Embodied cognition

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In his pre-critical period, philosopher Immanuel Kant advocated a similar embodied view of the mind-body problem that was part of his Universal Natural History and Theory of Heaven (1755).[14][15] José Ortega y Gasset, George Santayana, Miguel de Unamuno, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Heidegger and others in the broadly existential tradition have proposed philosophies of mind influencing the development of the modern 'embodiment' thesis.[16]

The embodiment movement in AI has fueled the embodiment argument in philosophy.[17] It has also given emotions a new status in philosophy of mind as an indispensable constituent, not a non-essential addition to rational intellectual thought. In philosophy of mind, the idea that cognition is embodied is sympathetic with other views of cognition such as situated cognition or externalism. This is a radical move towards a total re-localization of mental processes out of the neural domain. [18]


Visual Search[edit]



Results from the experiment show that accuracy decreases with an increase in the number of distractors.[19] Overall, participants made more orientation errors than color errors.[19] There was no main effect of accuracy between the pointing and grasping conditions, but participants made significantly fewer orientation errors in the grasping condition than in the pointing condition.[19] Color errors were the same in both conditions.[19] Because orientation is important in grasping an object, these results fit with the researchers' hypothesis that the plan to grasp an object will aid in orientation accuracy.[19] This supports embodied cognition because action intention (planning to grasp an object) can affect visual processing of task-relevant information (orientation).[19]

Distance Perception[edit]


The high-choice participants perceived the distance walked as significantly shorter than participants in the low-choice and control groups, even though they walked the same distance.[20] The manipulation caused high-choice participants to feel responsible for the choice to walk in the embarrassing costume.[20] This created cognitive dissonance, which refers to a discrepancy between attitudes and behaviors.[20] High-choice participants reconciled their thoughts and actions by perceiving the distance as shorter.[20] These results show the ability of internal states to affect perception of physical distance moved, which illustrates the reciprocal relationship of the body and mind in embodied cognition.[20]




Results show that participants who viewed photographs that included a person were significantly more likely to respond from another's perspective than those who saw photographs with no person.[21] There were no differences in perspective of responses for the person looking versus reaching.[21] Participants who saw the scene without a person were significantly more likely to respond from their own perspective.[21] This means that the presence of a person in the photograph affected the perspective used even though the question focused solely on the two objects.[21] The researchers state that these results suggest disembodied cognition, in which the participants put themselves into the body of the person in the photograph.[21]

Language Comprehension[edit]



Results show a significant "relative phase shift," or overall change in movement of the swinging pendulum, for the "performable" sentences.[22] This change did not occur for "inanimate" sentences or the control condition.[22] The researchers did not expect an overall phase shift, instead they expected a change in the variability of movement, or the "standard deviation of relative phase shift."[22] Although not entirely expected, these results support embodied cognition and show that the motor system is involved in the understanding of language.[22] The researchers suggest that the nature of this relationship needs to be further studied to determine the exact correlation this task has to bi-manual motor movements.[22]

Some researchers extend embodied cognition to include language.[2] They describe language as a tool that aids in broadening our sense of body.[2] For instance, when asked to identify “this” object, participants most often choose an object near to them.[2] Conversely, when asked to identify “that” object, participants choose an object further away from them.[2] Language allows us to distinguish between distances in more complex ways than the simple perceptual difference between near and far objects.[2]



Researchers gave the recall test to a group who did not read the monologue. They scored significantly lower than the other groups, which indicated that guessing was not easy.[23] In coding the answers to the recall test, exact words were labeled "Verbatim", and correct content but varied wording was labeled "Gist". The combination of "Verbatim" and "Gist" was called "Total Memory." The "Improvisational" group had more "Gist" memories than any other group and had more "Total Memory" than both of the discussion groups.[23] The results fit the researchers' hypothesis that the "Improvisational" group would remember more because they actively rehearsed the information from the monologue.[23] Although other groups had also elaborately encoded the information, the "Improvisation" group remembered significantly more than the discussion groups and marginally more than the "Reading Only" and "Writing" groups.[23] Simply experiencing the monologue in an active way aids in remembering the "Gist."[23] There were no differences across groups for "Verbatim" memory, which they suggest could take longer than the limited time during the experiment to develop.[23]


