and intentionality could come to dwell in molecular edifices or masses of cells is a thing that can never be made comprehensible, and here Cartesianism is right”. But the staunch anti-reductionist approach to intentionality found in phenomenological thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, also find its counterpart in the analytical tradition (cf. for instance Sellars, Davidson, Strawson, McDowell and Searle). The investigation of intentionality is crucial for our understanding of ourselves as conscious beings in a natural world and how we conceive of intentionality will have ramifications for our basic understanding of our embodied and social nature. We should not forget that the topic of intentionality did not first appear on the philosophical arena at the time when Husserl and Frege made their groundbreaking contributions. As recent years’ scholarship has demonstrated the concept of intentionality has a rich pre-history in classical, medieval and modern philosophy. This growing interest in the historical roots of present day discussions is reflected in a number of the International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2013 Vol. 21, No. 3, 313–316, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2013.812604