Has &quot;deceiving a machine&quot; been prosecuted/defined in practice? Alaska Statutes - Section 11.46.985 ("Deceiving a machine") states: In a prosecution under this chapter for an offense that requires "deception" as an element, it is not a defense that the defendant deceived or attempted to deceive a machine. For purposes of this section, "machine" includes a vending machine, computer, turnstile, or automated teller machine. Has anybody been prosecuted (and especially, convicted) for a crime under that chapter for an offense requiring "deception" where the "deception" was of a machine?
The reason this section exists is pretty well stated in an English case: Holmes v. Governor of Brixton Prison and Another. In paragraph 12, they discuss the law of theft in England, and note that under the law there as it stood in 2004 (and reaching back to principles of common law, which are often but not always shared with the US), deception required causing someone to believe something. A machine has no mind, cannot think, and can't be made to believe anything -- it sees an input and mechanically performs some response in response to that input. For instance, suppose you were to discover someone's bank account number and printed a check of your own that had that number on it. You then make that check up to look like it's a check from the someone else to you, and deposit it to an ATM; you then withdraw however much is available immediately. In all likelihood, no human will see that check until the victim looks into why they're significantly poorer than they remembered, so no human was deceived. The only things that were possibly deceived were the computers involved in the check-clearing process. But they don't have a mind: as far as they're concerned, they see pixels, pass them through an algorithm, and then send a message to another computer at the bank with certain information (which a human recognizes as an image of a check and an amount of money, but an ATM doesn't know what it means for something to be an image of a check). The machine then mechanically pushes bills out a slot. They don't think the check's real, don't think it's fake, and don't think it's a check: they're just piles of semiconductors and wires acting in accordance with the laws of physics. If you gave a check like this to a check-cashing place, it's clearly theft by deception: you make the human there (falsely) think you have a legitimate check, and they then pay you money based on it. But these days, a lot of this stuff is automated. Alaska's legislature didn't want you to get out of theft by deception charged because something was automated. So, they said that a machine could be deceived. This isn't a crime by itself; you can't be charged with deceiving a machine. You are charged with an offense under the chapter that involves deception. What 11.46.985 does is say you can't argue "this wasn't deception because only the machine was deceived."
What misrepresentation? Alice said she buried the money there. That the money is not there now is not evidence that she didn’t. it’s evidence that something happened to it between then and now. However, let’s not let the flawed example obscure the question. Let’s pretend instead that Alice said the money was there now. Misrepresentation Pre-contractural false statements of fact by one party that induce the other to enter the contract give a cause of action in contract law; they are not a tort. There are torts that are similar like deceit and negligent misstatement. The link provided is talking about fraud - the criminal equivalent of deceit (and the word fraud is often used when technically it’s talking about the tort of deceit). The out-of-pocket rule applies to torts so Bob can recover his losses. Personal time invested is not an out-of-pocket loss as it represents an opportunity cost, so, Bob cannot recover what he or his excavator might have earned instead. He can recover his fuel costs and depreciation on the excavator as those are “real” out of pocket expenses. If Bob had been an employee of a plaintiff company, they could recover his wages but not what they might have sold his time for. That’s just how it is with torts. Misrepresentation is a different beast. It’s a contractural claim so the damages are the “benefit of the bargain”, in this case $500. However, this is only available if the misrepresentation was fraudulent (Alice knew the money wasn’t there), Alice had no reasonable grounds for believing the statement to be true, or at the court’s discretion. Further Bob must prove that it was this statement that caused him to enter the contract and that he would not have entered it otherwise. Alice’s statement may give Bob more than one cause of action and it’s up to him which he chooses to pursue. If he spent less than $500 on fuel he stands to get more with a misrepresentation claim but if his out of pockets are more than $500 he’s better off with a negligent misstatement claim. In either case, these are tough causes to prove.
Because that's the law since 1935! StGG§ 265a (eng) declares, that it is a criminal offense to take transportation without a ticket and not wanting to pay. (1) Wer die [...] die Beförderung durch ein Verkehrsmittel [...] in der Absicht erschleicht, das Entgelt nicht zu entrichten, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu einem Jahr oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft, wenn die Tat nicht in anderen Vorschriften mit schwererer Strafe bedroht ist. (1) Whoever [...] uses a means of transportation [...] with the intention of not paying the fee therefor incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine, unless the offence is subject to a more severe penalty under other provisions. But how come transportation fares are in the same paragraph as tricking a vending machine into selling you an item or phones to call without paying the full or any fee? In this case, it's history: §265a was first enacted in 1935, targeting mainly public telephones and vending machines, because those could be tricked by modifying 2 pfennig coins to have the diameter of 10 pfennig coins. The wording was quickly broadened to encompass any machinery controlling entry, but not all sorts of transportation (e.g. a taxi). But where did this come from? Well, the need for the law came from a problem the lawmakers and justice system faced: Because no human was tricked into letting people use the machine for less than the price or nothing at all, it wasn't fraud, because fraud was defined to interacting with a human in such a way. So there had to be a separate offence that targeted tricking machinery. When enacted, Tickets and ticket vending machines were in the scope of the paragraph from day one, as ticket sales or access to the train in many places was handled by automatic machines already or you could buy pre-paid ticket booklets/strips which would then be stamped and devalued in the transportation or at the station. In 1953, the scope was broadened to any use of the telecommunication infrastructure without pay, as the upcoming lack of telephone company employees creating a physical connection would mean it wouldn't be fraud anymore, so they used the same reasoning. Finally, in 1997 the telephone network was renamed communication network, also encompassing the internet and cellphones. One year or fines The punishment is one year or fine. In Germany, that is a fine of up to 365 day-values, which then are determined by the wealth and income of the convicted person. If you can't pay or want to pay, you can instead go to prison, each day serving also reducing your fine. That is called Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe. Only in exceptional cases like a massive repeat offender, the sentence would be only jailtime and no fine instead. Also note that all transport is companies and not conducted by the state (even if the DB is state-owned), and as such it is an Antragsdelikt - the damaged private party has to convince the state attorney that going to court is worth their time. However, it is much better for the transportation company to instead leverage the Terms of Transportation and gain the increased fare - usually at minimum 60 € or multiple transport price, whichever is higher.
The accusation would be the crime of securities fraud ("insider trading" is legally meaningless), under 15 USC 78j(b). There is a bit more elaboration in 17 CFR 240.10b5-1. That law prohibits using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in" in connection with a securities transaction. Under 15 USC 78ff, violation of the law can result in a fine of up to $5 million and 20 years, thus it is a crime. As a crime, the standard of proof required is must higher than it in for a civil forfeiture (which can be as low as "reasonable suspicion"). In the US, and pursuant to the Due Process clause, that requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that is (from in re Winship), "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged". The statute itself does not state the elements that must be proven to secure a conviction, but they can be discerned based on jury instructions (which are circuit-specific). The 9th Circuit instruction is here. You can see that there are 4 specific allegations that have to be chosen between, and the prosecutor has to have at least alleged one of those prohibited acts (so that the jury can decide if the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did that thing). The evidence you have presented could constitute "reasonable suspicion", but not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". If we had a different standard of proof in criminal trials, where it was sufficient to just suspect based on a small bit of evidence that a person may have done something prohibited, then the conclusion could be different. Or, if you had stronger evidence surrounding the sale, your argument might carry a bit more weight. In other words, criminal prosecution is based on quite a lot of specific and objective evidence about what happened. An example of the kind of evidence and allegations required to get the ball rolling can be seen here; for "insider trading" specifically, look here (this case is based on an FBI investigation, where an agent will presumably testify to hearing the defendant state a plan to violate the law).
Defendant's girlfriend should produce the copies of the recording to police, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. Possession of the recording should induce the police and prosecution to at least re-evaluate the charges against Defendant, as Defendant would be able to subpoena the gun's owner to testify about the purchase and then use the recording to impeach him if he then denies owning the gun. It is unclear, though, whether the audio actually has any value because we don't know what charges Defendant is facing. If he's charged with unlawfully owning a gun, the recording would likely be quite helpful; if he's charged with unlawfully transporting a weapon, the recording's value would probably depend on whether the law in question outlaws &quot;knowingly&quot; transporting a weapon or &quot;negligently&quot; transporting a weapon, or transporting a weapon regardless of whether he knew about it.
An example is that a person eventually convicted of a crime has made a false statement in pleading &quot;not guilty&quot;. 1001a would compel confessions, because you cannot legally conceal a material fact. In a judicial proceeding, the analog that prevents certain kinds of &quot;lying&quot; is the law against perjury, which is much stricter than the broad language of 1001.
No. Oregon does not recognize this as within the scope of its self-defense law justification, except insofar as its owner is allowed to use non-deadly force to protect property. But, a sentient AI is also not a proper party to a criminal case and can't commit a crime.
This could be a violation of 18 USC 1030 (and a crime). A number of things go into requirements for conviction under this law. First, it has to be a computer, which is defined as an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar device Any printer that I have encountered in the past 40 years counts as &quot;a computer&quot;. Second, (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—...(C) information from any protected computer; It is highly likely that the person printing has to receive some information from the printer, and respond accordingly so you have your &quot;obtains information&quot; element. Maybe not useful information, but information nevertheless. It also has to be a protected computer, (B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States Well, a computer connected to the internet is a protected computer, see US v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918. Also, the access must be &quot;without authorization or exceeds authorized access&quot;. The law doesn't explain with &quot;without authorization&quot; means, but the latter is defined as to access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter If the law were stated in terms of &quot;prohibited access&quot;, meaning &quot;express denial of permission&quot;, and if the computer owner had set the computer to &quot;prohibited access&quot; by default (password protected), there would be no issue -- accessing the computer is prohibited. &quot;Unauthorized&quot; can also mean &quot;has not been explicitly authorized&quot;, i.e. lacking any indication one way or the other. Every computer access is initially unauthorized, until authorization is granted; and re-trying a login after mis-typing a user name (and being denied access) is not a violation of this law. There does not appear to be case law that addresses the status of computers just left open to the public, and whether using a computer that is so exposed constitutes &quot;unauthorized access&quot;. Also, it is not clear that the defendant in this case has &quot;obtained information&quot;, since with printing, information flows into the computer. There is also a clause about recklessly causing damage, but I don't see what damage would result (&quot;damage&quot; is defined as &quot;any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information&quot;), and how printing would be &quot;reckless&quot;. It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be deemed to be a crime, though if you experiment, you could be on the cutting edge of new case law.