&quot;Geographical limitation&quot; in the 1951 Refugee Convention? DW mentions that: Since the start of the war in Syria five years ago, more than 4.5 million Syrians have spilled over the border into neighboring Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan. None of the latter three countries has ratified the 1951 Convention, meaning they technically have no obligation to recognize the displaced individuals as refugees. While Turkey has ratified the Convention, it maintains a "geographical limitation," which means it still only recognizes refugees from Europe. The "geographical limitation" seems pretty loophole-ish to me. Can someone shed light on the details of how it's possible, e.g. what article in the Convention is invoked etc.? Are there other countries using this "geographical limitation" trick?
The 1951 Convention was limited in both space and time. Its definition of a refugee (found in Article I(A)) was someone who was protected under pre-1951 treaties or someone who [a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. In Article I(B), it gave states joining the Convention the option to interpret "events occurring before 1 January 1951" as referring to events occurring in Europe or to events occurring anywhere in the world. Countries that picked Europe could later expand their definition to cover the whole world, but not vice-versa. Turkey declared that it interpreted the Convention to mean the former. The 1967 Protocol removed the temporal limits on the definition (Article I(2)). It also removed the geographic limitation for newly acceding states, but states that had already declared that they would limit the 1951 Convention to European refugees were allowed to keep that geographic limitation (Article I(3)).
Anyone can claim asylum Whether that person qualifies as a refugee depends on the law in the country where they make the claim which usually involves an administrative decision making process. If a country is a signatory to the UN convention on refugees then local law will reflect that in some way. This outlines the process in australia. Under the convention a refugee is a person who: ... owing to well‐founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it ... Being a citizen or a resident of a state with an authoritarian government does not, of itself, make one a refugee. The individual must have a “well‐founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Most citizens of most authoritarian countries are not persecuted or at risk of persecution. They also must be outside their home country. You can always emigrate The UK has no general restrictions on people leaving the country in search of more freedom. However, you need to choose carefully. At last count the UK is less authoritarian than 151 of the 167 countries in the world. If you are going to emigrate there are 15 places you could go that are better. Fortunately, 4 of them have English as a primary language and, not coincidentally, a system of government in the UK model.
International Humanitarian Law applies to all armed conflicts The Geneva Conventions are a part of the overarching body of this law. It applies to all armed conflicts, not just declared wars. An armed invasion by R of U is a conflict to which IHL applies irrespective of if it is a declared war or not. BTW, declared wars outside Africa and South America are virtually unknown since WWII
The answer to your question, strictly in terms of whether they have the capacity to authorize states to violate international humanitarian law is yes. However, it is highly unlikely. It takes only one permanent member to veto such a resolution. Moreover, UN Charter Article 24(2) states that: ... the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations ... and International Humanitarian Law would certainly be considered a principle of the United Nations. So, are they capable of passing a resolution in violation of International Humanitarian Law? Sure. Is it likely to happen? Almost certainly not. Having said that, if this happened, it would be a novel area of law, and while currently, international law suggests it would be binding and legal, it is possible that sanctions could be imposed if such a resolution were passed by the Security Council.
The short answer is, in absence of a treaty or convention governing travel, then the law of the country over which the plane is located governs for the time the plane is in overflight. Laws of a jurisdiction (a country, or a state) are generally taken to extend upward from their boundaries (and downward for the control of mineral rights, etc.). There are a number of jurisdictional cases where service of process (presenting a defendant with a copy of citation starting a civil suit) or an arrest has taken place on-board aircraft where the action had to take place over a given country or state to invoke jurisdiction. As mentioned in the first sentence, there is nothing to prevent countries for entering into a Treaty or agreement that would alter the basic scheme, but absent a treaty or convention, the basic scheme of boundary extension would apply.
Many countries have such restrictions on land ownership. Vietnam does not allow foreigners to own land, likewise Laos, Cambodia (part of their constitution), and Myanmar. Thailand has numerous restrictions on foreigners owning land. Tanzania allows limited land ownership by foreigners (investment purposes only), though technically only the President owns land. Kenya does not allow foreign land ownership, just long-term leasing. Mexico has a no-foreigners zone of 100 km at its borders and the sea, and there is a similar restriction in Honduras. Australia requires government permission for foreigners to buy land. Greece imposes bureaucratic barriers on EU-relative citizenship for land owning. Sri Lanka imposes a 100% title-transfer tax on foreigners. There are enough examples that it might be the usual situation, though less common in Western countries.
