What does &quot;majority at&quot; mean in ruling documents Example document: https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/886946.pdf p. 13: Instead of following Cox, 14 the majority relies on City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S. Ct. 2502, 96 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1987) to support the notion that "obstruction statutes may not be used to limit citizens' right to express verbal criticism, even abusive criticism, at police officers." Majority at 12. What does "Majority at 12" mean? A footnote on page 16 says "Majority at 12 n.9.". What does the "n.9" mean?
A majority of the justices support the first opinion, written by Johnson, so Madsen (writing a separate concurring opinion) is referring to the previous opinion. "at 12" means "on p. 12" (special law talk), so at the top of p. 12 you see the quoted text. "n. 9" means "footnote number 9" (which is on p. 12).
While &quot;clause&quot; has a specific definition in linguistics, that is not how it is used in laws and legal documents. These terms have no standard definition for legal writing. Documents or legal codes that use both generally use &quot;article&quot; to mean a larger division than &quot;clause&quot; does. In discussion of the US Federal Constitution, for example, the largest divisions are called &quot;articles&quot;, each of which is divided into several &quot;sections&quot;, and each section generally contains several &quot;clauses&quot;. Some of these are actually grammatical clauses, being part of a sentence with a verb and a subject, while others might be called paragraphs in ordinary prose. A given document or legal code should ideally define which terms it will use for its parts, and which contain which others. This can be done in whatever way the drafters wish, but it is desirable that it be clear. In addition to the terms you have mentioned, terms often used include &quot;subsection&quot;, &quot;subsubsection&quot;, &quot;title&quot;, &quot;paragraph&quot;, &quot;subparagraph&quot;, &quot;chapter&quot;, &quot;part&quot; and &quot;division&quot;. These are not used consistently, and I have never seen a single document or code that uses all of them. The Us law code is divided into titles, each of which contains sections. In some of these sets of related sections are grouped into chapters. Sections may have subsections or paragraphs. In my experience smaller contracts or business documents rarely use &quot;articles&quot; and some just use &quot;section&quot; for any named or numbered part of the document. Usually titles or section headers are explicitly stated to have no legal effect, and the division into sections or other parts is simply to facilitate reference, and does not have legal significance. Whether a provision is called an article, a section, or a clause will not normally change its legal effect. However, where one part of a document refers to another part, such as &quot;as specified in section 23&quot; then the reference will be found in and only in the designated part, and will not be looked for in some other part.
Legally, nothing Grammatically they mean what parenthesis always mean, that the parenthesised words are less important i.e. parenthetical. Organisationally they serve to group legislation together. This is particularly common in regulations and other subordinate legislation where the tradition is that the regulation takes the name of the Act it is created under. Where there is more than one, the specific function of the regulation is put in parentheses. For heavily legislated areas, like Housing, some parliaments do the same thing for Acts.
It says They shall not confer the right [[to attend any meeting of members] and [to exercise one vote for every share held]]. The elements joined by a conjunction such as "and" should be grammatically parallel. Since the part after the conjunction is an infinitive verb phrase, the thing to which is it joined by the conjunction should also be an infinitive verb phrase. However, it is normal in English to use "or" when joining elements in a negative statement. For example, if it is forbidden to sing and it is forbidden to dance, one could post a sign saying "no singing or dancing." If the sign said "no singing and dancing" it could be interpreted as a prohibition only on doing both at once. So the sentence should read They shall not confer the right to attend any meeting of members or to exercise one vote for every share held. Perhaps less ambiguous: They shall not confer the right to attend any meeting of members or the right to exercise one vote for every share held. But the drafting error is unlikely to change the meaning of the text, since it is fairly easy to identify it as a drafting error.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are about civil and criminal court proceedings. They do not apply to a university's internal disciplinary procedures, which are the subject of the Dear Colleague letter. Note for example the text of the Fifth Amendment: ... or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A university's disciplinary procedures do not deprive anyone of their life, liberty, or property. Typically, they only decide whether to suspend or expel the person as a student at the university, or apply other academic punishments (failing grades, marks on transcript, etc). I don't think there needs to be any law "affirming" this. Rather, there is simply no law that requires universities to use Fifth / Sixth amendment standards in their internal disciplinary procedures.
You are referring to 32 CFR 47.4. The only reasonable interpretation of that list is that one must meet all of the 5 requirements. The alternative interpretation would make any group that "[has not] already received benefits from the Federal Government for the service in question" eligible to apply. Since this is a regulation, the interpretation of the agency that wrote the regulations is given great deference. An agency's interpretation of the regulations it writes itself is controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation". (Auer v. Robbins 1997) Regarding whether there is ambiguity at all, read King v. Burwell for several restatements of the principle that one must read words in context before deciding they are ambiguous: A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law. They refer to the "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme".
How to refer to Supreme Court cases by just one name In general, subsequent references to a decision can be the first name in the caption of that case. As an example, you will notice that in the decision Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484 (2019) the court makes an initial reference to Gill v. Whitford (at 2492), and thereafter most of the references to that decision are simply Gill (see, for instance, at 2498, 2501, 2507). Nate Elredge makes a good point in that there are exceptions. Where the general rule may result ambiguous, another main party in the caption would be mentioned. Using Nate's example of United States v. Nixon, the court's subsequent references to that case in Calley v. Callaway, 382 F.Supp. 650 (1974) is Nixon. There might be other, harder to find, instances where ambiguity persists. For instance, several unrelated decisions issued by the same court might involve the exact same parties. In those scenarios only the suffix (that is, the numbers following the caption) would distinguish among decisions.
The core principle of stare decisis is that the law should not depend on what judge you got; two cases with the same facts should have the same outcome. In the common-law tradition, there weren't really written statutes; there was only "what's been done in the past," and so the only reference you'd have to what the law should be in some situation is past court decisions. If judges didn't have some constraints to rule similarly to before, there really wouldn't be any legal standards (because there was no written law to go back to; in civil-law countries, there always has been a written law, so precedent isn't so important). Stare decisis doesn't actually directly stop a judge from entering a decision that goes against binding precedent. However, judges are expected to obey precedent, and for the most part do what they're supposed to do. If they don't, the case will likely be reversed on appeal. Binding precedent only applies within the area a court serves; a court doesn't have to listen to precedent from a different court that has nothing to do with the case. The rule is that precedent from any court up the appeals chain is binding; federal district courts are bound by their circuit court and SCOTUS, state courts are bound by higher state courts and SCOTUS (but not other federal courts, as the case can't be appealed to them). A court can sometimes overrule its own precedent, but the cases where it can do that are rare (and so applying a higher court's precedent can also be viewed as "if you appeal to them they'll say X, so we're saying X.")