A series of experiments demonstrated the interrelation between motor experience and high-level reasoning. For example, although most individuals recruit visual processes when presented with spatial problems such as mental rotation tasks [24] motor experts favor motor processes to perform the same tasks, with higher overall performance.[25] A related study showed that motor experts use similar processes for the mental rotation of body parts and polygons, whereas non-experts treated these stimuli differently.[26] These results were not due to underlying confounds, as demonstrated by a training study which showed mental rotation improvements after a one-year motor training, compared with controls.[27] Similar patterns were also found in working memory tasks, with the ability to remember movements being greatly disrupted by a secondary verbal task in controls and by a motor task in motor experts, suggesting the involvement of different processes to store movements depending on motor experience, namely verbal for controls and motor for experts.[28]

Approach and Avoidance[edit]



As predicted, in the first experiment participants in the "positive toward condition" responded significantly faster than those in the "negative toward condition."[29] This fits the approach/avoidance effect in embodied cognition, which states that people are faster to approach positive things and avoid negative ones.[29] In the second experiment, researchers expected participants in the "negative toward condition" to be faster, yet those in the "positive toward condition" responded significantly faster.[29] Although effects were smaller in the third experiment, participants in the "positive toward condition" were still faster.[29] Overall, people were faster in the "positive toward condition," regardless of the valence of the central word. Despite mixed results regarding the researchers' expectations, they maintain that the motor system is important in processing higher level representations such as the action goal.[29] In this study, participants showed strong approach effects in the "positive toward condition," which supports embodied cognition.[29]


An approach/avoidance effect was found in relation to product evaluation.[30] Participants in the "approach" condition liked the aversive product significantly more and would pay more for it. There were no differences between the "avoidance," "control," "correction," and "approach information" conditions. Simulation of approach can affect liking and willingness to pay for a product, but the effect can be reversed if the person knows about this influence.[30] This supports embodied cognition.[30]




Some suggest that the embodied mind serves self-regulatory processes by combining movement and cognition to reach a goal.[32] Thus, the embodied mind has a facilitative effect. Some judgments, such as the emotion of a face, are detected more quickly when a participant mimics the facial expression that is being evaluated.[20] Individuals holding a pen in their mouths to freeze their facial muscles and make them unable to mimic the expression were less able to judge emotions. Goal-relevant actions may be encouraged by embodied cognition, as evidenced by the automated approach and avoidance of certain environmental cues.[20] Embodied cognition is also influenced by the situation. If one moves in a way previously associated with danger, the body may require a greater level of information processing than if the body moves in a way associated with a benign situation.[32]

Social Psychology[edit]



There is a significant correlation between self-disclosure and positive emotions towards the other participant.[33] Participants randomly assigned to the self-disclosure task displayed more behavioral synchrony (rated by independent judges watching the tapes of each condition on mute) and reported more positive emotions than the control group.[33] Since bodily movements influence the psychological experience of the task, the relationship between self-disclosure and positive feelings towards one's partner may be an example of embodied cognition.[33]

Evolutionary View of Embodied Cognition[edit]

Embodied cognition may also be defined from the perspective of evolutionary psychologists.[34] Evolutionary psychologists view emotion as an important self-regulatory aspect of embodied cognition, and emotion as a motivator towards goal-relevant action.[34] Emotion helps drive adaptive behavior. The evolutionary perspective cites language, both spoken and written, as types of embodied cognition.[34] Pacing and non-verbal communication reflect embodied cognition in spoken language. Technical aspects of written language, such as italics, all caps, and emoticons promote an inner voice and thereby a sense of feeling rather than thinking about a written message.[34]

Cognitive science and linguistics[edit]


Conceptual metaphor[edit]

Main article: Conceptual metaphor



Image schema[edit]

Main article: Image schema


Main article: Prototype theory

Prototypes are "typical" members of a category, e.g. a robin is a prototypical bird, but a penguin is not. The role of prototypes in human cognition was first identified and studied by Eleanor Rosch in the 1970s.[37] She was able to show that prototypical objects are more easily categorized than non-prototypical objects, and that people answered questions about a category as a whole by reasoning about a prototype. She also identified basic level categories:[38] categories that have prototypes that are easily visualized (such as a chair) and are associated with basic physical motions (such as "sitting"). Prototypes of basic level categories are used to reason about more general categories.

Prototype theory has been used to explain human performance on many different cognitive tasks and in a large variety of domains.[39] George Lakoff argues that prototype theory shows that the categories that people use are based on our experience of having a body and have no resemblance to logical classes or types. For Lakoff, this shows that traditional objectivist accounts of truth cannot be correct.[39]

A classic argument against embodiment in its strict form is based on abstract meaning. Whereas the meanings of the words ‘eye’ and ‘grasp’ can be explained, to a degree, by pointing to objects and actions, those of ‘beauty’ and ‘freedom’ cannot.[40] It may be that some common sensorimotor knowledge is immanent in freeing actions or instantiations of beauty, but it seems likely that additional semantic binding principles are behind such concepts. So might it be necessary, after all, to place abstract semantics in an amodal meaning system? A remarkable observation has recently been offered that may be of the essence in this context: abstract terms show an over-proportionally strong tendency to be semantically linked to knowledge about emotions.[41][42] This additional embodied–semantic link accounts for advantages in processing speed for abstract emotional terms over otherwise matched control words.[42] In addition, abstract words strongly activate anterior cingulate cortex, a site known to be relevant for emotion processing [43] Thus, it appears that at least some abstract words are semantically grounded in emotion knowledge.

If abstract emotion words indeed receive their meaning through grounding in emotion it is of crucial relevance [44] [45] Therefore, the link between an abstract emotion word and its abstract concept is via manifestation of the latter in prototypical actions. The child learns an abstract emotion word such as ‘joy’ because it shows JOY-expressing action schemas, which language-teaching adults use as criteria for correct application of the abstract emotion word [43] [44] [45] Thus, the manifestation of emotions in actions becomes the crucial link between word use and internal state, and hence between sign and meaning. Only after a stock of abstract emotion words has been grounded in emotion-expressing action can further emotion terms be learnt from context.

Artificial intelligence and robotics[edit]

History of AI[edit]



Moravec's paradox[edit]

Main article: Moravec's paradox


As Moravec writes:


Embodiment as an approach to artificial intelligence[edit]

Solving problems of perception and locomotion directly[edit]




child. Things would be pointed out and named, etc. (Turing, 1950).[48]

Embodiment theory was brought into Artificial Intelligence most notably by Rodney Brooks in the 1980s. Brooks showed that robots could be more effective if they 'thought' (planned or processed) and perceived as little as possible. The robot's intelligence is geared towards only handling the minimal amount of information necessary to make its behavior be appropriate and/or as desired by its creator.

The embodied approach to AI has been given several different names by different schools of researchers, including: Nouvelle AI (Brooks' term), Situated AI, Behavior based AI and Embodied cognitive science.

Simulating the brain[edit]

Simulating the brain requires 3 biological mirrors. 1 topological and functional connected with a sensor (audio topic or visiotopic, an "ear" in the temporal cortex or an "eye" in the occipital cortex), 1 reflecting and representing the body position, a task of the cerebellum, and 1 reflecting the past, its memory, a task of the hippocampus in connection with the frontal mirror, its re-projection on the sensor mirror being a sound, image, word...If the mirrors were made of biological transistors (switch carriers), layered in a non-linear gradient for instance a log2 gradient, the system of 3 mirrors would also be able to compute its environment, its memory (the past) and even connect its past memory's in logic, predicting the future. (log(2)1=0, log(2)2=1...). As its body position is projected in the center of the 3 mirrors this machine would see and hear as being in the center of a sensor and the center of its thoughts (re-projections from the frontal cortex to the sensor mirror). A mechanical system (muscle apparatus) in connection with a motor cortex would redirect its position of interest (logical attraction or avoidance).






Criticisms of Embodied Cognition[edit]


Infants as Models of Embodied Cognition[edit]

Some[50] criticize the notion that pre-verbal children provide an ideal channel for studying embodied cognition, especially embodied social cognition.[51] It may be impossible to know when a pre-verbal infant is a "pure model" of embodied cognition, since infants experience dramatic changes in social behavior throughout development.[50] A 9-month old has reached a different developmental stage than a 2-month old. Looking-time and reaching measures of embodied cognition may not represent embodied cognition since infants develop object permanence of objects they can see before they develop object permanence with objects they can touch.[50] True embodied cognition suggests that children would have to first physically engage with an object to understand object permanence.[50]

The response to this critique is that infants are "ideal models" of embodied cognition.[51] Infants are the best models because they utilize symbols less than adults do.[51] Looking-time could likely be a better measure of embodied cognition than reaching because infants have not developed certain fine motor skills yet.[51] Infants may first develop a passive mode of embodied cognition before they develop the active mode involving fine motor movements.[51]

Overdrawn Conclusions?[edit]

