Were any crimes committed in The Duck Song? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MtN1YnoL46Q Let's take the song in a different direction: TL;DR version A duck repeatedly visits a lemonade stand, asking for grapes. Each time the proprietor says he has no grapes. After many repetitions the proprietor says &quot;If you come back, duck, I'll glue you to a tree and leave you all day, stuck!&quot; The duck reports this exchange to the police as an illegal threat. The proprietor claims that the duck harassed him. Is the proprietor guilty of some crime? Is the duck guilty of some crime? Assume that the duck is considered a person. Long version 🎶 A duck walked up to a lemonade stand, and he said to the man running the stand, &quot;Hey, [bum bum bum] got any grapes?&quot; The man said, &quot;no,&quot; and the duck did go; he just waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], he waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], till the very next day [bum bum bum bum bum bum babum], When the duck came back to the lemonade stand, and again asked the man running the stand, &quot;Hey, [bum bum bum] got any grapes?&quot; He still heard a &quot;no,&quot; and again he did go; he just waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], he waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], till the very next day [bum bum bum bum bum bum babum], He kept coming back to the lemonade stand, kept asking the man running the stand, &quot;Hey, [bum bum bum] got any grapes?&quot; This went on for days, he just wouldn't part ways, though he waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], he waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], till the very next day [bum bum bum bum bum bum babum], The duck came back to the lemonade stand, again asked the man running the stand, &quot;Hey, [bum bum bum] got any grapes?&quot; The man'd had enough, this was getting to tough, and he said to the duck who came to his stand, &quot;If you come back, duck, I'll glue you to a tree and leave you all day, stuck!&quot; After this louder no, the duck decided to go; he just waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], he waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], till the very next day [bum bum bum bum bum bum babum], When the duck walked up to the city police, and he said to the cop at the city PD, &quot;Hey, [bum bum bum], is this an illegal threat?&quot; The man went to court, accused of assault, and he looked at the judge, wanting the trial to halt; he said, &quot;I plead not guilty! This duck harassed me!&quot; The judge asked the duck, &quot;So what did you do? Was the lemonade man harassed by you?&quot; The duck answered back, &quot;Well, in part it is true. I wanted some grapes, but he had not even two. I went back every day, until the threat yesterday. Then I waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], I waddled away [waddle waddle waddle], I waddled away [waddle waddle waddle] and I told the DA.&quot; Now I'd like to know what this judge will say. Did the duck harass the man, coming every day? Did the man commit a crime, or is he OK this time? 🎶
Ducks are ducks, not people. It might surprise you, but even a hypothetical duck that could talk is a type of bird and is considered a waterfowl and wild game but not a person or human. As such, you can not commit any crime such as assault against it. In fact, provided that the lemonade stand owner has a hunting license and this is not in a zone where you can not hunt, such as inside a town, he could have shot the bird without repercussions - because a duck can be hunted. Threatening game birds is not covered by any law. Only would the lemonade stand owner have glued the bird to a tree he would have committed a crime, because gluing birds somewhere would be considered animal cruelty in most jurisdictions. As the duck is a bird and not a person, it can not commit any crimes, such as harassment. If a duck is a person... Assuming that there is such a place where duck is a slang term for a person, or where ducks are considered people, then the pattern is different: Such as duck would indeed perform a repeated action that is very much aimed at annoying the lemonade stand owner. But that is not necessarily legally harassment: In Germany, § 238 StGB is aimed at stalking and requires the aim of inciting fear, § 185 StGB is for insulting speech, including harassing speech, § 186 StGB is for defamation, and § 240 StGB for coercion through harassment. A charge under those would be tedious. In the United Kingdom, the English Protection from Harassment Act 1997, does not define harassment as any specific pattern. Scotland's variant reads a little simpler, and makes harassment for harassment's sake illegal. These laws might be applied to the duck. Many of the United States federal laws will simply not apply to the situation. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is about sexual harassment in the workplace, Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 is for schools, and the Fair Housing Act does deal with home purchases and renting. All seem inapplicable. If the threat of gluing someone to a tree is a real threat under the law depends very much again. In Germany, it might be interpreted as too hilarious to be considered a true threat, but humiliating enough to constitute one of the insult laws, but the lyrics do not offer enough facts to make a proper analysis for this part.
