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Probing the Limits of Categorization

The term “bystander” has gained as much traction as it has stirred controversy in recent years. The reasons for this surged interest are manifold. In part, they stem from the fact that among the three categories used to analyze the role of individuals in the Holocaust— perpetrators, victims, and bystanders—the category of the bystander is the broadest and vaguest. At the same time, it hints at an elemental aspect of human life, namely that people in conflict situations take on various, often ambiguous roles. A scene in Erich Maria Remarque’s novel The Night in Lisbon (1964) aptly captures this ambiguity by steering the reader’s view away from the perpetrator and the victim toward the hesitant “onlooker”—Joseph Schwarz, the author’s fictionalized alter ego: