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Response to ‘ Why Do Planning Theory? ’

John Friedmann’s (2003) commentary does less than justice to Bish Sanyal’s question about the relevance of planning theory to practice (Sanyal, 2002; see also Sanyal, 2000: 322–6) or to the more basic question he sets out to answer: why do planning theory at all? His answers boil down to the assertion that there are three kinds of planning theory. Theory 1 are theories for use in planning; these are about the subject or objects of the planning undertaking, often borrowed from cognate fields and specific to sub-specializations in planning: land-use planning, transportation, environmental planning, etc. Theory 2 is (normative) theory of planning, in its generic sense, i.e. common to all the field’s specializations. Theory 3 is critical theory about planning, i.e. theory based on empirical study or experience of practice. From here on, Friedmann’s discussion focuses on Theory 2, assuming that the practical relevance of Theory 1 and Theory 3 is undisputed. For Theory 1 this is no problem, but I have difficulty buying his distinction between Theory 2 and Theory 3, for reasons that will become clear later. His case for the relevance of Theory 2 continues with a synoptic review of its significant (to him) examples, from the rational decision-making models of the 1950s through his own Transactive Planning to the multicultural, radical and insurgent planning proposed today. But his claim for these theories’ relevance for practice is founded on only one statement: ‘there is no planning practice without a theory about how it ought to be practiced’ (Friedmann, 2003: 8). This statement unwittingly