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The "Wall Street Walk" as a Form of Shareholder Activism

We examine whether a large shareholder can alleviate the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers through his ability to sell his shares on the basis of private information. We show that large shareholder exit often has a disciplinary impact, but that (i) the effectiveness of this mechanism can be quite different depending on whether the agency problem involves a desirable or an undesirable action from shareholders’ perspective; (ii) additional private information may increase or decrease the large shareholder’s effectiveness; and (iii) in some cases the presence of the large shareholder may exacerbate the agency problem.