In the U.S are judges, attorneys, physicians, teachers, professors, politicians, administrative officers liable for ordinary negligence? E.g can a judge be tried for mistrial because of ordinary negligence? They are not employees or workers so that they could be reasonably absolved for ordinary negligence. We expect employees to be obedient so they have no moral responsibility, if we held them liable we would harm the market people would be reluctutant to enter a contract of employeement. In all these of judges etc cases they receive more than enough indenization for assuming responsibility. By freeing them from ordinary negligence we are making them negligent. Other than political economics why would the legislator free them from such responsibility?
In the U.S are judges, attorneys, physicians, teachers, professors, politicians, administrative officers liable for ordinary negligence? In the U.S., judges, prosecuting attorneys and legislators have absolute immunity from civil liability (but not from criminal liability) for legislative and judicial acts in their official capacity. Attorneys have absolute immunity from civil liability from some claims from some people (e.g. defamation claims from non-clients for statements made in connection with representing someone) and qualified immunity from civil liability from others (e.g. most claims of non-clients) for their acts as lawyers, but are liable to their clients for ordinary negligence. Physicians are liable to their patients for ordinary negligence in the nature of medical malpractice. Some acts taken by physicians that would otherwise constitute false imprisonment or assault or homicide are excluded from the definition of those crimes. Elected officials in the executive branch including mayors, law enforcement officers and the attorney general have qualified immunity from civil liability for their official non-judicial acts. This means that they are only liable for intentional violations of constitutional rights that are clearly established in the law. Subject to narrow exceptions (e.g. driving or medical malpractice) they are not liable for ordinary negligence. It is hard to know what kind of liability is contemplated for teachers and professors or administrative officers to answer. The answer would not be the same for all kinds of claims. Teachers of minors generally have the same immunities as a parent with respect to the use of physical force towards their students in order to maintain order in the educational process. The liability of teachers and professors also depends upon whether they are employed by public or private institutions. Those in public institutions often have more protections from liability, but also have exposure to civil rights claims that those in private institutions are not. Contractual waivers can also influence liability in these circumstances. Everyone has liability for ordinary negligence in their unofficial capacity and for many acts (e.g. driving a car) while on duty but not involving activities particular to their professional responsibilities. They are not employees or workers so that they could be reasonably absolved for ordinary negligence. We expect employees to be obedient so they have no moral responsibility, if we held them liable we would harm the market people would be reluctutant to enter a contract of employeement. In the private sector, employees are usually liable for ordinary negligence that they personally commit, even though the employer is also liable. Judges are employees and arguably workers as well. And, for their non-judicial acts, judges have the same liability as every other employee for their ordinary negligence. For example, if a judge gets in a car accident while driving from one courtroom to another, and harms another through negligence, the judge has personal liability for the judge's ordinary negligence and the judicial branch has vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, the judge. In all these of judges etc cases they receive more than enough indenization for assuming responsibility. By freeing them from ordinary negligence we are making them negligent. Other than political economics why would the legislator free them from such responsibility? Analysis of why the law is the way it is, or what it should be, are really better suited for Politics.SE than for Law.SE. I discussion of the why's of judicial immunity is appropriate for Politics.SE. A discussion of "judges etc" is probably to broad for either forum.
While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.
Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare
A company is liable for the actions of its agents This is known as vicarious liability and some well-established situations where this happens is in employer-employee and company-officer, &quot;executives&quot;, if senior enough, would be both employees and officers. Without it, the concept of a company just doesn't work - a company is only a record in a database, it can only act through human agents. So, if an employee or officer of the company by act or omission causes harm in the course of executing their duties, then the company has caused the harm. It is not enough for a company to have adequate &quot;internal procedures&quot;, it (which is to say the people with the power to act for it) must ensure that those procedures are followed and actually work. The allegations include that at least some senior personnel were aware that breaches of the law were occurring and they did not take steps to stop them - what they know, the company knows; what they do or don't do, the company does or doesn't do.
Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.
The store owners may well be liable for damages. See a very similar fact pattern in Mohamud v Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc (short title) which was an appeal concerning: : 2 [...] an employer’s vicarious liability in tort for an assault carried out by an employee. The details of which are: The Supreme Court upheld a damages claim brought by Ahmed Mohamud, an innocent customer who suffered serious head injuries in a savage, unprovoked attack in which he was repeatedly kicked and punched by Amjid Khan, a petrol kiosk attendant who was employed by Wm Morrison Supermarkets plc at a branch in Birmingham. The Court found that the supermarket giant was vicariously liable for Mr Khan's appalling behaviour. .. [T]he Court had to consider two matters. Firstly, what was the nature of the employee's job and was there sufficient connection between his field of activities and his wrongful conduct for the employer to be held liable for his actions? The Court noted that it was part of Mr Khan's job to attend to customers, to interact with them and to respond to their inquiries. His conduct was inexcusable and it could not be said that he had metaphorically taken off his uniform the moment he stepped out from behind the counter. In ordering Mr Mohamud never to return to the petrol station, Mr Khan was purporting to act in his capacity as a Morrisons' employee. His motive in launching the attack was irrelevant and it did not matter whether his actions were driven by personal racism rather than a desire to benefit his employer's business. The Court's decision opened the way for Mr Mohamud's estate and dependants to seek substantial compensation in respect of his lost earnings and the pain and suffering he endured before his death. [Source: SWlaw]
Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.
In broad terms, in a three pillar democracy, the job of the legislature is to make the law, the job of the executive is to enforce the law and the job of the courts is to interpret the law. The courts may find that a piece of legislation is invalid, either in whole or in part for any number of reasons. The legislature can respond by: Repealing the legislation Changing the legislation to remove the invalidity Doing nothing. Your first question is why would they go for option 3? I can, off the cuff, think of several reasons: Time pressures, a legislature can only deal with so many pieces of legislation per year - it may not be a worthwhile investment of time to "tidy up" the statute books. Possibility of appeal, the precedent may be open to appeal or having an alternative ruling in a higher court. Precedent, unless and until the decision reaches the Supreme Court or equivalent then the decision is only binding on lower courts. Possibility of change to superordinate legislation, in the particular circumstance you cite, the local authority may leave the law on the books in the hope or expectation that the state law may be repealed or overturned - the local law would then be valid. For your second question, the judge is supposed to know. That said, judges make mistakes so a wise plaintiff/defendant will draw the judge's attention to the current state of the law. It would certainly look bad for them on appeal if it emerged that they did know and allowed the judge to make a mistake. Firstly, they are officers of the court and secondly, justice is blind but justices may remember you made them look like a fool! For your third question ... maybe. However, such a claim would be limited to what you actually lost through your lawyer's malpractice. It can't be the case because you couldn't win it anyway - the law was against you! You may be able to argue that the lawyer should be responsible for some of the costs or losses that arose from you failing to settle earlier. Good luck with that.