Could a British monarch &quot;go full dictator&quot; if they wish to do so? Queen Elizabeth II was generally nice and didn't abuse her power. But could her successor do otherwise and &quot;go full dictator&quot;, in theory? Would he have enough legal powers to do so? Admittedly, dictators are not known for playing by the book, but they often start out in a lawful or a &quot;semi-lawful&quot; fashion. To what extent, if I put it another way, does the British democracy rely on solid legal checks and balances, not on the monarch's goodwill? Considering the UK's uncodified constitution, which is not really there, one may start to have some doubts about it.
Parliamentary Supremacy was established by the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in which James II &amp; VII was deposed by Parliament, and the line of succession was changed by Act of Parliament to favor William and Mary. Key laws passed during the aftermath of the Revolution included the Declaration of Right (which forbade keeping a standing army without Parliamentary consent, and put control of the military in Parliament), and the Coronation Oath Act 1688 which established in law obligations of the monarch. Since 1688 it has remained the governing principle of English (later British and UK) law that ultimate authority lies in Parliament, not with the monarch, and that Parliament can at any time depose a monarch for failing to act properly, and can settle the line of succession to the crown. A British King or Queen who tried to exercise dictatorial power, or even to use remaining Royal Prerogative powers to assume personal rule, could and quite likely would be deposed.
In england-and-wales this would fall within the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and depends on whether he lacks the mental not physical, capacity to make the decision for himself. Can he: Understand the information relevant to the decision Retain that information Use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision Communicate that decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other means). If the answer to any of these is&quot;no&quot; then he cannot lawfully give true consent. Although the Act allows for others, such as a power of attorney, to make decisions on behalf of someone lacking the mental capacity, s.27 specifically excludes the decision to marry.
Most of the implications here are political, not legal. For that, you'd have to ask Politics.SE. The law, however, is quite clear: If the President is alive, and &quot;a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide&quot; do not invoke the 25th amendment, the President would remain President and just not do their job in this case. Congress could presumably provide for a different set of people to validate the President's disability status, but in your hypothetical, this wouldn't happen due to a lack of consent from the Senate. The 25th amendment was created to solve this problem: it is the only solution to it. If it is not used, then there is no other means to remove a disabled-but-alive President. Most (all?) executive agencies can run themselves perfectly well day-to-day without the President's help, so nothing would be likely to fall apart immediately. There wouldn't be anyone to appoint new judges or other presidentially appointed officers, which would probably eventually become a problem.
Because the courts or the legislature decide they have them There is no doubt that both the courts and the legislature in common law countries have the ability to find, create, or extend rights and this has been done in the past. This is, in fact, where legal rights were created. The US Bill of Rights was created by the people in 1791. If the people in 2191 want to grant rights to AIs then they can do this. This is legally possible. Whether it's a good idea is a matter of philosophy and politics.
No, abuse of power is not necessarily criminal Imagine a judge that is “heightist” - they always rule in favor of defendants who are taller than 175cm and always rule against those who are shorter irrespective of the merits of the case. This is clearly an abuse of power. It’s not illegal because “height” is not a category protected from discrimination (AFAIK). However, it is a failure to correctly discharge their legal obligations.
We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf
The governing law would be the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). The relevant part is Article 29. Diplomats must not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. Diplomats are also immune from civil and criminal prosecution. Technically, it wasn't a US diplomat but a family member, but by Article 37 they have the same protection. The linked article suggests that her diplomatic immunity ended, but that's a bit of a non-issue. The host nation (the UK in this case) can declare anyone, diplomats or family to be persona non grata which indeed ends diplomatic immunity, but only after the person is allowed to leave the host nation. And when the act happened, the immunity was in place. Immunity cannot retroactively be withdrawn by the host nation.
I think we're talking about In re Hennen, which dealt with the removal of the clerk of the district court in Louisiana: It all these departments power is given to the secretary, to appoint all necessary clerks; 1 Story, 48; and although no power to remove is expressly given, yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their office at the will and discretion of the head of the department. It would be a most extraordinary construction of the law, that all these offices were to be held during life, which must inevitably follow, unless the incumbent was removable at the discretion of the head of the department: the President has certainly no power to remove. These clerks fall under that class of inferior officers, the appointment of which the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the head of the department. The same rule, as to the power of removal, must be applied to offices where the appointment is vested in the President alone. The nature of the power, and the control over the officer appointed, does not at all depend on the source from which it emanates. The execution of the power depends upon the authority of law, and not upon the agent who is to administer it. And the Constitution has authorized Congress, in certain cases, to vest this power in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of departments; and all inferior officers appointed under each, by authority of law, must hold their office at the discretion of the appointing power. Such is the settled usage and practical construction of the Constitution and laws, under which these offices are held. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259–60, 10 L. Ed. 138 (1839) (emphasis added).