Barring legal fees — why does one lone junior barrister (for each party) appear, in a minority of some UK Supreme Court cases? In most UKSC cases, at least 1 QC and 1 junior barrister appear for each party to the case. Often, multiple QC's and multiple juniors appear. But I have stumbled on exceptions like Mathieson v SSWP [2015] UKSC 47, where Respondent was represented by merely a junior barrister. But he, Tim Buley, became QC in 2019. Her Majesty's Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 (10 May 2021), where each litigant is represented by merely a junior barrister. Nate Eldredge sussed out that the Applicant's barrister became QC in 2022. Just edit this post, if you know of other such UKSC cases. Rule out legal costs and fees as a reason. Obviously, SSWP and Her Majesty’s Attorney General are wealthy enough to instruct QC's. And these cases can't simply be easier! If a case were straightforward, it would never have been litigated or appealed up to the UKSC, or been permitted by the UKSC to appeal!
I think the answer is that, despite the wording in the question, this case is simply easier. Note that the Attorney General is listed as the applicant, rather than the appellant. The case is a straightforward action for contempt of court but since the court in question is the Supreme Court, it heard the case itself (although with a different set of judges).
There is no answer to the question, as presented. The criminal law differs in various respects in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland: one cannot speak of 'UK law', because criminal procedure is really very different in the three separate jurisdictions. In England and Wales, the rules of criminal procedure are what govern the issue raised in the question, rather than the substantive laws relating to the various charges which might be brought; and while the substantive laws in England and Scotland are often fairly similar, the procedures are usually very dissimilar. In a trial at the Old Bailey, in London, a Jury has no role in the criminal procedure: once empanelled it performs its usual function of deciding the facts of the case, based upon the evidence presented, but it has no role in determining what charges are preferred against the accused (this is decided by a different court at a much earlier procedural stage), and the jury has no power to alter the charges on the indictment. Only the prosecution can decide what charges are made against an accused person. And if an amendment to the indictment is thought to be appropriate, only the prosecuting barrister can make such a change. If the case has come-on for trial, the permission of the Judge must usually be obtained to any alteration in the charges. The Judge might object to an attempt to add a charge carrying a more severe penalty at a late stage in the proceedings (as the case may of course have already taken many months to reach the Old Bailey). He will often be more accommodating to an application to reduce the charges, to a lesser offence, particularly if accompanied by an undertaking not to proceed on a more serious charge - e.g. due to a lack of evidence supporting it. Where several charges are brought in the alternative, then the jury has a function, since it can then convict of a lesser charge if the evidence on a more serious one does not satisfy it. But it cannot ask for the charges to be altered: the jury represents the layman, and jurymen are inevitably not legally qualified (at one time, being legally qualified was an automatic disqualification from serving on a jury). So the jury is assumed to be incapable of understanding the fine distinctions between different offences, and has no role whatsoever in deciding which offences shall be included on the indictment. Even the Barrister representing the accused has no role in determining which charges his client will face: that is purely a function of the Crown Prosecutor's office, and once the trial has come-on at the Bailey only the prosecuting Barrister and the Judge truly have a role in making any necessary amendments. The function of defending Counsel is to strike a plea-bargain, if he can, and where the opportunity arises: which is to say, if he can persuade his client to plead guilty to a minor charge (whether or not on the indictment), and can also persuade the prosecutor not to proceed on the more serious charge(s) on the indictment. A Judge will not usually object to a legally-represented defendant applying, by consent (i.e. through the prosecutor), to amend the indictment in order to enter a plea of guilty. He might refuse, if the accused has no legal representation, but not otherwise. The short answer, therefore, is that in England and Wales a defendant cannot be convicted on a charge that is not listed on the indictment, but a jury can convict of any charge on the indictment if the judge asks the jury to retire and consider a verdict - but the case may not get so far as that, if a plea-bargain is struck. There are rare occasions where a judge might withdraw a charge, if he desires, by directing the jury to acquit on that particular charge, but this only occurs if he considers that any conviction on that charge would be positively unsafe in all the circumstances of the case.
You should do one of two things. Either (1) fire your lawyer and obtain competent counsel, or (2) demand that he pay for the "second opinion" (in actuality, co-counsel or a consultant) if he is unfit to offer a proper opinion on the case. I am unfamiliar with the bar rules in Canada, however I am willing to bet they require one be competent to the prosecute the case they take. In the U.S. in all jurisdictions, the bar rules demand that an attorney not take a case unless he is competent to prosecute it. If he is not, he has a duty to either decline the case, or to find competent assistance to bring the case to closure. Unless your lawyer told you at the outset that he can only represent your defense and not your counterclaim, then he needs to be able to advise you about both issues. You should not be responsible for obtaining a second opinion. Most lawyers would not want their client seeking a second opinion as it reflects poorly on their ability competently practice. The fact that this guy has the gall to ask you to get one is unacceptable. As an example: I recently had a case that was within my practice area. During discovery I realized there was a substantial ERISA issue. This is a very specialized area of law that I am not very adept at dealing with as it is a complex regulatory scheme I don't deal with regularly. So...once I spotted this, I contacted an colleague who specializes in ERISA, who told me what I needed to argue, and gave me a primer on the area of ERISA law that I needed to be adept at. If I didn't have a friend who worked in this area, I would've had to get a co-counsel (at my own expense) by either splitting my fee, or by hiring him as a consultant but being personally responsible for the cost. If I didn't think that would be cost effective (i.e., the value of the case was not big enough to justify me hiring a consultant) then I would've had to tell the client that an issue arose that I was not competent to deal with and that he needed someone who specialized in that area (the problem is that people who do ERISA law aren't litigators traditionally) and had the ability to litigate. Or, give him the opportunity to say, "No, I want you to be trial counsel and we will hire him as the ERISA guy." In that case, the client would be responsible for the cost of the second attorney (otherwise I would just withdraw), but I couldn't demand this. What your lawyer is doing is trying to get you to ensure he does't get it wrong, and that is not OK.
