Medicaid Estate Recovery Can the Oregon Health Authority (OHA), Estate Recovery Unit (EAU) seek reimbursement for Medicaid services rendered after a person is deceased, if their assets are placed in a revocable trust prior to care? In other words, does a revocable trust protect against Medicaid recovery after death? (District: Oregon, United States)
A trust, revocable or irrevocable, does not protect the estate from claims by creditors. Under ORS 115.125(1)(k), the Department of Human Services or the Oregon Health Authority has a claim against the estate, behind the claim for "the state’s monthly contribution to the federal government to defray the costs of outpatient prescription drug coverage provided to a person who is eligible for Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage and who receives benefits under the state medical assistance program or Title XIX of the Social Security Act" (which is item (j)) and ahead of only the claim by the Department of Corrections for care and maintenance of any decedent who was at a state institution – that one is dead-last in the list of statutorily-listed claims.
I know this is not what you've asked (I will get to that too), but I figured I would take the opportunity to state that the owner of the well cannot send you an invoice for the water unless you agreed to a price and entered into a binding agreement. They cannot just decide their water is worth X and then tell you that the amount is due. Just as you cannot send them a bill, in the same amount, for the use and maintenance of the pump. While the well may be located on one parcel of land, with the pump on the other, chances are, the properties were linked at one point and that is why there is a separation of the two (unless you bought it as one and divided it yourselves). This should have been dealt with on the deed, with easements appurtenant to the neighboring land regarding water rights. A contractual agreement could have been attached by reference that dictated the land with the well would maintain the well, while the landowner with the pump would maintain the equipment (or whatever you both agreed to regarding upkeep and the like). Depending on the state you live in, the property itself may not even "own" the well. For instance, in Colorado, water rights typically come by way of 100 or 200 year leases, as the native american tribes of the area "own" the water rights. Other states have laws that declare that nobody owns the water table, hence land is only owned as far down as the water table and then it is owned by the county, or state, with easements running with the deed. Other states, (I'm wondering if this is your issue) the water runs in veins and does belong only to the property that it is below &ndash; as there is no water table, so to speak. Regardless, I would talk to your title insurance policy company and ask why this easement was not addressed in the deed. I'm assuming that you did not divide the land yourselves, post purchase, and the land with the pump cannot access the water table without going onto the land of the other. Otherwise, it would be very easily solved by drilling your own well (and much cheaper), whereby you already own all of the equipment to run the water to the dwelling. You just divert your equipment to the running of your own well. It's only a few dollars a foot to drill a well, unless you live in the Granite State! Likewise, you should check with your land assessor's office, or registry of deeds, and see how the title ran back regarding water. Again, depending on jurisdiction, you may be able to drill down and over. You cannot divert, but you can access, in most jurisdictions. I say to contact your title insurance company, because the water issue should have been dealt with at title examination, and further, if your land is inaccessible to any water, it would not be sub-dividable for dwelling purposes under almost any zoning law I have ever heard of. A property that is land locked, or utility inaccessible, cannot be zoned for dwellings, without irrevocable easements or rights of ways, respectively. Just because you purchased near family doesn't have anything to do with any of this analysis. They could be anyone, or you could end up at odds, the water cannot be relationship dependent and you cannot be held hostage over natural resources. If so, I would sue the title insurance policy for a refund of the purchase price or the negotiation of the purchase price of an easement to the well/water table, assuming you have none under your land and have no existing right to it. If you just happen to have the pump, and they have the well, you own the pump and they own the well. Simple as that. You do not have to allow the pump to be used for their well. Assuming you can drill your own well, but may not want to, you can just rent them the use of the pump at the same rate they are charging you for the water. You can agree to split the cost of maintenance of each, since you've invested in the upgrade of the pump.
Is this true? Yes. can someone explain how this might work? You can form an LLC, and then fund it with money that would be used to purchase the home, and buy the home in the name of the LLC. One minor exception is that a handful of rural U.S. states prohibit limited liability entities from owning farm land, so if the home is part of a farm or ranch, this could be prohibited in those states. If there is a mortgage, this is more difficult, but not impossibly so. The primary debtor on the mortgage would be the LLC. Ordinarily the owner of the LLC would be required by the bank to guarantee the mortgage, but loan guarantees do not necessarily have to be made a matter of public record. If the LLC has only one member, it is disregarded for income tax purposes, so that isn't a problem. There may be issues in this case of a house not qualifying for residential property tax treatment in some cases (which is often a lower rate than commercial real estate). There is also sometimes an issue that property owned by an LLC isn't eligible for a &quot;homestead exemption&quot; of equity in the home from creditor's claims. It may also be treated differently in terms of eligibility for means-tested benefits like Medicaid nursing home coverage. But, it is allowed. I ask the question, for it seems to me that it should not be difficult to find out who the owner of any given LLC is. In the U.S., the owners of a manager managed LLC are rarely disclosed in the public record (although about half of U.S. states require one or all of the members of a member managed LLC to be disclosed). But all U.S. states allow LLCs to be manager managed. Also, all U.S. states are required as a matter of constitutional law to all LLCs organized in a state other than the state where the LLC owns real property or operates to do business in that state. States can imposed regulations on out of state LLCs to some extent, however. The main exception to these general rules is California. Although the California Articles of Organization do not list the members of the LLC in the Artiles, California requires the LLC to file a Statement of Information within 90 days of the approval of the LLC. The Statement of Information does require a list of the LLC's members, and it does become public record. Records of LLC ownership are maintained in the private internal records of the LLC. A contact person, called a registered agent and sometimes the managers of the LLC with authority to act on its behalf must be publicly disclosed, but neither of these posts has anything to do with ownership. Many states also require the &quot;organizer&quot; of the LLC to be disclosed, but that doesn't have to be an owner of the LLC either. Often it is a lawyer or accountant for the LLC. It will be necessary to disclose the ownership to federal tax officials, and often also to state tax officials. Also, soon, under a newly enacted federal law that has not yet taken effect because regulations have not been written, to federal money laundering officials. But, both of these pieces of information are confidential and not available to the general public. This information can be obtained by subpoena in pertinent litigation, however, must often be disclosed when filing federal lawsuits, and is often required to be disclosed by counter-parties in business transactions. Footnote The U.S. practice is not the global norm. In most civil law countries, for example, ownership interests in entities need to be reflected in a notarized document kept in the custody of the notary involved. In recent times, interests in transparency and avoiding tax evasion and money laundering for terrorism and crime have promoted additional, less decentralized records of entity ownership.
No Pennsylvania law § 2104 requires: (10) Requirement that heir survive decedent for five days.--Any person who fails to survive the decedent by five days shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of intestate succession and the decedent's heirs shall be determined accordingly. Now, a will can provide contingencies for if an heir predeceases the testator such as flowing to the heir's spouse or children but if it doesn't then the heir is treated as non-existent and what would have been their bequest is dealt with by the other provisions of the will. The life annuity is not a part of the grandfather's estate and the funds will be distributed in accordance with the terms of its own contract, not the will. Usually, this means at the discretion of the trustee and nominations of beneficiaries are usually non-binding on the trustee; that is, they can distribute the funds as they believe the decedent would want. Your aunt should seek proper legal advice quickly.
Can people with low incomes qualify for free medical care (Medi-Cal) in California regardless of their assets? For some programs, but not others. The main exception, discussed below, is the Medicaid expansion component of Obamacare (a.k.a. the Affordable Care Act). One of the exceptions to the general rule considering property is as follows: The Affordable Care Act introduced a new methodology – Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) – to define a family’s size and count income in order to determine eligibility for insurance affordability programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14). As a result, household determination and income counting rules are largely aligned among Medi-Cal, the Medi-Cal Access Program (MCAP, the low-cost health insurance for moderate income pregnant women), and Covered California, with some exceptions. For Medi-Cal, the MAGI rules apply to the following programs: Expansion Adults (adults aged 19 through 64); Parents and Caretaker Relatives; Pregnant Women; and Children. Medi-Cal’s Tuberculosis Program and the Refugee Medical Assistance program also now use the MAGI income methodology. See Welf. &amp; Inst. Code 14005.20(b)(2) and ACWD 15-16 (Mar. 20, 