Nashville Protest Felony Legislation Can&#39;t Possibly be Legal, Right? Tennessee passed some legislation yesterday in what appears to be a thinly veiled attempt to come down hard on protestors in the capitol. The most notable is that it is now a felony (with severe penalties) to erect a tent on state property between the hours of 10PM and 7AM. Is there any mechanism to prevent the legislation of arbitrarily severe punishments for crimes like this or is there precedent for overturning something like this in the court system?
The law is part of a larger bill modifying punishments for various crimes. For example it increases the penalty for vandalizing government property, creates offenses for assault on a first responder carrying out their duties (depending on the severity of the assault), increases the penalty for aggravated rioting, obstruction of highways and so on. It also clarifies that being assembling or being present at the scene of a riot is not an offense. The only new crime created is assault on a first responder. Unauthorized camping on state property was already a crime: this is an increase in the penalty for committing that crime. It does have a requirement for notice and continued violation for 24 hours, unlike vandalism where if you do the deed, you can be arrested. The courts have not held that the First Amendment protects the right to trespass, assault or commit vandalism. The only viable avenue for a legal challenge is that the punishment is cruel and unusual (too severe). A change from Class A misdemeanor to Class E felony is the smallest increment in penalty. The state will argue that the increase in penalty is necessary to maintain public order, and that it is not arbitrary or capricious, because there have been many recent violations of the law. In general, when laws are frequently disobeyed, it is legal for the government to increase the penalty for breaking the law in order to achieve compliance.
Your rights notwithstanding, the government has the power to do such things under appropriate circumstances. First, you would have to be in violation of some ordinance, for instance in Columbus OH you are a violator if the grass is over 12". This should generate a notice informing you what the issue is and giving a deadline for remedy. If you don't comply by the deadline, they are then empowered to send out guys with tools, and the city will bill you for the work. You could call them and ask what the deal is. They might say "We put the notice on your gate", or "we mailed it to you". From a legal POV, the onus is on them to be sure that you're notified. It would be a good idea to verify that this isn't a scam. [Addendum] Bryan TX kindly provides a video about code enforcement, and gives a link where you can go directly to the section of interest (starting 0:43). Your description of the situation is at variance with what they say is the law (12"; 7 day advance notice whereafter they will correct the violation. They also say no notice is required for second violation within a year; $100 administration fee added to costs; lien will be placed on property if unpaid). I assume that your back yard is publicly visible: they recognize that "when the area observed is plainly visible, from a vantage point where the Code Officer has the right to be there, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy". That could include visible from a neighbor's property if the inspector has permission from the neighbor to be there. Otherwise, there's a simmering 4th Amendment problem (assuming that they didn't get a search warrant).
The only real answer is that Congress hasn't (to the best of my knowledge) chosen to pass such a law. But the kinds of forgery that Congress might plausibly and constitutionally prohibit, such as forgery of checks, forgery of legal documents, and forgery as part of a fraudulent scheme are already crimes under state law, and the states handle such prosecutions perfectly well. There is really no need for a separate federal law on such issues. The kinds of forgery covered in the answer b grovkin would probably not be covered by a federal forgery statute, if one were to be passed. But that is speculation.
The victims of these unconstitutional laws would likely not be able to recover any damages or refunds of their fees. Generally speaking, the only avenue to challenge fees imposed as a result of a criminal conviction for sodomy (or any other criminal law) is through a direct appeal of your conviction or sentence. The amount of time to raise that appeal is 30 days from the entry of the final judgment in most states, though it can be as low as 10 days in Virginia or as high as 90 days in Wisconsin. So by the time the court struck those laws down in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the only people who could still raise an appeal would probably be those who had been convicted in the month or so before the court's decision. Even then, many of those people would likely still be unable to appeal. If they paid their fine, they generally forfeit the right to seek to vacate it. If they pleaded guilty, they probably would have waived their right to appeal on constitutional grounds. If they failed to raise the constitutional defense, they probably waived their right to raise it on appeal as well. So now the only people who can seek to vacate their fines are those you're dealing solely with the people who raised a constitutional defense, were convicted anyway, and had not yet paid their fines. Probably a very small universe. The other possibility would be through a civil suit under Section 1983, alleging that the government infringed on their rights by bringing that lawsuit. There are several possible ways to get hung up here, as well. First, under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the courts can't allow a 1983 action based on a criminal conviction unless the conviction &quot;has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.&quot; Again, it would be too late to reverse the conviction, and habeas corpus would be unavailable for someone who had merely paid a fine. Perhaps one could obtain an expungement under a statutory procedure and characterize that as an executive order, but I don't know that that would be persuasive. Even if the plaintiff were able to address his conviction in one of those ways, the ongoing litigation over compulsory union fees makes me think he would probably remain unable to collect damages. In the union cases, the Supreme Court had previously explicitly allowed public-sector unions to impose mandatory union dues, and it then reversed course, finding those dues unconstitutional. Although the unions could no longer collect the dues, a question arose as to whether they had to refund the dues they had collected in the past. As far as I know, every court to consider the question has found that a &quot;good faith&quot; defense essentially immunized those unions from liability for damages based on the previous collection of dues. Analogizing here, the Supreme Court has previously explicitly permitted state anti-sodomy statutes in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), then reversed in Lawrence. In the meantime, many states collected fines from defendants convicted of sodomy in reliance on Bowers. So I suspect the courts would find that any municipal defendants in those cases would be eligible for the good-faith defense, and any individual defendants would be eligible for qualified immunity, as the illegality of their conduct was obviously not clearly established, given Bowers. So in short, I think any attempt to recoup those fees would fail.
Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.
Can Congress essentially pardon a violation of law through legislation? Yes. Congress has the power to retroactivity reduce the sentence for a crime for which someone has been sentenced. This was done most recently in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 that reduced excessive penalties for crack cocaine relative to powder cocaine. In the same way, when the death penalty is legislatively repealed in a state, the death sentences of the handful of people on death row at the time is often commuted legislatively. While Congress cannot impose criminal penalties on someone legislatively, which is a Bill of Attainder and constitutionally prohibited, it can single out people for special treatment in a private bill, which is a constitutional exercise of legislative power at the federal level (not every state allows private bills to be enacted due to Progressive era reforms to state constitutions). For example, private bills often eliminate the collateral effects of a criminal conviction upon a person, there is even a standard procedure for doing so, which is functionally equivalent to a Presidential pardon of the crime for that purposes (the vast majority of Presidential pardons are issued after the person convicted has served the sentence for the crime). A private bill cannot impair contract or property rights, which would be a prohibited ex post facto law. But no one other than the federal government has a legally protected interest in keeping someone incarcerated or otherwise punishing them for a crime. Crimes are prosecuted in the name of the People and victims of crimes do not have legal rights in those proceedings except as created by statute. So, this would not be an ex post facto bill or a taking governed by the Fifth Amendment for takings of property interests. And, Congress may, by legislation, determine what the federal government will do in essentially all cases where it is not expressly prohibited from doing so (some argue that there is a minimum of federal authority vested exclusively in the President in the area of foreign affairs and military affairs, but that exclusivity of power does not extend to domestic criminal justice). Basically, anything that Congress could do for everyone via a public bill, it can do for someone in particular via a private bill, unless a specific constitutional prohibition applies, and there is no such prohibition when it comes to relieving someone from a sentence or the collateral effects of a criminal conviction prospectively via a private bill. This isn't exactly equivalent to a Presidential pardon or commutation, but it is very close to one in practical effect. For a fuller, but somewhat outdated treatment of the issue, you can read this 1939 article in the California Law Review which acknowledged that legislative pardons were possible under existing law. This said, government prosecutors routinely fervently oppose any retroactive criminal legislation that reduces punishment, particularly via private laws (although some countries, such as France, have constitutional requirements to retroactively reduce the sentences of anyone currently serving time for a crime whose punishment is legislatively reduced prospectively). Private bills that constitute legislative pardons are very rare. A 2011 law review article recounts how the tool of the legislative pardon (in parallel with the executive pardon which is also used much less frequency) has fallen into disuse. Part of the decline is due to the adoption of the right to appeal from a trial court criminal convictions which did not exist in the federal system until the 1890s. Until then, the only judicial relief available from a federal criminal conviction was via a writ of habeas corpus, and that was available only on very limited grounds such as a lack of jurisdiction to conduct the trial, or the non-existence of the crime of conviction. Conviction by a jury in a court with jurisdiction of a constitutionally permissible crime was an absolute defense to the extent of the sentence imposed to a habeas corpus petition at that time. (As a footnote, the term "private bill" can be confusing. In many governments with a parliamentary system, a "private bill" means one sponsored by an individual legislator rather than the prime minister and his or her cabinet. But, in U.S. terminology, a "private bill" refers to a bill with an effect limited to one person or a small number of persons who are either identified by name or by a very narrowly defined situation.)
Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he &quot;should have&quot; (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an &quot;eggshell&quot; victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was &quot;fragile&quot; - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the &quot;Deep South&quot; it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the &quot;Deep South&quot; at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.
This is from an opinion piece (albeit by Law profs.) so you'll have to bear/excuse the tone and check the details... but seemingly there some similar laws introduced earlier this year, on different topics though: But the subversion of private enforcement laws to restrict individual rights goes far beyond abortion. Since the beginning of this year, Tennessee has authorized students and teachers to sue schools that allow transgender students to use the restrooms that match their gender identity; Florida has followed suit, with a law that allows students to sue schools that permit transgender girls to play on girls’ sports teams. My opinion is that the comparison falls short on (2), as the [plaintiff] students seem to have to be from the same school, so it's not as broad as SB.8., in terms of who can sue. (N.B. found a more in-depth news article on the Florida sports law. Some of the writeups on this aren't totally clear on that though, just saying &quot;another student&quot; can sue. I couldn't find the exact text of the law insofar.) The promoter of SB.8, actually gave some inspirational examples in an interview, and they are somewhat older: And this is ground that's been ploughed before - under current Texas law under Medicaid fraud, for example. Any person who discovers Medicaid fraud can bring a civil case to bring that forward. The Chick-fil-A law, Senate Bill 1978 from last session about your religious freedom, that also allowed any person to bring a civil action. So it's not a new concept in Texas law, and if elected officials won't follow the law, we'll empower the people of Texas to do it, and we think it makes sense. (Hat tip to a Politics.SE answer for this latter quote.) Again, I didn't check the details... I suspect there may be some divergence from the strict letter of the (1) requirement. I bet (Medicaid) fraud is criminal as well. It seems the Chick-fil-A law failed to do its (immediately) intended job because it was attempted to be used against a city municipality, but the suit was dismissed (on appeal) due to governmental immunity... The private enforcement of the Medicaid fraud issue was apparently passed because of the huge backlog that existed at one point in the state/agency enforcement in Texas: The Office of Inspector General was lambasted in a state review last year [2015--seemingly] for, among other things, a massive backlog of cases and a failure to recover significant tax dollars from providers it accused of fraud, sometimes incorrectly. N.B., these are referred to as qui tam cases, but they don't quite entirely substitute the plaintiff, at least not in the insurance cases that were won: So-called qui tam cases allow whistleblowers to file lawsuits alleging fraud on behalf of the government. If the claims turn out to be legitimate, state and federal laws award a finder’s fee of between 15 and 25 percent of the total settlement or judgment. Interestingly higher awards are possible if the government declines to intervene, but they are still not 100% going to the private initiator (under the False Claims Act)--from Wikipedia: If the government does not decide to participate in a qui tam action, the relator may proceed alone without the Department of Justice, though such cases historically have a much lower success rate. Relators who do prevail in such cases may potentially receive a higher relator's share, to a maximum of 30%. As Wikipedia also notes, some such laws that entirely left the prosecution to a private entity were found unconstitutional, at the federal level e.g. In 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the False Marking Statute was unconstitutional. Judge Dan Aaron Polster determined that it violated the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution, because it represented &quot;a wholesale delegation of criminal law enforcement power to private entities with no control exercised by the Department of Justice&quot;. Of some note, the FCA requires that the complaint actually be served on the government and not the actual defendant. This basically ensures that the gov't is notified of all such actions. The Texas-specific legislation on qui tam fraud cases actually seems to mirror the federal one pretty closely: A whistleblower under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act [TMFPA] may be entitled to an award between 15% -25% if the state intervenes in the case. If the state chooses not to participate in the litigation, then a whistleblower may be entitled to an award between 25% – 30% of the amount recovered. Nonetheless, a court may reduce the award if the court finds that the action is based primarily on information disclosed by someone other than the person bringing the action. [...] Note: Changes to the Texas laws were enacted by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1 (S.B. 219).