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Managing the Americans: Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and the Pursuit of ‘Power-by-Proxy’ in the 1950s

The idea of using American power ‘for purposes which we regard as good’ had been a feature of British foreign policy during the Labour governments of 1945–51. In the 1950s, however, Anthony Eden elevated ‘power-by-proxy’ to the status of strategy as he sought a means to maintain Britain's world role in the face of serious economic enervation. In the event, Eden's innate mistrust of the United States rendered him an imperfect front-man for the strategy – as Suez confirmed. However, the strategy was subsequently embraced by Eden's successor as Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, who from 1957 placed Anglo-American relations at the centre of his government's foreign policy. Yet like Eden before him, the more pro-American Macmillan ultimately doubted whether ‘power-by-proxy’ could be accomplished by reliance on the United States. Hence, at the close of the 1950s, the strategy underwent an evolution to include a new British relationship with Europe as a complement to the original, though increasingly unreliable, American proxy.