What was the legal basis for farmer Eckardt Heukamp to be forced to sell his farm to RWE? In Germany there are currently between 200 and 2000 climate activists in the Lützerath hamlet fighting the forced sale of the hamlet to a mining company. They are primarily on/around the property of farmer Eckardt Heukamp who objected to selling his farm. Here is the wikipedia article and here is a BBC article. In general the forced sale of land is driven by the ideas of Eminent Domain, which is the forced sale of property to the government for public use. The justification for the existence of Eminent Domain laws always heavily relies on the use of the land to be for the public. This case however implies that a company (the farmer) is forced to sell its land to another private company (RWE), so that the latter company can profit off of the resources in the land owned by the farmer against the wishes of the farmer. The only case I can think of where Eminent Domain is used somewhat commonly for sales to a private company is for the purchase of land for railways, but this is - as far as I am aware - justified by the positive externalities of train networks, so it's basically a form of 'subsidy'. Such a reasoning does not seem to apply to a mining company. So my question is basically: What is the reasoning behind laws allowing entire villages to be sold to private mining companies? Does the state get some 'maximum energy prices' or something similar in return to justify this as a 'public use', or is there a completely different justification? (Btw, I am not particularly interested in the specifics of German law, and more so in the general justifications for 'laws like this', so answers for different jurisdictions are welcome as well)
Art 14 GG provides a right to personal property, but not without limitations. In particular, expropriation is allowed on the basis of a concrete law with fair compensation, when necessary for a public interest. In 2013, these disputes relating to the Garzweiler mine were decided by the German constitutional court. In decision 1 BvR 3139/08, one such expropriation law was found constitutional. It gave public interests such as: supplying the economy with raw materials maintaining jobs in the mining industry maintaining and growing the economy More recently, the goal of fulfilling political energy strategies (e.g. energy independence) has become more prominent as well. Such public interests don't automatically override the right to property – all relevant rights and interests must be balanced. But in practice, the economic interests of a large corporation do seem to override individuals' right to their property, especially since they must be given fair compensation. Opposing public interests might weigh more strongly. It will be interesting to see how recent expropriation for the purpose of lignite mining will be viewed in retrospect, given that climate protection has also been found to be a constitutionally protected interest.
california The relevant parties may go to court for an equitable solution. See the 2010 California Code of Civil Procedure Chapter 3.6. Cullen Earthquake Act: 751.50. If the boundaries of land owned either by public or by private entities have been disturbed by earth movements such as, but not limited to, slides, subsidence, lateral or vertical displacements or similar disasters caused by man, or by earthquake or other acts of God, so that such lands are in a location different from that at which they were located prior to the disaster, an action in rem may be brought to equitably reestablish boundaries and to quiet title to land within the boundaries so reestablished.** (my emboldenment and embedded link)
Generally, if someone asks you to leave their property you have to leave*. Just because a place is owned by the public, doesn't mean anyone can go there any time they wish. Military bases, firehouses, and jails are owned by the public, but many of these have limited access to the public. It may be open to the general public, but that does not mean restrictions cannot be put into place, either on times, or activities, or individuals. For example, public parks often have time and activity restrictions; schools have the power to restrict individuals from their premises, either specifically or by general category. As a general point of law, the owner of any property, or their agent, can order anyone without the right to stay (e.g. not a co-owner or tenant), and that person must depart, otherwise that person is tresspassing. The Social Service Administrator is almost certainly an agent of the controlling entity that owns the property. Thus their demand that you leave the premises is enforceable, unless you have a non-revokable right to be in that space. *As user Justaguy points out there are some exceptions. Most notably, police can some times enter a property uninvited or against the owner's wishes (such as under emergency circumstances or with a warrant).
It isn't precisely clear which jurisdiction you are located in (recall that this website handles matters from everywhere in the world). But, generally speaking, in the United States, you have no right to limit someone's existing tree on their property merely because it casts a shadow on your solar panels. The installer should have known better. A minority of U.S. states, including California, consider new construction that blocks the view of existing structures a form of "nuisance" that can be abated if it unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of the existing property. But, that protects existing structures, rather than new ones. In Japan, there are building code requirements designed to insure that key portions of every home get natural sunlight daily. Again, this only applies to the construction of new buildings. I know of no law that gives someone who newly installs a solar panel a right to remove or trim a neighbor's tree simply by virtue of doing so. And, without knowing whose law is involved it would be impossible to determine with any reliability. The property with the solar panel could seek to buy the right to an unobstructed view from the property with the tree, in what would probably be called a "view easement", but that would only happen if the terms were such that both consented and it was written up in a legal document to that effect.
