Can republican advocacy be grounds for discrimination in the UK? In the UK there exists a republican movement (i.e., those advocating for the replacement of the monarchy), chiefly focussed around a group called Republic. Technically, advocating the establishment of a republic—even through peaceful means—is still illegal in the UK (though currently not enforced due to incompatibilities with the Human Rights Act 1998). However, the HRA appears to be firmly in the sights of the current government, so that might not be the case forever (though I imagine ‘bring back treason’ might be a hard sell, politically). However, MPs who refuse to make an oath/affirmation of allegiance are treated ‘as if they were dead’ if they try to vote or join a debate, so it is clear that republicanism can still cause headaches in modern Britain.* On the other hand, the Equality Act 2010 defines ‘philosophical belief’ as a protected characteristic that cannot be discriminated against, though with some exemptions. Republicanism appears to fulfil the criteria for such a belief. Given this somewhat ambiguous legal environment, my question is: is it legal to discriminate against someone in the UK for peaceful republican advocacy, such as paid membership in a group like Republic? And then some sub-questions: Given that an oath/affirmation of allegiance is required for membership of the Armed Forces,† Parliament, etc., can these organisations deny or revoke membership for republican advocacy (provided they still make the oath/affirmation and don't breach other rules, such as claiming to represent the Armed Forces at political events)? If the answer to #1 is ‘yes’, is this different for the reserve forces?‡ Can such advocacy be grounds for refusing meetings with royals?§ Notes * Famously, Irish Republican party Sinn Féin refuse to take up their seats in Westminster for this reason. Other republican MPs have tried other tactics. † The Armed Forces are explicitly exempt from four of the protected characteristics of the Equality Act, though not belief. As an answer to a previous question of mine explained, however, conscientious objection is nonetheless grounds for refusal or dismissal, so that appears to be a de facto exemption. ‡ Section 7 of the Reserve Land Forces regulations 2016 (for example) explicitly states that ‘Officers and soldiers of the Army Reserve...have the normal rights and responsibilities of citizens of the United Kingdom’, as opposed to Regular Army personnel. § Part of the reason I'm asking this question is also how I first heard of Republic - someone told me they had purchased membership for a monarchist friend as a joke, and that as a result they would never be allowed to meet a royal. However, I've not been able to find any evidence that this would be the case.
Regarding the question of whether republicanism or opposition to monarchy is a protected belief under the Equality Act 2010, there is still uncertainty about the scope of the law, but it is quite likely it would be protected. A tribunal in 2019 found that belief in Scottish independence was a protected belief, assuming it's a deeply held belief about political sovereignty, which makes it somewhat similar to republicanism. The law doesn't cover political affiliation/party membership and it doesn't necessarily cover all political beliefs, but the judge in that case found that the law protected a belief about &quot;weighty and substantial aspects of human life&quot; and agreed that &quot;how a country should be governed is sufficiently serious to amount to a protected philosophical belief&quot;. So a serious belief in republicanism certainly could be protected; the issue would be whether it was sufficiently serious and important and deeply held, not just an opinion which is subject to change. There has been speculation on whether support or opposition to Brexit would likewise be protected, but this doesn't seem to have been tested in court yet. For the armed forces it's likewise a little unclear. Exemptions to the Equality Act apply to situations where they affect the operational capacity or combat readiness of the armed forces. It's hard to see this as directly relevant. However as the answer you cite about conscientious objectors says, their treatment is a result of customs and practices in the army, not primary legislation. Further research may identify how the army has treated individual republicans in particular circumstances. It's not grounds for being refused permission to meet the Queen or other royalty. Here's a photo of Australian republican politician Malcolm Turnbull (who campaigned for the Queen to cease being Australia's head of state) shaking hands with the Queen. She has also met Martin McGuinness who has long campaigned for Northern Ireland to escape the Queen's reign. British writer and gay rights activist Simon Fanshawe didn't let republicanism stop him accepting an OBE. Jeremy Corbyn, former leader of the Opposition met royalty on several occasions, despite earlier republican activism (while later he stated he had no plans to abolish the monarchy but did not deny his republicanism). There are many more examples, e.g. Russell Brand (who Wikipedia says is a republican). Although advocating a republic is theoretically treasonous, peaceful advocacy is allowed by the Human Rights Act: see R. (Rusbridger) v. Attorney General [2003] UKHL 38; [2004] AC 357; [2003] 3 All ER 784. (Source: Wikipedia page on Republic (political organisation))
This would surely be a constitutional crisis in a country where the constitutional order is spread over many separate laws and traditions. The UK is generally accepted as a genuine democracy which has a monarch for reasons of tradition, and which lets the monarch sign some things as head of state which are decided by elected officials. The parliament dominates the crown-in-parliament, for all the ceremonial importance of the monarch. So by this reasoning, the elected officials should win the power struggle. Yet it also retains vestiges of the old order e.g. in the House of Lords. It would come down if the popularity of the monarch's action outweighs the genuine pride of the Brits in their democratic traditions.
Supporting a secessionist movement is protected by the First Amendment. Terrorism, in the name of a secessionist movement or otherwise, or support of terrorism is a federal offense. See 18 USC 2339A and 2339B. The latter applies to foreign terrorist organizations, the former applies to to anything in violation of a specific list of crimes (§§32, 37, 81, 175, 229, 351, 831, 842(m) or (n), 844(f) or (i), 930(c), 956, 1091, 1114, 1116, 1203, 1361, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1751, 1992, 2155, 2156, 2280, 2281, 2332, 2332a, 2332b, 2332f, 2340A, 2442 of Title 18, and a few other things). Advocating secesion is not a crime, so supporting the advocacy of secession – in the US – is not a crime. §2339B determines what terrorist-organization status via 18 USC 1189, which is basically a finding by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General that &quot;the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States&quot;. Here is a current list. Advocating the forceful overthrow of the US government or that of any state or lower political subdivision is a crime under 18 USC 2385, likewise abetting, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of such overthrow.
Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have.
Political party membership may be indirectly protected, insofar as party membership is a manifestation of a philosophical belief, but it is not a protected characteristic in itself. Political beliefs (e.g. in socialism) are capable of being protected characteristics, but not always. Nazism is not protected, because it is destructive of the rights of others and unworthy of respect in a democractic society. Businesses can usually choose who they do business with Assuming there is no other bad conduct going on (harassment, violence, discrimination, etc.), there is nothing to stop a shop or other business from excluding certain customers. This is the starting point. Some businesses have positive legal duties to serve the public in general. Your water company can't cut off your water, regardless of your beliefs. Barristers must follow the &quot;cab-rank rule&quot; and take your case even if you are a horrible person. So let's assume we just have an ordinary private-sector business, such as a shop. The protected characteristic of belief Contrary to the term &quot;protected class&quot;, which is from U.S. law, the U.K. uses the words &quot;protected characteristic&quot; to mean those personal characteristics named in the Equality Act 2010. These include age and race. They also include &quot;religion or belief&quot;, a characteristic inherited from prior equality law. Any discrimination claim relating to the &quot;No Nazis allowed&quot; sign would have to hang on the &quot;belief&quot; arm. Interpretation of &quot;religion or belief&quot; follows the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9. In relation to a philosophical belief, the applicable test is &quot;the Grainger test&quot; formulated by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 2009, The belief must be genuinely held. It must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. Careful readers will notice that 2009 is before 2010; the statute law was different but the point was the same. Classic examples of beliefs meeting the test include vegetarianism, humanism, and pacifism. Political beliefs There is no sharp line between a &quot;philosophical&quot; belief and a &quot;political&quot; one. Support of a political party is not covered (Grainger at 35), but there is room for belief based on a political philosophy. In this way, &quot;left-wing democratic socialism&quot; met the test in GMB v Henderson. On this basis, one might be tempted to conclude that &quot;Nazism&quot; or &quot;fascism&quot; would be similar, even if &quot;membership in a Nazi party&quot; was not. However, Article 17 of ECHR does not protect totalitarian or Nazi beliefs. This is consistent in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, and in U.K. cases on equality. It is the source of the fifth part of the Grainger test, via earlier cases in the House of Lords and before the European Court. For example, in Forstater v CGD Europe, the EAT held: A philosophical belief would only be excluded for failing to satisfy Grainger V if it was the kind of belief the expression of which would be akin to Nazism or totalitarianism and thereby liable to be excluded from the protection of rights under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by virtue of Article 17 thereof. Employment is more protected In Redfearn v UK [2012], the ECtHR said a bus driver's rights had been violated following his dismissal for being a member of the British National Party. That was in relation to Article 11 (freedom of association) and his Article 9 claim was dismissed. The court noted that the BNP had not been banned in the U.K. and it was also looking at an employment rights issue rather than (as in the question) access to business premises; there is a general set of rights relating to unfair dismissal which were in play. It had not been proved that the driver was actually unfit to do the job. So even though party membership is not protected under the Equality Act, people may still benefit from other legal protections. The case also shows the difficulties of inferring beliefs based on indicators like supporting a political party. If the BNP were banned then it would be another matter, and U.K. law does allow the banning of extremist organisations. (Principally, under the Terrorism Act 2000, part II.) Some extreme-right groups are proscribed in this way, although there is no general restriction of fascism or Nazism.
There is no current authorization to bar any member of the house from the floor, so the answer depends heavily on what actually happens. Since remote voting was approved, no constituency would be disenfranchised. But we could imagine the house adopting a rule barring remote participation, and also barring entry to the House floor for any person not wearing a mask. The House is constitutionally allowed to set its own rules. The House did bar Adam Clayton Powell from being seated, and he did indeed sue. SCOTUS, most importantly, asserted that this is a justiciable question, and most importantly &quot;In judging the qualifications of its members under Art. I, § 5, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution&quot;. This could be overcome by expelling the member who refuses to wear a mask (Congress has the power to expel, but not exclude). There would be a significant conflict of rights in this case. Residents of the district has a right to representation (equal protection clause), but Congress has the right to expel members. But Congress has expelled 5 members, and most recently, Ohio's 17th district was without representation in the US House for a half a year after Traficant was expelled. That did not prevent the House from exercising its right to expel a member.
A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it.
The Scottish Claim of Right makes clear that the people of Scotland are Sovereign, not Westminster. Not so much. It establishes principles of parliamentary monarchy... (for example) That the chargeing of the leidges with lawborrowes at the Kings instance and the imposeing of bonds without the authority of Parliament and the suspending advocats from their Imployment for not Compearing when such bonds were offered were Contrary to Law That the putting of Garisones on privat mens houses in tyme of peace without their Consent or the authority of Parliament is Contrary to law ...while inviting William and Mary to accede to the Scottish throne: The said Estates of the Kingdome of Scotland Doe resolve that William and Mary King and Queen of England France and Ireland Be and be Declared King and Queen of Scotland To hold the Crowne and Royall Dignity of the said Kingdome of Scotland To them the said King and Queen dureing ther lives and the longest liver of them and that the sole and full exercise of the regall power be only in and Exercised by him the said King in the names of the said King and Queen Dureing ther joynt lives And after ther decease The said Croune and Royall Dignity of the said Kingdome to be to the heirs of the body of the said Queen which failing to the Princess Ann of Denmark and the airs of her body which also failing to the aires of the Body of the said William King of England And they do Pray the said King and Queen of England to accept the same accordingly ... That for redress of all greivances and for the amending strenthneing and preserveing of the lawes Parliaments ought to be frequently called and allowed to sit and the freedom of speech and debate secured to the members In other words, it provides that the monarchy is not absolute, and that its power is circumscribed by parliament. One thing it certainly does not do is circumscribe the power of the Westminster parliament, which had no power in Scotland before the Acts of Union of 1707. Before then, the Westminster parliament was only the Parliament of England. The Acts of Union provided, in part, That the United Kingdom of Great Britain be Represented by one and the same Parliament to be stiled the Parliament of Great Britain With that act, the Parliament of Great Britain assumed the role of the Parliament of Scotland. As a consequence, the Claim of Right Act of 1689 grants power to the Westminster parliament rather than circumscribing its power. To the extent the people are sovereign, this sovereignty is vested in their representatives in Westminster. On the other hand, if you're talking about the 1989 claim, that document has never had or claimed any legal force.