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Social Ethics and Logic

This essay considers an issue that Durkheimian scholarship has largely bypassed: namely the conceptual affinities between Durkheim's and Hegel's epistemological and moral projects. Developing key themes from both thinkers, it is argued that Hegel's categories are present in various crucial Durkheimian configurations, especially those that deal with the structure of modern society and its epistemological justification. Durkheim's partial misunderstanding of Hegel regarding the modern state does not abstract from his implicit debt to the latter's systematic exposition of the reconciliation between the `particular' and the `universal', the `individual' and `society'. Because of this misconception, many significant interpretations place Durkheim strictly within the Kantian paradigm without drawing sufficiently the Hegelian threads in Durkheim's attempt to correct Kant. Conducive to the defence of this point is Durkheim's epistemology, his teleological organicism and his reflections on freedom and causality in the backdrop of major social reconstructions such as the French Revolution and socialism. In this attempt to bring forth this affinity, emphasis is given to the axiological and normative dimension of Durkheim's thought through the lens of moderation as a principle which also fits Hegel's system.