Can a company vary its prices for individuals based upon their race, gender, or sexual orientation? With the growth of the technology industry and lack of skilled computer professionals, there's been a rapid rise in the number of for-profit providers of short term courses in various computer science disciplines. Examples include General Assembly, Galvanize, and Maker's Academy, among several others. Many of these providers offer lower rates to individuals if they are of a certain race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, or sexual orientation. As a result, the price for the programs could be lower for one person over another just because of a difference in, say, their race. See https://www.coursereport.com/resources/the-definitive-list-of-programming-bootcamp-scholarships I'm no attorney, but I suppose that such discriminatory pricing is permitted because these companies are considered not to be providing a public accommodation. Moreover, many of these companies claim to scholarships rather than lower tuition. Finally, they claim to have a legitimate reason for offering these scholarships -- to increase certain populations' numbers within the tech field. So this could all be within the law. But when I consider any of the following made up hypotheticals in other industries, I shudder: Kroger automatically gives a 10% discount coupon on vegetables only to Black customers, and not to Hispanics, to increase healthy eating among blacks. Apple gives a $100 gift card with purchases of iPhones only to Asian American customers, but not to individuals of other races. Reason offered is to increase wireless connectivity among Asian-American population. Buffalo Wild Wings gives white diners, but not anyone else, a $10 gift card for every time they dine at the restaurant. Reason offered is to increase interest and participation in televised sports among white women, whose rates of interest lag those of men of all races. And now it seems to me that it's grossly unfair to charge two individuals different prices for the same product solely on the basis of race, gender or similar characteristics. So I was wondering if there's anything legally wrong with the tech bootcamps' pricing policies.
Discriminatory pricing is a real thing. See this BuzzFeed video on discriminatory pricing as an example on how men's and women's products cost differently, even if the men's product consumes more raw material yet still costs less. However, it's illegal for hotels to charge different rates for their rooms, or for restaurants to charge unfairly or give preferential treatment; they are "public accommodations" protected under the various Civil Rights Acts. However, colleges are exempt from current laws, and it's not just tech colleges; even traditional colleges require different SAT scores for entry based on race and/or gender, and also charge different tuition. They are private accommodations and are therefore generally allowed to do this. For example, you'll have a much harder time getting in to Harvard if you're of a particular race, even if you can afford the tuition, simply because you'll be expected to have a higher SAT score. There was a class action lawsuit in California over this (the students were above 4.0 GPA, yet denied entry based on race), and as a result of law changes afterwards, California institutions can no longer do this. This is not the situation in the rest of the country, as no Federal law yet exists that protects minorities, gender, sexual orientation, etc, in regards to higher education. Also, sometimes merely proving a gap exists might not be noticeable, as companies are also starting to display pages on their websites based on data-mined information about visitors, possibly including information that would otherwise be discriminatory if it were done in person, and hiding the information from the general public. Discrimination is a difficult beast to tame, and until the law is introduced that all products and services must be offered to all consumers at the same price regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, etc, businesses will continue to find ways to discriminate in legal ways.
I don't think so. When it comes to wages, there may be a Tarifvertrag (union-negotiated wage schedule), which may apply even if the employee in question is no union member. It is enough if the employer is member of the employer's association negotiating the schedule, or in certain other cases. (Clever, really, by extending union benefits to non-members they weaken the unions ...) The Tarifvertrag stipulates minimum wages for certain positions, and it may define those positions implement that. An employer could not underpay a skilled machinist by calling her a 'gadget specialist' or similar non-scheduled position. But the deputy department head is likely paid above the highest bracket of the wage schedule, called außertariflich (AT, beyond the schedule). At this level, it comes down to individual negotiations between the employee and employer.
Even if you're a white guy, you could get a report from 23andMe and you'll probably find out that you have at least 1/100 "African American" heritage. The way America is now (and especially the university system) it is more relevant what you "identify as" than what you are. What exactly is the wording on the scholarship application form? If it says "Do you identify as African American?" then feel free to say you do. In this case, the contract is clear that what you identify as is what is important. If the application says "Do you have at least 50% African DNA?" and you lied about it then they could sue you, but I doubt that's what it says. So check the wording and if you answer truthfully, they can't sue you. What you "identify as" is completely up to you.
Why is a business allowed to refuse a customer? Because also freedom of contract is a right. Except for discrimination on the basis of protected categories, a person or entity is entitled to discretion on whether or with whom to do business and enter contracts. The last sentence in your post reflects a misconception of "completely different set of values and laws" between the USA and members of the EU. Clearly there are many differences, but a comparison of the Wikipedia link you posted and, for instance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 reflects an overlap of protected categories in the laws of the Netherlands and of the US, such as religion, sex, race, or national origin/nationality. One would need persuasive evidence to support a finding of unlawful discrimination in the two examples you have experienced. Assuming the bank responded to your GDPR inquiry truthfully, the bank's refusal to open an account might have stemmed from profiling or decision-making that (1) does not precisely require specific data about you, and/or (2) uses information the bank does not need to log for purposes of compliance with the GDPR. Note that the GDPR does not outlaw algorithmic decision-making. Since legislation in the EU (as in the US) portrays an approach of market economy, both bank and landlord are entitled to made decisions on the basis of their inner policies for risk management. The policies might be unclear to you, but that does not necessarily mean they contravene principles of equal opportunity.
Most class action litigation involves a whole mass of people who suffered minute injury, whereby it wouldn't be cost effective to bring individual suit. There are exceptions, as with every rule. So, for instance, (I'll use one I was involved in): BARBRI, who established the curriculum, study aids, and taught nearly all of the prep courses for the bar exams in every state, illegally colluded with Kaplan, who ran nearly all of the prep courses for the LSAT (the law school entrance aptitude test) to create unfair trade advantage by price fixing and agreeing not to offer each others' service, thereby creating a monopoly. Because of this, there was no way to cheaply prep for either of these major events &ndash; it was use BARBRI or Kaplan, respectively, or study without these invaluable classes/aids. They were expensive but necessary to excelling on these very important tests. It wasn't that they weren't great test prep courses, it was that they created an environment free of any competition where you were forced to pay whatever they were asking. I got notice of class action, didn't opt out, and about 3 years later got a check for nearly $300. Perfect from my perspective. They taught me a ton, I did good on the LSAT and the Bar Exam and the money came at a perfect time. For those exceptions to the rule, opting out may be the best course of action, but as @nomen agentis noted, it does bar you from recovery as part of the class (although that is usually nominal) if you fail to bring private action, miss the statute of limitations, or fail to recover via settlement or trial award. As a further example based on my experience with BARBRI/Kaplan: say you were a person who couldn't afford to take the bar prep course, and because of the price fixing and limit on competition (monopoly) couldn't find any other alternative review course. If you studied on your own, looked for alternative study aides/courses to no avail (there were literally no others) and then failed the bar exam, and you could show that because of this, it was more likely than not that it was the reason you failed, you might have a case individually, arguing that your quarter-million-dollar education was functionally meaningless without a license to practice, and you couldn't get a job that paid enough to repay the loans because you couldn't get a job, etc. This would be the type person to consider opting out. Typically, these (the more injured person) are the people the attorneys search for who end up named as the representing party to the class, but not everyone can be a named plaintiff that suffered more than the nominal injury. Because of this, not everyone who had a more serious injury will be adequately compensated by the class action. These suits are meant to get a lot of people a little justice and to teach a lesson, not to get a few people largely compensated for substantial injury. They are also quite nice for the lawyers who make millions, because they get a percentage of the entire pie. But, if you suffer a serious injury for which a class action suit exists, then it would probably behoove you to opt out, after consulting with a lawyer. It's important to understand that for most people it's more beneficial to be in the class. These are typically the type injuries that on the aggregate equal substantial injury, but individually, no lawyer would take on a contingency and it wouldn't be worth while to pay to litigate, as the recovery would be nowhere near the cost of the litigation/attorneys' fees. If you are (like the example above) the odd individual who suffered a much greater injury than the remainder of the class, then opting out would not be wise. However, you don't automatically get more just because you sue individually, and there is no collateral estoppel or issue preclusion because you are suing on a different theory of damage. If you opt out, you start over. If you waited, you may benefit from any admissions in court, which can be used against them, but not any findings. However, a class suit will typically run much longer than an individual, so you would probably finish your suit before the class action concluded. If you are the person who suffered substantial injury, when you get the class notice you should consult an attorney right away, to see if you have a provable case and if opting out is the right choice for you. Statute of limitations need to be examined, as well as other procedural things. Generally speaking, those other reasons for potentially opting out that are in the question are not typical considerations.
