After being Justice of the UK Supreme Court from 2010-2, why did Lord John Dyson demote to Master of the Rolls from 2012-6? Lord John Dyson was Master of the Rolls (President of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales and Head of Civil Justice) for four years until he retired in October 2016. He was a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom from April 2010 until October 2012. As you can see from the 2nd and 5th bullet points from below picture, JSC (Justice of the Supreme Court) outranks MR (Master of the Rolls). Dyson demoted himself, or got demoted. Right? But why this demotion? Did he bumble something? Why did he stop being JSC in 2012, and become MR?
&quot;Why&quot; someone did something is potentially off-topic, but in regards to your hierarchical image - it lacks provenance so cannot be tested, however according to the official judiciary website: The Master of the Rolls is second in judicial importance to the Lord Chief Justice.
If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement.
First of all, the case US v Microsoft was originally a 1998 case, not 2001. Jackson entered his judgment in June 2000. Microsoft appealed timely. It went from Jackson's district court, straight to the Supreme Court, using 15 U.S.C. §29(b), and the Supreme court issued 530 US 1301. While the states filed for being heard, the Supreme Court declined them, remanding the whole case back to the lower courts. In No. 00-139, direct appeal [to the Supreme Court] is denied, and case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Clerk is directed to issue the judgment forthwith. In No. 00-261 [the request of the states to be heard], certiorari before judgment is denied. The case thus went to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, and due to the time it takes to schedule, became a 2000 case. The court noticed, that while Jackson was still on the case he had given interviews about it: The Court of Appeals held that: [...] (6) district judge’s comments to the press while the case was pending required his disqualification on remand. Immediately after the District Judge entered final judgment on June 7, 2000, accounts of interviews with him began appearing in the press. Some of the interviews were held after he entered final judgment. (p.107) Microsoft urges the District Judge’s disqualification under § 455(a): a judge ‘‘shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The standard for disqualification under § 455(a) is an objective one. The question is whether a reasonable and informed observer would question the judge’s impartiality. (p.114) Our application of Liljeberg leads us to conclude that the appropriate remedy for the violations of § 455(a) is disqualification of the District Judge retroactive only to the date he entered the order breaking up Microsoft. We therefore will vacate that order in its entirety and remand this case to a different District Judge, but will not set aside the existing Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law (except insofar as specific findings are clearly erroneous or legal conclusions are incorrect). (p.116) When Jackson gave the interviews, he violated the Code of Conduct for judges because the appeals process was not yet complete and he was still on the case. As such, he created the image, that he might not be impartial: Canon 3A(6). The admonition against public comment about the merits of a pending or impending matter continues until the appellate process is complete. If the public comment involves a case from the judge’s own court, the judge should take particular care so that the comment does not denigrate public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality, which would violate Canon 2A. A judge may comment publicly on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity, but not on mandamus proceedings when the judge is a litigant in an official capacity (but the judge may respond in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 21(b)). Jackson did not appear as he was to be heard in the Circuit Court. As shown above, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals found, he did violate the code of conduct and disqualified him under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). While this did suffice to overturn the verdict prescribed by Jackson, the court did not throw out the findings of fact that had been issued well before the interviews and noted that the traditional setup might be inadequate for this case. They remanded back to a different judge to decide a remedy under a different scope. The case didn't end there, Microsoft attempted to get even the findings of fact thrown out based on the very ruling that sent it back for remand, claiming that the judge had shown to be biased way earlier, during the trial and before the finding of facts. They did so by appealing a second time to the Supreme Court in August 2001 but the court rejected to hear the case in October. In the end, DoJ and Microsoft settled in November 2001, the settlement was accepted by the District Court in 2002, and affirmed by the appeals court in 2004, as some states didn't want that one.
"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services
Lawyers neither try nor judge cases; they advise and argue them. Criminal cases in jurisdictions based on British law (which seems to be what you are asking about) are tried by prosecution and defence both putting their best arguments to the court (either a judge or a jury) who then reaches a verdict. There is no reason why the prosecuting lawyer should not be a police officer (assuming he is properly qualified), though in reality 'prosecuting advocate' is a full-time job, so the officer would need to transfer to the District Attorney's office or something similar. Actually, such an officer would be wasted by a transfer to advocacy. Somebody who knows not only what evidence is inadmissible and the leading cases on permitted searches but also where the local crime blackspots are and which officers, likely to fall apart on creoss-examination, should not be put up as the only witness is valuable enough that the authorities (whoever they may be) will make considerable efforts to use these talents to best effect.
australia Although the alleged victim has not been found, this case from the upi.com archives dated 25/09/1986 is worthy of note (emphasis mine): A woman jailed for murdering her husband had her conviction reversed when a witness testified she saw the man on television -- in a crowd at a cricket match -- three years after he allegedly was killed. The New South Wales Court of Appeal Wednesday overturned the murder conviction of Margaret Burton, saying the case against her relied on a web of circumstantial evidence and that the new evidence provided reasonable doubt of her guilt. Burton, however, still must complete an 8-year sentence for conspiracy to commit murder. She was sentenced to life in prison on Nov. 8, 1984, for the May 1983 murder of her husband. She and Ronald Burke, a close friend, also were sentenced to eight years in jail for conspiracy to murder her husband, Peter Burton. Peter Burton's body never was found. At the appeals court hearing, Judy Edmonds testified she is sure she saw Peter Burton in the crowd at a televised cricket match in January. Edmonds was shown a videotape of part of the cricket match and identified a man in sunglasses as Peter Burton. She said she was a close friend of his. Another witness, Jan Dyson, told the court the man in the videotape bore a remarkable resemblance to Peter Burton. Lawyers for Margaret Burton argued before the appeals court her conviction should be overturned because the prosecution failed to prove Peter Burton was dead. Appeals Court Chief Justice Sir Laurence Street agreed, saying it is not for the court to decide whether or not the person on the videotape is Peter Burton, but it is the court's responsibility to determine how a reasonable jury would have regarded the new evidence.
Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority.
Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been &quot;sealed&quot; i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, &quot;the judge agrees to vacate them&quot; but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial.