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Politics and Policy in the 103rd and 104th Congresses: Evaluating the Effects of Divided Government in the Postreform Era

In his systematic analysis of the significant legislation passed since 1946, Mayhew (1991) demonstrates that divided government may not, in fact, affect the amount of significant legislation enacted into law. In a recently published article, Krehbiel (1996) develops a formal model that makes such a prediction. Krehbiel argues that "unified government is neither necessary nor sufficient for gridlock to be broken." Such conclusions are at odds with the more conventional view of divided government, such as those of Sundquist (1988), Ripley (1983), and Key (1964). Does divided government affect the legislative process? If so, how? In this paper, we analyze the significant legislation passed during the 103rd and 104th Congresses. We find that the formation of partisan coalitions on final votes of passage occurs much more frequently during periods of unified government than during periods of divided government. We also provide indirect evidence that the legislation that was passed during unified government was more ideologically extreme than the legislation passed during divided government. We discuss the implications of these findings, particularly in light of earlier research done on the effects of divided government. Political scientists have long disagreed as to the relative influence that political