Is a police chief charging me again for same cause of action previously dismissed selective prosecution? I live in a smal TX town (&lt;850 people), with one policeman and a chief overseen by mayor and town council, where there is a 250ft rule for no livestock within city limits &amp; an exemption noted for children as part of FFA, 4H, etc. Our daughter is 15, and belongs to multiple qualifying youth organizations, having rescued and had the animals 5yrs of where we've lived for 7yrs. Ordinance was written in 2012, first enforced (on me only) in 2021, and I was cited and posted bond moving it out of the town to have the county judge dismiss it 10 months later in ~15min (did not specify &quot;with prejudice&quot; unfortunately). Originally the citation was due to a town citizen that never occupied his property, yet had argued that he wanted to have a cow &amp; was told no. As part of the dismissal, the ADA suggested that we get our neighbors to sign a statement of no concern, which they all did - 26 signatures reflecting 100% response rate. 2mos after the dismissal, I was summoned again (without a new citation) this time with a bond of $1000 (1st bond was $200). In so many words, the chief stated he was doing it again, because there is nothing that says he can't. The town has never created the exemption paperwork to assist in executing the mechanics of the ordinance. I have been given multiple verbal ultimatums by the chief that the only way we will keep our 2 mini horses and mini donkey (on 3 acres) is to request a variance at the town monthly meeting. However, the variance process is neither defined nor recognized in the code of ordinance. As significantly, there are at least 6-8 other properties in same open violation seen clearly from the street, that continue to be ignored by police. Is this not a clear case of selective enforcement, prosecution, and abuse of power?
Selective prosecution is when a defendant (1) is charged with a crime based on conduct that others are generally not prosecuted for; and (2) is singled out for an impermissible reason, such as race, religion, or First Amendment-protected speech. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985). Because there is no indication that you are being targeted for an impermissible purpose, this does not appear to be selective prosecution. It does sound like the chief is a jerk, but American courts do not care about that sort of thing.
I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario.
Most prosecuting attorney positions in a District Attorney, or State Attorney General's office are full time salaries positions that prohibit individuals holding those positions from having any other legal employment. They are also, often, conceptually a division of state government, even if the DA is locally elected. So, any criminal defense engagement in the same state court system would also be a conflict of interest, and the reality of joint task forces discussed below would also make almost any federal case criminal defense engagement in the same state a conflict of interest in most cases because state prosecutors would gain confidential information about pending federal criminal prosecutions (and vice versa). In theory, a criminal defense engagement in the next state over, for example, say, in Gary, Indiana for a prosecutor employed in Chicago, Illinois, would not be a conflict of interest, but it would still be prohibited in most cases because the prosecutor is a full time salaried employee whose full efforts are required to be devote to that position. (In practice, de minimis civil transactional work for the assistance of friends and family members, even for a small fee, or representation of such persons in small civil lawsuits would probably be tolerated, however, and maybe even a defense of a civil ordinance violation like a traffic ticket brought by a separate local government as discussed below, for a friend or family member for free, might be tolerated.) Local governments such as cities, towns, and counties, however, sometime have an office separate from the DA's office or State Attorney General's office often called a city attorney, town attorney, or county attorney, who works part-time on a contract basis for that government and has limited authority to prosecution violations of that local government's own ordinances in the name of that governmental entity, rather than on behalf of the People as part of the state government. In those cases, it is generally ethically permissible for the city attorney (for example) to serve as a criminal defense attorney in cases outside that city that do not otherwise pose a conflict of interest from having been adverse to various criminal defendants in the city attorney role. But there might be a conflict of interest, if, for example, there was a joint task force of the city attorney, the local DA, and the federal assistant U.S. attorney to prosecute people in a coordinated fashion on federal, state and local charges of various kinds, in connection with a rash of gun violence. And, if one of the city attorney's clients were arrested for an ordinance violation in the city, a non-conflicted counsel would have to be retained by the city for that case. Often, in those cases, however, even though it is not a prohibited conflict of interest, the lawyers involved would view a criminal defense representation as a &quot;business development conflict&quot; that would risk non-renewal of the city/town/county attorney position if undertaken. Incidentally, government attorneys, unlike almost all other government employees, are usually employees at will, as a matter of legal professional ethics, unlike almost all other fixed term contract or civil service employees, even if they have other contractual or civil service employee rights.
The statute reads (emphasis mine): A person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Suppose Alvin has sex with Betty while Betty is married to Charlie. Does Alvin's conduct satisfy the elements of the crime? Alvin engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (namely Betty) at a time when the other person (Betty again) had a living spouse (namely Charlie). So yes, Alvin has violated this law. Betty has also violated the law (the first clause instead of the second). Betty engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (Alvin) at a time when he (Betty; the pronoun "he" is meant to be gender-neutral in the statute's style of writing) had a living spouse (Charlie). However, this law is effectively unenforced in modern times. According to https://www.dbnylaw.com/adultery-is-still-a-crime-in-new-york-state/: It is extremely rare for anyone to be arrested just for adultery. Indeed, since 1972, only 13 persons have been charged with adultery. Of those 13 persons, only five actually were convicted of the crime. In virtually every one of those cases, there was some other crime that was committed and the prosecuting attorney added adultery as just one of many crimes committed. If Charlie files a complaint regarding the affair, it is almost certain that the police and prosecutors will ignore it, and that nobody will actually be charged with anything.
(Lots of digging) https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.341 The above is a series of definitions for the purposes of criminal statues. Way down (noting that the page notes that this section was amended in 2021, so almost certainly in response to this case, given the amount of attention it has received), as subdivision 22, we have the definition: Subd. 22.Predatory crime. &quot;Predatory crime&quot; means a felony violation of section 609.185 (first-degree murder), 609.19 (second-degree murder), 609.195 (third-degree murder), 609.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 609.205 (second-degree manslaughter), 609.221 (first-degree assault), 609.222 (second-degree assault), 609.223 (third-degree assault), 609.24 (simple robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping), 609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.498 (tampering with a witness), 609.561 (first-degree arson), or 609.582, subdivision 1 (first-degree burglary). Thus, it looks like your Minnesota government website is not complete. However, the above seem like the most likely crimes to warrant inclusion on the register. The prominent reason in this instance is the registration will hamper Chauvin from regaining employment as a police officer in Minnesota or any other state. Where I live, there are reports of &quot;problematic officers&quot; being &quot;shuffled&quot; between departments; this would explicitly prevent that.
No, there is no recourse. An yes, the potential "costs", both personal, financial, social, can be high and are not compensable under an investigatory hold scenario; however, it doesn't usually happen like that. There is no investigatory hold that long without arrest. If the police want to talk to you but don't have enough to arrest you, you can leave any time. If you call your lawyer, he/she will come to the police station and tell the cops to release or arrest you. If the police really want you to stay, likely there is probable cause and they can keep you anyway. The police can arrest you and keep you, without a warrant so long as there is "probable cause" to believe that a crime has been committed (by you). Once arrested without a warrant, this is what is usually referred to as an investigatory hold, where the law says you must be arraigned within 72 hours (some states it must be 48 hours, 1 day less than supreme court says is reasonable). During this time they can investigate their case against you and decide what, if any, charges they will bring. There is no recourse for this, (in the event they bring no charges) unless you can establish that you were held for no reason (including not being falsely identified) and that it was only to intentionally deprive you of your right to liberty. This is nearly impossible to prove, unless you really did nothing and the cop was just messing with you (for instance in a personal vendetta) and you can show that.
In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.
There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.