Neighbors trampoline on my property We live in a community with small yards and restrictions on putting up fences in the yards. Recently, my neighbor assembled a trampoline and I'm sure it's a couple of feet on my property. I'm not worried about a few square feet of yard, since our kids play together all the time, but I am worried that I may be liable for damages if one of our other neighbor kids was hurt on said trampoline. This is in Illinois, USA. I know trampolines are red-flags, and would not have one in my yard, but since it's obvious who's trampoline it is, how much risk am I assuming with this situation? EDIT: So technically the lots are organized under a "condo" association, and we most definitely have a HOA. Tramps are not addressed since they would not be considered "permanent" fixtures. My swing and slide playscape did need to be approved. No biggie. Also, Insurance company informed me that I am not at risk in the current state of things. If it was all on my property or was operated as "my trampoline" it would be a different matter. ( I do intend to get that in writing :) )
Check out this article on "Attractive Nuisances" http://realestate.findlaw.com/owning-a-home/dangers-to-children-attractive-nuisances.html Here are some of the general requirements of something being an "Attractive Nuisance" A potentially dangerous condition exists on the property The landowner created or maintained the potential hazard (this one is important since you did not create nor maintain the potential hazard) The landowner should have known the condition would attract children The landowner should have known the condition could harm children Generally, a landowner is not going to be held liable for the injuries of a undiscovered trespasser. Consider that word undiscovered. (aka, the landowner doesn't know someone is sneaking in and using the trampoline) However, if a landowner knows that trespassers have been on his/her land, then these persons are discovered trespassers to whom the landowner owes "the duty of ordinary care to warn of danger." What all this means? Anyone can always be sued for anything. If the kid jumps badly, lands on your property, gets hurt, they might have a case or the judge might see it your way. Perhaps consider the laws of "Attractive Nuisances" and "Discovered Trespassers". To note: A lot of people might say that you can't be held liable for something like this, but that is slightly false. As a property owner you CAN be held liable for anything that happens on your property. Including someone trespassing onto your property without your permission, even to commit crimes, and hurting themselves in the process. Many court cases have ruled in favor of the law-abiding landowner, but that's not to say there is a guarantee of this. The best thing to do is always minimize your risks.
Yet I publicly wear shirts with copyrighted designs all the time. I'm unclear about this; do you mean T-shirts you have made yourself using copyrighted images or T-shirts you have bought? If the former then it is a prima facie breach and you could be sued by the copyright holder. You would probably not be as it would be impracticable. If the latter then there are 2 possibilities: The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain all hold valid licences to put the image on a T-shirt and display it in the usual way so there is no breach involved. The manufacturer/distributer/retailer chain does not hold a valid licence in which case there is a breach and the copyright holder would target, say Wall-Mart rather than you. what about displaying ... works of art in my yard? Notwithstanding that it can be viewed from a public space, your yard is not public; therefore this is not public display.
I think that the language In consideration of permission to use, ... Recreational Sports Department ... arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. would be read as limiting the waiver to cases in some way connected with the RSF. Even so limited it is rather broad, and may not be enforceable. In particular public facilities are not always allowed to obtain a waiver of otherwise valid negligence claims. If it were interpreted to mean "all claims on any matter, even ones having nothing at all to do with the RSF" then I think it would be so broad as to be unenforceable as unconscionable, and as misleading, so that there was no meeting of minds.
Yes, barring any statutory prohibitions against such a rule. I would be very surprised if any existed. They don't exist in any jurisdiction I'm familiar with. Look up the local by-laws to be sure.
Charlie is not a party to the contract between Alice and Bob Alice and Charlie have no contractural relationship and Alice cannot require him to do anything nor is he liable to Alice in any way. Alice’s issue is with Bob who has clearly breached his contract. Alice can sue Bob for damages and may be able to end the lease. There is no trespass because Charlie is there with the permission of the leaseholder. From Charlie’s position there is no reason to believe that Bob does not have the authority to give this permission so Charlie is not in breach of the law. The police will see this as a civil matter and won’t intervene.
we would like to know whether we have sufficient legal grounds to sever/terminate/exit this contract with Superior Management Co.*, if the company does not mutually agree to do so. No. In that event the HOA is stuck with the contract at least for the remaining part of the current period. The HOA's concern that the provider could breach the contract by significantly underperforming seems speculative and does not entitle the HOA to breach it first. Changes in the name and/or ownership of a party does not alter the parties' rights and obligations pursuant to the contract. This implies that neither party is entitled to disavow his obligations by terminating the contract altogether. For early &amp; unilateral termination to be an option, it would have to be provided in the terms of the contract itself.
There are a number of rules related to trespassing vegetation, reviewed in Lane v. W.J. Curry &amp; Sons, 92 S.W.3d 355. Virginia law was set in Fancher v. Fagella, 650 S.E.2d 519, that encroaching trees and plants are not nuisances merely because they cast shade, drop leaves, flowers, or fruit, or just because they happen to encroach upon adjoining property either above or below the ground. However, encroaching trees and plants may be regarded as a nuisance when they cause actual harm or pose an imminent danger of actual harm to adjoining property. If so, the owner of the tree or plant may be held responsible for harm caused to [adjoining property], and may also be required to cut back the encroaching branches or roots, assuming the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance. so under the circumstances, you can't make him do anything. However, the court continues that the adjoining landowner may, at his own expense, cut away the encroaching vegetation to the property line whether or not the encroaching vegetation constitutes a nuisance or is otherwise causing harm or possible harm to the adjoining property. You are, however, responsible for damage to the tree caused by such trimming, and you can't trespass onto his property to trim it (fences are often an approximation of property lines)
Does the town have any responsibility towards the direct and indirect damage done to these properties? What can be done to hold the town responsible for potentially lost property value, and direct property damage? Most claims are barred by some sort of governmental immunity and also face strict procedural hurdles, but it isn't impossible that the defectively installed storm drains could give rise to some liability for property damage if the suit were brought swiftly in the proper manner. Also, even if there is liability this will almost certainly not extend to lost property value, only to direct property damage, because while the direct property damage might be caused by something that the government has waived sovereign immunity for, the lost property value is almost entirely due to its discretionary regulatory decisions about land use and whether it should provide storm drainage at all. There are several potential theories of municipal liability that need to be considered. One is that the township has liability because it approved development that foreseeably caused this problem. This claim is probably without merit although there might be a claim against the homeowners who inadequately drained their properties in a way that impacted their neighbors. This is because land use regulation is a discretionary governmental action. A second is that the township has liability because it had a duty to an individual property own to provide adequate storm drainage and failed to do so. This claim is probably also without merit. This is also a discretionary governmental action and even if it was not, would not meet New York State's &quot;special relationship&quot; test set forth below. A third theory is that the township has liability because once it undertook to install storm drains the workmanship of the storm drains that it installed fell below the standard of reasonable care in workmanship that applies to all construction work that foreseeable causes injuries to persons or property. This is a much closer call and might prevail, although it would still be subject to the strict procedural limitations of the New York Court of Claims Act including a 90 day statute of limitations under Section 10(3) of the Act and a notice requirement. There would also be no right to a jury trial in the case. Once the storm drain is actually built, there is arguably a non-discretionary duty to build it in a workman-like manner and the location of the particular defective drain may trigger New York's &quot;special relationship&quot; test. Also, it might be possible to sue the private contractor that defectively installed the storm drain for the township. As explained in a July 8, 2014 article written by a lawyer in the New York City law department which is more or less identical in its sovereign immunity status to a New York State township: When municipalities are sued in tort, two of the most powerful bars to recovery are the public duty principle and the governmental function immunity defense. When these two principles are applicable, the City will not be made to pay compensation even if a City employee had been negligent and caused an injury. . . . An injured person alleging an injury caused by the City’s failure to perform a public duty cannot recover unless the injured person alleges and establishes, as an element of his or her claim, a special relationship by which the City assumed a specific duty with respect to the injured person. . . . the plaintiff, to present a prima facie case for recovery, must first successfully establish a special duty. If the plaintiff cannot get past the special duty hurdle, there is no need for the court to address the applicability of the governmental function immunity defense, which provides absolute immunity for discretionary determinations where discretion has been exercised. The often-repeated policy reason for limiting governmental tort liability is that government would not be financially viable if it were made the insurer of the safety of the public for injuries caused principally by third parties. Governmental entities could have a disincentive from providing important governmental services if they knew that doing so could seriously jeopardize the public treasury. The courts do not limit recovery, however, when a municipality acts in a proprietary capacity — when its activities essentially substituted for or supplemented those undertaken by a private enterprise, such as property ownership, operation of a motor vehicle, or providing hospital services. When a municipality acted in its governmental capacity, sovereign immunity historically protected the municipality against tort recovery by injured persons. That absolute protection against tort recovery lasted in New York until the State Legislature, in 1929, waived New York State’s sovereign immunity as part of the Court of Claims Act. Although the waiver by the State Legislature only mentioned the State of New York, the Court of Appeals in 1945, in Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361 (1945), interpreted the waiver to apply as well to municipal entities like New York City. But as the Court of Appeals subsequently held, the waiver did not eliminate all governmental immunities or other bars to governmental liability. In the years since 1945, courts wrestled with sorting out when liability was appropriate and when it was not. For example, courts generally refused to hold municipal governments liable for failing to prevent fires or crime. Municipal governments undertake all sorts of public duties like police protection, fire protection, child protection, education, building inspections, and the like. Were a municipality liable every time a crime was committed that governmental actors had failed to prevent, or an inspector made a mistake, or a student was not sufficiently educated, it would be under a crushing financial burden that could result in bankruptcy. At the same time, courts created exceptions that allowed negligence claims to proceed even where municipalities performed quintessential governmental functions. Special duty was one such exception. Another exception allowed for liability where the governmental action was ministerial rather than discretionary. . . . In October 2011 the Court of Appeals [*ed. the highest court in the state of New York called a state supreme court in most other states] in Valdez v. City, 18 N.Y.3d 69 (2011) clarified 70 years of jurisprudence and articulated an analysis to be applied when considering whether an individual may sue a municipal government for negligent performance of, or failure to perform, governmental functions. The decision in Valdez must now be the starting point in analyzing liability in any negligence tort suit against the government or governmental actors. First, the Court of Appeals confirmed the basic tenet that although sovereign immunity was waived in the Court of Claims Act, tort liability will generally not attach to governmental entities or government employees performing governmental functions, regardless of whether the function is discretionary or ministerial. Where statutory or regulatory mandates require a government to act for the benefit of the public as a whole, the government and its actors cannot be sued for failing to provide or negligently providing such services. The Court articulated this principle as the “public duty” rule, not as “immunity.” In order to overcome the public duty bar, an individual as a threshold issue must show that there existed a special duty running in favor of the claimant as an individual. The Valdez Court held that for a litigant to proceed successfully with a tort suit against a municipality, a plaintiff must first plead a “special duty” running specifically to him or her. A special duty can be formed when a municipality or its employee: • violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; • assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant, and dangerous safety violation; or • voluntarily assumes a duty that generated justifiable reliance by the person through the employee’s actions or promises to the person. The Valdez Court also held that whether the facts are legally sufficient to establish a special duty is an objective question of law for the court. The Court of Appeals made clear, therefore, that special duty is neither an exception to immunity nor a defense, but instead is an initial and essential element of any tort claim against the government and governmental actors. The Court of Appeals also made clear that, even if a plaintiff succeeds in articulating a viable special duty, tort liability may still be barred by the “governmental function immunity defense.” Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 75-76. That defense shields governmental entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions. This discretionary defense is qualified in that the municipality must establish that the governmental action related to the incident was both a discretionary one and that discretion was, in fact, exercised. A government employee’s failure to perform a ministerial action, on the other hand, may subject the government to liability if a special duty has been established. In late 2012 and mid-2013, the Court of Appeals issued two additional opinions which reconfirmed Valdez’s analysis of when the government may be sued in tort. In Metz v. State, 20 N.Y.3d 175 (2012), twenty people were killed and many others injured when a tour boat on Lake George capsized. Plaintiffs claimed that State inspectors had negligently inspected the vessel and had failed to exercise any discretion in fixing the number of passengers who could safely travel on the tour boat. They argued, therefore, that the State was not entitled to immunity for their actions. The Appellate Division, Third Department, ruled that the inspection function was governmental and found that plaintiffs had failed to establish a special duty. However, the Third Department went on to find a viable claim against the State because the State could not demonstrate that it exercised discretion in certifying the vessel as seaworthy. The Court of Appeals reversed and rejected the Third Department’s analysis. The Court, relying on Valdez, ruled that, since inspections are a governmental function, the Appellate Division’s analysis should have ended with the finding that plaintiffs had not established a special duty. Insofar as the plaintiffs did not and could not articulate a special duty, no liability could be imposed against the State and the nature of the governmental conduct – discretionary or ministerial – was not relevant. There was no reason to address the immunity defense since the plaintiff had not established the initial requirement of a special duty. In Applewhite v. City, 21 N.Y.3d 420 (2013), plaintiff, a 12-year-old child living at home and cared for by a private nurse, went into cardiac arrest after being administered certain medications. The plaintiff’s mother called 911 and an ambulance arrived within minutes. The plaintiff child and mother sued the nurse and the City, claiming that the child suffered severe brain damage as a result of negligent treatment at the scene. Plaintiffs argued that, although maintaining the 911 system and ambulance services are governmental functions, once the EMTs cross the threshold and tend to the patient, the function becomes a proprietary one. The City responded that the function continues as a governmental one and that no special duty was created. The Court of Appeals agreed with the City’s argument that the emergency rescue function is a governmental police protection function both before and after the emergency medical personnel arrived. Because these were governmental and public duties, the plaintiffs needed to articulate a special duty in order to state a viable tort claim. The Court then ruled that there existed a question of fact as to whether the City assumed a special duty under the unique circumstances of the case and remanded the case for trial. For litigants against the City, step one in developing a claim is to distinguish the City’s proprietary activities from the governmental. If proprietary, then there generally is no issue of a public duty bar and the claim may proceed. If the activity is governmental, however, the public duty bar must first be overcome. As an element of the plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff must allege and establish the existence of a special duty. Assuming a plaintiff successfully overcomes the special duty hurdle, the government will still not be liable if the challenged conduct was discretionary and it exercised discretion. If plaintiff overcomes the public duty principle and the immunity bar, the plaintiff’s tort claim may then proceed.