Concise and Tight Security Analysis of the Bennett-Brassard 1984   Protocol with Finite Key Lengths
  We present a tight security analysis of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol taking into account the finite size effect of key distillation, and achieving unconditional security. We begin by presenting a concise analysis utilizing the normal approximation of the hypergeometric function. Then next we show that a similarly tight bound can also be obtained by a rigorous argument without relying on any approximation. In particular, for the convenience of experimentalists who wish to evaluate the security of their QKD systems, we also give explicit procedures of our key distillation, and also show how to calculate the secret key rate and the security parameter from a given set of experimental parameters. Besides the exact values of key rates and security parameters, we also present how to obtain their rough estimates using the normal approximation. 
Masahito Hayashi, Toyohiro Tsurumaru
quant-ph