Under what circumstances can you be convicted of indecent exposure for being naked in a California changing room? Recent events have seen a person (with a history of sexual offending) charged for indecent exposure in the changing room of a nude spa in Los Angeles. However, I am confused because surely a changing room necessarily involves the nude exposure of body parts not ordinarily exposed. Under what circumstances can you be charged with indecent exposure in a setting where nudity is necessary in California?
That would be when he does so willfully and lewdly. Simple nudity is not illegal. See for instance in re Dallas W., where the court found that sexual intent is necessary: &quot;'something more than mere nudity' must be shown&quot;, citing In re Smith (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 36. A propos this incident, the reported partial erection is not irrelevant.
In the US, does a person photographing private property (houses, farms etc.) while standing on public ground (road, park etc.) commit any offence? No. In general, while standing on public land, it is legal for your eyes to glance onto everything around you. You cannot be arrested and imprisoned for allowing your gaze to pass over your neighbours lawn. It is legal for you to take out a tripod, canvas and paintbrushes and paint the general scene, even if it includes, for example, a tree standing on private land. Instead of a paintbrush, you may use a camera to create a picture of the scene. There are a few exceptions Some military installations Some installations operated by the department of energy (e.g. some nuclear power stations) You cannot photograph people where they have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" - Note that this is not dependant on how the people feel about it. You can photograph a couple kissing at a bus stop, you probably can't legally point a telephoto lens at their bedroom window through a broken privacy-fence. will they commit any offence by publishing the photos They may need copyright permission from the owners of any identifiable works of art included and may need model releases from identifiable people included. There are specific exceptions allowing the publishing of photographs of sculptures and buildings that are visible from public spaces. See The Photographer's Right
In NSW Australia this is covered by Division 15A of the Crimes Act 1900 which deals with Child Abuse Material. Under Section 91FA a &quot;child&quot; means a person who is under the age of 16 years - the situation you describe would be between consenting adults in NSW. “Child abuse material” can be text or images that are sexually explicit and would be “offensive” to a normal person (which means offensive to the particular jury) Assuming Jane is 15 or less, however, prima facie the image would be child abuse material and under Section 91H &quot;A person who produces, disseminates or possesses child abuse material is guilty of an offence.&quot; The punishment is up to 10 years in jail. Section 91H provides a number of defences, the most relevant to the circumstances you describe being: that the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that he or she produced, disseminated or possessed (as the case requires) child abuse material. that the material concerned came into the defendant’s possession unsolicited and the defendant, as soon as he or she became aware of its nature, took reasonable steps to get rid of it. (for possession only) If, considering all the circumstances of the relationship, Joe doesn't know and could not reasonably be expected to know Jane's age then he can use the defence under S91H(1). If he did not request the picture and as soon as he was aware of Jane's age, deleted it, then he can use the defence under S91H(2). The outcome is not so rosy for Jane: she is guilty of both production and dissemination of child abuse material and (assuming she knows how old she is) faces up to 10 years in jail (14 if she is under 14) and registration on the Sex Offenders List for life. It is admittedly unlikely in the circumstances that the state would prosecute her and, if they did, it is very likely that the judge would rule that no conviction be recorded.
Assuming that the above can be established by admissible evidence, that sounds like a case for first degree murder, and probably various other crimes as well. In some jurisdictions there is a specific crime of &quot;Murder for hire&quot; which might also apply if available on the jurisdiction where this occurred. A comment mentions a possible insanity defense. That is going to depend on detailed facts not included in the question, but might be possible.
england-and-wales There's no law specifying that shirts must be worn by people visiting shops or restaurants. As the owner or tenant of the property the business can set the rules for who is allowed entry and service, provided it does not discriminate based on a 'protected characteristic' in the Equality Act. The business can set a 'dress code' and refuse entry to people who are not dressed to code. If a rule says &quot;no topless people&quot; that's OK. If a rule says &quot;men must not be topless&quot; then on the face of it that's unlawful discrimination. If a rule requires smart footwear that's OK. If a rule says &quot;women must wear high heels&quot; then on the face of it that's unlawful discrimination. Generally the business can refuse to serve a person and require the person to leave the premises. If the person refuses to leave then they commit the civil tort of trespass. If the person then obstructs the lawful activity of the business or damages its property then they commit the criminal offence of aggravated trespass.
