{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.022380467955239063, 'fraction_numerical': 0.004069175991861648, 'mean_word_length': 4.963636363636364, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Quantitative Easing, Bank Lending, and Competition

We study the effects of the European Central Bank’s quantitative easing (QE) program announced in January 2015 on lending by Italian banks. We use data from the Italian credit and loan application registers, and banks' security-level holdings data. Banks exposed to QE increased their lending at both the intensive and extensive margins after QE. There is also evidence of substitution. QE-exposed banks formed new credit relationships with firms that were previously rejected for credit by their non-exposed bank. Also, branches of non-QE exposed banks contracted lending in areas where QE-exposed banks dominate. Because of this credit substitution and the fact that only a narrow segment of the Italian banking system was exposed to QE, we find no evidence of an aggregate expansion in credit supply. Our evidence suggests that QE programs that target a broader swath of the banking system could more effectively expand lending.