Economic Duress Induced Illegally Makes a Contract Void or Voidable? This answer explains the difference between a void and voidable contract: Void means it never happened Voidable means someone has the right to declare it void (q.v.) If a contract was signed due to illegal economic duress, I understand the contract can be voided. But is it automatically void or is it voidable by the victim if they choose? Can the victim choose to enforce the contract if s/he so wishes? What if the victim only wants to enforce certain parts of the contract (assume the contract contains a clause stating that if one clause is unenforceable it shall shall not prevent other clauses from being enforced)? Does the victim have the option to enforce specific parts? Update: By illegal economic duress I mean duress that was not induced simply due to one side having better bargaining power but duress that was induced in violation of the law.
If a contract was signed due to economic duress, is it void or voidable? No. Economic duress is not a ground to find that a contract is void or voidable. is it automatically void or is it voidable by the victim if they choose? Some kinds of conduct do give rise to a duress defense to a contract (e.g. a threat of violent conduct directed at the other party to the contract or someone connected to them which also constitutes criminal extortion), and while I'm not familiar with cases specific to illegal economic duress as defined in the question, usually, duress that is an affirmative defense to contractual liability causes a contract to be voidable but not void. I can't recall ever seeing anyone prevail on an affirmative defense of illegal economic duress, although I recognize that such cases exist in circumstances that include the conditions described by the question (i.e. in circumstances where the economic pressure applied arose from or involved illegal conduct by the party seeking to enforce the contract). Can the victim choose to enforce the contract if s/he so wishes? A victim of conduct that makes a contract voidable can generally enforce a voidable contract. In contrast, no one can enforce a void contract (e.g., if it is void due to illegality or because the person who supposedly assented to it didn't execute it knowing that it was a contract which is called fraud-in-the-factum). What if the victim only wants to enforce certain parts of the contract (assume the contract contains a clause stating that if one clause is unenforceable it shall shall not prevent other clauses from being enforced)? Does the victim have the option to enforce specific parts? Generally not. One exception is the &quot;severability&quot; doctrine is applied to arbitration clauses in contracts that are voidable as a whole due to the existence of an affirmative defense. The doctrine will allow such contracts to be subjected to arbitration, unless there is a problem specific to the arbitration clause, even if there is an affirmative defense to enforceability of the contract, such as duress, that otherwise renders the contract as a whole voidable.
Jurisdiction has not been provided, so I've written a general answer: Not necessarily; often, such provisions clauses will have their own expiration dates, for example "for five years after signing, X", with X still being valid after cancellation up to 5 years(so if you cancel after 3 years, X is still valid for 2 more years), or "for two years after cancellations, Y"(especially common with non-compete clauses) where the time-limit of Y starts when the contract is cancelled. Other clauses are meant to indeed be enforced forever, such as some non-disclosure, non-disparagement, or indemnity clauses. For example, an indemnity clause in a contract that prevents a party from suing the counter-party for work done under the contract would be pointless if it could be bypassed by a party terminating the agreement. There are lots of legal limits, based on the terms of the provision, and its nature, all governed by the contract law of the jurisdiction under which the contract was drafted under and/or is governed by (this is generally obvious, except for some cross-border contracts, which generally will have a declaration as to whose laws apply). It is not inherently abusive, but can certainly be abused. What is considered abusive often varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (not only on this issue, but on legal issues in general). It depends on the jurisdiction, and generally on the terms of the provision itself. If the court asked to enforce the terms of the agreement feels that the provision is illegal or abusive, they won't be enforced (and possibly the entire document declared null and void, depending on the central-ness of the illegal or abusive provision; some provisions specifically state that invaliding the provision doesn't invalidate the whole contract to try to prevent this). If they don't feel the provision is illegal or abusive, they will generally enforce it.
It doesn't matter. When a contract is left ambiguous the interpretation that is used is the one that is the most favorable to the party that did not draft the contract, under the logic that if the party that did draft the contract chose all the wording and thus, they could have stated their interpretation in the contract just avoided this whole mess in the first place. A similar rule exists in criminal law, where if the law is ambiguous, the interpretation used is the one most favorable to the defendant, since the state could have drafted it in a way that made their interpretation clear.
An agreement to agree is void There is a multitude of case law on this point. If the NDA was not available to you when you signed the employment contract and the term was couched as you describe; then the term would be unenforcable. That is, your employment contract would be binding except for that term i.e. you could not be compelled to sign the NDA. Now, there may be a requirement on you to negotiate in good faith in an attempt to find an NDA you can agree to but if you can't find one you can't find one. You cannot (legally) be fired for this reason. Now, if the NDA was available, and you were told where to find it, and irrespective of if you did or didn't find it, you would be bound to the NDA.
Such a clause must be presented before or at the same time the offer is made. The (somewhat new) law NH RSA 275:70 says Any employer who requires an employee who has not previously been employed by the employer to execute a noncompete agreement as a condition of employment shall provide a copy of such agreement to the potential employee prior to the employee's acceptance of an offer of employment. A noncompete agreement that has not been disclosed to an employee as required by this section shall not be enforceable against the employee, but all other provisions of any employment, confidentiality, nondisclosure, trade secret, intellectual property assignment, or any other type of employment agreement or provision shall remain in full force and effect The question is whether such an agreement would mean you can't set up shop on your own and take a bunch of customers with you (it seems that such clauses are enforceable), or does it mean you can't work in that trade (competing for new customers, or as an employee of a competitor) – such an interpretation would not be enforced, in the analysis of this article. The clause must be "drafted narrowly to protect only a company's legitimate business interests, like customer goodwill and confidential information". A specific case of this interpretation is Merrimack Valley Wood Products v. Near, 152 N.H. 192, which finds that the law does not look with favor upon contracts in restraint of trade or competition...Such contracts are to be narrowly construed. Nonetheless, restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable, given the particular circumstances of the case In assessing reasonableness, three tests must be passed (must be answered "no"): first, whether the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer; second, whether the restriction imposes an undue hardship upon the employee; and third, whether the restriction is injurious to the public interest. As an example of a reasonable restriction: When an employee is put in a position involving client contact, it is natural that some of the goodwill emanating from the client is directed to the employee rather than to the employer. The employer has a legitimate interest in preventing its employees from appropriating this goodwill to its detriment. But restricting a person from working with any customers of the company (not just the employees work-related contacts) is unenforceable, because the company had no legitimate interest in protecting its entire client base from its former employee, because he had no advantage over any other complete stranger, possessing no special hold on the goodwill of the majority of Technical Aid's customers. See also Brian's Fitness v. Woodward for reaffirmation ("valid only to the extent that it prevents an employee from appropriating assets that legitimately belong to the employer"), and additional citations. The question arises whether there is a distinction between the former employee approaching former customers, versus those same customers approaching the former employee. I have not located any case that directly addresses that, but Technical Aid v. Allen, 134 N.H. 1 says A restrictive covenant must unreasonably limit the public's right to choose before it will be found to be injurious to the public interest. I think it is likely that the courts would find it to be an unreasonable limit on the public's right to choose, if a customer were prevented from choosing a different company to provide the desired service simply because the customer happened to have previously had a business relationship with the former employee. This "right to choose" is asymmetrical – the public has a right to choose any service provider, an employee does not have an equivalent right to pursue (seek out, woo) a customer, in light of a restrictiveness covenant.