Some criticize the conclusions made by researchers about embodied cognition.[52] The pencil-in-teeth study is frequently cited as an example of these invalidly drawn conclusions. The researchers believed that the quicker responses to positive sentences by participants engaging their smiling muscles represented embodied cognition.[3] However, opponents argue that the effects of this exercise were primed or facilitated by the engagement of certain facial muscles.[52] Many cases of facilitative movements of the body may be incorrectly labeled as evidence of embodied cognition.[52]

Six views of embodied cognition[edit]

The following “Six Views of Embodied Cognition” are taken from Margaret Wilson:[53]

  2. "Cognition is time-pressured. We are 'mind on the hoof' (Clark, 1997), and cognition must be understood in terms of how it functions under the pressure of real-time interaction with the environment." When you’re under pressure to make a decision, the choice that is made emerges from the confluence of pressures that you’re under. In the absence of pressure, a decision may be made differently.
    2. Working Memory: Short term memory
    3. Episodic Memory: Long term memory of specific events.

Criticism of the Six Claims[edit]


See also[edit]


  1. ^ Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1992
  2. ^ a b c d e f Borghi, A. M.; Cimatti, F. (2010). "Embodied cognition and beyond: Acting and sensing the body". Neuropsychologia 48 (3): 763–773. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.10.029. PMID 19913041. 
  3. ^ a b Glenberg, A.; Havas, D.; Becker, R.; & Rinck, M. (2010). "Grounding language in bodily states: the case for emotion". 
  5. ^ Moravec 1988, Brooks 1990, Pfeiffer 2001
  6. ^ Clark 1997, Hendriks-Jansen 1996
  7. ^ Edelman 2004, Damasio 1999
  8. ^ Maturana & Varela 1987, Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1992
  9. ^ Liberman, AM; Cooper, FS; Shankweiler, DP; Studdert-Kennedy, M (1967). "Perception of the speech code". Psychological review 74 (6): 431–61. doi:10.1037/h0020279. PMID 4170865. 
  10. ^ Liberman, AM; Mattingly, IG (1985). "The motor theory of speech perception revised". Cognition 21 (1): 1–36. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90021-6. PMID 4075760. 
  11. ^ Liberman, AM; Mattingly, IG (1989). "A specialization for speech perception". Science 243 (4890): 489–94. doi:10.1126/science.2643163. PMID 2643163. 
  12. ^ Liberman, AM; Whalen, DH (2000). "On the relation of speech to language". Trends in cognitive sciences 4 (5): 187–196. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01471-6. PMID 10782105. 
  13. ^ Galantucci, B; Fowler, CA; Turvey, MT (2006). "The motor theory of speech perception reviewed". Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 13 (3): 361–77. doi:10.3758/bf03193857. PMC 2746041. PMID 17048719. 
  15. ^ Carpenter, A.: Kant on the Embodied Cognition, فلسفه (Volume:36 Issue:1)[1]
  16. ^ Cowart, Monica 2004 Embodied Cognition The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 2161-0002, [2], retrieved 27 Feb 2012.
  17. ^ Hendriks-Jansen, Horst (1996) Catching Ourselves in the Act: Situated Activity, Interactive Emergence, Evolution, and Human Thought. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-08246-2
  19. ^ a b c d e f g h Bekkering, H.; Neggers, S. F. W. (2001). "Visual search is modulated by action intentions". Psychological Science 13 (4): 370–374. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2002.00466.x. PMID 12137141. 
  20. ^ a b c d e f g h i Balcetis, E.; Dunning, D. (2007). "Cognitive dissonance and the perception of natural environments". Psychological Science 18 (10): 917–921. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.02000.x. PMID 17894610. 
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  22. ^ a b c d e f g Olmstead, A. J.; Viswanathan, N.; Aicher, K. A.; & Fowler, C. A. (2009). "Sentence comprehension affects the dynamics of bimanual coordination: Implications for embodied cognition". The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 62 (12): 2409–2417. doi:10.1080/17470210902846765. PMID 19396732. 
  23. ^ a b c d e f g h Scott, C. L.; Harris, R. J.; & Rothe, A. R. (2001). "Embodied cognition through improvisation improves memory for a dramatic monologue". Discourse Processes 31 (3): 293–305. doi:10.1207/S15326950dp31-3_4. 
  24. ^ Hyun, J. S., & Luck, S. J. (2007). Visual working memory as the substrate for mental rotation" Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 14(1), 154-158.
  25. ^ "Moreau, D. (2012). The role of motor processes in three-dimensional mental rotation: Shaping cognitive processing via sensorimotor experience. Learning and Individual Differences, 22(3), 354-359"
  26. ^ "Moreau, D. (2013a). Constraining movement alters the recruitment of motor processes in mental rotation. Experimental Brain Research, 224(3), 447-454."
  27. ^ "*Moreau, D., Clerc, J., Mansy-Dannay, A., & Guerrien, A. (2012). Enhancing spatial ability through sport practice: Evidence for an effect of motor training on mental rotation performance. Journal of Individual Differences, 33(2), 83-88."
  28. ^ "*Moreau, D. (2013b). Motor expertise modulates movement processing in working memory. Acta Psychologica, 142(3), 356-361."
  29. ^ a b c d e f g h van Dantzig, S.; Zeelenberg, R.; & Pecher D. (2009). "Unconstraining theories of embodied cognition". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (2): 345–351. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.11.001. 
  30. ^ a b c d e Labroo, A. A.; Nielsen, J. H. (2010). "Half the thrill is in the chase: Twisted inferences from embodied cognitions and brand evaluation". Journal of Consumer Research 37: 143–158. doi:10.1086/649908. 
  31. ^ a b c d Hung, I. W.; Labroo, A. A. (2011). "From firm muscles to firm willpower: Understanding the role of embodied cognition in self-regulation". Journal of Consumer Research 37 (6): 1046–1064. doi:10.1086/657240. 
  32. ^ a b Balcetis, E.; Cole, S. (2009). "Body in mind: the role of embodied cognition in self-regulation". Social and Personality Psychology Compass 3 (5): 759–774. doi:10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00197.x. 
  33. ^ a b c d e Vacharkulksemsuk, T.; Fredrickson, B. L. (2011). "Strangers in sync: achieving embodied rapport through shared movements". Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (1): 399–402. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.07.015. PMC 3290409. PMID 22389521. 
  34. ^ a b c d Kaschak, M. P.; Maner, J. K., Miller, S., & Coyle, J. M. (2009). "Embodied social cognition: bodies, emotions, and blackberries". European Journal of Social Psychology 39 (7): 1255–1256. doi:10.1002/ejsp.692. 
  35. ^ a b Lakoff & Johnson 1980.
  36. ^ Lakoff & Turner 1989.
  37. ^ Rosch, Eleanor (1973). "Natural categories". Cognitive Psychology (4): 328–350. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(73)90017-0. 
  39. ^ a b Lakoff 1987.
  40. ^ Pulvermuller, Friedemann (2013). "How neurons make meaning: brain mechanisms for embodied and abstract-symbolic semantics". Trends in cognitive sciences (Elsevier) 17 (9): 458–470. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.004. 
  41. ^ Meteyard, L. et al. (2012). "Coming of age: a review of embodiment and the neuroscience of semantics.". Cortex 48: 788–804. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2010.11.002. 
  42. ^ a b Kousta, S.T. et al. (2011). "The representation of abstract words: why emotion matters". J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 140: 14–34. 
  43. ^ a b Vigliocco, G. et al. (2013). "The neural representation of abstract words: the role of emotion.". Cereb. Cortex. doi:10.1093/cercor/bht025. 
  45. ^ a b Baker, G.P. and Hacker, P.M.S. (2009). Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part 1: Essays. Wiley-Blackwell. 
  46. ^ See The problems (in History of AI)
  47. ^ Moravec 1988, pp. 15–16.
  48. ^ Turing 1950.
  49. ^ Liberman N, Trope Y. (2008-11-21). "The Psychology of Transcending the Here and Now". Science 322 (5905): 1201–1205. doi:10.1126/science.1161958. PMC 2643344. PMID 19023074. 
  50. ^ a b c d Longo, M. R. (2009). "What's embodied and how can we tell?". European Journal of Social Psychology 39 (7): 1207–1209. doi:10.1002/ejsp.684. 
  51. ^ a b c d e Daum, M. M.; Sommerville, J. A., & Prinz, W. (2009). "Disentangling embodied and symbolic modes of social understanding". European Journal of Social Psychology. 1214-1216 39 (7): 1214. doi:10.1002/ejsp.686. 
  52. ^ a b c Adams, F. (2010). "Embodied cognition". Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4): 619–628. doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9175-x. 
  53. ^ Wilson, Margaret (2002). "Six Views of Embodied Cognition". Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 9 (4): 625–636. doi:10.3758/BF03196322 
  54. ^ Wilson (2002: 627).
  55. ^ Wilson (2002: 625).

External links[edit]