When aquitted in a &quot;The People vs XYZ&quot; trial, is XYZ entitled to any compensation for all they went through as an innocent party? Say that Bob is put on trial for murder in some County. So the trial will be &quot;The People vs Bob&quot;, and headed by the local government*. Bob spends weeks held in jail and spends tens of thousands on attorneys. Ultimately, Bob is found unanimously not guilty (e.g. due to some very strong evidence that obviously shows he's innocent). Is Bob entitled to any compensation from the government or anyone? A completely innocent man spent weeks in jail and had to spend thousands. Not to mention probably completely trashing his reputation. Can the government just do that to citizens and the citizens just have to live with it? I'm mainly interested about the answer for the USA, and perhaps California in particular. *I don't know how law works, so sorry if I'm not exactly write about the naming/jurisdiction conventions. The point is that it's the public government vs Bob.
Short Answer Is Bob entitled to any compensation from the government or anyone? Generally not, although there are some states where this is possible on a limited basis or in isolated circumstances. Sometimes Bob can get his non-attorney fee court costs reimbursed or can have his government employer indemnify him for his attorney fee expenses in work related criminal prosecutions resulting in an acquittal. California is among the states that reimburse people acquitted of misdemeanor or infraction cases for court costs incurred (but not attorney fees), but this doesn't extend to felony criminal case acquittals. A minority of states (including California and federal criminal prosecutions) have exceptions for malicious prosecutions that are groundless and/or frivolous where reimbursement can be sought in a parallel case. Washington State allows an award of defense attorney fees if there is a self-defense based acquittal. Most states don't require reimbursement of the attorney fees incurred for a state provided public defender whether or not one is acquitted, but some do, at least in cases of conviction. Six states require a defendant who is acquitted but found to have had some ability to pay the legal fee of the defense to that extent. Those states are Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Nevada, New Hampshire and North Dakota. In addition, Michigan, does not allow for recoupment of appointed counsel defense costs after the fact, but it does require all able defendants to contribute to the costs of their assigned defense. A completely innocent man spent weeks in jail and had to spend thousands. Not to mention probably completely trashing his reputation. Can the government just do that to citizens and the citizens just have to live with it? Yes. State law is the main protection and varies widely. The majority rule is to provide no compensation. Federal Civil Rights Action Remedies There can also be an award as part of the remedy in a separate parallel lawsuit for an intentional violation of a person's federal constitutional rights by a state or local official acting under color of state or local law, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if the qualified immunity defense is overcome. Even then, there is almost never liability against a judge or prosecutor who intentionally violated the well established constitutional rights of a criminal defendant. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their court related conduct. But liability can be imposed if a judge's actions are complete ultra vires (i.e. outside the scope of his or her authority), or if a prosecutor participates in the investigative phase of a criminal case in a manner indistinguishable from other law enforcement officers. The only case I can recall where civil liability was imposed on a judge was a case where he threw a child who was not a party to a custody case (a sibling of a child whose case was before the judge) in jail without any legal proceedings for a few days on grounds that did not constitute contempt of court. Judges and prosecutors are not immune to criminal charges related to their misconduct or to removal from office or disbarment for their misconduct, however. Long Answer There are some U.S. states where almost all acquitted defendant are entitled to some compensation (at least for &quot;court costs&quot;): Florida, Missouri, New Jersey, and North Carolina without limiting reimbursement by type of case or type of defendant. Thus, all defendants acquitted of criminal charges in these four states are potentially eligible to receive compensation for certain defense expenses. But these usually don't include attorney fees, just out of pocket court process related costs other than attorney fees. Washington State which reimburses attorney fees incurred defendant a self-defense case has arguably the broadest provision of for awarding attorney fees to acquitted defendants who hire their own counsel. Louisiana allows discretionary awards of attorney fees as a general matter, but in practice, it is closer to the states and the federal rule that allows for malicious prosecution actions in exceptional cases. In the vast majority of U.S. states, an acquitted defendant is not entitled to any compensation. In some U.S. states, such as North Carolina and Texas, a convicted defendant must often pay the cost of their public defendant as part of their court costs, a debt which is owed to the state which pays for public defenders. In theory, at least, this reflects the fact that an acquittal is not a finding that the defendant is innocent, only a finding that guilt was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Some states allow compensation for a &quot;malicious prosecution&quot; in a collateral