Correlated and Coarse equilibria of Single-item auctions
  We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid -- i.e., bid above their values.   Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well. 
Michal Feldman and Brendan Lucier and Noam Nisan
cs.GT