Quantum Strategies
  We investigate the consequences of allowing players to adopt strategies which take advantage of quantum randomization devices. In games of full information, the resulting equilibria are always correlated equilibria, but not all correlated equilibria appear as quantum equilibria. The classical and quantum theories diverge further in games of private information. In the quantum context, we show that Kuhn's equivalence between behavioral and mixed strategies breaks down. As a result, quantum technology allows players to achieve outcomes that would not be achievable with any classical technology short of direct communication; in particular they do not occur as correlated equilibria.   In general, in games of private information, quantum technology allows players to achieve outcomes that are Pareto superior to any classical correlated equilibrium, but not necessarily Pareto optimal. A simple economic example illustrates these points. 
Gordon B. Dahl, Steven E. Landsburg
math.OC quant-ph