It may depend on what offences are suspected of being committed. One example is: In the united-states under 18 U.S. Code § 2258A an Electronic Service Provider (ESP) is required to report apparent violations of sections: 2251 [Sexual exploitation of children] 2251A [Selling or buying of children] 2252 [material involving the sexual exploitation of minors] 2252A [material constituting or containing child pornography] 2252B [Misleading domain names with intent] 2260 [sexually explicit depictions of a minor etc] The report is made to the National Center for Missing &amp; Exploited Children (NCMEC) who in turn forward the information to the relevant domestic or foreign law enforcement agency. The ESP is protected from commiting distribution or related offences when making the report by virtue of subsection (g)(4): Permitted disclosure by a provider.— A provider that submits a report under subsection (a)(1) may disclose by mail, electronic transmission, or other reasonable means, information, including visual depictions contained in the report, in a manner consistent with permitted disclosures under paragraphs (3) through (8) of section 2702(b) only to a law enforcement agency described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) of paragraph (3), to NCMEC, or as necessary to respond to legal process.
The relevant law is not so specific. It prohibits child abuse and child neglect which are defined only as general standards and not as specific rules. This doesn't appear to be child neglect, indeed, the opposite to the extent that there is such a thing. So, would it be child abuse? This would be up to the finder of fact to determine, and might depend upon the manner in which this is done (for example, what is said to a child about it) and the reason that it is done (e.g. a history of self-harm) and more generally in light of the total context of the situation. But it is not obviously child abuse, unless, for example, recorded video was used for child pornography purposes, which there is nothing in the question to indicate. A comment suggests that the criminal offense of voyeurism (F.S. § 810.140) or video voyeurism (F.S. § 810.145) might be implicated, but both of those statutes apply to &quot;secretly&quot; observing someone or &quot;secretly&quot; setting up cameras, while in this case, the cameras and viewing are anything but secret. So, even if it were child pornography, it would not be voyeurism or video voyeurism under state law in Florida. As a general rule, a child is not entitled to privacy from a parent except in certain specifically defined circumstances (e.g. certain privileged communications).
The definition of defamation, itself, doesn't change. What may change is whether certain kinds of false statements are &quot;so bad&quot; that it is not necessary to prove that the person was actually damaged by the statement, i.e. is defamation per se. In California this is Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime; Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease; Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits; Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; Hence, being falsely claimed to be a virgin is not defamation per se, but if you can show that you were actually damaged by the claim then you can be compensated for those damages. This is long-standing law (Tonini v. Cevasco (1896) 114 Cal. 266), which makes it difficult to erode in lieu of a change in statutory language (as in the case of the California Civil Code, amended in 1948). Barnes-Hind v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377 provides a loophole, that the reader of a libel will recognize it as such. If no reasonable reader would perceive in a false and unprivileged publication a meaning which tended to injure the subject's reputation in any of the enumerated respects, then there is no libel at all. If such a reader would perceive a defamatory meaning without extrinsic aid beyond his or her own intelligence and common sense, then (under section 45a and the cases, such as MacLeod, which have construed it) there is a libel per se. But if the reader would be able to recognize a defamatory meaning only by virtue of his or her knowledge of specific facts and circumstances, extrinsic to the publication, which are not matters of common knowledge rationally attributable to all reasonable persons, then (under the same authorities) the libel cannot be libel per se but will be libel per quod. A &quot;reasonable&quot; reader would not recognize a claim of non-virginity as having a defamatory meaning, but would likely recognize being a professional incompetent as having a defamatory meaning. In other words, even false statements statutorily listed as being potential defamation per se will be subject to a &quot;reasonable man&quot; test: but proving actual damage is still an option.