Testing for voter rigging in small polling stations
  Since the 1970s there has been a large number of countries that combine formal democratic institutions with authoritarian practices. Although in such countries the ruling elites may receive considerable voter support they often employ several manipulation tools to control election outcomes. A common practice of these regimes is the coercion and mobilization of a significant amount of voters to guarantee the electoral victory. This electoral irregularity is known as voter rigging, distinguishing it from vote rigging, which involves ballot stuffing or stealing. Here we develop a statistical test to quantify to which extent the results of a particular election display traces of voter rigging. Our key hypothesis is that small polling stations are more susceptible to voter rigging, because it is easier to identify opposing individuals, there are less eye witnesses, and supposedly less visits from election observers. We devise a general statistical method for testing whether voting behavior in small polling stations is significantly different from the behavior of their neighbor stations in a way that is consistent with the widespread occurrence of voter rigging. Based on a comparative analysis, the method enables to rule out whether observed differences in voting behavior might be explained by geographic heterogeneities in vote preferences. We analyze 21 elections in ten different countries and find significant anomalies compatible with voter rigging in Russia from 2007-2011, in Venezuela from 2006-2013, and in Uganda 2011. Particularly disturbing is the case of Venezuela where these distortions have been outcome-determinative in the 2013 presidential elections. 
Ra\'ul Jim\'enez, Manuel Hidalgo, Peter Klimek
stat.AP physics.soc-ph