Why was no constitutional amendment needed to change the rules on succession to the Canadian throne? In 2013 a statute altered the rules on succession to the throne in Canada. (Specifically, if a woman is the eldest child of the monarch then she inherits the throne upon the monarch's death even if she has a brother. Earlier, a woman could inherit the throne only if she had no brothers.) Juxtapose this with the fact that nothing short of a constitutional amendment could make it lawful to build a bridge connecting Prince Edward Island with the mainland, and it seems weird. In Canada maybe it's not as easy as in the U.S. to discern which parts of the law are to be considered part of the constitution. (By comparison.) But this seems &quot;constitutional&quot; if that means how the state is constituted. Why was no constitutional amendment needed in this instance?
The top courts in both Ontario and Quebec have heard challenges to the Succession to the Throne Act, 2013, both upholding the Act, but for different and somewhat contradicting reasons. For reference, here is the Act's only substantive provision: The alteration in the law touching the Succession to the Throne set out in the bill laid before the Parliament of the United Kingdom and entitled A Bill to Make succession to the Crown not depend on gender; to make provision about Royal Marriages; and for connected purposes is assented to. Quebec I'll start with Quebec, since it provides a clear direct answer to your question. In Motard v. Attorney General of Canada, 2019 QCCA 1826 (English translation linked) the court concludes in paragraph 95 that: [...] Canada does not have rules of succession to the throne save for the unwritten constitutional principles of symmetry and hereditary succession determined by the United Kingdom. [...] Note that the principle of symmetry means maintaining the same monarch and/or rules of succession as the United Kingdom. Effectively, Canada only assented to the British changes as required by the Preamble to the Statute of Westminster 1931. Since there exist no separate Canadian rules of succession, there was no effective change to Canadian law, let alone one requiring constitutional amendment. Leave for appeal to the Supreme Court was denied. Ontario The Ontario challenge was Teskey v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 5046 (lower court decision cited, the Court of Appeal summarily affirmed). It relies mainly on precedent set in O’Donohue v. Canada, 2003 ONSC 41404. I'll outline my opinion, but unfortunately there is no direct answer to your question as both cases revolved around an attempt to invalidate the previous rules of succession on the basis that they violated the Charter by barring people who married Catholics (which the new rules also removed). As such, there was no clearly articulated reason in Teskey as to why the 2013 Act followed proper constitutional amendment procedure or whether it was required to begin with. O'Donahue is in agreement with Motard that symmetry and rules of succession are constitutional (para. 28 &amp; 36-37), but asserts that there exists separate Canadian and British rules in paragraph 34: The operation of this commitment to symmetry and union of Canada under the British Crown was demonstrated by the adoption in 1937 of the Succession to the Throne Act, 1 Geo. IV, c.16. This Canadian statute effected changes to the rules of succession in Canada to assure consistency with the changes in the rules then in place in Great Britain. The changes were necessary in light of the abdication of Edward VIII in 1936. Absent this Canadian statute, the statutory change in Great Britain to account for Edward VIII’s abdication would have been contrary to Great Britain’s commitment in the Statute of Westminster. Arguably, without this statute, Edwards [sic] VIII’s abdication would not have been effective in respect of the Crown of Canada. This results in a bit of a puzzle. If both symmetry and separate Canadian rules of succession are part of the constitution, then on a change in the British rules, Canada must either break symmetry (presumably a constitutional violation) or amend the rules of succession (presumably a constitutional amendment). This did not matter much for Edward VIII's abdication, as prior to patriation in 1982 this was all a bit moot since the Canadian constitution was effectively British, but it does matter for the 2013 Act. Here, Teskey paragraph 13 hints at a resolution: In the present case, the Applicant submitted in argument that Canada could and should adopt different succession rules from those which pertain in Great Britain with the possibility of recognizing a different monarch. I reject that argument on the same basis as Rouleau J. which is that this would change our present constitution in a fundamental manner and would involve the court changing, rather than protecting, our fundamental constitutional structure. and also paragraph 15: [...] the rules of succession and the requirement that they be the same as those of Great Britain, are necessary to the proper functioning of our constitutional monarchy [...] I believe that the most sensible reading is that Canada was constitutionally required to adopt the 2013 Act both to maintain symmetry and to respect the constitutional Statute of Westminster 1931. In light of this, it's my opinion that a constitutional amendment for modifying Canadian rules of succession was not required, since the constitution already foresaw this scenario.
