Sentencing guidelines for Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) I have read into section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) which can demand suspects surrender passwords for encrypted devices, and section 53 makes it an offence not to do so when compelled. I am confused as to why I was unable to find the sentencing guidelines for the above RIPA offences, to better understand how a judge would make a decision as to the sentence, and type of sentence (suspended, community order, immediate custodial etc...). Why do some offences not appear on the sentencing guidelines website?
The statutory requirement for sentencing guidelines are at section 120 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which includes: (2) A sentencing guideline may be general in nature or limited to a particular offence, particular category of offence or particular category of offender. Therefore, not every offence etc requires - or has - its own specific sentencing guideline. (Presumably as there are far too many offences to easily cover, so limited resources might need to be focused on the more common ones.) Note that at the foot of the Sentencing Council's explantory materials is this link: Where there is no guideline for an offence, refer to the General guideline. Which states it is for: sentencing offences for which there is no offence specific sentencing guideline... So this General guideline is the one to be applied when dealing with a s.53 RIPA offence. (I've not reproduced it here to save space)
I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)
In the UK this is just called &quot;an appeal for the suspect to come forward.&quot; The UK police are not allowed to lie or mislead as suggested in the OP, and any reduction in punishment is in the hands of the courts when passing sentence (unlike some other jurisdictions, I believe).
Police can get a warrant, if the warrant is supported by &quot;probable cause&quot; to believe that evidence of a crime exists. A separate &quot;probable cause&quot; requirement is that to arrest a person, there must be &quot;probable cause&quot; that they committed a crime. However, the Privacy Protection Act makes it unlawful to search &quot;work product materials possessed by a person reasonably believed to have a purpose to disseminate to the public a newspaper, book, broadcast, or other similar form of public communication&quot;, unless there is probable cause that the person committed the crime in question. There are similar laws (&quot;shield laws&quot;) at the state level. Here is a map which gives you an indication what immunities exist in what states.
You might be misreading the extradition criterion The UK–USA extradition treaty has an example of the clause you're asking about: An offense shall be an extraditable offense if the conduct on which the offense is based is punishable under the laws in both States by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more or by a more severe penalty. Similar wording is used in all other treaties that I have reviewed: UK–Algeria (&quot;offences which are punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for at least a period of one year&quot;) UK–Argentina (no extradition when &quot;the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for less than one year&quot;) UK–Bolivia (same as Argentina) UK–Chile (same as Argentina) ... UK–U.A.E. (&quot;offence is based is punishable under the laws of both Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of at least one year&quot;) If there is a treaty that requires there to be a mandatory minimum punishment of at least one year, I have not found it. While you say that &quot;[u]sually, the minimum sentence for a crime has to be 12 months for an extradition to be allowed&quot; and &quot;[e]xtraditions are based on minimum sentence in the UK,&quot; my review of the treaties makes me doubt that. The rest of this answer explains how to interpret the clauses quoted above. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the &quot;possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year.&quot; The inquiry is focused on the offence that the conduct is alleged to give rise to and the range of punishment available for that offence generally. E.g. an offence with a minimum punishment of a fine and a maximum punishment of 16 years in prison is an offence that is &quot;punishable... by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more.&quot; Said another way: it is not necessary that the offence have a mandatory minimum of one year imprisonment. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the &quot;possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year.&quot; See Canada v. Barrientos, 1995 ABCA 468 (CanLII) at para 103, Hetherington J., dissenting; but appeal allowed, for the reasons of Hetherington J. by the SCC in Canada v. Barrientos, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 531. In Barrientos, the courts were interpretating Article 2 of the Canada–U.S. extradition treaty, with wording substantially similar to the UK extradition treaties I reviewed above: &quot;provided these offenses are punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.&quot; One remaining question is whether the decision-maker needs to consider the specific facts of defendant's conduct and make a preliminary estimation as to whether in fact a term of imprisonment more than one year is likely. This position has not been adopted in Canada. At the stage where a judge or Minister of Justice is determining the authority to proceed, this is not to become a &quot;sort of sentencing hearing.&quot; See USA v. English, 2002 BCSC 1902 at para 23.
Obtaining consent for cookies is not required by the GDPR at all. Instead it is covered by the e-privacy directive, which as a directive rather than a regulation, must be implements by specific legislation in each individual country. The exact requirements vary with the law of each country. An e-privacy regulation has been proposed, which would have scope similar to the GDPR, would replace the Directive, and would not require national implementing legislation. However it has not yet been adopted. Proposed versions have significantly different requirements than the current Directive. Nor does the GDPR require consent for advertising that does not involve the processing of personal information, unlike some other privacy laws such as the California CCPA. However, if the Google package sets cookies without consent that are not strictly necessary for operation of the web site, it might well fail compliance with some of those national laws implementing e-privacy. Also, even necessary cookies must be disclosed to the user, as I understand it, possibly only in general terms. Several national Data Protection agencies have said that cookie compliance is not a major priority, at least not until an e-privacy regulation is in place. But that does not mean that lack of compliance is legal. Unfortunately I see no way for a developer using the Google package to correct this issue within the package. One would either have to implement a different solution, or trust that Google will fix this before enforcement becomes a serious issue. However, the app developer could add a separate general cookie consent banner, and turn off all adds if consent is not given, I believe.
This is a developing area within the law. In the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) governs. However, the law is broadly written. This means creative prosecutors can and do win federal criminal cases by arguing the law should apply. Whether violating a website's terms of service should be considered a federal crime subject to the Act has been a subject of hot debate. In United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), the 9th Circuit decided violations of use should be considered breaches rather than crimes. However, the district court refused to dismiss some charges against Nosal when the case was returned, and a jury conviction resulted in a prison sentence. At least three different circuits have arrived at other interpretations of the CFAA. Draft legislation (H.R. 2454 and S. 1196) would limit the scope of the CFAA by excluding TOS violations, however, it hasn't been adopted as of this writing. That CAPTCHA breaking violates website terms of service isn't really in question. For example, see U.S. v. Lowson, 10-cr-114, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey (Newark) in which the judge brought a criminal case to which two defendants plead guilty to wire fraud, one plead guilty to misdemeanor computer crimes, and a fourth went on the lam. But does for-profit CAPTCHA solving violate U.S. law? Given the state of the law, one could make a case either way. Given the industry's reputation, serious questions about intended use, and questionable labor practices, that's a significant risk.
Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies.