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High Court of Justiciary

Douglas Murray Mcintyre was indicted for murder to the High Court of Justiciary sitting at Perth in January 1994. It was alleged that in September 1993 in a house in Dundee he assaulted a man to his injury and also assaulted his mother by throwing or pouring concentrated sulphuric acid on her head and body whereby she was so severely injured that she died a short time later in hospital. After trial the jury unanimously convicted the accused of assault on the man and by a majority convicted the accused of the culpable homicide of his mother. The accused was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. He appealed against the sentence on the statutory ground that it was excessive, reported at 1994 G.W.D. 28-1687. Counsel for the appellant submitted that a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment did not give proper recognition to the difference between a conviction for murder and a conviction for culpable homicide. Whilst this period of imprisonment was not lifeimprisonment the distinction was not a meaningful one in the present circumstances. Counsel listed various factors which cast doubt on the question whether the appellant appreciated the full consequences of what he was doing. In the opinion of the appellate judges where an assault has resulted in grave injuries and a lingering death in circumstances of extreme discomfort then a long sentence of imprisonment must follow. This crime was in its nature a horrifying one. However, the appellant was acquitted of the crime of murder so that this appeal was to be approached as one of culpable homicide on the view that the degree of recklessness was less than that required for murder. In the circumstances a long sentence was essential in order to mark the gravity of what the appellant did but that 14 years was to be substituted for the original term.