Does Romeo &amp; Juliet (1968) constitue Child Porn? In Romeo and Juliet (1968), the actress playing Juliet (age 15 at the time), had her bare chest exposed for a bit after sleeping with Romeo. Romeo's actor (who was also underage) had his naked bottom exposed in the same scene. Basically, two underage actors were shown nude after a (presumed) sexual encounter. Would this make the film constitute child porn, and would possession of it be cause for arrest? It is a fairly celebrated film that's still openly on sale, so I'd imagine it isn't regarded as CP. I'm just not sure what the relevant standard is for why it wouldn't (or would) be considered CP.
From the justice.gov site Federal law defines child pornography as any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving a minor (persons less than 18 years old). So no, the mere showing of a naked chest or bare bottom does not constitute child pornography.
In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible.
The issue is not exactly with minors, it is with FERPA and COPPA. This assumes that you have some indication of what students are connected to the web page. If you have students under 13 (surely you do), you need verifiable parental consent. The FTC approves or disapproves particular methods of verification, here is their page on that. One approved and patented method is ChildGuardOnline Technology (it;s a business, not a free service). The other concern is that you have to scrupulously protect "student records". You already know that you can't disseminate "student records" without parental consent, what this adds is possibly new concerns with online security. However, many schools are exempt from the COPPA requirements. Here are some "exceptions" to the rule, and nonprofit organizations are not subject to Section 5 of the FTC Act.
18 U.S. Code § 2252 defines a crime and punishment for knowingly transporting, or reproducing for distribution by any means, visual depictions involving the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. Here are some sample jury instructions that rephrase this and give definitions for each of these terms. Here are some others (at p. 469). This law review article discusses the knowledge requirement of this statute. It would be an easy argument that the operators of the intermediary nodes do not have the requisite knowledge of the material flowing over their networks and computers to be implicated by section 2252, especially when they are broken down into chunks that can only be re-assembled at the destination. United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2006) is an example of a case where a defendant was found to not have the requisite knowledge of child pornography that was found in his browser's cache folders. These were complete files, no assembly required. However, the court said: where a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly lacks access to and control over those files, it is not proper to charge him with possession and control of the child pornography images located in those files An IPFS user has no more knowledge of the pieces being passed through their computer than this defendant did of his cache (unless of course they are the source or destination).
Section 108(a) is the most useful for an infringer who posts an entire copy of a protected work in public. Subsections(b,c) require that the copy not be made available outside the premises, which precludes internet posting; (d) requires a user request to make a copy; (e) applies only to items that are off the market and transferred to a specific user; (h) allows more copying in the last 20 years of the period when a work is protected (not applicable here). Subsection (a) allows a library or archive to make one copy of a work, as long as there is no commercial advantage to making the copy, the library is relatively public (it might restrict access to bona fide researchers), and a copyright notice is included: this has the fewest restrictions on copying. The internet downloader is not a library or an archive, so the downloader is not granted any permission under 108 to make a copy. Under 108(a) a library can make no more than one copy available, but every uploading or downloading is "making a copy". A library would be contributorily liable for the illegal downloadings of their "customers". It is difficult to know exactly what one can get away with under 17 USC 107 a.k.a. "fair use". I am fairly sure that posting a copy of a contemporary book in the open is not "fair use" even if the intent is to make it possible for dummies to study chemistry: such copying is not at all transformative, totally unlimited, and provides a significant market substitute for the protected work.
In 2017 Illinois changed its law so that criminal charges for child abuse have no statute of limitations, and can be prosecuted as long as the accused is alive. This applies to all such crimes that occur after the new law was passed, and to all prior crimes on which the previous statute of limitations had not yet expired. See this news story on the change Previously, Illinois law allowed for prosecution for up to 20 years after the victim turned 18. Since the women Kelly is accused of having abused were 16 or younger in 1998 or later, the older statute of limitations would not have expired until at least 2020. More than 35 states now have no statute of limitations for child abuse. By the way, for civil actions, as opposed to criminal charges, the Illinois law now says: an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 10 years of the date [a person turns 18] or within 5 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse." (ILCS § 5/13-202.2(b)) Thus, a civil suit by one of the alleged victims might or might not be barred by time, depending on details of the date of the abuse and the victim's age. In short, do not take a drama as a source of legal advice. Look it up or ask a reliable source.
I think this relates to individual stores interpretation of California's "ABC Laws": § 25658. Sale to and consumption by person under 21 years of age; Use by peace officers to apprehend sellers of alcoholic beverages to minors (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (c), every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or given away any alcoholic beverage to any person under 21 years of age is guilty of a misdemeanor. (b) Except as provided in Section 25667 or 25668, any person under 21 years of age who purchases any alcoholic beverage, or any person under 21 years of age who consumes any alcoholic beverage in any on-sale premises, is guilty of a misdemeanor. (c) Any person who violates subdivision (a) by purchasing any alcoholic beverage for, or furnishing, giving, or giving away any alcoholic beverage to, a person under 21 years of age, and the person under 21 years of age thereafter consumes the alcohol and thereby proximately causes great bodily injury or death to himself, herself, or any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The last part is the part that scares business owners. Some interpret it as "if they furnish alcohol to you (a person over 21) and have reasonable suspicion that the purchase will be given to the minor, the person furnishing the alcohol is guilty of a misdemeanor". This is absolutely true in the case of bar owners/bartenders. If they sell somebody a drink, even if that person is over 21, and that drink is then given to a minor, they can be (probably not successfully) held responsible in some form for any injury that person sustains or commits as a result of alcohol consumption. Some stores take this much more seriously (because a violation can mean the loss/suspension of the liquor license) than others, and it is at the stores discretion to deny the sale based on any suspicion, whether based in reality or not.
I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well.