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Stephanie Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East: Politics, Nationalism, and Military Reform (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014). Pp. 310. $30.00 paper. ISBN: 9781780767406

in India (p. 404). In other words, the British did not fear Ottoman or German jihad propaganda as much as they dreaded seeming unable to defeat the seemingly feeble Ottoman Empire. Given the circumstances, Rogan suggests, in the early summer of 1916 the British needed the Hashamites, much more than they did in early 1915, to weaken the Ottomans by forcing them to divert troops and resources in case of an Arab revolt (p. 297). Thus, in order to score some victories after the two major defeats, negotiations with Sharif Husayn were put on a fast track to declare the Arab revolt as soon as possible during the summer of 1916. Rogan consulted private papers, diplomatic, and military documents located in the New Zealand Archives, Australian War Memorial, US National Archives, Imperial War Museum, Cambridge University Library, and St Anthony’s College, Oxford. These rich sources allow the author to add descriptive depth to the narrative. Some of Rogan’s assertions, such as Mustafa Kemal being a “committed Ottomanist” at the time of the National Pact, are open to question (p. 394). Describing the nation as “Turkish” only would not have been the savviest thing to do since he was trying to appeal to Kurds, Arabs, and other ethnic groups as well. The declaration of mobilization, which Rogan notes as 1 August 1914 (p. 54–55), was actually on 2 August. Some issues also remain unor underexplored. For instance, significant Ottoman military commitments to its allies in Galicia and Romania, which diverted the most experienced troops away from the Caucasus, Palestine, and Mesopotamian fronts where they were needed urgently, are not covered at all. Similarly, some elaboration on the overall ethnic makeup of the Ottoman soldiery, which the British and the French, as Rogan notes, simply referred to as “Turks”—much like Turkish nationalists do now—would have been helpful to show the ethnoreligious diversity of the Ottoman army. But this is perhaps too much to ask of a book that already pushes page limits and covers other issues in great detail. An important strength of this book is the author’s skill in presenting the complex history of World War I in the Middle East in a most accessible way. Rogan brings together the many aspects of the war into a single engaging volume. With his Middle Eastern or specialist readers probably already on his side in this respect, he deserves significant credit for reminding everyone that World War I in the Middle East was no mere “side show.” The Fall of the Ottomans is an important contribution to the rapidly growing body of scholarship on the Ottoman experience of World War I.