You will almost certainly be sued For a small amount like this they would use junior lawyers and while the suit may take a while I’d be surprised if a lawyer spent a week all up on such a simple case. Say 40h at $200 = $8,000 which, when they win, you have to pay. Bargain.
There isn't a difference. The terminology in England and Wales that means the same thing is "litigant in person", with the source of these Latin phrases have abandoned them in favor of plain English terminology. The variation of usage, however, does not necessarily break down on a federal v. state court basis. Pro se is the majority usage, but the variation is more regional, within state courts, than it is a federal v. state divide. California and Michigan, for example, use both terms and use them interchangeably. If there is a historical reason for the variation in terminology, I haven't groked it. Incidentally, there was historically a subtle distinction between the two concepts related to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court that has long since become obsolete (more than a century ago), but which movements such as the "sovereign person" movement errantly believe has great legal importance to the power of a court over them.
This is explained at paragraphs 2-4 of the decision you link. There were two proceedings: a claim in the county court and an application to the Tribunal. The county court claim was transferred to the Tribunal to be consolidated with the application, and they were to be heard together. (Although, technically there should be no literal &quot;transfer&quot; or &quot;consolidation&quot;; the claim is always a county court claim, separate from the tribunal application. It is just that the matters are heard at the same occasion by inviting a tribunal judge to sit in their capacity as a county court judge. See commentary on City, University of London v. Vodafone Limited (2020).) In that circumstance, Judge Nicol was sitting as both a tribunal judge and as a county court judge. This is possible because: On 22 April 2014, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 Sch.9(1) para. 4 was brought into force, providing that judges of the First-tier Tribunal are judges of the county court and therefore able to exercise the jurisdiction of the county court, providing that a claim form has been issued and the matter has been listed for hearing by them. Stephen Jourdan, K.C., &quot;FTT Judges sitting as judges of the county court&quot; (January 2019) See also this previous Q&amp;A where this was explained.
united-states The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutional right to self-representation in Faretta v California, but in Godinez v. Moran, the court injected the logically prior question of competence, rejecting a mixed-bag approach to competence. The court held that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted. While States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose them. The specific issue in this case is competence to plead guilty. In Indiana v. Edwards, the court stated that there is no absolute right to self-representation if one is competent to stand trial. It is held that The Constitution does not forbid States from insisting upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. One conclusion to be drawn from this is that states may but are not required to insist on a specific competence to self-represent, so there can be multiple standards of competence. Second, the Edwards court put the issue more in the realm of questions of insanity, where the limit imposed on a technical minor would have to be a substantial finding of incompetence, and not just a statutory declaration that anyone below the age of 18 is ipso facto incompetent to legally defend themselves but they can be competent to stand trial. In Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, the court further held that nothing &quot;requires a State to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction&quot;. This study indicates that individual states have not eagerly cleared the path to minor self-representation, noting that &quot;Many states permit waiver by a juvenile after cursory inquiry by the court&quot;, but &quot;Others require that the juvenile consult with a parent, lawyer or other adult&quot;. Nevertheless, &quot;waiver of counsel is, almost without exception, connected to an 'admission,' or guilty plea&quot;, simply asserting that &quot;Juveniles do not represent themselves at trial&quot;, and what minors waive is the right to trial. There is a lack of relevant case law citations in this study, in that no ruling is cited where the court affirms that minors are automatically incompetent to represent themselves in a criminal trial. The specifics of the qualifier &quot;almost without exception&quot; would be very relevant to this question.
In appellate cases, the party appealing is called the "petitioner", and the other party is called the "respondent". These cases are listed Petitioner v. Respondent. In your example, Twombly was the original plaintiff, and Bell was the defendant in a class-action. This initial action would have been referred to as Twombly v. Bell. The case was dismissed by the trial court. Twombly appealed to the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. This action would have been still been called Twombly v. Bell, since Twombly was the party petitioning for the appeal. The 2nd Circuit agreed with Twombly, and reversed the district court's decision. Bell, then on the losing side, decided to appeal to the US Supreme Court. Because Bell was the petitioner in this action, Bell gets listed first.