2015), http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/services/medi-cal/eligibility/Documents/ACWDL2015/ACWDL15-16.pdf. These programs, however, are not considered MAGI Medi-Cal in the Medi-Cal hierarchy because they are limited in scope or duration and should only be used when an individual is not eligible for any other form of free Medi-Cal. In general, unless an individual gets Medi-Cal through a linked program such as SSI or CalWORKs, or due to former foster youth status, Medi-Cal eligibility is reviewed for the MAGI programs before looking to the Non-MAGI programs. Outside that Obamacare program, someone can have significant assets of types that are exempt from consideration (e.g. in the Medicaid nursing home program), but they cannot qualify regardless of their assets. The exact extent to which assets are disqualifying varies by subprogram, with ordinary Medi-Cal, the nursing home program, and the CHIP program for children, having different requirements. The key language is &quot;countable asset levels&quot;. This is defined in a combination of state statutes and regulations which in turn are enacted in order to comply with federal Medicaid program requirements. Only some assets count for purposes of Medi-Cal eligibility. In particular, a personal residence, a single motor vehicle, certain household goods, certain retirement assets, certain cash value in life insurance policies, and investment assets that don't generate current cash income and are impracticable so sell in a timely manner at anything approaching their true value because they are illiquid for some reason or other, don't count. Exactly what does and does not count as a countable asset for purposes of Medi-Cal eligibility is a rather technical and detailed matter because there are some many different kinds of assets out there and the rules address them on a type by type basis. The most common exemptions are set forth here: The main regulations for the Department of Health Services that govern this are found here and here. More legal sources are found here. These primary sources, alas, aren't organized in a very user friendly way. In part, this is because the Medicaid Rules incorporate by reference (with modifications) the rules for the Aid To Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) rules, rather than restating them with the modifications include in full. So the chart on the form is assembled from a mishmash of state and federal regulations in multiple locations. I didn't find a chapter and verse citation for a few kinds of non-countable assets but know they exist from continuing education classes and practicing in the area.
Sorry for your loss. It appears that this is generally possible. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Title I, Chapter 55, Article 55.011: Art. 55.011. RIGHT OF CLOSE RELATIVE TO SEEK EXPUNCTION ON BEHALF OF DECEASED PERSON. (a) In this article, "close relative of a deceased person" means the grandparent, parent, spouse, or adult brother, sister, or child of a deceased person. (b) A close relative of a deceased person who, if not deceased, would be entitled to expunction of records and files under Article 55.01 may file on behalf of the deceased person an ex parte petition for expunction under Section 2 or 2a, Article 55.02. If the court finds that the deceased person would be entitled to expunction of any record or file that is the subject of the petition, the court shall enter an order directing expunction.
You can't sue her for not having insurance. You sue for the damage you suffered. You can name her as a defendant alongside her son on the theory that she contributed to the accident by letting her son use the car, and then let the judge sort out who gets landed with the liability. Depending on the rules in your jurisdiction you might have to pay her travel expenses and/or lost wages if the judge decides she wasn't to blame (and the same for her son, but that sounds like a slam-dunk). However you might be better off going for victim restitution. That way the order gets made as part of the criminal case against the son. Less hassle for you, and the state authorities are responsible for actually getting the money out of them. Edit: It turns out that Idaho has the Family Car Doctrine in its law, so the mother is legally liable for her son's accident (thanks to ohwilleke for the pointer).
Short Answer Is Bob entitled to any compensation from the government or anyone? Generally not, although there are some states where this is possible on a limited basis or in isolated circumstances. Sometimes Bob can get his non-attorney fee court costs reimbursed or can have his government employer indemnify him for his attorney fee expenses in work related criminal prosecutions resulting in an acquittal. California is among the states that reimburse people acquitted of misdemeanor or infraction cases for court costs incurred (but not attorney fees), but this doesn't extend to felony criminal case acquittals. A minority of states (including California and federal criminal prosecutions) have exceptions for malicious prosecutions that are groundless and/or frivolous where reimbursement can be sought in a parallel case. Washington State allows an award of defense attorney fees if there is a self-defense based acquittal. Most states don't require reimbursement of the attorney fees incurred for a state provided public defender whether or not one is acquitted, but some do, at least in cases of conviction. Six states require a defendant who is acquitted but found to have had some ability to pay the legal fee of the defense to that extent. Those states are Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Nevada, New Hampshire and North Dakota. In addition, Michigan, does not allow for recoupment of appointed counsel defense costs after the fact, but it does require all able defendants to contribute to the costs of their assigned defense. A completely innocent man spent weeks in jail and had