Fully general device-independence for two-party cryptography and   position verification
  Device-independent quantum cryptography allows security even if the devices used to execute the protocol are untrusted - whether this is due to unknown imperfections in the implementation, or because the adversary himself constructed them to subvert the security of the protocol. While device-independence has seen much attention in the domain of quantum key distribution, relatively little is known for general protocols. Here we introduce a new model for device-independence for two-party protocols and position verification in the noisy-storage model. For the first time, we show that such protocols are secure in the most general device-independent model in which the devices may have arbitrary memory, states and measurements. In our analysis, we make use of a slight modification of a beautiful new tool developed in [arXiv:1607.01796] called "Entropy Accumulation Theorem". What's more, the protocols we analyze use only simple preparations and measurements, and can be realized using any experimental setup able to perform a CHSH Bell test. Specifically, security can be attained for any violation of the CHSH inequality, where a higher violation merely leads to a reduction in the amount of rounds required to execute the protocol. 
J\'er\'emy Ribeiro, Gl\'aucia Murta, Stephanie Wehner
quant-ph