What does &quot;without apportionment&quot; mean in the 16th amendment of U.S. Constitution? Here's the text of the 16th amendment to the U.S. Constitution: The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration. What does "without apportionment among the several States" mean? To me it sounds like something similar to the electoral college, where Florida has more people than Georgia by an approximate ratio of 29:16, therefore we will charge Florida 29% income tax but Georgia only 16%. That sounds absurd to me and I'm pretty sure it's not done that way (and hopefully wasn't done that way before the 16th amendment?). But I can't understand what else "without apportionment" might mean.
In Article I, section 9, the Constitution says: No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken. A "capitation" is also called a head tax; it means you tax $X for every person. The meaning of "other direct Tax" is less clear; the historical understanding in the late 19th century was that it didn't apply to income. However, one thing that is clear is that it does apply to a property tax: if the federal government seeks to tax you on the value of your real or personal property, it must apportion the tax among the states on the basis of population. If Virginia has 2.5% of the US population and New York has 6.25%, then the total tax money collected from Virginia must be 2.5% of the total tax money collected nationwide, and likewise for New York; the total money collected from Virginia must be 40% the amount collected from New York. This doesn't mean Virginia's rate is 40% of New York's. If Virginia's land had a total value of 40% what New York's did, then the rates would actually be the same. But the ratio between tax collected from the two states would have nothing to do with property value; it would be just based on population. This is a rather convoluted and silly system; one theory I've read suggests that part of the point was to discourage these sorts of taxes unless they're truly necessary (and if they do happen, to collect the most money from the states with the most congressmen that could vote on the bill). But it's unworkable for almost any actual tax that's not a head tax, and head taxes are very much out of fashion. Most taxes have been considered to not be direct taxes. Income tax was generally not considered direct either. However, an 1895 Supreme Court case (Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &amp; Trust Co.) found that a tax on income which was derived from property (rent, dividends, interest, etc.) was effectively a tax on the property, and so was a direct tax. This would apply to only a subset of income (wage income wasn't included), but it's a reasonably significant subset. Many people didn't particularly like the decision; it pretty much said "the kind of income rich people make can't be taxed by a practical method, only this impractical apportionment system." The Supreme Court can be overruled via constitutional amendment; that's what the 16th Amendment did. It clarified that Pollock was no more, and that income tax didn't need to be apportioned no matter where the income came from. It was enacted precisely because apportionment is utterly impractical.
However, in the last 233 years, only a handful of people have been prosecuted for violating this law. The census bureau has noticed that a more effective way to get everyone counted is to follow up in person if someone neglects to respond to the questionnaire. Once they follow up and the person has responded, there's no longer a basis for prosecuting. What is the point of one of the oldest laws, in which some people have cared enough to amend, but not enough to actually enforce? The possibility of prosecution is presumably thought to increase the response rate even if virtually nobody is ever prosecuted. The law also serves as a formal statement by congress that responding to the census is important, even if the executive doesn't prosecute people for failing to do so. Another thing to consider is that an element of the offense specified in 13 USC 221 is refusal or willful neglect. Without evidence of an affirmative refusal to respond, the prosecutor would need evidence of willfulness, which goes to state of mind, and that is notoriously difficult to prove. Any defendant who claims to have intended to respond but for chronic forgetfulness would introduce reasonable doubt unless the prosecutor had something to show that the defendant intentionally refrained from responding.
