{'fraction_non_alphanumeric': 0.02512562814070352, 'fraction_numerical': 0.002871500358937545, 'mean_word_length': 5.2792792792792795, 'pattern_counts': {'":': 0, '<': 0, '<?xml version=': 0, '>': 0, 'https://': 0, 'lorem ipsum': 0, 'www.': 0, 'xml': 0}, 'pii_count': 0, 'substrings_counts': 0, 'word_list_counts': {'cursed_substrings.json': 0, 'profanity_word_list.json': 0, 'sexual_word_list.json': 0, 'zh_pornsignals.json': 0}}
An Orange-Tinged Revolution: The Ukrainian Path to Democracy

When the late 1980s brought the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, people in the West talked about the “reform-minded states” [gosudarstva reform] that replaced the Communist dictatorships. The “reformminded states” concept reflected expectations that democracy, a market economy, and a state based on law [pravovoe gosudarstvo] would soon create a political space that integrated basic values from the Atlantic Ocean to Vladivostok. This would not only have overcome the global East–West division but would also have deprived the old cultural boundaries in Europe of contemporary significance. In real life, those expectations were not fulfilled. In the last fifteen years, a relatively strong democratic system has developed in only one part of Eastern Europe, mainly in the Latinized West. Meanwhile, such features of disintegration as corruption and moral degeneration among the elite have become ever more extensive in Western Europe itself. In this way, a negative convergence of societies is taking place here. In contrast to Central Eastern Europe, throughout the former Soviet space democracy has been mainly virtual in nature. That is, it appears in constitutions, government leaders appeal to it whenever they can, and the West attests to its presence. In both state and society, however, the mechanisms of