&quot;Outrageous conduct&quot;? Is there a cause of action for &quot;Outrageous conduct&quot; that does not depend on the vulnerability to the emotional distress of an individual but might be properly applied to a public official (acting in official capacity) due to the effects on society as a whole? I found California jury instructions regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress that defined outrageous conduct as: “Outrageous conduct” is conduct so extreme that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency. Conduct is outrageous if a reasonable person would regard the conduct as intolerable in a civilized community. Outrageous conduct does not include trivialities such as indignities, annoyances, hurt feelings, or bad manners that a reasonable person is expected to endure. If that definition fits the acts (or inaction) of a public official, might it be applicable under a different cause of action, e.g. mandamus under 28 U.S. Code § 1361? (See for example https://www.judicialwatch.org/documents/jw-v-united-states-capitol-police-121-cv-00401/) Could outrageous conduct overcome allowance for a discretionary duty? (I think there was a hearing, in this case, today, but the results aren't public yet.) Stretching my lack of knowledge of the legal process, could outrageous conduct be used in a class action?
Is there a cause of action for &quot;Outrageous conduct&quot; that does not depend on the vulnerability to the emotional distress of an individual but might be properly applied to a public official (acting in official capacity) due to the effects on society as a whole? No. There is no such cause of action. A public official acting in the official's official capacity is immune from civil liability in tort for intentional acts that do not violate a clearly established constitutional right. There are some narrow exceptions to this general rule. For example, certain employment discrimination lawsuits are allowed. Similarly, for example, embezzlement of private funds held in a fiduciary capacity by a public official in charge of conducting foreclosures would be actionable in many states. But there are no exceptions that are in any way a fit to the fact pattern described. Furthermore, at least in federal courts, there can't be such a cause of action. An action that has an effect on society as a whole is, by definition, an act which no one has standing to sue regarding. Standing to sue, which is a subject matter jurisdictional requirement in federal court, requires a particularized injury to a legally protected interest of an individual that is distinct from the injury caused to the general public, or taxpayers generally, or citizens generally. State law, in principle, can give standing to someone who does not have standing under this federal constitutional law standard in state court, but most states make only the most narrow exceptions to the principle. For example, some states give someone standing to sue for violation of state constitutional budget and tax rules that apply to legislation generally. Often standing exceptions and exceptions from the federal court case and controversy requirement (which is also a matter of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court) are waived at the same time.
Section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 (which was amended by section 154 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994). [F14A Intentional harassment, alarm or distress. (1)A person is guilty of an offence if, with intent to cause a person harassment, alarm or distress, he— (a)uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b)displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting, thereby causing that or another person harassment, alarm or distress. (2)An offence under this section may be committed in a public or a private place, except that no offence is committed where the words or behaviour are used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation is displayed, by a person inside a dwelling and the person who is harassed, alarmed or distressed is also inside that or another dwelling. (3)It is a defence for the accused to prove— (a)that he was inside a dwelling and had no reason to believe that the words or behaviour used, or the writing, sign or other visible representation displayed, would be heard or seen by a person outside that or any other dwelling, or (b)that his conduct was reasonable. (4)F2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (5)A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale or both.]
Does IIED (emotional distress) apply to infidelity and if no, why not? Generally speaking, infidelity falls short of liability for IIED. Clark v. Clark, 867 S.E.2d 704 (2021) appears to be one recent exception, but that is because there the defendants' conduct allegedly entailed more than mere infidelity, such as &quot;sen[ding] at least one email to Plaintiff in which Defendant Barrett told Plaintiff she &quot;was a bad mother, that [she was] uneducated... [she] was a bad wife,&quot; and that Plaintiff came &quot;from an unsuccessful family&quot;&quot; (quotation marks in original), conduct that the court seemed to associate with elements of Watson v. Dixon (i.e., frightening the plaintiff, humiliation, etc.), cited in the preceding paragraph of the Clark decision. The difficulty for prevailing on a claim of IIED generally lies in proving that &quot;the defendant's conduct was [...] so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society&quot;, Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 207 (2012). The notion that infidelity &quot;is not tolerated by civilized society&quot; is hard to establish. For instance, many people do not very often distance themselves from a co-worker, friend, or acquaintance merely on grounds of that person being known to cheat on that person's spouse or partner. Also the fact that adultery is hardly ever prosecuted despite being prohibited in a jurisdiction's penal code reflects the extent of societal and governmental tolerance to infidelity.
