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The Daily Grind: Cash Needs, Labor Supply and Self-Control∗

Using detailed data on labor supply and daily shocks among 257 bicycle taxi drivers in Western Kenya, we show that labor supply responds to both unexpected and expected demands on income on the day money is needed, but does not adjust in days prior to expected needs. We find that the quitting hazard within a given work day increases discontinuously once earned income reaches the day’s cash need. We conjecture that workers set a personal rule of “earning enough for the day’s need” as an internal commitment device to provide effort. Since demands on income are empirically uncorrelated with the wage rate, this rule generates a negative wage elasticity. The inability to better arbitrage intertemporally has substantial welfare costs: greater variance in hours worked is associated with worse health, and we estimate a lower bound on lost