Does Norway&#39;s new &quot;LGBTQ+ Hate Speech&quot; outlaw reading parts of religious texts in churches / mosques? Recently I read a National Review article titled Norway’s ‘LGBTQ+ Hate Speech’ Law. It quotes from a Reuters article Norway outlaws hate speech against trans and bisexual people. That article is saying: People found guilty of hate speech face a fine or up to a year in jail for private remarks, and a maximum of three years in jail for public comments, according to the penal code. Given that, for example the bible contains passages like Leviticus 20:13: If a man practices homosexuality, having sex with another man as with a woman, both men have committed a detestable act. They must both be put to death, for they are guilty of a capital offense. I am fairly sure the quran has equally despicable passages. Does that mean that these are not allowed to be read publicly (ie in a church/mosque), or am I misunderstanding the NR / Reuters reference?
Probably not. I can't find the new text, but the existing law was probably just amended with a new category: &quot;hate speech&quot; based on race, religion, disability and &quot;homosexual leanings, lifestyle, or orientation&quot; was illegal – this new law seems to just tweak the categories. The Supreme Court has addressed the general law here in a race-based case, stating that expression of contempt is crucial to defining the crime (&quot;to threaten or insult, or promote hatred, persecution or contempt&quot; based on a protected category). The line that would be drawn is between reading the text, versus promoting hatred or contempt using the text as justification. You can't be prosecuted for hate speech in Norway by reporting the existence of racial etc. discrimination.
One could make a First Amendment challenge to mask requirements through either the Free Exercise Clause or the Free Speech Clause. Neither approach is likely to succeed. Because going without a mask is not recognized as &quot;expressive conduct,&quot; it is not protected by the Free Speech Clause A free-speech challenge would likely also fail for two reasons. As you correctly suggested, the First Amendment protects more than just speech, also protecting &quot;expressive conduct,&quot; such as flag burning, dancing, and wearing armbands. Of course, literally any conduct could have some secret expressive meaning in the mind of the person carrying out -- &quot;I shot him in the face to say I didn't like him&quot; -- so we have a question of where to draw the line between what expressive conduct does and does not receive the strong protection the First Amendment affords to speech. The Supreme Court detailed that test in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), and it's now generally formulated as asking two questions: Did the speaker actually intend to convey a particularized message through his conduct? Are the people who see the conduct likely to understand that message? At the Sturgis rally, or at the statehouse protests over COVID restrictions, or some similar event that is explicitly opposed to masks, refusing to wear a mask goes a long ways in communicating an opposition to the mask requirements. But in the vast majority of cases, no one you run into in the normal course of daily life is likely to recognize that you are not wearing a mask because you are trying to communicate a message, let alone decipher what that message is. Do you believe that mask mandates are tyranny? That COVID-19 is a hoax? That life is meaningless and we should all welcome the hastening of human extinction? None of that is clear to the average viewer, which is who the courts are going to be concerned with. Because refusing to wear a mask is generally insufficient to convey a specific message, I'd argue that it is not expressive conduct. Because mask requirements are neutral as to religion and generally applicable, they do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. A religious challenge (&quot;My religion prohibits wearing masks&quot;) is likely to fail because &quot;the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'&quot; Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This means that if the mask ban generally applies to everyone and you just happen to belong to a religion that forbids mask-wearing, you can't use that affiliation to escape the law's requirements. (The outcome may be different when you run the problem through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act or state-level analogues, which impose more stringent tests for infringements on religious liberty.)
