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Science and Enterprise

For perhaps the past 20 or 30 years, analysts and policymakers have asserted that science as a means of production has reshaped and reorganized the global economy. Economic advance, according to this view, is driven substantially by developments in science and technology. Sectors like biotechnology and information technology are widely touted. New monikers, like ‘mode 2’ (Gibbons et al., 1994) and the ‘triple helix’ (Etzkowitz, 2003), are deployed by writers and have come into widespread usage among students of the knowledge economy. In this fast changing and supposedly novel environment, many believe that science itself is practiced differently than in the past, that the nature of universities has changed, and that the relationship between academia and industry has been reconfigured. Sadly, much of the scholarship on science and the economy either lacks empirical substantiation or is ahistorical. Thus, analysts like Michael Gibbons and his colleagues (1994) assert that in the ‘mode 2’ world the boundaries between disciplines are increasingly blurred and teamwork is a widespread form of research organization, but do not provide the empirical support necessary to uphold such claims. Similarly, writers like Jennifer Washburn (2005) assert that industry influence has led academic scientists to be increasingly secretive and has undermined the free flow of information. While she and others provide some support for problems with secrecy and barriers to open information flow, they present little Science as Culture Vol. 19, No. 3, 381–386, September 2010