lawsuit. For example, in federal criminal cases, the Hyde Amendment to the Equal Access to Justice Act, permits a criminal defendant to recover reasonable attorney's fees if (1) the defendant are acquitted, and (2) “if the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith.” 18 U.S.C. § 3006A note. This is parallel to the standard for sanctions for a lawsuit lacking substantial justification in a civil case. A law review article from 2001 reviews how that provision has been applied. (Spoiler: acquitted defendants who are themselves particularly rare in the federal system with only nine successful cases from 1997 to 2001, rarely win Hyde Amendment claims in the entire United States. But it does happen now and then.) As survey of U.S. practice in these situations is found in a 2015 law review article (with relevant footnotes included below): This controversy is a national issue, affecting defendants prosecuted at both the federal and state levels.6 While the federal government has adopted a single, limited approach by which acquitted defendants may seek reimbursement,7 state approaches vary widely8 -from providing no reimbursement whatsoever9 to providing full reimbursement for legal expenses and attorney's fees in certain situations.10 For example, some states limit reimbursement to defendants acquitted of certain offenses,11 while other states limit reimbursement to public employees12 or to those who have been prosecuted in bad faith.13 Although there have been occasional scholarly efforts advocating compensation for acquitted criminal defendants,14 none reviews the existing state laws on reimbursement or how these laws are applied. At least twenty states provide some form of reimbursement to certain defendants.15 Civil-suit reimbursement is a separate but related issue. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-37-10 (2013) (providing that the attorney of a prevailing party in a civil suit may recover attorney's fees and disbursements from the adverse party); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 15-17-37 (2013) (&quot;The prevailing party in a civil action or special proceeding may recover expenditures necessarily incurred in gathering and procuring evidence or bringing the matter to trial.&quot;). See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DuKE L.J. 651 (discussing several rationales for attorney fee shifting in civil litigation but refraining from expressing a preference for or against fee shifting). This Article focuses only on reimbursement for acquitted criminal defendants. The Hyde Amendment allows a prevailing party in a criminal case to recover attorney's fees and other expenses when the position of the United States was &quot;vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith.&quot; Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012)). While states have taken various approaches to reimbursement, they have almost uniformly addressed the issue through legislation. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Sawyer, 620 So. 2d 757, 758 (Fla. 1993) (&quot;Cost provisions are a creature of statute and must be carefully construed. This Court has held for over a century that cost provisions against the State must be expressly authorized .... ); People v. Lavan, 218 N.W.2d 797, 798 (Mich. Ct. App. 1974) (stating that the trial court's award to acquitted defendant of his costs and attorney's fees violated the sovereign immunity doctrine because there was no statutory authorization for the award). But see Latimore v. Commonwealth, 633 N.E.2d 396, 398 (Mass. 1994) (&quot;As a general rule, absent a statute or court rule authorizing the award of attorney's fees and costs, parties are responsible for their own costs of litigation.&quot; (emphasis added) (citing cases)), superseded by amended rule, MASS. R. CRIM. P. 15, as recognized in Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 739 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 n.4 (Mass. 2000) (noting that Rule 15 was amended following Latimore in order to provide additional reimbursement). There are a few exceptions, however. For example, North Carolina provides for reimbursement through a constitutional provision, see N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23, and Massachusetts provides for reimbursement through court-made procedural rules, see MASS. R. CRIM. P. 15(d), 25(c)(2), 30(c). See, e.g., James J. Belanger, Frederick R. Petti &amp; James Berchtold, Seeking Attorney's Fees in Criminal Cases, NEV. LAW., Mar. 2002, at 6, 32 (&quot;Nevada currently has no mechanism for compensating a criminal defendant who has been forced to defend him or herself in a groundless action.&quot;). Not only do the remaining states provide no reimbursement to acquitted defendants, but a few of them partially charge acquitted indigent defendants for their legal representation. Six states currently have &quot;recoupment&quot; statutes that require acquitted indigent defendants to reimburse the state for a portion of their appointed defense counsel's fees if they are able. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113-3.1(a)-(b) (West 2014); IOWA CODE § 815.9 (2013); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.120(1)(b) (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.3975(1)-(2) (2001); Id. § 178.398 (LexisNexis 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A:9(J) (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1(2) (2013). A seventh state, Michigan, does not allow for recoupment after the fact, but it does require all able defendants to contribute to the costs of their assigned defense. See MICH. CT. R. 6.005(C). The United States Supreme Court, in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974), upheld the constitutionality of recoupment statutes, finding that requiring repayment does not interfere with, or have a chilling effect on, the constitutional right to counsel. See id. at 51-53. The Court found significant, however, that the statute at issue in Fuller imposed reimbursement obligations only upon defendants who were actually able to pay. Id. Other states also have recoupment statutes, but those states recoup only from convicted defendants. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 161.665 (2011). The American Bar Association recommends that states go even further by recouping from defendants &quot;only in instances where they have made fraudulent representations for purposes of being found eligible for counsel.&quot; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 5-7.2 cmt, at 92-93 (3d ed. 1992). See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &amp; JUD. PROC. § 12-302(c)(4)(vi) (LexisNexis 2014) (&quot;If the State loses the appeal, the jurisdiction shall pay all the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal.&quot;); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.110(2) (2014) (reimbursing defendants acquitted by reason of self-defense for &quot;all reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in[the] defense&quot;). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1447 (West 2011) (misdemeanors or infractions); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 63.070 (West 2006) (impeachment proceedings); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-103 (2013) (misdemeanors). See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 16-6.1 (West 2014) (acts or omissions arising out of one's performance of official duties); N.Y. Pur. OFF. LAW § 19(2)(a) (McKinney 2008) (actions within the scope of one's public employment or duties). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-327(B) (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1447 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3923 (2004); MICH. CoMP. LAWS § ld (2014). See, e.g., Fotios (Fred) M. Burtzos, Should I Lose Just Because You Accuse?, COLO. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 101, 102, 104 (&quot;A defendant who prevails, regardless of how that takes place, should not be mined or left significantly worse off for winning .... If the district attorney chooses to pursue someone in court and fails in that pursuit, the office of the district attorney should be required to try to return that person to the same financial position he or she was in before the prosecution began.&quot;); Omer Dekel, Should the Acquitted Recover Damages? The Right of an Acquitted Defendant to Receive Compensation for the Injury He Has Suffered, 47 CRIM. L. BULL. 474, 474 (2011) (contending that the &quot;prosecution should bear the various costs of an acquitted defendant's trial process&quot;); Luciana Echazu &amp; Nuno Garoupa, Why Not Adopt a Loser-Pays-All Rule in Criminal Litigation?, 32 INT'L REV. L. &amp; ECON. 233, 234 (2012) (considering an economic model for implementing &quot;a loser-pays-all rule&quot; in criminal cases, with a focus on the rule's effects on deterrence and legal error); Pamela S. Karlan, Fee Shifting in Criminal Cases, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 583, 584, 600 (1995) (suggesting that fee shifting should be applied to certain classes of criminal cases, including cases in which defendants retained private counsel and were acquitted, but only if such defendants can &quot;prove their actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence&quot;); Russell E. Lovell II, The Case for Reimbursing Court Costs and a Reasonable Attorney Fee to the Non-Indigent Defendant upon Acquittal, 49 NEB. L. REV. 515, 516-18 (1970) (advocating for reimbursement for non-indigent acquitted defendants using a tort-like remedy to make them whole again); Keith S. Rosenn, Compensating the Innocent Accused, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 705, 706 (1976) (noting the devastatingly high costs of criminal defense work and arguing for the creation of a &quot;a right to compensation for damages resulting from erroneous criminal charges&quot;); cf Johan David Michels, Compensating Acquitted Defendants for Detention Before International Criminal Courts, 8 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 407, 408 (2010) (arguing that acquitted defendants &quot;should have a right to compensation for the period spent indetention before an international criminal court&quot;). But see David S. Jones, How Many Shields Are Enough?, COLO. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 101, 103 (responding to Burtzos' article, supra, and stating that &quot;[tlo say we need new legislation allowing [acquitted defendants] recovery of attorney fees, costs, or other damages from the government ignores not only the current safeguards for the accused, but also their existing remedies&quot;). The article continues noting that: Ten states reimburse at least some acquitted defendants for their attorney's fees. l00 While no state provides attorney's fees reimbursement to all acquitted defendants, every state allowing for reimbursement of public employees includes such fees in their reimbursement laws. The ten states are: Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Washington. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5108.3(B)(1) (2014) (permitting &quot;payment of legal fees and expenses for defense&quot;); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &amp; JuD. PROC. § 12-302(c)(4)(vi) (LexisNexis 2014) (stating that for certain unsuccessful appeals by the State, &quot;the jurisdiction shall pay all the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal&quot;); MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-1-47(1) (2010) (authorizing municipalities &quot;to investigate and provide legal counsel&quot; to public employee defendants); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A: 12-20 (West 2014) (stating that, for boards of education members, &quot;the board of education shall defray all costs of defending such action, including reasonable counsel fees and expenses&quot;); id. § 18A:16-6.1 (stating that, for officers and employees of boards of education, &quot;the board of education shall reimburse [them] for the cost of defending such proceeding, including reasonable counsel fees&quot;); id. § 40A: 14-155 (West 2014) (providing that, for members of municipal police departments, &quot;the municipality shall provide said member or officer with necessary means for the defense&quot;); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 19(2)(a) (McKinney 2008) (I]t shall be the duty of the state to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses incurred by or on behalf of an employee in his or her defense of a criminal proceeding .... ); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-6-201(1) (LexisNexis 2013) (&quot;[Public] employee[s] shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs necessarily incurred in the defense .... &quot;); id. § 53A-6-503(2) (&quot;[A]n educator is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the educator's defense .... &quot;); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-124.28 (2013) (stating that, for acquitted members of the Virginia Retirement System, &quot;the Board may reimburse all or part of the cost of employing legal counsel&quot;); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.110(2) (West 2014) (providing that, for a defendant acquitted by reason of self-defense, &quot;the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for all reasonable costs, including ... legal fees incurred ... in his or her defense&quot;); PA. R.J.A. No. 1922(A) (A judge may be reimbursed for legal fees paid in the defense of a criminal action .... &quot;); supra notes 84, 88-90 (quoting Massachusetts' four relevant court rules permitting reimbursement of a defendant's &quot;reasonable attorney's fees&quot; for certain unsuccessful appeals by the Commonwealth). Footnote On Compensation For Wrongful Convictions There is also no general right to reimbursement or compensation after a wrongful conviction which is set aside, apart from a § 1983 lawsuit against a law enforcement official who intentionally violated the well established constitutional rights of the wrongfully convicted person. Some states provide by statute or court rule for compensation of wrongfully convicted defendants whose convictions are set aside, but state law varies greatly on the standard for determining a right to compensation and on the amount of compensation that must be awarded. Often there is no right to compensation absent proof of actual factual innocence rather than a merely vacated conviction, and/or wrongdoing by a state actor. Many states provide no relief or compensation to a wrongfully convicted defendant who is later released other than the federal § 1983 action if it is available.
Almost certainly the answer to this is no because SB.8 talks of the $10K as being (minimum) statutory damages. (The actual provision 171.208(b)(2) is for damages &quot;not less&quot; than $10K, i.e. the court can award more in the first suit.) If e.g. someone breaks the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by making spurious claims against a group of people, they are each entitled to up to $1,000 statutory damages each (and class action is specifically allowed/mentioned). Generally, you can't avoid paying damages to an injured party by paying them to someone unrelated (before). There's nothing in SB.8 to suggest otherwise, the wording is: a court may not award relief under this section in response to a violation of Subsection (a)(1) or (2) if the defendant demonstrates that the defendant previously paid the full amount of statutory damages under Subsection (b)(2) in a previous action for that particular abortion performed Only proof of payment (not even having lost another suit on the same incident in another county) precludes a judge from awarding the statutory damages. (Claimants can file suits in their county of residence per 171.210, which me not knowing the Texas civil procedure too well, seem to allow multiple parallel lawsuits to proceed.) Now SB.8 is special in that limits relief to the first who sues (or maybe the first who wins) while enabling a very large class to claim injured status and sue... which in itself doesn't make a lot of sense when speaking of statutory damages, but it's a novel kind of relief, so who knows what courts may decide. (It would be interesting if a court determined that that first-claimant limit in SB.8 is unconstitutional, under either Texas or federal constitutions. In some other state laws, there is sometimes a limit on the total amount of damages out of a single incident, but it's not awarded on a first-winner basis, instead there's a provision to &quot;allocate to each claimant his equitable share of the total&quot;.) Granted a defendant could come with a legal strategy that look something like: when sued in Texas county arrange for a &quot;friendly&quot; organization (members) to immediately sue in another county. Fight the first lawsuit so as to delay judgement, but immediately concede the one from the &quot;friendly&quot; organization members, so that only the &quot;friendlies&quot; get the statutory damages (first), possibly e.g. donating them back to the defendant thereafter. Whether this would work really depends on details in the Texas civil procedure law, which I'm not too familiar with.