The segment of the video I watched is wrong or misleading in several ways. The speaker apparently claimed to be performing a &quot;citizen's arrest&quot; on a police officer on the basis of s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986. The question above also talks about s.26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2013, which deals with an offence of improperly exercising the powers of a constable. Somebody who is not a police officer is allowed to arrest somebody else without a warrant only under tightly defined circumstances. These are given in s.24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (inserted by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005). The elements include that the offence be indictable, which does not mean as claimed in the video that &quot;you can get sent to prison for it&quot;, but refers to the mode of trial. Some summary offences are imprisonable. Since the offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act is a summary one, rather than indictable, we fall at the first hurdle. A further qualifiction is that this power of arrest can only be exercised if the person believes it would be impractical for a constable to do it instead, and that the arrest is necessary to stop the arrestee from escaping, hurting themselves or someone else, or damaging property. In the video, the police officer does not look like he is doing any of those things, and there is another officer right next to him. Thus it would be hard to argue that there are reasonable grounds for arresting the officer in this way. Also, while members of the public may object to the conduct of police officers, that does not always amount to an offence under s.26 of the 2013 Act. The offence there is about corruption, exercising the powers of a constable for personal benefit. That personal element does not seem to be shown in the video. There are some other mistakes in the part I watched. A lawful arrest cannot be effected just by using the words &quot;I am arresting you&quot;. The arrestor has to take or imply some directive action as well, or else there is no arrest at all: just two people continuing to stand awkwardly. This also goes to the point about needing to stop the arrestee from causing injury (etc.) - if you aren't actually taking steps to restrain them then you can't say you're preventing the harm. The point of the provision is to take the fact of an arrest (I am stopping you from getting away) and make it a legal arrest; it can't conjure up an arrest where none exists. In a citizen's arrest there is no need to give a warning about &quot;anything you say may be used against you&quot; or whatever. This is applicable to the police when they are questioning suspects, which is not what is happening here. Indeed, while the police can arrest somebody without warrant because they want to investigate whether they've committed a crime, a regular person can't. Although there is a statutory requirement to tell somebody why they've been arrested, coming from ECHR as well as domestic common-law principles, the police are not expected to cite the law with precision. It's OK to say &quot;I'm arresting you for selling heroin&quot; rather than &quot;I am arresting you because I have reasonable grounds to suspect you of supplying a controlled substance to another without lawful authorisation, contrary to section 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971&quot;. While there are more rules that kick in during pre-charge detention or questioning, the law recognizes that the operational circumstances of an arrest make a briefer explanation more appropriate. Indeed, more formal language would defeat the point of the rule, which is that the arrestee should know what's going on. &quot;You can only arrest a cop for an indictable offence&quot; is not quite right. You (a non-constable) can only lawfully arrest anyone for such an offence, and if the other conditions are met. A constable can be arrested for any kind of offence: there's no special immunity for summary offences. As to the general question of &quot;How can one arrest a police officer?&quot;, the usual way is to become a police officer yourself. Almost all arrests, especially those involving police misconduct, are done by the police. For corruption it is likely that an arrest would be made after a long investigation and after the issue of a warrant, rather than on the spur of the moment. As a normal person, wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty is an offence (Police Act 1996, s.89), and affecting an arrest may amount to assault on the officer. That does not make it impossible to arrest an officer in this way, just fraught with future difficulty.
He is probably guilty of negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter, at most (a minor felony), and is possibly not guilty of a crime at all. The primary distinction between classes of homicide is mens rea (i.e. intent). The only affirmative act he took was to move the pillow. He did so both without intending to or knowing that he would kill Jane (the intent necessary for murder), and also, without clear actual knowledge that he would be creating a risk that Jane would die (a reckless state of mind that would support a conviction for manslaughter). Also, note that Walter himself, at this time, is not engaged in a felony, so he is not guilty of felony murder. We can presume he is present with the consent previously given of the owner of the property and did not mean anyone any harm. Likewise, this is not what is meant by "extreme indifference" for purposes of a murder statute, the paradigm of which is shooting randomly into a crowd knowing that someone will almost certainly be killed without knowing or intending that any particular person will die. The mental state necessary for negligent homicide is the equivalent of "gross negligence" in a civil case and is called "criminal negligence" in a criminal case. To be criminally negligent a person must fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a certain result will occur, and the risk must be of such a nature that the defendant's failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from a reasonable person's standard of care. If a jury found that a reasonable person ought should clearly know that moving a pillow put Jane at risk of dying, then he might be guilty of criminal negligence. But, if a jury found that a reasonable person would not know that moving the pillow put Jane at grave risk of death, his action would not be criminally negligent. There are also at least three questions of causation which is not entirely independent of the question of negligence. First, generally an act is only considered a cause of a consequence if it is a foreseeable result of the action. If Jane's vomit caused death is not a foreseeable result of moving the pillow, then her death might not be legally caused by moving the pillow. Second, how likely is it that she would have died even if Walter had never entered the room. There are lots of ways that the pillow could have been jostled during the night leading to the same result. If it likely would have happened anyway, Walter's involvement might not be the legal cause of the death. Third, how much fault should be attributed to Jane? This is closely related to the second question. If her death was primarily caused by her getting dangerously high and placing herself in a vulnerable position, perhaps Walter's involvement is not a meaningful cause of the death. A New Mexico court has held that the defense that the victim was negligent has value only if it establishes that the victim's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. State v. Maddox, 99 N.M. 490, 660 P.2d 132 (Ct. App. 1983). But, what about Jesse's negligence? Under a relevant standard criminal jury instruction in New Mexico: The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was a significant cause of the death of __________________ (name of victim). Evidence has been presented that the negligence of a person other than the defendant may have contributed to the cause of death. Such contributing negligence does not relieve the defendant of responsibility for an act that significantly contributed to the cause of the death so long as the death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's actions. However, if you find the negligence of a person other than the defendant was the only significant cause of death, then the defendant is not guilty of the offense of __________________ (name of offense). Caveat: A number of states impose strict criminal liability on drug dealers, often for murder, if someone died from using a drug sold by them, but often it has to be a child, and often the drug has to be the proximate cause of death, e.g. due to an overdose or impurity in the drug. I would presume that Jesse and not Walter supplied the drugs to Jane, that Jane is an adult, and it is not obvious that the drug itself (as opposed to the vomiting due to the manner in which the drugs were used) was the proximate cause of death, so a statute like this might not apply in any case. This brings us to the hard part of the question: Without the pillow Jane rotates on her back and starts to vomit and cough, still sleeping. At first Walter tries to react, running to the other side of the bed to help her, but then he stops and decides to do nothing as she dies. Note that if Walter had moved the pillow without knowing that he was creating a risk, left the room ignorant, and then this happened, surely Walter would have no legal liability for Jane's death. If Walter develops the necessary intent for criminal liability, this probably doesn't happen until he observes that she is starting to choke on her vomit and might die. Even then, he does not intend for Jane to die and probably doesn't even know for certain that she will die from his inaction, so he is probably, at most reckless, if he has a duty to rescue for criminal law purposes. Generally, under both civil and criminal law, there is no duty to rescue, even if you can do so without any risk of harm to yourself. But, there is an exception, at least in civil liability, for a duty to rescue that arises from the fact that you put the person at risk of peril through your affirmative actions. Does this apply here, at all, or in a criminal case? The first question is the exact language of the homicide statute. Some homicide offenses require affirmative acts, while others can arise from acts or omissions where there is a legal duty to act. Every crime requires some voluntary act or omission, and the voluntary act itself was not a crime and perhaps was not even a tort, at the moment it was taken, because Walter did not realize that his act created a risk of harm. He create a peril, but he did so innocently. A pretty standard formulation is that an omission is only a crime when the law creates a legal duty to act, but this is, of course, a question begging standard as it doesn't clarify whether there is a legal duty to act, which is at issue here. As the previous link notes, creation of a peril can give rise to a legal duty to act, but only sometimes. (4) Duty arising from creation of peril. If a person acts culpably to imperil another, he or she has a legal duty to rescue the victim. The cases are split on whether a duty to rescue arises if someone innocently or accidentally imperils another. This case would fall in the category of someone who innocently or accidentally imperils another, in which the cases are split, which which the linked article cites the following authority: Compare Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (1923) (defendant under duty to try to extinguish a fire that he accidentally set to his house and thus was guilty of arson when he did not) with King v. Commonwealth, 285 Ky. 654, 659, 148 S.W.2d 1044, 1047 (1941) (defendant who, in lawful defense of a third person, shot and wounded an attacker was under no duty to seek medical attention for the wounded assailant). A commentary that is part of a California standard jury instruction (for involuntary manslaughter, not murder for which this kind of liability is presumably not available) makes the following observation: A legal duty to act may also exist where the defendant's behavior created or substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim, either by creating the dangerous situation or by preventing others from rendering aid. (People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147-148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138] [defendant had duty to act where she drove victim to her home knowing he was drunk, knowingly allowed him to use her bathroom to ingest additional drugs, and watched him collapse on the floor]; Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 446, 456 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 681] [defendant had duty to prevent horses from running onto adjacent freeway creating risk].) These examples would suggest that an innocently or accidentally created risk is sufficient to create a duty sufficient to support involuntary manslaughter liability for an omission under California law, and would probably lead to involuntary manslaughter liability in the case in the question as well, under California law. New Mexico, unlike California, does not have a standard criminal jury instruction or really definitive section of its criminal code that clearly resolves this question, although the fact that California which uses a murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter distinction in the same way that New Mexico does, limits criminal liability for omissions to involuntary manslaughter suggests that New Mexico would as well. The New Mexico case State v. Greenwood, 2012 -NMCA- 017, 271 P.3d 753 (N.M. App. 2011), touches on the issue, suggesting that there may be liability only for involuntary manslaughter (or certain specialized crimes based upon a relationship such as that of a nursing home to a resident of a nursing home) based upon an omission, and that the liability for an omission can only arise when there is a legal duty, but almost implies that only contactual duties are sufficient. It does so at paragraph 35 which says: Importantly, even if the LINKS contract relating to Jared were to have been renewed and to have been in force at the time of Jared's death, we are not convinced that it would be the sole basis or even a controlling factor in determining Defendant's legal responsibility under the Act. Defendant's criminal liability must exist solely based on an omission— a failure to act when she had a legal responsibility to act. See Deborah A. Goodall, Penal Code Section 22.04: A Duty to Care for the Elderly, 35 Baylor L.Rev. 589, 594 (1983) (stating that " authorities have long agreed that before an omission can constitute an offense[,] there must first be a duty to act" ); see also People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (1907) (" The law recognizes that under some circumstances the omission of a duty owed by one individual to another, where such omission results in the death of the one to whom the duty is owing, will make the other chargeable with manslaughter. This rule of law is always based upon the proposition that the duty neglected must be a legal duty, and not a mere moral obligation. It must be a duty imposed by law or by contract, and the omission to perform the duty must be the immediate and direct cause of death." (citation omitted)). But, this could be dicta because it was a case where any legal duty would arise under contract rather than for another reason, and as is the case in many smaller states, there is simply no case that has ever been decided in New Mexico which is squarely on point. Under British criminal law, in similar circumstances, a homicide conviction was vacated: R v Khan &amp; Khan (1998) CLR 830, confirmed that there is no separate category of manslaughter by omission unless the omission constitutes a breach of duty to act. The defendants supplied a 15-year-old prostitute with twice the amount of heroin likely to be taken by a regular user. The defendants left her unconscious in the flat, returning the next day to find that she had died of the overdose. Had medical assistance been called, the girl would probably not have died. The unlawful act was supplying the drug but the death was caused by the quantity injected by the victim. The trial judge invited jury to consider liability on the basis of the defendants' failure to summon medical assistance. On appeal, the conviction was quashed because the brothers had not accepted a duty to act before she took the heroin. A dissertation on when criminal liability is imposed for omissions in Scottish law can be found here. New Mexico, whose laws really should govern, has just two homicide statutes: § 30-2-1. Murder A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused: (1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing; (2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or (3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life. Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital felony. B. Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. Murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder in the first degree. Whoever commits murder in the second degree is guilty of a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. Walter doesn't qualify for any of these prongs of the statute. § 30-2-3. Manslaughter Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being. B. Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection. Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Clearly, Walter also does not qualify as guilty of voluntary manslaughter. There is no quarrel or heat of passion. So, either Walter is guilty in New Mexico of involuntary manslaughter, or he is not guilty of homicide at all. New Mexico also has an unusual, and rather merciful "excusable homicide" provision at New Mexico Statutes § 30-2-5, that should also be considered: Homicide is excusable in the following cases: A. when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act, by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent; or B. when committed by accident or misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, if no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. Arguably, Walter falls under "excusable homicide" part A, as moving the pillow was a lawful act done without unlawful intent and that is what caused the death.
It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.
Regardless of the context of the first solicitation, Officer Jones' second solicitation was made in willful refusal to accept Betty's unambiguous "no" for an answer; this is sexually coercive behavior, specifically postrefusal sexual persistence. If this question is assessed from the perspective of the "average" woman, then after her initial declination, extraction of a "yes" cannot be considered uncoerced. Here's a question: how many times does she have to say no before it starts to count? Before it counts against her finally being exhausted, harassed, or intimidated into capitulating? Because by that logic, he never has to stop; he can continue to harass her until he finally accomplishes his objective (grounds to arrest her) - in which case, why bother with the pretense? If it takes 200 "no's" to wear her down to "whatever", then the first 200 "no's" just didn't matter as much as the first "whatever", so why bother with the formality of pretending like the first mattered when it clearly does not? To demonstrate the significance of her initial "no, thanks" and his subsequent refusal to accept it from another perspective: if Betty and Jones were coworkers in the same office, if he continued to solicit her after being told no the first time, that would be the definition of sexual harassment on his part and it would not matter how genial or friendly or casual he thinks he's being; furthermore, if her workplace failed to intervene on her behalf, they would be engaging in sexually discriminatory behavior by creating a hostile work environment, regardless of how genial / friendly / casual, etc. It's hard to see how this could act as evidence of her having committed a crime in one context while being grounds for termination of his employment in another context. HTH.
Assuming U.S. Jurisdiction: In the case of The People vs. Hansel and Gretel Holzfaller: Ms. Gretel Holzfaller is charged with the following: 1 Count of Murder in the First Degree (Murder of Ms. Witch Hazel) 1 Count of Grand Larceny (Theft of precious metals and jewels from Ms. Hazel) 1 Count Petty Theft (Theft of Candy) 1 Count of Vandalism (Bite marks left in Gingerbread Masonry) 1 Count Trespassing Mr. Hansel Holzfaller is charged with the following: 1 Count of Accessory to Murder 1 Count of Grand Larceny 1 Count Petty Theft 1 Count of Vandalism 1 Count Trespassing Ms. Holzfaller has raised the Affirmative Defense of Self-Defense. The defense is problematic on the onset as the court must consider the nature of the case. As a Duty to Flee state, Ms. Holzfaller must show that there was no reasonable way to flee the Witch. The court finds sufficient evidence exists, given that both defendants were detained against their will by Ms. Hazel. Next, we must consider if Ms. Hazel's actions were within her legal rights. Common law allows citizens to make a "Citizen's Arrest" if they are witnesses to criminal activity and when no law officer is appointed. Should the court find in favor of the state on this ground, then Self-Defense is not applicable as Ms. Hazel was acting within her right to hold the children for crimes committed against her. This court, however, will not find in favor of the State. Ms. Hazel had kept the children confined to her home for sufficient time for Mr. Holzfaller to put on the substantial weight given his family's inability to provide sufficient meals for a child of his age. Mr. Holzfaller was described as starving and lean upon his disappearance and, upon recovery of Mr. Holzfaller, contemporary media reports took note of his "fat and plump" appearance. Ms. Holzfaller had similarly put on sufficient weight in this time, though not to the degree of her brother. This amount of weight gain in a child is rather unhealthy and disturbing to consider, but more shocking to this court is that any reasonable person could consider such a duration of time a justifiable "Citizen's Arrest". This is in addition to the fact that Ms. Hazel was intending to engage in the murder of the children and the consumption of them. This court cannot find Ms. Hazel's actions reasonable or just and thus will not consider her to be affecting Citizen's arrest. While Ms. Holzfaller was not herself likely in immediate danger, she was asked to prepare a stove for her brother's imminent murder and consumption. Self-Defense need not apply to one's own self, but can be a legitimate defense when one is defending others from becoming victims of a crime. Furthermore, as the witch was clearly stronger than either Holzfaller's child, Ms. Holzfaller was using only the most reasonable amount of force necessary to incapacitate Ms. Hazel. As such, this court renders the verdict of Not Guilty by means of Self-Defense to Ms. Holzfaller's charge of Murder in the First degree. With a not guilty verdict rendered, this court will dismiss the charge of Accessory to Murder against Mr. Holzfaller. We now turn to the lesser sentences of trespassing, vandalism, and petty theft. This court must recall that at the time of the abduction, the children were both younger. In addition, while Ms. Hazel is not able to stand trial for her alleged crimes, given the nature of the previously dismissed murders, this court must consider that the children were enticed by the house and its unusual choice of confectionery as a construction material and that this was exactly the incident Ms. Hazel intended to induce the children into committing. This is not sufficient in and of itself to excuse the Children from their behavior and this court will not allow an excuse based solely on the fact that Ms. Hazel wanted to trap children to satisfy her unusual palate. As the children were significantly younger when they were engaged in these activities, however, we can reasonably assume that these children were below the Age of Criminal Responsibility and thus did not have the adequate mental development to know that these actions were of a criminal nature. Thus, this court will dismiss these three charges against both defendants. Finally, on the charge of Grand Larceny, this court finds sufficient merit to go to trial. There is no excuse for theft of property from someone, even if they were trying to eat you. Given the nature of the case, however, this court would be satisfied with dismissing the charges if Mr. and Ms. Holzfaller returned the stolen property to the Estate of Ms. Hazel, and the estates' current custodian, Mr. William Wonka. The Holzfaller family has stated that they believe Ms. Hazel's actions warrant punitive actions against Ms. Hazel's estate, but as this is a criminal court, we find that the property in dispute is rightfully Mr. Wonka's pending the outcome of a civil suit on the matter. Next on the Docket: The People v. Rumpelstiltskin on 3 charges of Counterfeiting Currency.
