Does encrypting Internet traffic (possibly) create a reasonable expectation of privacy? The fourth amendment to the US constitution protects people from seizures and searches in certain situations for reasons of privacy. In Katz v United States, the US Supreme Court has defined a two-part test on whether a search violates a person's right to privacy: The person must have had an expectation of privacy The expectation must be reasonable When a person sends a letter, the contents of the letter are protected by the Fourth Amendment, because the letter is sealed. When a person sends data on the Internet, would the same argument hold? This question is asked in the light of recent attempts to force companies to create backdoors in encryption, so that they can decrypt data when requested to do so.
I don't think any appellate court has given an opinion on whether encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is not surprising as only recently has it come to light that the government may have weakened encryption protocols and asked for backdoors in order to aid in decryption. However, Orin Kerr, professor of Law at George Washington University School of Law wrote this article in 2001. He argues that encryption does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy. He says: the Fourth Amendment regulates access, not understanding. Once you introduce your communication into third party systems (or the garbage :P), they may give it up to the government. If the government happens to be able to understand that communication, so be it. He shows how this conclusion is consistent with how the courts have ruled on "reassembly of shredded documents, recovery of deleted files, and the translation of foreign languages". Note that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is only one of the tests used to determine whether a search or seizure is reasonable. Another test is the "trespass" test which deems an interaction to be a search per se if there is a trespass on a person's personal effects. It was used before Katz and was reiterated recently in US v Jones (2012). Regardless, your question is still meaningful because the two tests are used alongside each other.
They aren’t treated differently In most jurisdictions, law enforcement requires a warrant to intercept/open/read the contents of physical or electronic correspondence. Similarly, in most jurisdictions, a warrant is not required to read the metadata: who is communicating with whom, how and when but not what. That is they can read what’s written on the outside of the envelope or the routing information of the email/SMS. Telephony is not correspondence because it is not the intent of the parties to create a permanent record. It is usually treated as any other conversation - if it carried out in a place and manner that the participants have a reasonable expectation of privacy it’s usually illegal to record it (electronically or by writing it down). If it’s said publicly, it isn’t illegal.
Most of the question has nothing to do with the law, it's about technical how-to or how-does, which should be asked in Information Security SE. There are two possible legal questions: is it legal to break into a computer system and take a database of passwords, and it is legal to acquire such a database obtained by someone else. As should be known in the US, per 18 USC 1030, breaking into a computer is illegal in the US. Given that, it is extremely unlikely that Google illegally breaks into other computer systems to obtain passwords. The aforementioned law criminalizes accessing computers without authorization, not (just) &quot;taking&quot; stuff from computers without authorization. The law does not criminalize receipt of illegally obtained material. Passwords are not protected by copyright. If Google were to induce someone to break into a computer system to get passwords, that would be legally actionable, however there is no law penalizing innocent receipt of illegally-obtained passwords (insofar as they are not protected by copyright). It is not illegal to access the dark web, at least in the US (probably it is illegal in Saudi Arabia). Using stuff gotten from the dark web can easily be illegal (e.g. logging in to someone's bank account, or forging a passport). There are many services which monitor the dark web and report breaches, which is totally legal.
In general, people have less expectation of privacy in cars than in their homes. To challenge a search and/or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, a person must have standing - the right to sue (that is, you must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place where the search happened; if you didn't, no standing - can't claim your privacy was violated if you had no privacy). The US Circuit Courts are split on the issue of unauthorized rental drivers and whether they have the same reasonable expectation of privacy as the authorized driver of a rental car would have. Some Circuits allow the unauthorized driver to challenge a car search if the authorized driver gave them permission. Some Circuits look only at the agreement and if the driver isn't authorized on that, they're out of luck. The 6th Circuit is more case-by-case, with a presumption that driver can't challenge the search that can be overcome based on the facts. (All this info from US v. Haywood, 324 F.3d 514) There's a current case before the Supreme Court (argued January 9, 2018), Byrd v. US, on this very issue. This SCOTUSblog page has a lot of information on the case. Edited to add: Texas is in the Fifth Circuit, which follows the rule that unauthorized drivers don't have standing to challenge a search/seizure even with the authorized driver's permission to drive the car; unauthorized drivers of rental cars don't have a reasonable expectation of privacy because they lack a possessory interest in the car and/or they're violating the rental agreement. Basically, even though it seems the cops' stop of the car would've violated the Fourth Amendment if he were the authorized driver, since this happened in Texas, he's not going to be able to challenge the stop. IMO, this is incredibly unjust especially when the cops admitted there was no probable cause, so hopefully the Supreme Court makes this rule obsolete and allows unauthorized drivers to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights. Some law review articles on the topic of unauthorized rental drivers: "Hertz and the Fourth Amendment" "Resolving a Three-Way Circuit Split"
National security letters can compel the production of some kinds of (non-&quot;content&quot;) user data, and (according to Wikipedia) typically contain a nondisclosure requirement forbidding the recipient of the letter from disclosing it. I assume that a witness has received and complied with a national security letter, and a non-government party wants to ask the witness questions which outside the courtroom, the witness would be forbidden to answer by the national security letter. The witness, or the government if represented in the lawsuit in question, may object to the questions. The purpose which justifies the secrecy requirements of a national security letter is also likely to justify the exercise of state secrets privilege. If the judge thinks a statute might otherwise be violated, they might intervene in the absence of any objection, or consider alternative remedies like an in camera hearing. If the court does not intervene to prevent the evidence being given, and the witness is charged with breaching the secrecy law, this would raise complex questions about the interpretation of the law imposing criminal penalties. The common law doctrine of absolute privilege for witnesses giving evidence in judicial proceedings applies in the United States, and could be raised in defence to any criminal charges.
It depends on the nature of the documents. This law specifies that it is illegal to disclose or publish etc. classified information concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government and there are 4 such subcategories. Violation results in imprisonment up to 10 years. This is an ordinary prohibition. Government employees may also be given access to classified information whose disclosure is not criminal in the general case, but would be illegal for the government employee to disclose owing to his position, under this law.
Basically, the author is saying that if the First Amendment were interpreted in the way described, as an all-purpose shield -- and therefore, journalists were not subject to libel laws, and could not be searched or deposed -- then journalists, being all but above the law at that point, would have a tremendous amount of power. There would need to be checks and balances to that power for the sake of justice, personal privacy, etc, lest we end up ruled by the press. The implication, and the point of the bolded part, is that these checks and balances must inherently weaken the protection offered by the First Amendment. So the Amendment can be seen as either an all-but-inviolable protection of the specific freedoms enumerated within, or as a general get-out-of-jail-free card that can be voided as community interests demand. It can not reasonably be both strong and overly broad.
Yes. The right to gather information is a central component of First Amendment protection.