The Fifth Amendment, and all the other amendments in the "Bill of Rights" (numbers 1-10) were universally understood when passed to be restrictions on the Federal Government only. The courts treated them that way through the end of the US Civil War. This was made definite in the US Supreme Court case Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the courts have decided that most of the provisions of the bill of rights also apply to actions by the states. A few do not apply, such as the requirement that indictments be by a grand jury, and the Third Amendment ban on quartering soldiers in private dwellings. This was done through a somewhat roundabout mechanism -- the Supreme Court decided that the protections of the Bill of Rights were included in the Due process clause of the 14th. As a result not all the provisions were made applicable at the same time. (Most were held to be incorporated during the period from 1925-1985. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) thru Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). Modern legal opinions sometimes discuss incorporation as if it was a fact from the passage of the 14th in 1868. But the actual gradual process is clear in the case law. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases was first incorporated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), but only for death penalty cases, and only if "special circumstances" existed, such as a defendant who was illiterate, far from home and support, or feeble-minded. Later cases gradually found "special circumstances" in more and more fact patterns, and in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the Court extended the right to all felony cases. It has later been extended to misdemeanor cases if jail time is a possible result. A similar history could be spelled out for the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, or for the Fourth's against search and seizure, particularly the "exclusionary rule". I, and a number of legal scholars who have better rights to an opinion, think that the 14th's "Privileges and Immunities" clause would have been a more sensible means to this end, but for various reasons that isn't how it was done. Justice Thomas seems to be trying to reverse this -- he has made comments in a number of opinions of late that various things should be protected under the Privileges and Immunities clause of the 14th, rather than the Due Process clause.. Even if the Court adopts this theory, it probably won't change many outcomes. That is how the Fifth, and other Bill of rights Provisions like the Fourth (search and seizure) and the First (free speech and religion) have been applied to restrict the states. None of these provisions directly restrict private individuals. In some cases, courts have said that while individuals may not be forbidden to do things that are forbidden to governments under the Bill of Rights, the courts will not help you do such things, such as by enforcing contracts to do them. No person shall be held to answer for a... crime "held to answer" here means prosecuted in court. Only governments do that. That provision forbids criminal court cases that do not start with a grand Jury indictment. it is one of the few Bill of Rights provisions which the Supreme Court has held do not apply to the states. But in any case it is purely procedural. It doesn't say that crimes may not be prosecuted, nor that they must. It says only "if you want to try someone for a crime, this is a step you must go through." The other provisions of the Fifth all do apply to the states, such as the ban on double jeopardy, and the protection against self-incrimination. does that mean that government can declare it legal for citizens to kill a particular person? No. That would violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause if don3 by the Federal Government, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause and its Equal Protection clause if done by a state. It would probably also violate the provision against Bills of Attainder, and perhaps the provision against cruel and unusual punishment. Once upon a time, several hundred years before the US was founded, the government of England did just that. It was called "outlawry". For certain crimes, the punishment was to be put "outside the law". An "outlaw" (in this older sense) was not protected by the law. Anyone could kill an outlaw, or steal from one, and the legal system would do nothing about it. The US has never used outlawry.
Anyone can say anything on Wikipedia – even they tagged that claim as requiring a citation. There's no way to directly prove that there is no such requirement, but these guys maintains that there are no such laws in the US, and EFF says the same thing. This Wiki page agrees, giving details about a specific bill introduced in the House and also in the Senate in the 111th Congress that did not become a law (it did not survive the scrutiny of the judiciary committee in either case). Another failed attempt was in the 112th Congress.
See Article VI of the Constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. This seems to me that it pretty clearly establishes the Constitution as taking the place of any previous laws. In particular, Article XI of the Articles is in conflict with Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"). The Constitution says that Congress's action is required to create a new state, and doesn't mention any exceptions. The Constitution's terms presumably take precedence. If Canada wanted to become a state, it would have to be admitted by Congress under Article IV Section 3.
Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? No. It is very common for local governments to make changes to zoning ordinances, building codes, etc, that have the effect of restricting the way that property can be used. In most cases this is not considered to be a &quot;taking&quot; for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, even if it reduces the value of the property, and the government does not have to compensate the property owner. See for instance Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Roughly speaking, the Takings Clause only applies if the regulations are so restrictive that the land cannot really be used at all. Here you are still perfectly able to use the existing house, and it sounds like you can even build an addition - you just can't build in the exact way that you want. You'll either need to design your addition to comply with the current setback rules, or see if you can get the village to approve a variance.
