Strategy-Proof Prediction Markets
  Prediction markets aggregate agents' beliefs regarding a future event, where each agent is paid based on the accuracy of its reported belief when compared to the realized outcome. Agents may strategically manipulate the market (e.g., delay reporting, make false reports) aiming for higher expected payments, and hence the accuracy of the market's aggregated information will be in question. In this study, we present a general belief model that captures how agents influence each other beliefs, and show that there are three necessary and sufficient conditions for agents to behave truthfully in scoring rule based markets (SRMs). Given that these conditions are restrictive and difficult to satisfy in real-life, we present novel strategy-proof SRMs where agents are truthful while dismissing all these conditions. Although achieving such a strong form of truthfulness increases the worst-case loss in the new markets, we show that this is the minimum loss required to dismiss these conditions. 
Ayman Ghoneim and Robert C. Williamson
cs.GT cs.MA