Under what rule do bills etc. die (US Congress)? It is generally accepted that when a bill (for example) is introduced in one house of Congress, it must be approved by both houses before that Congress adjourns. A bill approved by one house cannot be carried over for approval by the other house across congressional terms. The Constitution does not overtly mandate this (unless the mandate is very subtle). Is there an "official" mechanism encoding this result? For example a statute passed into law at some point; rules of the House and Senate that declare this; or some SCOTUS ruling that mandates this as a result of the common law? Or is this just one of those "it's how we've always done it" things?
The rule that all bills die when a Congress ends is an unwritten rule, based on precedent. It is part of a more general rule: All unfinished business dies when a Congress ends. The logic of this rule is simple: Because every member of the House is elected every term, every new Congress is considered a separate Congress. To require a new Congress to take up the unfinished business of the previous Congress would violate yet another, more general rule: “No Congress can bind its successors.” This rule came from England, where it was thought to be a direct implication of parliamentary supremacy. In the US, it is justified either as implied by the constitution, or by practical political realities. What the Congressional manuals say The rule “all business dies” is mentioned in several of the standard compilations of Congressional practice and precedent. These compilations, (available online from the GPO,) include House Practice: However, because past proceedings of one Congress do not bind its successor, business remaining at the end of one Congress does not carry over to the beginning of a new Congress (with the exception of impeachment). Precedents of the House, § 8. Legislative Business of a Prior Session: Each Congress is a separate parliamentary body that comes into being at assembly and terminates upon sine die adjournment. Thus, it is generally the case that business of one Congress does not continue as business of the next Congress. For example, bills and resolutions introduced in one Congress cannot be taken up in a subsequent Congress but must be formally reintroduced. Unfinished business pending at the close of one Congress does not remain unfinished business of a subsequent Congress. Decschler’s Precdents, Ch. 1 § 11, The vast majority of business remaining at the end of one Congress does not, however, carry over to the beginning of a new Congress, since Congress does not allow the past proceedings of one Congress to bind its successor. Few categories have carried over from one Congress to the next; impeachment proceedings pending on the last day of one Congress have been continued at the beginning of the succeeding one, and a Presidential veto message to the House was on one occasion read and received at the beginning of the next Congress. Legislative Entrenchment: Why Congress Can't Bind The idea that one legislature cannot bind a later legislature is known as the rule against ”legislative entrenchment.” This rule traces back to England, where it was first stated by Edward Coke, in his Institutes of the Laws of England, published in 1644. Acts against the power of the Parliament subsequent bind not. In England, the rule was seen as a direct implication of parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone argued that to allow one parliament to bind another would be logically inconsistent with the idea of parliamentary supremacy: Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal…absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament. Interestingly, during the Revolution, an American colonist, writing as Cassandra, used the rule against entrenchment to argue for independence. He quoted Coke to claim that because no Parliament could bind future Parliaments, any British promise to respect the rights of colonists was not, as the game theorists would say, credible. It is out of the power of the British Legislature to give us security for the future enjoyment of our rights and liberties…Is there safety in entering upon terms of accommodation with a power which cannot stipulate for the performance of its engagements? In reaction to such criticisms of the British system of Parliamentary supremacy, Americans decided to adopt a written constitution. The Americans argued that while a legislature might not be able to bind itself, the people, acting through the Constitution, could bind the legislature. Instead of invoking Parliamentary supremacy, Americans justified the “no Congress can bind” rule by appealing to the Constitution (ie, the electoral cycle + the vesting clause = every Congress is a new Congress, which alone is vested with the legislative power under Art. I, § 1), or to practical considerations (it is impossible for today’s Congress to enforce a binding clause on a later Congress, which could simply pass a new statute). (For fuller discussion of these arguments, see here.) Unwritten Rules in the House Here is what House Practice, Ch. 50. Rules and Precedents of the House, says about Rules Based on Precedent or Custom: Much of what is known as parliamentary law is not part of the formal written rules of the House but springs from precedent or long-standing custom. Such precedent may be invoked to resolve a procedural question in the absence of an express written rule on the subject. More frequently, the precedents of the House are used to show the scope and application of one of its formal rules… On the theory that a government of laws is preferable to a government of men, the House has repeatedly recognized the importance of following its precedents and obeying its well-established procedural rules. The House adheres to settled rulings, and will not lightly disturb procedures that have been established by prior decision of the Chair. However, the Speaker or Chairman may refuse to follow a precedent even though it is relevant to a pending question, where it is the only precedent on the point and was not carefully reasoned.
Only with the approval of Congress. An agreement between states is called an "interstate compact" (a variety of existing compacts are listed in the link). The federal government can also unilaterally create an independent agency with authority in some states, but not others such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appalachian Regional Commission. The relevant parts of the Constitution are Article I, Section 10, which states: 1: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. Also relevant are Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1: New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. and Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
No A state may not do that. The US Constitution Art. I section 8 says: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; Art I section 10: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. The power to regulate interstate commerce and foreign commerce is exclusive to Congress, no state may exercise it. The power to tax imports and exports is only given in vary limited degree to states, and only by specific permission of Congress. The Interstate Commerce Clause has been interpreted to mean that a state may not favor its own citizens over citizens of other states in taxation or in commercial privileges, although it may restrict state services to state residents, or charge non-residents higher fees, as for tuition at public colleges. Even with the consent of Congress, or if passed by Congress, such a law might well be precluded by the Equal Protection clause. Congress may prohibit specific items from being moved in interstate commerce, or it may limit, license, or tax them. But all such regulations must be uniform across the United states, and may not apply only to a specific state. Regulation of interstate commerce can include regulation of purely intra-state transactions, if they are held to "affect" interstate commerce. This power is very wide-ranging.
