E-Embargoes: Discouraging the Deployment of Traffic Manipulating Boxes   With Economic Incentives
  An increasing number of systems have been proposed or deployed to the transit core of the Internet with the goal of observing and manipulating traffic in flight, systems we term Traffic Manipulating Boxes. Examples of these include: decoy routing systems, surveillance infrastructure like the NSA's alleged QUANTUM project, and traffic shaping middleboxes. In this work, we examine a new approach that a routing capable adversary might take to resisting these systems: the use of economic pressure to incentivize ISPs to remove them. Rather than directly attacking the availability of these systems, our attack inflicts economic losses, in the form of reduced transit revenue, on ISPs that deploy them, while at the same time incentivizing ISPs that do not.   We alter and expand upon previous routing around decoys attack of Schuchard et al., by adjusting the priority given to avoiding TMBs. This reduces or eliminates the key costs faced by routing capable adversary while maintaining the effectiveness of the attack. Additionally, we show that since the flow of traffic on the Internet is directly related to the flow of cash between ISPs, a routing capable adversary is actually a powerful economic adversary. Our findings show that by preferentially using routes which are free of TMBs, some routing capable adversaries can inflict in excess of a billion dollars in annual revenue losses. 
Max Schuchard and Nicholas Hopper
cs.CR