detecting the problem. In the previous example, the change  that occurred was a yaw.  The failed engine is the side that requires no rudder pressure,  in this case the right engine. Second, having identified the  failed right engine, the procedure is to feather the right engine  and adjust power to maintain descent angle to a landing.  However, in this case the pilot feathered the left engine because  he assumed the engine failure was a left engine failure. During  twin-engine training, the left engine out is emphasized more  than the right engine because the left engine on most light  twins is the critical engine. This is due to multiengine airplanes  being subject to P-factor, as are single-engine airplanes.  The descending propeller blade of each engine will produce  greater thrust than the ascending blade when the airplane is  operated under power and at positive angles of attack. The  descending propeller blade of the right engine is also a greater  distance from the center of gravity, and therefore has a longer  moment arm than the descending propeller blade of the left  engine. As a result, failure of the left engine will result in the  most asymmetrical thrust (adverse yaw) because the right  engine will be providing the remaining thrust. Many twins are  designed with a counter-rotating right engine. With this design,  the degree of asymmetrical thrust is the same with either engine  inoperative. Neither engine is more critical than the other.  In the engine-out example, the aircraft yawed right, the pilot  was on final approach, and the problem warranted a prompt  solution. In many cases, overreaction and fixation excludes  a safe outcome. For example, what if the cabin door of a  Mooney suddenly opened in flight while the aircraft climbed  through 1,500 feet on a clear sunny day? The sudden opening  would be alarming, but the perceived hazard the open door  presents is quickly and effectively assessed as minor. In  fact, the door’s opening would not impact safe flight and  can almost be disregarded. Most likely, a pilot would return  to the airport to secure the door after landing.  The pilot flying on a clear day faced with this minor problem  may rank the open cabin door as a low risk. What about  the pilot on an IFR climb out in IMC conditions with light  intermittent turbulence in rain who is receiving an amended  clearance from ATC? The open cabin door now becomes  a higher risk factor. The problem has not changed, but the  perception of risk a pilot assigns it changes because of the  multitude of ongoing tasks and the environment. Experience,  discipline, awareness, and knowledge influences how a pilot  ranks a problem.  Since the pilot never executed the first step of identifying  which engine failed, he feathered the left engine and set the  right engine at zero thrust. This essentially restricted the  aircraft to a controlled glide. Upon realizing that he was  not going to make the runway, the pilot increased power to  both engines causing an enormous yaw to the left (the left  propeller was feathered) whereupon the aircraft started to turn  left. In desperation, the instructor closed both throttles and  the aircraft hit the ground and was substantially damaged.  This case is interesting because it highlights two particular  issues. First, taking action without forethought can be just  as dangerous as taking no action at all. In this case, the  pilot’s actions were incorrect; yet, there was sufficient  time to take the necessary steps to analyze the simulated  emergency. The second and more subtle issue is that decisions  made under pressure are sometimes executed based upon  limited experience and the actions taken may be incorrect,  incomplete, or insufficient to handle the situation.  After the problem has been identified and its impact  estimated, the pilot must determine the desirable outcome  and choose a course of action. In the case of the multiengine  pilot given the simulated failed engine, the desired objective  is to safely land the airplane.  The pilot formulates a plan that will take him or her to the  objective. Sometimes, there may be only one course of action  available. In the case of the engine failure already at 500  feet or below, the pilot solves the problem by identifying  one or more solutions that lead to a successful outcome. It is  important for the pilot not to become fixated on the process  to the exclusion of making a decision.  Once pathways to resolution are identified, the pilot selects the  most suitable one for the situation. The multiengine pilot given  the simulated failed engine must now safely land the aircraft.  Finally, after implementing a solution, evaluate the decision  to see if it was correct. If the action taken does not provide  the desired results, the process may have to be repeated.  Problem detection is the first step in the decision-making  process. It begins with recognizing a change occurred or an  expected change did not occur. A problem is perceived first  by the senses and then it is distinguished through insight  and experience. These same abilities, as well as an objective  analysis of all available information, are used to determine  the nature and severity of the problem. One critical error  made during the decision-making process is incorrectly  2-20  Evaluate (the Effect of the Action)  Do (the Necessary Actions)  Identify (Solutions)  Detect (the Problem)  Choose (a Course of Action)  Estimate (the Need To React) 