{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.022781205505457997, 'fraction_numerical': 0.00047460844803037496, 'mean_word_length': 4.988636363636363, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
How to Use Pragmatism Pragmatically?: Suggestions for the Twenty-First Century

Introduction I am never entirely sure what those who call themselves pragmatists or who declare an affinity with pragmatism actually believe in. Pragmatists would probably respond that this is the wrong question, as what matters is not what they believe in but what they do with their beliefs—or, to be more precise, what follows from their beliefs. After all, one of the founding insights of pragmatism is Charles Peirce’s contention that different beliefs are distinguished solely “by the different modes of action to which they give rise” so that “[i]f beliefs do not differ in this respect . . . then no mere differences in the manner of consciousness of them can make them different beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different keys is playing different tunes.”1 Yet even if it is granted that we should focus first and foremost on the consequences of pragmatism, it cannot be denied that pragmatism also consists of a set of beliefs such as, in John Dewey’s case, a belief in naturalism, in communication, in the scientific method, in intelligence, and in democracy. The problem is that many critics of pragmatism have focused on these beliefs rather than on the particular arguments in which these beliefs function. This has led to much misunderstanding about pragmatism, not only among critics of pragmatism but sometimes also among those who are sympathetic to pragmatism. In this paper I wish to focus on one particular aspect of this discussion—one particular misunderstanding, so to speak—that concerns Dewey’s appreciation for the method and worldview of modern science. A superficial reading of Dewey’s work—or perhaps we should say a reading that focuses exclusively on the beliefs that can be found in Dewey’s writings—might indeed give the impression that Dewey not only endorsed the scientific method but also seemed to believe in the worldview of modern science. I wish to argue, however, that rather than a celebration of the method and worldview of modern science, Dewey’s philosophy actually amounts