The above results are not readily explained by conventional group polarization theory. The differential polarization by policy side, in particular, is at odds with the informational and normative theories. A straightforward application of persuasive arguments theory would predict that both favorite and underdog groups should show a risky shift given that group members presumably all possess different information in support of their common team choice. Similarly, social comparison theory would predict that a norm toward risk-taking (caution) would increase (decrease) wagers regardless of team choice. As the standard theories are not integrated with broader social influence pro- cesses, they make no clear predictions with respect to the effects of disagreement level. For instance, persuasive arguments theory predicts that the members of a zero- disagreement group would exchange new information leading to a considerable shift whereas a consensus-oriented account would predict that they simply reach consen- sus at their common position. The standard theories are also silent with respect to network effects. However, a plausible extension of persuasive arguments theory would predict complete networks to exhibit a greater shift due to the freer flow of information. The experimental results can also be considered with respect to the extremist- tilting explanation. As the wager is a very visible signal of confidence, one would expect high wager individuals to have greater influence regardless of policy side so extremist-tilting mistakenly predicts comparable polarization for favorites and un- derdogs. Extremist-tilting does produce an unambiguous prediction of increasing polarization with increasing disagreement level because the extremist becomes more extreme and so more influential. Although extremist-tilting has been proposed within social influence network theory, the theory makes no claims regarding topology and polarization and an experiment found no effect of topology (Friedkin 1999). 26