Secure Network Coding Against the Contamination and Eavesdropping   Adversaries
  In this paper, we propose an algorithm that targets contamination and eavesdropping adversaries. We consider the case when the number of independent packets available to the eavesdropper is less than the multicast capacity of the network. By means of our algorithm every node can verify the integrity of the received packets easily and an eavesdropper is unable to get any meaningful information about the source. We call it practical security if an eavesdropper is unable to get any meaningful information about the source.We show that, by giving up a small amount of overall capacity, our algorithm achieves achieves the practically secure condition at a probability of one. Furthermore, the communication overhead of our algorithm are negligible compared with previous works, since the transmission of the hash values and the code coefficients are both avoided. 
Yejun Zhou, Hui Li and Jianfeng Ma