Classifying Material Implications over Minimal Logic
  The so-called paradoxes of material implication have motivated the development of many non-classical logics over the years \cite{aA75,nB77,aA89,gP89,sH96}. In this note, we investigate some of these paradoxes and classify them, over minimal logic. We provide proofs of equivalence and semantic models separating the paradoxes where appropriate. A number of equivalent groups arise, all of which collapse with unrestricted use of double negation elimination. Interestingly, the principle \emph{ex falso quodlibet}, and several weaker principles, turn out to be distinguishable, giving perhaps supporting motivation for adopting minimal logic as the ambient logic for reasoning in the possible presence of inconsistency. 
Hannes Diener, Maarten McKubre-Jordens
math.LO