A tale of a Principal and many many Agents
  In this paper, we investigate a moral hazard problem in finite time with lump$-$sum and continuous payments, involving infinitely many Agents with mean field type interactions, hired by one Principal. By reinterpreting the mean$-$field game faced by each Agent in terms of a mean field forward backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE for short), we are able to rewrite the Principal's problem as a control problem of McKean$-$Vlasov SDEs. We review one general approache to tackle it, introduced recently in [1, 43, 44, 45, 46] using dynamic programming and Hamilton$-$Jacobi$-$Bellman (HJB for short) equations, and mention a second one based on the stochastic Pontryagin maximum principle, which follows [10]. We solve completely and explicitly the problem in special cases, going beyond the usual linear$-$quadratic framework. We finally show in our examples that the optimal contract in the $N-$players' model converges to the mean$-$field optimal contract when the number of agents goes to $+\infty$, thus illustrating in our specific setting the general results of [8]. 
Romuald Elie, Thibaut Mastrolia, Dylan Possama\"i
math.PR math.OC