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The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding Post-9/11

The popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Libya and Yemen have put into sharp relief the tensions between peace, security and stability. They have also exposed the shortcomings of much of the current international discourse on peacebuilding. In the 20 years since peacebuilding entered the international lexicon, it has generated a vast body of literature, much of it focusing narrowly on post-conflict peacebuilding. While it is true that countries emerging from conflict face multi-faceted challenges that require special attention, viewing peacebuilding narrowly from a post-conflict lens has unintentionally given rise to an artificial separation between the requirements for negative peace (stopping violence and avoiding its recurrence) and positive peace (addressing the deeper roots of societal conflict). The conceptual divide between the so-called ‘minimalist’ and ‘maximalist’ views of peacebuilding has regrettably led to a situation whereby it was acceptable to view countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia – which all exhibited high risks of conflict – as being at peace while countries like Sierra Leone, Burundi and Liberia were seen as particularly vulnerable to violent conflict. The outbreak of violence in several Arab countries has served to shatter the fragile line between pre-conflict, in-conflict and postconflict countries which tend to have similar structural problems.