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Official Islam and the Limits of Communicative Action: the paradox of the Amman Message

Abstract After 11 September 2001 many analysts, declaring a ‘crisis of authority’ in Islam, bemoaned the dearth or absence of Islamic moderates who could rise up and lead the way beyond what many worried was an impending ‘clash of civilisations’. The 2004 ‘Amman Message’—which seeks to clarify who and what does and does not constitute ‘true Islam’—was put forth precisely as a response to that challenge. At the same time critical examination of the construction of this declaration, and of the uses to which it has been put, reveals that, as much as this document may seem to provide an example of communicative action, in practice it has all too often served strategic actions. I argue that the embeddedness of the Message in domestic, regional and international political interests undermines the document's authority as the basis for dialogue or action aimed at civility and mutual understanding.