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US Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: A dilemma of deterrence

A policy of strategic ambiguity is the fundamental policy of the US toward cross-Strait relations. The US takes very ambiguous positions on its commitment to Taiwan's security, arms sales to Taiwan and Taiwan's future status, which are hoped to facilitate peace keeping and stability maintenance in the Taiwan Strait. However, a policy of strategic ambiguity cannot avoid three main troubles in dealing with the Taiwan issue: the dilemma of deterrence; a cross-Strait arms race; and possible military involvement in potential cross-Strait conflict. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis has demonstrated the bankruptcy of this ambiguous strategy. US policy regarding the Taiwan question has been forced to a crossroads. It is high time the US abandoned its strategic ambiguity policy. Clarifying Taiwan policy should be the Bush Administration's top, if not the first, priority. But neither clear commitment to Taiwan's defense, either conditional or unconditional, nor letting Taiwan defend itself are correct directions for US policy clarification. Only supporting peaceful reunification of both sides across the Taiwan Strait is the best alternative, which would serve America's national interest in the Asia-Pacific region better.