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Rural Development in South Korea, 1950s–1970s

This chapter explains South Korea's mixed record of rural development. It begins with an overview of rural change in the postwar period and shows that agriculture did not contribute much to the overall economy or to rural household incomes because of an adverse policy environment. The situation improved in the 1970s, with noticeable gains in production, incomes, and infrastructure, although progress was uneven in each of these areas. The chapter then discusses rural institutions and the shift away from urban bias. It argues that agriculture underperformed because land reform was insufficient for long-term growth and because South Korea's rural institutions were relatively weak. The Ministry of Agriculture was low in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and its extension agencies never developed deep roots in society. The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) in particular was qualitatively different from its counterpart in Taiwan; it was an appendage of the state that exhibited linkage but not autonomy. Rural policy was implemented in a more rigid, top-down manner, with less participation from small farmers and fewer people advocating on their behalf. The South Korean case illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of a campaign approach to development. The New Village Movement essentially reset the priorities of every branch of government, temporarily overriding other work.