Delaware County Code Case Verbiage I'm reading about a case going on in Delaware between neighbors. It seems to come down to a particular line in county code law: Code requires a special-use exception for “private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district." There's two conditions: 1) more than four cars, and 2) larger than 900 square feet. One side believes the word 'and' to mean it has to fulfill both conditions, whereas the other believes the exception is intended to apply to both conditions separately. My understanding is that in the English language, the use of and in this sentence structure means it's referring to both things in the totality of the condition. But, in this case, it is also talking about two different ways of measuring the space, namely by occupancy and size. I believe it would be a little tight but four cars within 900 square feet seems reasonable for the most part. Is this a common problem in law? The use of the word and? Is this particular line of county code law open and shut as far as most lawyers see it? EDIT Based on the answers that agree that the verbiage in this case is clear, if one is being taken to court because someone is interpreting the clause differently, why is a lawyer really required? If you have the law on your side, why isn't it as simple as stating that? This seems to be a good example of how someone with wealth (or too much time) can strain someone financially using the courts meant to protect everyone.
As a linguist who reads laws for a hobby, I would say that "and" legally means what it was intended to mean. There are often interpretive statutes which say that "and" can be read as "or" or vice versa, when necessary (as in ORC 1.02 "And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it. Delaware doesn't have that as a rule, but it is a rule employed by courts "as required". One approach to interpretation is to discern intent from surrounding text, so we would look at the whole code. The general context is the rule that "A building or land shall be used only for the following purposes". Following Article XXVII of the code, other uses could be permitted because "§115-32. Special use exceptions may be permitted by the Board of Adjustment and in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVII of this chapter and may include...". That section ends with "C:Other special use exceptions as follows", and includes "Private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district". From the list of things enumerated in §115-32, there is no coherent pattern – some things are in the list of special exceptions, some things are in this list, some not. So the "surrounding text" approach doesn't help in this case. Scrutiny of legislative debate is sometimes invoked, especially at the federal level, but there is negligible chance that there is any such evidence here. The almost-final approach is to spell out the competing interpretations, and see if anything jumps out as ridiculous (because it is assumed that lawmakers do not pass ridiculous laws). The two interpretations are "both must be true", versus "one must be true". Since the general rule is that you can go ahead unless it is restricted, then with the "both" interpretation, you need a special exception permit if you simultaneously plan to have more than 4 automobiles (which means, 5+, so 4 is allowed) and floor area greater than 900 sf. Thus if you plan for only 4 cars, or can fit the 5 cars into 900 sf, then you would not require a permit (on the "both" interpretation). Which btw is the literal interpretation of "and". This is not an absurd scenario (using a generous 10'x18' space, which I derived from parking slot regulations in Danbury CT). So it is reasonable to think they meant "both". The "either of these" interpretation says that they are being even more restrictive – you need permission to have a 5+ car garage (regardless of size), and you need permission to have a garage larger than 800 sf (even if there were only 1 car in it). This seems a bit specific since there isn't generally a size restriction on structures in the code – except that playhouses are limited to 150 sf. and can't be tall enough for an adult to stand up. Since the literal meaning of "and" is "both at once", and since no facts about the code say otherwise (i.e. that interpretation does not result in an absurd nullification of some other provision), an objective court should interpret this rule to mean "both at once", thus the government imposes the fewest restrictions on your property. No way to know what they will do.
It would not work. There is apparently a common misconception in Georgia that this would be the case, based on Article IX, Section II, Paragraph III (b)(1) of the Georgia constitution, which says: No county may exercise any of the powers listed in subparagraph (a) of this Paragraph [including police protection] or provide any service listed therein inside the boundaries of any municipality or any other county except by contract with the municipality or county affected. What many people miss is the clause right before that: "Unless otherwise provided by law." Georgia courts have held that the law does provide otherwise when pursuing someone for a traffic offense: The plaintiff contends that when the collision occurred, the policeman-deputy sheriff had no authority to be pursuing the Mitchell car because he was outside the county in which he had a power of arrest. While ordinarily a peace officer has power of arrest only in the territory of the governmental unit by which he was appointed, there are two exceptions to the rule present in this case. Code Ann. s 92A-509, which deals with arrests for traffic offenses, provides by implication that certain officers (including deputy sheriffs) have arrest powers for these offenses outside their appointed territories. City of Winterville v. Strickland, 127 Ga. App. 716, 718, 194 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1972). What that case decided in 1972, the principle was in place well before the boys began their hijinks. I don't know of any state where the law is different, though the answer would be different if the boys crossed into another state.
