A Diffusive Strategic Dynamics for Social Systems
  We propose a model for the dynamics of a social system, which includes diffusive effects and a biased rule for spin-flips, reproducing the effect of strategic choices. This model is able to mimic some phenomena taking place during marketing or political campaigns. Using a cost function based on the Ising model defined on the typical quenched interaction environments for social systems (Erdos-Renyi graph, small-world and scale-free networks), we find, by numerical simulations, that a stable stationary state is reached, and we compare the final state to the one obtained with standard dynamics, by means of total magnetization and magnetic susceptibility. Our results show that the diffusive strategic dynamics features a critical interaction parameter strictly lower than the standard one. We discuss the relevance of our findings in social systems. 
Elena Agliari, Raffaella Burioni, Pierluigi Contucci