technique, especially after arming the system to make a  change in course or altitude. In advanced avionics aircraft, proper automation management  also requires a thorough understanding of how the autopilot  interacts with the other systems. For example, with some  autopilots, changing the navigation source on the Electronic  Horizontal Situation Indicator (e-HSI) from GPS to localizer  (LOC) or VOR while the autopilot is engaged in NAV  (course tracking mode) causes the autopilot’s NAV mode to  disengage. The autopilot’s lateral control defaults to wings  level until the pilot takes action to reengage the NAV mode  to track the desired navigation source. Not only did the crew fail to fully monitor the aircraft’s  automated routing, they also failed to retract the spoilers  upon adding full thrust. This prevented the aircraft from  outclimbing the slope of the mountain. Simulations of the  accident indicate that had the aircraft had automatic spoiler  retraction (spoilers automatically retract upon application of  maximum thrust), or if the crew had remembered the spoilers,  the aircraft probably would have missed the mountain.  through their own inattention. By failing to evaluate each turn  made at the direction of automation, the pilots maximized  risk instead of minimizing it. In this case, an avoidable  accident became a tragedy through simple pilot error and  complacency. Pilots en route to La Paz unwittingly deselected the very low  frequency (VLF) input, thereby rendering the automation  system unreliable. Although the system alerted the pilots to  the ambiguity of navigation solution, the pilots perceived the  alert to be computer error, and followed the course it provided  anyway. They reached what they thought should be La Paz,  but which was later estimated to have been approximately 30  NM away. They attempted to execute the published approach  but were unable to tune the VOR radio, so they used instead  the VLF of the KNS 660 to guide them on an impromptu  approach. They were unable to gain visual contact with the  runway environment due to in-cloud conditions despite the  reported weather being clear with unrestricted visibility. Then  they proceeded to their alternate about 1½ hours away. After  2½ hours of flight and following what they thought was the  proper course, the aircraft became fuel critical, necessitating  a controlled let-down from FL 250 to presumably visually  conditions. Ironically, at about 9,000 mean sea level (MSL)  they broke out of the cloud cover above an airfield. Although  they attempted to align themselves for the runway, the aircraft  ran out of fuel. The pilots dead-sticked the King Air to a ramp  after which they broke through a fence, went over a berm,  and into a pond. The aircraft was destroyed. After exiting  the aircraft relatively unscathed, they found out they landed  in Corumba, Brazil.  [Figure 7-3] In this accident, the pilots failed to realize that when no  Omega signals were available with the VLF/Omega system,  the equipment could continue to provide a navigation solution  with no integrity using only the VLF system. Although the  VLF/Omega system is now obsolete and has been replaced by  the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Loran-C,  this accident illustrates the need for pilots of all experience  levels to be thoroughly familiar with the operation of the  avionics equipment being used. A pilot must not only know  and understand what is being displayed, but must also be  aware of what is not being displayed. Risk is also increased when the pilot fails to monitor the  systems. By failing to monitor the systems and failing to  check the results of the processes, the pilot becomes detached  from aircraft operation. This type of complacency led to  tragedy in a 1999 aircraft accident in Colombia. A multi- engine aircraft crewed by two pilots struck the face of the  Andes Mountains. Examination of their FMS revealed they  entered a waypoint into the FMS incorrectly by one degree,  resulting in a flightpath taking them to a point 60 nautical  miles (NM) off the intended course. The pilots were equipped  with the proper charts, their route was posted on the charts,  and they had a paper navigation log indicating the direction of  each leg. They had all the tools to manage and monitor their  flight, but instead allowed the automation to fly and manage  itself. The system did exactly what it was programmed to do;  it flew on a programmed course into a mountain, resulting  in multiple deaths. The pilots simply failed to manage the  system and created their own hazard. Although this hazard  was self-induced, what is notable is the risk the pilots created  Consider the pilot whose navigational information  management strategy consists solely of following the  magenta line on the moving map. He or she can easily fly  into geographic or regulatory disaster if the straight line GPS  course goes through high terrain or prohibited airspace or if  the moving map display fails. An advanced avionics aircraft may offer increased safety  with enhanced situational awareness. Although aircraft flight  manuals (AFM) explicitly prohibit using the moving map,  topography, terrain awareness, traffic, and weather datalink  displays as the primary data source, these tools nonetheless  give the pilot unprecedented information for enhanced  situational awareness. Without a well-planned information  management strategy, these tools also make it easy for an  unwary pilot to slide into the complacent role of passenger  in command. Enhanced Situational Awareness 7-6