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Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental Care

FOR at least thirty years economists have argued that federal regulatory bodies further the interests of the industries they oversee rather than protect consumers. This contention has been embodied in an increasing number of congressional proposals for regulatory reform.1 More recently economic analysts and policymakers have addressed competitive restraints imposed by licensing boards at the state level. For example, empirical studies have examined professional control among pharmacists and opticians.2 Concurrent legislation in various parts of the country contemplates reversing promotion, pricing, and licensing restrictions imposed by state licensing boards.3 For the first time certain of these activities are also being challenged by antitrust prosecutors.4 This paper assesses how licensing practices by state authorities influence the availability of dental services. Particular attention is devoted to the refusal of most dental boards to recognize licenses granted in other states.