conditions as these despite the apparent risk. This time,  however, the conditions were forecast with surface fog.  Additionally, the pilot and his passenger were in a hurry. They  were both late for their respective appointments. Perhaps  being in a hurry, the pilot failed to factor in the difference  between the forecasted weather and weather he negotiated  before. Can it be said that the pilot was in a hurry definitively?  Two years before this accident, the pilot landed a different  aircraft gear up. At that incident, he simply told the fixed- base operator (FBO) at the airport to take care of the aircraft  because the pilot needed to go to a meeting. He also had an  enforcement action for flying low over a populated area.  It is apparent that this pilot knew the difference between right  and wrong. He elected to ignore the magnitude of the hazard,  the final illustration of a behavioral problem that ultimately  caused this accident. Certainly one would say that he was  impetuous and had what is called “get there itis.” While  ducking under clouds to get into the Michigan airport, the  pilot struck terrain killing everyone onboard. His erroneous  behavior resulted from inadequate or incorrect perceptions  of the risk, and his skills, knowledge, and judgment were not  sufficient to manage the risk or safely complete the tasks in  that aircraft. [ Figure 1-6 ]  The hazards a pilot faces and those that are created through  adverse attitude predispose his or her actions. Predisposition  is formed from the pilot’s foundation of beliefs and,  therefore, affects all decisions he or she makes. These  are called “hazardous attitudes” and are explained in the  Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, Chapter 17,  Aeronautical Decision-Making. A key point must be understood about risk. Once the situation  builds in complexity, it exceeds the pilot’s capability and  requires luck to succeed and prevail. [ Figure 1-7 ]  Unfortunately, when a pilot survives a situation above his  or her normal capability, perception of the risk involved and  of the ability to cope with that level of risk become skewed.  The pilot is encouraged to use the same response to the same  perceived level of risk, viewing any success as due to skill,  not luck. The failure to accurately perceive the risk involved  and the level of skill, knowledge, and abilities required to  mitigate that risk may influence the pilot to accept that level  of risk or higher levels. Many in the aviation community would ask why the pilot did  not see this action as a dangerous maneuver. The aviation  community needs to ask questions and develop answers to  these questions: “What do we need to do during the training  and education of pilots to enable them to perceive these  hazards as risks and mitigate the risk factors?” “Why was this  Figure 1-7.  Pilots accept their own individual level of risk even  though they may have received similar training. Risk, which must  be managed individually, becomes a problem when a situation  builds and its complexity exceeds the pilot’s capability (background  + education + predisposition + attitude + training). The key to  managing risk is the pilot’s understanding of his or her threshold  and perceptions of the risk. Figure 1-6. Each pilot may have a different threshold where skill  is considered, however; in this case no amount of skill raises this  line to a higher level. Acceptable High Low PILOT 1 PILOT 2 PILOT 3 Background Training Predisposition Education Attitude Background Training Predisposition Education Attitude Background Train- Predisposition Education Attitude ing 1-7