Why do legal scholars influence civil codes&#39; interpretation, more than judges? Source: A Brief Introduction to Law in Canada (2017). p. 39 Top. Publisher uploaded chapters 1-3. As the foregoing account makes clear, the civil law system has a long and historical evo-lution on the European continent. It has been shaped by Roman law more than English common law was. It also differs from the common law in that judges play a more active role in the judicial process (such as in the questioning of witnesses and marshalling of evi-dence), in what is referred to as an inquisitorial system. Further, the interpretation of civil codes is more influenced by legal scholars than by judges. inquisitorial system a feature of civil law proceedings whereby trial judges actively assist lawyers in present-ing their cases and are free to call and question witnesses and to order investigations into other evidentiary matters; contrasts with the adversarial system used in common law courts I know that Continental Law judges "works within a framework established by a comprehensive, codified set of laws". But how does this absence of official stare decisis explain the grey sentence overhead? https://imgur.com/ZEKyLhx may help.
First off, let me confirm that this text accurately describes the reality. Second, this is less far afield from the common law than you would think. If you are in a jurisdiction without any binding case law on a particular point, a so called "question of first impression", you then turn to persuasive authority. Persuasive authority includes case law that is binding in some other jurisdiction and legal scholarship, often in the form of a treatise or commentary. And, it is much easier to find an answer in a treatise which is carefully arranged on a subject matter basis, than to do case law research from other jurisdictions. This is particularly true when you have not devoted a lot of time to learning how to find the needle of the law you want in the haystack of the mountain of decided cases on all available subject. The very difficult task of case law research was only possible on more than an isolated hit or miss basis at all in common law systems where case law matters in the years before the 1980s when computerized case law word searching started to become possible at an affordable to lawyers price, because a lot of full time institutional actors devote a great deal of time and money to developing and maintaining tools like digests, citation indexes, and annotations to statutes to allow practitioners to locate that case law. If court decisions don't serve as binding precedents, those institutions aren't developed. For example, in common law countries, until very recently, there were no good resources for locating trial court decisions and rulings in state courts which handle the bulk of litigation, but whose rulings are not binding precedents. (Electronic record keeping in trial courts has changed the economics of this practice and made it much more common to publish trial court decisions and to index them appropriately.) So, if persuasive authority in your legal system in the form of non-binding case law is hard to find because it wasn't worth the money for the legal system to collectively develop the resources to publish and index it on a systematic basis for an audience of pretty much the entire legal profession, the other form of persuasive authority, legal treatises, becomes much more influential by default. You see something similar in very early legal opinion writing by American judges before the institutions necessary to systemically utilize case law precedents was developed. Judges were constantly citing treatises like Blackstone, which is something they rarely do now, because that was what was on their bookshelf. Further, there are feedback effects. Smart people who wish to influence the law for society without going the legislative route in common law countries will often seek careers as judges. But, absent the psychic perk of influencing the law and making a difference in society, a lot of the most ambitious people in the judiciary in a common law system will choose instead to go the route of academia and seek to become law professors where they can have a similar influence, while earning similar pay and having more time off and freedom to pursue your own personal and professional interests. So, in systems where legal precedents aren't binding, people who might otherwise be inclined to write probing legal opinions that develop legal concepts are less inclined to become judges, and the people who do become judges care more about getting the right result and less about explaining their decisions in a way that will influence future judges in the same circumstances. Finally, consider that many civil law legal systems involve countries with a lot less appellate litigation than the United States (currently 330 million people with more than 200 years of case law), or the UK (currently 60 million people with about 1000 years of case law), or India (more than 1 billion people with a couple of centuries of case law, since colonial precedents have relevance). Suppose that you live in Denmark or Belgium or Portugal or Costa Rica or South Korea, where your population is much lower and your time frame during which your legal system has been in place is not as long. In a situation like that, half a dozen or a dozen leading legal scholars can publish treatises over ten or twenty years that are going to cover, somewhere, the lion's share of the pressing issues in the legal system, and there is probably only one law school in the entire country, so it is quite likely that most of the lawyers in the entire country took contracts or property or family law from the the same people in law school, which makes them predisposed to consider a treatise written by that professor a credible one in that area of law. And, all other sources are a comparative vacuum. If you are a judge, why cite non-binding precedents from your fellow non-specialist judge in a country that simply has no precedents in many areas of law and has fewer carefully reasoned ones, when you could instead look for guidance from the person who taught you this area of law in the first place and literally "wrote the book" and who was probably consulted by the government in any recent amendments to relevant civil code or statute of broad general applicability. And, once you start out using those methods, it becomes habitual and legal treatises become very influential.
