How can the date for the 2020 US census legally be changed? The next US census is scheduled for 2020-04-01. In light of the recent COVID-19 pandemic it might become necessary to delay this. How can this legally be done (since the census is required by the constitution)?
The date of the census is not specified in the US constitution. It only says The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. There is no requirement that "ten years" be interpreted precisely to the day. The date is fixed by statute at 13 USC 141(a): The Secretary shall, in the year 1980 and every 10 years thereafter, take a decennial census of population as of the first day of April of such year.... This requires that the census seek data describing the population on April 1, 2020. It does not require that census workers actually visit people on that day. They could conceivably do it in mid August, for example, or at any other time. Of course, that would probably reduce the reliability of the census. Congress could pass a law moving the census date to another later date if they wanted to get a more accurate count of the population on that date instead of a less accurate count of the population on the first of April. In fact, when I got home later in the day after writing this answer, there was a letter from the census bureau inviting me to submit my census survey through the internet. I did that a few minutes ago, so if I die in the next two weeks, the census will be off by one. The letter I got says that if I don't fill out the survey online, they'll send me a paper questionnaire. If I don't fill that out, someone will come to visit. The prospect of that happening on April 1st seems quite remote.
So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds.
The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in.
Final Result: The 117th Congress did actually meet and swear in on a Sunday, January 3, 2021. Per the other answer by @NateEldredge, this was the first Sunday swearing in for at least several decades. December Update: There still does not appear to be a bill to change the date of convening the 117th Congress. However, an entry in the Congressional Record for December 20, 2020 states this: Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, today is Sunday, and I want to remember what Senator Byrd said on a lot of Sundays when the Senate was in session. He didn't say this because he didn't want to work on Sunday, but he wanted everybody to remember the significance of Sunday for some people, particularly Christians. He always said: ``Remember the Sabbath and keep it holy.'' Now, I want to refer to another particular Sunday. Never in the Senate's history has the Senate convened Congress -- meaning a new Congress -- on a Sunday. The Constitution mandates that Congress convene at noon on January 3, unless the preceding Congress, by law, designates a different day. Of course, January 3 has fallen on a Sunday over the last 238 years, and each time, by unanimous consent, the Congress set a new convening day other than that Sunday. So now it appears, for the first time in history, that Senate Democrats don't want to agree to such unanimous consent and instead are insisting that the Senate start the 117th Congress on Sunday. I am not looking to get out of work. I have proven that I have respect for attendance in the Senate. But out of respect, the Senate usually does not have business on religious holidays observed by members of various faiths. So just like Senator Byrd, I also think the Lord's Day, particularly when it is paired with the weight of starting a new Congress, deserves reverence. I yield. If Senator Grassley is correct, then all previous Congresses never allowed the convening date to fall on a Sunday. Although there do not appear to be any bills formally introduced yet for the convening of the 117th Congress, his remarks above suggest that there has at least been discussion of the issue, and he accuses Senate Democrats of preventing the change of date.
Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).
I don't know where you looked, but the Housing Act 2004 on legislation.gov.uk is up to date according to its header: [the] Housing Act 2004 is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 12 January 2023. There are changes that may be brought into force at a future date. Sections 212 to 215 fall within Part 6, Chapter 4 of the Act. With hindsight, you may be looking at an earlier version. So for awareness, if the entry's header is: green, then it is up to date. Any provisional amendments (i.e. yet to be enacted) there might be can be found using the &quot;view outstanding changes&quot; drop down option if there is one. red, then there are changes yet to be made which can be found via the &quot;view outstanding changes&quot; drop down option. blue, it's either the original version that has not had any amendments, or it's an earlier version that can be navigated to/from by selecting the the tick box &quot;show timeline of changes&quot; and the sliding calendar above the header.
The UK remains an EU member state until 31st October 2019. Unless a further extension is requested and granted. (One is obligated to be requested if an agreement is not reached by the 19th Oct) At the time of writing, there have been no changes to identity document requirements for EEA (includes EU) or Swiss citizens visiting the UK - they can enter the UK with a valid passport or a national identity card issued by such a state. We don't know today whether that will change after March 2019.
tl;dr: Precedent takes effect on the decision date. You didn't list a jurisdiction, so I'll give a U.S. example. In Citizens United v. FEC (U.S. 2010), there are three dates listed in the header: Argued March 24, 2009 Reargued September 9, 2009 Decided January 21, 2010 Precedent attaches to a decision date. That's also why we see 2010 in the case citation above. However, it's important to note that not all precedent is binding. A decision made in the 7th Circuit isn't binding on a district court in the 2d Circuit, and vice versa. As to the impact on cases in progress, the party that is more favorably impacted by the change can bring it to the judge's attention. The outcome will depend on the a) whether the decision is relevant, b) whether the decision is binding, and c) how far along the case at bar happens to be. Note: most U.S. cases never go to trial. It is (relatively) lower stakes to incorporate new legal theories in the pleading or discovery stage.