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The Fourth Academy

However, a passage of Origen mentioned earlier (SVF 2.988) does itself classify fire, veins of metal (believed to 'grow' in the earth), and perhaps springs of water as things which contain a cause of movement within themselves; and Senecaadmittedly not a reliable source for Stoic doctrine here speaks of fire rising as' going where it wishes' (Nat. quaest. 2.24.2f.; cf. 6.17.1 on air), as Voelke pointed out. It is true that what Origen had in mind may rather be the tendency of fire to spread and consume. There is perhaps room for disagreement with I.'s assessment of Chrysippus' position on weakness of will: 'a sad witness to the strength of the Stoics' theoretical commitment to their psychology of action' (p. 138). May introspection not in fact suggest that our experience is one of rapid wavering between two judgements, rather than of a simultaneous pull in two directions by two different parts of our psyche? Chrysippus' appeal to a wavering that is so rapid that we do not observe it does indeed sound unscientific; but is he claiming that the wavering is so rapid that it is unobservable in principle, or only that it is so rapid that it is natural to mistake it for a conflict? Again, I.'s comparison between consistency of judgements in the soul for Chrysippus and psychic harmony for Plato seems exactly right, but he describes the former as a strange interpretation of the latter (p. 164); Socrates would not have found it so. I. gives a helpful account ofoikeiosis and of the' primary things according to nature' in ch. 6 and appendix 1.1 am not sure why he refers to pseudo-Alexander quaestiones 1.1 and 4.9 (p. 331); not all the quaestiones are by Alexander himself, but the case needs to be argued separately for each one. An index locorum would have been useful, and some might prefer notes at the end of each chapter rather than all together at the end of the book. The transliteration of key Greek technical terms is obviously desirable, but whole sentences (e.g. pp. 234, 246, 248) will only be comprehensible to those who know Greek anyway. I.'s book is a major contribution which will be indispensable for serious students of many aspects of the Stoics' philosophical system.