159 In 2011, to reflect the low interest rate environment, Aegon lowered its long-term assumption for 10-year US treasury yields by  50 basis points to 4.75% (graded uniformly over the next five years) and lowered the 90-day treasury yield to 0.02% for the next two  years followed by a three year grade to 3%. In addition, Aegon lowered its assumed return for US separate account bond fund returns  by 200 basis points to 4% over the next five years, followed by a return of 6% thereafter. A 1% decrease in the expected long-term equity growth rate with regards to Aegon’s variable annuities and variable life insurance  products in the United States and Canada would result in a decrease in DPAC and VOBA balances and reserve strengthening of  approximately EUR 169 million (2012: EUR 150 million). The DPAC and VOBA balances for these products in the United States and  Canada amounted to EUR 2.3 billion at December 31, 2013 (2012: EUR 2.1 billion). For the fixed annuities and fixed universal life insurance products, the estimated gross profits (“EGP”) calculations include a net interest  rate margin, which Aegon assumes will remain practically stable under any reasonably likely interest-rate scenario.  Applying a reasonably possible increase to the mortality assumption, which varies by block of business, would reduce net income  by approximately EUR 105 million (2012: EUR 53 million). A relative 20% increase in the lapse rate assumption would increase net  income by approximately EUR 18 million (2012: EUR 42 million). Any reasonably possible changes in the other assumptions Aegon uses to determine EGP margins (i.e. maintenance expenses, inflation  and disability) would reduce net income by less than EUR 37 million (per assumption change) (2012: EUR 39 million). Determination of having control over investees In making the determination whether Aegon controls an investee, Aegon analyses whether it has power over the investee (existing  rights that give it the current ability to direct the relevant activities). The outcome of this analysis depends on the following criteria: ■ Purpose and design of the investee; ■ What are the relevant activities (that drive the investee’s returns) and how decisions about them are taken; and ■ Whether rights of the investor give current ability to direct the relevant activities. The analysis also depends on whether Aegon is exposed or has rights to variable returns from its involvement with the investee and  whether Aegon has the ability to use its powers over the investee to affect the amount of the investor’s returns. In addition, IFRS requires that the assessment also consider Aegon’s relationships with other parties (who may be acting on Aegon’s  behalf) and the possibility that the investee contains deemed separate entities that should be assessed for control separately. In specific cases, which are described below, Aegon applied judgment involving the criteria for consolidation to come to the conclusion  whether Aegon controls an investee. An investment vehicle is considered to be any vehicle (fund) whose primary objective is investing and managing its assets with a view to  generate returns. For the purpose of determining whether Aegon controls an investment vehicle and whether Aegon is an agent or  a principal, the following has been analyzed: Investment vehicle Investment funds Investment funds managed by the Group in which the Group holds an interest are consolidated in the financial statements if the Group  has power over that investment fund and it is exposed, or has rights, to variable returns from its involvement with the investee and has  the ability to affect those returns through its power over the investee. In assessing control, all interests held by the Group in the fund  are considered, regardless of whether the financial risk related to the investment is borne by the Group or by the policyholders (unless  the fund meets the definition of a deemed separate entity or under strict facts and circumstances a direct link between the policyholder  and the fund can be assumed). ■ The scope of its decision-making authority over the investee; ■ The rights held by other parties; ■ The remuneration to which it is entitled in accordance with the remuneration agreement; and ■ The decision maker’s exposure to variability of returns from other interests that it holds in the investee.