A Resource-Competitive Jamming Defense
  Consider a scenario where Alice wishes to send a message $m$ to Bob in a time-slotted wireless network. However, there exists an adversary, Carol, who aims to prevent the transmission of $m$ by jamming the communication channel. There is a per-slot cost of $1$ to send, receive or jam $m$ on the channel, and we are interested in how much Alice and Bob need to spend relative to Carol in order to guarantee communication.   Our approach is to design an algorithm in the framework of resource-competitive analysis where the cost to correct network devices (i.e., Alice and Bob) is parameterized by the cost to faulty devices (i.e., Carol). We present an algorithm that guarantees the successful transmission of $m$ and has the following property: if Carol incurs a cost of $T$ to jam, then both Alice and Bob have a cost of $O(T^{\varphi - 1} + 1)=O(T^{.62}+1)$ in expectation, where $\varphi = (1+ \sqrt{5})/2$ is the golden ratio. In other words, it possible for Alice and Bob to communicate while incurring asymptotically less cost than Carol. We generalize to the case where Alice wishes to send $m$ to $n$ receivers, and we achieve a similar result.   Our findings hold even if (1) $T$ is unknown to either party; (2) Carol knows the algorithms of both parties, but not their random bits; (3) Carol can jam using knowledge of past actions of both parties; and (4) Carol can jam reactively, so long as there is sufficient network traffic in addition to $m$. 
Valerie King, Seth Pettie, Jared Saia, Maxwell Young
cs.DC