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Missile Defense and Europe: Strengthening Transatlantic Co-operation in an Evolving Setting

From the outset of any discussion on missile defenses, it should be realized that ballistic missile defense involves defending against a delivery system, one of many possible delivery systems that carry weapons, which are in a spectrum of weapons. Defenses against ballistic missiles that carry nuclear weapons call for a different response than defending against a barrage of missiles carrying high explosive warheads. We ask two obvious questions: why is this so, and what does it imply? First of all, in the process of deciding how to use defense resources, such as airborne lasers, mid-course interceptors or interceptors for a terminal phase defense, it is important to examine assumptions about the type of warhead and whether to attempt a shoot-down or let the missile take its toll. For example, in a barrage of conventionallyarmed ballistic missiles, one might be tempted to exhaust a reserve of interceptors prior to an attack using chemical, biological or nuclear agents. Clearly, an opponent would develop a strategy that misleads the defender into exhausting most of the available resources until the more potent attack is launched. Second, in designing the location of interceptor sites, the value of assets to be defended – whether cities or military installations – must be decided upon. Third, the type of attack must be taken into consideration in the detailed design and placement of defenses. This is usually based either on assumptions such as whether all attacks will use WMD, all attacks will be nuclear attacks, or all attacks will use high explosives. If it is assumed, for example, that every incoming ballistic missile carries a nuclear warhead, then one might infer reasonably that an all-out expenditure of interceptor resources is in order from the very beginning. Here is where game theory, not the science of ballistics, comes to the fore. By invoking a decision process using game theory, one is led to state assumptions explicitly and clearly and then deliberately assess values of game outcomes. It seems clear that the high technology of missile defense provides the means by which decisions Missile Defense and Europe: Strengthening Transatlantic Co-operation in an Evolving Setting