T > R > P > S .So, it is best to defect, regardless of the opponent’s decision, which in turns makes cooperators unable to resist invasion by defectors. In this paper, we study the effect of non-uniform interaction rates on evolu- tionary dynamics of non-repeated PD game [1], via benefit and cost dilemma . In section 1, we present the classical approach of the replicator equation of PD with uniform interaction rate between any two individuals. This rate does not depend on the strategies of these individuals. In section 2,we assume that the interaction rates are not uniform. For example, players who use the same strat- egy might interact more frequently than players who use different strategies. Non-uniform interaction rates lead to non-linear fitness functions and therefore allow richer dynamics than the classical replicator equation, which is based on linear fitness functions. If strategy D is a strict Nash equilibrium[5], then it remains uninvadable for positive non-uniform interaction rates. If D dominates C then non-uniform interaction rates can introduce a pair of interior equilibria; one of them is stable the other one is unstable. If C and D coexist, then non- uniform interaction rates cannot change the qualitative dynamics, but alter the location of the stable equilibrium. Consider PD game between two players each having two strategies C(cooperation) and D (defection) and Cooperator pay a benefit b at a cost c to his Cooperator opponent, whereas Defector opponent only receive a benefit b [6]. Then we have payoff matrix 1 Dynamical PD game with uniform interaction rate    b − c − c b 0    (1) 2