{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.026030368763557483, 'fraction_numerical': 0.01373825018076645, 'mean_word_length': 5.176339285714286, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia

Efforts by the senior leadership in the Ministry of Defence to reform Russia’s armed forces continue. As in previous years, these initiatives ranged in 2012 from the bureaucratic to the practical, such as developing the armed forces’ training and exercise regimes. The stated ambition to professionalise the armed forces is intended to be achieved by increasing the number of contract servicemen while retaining a conscript element. The armed forces, however, remain unable to generate sufficient numbers of contract personnel and non-commissioned officers to meet personnel targets, and manpower levels continue to fall. Many junior officers, as in the previous year, remain posted to units as NCOs (see box). The pattern of the structural reform process generally remains as before: design, test, and then adjust or adapt if required. Some analysts believe that key elements of the reform process are largely complete, such as the initiative to transform the army towards a combined-arms brigade-based structure, though adjustments are still to be made, largely in the internal formation of these units. Some units retain established structures: the Airborne Forces (VDV) remain a divisional-level formation, and the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division continues to be stationed in the Kuril Islands. There are some outstanding issues: changes in unit-level combat training are still under development; there is a lack of clarity over how the Joint Strategic Commands (see The Military Balance 2011, p. 174), which are planned to operate in Military Districts in times of war, will actually work when activated; and the armed forces are still waiting for an integrated and automated command and control (C2) system to emerge. But the army has already changed substantially, while the armed forces in general have become more compact and mobile and have benefitted from improved frequency of training. Whether this translates directly into improved ‘readiness’ is less clear. The authorities in Moscow increasingly see rearmament as a second stage in the reform process. The administration maintains its ambitions to field more and newer equipment, though in recent years budgetary problems as well as changing requirements have meant that some programmes have not been realised on schedule, if at all. The latest programme, The State Armaments Programme 2011–2020, was signed by then-President Dmitry Medvedev on 31 December 2010. It saw around R19 trillion ($US610bn) out of the programme’s total R20tr allocated to the Ministry of Defence; the remainder going to other forces. Generating the industrial capacity to address new as well as established procurement ambitions remains a major problem (see Defence Economics, p. 205).