Security proof of a three-state quantum key distribution protocol   without rotational symmetry
  Standard security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols often rely on symmetry arguments. In this paper, we prove the security of a three-state protocol that does not possess rotational symmetry. The three-state QKD protocol we consider involves three qubit states, where the first two states, |0_z> and |1_z>, can contribute to key generation and the third state, |+>=(|0_z>+|1_z>)/\sqrt{2}, is for channel estimation. This protocol has been proposed and implemented experimentally in some frequency-based QKD systems where the three states can be prepared easily. Thus, by founding on the security of this three-state protocol, we prove that these QKD schemes are, in fact, unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main task in our proof is to upper bound the phase error rate of the qubits given the bit error rates observed. Unconditional security can then be proved not only for the ideal case of a single-photon source and perfect detectors, but also for the realistic case of a phase-randomized weak coherent light source and imperfect threshold detectors. Our result on the phase error rate upper bound is independent of the loss in the channel. Also, we compare the three-state protocol with the BB84 protocol. For the single-photon source case, our result proves that the BB84 protocol strictly tolerates a higher quantum bit error rate than the three-state protocol; while for the coherent-source case, the BB84 protocol achieves a higher key generation rate and secure distance than the three-state protocol when a decoy-state method is used. 
Chi-Hang Fred Fung and Hoi-Kwong Lo