What legal provision in the U.S. law allow the Catholic Church to discriminate against women? What legal provision in the U.S. law allow the Catholic Church to discriminate against women? Women aren't allowed to become priest yet, but isn't this against the discrimination law? If not, what legal provision allows the Catholic Church to practice discrimination without any legal punishment?
This is known as the &quot;ministerial exception&quot;, which protects the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, which include the right of religious groups to determine who is and is not a member of their clergy, and emerges from the case-law of the US Supreme Court. The most recent leading case on this is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); as Chief Justice Roberts put it in that case: the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own
Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional.
The words of the prohibition in 24 CFR 100.60(a)are that It shall be unlawful for a person to refuse to sell or rent a dwelling to a person who has made a bona fide offer, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin or to refuse to negotiate with a person for the sale or rental of a dwelling because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin, or to discriminate against any person in the sale or rental of a dwelling because of handicap. It would be discriminatory for the landlord to refuse to rent to a person because they are or are not of some sex. Based just on the plain language of the prohibition, the author of the app or operator of a website is not renting / refusing to rent. Nevertheless, Roommate.com was sued, and found not liable, though not on the grounds that they hadn't discriminated Fair Housing Councils v. Rommate.com addressed an attempt to punish roommate.com on discriminatory grounds. The court states that &quot;The pivotal question is whether the FHA applies to roommates&quot;. The court's reasoning is a clear application of the notion of &quot;Congressional intent&quot;. As they say, There’s no indication that Congress intended to interfere with personal relationships inside the home. Congress wanted to address the problem of landlords discriminating in the sale and rental of housing, which deprived protected classes of housing opportunities. But a business transaction between a tenant and landlord is quite different from an arrangement between two people sharing the same living space. We seriously doubt Congress meant the FHA to apply to the latter. Consider, for example, the FHA’s prohibition against sex discrimination. Could Congress, in the 1960s, really have meant that women must accept men as roommates? Telling women they may not lawfully exclude men from the list of acceptable roommates would be controversial today; it would have been scandalous in the 1960s The court continued on other grounds, observing that given that the FHA is a remedial statute that we construe broadly... we turn to constitutional concerns, which provide strong countervailing considerations That is, even if you ignore congressional intent, there is a constitutional reason why FHA cannot apply to roommate choice. SCOTUS in Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 stated that &quot;the freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights&quot;, and &quot;Courts have extended the right of intimate association to marriage, child bearing, child rearing and cohabitation with relatives&quot;. Then in order to &quot;determine whether a particular relationship is protected by the right to intimate association we look to 'size, purpose, selectivity, and whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship'&quot;. After extensive analysis centered around the point that &quot;Government regulation of an individual’s ability to pick a roommate thus intrudes into the home, which 'is entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of our people'&quot;, the court &quot;adopt[s] the narrower construction that excludes roommate selection from the reach of the FHA&quot;. TL;DR the FHA doesn't apply to roommates and it's legal to select one's roommates based on their race, color, religion, sex, sexuality, etc...
Clause (c) says that while schools cannot generally restrict otherwise legal expressions by students, a school run by a religious organization can restrict such speech in terms of its tenets. It then becomes a matter of fact to be proven in court that the church has a particular tenet. So if you are asking whether it is correct that the religion exception is narrowly limited to contradictions of the religion's tenets, that is correct.
With respect to disciplining its students and employees, a private school can basically do whatever it wants. There's more freedom to do so with respect to students than with employees, who have greater protections derived from anti-discrimination laws, collective-bargaining agreements, and the like. If a private school wants to impose a No Burger Tuesdays and a complete ban on political activity, that's probably going to be permissible. The First Amendment will protect the school's right to associate with only those who meet its standards, as absurd as those standards may be. Again, there are exceptions to this rule, like Title IX, which requires equal educational opportunities regardless of sex, but they don't have much bearing on your question. Even for a public school, there will be quite a bit of latitude here, because these rules don't actually regulate off-campus conduct. If a student wants to attend an off-campus public gathering, the campus police aren't going to lock him in his room or arrest him for leaving campus. The rule is simply that if you attend a public gathering off campus, you may not come back on campus afterward to threaten the lives of your classmates.
Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise.
No. Only specified means of disposition of bodies are allowed by law in Kentucky and this is not one of them. The statute that applies once the body comes into the possession of a coroner is here. The statute that applies when a death appears to involve suspicious circumstances is here. Dispositions of a body that constitute the crime of "desecration of a dead body" crimes in Kentucky are described here. But, the the scenario in the question, while not within any of the clear exceptions to that particular crime, is also not clearly within the definition of that crime. Instead, it would probably be a violation of state funeral home regulations, which are mostly civil rather than criminal offenses. A subtle point is that certain transformations of a dead body such as cremation and certain kinds of treatments (such as plasticizing) that can cause a body to cease to rot also have the effect of causing the dead body to no longer count as a dead body legally for purposes of laws regulating the disposal of dead bodies. Kentucky law does not expressly authorize something quite similar to the original post which is the Tibetan Buddhist and Parsi (a.k.a. Zoroastrian) religious practice of "sky burial". But, the free exercise clause of the freedom of religion granted by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and incorporated against the states via the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (a federal statute), may either render this state prohibition unconstitutional or pre-empt it under federal law, because religious practices have greater legal protections than artistic practices. This would be a close call because sky burial can present public health risks that overcome first amendment freedom of religion rights.
Federally, in places of public accommodation, discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This was upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 379 U.S. 241. As summarized in that case, "Public Accommodations" cover: any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence any restaurant, cafeteria . . . any motion picture house . . . any establishment . . . which is physically located within the premises of any establishment otherwise covered by this subsection, or . . . within the premises of which is physically located any such covered establishment . . . In Oregon, there are additional restrictions imposed by the Equality Act of 2007: Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all persons within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation, without any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or age if the individual is 18 years of age or older. In Oregon, a "place of public accommodation" includes: Any place or service offering to the public accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges whether in the nature of goods, services, lodgings, amusements, transportation or otherwise. Other states may not have these extra prohibitions or different prohibitions. They may also have statutory exceptions for peoples' sincerely held religious beliefs. Why the legislature chose to specifically protect these classes is a policy question better asked on Politics.SE.