Do newer contracts superceed prior ones? It depends on whether the contracts conflict with each other. That is why many contracts contain language akin to &quot;This contract supersedes and replaces any previous or contemporaneous agreements between the parties&quot;. The parties would need to adapt such clause if the contracts are compatible and they intend to maintain them. I have seen many contracts saying tgis &quot;this will happens unless agreed in writing to do something else&quot;.However many contracts do not have this in written. The main purpose of that language is to specify that any amendments to the contract shall be in writing. That precaution makes it easier to ascertain whose version of the contract is binding, such as where party A alleges an oral amendment and party B denies that such amendment was agreed upon. Your outline of the agreements between A and Z is incomplete. At the outset, the contracts are not necessarily incompatible: The first contract does not provide a deadline for payment; it is unclear when the 2nd contract will be in force; there is not enough information to discern whether the 2nd contract is an amendment of the 1st one, or an independent agreement involving unrelated considerations; there is no indication that the 2nd contract replaces and supersedes the 1st one; and if Z is the draftsman in both contracts, the doctrine of contra proferentem could favor A's legal position. Therefore, the matter of superseding contracts depends on various factors.
You don’t have to swear Witnesses are given the option to swear (technically take an oath) or to affirm, which has no religious connotations. You also don’t actually swear on a Bible if you do swear. For example california. The US is a very religious state france is a secular state - it prohibits religious clothing (hijabs, crucifixes etc.) in schools. The united-kingdom (specifically England) has an official state religion (Anglican) but religion is far less prevalent in politics or society than it is in the US. For example, outside of a place of worship, who your mother is sleeping with is a far more acceptable topic of conversation than what her religious beliefs are. Which is not to say it actually is an acceptable topic of conversation, just that it’s more acceptable than religion. australia elected its first openly atheist Prime Minister in 1983. The US was not founded on the idea that there shouldn’t be established religion, just that there shouldn’t be a state religion - that is, a church backed by the power of the government. Many of the early settlers were fleeing religious prosecution from state religions. Nevertheless, it was never the intention to exclude religion from politics. Indeed, religion in the US influences politics to a much greater degree than it does in most European or Anglophone countries.
Organically rather than by design, laws and courts preceded the theoretical constitutional basis. Kings developed a practice of legislating in council, rather than solo, meaning that their edicts went out not as &quot;the King decrees XYZ&quot; but &quot;the King, with the assent of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, barons, etc., decrees XYZ&quot;. This eventually became the Parliamentary system, wherein only Parliament could make laws (especially about raising taxes) and the King alone could not. Because of the gradual evolution, it's not easy to point to the first such statute or even the first proper &quot;Parliament&quot;. The form was not settled. Nowadays we expect Acts to start with a set &quot;enacting formula&quot;, to be published in a set way, and to be called &quot;Acts&quot; at all. Earlier laws lacked these elements. It was common for Parliaments to transact a variety of business, such as appointing officials or distributing money, without strictly distinguishing a category of what we would now call a &quot;public general Act&quot;, something setting out broadly applicable rules under the tenor of law. To take an early example, the Domesday Book was undoubtedly commissioned by William I in council in 1085, but we could argue for a long time whether that really counted as a law made by the King alone or through a proto-parliamentary approach. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 is closer - we have the text and it refers to the counsel of all the barons - but still not obviously &quot;an Act&quot;. Magna Carta came in 1215 and was repeatedly confirmed by successive monarchs in slight variations; only the 1297 version is currently deemed to be an Act still partially in force. At the same time as this legislative activity, a bewildering array of courts applied essentially customary law for local cases. If you commit a murder in Durham in 1300 and would like to not be executed, then you would be appealing (I think?) to the mercy of the Prince-Bishop in his own court. A few dozen miles away and the process and authority was different. Things gradually became more uniform and