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Hybrid War: The Gap in the Range of Military Operations

Abstract : While the Israeli operation in Gaza against Hamas in 2008 was effective in some ways, the U.S. military should not look to the operation as a model for defeating groups postured for hybrid war. Although the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) proved they could effectively move through Gaza and take ground against Hamas, a force fighting a hybrid foe would still face some unresolved operational challenges. Whether against Hamas, or the more sophisticated Hezbollah, the fighting took place within civilian areas and often with, or seemingly with, civilians integrated in the fighting. Any force using the IDF's operational template would have to understand that it provides no way to separate combatants from the population. Additionally, the IDF did not achieve most of its objectives in either operation. Both Hamas and Hezbollah retained legitimacy and maintained a significant military capability. Importantly, Israel had no plan to conduct a "hold" or "build" phase in their operations. Without those phases, it is difficult to see what a U.S. commander could accomplish using a template that is essentially an operational raid. Finally, both Hamas and Hezbollah dominated information management by defining victory simply as not losing and effectively manipulating the media environment. Although the IDF experience provides some insights into information operations (IO), there are still significant challenges in countering adversaries who can so easily control the message.