Forcing Iterated Admissibility in Strategic Belief Models
  Iterated admissibility (IA) can be seen as exhibiting a minimal criterion of rationality in games. In order to make this intuition more precise, the epistemic characterization of this game-theoretic solution has been actively investigated in recent times: it has been shown that strategies surviving m+1 rounds of iterated admissibility may be identified as those that are obtained under a condition called rationality and m assumption of rationality (RmAR) in complete lexicographic type structures. On the other hand, it has been shown that its limit condition, $R\infty AR$, might not be satisfied by any state in the epistemic structure, if the class of types is complete and the types are continuous. In this paper we introduce a weaker notion of completeness which is nonetheless sufficient to characterize IA in a highly general way as the class of strategies that indeed satisfy $R\infty AR$. The key methodological innovation involves defining a new notion of generic types and employing these in conjunction with Cohen's technique of forcing. 
Fernando Tohm\`e, Gianluca Caterina, Rocco Gangle
math.LO