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Formal Purposiveness and the Continuity of Kant’s Argument in the Critique of Judgment

Pascal wa;s not the first to be interested in rationalizing chance: no doubt the interest has been there since gambling first began and people developed their personal systems for winning a game; and certainly gambling itself has been with us for several thousand years. But Pascal was the first to succeed in giving mathematical formulation to it, thus reducing chance to mathematically necessary laws and demonstrating that even what appears wholly arbitrary can, in its form, be subjected to the demands of human reason. He had, moreover, the genius to recognize the metaphysical implications of the possibility of such formulation. In other words, Pascal was also the first to recognize that the amenability of chance to quantitative computation suggested that nature in its essential contingency as, in his view, a divine creation, was congenial to reason even in nature's infinite diversity of particular events. To be sure, man, even the non-gambler, had been tacitly assuming this since he first started to learn from experience, but it took Pascal to prove the legitimacy of the assumption. It is with this conformity to law of the contingent that Kant is primarily concerned in the Critique of Judgment. There is no evidence to suggest that Kant was directly influenced by Pascal, whom he mentions only twice, both times in the Anthropology and both times disparagingly. Nevertheless, we know that the work of Pascal and