Can declassified information be reclassified? It seems that the laws around the safekeeping of certain US government and national security information are described by President Obama's Executive Order 13526. These make clear that the ultimate power to declassify documents rests with the executive. Topically, President Trump appears to be referring to this fact to justify being in possession of &quot;documents with classification markings&quot;; that he had the authority to declassify such during his Presidency and hence the documents are hence no longer subject to the protections demanded of classified documents. This, to a layman, seems like a (nearly) bulletproof defence. The one exception I can see is if a future President (e.g. President Biden) unilaterally reclassify the document at a higher level, now that President Trump no longer possesses his powers of classification under the Presidential office. This leads to two related questions: If the classification level of a document has been reduced - so exposing this to a larger audience - can it later be reclassified to a higher level? Can the President or delegated power capriciously classify any document in the possession of a political rival, without him or her knowing, and cause the rival to be in breach of law?
The DOJ has a handy FAQ about declassification on their site. There are statutory and E.O. provisions for automatic declassification of information (I think the most common one in practice is &quot;historically important information after 25 years&quot;). Though this is subject to review and may be rejected in particular situations, dictated by much the same provisions. As for reclassifying automatically declassified information, the FAQ says: CAN INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED BE RECLASSIFIED? Yes. Information that has not previously been disclosed to the public under proper authority may be classified or reclassified after an agency has received a request for it under the FOIA, Presidential Records Act, 44 USC 2204(c)(1), the Privacy Act of 1974, or the mandatory review provisions of E.O. 13526, only if such classification or reclassification meets the requirements of E.O. 13526, and is accomplished on a document-by-document basis with the personal participation or under the direction of the agency head, the deputy agency head, or the senior agency official. Information may not be reclassified after declassification and release to the public under proper authority. Similar provisions were detailed in E.O. 12958. A &quot;proper authority&quot; would not include, say, leaks, like those due to Snowden. Note that, as for Trump's situation, while he most surely counted as a &quot;proper authority&quot; while President, there is no indication whatsoever that the information was also released to the public under his or any other proper authority. A recent and somewhat controversial example of reclassification began in 1999 under the Clinton administration, as a result of aforementioned E.O. 12958, and lasted for several years after. To justify their reclassification program, officials at CIA and military agencies have argued that during the implementation of Executive Order 12958, President Clinton's program for bulk declassification of historical federal records, many sensitive intelligence-related documents that remained classified were inadvertently released at NARA, especially in State Department files. Even though researchers had been combing through and copying documents from those collections for years, CIA and other agencies compelled NARA to grant them access to the open files so they could reclassify documents. A separate article from the same link provides: ...security officials at DOE had become concerned that the implementation of EO 12958 had led to the inadvertent release in State Department and other agency records at NARA of &quot;unmarked&quot; restricted and formerly restricted data on nuclear weapons. In the fall of 1998, Congress formally authorized the Department of Energy to remove from public document repositories any and all sensitive nuclear weapons design-related information pursuant to Section 3161 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, entitled &quot;Protection Against Inadvertent Release of Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data.&quot; The argument the agencies seemed to advance for this reclassification is that prior declassifications had not undergone the proper equity considerations: meaning that agencies other than the ones who declassified them had an interest and say in their classification, which should not have been overlooked. While some complained about the reclassification of information that had entered the public domain—the material had been on the public shelves for years, and some of it had even been published and a good deal more of it sifted through by various parties—this did not seem to matter to the agencies. Much as classified information leaked by Snowden or anyone else remains classified, the information becoming common/public knowledge does not necessarily automatically affect its classification status, or ability to be (re)classified.
You have misread the DMLP page. In Pennsylvania, it is illegal to record a conversation if you are a party and if the other party does not consent. The fact that federal law doesn't ban something doesn't mean that states can't ban it. There is generally a presumption that when both the feds and the states can legitimately regulate something, the feds weren't trying to preempt all state laws on the topic. While people often say "federal law takes precedence over state law," the normal rule is that both laws apply; the federal law only blocks the state law if the feds wanted to block said state laws. So far as I can tell, the federal law has never been held to preempt two-party consent laws; the point of the federal law was to restrict recording, not extend it. It's like how federal law doesn't prohibit taking hostages inside the US to coerce a private company into doing what you want (anti-terrorism laws might, I guess, but the federal hostage-taking law doesn't); while the federal law excludes most hostage-taking in the US, that doesn't mean that it's legal to take hostages. Congress sometimes wants to establish nationwide standards for something, but the presumption is that they didn't.
Your parsing is incorrect. The semicolon after &quot;from the same&quot; starts a new clause. It should be read as: [Part 2] They shall in all cases, except treason, felony and breach of the peace, [Part 3] be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; [Part 4] and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other place. So they are privileged from arrest while attending sessions, or while going to and returning from those sessions, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of the peace. As a separate privilege, they shall not be questioned anywhere (except in Congress itself) regarding their speech and debate in Congress. But if they are neither attending, going to, or returning from a Congressional session, and the crime is not related to their speech or debate, they have no immunity. Also, to echo user6726, the privilege from arrest while attending Congress or traveling is not the same as immunity. If they commit a crime on the way to or from Congress, they can still be arrested after they get home, and subsequently tried and convicted.
Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple | Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.”
It should be legal (though I can't find an analogous case where the court has ruled that it is). There is a regulation summarizing the government's position (thus, what will be enforced in 17 CFR 240.10b, which prohibits use of "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in stock trading. Section 240.10b5-1 says: The “manipulative and deceptive devices” prohibited by Section 10(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j) and §240.10b-5 thereunder include, among other things, the purchase or sale of a security of any issuer, on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information. The executives clearly have a direct duty of trust of confidence. Section 240.10b5-2 enumerates the following duties: (1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence; (2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or reasonably should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or (3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who was the source of the information expected that the person would keep the information confidential, because of the parties' history, pattern, or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding to maintain the confidentiality of the information. In the hypothetical, (1) is plainly not applicable. (2) is predicated on having a relationship (which doesn't exist) and the information-having expecting you to keep the information secret (he doesn't know that you have overheard them). (3) is likewise not applicable. The basic rule is that you can't "misapproprate" information, but you can use information that falls into your lap (even from a person who has a duty to not disclose the information). This subsection starts saying "For purposes of this section, a “duty of trust or confidence” exists in the following circumstances, among others", which means they aren't necessarily giving you an exhaustive list. Still, there is currently no legal basis for prosecuting a person who overhears information from someone he has no relationship to, even if you are pretty confident that the information has not been made public.
Doesn't the last statement contradicts the first one? Are agencies controlled by the President or insulated from his control? These statements aren't contradictory. They just reflect a somewhat complex reality (although the new post-Scalia ultra-conservative supermajority on the U.S. Supreme Court has pushed the notion of a &quot;unitary executive&quot;, a long time conservative goal, that casts doubt on the constitutional validity of the structures discussed below that previously went unchallenged). Especially starting around the time of the New Deal (the 1930s), Congress started to vigorously utilize the concept of an &quot;independent agency&quot; such as the National Labor Relations Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Postal Service Board (formed in the 1970s), Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and myriad other &quot;alphabet agencies.&quot; (The Federal Reserve Board was one the first). Congress also experimented with structures like that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the FBI) whose director serves for a seven years term, even though the director is a single person rather than a collective board. Generally speaking, these agencies are run by the Presidentially appointed and U.S. Senate confirmed directors or boards with appointee who serve for fixed terms. As Presidential appointees, they are ultimately controlled by the Presidency as an institution, even if not by the current sitting President. But, since these appointees have fixed terms of office and aren't merely employees at will who may be fired on demand by the President like cabinet secretaries, these appointees have some measure of insulation from direct Presidential direction on a day to day basis in the minutia of decision making. How much control of The President is enough for a textualist to accept Chevron doctrine? What if he could hire them but not fire them? What if he could suggest them what to do but not order them what to do? The Chevron doctrine really has nothing to do with the amount of authority that the President exercises over independent agencies and the civil service. Instead, the Chevron doctrine is a separation of powers doctrine that provides that courts should defer to the executive branch (which is ultimately directed by the President, who has near absolute authority over agencies in some cases, and less authority over agencies in other cases), rather than interpreting laws from a blank slate, in cases where a federal agency has adopted an authoritative interpretation of a federal law that is not precluded by a fair reading of the statue in question, even if the court would have interpreted the statute differently in the absence of federal agency input. The Chevron doctrine tilts the balance between courts and the President in favor of the President, making the President stronger than the President would otherwise have been in the absence of this doctrine. (And, keep in mind that all regulations and litigation of the federal government goes through the Justice Department, which the President does directly control, to a great extent, even when agencies are independent and have significant autonomy.) The authority of the President to direct tenured civil servants who are not political appointees who can be hired and fired at will, or with U.S. Senate approval, is an entirely different issue with far less of a constitutional dimension until the last couple of years when a conservative supermajority captured the U.S. Supreme Court and has tried to push the non-textual and non-originalist &quot;unitary executive&quot; doctrine.