Yes. See Florida Man's Version of Dine and Dash Involving A Pizza Delivery James Chandler was arrested after allegedly ordering a pizza and cinnamon sticks and partially eating them without paying. The basis for arrest was defrauding an innkeeper. Any person who obtains food, lodging, or other accommodations having a value of less than $1,000 at any public food service establishment, or at any transient establishment, with intent to defraud the operator thereof, commits a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083 (Emphasis added; this is the current text of the law, but &quot;less than $1000&quot; was &quot;less than $300&quot; at the time of the incident.) For anyone doubting this or looking for more detail, the case number is 2016MM002854A before the Circuit Court of St. Lucie County, Florida, and not only was he arrested, but he was convicted and sentenced to 60 days in county jail. The above example was pizza by delivery. For an example involving dine-in pizza see Crime briefs: Father's Day fight, copper theft, unpaid pizza bill a woman was arrested at Blue Line Pizza in California on suspicion of &quot;defrauding an innkeeper&quot; after refusing to pay the bill. Another Florida example is Off The Beat: Price of pepperoni pizza and vodka? A trip to jail: Brown’s bill was $30.36, consisting of three Ketel One vodka drinks ($19.50), a pepperoni pizza ($9) plus tax ($1.86). ... Told by a deputy that the restaurant wanted her to settle up her tab, Brown said she brought no money ... Deputies arrested Brown on charges of defrauding an innkeeper and obstruction without violence. The above case is 19001773MMAXMX of Marion County, Florida. She entered a plea agreement, whereby she pled no-contest to the non-violently resisting in exchange for the defrauding an innkeeper not being prosecuted, and was sentenced to time served (about 3 days in jail) and $735 in fees and fines. Also, see Selma [North Carolinia] police: Arrested man glad to go to jail: Police were called to the Pizza Inn at 1441 South Pollock St. after the man allegedly filled his plate with food then walked out the door. Police found 49-year-old Alan Miscavage, of New Jersey across the street. Miscavage allegedly told officers he was homeless and was happy to be going to jail. He told them the jail offered free food, running water, and a place to stay until his court date. Miscavage was charged with defrauding an innkeeper for not paying for the food, and misdemeanor larceny for leaving with the food plate valued at $10. Bond was set at $3,500. His court date was set for August 22. Also, see Police: Man didn't pay for pizza, tried to flee from officers: A Lemoore man was arrested Sunday for allegedly defrauding a pizza delivery driver and trying to flee from police. The Hanford [California] Police Department was called to the 900 block of West Sixth Street at 10:37 p.m. for a report of a man refusing to pay for a pizza delivered by a Pizza Hut delivery driver. Officers found Peter Delano, 59, sitting in his car eating the pizza. So, in conclusion, if you order pizza and don't pay you could be arrested for defrauding an innkeeper.
The statute reads (emphasis mine): A person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Suppose Alvin has sex with Betty while Betty is married to Charlie. Does Alvin's conduct satisfy the elements of the crime? Alvin engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (namely Betty) at a time when the other person (Betty again) had a living spouse (namely Charlie). So yes, Alvin has violated this law. Betty has also violated the law (the first clause instead of the second). Betty engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (Alvin) at a time when he (Betty; the pronoun "he" is meant to be gender-neutral in the statute's style of writing) had a living spouse (Charlie). However, this law is effectively unenforced in modern times. According to https://www.dbnylaw.com/adultery-is-still-a-crime-in-new-york-state/: It is extremely rare for anyone to be arrested just for adultery. Indeed, since 1972, only 13 persons have been charged with adultery. Of those 13 persons, only five actually were convicted of the crime. In virtually every one of those cases, there was some other crime that was committed and the prosecuting attorney added adultery as just one of many crimes committed. If Charlie files a complaint regarding the affair, it is almost certain that the police and prosecutors will ignore it, and that nobody will actually be charged with anything.