The law is part of a larger bill modifying punishments for various crimes. For example it increases the penalty for vandalizing government property, creates offenses for assault on a first responder carrying out their duties (depending on the severity of the assault), increases the penalty for aggravated rioting, obstruction of highways and so on. It also clarifies that being assembling or being present at the scene of a riot is not an offense. The only new crime created is assault on a first responder. Unauthorized camping on state property was already a crime: this is an increase in the penalty for committing that crime. It does have a requirement for notice and continued violation for 24 hours, unlike vandalism where if you do the deed, you can be arrested. The courts have not held that the First Amendment protects the right to trespass, assault or commit vandalism. The only viable avenue for a legal challenge is that the punishment is cruel and unusual (too severe). A change from Class A misdemeanor to Class E felony is the smallest increment in penalty. The state will argue that the increase in penalty is necessary to maintain public order, and that it is not arbitrary or capricious, because there have been many recent violations of the law. In general, when laws are frequently disobeyed, it is legal for the government to increase the penalty for breaking the law in order to achieve compliance.
The statute in question (which is unusual and not part of the law in most U.S. states) is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if the person: (1) observes the commission of a felony under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe that an offense had been committed in which serious bodily injury or death may have resulted; and (2) fails to immediately report the commission of the offense to a peace officer or law enforcement agency under circumstances in which: (A) a reasonable person would believe that the commission of the offense had not been reported; and (B) the person could immediately report the commission of the offense without placing himself or herself in danger of suffering serious bodily injury or death. (b) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. There is no indication that violation of this section gives rise to civil liability. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez came to its conclusion that there was no civil liability of a police department or police officers for failure to enforce a restraining order in the face of language in a state statute whose plain language fairly clearly created a mandatory duty to that effect. The offense of unlawful restraint Texas Penal Code § 20.02 is as follows: (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly restrains another person. (b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child younger than 14 years of age; (2) the actor was a relative of the child; and (3) the actor's sole intent was to assume lawful control of the child. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is: (1) a state jail felony if the person restrained was a child younger than 17 years of age; or (2) a felony of the third degree if: (A) the actor recklessly exposes the victim to a substantial risk of serious bodily injury; (B) the actor restrains an individual the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty or in retaliation or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public servant; or (C) the actor while in custody restrains any other person. (d) It is no offense to detain or move another under this section when it is for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest or detaining an individual lawfully arrested. (e) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that: (1) the person restrained was a child who is 14 years of age or older and younger than 17 years of age; (2) the actor does not restrain the child by force, intimidation, or deception; and (3) the actor is not more than three years older than the child. In practice, almost any restraint by a police officer would not obviously be outside the immunity for a lawful arrest sufficient to give rise to the duty to report a felony. Also, the person who decides whether to press charges is the prosecuting attorney who has a strong long term strategic interest in maintain a positive relationship with law enforcement and who often subjectively views law enforcement as his client even though this is the correct as a matter of legal doctrine. Question 1: Are any police on the scene responsible for reporting the crime of unlawful restraint which has become a felony in their presence? In general law enforcement may have a duty under department policy as a matter of employment law, but there is no general legal duty for a police officer to report a crime committed in their presence. Law enforcement officers, like prosecutors have wide discretion over whether they will choose to enforce crimes in the U.S. But, since Texas has a mandatory reporting law, this comes down more to a matter of interpretation and a restraint by an officer would almost never never give rise to a felony due to the privilege for an arrest. Also, it isn't at all obvious that a law enforcement officer has to report the crime to anyone but him or herself to satisfy the requirements of the law, and there is no duty for a law enforcement officer to act upon a report of a felony. Question 2: Would the police in not reporting the crime be implicating more involvement than mere presence and thereby threaten their immunity stance? Generally not. To have liability personally, the law enforcement officer would have to be a co-conspirator. Usually conspiracy liability would require an affirmative action in support of the illegal action and not merely inaction in the form of failing to report a crime. Police have qualified immunity from civil liability for any act that is not a clearly established violation of a constitutional right. If the police do not owe a duty to protect the person being unlawfully restrained, it would seem they still owe a duty to uphold the laws of the state like they would for the crimes of jaywalking, driving without a seat belt, or rape. This is mistaken. Law enforcement officers have no legally enforceable duty to uphold any laws. They may have a moral duty to do so, and they may have a strong employment relationship pressure to do so, but a law enforcement officer faces neither civil nor criminal liability for merely failing to enforce a criminal law when they know a crime has been committed. If the police do not owe a duty to the citizen to arrest another officer for violating the law do they at least owe a duty to the law to make a criminal complaint regarding the violation they witnessed? Arguably, there is a criminal law duty to report a clear felony, but since the duty is only to report the matter to a law enforcement officer and they are a law enforcement officer, it isn't clear that this statute applies at all. A report of a suspected felony is not a criminal complaint. And if so, and if they do not, would they be more accountable than the populace who are required by law to report felonies? No. As noted above, they are arguably less accountable than members of the general public.
