Can a political party falsely inform its opponent&#39;s voters that their voter registrations have been cancelled? Location: Michigan, United States Let's say we have two major political parties - let's call them YellowParty and PurpleParty. YellowParty obtains a list of reliable PurpleParty voters and sets out to falsely inform these voters that their voter registrations have been cancelled. YellowParty sets up text banks, phone banks, and canvasses for its volunteers. YellowParty volunteers send text messages such as - for example - &quot;ATTENTION: Your voter registration has been cancelled. Do not attempt to vote.&quot; YellowParty volunteers also make phone calls sharing similar messages. They also knock on the voters' doors (canvassing) with similar messages. YellowParty volunteers never threaten voters, impersonate law enforcement or government officials, or claim that they are from the Secretary of State's office or other government entity. Setting aside the efficacy of YellowParty's program*, let's consider its legality. Would this program violate Michigan state law and/or US federal law? Additionally, if this program was not run by YellowParty itself, but instead outsourced to a political action committee (PAC), would that change its legal status? *The efficacy of YellowParty's program is another matter. Many voters would be rightly skeptical of the messages. They may know that messages from the Secretary of State's office come via official mail. Other voters would simply check their voter registration status and confirm that they are still registered. However, as is the case with any false advertisement (political or otherwise), some voters will believe it.
The conduct described would be a felony. Two men where just convicted of state crimes this week for very similar conduct in Ohio. Jacob Wohl and Jack Burkman pleaded guilty to felony telecommunications fraud yesterday. According to Cleveland.com, the pair &quot;placed thousands of robocalls with false information to largely minority and Democratic voters in Cleveland in the months before the November 2020 election.&quot; They face up to a year in state prison. (Source) Michigan state law also criminalizes this conduct, which also violates federal law. Other legal consequences that they face as a result of their conduct according to the same source include the following civil and criminal cases: The men have been sued in federal court in New York City and face a $5.1 million fine levied by the Federal Communications Commission. Wohl and Burkman are appealing criminal charges filed against them in Detroit stemming from a similar bogus robocall scheme targeting Black voters. As this blurb notes, Michigan itself is in the process of prosecuting these men criminally for part of the same pattern of conduct. While it isn't inconceivable that these particular offenders may have some valid grounds for an appeal in the particular Michigan case that they are appealing (e.g. due to irregularities in their particular prosecutions), the validity of the statutes criminalizing this conduct is not seriously subject to question. The First Amendment protects a great deal of intentionally false politically motivated speech about policy and political ideas or more generally why one should vote in a particular way. But, the First Amendment does not protect a large scale organized campaign outright intentional lies about the eligibility to vote of particular voters. This distinction is explored, for example, in a 2018 law review article on political lies and the First Amendment, citing, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983); Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Ctr. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228 (1989) (“The State’s second justification for the ban on party endorsements and statements of opposition is that it is necessary to protect primary voters from confusion and undue influence. Certainly the State has a legitimate interest in fostering an informed electorate.”); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1970) (describing the state interest in “avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); and Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997). Based upon these cases, taken as a whole, the author of the law review article concludes that: In sum, many intentional lies aimed at undermining election administration are already unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and if told with discriminatory partisan motives, also violate the First Amendment. But what about intentional lies told by private actors, along the lines of the examples provided above (poll workers, campaign volunteers, and the like)? While such lies might be thought to be less coercive than government lies, they also pose a serious threat to democracy. Although private individuals must be guaranteed ample freedom to speak on matters of public concern, I believe intentional lies meant to undermine the right to vote may be regulated. The Supreme Court, albeit in another context, has relaxed First Amendment rights when weighed against the right to vote. Judicial deference is given to “generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.” Time and again, the Court, in evaluating various election administration issues, has affirmed a government interest in avoiding electoral confusion. If one can prove that someone else orchestrated or conspired in the conduct, such as a political party, it and the party officials involved can have legal responsibility for this conduct as well. One of the darlings of federal prosecutors, the mail and wire fraud statute, for example (the elements of which are set forth here by the U.S. Justice Department) would probably also apply to this fact pattern. This source cites some of the following authorities and recited their holding as follows: United States v. Hanson, 41 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1994) (two elements comprise the crime of wire fraud: (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud; and (2) use of interstate wire communication to facilitate that scheme); United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 771 (5th Cir. 1994) (essential elements of wire fraud are: (1) a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of, or causing the use of, interstate wire communications to execute the scheme), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 193 (1995); United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1993) (to prove wire fraud government must show (1) scheme to defraud by means of false pretenses, (2) defendant's knowing and willful participation in scheme with intent to defraud, and (3) use of interstate wire communications in furtherance of scheme); United States v. Maxwell, 920 F.2d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (&quot;Wire fraud requires proof of (1) a scheme to defraud; and (2) the use of an interstate wire communication to further the scheme.&quot;). The remedy that is not available, however, as a general rule, is to invalidate the election that was swayed by the illegal conduct.
It depends on the rules of the particular betting market and the laws under which it operates. Assuming that the bet itself is legal, it is not uncommon that participants in the contest are not allowed to bet, not because they distort the market, but because they can influence the outcome. Consider if instead of betting to win, Mr Trump bet on himself to lose and then do something which would reduce his chances (hard to imaging what he could do that he hasn't done but anyway).
