Who adjudicates whether a Bill contains &quot;any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years&quot; as per the Parliament Act 1911? The Parliament Act 1911 (in the UK) gives the House of Lords different levels of power over a bill that has been passed by the House of Commons, depending into which of three categories the bill falls: for a &quot;money bill&quot;, the House of Lords can only delay passage of the bill by one month; for a bill that contains &quot;any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years&quot;, the House of Lords has an absolute veto over passage of the bill; for any other bill, the House of Lords can delay passage of the bill by one year (or longer if there is no prorogation/opening of a new session during that year). The 1911 Act, at section 1(2), is explicit about who adjudicates any disagreement as to whether or not a particular bill is a &quot;money bill&quot;: the Speaker of the House of Commons. However, the 1911 Act contains no explicit statement of who adjudicates any disagreement as to whether or not a particular bill contains &quot;any provision to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years&quot;. Who would adjudicate any such disagreement?
Before getting into the technical answer to this question it is worth noting that when matters of a constitutional nature are involved then in practice it is not just a matter of a technical &quot;legal&quot; answer. Students and academics like to pose hypothetical questions such as &quot;What would happen if the Queen refused assent to a Bill?&quot; or &quot;If Parliament is supreme, could it abolish the courts?&quot; etc. The practical reality is that a liberal democracy, such as ours, ultimately relies on those in positions of power to respect the democratic conventions and preserve the constitution. When there is a legal angle to some constitutional issue the courts will play their part but, whatever legal analysis their judgments may contain, they will always have in mind the importance of maintaining our democratic system. It is also worth noting that where an Act contains an &quot;ouster&quot; clause (saying that a certificate of X shall not be questioned in any court of law) the courts always find a way to interpret that so that it does not apply in any case where the courts think they should adjudicate! Those preliminaries out of the way, I think the technical legal answer to your question is that first of all the Speaker decides and provides a certificate under s.2(2). You will see that s.2(1) deals with &quot;any other bill&quot; (your third bullet point) and s.2(2) requires a certificate from the Speaker that &quot;the provisions of this section have been duly complied with&quot; (i.e. that it is indeed in the &quot;any other bill&quot; category). Of course there is a further question of whether, if the Speaker gets it wrong, the courts could intervene and exactly how that might happen (the so-called &quot;John Bercow question&quot; of what if a Speaker goes rogue), but the initial technical answer to you question is &quot;the Speaker of the House of Commons&quot;.
The way law works is that you don't need to find a law which says you can do something. Instead, there needs to be an absence of a law which says you cannot do that thing. In other words, you can do anything you want so long as there isn't a law which says you can't. It's unlikely that you will find a law in any jurisdiction which says you cannot charge for a handshake. If you want the charge to be legally binding on the other party, then you need to ensure that the formalities of a valid contract are met. In particular, either each side needs to provide consideration (something of value) or the contract needs to be executed as a deed (england-and-wales). The party who pays the charge is clearly providing consideration. What about the handshake? Is it something of value? The rule is that consideration must be &quot;sufficient&quot; but does not need to be &quot;adequate&quot;. That means that it must have some value (however small) but it doesn't need to be valuable enough to be a fair bargain for the parties. This was confirmed by the House of Lords in Chappell &amp; Co. v Nestle Co. Ltd (1960) AC 97 (england-and-wales) which held that empty chocolate wrappers, which would be thrown away upon receipt, were sufficient consideration. A more common example of low-value but sufficient consideration is a &quot;peppercorn&quot; which is often used as token consideration where (in practical terms) a party is not offering anything of substance. Note that &quot;value&quot; doesn't need to mean something that benefits the recipient. It can also be something which detriments the person who provides it. The courts have held that a promise to do something you were not otherwise legally required to do is sufficient consideration. For example, in Hamer v Sidway (1891) 27 NE 256 (new-york-state), the court held that a promise to quit smoking was sufficient consideration. It doesn't matter whether the recipient values the consideration or not. In Chappell (see above) the court held: It is said that when received the wrappers are of no value to Nestle’s. This I would have thought irrelevant. A contracting party can stipulate for what consideration he chooses. A peppercorn does not cease to be good consideration if it is established that the promisee does not like pepper and will throw away the corn. A handshake is almost certainly sufficient consideration because it involves doing something that you were under no legal obligation to do before you agreed the contract. How you write a receipt is a matter of personal choice and therefore off-topic.
One can argue both ways. On one side, yes, zero representation in the Senate for all states is equal suffrage in the Senate. On the other side, no, depriving all states of all representation in the Senate deprives them of their suffrage in the Senate (without needing to consider the question of whether the suffrage is equal). Since this question has never been considered by a court, we can't do much more than speculate how one might rule. There has never been an amendment proposed to modify the composition of the Senate -- at least not one that was seriously considered. The spirit of the law works in favor of the second interpretation. Furthermore, a strict application of abstract logical reasoning was probably not the intention of the framers. A strategy that might seem more likely to succeed would be to introduce amendments reducing the Senate's power in the legislative process, similar to the evolution of the House of Lords in the UK. If the goal were to sideline one state, this might work, but if the goal is to address the complaint that the Senate is undemocratic because people in smaller states have proportionally more influence there, there's no way the amendment would pass 3/4 of the states' legislatures. The number of states with one or two representatives is 13, by itself a sufficient number to block the adoption of an amendment.
Inferring from the question, it appears that: The tenancy is an Assured Shorthold Tenancy. The tenancy agreement started on 16 December 2014. The initial fixed term was for 12 months. (Please comment below if any of this is incorrect). A Section 21 order gives notice that, unless the tenant leaves by the date given in the document, the landlord will begin legal proceedings against the tenant, in order to obtain a court order forcing the tenant to leave. To answer the OP's questions: Does it mean that she wants to use her right to cancel the contract after 2 months? It looks like that to me but I am not 100% sure. Yes - but if this is before the end of the fixed term (which I'm assuming is 15 December) there must be a clause in the tenancy agreement (normally called a "break clause") allowing the fixed term to be terminated early. If there is no break clause, then you cannot be asked to leave before the end of the fixed term. What does it mean "after 16/11/2015"? After can mean anything... even end of contract in December. Yes. The landlord would like you to leave before the date shown - but if you don't, the landlord can begin legal proceedings any time after that. Is this a legal document or just something she made up? It is a legal document. Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 allows a landlord to ask a tenant to leave without having to give a reason. The landlord must meet certain conditions in order for the notice to be valid. What happens if I want to leave the house later because I don't find alternative? You'll need to discuss that with the landlord. However, if you don't leave by the end of the fixed term, you are entitled to stay (and pay rent!) until a court (not the landlord) orders your eviction. EDIT: This website goes into a lot more detail about the whole Section 21 procedure.
No. This is black-letter constitutional law. From Article 1, section 9: No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
There is no particular mention in the OSCOLA guidelines for how to refer to laws of England and Wales. In academic papers it is common to see both &quot;English Law&quot; and &quot;English and Welsh Law&quot;, usually depending on whether the particular point relates directly to England, Wales or both. However, in the case of Welsh Measures and Statutory Instruments of Wales then it would be correct to only describe the laws as &quot;Welsh Law&quot;.
