One-sided Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution: Security,   feasibility, and the connection with steering
  We analyze the security and feasibility of a protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in a context where only one of the two parties trusts his measurement apparatus. This scenario lies naturally between standard QKD, where both parties trust their measurement apparatuses, and Device-Independent QKD (DI-QKD), where neither does, and can be a natural assumption in some practical situations. We show that the requirements for obtaining secure keys are much easier to meet than for DI-QKD, which opens promising experimental opportunities. We clarify the link between the security of this one-sided DI-QKD scenario and the demonstration of quantum steering, in analogy to the link between DI-QKD and the violation of Bell inequalities. 
Cyril Branciard, Eric G. Cavalcanti, Stephen P. Walborn, Valerio   Scarani, Howard M. Wiseman
quant-ph