was there a good way to publicly shame Bob, and prevent him from getting his next job, without breaking Carol’s confidence? Apparently not. The conclusion that Bob's violations of company policy are short of breaking any laws leaves little to no reason for publicly shaming him. Details on the company policy, the facts, and the statements might make a difference, but your description is generic in that regard and would require us to speculate on what they could be. Could there have been grounds for a lawsuit? It largely depends on the terms of the publications, their veracity &amp; import, and --if false or unfounded-- their effect on Bob's prospects and/or whether the statements are defamatory per se. Would a truth defense for a statement such as, “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct,” require disclosing the investigation? Yes. A defendant has the burden to prove the [affirmative] defense(s) on which he intends to premise his position. Note that the statement “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct” in and of itself is not really a truth defense because it is inconclusive as to whether Bob was found to have incurred misconduct. The sole fact that Bob was investigated does not justify imputing to him disreputable conduct. Would a defense that the investigation gave them legitimate reasons to believe that the insinuation they made is true require them to disclose it? Yes. Bob is entitled to gather from the defendant the bases for the latter's allegations. Otherwise defamers would systematically elude their liability by sticking to generic allegations only. Are there other good defenses that could have gotten the lawsuit dismissed as frivolous? That requires us to speculate because we are given no details about the underlying events, Bob's pleadings, the evidence obtained during discovery, and so forth. That being said, a prevailing defense does not imply that the lawsuit is frivolous. Would the identities of the witnesses have been redacted? No. The fact that Bob did not break any laws suggests that the matter does not warrant measures akin to witness protection. Nor does your description reflect that the communications are protected by some privilege. Is it credible that Ethan had a good legal reason to keep this “in the family” for Carol’s sake? That is unanswerable because, inter alia, it is not about the law, it is unclear what exactly &quot;Carol's sake&quot; entails, and the substance of the company's other scandals as well as Ethan's reason(s) are unspecified. Ethan's &quot;good legal reason&quot; does not necessarily have to protect or advance &quot;Carol's sake&quot;.
"Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent.
This is manslaughter of the vehicular variety Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds:... (c) Vehicular— (1) ... driving a vehicle in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. This is what they call a wobbler, and could be charged as a felony or a misdemeanor. In the latter case, the maximum penalty is a year in county jail and in the former it is six years in state prison. If the cause was ordinary negligence, it is just a misdemeanor. The details of gross negligence are set forth in the jury instruction CALCRIM 592 A person acts with gross negligence when: He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury; AND A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. The "absent-mindedness" defense seems a bit far fetched, but still not everybody who drives inattentively is prosecuted for a felony, or even a misdemeanor. However, it is really hard to imagine not being acutely aware of the fact that people drive on the right side of the road here. Without a more-detailed story, I don't see a basis for deciding what level of negligence a prosecutor is likely to argue for, and what the prosecutor's agenda is: somewhere between no prosecution, and (most likely) misdemeanor manslaughter.
You can only sue once on the same facts on the same defendant The issue here is res judicata - once a case between 2 parties has been resolved, that matter can never be litigated again. So Adam cannot split his litigation against Bill. Adam has suffered no damage from Charlie If Adam now had an artwork of reduced value as a result of Charlie’s negligence he would. But he doesn’t have a damaged art work so Charlie has caused Adam no harm.
I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).
It seems like callous behavior which leads to a foreseeable death deserves a bigger punishment than just firing of the administrator. The starting point of the analysis is that no one is legally responsible, civilly or criminally, for a suicide unless that person intended that the person who committed suicide do so, which is almost certainly not true in this case. As a matter of law, a suicide caused by merely callous behavior not intended to cause someone to commit suicide is not foreseeable. And if the only actions brought are civil, then the University would be the defendant and the actual individuals who were involved would not themselves even face any trial. This is not accurate. It would be routine to bring suit against anyone personal involved (probably both the administrator and the gay student who allegedly colluded), as well as the University, and indeed, the likelihood of a recovery against one or both of the individuals would be greater than the chance of recovery against the University. To recover against the University it would be necessary to show that the Title IX violation occurred pursuant to an officially approved policy or practice of the University, but this case seems to have at its heart, a failure to an administrator to follow a policy of the University. It might be possible to sue the University or someone involved in the process for a violation of his civil rights, but generally speaking, his death would not constitute recoverable damages in a such a suit. Also, generally speaking, a Title IX claim requires that any party held liable to have had an intent to violate someone's civil rights, rather than that the person was merely mere inept or negligent in implementation or non-implementation of a bureaucratic policy or dispute resolution procedure. This is alleged by the Plaintiff, probably in part because it has to be to prevent the case from being dismissed on the pleadings, but is quite implausible that this really happened that way, and this is difficult to prove unless there is some