User:NKuldell/Q/A working page 2

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Disclaimer: This page is a work in progress and reflects ongoing editing and revision by Reshma, Barry and me as well as contributions/feedback from PoETs.

Many revisions as of 05.17.06. Those in need of most work are in blue .


Part 1: Defining the field and its capabilities


In some ways, it's no different. People have been purposefully modifying genetic material for much of recorded history via breeding and genetic crosses. With the advent of recombinant DNA technology, more methodical combination of DNA became possible. Today, genomic data is available for many of the planet's organisms AND technologies exist to make the genetic material from scratch. These two technologies of sequencing and synthesis are key enabling technologies of synthetic biology.






Here are some ideas:



Do we want to add example of novel chemistry efforts?-NK

Question: Why is biology so hard to engineer now?

this seems most similar to runner up question "impediments to progress". this may or may not be relevant for Q/A series devoted to social implications of the field. worth considering further...-NK


  2. Biological systems can evolve.
  3. Most importantly, biological organisms can self-replicate.


Additionally, existing descriptions of basic cellular activities do not allow the activities to be predictably combined in novel and re-useable ways. Certainly the behavior of cells is guided by laws of the natural world (physics, inheritance etc) but biology continues to surprise those who study it. And while surprises may be exciting for scientists, they constrain the activities of engineers who might like to reliably build with biological parts. Thus an important effort in synthetic biology aims to develop improved foundational technologies for reusing genetic elements. If successful, biological engineers might work with the confidence enjoyed by other engineering disciplines who don't, for example need to build a bridge to see if it will fall down. Furthermore, once tamed, the features that make the engineering of biological systems difficult may yield novel systems capable of operations and behaviors not achievable by other engineering methods.


delete this Q/A? seems outside of implications and directions stream--NK



Question: How quickly is the field moving towards its goals?

  • can this be answered factually?--NK

Part 2: Defining the community

Question: Who is doing the work today?

alternatively phrased question: What is the nature of the SB community? thought this presumes an established community

  • Approaches for answering:
    • estimates of numerical strength (both commercial and academic)
    • international distribution?
    • how are they funded?

As an approach to answering this question we may want to search for meeting attendance numbers, SB departments, jobs that use SB in description, number of papers published with SB in title or abstract and where investigators are housed. As important as who is doing the work today is who will be doing the work tomorrow, so we may want to cite iGEM growth--NK

Other ideas?

Question: Who speaks for the field?

There is no single spokesperson. This question presumes a defined and mature community and opens the opportunity for those of us answering to list ongoing activities to build community.

Part 3: Possible future benefits of synthetic biology

organizational note on this section: though it's not an easy task, it would be ideal to balance benefits listed in this section (i.e., # of questions, importance of answers) with material offered in the "risk" section and with that provided in the "defining the field" section, to avoid leaving an anti-technology impression and to avoid looking narcissistic, respectively.

Question: What are the perceived benefits of synthetic biology?

Given Synthetic Biology's wide scope for engineering biological systems, the potential application space of synthetic biology is similarly wider. Novel medical applications, environmental remediation, energy production, biomaterials, and information processing may all be approachable through synthetic biology. In the future, cells may be quickly and predictably programmed to meet these and other discrete engineering goals. Synthetic biology may also benefit traditional biologists in their efforts to understand the natural world since these investigators may more easily test existing models of natural systems by building them from the ground up. Additionally, synthetic biology presents opportunities for synthetic chemists since cells may be considered self-replicating bags of intersting chemicals. Thus synthetic biology may enable the synthesis of novel chemical species under environmentally-gentle conditions.






delete this Q/A? seems redundant with "benefits" question above, although there is a place for repetition in this kind of format--NK


Question: Is it hoped that SB will have a role in producing medicines and tissues that will keep people healthy?

Question: Is it hoped that SB will lead to new ways of “manufacturing” chemical entities that are now scarce or unavailable?

Question: What other classes of benefits are foreseen?

  • note that these last three questions may be place holders for other benefits questions

Part 4: Possible future risks of synthetic biology

NOTE: still under heavy construction I've brought all the questions of safeguards under this tent, since it might help balance the sky-is-falling feeling of this cluster. But perhaps the safeguard questions may be better placed under public perception or even community. Input? --NK


Could we more simply state this question as: does synthetic biology bring with it risks not associated with existing, related fields)--NK


Question: What federal program[s] has responsibility for synthetic biology safety assurance?

  • or related question....

Question: What are the existing barriers to the risk of potentially harmful synthetic biology products?

  • answer should included mention of barriers in place to regulate research labs and commercial fabricators. Could also bring in surveillance ideas to monitor SB biohackers and any means of restricting products from overtly malicious agents (if there is evidence for this). As a correlary (or maybe as the lead line) can describe how community of openess and dialog (i.e. the “ethos” of current researchers) acts to anticipate and root out potential risk.

Question: Are the safeguards established to regulate/oversee genetic engineering seen as working well?

  • this question can be rephrased to sound less opinion driven but seems important to include somehow as it allows us to include the fact that leadership in the research community helped setup safeguards that have successfully lowered risks from release of genetically altered organisms and accidental release of harmful ones. Can also include future SB plan for release of documentation if accidental release occurs.

