What prevents laws from being interpreted pedantically? In some discussion on another StackExchange, 18 US Code §1464 came up, which states: Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Interpreted literally, this is quite absurd: it would mean one can't curse on a cell phone, or view (otherwise legal) pornography with WiFi, both of which I'm pretty sure are legal activities within the US. I'm not so much worried this particular issue, but I am curious about the general case: there must be thousands of things like this which can be interpreted literally to make a subjectively absurd argument. What is the general principle that keeps application of law sane, and not devolve into chaos and pedantry?
This ultimately is a matter of Statutory Interpretation. One of the principles of statutory interpretation is that all words are interpreted in their context. For your example, that means we look at the title of 1464, "Broadcasting obscene language". From this it becomes apparent that radio is used in its common meaning of AM and FM radio broadcasts. Statutory interpretation is broader than that single rule, though. Legislative intent is another important factor, and that is rather effective in eliminating absurd arguments. Via the link above, from New Mexico's State Court: words have their ordinary meaning "as long as the ordinary meaning does not render the statute's application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust." In other words, absurdity is so bad that the court will prefer an alternative interpretation of the offending words.
See this working paper by Silvia Ferreri for an excellent write-up of this issue. The key point is that because each linguistic version of legislation is equally authentic, none can be taken as the authentic version. The court then resolves this by applying two principles: comparing the linguistic versions and giving deference to legislative intent. This is necessarily a case-by-case analysis. The paper calls attention to Case C‑445/09 arising from the Netherlands, where 9 different linguistic versions are compared and shows that the straightforward Dutch reading of the legislation in question isn't compatible with the other linguistic versions or legislative intent. In paragraph 25, the decision also contains a concise summary of the general principle of interpreting laws in multiple languages: According to settled case-law, the need for uniform application and, accordingly, for uniform interpretation of an EU measure makes it impossible to consider one version of the text in isolation, but requires that it be interpreted on the basis of both the real intention of its author and the aim which the latter seeks to achieve, in the light, in particular, of the versions in all languages (see, inter alia, Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419, paragraph 3; Joined Cases C‑261/08 and C‑348/08 Zurita García and Choque Cabrera [2009] ECR I‑10143, paragraph 54; and Case C‑473/08 Eulitz [2010] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 22).
Surely such a well meaning albeit naive driver wouldn't stand a chance in court if they said that it's because they've a section 230-like protection. Because Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act explicitly protects computer service providers from such charges. A driver is not a computer service provider, and the US legislature has never voted to offer similar protection to drivers picking up hitchhikers. You say that an email can easily be classified as fraudulent, but that's not true. Spam detection has gotten pretty sophisticated, but they still get plenty of false positives. They were a lot less sophisticated back in 1996 when the Communications Decency Act was passed.
What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be &quot;crucial military information&quot;.
united-states Simply insulting someone without saying something false is not defamation in the U.S. (historically it was the subject of criminal defamation liability to might light of someone's disabilities or call them out in an insulting way, but later U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence interpreting the First Amendment in the late 20th century rendered these laws unconstitutional). If a statement might damage someone's reputation if taken literally, and the statement is false, it can be defamatory and give rise to civil liability (or criminal liability in the few states that still have criminal defamation statutes), if the people to whom the statement is &quot;published&quot; (i.e. the audience of the statement) could reasonably believe that the statement was intended to be taken literally. Whether a statement can be taken literally is an &quot;all of the facts and circumstances&quot; analysis. Statements meant only as hyperbole or parody or metaphorically, if a reasonable audience person would understand the statements in that sense, do not impose liability based upon what they would mean if taken literally. Other Countries As noted in the question itself, not all countries treat statements like this the same way. Germany imposes criminal liability for all manner of insults. England and Wales imposes defamation liability in many circumstances when U.S. law would not. And, many countries in Asia are closef to the German model of liability for insulting speech than they are to the U.S. model.
I think it's ultimately a natural extension of the basic concept from Roman Law: ignorantia legis non excusat, i.e &quot;ignorance of the law excuses not&quot; and that in order for that to be workable laws can only truly obtain proper binding force when they are promulgated. In simple terms someone can't claim innocence through ignorance because the knowledge of what the law is has been made easily available to them. Thus the law can operate on the presumption that the people it applies to are aware of them. Indeed there have been occasional instances in history where someone could not have been reasonably expected to know that what they did was against the law and this has been taken into account.
In one sense, nothing. Absence of such language would not cancel any statutory rights. One purpose of such language is that the consumer cannot later claim that the company tried to hide those statutory rights. In some consumer protection statutes, attempting to decisive a consumer into thinking that s/he does not have the rights granted by statute may itself be unlawful and a ground for damages. Also a court may be less likely to void the contract as contrary to the statue, when the contract says that it should be read as subject to the statute and the consumer's rights under it. Also, once such language becomes common, drafters of corporate contract language often imitate it without thinking what actual purpose it serves.
Listening to navigation instructions coming from a phone would meet the definition of: (1)(e) “Using a mobile electronic device” includes but is not limited to using a mobile electronic device for text messaging, voice communication, entertainment, navigation, accessing the Internet or producing electronic mail. The next section goes on to say that: (2) A person commits the offense of driving a motor vehicle while using a mobile electronic device if the person, while driving a motor vehicle on a highway or premises open to the public: (b) Uses a mobile electronic device for any purpose. Later in section (4) it states &quot;It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution of a person under this section that the person:&quot; (b) Was 18 years of age or older and was using a hands-free accessory; Since your minor in question was using a portable electronic device for navigation, and due to their age cannot exercise the &quot;hands-free&quot; defense, it is logical to conclude that your scenario would be a violation of this statute. Silly as it might seem, this apparently wouldn't preclude them from interacting with a permanently installed navigation unit while driving unless it was observed to be causing a distraction since (1)(d)(A) states: “Mobile electronic device” means an electronic device that is not permanently installed in a motor vehicle.