Several scholars have addressed this issue. Here's a quick bibliography. It appears that the most relevant "experiments" are the imposition of loser pays in medical malpractice suits in Florida for the first half of the 1980s, and Alaska's loser pays system. The Gryphon article below includes and discusses a decent amount of empirical data; the Di Pietro et al report is very extensive and has a lot of data. The Florida experiment resulted in a significant increase in suits dropped without settlement or trial, a significant decrease in the number of trials, and, apparently, one spectacular fee award in favor of a plaintiff, which impelled the Florida medical establishment to torpedo the law. Susanne Di Pietro et al, Alaska's English Rule: Attorney's Fee Shifting in Civil Cases (1995), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/atyfee.pdf. Marie Gryphon, Assessing the Effects of a "Loser Pays" Rule on the American Legal System: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform, 8 Rutgers J. L. &amp; Pub. Pol'y 567 (2011). Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 &amp; Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Alaska's English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 Alaska L. Rev. 1 (2012). David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the "American Rule" and "English Rule", 15 Ind. Int'l &amp; Comp. L. Rev. 583 (2005) (student article) (not available online). James R. Maxeiner, Cost and Fee Allocation in Civil Procedure, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 195 (2010) (not available online).
I think this idea has prior art. It is called &quot;a law firm&quot;. There are many ways in which such organizations can be structured, but what you end up with is a team of people with different levels of experience, and different specialities, who are able to take on a variety of legal work. Some of that will be routine, and some of it will explode into years of complex litigation. Internal collaboration is normal, including with the aid of technology. Larger firms will have many locations and lots of people. As a client, the fees you pay are a reflection of the market. If you would like to pay $200/hour for two people rather than $400/hour for one, then a prerequisite is that those people are willing to do it. Maybe they are and maybe they aren't. It's just like paying for any other kind of service. In some practice areas, it's possible to offer low fees for &quot;bulk&quot; or &quot;routine&quot; work - sometimes because that's amenable to automation, such as with air passenger delay claims. Patent law may not fall into this category because it is genuinely very difficult to write a patent well. You have to know the law and the technology, and the starting point presented by the client may be far from expressing the actual patentable ideas, if any. That means we have a more high-touch process with specialized expertise. The long durations involved also make it unsuitable for a &quot;no win, no fee&quot; structure (that is essentially a business risk management issue, where some cases pay for the rest). As a business idea, you would have to think about how to manage all that. Maybe you can make it work.
There are exemptions, and "justifications", in 24 CFR 100. The exemption is 100.10: (c) Nothing in this part, other than the prohibitions against discriminatory advertising, applies to: (1) The sale or rental of any single family house by an owner, provided the following conditions are met: (i) The owner does not own or have any interest in more than three single family houses at any one time. (ii) The house is sold or rented without the use of a real estate broker, agent or salesperson or the facilities of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings. So such a restriction could be allowed if e.g. you live in the house and rent only a few rooms, or a single family home marketed and managed in the right way. There is also an exemption for religious organizations and private clubs allowing rental to members only. 100.500 lays the groundwork for disparate impact hot water. It says: (a) A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. So only renting to students in a particular seminary would most likely have a disparate impact. There is, however, the possibility of justifying the policy, following 100.500: (b) (1) A legally sufficient justification exists where the challenged practice: (i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614; and (ii) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. (2) A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section. So let's say that the offended party has made the case that the practice will have a discriminatory effect, then the accused can set forth the aforementioned justification: (c)(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant. (c3)(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. The crux of the matter is having a "substantial, legitimate nondiscriminatory interest", i.e. why would you want to rent to only seminary students.