Antineutrino monitoring for the Iranian heavy water reactor
  In this note we discuss the potential application of antineutrino monitoring to the Iranian heavy water reactor at Arak, the IR-40, as a non-proliferation measure. We demonstrate that an above ground detector positioned right outside the IR-40 reactor building could meet and in some cases significantly exceed the verification goals identified by IAEA for plutonium production or diversion from declared inventories. In addition to monitoring the reactor during operation, observing antineutrino emissions from long-lived fission products could also allow monitoring the reactor when it is shutdown. Antineutrino monitoring could also be used to distinguish different levels of fuel enrichment. Most importantly, these capabilities would not require a complete reactor operational history and could provide a means to re-establish continuity of knowledge in safeguards conclusions should this become necessary. 
Eric Christensen, Patrick Huber, Patrick Jaffke, Thomas Shea
physics.ins-det nucl-ex physics.soc-ph