In what language(s) are laws written in Puerto Rico? A comment on the recent question about the possibility of U.S. laws in Spanish mentioned an assumption that Puerto Rican law would be mostly in Spanish. Not being familiar with Puerto Rican law, this comment just made me curious whether or not that assumption is correct. Are Puerto Rican laws indeed written primarily (or entirely) in Spanish? Or are they written primarily or entirely in English? Or are they written in both in parallel? It seems that having them written in Spanish only would be problematic for federal court cases arising from them, since the federal courts (including the one in Puerto Rico) would be conducting any proceedings in the English language - and comparing the Puerto Rican laws with U.S. federal law and existing case law, which are also in English. On the other hand, having laws that much of the local populace couldn't read would also be problematic. (As background for those who may not be familiar with Puerto Rico, it is a territory of the United States, but Spanish is by far the primary local language there.)
It depends on the language used to pass the statutes, but if in doubt then Spanish prevails. See section 13 of the Civil Code: In case of discrepancy between the English and Spanish texts of a statute passed by the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico, the text in which the same originated in either house, shall prevail in the construction of said statute, except in the following cases: (a) If the statute is a translation or adaptation of a statute of the United States or of any State or Territory thereof, the English text shall be given preference over the Spanish. (b) If the statute is of Spanish origin, the Spanish text shall be preferred to the English. (c) If the matter of preference cannot be decided under the foregoing rules, the Spanish text shall prevail.
The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.
First, the relevant term is "precedent". You have misstated the nature of "precedent". Precedent is simply the addition of further information about what the law is. A legislature may set forth a law that say "If A, then (if you B, you will suffer consequence C)". But it is not self-evident in a given instance whether A is true, or B is true, or what exactly C refers to. In addition, law is an integrated system, so Law #39 may seem to contradict Law #12: does that mean that Law #39 doesn't apply, or is it that Law #12 (if #12 is a Constitutional provision, #39 is just wrong – laws exist in a hierarchy). Therefore, laws must be interpreted. "Precedent" refers to the creation of a rule of interpretation, one which is logically consistent with existing rules of interpretation (which are arranged in some logical hierarchy). If the Supreme Court establishes a rule that laws penalizing "hate speech" contradict the First Amendment (R.A.V v. St Paul) and therefore cannot be a law in the US, then any similar law is, by rule, also not actually a law. Creation of precedent itself follows rules, though ones that are harder to discern – this is what "jurisprudence" is about. For example, some justices believe that they should appeal to an inherent feeling of justice; others believe that a law should be interpreted according to perceived legislative intent; still others focus on the wording of the legal text (statute, usually). This does not involve appeal to popular sentiment. It does mean (usually) that law is seen to be a system of rules, and not case-by-case feelings.
The law was changed several times, and different versions apply to different age groups because certain rules were not changed retroactively. The page you link describes the situation for children born after the year 2000. My advice: citizenship is such a serious matter that you should consult a specialized lawyer, not a random crowd on the web.
The only really authoritative source of answers is a court interpreting the laws on an as applied basis (and there are many U.S. traffic laws, one in every state and sometimes additional local ones, not a single U.S. traffic law). An answer from a government official or police department is not authoritative, although it may be informative of how the official in question would enforce the law.
In the US it is not a crime to be in the country illegally. As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain in the United States. Arizona v US So it's illegal, you get a state induced consequence (deportation) but it doesn't make you a criminal e.g. you don't go to jail for it. I have no idea if that's what's going on over there but it's a plausible explanation.
That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., &quot;The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.&quot; In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.
"Ignorance of the law" refers to a (non)-defense for committing a crime ("I didn't know it was against the law"). In this case, the government hasn't passed a law saying that "the term 'simple majority' shall always be defined as..." – there is no law saying that "simple majority means more than half of the total number of votes". Instead, terms are generally given their "common meaning". A reasonable case can be made that the common meaning of "majority" is "more that any other choice", and one can point to ample evidence showing that, such as this. However, one can also argue that extra weight should be given to to specialized definitions appearing in The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure or Robert's Rules of Order (or other such document), in support of a competing definition of "simple majority". Both sides will need to provide evidence that supports their interpretation of the phrase, based on external sources (parliamentary handbooks, dictionaries, and so on), as arguments for a particular interpretation of the term. The courts will be most impressed by evidence pertaining to the behavior of the parties, so that if everybody agrees that they understood "simple majority" to be "the choice with the most votes", then that is how the term will be interpreted.