It’s a common law rule dating from the 17th to 19th centuries Known as the rule against perpetuities “that prevents people from using legal instruments (usually a deed or a will) to exert control over the ownership of private property for a time long beyond the lives of people living at the time the instrument was written.” The rule has its origin in the Duke of Norfolk's Case of 1682. That case concerned Henry, 22nd Earl of Arundel, who had tried to create a shifting executory limitation so that some of his property would pass to his eldest son (who was mentally deficient) and then to his second son, and other property would pass to his second son, but then to his fourth son. The estate plan also included provisions for shifting property many generations later if certain conditions should occur. When his second son, Henry, succeeded to his elder brother's property, he did not want to pass the other property to his younger brother, Charles. Charles sued to enforce his interest, and the court (in this instance, the House of Lords) held that such a shifting condition could not exist indefinitely. The judges believed that tying up property too long beyond the lives of people living at the time was wrong, although the exact period was not determined until another case, Cadell v. Palmer, 150 years later. Historically, the rule was no longer than 21 years from the death of some person alive at the time the trust or estate was created. However, that person(s) must be limited and identifiable. Which led to the creation of Royal lives clauses. The descendants of British monarchs became popular because it’s easy to find out who they are, even many years after the fact, and that family tends to live a long time. Other popular choices, particularly in the United States, are the descendants of John D. Rockefeller or Joseph P. Kennedy. This is often only one of the conditions for the end of the trust and becomes a “savings clause” to prevent violation of the rule if the other conditions are (or become) too far in the future. The period has been changed or abolished by statute in many jurisdictions. For example, England and Wales has adopted a flat 125 year limit. As a state-based law, the United States is hugely variable. Examples For example, one of the businesses I run operates under a trust deed that says: &quot;The Vesting Date&quot; means the first to occur of the following three dates namely:- (i) Sixty years after the date of this Deed. (ii) Twenty years after the date of the death of the last survivor of the lineal descendants of His late Majesty King George V born and living at the date hereof or, (iii) The date (if any) which the Trustee shall in his discretion appoint as the distribution date of this settlement. The deed was made in 1982, which partly explains its style and implicit sexism, but I suspect that the solicitor who drafted it has been using the clause about George V for a lot longer than that. As of today, there are 35 living people who fall into the definition, including Charles III (see if you can work out the others); since there are now less than 20 years to go until 60 years after the deed, the clause will never be relevant. Another business operates under a deed made in 2022: 14.1 Termination date The Trust shall be wound-up and terminate on the first to occur of: a) the date which The Trustee with the written consent of the Leading Member Appointer determines; or b) 80 years from the date of this deed unless a State law allows otherwise including South Australia. Note that the reference to living people is gone. Also, note the specific reference to South Australia, a jurisdiction that has abolished the rule against perpetuities. So long as they don't change their law back, this trust is effectively perpetual. Finally, not how much easier this is to read and skips the implicit sexism; progress. Why doesn’t it affect the property of ‘immortal’ entities like companies or governments? Because, in theory, it isn’t dead people telling living people what they can do with the property. While the organisation may be ‘eternal’ the people making decisions for that organisation aren’t - the directors and legislators/executives in charge today can decide what to do with the property. This includes having the capacity to rewrite the rules of the organisation. While it may be hard to change a company’s rules and very, very hard to change a country’s constitution, it isn’t impossible the way it is with a trust deed or a will. Changing a deed or will too much can result in resettlemet; creating a new trust and usually crystalising tax obligations the delaying of which was often one of the motivations for the trust in the first place.
I don't wish to gainsay or contradict a &quot;professional adviser&quot;, especially as I have no idea on what information they based their suggestion. All I can do is direct the OP to the relevant extracts from the section headed &quot;II ACCELERATED POSSESSION CLAIMS OF PROPERTY LET ON AN ASSURED SHORTHOLD TENANCY&quot; in the Civil Procedure Rules, especially my emboldened text at the end of Rule 55.15. Rule 55.14 (1) A defendant who wishes to – (a) oppose the claim; or (b) seek a postponement of possession in accordance with rule 55.18, must file his defence within 14 days after service of the claim form. (2) The defence should be in the form set out in Practice Direction 55A. Rule 55.15 (1) On receipt of the defence the court will – (a) send a copy to the claimant; and (b) refer the claim and defence to a judge. (2) Where the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence – (a) the claimant may file a written request for an order for possession; and (b) the court will refer that request to a judge. (3) Where the defence is received after the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired but before a request is filed in accordance with paragraph (2), paragraph (1) will still apply. (4) Where – (a) the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence; and (b) the claimant has not made a request for an order for possession under paragraph (2) within 3 months after the expiry of the period set out in rule 55.14, the claim will be stayed.