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The unintended consequences of using an MCI as an operational monetary policy target in New Zealand: Suggestive evidence from rolling regressions

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand used a Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) as an operational target for monetary policy from June 1997 to March 1999. We report estimates for New Zealand and Australia obtained from a series of 10‐week rolling regressions that examine the relationship between short‐term interest rates and the exchange rate. They suggest that, against its stated intentions, the MCI regime failed to improve the Bank's communication of its monetary policy stance to financial markets. Instead, it worsened economic performance by creating a systematic inverse relationship between short‐term interest rates and the exchange rate. This contrasts with Australia's monetary policy at the time.