Why is the federal judiciary of the United States divided into circuits? There are many questions (and answers) on this site pertaining to circuit splits. It is also my understanding that rulings/interpretations made by courts are binding on all lower courts within their circuit until repealed by a higher court. My question is fairly simple: Why have circuits in the first place? All they seem to do is enable this awkward circuit-split situation to arise at which point people cease to be equal under the law because the law has been interpreted differently in different parts of the country - which might not even be in their state. Surely it makes more sense to either abolish the circuits entirely, and have all decisions by higher courts binding on all lower courts regardless of state, or, if you want to take a states' rights approach, limit the scope of these decisions to the state in which they were made. This half-way house seems somewhat intolerable and I'm unable to discern any particular merit.
While the answer by Jen does a good job explaining why some possible alternative structures for US courts of appeal (circuit courts) would be unworkable, the real reason why we have such courts is their historical origin. In the United states, Justices of the Supreme Court regularly traveled through the country. They would stop at particular locations, and hold court together with the local judge of a district court as a two-judge court. Appeals from district court decisions were heard. Some were passed along to the full Supreme Court, particularly ones in which the Justice did not agree with the judge. Each Justice had a route, or &quot;circuit&quot; which that Justice covered once or twice a year on horseback (or by carriage) spending half or more of his time &quot;riding circuit&quot;. The process was quite onerous, and was by far the larger part of the work of a Justice. It allowed decisions to be reviewed by a Supreme Court member at places physically closer to the original trials, and served as a filter on cases to be decided by the full court. This practice was derived from the older English practice of having Justices in Iter (later known as circuit judges) who traveled through the country, judging cases that had been held awaiting their arrival. (The word &quot;Iter&quot; is related to &quot;Itinerary&quot;, the list of places one is scheduled to visit.) The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 by G. Edward White (ISBN 978-0195070590) includes a detailed description of the process of circuit riding during the period of 1815-1835, and the way in which proceeding in the circuit courts influenced constitutional jurisprudence and how cases came to the Supreme Court. I recommend this extensive book for better understanding of the origins of many features of the US Judicial system. Some years after the US Civil war the Circuit Courts officially became the Courts of Appeals and Supreme Court justices stopped &quot;riding circuit&quot;, but the geographical divisions continued to be called &quot;circuits&quot;, and each circuit is still supervised by a single Justice, who rules on &quot;emergency&quot; applications, often for stays of judgement, or for injunctions. The division of the US court system into circuits thus is due as much to historical inertia as to careful design, although an alternate design that was an improvement would not be easy to create.
Even within the United States, this would depend upon the jurisdiction involved. Some jurisdictions recognize a legal privilege of a journalist to keep confidential sources secret (also called a "reporter's privilege"), while others do not. There is a split of authority on the question within the various circuits of the U.S. federal court system, and there is also a split of authority between different U.S. states. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have all held that a qualified reporter's privilege exists. In the recent case of U.S. v. Sterling, the Fourth expressly denied a reporter's privilege exists. Furthermore, forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes called shield laws protecting journalists' anonymous sources. Three U.S. Court of Appeals circuits, the 6th, the 7th and the Federal Circuit, do not have any controlling case law on the subject. Ten U.S. states do not have shield laws protecting journalists' anonymous sources. The U.S. Department of Justice, as a matter of policy, seeks to compel journalists to disclose their anonymous sources only under specified conditions where the need is great, but this policy is not a defense available to a journalist in a case brought by the U.S. government. In the absence of a legal privilege, the journalist could be incarcerated until the information is disclosed or the need for the information is moot, for contempt of court. Quite a few journalists in the United States, faced with that choice, have opted to be incarcerated rather than to reveal a source. If the subpoena is upheld, even if the face of a good faith effort of the journalist to quash the subpoena on the basis of a legal privilege or other grounds, if the journalist does comply with the subpoena, the breach of the non-disclosure contract is legally excused and cannot be a ground for the journalist to be legally liable to the informant.
