Why was this man not charged with this offence that it seems he has committed? I was reading this article, Man jailed after sending photos of his genitals to undercover police officer. This article states: Malcolm Blount, 55, was caught by police after he emailed three pictures of his genitals to an officer posing as the 12-year-old girl. He was arrested for a few offenses but NOT Causing a child to watch a sexual act (Section 12 of the Sexual Offenses Act 2003). If you look at the Sexual Offences Definitive Guideline One would think category 3 would apply. Perhaps I am not clear on what "Sexual activity" in the legal sense means. Would this boil down to the genital being erect or flaccid? There has been a recent provision to Section 67 of the serious crime Act (2015), called sexual communications with a child (2017). which he would have been charged with, but the offense was committed in 2016. In this instance, what constitutes a bare minimum of sexual activity?
There was no actual child who was caused to view the material, so there was no offense under that provision. By contrast, inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity is an inchoate offense, so it is not necessary for any harm to an actual victim to have occurred. Note that the relevant section of the Sexual Offenses Act 2003 concerns "causing or inciting," and that the charge was "inciting." The section concerning watching a sexual act, by contrast, only inludes "causing."
england-and-wales From your first link: &quot;A leading Premier League footballer arrested on suspicion of rape has been further arrested on suspicion of two incidents of rape against a different woman.&quot; As he was arrested that means there are now 'active' 'criminal proceedings' against him within the meaning of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (as amended). Therefore reporting is now subject to the 'strict liability rule': &quot;it is a contempt of court to publish anything to the public which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the proceedings in question will be seriously impeded or prejudiced, even if there is no intent to cause such prejudice.&quot; Reporting Restrictions in the Criminal Courts April 2015 (Revised May 2016), Judicial College Per the Contempt of Court Act there are four defences: s3(1) &quot;A person is not guilty of contempt of court under the strict liability rule as the publisher of any matter to which that rule applies if at the time of publication (having taken all reasonable care) he does not know and has no reason to suspect that relevant proceedings are active. s3(2) &quot;A person is not guilty of contempt of court under the strict liability rule as the distributor of a publication containing any such matter if at the time of distribution (having taken all reasonable care) he does not know that it contains such matter and has no reason to suspect that it is likely to do so. s4(1) &quot;a fair and accurate report of legal proceedings held in public, published contemporaneously and in good faith&quot; s5 &quot;A publication made as or as part of a discussion in good faith of public affairs or other matters of general public interest is not to be treated as a contempt of court under the strict liability rule if the risk of impediment or prejudice to particular legal proceedings is merely incidental to the discussion.&quot; Really the publication is mitigating its legal risk at the present time and it will no doubt report the name of the footballer if he is tried or does not proceed to trial.
In many US states (and in the UK), statutory rape is a strict liability offense. This means that there is no intent requirement at all; the only allowable defenses are those that negate the actual act (there was no sex, the person was of age, or sometimes that the action was not a conscious or voluntary action), it falls within a statutory exception to the crime, or there is an applicable defense that has nothing to do with intent. Many general defenses do not apply to strict liability crimes; in particular, "I thought X when Y was true" tries to show there was to intent to commit the crime, which is irrelevant. In Michigan (where the crime took place), statutory rape is evidently such an offense. That throws some standard defenses into doubt, because anything based on negating criminal intent doesn't matter. However, Michigan does specifically say that it is not criminal to have sex with a person under 16 if they are your legal spouse; this is a very common exception to statutory rape laws. So, marriage is a way to not risk jail for statutory rape in Michigan. However, things do vary by state. In Indiana, it is specifically a defense that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the victim was over the age of consent (unless it was a forcible rape).
I'm not sure a case of harassment could be made out (it would depend on the circumstances in which you purportedly did those things or threatened her, except for touching her. Sexual assault The Sexual Offences Act 2003 defines sexual assault as: (1) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) he intentionally touches another person (B), (b) the touching is sexual, (c) B does not consent to the touching, and (d) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. (2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents. To your questions: What is the law on a 16 year-old doing the things listed above with a 14 year-old? Same as the above, except what would happen if it was made out that there was not consent? For sexual assault, it is presumed that if the person is between the ages of 13 and 16, they do not have the capacity to consent. That is - if there is no proof of consent, you are guilty of the offence, if the requisite mens rea - intent - to touch them can be proved. For everything else - it might amount to harassment but that is probably a stretch, I don't see the elements being made out. However, there are certain limits to what people can consent to - you can't consent to someone murdering you in most jurisdictions, for example. ... what would be the best way to go about disproving (in a court scenario) that I did all of these things? You do not have to disprove that you did these acts - it is the job of the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond reasonable doubt that you have done so. You can present evidence that satisfies an evidentiary burden that you did not do these acts, such as not being able to do so (by being in another place), or not intending to do the act. However, you would need to prove that you had consent and believed she was 16 or over to stand a reasonable chance of escaping conviction for the above crime, if prosecuted. As Martin has said - you need to get a lawyer for the right answer here.
