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Regional party system, causal attribution, and economic voting in new democracies: The case of the 2007 Korean presidential election

How do citizens in new democracies locate the target of responsibility for economic conditions, and how do political cleavages mediate citizens’ attribution process and their consequences? To answer these important but little-studied questions, this study analyzes the 2007 presidential election in Korea. Primary findings in this study elucidate the need to consider the role of political cleavages in explaining economic voting in new democracies. Specifically, even after controlling for economic salience and voters’ political sophistication, political cleavages (represented by hometown and regional partisanship) exercise a clear and significant influence on voters’ attribution process and their electoral choices. Thus, in new democracies, in particular in Korea, the attribution of responsibility clearly works in a manner different from that in established democracies. Although focused on the case of Korea, the results of this study have important implications for economic voting in any new democracy.