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John W. House: Frontier on the Rio Grande. a Political Geography of Development and Social Deprivation (Oxford and London: Oxford University Press, 1982, £17.50). Pp. 281.

The United States grew increasingly angry and frustrated as the Argentine government continued to delay severing relations with the Axis powers. The Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was especially hostile, to an extent which worried even some prominent members of his own department. In Britain's view this hostility was excessive and misguided. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, for example,' did not believe, as Hull did, that Argentina was a fully-fledged fascist state and the headquarters of the fascist movement in the western hemisphere' (p. 181). But the British government was under strong pressure from the United States to limit its contracts for Argentine meat, a matter which greatly exercised Hull. Yet, ironically, it fell to Britain eventually to facilitate a rapprochement between Argentina and the United States. The British charge d'affaires in Buenos Aires transmitted the message from Assistant Secretary Nelson Rockefeller to Peron which paved the way for Argentina's entry into the United Nations and return to effective membership of the inter-American system. Professor Humphreys' last chapter, 'From War to Peace', is devoted in large part to the inter-American system and its projected relationship with the new world organization. This was an aspect of a more fundamental question: whether the United States could maintain Latin America as its special sphere of influence in the post-war world. For, as Professor Humphreys shrewdly observes, the Act of Chapultepec of 1945, forerunner of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed two years later, ' had strengthened, not weakened, the Monroe Doctrine, and while the United States was anxious to do nothing to impair the success and prestige of the World Organization, the Monroe Doctrine still remained a United States doctrine' (p. 220). And so the Monroe Doctrine has remained ever since, successfully challenged by Castro's Cuba, but recently reasserted in Grenada. Professor Humphreys' study of Latin America and the Second World War thus provides new perspectives upon both inter-American and Anglo-American relations during the period covered. Interestingly, the differences between Britain and the United States over aspects of Latin America's role in the war sometimes are reminiscent of rivalries between the two countries in the region during the nineteenth century which, of course, were the subject of Professor Humphreys' presidential addresses to the Royal Historical Society in the nineteen-sixties. The problems of Anglo-American co-operation and consultation in the western hemisphere, so carefully analysed in this book, are given added interest by the circumstances surrounding the United States invasion of Grenada in October 1983.