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Class and Capital on the Copperbelt

black workers, but though Kadalie claimed to have caused a rise in dock-workers' wages from 4s. to 8s., Wickins argues: 'This famous victory was a wretched four pence a day extra for rackrented Blacks in Cape Town and nothing at all for those living at Ndabeni or in the Docks Location, and these were the men who had made up the bulk of the strikers' (p. 36). It is possibly this fact which helps to explain the subsequent 'on/off' relationship of the dockworkers to the ICU. The ICU, as described by Wickins, contained immense possibilities and in its early stages put forward comprehensive demands on the part of the mass of the black working population. Yet, as this work clearly shows, it repudiated the actual struggles of the African workers (with the single notable exception of the Cape Town dock strike). In comparison with Britain, for example, there was the curious phenomenon of a mass labour movement, with often fiery leaders, without a strike movement. The twists and turns of this leadership when faced with strikes are well documented by Wickins; what is not attempted is any real explanation of this surprising contradiction.