A Market for Air Traffic Flow Management
  The two somewhat conflicting requirements of efficiency and fairness make ATFM an unsatisfactorily solved problem, despite its overwhelming importance. In this paper, we present an economics motivated solution that is based on the notion of a free market. Our contention is that in fact the airlines themselves are the best judge of how to achieve efficiency and our market-based solution gives them the ability to pay, at the going rate, to buy away the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis.   The issue of fairness is simply finessed away by our solution -- whoever pays gets smaller delays. We show how our solution has the potential of enabling travelers from a large spectrum of affordability and punctuality requirements to achieve an end that is most desirable to them.   Our market model is particularly simple, requiring only one parameter per flight from the airline company. Furthermore, we show that it admits a combinatorial, strongly polynomial algorithm for computing an equilibrium landing schedule and prices. 
Vijay V. Vazirani
cs.CC cs.GT