to spend thousands. Not to mention probably completely trashing his reputation. Can the government just do that to citizens and the citizens just have to live with it? Yes. State law is the main protection and varies widely. The majority rule is to provide no compensation. Federal Civil Rights Action Remedies There can also be an award as part of the remedy in a separate parallel lawsuit for an intentional violation of a person's federal constitutional rights by a state or local official acting under color of state or local law, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if the qualified immunity defense is overcome. Even then, there is almost never liability against a judge or prosecutor who intentionally violated the well established constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their court related conduct. But liability can be imposed if a judge's actions are complete ultra vires (i.e. outside the scope of his or her authority), or if a prosecutor participates in the investigative phase of a criminal case in a manner indistinguishable from other law enforcement officers. The only case I can recall where civil liability was imposed on a judge was a case where he threw a child who was not a party to a custody case (a sibling of a child whose case was before the judge) in jail without any legal proceedings for a few days on grounds that did not constitute contempt of court. Judges and prosecutors are not immune to criminal charges related to their misconduct or to removal from office or disbarment for their misconduct, however. Long Answer There are some U.S. states where almost all acquitted defendant are entitled to some compensation (at least for &quot;court costs&quot;): Florida, Missouri, New Jersey, and North Carolina without limiting reimbursement by type of case or type of defendant. Thus, all defendants acquitted of criminal charges in these four states are potentially eligible to receive compensation for certain defense expenses. But these usually don't include attorney fees, just out of pocket court process related costs other than attorney fees. Washington State which reimburses attorney fees incurred defendant a self-defense case has arguably the broadest provision of for awarding attorney fees to acquitted defendants who hire their own counsel. Louisiana allows discretionary awards of attorney fees as a general matter, but in practice, it is closer to the states and the federal rule that allows for malicious prosecution actions in exceptional cases. In the vast majority of U.S. states, an acquitted defendant is not entitled to any compensation. In some U.S. states, such as North Carolina and Texas, a convicted defendant must often pay the cost of their public defendant as part of their court costs, a debt which is owed to the state which pays for public defenders. In theory, at least, this reflects the fact that an acquittal is not a finding that the defendant is innocent, only a finding that guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Some states allow compensation for a &quot;malicious prosecution&quot; in a collateral lawsuit. For example, in federal criminal cases, the Hyde Amendment to the Equal Access to Justice Act, permits a criminal defendant to recover reasonable attorney's fees if (1) the defendant are acquitted, and (2) “if the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A note. This is parallel to the standard for sanctions for a lawsuit lacking substantial justification in a civil case. A law review article from 2001 reviews how that provision has been applied. (Spoiler: acquitted defendants who are themselves particularly rare in the federal system with only nine successful cases from 1997 to 2001, rarely win Hyde Amendment claims in the entire United States. But it does happen now and then.) As survey of U.S. practice in these situations is found in a 2015 law review article (with relevant footnotes included below): This controversy is a national issue, affecting defendants prosecuted at both the federal and state levels.6 While the federal government has adopted a single, limited approach by which acquitted defendants may seek reimbursement,7 state approaches vary widely8 -from providing no reimbursement whatsoever9 to providing full reimbursement for legal expenses and attorney's fees in certain situations.10 For example, some states limit reimbursement to defendants acquitted of certain offenses,11 while other states limit reimbursement to public employees12 or to those who have been prosecuted in bad faith.13 Although there have been occasional scholarly efforts advocating compensation for acquitted criminal defendants,14 none reviews the existing state laws on reimbursement or how these laws are applied. At least twenty states provide some form of reimbursement to certain defendants.15 Civil-suit reimbursement is a separate but related issue. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-37-10 (2013) (providing that the attorney of a prevailing party in a civil suit may recover attorney's fees and disbursements from the adverse party); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 15-17-37 (2013) (&quot;The prevailing party in a civil action or special proceeding may recover expenditures necessarily incurred in gathering and procuring evidence or bringing the matter to trial.&quot;). See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651 (discussing several rationales for attorney fee shifting in civil litigation but refraining from expressing a preference for or against fee shifting). This Article focuses only on reimbursement for acquitted criminal defendants. The Hyde Amendment allows a prevailing party in a criminal case to recover attorney's fees and other expenses when the position of the United States was &quot;vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith.&quot; Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012)). While states have taken various approaches to reimbursement, they have almost uniformly addressed the issue through legislation. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Sawyer, 620 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. 1993) (&quot;Cost provisions are a creature of statute and must be carefully construed. This Court has held for over a century that cost provisions against the State must be expressly authorized .... ); People v. Lavan, 218 N.W.2d 797, 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that the trial court's award to acquitted defendant of his costs and attorney's fees violated the sovereign immunity doctrine because there was no statutory authorization for the award). But see Latimore v. Commonwealth, 633 N.E.2d 396, 398 (Mass. 1994) (&quot;As a general rule, absent a statute or court rule authorizing the award of attorney's fees and costs, parties are responsible for their own costs of litigation.&quot; (emphasis added) (citing cases)), superseded by amended rule, MASS. R. CRIM. P. 15, as recognized in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 739 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 n.4 (Mass. 2000) (noting that Rule 15 was amended following Latimore in order to provide additional reimbursement). There are a few exceptions, however. For example, North Carolina provides for reimbursement through a constitutional provision, see N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23, and Massachusetts provides for reimbursement through court-made procedural rules, see MASS. R. CRIM. P. 15(d), 25(c)(2), 30(c). See, e.g., James J. Belanger, Frederick R. Petti &amp; James Berchtold, Seeking Attorney's Fees in Criminal Cases, NEV. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 6, 32 (&quot;Nevada currently has no mechanism for compensating a criminal defendant who has been forced to defend him or herself in a groundless action.&quot;). Not only do the remaining states provide no reimbursement to acquitted defendants, but a few of them partially charge acquitted indigent defendants for their legal representation. Six states currently have &quot;recoupment&quot; statutes that require acquitted indigent defendants to reimburse the state for a portion of their appointed defense counsel's fees if they are able. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3.1(a)-(b) (West 2014); IOWA CODE § 815.9 (2013); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.120(1)(b) (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.3975(1)-(2) (2001); Id. § 178.398 (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9(J) (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1(2) (2013). A seventh state, Michigan, does not allow for recoupment after the fact, but it does require all able defendants to contribute to the costs of their assigned defense. See MICH. CT. R. 6.005(C). The United States Supreme Court, in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974), upheld the constitutionality of recoupment statutes, finding that requiring repayment does not interfere with, or have a chilling effect on, the constitutional right to counsel. See id. at 51-53. The Court found significant, however, that the statute at issue in Fuller imposed reimbursement obligations only upon defendants who were actually able to pay. Id. Other states also have recoupment statutes, but those states recoup only from convicted defendants. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 161.665 (2011). The American Bar Association recommends that states go even further by recouping from defendants &quot;only in instances where they have made fraudulent representations for purposes of being found eligible for counsel.&quot; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-7.2 cmt, at 92-93 (3d ed. 1992). See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &amp; JUD. PROC. § 12-302(c)(4)(vi) (LexisNexis 2014) (&quot;If the State loses the appeal, the jurisdiction shall pay all the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal.&quot;); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.110(2) (2014) (reimbursing defendants acquitted by reason of self-defense for &quot;all reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in[the] defense&quot;). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1447 (West 2011) (misdemeanors or infractions); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.070 (West 2006) (impeachment proceedings); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-103 (2013) (misdemeanors). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 16-6.1 (West 2014) (acts or omissions arising out of one's performance of official duties); N.Y. Pur. OFF. LAW § 19(2)(a) (McKinney 2008) (actions within the scope of one's public employment or duties). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-327(B) (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1447 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3923 (2004); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § ld (2014). See, e.g., Fotios (Fred) M. Burtzos, Should I Lose Just Because You Accuse?, COLO. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 101, 102, 104 (&quot;A defendant who prevails, regardless of how that takes place, should not be mined or left significantly worse off for winning .... If the district attorney chooses to pursue someone in court and fails in that pursuit, the office of the district attorney should be required to try to return that person to the same financial position he or she was in before the prosecution began.