the private information of the insider has been generally assumed to be static . For example, in [2] and in [7] the insider knows ex ante the final value of the firm, and in [6] she knows ex ante the time of default of the company issuing the asset. This literature has shown that i ) the presence of an insider on the market does not necessarily lead to arbitrage (i.e. the value function of the insider is finite), and that ii ) the presence of insiders might be considered beneficial to the market, in the sense that it leads to higher information efficiency of the equilibrium price process. Nevertheless, the assumption of insider’s perfect foresight is unrealistic, since the fundamental value of the firm should be connected to elements (like future cash-flows, productivity, sales etc.) that have intrinsically an aleatory component. That is, a more natural assumption would be that the fundamental value is in itself a stochastic process, and that the insider can observe it directly – or at least observe it in a less noisy way than the other agents on the market. Thus, in this paper I relax the assumption of static insider information, and study the equilib- rium trading and price processes, as well as market efficiency, in a setting with dynamic private information. The model I consider in this paper is a generalization of the static information setting of [2]. An earlier attempt to generalize this framework to include dynamic information is in [3]. This latter paper considers a much smaller set of admissible trading strategies and pricing rules, and has much more stringent assumptions on the parameters, than the ones considered in my work. Moreover, it shows the existence of one possible Markovian equilibrium, while my work characterizes all optimal strategies and establishes that there is a unique Markovian inconspicuous equilibrium price process, i.e. an equilibrium price that allows the insider to trade undetected and depends only on the total order process. Moreover, I identify this Markovian equilibrium in closed form, and show that the presence of an insider increases the market informational efficiency for times close to dividend payment. Furthermore, I show that even when the market parameters do not satisfy the conditions for the existence of a Markovian equilibrium, there exists a non Markovian inconspicuous equilibrium which I also identify in closed form. Additionally, I give characterization of all optimal trading strategies for the equilibrium price process. I show, based on this characterization, that in the case of non Markovian price process it is optimal for the insider to reveal her private information 3