49 Performance metrics, operation  and standards The table below provides other scenarios, in the absence of any election by the CEO to defer  additional shares. The number of shares is an  assumption based on the closing share price as at 31 December 2012 of €13.30 and a £/€ exchange rate of 1.22. In 2012, the CEO was awarded 97,603  performance shares (in the form of nominal  price options). Since the first operation of the EIP, the grant to the CEO has been set by reference to a  percentage of the available pool, rather than by reference to salary. The Committee continues  to believe that de-linking salary and grant  level allows: Notes: *Together with a basic award, this takes the maximum award for the CEO would not exceed 160,000 shares. The Committee has determined that the  appropriate level of award for the CEO is  normally 20% of the available annual pool,  which represents 0.15% of the issued share  capital of the Company. For 2013, the  Committee determined that this level of award remains appropriate, and is termed the  basic award . As part of the Shareholders’ approval for the EIP in  2010, the Committee undertook to ensure that the  level of stringency with regard to the attainment  of the performance targets is maintained for  each and every grant under the EIP. To give  comfort to Shareholders that there is integrity in the process, the Committee undertook to  provide full retrospective details of the annual  targets each year. This is set out below. These corporate performance conditions are set annually over the three-year holding period.  For each annual period, a third of this part of  the award (i.e. ¹/ ³  of 75%) is determined based  on the actual performance against the targets  set at the beginning of each year. This is illustrated in the diagram below:  As noted in the annual bonus section above, the Committee has introduced a mechanism  that links the amount of deferred shares from the annual bonus plan to the level of  award under the EIP. For each share deferred  (whether compulsorily or voluntarily) an  additional share will be awarded under the EIP.  This will be termed the  invested award . Based on the current base pay and bonus  structure, the maximum value of the invested  award is equivalent to 200% of salary. This only  occurs if a maximum bonus is earned and the  CEO elects to take it all in deferred shares. EBIT and revenue: 75% of each award  in total ■ For more independence between elements  of pay, thereby avoiding an unnecessary  ratchet of pay; ■ An incentive for the share price to increase;  and ■ Avoiding overgranting of value if share price  were to dip at the time of grant. Any remaining options lapse Exercise period Vested options can be exercised up to  three years after end of holding period Year 3 Measurement period 3 Year 2 Measurement period 2 Year 1 Measurement period 1 Start of  holding period End of  holding period Year 1 revenue  and EBIT  targets set Year 2 revenue  and EBIT  targets set Year 3 revenue  and EBIT  targets set Revenue growth  and EBIT  measured Options vest based on corporate performance Deferred EIP invested Invested  Cash shares award award  Bonus earned (% of salary)  % of salary  % of salary  % of salary  shares* Target 100  0  0  0 Target with maximum voluntary deferral  0  100  100  30,954 Maximum 100  100  100  30,954 Maximum with maximum voluntary deferral 0  200  200  61,908