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Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise. By Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. 312p. $59.95 cloth.

At first glance many might wonder why a crisis over the city and governorate (province) of Kirkuk, Iraq, would be so important. However, as Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield ably explain: “Kirkuk is a classic divided city, defined as a place in which groups are rivals for power and resources . . . and where there is a fundamental conflict over the cultural identity and state location of the city” (p. 9). Situated on Iraq’s fault line where Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmens (with Christians being a tiny fourth group), come together, “it is no exaggeration to assert that the future of Iraq hinges on finding a resolution to the problem of Kirkuk’s status in a way that is mutually tolerable to all parties” (p. 4). Although many view its rich oil resources as the reason for the crisis, the authors demonstrate that diametrically opposing historical narratives are even more important, detail how this has played out since 2003, and then present their compromise solution. The book is divided into four parts. The first briefly surveys Kirkuk’s history before 2003 and concludes that its local ethnic and sectarian relations were largely peaceful until the twentieth century’s need for oil and the rise of nationalism in the region led to the creation of an Arab Iraq following World War I. Saddam Hussein “Arabized” and gerrymandered both the city and governorate of Kirkuk, even renaming the latter Tamim or “Nationalization” in recognition of Iraq’s nationalization of the foreign oil companies in 1972. With the dictator’s fall in 2003, however, the Kurds and Turkmens who had been dispossessed were able to return. Part II analyzes the conflicting ethnic and historical narratives. In so doing, the authors argue that as difficult as it often is to establish the truth, what is even more important but problematic is what each community believes “because the [actual] facts, in some ways, are irrelevant” (p. 50). Thus, the Turkmens see Kirkuk as the capital of a notional Turmeneli or “Land of the Turkmens” and claim a wealthy, glorious past and a population much larger than most others would grant; remember massacres at the hands of the Kurds as recently as 1924 and 1959; and rue the “Arabization” and “Kurdification” of their homeland. Although they held Kirkuk for less than a month during their uprising in 1991, “the Kurds commonly refer to the city as their ‘Jerusalem’ or, more often, the ‘heart’ of Kurdistan” (p. 76). Many Kurds would like to make it the capital of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) as this “would be the ultimate proof that they have finally succeeded in their quest for meaningful autonomy in the Iraqi state” (p. 76). As for the Arabs, “Kirkuk . . . has a long history of being an Iraqi city, identified not with one particular ethnic group or another but with Iraqis. . . . The real situation to challenge is the attempts by Kurds to portray Kirkuk as historically theirs and to incorporate what was once a cosmopolitan Iraqi region into their national territory” (p. 79). Part III documents the post-2003 struggle for Kirkuk as first the Kurds were “ascendant” (Chapter 7), then “triumphant” (Chapter 8), but now are “denied” (Chapter 9). When Turkey decided not to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Kurds suddenly became the main northern ally of the Americans, and Kirkuk fell easily into their hands. Dispossessed Kurds returned, and Article 140 of the new Iraqi constitution outlined a formula for constitutionally bringing both Kirkuk the city and province into the KRG by a referendum to be held by the end of 2007. The December 15 national election in 2005, in which parties representing all ethnic groups actively participated, indicated that “the Kurds comprised either a large plurality or a small absolute majority of Kirkuk’s population” (p. 142). However, for both the Shiite and Sunni Arabs, “Kirkuk is one issue that unites rather than divides” (p. 194), and thus, implementation of Article 140 “was extremely susceptible to intentional delay and disruption” (p. 137). In addition, although the horrific Iraqi civil war largely spared Kirkuk, “the US risked alienating every other group in Iraq, and every state in the region if it threw its full weight behind the implementation of [Article] 140” (p. 173). The fourth and final part of the book critically evaluates why the Kurds failed to implement Article 140. More importantly, this section succinctly prioritizes what each ethnic group wants and the possible compromises. On this basis the authors conclude that for the Kurds “the only plausible outcomes involve a special status for Kirkuk, either inside or outside the Kurdistan region” (p. 203). And for the Arabs the outcome would be “a compromise that gives the Kurds’ ‘ownership’ of Kirkuk in the sense that it is officially recognized as territory of the Kurdistan Region, but that denies them political control” (p. 232) through a consociational model that gives all three groups in Kirkuk equal power. This book can be read on two different levels. The first and most obvious is as an important but nuanced analysis of the crisis in Kirkuk and how it will affect the | |