awareness, hazardous risk perception, motivational factors,  or simply improper decision-making? Or is it that adequate  weather information is unavailable, simply not used, or  perhaps not understood? Extracting critical facts from  multiple sources of weather information can be challenging  for even the experienced aviator. And once the pilot is in  the air, en route weather information is available only to  the extent that he or she seeks it out if their aircraft is not  equipped with operational weather displays. No one has yet determined why a pilot would fly into IMC  when limited by training to fly under VFR. In many cases,  the pilot does not understand the risk. Without education,  we have a fuzzy perception of hazards. It should be noted  that pilots are taught to be confident when flying. Did  overconfidence and ability conflict with good decision- making in this accident? Did this pilot, who had about 461  flight hours, but only 17 hours in make and model overrate  his ability to fly this particular aircraft? Did he underestimate  the risk of flying in marginal VFR conditions? Situational awareness is the accurate perception and  understanding of all the factors and conditions within the  four fundamental risk elements (pilot, aircraft, environment,  and type of operation) that affect safety before, during, and  after the flight. Thus, loss of situational awareness results  in a pilot not knowing where he or she is, an inability to  recognize deteriorating circumstances, and the misjudgment  of the rate of deterioration. In 2007, an instrument-rated commercial pilot departed on  a cross-country flight through IMC. The pilot made radio  transmissions to ground control, tower, low radar approach  control, and high radar approach control that he was “new  at instruments” and that he had not flown in IMC “in a long  time.” While maneuvering to get back on the centerline of  the airway, while operating in an area of heavy precipitation,  the pilot lost control of the airplane after he became spatially  disoriented.  Recorded radar data revealed flight with stable parameters  until approximately 1140:49 when the airplane is recorded  making an unexpected right turn at a rate of 2° per second.  The pilot may not have noticed a turn at this rate since there  were no radar calls to departure control. The right turn  continues until radar contact is lost at 1141:58 at which  point that airplane is turning at a rate of approximately 5°  per second and descending at over 3,600 fpm.  Wreckage and impact information was consistent with a right  bank, low-angle, high-speed descent. IMC prevailed in the  area at the time of the accident. The descent profile was found  At 1032, the pilot calls AFSS again and sounds distressed.  The pilot stated he wants to get home, has not showered in 1½  days, is getting tired, and wants to depart as soon as possible.  The AFSS briefer briefs the AIRMET for IFR conditions  and forecasts IFR en route. At 1055, the pilot phones AFSS  for the final time and talks for approximately 7 minutes.  Then, he files an IFR flight plan. The AFSS briefer states  improving conditions and recommends delaying departure  to allow conditions to improve. However, this pilot made  the decision to fly in weather conditions clearly outside his  personal flying comfort zone. Once he had exceeded his  proficiency level, the newly minted instrument pilot had no  instructor in the other seat to take over. During the second phone call, the pilot stated he was  instrument rated but did not want to take any chances. At  this time, the AFSS briefer forecast light rain and marginal  conditions for VFR. The third phone call lasted approximately  5 minutes during which the AFSS briefer gives weather, the  AIRMET, and forecasts a cycle of storms for the day of  flight. The pilot responds that it sounds like a pretty bad  day to fly. During the fourth phone call, the pilot states that  he has been advised by a flight instructor at his destination  airport that he should try to wait it out because the weather  is “pretty bad right now” The AFSS briefer agrees and briefs  light to moderate rain showers in the destination area and the  AIRMET for IFR conditions. The AFSS briefer states that  after 1100 the weather should improve. The pilot had telephoned AFSS six times prior to take off  to request weather reports and forecasts. The first phone  call lasted approximately 18 minutes during which time  the AFSS briefer forecasts IMC conditions for the route of  flight and briefs an airmen’s meteorological information  (AIRMET) for IFR conditions. The pilot stated that he did  not try to take off a day earlier because he recalled that his  instrument flight instructor told him not to take off if he did  not feel comfortable.  The following abbreviated excerpt from the accident report  offers insight into another example of poor aeronautical  decision-making. The 26 year old pilot was reported to have accumulated a  total of 456.7 hours, of which 35.8 hours were in the same  make and model. Prior to the accident flight, the pilot had  accumulated a total of 2.5 hours of actual instrument time,  with 105.7 hours of simulated instrument time.  to be consistent with the “graveyard spiral.” Prior to flight, for  unknown reasons, the telephone conversations with the AFSS  progressed from being conservative to a strong desire to fly  home, consistent with the pilot phenomena “get-home-itis.”  Loss of Situational Awareness 5-8