Is handing out bibles near school property a 1st amendment violation? Context: There was some random guy handing out pocket bibles on the road path leading out of the school a few weeks ago. I don't think they were on school property, but they were close if that is important. They were holding out bibles, but never forced or asked anyone to take it. They did not show up ever again. The next day, some kids were arguing that the bible guy was indoctrinating us into their religion. Given that this guy wasn't an employee of the school, wasn't in the school itself, and that the school was public rather than private, would this be a violation of the 1st amendment of the United States? Specifically the part that states that the government should not promote one religion over another.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit people with no affiliation with the government from trying to convert people to their religion in a way not endorsed by a government official or agency. It could be that there is some content neutral prohibition on strangers accosting young school children if that person is so persistent that it amounts to content neutral harassment, or that the person might actually be a sex offender prohibited from contacting children. But, the facts of the question don't seem to compel this conclusion. Even if it violates any law to do this, it is not a violation of the U.S. Constitution.
Alternate explanation: Richard is saying that the witness has no &quot;testimony that would assist in making a determination of guilt or innocence&quot;, and therefore should not be allowed to testify.
This is an important question that affects consumer advocacy, blog-based-journalism, political speech and spending, and probably other things. People disagree about what the answer is. This podcast episode features both sides of the argument. Professor Volokh holds the view that the freedom of the press is "freedom to print", "freedom to use the printing press". Freedom of the press is the freedom of everybody to use the printing press. Assessing the grammar of the clause, he argues that this points in the same direction. The text says "freedom of speech or of the press". He points out that speech is not a group of people. It would be odd to treat "speech" as an activity, but to treat "press" as a group of people given the parallel construction. This side of the argument is described more in this article by Prof. Volokh. Professor West argues that there is a defined group of people called "the press" that deserves protection under this clause. This article explains Prof. West's position in detail. The main point is that "An expansive definition of the press means virtually complete overlap between press and speech and thus no meaningful way to interpret the Press Clause." If "press" means simply the right to publish speech, then it becomes redundant because courts have held the right to publish speech is given under that "speech" portion of the clause. Justice Stevens's concurrence in Citizens United also argued for "some kinds of identity-based distinctions" regarding whether a person is a member of the press. Each side can give examples of the term "the press" being used at the time of the First Amendment that is consistent with their favored interpretation. I think to get the best idea of the two sides to this question, you should read Citizens United (including all dissents and concurrences), read the two articles linked above, and listen to the podcast episode.
There is no federal prohibition against sexual discrimination in public accomodations. Colorado has an applicable state law, which covers "any place of business engaged in any sales to the public", where "It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful ...to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of ...sexual orientation...the full and equal enjoyment of the goods...". No provision exempts lemonade stands. Churches etc. are specifically exempted: "'Place of public accommodation' shall not include a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes". Sex discrimination is allowed "if such restriction has a bona fide relationship to the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such place of public accommodation", an argument that can't reasonably be made in the described case. It is also not obvious that running a lemonade stand is a business (the courts will not admit unsubstantiated Wiki assertions as evidence). It would be relevant to wonder what constitutes a "business" under Colorado law. E.g. is a business license required? In Colorado (US) law, it has not been definitively decided whether there can be a religious exception to the anti-discrimination law. Masterpiece Cakeshop was decided without answering that (the state showed clear religious intolerance in its handling of the case). We do not know how a similar case will be decided: Arlene's Flowers was handed back to the state court with the instruction "do it again" (with nothing more than a mention of Masterpiece Cakeshop). The court cannot establish certain beliefs and practices as "valid religions" (Establishment Clause); the proxy expression that is used is "deeply held belief", which includes atheism. The relationship of the issue to the First Amendment is uncertain.
The First Amendment does not guarantee a right to not be offended. However, as held in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), it does prohibit compelled speech, and a person cannot be compelled to recite the pledge. The basis is not religion: this is a general prohibition on what the government can do. ("Parental consent" comes through the school informing parents of the right to not recite the pledge, and a parent who objects will tell their child to not recite the pledge, thus consent is implicit for those parents whose children do recite -- unless the child's actions don't reflect the parents' intent).
If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed.
As far as I can tell, one can hold any beliefs or lack thereof, and there is no need to register your beliefs with the government per se. However, there are laws where religion is relevant, such as the Hindu personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Hindu Succession Act, such as stating who gets your stuff if you die intestate. These laws apply to Hindus, and since Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists are treated as legal Hindus (!), it applies to them; and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. and don't ask me to interpret that "unless clause". That is, the Hindu laws do not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews. On the face of it, that would mean that Yazidis would be treated as Hindus, w.r.t. the subject matter of those laws. Registering a religion isn't relevant to the question: what matters is that the Indian Government decided to create these particular laws, and they have not created any Yazidi-specific laws. There are currently no national laws prohibiting religious conversion, and I can't find the state laws. This article discusses such laws, noting that some states require a person to register their conversion. I seems that the restriction is on A converting B, and not on B converting sua sponte.
most likely The government can't compel people to some sort of speech under the 1st amendment. Forcing a company to host people is compelled speech by the company. It is well established that the government can't compel a newspaper to host its messages as it wants. The key case might be Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 418 US 241 (1974). In this case, it was deemed unconstitutional that a newspaper would need to host speech of a political candidate the newspaper didn't like in the same amount it had used to disparage that candidate. While the Miami Herald brought the newspaper into the line by the action of the newspaper, Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705 (1977) held that the state could not force any citizen to host its motto. Or for the matter, any message. The State may not constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. Pp. 71717. Forcing a public web page to host advertisement or speech from any government - or under the threat of the government action - is compelled speech and violates the rulings of Miami Herald, Wooley and other cases. However, there is a little light for the government under PruneYard, Turner Broadcasting and Rumsfeld. However, all of them don't cut here: Turner Broadcasting was about a service provider for radio that did not host its own speech. PruneYard is a shopping center that doesn't host its own speech and is only useful in California as there is a California constitution issue. And Rumsfeld dealt with military recruitment, which always is special. A similar Florida law was deemed to be very likely unconstitutional by the (federal) Northern District of Florida (Injunction Text) Addendum A joint lawsuit by NetChoice &amp; CCIA was filed against Texas on 22nd September 2021 (Complaint), asking for a preliminary injunction. NetChoice puts its filings on their website. Further reading: Ken White - Make No Law podcast #11: Deplatformed Ken White - Section 230 Is The Subject of The Most Effective Legal Propaganda I've Ever Seen 01st December 2021 Update Indeed, the relevant parts of HB20 were put out of enforcement via injunction on December 1st, 2021, reasoning that: Social media platforms have a First Amendment right to moderate content disseminated on their platforms. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1932 (2019) (recognizing that “certain private entities[] have rights to exercise editorial control over speech and speakers on their properties or platforms”). Three Supreme Court cases provide guidance. First in Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers to print a candidate’s reply if a 13 newspaper assailed her character or official record, a “right of reply” statute. 418 U.S. at 243. [...] In Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &amp; Bisexual Grp. of Bos., the Supreme Court held that a private parade association had the right to exclude a gay rights group from having their own float in their planned parade without being compelled by a state statute to do otherwise. 515 U.S. 557, 572– 73 (1995). [...] Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that California could not require a private utility company to include a third party’s newsletters when it sent bills to customers in Pac. Gas &amp; Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986). HB 20 compels social media platforms to significantly alter and distort their products. Moreover, “the targets of the statutes at issue are the editorial judgments themselves” and the “announced purpose of balancing the discussion—reining in the ideology of the large social-media providers—is precisely the kind of state action held unconstitutional in Tornillo, Hurley, and PG&amp;E.” Id. HB 20 also impermissibly burdens social media platforms’ own speech. Id. at *9 (“[T]he statutes compel the platforms to change their own speech in other respects, including, for example, by dictating how the platforms may arrange speech on their sites.”). For example, if a platform appends its own speech to label a post as misinformation, the platform may be discriminating against that user’s viewpoint by adding its own disclaimer. HB 20 restricts social media platforms’ First Amendment right to engage in expression when they disagree with or object to content. For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the State’ s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 23), is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, (Dkt. 12), is GRANTED. Until the Court enters judgment in this case, the Texas Attorney General is ENJOINED from enforcing Section 2 and Section 7 of HB 20 against Plaintiffs and their members. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), Plaintiffs are required to post a $1,000.00 bond. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, (Dkt. 43), is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT.