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Who Gets What? Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources . By Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008. 180p. $60.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

producing greater state repression and abuse of worker rights. In bridging the divide between economic-social and civil-political rights, the authors overlook two possibilities. First, their measure of economic and social rights may be driving one of the book’s puzzling findings: why respect for economic and social rights is inversely related to respect for physical integrity and worker rights. They speculate about the role of a “threshold effect” (p. 201), wherein economic and social rights are influential only after a certain level of protection is reached. Another possibility, however, is that the Physical Quality of Life Index (a composite of infant mortality, life expectancy, and adult literacy) is not always a valid proxy for economic and social rights, since quality of life may also signal societal expectations and a capacity to demand change. Paradoxically, people who enjoy a higher quality of life may be more likely to rebel against long-standing SAAs, sparking violations of physical integrity and worker rights. Measurement challenges, then, make it difficult to assess how different human rights practices are actually connected. Second, Abouharb and Cingranelli assume that structural adjustment affects state repression indirectly, but direct effects may also be at work. Once states enter into an SAA, they may repress and abuse worker rights preemptively, attempting to ward off potential social opposition. Accordingly, repression (especially of labor groups) may be a corollary of the state’s implementation of structural adjustment, not an indirect and unintended outcome. This argument highlights more fully the interdependence of different types of rights, in contrast to the linear sequencing depicted by the authors; that is, economic hardship produces social rebellion, moving a reactive state to repress and abuse worker rights. Future research should extend this analysis to explore additional pathways of influence, including interaction effects among different types of rights and between state and society. Human Rights and Structural Adjustment is pathbreaking in its comprehensiveness, linkage of economic-social and civil-political rights, and thorough empirical testing. It will be the authoritative work on the subject for some time, provoking discussion among political scientists, economists, human rights students, and policy stakeholders. Abouharb and Cingranelli establish quite convincingly that structural adjustment has undermined human rights, and they call compellingly for a human rights–based approach to development, one promoting basic rights protections alongside economic growth. The authors are also on solid theoretical (if empirically unverifiable) ground when they appeal to international legal and normative arguments for the reasons that IFIs should adopt a human rights approach. Overall, the book sets the stage for a new and overdue research agenda—assessing how transnational economic factors like finance, trade, and intellectual property shape human rights practices.