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Toward Formal Verification of SDN Access-Control Misconfigurations

Software-defined networking (SDN) allows centralizing and simplifying network management control. It brings a significant flexibility and visibility to networking, but at the same time creates new security challenges. The promise of SDN is the ability to allow networks to keep pace with the speed of change. It allows frequent modifications to the network configuration. However, these changes may introduce misconfigurations by writing inconsistent rules for single flow table or within a multiple open flow switches that need multiple FlowTables to be maintained at the same time. Misconfigurations can arise also between firewalls and FlowTables in OpenFlow-based networks. Problems arising from these misconfigurations are common and have dramatic consequences for networks operations. To avoid such scenarios, mechanisms to prevent these anomalies and inconsistencies are of paramount importance. To address these challenges, the authors present a new method that allows the automatic identification of inter and inter Flowtables anomalies. They also use the Firewall to bring out real misconfigurations.