how (academically) acceptable are such discussions and proposals? Some academic somewhere has probably discussed it, and did not breach strong academic norms by doing so. Is it the academically acceptable practice to argue about such questions or is it a marginal view? It isn't taboo to argue such a position, but it is highly marginal and extreme. It is even more extreme in Eastern Europe (nominally in the civil law tradition) than it is in common law countries (which have more of a natural law tradition), and would be least marginal in the U.S. which has a strong natural law tradition, although it would marginal even in the U.S. Legal positivism (i.e. the law is what legislators and the governmental process including courts and citizen ballot issues says it is), is very strong now compared to prior eras and stronger in civil law countries than in common law countries. The battle between natural law and legal positivism was mostly won by legal positivism by the late 19th century although the debate continued indifferent to the reality on the ground. Philosophically, human rights are often viewed as an enlightened codification of natural law (which sometimes justifies its extraterritorial application), but it would be rare for someone who was a strong supporter of natural law to argue that human rights codifying natural law should be disfavored (really, that kind of reasoning is mostly seen in pre-modern Confucian legal arguments in China as part of the Eastern rule of law v. rule of man argument that tends to favor rule of man on the theory that any codification can be twisted by sneaky lawyers).
When? There are basically several times to look at when you want to look at the text, and then in what language. The Codex Iustinianus itself is part of the Corpus iuris civilis and contained only laws given by the previous emperors, while other older laws were in the Digesta/Pandecta and the Novellae contained any new imperial laws after 534. The whole CICiv, was given an introductory text right from inception: When it was compiled, back around 528, one of the books of the CICiv was the Institutiones Iustiniani, which was the prescribed legal education basis - the study book for the aspiring lawyers of his time. It contained how to practice law and cases that were to be discussed. On this basis, a glossa marginalis commentary has survived in Turin, which was made from a copy of the Institutiones. The commentary is dated to be contemporary to the CICiv and was made by adding comments around the real text, making researchers believe this was a work by a teacher, so he could answer or explain parts of the text, or reference earlier parts of the book easier. Around the 7th century, the Pandekta/Digesta were pretty much forgotten in big parts. In the middle ages, it took about till late 1000s, early 1100s, to re-compile the CICiv, when Irnerius of Bologna did manage to collect a sizeable portion of it by rediscovering the Littera Florentina and added to this collection by referencing earlier glossae. The Florentina alone is more than 900 pages long, and his littera vulgata/bologniensis (a german edition's Bibliography an Italian edition's bibliography), a new commentary on the re-compiled laws, including large parts of the Digesta. This book became the new introduction and teaching text about the CICiv and leading teaching bok for all lawyers in Europe at that time. This text is, what defined the roman tradition of law In the 19th century, legal scholars that studied a lot of the CICiv and argued along those lines - a style predominantly Existant in Germany - were known as Pandectists. One of the more central books of them was the Lehrbuch der Pandeketen by Karl Ludwig Arndts von Arnesberg (Stuttgart 1877). The praxis that developed in these circles greatly did influence the style of how the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch BGB was organized and written, and this systematic was exported. Later, books such as Paul Koschaker: Europa und das römische Recht (4th edition Munich 1966) did recept the whole roman legal body, giving the CiCiv a very thorough look, and how it influenced the modern Code Civil and Germanic tradition of law, while Franz Wieacker: Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung (2nd Edition, Göttingen 1967) did look at the Pandectists and how they were influenced by the CICiv. As more scholarly works I want to point to three that were referenced in the notes of the page when my ancient history Professor mentioned Roman Law being &quot;verklauselt, kompliziert und voller sonderfälle&quot; (~complicated and with many exceptions) in passing. A Short History of Roman Law by Olga Tellegen-Couperus (1993) does spare the last 8 pages on the CiCiv. The more thorough Herbert Felix Jolowicz; Barry Nicholas: Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge 1967) does spare the last chapters on the CICiv. Adolf Berger, Adolf: Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (The American Journal of Philology 1953) is taken still one of the main shorthands and (sometimes outdated) bibliographies under historians. Large parts of the Latin CICiv (as #12) can be accessed in &quot;the Roman Law Library&quot; by the Grenoble University, together with edition scans.