The words "an Act" and "a law" are often used loosely to be synonymous in an every day conversation, but "a law" is a broader term. For example, the criminal code is "a law". But, while the original version of the criminal code may have been a single "act", the criminal code has almost certainly been amended by many other acts over the years after its original enactment as a single act. An "act" is a single enacted bill proposed in a single legislative session approved in a single Presidential assent. A law, in contrast, can be the result of multiple acts approved in multiple Presidential assents at different times and then codified into a single statute. Also, the term "a law" can be used correctly to refer to a particular holding of case law that is judicially created and not enacted by the legislature. For example, someone might correctly say, "there is a law that makes it illegal to breach a contract without legal justification", even though that is a case law principle, rather than a legislatively enacted rule. Confusingly, it isn't uncommon for the short title of a statute (i.e. a law) that is the product of multiple acts amending the original one, to be the short title of the original act that has been amended over the years. For example, in the United States, the "1933 Securities Act" which was the short title of the original act giving rise to that statute, is still described by that short title, despite the fact that it has been amended scores of times since then well into the 21st century. (A careful writer would say "the 1933 Securities Act, as amended"). I suspect that this practice is also followed in India, because the American practice of naming statutes in this fashion dates back to English practice that was in place before the American revolution and has continued to be followed since then. This isn't a hard and fast rule, however. Hence, another statute has the short title, "Statute of Frauds", even though it could have been described by the short title of the original act from the reign of Queen Anne. But, in the abstract, "an act" has its more narrow technical meaning. Incidentally, to prevent confusion, "the law" is a term much broader than either "an act" or "a law". The phrase "the law" encompasses not just a particular statute, but all statutes, all regulations that have the force of law, all treaties, the constitution, and all judicially created case law, not just statutes which come into being through the passage of bills as acts by the legislature.
This is customary legal language in some places that doesn't have the negative connotations that it does in everyday life. The part of the pleading you are referring to is commonly called &quot;the Demand&quot;, &quot;the Prayer for Relief&quot;, or the &quot;Wherefore clause&quot; depending upon local custom. In the part of Colorado where I practice, the customary phrase is usually: Wherefore, Plaintiff requests that the Court . . . But this is really just a matter of regional custom. Relatedly, in some jurisdictions to sue for breach of contract you have to ask the breaching party to perform and that request, regardless of the actually language used, is usually called a &quot;demand for performance.&quot;
31 USC 330 enables the Dept. of Treasury to regulate those who are in the practice of representing persons before the Department. This results in Circular 230 which is a part of the Code of Federal Regulations. Part 10.3 specifies various types who are authorized to engage in the practice. The meaning of "practice" is not defined in the federal regs or the US code, so it has its ordinary meaning. To "practice" something is to habitually do something as a profession (not necessarily for money). The situation you describe does not in any reasonable interpretation constitute being a "practice". Moreover, except for talking to an IRS agent on the phone, the actions could not be construed as "representing" (and if I am correct in surmising that this was a simultaneous conversation with 3 people on the line, this wasn't "representing" since representing meaning to "do in someone's place", not "help someone while they do"). This contrasts with the typically stricter rules about "practicing law", which forbid filling out legal forms and so on.
Short Answer Generally, a landlord could validly have a term in a lease requiring the tenants collectively to indemnify the landlord for any fine, penalty, or expense arising from the conduct of the tenants, their licensees or invitees. If there is such a term, your only remedy may be to sue the co-tenant engaged in misconduct for contribution. When Can Landlords Be Indemnified? Usually, a provision indemnifying the landlord against the landlord's own intentional acts, reckless acts, willful and wanton acts, gross negligence, or bad faith is void as against public policy, but a provision indemnifying a landlord for the act of another for which the landlord has only vicarious liability as a landowner, and for strict liability offenses and torts, is usually valid. The municipal fine in question appears to be one for which the landlord has only vicarious liability will not proof that the landlord or even an agent of the landlord who is not an agent of a tenant took that act to impose liability. There is a split of authority over when the tenant may be held responsible for (either by waiving liability or indemnifying the landlord) for merely simple negligence by the landlord or an agent of the landlord who is not an agent of the tenant. Some states allow it. Some do not. Many allow it in some cases (e.g. private party landlords), but not in others (e.g. public entities). A 50 state survey of the law of indemnification in the U.S. with statutory and case law citations can be found here. There is no indication, however, in this OP that the landlord engaged in any conduct that caused the landlord to incur the fine. The conduct was apparently engaged in by one of your fellow tenants. This Is Not A Prohibited Contractual Penalty In general, a private contract may not impose an arbitrary penalty or fine that does not meet the standards necessary to be considered a form of liquidated damages. But, indemnification of a third-party imposed penalty or fine, does not violate the public policy against having such penalties or fines imposed by a private contract. An indemnification provision is a compensatory contractual provision as between the landlord and the tenant, not a fine or penalty created by the contract. Many government imposed penalties or fines, however, do require that the person fined engaged in an intentional act, or reckless act, or willful or wanton act, or grossly negligent act, or engaged in bad faith conduct that cannot be indemnified by a tenant. But that does not appear to be the case in the OP. Collective Responsibility Lease Terms Are Usually Valid More generally, a lease may impose collective responsibility on all co-tenants combined. This is the default rule when all tenants are on a single lease. But it is unlikely that it would violate public policy even if applied to multiple tenants in the same building or complex with separate leases. Partnerships and joint ventures allow joint and several liability, and the circumstances, e.g. units that are part of a single HOA or co-operative apartments, often do so implicitly, so public policy arguments against this kind of much less common arrangement are weak. Anywhere that joint and several liability is permitted, a fortiori, proportionate liability should also be permitted. The Necessity Of A Lease Term For These Remedies Furthermore, none of these obligations can arise unless the lease says that these remedies are available to the landlord. If the lease doesn't create the obligation to indemnify the landlord for trash bagging fines on a joint and several or proportionate basis with tenants on other leases in the same building or complex, then the landlord can't impose this amount upon you. I've interpreted the language below from the OP to mean that; Part of my lease agreement is to cooperate in keeping the communal trash area tidy. But, in the absence of lease language to the contrary specifying a broader remedy, the landlord can only impose liability on you for personally (or through your guests) for failing to do so. Remedies Against Co-Tenants Your remedy, if you are blameless and know who is at fault, would be to seek compensation in the form of contribution from the at fault party in small claims court from an offending co-tenant, or via a cross-claim against a co-defendant if the landlord brought suit to enforce the term against the tenants.
In principle, police are liable for the safety of anyone they detain. If an officer creates a hazardous condition, as was described in this scenario, he or his agency (which effectively means the taxpayers who fund his agency) can be held liable for damages resulting from that action. (Whether it is the officer or instead the taxpayers who get stuck with the bill is a separate question of "qualified immunity.") This idea has been formalized under two theories: The "special relationship doctrine" would apply in this case because the officer was detaining the driver. Otherwise, the liability could be argued under the more broad "state-created danger doctrine."
The sentence has a rather easy-to-spot subject (construction): Disputes [handled by TeamX]. This is the verb construction is can [only] address and it has two objects: only [address] the hours as well as not the quality. The only clearly belongs to the first object, but makes no grammatical sense with the second. The sentence would be arguably less ambiguous if there was a but after the comma for [but] not the quality. As such, the sentence is easy: TeamX can only handle (address) disputes regarding the length of work (hours). But TeamX can not handle disputes about the quality of work.