Parliament&#39;s internal rules applying to non-members Rules established by parliaments to govern their internal discipline usually imply reductions of financial allowances on members, banning them from the parliament's grounds for a set period of time, or even expelling them in some countries and/or parliaments. These sanctions may usually be decided by a presiding officer, a special commitee/commission, or even the whole house. They are rarely appealable, and never (that I know of) before a normal trial jurisdiction (the EU's Court of Human Rights notwithstanding). Can non-members of these assemblies be subject to application of these rules ? There are things I don't include in my question, such as offences made under normal law on parliament grounds or against members of congress/parliament, or even enforced by parliament police. In particular, contempt of Congress (refusing to answer as a witness in a committee) is outside the purview of this question, since it's an offence established by law and adjudicated by a judge. Capitol Police ousting someone from the building at times when the internal rules say the building is closed also wouldn't count, if the person can walk away freely and no prosecution, sentence or fine is engaged. I'm mainly asking about whether a parliament's internal rules can be applied like a law on a non-member, and whether internal organs such as the president of an assembly can apply that rule the same way a judge would apply a law.
Yes The Browne-Fitzpatrick Privilege Case in 1955 resulted in the two being gaoled for 90 days for breaching the privilege of the Australian Parliament. They were, respectively, the owner and editor of the Bankstown Observer and the breach was an article in that paper that alleged that a then sitting MP, Charles Morgan, had been involved in immigration malfeasance as a lawyer prior to being elected. The men were grilled by the Privileges Committee of Parliament during which they were denied legal representation. The Committee determined that they had infringed privilege and the House, on the motion of the Prime Minister Robert Menzies, voted to gaol them. The High Court of Australia refused to hear an appeal as did the UK Privy Council (which was the highest court with Australian jurisdiction at the time). So, for things printed 300km from Parliament, Parliament decided that these men had broken Parliamentary rules and should be imprisoned. There is doubt, both then and now, that this was a political hatchet job. There is also no doubt that what was done was legal then, however, given that the High Court has since discovered an implied right to political communication in the Constitution, it may not be possible today.
Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.
The Rules of Professional Conduct apply only to lawyers and are the foundation for a lawyer to be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred or receive other license related professional discipline. They are neither criminal offenses, nor on their own, a grounds for a civil lawsuit (although they may be relevant to an element of a civil cause of action giving rise to a lawsuit). The Rules of Professional Conduct also prohibit using a non-lawyer as a sock puppet to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. But, the Rules of Professional Conduct themselves are not applicable to pro se parties or even to non-lawyer parties who are acting fully independently of the lawyers they have retained. In some circumstances, a violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(g) could also constitute the crime of extortion, or could constitute duress such that an action taken in the course of litigation or a business deal is not actually legally considered to be voluntary and making it potentially voidable. But this would not always, or necessarily even usually, be the case. Incidentally, Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 is one of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the most state to state substantive variations and it also has multiple differing interpretations even in cases where the language is verbatim identical between states. The appropriate scope of this rule as a matter of policy is one of considerable controversy. And, it isn't unusual for the converse to happen (i.e. for a criminal prosecutor or an attorney regulation system official to force the hand of a civil litigant in the course of negotiations about those charges).
The list is enormous. For example, if subpoenaed to appear in a legal case, you must appear pursuant to the order. If ordered to pay child support, you must pay child support. If you are an executive in a company, you may not act on the basis of non-private information regarding the company. Your comment that &quot;If it's not detailed on this list, you'll probably never be concerned with it, eg, gun registration laws and other situations that don't apply to most residents&quot; applies to a number of things on the list, for example most people are not called for jury duty, probably the majority of people are not subject to property tax requirements. most people do not have to register for the draft. By adding &quot;If X...&quot;, you can make these into universal rules – everybody that meets the filing requirements must file federal income taxes. Non-citizens have a few additional requirements, but they are a drop in the bucket compared to the general case, obey the law which applies to everyone.
Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.
There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process.
This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling.
No, abuse of power is not necessarily criminal Imagine a judge that is “heightist” - they always rule in favor of defendants who are taller than 175cm and always rule against those who are shorter irrespective of the merits of the case. This is clearly an abuse of power. It’s not illegal because “height” is not a category protected from discrimination (AFAIK). However, it is a failure to correctly discharge their legal obligations.