This was asked and answered by KPD on the Politics stackexchange. This issue came up in a decision from an appeals court, with a judge dying before the opinion was released, leading to the following SCOTUS opinion. The short of the answer: that Judge's vote is voided. If the result of negating the deceased Justice's vote is a 4-4 tie, then the usual procedure for a 4-4 tie is invoked, which is addressed in the Q&amp;A you link. Of course this assumes that SCOTUS will apply this to themselves, but the issue appears to be non-controversial, as it was a fairly recent decision with no dissents noted. So this assumption seems safe.
Assume that this happened in a matter that goes to court. In civil court, there is no "innocent until/unless proven guilty". In civil court, the judge hears everyone's story, and decides which story is more likely to be true. So I tell the judge "I sent a letter by registered mail; this is what was in the letter, and the post office reported to me that they delivered the mail, and someone signed for it". And you say "I never received a letter". The judge will believe me and the post office. You say "I received a letter and signed for it, but there was just a birthday card inside". Who does the judge believe? Does he or she believe that you received a letter with the contents I said and you are lying about it, or does she believe that I sent you an unsolicited birthday card by registered mail? Why would I do that? So they believe me. Now if you said "I received a registered letter containing just a birthday court, so I immediately called my secretary and three other people in the office to see this and to verify there was nothing but the birthday card, and here they are as witnesses", then the court might start believing you.
If the government withholds information that is pertinent to the credibility of a witness is that cause for a mistrial? Only if the error is not harmless under the standard applicable to evaluating harmless error in criminal cases (there is a voluminous case law on that point). Basically, it means that a new trial may be held and a conviction vacated on a charge against a particular defendant if there is a reasonable possibility that the withheld evidence, when considered in light of the total picture of evidence presented at trial, might have changed the outcome on guilt or innocence. Does whether the government knowingly or unknowingly withheld this information influence whether a mistrial will be granted? Not really. Knowledge is imputed. If someone in the prosecution team including the police knows, then it is known to the entire team for Brady purposes. If no one knew that it had the information (e.g. a key exculpatory document in possession of the prosecution was misfiled in one of dozens of bankers boxes of documents that it seized in a search and no one reviewed those particular boxes knowing to look for a document like that one or attuned to its potential significance, since it wasn't supposed to be in the place where it was filed), then it hasn't been withheld in the Brady sense unless someone specifically asked for the information in question with enough specificity that it could have been located if they looked at what they already had. The knowledge that must be disclosed is what the prosecutor's office or the police the prosecutor's office is working with knows. So, if a beat cop hides exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor's office, that is a Brady violation, but if the cops do a sloppy investigation that fails to reveal exculpatory evidence that is out there to be found, it isn't a Brady violation. Likewise, if a cop in another department halfway across the state knows something that impacts the credibility of a witness and the prosecutor is totally unaware of the existence of that information as are all the cops working on the case, then that isn't a Brady violation. What If It Isn't A Brady Violation? Exculpatory evidence discovered after the trial that isn't a Brady violation not to disclose may still be grounds for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence in a motion for post-trial relief. But, the standard to get the court to grant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence that was not withheld in a Brady violation is much more stringent than the mere harmless error standard. Instead: With a single exception, criminal defendants in the United States seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are required to establish only that the new evidence makes it more likely than not that, in a new trial, they would be acquitted. Ohio requires clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. There's a lot of case law on what constitutes newly discovered evidence which is &quot;new, material evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original trial[.]&quot; If evidence was available, but not used at trial, it can't be presented in a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Often this means that it can't be considered even if the salience of the evidence previously available is only clear later in the light of other evidence that is genuinely newly discovered, or the defense attorney's failure to use that evidence in the first trial was negligent to a level constituting legal malpractice.
This is wire fraud and punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. It is not relevant that the victims of this fraud are people who support a cause that the US government opposes. Nor is it relevant what your friend chooses to do with the ill-gotten money. It is still just as illegal. Whether your friend would be prosecuted would be at the discretion of federal prosecutors, and political motivations could come into play. That is beyond the scope of Law.SE to address. What is certain is that he could be prosecuted. Giving information to the FBI probably won't help, as from your description, the victims of this fraud aren't doing anything illegal. &quot;Donating money to support Russia&quot;, while vague, does not sound like it violates any of the current sanctions.
It says if some portion of the electorate is deprived of the right to vote then the state looses an equal proportion of its representation in Congress (and therefore electoral college votes). There is an exception &quot;rebellion, or other crime&quot;. So if a state disenfranchises X% of the population for rebellion or crime they do not lose X% of their representatives/electors.
&quot;CAM CONTR/ACC 2&gt;CONT&quot; refers to F.S. 106.08(7)(B), under which Artiles is charged with &quot;making or receiving two or more campaign contributions over or in excess of the limits,&quot; as well as engaging in a conspiracy to do so. &quot;ELECTION CODE/FALS&quot; refers to F.S. 104.011(1), under which Artiles is charged with &quot;swearing or affirming falsely to any oath or affirmation, or willfully procuring another person to swear or affirm falsely to an oath or affirmation, in connection with or arising out of voting or elections&quot; &quot;VOTER REG/FLS INFO&quot; refers to F.S. 104.011(1), under which Artiles is charged with aiding and abetting another to &quot;submit any false voter registration information.&quot; More information about the factual basis for the charges is available in the arrest warrant here.