cannot possibly find out what the action is going to be, since the player does not know it himself. “Ignorance is obviously a very good safeguard against disclosing information directly or indirectly” [16, Section 17.2.1] The fact that the game is determined shows that the player who follows the Founders’ advice does not lose anything if his plan is indeed found out, so he might as well declare it. In the proof of Theorem 1.3 we walked the reverse path: Determinacy follows from the fact that a player does not lose anything if he declares his contingent plan. Example 5.1 shows that the argument relies on the assumption of eventual perfect monitoring. The following questions about possible extensions of Theorem 1.3 are interesting for their own sake, and also because they highlight the assumptions on the game that were used in the proof of Theorem 1.3. The first question is about relaxing eventual perfect monitoring. Say that an infinite game Γ = ( A, ( P$_{n}$ )$_{n}$$_{≥}$$_{0}$ , W ) admits eventual outcome monitoring if both players know the identity of the winner (that is, the outcome of the game) at infinity. Formally, this means that for every u, u ′ ∈ A N such that u ∈ W and u ′ / ∈ W , there exists an n such that u ≁$_{k}$ u ′ for every k > n . 6. Open questions Question. Is every game with perfect recall and eventual outcome monitoring determined ? The construction of the auxiliary game Γ ∗ in the proof of Theorem 1.3 relies on Lemma 4.1, that if both players know the play path at infinity then each action becomes commonly known at some finite time, and so the play path in Γ can be reconstructed from Chance’s actions in Γ $^{∗}$. However, when both players know the occurrence of W at infinity, it still needs not be the case that W depends only on things that are commonly known at some finite times. The second questions relates to general payoff functions. Assume that the game is played as in Section 1, and at infinity player 2 pays player 1 the amount f ( a$_{0}$, a$_{1}$, . . . ), where 18