What constitutes a “Rule 69 agreement” after a judge has issued a final ruling and required mediation? The context is in Arizona and I'm wondering how can a party prove an agreement existed.
It has to be in writing To prove it exists you can point to it and say “that’s it”. Further, to be valid it must be stated on the record in court or before a Judge Pro Tem, before a court reporter, or any other mediator or settlement conference officer appointed by the court to conduct a settlement conference. They’ll have a copy of it.
The judge would be required to recuse himself in that case, subject to the exception that applies when all judges with jurisdiction over the case would otherwise be disqualified. Generally a judge must recuse in cases in which the judge as a personal interest in the case (roughly speaking the same kind of interest that would give the judge standing to participate as a party in the case), or when the judge has personal ties to the parties or their counsel that would create an appearance of impropriety. The controlling provision of Colorado's Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 2.11, which is typical, and its official commentary, states: RULE 2.11. Disqualification (A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances: (1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding. (2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is: (a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party; (b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; or (d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. (3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, child, or other member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding. (4) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that commits or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in a particular way in the proceeding or controversy. (5) The judge: (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association; (b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy; (c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or (d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court. (B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary economic interests, and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and minor children residing in the judge's household. (C) A judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may disclose on the record the basis of the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be incorporated into the record of the proceeding. (D) In limited circumstances, the rule of necessity applies and allows judges to hear a case in which all other judges also would have a disqualifying interest or the case could not otherwise be heard. OFFICIAL COMMENT [1] Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (5) apply. The term “recusal” is sometimes used interchangeably with the term “disqualification.” [2] A judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed. [3] The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. The rule of necessity is an exception to the principle that every litigant is entitled to be heard by a judge who is not subject to disqualifications which might reasonably cause the judge's impartiality to be questioned. The rule of necessity has been invoked for trial court and court of appeals judges where disqualifications exist as to all members of the court and there is no other judge available. It has been invoked as to the supreme court when all or a majority of its members have a conflict of interest; the importance of having the court render a decision overrides the existence of the conflict, which might otherwise leave litigating parties in limbo. Under the rule of necessity, a judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable. Rather than deny a party access to court, judicial disqualification yields to the demands of necessity. [4] The fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a relative of the judge is affiliated does not itself disqualify the judge. If, however, the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or the relative is known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be substantially affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(c), the judge's disqualification is required. [5] A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification. [6] “Economic interest,” as set forth in the Terminology section, means ownership of more than a one percent legal or equitable interest in a party, or a legal or equitable interest in a party of a fair market value exceeding $5,000, or a relationship as a director, advisor, or other active participant in the affairs of a party, except that: (1) Ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities, or of securities held in a managed fund, is not an “economic interest” in such securities unless the judge participates in the management of the fund; (2) securities held by an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization in which the judge or the judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child serves as a director, officer, advisor, or other participant is not an “economic interest” in securities held by the organization; (3) the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositer in a financial institution or deposits or proprietary interests the judge may maintain as a member of a mutual savings association or credit union, or a similar proprietary interest is an “economic interest” in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the interest; and (4) ownership of government securities is an “economic interest” in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could substantially affect the value of the securities. The general rule of 2.11(A) and also 2.11(A)(2)(c) would apply in this case.
The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.
Law does not have an all-encompassing syntax and structure that, if not followed, makes it null and void. If a reasonable person could determine that (in the example of the sign you have) you are required to get written permission from any or all of the Paulding County Commissioners, then the sign is enforceable. I honestly don't see anything wrong with the sign you are displaying, it is reasonably clear. If, for example the notice contains an ambiguity or unclear phrase, the &quot;spirit&quot; of the law or sign is upheld. If the sign had said something to the effect of &quot;No trespassing without permission&quot;. It doesn't say who you need permission from, but you can reasonably ascertain that you must have permission from somebody in control of the land. There is no line in the sand here. Often when a dispute in a contract comes up where it could be interpreted more than one way, it is often interpreted in favor of the person who did not write the contract. &quot;Offer ends October 30 or while supplies last&quot; Isn't really &quot;ill-phrased&quot; either. I assure you that those statements are vetted by highly paid lawyers from many jurisdictions. I'm not sure what &quot;nonsense&quot; you would be referring to in there. If the vendor runs out of promotional materials the promotion ends... If they had said &quot;free hats to the first 100 customers on December 31st&quot;, you can't show up as the 101st customer and demand a hat, nor could you show up on January 1st (even if there were not 100 customers the previous day) and demand one either.
In general, the express terms of the lease signed supersede all prior negotiations of the parties, except to the extent that the particular language in question in the lease is ambiguous. This is called the parol evidence rule (which is the law in all U.S. jurisdictions although it has been expressly rejected in Israel). The parol evidence rule expressly makes a written agreement supersede a verbal agreement, rather than making them equally valid. Also, even if both agreements had been written, generally speaking, the last and final version of the agreement will supersede earlier versions of the agreement. The best defense would be along the lines of fraud-in-factum or fraudulent inducement, i.e. that this term was slipped into the final draft in a manner expressly intended to mislead the signing party about what was being signed. I've won one case where this happened (where there was extensive email correspondence between business lawyers regarding the changes that would be made in each draft and there the version signed did not correspond to the last version signed electronically in a very long document on paper and there were other indicia of fraud), but by far the more common outcome is to bind the party signing the document (especially in a commercial context) and to consider failing to carefully read all terms of the final draft to be negligent on the part of the party signing the contract. Arguably, there might also be a malpractice claim against the lawyer for the tenant for missing this change in a material term before the contract was signed.
Dale is right; here are the details from CA statutes: Since 1872, CA law has told CA courts to assume the parties to contracts in CA are reasonable, not crazy. If the literal reading of the contract is crazy, the California Civil Code's rules for the Interpretation of Contracts tells its courts: ignore the crazy reading. Here is what the statute says: § 1636 A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. To win under this section, you would need to claim that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. No judge would believe this. § 1637 For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties to a contract, if otherwise doubtful, the rules given in this Chapter are to be applied. To win under this section, you would need to claim that there is no doubt that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1638 The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity. To win under this section, you would need to claim that it was reasonable that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1640 When, through fraud, mistake, or accident, a written contract fails to express the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be regarded, and the erroneous parts of the writing disregarded. To win under this section, you would also need to claim that both you and the landlord really intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Since no judge would believe this, any judge would rule that the wording was a mistake, and should be disregarded. § 1643 A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties. Ditto.
This is a Federal court decision There are no state courts involved. This was a ruling by the presiding judge of the original trial There is no appeal involved because the case wasn't final. This is a ruling on a Motion for Judgement of Acquittal Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure spells this out: After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict.
There is no absolute rule in such cases. It is often a matter of negotiation between the state and federal authorities, and failing agreement, a matter of which authority has the prisoner in custody. Often the question of which crime is more serious or carries a longer sentence is an issue in such negotiations.