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Blackburn on the Ban on Mixed Moral Worlds

This is a realist response to Blackburn’s version of the explanatory inadequacy of the moral thesis based on the ban on mixed worlds, and to its possible explanatory reductionism version. First, the moral supervenience relationship is made explicit, for the ban on mixed worlds has been expressed most commonly by employing the notion of moral supervenience. This is done to clarify the implications of the ban. Second, it will be argued that the dependence relationship between the two is self-explanatory, given the dependence relationship expounded here. This will allow us to show that there is no such modal fact as the ban on mixed worlds for projectivists such as Blackburn to explain. Third, I shall consider and reject a possible rejoinder from Blackburn: explanatory reductionism. A nonreductive physicalistic type of moral realism can still fail if it can be shown that all of the explanatory power possessed by the supervening properties is reducible to the explanatory power provided by the subvening properties. This is especially so when the explanation is understood as closely related to causation. It will be shown that the causal power of supervening properties is irreducible to their subvening properties, while it is acknowledged that further work has to be done in establishing the falsity of the explanatory reductionism of moral facts to nonmoral facts.