Can &quot;agreeing not to know anything&quot; be enough to constitute &quot;knowledge&quot; of a waiver? For example, if I waive my rights to know what you'll be doing with my internet search history, is that a knowing and intelligent waiver?
The question is rendered moot because Cal. Civ. §1798.100 declares that Any provision of a contract or agreement of any kind, including a representative action waiver, that purports to waive or limit in any way rights under this title, including, but not limited to, any right to a remedy or means of enforcement, shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be void and unenforceable. This section shall not prevent a consumer from declining to request information from a business, declining to opt out of a business’s sale of the consumer’s personal information, or authorizing a business to sell or share the consumer’s personal information after previously opting out. You can fail to request such information, and you can tell a business that you don't plan to ever exercise that right, but you cannot be bound by such promises, which is to say, this is an un-waivable right. For another right, you might be able to waive that right. Your 5th amendment rights can be waived, but we would have to know more of the circumstances to know if that was a knowing and intelligent waiver.
Can defense request findings of fact before resting? Is it possible for the Defense to avoid presenting affirmative defenses (like Self Defense) before the Court has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime? If so: How? No, no and not applicable. A verdict is a singular declaration by the jury (or judge) that the state has or has not proved their case. Affirmative Defence These are all affirmative defenses which defeat or mitigate the consequences of the unlawful conduct and the onus of proof lies with the Defence, not the Prosecution. An affirmative defence must be pleaded in a timely manner. If the Prosecution fails in their burden to prove the unlawful conduct the affirmative defence does not get engaged. This is a threshold decision point for the trier of fact and the judge should so instruct the jury. Of necessity, affirmative defences require some admission of fact, however, these facts may not be in contention anyway. Where they are in contention, it requires a strategic choice by the defendant as to whether to use the affirmative defence or not. Is there some theory or principle that illuminates why this is not considered a violation of the Defendant's fifth-amendment rights? Because the defendant is not compelled to make these defences.
Are there any legal terms which can make it clear that such questions are about the &quot;outside of reach&quot; rather than &quot;outside of claim of reach&quot; situations? Enforceability Laws that claim but cannot reach lack enforceability. Note that enforceability is case-specific and subjective. The US may or may not be able to reach out to those it deems to be criminals on the other side of the world; those may or may not care.
There is no search analog to the Miranda requirement. The Supreme Court in Miranda didn't just decide that people had to be told their rights, for all rights in all contexts. Miranda applies just to 5th and 6th Amendment rights, in case a person is being held coercively. If you are free to go, you need not be apprised of your rights: so, if the police are just asking questions when you are not being held, they are not required to give a rights warning. Likewise, they are allowed to request permission to conduct a search. It is true than many people do not understand that a request is distinct from an order. A useful phrase to remember is "Am I free to go?". If the answer is no, you are busted and they can search you. If the answer is yes, you don't have to let them search you (to avoid the ambiguity of silence, refusing permission to search is not a bad strategy, unless you want then to search you – e.g. if you want to get on the plane).
This is called the &quot;waiver trap,&quot; and it can be quite harsh indeed. Rule 8 and Rule 12 require a defendant to assert most affirmative defenses almost immediately -- either in their answer or in either a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Failure to assert them does indeed result in a waiver of the defense. For instance, in Hunter v. Serv-Tech, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based on defects in service of the complaint. The defendants' motion purported to &quot;reserve the right&quot; to challenge personal jurisdiction, as well, but did not actually move for dismissal on that basis. After the service issue was resolved, the defendants actually moved to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction, but the court denied the motion, saying that Rule 12 requires an actual assertion and argument in support of the defense: The Court is aware that the outcome it reaches today is a harsh one, especially in light of the fact that it appears that, absent waiver, this motion might well be granted. But the Court is duty-bound to apply the law as it is written, and as written the Rules enact a policy of requiring all 12(b)(2)-(5) defenses to be made by motion, once, prior to filing an answer. Given this policy, Offshore’s “reservation” language is not sufficient to preclude waiver. So the court acknowledges that the defendant had a winning defense, but it must nonetheless continue to litigate. The rule is applied quite strictly in cases involving Rule 12(b)(2)-(5) defenses. There is quite a bit more wiggle room for other affirmative defenses, i.e., defenses that allow the defendant to escape liability regardless of whether his conduct was wrongful, but it still remains quite dangerous to omit any available defense from your first responsive pleading. See, e.g., Am. Nat. Bank of Jacksonville v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d 1528, 1537 (11th Cir. 1983) (&quot;In any case, we need not consider these points since SFC waived its right to advance the statute of limitations defense by its failure to assert this affirmative defense in any pleading filed below in compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c).&quot;). As a practical matter, then it is not usually sufficient to simply say &quot;I disagree&quot; in response to a claim, unless your defense amounts to either a denial that the facts supporting the claim are true or a denial that the facts as alleged creates a cause of action. If you intend to assert an affirmative defense – such as personal jurisdiction, statute of limitations, failure of consideration, accord and satisfaction, immunity, etc. – you must say so clearly. So if your first responsive pleading is an answer, it is typically sufficient to simply say, &quot;The claim is barred by the statute of limitations.&quot; But if your first responsive pleading is a motion to dismiss, you need to both assert and argue your defense; otherwise, you risk waiving it as in Hunter. Note, though, that there are some affirmative defenses that are not waived by failing to assert them immediately. Failure to join a necessary party, for instance, can be asserted at any time up until trial, and subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at basically any time at all.
This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.
Normally, the term &quot;benefit of the doubt&quot;, if it was used, would mean that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the person entitled to it. This could be applied to contract interpretation or to statutory interpretation. Here is an example: When dealing with restrictions on campaign spending and speech, a court's construction must “give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship. The First Amendment's command that ‘Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech’ demands at least that. Colorado Educ. Ass'n v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65, 75–76 (Colo. 2008) (ultimately holding that union activities to organize volunteers to walk precincts with a political candidate did not constitute a &quot;campaign expenditure&quot; of a union within the meaning of a state law restriction campaign contributions by unions).
In the real world, the contract could not be enforced, as being unconscionable. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445. This, from the ruling, seems particularly applicable to TOS conditions: Did each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices