&quot;as long as there is an implied term that B is not B&quot; I can't grasp the meaning of "A believes that B who pretends to be C is not B (whether C exists or not)". How can B, who pretends to be C, be not B? Again "B is not B" doesn't make sense to me! I'm asking this separately because here, if I understood the boldened quote, B isn't necessarily pretending to be C. Mindy Chen-Wishart. Contract Law (2018 6 edn). p 262. 6.2.5 Non-existence of the identity assumed According to this rule, A’s mistake as to B’s identity will only void their contract if A mistook B for another existing and identifiable party, C. If A merely believes that B is C who is non-existent or unidentifiable, the contract is only voidable. In King’s Norton Metal Co Ltd v Edridge, Merrett &amp; Co Ltd (1897), K sent goods in response to an order from the fictitious ‘Hallam &amp; Co’, written on headed stationery with a picture of a large factory and a list of overseas depots. The fraudster then sold the goods to E. Although the contract was in writing, the contract was only voidable for fraud because K intended to contract with the writer of the letter, being mistaken only as to his attributes; namely, solvency and respectability. The contract was not void for K’s mistake that it was contracting with ‘Hallam &amp; Co’ because ‘Hallam &amp; Co’ was nonexistent. ‘If it could have been shown that there was a separate entity called Hallam &amp; Co . . . then the case might have come within the decision in Cundy v Lindsay.’ &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; It is difficult to see why A and D’s rights should depend on whether A mistook B for another real entity or not. Furthermore, why was it not enough in King’s Norton that K believed that ‘Hallam &amp; Co’ existed, when it did not? This supposed rule is subject to two exceptions, which require impossible distinctions to be drawn: (i) A contract may be voided if A makes the additional mistake that C exists, even if C does not exist. But is there a meaningful difference between A believing ‘B to be not B’, and by implication someone else (contract not void); and A believing ‘B to be C, mistakenly believing that C exists’ (contract is void)? After all, in Lake v Simmons p 263. (1927), the mistress of a wealthy customer, a widower, purchased some items from L, and then persuaded L to let her take away valuable pearl necklaces for her ‘husband’s approval’. L’s loss was only insured if no valid contract was made with the mistress. The court so found, although she was posing as a non-existent wife. (ii) A contract is void when [1] A believes that B who pretends to be C is not B (whether C exists or not), [2] as long as there is an implied term that B is not B (Said v Butt (1920)), as where: • an offer is made only to persons fitting particular descriptions which excludes B (eg ‘current students of a particular university’, or being ‘over 18 years’ to buy alcohol); or • B may know from previous dealings that A is unwilling to contract with them (eg B is barred from a pub or a soccer match). If the rationale is merely that B cannot accept an offer known not to be meant for her, then why did this not apply in King’s Norton Metal when the fraudster must have known that K had no intention of contracting with him?
How can B, who pretends to be C, be not B? They can’t. However, that doesn’t matter. What matters is that A believes they are not B and, more importantly, B not being B is an implied (or explicit) term of the contract.
I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.
There is no prohibition on lying in general. Misrepresentation If you misrepresent a fact and that misrepresentation is a material inducement to someone entering into a contract with you then there are a number of problems that follow: The (mis)representation may become a term of the contract and if not complied with can allow the aggrieved party to either sue for damages or rescind the contract. If the misrepresentation led to the contract being entered into by mistake then the contract is void for mistake The misrepresentation may have become a collateral contract an innocent or negligent misstatement may give rise to the tort of negligent misstatement misrepresentation may put you in breach of trade practices statutes. Fraud If you knowingly tell a lie with the intention of receiving a benefit then this is both the tort and crime of fraud. You receiving employment or your company securing a contract probably qualifies as intending to receive a benefit.
In an adversarial legal system, the parties are responsible for framing the issues in dispute and adducing relevant evidence. The parties, and perhaps more importantly their lawyers, also have an obligation of candour to the court. Courts routinely accept unchallenged assertions because there are serious consequences for misleading the court, and the opponent (rather than the court which should remain neutral) is in the best position to investigate and prove any suspected dishonesty. It is a matter for the party commencing proceedings (plaintiff or prosecutor) to decide how the parties will be named. People often change their names, and may use multiple spellings. It is not uncommon for typographical or other errors to appear. Generally, it is in the interest of at least one party to name the parties &quot;correctly,&quot; ie. consistently with other government records that will be used to enforce any judgment, but a person's name is ultimately a formal matter that can be corrected if necessary. In cases of uncertainty, aliases can be specified, as occurred in Microsoft v McDonald (aka Gary Webb) [2006] EWHC 3410 (Ch). A person who is genuinely known by an alias (ie. the use of the alias is not part of an attempt to mislead the court) should use their &quot;real&quot; name in court, but could potentially conduct litigation using the alias without anybody noticing. However, court proceedings are public and this would not necessarily protect the person's identity. To achieve this, an anonymity order under CPR 39.2 is required, as explained in XXX v Camden London Borough Council [2020] EWCA Civ 1468 [13]–[22].
That really depends what they lie about In the United States, there's no general law against lying. The fact that a statement is false doesn't inherently strip it of protection under the first amendment. Public figures lie to the public all the time. That's why news companies have fact checkers. Was it defamatory? It is, however, illegal to defame someone. If someone makes a false statement of fact (that is, not an opinion) about a person or company, they may be liable for that. Whether they are liable for that depends on a number of factors, including whether the target is a public figure (see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan), the speaker's knowledge of its falsity, and whether the target was damaged by it. Was it part of some other criminal scheme? False statements to the public could be part of some sort of fraud, for instance. Pump and dump schemes, for instance, are illegal. Was it under oath? Lying under oath (such as when testifying in court) would constitute perjury, which is a crime. There are many other situations in which lying could be a crime (such as lying on your taxes), but these are the main ones I can think of that would be about lying to the public. In this case (I'm unfamiliar with the details of what he said, so I'm just going off your description), I can't immediately think of any reason that could lead to liability. Mocking and calling something a &quot;nothing burger&quot; is pretty clearly an opinion, not a false statement of fact. I'm not aware of any securities law against saying you don't like something you're actually invested in (though I'm not especially familiar with securities law).
That would likely be treated as a preamble. These have been held in some jurisdictions to not have any weight. For example, see Sherbrooke Community Centre v. Service Employees International Union, 2002 SKQB 101: The preamble to a contract is nothing more than an introduction to that about which the parties have actually agreed. It puts the agreement into context. It describes the goals of the agreement. It speaks to what went before and the spirit in which agreement was achieved. On the other hand, it does not contain any promises. It does not contain any restrictions or commitments. It could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to and set out in specific terms. [...] this clause in the preamble does not create or eliminate rights or obligations Granted, the introductory phrase in your hypothetical clause is not literally a preamble, but it has the same characteristics cited in the above decision: &quot;it describes the goals&quot;, &quot;it does not contain any promises&quot;, &quot;it could be removed entirely without in any way altering that which was agreed to&quot;. If you wanted the clause to only take effect if toilets overflowed, use an alternative wording, like: Company B may not resell any products purchased from Company A at a discounted price in a manner that causes toilets to overflow.
If Bob acknowledges how he has altered the evidence at the time he submits it, there shouldn't be any issues with it turning into falsification, which generally only becomes a problem when it's done with an intent to mislead the court. More likely, an opposing party would raise an authenticity objection, i.e, that the evidence has been altered and is therefore not trustworthy. It's probably going to be up to the judge whether to sustain that objection or not, and I'd expect the court's decision to turn in large part on how plausible it finds Bobs allegations of fraud and retaliation. I'd also expect that the Court would be less concerned with the pitch alteration than the redaction of portions of the recording. If we don't know what Bob is saying, it makes it hard to understand the full context of the conversation. Of course, all of this assumes that Bob hasn't already been forced to turn over the original recordings to Company, which he will be. The parties have a right to each other's evidence, and they are required to identify their witnesses to each other. The moment Company knows about the recording, it is going to submit a discovery request demanding a copy, and Bob will be obligated to comply. If Bob objects that doing so would expose the representatives to retaliation, I would expect the court to warn Company against tampering with witnesses and then order Bob to comply with his discovery obligations.
A typo in a contract does not ever void the contract. If the typo changes the meaning of the contract from what was actually intended, then it is up to a judge to interpret the contract and whether it is reasonable that a person would assume its intended meaning. In your example, it is obvious that the word "least" was meant to be there and not "lease" - as the alternate word makes no sense in context - so a judge would not void the contract or release you from your 30 day obligation (which is probably even granted to the landlord by local laws regardless of whether it was stated in the contract). Even misspellings of people's names or addresses on a lease do not void a contract if you have already paid or taken up residence. If any of these situations were brought to court, the judge would just amend the contract to a corrected version that would then serve as the contract between the two parties, replacing the version with the typo. This is known as contract reformation.