{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.0291897332662305, 'fraction_numerical': 0.01459486663311525, 'mean_word_length': 5.291139240506329, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Does PR promote political extremism, redux.

The last special issue of Representation (40:2) presented an important collection of articles monitoring the electoral fortunes of radical right parties in many countries of Western Europe, particularly the role of electoral systems in contributing towards their rise. The opening piece by Elisabeth Carter (2004) provided a comprehensive classification of electoral systems used in 14 Western European nations compared with the mean vote for 33 right-wing extremist parties from 1979-2002. The results of Carter's research appeared to be a striking refutation of the conventional wisdom: 'Contrary to prevalent assumptions, the share of the vote won by the West European parties of the extreme right in the period 1979-2002 appears unrelated to the type of electoral system in operation in the various countries. This finding is both intriguing and important' (p.93). Majoritarian electoral rules, it appeared, do not depress popular support for these extremist parties. Could the conventional wisdom be so wrong? The answer, quite simply, is that it isn't. In analysing the effects of electoral systems, we should distinguish their potential impact upon votes, seats, and party strategies. Carter counts only the ballots cast. But radical right parties benefit from PR in terms of their share of seats, which is what matters, after all, for the power, legitimacy, status, and resources that flow from elected office. In this regard, as this brief note will demonstrate, majoritarian electoral systems work exactly as proponents claim by excluding extreme parties from Parliament. 'Combined' or 'mixed' electoral systems prove the intermediate position, as predicted, because they include elements from both the majoritarian and PR systems. And, as expected, radical right parties gain their greatest parliamentary rewards under PR elections. This observation is hardly novel, but it is worth restating in the light of revisionist critiques.