Security of quantum key distribution with non-I.I.D. light sources
  Although quantum key distribution (QKD) is theoretically secure, there is a gap between the theory and practice. In fact, real-life QKD may not be secure because component devices in QKD systems may deviate from the theoretical models assumed in security proofs. To solve this problem, it is necessary to construct the security proof under realistic assumptions on the source and measurement unit. In this paper, we prove the security of a QKD protocol under practical assumptions on the source that accommodate fluctuation of the phase and intensity modulations. As long as our assumptions hold, it does not matter at all how the phase and intensity distribute nor whether or not their distributions over different pulses are independently and identically distributed (I.I.D.). Our work shows that practical sources can be safely employed in QKD experiments. 
Yuichi Nagamatsu, Akihiro Mizutani, Rikizo Ikuta, Takashi Yamamoto,   Nobuyuki Imoto, and Kiyoshi Tamaki
quant-ph