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Price Formation and the Scope for Oligopolistic Conduct in a Small Open Economy

The aim of this paper is to derive and test equilibrium relations between aggregated indices of market power, concentration and foreign trade variables. Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980) established such relationships between different measures of concentration and Lerner indices, but do not take into account international competition.The first part of this paper provides a brief survey of previous theoretical work concerning the impact of foreign trade on domestic market performance, and derives a set of oligopolistic models for both homogeneous and differentiated goods in a open economy. The second part tests these models using a sample of 31 Belgian industrial sectors in 1973.Because Belgium is a small open economy, Belgian producers are unable to affect prices on international markets for homogeneous goods (assuming there are no impediments to trade). Thus Belgian firms are expected to be price-takers enjoying no market power whatever the level of concentration. There are, however, situations in which firms in a small open economy could theoretically enjoy some market power. First, if there are impediments to trade, the domestic market can be separated from the foreign market so that domestic producers are able to charge higher prices at home than given world market price (price discrimination). Second, industries manufacturing differentiated goods for which no perfect substitutes are being produced in the rest of the world face a downward-sloping demand curve.