In addition to the points raised by Dale M's answer, it is important to recall the law as clarified by the Supreme Court in Lee v Ashers Baking Co &amp; Ors [2018] UKSC 49 (aka, the 'gay cake case'). This case found that the providers of business services have a right not to be compelled to make speech with which they disagree without proper justification, under the Human Rights Act 1998. To quote from Lady Hale's judgment (emphasis added): [56] Under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, all legislation is, so far as it is possible to do so, to be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. I have already indicated my doubts about whether this was discrimination against Mr Lee on the grounds of his political opinions, but have acknowledged the possibility that it might be. But in my view, FETO should not be read or given effect in such a way as to compel providers of goods, facilities and services to express a message with which they disagree, unless justification is shown for doing so. (nb: FETO refers to the statutory equalities instrument in Northern Ireland at issue; the analagous statute here is the Equality Act 2010) Given that the RA stocking Ms de Wahls was seen by critics as a communication of endorsement of the artist, there is a strong argument that the RA have the right not to be compelled to express endorsement of Ms de Wahl's views. (Whether or not stocking an artist is expressing their views is an open question, but I think the relevant point here is that the communicated message to some in the art community was of endorsement, meaning that RA was dealing with the semiotics of seeming to endorse). I think Lees provides support that the RA cannot be compelled to agree with Ms de Wahls's beliefs.
Sometimes In general, intentionally false speech gets less protection than other speech, and in some cases it is unprotected. The classic example of speech that is unprotected is "Falsely shouting FIRE in a crowded theater". Note that this is both intentionally false and highly likely to be seriously harmful to multiple uninvolved people. On the other hand, the classic case of New York Times vs Sullivan said that, at least when the subjects were public officials (later broadened to public figures) it was not enough to prove simple falsehood in a defamation case, one must prove "actual malice" (an unfortunate term) which in this context means statements that are either knowingly false or are made with reckless disregard for the truth. The court in that case said, in effect, that if a newspaper had to be sure that its every statement could be proved true in every detail, it would be unwilling to vigorously report on matters of significant public concern (this is a paraphrase, I'll add a quote later). Opinions are considered legally not to be either false or true. "President Jone is the worst leader the US has ever had" Is a statement of opinion, and so is not defamation. Moreover, in political contexts, attempts to punish false statements of fact that are not defamatory have been held unconstitutional. One example was the "Stolen Valor" act, which punished falsely claiming to have been awarded a medal by the US armed forces. This was held to be against the First Amendment. In general, regulation of speech (which here includes writing and other forms of communication) must be fairly narrowly drawn and must have good reasons behind them to survive a court challenge. How much so depends on the nature of the law, and particularly whether it is "content-neutral" or not. Details and cites to come when i have a little more time.
Actually, there is not a government kill list, that is just a meme. The First Amendment says (starts) &quot;Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...&quot;. That means a number of different concrete things: there shall be no laws prohibiting any religion, or preferring a religion, not may there be laws impeding or promoting the practice of a religion. The government therefore cannot reward or punish a person for believing in skin walkers, nor for turning themselves into a coyote (if they can do it). The old practice of burning witches at the stake is illegal, similarly at least under current understandings of the law it would be illegal to punish those without a religion with a fine or death. The aforementioned person can thus practice witchcraft – up to a point. One cannot get away with murder by claiming that they are just practicing the Ásatru ritual of blót. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah is an example of how the government can not restrict a religious practice (banning animal sacrifices of a particular religion), Employment Division v. Smith is an example of a neutral prohibition which happens to impinge on a religion (outlawing certain drugs limits a religious practice).
Crime and disorder act 1988 s32 introduces religiously aggravated harassment which effectively extends S2 and S4 of protection from harassment act. This seems to completely nullify the protections of the behaviours allowed by s29J of racial and religious hatred act 2006. I don't understand how you arrive at that conclusion. Harassment is unwanted behaviour repeatedly targeting a particular individual or connected group of individuals (e.g. a family or members of a particular club or place of worship). &quot;Religiously aggravated&quot; means it has a religious component and adds to the sentence. For example, standing outside a place of worship every day, shouting at the coming and going individual(s) &quot;you Christian/Jewish/Muslim scum.&quot; https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/stalking-and-harassment Commenting or joking about Christianity/Judaism/Islam generally is entirely different behaviour and has the 29J defence.
The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.
The First Amendment states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. It thus protects such videos. An analogous situation is that there is network news coverage of riots, bank robberies, terrorist attacks and assaults. Backpage was seized because it facilitated prostitution, not just reported or even encouraged it. That is basically where the line exists.