A Model for Partial Kantian Cooperation
  In several game situations, the behavior of the players may depend not only on individual interests, but also on what each player considers as the correct thing to do. This work presents a game theoretic model, aiming to describe game situations in which the players' behavior is affected by ethical considerations. Particularly, we assume that they partially follow, Kant's `Categorical Imperative'. The model is stated for games with a continuum of players. The basic assumption made is that the participants perceive that they belong to virtual (imagined) groups, in which they optimize their actions as if they were bound to follow the same strategy. A partially cooperative equilibrium, called $r$-Kant-Nash equilibrium is then introduced. We then study the relationship of the $r$-Kant-Nash equilibrium with the Nash, (Bentham-) Harsanyi, Rawls difference and Roemer solutions. For the case where the set of possible player types is finite, we prove sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the $r$-Kant-Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium is characterized in terms of a variational inequality. For the case of continuous types, necessary conditions characterizing the partial Kantian equilibria are derived using a reduction to a set of optimal control problems. Finally, some numerical examples are given. 
Ioannis Kordonis
cs.GT