Legal standing of pro-LGBT decor in stores In this question, there are several items (such as decor) mentioned and recommended towards the end of making a business appear more LGBT-friendly. However, it is my understanding that the law DOES NOT require accomodations for LGBT customers. The law DOES require accomodations for religious customers. Religion is a protected class. Sexual orientation and gender identity are not. As a Christian, what legal standing would I have to demand that pro-LGBT items such as rainbow flags, pronoun pins, and other items be removed while I am in the store? Realistically, I would never enter a store that displayed pro-LGBT items and would leave immediately if I saw such items, but let's say I wanted to force the store to remove their pro-LGBT items. Could I? Is there not a legal obligation on businesses to be more Christian-friendly?
Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional.
It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin A medical condition like an allergy is not necessarily a physical disability. The school is arguably fulfilling its obligations under WHS legislation by banning nut products if that is what a risk assessment indicates. It may also be necessary to ban milk products if that is required for your daughter's safety. If (and I do not know) nuts pose a greater risk than milk then banning the former and not the latter may be perfectly justified. Ask to see the risk assessment.
Let's deal with the somewhat misguided notion of "public space": what it means and what it doesn't: "publicly owned" is not equivalent to "public space" - Camp David is "publicly owned"; it is not "public space". "privately owned" can be "public space" - the publically accessible parts of shopping malls are privately owned public spaces. "public space" does not mean you have unconditional access. Access may be limited or subject to restrictions placed on it by whoever has lawful authority over it. For example, the aforementioned shopping mall is not public when the mall is closed, roads may be closed for maintenance, street festivities or emergencies etc. So: if you are in a place where you have permission of the lawful authority to be (public spaces give you this implicitly, private spaces require explicit permission), and the lawful authority has not placed restrictions on photography, and the subject does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy (like they would in a public toilet), and the subject matter is legal (e.g. considering restrictions on sexual or commercial activities), then you can take photographs.
This could be a violation of the Fair Housing Act, but Fair Housing v. Roommate.com, 521 F.3d 1157 says that we find that the FHA doesn’t apply to the sharing of living units The crux of the argument is that a room in a house is not a "dwelling", since it is not a complete living unit. Whether or not courts outside the 9th Circuit follow suit remains to be seen. Florida state law (760.29) states exceptions to its anti-discrimination laws, covering for instance Any single-family house sold or rented by its owner, provided such private individual owner does not own more than three single-family houses at any one time. If that is the case, then the exemption exists if the rental a. Without the use in any manner of the sales or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real estate licensee or such facilities or services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such licensee or person; and b. Without the publication, posting, or mailing, after notice, of any advertisement or written notice in violation of s. 760.23(3) Another exemption exists if Rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his or her residence. Your attorney (hint) will be able to interpret that complicated section of the law.
I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation.
It's hard to prove a negative, and I'm not sure which specific part of the quoted Terms you object, to, but it specifically states that content access may be done to: Comply with the law Protect its customers; and Protect the security of its business; and Protect its business interests. It's unlikely that access of information to comply with the law is illegal. At least one EU directive, Directive 95/46/EC, sets limits on the collection and use of personal information. We're concerned with the first condition for lawful data processing, and the second principle of data quality. Data processing is only lawful if the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party; or processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; or processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party; or processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interest pursued by the controller or by the third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection. The principles of data quality, which must be implemented for all lawful data processing activities, are the following: personal data must be processed fairly and lawfully, and collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes. They must also be adequate, relevant and not excessive, accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date, must not be stored for longer than necessary and solely for the purposes for which they were collected; special categories of processing: it is forbidden to process personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. This provision comes with certain qualifications concerning, for example, cases where processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or for the purposes of preventive medicine and medical diagnosis. So, let's say that someone has given their consent. It'd be at least a little questionable whether the inspection of private information could mean that they access personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life. I'm a bit less clear on US laws, but you'd probably look for laws around Personal Identifying Information, as that's where a lot of focus has been.
No, given McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 and In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582. The principle is that laws with religious origins are constitutional if they have a secular purpose. In Braunfeld, the defendants who were Orthodox Jews could not operate their business from sunfall to sunfall on Friday-Saturday, and sought to operate on Sunday contrary to a Pennsylvanis law prohibiting retail sales of their commodities on Sunday. The court rules that the law &quot;does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor constitute a law respecting an establishment of religion, and it does not prohibit the free exercise of appellants' religion, within the meaning of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment&quot;. Their argument was based on the fact that to comply with the requirements of their religion plus the statutes of Pennsylvania, they would suffer economic loss. The court historically reviewed blue laws and concluded that the requirement to be closed on Sunday is not necessarily tied to religion, noting for example that in 1776 Virginia seemed that &quot;all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion&quot; and repealed laws penalizing expression and observations of religions, but also maintained laws prohibiting Sunday labor. Restrictions are possible on &quot;people's actions when they are found to be in violation of important social duties or subversive of good order, even when the actions are demanded by one's religion&quot;. The matter has not come before SCOTUS since then (the constitutionality of blue laws is now &quot;established law&quot;, until these rulings are overturned, analogous to Dobbs overturning Roe).
Adding m/w/d in a job posting is not explicitly required by any German law. It is however the established way to implement the requirements of the AGG (~ general equal treatment act) which in turn implements various EU directives. Protected classes under the AGG are race, ethnic origin, gender, religion or belief system, disability, age, and sexual identity. Of these, only gender manifests itself in the German language, making workarounds necessary that indicate that no gender is preferred. Within certain bounds, the German language can use gender-neutral terms, for example a job called “Lehrer/-in” or “Lehrer*in” could also be called “Lehrkraft”. If you are able to use gender-neutral language in English but are still subject to German law, adding “m/f/d” is probably not necessary but still a very sensible idea as it corresponds to German best practices. If you fail to add some explicit note that applicants of all genders are welcome, nothing bad will happen automatically. However, a person with a not-explicitly listed gender may apply for the job, get denied, and then sue with the argument that they were denied because of their gender. The employer would have the obligation to prove that their job postings are non-discriminatory.