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Between operations ‘Desert Storm’ and ‘Allied Force’ repeat ‘Lessons’ were learned by British Air Power. What caused this repetition and what lessons can be drawn for future air power employment?

Operation 'Desert Storm', a coalition operation, occurred in 1991 following a six-month force build-up precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. United States (US) air doctrine was in a state of flux, following the developmental hiatus of the Cold War, and the United Kingdom (UK) had no appropriate concept of operations for a major air battle away from the Central European front. In 1999, 'Allied Force' was the name given to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) operation in Kosovo and Serbia. Expeditionary concepts and both air and 'joint' doctrine were taking hold in the UK; the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) process had defined structures and guidance that adapted well to this operation. The advent of the Permanent Joint Headquarters, inter alia, assisted in the relatively smooth management of the operation from the UK's perspective. One key difference between the two conflicts was overt legitimacy. The United Nations (UN) sanctioned action in Iraq and support was almost unanimous. The UN did not sanction action in Serbia; elements within NATO argued that humanitarian rights were paramount and that something had to be done. While air power was employed in differing circumstances, its role, that of coercion, was similar. Air platforms enabled a high-technology lowcollateral approach at relatively low cost (when compared with ground