The case that you mentioned isn't an example of what you're talking about. One thing that immediately comes to mind is the Shamima Begum case. She fled her London home to join the Islamic state but now she wants to come back to the UK (after realizing), but UK's Home Office revoked her citizenship, claiming that she could claim Bangladesh citizenship by descent even though she isn't a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. No, they are claiming that Shamima Begum is a citizen of Bangladesh at the time of revocation. According to section 5 of Bangladesh's Citizenship Act 1951, a child born abroad to a Bangladeshi citizen father is automatically (&quot;shall be&quot;) a Bangladeshi citizen by descent at birth. (Mothers were allowed to pass on citizenship after 2009, but that was after Begum was born.) Note that registration at a Bangladeshi consulate within 1 year of birth is only necessary in the case where the father is a Bangladeshi citizen by descent. I believe Begum's father was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise by descent, in which case no registration or other action is necessary for her to be a Bangladeshi citizen at birth. It doesn't matter that she has never been to Bangladesh nor does it matter that she never claimed to be a Bangladeshi citizen. There were two men of Bangladeshi descent in a separate case who successfully fought their revocation of British citizenship, but the difference between their cases and Begum's case was that they were over 21, which she was under 21 at the time of revocation. Section 14 of Bangladeshi's Citizenship Act provides that someone with dual citizenship automatically loses Bangladeshi citizenship if they don't renounce their other citizenship, but this provision doesn't apply to those under 21. So these two men had Bangladeshi citizenship too, while they were under 21, but they lost it when they turned 21, before their supposed revocation of British citizenship, whereas for Begum, she hadn't lost Bangladeshi citizenship at the time of the revocation of her British citizenship, because she hadn't turned 21. (Perhaps you got the idea of &quot;claiming&quot; of citizenship from some report that one can &quot;claim&quot; Bangladeshi citizenship by descent while under 21, and these men failed to claim it, but Begum can still &quot;claim&quot; it. But if you read the text of the law, that is clearly not the case. For a child born to a father who was a Bangladeshi citizen otherwise than by descent, there is no &quot;claim&quot; of citizenship -- it is automatic and involuntary at birth.) As to your question, there are no universal restrictions to how a country can grant or take away citizenship. There is the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, which countries may voluntarily join, but only a minority of countries of the world are party to the convention. Article 8 of the Convention does prohibit countries that are party to the Convention from depriving someone's citizenship if it would &quot;render him stateless&quot;, though there are several exceptions including if the citizenship was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The language seems to require that the person already have another citizenship, not just have the ability to acquire one, though I am not sure how much leeway countries have to interpret this. In the case of the UK, it is a party to the Convention, and it has largely implemented the provisions of the Convention in its domestic law. With respect to deprivation of citizenship, section 40 subsection (4) of the British Nationality Act 1981 prohibits a deprivation order if the Secretary &quot;is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless.&quot; (Subsection (4A) has a looser restriction where British citizens by naturalization can be deprived of citizenship if the Secretary believes that the person is able to become the national of another country. I am not sure whether this is compatible with the Convention. In any case, this is not relevant to Begum's case as she was not a British citizen by naturalization.) So if the UK were to try to deprive citizenship of a British citizen otherwise than by naturalization like Begum, not on the basis that the person already has another citizenship but on the basis that they are &quot;eligible&quot; to &quot;claim&quot; one (which as I described above I do not believe is the case for Begum; I am talking hypothetically if such a case were to arise), that can already be challenged as a violation of British law, in British courts, without considering the UK's obligations under the Convention. If it's another country that's a party to the Convention, but their law expressly allows deprivation of citizenship for being &quot;eligible&quot; to acquire another citizenship even though the person doesn't have one (including, perhaps, British citizens by naturalization deprived citizenship under section 40(4A)), and a person in that situation is deprived of citizenship, they don't really have any recourse. A private party cannot &quot;sue&quot; a country over any violations of the Convention in an international court.
Yes, for most of them. Article 42.7 TEU If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. The &quot;specific character&quot; for &quot;certain Member States&quot; refers to states with a traditional military neutrality, notably Austria, Ireland, and Sweden. Those EU states which are also NATO members would not have that excuse since they agreed, in principle, to use military force to protect others, so they cannot say they are constitutionally incapable of doing so in the EU case. This is why the EU does not, generally, admit members with open territorial conflicts. Probably no, for the rest of NATO Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. This is in a way weaker than the EU clause, &quot;such action as it deems necessary&quot; might allow individual countries to do less than going to war if that is unnecessary. Also, NATO-but-not-EU countries might claim that a Russian attack on EU forces in an EU-but-not-NATO country does not constitute an attack in the treaty area: Article 6 For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, [...] How to interpret a Russian counter-counter-attack on NATO countries after those counter-attack Russia in accordance with collective defense after a Russian attack on a non-NATO country would become a political issue. As pointed out in the comments, the practical application of either TEU 42.7 or NATO Article 5 would be intensely political, not just in the &quot;indirect&quot; case but also where it seems to be clear-cut. Nations might rally to the flag or drag their feet, depending on the details. Or even depending on totally unrelated issues where they want to get concessions. Or they might alert their forces and deploy them on different flanks than the one under attack, because that flank feels exposed.