In what cases is a U.S. Federal Executive Official named in a lawsuit in their official capacity as a defendant and when is the US itself named? I was curious under what situations the United States is named as the defendant in a lawsuit as opposed to when a U.S. Federal Executive Official (or agency) is named (in their official capacity) as the defendant? Further, in cases the U.S. government is the plaintiff what determines whether the named plaintiff is the United States, Executive Official, or agency in the lawsuit? Take for example NFIB v. OSHA, Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Collins v. Yellen, or the recent Biden v. Nebraska cases. In these specific examples is there any particular reason why was OSHA named as opposed to the U.S. or the agency official, the CFPB was named instead of the Director, or Biden as opposed to the U.S. Is it determined by statute and/or the enforcing official? Or generally what determines these features? Thank you.
There are two main main circumstances in which individual officials are named. One is where the relief sought is non-monetary and the official has the ability to provide the relief, such as a habeas corpus action, which names the warden of the facility having custody of the individual bringing the action, or an action to has an official interpret a statute in a particular way by someone regulated by the statute. Usually, it is an action for an injunction, declaratory relief, or a writ compelling an official to do or refrain from doing something. The other is a Bivens action seeking to hold a government official responsible for misconduct in money damages, akin to a Section 1983 lawsuit against a state or local government official, although this is arguably not an official capacity lawsuit. Until the federal rules of civil and criminal and appellate procedure were amended in the late 20th century, interlocutory appeals from a judge's decisions (i.e. from orders entered before the case was completed) were structured as lawsuits brought by the appealing party against the judge in his official capacity seeking a writ under the All Writs Act, ordering him to change his order. But, this procedural nuance has been reformed in the federal courts and many state courts which instead now provide for these requests for relief to be structured as appeals of an order just like a final order, but under a different court rule authorizing certain interlocutory appeals. Cases brought in the U.S. Court of Claims seeking money damages from the United States where sovereign immunity has been waived or does not exist are brought against the United States. Claims in U.S. District Court seeking a refund of tax money paid are brought against the United States. Cases seeking to adjudicate title to property in which the United States government may have an ownership interest are brought against the United States. Counterclaims in cases brought by the United States against a person are brought against the United States. Cases against a specific independent government agency (e.g. AMTRAK a.k.a. the National Railroad Passenger Authority, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the U.S. Postal Service, or the CFPB) are brought against the agency, either if the government agency in fiscally independent of the U.S. government as a whole so money damages come from the agency alone, or where there would be an official capacity suit if the person who could afford relief was a single governmental official in charge but for the relief requested only the multi-member board running the entire independent agency can make the decision, or in a counterclaim to an action brought by the agency against someone. It is better practice not to sue an agency or office of the United States which is not an independent agency, for example, the U.S. Justice Department, when the United States should have been the defendant. But, often this defect in naming a defendant is overlooked when someone sues, for example, the Justice Department for money damages in the U.S. Court of Claims for failure to pay a court reporting invoice, or sues the IRS in District Court seeking a tax refund, if it doesn't lead to any confusion. Agencies of the United States proper without separate corporate existence may not sue each other (e.g. the Justice Department may not sue the Labor Department), although this has been attempted more than once in some high profile cases by federal government attorneys who aren't very sharp when it comes to procedural issues, to the consternation of the judges involved. I'm not sure that there is any one convenient place where this is written down. Instead, it is spread piecemeal over case law in many different places. There are also probably special cases and exceptions that I haven't mentioned, but the cases I've mentioned are the most common and obvious ones. Perhaps one of them explains NFIB v. OSHA, for which I have no good explanation.
