9 System Safety Considerations  9.1  System Safety  9.2  Integrated Safety Management  System safety is a standardized management and engineering discipline that integrates the  consideration of human, machine, and environment in planning; designing; testing; and  maintaining operations, procedures, and acquisition projects. System safety is applied  throughout a system's lifecycle to achieve an acceptable level of safety risk within the  constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost.  For each new system acquisition, the Program Office (PO) must establish and implement a  System Safety Program that meets the requirements of the  Air Traffic Organization (ATO)  Safety Management System (SMS). The status of system safety must be presented at all  decision points and investment reviews. Detailed guidelines for safety management and  development assurance are found on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Acquisition  System Toolset (FAST) website; in the ATO SMS Manual; in SAE Aerospace Recommended  Practice (ARP) 1  ARP4754A,  Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems ; in  RTCA 2  DO-278A,  Software Integrity Assurance Considerations for Communication, Navigation,  Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Systems ; and in RTCA DO-254A,  Design  Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware .  Section 5.4 of the preliminary Program Requirements Document (PRD) constitutes the safety  plan required by the Safety Risk Management Guidance for System Acquisitions (SRMGSA) for  the Investment Analysis Readiness Decision (IARD). The PO must develop a Program Safety  Plan (PSP) consistent with this safety plan for the IARD and update it for the Initial Investment  Decision (IID) and Final Investment Decision (FID). The PSP’s scope, content, and list of  required Safety Risk Management (SRM) activities are based on the Safety Strategy Meeting  that should be conducted between the PO and the Safety and Technical Training (AJI) Safety  Engineering Team, AJI-314.  The highly distributed and interconnected nature of the National Airspace System (NAS)—and  Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), in particular—presents complex safety  challenges to the NAS. In addition, many changes to the NAS necessary for implementing  NextGen initiatives may occur in a parallel or overlapping manner. The past SRM paradigm  was focused on analyzing individual changes; it was insufficient for addressing all the hazards  identified as a result of the planned interactions and interconnectivity.  The legacy NAS is a “system of systems” that provides multiple services to users. The NAS is  evolving into an even more complex configuration. Future acquisitions are beginning to blur the  lines of a “system” with defined/fixed boundaries and interfaces. Systems, programs, and  projects no longer have unique or exclusive functionality. In fact, the functionalities not only  overlap, but may also build on one another, subsume each other, or combine for a joint function  or capability. This perspective was not considered historically but is important to applying the  concept of integrated safety in acquisitions. Integrated Safety Management must be performed  to assess risks of initiatives in support of agency Risk-Based Decision Making.  1. An ARP is a guideline from SAE International. 2. RTCA, Inc., is a private, not-for-profit association founded in 1935 as the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics; it is now referred to simply as “RTCA.” 9_SRMGSA_202003  Originally published March 2020  Uncontrolled copy when downloaded  49