Miller: The limits of military force in Syria

F-15E Strike Eagles of the 4th Fighter Wing

F-15E Strike Eagles of the 4th Fighter Wing performing an "Elephant Walk" as they taxi down the runway during a Turkey Shoot training mission at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base. (Credit: U.S. Air Force, 2012)

By now, President Barack Obama has almost certainly decided what kind of military strike he intends to launch against Syria - and he probably also has a pretty good idea of when it will happen.

Indeed, Obama is on the verge of doing something he's willfully tried to avoid for the last two and a half years: putting America in the middle of a nasty, brutal and complex Syrian civil war.

And because the president is one very smart guy, a methodical intellect and lawyer-in-chief, I expect he's rigorously grappled with every angle, dimension and nuance of the Syrian problem.

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1. Q: What are U.S. objectives in Syria? A: Pretty limited.

You know the old adage: When you don't know where you're going, any road will get you there. After more than two years of civil war, what are the Obama administration's real objectives in Syria - the ones it's truly prepared to invest in? Is it to play the lead role in stopping the Syrian civil war and become the dominant architect in replacing the Bashar Assad regime with a democratic polity run by the pro-Western opposition? Keep in mind, the United States couldn't do that in Afghanistan and Iraq with hundreds of thousands of boots on the ground and trillions of dollars expended. And we can't even manage to bring significant influence to bear in Egypt, where we've had a close, 40-year relationship with a military that's now running the country.

If the United States is not building democracy, then is it or should it be immersed in the Levant's Great Game - trying to turn the Syria crisis into a broad Manichean struggle with Hezbollah and Iran in order to weaken the latter, halt its nuclear program, and crush the so-called Shiite crescent that stretches from Tehran to Beirut? I saw a version of this movie in Lebanon in the early 1980s, when the Reagan administration made the wrong-headed Cold War calculation that defeating Syria in Lebanon would be a blow to the Russians and tried to work with the Israelis and the Christian Phalange to bring that about. The entire Lebanon policy proved to be a failure in part because U.S. policymakers persisted in seeing Lebanon, Israel and Syria as part of some great power game when in fact it was all about local politics and regional balance of power.

All this talk of grand strategies, threatening arcs and hordes of Shiite and Sunni extremists reflects the view - just like in Lebanon during the 1980s - that the Syrian crisis is going to produce some clear winner in the end. But Syria is much more likely to morph into a decentralized polity where Alawites, Kurds and Sunnis continue to struggle with each other and with al-Qaida-type extremists in semi-autonomous and dysfunctional enclaves for years to come.

So if there is no clear or definitive end game, what is the president's plan? I suspect it's to try to make a difference where the United States can - commensurate with its other priorities and obligations - on a variety of fronts: including the humanitarian side (as the largest aid contributor), the political side (as the most active Western power engaging with the Syrian opposition), the military side (by providing limited amounts of lethal assistance and facilitating more through other powers), and the diplomatic side (by continuing to pressure the Russians to leverage Assad into a political transition - see Geneva 1.0 and maybe 2.0). Though with the cancellation of planned talks with the Russians this week, the Geneva approach seems to be all but over - for now.



2. Q: Does a military strike serve U.S. interests? A: Yes, but very imperfectly.

The context of the Syrian situation and the president's broader goals there should guide how he uses force. Military power is a means to an end. That correlation is never exact, precise or certain. But the president needs to get as close as he can to identifying clear objectives and making sure he has the capacity to carry them out. It's that lesson - not the cautionary tale about boots on the ground - that's worth applying to Syria. What is it precisely that a military strike, campaign, or war is designed to accomplish? How will it shape the political endgame the United States is trying to achieve? The major challenge in Syria involves chemical weapons. After all, that's why the president is reportedly close to authorizing a military strike. But the United States must also contend with a fragmenting state that's spewing sectarian violence, hemorrhaging refugees, offering up opportunities for Sunni and Shiite extremists, and spreading instability to its neighbors.

Which facet of the Syrian problem will Obama's military action address? On the one hand, a one-off strike to dissuade Assad from using chemical weapons again - no matter how punishing - won't impact the broader course of the war. On the other, the president has repeatedly indicated that he isn't ready to commit to a sustained and integrated military campaign - arming the rebels, implementing a no-fly zone, and carrying out intensive strikes on Assad's forces and infrastructure - that would tilt the balance decisively in the favor of the rebels.




The Balkan precedent - a favorite these days, invoked as a model for a Syrian intervention both in terms of mobilizing consensus outside of the U.N. Security Council and the effective use of air power - also provides a cautionary tale.


Where Joseph and O'Bagy do see commonality between the Balkans and Syria is in U.S. ownership - or lack thereof. And this gets to the heart of any military option the president chooses. Having willfully avoided real ownership of the Syrian problem to date, is he really willing to own it now? Because direct military action - whether alone or with allies - is encumbering and filled with uncertainties no matter how controlled or deliberate. Is Obama ready to get stuck with the Syrian tar baby? Which brings us to question three.

3. Q: How important is Syria to President Obama? A: So far, not very.

There are a lot of very smart people who disagree. Former CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell has actually asserted that Syria is the gravest threat to U.S. national security. But you don't need to go that far to see the crisis for what it is - a breeding ground for extremism, sectarian violence, and proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

The Syrian civil war is a moral, strategic, and human disaster. About that there can be little doubt. Some are already saying "I told you so" - that Syria is only getting worse and eventually Obama will have no choice but to act.

So why not draw up a real strategy and lead now? Why not organize the region and our European allies, pretend you're Bush 41 and Assad is Saddam Hussein, accept some risk, and where you lead others will follow? I've argued repeatedly that Syria is a trap, and that given the president's priorities and legacy - helping the middle class, not fixing the Middle East - he's been right to be cautious. This isn't Iraq in 1990. It's a cruel and bloody civil war that America can't end, and it shouldn't be stuck with the enormous bill for cleaning up after the fact. Moreover, it's not as if the broader region is a poster child for stability. It's all a mess.



Miller, FP columnist, is vice president for new initiatives and a scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

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