No, each state is a "sovereign" and whenever a statute describes a crime it is always some act committed by a "person" and these two categories are mutually exclusive. See, for example, US Supreme Court in U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 SCt 677 (1947): "In common usage, the term `person' does not include the sovereign and statutes employing it will ordinarily not be construed to do so." Repeated by US Supreme Court in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 442 US 653, 667 (1979): "In common usage, the term 'person' does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing the word are ordinarily construed to exclude it."
united-states Sort of. Most particular courts have a chief judge, a position that is paid slightly more than that of a usual judge for a huge additional burden of administrative work managing the court house (e.g. courtroom assignments, policies on implementing case assignments, overseeing the jury system, security measures, hiring court clerk's office and court building staff, reviewing court budgets, deciding whether to close the courthouse for weather or pandemics and the like, etc.). In Colorado, there is a state appointed panel for each court that in connection with an outside private contractor evaluates judges periodically and prepares a report recommending or not recommending their retention in periodic retention elections, and there is a separate appointed panel that investigates allegations of judicial misconduct. In many other states, some or all judges have to run for re-election when their terms end and the voters decide if they should stay in office. Sometimes judges in these states are nominated by the appropriate level of one of the major political parties. In the federal courts, since judges serve for life and there is far less discretion to discipline them, Congress is the main supervisor in the sense of having the power to &quot;fire&quot; a judge. Trial court judge's substantive legal decisions are subject to review by courts with appellate authority over their court on a case by case basis. For courts of general jurisdiction, direct review of their cases on appeal is vested in an intermediate court of appeal in all but a few small states. For courts of limited jurisdiction that handle smaller civil disputes and/or misdemeanor criminal cases, direct appellate review is usually vested in the courts of general jurisdiction above it. In each state, the state judiciary as a whole has at its pinnacle a highest court, usually called the state supreme court, although a few states call it something else. It is the final court of review in the appellate process. It also has the authority to intervene in particular judicial decisions that would not ordinarily be ripe to raise in an ordinary direct appeal (e.g. questions about whether allegedly attorney-client privileged or other privileged evidence must be disclosed), including the authority, in rare cases to order that a judge in a case that was appealed be removed from a case. The federal court system and some larger states vest this authority in intermediate appellate courts as well. State supreme courts also have general administrative authority over the judiciary as a whole. The state supreme court (primarily through the chief justice of the state supreme court) in its administrative capacity handles budget issues, formulates court rules, prepares annual reports on the judicial branch, lobbies for state funding, is responsible for auditing lower court finances, makes IT decisions for the state judiciary as a whole, and makes myriad other policy decisions, although it does not directly supervise judges in the way that a line manager in a government agency would supervise that manager's subordinates.
The short answer is &quot;yes&quot;. There is U.S. Supreme Court authority that supports this position, In particular, United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 599 (1965), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), stand for the proposition that a defendant may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurances that he will not be punished for those actions. If the U.S. Department of Justice (or a U.S. Attorney with jurisdiction over the place the offense was committed) (hereinafter DOJ) says this, people who reasonably rely on that pronouncement can't be prosecuted until a different policy is announced and people who acted in reliance on the previous DOJ position are given a reasonable opportunity to change their conduct in response to the newly announced policy. The statement does have to be a publicly announced policy (or a policy personally communicated to the defendant or his counsel), and not just a de facto reality in terms of prosecutions not being brought in the past, or a secret, unannounced policy (or, for example, an unofficial and offhand statement of the U.S. Attorney General at a party that does not amount to a policy statement). Of course, the defense doesn't protect you if the DOJ says it won't prosecute if you do X, but you do X times Y which goes beyond the safe harbor created by the DOJ pronouncement. For example, the DOJ might say that they will not prosecute conduct involving marijuana offenses that is legal under state law, if it does not violate any other laws, and also meets certain conditions found in federal law (e.g. no offenses within 1000 feet of a school) that the DOJ chooses not to refrain from enforcing. But, if the DOJ then publicly says that it will start enforcing federal law without exceptions on July 1, 2021 and has rescinded its prior policy, a reasonable time in advance, then this defense ceases for conduct after that date. What constitutes reasonable notice would depend upon the facts and circumstances. The DOJ can also reach a binding agreement not to prosecute a particular instance of conduct by a particular person irrevocably in connection with plea bargaining type agreements, with respect to offenses of which the DOJ has jurisdiction (but not necessarily prosecutions by a different government such as a state government or the government of another country, for which the DOJ is not an authorized representative). For example, suppose that a mail carrier is killed by a resident of a home claiming to have acted in self-defense in Denver, Colorado. The DOJ could reach an irrevocable agreement with the resident to accept a plea bargain to a misdemeanor charge of not paying the tax due on the sale of the firearm from a non-compliant gun shop, dismissing forever the charge of murder of a federal post office employee. But that agreement would not bar the District Attorney in Denver from bringing murder charges twenty years later under state law prohibiting murder of human beings in the State of Colorado. For the defendant resident to prevent that from happening definitively, an agreement from the State of Colorado's District Attorney in Denver, or the Colorado Attorney General, would also be required.