No. Causing someone "pain and suffering" is not against the law; it is merely one kind of damages that can be awarded when someone has done something that is against the law. You may, for instance, endure pain and suffering from a car accident or shooting, in which case you could collect damages for your pain and suffering after proving that the other party committed the torts of negligence or battery, which are illegal. But if you were enduring pain and suffering from the last episode of Lost, you could not collect damages for your pain and suffering because it is not against the law to write a crappy finale. So in your case, cannot sue for pain and suffering based simply on the existence of a secret audio recording. North Carolina allows secret audio recordings, and it does not make exceptions for audio recordings that hurt someone's feelings. But to go beyond your explicit question, there still remains the possibility that you could pursue a legal action. If the other party used that recording in a way that violated the law, that might give rise to a tort that would support an award of damages for pain and suffering. If they publicly distributed a recording of themselves having sex with someone, that might constitute the tort of public disclosure of private facts. If they edited the recording to make it sound like someone had said something that they had not and then gave it to someone else, that might be grounds for a libel action.
The case Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 may help to explain this. In a use-of-force case, "courts must identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force, and then judge the claim by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right", therefore "The notion that all excessive force claims brought under § 1983 are governed by a single generic standard is rejected". Such claims "invok[e] the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right "to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizures," and must be judged by reference to the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard". In invoking the notion of "reasonable", the court is referring to the fact that a person chooses an action being in possession of certain knowledge, and using that knowledge plus reasoning, to judge an outcome. So when a suspect appears to be armed, the officer has to decide whether the weapon is real and whether the suspect is likely to use it against the officer. When one conjectures that a lesser degree of force could have been used because it turns out that the suspected weapon was a plastic toy, one is appealing to knowledge not available to the officer at that time. In Graham, the court held that the legal question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation In other words, the judgment is made by reference to the objective facts of the circumstance, and not the subjective emotional state of the officer. As the court put it, "The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight".
Meta Considerations I'm not aware of any such cases and I don't think that there are any, because if there was, the case would have generated more publicity around a &quot;glamorous&quot; issue in the law. Despite the fact that constitutional law makes it much easier to bring defamation cases when one is a private individual suing a non-media defendant in a matter of private concern, any search of the case law reveals that the defamation cases that actually get brought are those against media defendants and those involving matters of public concern. Private individuals rarely suffer enough harm to make it economical to bring a defamation suit, and people whose lives are not a matter of public concern rarely have deep pockets to hire attorneys to bring defamation lawsuits. Only Nominal Damages And No Attorneys' Fees Could Be Recovered First of all, even in a negligence per se case, where an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1 and court costs excluding attorneys' fees) is allowed as matter of law to the prevailing party, I don't think that an award of more than nominal damages would be upheld in the face of affirmative evidence that there was no actual harm to the reputation of the person defamed as a result of the publication of the defamatory statement. In defamation per se cases, nominal damages are awarded when &quot;there is no proof that serious harm has resulted from the defendant's attack upon the plaintiff's character and reputation&quot; or &quot;when they are the only damages claimed, and the action is brought for the purpose of vindicating the plaintiff's character by a verdict of a jury that establishes the falsity of the defamatory matter.&quot; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 620 cmt. a (1977). This would apply in a case of complete disbelief. Since the American rule applies to attorneys' fees in defamation cases, this would make every such suit an economic loser – which doesn't mean that someone might not act in an economically irrational way to defend their honor or something like that. Suing Increases The Harm Rather Than Mitigating It The publicity of a public trial undermines that approach in the kind of case in the hypothetical as well. Absent a lawsuit, there are one or two people who don't even believe it who heard the defamatory statement. But, if you bring a lawsuit, given the likelihood that the media will cover such a case, millions of people will hear the defamatory statement and they may very well believe those statements because they don't know any better. Even if you are ultimately vindicated at the conclusion of a trial, many people will have heard the defamatory statements after the suit is filed, but will never find out that you were vindicated many months later following a trial. Massively spreading defamatory statements about yourself that nobody would otherwise have heard about is just stupid as a matter of litigation tactics. The Presumption Of Harm To Reputation May Be Rebuttable Secondly, it isn't obvious to me that the presumption of harm to reputation in a negligence per se case is a conclusive presumption as opposed to a rebuttable presumption. For example, one can generally argue in a defamation case that someone's reputation before the defamatory statement was made is so irretrievably bad in the area