68 Long-term incentive compensation  is based on the  following indicators. Long-term incentive compensation is based on  performance over a three-year period during which the  terms and conditions of the long-term incentive  compensation plan remain unchanged. A three-year  target is set for each indicator. At the end of the three- year period, a comparison is made between the targets  and actual performance, and long-term incentive  compensation is calculated accordingly. At an aggregate  level, payments are made as follows:  Members of AEGON’s Executive Board are offered   pension arrangements and retirement benefits in line  with local practice in their countries of residence and in  line with those provided to executives at other   multinational companies in those countries. Benefits are   similarly offered consistent with Executive Board  members’ contractual agreements, local practices and  comparable arrangements at other multinationals.  AEGON does not grant Executive Board members  personal loans, guarantees or the like, unless in the  normal course of business and on terms applicable to all  employees, and only with the approval of the company’s  Supervisory Board.  AEGON’s Supervisory Board may make adjustments to  variable compensation payments as follows: In cases of material financial restatements or individual  gross misconduct, AEGON’s Supervisory Board reserves  the right to re-claim short-term incentive compensation  payments. With regard to long-term incentive  compensation, AEGON believes the three-year  performance period already provides sufficient scope to  identify any potential accounting errors or individual  wrongdoing.  Pension arrangements  Claw-back provision  Circuit breaker  Discretionary adjustments  ■ 50% of the maximum long-term incentive  compensation if the threshold target is reached. ■ 80% if the pre-determined performance targets are met. ■ Up to 100% if the targets are exceeded. ■ Should the Supervisory Board decide that AEGON’s  short or long-term business is being affected by  significant and exceptional circumstances, not  reflected in the performance indicators, it may request  the company’s Compensation Committee to consider  possible adjustments.  ■ The Compensation Committee reviews all  circumstances in detail and documents its fi ndings.  If its analysis confirms the Supervisory Board’s initial  assessment, the Committee will then bring forward a  proposal to the Supervisory Board to adjust either  short or long-term incentive compensation.  ■ To reflect such exceptional circumstances, variable  compensation may be adjusted within a range of  between 75% and 125% of the original entitlement,  but may not exceed 100% of the maximum.  ■ Discretionary adjustments may not be made to fi xed  compensation. Short-term incentive compensation is only paid if  AEGON N.V. reports a net income for the year.  Maximum %  of total long- term incentive  compen sation Target Earnings  20% Growth in net  underlying earnings Return on capital 20% Return on capital,  adjusted for risk Shareholder  returns 35% Relative total  shareholder return  as measured against  peers  1 Non-fi nancial 25% Objectives  measuring corporate  responsibility 1 In 2010, the peer group comprises the following companies: Aviva, AXA, Generali, Hartford Financial Services Group, Legal & General,  Manulife Financial, MetLife, Principal Financial Group, Prudential Financial, Prudential Plc, Sun Life Financial, and Zurich Financial Services.