No punishment followed because those policies are not the law, and, even it was found out earlier, no Inspector General would have the authority to dismiss Mrs. Cliton, it's POTUS's prerogative, as I understand it. That is true for maybe 10 people max in a government department. For the tens or hundreds of thousands of employees who weren't appointed by the President to serve at their pleasure, violating policies can lead to suspension, fines, or dismissal.
No. A plaintiff may travel to the defendant's jurisdiction to file suit if desired. Nobody usually does this, though, due to travel and logistical considerations. The defendant is the one who decides whether to challenge jurisdiction. Good contacts will include a forum selection clause which would lay out what happens where in the event of a dispute. And this can be anywhere, it is not limited to the locations of the plaintiff and the defendant. N/A.
The answer by Dale M is basically correct but has some details wrong. US Courts of Appeal Recall that in the US Federal system the circuit courts are the &quot;Courts of Appeal&quot;, that is the middle level of the system, above the district courts, but below the Supreme Court. In the early days of the US, each Justice of the Supreme Court was assigned to one circuit, usually consisting of several adjacent states. The Justice spent roughly half of each year &quot;riding circuit&quot;. The Justice would stop at two to four places in the circuit, where Federal district courts were located.The justice would sit together with one of the district court judges in those places, in the courthouse that would be otherwise used for the district court. That Two-judge panel would constitute the session of the Circuit Court. The places where the circuit court was held were usually state capitols or other large towns or cities. The Justice would not stop at every small town along the way. (I recently read The Marshall Court and Cultural Change: 1815-1835, Which describes the practice in detail. Travel was quite wearing on the Justices. During the actual Supreme Court term, they lived in a boardinghouse in Washington DC, usually the same house for all the Justices. Cases were often discussed after hours at these boardinghouses. The Chief Justice often made arrangements for the coming year's accommodation. The Justices' wives did not normally join them in Washington nor on circuit.) This practice persisted until 1912, but had ceased by the early twentieth century. It stopped in some Circuits sooner than others. There are now permanent judges assigned to the Courts of Appeal, which is now their proper formal name, but the areas over which they have jurisdiction are still known as circuits, and the courts are informally still called the Circuit courts. In fact the judges of the Courts of appeal are often where Presidents look when there is a vacancy on the Supreme Court. Each circuit still has a supervising Justice assigned to it. That Justice handles certain &quot;emergency&quot; appeals from the circuit court, either ruling on them at once, or relaying them to the full Supreme Court. English Assize Circuits In England, before the US existed, judges rode circuit. These assize circuits were defined by statute in 1293, and remained in use until they were replaced by the Crown Court in 1972 under the Courts Act 1971 Western US In the West and Mid-west of the US during the nineteenth century, some state courts (not federal courts) rode circuit in areas where the population was not dense enough to support a full time stationary court. The Judge was often accompanied by a group of lawyers, whom would take on the various cases that awaited the judge. However, these courts are not what is usually meant by &quot;circuit courts&quot; in US usage. These judges did often stop at a relatively large number of small towns, often county seats or comparable locations, where a county courthouse might exist. This practice stopped at different times in different areas, but it was obsolete by the early twentieth century.
This is a perfectly common question. &quot;What is your full name?&quot; &quot;Do you have any aliases?&quot; &quot;What other names do you go by?&quot; Like any other question, though, it must be relevant, and you should be prepared to explain why it is relevant. If the court allows the question, the defendant must answer.