When a U.S. Attorney files charges, does this mean it is automatically filed on behalf of the DoJ? Background Piggy backing off the question about two United State political bodies conducting an investigation, someone made a comment that the a U.S. attorney is always part of the DoJ. I understand that in the typical case, a lawyer (usually) represents someone who is the entity pressing charges. But I'm not sure if the same rules necessarily apply to U.S. attorneys of the Federal Government. Question When a U.S. Attorney files charges acting in his office, does this automatically mean that the DoJ itself is the party filing a charge?
No. The U.S. Attorney brings charges on behalf of the United States, which is the filing party, at least in criminal cases. That's why every criminal case is styled "United States v. [Whomever]."
Yes. The U.S. AG can decline to prosecute an indictment at any time until jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn in to consider the charges at trial. The AG can also abandon a prosecution mid-trial but then cannot retry those charges later. The AG might abandon charges, for example, because the evidence does not appear to support the charges when presented at trial, or because, for example, a prosecution might damage a diplomatic relationship of the U.S. with another country, or because a new administration has different priorities than an old one and recently had its AG appointed to office while the trial was pending. This said, there are some situations (e.g. when there is a special prosecutor, or after a lower level prosecutor has entered into a binding plea agreement) when the AG does not have the authority to overrule the decisions to prosecute or not prosecute an indictment that is made by a lower level prosecutor. The AG has line authority to give orders to lower level prosecutors in the AG's office 99% of the time, but not always.
Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.
Double jeopardy does not bar him from facing federal charges, although U.S. Justice Department policy reserves such prosecutions for exceptional cases. Also, it depends to some extent upon whether there is a suitable federal crime that fits the conduct.
I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply.
The Copyright Office has determined, in chapter 300 of the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, on page 36, that the copyright bar extends to works created by the President; Congress; the federal judiciary; federal departments, agencies, boards, bureaus, or commissions; or any other officer or employee of the U.S. federal government while acting within the course of his or her official duties. So the Senator is a US employee for copyright purposes, at least according to the US Copyright Office. Technically, this is interpretation rather than law, and in theory a court might disagree, but if anyone is qualified to speak on this issue, it's the Copyright Office. In my opinion, it is most reasonable to assume that the Copyright Office is correct in their interpretation unless there is case law directly contradicting them. The only question is whether the letter was created by the Senator &quot;while acting within the course of his or her official duties.&quot; I'm not aware of any case law suggesting that constituent building is or is not an &quot;official duty&quot; of a US Senator, and there are reasonable arguments to be made in both directions. On the one hand, the letter is clearly beyond the scope of Congress's lawmaking and oversight Constitutional functions. On the other, the office of Senator is an inherently political office, and a case can be made that campaigning for reelection is part of the job. Perhaps surprisingly, that question was extensively litigated during E. Jean Carroll's first defamation lawsuit against Donald Trump, because Trump argued that his statements about Carroll were within the scope of his employment (and so a defamation claim would be effectively barred under the Westfall Act). To my understanding, the current disposition of that lawsuit is that this is considered a question of fact for a jury to decide (at least according to the Second Circuit). What can be said is who does not hold copyright: The US Senate and/or the US government as a whole. The only way the Senate could acquire copyright in this letter (short of the Senator directly granting it to them) would be as a work made for hire, but the work-for-hire doctrine requires that the work be prepared by an employee as part of their official duties, just like the federal copyright bar. So the Senate cannot acquire copyright in this manner. If anyone owns the copyright, it is most likely the Senator.
Yes, the role of a Representative is largely to serve as a point of contact for supervisory authorities and data subjects. Much of this could be done by a person who just scans and forwards any incoming mail. In practice, the Representative should be a lawyer or at least a compliance professional in order to fulfil their role effectively, in particular when it comes to a lawsuit or administrative proceedings against the controller/processor. These would be carried out against the representative on behalf of the controller/processor. Regarding liability, recital 80 explicitly says: “The designated representative should be subject to enforcement proceedings in the event of non-compliance by the controller or processor.” This doesn't shield the controller/processor from liability, this just simplifies enforcement and ensures that judicial remedies are in fact available to data subjects. There is a much more imminent consequence for the choice of Representative: which data protection agency will serve as main supervisory authority. Non-EU controllers might prefer the convenience of an English-speaking authority, otherwise (expensive) translation could be needed. Consequently, Representatives based in Ireland are effectively the default choice. Many representatives do offer extra services, such as offering to serve as a Data Protection Officer. That would help justify the fees. Unfortunately, the conditions for appointing a representative and for appointing a DPO are somewhat different: per the letter of the law many controllers would need a Representative but not a DPO. A Representative is needed as soon as data processing is non-occasional, whereas a DPO would only be needed for processing on a large scale. I'll just add that many controllers forget about that and only think about getting a representative when appointing a DPO. Since the Representative aids enforcement, enforcing against a controller without a Representative is rather difficult, and I don't know of any fines for failing to appoint a Representative.
An indictment is issued by a grand jury when they are convinced, on the basis of evidence presented to them by the government, that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed a crime. However, the indictment only has to state the charges, i.e. the grand jury's conclusion; it doesn't have to describe the evidence that led them to this conclusion. In particular, the grand jury can hear the testimony of witnesses under oath, and has subpoena powers to compel testimony. But testimony before a grand jury is sealed and must not be revealed by anyone except the witness themself. A good source for learning more about the grand jury process is the Handbook for Federal Grand Jurors. The authoritative source is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Title III. So, there must have been some evidence that he committed a crime, at least in the grand jury's view. But we, the public, don't get to see it at this time. If the case goes to trial, evidence will be presented publicly at that time, though it won't necessarily be the same evidence that convinced the grand jury to indict. (Note that this answer is about the US federal criminal justice system, since that's what's involved in the Collins case. Some states may have a similar system; others may not.)