The issue raised by the post primarily comes up in the context of a &quot;National Security Letter&quot; which is a form of administrative subpoena which a recipient is not allowed to disclose having received in many cases. For example, the case of ACLU v. Ashcroft, linked in the question, and pertaining to Calyx Internet Access (2004), involved a National Security Letter. There was also a National Security Letter component to the Lavabit (2013) case cited in the question. But the National Security Letter statute itself (at least as presently amended) expressly allows conferral with counsel about it. The relevant statute is 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(2) which provides: (A) In general. — A wire or electronic communication service provider that receives a request under subsection (b), or officer, employee, or agent thereof, may disclose information otherwise subject to any applicable nondisclosure requirement to — (i) those persons to whom disclosure is necessary in order to comply with the request; (ii) an attorney in order to obtain legal advice or assistance regarding the request; or (iii) other persons as permitted by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the designee of the Director. Even if this exception were not in the law, however, this exception would probably be implied in law, because the courts have held that National Security Letters and similar non-disclosure agreements must provide a timely opportunity for judicial review, which implicitly includes a right to counsel in the proceeding. See Under Seal v. Sessions, Slip Op. at 34-40 (9th Cir. 2017). Similarly, a Medicaid gag rule, that prohibited people from conferring with lawyers regarding legal options for circumventing means tests for the Medicare nursing home program, were held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Zahner v. MacKereth, Civil No. 11-306 Erie (W.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2014, not overruled or negatively treated on appeal). There are a few tribunals, primarily the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court (that provides probable cause and legality review for national security inquires) and the military commissions in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in which a lawyer representing a party in those tribunals must have a security clearance. But, the requirement of a security clearance to represent someone in the tribunal would not apply to pre-litigation legal counsel to review and response to the National Security Letter.
The short answer is no. The President has plenary and absolute power to pardon anyone other than himself, before or after conviction, of any federal crime. Therefore, his constitutional exercise of this power, whatever its motive, can not constitute a crime, although it could be a ground for impeaching the President or retaliating against the President politically. In historical practice, Presidents and Governors have been increasingly loathe to use the pardon power, and tend to use it only when they are political lame ducks, precisely because the political costs of a pardon can be so high. UPDATE: Also, to be clear, a President cannot pardon a crime before it is committed, so a true &quot;pre-emptive pardon&quot; does not exist. A President can pardon a crime that has not produced a conviction, but that is very different from pardoning a crime that has not yet occurred. Further, a pardon does not relieve an individual of civil liability, for example, monetary liability to another private individual, for the same conduct, or of state criminal law liability. It extends only to federal crimes and the civil collateral consequences of any conviction of that crime if there has been a conviction of that crime. For example, a pardon relieves the person pardoned from collateral consequences such as a prohibition on possessing a firearm, a loss of the right to vote, or a prohibition on the right to engage in a licensed occupation that felons are prohibited from being licensed to perform. But, a pardon does not relieve the person pardoned, for example, of engaging in wire fraud, of civil liability for money damages to the person defrauded. Similarly, while one can pardon a criminal contempt conviction, in which a court punishes someone with incarceration or a fine for violating a court order, a pardon can not relieve someone from a civil contempt citation which imposes incarceration or a per day fine (usually) until someone complies with a court order that it is within the power of that person to comply with (e.g. an order directing someone to testify in a civil lawsuit or to turn over the password to a Swiss bank account).