Wavelength attack scheme on continuous-variable quantum key distribution   system using heterodyne detection protocol
  The security proof of continuous variable quantum key distribution(CV QKD) based on two assumptions that the eavesdropper can neither act on the local oscillator nor control Bob's beam splitter. These assumptions maybe invalid in practice due to some potential imperfections of the implementations of the protocol. In [Phys.Rev.A, 84.062308], we found that one can control the intensity transmission of the beam splitter by switching the wavelength of the input light. In this paper, we revisit the problem of transmitting the local oscillator in public channel, and propose a wavelength attack targeting the CV QKD systems using heterodyne protocol. Our attack is proved to be feasible and renders all final key shared between the legitimate parties insecure even they have monitored the intensity. To prevent our attack, a wavelength filter should be added before performing the heterodyne detection. 
Jing-Zheng Huang, Zhen-Qiang Yin, Shuang Wang, Hong-Wei Li, Wei Chen,   Guan-Can Guo and Zheng-Fu Han
quant-ph