Securing Tor Tunnels under the Selective-DoS Attack
  Anonymous communication systems are subject to selective denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Selective DoS attacks lower anonymity as they force paths to be rebuilt multiple times to ensure delivery which increases the opportunity for more attack. In this paper we present a detection algorithm that filters out compromised communication channels for one of the most widely used anonymity networks, Tor. Our detection algorithm uses two levels of probing to filter out potentially compromised tunnels. We perform probabilistic analysis and extensive simulation to show the robustness of our detection algorithm. We also analyze the overhead of our detection algorithm and show that we can achieve satisfactory security guarantee for reasonable communication overhead (5% of the total available Tor bandwidth in the worst case). Real world experiments reveal that our detection algorithm provides good defense against selective DoS attack. 
Anupam Das and Nikita Borisov
cs.CR cs.NI