Organically rather than by design, laws and courts preceded the theoretical constitutional basis. Kings developed a practice of legislating in council, rather than solo, meaning that their edicts went out not as &quot;the King decrees XYZ&quot; but &quot;the King, with the assent of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, barons, etc., decrees XYZ&quot;. This eventually became the Parliamentary system, wherein only Parliament could make laws (especially about raising taxes) and the King alone could not. Because of the gradual evolution, it's not easy to point to the first such statute or even the first proper &quot;Parliament&quot;. The form was not settled. Nowadays we expect Acts to start with a set &quot;enacting formula&quot;, to be published in a set way, and to be called &quot;Acts&quot; at all. Earlier laws lacked these elements. It was common for Parliaments to transact a variety of business, such as appointing officials or distributing money, without strictly distinguishing a category of what we would now call a &quot;public general Act&quot;, something setting out broadly applicable rules under the tenor of law. To take an early example, the Domesday Book was undoubtedly commissioned by William I in council in 1085, but we could argue for a long time whether that really counted as a law made by the King alone or through a proto-parliamentary approach. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 is closer - we have the text and it refers to the counsel of all the barons - but still not obviously &quot;an Act&quot;. Magna Carta came in 1215 and was repeatedly confirmed by successive monarchs in slight variations; only the 1297 version is currently deemed to be an Act still partially in force. At the same time as this legislative activity, a bewildering array of courts applied essentially customary law for local cases. If you commit a murder in Durham in 1300 and would like to not be executed, then you would be appealing (I think?) to the mercy of the Prince-Bishop in his own court. A few dozen miles away and the process and authority was different. Things gradually became more uniform and systematized, and by the sixteenth century there was enough critical mass of legal philosophy to try to &quot;explain&quot; the legal system more formally and in recognizably modern terms. We may as well take Edward Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644) as a turning point: four volumes setting out a comprehensive view of what English law was all about. In contrast, take Bracton's similar work of 1235, which was the first real analysis of case law in England. Bracton was writing in a context without a general idea of precedent, and where the binding extent of Roman civil law was not clear. By Coke's time that was well established. But they are both trying to make sense of the law as they found it: giving explanations for the data, if you like. (A parallel course was taking place in Scotland with its institutional writers, although they ended up with a different system from England's. They were equally trying to explain what they saw.) Some of the early modern authors contributed to figuring out which decisions of past Parliaments or councils should be taken to be Acts, as such. Coke, in particular, also set out the criterion that an Act should purport to have been made by all three of the King, Lords and Commons. Our modern consolidated versions of the statute book derive from this time, and on legislation.gov.uk you can see the oldest Act still in force, The Statute of Marlborough 1267. That's different from the oldest Acts ever made, as discussed above, a more slippery concept. Ideas such as the separation of powers are reverse-engineered in this way. Indeed, it's not obvious that Britain has that separation. It may not be the right way to understand the governmental and legal order that has developed. John Locke might have thought it would be a good idea, but Walter Bagehot denied it was a useful frame for analyzing the interrelationships of various public bodies.
Short Answer The concern raised is a real one, but it is much less serious than one might naively expect. Long Answer Precedents Apply Only To Resolve The Legal Arguments Presented On The Facts Found To Exist At Trial A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Develop Facts At Trial Isn't A Serious Problem A precedent determines the law as applied to a particular set of facts found by the trial court and confirmed as properly in the trial court record by the appellate court, as to a particular legal issue. Failure to prove facts at trial due to the fault of counsel for a party in the trial court changes the scope of the precedent. Failure to establish facts in one case that sets a precedent, doesn't prevent a similarly situated party, in a case with essentially the same actual facts, from doing a better job and thus presenting a set of facts that are not governed by the same precedent. The precedent from the ill argued case would not apply because the facts as found by the trial court would be different. A Bad Lawyer's Failure To Present Legal Arguments Isn't A Serious Problem if a someone lost a case merely because they did not come up with an argument which, should they have come up with, would convince the judge to rule in their favour, and that case has become a precedent, the fate of any following cases in lower courts with comparable facts will be decided by that unluckily slow-thinking litigant/lawyer. Likewise, suppose that due to incompetence of counsel, a key legal argument isn't made. When a trial court lawyer makes that mistake, the precedent will merely resolve the legal arguments that were resolved by the trial court. This won't preclude a future litigant from making different legal arguments that are stronger in the same circumstances since the precedent won't resolve those legal arguments. For example, suppose that a trial, a lawyer for one side fails to argue that the statute of frauds (which requires certain contracts to be in writing) bars the claim, and the judgment in favor of other other side on an oral agreement is upheld on appeal. A lawyer in a new case with the same facts can move to dismiss the other side's claim based upon the statute of frauds, because the precedent upholding the oral agreement didn't resolve the question of whether the statute of frauds could be used to dismiss the claim arising under that agreement. There Aren't Better Alternatives To Sift Through Legal Arguments No lawyer can make every argument. The incentives of the system and the professional regulation of lawyers, however, increases the likelihood that the strongest arguments will be made to the court setting the precedent and in the trial court before an appellate court considers the issue, relative to pretty much any other means of clarifying ambiguous issues in the law, where the advocates for different legal rules usually don't have the same strong incentives to argue their cases as well as they possibly can. The Risk Posed By Ineffectual Rhetoric In Favor Of Good Rules Of Law Is Real But Limited This doesn't mean that bad lawyering doesn't give rise to bad precedents. But when this happens it is usually because for a given argument and set of facts, the lawyer for one side is so much more rhetorically effective in making a legal argument than the lawyer for the other side which is proposing a &quot;better rule&quot; of law. But the exclusion of people who can't finish law school and pass the bar exam from the process makes a truly decisive advantage for one party over another in rhetorical effectiveness fairly rare. To the extent that rhetorical failure in appellate briefing is the cause of a bad precedent, the long term systemic effect of this problem (some would call it a feature of the system rather than a flaw) is that the side with more resources that can afford to hire better lawyers will tend to produce legal results that favor similarly situated parties going forward. Thus, it produces a sort of diluted &quot;natural selection&quot; effect (a bias that is equally, if not more concerning, in the duel of lobbyists for all sides of an issue in the legislative process). The other safeguards discussed below, limit this risk, although not completely. Other Safeguards Subject-Matter Jurisdiction The requirement of an actual &quot;case and controversy&quot; for subject-matter jurisdiction, and the requirement of &quot;standing&quot; for subject-matter jurisdiction are designed to prevent someone from intentionally making straw man arguments on appeal that produce precedents that are bad law. Thoughtful Appellate Judges When Opinions Are Published Also, appellate court precedents are made by a panel of multiple (usually three at the first direct appeal level) experienced and esteemed judges who are acutely aware that the decisions that they are making in precedent setting cases influence the law in other cases which causes them to look beyond the arguments of the parties to resolve the dispute. It isn't at all uncommon in such cases for an appellate court to resolve a case on appeal on the basis of arguments not made by either party in their briefs, or precedents or statutes not mentioned by either party. Furthermore, most appellate court decisions are unpublished opinions that expressly determined by the panel making the decision not to make a binding precedent, which allows panels of judges in these cases to take less care to run afoul of the risk of making a bad decision due to bad lawyering by a party. So, in the minority of cases that are published and create binding precedents, judges are especially careful to consider this risk. Five More Safeguards The other main safeguards in the case law system against bad precedents due to poor lawyering by a party are: (1) the ability of uninvolved third-parties to file amicus briefs in connection with an appeal presenting perspectives on legal issues not presented by a party, (2) the ability of a state supreme court or the U.S. Supreme Court (or both) as the case may be, to overrule intermediate appellate court precedents that were wrongly decided, (3) the ability of legislatures to change non-constitutional legal rulings by statute, (4) the procedural requirement that the relevant state or federal attorney general be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in cases challenging the constitutionality of a law, and (5) the ability of the political process to amend the relevant constitution to address a bad binding precedent by a highest court on a constitutional issue that the legislature cannot fix. Collectively These Safeguards Help Somewhat None of these safeguards are fool proof. But, collectively, these safeguards reduce the risk of a bad precedent being established due to bad lawyering in an adversary system, that the inherent limitation of a precedent being limited to particular facts and particular legal arguments provides as a primary means of preventing. Other Causes Of Bad Precedents Are More Of A Problem In general, once all of the considerations above are taken together, the risk of a bad precedent being made due to bad lawyering, while it is real, is significantly smaller than the risk that a bad precedent will be made because the appellate judges rendering the precedent making opinion are bad judges. Bad judges usually end up as judges with appellate precedent making power because they were selected more based upon political considerations, as they are in many states, and in the federal system, rather than primarily based upon the soundness of their legal judgment. When one risk factor that can lead to a bad decision is much larger than another risk factor that can lead to a bad decision, further improvements in the smaller risk factor will rarely make all that much of a difference in the overall likelihood that the system will produce a bad precedent. So, the adversary system, is, on balance, good enough make the risk of bad precedents arising from bad lawyering a not very troubling problem with the system, even though it is a real risk that sometimes does produce bad precedents.
It depends on the judge. Both narrative and question-answer formats can be required. Under the narrative format, the defendant gives their statement. The prosecution can then cross-examine. Under the question-answer format, the defendant plays both the role of themself and the role of their representative. They ask questions to themselves then answer. This was used in United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989).
I think what you're talking about is probably quite rare. There are certainly law firms that market their ability to thoroughly investigate the facts, aggressively question or impeach hostile witnesses, present compelling evidence at trial, or make persuasive oral arguments. But I don't think I've ever heard of a firm that treats any particular litigation tactic as its specialty rather than treating it as part of its specialization in domestic relations, DUI defense, employment law, etc. If you think of litigating at different stages of a case as &quot;techniques or functions,&quot; then I'd point to the various firms that consider themselves trial specialists, or appellate specialists, or even Supreme Court specialists. Even then, though, any of those specialties is going to involve a variety of discrete techniques or functions. A trial lawyer needs to do investigations and cross examinations and closing statements, and a Supreme Court specialist needs to be able to petition for cert, draft merit briefs, and give oral arguments.
The notion of a peer for purposes of the jury is someone who "walks in the same shoes" as the defendant or litigants. A freeman was to be juried by other freemen, a Peer of the Realm by other (capital P) Peers, a landsman by other landholders, and a marine by other sailors. The ancient origins of a judgment by jury were rooted in removing allegations by the defendant, alleging unfairness of the process, since the defendant himself was a party to the selection of those who would weigh his actions before the law and mete out punishments, the defendant could have confidence that he wasn't being railroaded. In the USA, we've done away with the codified, defined social definitions such as peerage and royalty and owned/indentured vs. free...so we are all, as far as the law defines, equal peers.