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Book Reviews: International Relations

military expenditure and budgetary behavior leads the author to observe that "countries have larger budgets because they have larger military expenditure[s] rather than they have larger military expenditures because they have larger budgets" (p. 33); that military spending is unconstrained by shortor long-term financial constraints such as relative public debt and interest payments; and that military spending has greater autonomy than health and education expenditures but does not have a negative impact on education and health expenditures. After unnecessarily trudging through possible "realist" and "idealist" perspectives on international interactions in a chapter on the empirical relationship between military expenditures and international interactions, McKinlay concludes that military spending is essentially independent from private sector international interactions such as trade and investment, while public sector international interactions such as diplomatic ties and arms imports drive military spending upward. An additional conclusion that the diffusion of capitalism cannot be regarded as having stimulated military spending, while interesting, is not based on any empirical evidence presented in the book. Trenchant criticisms of bureaucratic politics' explanations of military spending are offered in the context of an investigation of the relationship between domestic conflict and military expenditures. But the author's analysis of the relationship between military influence on the state (as measured by military coups, military regimes, and the proportion of executive governmental positions occupied by military representatives) and military spending is flawed by the explicit omission of attempted coups and the failure to factor into the analysis of precise executive positions—and the relative importance of the executive positions—occupied by the military; for where the military sits may well influence where the government stands. While the author finds that there is no evidence to suggest that direct military influence affects military spending (indeed, there is no discernable difference in the levels of defense spending by civilian and military regimes) or that sustained, organized domestic violence contributes only marginally to higher levels of military spending, armed interstate conflict, especially at higher levels, is found to be a powerful stimulant.