Can errors in a Judge&#39;s decree allow the appealing party to appeal after the appeal time has elapsed? In Iowa, can errors in a decree by a district Judge allow the appealing party to appeal past the normal appeal period? Without revealing the specific codes referenced in the Iowa Code library, the Judge made several crime code errors in the decree. I'm not an attorney, but even I'm able to tell which codes he was referring to in his ruling (even after the errors). Can the other party appeal the decision after the appeal period has elapsed due to an error like this by the Judge?
No. Generally speaking, the deadline to appeal a decision is jurisdictional. The exact details of the rules differ depending upon the jurisdiction in which the case was conducted. Colorado's rules are not precisely the same as California's, the federal rules are different again, and the rules are slightly different in civil, criminal, and other kinds of cases (mostly administrative law cases). Sometimes, failure to meet a deadline to appeal can be excused for &quot;excusable neglect&quot;, which is a very high standard. Generally, excusable neglect must involve circumstances that made an appeal (or a timely request for an extension of time to appeal) impossible and were beyond any reasonable ability of the party seeking to appeal the decision to control. For example, if a natural disaster shut down the courts in the week leading up to the deadline, or if the attorney for the party seeking to appeal died shortly before the deadline, this could constitute excusable neglect. There is often a limit on the duration of the extension that is available even then (e.g. 30 days). In the case of a judgment that is not appealed, it is still possible to bring a post-judgment motion to set aside the final judgment in the case in the trial court that entered the judgment (in the federal rules of civil procedure this is codified at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 in civil cases and in a parallel provision of the rules of criminal procedure that was historically denominated as a habeas corpus petition) for grounds such as correction of a clerical error or newly discovered evidence. There is a time limit on most grounds for this relief set forth in these rules, although some grounds, such as a claim that the court lacked of jurisdiction over the case, can be raised at any time. Errors regarding legal conclusions made by a judge that are manifestly apparent on the face of the decree issued by the judge almost never fall within the exceptions for which a motion to set aside a judgment after it is final and the appeal deadline has lapsed (or an independent legal action to do so) is available. Exceptions might apply if the judge in a criminal case in Iowa failed to advise the defendant of the defendant's right to appeal. See Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure § 2.23(3)(e). Also, illegal criminal sentences and clerical errors in a judgment in a criminal case may be corrected at any time. See Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure §§ 2.23(3)(g) and 2.24(5)(a).
You file an appeal. In federal courts, the procedure is governed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the process begins with filing a notice of appeal under Rule 4. The process is fairly similar in all the state courts, as far as I know. If you've identified a problem with a ruling other than the final decision of your case, you could also file a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. You would typically not use this procedure to contest the court's final judgment, as it would likely take so long to decide that your opportunity to appeal would be expired.
While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.
Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
No. A federal court may not vacate the conviction which the state court declined to vacate under these circumstances. On March 22, 2009, a jury found Luis Villavicencio‐Serna guilty of first‐degree murder of Armando Huerta Jr. Scant physical evidence linked him to the charge. The conviction instead was largely based on testimony from three of his friends, all of whom later recanted. Villavicencio‐Serna exhausted his state‐court appeals and then sought a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Throughout these proceedings, he consistently has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. He emphasizes the lack of physical evidence connecting him to the murder, and he suggests that several factors - inconsistencies between the testimonies of his three friends, their subsequent recantations, and the interrogation tactics used by the police—reveal that the police pressured his friends to implicate him. Finally, he offers an alternative theory that links another group to the murder. In the face of these arguments, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld his conviction. The [federal] district court, applying the double‐layered deference required by section 2254(d), concluded that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable, and so it refused to issue the writ. See Villavicencio‐Serna v. Melvin, No. 17 C 5442, 2019 WL 2548688 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2019). Although we sympathize with the district court’s observation that “the lack of any physical evidence in this case is troubling,” we too conclude that Villavicencio‐Serna has not shown enough to entitle him to issuance of the writ. We therefore affirm.
united-states This answer is based upon general principles of criminal procedure in the United States which are quite similar in most states, although not necessarily exactly identical. The answer is likely to be different in other jurisdictions. If inadmissible evidence is offered by the prosecution and admitted at trial, this is a ground upon which the defense can move for a mistrial (which due to double jeopardy amounts to an acquittal), or upon which the defendant can appeal the conviction of the jury, if convicted. Acquittals of a defendant at trial cannot be appealed by the prosecution. But, to appeal, the error in admitting inadmissible evidence must be contemporaneously objected to by the defendant's lawyer (or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel), or the admission of the evidence must be &quot;plain error&quot; (which is very rarely met on evidentiary issues). If the defendant's lawyer doesn't promptly say &quot;I object&quot; that ground for contesting a conviction is usually lost. Even then, the standard of review on appeal is whether the judge abused the judge's discretion in admitting the evidence, not whether the appellate court would have ruled the same way if presented with that evidentiary question. Also, even if there is an error, a conviction on a particular count will not be overruled if the error was &quot;harmless&quot;, which is to say that there is a reasonable possibility that admitting the inadmissible evidence caused the defendant to be convicted of that count. Often, if the evidence is overwhelming, or the inadmissible evidence wasn't that prejudicial, a conviction will be affirmed notwithstanding the admission of inadmissible evidence. Sometimes harmless error is evaluated considering all of the errors at trial as a whole, rather than individually, in addition to all of the other evidence admitted at trial. If an evidence issue can be foreseen and is central to the case (e.g. suppression of evidence of possession of drugs in a drug possession case), the issue of the admissibility of the evidence will often be resolved in a pre-trial hearing and subject to appeal then, prior to trial, rather than being resolved in the trial itself where the prosecution has no right to appeal, and the defendant risks conviction if the ruling goes against the defendant. If the conviction is overturned on appeal, the usual remedy is to remand the case to the same judge to conduct a new trial with a new jury, in a manner consistent with the appellate court's rulings.
I don't wish to gainsay or contradict a &quot;professional adviser&quot;, especially as I have no idea on what information they based their suggestion. All I can do is direct the OP to the relevant extracts from the section headed &quot;II ACCELERATED POSSESSION CLAIMS OF PROPERTY LET ON AN ASSURED SHORTHOLD TENANCY&quot; in the Civil Procedure Rules, especially my emboldened text at the end of Rule 55.15. Rule 55.14 (1) A defendant who wishes to – (a) oppose the claim; or (b) seek a postponement of possession in accordance with rule 55.18, must file his defence within 14 days after service of the claim form. (2) The defence should be in the form set out in Practice Direction 55A. Rule 55.15 (1) On receipt of the defence the court will – (a) send a copy to the claimant; and (b) refer the claim and defence to a judge. (2) Where the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence – (a) the claimant may file a written request for an order for possession; and (b) the court will refer that request to a judge. (3) Where the defence is received after the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired but before a request is filed in accordance with paragraph (2), paragraph (1) will still apply. (4) Where – (a) the period set out in rule 55.14 has expired without the defendant filing a defence; and (b) the claimant has not made a request for an order for possession under paragraph (2) within 3 months after the expiry of the period set out in rule 55.14, the claim will be stayed.
Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.