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Let's Use Einstein's Safety Razor, Not Occam's Swiss Army Knife or Occam's Chainsaw

In 1945, Pablo Picasso distilled the essence of a bull. In 1946, Picasso’s 6-year-old niece asked him to draw a buffalo. Picasso told the child that he’d already done it, and he referred her to his drawing of a bull. The girl then asked for pictures of a yak, an impala, and a gazelle. Picasso’s response: see the bull. It’s the essence of all ungulates. The girl then asked for a picture of an animal. See the bull. It’s the essence of all animals. The girl ran away crying. This story did not really happen, but it distills the essence of our concern about Gray, Young, and Waytz’s (this issue) target article. Picasso’s drawing (Figure 1) is so abstract that it is not very informative. One would never know, for example, that bulls have large heads and can be aggressive under some circumstances. Picasso’s drawing is so minimal that it could be a rendering of a variety of male ungulates. Did this one drawing capture the platonic form of bulls, ungulates, or animals? Are other images of bulls, ungulates, or animals now rendered superfluous or uninformative? We don’t think so. We think morality is not a basic-level category, like a chair or a bull, that can be depicted in a single image. We think morality is a superordinate category, like furniture or animals. We agree that harm is enormously important in moral psychology. Harm may be to morality what chairs are to furniture—the most prominent basic-level member of the category. But we see neither pragmatic utility nor a philosophical need to engage in the kind of eliminative reductionism that says that harm is therefore all of morality. As we read their article, Gray, Young, and Waytz (this issue) propose that (a) perceptions of others’ mental states and intentions influence moral judgments, (b) the primary locus of moral judgment is the dyadic template of a moral agent + a moral patient, and (c) all moral judgments are based on perceptions of suffering. We fully agree with the first proposition and say no more about it. We generally agree with the second proposition, and we praise the authors for bringing a powerful new idea into moral psychology. We are persuaded by their empirical studies that human minds easily and frequently interpret actions in terms of agents and patients. We think that dyadic completion is real, interesting, and useful in explaining some otherwise puzzling aspects of moral judgment. The rest of our commentary concerns the third proposition, with which we disagree. Is all moral judgment ultimately reducible to perceptions of suffering by a patient, caused by an agent?