terrain. Contributing factors were the pilot’s inadequate  preflight planning, self-induced pressure to conduct the flight,  and poor judgment. At 1414:53, approach control asked the pilot what was his  current destination. The pilot responded, “We’re deviating.  I think we’re going to go back over near Eau Claire, but, ah,  we’re going to see what the weather is like. We’re, we’re  kinda in the soup at this point so I’m trying to get back, ah,  to the east.” At 1415:10, approach control informed the pilot that there  was “some level one rain or some light rain showers” that  were about seven miles ahead of his present position. At 1415:30, the pilot asked approach control, “What is the  ah, ah, Lakeville weather? I was showing seven thousand and  overcast on the system here. Is that still holding?”  Approach control responded, “No, around [the] Minneapolis  area we’re overcast at twenty three hundred and twenty one  hundred in the vicinity of all the other airports around here.” At 1415:49, the pilot stated, “I’m going to head due south  at this time, down to, ah, about two thousand and make it  into Lakeville.”  Approach control responded, “...you can proceed south  bound.” At 1416:02, the pilot responded, “...thanks (unintelligible).”  The radar data indicated that the airplane’s altitude was about  2,600 feet MSL. There were no further radio transmissions. After the last  radio transmission, three radar returns indicated the airplane  descended from 2,500 feet to 2,300 feet MSL before it was  lost from radar contact. A witness reported he heard an airplane and then saw the  airplane descending through a cloud layer that was about  400–500 feet above the ground. The airplane was in about  a 50° nose-down attitude with its engine producing “cruise  power.” He reported the airplane was flying at a high rate  of speed for about four seconds until he heard the airplane  impact the terrain. The observed weather in the area of the  accident was reported as marginal VMC and IMC.  The NTSB determined the probable cause(s) of this accident  to be the pilot’s continued flight into IMC, which resulted in  spatial disorientation and loss of control. Research can offer no single explanation to account for  this type of accident. Is it the end result of poor situational  Approach control instructed the pilot to proceed to the  northeast and maintain VFR. At 1413:45, approach control asked the pilot if he was going  to reverse course. The pilot replied, “Ah, affirmative, yeah  we’re gonna make, we’re gonna actually head, ah, due north.”  In 2007, a Beech 836 TC Bonanza was destroyed when it  impacted terrain. The private, non-instrument-rated pilot  departed in VMC on a personal flight and requested VFR  flight following to his destination. When he neared his  destination, he contacted approach control and reported that  his altitude was 2,500 feet above mean sea level (MSL).  Approach control informed the pilot that there were moderate  to heavy rain showers over the destination airport. The pilot  reported that he was experiencing “poor visibility” and was  considering turning 180° to “go back.” Approach control  informed the pilot that IMC prevailed north of his position  with moderate to heavy rain showers. Their exchange follows: One question frequently asked is whether or not pilots  associated with VFR flight into IMC even knew they were  about to encounter hazardous weather. It is difficult to know  from accident records exactly what weather information  the pilot obtained before and during flight, but the pilot  in the following accident departed in marginal visual  meteorological conditions (VMC). Continuing VFR into IMC often leads to spatial disorientation  or collision with ground/obstacles. It is even more dangerous  when the pilot is not instrument rated or current. The FAA  and NTSB have studied the problem extensively with the goal  of reducing this type of accident. Weather-related accidents,  particularly those associated with VFR flight into IMC,  continue to be a threat to GA safety because 80 percent of  the VFR-IMC accidents resulted in a fatality. Unfortunately for this pilot, he fell into a high-risk category.  According to the NTSB, pilots on flights of more than 300  nautical miles (NM) are 4.7 times more likely to be involved  in an accident than pilots on flights of 50 NM or less. Another  statistic also put him in to the potential accident category: his  lack of an instrument rating. Studies have found that VFR  pilots are trained to avoid bad weather and when they find  themselves in poor weather conditions, they do not have the  experience to navigate their way through it. Continuing VFR into IMC 5-7