There is no requirement that the terms of a contract be even-handed The common law position is that parties are free to contract on whatever terms they like: if you agree to sell me your late model car for $1 that's a matter between the two of us. The law allows you to make a bad bargain. Unconscionability There is an equitable doctrine that allows the court to refuse to enforce unconscionable contracts or terms. The California Supreme Court has ruled that &quot;the central idea (of the) unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‘a simple old-fashioned bad bargain &quot;… but with terms that are 'unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party.'&quot; In other words, courts will not enforce contracts that are &quot;overly harsh,&quot; &quot;unduly oppressive,&quot; or &quot;so one-sided as to shock the conscience.&quot; However, I would be extremely surprised if the terms you are upset about rising to the level of unconscionability. The basic test of unconscionability, as expressed in official comment 1 to section 2-302, is: whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract. . . .The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise. . . and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. They seem to be dealing with risk allocation and moving risks that are normally on the lender to the buyer or requiring the buyer to waive statutory rights and warranties - there is nothing illegal in that unless the law has a &quot;no contracting out&quot; provision. Some laws do and some laws don't. Some laws may not allow contracting out in consumer transactions but may allow them in business transactions. You seem to be talking about some sort of equipment financing arrangement. As such, if you don't like the deal, there's a bank down the street with a different deal. US law recognises that once there is a contract, the parties have to act in good faith to ensure each party gets the benefit of the bargain they made but there is no such requirement in negotiating that bargain. If you can use your economic strength to get a better deal, that's called capitalism.
First of all, there is no breach - they said they would pay it "over the course of the first year"; in what way is the first week not part of the first year? Second, breaching a contract doesn't always allow the aggrieved party to terminate it: in fact, being able to terminate is only for the most egregious of breaches or ones that are specifically spelled out as giving a right to termination. For example, failure to deliver (or pay) on time or in full would not allow termination, only damages.
Judicial estoppel prevents a party from arguing two opposite positions in separate proceedings. Is there a similar doctrine that applies to argumentation in the same brief? No. The general rule is that a party is permitted to argue inconsistent positions in the alternative within a brief. When a party does so without expressly saying so, it is assumed that they are arguing in the alternative unless the party clearly indicates otherwise (and is just being illogical). But the law in the context of arbitration is a special case that doesn't align perfectly with the general rule, and makes different distinctions sometimes. Under the substantive law of arbitration clause validity, sometimes a party can be forced to arbitrate even if there is a possibility that the underlying contract is unenforceable, with the arbitrator making that decision. But, a party cannot be forced to arbitrate in every case where the validity of the underlying alleged agreement is in doubt, simply because an agreement, on its face, contains or references an arbitration agreement. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, certain preliminary decisions are vested in the courts even if a written arbitration purports to provide otherwise, if a party choses to raise those issues. A dispute over which of two significantly different competing arbitration agreements applies to an issue between the parties could be such a circumstance. Thus, a term that provides that &quot;delegates threshold questions such as the 'applicability, existence, scope, or validity' of the agreement to the arbitrator,&quot; is partially void as a matter of public policy under the Federal Arbitration Act, although some of its retains its validity. For example, you can't delegate the question of the existence of an arbitration agreement to an arbitrator if that question is disputed, even if the contract says otherwise. In arbitration cases, there is a rather elaborate jurisprudence governing what issues are for a court to decided and what are for an arbitrator to decision when the right of a party to arbitrate, and/or the validity of the underlying contract, are disputed, that makes some very fine distinctions between different kinds of arguments. For example, if a party claims that he never had dealings with a party that presents an unsigned document that is a contract and also asserts that this party is bound to an arbitration agreement, that question can be decided by a court. But, if a party signed an agreement with a plain vanilla arbitration clause but claims it is unenforceable because it was induced by duress or undue influence, the arbitration will usually go forward with the arbitrator deciding the validity of the contract. When a decision is decided by a court, or by an arbitrator, is not easily summarized or manifestly obvious without a review of the relevant case law which is voluminous and intricate. See, e.g., Samson v. NAMA Holdings, LLC, 637 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2011); Santich v. VGG Holding Corp., 2019 CO 67 ¶ 6 (June 24, 2019); N.A. Rugby Union, LLC v. U.S. of Am. Rugby Football Union 2019 CO 59, ¶¶ 20-22, 442 P.3d 859, 863-864 (June 17, 2019);;;