It's important to be absolutely clear on what is being sold. Using English translations may affect the outcome. Assuming "SoleTraderCompA" is an Einzelunternehmen, the sale would be an asset sale. The company isn't sold, because the company is legally identical to person A! Instead, person A makes an extensive list of all assets he's selling (goods, real estate, intellectual property, etcetera). "SoleTraderCompA" might be a trade mark, in which case the trade mark can be sold. Person B can also be an Einzelunternehmen, and as part of its business operations buys aforementioned assets from person A. But in general, any legal entity can buy the assets of person A, including a GmbH or AG.
You say the permission was "public", therefore I am going to assume that it cannot be argued that there was no agreement. There are two possibilities: If Company B has given consideration for the promise then there is a binding contract and Company A may be able to end it but could not seek redress for when it was in place. If there is no contract then the principle of promissory estoppel should have essentially the same effect. An agreement, including an IP licence, does not have to be in writing nor does it have to have any particular form.
No, it is not illegal under 7 USC 136j (a)(2)(G) to use a pesticide labeled for use against one pest against another pest... at least not anymore. It turns out that there apparently were cases of the EPA interpreting the language of that portion of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in an overly broad manner. This included the interpretation in question here, as well as even interpreting it to ban using doses or concentrations less than those specified by the label. In response, Congress amended FIFRA in 1978 to add a definition of the term "To use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling" as 7 USC 136 (ee): The term “to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling” means to use any registered pesticide in a manner not permitted by the labeling, except that the term shall not include (1) applying a pesticide at any dosage, concentration, or frequency less than that specified on the labeling unless the labeling specifically prohibits deviation from the specified dosage, concentration, or frequency, (2) applying a pesticide against any target pest not specified on the labeling if the application is to the crop, animal, or site specified on the labeling, unless the Administrator has required that the labeling specifically state that the pesticide may be used only for the pests specified on the labeling after the Administrator has determined that the use of the pesticide against other pests would cause an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment... [other exceptions not relevant to this question] The act that included the amendment became Public Law 95-396 (PDF), also known as the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, upon being signed into law by President Carter on Sept 30, 1978. A question was raised on the linked question that this exception might have been referring to accidental use against one pest when another was being targeted, however, the following description of the meaning was given in a summary of the bill on the Senate floor when the final version of the bill was being considered for passage: Third, the new definition will permit farmers to use pesticides that are already registered for a crop or site for pests not listed on the labeling. It is rather foolish to tell farmers that they can put a pesticide on a crop for one bug, but that they cannot apply it to the same crop for another bug. Senator Herman Talmadge (D-GA), Senate Floor, Sept 18, 1978 (Source: Congressional Record vol. 124 (1978), part 22, page 29760 (Warning: 584 MB PDF)) Senator Talmadge was Chair of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry at the time and so had been heavily involved in crafting the bill. So, allowing the use of a registered pesticide against a pest not mentioned on its label was indeed the expressed intent of Congress in adding this exception to the definition of using a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling. As long as the pesticide in question is being applied to a plant, animal, or site specified on the label and the Administrator of the EPA hasn't required the specific pesticide in question to expressly prohibit use against other pests on its label, then intentionally using it against a pest not specified on its label is not a violation of 7 USC 136j (a)(2)(G).
I am unfamiliar with a "perpetual contract" and that phase does not appear in any reported appellate court decision of the State of Oklahoma. However, usually unpaid utility bills do constitute a lien against the property that is enforceable against a subsequent purchaser, which has the same practical effect. This kind of obligation is also sometimes described as an "encumbrance". Usually, in an arms length sale of real estate through real estate agents, a title insurance company is hired and is responsible for determining if there are any outstanding liens, pro-rating utility bills, pro-rating property taxes, etc. at closing. If the title company fails to find a lien and there is one, the title company is responsible for paying off the lien that it failed to find (although it can often force the previous owner to indemnify it for the payment it has to make). It could be that since water service was not currently being delivered, that the title company did not search in the manner that it should have to find this lien, or it could be that there was no title company used and so no one ever checked. Also, if the property was conveyed with a "warranty deed" such a deed contains a promise from the seller that there are no liens or encumbrances not listed on the face of the deed that have to be paid, and the seller has liability for breach of the warranty of title. But, if the property was conveyed with a "quitclaim deed" there is no such warranty.