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Special Operations and the Intelligence System

The ongoing United States campaign against terrorist groups has emphasized the heavy use of special operations forces. Defense Department (DoD) officials have made it clear that their preferred strategy is based on the Afghanistan model, in which a small number of troops, backed by an extensive support structure, destroy terrorist targets and their infrastructure. A constant emphasis is placed on the requirement for accurate intelligence in support of these operations. The internal intelligence capabilities of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) units, and the interface of SOF with the larger intelligence structure, are a critical aspect of success in the overall campaign. Clearly, DoD planners are counting on a synergy between SOF and intelligence systems in which the national intelligence community is closely linked with SOF for its operations, and SOF provides critical intelligence for larger strategic operations. Such a strategy could have significant benefits for the U.S. as its military forces are stretched in multiple areas of operations. Given its criticality, examining how well such a strategic concept has thus far worked in practice is worthwhile. Most attention will be paid here to Afghanistan since that seems to be the template for future planning. Some issues involving SOF operations in Iraq are also discussed, insofar as they illustrate further refinements or possible future weaknesses. Special operations may best be defined as those activities which regular U.S. military forces are incapable of doing particularly well, or which they are not particularly willing to do. In most cases, such operations aim at