systematized, and by the sixteenth century there was enough critical mass of legal philosophy to try to &quot;explain&quot; the legal system more formally and in recognizably modern terms. We may as well take Edward Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644) as a turning point: four volumes setting out a comprehensive view of what English law was all about. In contrast, take Bracton's similar work of 1235, which was the first real analysis of case law in England. Bracton was writing in a context without a general idea of precedent, and where the binding extent of Roman civil law was not clear. By Coke's time that was well established. But they are both trying to make sense of the law as they found it: giving explanations for the data, if you like. (A parallel course was taking place in Scotland with its institutional writers, although they ended up with a different system from England's. They were equally trying to explain what they saw.) Some of the early modern authors contributed to figuring out which decisions of past Parliaments or councils should be taken to be Acts, as such. Coke, in particular, also set out the criterion that an Act should purport to have been made by all three of the King, Lords and Commons. Our modern consolidated versions of the statute book derive from this time, and on legislation.gov.uk you can see the oldest Act still in force, The Statute of Marlborough 1267. That's different from the oldest Acts ever made, as discussed above, a more slippery concept. Ideas such as the separation of powers are reverse-engineered in this way. Indeed, it's not obvious that Britain has that separation. It may not be the right way to understand the governmental and legal order that has developed. John Locke might have thought it would be a good idea, but Walter Bagehot denied it was a useful frame for analyzing the interrelationships of various public bodies.
The rule that all bills die when a Congress ends is an unwritten rule, based on precedent. It is part of a more general rule: All unfinished business dies when a Congress ends. The logic of this rule is simple: Because every member of the House is elected every term, every new Congress is considered a separate Congress. To require a new Congress to take up the unfinished business of the previous Congress would violate yet another, more general rule: “No Congress can bind its successors.” This rule came from England, where it was thought to be a direct implication of parliamentary supremacy. In the US, it is justified either as implied by the constitution, or by practical political realities. What the Congressional manuals say The rule “all business dies” is mentioned in several of the standard compilations of Congressional practice and precedent. These compilations, (available online from the GPO,) include House Practice: However, because past proceedings of one Congress do not bind its successor, business remaining at the end of one Congress does not carry over to the beginning of a new Congress (with the exception of impeachment). Precedents of the House, § 8. Legislative Business of a Prior Session: Each Congress is a separate parliamentary body that comes into being at assembly and terminates upon sine die adjournment. Thus, it is generally the case that business of one Congress does not continue as business of the next Congress. For example, bills and resolutions introduced in one Congress cannot be taken up in a subsequent Congress but must be formally reintroduced. Unfinished business pending at the close of one Congress does not remain unfinished business of a subsequent Congress. Decschler’s Precdents, Ch. 1 § 11, The vast majority of business remaining at the end of one Congress does not, however, carry over to the beginning of a new Congress, since Congress does not allow the past proceedings of one Congress to bind its successor. Few categories have carried over from one Congress to the next; impeachment proceedings pending on the last day of one Congress have been continued at the beginning of the succeeding one, and a Presidential veto message to the House was on one occasion read and received at the beginning of the next Congress. Legislative Entrenchment: Why Congress Can't Bind The idea that one legislature cannot bind a later legislature is known as the rule against ”legislative entrenchment.” This rule traces back to England, where it was first stated by Edward Coke, in his Institutes of the Laws of England, published in 1644. Acts against the power of the Parliament subsequent bind not. In England, the rule was seen as a direct implication of parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone argued that to allow one parliament to bind another would be logically inconsistent with the idea of parliamentary supremacy: Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal…absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament. Interestingly, during the Revolution, an American colonist, writing as