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Frege’s New Logic and the Function/Argument Regimentation

Frege says his new logical language is not designed to play the role of natural language. It is, rather, a tool designed for specific scientific purposes. The role he assigns to his logical language forces him to abandon traditional subject–predicate analyses of statements in favor of a new kind of analysis in terms of function and argument. But the function-argument analysis, in its original version, gives rise to several problems, among them the problem about identity with which Frege begins “On Sinn and Bedeutung.” This chapter traces through the problems with the original version of the new logical language and Frege’s later solutions. A key part of these solutions is to take sentences to be object names. And, while this may be problematic in an account of the workings of natural languages, it is unproblematic in a language that plays the role of Frege’s logical language.