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A Secure Peer Sampling Service

Gossiping protocols have proven to be valuable components to build higher level services and applications. Many of them rely on a common feature; the ability to exchange information with a neighbor randomly selected from the current node population. This feature is provided by what is named a “peer sampling service.” Its principle relies on providing each node with references to a small subset of the current node population, called a partial view, and exchanging elements from these views through gossiping. Views are updated as part of the gossiping in such a way that they form a random sample of all nodes. Although maintaining this randomness is relatively easy and highly independent of the actual gossiping protocol, the situation changes dramatically when malicious peers come into play. In this paper, we present a general attack model by which a handful of nodes can swiftly disrupt even very large gossiping networks. Our solution is essentially based on detecting anomalies, leading to a “secure peer sampling service.” However, as we show, the speed by which attackers can operate requires special measures to detect the process of disruption in a timely manner.