Abstract Pari-mutuel markets are trading platforms through which the common market maker simultane- ously clears multiple contingent claims markets. This market has several distinctive properties that began attracting the attention of the financial industry in the 2000s. For example, the plat- form aggregates liquidity from the individual contingent claims market into the common pool while shielding the market maker from potential financial loss. The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we provide a new economic interpretation of the market-clearing strategy of a pari-mutuel market that is well known in the literature. The pari-mutuel auctioneer is shown to be equivalent to the market maker with extreme ambiguity aversion for the future contingent event. Second, based on this theoretical understanding, we present a new market-clearing algorithm called the Knight- ian Pari-mutuel Mechanism (KPM). The KPM retains many interesting properties of pari-mutuel markets while explicitly controlling for the market maker’s ambiguity aversion. In addition, the KPM is computationally efficient in that it is solvable in polynomial time.