related to the defamatory statement that it is impossible to damage someone's reputation any further, and so far as I know, that argument is not prohibited in negligence per se cases. For example, an intentionally false defamatory statement (which he can prove is false with an iron clad alibi and which the maker of the statement admits was made up at trial) that Ted Bundy once punched a prostitute in the nose giving her a black eye at the Moonbeam Bar at a particular date in the midst of Ted Bundy's serial killing spree, while constituting negligence per se might not state a claim for relief given that Ted Bundy's reputation for not being a violent criminal is already hopelessly tarnished by his multiple murder convictions for similar conduct. Milkovic Can Be Evaluated In Context Third, I am inclined to think that Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, one of the holdings is that &quot;statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected,&quot; together with cases such as the New York Times case reflect an evolving understanding in the law (quite distinct from the British concept of defamation which has a bit of an &quot;if you don't have something nice to say don't say anything at all&quot; to it), that defamation is simply a special kind of fraud claim in U.S. law, and that the tort of defamation is only constitutional in the United States because it is a form of fraud claim. If defamation is and must be merely a special kind of fraud, then the reliance element of a fraud claim is probably constitutionally required in a case where the existence or absence of reliance can be discerned as a matter of fact, without resorting to generalities as the court in Milkovich had to since the statement was published to a large number of people. It would not be unreasonable (and arguably constitutionally mandatory) to read a gloss on the &quot;statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual are protected&quot; standard of Milkovich, to include an implied &quot;by the people to whom the statement was published&quot; clause, which would have one meaning when a large number of people in the general public heard it, and another in a context when only one or two people actually heard the statement, or when it was only heard by a group of people who would interpret it differently than the general public would. And, if so, that would be a complete defense and would not just reduce the claim to one limited to nominal damages. This is not a great stretch. For example, in California the words of an alleged libel must be considered &quot;according to the sense and meaning under all the circumstances attending the publication which such language may fairly be presumed to have conveyed to those to whom it was published.&quot; Macleod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal.2d 536, 546-547; Selleck v. Globe International, Inc., 166 Cal.App.3d 1123, 1132. Libel Per Se No Longer Exists For Media Defendants Absent Actual Malice At one point it looked like the case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 481 U.S. 323, 349-350 (1974) might constitutionally eliminate libel per se, but this was premature. Gertz does not apply in cases involving matters of private concern to private individuals where the defendants are not media defendants. Dun &amp; Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (where a defendant's speech concerned a private individual and a matter of private concern, states could allow plaintiffs to recover presumed and punitive damages even absent a showing of actual malice). But, Dun &amp; Bradstreet didn't address the question of whether the presumption of damages in a libel per se case was a conclusive presumption or a rebuttable one, because if it is a rebuttable presumption, then it could be overcome in the hypothetical of the question. And, it also doesn't address the question of whether the Milkovich analysis in a libel per se case must be context specific. In a case involving a media defendant and a private individual plaintiff the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 481 U.S. 323, 349-350 (1974) that: States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Additionally, the doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion, rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact. More to the point, the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury. We would not, of course, invalidate state law simply because we doubt its wisdom, but here we are attempting to reconcile state law with a competing interest grounded in the constitutional command of the First Amendment. It is therefore appropriate to require that state remedies for defamatory falsehood reach no farther than is necessary to protect the legitimate interest involved. It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for actual injury. We need not define &quot;actual injury,&quot; as trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury. We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-defined standards of liability for defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence. In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury. See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 (1976). In the cases where it applies, Gertz requires proof of actual damages and bars the award of punitive damages, as a First Amendment requirement, and since actual damages are entirely absent in the case of the defendants in the question's hypothetical, if Gertz applied to them, they would not prevail. Now, Gertz in 1974 when it was decided, had limitations – it involved media defendants for whom actual malice could not be shown, but it did eliminate the public figure/public concern requirement. But, it isn't obvious to me that the Gertz limitations have not been expanded since then. Libel per se no longer exists in cases governed by Gertz (i.e. media defendants for whom there is no showing of actual malice). From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So.2d 52 (Fla. App. 1981). Texas has expanded Gertz somewhat and held that even in cases where it does not apply, actual proof of actual damages is required to recover exemplary damages, even in libel per se cases where damages are presumed. Doubleday &amp; Co., Inc. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1984).