Experiments on small groups deciding upon options of varying risk levels have shown that discussion can shift group members toward more risky preferences. This risky shift effect was the first demonstration of the broader phenomenon of group po- larization in which discussion among members who share the same initial inclinations on an issue induces more extreme decisions or opinions. Hundreds of experiments have shown, for example, that groups also exhibit systematic shifts in the direction of more caution, greater hostility toward an out-group, more lenient punishments, and more extreme political attitudes (Myers and Lamm 1976; Isenberg 1986; Brown 1986). Metrically, group polarization occurs if, when all group members have posi- tions that lie on one side of the issue’s neutral reference point, the post-discussion mean position shifts even further away from the reference point compared with the pre-discussion mean. Although group polarization has earned a place in the canon of social influence phenomena, fundamental questions remain open including its integration with pro- cesses that reduce disagreement, the effect of network structure, and reference point determination. This paper addresses these three areas theoretically, mathematically, and experimentally. We present a theory in which the distinction between the policy under debate and the rhetorical issue upon which discussion is centered is crucial. A concave (downward curving) functional dependence of the rhetorical issue upon policy induces an asymmetry wherein the rhetorical distance between extreme members is compressed relative to more moderate ones. This “rhetorically-induced asymmetry” (RIA) facilitates the emergence of a majority at the extreme, which then drives the final consensus. Furthermore, the substitution of a heuristic issue in place of the proper rhetorical issue can shift the operative reference point for discussion, enhanc- ing polarization on one policy side yet suppressing it on the other. We implement this theory mathematically using a simple “rhetorically-proximate majority” (RPM) 3