really hard evidence backing up the alleged collusion. Generally speaking, the fact that a hearing board comes up with a wrong conclusion after allegedly not following proper procedure, is not actionable for damages and certainly wouldn't constitute fraud. UPDATED RESPONSE TO EDIT 2: there maybe other victims, in similar situations, who are not protected by the criminal justice system if nothing of what is alleged to have transpired is deemed illegal It is a common fallacy that if something is not a crime, that it is not illegal or that there are no remedies. A civil lawsuit is a common and often appropriate remedy for all manner of wrongs, and the compensatory and injunctive remedies for civil wrongs such as a breach of contract and torts such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress are often significant. This said, as a government entity, the University of Texas and its employees are probably immune to many tort causes of action that would be available against a private party engaged in the same conduct. In this case, probably the only viable causes of action against the University of Texas itself, as opposed to the responsible individuals in a particular case, would be for breach of contract for not actually carrying out its policies as impliedly promised, and for injunctive relief under Title IX insisting on new policies that would prevent misconduct in disciplinary proceedings. Generally speaking, a criminal law remedy is less victim oriented than a civil remedy and is outside the control of the victim, which can be traumatic for a victim who would prefer not to be involuntarily dragged into the criminal justice process. The notion that settlement is not possible in the criminal justice system is likewise mostly incorrect. There is a reason why we don't handle rapes (for example) in civil courts. Criminal justice system exists to make sure that, at least in theory, those who commit heinous acts cannot buy their way out of consequences of those actions. In fact, one can bring a cause of action for a rape in a civil court. I've done it. And, the lower threshold of proof, the lack of a right to remain silent without legal consequences under the 5th Amendment, the greater focus on compensation for the victim, and the greater level of control of the victim are all good reasons to pursue this route. Many cases of rape by people able to afford to pay compensation are also cases of actionable sexual harassment. In general, criminal law is the solution that is usually resorted to not so much because the acts committed are heinous, but because the typical person who violates a law that is criminally prosecuted is judgment proof and unable to pay compensation that is even remotely proportionate to the harm done, so a civil remedy does not discourage that behavior. Your typical rapist who is prosecuted in the criminal justice system isn't capable of paying meaningful compensation to a victim, although there are always exceptions. Preventing people from buying their way out of their wrongdoing is almost never advanced by criminal justice scholars as a reason for a criminal justice remedy. And, when I have clients who have been harmed, for example, by fraud, most would far prefer to receive compensation from the wrongdoer, than to see the perpetrator punished without receiving any meaningful compensation for their own injuries, which is the usual result in the criminal justice process. Most people think of the criminal justice system as more of a last resort when all other options fail than as a good first choice which it rarely is even when it is the least bad option. So back to the main question, what, if any, criminal charges can be leveled against the administrator and the false accuser if the alleged facts of the case can be confirmed to be true? In the fact pattern presented, where a public official at the University of Texas conspires with a student with whom the official has a pre-existing personal relationship to produce an intentionally inaccurate result in a University disciplinary hearing harming a defendant in that process, there are several university statutes that might form a basis for criminal action against either the public administrator or the conspiring student on the offense identified or conspiracy to commit the offense identified. In no case are any criminal charges against the University of Texas a plausible option in this fact pattern. Each of the offenses is a misdemeanor under Texas law. The best fit is "improper influence". Texas Penal Code § 36.04. This involves reaching an outcome in an adjudication for a reason other than one legally allowed due to someone's application of influence other than a bribe or kickback. The section states: (a) A person commits an offense if he privately addresses a representation, entreaty, argument, or other communication to any public servant who exercises or will exercise official discretion in an adjudicatory proceeding with an intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law. (b) For purposes of this section, “adjudicatory proceeding” means any proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal rights, powers, duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Two other possibilities are "abuse of official capacity", Texas Penal Code §39.02, or "official oppression" Texas Penal Code § 39.03. These sections and a related one, read as follows in the pertinent or potentially pertinent parts: Sec. 39.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and that directly or indirectly: (A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or (B) governs the conduct of the public servant. . . . Sec. 39.02. ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY. (a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly: (1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment . . . (b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. . . . 39.03. OFFICIAL OPPRESSION. (a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: . . . (2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or (3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment. (b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity. (c) In this section, "sexual harassment" means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly. (d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor . . . Also, in all three of these cases, the fact that someone committed suicide afterwards is basically irrelevant legally.