&quot;); Omer Dekel, Should the Acquitted Recover Damages? The Right of an Acquitted Defendant to Receive Compensation for the Injury He Has Suffered, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 474, 474 (2011) (contending that the &quot;prosecution should bear the various costs of an acquitted defendant's trial process&quot;); Luciana Echazu &amp; Nuno Garoupa, Why Not Adopt a Loser-Pays-All Rule in Criminal Litigation?, 32 INT'L REV. L. &amp; ECON. 233, 234 (2012) (considering an economic model for implementing &quot;a loser-pays-all rule&quot; in criminal cases, with a focus on the rule's effects on deterrence and legal error); Pamela S. Karlan, Fee Shifting in Criminal Cases, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583, 584, 600 (1995) (suggesting that fee shifting should be applied to certain classes of criminal cases, including cases in which defendants retained private counsel and were acquitted, but only if such defendants can &quot;prove their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence&quot;); Russell E. Lovell II, The Case for Reimbursing Court Costs and a Reasonable Attorney Fee to the Non-Indigent Defendant upon Acquittal, 49 NEB. L. REV. 515, 516-18 (1970) (advocating for reimbursement for non-indigent acquitted defendants using a tort-like remedy to make them whole again); Keith S. Rosenn, Compensating the Innocent Accused, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 705, 706 (1976) (noting the devastatingly high costs of criminal defense work and arguing for the creation of a &quot;a right to compensation for damages resulting from erroneous criminal charges&quot;); cf Johan David Michels, Compensating Acquitted Defendants for Detention Before International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 407, 408 (2010) (arguing that acquitted defendants &quot;should have a right to compensation for the period spent indetention before an international criminal court&quot;). But see David S. Jones, How Many Shields Are Enough?, COLO. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 101, 103 (responding to Burtzos' article, supra, and stating that &quot;[tlo say we need new legislation allowing [acquitted defendants] recovery of attorney fees, costs, or other damages from the government ignores not only the current safeguards for the accused, but also their existing remedies&quot;). The article continues noting that: Ten states reimburse at least some acquitted defendants for their attorney's fees. l00 While no state provides attorney's fees reimbursement to all acquitted defendants, every state allowing for reimbursement of public employees includes such fees in their reimbursement laws. The ten states are: Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5108.3(B)(1) (2014) (permitting &quot;payment of legal fees and expenses for defense&quot;); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &amp; JuD. PROC. § 12-302(c)(4)(vi) (LexisNexis 2014) (stating that for certain unsuccessful appeals by the State, &quot;the jurisdiction shall pay all the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal&quot;); MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-1-47(1) (2010) (authorizing municipalities &quot;to investigate and provide legal counsel&quot; to public employee defendants); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 12-20 (West 2014) (stating that, for boards of education members, &quot;the board of education shall defray all costs of defending such action, including reasonable counsel fees and expenses&quot;); id. § 18A:16-6.1 (stating that, for officers and employees of boards of education, &quot;the board of education shall reimburse [them] for the cost of defending such proceeding, including reasonable counsel fees&quot;); id. § 40A: 14-155 (West 2014) (providing that, for members of municipal police departments, &quot;the municipality shall provide said member or officer with necessary means for the defense&quot;); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 19(2)(a) (McKinney 2008) (I]t shall be the duty of the state to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses incurred by or on behalf of an employee in his or her defense of a criminal proceeding .... ); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-6-201(1) (LexisNexis 2013) (&quot;[Public] employee[s] shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs necessarily incurred in the defense .... &quot;); id. § 53A-6-503(2) (&quot;[A]n educator is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the educator's defense .... &quot;); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-124.28 (2013) (stating that, for acquitted members of the Virginia Retirement System, &quot;the Board may reimburse all or part of the cost of employing legal counsel&quot;); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.110(2) (West 2014) (providing that, for a defendant acquitted by reason of self-defense, &quot;the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for all reasonable costs, including ... legal fees incurred ... in his or her defense&quot;); PA. R.J.A. No. 1922(A) (A judge may be reimbursed for legal fees paid in the defense of a criminal action .... &quot;); supra notes 84, 88-90 (quoting Massachusetts' four relevant court rules permitting reimbursement of a defendant's &quot;reasonable attorney's fees&quot; for certain unsuccessful appeals by the Commonwealth). Footnote On Compensation For Wrongful Convictions There is also no general right to reimbursement or compensation after a wrongful conviction which is set aside, apart from a § 1983 lawsuit against a law enforcement official who intentionally violated the well established constitutional rights of the wrongfully convicted person. Some states provide by statute or court rule for compensation of wrongfully convicted defendants whose convictions are set aside, but state law varies greatly on the standard for determining a right to compensation and on the amount of compensation that must be awarded. Often there is no right to compensation absent proof of actual factual innocence rather than a merely vacated conviction, and/or wrongdoing by a state actor. Many states provide no relief or compensation to a wrongfully convicted defendant who is later released other than the federal § 1983 action if it is available.