Incentives-Based Mechanism for Efficient Demand Response Programs
  In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal outcome. We propose an incentives scheme that promotes optimal outcomes in the inefficient electricity market. The economic incentives can be seen as an indirect revelation mechanism that allocates resources using a one-dimensional message space per resource to be allocated. The mechanism does not request private information from users and is valid for any concave customer's valuation function. We propose a distributed implementation of the mechanism using population games and evaluate the performance of four popular dynamics methods in terms of the cost to implement the mechanism. We find that the achievement of efficiency in strategic environments might be achieved at a cost, which is dependent on both the users' preferences and the dynamic evolution of the system. Some simulation results illustrate the ideas presented throughout the paper. 
Carlos Barreto, Eduardo Mojica-Nava, Nicanor Quijano
cs.GT