Why was abortion legal when the United States was founded? The US supreme court recently ruled to overturn Roe vs. Wade. Part of the decision was based on abortion laws when the 14th Amendment was ratified. While I understand that cherry picking the 14th Amendment's ratification might confront an equal protection challenge, it doesn't deal with the fundamental finding in Roe. I.e. that determining a) a fetus was present and b) that the fetus died of non-natural causes would require an unreasonable search by the government in violation of an individual's 4th amendment rights. The first 10 amendments finished ratifying in 1791 when there were no abortion laws in the US. So, if the court's originalists base their opinion on what those authors intended, why do they believe were there no laws against abortion when the bill of rights was ratified?
Of course there were laws on abortions in 1791 There just weren’t any statutes because this was handled by the common law. Under that, abortions were legal until quickening (when the mother first feels the foetus moving) and murder after that. Quickening usually takes place around 15-17 weeks. The fact that the Mississippi law makes 15 weeks the cutoff is probably not coincidental.
Is it a correct inference that the right &quot;to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects&quot; extends to even a private corporation? No. It's not even a correct inference that it extends by its own terms to state and local governments. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights was enacted as part of the federal constitution and only restricts the exercise of the federal government's authority. State and local governments are instead bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Over the years, the courts have held that state action that deprives someone of fundamental rights deprives them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the Supreme Court held that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a fundamental right, so state action violating it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most of the Bill of Rights has been held to be &quot;fundamental,&quot; and people routinely say &quot;the state violated the Fourth Amendment&quot; instead of &quot;the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search of the sort that would violate the Fourth Amendment if conducted by the federal government.&quot; Courts will say &quot;the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth.&quot; But the point is that the Fourth Amendment itself is not applicable to anyone except the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, only restricts the states. The Fourth Amendment only restricts the federal government. With rare exceptions, neither applies to private entities.
Because the Supreme Court, who interprets the meaning of the Constitution, said so: Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. &quot;District of Columbia, et al., v. Dick Anthony Heller. 554 U.S. 570&quot;. United States Supreme Court. June 26, 2008
State supreme courts are not allowed to defy binding supreme court precedents and are quickly slapped down if they do. But not all U.S. Supreme Court rulings have that character. For example, even if a state has rules of civil procedure which are verbatim identical to the federal rules of civil procedure, it does not have to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of an identical rule. For example, many states have rules of civil procedure 8, 9 and 12 which are verbatim identical to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9 and 12. But, when the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted FRCP 8, 9, and 12 in a new way in cases known as Iqbal and Twombly, not all state courts adopted the new interpretation and this was not a defiance of binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, because the U.S. Supreme Court's precedents only apply to federal laws and rules. Similarly, many states have state constitutional rights in a bill of rights which are worded with language identical to that of parallel rights under the U.S. Constitution as amended. But, state courts don't always interpret that language in the same way that the U.S. Supreme Court does. If the federal constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court is more protective of a right than the state constitution, then the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation sets a floor of protection (except in the small number of circumstances like the right to a civil jury trial, or the requirement that serious crimes be pre-approved by grand juries, where a federal right is not applicable to state and local governments). But, if the state constitution is interpreted by the State Supreme Court in a manner more protective a right than the U.S. Supreme Court, this is allowed and does not conflict with the U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of identical language in the United States Constitution.
There is no &quot;different legal procedure&quot; for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling.
Congress has the power to propose amendments, but not to enact them. Amendments are only enacted once they're ratified by 3/4ths of the state legislatures. And yes, there's no reason to think it would be unconstitutional for 2/3rds of each house of Congress plus 3/4ths of the state legislatures to make fundamental changes to the Constitution like eliminating other branches of government. The only limit on amendments that's still in effect is that states can't be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate without their consent.
No. Labeling an abortion as &quot;homicide&quot; would be a matter of criminal law and generally not the subject of international law. There are no international laws or treaties limiting a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy. On the contrary, international agreements are generally understood to protect a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and do not attempt to define fetal viability or otherwise establish a point at which a fetus is treated as a life entitled to legal protection and recognition. For instance, the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment on the Right to Life says that states may regulate abortions, but those regulations must not &quot;must not result in violation of the right to life of a pregnant woman or girl,&quot; and must not &quot;jeopardize their lives, subject them to physical or mental pain or suffering which violates article 7, discriminate against them or arbitrarily interfere with their privacy.&quot; Laws governing medical abortions are jurisdiction-specific, and the Center for Reproductive Rights has a helpful guide to the legality of abortion in different countries.
The restrictions of the First Amendment have been made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. For the right to assemble, this was recognized in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). But note that the right only protects peaceable assembly. When it is alleged that improper violence or other properly unlawful action has occurred, the state may make that criminal, and indeed laws against rioting have existed throughout the history of the US. Whether a law is criminalizing peaceful assembly or prohibiting unlawful violence is a question that depends on th wording of the law, and the way it is applied In the De Jonge opinion the Court wrote: The broad reach of the statute as thus applied is plain. While defendant was a member of the Communist Party, that membership was not necessary to conviction on such a charge. A like fate might have attended any speaker, although not a member, who &quot;assisted in the conduct&quot; of the meeting. However innocuous the object of the meeting, however lawful the subjects and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable and timely the discussion, all those assisting in the conduct of the meeting would be subject to imprisonment as felons if the meeting were held by the Communist Party. ... While the States are entitled to protect themselves from the abuse of the privileges of our institutions through an attempted substitution of force and violence in the place of peaceful political action in order to effect revolutionary changes in government, none of our decisions goes to the length of sustaining such a curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly as the Oregon statute demands in its present application. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, under the New York statute defining criminal anarchy, the defendant was found to be responsible for a &quot;manifesto&quot; advocating the overthrow of the government by violence and unlawful means. Id. pp. 268 U. S. 656, 268 U. S. 662, 268 U. S. 663. In Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, under the California statute relating to criminal syndicalism, the defendant was found guilty of willfully and deliberately assisting in the forming of an organization for the purpose of carrying on a revolutionary class struggle by criminal methods ... Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Gitlow v. New York, supra, p. 268 U. S. 666; Stromberg v. California, supra, p. 283 U. S. 368; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 707; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 243, 297 U. S. 244. The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press, and is equally fundamental. As this Court said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 92 U. S. 552: implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions -- principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 272 U. S. 316; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S. 67; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra.