On the Power of Deterministic Mechanisms for Facility Location Games
  We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a metric space, and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. Our main result is an elegant characterization of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line. In particular, we show that for instances with n \geq 5 agents, any such mechanism either admits a unique dictator, or always places the facilities at the leftmost and the rightmost location of the instance. As a corollary, we obtain that the best approximation ratio achievable by deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for the problem of locating 2 facilities on the line to minimize the total connection cost is precisely n-2. Another rather surprising consequence is that the Two-Extremes mechanism of (Procaccia and Tennenholtz, EC 2009) is the only deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on the line.   The proof of the characterization employs several new ideas and technical tools, which provide new insights into the behavior of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for K-Facility Location games, and may be of independent interest. Employing one of these tools, we show that for every K \geq 3, there do not exist any deterministic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for K-Facility Location on the line, even for simple instances with K+1 agents. Moreover, building on the characterization for the line, we show that there do not exist any deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio for 2-Facility Location on more general metric spaces, which is true even for simple instances with 3 agents located in a star. 
Dimitris Fotakis and Christos Tzamos
cs.GT