Question: Is there evidence of interest in synthetic biology capabilities in the part of terrorists?

  • this question is posed from the view that those who are charged to limit the threat of terrorism may set their priorities based on hurdles that potential terrorists face in deploying destructive technologies. For example they may weigh the amount of scientific and technical know how required, the availability of expensive or controlled materials, danger to the miscreants themselves etc. Given that synthetic biology works to lower such barriers, it seems ripe for abuse but is there evidence that for such misappropriation of the technology. As part of the answer may want to explicitly describe what hurdles exist for the abuse of synthetic technologies by terrorists? as a start "DNA on demand significantly lowers barriers to potentially dangerous substances in the hands of miscreants. DNA synthesis companies have a record of synthesis orders but it’s not clear how or if that information would be shared. Most companies check sequence requests to look for ones that might encode dangerous substances and the companies can refuse to synthesize such DNA."

Question: Is biohacking possible?

  • Existing approaches to answering this question include the idea that SB is sometimes presented as a special form of information processing technology…a program written for assembly of organisms or parts of organisms. This leads to the question: is it significantly more difficult for “biohackers” to cause mischief that those who wish for whatever reason to set loose the biological counterpart of a computer virus into the human environment?

Another part of this answer has been that right now SB is incredibly hard. Very little works as predicted and there are only a few interchangeable parts to play with. But with time and success both these statements will be false and then hackers will have plenty to use for mischief. It might be best understood by thinking about computer operating systems and computer viruses. No computer viruses were written until lots of folks had their own computers and there were programs to attack and damage to be done.

Part 5: Social implications and public attitudes

Note: still under heavy construction

Question: Is the synthetic biology community seen as part of the genetic engineering community?

  • this is a question that tries to calibrate public confidence (Q15) by asking if misgivings or trust can be infered from those surrounding genetic engineering. As indicated in the lack of public controversy over the implementation of genetically engineering safeguards and the open release of GMO products, the public has some level of confidence in those who are doing that work. Is the SB community effectively part of the same community?

Question: What groups are closely following synthetic biology and its implications?

  • Question is looking for an SB "watchdog," and there is none (at least none dedicated to SB). Public perceptions are sometimes affected by the knowledge that entities exist that focus on palpable risks, playing a “watchdog” role. If there are no public or private groups that appear to be applying vigilance against or address events involving man-made organisms, are there other assurances to offer?

Question: Are there relevant lessons to be learned from existing, related technologies?

  • answer could detail perceived risks with other S/T disciplines that have confronted and managed public risks: nuclear safety, hazardous chemical, GE, cryptography. Can ask if these provide suggestions as to the future role of the SB community. Can also mention lessons that have already been translated into action.

Question: Is the synthetic biology community devoloping and operating awareness efforts?

  • this question was originally posed to probe public awareness efforts. Premise is: for some potentially risky technologies, professional organizations themselves develop and operate awareness efforts and training aids to reduce public and worker risk and asks if the SB community already doing this. This answer might offer nice place to talk about curriculum/education efforts underway.

Runner-up questions

Part 1: defining the field and its capabilities

  • Origins? How and when did SB emerge as a distinct field? From what precursors?
  • Self-Selection Rules? Why did SB researchers decide to enter this new field? What background characteristics do they share?

Part 2: defining the community

Part 3: future benefits

Part 4: future risks

  • Gene Transference Risk? How does SB affect the risk of horizontal gene transference?
  • Extinction Risk? Is it possible that SB will lead to the eventual replacement of natural species by artificial ones?
  • Process Risks? In addition to the risk of effects of new synthesized organisms – and components of organisms – is there a risk of changed scientific publishing practices, of our concept of what “life” is, of reifying the analogy between computer codes and biological code? Other?

Part 5: social implications, public attitudes

  • Applications Gatekeepers? Who are the likely gatekeepers for the SB applications that emerge? Will profit potential prove to be the primary factor in deciding what applications are pursued? What intellectual-property considerations will influence what applications are pursued?
  • Open Software and Risk? What is the relationship between the possibility of SB-hacking and the movement toward free and open software in the SB community?
  • Worst-Case Planning? In the event that we learn of an adverse event involving a potentially hazardous manmade organism, are there those who are ready and able to undertake effective remedial action? Has the remedial program been tested and validated by simulated game-playing or other proven techniques? [If Ans= “none,” weave this Q into others?]
    • editorialized answer: Ion’t know if any “worse case scenarios” and “best case responses” have been detailed. If the response to recent natural disasters and public health threats is any guide, then we’d be foolish to expect government agencies to protect our well being through such crises. --NK

Cutting Room Floor?

Question:The Safety Record for GE? Some number of genetically engineered organisms have by now been unintentionally introduced into commerce and the environment. Have there been unanticipated adverse health or ecological impacts from these introductions? Who is monitoring this area?

Genetically modified crops have upset and worried many folks, in no small part because there seems to be no one who is monitoring or controlling the release of such agents. Reaction to genetically modified pets (like GFP-fish) has been small by comparison.

Question: Intramural Risk Identification? What do those working closely on SB see as the plausible way that SB might be misused? Have they taken steps to see that policy or other counter measures are taken to minimize such possibilities?

Policies are still being discussed

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