What&#39;s counts as &quot;taking active part in the hostilities&quot; under the Geneva Convention? The Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War states that Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely ... In the comments to an answer to another question, there were questions as to the definition there. When is a soldier taking &quot;active part&quot; in the hostilities? Are they considered to take an active part when they are sleeping? Awake but eating dinner? Does it matter if they are armed at the time, or merely &quot;in uniform&quot;? Are there (other) times when a uniformed member of the military would not be considered &quot;taking active part&quot; in the hostilities? Or are they considered to be taking an active part simply by being a uniformed member of a belligerent party?
Members of the armed forces who are not hors de combat are taking an “active part” Hors de combat is not there for padding - its a defined term of the Convention: A person is hors de combat if: (a) he is in the power of an adverse Party; (b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or (c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is incapable of defending himself; provided that in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to escape. A person is not hors de combat simply because they are: Sleeping Eating Unarmed Out of uniform Defecating Fornicating Drunk
If your motivation isn’t material, you aren’t a mercenary Under the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 4 December 1989: A mercenary is any person who: a Is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; b Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar rank and functions in the armed forces of that party; c Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled by a party to the conflict; d Is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and e Has not been sent by a State which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces. Furthermore, if these people were serving in the Ukrainian military, even In dedicated foreign units, they aren’t mercenaries.
In Illinois: The General Assembly has established numerous protections for the generous and compassionate acts of its citizens who volunteer their time and talents to help others. Basically, if you are a licensed medical profession, or have had successful training in CPR provided by the the American Red Cross or the American Heart Association, and you try in good faith to save somebody's life and fail, you are not liable for their death, under the assumption you did not cause harm in the first place (i.e. you can not stab someone in the chest, attempt CPR, and be exempt from lawsuit(s)). Note that this doesn't apply to just CPR or physicians. This also covers dentists, Pharmacists, Optometrists, Physical Therapist, etc.
It may be discrimination; not all discrimination is illegal. Details vary by jurisdiction, for example discrimination on the following bases is illegal in Australia: race colour sex sexual preference age physical or mental disability marital status family or carer’s responsibilities pregnancy religion political opinion national extraction social origin A medical condition like an allergy is not necessarily a physical disability. The school is arguably fulfilling its obligations under WHS legislation by banning nut products if that is what a risk assessment indicates. It may also be necessary to ban milk products if that is required for your daughter's safety. If (and I do not know) nuts pose a greater risk than milk then banning the former and not the latter may be perfectly justified. Ask to see the risk assessment.
Your question is about "Would it be kidnapping if I was injured and someone took me to a hospital without my consent", so I don't understand these other answers which say "it depends on the situation". The key point is what you mean by "without my consent". Good Samaritan laws are also relevant, which offer defenses to people who do things that would otherwise be unlawful when they are doing it with good intentions to help someone who they believe is injured or would become injured without their intervention. The main things to consider are the degree of injury, which is a spectrum ranging from no injury at all to being dead, and whether the injured person is conscious. Are you so injured that you are unconscious? In most jurisdictions, being unconscious is considered as you consenting to any actions which are done with the intent of giving you medical assistance, which is on a spectrum of saying "hey are you ok?" or shaking you in order to wake you up, all the way up to treatment including major surgery. So by being unconscious it is usually automatically consent, but if you are awake and are refusing help or treatment, even if you could die if you didn't receive treatment, it would be easy to argue that you were not consenting and that any treatment/assistance etc was unlawful. This situation sometimes happens, and EMTs are often trained to wait until the person goes unconscious to then give them medical assistance/transport etc, but assisting someone before they go unconscious could still be argued as permissible, if the injured person was so distressed that they were unable to give/refuse consent, or at least if the assistor believed that to be the case. This is why if someone has a major medical problem and is unconscious, hospitals can resuscitate them and even perform surgery without them signing a consent form. By being unconscious, it is considered that they are consenting to any necessary surgery to help them, even including amputation or other negative consequences. Conversely, if someone has a valid Advance healthcare directive on file which forbids measures such as resuscitation, they will be considered not to consent, and will usually be left alone without life-saving assistance. Resuscitating/performing surgery on someone in this case can be cause for damages to the injured person, because it would have been clear that they did not consent to such assistance.
If President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Probably not, but it depends on the definition of treason. Congress could decide that it is, impeach him, and remove him from office. They could also remove him from office without using the term treason. Is he required to act on such a resolution? Not really. As chief executive, he has discretion to prioritize the tasks assigned to him by congress. Furthermore, there is plenty of precedent in international affairs for countries being legally in a state of war without any actual combat or other hostilities. If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? There's always political pressure. But there's no way to relieve the president of his command of the armed forces without relieving him of his office. Aside from impeachment by the congress, this can be temporarily achieved by the cabinet, as specified in the 25th amendment. POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. The president's ability to make immigration policy and the fact that such policy is subject to judicial review are unrelated to his powers as commander in chief. Immigration is a civil and criminal matter, not a military one. The president's powers in this regard are delegated to him by congress, not specified in the constitution. On the other hand, the president's role as commander in chief of the military is explicit in the constitution. Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? The judiciary does not have the power to order military operations.
The international laws of war are generally much easier to apply in the context of a group of people claiming to be a state, than in the context of a group of people who do not claim to be a state. For example, one of the critical questions for classifying an individual under the laws of war is whether the enemy combatant is publicly identified as a soldier of the entity against which a country has declared war. In the context of an entity that claims to be a state, like Daesh, the distinction between identified soldiers, civilians, and covert combatants is relatively workable to apply. There are actually tens of thousands of people who personally identify themselves as regular soldiers loyal to a particular Islamic State with a defined territory, chain of command and political leaders, and there are millions of people who personally identify themselves as civilian subjects of Daesh who are not soldiers, and there are probably even people who personally identify themselves as covert combatants for Daesh - like some of the European terror incident perpetrators we've seen over the last couple of years. People applying the laws of war still need to do their best to accurately determine who fits in which category, but the categories in question are bona fide meaningful categories that are mutually socially agreed to by everyone involved that are reasonably well defined. Recognition of something as a "state" for law of war purposes is also something quite different from recognition of something as a state for diplomatic purposes. Inherent in the laws of war is the understanding that one side may believe that the other side is an usurper or illegitimate government. In contrast, in conflicts with many organized groups that are clearly non-state actors in the eyes of all involved, the distinction between publicly identified soldiers of a state and covert combatants is often ill defined. Calling people citizens or subjects of that non-state group is likewise hard to analogize to the kinds of situations contemplated when the laws of war were devised. Does one have to be a "member" of the organization to qualify as a subject? Does one have to provide "material support" or conspire to carry out some specific acts? Or, does subjective support or a bare public statement of allegiance on a facebook page or bumper sticker suffice that did nothing material to aid the cause suffice? This matters because, under the laws of war, subjects of an enemy can be interned humanely even if they are not combatants, and the lawful treatment of public and covert combatants is very different under the laws of war.
&quot;War crimes&quot; are codified in international treaties (especially the Geneva Conventions), and in determinations by courts and in statutes made in domestic legal tribunals. This is one area of law, however, where it is often considered acceptable to impose criminal liability on people in a country that have not adopted a relevant treaty, and have not adopted domestic law prohibiting the conduct, on that theory that it is mandatory, globally binding, customary international law which it is proper for third parties to impose upon people and countries that violate it. The analysis in the case of war crimes is not as contractarian as in other areas of international treaty enforcement and international law.