Overview The cop is basically wrong. Sexual harassment is not the only kind of harassment recognized by U.S. law. The question and the cop's answer to it, assume that simply asking certain questions is illegal or not illegal, but it isn't that straight forward. Words communicated verbally are part of the analysis, but not the entire analysis. It all depends upon context and the character of the communication. None of these questions are per se (i.e. always) illegal to ask in the abstract, although a good lawyer would advise a client that it is rarely prudent to ask them because, together with other facts, they could give rise to civil or criminal liability. In this regard, he is correct that two of the three questions aren't necessarily unlawful, but he is incorrect when he assumes that the third one, which would suggest that there might be sexual harassment present, is always unlawful. But, any of these three questions could be a part of a pattern of conduct that constitutes illegal harassment, and each of these three questions suggest an intent that one would often expect to be a part of a larger pattern of harassing conduct. So, he is incorrect when he suggests that non-sexual forms of harassment are definitely legal. Also, there are really at least three kinds of illegal harassment that need to be analyzed separately, one in the context of state and federal laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of protected classes, one in the context of the common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising under state law, and the third under a state's general criminal laws. In addition, certain kinds of harassment can provide a basis for the issuance of a restraining order or protection order under state law. A particular course of harassing conduct may be governed by only one of these kinds of laws, by some but not all of these kinds of laws, or by all of these kinds of laws, depending upon the nature of the conduct and the laws of the state that are at issue. In cases where the relevant law is state law, rather than federal law, the applicable laws may, and frequently do, differ in important details from state to state. I describe the most common provisions of state law that apply, using the state of Colorado, which is the primary place where I practice law, for some specific examples. But, while some important details (particularly with regard to criminal liability) differ from state to state, the broad outlines of the relevant state laws are usually fairly similar in the vast majority of U.S. states. Harassment That Is A Form Of Discrimination The Nature Of The Liability One kind, is a subset of discriminatory conduct in the context of a relationship such as employment, or operating a &quot;public accommodation&quot; (such as a restaurant open to the public), or carrying out governmental functions, in which there is a legal duty not to discriminate on a particular basis. This is implicated in the second and third questions. In both of these cases, harassment as a form of employment discrimination arises from the same statute. Neither that statute nor regulations interpreting it, at the time that sexual harassment claims were first recognized by the courts, specifically delineate an offense of sexual harassment or other kinds of harassment separate and distinct from employment discrimination generally. Subsequently, the case law, regulations interpreting the statute promulgated by the EEOC, and to a less extent some statutes (especially at the state and local level), have spelled out sexual harassment as a distinct type of discrimination on the basis of sex in employment with its own set of specific legal elements of the claim that must be established which differ somewhat from other employment discrimination claims. Why Isn't This A Free Speech Violation? One of the reasons that this can be prohibited, notwithstanding the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, is that in the employment and public accommodations cases, this involves commercial speech, the regulation of which is subject to less rigorous review than non-commercial speech, as a matter of United States constitutional law. In the case of governmental speech, this regulation is directly authorized (and arguably required) by the 14th Amendment requiring government to provide people with equal protection of the laws, which was enacted after the First Amendment. Also the First Amendment generally limits the power of government to regulate the speech of others, not its own speech. Discrimination On The Basis Of Sex In the context of an employer-employee relationship, a man (or woman) asking a woman &quot;How big are your breasts?&quot;, could be interpreted as sexual harassment, which is a kind of employment discrimination on the prohibited basis of sex, and if violated, gives rise to the right of the EEOC or the woman to whom the question is directed, and possibly even to the all of the women in that workplace to bring a civil action for employment discrimination seeking money damages. While the expectation is that this sort of harassment happens from superior to subordinate that is not necessarily the case and it can occur between peers or from subordinate to superior. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC) defines sexual harassment as follows: Sexual Harassment It is unlawful to harass a person (an applicant or employee) because of that person’s sex. Harassment can include “sexual harassment” or unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment of a sexual nature. Harassment does not have to be of a sexual nature, however, and can include offensive remarks about a person’s sex. For example, it is illegal to harass a woman by making offensive comments about women in general. Both victim and the harasser can be either a woman or a man, and the victim and harasser can be the same sex. Although the law doesn’t prohibit simple teasing, offhand comments, or isolated incidents that are not very serious, harassment is illegal when it is so frequent or severe that it creates a hostile or offensive work environment or when it results in an adverse employment decision (such as the victim being fired or demoted). The harasser can be the victim's supervisor, a supervisor in another area, a co-worker, or someone who is not an employee of the employer, such as a client or customer. Discrimination On The Basis Of National Origin Similarly, in the context of an employer or prospective employer asking an employee or prospective employee who is apparently a foreign-born man, &quot;What country are you from?&quot;, this could be interpreted as evidence of employment discrimination on the prohibited basis of national origin, which, if it was occurring could give rise to the right of the EEOC or the man to whom the question is directed, and possibly even to the all of the foreign born people in that workplace to bring a civil action for employment discrimination seeking money damages. General Considerations Regarding Harassment As A Form Of Discrimination In each of these cases, the damages could be related to the direct economic harm associated with not being hired or promoted, for example, or could arise from the largely non-economic harm suffered from harassing conduct itself. Also, in each of these cases, simply asking the question is not harassment. The asking of the question must be part of a pattern of conduct that together has the effect of constituting harassment taken as a whole, and must involve some sort of improper motive on the part of the employer. An employer asking &quot;how big are your breasts?&quot; for purpose of ordering uniforms for a woman isn't engaged in harassment, nor is an employer asking &quot;what country are you from?&quot; for the purpose of determining if the employee has knowledge that would allow the employer to better serve a customer in a particular country. Harassment as a form of employment discrimination is not generally a crime, it is merely tortious conduct prohibited by law. Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress The Common Law Tort Courts in the United States have the power to established when conduct gives rise to a claim for money damages against another person which is developed through case law precedents extending back for centuries into the laws of England, so long as this is not in conflict with a statute. One such claim that is recognize by U.S. courts in most states is a tort (i.e. civil wrong) known as &quot;intentional infliction of emotional distress.&quot; In the case of asking a (very short) guy &quot;How tall are you?&quot;, except to the extent that the short statute was such that it amounted to a disability protected by the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) (which would be unusual but not inconceivable), this would not be a protected class and so it could not constitute harassment in the sense of a subtype of employment discrimination. But, that is not the end of the analysis in the case of the short employee. The law also recognizes a tort (i.e. a right to sue someone for a civil wrong) that is sometimes called &quot;intentional infliction of emotional distress&quot; and sometimes called &quot;outrageous conduct&quot; that is not infrequently invoked in an employer-employee context. Wikipedia at the link above summarizes this tort as follows: Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED; sometimes called the tort of outrage) is a common law tort that allows individuals to recover for severe emotional distress caused by another individual who intentionally or recklessly inflicted emotional distress by behaving in an &quot;extreme and outrageous&quot; way. Some courts and commentators have substituted mental for emotional, but the tort is the same. In the United States, the common law tort most often tracks the language of the Restatement of Torts (Second) Section 46 (1965), which states: One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm. This tort cannot, however, be used to shut down offensive statements and parodies. Per the same Wikipedia entry: The U.S. Supreme Court case Hustler v. Falwell involved an IIED claim brought by the evangelist Jerry Falwell against the publisher of Hustler Magazine for a parody ad that described Falwell as having lost his virginity to his mother in an outhouse. The Court ruled that the First Amendment protected such parodies of public figures from civil liability. Unlike harassment as a form of discrimination, this tort is not limited to any particular protected class of persons, or to a particular specified kind of relationship between the perpetrator and the victim. But, the threshold of conduct which qualifies as &quot;extreme and outrageous&quot; needs to be both much more egregious and much more directly targeted at a particular individual. Basically, the conduct complained of must amount to either effective bullying, or to a malicious prank (there is considerable overlap between these kinds of conduct). An Example Of Conduct Held To Be Actionable Outrageous Conduct An example of conduct that was held sufficiently extreme and outrageous to give rise to tort liability if established at trial was this case: In January 1978, Zalnis contracted with defendant Thoroughbred Datsun for the purchase of a 1978 Datsun automobile. She took possession of the car on that day, and paid the balance of the purchase price two days later. Zalnis dealt directly with Linnie Cade, a salesperson employed by Thoroughbred Datsun. Defendant Trosper, President of Thoroughbred Datsun, approved the transaction based on representations by Cade which were later determined to be based upon erroneous calculations. When Trosper discovered several days later that Cade had sold the car at a loss of approximately $1,000, he instructed Cade and the sales manager to make good the loss by either demanding more money from Zalnis, retrieving the car, or repaying the difference out of Cade's salary. Cade refused to follow any of Trosper's alternative instructions, but another sales employee, defendant Anthony, telephoned Zalnis and told her to return her car to the dealership because it was being recalled. When Zalnis arrived at Thoroughbred Datsun, she refused to give up possession of her car without a work order explaining the need for the recall. Nevertheless, her car was taken from her. During the next few hours, Zalnis alleges that Anthony called her a “French whore,” followed her throughout the showroom, told her they were keeping her automobile, yelled, screamed, used abusive language, grabbed her by the arm in a threatening manner, and continually threatened and intimidated her when she attempted to secure the return of her automobile by telling her to “shut up.” During this period, Zalnis telephoned her attorney, who then telephoned Trosper and eventually obtained the return of her car. During their conversation, Trosper told the attorney that Zalnis had “been sleeping with that nigger salesman and that's the only reason she got the deal she got.” Trosper had known Zalnis for many years, and had told Cade and the sales manager that she was crazy and she had watched her husband kill himself. Zalnis v. Thoroughbred Datsun Car Co., 645 P.2d 292, 293 (Colo. App. 1982). The analysis that lead the Court to reach this conclusion was as follows (most citations omitted): The defendants argue that their actions here were no more than “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, and other trivialities.” However, the defendants did not merely threaten and insult Zalnis; they took away her car and repeatedly harassed her. Conduct, otherwise permissible, may become extreme and outrageous if it is an abuse by the actor of a position in which he has actual or apparent authority over the other, or the power to affect the other's interests. The conduct here is not a mere insistence on rights in a permissible manner. Rather, the defendants' recall of the car was to avoid a bad bargain, and accordingly, the conduct was not privileged. [S]ee Enright v. Groves, 39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851 (1977). Defendants assert that their actions must be judged by the impact they would have on an ordinary person with ordinary sensibilities. We disagree. The outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. In Enright, supra, outrageous conduct was found where a police officer effecting an illegal arrest grabbed and twisted the plaintiff's arm even after she told him her arm was easily dislocated. In the instant case, plaintiff was peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress because she had witnessed her husband's suicide, and Trosper and Anthony knew about her susceptibility. Here, as in Enright, the defendants' knowledge exacerbated the conduct. There is outrageous conduct where the actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress or knows that such distress is certain or substantially certain. Here, Zalnis has sufficiently alleged that Trosper and Anthony acted with the intent to bully her into giving up her car. In view of their knowledge of her emotional susceptibility, they could be considered to have acted intentionally or recklessly in causing her severe emotional distress. The defendants argue that we should observe a distinction between a single outrageous occurrence and an outrageous course of conduct. While it is true that “the courts are more likely to find outrageous conduct in a series of incidents or a ‘course of conduct’ than in a single incident,” it is the totality of conduct that must be evaluated to determine whether outrageous conduct has occurred. Zalnis v. Thoroughbred Datsun Car Co., 645 P.2d 292, 294 (Colo. App. 1982) Harassment That Is Criminal Conduct General Considerations Another form of harassment is harassment that constitutes criminal conduct. In these cases, the existence or absence of protected class status is irrelevant (or only goes to the sentence that is appropriate for a violation, rather than guilt or innocence), and the formal character of the relationship between the people (e.g. as employer-employee, merchant-customer, government employee-citizen) is secondary. Instead, in these cases, the existence or absence of harassment hinges on the character and subtextual message of the question in the context of the larger interaction. Exactly what is defined to be criminal harassment varies from state to state, but the key point is that the subtext of the message must either be (1) something that is outright prohibited, for example, when the superficially non-threatening question, in light of the tone used, body language, and the physical context where it takes place is an implied threat to harm someone, or (2) must be part of an overall context of conduct including the question, and a manner of communication which is calculated to distress, annoy, or disturb a person, to an extent that exceeds communication of an idea they may be inherently distressing in a civil, calm and non-combative manner, and would in fact disturb a reasonable person. In the latter case signs that it may be criminal harassment include yelling at a person, bombarding them over and over again with the statement in a way that it can't be avoided verging upon stalking, and being part of a large context of discussion showing specific animus against the individual target of the communication. The Example Of Colorado's Criminal Harassment Statute For example, Colorado's criminal harassment statute reads as follows: (1) A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she: (a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to physical contact; or (b) In a public place directs obscene language or makes an obscene gesture to or at another person; or (c) Follows a person in or about a public place; or (e) Directly or indirectly initiates communication with a person or directs language toward another person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telephone network, data network, text message, instant message, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium in a manner intended to harass or threaten bodily injury or property damage, or makes any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal by telephone, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium that is obscene; or (f) Makes a telephone call or causes a telephone to ring repeatedly, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate conversation; or (g) Makes repeated communications at inconvenient hours that invade the privacy of another and interfere in the use and enjoyment of another's home or private residence or other private property; or (h) Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively coarse language to, another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly response. (1.5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “obscene” means a patently offensive description of ultimate sexual acts or solicitation to commit ultimate sexual acts, whether or not said ultimate sexual acts are normal or perverted, actual or simulated, including masturbation, cunnilingus, fellatio, anilingus, or excretory functions. (2) Harassment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section is a class 3 misdemeanor; except that harassment is a class 1 misdemeanor if the offender commits harassment pursuant to subsection (1) of this section with the intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's actual or perceived race; color; religion; ancestry; national origin; physical or mental disability, as defined in section 18-9-121(5)(a); or sexual orientation, as defined in section 18-9-121(5)(b). (3) Any act prohibited by paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section may be deemed to have occurred or to have been committed at the place at which the telephone call, electronic mail, or other electronic communication was either made or received.... (7) Paragraph (e) of subsection (1) of this section shall be known and may be cited as “Kiana Arellano's Law”. (8) This section is not intended to infringe upon any right guaranteed to any person by the first amendment to the United States constitution or to prevent the expression of any religious, political, or philosophical views. Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-9-111 (emphasis added). The case of the harassment of Kiana Arellano, after whom the statute was named, is discussed in an article in the Denver Post, and sheds some light on the kind of conduct that legislators where attempting to punish when they passed the law. It was a case of severe cyber bullying that caused this person to attempt to commit suicide. Restraining Orders And Protection Orders Both tort remedies and criminal sanctions for harassment punish a perpetrator and/or compensate a victim of harassment after it has happened. In many case, the law also allows a court to enter orders known as restraining orders or protection orders directing someone who has engaged in harassing conduct to cease doing so. States differ considerably in defining exactly what kinds of harassing conduct can provide a basis for entry of a restraining order or protection order against an individual directing that person to cease having contact with or harassing the individual protected by the order. The most common fact patterns in which restraining orders or protection orders are entered for harassment (which is not the only kind of conduct that can provide basis for an order like that) involve (1) a former romantic partner harassing his or her ex, (2) a person who had engaged in elder abuse harassing the elderly person who had been abused, (3) a criminal defendant harassing potential witnesses in a case, and (4) a &quot;fan&quot; (often, in part, because they don't really understand the difference between entertainment performances and reality), or a &quot;hater&quot; (often, as part of a larger political agenda intended to bully opponents into compliance) harassing a celebrity, politician, or adult entertainer. Harassment that justifies issuance of a restraining order or protection order, like the harassment that can justify a common law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, must typically be very extreme and pose an imminent threat to the protected person's safety, emotional well being, the judicial process, or the ability of the protected person to live an ordinary daily life. There must also generally be some reasons to think that the harassing conduct will continue if the court does not act. As in the case of other legal remedies for harassment, harassment in a restraining order or protective order context usually involves consideration of the context of a pattern of conduct over time, even though it can be based on a single very extreme incident. Every state provides that someone who violates a court order like this one may be held in contempt of court, which can result in incarceration or a fine, after a hearing is held in which someone (usually the victim's attorney) acts as prosecutor against the person who violated the order in a quasi-criminal proceeding within the main civil or criminal lawsuit in which the order was obtained. Some states make violation of a court order like this one a criminal offense as well, that can be enforced by law enforcement prior to a hearing if there is probable cause to believe that it was violated.
In NSW Australia this is covered by Division 15A of the Crimes Act 1900 which deals with Child Abuse Material. Under Section 91FA a &quot;child&quot; means a person who is under the age of 16 years - the situation you describe would be between consenting adults in NSW. “Child abuse material” can be text or images that are sexually explicit and would be “offensive” to a normal person (which means offensive to the particular jury) Assuming Jane is 15 or less, however, prima facie the image would be child abuse material and under Section 91H &quot;A person who produces, disseminates or possesses child abuse material is guilty of an offence.&quot; The punishment is up to 10 years in jail. Section 91H provides a number of defences, the most relevant to the circumstances you describe being: that the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably be expected to have known, that he or she produced, disseminated or possessed (as the case requires) child abuse material. that the material concerned came into the defendant’s possession unsolicited and the defendant, as soon as he or she became aware of its nature, took reasonable steps to get rid of it. (for possession only) If, considering all the circumstances of the relationship, Joe doesn't know and could not reasonably be expected to know Jane's age then he can use the defence under S91H(1). If he did not request the picture and as soon as he was aware of Jane's age, deleted it, then he can use the defence under S91H(2). The outcome is not so rosy for Jane: she is guilty of both production and dissemination of child abuse material and (assuming she knows how old she is) faces up to 10 years in jail (14 if she is under 14) and registration on the Sex Offenders List for life. It is admittedly unlikely in the circumstances that the state would prosecute her and, if they did, it is very likely that the judge would rule that no conviction be recorded.
The specific elements of the crime in question are going to be defined by Maltese law, which appears to be a blend of a European-style civil code with English-style common law. However, under ordinary Anglo-American standards, the alleged acts do seem to meet the legal definitions of these terms. At common law, an "assault" consists of placing someone in fear of an unwanted touching, and a "battery" is a completed assault; that is, an actual unwanted touching. If Mr. Suda, as alleged, took the victim's hand and touched it to his own genitals, without her consent, he committed an assault and battery. Any touching can constitute a battery, from a tap on the shoulder to a bullet in the head. Likewise, at common law, "violence" is any degree of physical force. If he tricked her into touching his genitals, that would not be a crime of violence; if he physically moved her hand to his genitals with his own hand, then he used physical force, or violence, to commit the crime. Again, what actually needs to be proven will depend on specifics you would need a Maltese lawyer to go into--but under general common law principles, neither "assault" not "violence" are particularly surprising.
It depends In the united-states &quot;Pedophilia&quot; is not a legal term for the prohibited content. The relevant legal term is &quot;child pornography&quot; The US DOJ offers a useful &quot;Citizen's Guide To U.S. Federal Law On Child Pornography&quot; which mentions key federal laws on the topic, including: 18 USC §2251 18 USC §2251 (Sexual exploitation of children) prohibits having a minor (person under 18) engage in sexual activity &quot;for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct&quot; So if a drawing is modeled from an actual child who engaged in sexual activity, it is illegal under 18 USC §2251. That section also makes it illegal for a parent, guardian, or custodian to permit such sexual activity and the making of a depiction of it. It also prohibits the advertising and distribution of any such depiction. All offenses under 18 USC §2251 involve an actual child at some point. 18 USC §2252 18 USC §2252 (Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors) makes it a crime when someone knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; under certain circumstances, mostly involving intestate or foreign transmission or distribution. The same section also makes it a crime when a person: knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction... if the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of such conduct; So again to be covered under 2252 an actual child must have engaged in sexual conduct at some point, but a drawing modeled on such a child would be covered under this section. 18 USC §2252A 18 USC §2252a (Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography) makes it a crime if anyone: knowingly mails, or transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any child pornography knowingly receives or distributes any child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce ... [or] any material that contains child pornography [that has been similarly mailed shipped or transported] or who possesses such child porn. This section does not define &quot;child pornography&quot; but 18 USC §2256 (8) defines it as: any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; It would appear that under this section an image that &quot;appears to&quot; be a depiction of an actual minor engaged in sexual acts or is advertised as such may count as &quot;child pornography&quot; and thus be criminal. Whether this can apply to a wholly fictional character not based on any real child is not clearly stated in the law. I don't find any reported conviction involving an invented child character under this section. However in United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) aff ’d, 09-3935 WL 677398 (2011), the US 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that an image created by combining the image of the face of an actual child with the body of an adult in a sexual situation was child porn under this section. That case involved computer morphing to in effect paste photos of the heads or faces of children onto the bodies of adults engaged in sex, but a combination done by an artist's skill would presumably face the same ruling, if the child was recognizable. 18 USC §2260 18 USC §2260 makes it a crime if anyone outside the US has a minor engage in sexually explicit activities in order to make a visual depiction of such activities, and imports that depiction into the US, or who participates in the import or attempted import of such a depiction into the US. 18 USC § 1466A 18 USC § 1466A (Obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children) makes it a crime when anyone knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting, that depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and is obscene; or depicts an image that is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse ... lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Simple possession of such a visual depiction is also a crime under this section. In United States v. Whorley No. 06-4288. (2008) the 4th circuit Court of Appeals wrote: Counts 1-20 [of the indictment] charged Whorley with using a computer on March 30, 2004, to knowingly receive obscene cartoons in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462. The 20 cartoons forming the basis of those counts showed prepubescent children engaging in graphic sexual acts with adults. ... We also reject his arguments that ... cartoons depicting minors in sexually explicit conduct must depict real-life minors to violate § 1466A(a)(1). ... The clear language of § 1466A(a)(1) and § 1466A(c) is sufficiently broad to prohibit receipt of obscene cartoons ... The Supreme Court declined to review Whorley Leaving this holding in place. First Amendment issues In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) the US Supreme Court held that obscene content, which it defined by a 3-part test somewhat looser than the previous test in Roth, was not protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under 18 USC § 1466A have no first amendment issues, because only obscene visual depictions are prohibited under that section. in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) the Court held that child pornography was not protected by the first amendment. However, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) the Court limited this to visual depictions of actual children that are produced by the abuse of such children, and found that depictions of fictional children that are not obscene under Miller are protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, §2260 and related sections of 18 USC have no first amendment issues, because all of these are limited to the depictions of actual minors. Some of these sections, however, also criminalize possession or distribution of images that &quot;appear to be&quot; minors, or are advertised as being of minors. Prosecutions under those provisions for images that do not in fact depict any actual child and are not obscene might be barred by the US first amendment. I have not found any reported case in which such a claim has been raised and decided, one way or the other. Conclusion &quot;Cub art&quot; as described in the question will not be protected under the US first amendment simply because it is a drawing rather than a photograph. A drawing which recognizably represents an actual child engaged in explicit sexual activity will probably trigger prosecution under one or more of §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, or §2260. Even if the child was not actually abused, using the recognizable image of an actual child can be treated, under Hotaling (cited above) as child pornography and therefore criminal. If the art does not depict any actual child, but the image is found to be obscene under Miller, then a prosecution could be brought under § 1466A. Note that whether a given image is or is not obscene is a matter of fact, ultimately for a jury to decide, based on the Miller standard. As Whorley shows, completely fictional cartoons may be the basis of a successful prosecution under § 1466A. Anyone reading this answer should be aware that anything that might be considered &quot;child porn&quot; is taken quite seriously by US law enforcement. Penalties for conviction are severe. Even if the materiel is found to be protected by the first amendment, an arrest may lead to significant expense, loss of employment, and other negative consequences. It should also be noted that a &quot;minor&quot; or &quot;child&quot; under the sections of US law mentioned here means anyone under the age of 18. The age of consent under state law is not relevant. Thus it might be lawful for a person of 16 to engage in sex in some US states, but it will still be criminal to distribute or poses a photo or other image of such an act. People should also be aware that the law on such matters differs significantly between different countries. Content that US courts have held to be protected by the US first amendment may be criminal to posses, receive, or transmit under the laws of other countries. Penalties are potentially severe. The question of whether any given image is protected or criminal is not always easy to resolve, and finding out via an arrest and a criminal trial could be a very unpleasant and expensive way to determine this. Consulting a lawyer skilled in such matters might be wise if any content in one's possession is even arguably questionable on such points.