The nature of honesty Lawyers seem to be accustomed to the phrase &quot;reasonably ought to have known.&quot; Lawyers also sometimes have occasion to be concerned with the concepts of honesty and dishonesty. If you reasonably ought to have known that the sky is blue, but didn't and thought it was green, and said so, when, if ever, would lawyers consider that dishonest?
Honesty is about actual knowledge, not &quot;knew or should have known&quot; which is a standard that the law holds people to. In criminal law, &quot;should know&quot; is important because many crimes have a scienter requirement, but you will usually have a hard time proving beyond reasonable doubt that a person had actual knowledge of some fact. It is almost commonplace that people who are not fluent speakers of English &quot;know&quot; things that are untrue and that a &quot;reasonable&quot; person would know to be wrong, such as being confused about the referent of &quot;eye&quot; versus &quot;ear&quot; (tragic, in the context of &quot;___drops&quot;). A reasonable person would not judge a factual mistake as being dishonest, and in general would never impute evil motives (dishonesty) to what appears to be an incomprehensible response (e.g. saying &quot;Yes&quot; to the question whether the sky is green). Lawyers are reasonable people, so they don't actually impute dishonesty to people at a surprisingly higher rate that other reasonable rate.
australia It's dishonest. Dishonesty is not, in general, illegal. Dishonesty is illegal when it is used to obtain someone else's property or financial advantage through fraud. It's also illegal if it's part of a statement made when applying for an authorisation or benefit. It's potentially misleading. Misleading people is not, in general, illegal. Misleading is illegal when it takes place in trade or commerce. It gives you a title you don't hold. Claiming a title you don't hold is not, in general, illegal Claiming a title you don't hold is illegal if it is a protected title under Australian law. For example, there are protected titles under the National Health Practionioners Registration Scheme: "medical practitioner" is a protected title; "doctor" isn't. Further, holding yourself out to be able to practice in certain professions when you are not (e.g. law, engineering in some states etc.) is illegal. Context matters Putting on a white gown, wearing a stethoscope and calling yourself "doctor" when attending a fancy dress party is not illegal. Doing it to angle for a free upgrade on your airline ticket is.
First thing is, the statement has to be with a specific governmental sphere, such as in a submission to a court, or a document with some legal weight submitted to a party where the government has mandated that the declaration be &quot;sworn&quot; (an employment application involving security clearances; a DMCA takedown notice which has a connection to copyright law). Second, the statement has to be material, i.e. has &quot;a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed&quot; Kungys v. US, 485 U.S. 759. Third, you have to know that the statement is false (mistakes of knowledge are not perjury): the lie has to be willful. Fourth, the statement has to be literally false (Bronston v. US, 409 U.S. 352). W.r.t. the Bronston standard, a desire to not reveal a fact when testifying in a proceeding does not render the statement perjurious, when the statement is literally true but incomplete, thus telling the whole truth is not required (attorneys are expected to detect incomplete responses and press the issue on things not said). The edges of &quot;literal truth&quot; are a bit murky. What distinguishes Bronston from a number of cases of literally true perjury is that Bronston's testimony contained a clear sign that it was incomplete, but other &quot;literally true&quot; false statements (de Zarn, for example) contained nothing that an alert attorney could focus on. See US v. Robbins where defendant offered &quot;11th and MacArthur&quot; as the name of a corporation, the one in question, then falsely testified that it had no assets – the name of the corporation was actually &quot;MacArthur and 11th Properties, Inc.&quot;.
While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.
Fraud new-south-wales There are a number of offences that fall under the broad category of fraud. The most relevant for this type of behaviour is in s192E of the Crimes Act 1900: &quot;Obtain financial advantage or cause financial advantage by deception&quot; which carries a maximum penalty of 10 years. In order to understand what the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt it is useful to look at the suggested jury direction from the Criminal Bench Book (a crib sheet for judges): [The accused] is charged that [he/she] by a deception dishonestly [obtained a financial advantage for himself/herself] or [kept a financial advantage that he/she had]. The Crown contends that the financial advantage is [set out the financial advantage]. It does not matter whether the financial advantage alleged was permanent or temporary. The deception that the Crown alleges that the accused perpetrated was [set out the deception]. It must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the financial advantage was obtained as a result of that deception and that the accused perpetrated that deception intentionally to obtain the financial advantage or acted recklessly in that regard. Here reckless means foreseeing the possibility that as a result of the deception [he/she] would [obtain a financial advantage] or [retain the financial advantage that he/she had] and carrying on with the deception notwithstanding that possibility. However, the Crown does not need to prove a particular person was deceived. The Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in [his/her] deceptive conduct. Dishonest in this context means that the accused acted dishonestly according to the standards of ordinary people. You as ordinary members of the community determine what is dishonest conduct in this regard. You must not only find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused acted dishonestly in deceiving [the victim] but also that [he/she] knew that [his/her] conduct was dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people. It is not enough that a person is shithouse at delivering on their contractual obligations: even repeatedly so. That just makes them a bad business person, not a criminal. They must have acted dishonestly and deceived their victims from the get-go with the intention of not fulfilling their bargain or have been reckless as to their ability to do so. If you believe that you have knowledge of criminal fraud, you should report it to the police who have the discretion to investigate and prosecute. As a general rule, police devote fewer resources to non-violent crime than they do to violent crime and less to crimes where the victim has handed over property/money than those where it was taken from them involuntarily so fraud tends to be lower on their radar.
Although there have long been requirements to disclose certain types of defenses -- alibi, insanity, etc. -- common law jurisdictions have more recently moved in the direction of greater disclosure obligations for the criminal defendant. Virtually every jurisdiction now requires the defendant to disclose his witnesses and his evidence to the prosecution at some point before the trial, at least if the defendant has made discovery demands of the prosecution. For more information on common-law discovery rules, see here.
If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked.
In the case you link, this was given as an opening statement by the defense. Opening statements do not contain evidence. The defendant may or may not testify on their own behalf during the trial - this testimony, if given, counts as evidence, even if it is somewhat self-serving. And anything which tends to casts doubt as to the defendant's guilt is evidence that they didn't do it, even if it isn't proof. If there is reasonable doubt, then &quot;he didn't do it&quot; is not illogical. And it would seem unfair to allow the prosecution to say &quot;he did it&quot; but not allow the defense to say &quot;no he didn't&quot;.