In light of this violence, co-chairs of Tokyo Donor conference called on both parties to return to negotiating table. The co-chairs—the United States in particular—were heavily critical of violence perpetrated by ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ. US ರಾಜ್ಯ Department officials, as well as US ambassador to ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾ, gave warnings to Tigers clಗುರಿing return to hostilities would mean that Tigers would face "more capable ಮತ್ತು more determined" ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾದ ಸೇನೆ. While talks were going on there was violence targeted towards ನಾಗರಿಕರ such as ನರಮೇಧ of 5 ತಮಿಳು students on January 2, 2006, in Trincomalee when high school students playing by beach were briefly detained ಮತ್ತು then shot dead.

In last-minute effort to salvage agreement between parties, Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim ಮತ್ತು ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ theoretician Anton Balasingham arrived in ದ್ವೀಪ. The parties severely disagreed on location of talks; however, continued efforts produced breakthrough when both parties agreed on February 7, 2006, that new talks could be held in Geneva, Switzerland on February 22 ಮತ್ತು February 23. These talks were reported to have gone "above expectations", with both ಸರ್ಕಾರ ಮತ್ತು ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ agreeing to curb violence ಮತ್ತು to hold further talks on April 19–21.

During weeks after talks, there was significant decrease in violence. ಆದಾಗ್ಯೂ, ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ resumed attacks ವಿರುದ್ಧ ಸೇನೆ in April beginning with Claymore anti-personnel mine attack on ಸೇನೆ vehicles which killed 10 navy sailors on April 11. The following day, coordinated bombings by rebels ಮತ್ತು rioting in north-eastern part of ದೇಶ left 16 dead. First, Claymore anti-personnel mine exploded in Trincomalee, killing ಎರಡು policemen in their vehicle. Another blast, set off in crowded vegetable market, ಹತರಾದರು one soldier ಮತ್ತು some ನಾಗರಿಕರ. Ensuing rioting ಯಿಂದ ನಾಗರಿಕರ left more than dozen dead. Responsibility for these attacks was clಗುರಿed by organisation called Upsurging People's Force, which ಸೇನೆ accused of being front for ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ.

In light of this violence, ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ called for postponement of Geneva talks until April 24–25, ಮತ್ತು ಸರ್ಕಾರ initially agreed to this. Following ಸಂಧಾನಗಳು, both ಸರ್ಕಾರ ಮತ್ತು rebels agreed to have civilian vessel transport regional ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ ನಾಯಕs with international truce monitors on April 16, which ಒಳಗೊಳ್ಳು crossing ಸರ್ಕಾರ-controlled territory. ಆದಾಗ್ಯೂ, climate shifted drastically when ತಮಿಳು ಹುಲಿಗಳು canceled meeting, clಗುರಿing not to have agreed to naval escort. ಒಪ್ಪಂದing to SLMM, ತಮಿಳು rebels had previously agreed to escort. This led to Helen Olafsdottir, spokesperson for SLMM saying "It was part of agreement. The rebels should have read clauses carefully. We are frustrated."

On April 20, 2006, ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ officially pulled out of peace talks indefinitely. While they stated that transportation issues had prevented them from meeting their regional ನಾಯಕs, some analysts ಮತ್ತು international ಸಮುದಾಯ held deep skepticism, seeing transportation issue as delaying tactic by ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ in order to avoid attending peace talks in Geneva.

Violence continued to spiral ಮತ್ತು on April 23, 2006, six ಸಿಂಹಳೀಯರು rice farmers were ನರಮೇಧd in their paddy fields by suspected ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ cadres in Trincomalee district. The following day, ಎರಡು suspected ತಮಿಳು ಹುಲಿ rebels were shot dead in Batticaloa when caught planting mines after rebels reportedly hacked young mother to death ಮತ್ತು kidnapped her infant.

After ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ launched suicide assault on naval convoy in which 18 sailors died, Allaipiddy ನರಮೇಧ of May 13, 2006, happened in which 13 minority ತಮಿಳು ನಾಗರಿಕರ were killed in separate incidents in three villages in islet of Kayts (Uruthota) in northern ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾ.
International condemnation ವಿರುದ್ಧ ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ skyrocketed following attempted assassination of commander of ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾ Army, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka by pregnant ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ Black Tiger suicide bomber Anoja Kugenthirasah, who blew herself up at ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾದ Army headquarters in capital, ಕೊಲಂಬೊ. Lt. Gen. Fonseka ಮತ್ತು twenty-seven others were injured, while ten people were killed in attack. For ಮೊದಲ time since 2001 ಕದನ ವಿರಾಮ, ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾ ವಾಯು ದಳ carried out aerial assaults on rebel positions in north-eastern part of ದ್ವೀಪ nation in retaliation for attack.

This attack, along with assassination of Lakshman Kadiragamar year earlier ಮತ್ತು unsuccessful attack ವಿರುದ್ಧ naval vessel carrying 710 unarmed security force personnel on holiday, proved catalysts as European Union decided to proscribe ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ as terrorist organisation on May 19, 2006. It resulted in freezing of ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ assets in member nations of EU, ಮತ್ತು put end to its efforts to raise funds its terror campaign in ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾ. In statement, European Parliament said that ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ did not represent all ತಮಿಳರು ಮತ್ತು called on it to "allow for ರಾಜಕೀಯ pluralism ಮತ್ತು alternate democratic voices in northern ಮತ್ತು eastern parts of ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾ".

As ಉತ್ತರ ಮತ್ತು ಪೂರ್ವ of ದೇಶ continued to be rocked by attacks, new talks were scheduled in Oslo, Norway, between ಜೂನ್‌ 8–9. Delegations from both sides arrived in Oslo, but talks were canceled when ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ refused to meet directly with ಸರ್ಕಾರ delegation clಗುರಿing its fighters were not been allowed safe passage to travel to talks. Norwegian mediator Erik Solheim told journalists that ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ should take direct responsibility for collapse of talks.

Further violence followed, including Vankalai ನರಮೇಧ in which family of four minority ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾದ ತಮಿಳರು from village of Vankalai in district of Mannar in ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾ on ಜೂನ್‌ 8, 2006, were tortured ಮತ್ತು killed. Both mother ಮತ್ತು nine year old daughter were allegedly raped before being killed. The gory images of corpses published by pro rebel Tamilnet news site created controversy in ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾ ಮತ್ತು abroad. The ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾದ army ಮತ್ತು ತಮಿಳು ಹುಲಿ rebels have blamed each other for killings. There was also Kebithigollewa ನರಮೇಧ on ಜೂನ್‌ 15, 2006, in which ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ attacked bus killing at least 64 ಸಿಂಹಳೀಯರು ನಾಗರಿಕರ ಮತ್ತು prompting more air strikes by ವಾಯು ದಳ, ಮತ್ತು assassination of ಶ್ರೀಲಂಕಾ's third highest-ranking army officer ಮತ್ತು Deputy Chief of Staff General Parami Kulatunga on ಜೂನ್‌ 26 by ಎಲ್‍ಟಿಟಿಇ suicide bomber. These events led SLMM to question whether ಕದನ ವಿರಾಮ could still be said to exist. ಆದಾಗ್ಯೂ most analysts continued to believe that return to full-scale war was unlikely ಮತ್ತು "low-intensity ಸಂಘರ್ಷ" would continue.

Talks ಮತ್ತು further violence
ಭಾರತದ ಹಸ್ತಕ್ಷೇಪ
2002 ಶಾಂತಿ ಪ್ರಕ್ರಿಯೆ
ಶೀಲಂಕಾ