What statutes constrain an insurance provider&#39;s treatment of suicide? Many insurance companies have explicit suicide clauses: exclusions that allow the company to deny benefits to the policy holder's estate. Essentially, suicide voids the benefits policy. What statutes (if any) govern an insurance company's actions in this arena? That is, do any statutes prohibit a company from denying benefits? Note: If you've been contemplating things, the people at the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline are great. They speak Spanish and English, and their number is 1-800-273-8255.
As no jurisdiction was given, the law in Australia is the Life Insurance Act 1995. Section 228 says; A life company may only avoid a life policy on the ground that the person whose life is insured by the policy committed suicide if the policy expressly excludes liability in case of suicide. This 2011 parliamentary report says: For a death to be classified as a suicide in Australia, it must be: … established by coronial enquiry that the death resulted from a deliberate act of the deceased with the intention of ending his or her own life (intentional self-harm). In practice, life insurance policies have an exclusion period for suicide when the policy is taken out where it is not covered; after that it is.
The liability shield is the big one, and it can't be achieved with a contract. Just because the contract says you're not liable, that doesn't make it true. If I sign a contract with my friend that says "Nate Eldredge is hereby the King of France", that won't make me the king, nor will it force anyone except maybe my friend to acknowledge me as the king. By its nature, a contract can only bind the parties to the contract, and has no effect on the rights of anyone else. Suppose, then, that Alice and Bob agree to start a pizza delivery business, using a contract like you suggest. Their delivery car crashes, injuring Carol, a bystander, who incurs medical bills that exceed the assets of the business. Carol decides to sue Alice and Bob personally. Sure, Alice and Bob have a contract, and maybe it prevents them from suing each other, but it certainly doesn't prevent Carol from suing them; Carol never signed it. So Carol can still go after Alice and Bob's personal assets. Thus contract law cannot give them a liability shield. However, the government can, since it makes the laws about who can sue whom under what circumstances. And it has made laws saying that Alice and Bob can be protected from such suits, but only if they form a company according to the process that the law sets forth. So that's what they have to do.
CNBC's explanation is simply wrong. The law says that a vaccine manufacturer is immune from suit and liability under Federal and State law with respect to all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure if a declaration under subsection (b) has been issued and there was a declaration under subsection (b). This immunity is not conditioned either way by being approved, indeed the declaration states To be a Covered Countermeasure, qualified pandemic or epidemic products or security countermeasures also must be approved or cleared under the FD&amp;C Act; licensed under the PHS Act; or authorized for emergency use under Sections 564, 564A, or 564B of the FD&amp;C Act The liability immunity is not perpetual, the declaration says: Liability immunity for Covered Countermeasures administered and used in accordance with the public health and medical response of the Authority Having Jurisdiction begins with a Declaration and lasts through (1) the final day the emergency Declaration is in effect, or (2) October 1, 2024, whichever occurs first. That doesn't mean that there can't be another declaration in the future. Immunity of a manufacturer to liability is not related to a patient being &quot;covered&quot;. There are other ways in which a patient could be &quot;covered&quot;. One of them is the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program and the other is the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which presently redirects you to CICP.
In Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons &amp; Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260 defendants were found liable for &quot;grossly negligent and reckless release of prisoner Mitchell Thomas Blazak&quot; resulting in death. That case led to a significant holding, we now abolish the absolute immunity previously granted to public officials in their discretionary functions In Tarter v. NY, 113 A.D.2d 587, liability was found for release of a convict who then injured a person: the board negligently failed to follow statutory criteria and the board's own guidelines, not acting &quot;in accordance with law&quot;. With respect to the decision by the parole board to release a prisoner, the statute directs that certain factors and criteria be considered, mandates that the parole board follow guidelines established for that purpose, and provides that any determination is deemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law The key here is that states may have laws governing the release of prisoners, so parole is not a purely discretionary act, there may be statutory limits.
Since this apparently amends the law giving colleges and universities the power to adopt and enforced various regulations, what it really means is that if such an institution adopts a rule in violation of this law, it may not legally enforce that law. It might also give an affected student a right to sue if such a rule is adopted and enforced. As a comment by ohwilleke mentions, such a law might well authorize a court to issue an injunction forbidding the institution from enforcing the kind of rule prohibited by the law. Note that it is not at all uncommon to have &quot;or else&quot; provisions in different sections of the law. For example Section 123 of the (hypothetical) New France state code might prohibit having a faked driver's license, section 124 prohibit obtaining a license through false or misleading statements on nthe application, and section 458 say &quot;anyone who violates sections 123, 124, 125, or 126 shall be fined up to $2,000, or imprisoned for up to 1 year, or both, as a court may think just&quot;. Thus it is not always easy to find what penalties, if any, apply to a code section.
It means exactly what it says: one of the parties (call them A) to the case purchased a life insurance policy that would pay £300,000 (presumably to A) if the judge were to die. Why they did this, we can only guess. But if the case was extremely long, there may have been a greater chance that the judge would die before it ended, and this would presumably delay the proceedings even further, causing more trouble and expense to the parties. It may be that A wanted to be protected financially if this happened. Another possibility is that A felt that Scarman was favoring A's side of the case; if Scarman were to die and be replaced by another judge, it might reduce A's chances of winning, and so A wanted insurance against that.
Most states have a low barring the distribution of counterfeit drugs, which this would appear to violate. For example, the Colorado Imitation and Counterfeit Controlled Substances Act, codified at Sections 18-18-419 to 18-18-424, Colorado Revised Statutes, makes it a minor drug felony (class 4) to distribute an imitation controlled substance which is &quot;a substance that is not the controlled substance that it is purported to be but which, by appearance, including color, shape, size, and markings, by representations made, and by consideration of all relevant factors as set forth in section 18-18-421, would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is the controlled substance that it is purported to be.&quot; It already contains a placebo exception for medical professionals stating that it &quot;shall not apply to practitioners licensed, registered, or otherwise authorized under the laws of this state to possess, administer, dispense, or distribute a controlled substance, if the distribution, possession, dispensing, or administering of the imitation controlled substance is done in the lawful course of his professional practice.&quot; But there is an argument that the intended purposes of the use of the counterfeit rather than the real thing was to prevent a suicide, and that doing so had that effect, which might excuse the crime. The fact that B initiated the conversation by asking A and might have successfully obtained the drug if he asked someone else makes this defense particularly plausible. People who fail to commit suicide do not statistically just try again by another method, suicide is an impulsive action that if prevented is not nearly as likely to recur if someone fails to do so by one particular method. Colorado expressly allows the use of physical force to prevent a suicide. &quot;A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious bodily injury upon himself may use reasonable and appropriate physical force upon that person to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to thwart the result.&quot; Section 18-1-703(1)(d), Colorado Revised Statutes. This isn't actually a use for physical force, but it informs the application of the &quot;choice of evils&quot; defense, codified at Section 18-1-702, Colorado Revised Statutes in Colorado, which provides (with nuances not reproduced here) that: conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no conduct of the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue. It isn't obviously immoral either (for the same reasons), although one could make a case that the &quot;victim&quot; could bring the tort of outrageous conduct a.k.a. intentional infliction of emotional distress, against the person causing it, although again, the question would be what were the damages and was it justified. The tort remedy is a better fit as it is often used in cases of &quot;pranks&quot; calculated to cause extreme emotional distress as this one apparently was. The intent of the &quot;victim&quot; to commit suicide might also constitute &quot;unclean hands&quot; barring a tort recovery in this situation in tort law if asserted by person A.
None because the principle is Freedom to contract There is a general right of any being (natural like a person or even a company) to contract with anyone. Buying someone's service is a contract. A contract forms when: They offer something You offer something Both sides agree on it. (meeting of the minds) It is totally legal for a company to make wears a mask in our place of business a part of either being admitted onto the property or agreeing to contract with you. Noncompliance means as a result that they don't agree to serve you and don't offer to you. In fact, they explicitly reject to contract with you unless you wear a mask, which is their right unless there is a law that would specifically make that reason illegal. There are laws that reduce the freedom of contract, such as the civil right act (protected classes, such as religion, race, sex and more), the Americans with disabilities act (demanding reasonable accommodation), and labor laws (outlawing labor practices or limiting the amount of work or minimum payment) as well as anti-discrimination laws (establishing further classes). However note, that laws need to be written in such a way that they don't discriminate against the company either! One case where freedom to contract was attacked using an anti-discrimination law was Masterpiece Cakeshop - which was decided on first amendment grounds based on the rights of the owner: the law can't force someone to make a product he would not support the message of. Currently, there might only be some ordinance that bans mask policies in Texas, but it is dubious if that might be even an enforceable order from the Texas governor - Especially since OSHA just made adjustments to standards and mandates on the federal level - which include adjustments to respiratory protection fields.