Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case? According to this article in Newsweek, people are calling for Amy Coney Barrett to recuse herself from the 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case because she has strong ties to anti-gay Christian groups. While these people are probably right that she is biased, this still seems a little odd to me. Barret does not have ties to 303 Creative LLC itself, or to anyone directly involved in the case. She just has ties to people with strong opinions on the issue, which seems like something that would apply to many judges in many cases. Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case?
Is there precedent for Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases when they have strong ties to groups with strong opinions on the case? Not really. Supreme Court justices decide unreviewably whether or not to recuse themselves from cases, informed by general canons of judicial ethics which guide their decisions even though they are non-binding on Supreme Court justices. There is a strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from particular cases in which the justice was involved as lawyer prior to becoming a Supreme Court justice. There is also a fairly strong record of Supreme Court justices recusing themselves from cases where they have a strong, personal, and particularized to them (as opposed to general to people of their class and situation) financial interest (e.g. from cases involving companies in which they have large investments or family members who are top managers). In the example given of the 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case, her strong ties to anti-gay Christian groups would normally not be a ground for recusal. General strong policy dispositions are normally not a basis for recusal. But, if instead, she were an investor in (or even a long time regular customer of) 303 Creative LLC, she would probably recuse.
The custom is that the person who brings the case is named first. This will be the plaintiff in a civil case. But when the plaintiff wins, and the defendant appeals, the case in the appeals court may have that person (often referred to in older cases as the "defendant appellant") named first. More recent practice is to keep the name of the case the same. But it used to be considered a separate case with a separate name in some jurisdictions. In any event, this is merely a custom, and not a law. The court has discretion to name cases as it chooses in its judgements, and if a court chooses for whatever reason to follows a practice that differs from the usual one, that is the name of that particular case. Without a full citation or a link, so that the actual opinion could be consulted, three is no way to know what reason, if any, there was for the order of parties in the particular case mentioned in the question. A quick Google search did not turn up the case.
Two reasons that spring to mind: The Respondent wanted the appeal to proceed so that they would have definitive case law from a higher court. That is they thought they would win and, quite possibly, the appellant thought they would win too. Rolling the dice on a losing proposition is not so bad if you have no skin in the game so the Respondent is encouraging the appeal. Its a commercial PR decision - it looks bad in the press if you use your money and power to prevent someone from pursuing their legal rights. This way, they can put their hand on their hearts and say "we gave them every opportunity to prove us wrong".
I'm not convinced that there is a U.S. Supreme Court case with such a clear holding. For example: May a private entity running a public access channel ban speakers based on the content of their speech—something a government entity running the same channels could not do? Yes, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion in Manhattan Community Access Corporation v. Halleck (2019). Why? Because the First Amendment doesn’t apply to private entities in this instance. You may be looking for one of the cases discussed in Halleck which notes (in the official syllabus) that: &quot;A private entity may qualify as a state actor . . . when the entity exercises “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 352 [1974]. The Court has stressed that “very few” functions fall into that category. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 158 [1978]. Per the official syllabus in the link above, Jackson held that: The convergence between the actions of a state and a heavily regulated private utility company do not rise to the level of state action if the utility company has a partial monopoly in providing electrical service and uses a procedure that the state utilities commission finds to be appropriate under state law in terminating service to customers. As the linked material explains: A private entity performing a public function can be classified as a state actor, but merely being regulated and overseen by the state does not equate to performing a public function if the company is managed by private actors. In this decision, the Court placed limits on the public function doctrine, which otherwise could have grown into a massive exception permitting the inference of state action. Thus, heavy state regulation of a private entity still doesn't constitute state action which can violate a constitutional right, in this case, even though if the state has had greater control over the nominally private entity (e.g. appointing its board of directors), the private entity's actions would be state action. Per the official syllabus in the link above, the primary holding of Flagg Bros. was that: A warehouseman's proposed sale of goods entrusted to him for storage, as permitted by [New York State's Uniform Commercial Code] § 7-210, is not &quot;state action,&quot; and since the allegations of the complaint failed to establish that any violation of respondents' Fourteenth Amendment rights was committed by either the storage company or the State of New York, the District Court properly concluded that no claim for relief was stated by respondents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In reaching this conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that: The challenged statute does not delegate to the storage company an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign. Other remedies for the settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors (which is not traditionally a public function) remain available to the parties. Though respondents contend that the State authorized and encouraged the storage company's action by enacting [the statute], a State's mere acquiescence in a private action does not convert such action into that of the State. In other words, enactment of a state statute authorizing private action is not state action that can violate a constitutional right.
Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, says (at p. 24): The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. That indicates to me that there is probably a majority on the court that thinks same-sex couples should have the same adoption rights and other tangible benefits as opposite-sex couples, but that would have to be tested in court. Regarding level-of-scrutiny, this opinion says nothing on the issue. But, given that Justice Kennedy follows a fundamental rights analysis, it could be argued that it is likely strict scrutiny, or at least a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 631 (1996) (emphasis added, internal punctuation removed): If a legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold it so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.
Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this!
NO If there were no extenuating circumstances (or they should not have been looked at as they were not presented), the losing party can petition for reconsideration and appeal the decision as a matter of law. The Judge/court of appeals then reviews the case and decides if the verdict stands. But you can't plead new facts at that stage, so if the losing side's lawyer messed up the case, that's up to them, not the judge. If it was a criminal case, the victim can't force the DA to appeal either, though they can try to get an injunction in related civil cases. But no person, or for the matter neither party, can sue the judge at all for misbehavior on the bench because judges have judicial immunity. Even when they did something so out of scope, such as a judge ordering from the bench that a lawyer shall be beaten up by police because they missed a court date, they get immunity as they acted as a judge (Miles v Waco). Indeed, let me quote from the first section of that SCOTUS case (emphasis mine): A long line of this Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages. See, e. g., Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985); Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pierson *10 v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).1 Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, &quot;it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.&quot; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872). ... Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554 (&quot;[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly&quot;). See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-819 (1982) (allegations of malice are insufficient to overcome qualified immunity). In the example OP posed nobody, not even the police, becomes liable for the actions of Bob but Bob himself: Police does not need to help you, even if they know for a fact that something is happening right now. There's a huge error in the case as presented by OP You start to work up a case, and points 1 to 3 are fine. But you start to get off the rails starting in point 4: The evidence does not say that someone is to be locked up, it only indicates what the facts of the case (upon which is to be decided) might be. The decision if someone is to go to jail or not is only up to the verdict - which happened in dot 5. Dot 5 however indicates that the judge looked at extenuating circumstances which is also evidence, so point 4 is presented incompletely. Let me present a more complete version of point 4: Evidence from side A was presented, as was other evidence by side B. To the victim, it seemed that side A (either her attorney or the DA, not clear from OP) had the better evidence and might get a conviction on side B. But the Judge did weigh the evidence differently than the observer and declared a verdict favoring B in point 5 to the dissatisfaction of the victim The missing bullet between 5 and 6 (a motion for reconsideration or appeal) does not seem to happen. Assuming it did not happen, because months go by, the verdict becomes final and the case becomes res iudicata - the case is closed. Point 6 is a different and separate crime. The case files of the earlier case can get pulled to show a pattern of behavior, but not to re-adjudicate the earlier case. Finally: Point 7 does not matter before the law: If-Then hypotheticals can't be adjudicated. Because the counterpoint to the presented argument in this point is: Would the lawyer of Side A have filed for reconsideration and/or appeal, the verdict would not have become final and waiting for the verdict from the court of appeals, Bob might still await the next step of the trial. tl;dr As presented, the rundown of the hypothetical case does not present anything that the judge could be liable for but instead shows that side A did not take the necessary steps to ask for reconsideration or file an appeal to the verdict they didn't like. The separate incident opened a new case, the hypothetical that side B would sit in jail is conclusory.