Does the &quot;Interstate Commerce Clause&quot; prohibit local or state government from &quot;boycotting&quot; another state Recently I read that some municipalities in California are restricting &quot;official travel&quot; to Florida and Texas, presumable over legislation they consider objectionable. In the past, I know they've also implemented bans on government purchases from companies that reside in these states for similar reasons. Is this a violation of Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. constitution, or &quot;Interstate Commerce Clause&quot;, or more specifically the doctrine of the &quot;Dormant Commerce Clause&quot;?
Under the commerce clause, a state cannot (without authorization from Congress), forbid its residents to travel to another state, nor tax such travel. It cannot prohibit imports from, or exports to, another state. It cannot tax products from other states in general, or from specific states, at a different rate or in different ways from products made within the taxing state. However, a state government may decide where its own employees will go on official business. It may decide where its own funds will be spent, and what products or services it will purchase for its own use. It may decline to purchase products from states with policies it disapproves of. It may forbid official travel that it would be responsible to pay for to such states, if it so chooses. It can probably also encourage its citizens and residents not to travel to or buy from such states, as long as it sticks to persuasion, and does not impose any penalty or tax on those who do so trade or travel, and also does not refuse to deal with people who do deal with the state it dislikes.
Such a law could probably be passed under the authority of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. Price controls on various products have previously been justified under that clause.
This question is controlled almost entirely by local municipal and county ordinances. It is not a question of federal law that is uniform across the U.S. and in most cases it is not even a question of state law. So, there is no single answer to your question. Most localities regulate this with some combination of hotel specific building codes (usually incorporated by reference from a uniform building code promulgated by a private non-profit organization as a model building code provision) and hotel specific local zoning ordinances.
The law works in the opposite direction of what you seem to be imagining. State courts generally have jurisdiction to hear lawsuits based on federal law, even without &quot;authorization&quot; from Congress. It is therefore perfectly normal to see lawsuits under Section 1983 , the Privacy Protection Act, or the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Protection Act being litigated in state court. Instead, when Congress authorizes a private right of action, it includes explicit language when it does not want cases heard in state court. This is the case with copyright, patent, and bankruptcy litigation, for example.
The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.
No. A governor could not be held liable in a lawsuit on those grounds. Governors in every U.S. state have governmental immunity from liability in tort (and a lawsuit for wrongful death is a kind of tort lawsuit) for their official actions, and there is no U.S. state in which this kind of lawsuit would fall within an exception to that governmental immunity. There is not private cause of action against a state government executive branch official under federal law for a violation of "Trump administration official guidelines for reducing the covid-19 mitigation." Indeed, it isn't clear that a federal statute creating such a private cause of action that purported to pierce a state law official's governmental immunity from liability, even if it were enacted, would be constitutional. In contrast, if a corporation violated such a guideline, the violation of the guideline would be evidence of negligence, although probably not conclusive evidence, in a suit for wrongful death by a non-employee brought against the corporation.
No. As a superior sovereign, the United States can sue states in federal court without restriction. I’m not sure if that would apply in state court, but the federal government doesn’t generally file cases in state court to begin with. States can also sue each other in federal court, having waived their immunity to lawsuits brought by other states when they agreed to Article III of the Constitution (although Congress has said that these lawsuits must be filed directly in the Supreme Court).
There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.