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Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security Policy

Soviet military doctrine has traditionally held that a nuclear war would be a continuation of politics, and that despite the scale of destruction, socialism would emerge victorious.1 Starting in the early 1970s, however, articles began to appear in the Soviet press which implicitly challenged the prevailing view.2 By 1981, this challenge had become fully explicit. In an interview with Pravda, former President Brezhnev described the attitude of the Soviet leadership toward nuclear war in a manner hardly consistent with the U.S.S.R.'s supposedly Clausewitzian tradition: