Without judicial review, what is the point of the Dutch constitution? I gather from various sources (note: most links are in Dutch) that no process of judicial review exists in the Netherlands. In my understanding, most democracies have a process for creating, amending and removing ordinary legislation (requiring a simple majority vote in their various legislative bodies) and another for amending their constitution (requiring a two-thirds majority vote and/or additional restrictions, such as the Dutch procedure of voorstelwetten or the similar Belgian practice of 'unlocking' only certain Articles for editing by the next legislature). If a simple majority in the legislature decides they want to pass a law which violates the constitution, they could certainly do that if they really wanted to, but will quickly find that they have wasted their time - as every court case stemming from the new law will simply end in the relevant section of the constitution trumping the new law. However, in the Netherlands, judges do not practice judicial review (in fact, Article 120 of the Constitution expressly prohibits it). It is my understanding that, even in the event that a law unambiguously violates a constitutionally-protected right, the judge will have no choice but to apply the law anyway. Now - assuming that my understanding is correct - my question is this: leaving aside its symbolic value, what is even the point of the Dutch Constitution (at least those Articles that confer rights, rather than describing governmental functions)? Or more specifically, what is the point of placing safeguards upon the process of amending it above and beyond those placed on ordinary legislation? For example, if I were to command a 52% majority coalition in the legislature and I would very much like to pass a certain law that happens to be blatantly unconstitutional - which seems like it is exactly the sort of situation that a constitution is supposed to protect against - in what way am I actually stopped? If all the members of my coalition just stick our fingers in our ears while the 48% complain about our bill's unconstitutionality, and we pass it anyway, won't the new law be enforced just as much as it would have if we'd jumped through all the hoops of amending the constitution?
Compliance with the Dutch Constitution is evaluated pre-enactment, rather than post-enactment as indicated below. The Dutch Constitution prohibits the courts from reviewing the constitutionality of Acts of Parliament. They are however obliged to assess whether statutory regulations are compatible with international treaties. The ban on constitutional review is laid down in the Constitution. This does not mean that this type of legislation is at no point reviewed in the light of the Constitution. This is in fact done during the preparatory stage by the bodies involved in enacting legislation (the Council of State in its advisory role, and the legislature, in other words, the government and both Houses of Parliament). It is first and foremost the responsibility of these bodies to ensure that no legislation is passed that is in conflict with the Constitution. From here. Also, keep in mind that most of the entrenched human rights protections in the Netherlands are via treaties associated with the Council of Europe, and the Dutch courts can determine if domestic laws violate international treaties (which Dutch law does not allow the Netherlands to abrogate unilaterally unless the treaty so provides). This makes the lack of judicial review far less interesting in the Netherlands than in the United States or many other countries (e.g. Canada or India), and it makes international law much more interesting. American constitutional law would not be much of a big thing if it were (1) stripped of its individual rights protections (2) was in a unitary state like the Netherlands, where the are no federalism concerns to protect, and (3) there is also not a constitutionally enshrined separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, as there is in the U.S. You could teach a course on American constitutional law stripped of those issues in a week and the questions that are left would be much easier to evaluate in advance, rather than after the fact, since they would concern the legislative process for the most part. Institutional And Political Culture Matter This question is premised, to some extent, on the belief that judges act in one way that respects legal enactments, while other political bodies do not. But, this behavioral claim is not a universal one, it is a function of particular sets of institutional and political cultures. The legislative check also has more bite in the Netherlands because it is more of a "deliberative democracy" in terms of its political culture (i.e. decision-making relies more heavily on the substantive merits of legislation rather than ethic or partisan identity and seeks wide input) (the Netherlands ranks #9, the U.S. ranks #94). See internal pagination 91-93 of this report. The constitution's pronouncements are also more meaningful in the legislature because people act differently when they know there is no "safety net" from the courts to which they can pass the buck for ensuring compliance with the constitution. You see the same thing in the U.K. parliament which historically was not subject to any form of judicial review. The Council of State and its institutional norms, in particular, are a known quantity, because the Dutch Council of State has operated continuously since 1531 CE making it one of the oldest continuously functioning state institutions in the world. Likewise, Dutch judges, when applying the laws and treaties currently in force, are independent, and are arguably less partisan than U.S. courts. So, enforcing a binding treaty may have considerable power in the courts.
This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.
The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court.
The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White &amp; Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen).
(The original title of your question suggested you might think that federal circuit precedent binds state courts: it generally does not, even on matters of federal law.) But regardless, Congress would not be able to legislatively lower the constitutional floor. If a certain police act is prohibited by the Constitution, Congress cannot legislatively allow that act, whether in a single state or uniformly across all states. That means that if the Fifth Circuit has decided that the use of some new investigatory tool is a search under the Fourth Amendment, no law that Congress passes could affect that holding. When congress creates laws that result in different effects for different people (e.g. people in Texas vs. people in Florida, as in your hypothetical), the distinction must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Many of the enumerated powers allow for local distinction, some prohibit it. Some examples where Congress has distinguished between states include: localized agricultural programs, time zones, voting rights protections, and various others listed in ohwilleke's review. Some distinctions between states could also intrude on principles of federalism and state sovereignty (e.g. the Supreme Court has said that the Voting Right Act does this). Maybe I am unimaginative, but I cannot think of a legitimate federal government purpose that would call for the powers that police have against the people to vary from state to state. Any such variation would have to come from the states themselves: from their state constitutions, or legislative choices to provide heightened protections. Discord between circuits is problematic (see a list of examples of existing splits), and this is why the Supreme Court of the United States will often hear an appeal where there is a circuit split on a question of constitutional rights.
First of all, as noted in the comments, Babylon Bee is SATIRE. It's not intended to be news, just entertainment. But the real question is whether or not a President COULD do such a thing. Or perhaps better, could a President attempt to do something like this. If a President did attempt to do this, it would be totally without precedent and also without any constitutional authority. Since the US Constitution enumerates the powers between the branches and gives the President only the authority to appoint, with the advice of the Senate, a SCOTUS justice, trying to change things by giving an existing justice 2 votes would almost certainly be immediately challenged by the Senate. It also seems unlikely that such an action would be upheld as constitutional. Of course this is all speculative since nothing of this nature has happened.
Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.
This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling.