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Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

A synthetic truth is true both because of the way the world is, and because of what it means. An analytic truth, by contrast, is meant to be true in virtue of its meaning alone. Standard candidates for analytic truth include conceptual truths like bachelors are unmarried and squares have four sides, logical truths like copper is copper and oxidised copper is oxidised, and mathematical truths such as 5+7=12 and {2} ⊆ {2, 3}. Quine held that there were no analytic truths and moreover that it was unclear what analytic truth was, a thesis that is sometimes expressed by saying that there is no such thing as the analytic/synthetic distinction. His views on analyticity were a departure from a long-standing philosophical orthodoxy and they made space for a new, more radical kind of empiricism, according to which nothing can be known apriori, not even mathematics or logic. Nowadays, thanks largely to Quine, the thesis that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction is a mainstream view. There isn't just one Quinean argument against analyticity however, but many. The paper " Two Dogmas of Empiricism " (Quine, 1951) contains the most famous though its arguments are often regarded as puzzlingly unconvincing