with others, but were not considered physically inclined.  The accident-repeater group had better gymnastic skills,  was considered aggressive and impulsive, demonstrated  rebellious behavior when under stress, were poor losers, and  liked to be the center of attention. One interpretation of this  data—an adult predisposition to injury stems from childhood  behavior and environment—leads to the conclusion that  any pilot group should be comprised only of pilots who are  safety-conscious, industrious, and cooperative.  Clearly, this is not only an inaccurate inference, it is  impossible. Pilots are drawn from the general population and  exhibit all types of personality traits. Thus, it is important that  good decision-making skills be taught to all pilots.  Historically, the term “pilot error” has been used to describe  an accident in which an action or decision made by the  pilot was the cause or a contributing factor that led to the  accident. This definition also includes the pilot’s failure  to make a correct decision or take proper action. From a  broader perspective, the phrase “human factors related” more  aptly describes these accidents. A single decision or event  does not lead to an accident, but a series of events and the  resultant decisions together form a chain of events leading  to an outcome.  In his article “Accident-Prone Pilots,” Dr. Patrick R. Veillette  uses the history of “Captain Everyman” to demonstrate how  aircraft accidents are caused more by a chain of poor choices  rather than one single poor choice. In the case of Captain  Everyman, after a gear-up landing accident, he became  involved in another accident while taxiing a Beech 58P Baron  out of the ramp. Interrupted by a radio call from the dispatcher,  Everyman neglected to complete the fuel cross-feed check  before taking off. Everyman, who was flying solo, left the  right-fuel selector in the cross-feed position. Once aloft and  cruising, he noticed a right roll tendency and corrected with  aileron trim. He did not realize that both engines were feeding  off the left wing’s tank, making the wing lighter.  After two hours of flight, the right engine quit when  Everyman was flying along a deep canyon gorge. While he  was trying to troubleshoot the cause of the right engine’s  failure, the left engine quit. Everyman landed the aircraft on  a river sand bar but it sank into ten feet of water.  Several years later Everyman flew a de Havilland Twin  Otter to deliver supplies to a remote location. When he  returned to home base and landed, the aircraft veered sharply  to the left, departed the runway, and ran into a marsh 375  feet from the runway. The airframe and engines sustained  considerable damage. Upon inspecting the wreck, accident  investigators found the nose wheel steering tiller in the fully  Risk management and risk intervention is much more than the  simple definitions of the terms might suggest. Risk management  and risk intervention are decision-making processes designed  to systematically identify hazards, assess the degree of risk, and  An understanding of the decision-making process provides  the pilot with a foundation for developing ADM and SRM  skills. While some situations, such as engine failure, require an  immediate pilot response using established procedures, there is  usually time during a flight to analyze any changes that occur,  gather information, and assess risks before reaching a decision.  Five traits were discovered in pilots prone to having  accidents. These pilots:  The successful pilot possesses the ability to concentrate,  manage workloads, and monitor and perform several  simultaneous tasks. Some of the latest psychological  screenings used in aviation test applicants for their ability  to multitask, measuring both accuracy, as well as the  individual’s ability to focus attention on several subjects  simultaneously. The FAA oversaw an extensive research  study on the similarities and dissimilarities of accident-free  pilots and those who were not. The project surveyed over  4,000 pilots, half of whom had “clean” records while the  other half had been involved in an accident.  Now, is Everyman accident prone or just unlucky? Skipping  details on a checklist appears to be a common theme in the  preceding accidents. While most pilots have made similar  mistakes, these errors were probably caught prior to a mishap  due to extra margin, good warning systems, a sharp copilot,  or just good luck. What makes a pilot less prone to accidents?  deflected position. Both the after takeoff and before landing  checklists require the tiller to be placed in the neutral position.  Everyman had overlooked this item.  • Have disdain toward rules  • Have very high correlation between accidents on their  flying records and safety violations on their driving  records  • Frequently fall into the “thrill and adventure seeking”  personality category  • Are impulsive rather than methodical and disciplined,  both in their information gathering and in the speed  and selection of actions to be taken  • Have a disregard for or tend to under utilize outside  sources of information, including copilots, flight  attendants, flight service personnel, flight instructors,  and ATC  The Decision-Making Process  2-12 