Cassandra, used the rule against entrenchment to argue for independence. He quoted Coke to claim that because no Parliament could bind future Parliaments, any British promise to respect the rights of colonists was not, as the game theorists would say, credible. It is out of the power of the British Legislature to give us security for the future enjoyment of our rights and liberties…Is there safety in entering upon terms of accommodation with a power which cannot stipulate for the performance of its engagements? In reaction to such criticisms of the British system of Parliamentary supremacy, Americans decided to adopt a written constitution. The Americans argued that while a legislature might not be able to bind itself, the people, acting through the Constitution, could bind the legislature. Instead of invoking Parliamentary supremacy, Americans justified the “no Congress can bind” rule by appealing to the Constitution (ie, the electoral cycle + the vesting clause = every Congress is a new Congress, which alone is vested with the legislative power under Art. I, § 1), or to practical considerations (it is impossible for today’s Congress to enforce a binding clause on a later Congress, which could simply pass a new statute). (For fuller discussion of these arguments, see here.) Unwritten Rules in the House Here is what House Practice, Ch. 50. Rules and Precedents of the House, says about Rules Based on Precedent or Custom: Much of what is known as parliamentary law is not part of the formal written rules of the House but springs from precedent or long-standing custom. Such precedent may be invoked to resolve a procedural question in the absence of an express written rule on the subject. More frequently, the precedents of the House are used to show the scope and application of one of its formal rules… On the theory that a government of laws is preferable to a government of men, the House has repeatedly recognized the importance of following its precedents and obeying its well-established procedural rules. The House adheres to settled rulings, and will not lightly disturb procedures that have been established by prior decision of the Chair. However, the Speaker or Chairman may refuse to follow a precedent even though it is relevant to a pending question, where it is the only precedent on the point and was not carefully reasoned.
No Governments have sovereign power. Subject to constitutional and legislative constraints, governments can change laws as they wish. That includes legislative changes and administrative policies. Most governments tend not to use this power arbitrarily because it tends to make investors wary - economists call this sovereign risk. Like any other risk, the higher it is, the greater return an investor expects - countries with high sovereign risk get less foreign investment and pay more for it. Further, most governments don’t make laws that are retrospective but unless there is a constitutional prohibition (like there is in the United States, for example), they can. So Ireland could not only change the rules going forward, they could change the rules that applied in the past (assuming the Irish constitution doesn’t prohibit this, which I don’t know enough about). If Ireland were to change this law, it’s likely there would be plenty of forward notice. The arrangement you spell out between mother and son is not enforceable unless it’s a contract and the presumption is that such familial agreements are not contracts. Such a presumption can be overcome by an explicit declaration by the mother and the son that they intend for it to be legally binding, preferably in writing. Now, governments can and do enter contracts which are enforceable by the courts but that is a one-on-one relationship between a government and a contractor; not a decree that must be followed by everyone. Unless, of course, they are the sort of government that doesn’t follow their own laws - I’m sure you can think of some - but they are huge sovereign risk.
There is no &quot;different legal procedure&quot; for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling.
why do they sometimes specify the federal law as well as the state/provincial law? Isn't it redundant? Not necessarily. The contract might be entered and/or performed in a different country, whence mentioning only the Canadian provincial law does not override the other country's federal law (or that country's &quot;supra-provincial&quot; equivalent). Mentioning Canadian federal law removes --at least on paper-- the ambiguity of which law applies for matters beyond the scope of Canadian provincial law. In such scenarios, portions or the entirety of the provision might be null and void. For instance, an employment contract might establish waivers which are void or perhaps even unlawful under the legislation of that other country. Please note that in general a copy/paste of sample clauses is strongly discouraged unless the parties fully understand their meaning and implications.