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Conclusion to Part IV

Bargaining asymmetries undermined the prospects for reconciliation in Afghanistan. President Obama’s decision on December 1, 2009, to announce both a surge of forces and a timeline for withdrawal limited American leverage. The Taliban aimed to gain concessions that improved its legitimacy while coaxing the United States to complete its withdrawal, but the insurgents were not interested in negotiating an end to the conflict at that time. As the drawdown continued, American bargaining power declined further. By March 2012, the Taliban postponed talks with the United States. The persistent and increasingly specific withdrawal announcements likely doomed any hopes of a peace process before the withdrawal of American troops. The Pentagon continued to receive a level of White House scrutiny about military operations that diplomats never underwent regarding reconciliation, regional diplomacy, and the 2014 elections. The number of meetings about those matters were comparatively few and far between....