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The Political Economy of Knowledge and The Changing Politics of Philosophy of Science

The most striking characteristic of academic thought is its innocence. What follows is an argument that this innocence grossly distorts current discussions of the role of falsification in the growth of scientific knowledge. Specifically, that the real causes of the irresolution and aimlessness of the dispute are the diverse images of the societal functions of science, comprising both descriptive and prescriptive components, held firmly, although not fully consciously, by Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend. These images are of varying ages; each was once functional, but only Feyerabend's comports the present situation in the political economy of knowledge. This fact is obscured by the disputants' habit of pulling their examples indiscriminately from Thales down to Niels Bohr and beyond.