The plain meaning of "any" is "all". That does not mean that that is how the word is interpreted under current US law: that can only be determined by inspecting the case law. In US v. Alabama 443 Fed. Appx. 411 (No. 11-14532-CC), fn. 2 states "Pursuant to § 1304(e), every alien eighteen years of age and older must carry a certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card", thus this court has suggested that the meaning is actually "some". However, the case was not ruling on the interpretation of "any" here, so this could be a slip. The case involves an Alabama law, which as reported in the opinion's summary of the part of Alabama law being challenged by the US states: Section 10 creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)..." indicating that the Alabama statute refers to "some" (which could influence the interpretation of "any", since "some" and "any" are often mixed up in legal drafting). That is, it is possible that the court in the footnote read "any" as "some" because the state law in question, which is parallel to the federal law, says "an". In US v Arizona 641 F.3d 339, the court weakly suggests a "some" interpretation as well, saying: Determining Congress' purpose, and whether Section 3 poses an obstacle to it, first requires that we evaluate the text of the federal registration requirements in in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306. These sections create a comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration, including penalties for failure to carry one's registration document at all times.. Again, the meaning of "any" is not the central issue: in using "one's registration document" in the singular, the court must have been interpreting "any" as "some". US v. Daubon 334 Fed.Appx. 167 (2009), another case that invokes the law but does not rule on the meaning of "any", rephrases the law: 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) requires every alien over eighteen to carry his permanent resident card at all times. which is at odds with the possibility of there being two such documents: it suggests that an I-766 is not good enough. Lexis-Nexis returns 18 cases that cite this statute, and only Arizona v. US which was about the preemption issue was decided by SCOTUS. None of these opinions rules on the meaning of "any", so the matter has not yet been decided.
The historical record on the question is probably too thin to yield a well-supported answer as to the due diligence and the underlying "what were they thinking" question, that is, I doubt there is any record of any original debate where one side demands resolution of the contradiction, and how that charge was answered. The American Law of Taxation: As Determined in the Courts of Last Resort gives a summary of the ensuing case law relationship between taxation and compensation, as of 1884 (p. 31 of the book, p. 100 in the PDF): Taxation differs from the power of eminent domain in this: that it has no thought of compensation by way of return for that which it takes and applies to the public good, further than all derive benefit from the purposes to which it is applied; in other words, that the support of government and other objects of public utility promoted by taxation are supposed to return to the individual the same which has been taken from him, as his share of the public burden and The limitation in the constitution that private property shall not be taken for public use, refers solely to the right of eminent domain, and not to taxation or special assessments for local benefits. (both quotes with long lists of supporting state law citations). The New York case People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 apparently overturned its prior ruling (I think the citation is 6 Barb. 214, which I can't track down), commenting on the earlier ruling on an assessment. The supreme court reversed and annulled the assessment, holding... That money is property; that it can not be taken from a citizen for public use by the right of eminent domain, without just compensation; and that the enhancement in value of the relators' lands, by the grading and paving of Flushing avenue, is not that just compensation within the meaning of the constitution. The later court gets out of this, noting that Taxation exacts money, or services, from individuals, as and for their respective shares of contribution to any public burden. Private property taken for public use by right of eminent domain, is taken not as the owner's share of contribution to a public burden, but as so much beyond his share. Special compensation is therefore to be made in the latter case, because the government is a debtor for the property so taken; but not in the former, because the payment of taxes is a duty and creates no obligation to repay, otherwise than in the proper application of the tax. Taxation operates upon a community or upon a class of persons in a community and by some rule of apportionment. The exercise of the right of eminent domain operates upon an individual, and without reference to the amount, or value exacted from any other individual, or class of individuals. In other words, the Takings and Just Compensation clauses are understood to be about the power of eminent domain, which specially burdens the individual, and that is distinct from the general burdening of society that is taxation. There are, as far as I know, no finely-tuned SCOTUS rulings on the relation between the Just Compensation clause and the tax and spend clause. There is case law that holds that there is no contradiction between the power to tax and the Fifth Amendment. For example McCray v. US, 195 U.S. 27: While both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments qualify, insofar as they are applicable, all the provisions of the Constitution, nothing in either of them operates to take away the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, and that power being unrestrained except as limited by the Constitution, Congress may select the objects upon which the tax shall be levied, and, in exerting the power, no want of due process of law can possibly result, and the judiciary cannot usurp the functions of the legislature in order to control that branch of the Government in exercising its lawful functions. And Brushaber v. Union Pacific, 240 U.S. 1: So far as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say that there is no basis for such reliance, since it is equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, that the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a taxing power, and taking the same power away, on the other, by the limitations of the due process clause. This however says that taxation laws do not violate the due process requirement.