This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling.
united-states Overview If someone owns a house before marriage, would that house be exempt from asset division in divorce? For simplicity, assume that otherwise, asset picture is fairly simple and even (2 working spouses with similar income, no children, a shared savings/checking account, similarly sized retirements accounts, no other properties or investments). This seemingly simple question doesn't have a simple answer. This is in part because state law on the subject varies so much. Would the answer depend on any factors other than whether the state is Equitable Distribution vs community property? Yes. The other reason that this is a difficult question to answer is that there are many other potentially relevant factors. This answer will provide some examples of some of the relevant facts that were not provided in the question. State Law Varies Greatly It is necessary to look to particular states, such as the New York and California, as suggested in the question, regarding this matter, as there is no uniformity or even guidance in federal law (there is even a common law exception to federal court jurisdiction that actually specifically prohibits federal courts from handling divorces and other domestic relations matters). There are two extreme starting points in terms of how this question is handled under state law, but many states are hybrid systems that borrow from each of these systems. Also, there are very practically important differences in detail with respect to how final outcomes are determined, even in states that have the same basic systems. Once critical details are considered, there are probably at least half a dozen basic sets of rules among the fifty U.S. states concerning the question of how a house acquired prior to marrying by one spouse before marriage is treated in a property division during a divorce, and each of those basic sets of rules has some state specific variations. This also sets aside the ubiquitous possibility in every U.S. state that these rules have been modified by a marital agreement between the spouses (such as a prenuptial agreement). There are also significant differences between states, beyond the scope of this question, regarding the inheritance rights of a spouse in a house acquired by the other spouse before the marriage began in that spouse's sole name, at death. Equitable Division One of the two extremes in U.S. law is the pure traditional equitable division rule, in which all property of each spouse (regardless of whose name it is titled in) may be distributed in a manner that the judge finds to be equitable, rather than equal, and the concepts of separate and marital or community property does not exist. In the traditional equitable division regime, and in some states, but not others, a divorce court may consider marital fault in some (but not all) divorces, in deciding what is equitable in divorces commenced on fault based grounds. Each of these states has both fault based and no-fault divorces, a marital fault in not considered in property divisions in no-fault divorces in these states. New York State, for example, has a mixed fault and no-fault based divorce system. In equitable division states, often a business or a pension will be allocated entirely to a spouse who is active in the business or occupation associated with that asset, and a house will be allocated to a spouse who is not involved with the business or the occupation that gave rise to the pension. Community Property Another of the extremes in U.S. law is the community property regime, in which property acquired before the marriage and by a gift or inheritance are separate property not subject to division in a divorce, and everything acquired during the marriage is owned 50-59 by the spouses. In a community property state, property acquired by either spouse during the marriage automatically becomes property that is owned 50-50 by the spouses immediate and often some kinds of property formally titled in only one spouse's name can't be transferred without the consent of both spouses. For example, in California, which is a community property state, a house purchased in the name of one spouse before the couple marries is initially, at least, on the day of the wedding, entirely the separate property of the spouse who owns it. But, considerations discussed below regarding appreciation and the source of payments to related to the house will sometimes muddy the waters of this analysis. New York State: A Hybrid System New York State is strictly speaking an equitable distribution state and a spouse does not have a present ownership interest in property titled in their spouse's name which is acquired during the marriage. But, New York State does make a distinction between separate property and marital property at the time of a divorce, so it is really a hybrid of a traditional equitable division regime and a community property regime, unlike some other states that are more pure examples of the traditional equitable division system. During the divorce both spouses have to tell the judge about their income and any debts they owe. When the court grants a divorce, property will be divided equitably (though not always equally) between the spouses. New York's Equitable Distribution Law recognizes marriage as an economic as well as a social partnership. The law requires that a judge divide property as fairly as possible. The Equitable Distribution Law talks about two types of property for purposes of divorce: marital property and separate property. Marital property will be divided between the two spouses. Marital Property: all property either spouse bought during the marriage, regardless of whose name is on the property. Pension plans and other retirement plans are considered marital property. The portion of marital property earned during the marriage will be divided by the court. Separate Property: property a spouse owned before the marriage, or any inheritance or personal injury payments or gifts from someone other than the spouse during the marriage. To see the factors a court should consider in making an equitable distribution award, see Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(5)(d). (Source) In New York State, separate property and marital property is defined as follows: c. The term &quot;marital property&quot; shall mean all property acquired by either or both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held, except as otherwise provided in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part. Marital property shall not include separate property as hereinafter defined. d. The term separate property shall mean: (1) property acquired before marriage or property acquired by bequest, devise, or descent, or gift from a party other than the spouse; (2) compensation for personal injuries; (3) property acquired in exchange for or the increase in value of separate property, except to the extent that such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of the other spouse; (4) property described as separate property by written agreement of the parties pursuant to subdivision three of this part. (Source) The factors to be considered in the equitable property division in New York State, per the same source, are as follows: Disposition of property in certain matrimonial actions. a. Except where the parties have provided in an agreement for the disposition of their property pursuant to subdivision three of this part, the court, in an action wherein all or part of the relief granted is divorce, or the dissolution, annulment or declaration of the nullity of a marriage, and in proceedings to obtain a distribution of marital property following a foreign judgment of divorce, shall determine the respective rights of the parties in their separate or marital property, and shall provide for the disposition thereof in the final judgment. b. Separate property shall remain such. c. Marital property shall be distributed equitably between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. d. In determining an equitable disposition of property under paragraph c, the court shall consider: (1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action; (2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties; (3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and to use or own its household effects; (4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dissolution; (5) the loss of health insurance benefits upon dissolution of the marriage; (6) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part; (7) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career potential of the other party. The court shall not consider as marital property subject to distribution the value of a spouse's enhanced earning capacity arising from a license, degree, celebrity goodwill, or career enhancement. **However, in arriving at an equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider the direct or indirect contributions to the development during the marriage of the enhanced earning capacity of the other spouse; (8) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property; (9) the probable future financial circumstances of each party; (10) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party; (11) the tax consequences to each party; (12) the wasteful dissipation of assets by either spouse; (13) any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration; (14) whether either party has committed an act or acts of domestic violence, as described in subdivision one of section four hundred fifty-nine-a of the social services law, against the other party and the nature, extent, duration and impact of such act or acts; (15) in awarding the possession of a companion animal, the court shall consider the best interest of such animal. &quot;Companion animal&quot;, as used in this subparagraph, shall have the same meaning as in subdivision five of section three hundred fifty of the agriculture and markets law; and (16) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper. e. In any action in which the court shall determine that an equitable distribution is appropriate but would be impractical or burdensome or where the distribution of an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court in lieu of such equitable distribution shall make a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court in its discretion, also may make a distributive award to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property. f. In addition to the disposition of property as set forth above, the court may make such order regarding the use and occupancy of the marital home and its household effects as provided in section two hundred thirty-four of this chapter, without regard to the form of ownership of such property. g. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision, the court shall set forth the factors it considered and the reasons for its decision and such may not be waived by either party or counsel. h. In any decision made pursuant to this subdivision the court shall, where appropriate, consider the effect of a barrier to remarriage, as defined in subdivision six of section two hundred fifty-three of this article, on the factors enumerated in paragraph d of this subdivision. Thus, in New York State, unlike Colorado (discussed below), appreciation in the value of separate property during the marriage is separate property and not marital property. Section 234 of the New York Domestic Relations Law referenced in the bolded language above states: § 234. Title to or occupancy and possession of property. In any action for divorce, for a separation, for an annulment or to declare the nullity of a void marriage, the court may (1) determine any question as to the title to property arising between the parties, and (2) make such direction, between the parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court's discretion justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. Such direction may be made in the final judgment, or by one or more orders from time to time before or subsequent to final judgment, or by both such order or orders and final judgment. Where the title to real property is affected, a copy of such judgment, order or decree, duly certified by the clerk of the court wherein said judgement was rendered, shall be recorded in the office of the recording officer of the county in which such property is situated, as provided by section two hundred ninety-seven-b of the real property law. Usually, the authority granted by Section 234 is used to enter temporary orders granting a spouse possession and use of a residence titled in the name of the other spouse until the case is concluded, although it could be applied to a post-decree decision as well. Also, while New York State now finally has &quot;no fault&quot; divorces (it was the last state in the U.S. to make this option available), it also allows spouses to commence a fault based divorce. In a fault based divorce, marital fault (e.g. having an affair) can be considered as a factor by the court in equitably dividing the couple's property in the divorce if fault is successfully established. Fun Fact: In New York State, family court judges don't have jurisdiction over divorces, which are instead handled by the general jurisdiction trial court in the state known as the &quot;Supreme Court&quot;. New York State's apex court is called the &quot;Court of Appeals&quot;. Complicating Factors The reality, however, is more complicated than these extremes in most cases. Many states adopt parts of each regime, develop their own special rules, or implement the same basic system of marital property ownership and property division upon divorce in different ways. Appreciation And Payment Of Carrying Costs During The Marriage For example, Colorado is not technically a community property state, and community property rights of a spouse in marital property are not recognized during the marriage. But in Colorado, upon divorce, there is a distinction between separate property and marital property that is very similar to that found in community property states. And, in Colorado, while property owned before a marriage is not marital property, appreciation in the value of separate property during the marriage, and income from separate property, is marital property. Another issue is what payment of mortgages and other costs of maintain real estate that is separate property from funds earned from wages or investments of either spouse during the marriage, will often muddy the waters. California's rule in this situation is non-obvious from general community property principles ands is quite tricky and technical. California allocates some appreciation of separate property which has had mortgage principal paid for in part from income earned during the marriage or marital property to community property and some of the appreciation to separate property, on a pro-rated basis determined at the time that the property is valued for divorce purposes. For example, in California, if the home was worth $100,000 net of a $100,000 mortgage at the time of the marriage, and then is then sold free and clear net of costs of sale for $400,000, then $100,000 of the proceeds are separate property, $100,000 of the proceeds are community property, and $200,000 of the proceeds are appreciation is is pro-rated between the two, in this case, evenly. so $200,000 of the proceeds is separate property and $200,000 of the proceeds is marital property. But, taxes, insurance payments, and interest payments as opposed to principal payments, do not add to the community property value of the house, as they are current expenses that don't change the value of the property under California law, even though money is fungible. In general, some states that distinguish between separate and marital property, or separate and community property, at the time of a divorce, treat appreciation in separate property and payment of carrying costs for separate property as giving rise to some marital or community property interest in that property that is traceable to appreciation during the marriage or income acquired during the marriage, while other states continue to treat property acquired before the marriage entirely as separate property even if it appreciates, and/or even if carrying costs for the property are paid for from income acquired during the marriage. In states where appreciation in the property and/or payment of carrying costs with income earned during a marriage, gives separate property a partial marital property status, these two factors often convert a house that was originally separate property almost entirely into marital property after a long marriage, while modifying its separate property status only slightly after a short marriage. In the same vein, different states that distinguish between separate property on one hand, and marital or community property on the other, treat income from separate property earned during a marriage such as rent, interest, and dividends, differently than other states do and sometimes differently than appreciation in the asset itself. Quasi-Community Property A third complicating issue is the question of &quot;quasi-community property.&quot; If property is acquired as separate property or community property in a community property state, many states which are not community property states will treaty property acquired or owned by one or more members of the couple while they lived in that community property state as if it were governed by the community property laws of the place where the property is located, or the laws of the place where it was located before it was sold and reinvested in property in the state where the divorce case is being litigated. Other jurisdictions recognize property acquired while a couple lived in a community property state and its proceeds to retain its community property v. separate property status with a &quot;quasi-community property&quot; doctrine. But, these jurisdictions, rather than applying the community property laws of the state where particular property was acquired, applies a generic set of community property laws to property acquired in any community property state during the marriage. Sanctions For Economic Waste Also, in both traditional equitable division regimes that make a separate v. marital property distinction, and in community property regimes, sometimes if the owner of the house that would otherwise be classified as separate property commits &quot;economic waste&quot; that destroys the value of marital property out of spite, or without good cause. When that happens, a court may order that the harm to the marital or community property caused by the economic waste of a spouse be remedied with a contributions from the guilty spouse's separate property. Marital Agreements Finally, almost every state allows married couples to modify the property division rules of the state as applied to that couple, in a prenuptial agreement or a postnuptial agreement (collectively, &quot;marital agreements&quot;) if it is prepared with the proper disclosures and formalities, and informed consent is given to the agreement. For example, one of the common terms of a marital agreement (especially for late in life remarriages of widows and widowers, but also in many other cases) states that upon a divorce, legal title to property will be followed strictly when making a property division, with the value of any jointly owned property split exactly equally. In other words, a marital agreement will often provide that property will be divided upon a divorce in the same way that it would be divided if the couple had never married. This is sometimes called a &quot;your's is your's, and mine is mine&quot; prenup. Marital agreements like this also often waive any right to alimony to the full extent permitted by law (which economically is almost equivalent to treating the members of the couple as if they had never married) and often waive any inheritance rights of a surviving spouse upon their spouse's death.
Ties In the case of a 4-4 tie, the decision from the lower court is left as-is, and the opinion sets no precedent that would bind other circuits. The opinions in tied cases are generally very short, simply stating that the court was equally divided. For example, in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S. A. 562 U.S. ___ (2010), Justice Kagan recused herself due to prior involvement with the case when she was with the Justice Department. The court split 4-4. This was the entirety of the per curiam opinion: Per Curiam. The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. In another example, Reagan v. Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987), the court tied 3-3 (quorum is six). There was a vacancy due to the retirement of Justice Powell; Justices Blackmun and Scalia recused themselves. History and congressional support Edward A. Hartnett, in Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, gives a historical account of this practice. This is a practice established by the court itself, not by direction of Congress, but Congress has "presupposed the existence of the rule of affirmance by an equally divided court". Hartnett points to 28 U.S. Code § 2109. That section relates to quorum, but notes that if the court fails to achieve quorum: [...] the court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided court. In cases of original jurisdication The situation is not so clear for Original Jurisdiction Deadlocks. In these cases, there is no lower court ruling to affirm. There have been only two original jurisdiction deadlocks. Michael Coenen summarizes: First, in the nineteenth century case of Virginia v. West Virginia, Chief Justice Chase announced that the Justices were “equally divided on the demurrer, and equally divided also upon the order which should be made in consequence of that division.” As a result, the matter stood unresolved for nearly three years. Second, in the twentieth-century disbarment action of In re Isserman, the Court split evenly on the question of disbarment but ordered disbarment anyway. One year later, the Court changed its mind and overruled its prior decision. Avoiding ties The court has a few internal things they can do to avoid ties. They could delay issuing an opinion on a case and ask for re-argument by the parties in front of the eventual nine-justice court. They could revisit the case in conference and get votes to shift around based on a more narrow or procedural ruling. In both of these situations, we wouldn't necessarily know that there was an internal deadlock.
Generally not. Federal court uses a principle known as the enrolled bill rule -- in deference to the coequal status of the three branches of government, the "enrolled bill" (the thing printed on fancy paper that actually went to the President for signature) is irrebuttable evidence that the law was properly passed. The courts cannot deal with inquiries into whether legislative process was followed; it's the legislature's job to decide what the right process is. They can't even look into whether the same text passed both houses -- as a matter of law, the enrolled bill is conclusive evidence that it did. Senate rules are enforceable in the Senate. But the Senate is the body in charge of enforcing them, not the courts.
In the United States, individual members (States) of the union are allowed to make their own constitutions and state laws &amp; regulations. This includes laws that may contradict Federal law, although this is a grey area. It usually comes down to enforcement: Federal laws are usually enforced by Federal law enforcement as they can not force states to do so. Further more, State prosecutors will usually not attempt to prosecute you for a Federal law infraction. Only Federal prosecutors OR the department of justice will do this. To see a more detailed explanation on this, look at this &quot;How Stuff Works&quot; article.
The US Constitution doesn't say one way or the other how a state's representatives are to be chosen, so until this law was passed in 1841, a state could have all of their representatives elected at-large, without districts. It is only recently that SCOTUS has gotten involved in redistricting questions: here is a summary of leading redistricting rulings. A recurring theme in these rulings has been the Equal Protection Clause, where certain redistricting plans (or non-plans) were found to violate that clause (especially ordering a state to redistrict when it refused to do so with the result being that population changes diluted the vote of those living in certain districts). Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 held that The constitutional requirement in Art. I, § 2,that Representatives be chosen &quot;by the People of the several States&quot; means that, as nearly as is practicable, one person's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's thus redistricting is a justiciable question, answerable with respect to the federal government's need to enforce the 14th Amendment. It is not necessary to amend the Constitution further to specify a means of enforcing that clause.