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Aesthetic Constraints on Theory Selection: A Critique of Laudan

In his Science and Values [1984], Larry Laudan considers the role of axiological constraints on theory selection. He presents criteria which are purported to characterize those epistemological values that have a legitimate place in scientific reasoning. In this context, he rejects the relevance of aesthetic values such as simplicity and elegance to rational activity because they do not satisfy the criteria he has established. But the evidence is that a number of great scientists from Kepler to Einstein have reported themselves to have been influenced by such constraints. This presents a difficulty for Laudan's account. Were Kepler and Einstein acting irrationally in permitting themselves to be guided by aesthetic values? Not necessarily. This paper is a critique of some aspects of Laudan's account of values, and the notion of rationality he seems to presuppose. Much of his discussion is disappointingly ambiguous, but his general thrust is clear enough. Laudan requires of values that they be capable of being 'operationalized' (explicitly conceivable and fully realizable) in order that they have a place in rational activity. And this requirement eliminates aesthetic values from the realm of legitimate epistemic constraints. But suppose the case is otherwise. Suppose aesthetic factors are significant and rational determinants of the activities of natural scientists. Then another view of epistemic values is called for. An alternative is proposed in this paper which sheds light on some of the ways in which values, aesthetic and otherwise, operate to guide the scientific imagination in respect of both the discovery and confirmation of hypotheses. The view of scientific rationality achieved thus mitigates the distinction between the so-called contexts of discovery and justification.