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Fridtjof Nansen and the Aegean population exchange

This article examines Fridtjof Nansen’s role in elaborating the compulsory Greco-Turkish population exchange of 1923–1924. Thrust into a spiralling crisis, the League’s High Commissioner took on humanitarian, representational and negotiating roles having long-term as well as immediate impact, while the Norwegian’s emergence at Lausanne as chief spokesman for an agreement widely considered reprehensible invites scrutiny of his interventions. Drawing on recent publications and key archival sources, the analysis presses four strands of argument. First, while Nansen helped articulate the exchange idea along with Greece’s Eleftherios Venizelos, he neither originated it nor provided the essential political impetus. Second, Nansen’s oft-cited ‘first mention’ of making it compulsory assigns him a misleadingly strong role in a solution chiefly engineered by Kemal’s Turkey. Third, his impact on the agreement’s scope, involving exemptions for minority populations in Western Thrace and Constantinople, was limited. Fourth, Nansen’s ultimate push for a lasting settlement blended pragmatism with strategic vision. Subsequent delays and wider political failure not of his making to secure equitable property exchange highlighted the harsher aspects of a deal all the main parties in fact favoured, Nansen recognized as necessary and which thwarted a still worse calamity.