There are a number of areas in which the US states can pass laws only to the extend that they do not conflict with Federal laws passed by Congress. When a federal law clearly says that states may not pass laws on a given subject, the issue is clear. When it specifically invites state laws, the issue is also clear. But when a Federal law imposes certain regulations in a given area, it may not be clear if a state may go beyond the Federal requirements. Sometimes it can. For example, there is a Federal Minimum Wage. But states are free to impose higher minimum wage levels, and some have done so. So when a court decision or legal article says &quot;Congress having occupied the field&quot; it means that a set of Federal laws is intended to be a compelte regulation of a given area, and states may not add additional regulations of their own in that area. I am not sure what rules apply to disclosure of information by the Capitol police.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186 (2003) and Golan v. Holder 565 U.S. ___ (2012), especially the first four pages of Eldred (the syllabus). How does extending the term for existing works "promote the progress"? This is a judgement that the courts have left in the hands of the legislature. The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain. (Eldred) if it is generally expected that the copyright term will be extended continually, then, effectively, the perception is that the copyright term is unlimited First, this isn't generally expected. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress might evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together "an unlimited number of 'limited Times,'" the Court of Appeals stated that such legislative misbehavior "clearly is not the situation before us." (Eldred) Second, in the situation that has actually been happening, Eldred says: Although conceding that the CTEA's baseline term of life plus 70 years qualifies as a "limited Tim[e]" as applied to future copyrights, petitioners contend that existing copyrights extended to endure for that same term are not "limited." In petitioners' view, a time prescription, once set, becomes forever "fixed" or "inalterable." The word "limited," however, does not convey a meaning so constricted. At the time of the Framing, "limited" meant what it means today: confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed. Thus understood, a timespan appropriately "limited" as applied to future copyrights does not automatically cease to be "limited" when applied to existing copyrights. This is Constitutional because the Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to make these extensions, and its legislative actions until now have not strayed beyond the scope of what the Constitution permits. Briefly, the court took a textualist approach to interpreting the "limited times" restriction. They found that "at the time of the Framing, limited meant what it means today: confined within certain bounds, restrained, or circumscribed," and that Congress has a long established practice of providing extensions to both patent and copyright holders. "Congress’ unbroken practice since the founding generation of applying new definitions or adjustments of the copyright term to both future works and existing works overwhelms petitioners’ argument." This weighs in favor of the view that "limited times" did not mean to the founders that extensions are unconstitutional.
Under the present constitution . . . Are there any consequences of the fact that the Constitution of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States use two different names for that state? No. Lots of the language in the United States Constitution is no longer in place or in common usage or is invalid due to subsequent amendments, and that language is still effective as originally intended. The U.S. Constitution has never been "amended and restated" and can't be understood properly without annotations to its raw text. Might a federal statute be needed for some states (e.g. Vermont, because of what is noted above) but not for others, because of differences in the federal statutes that admitted the state, or because of the lack of any need for admission by Congress in the case of the original thirteen states? Not really. Every state's name is embedded in myriad federal laws and regulations in addition to the statute that admitted the state to the United States, e.g. laws assigning names to post offices, laws allocating judgeships, laws purchasing property, laws appropriating funds, laws assigning states to various districts for purposes of executive branch departments and the judiciary, tax laws (e.g. the Obamacare tax credit), etc. Would a state statute suffice? Would a state constitutional amendment suffice? Would a federal statute suffice without a state statute or a state referendum? Would a federal constitutional amendment be needed? A federal constitutional amendment would not be needed. The Constitution vests Congress with the authority to admit states and to change their boundaries with the permission of the affected states. This would be within the power over states that could be inferred from those powers. A state and the federal government could each pass a statute to call itself something different for various purposes. For example, the official name of the state of Rhode Island is "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" but various state and federal statutes authorize the use of the short form of the "State of Rhode Island" for most purposes. As a practical matter a state constitutional amendment would probably be desirable on general principles to officially change the name of a state, whether or not it was strictly required, in part, because a state constitution usually sets forth an official name of a state in its body text. It would be possible for a state to change its constitution and statutes and change its name in a move that the federal government did not accept, and if that happened, the federal government and its officials would probably continue to use the old name and the state government and its officials would probably use the new name. I think it is as a practical matter, unlikely that a standoff like this would persist, but I think that this is the most likely outcome. A federal government move to change a state's name without its consent proactively, however, would probably be struck down as violating federalism concerns. Of course, all of this is speculative, because there are really no precedents for disputes over the changing of a state's name. Context would influence the outcome of any such case.
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 says The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Therefore, the House cannot try an impeachment. The wording of the Constitution does not say "The Senate must try any impeachment delivered by the House". The option to reject an impeachment by simple majority runs completely counter to Senate tradition. But analogous to deployment of the "nuclear option" to change Senate rules, it is a conceivable outcome. The first impeachment presented to the Senate was against a Senator, William Blount in 1797, and in that instance the Senate appears to have voted that Blount was not an impeachable officer (so they did not vote on impeachment, but they did vote to expel him). In Nixon v. US, SCOTUS ruled that Senate impeachment actions are not justiciable. While current Senate rules require a trial, the rules can be changed by the Senate by a majority vote, and SCOTUS will not review such actions. The Senate can also adjourn and not take up one or more articles, as happened in Andrew Johnson's case.
Lower courts are only bound by US Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law once the US Supreme Court releases an opinion on an issue. Until that point in time, the US Supreme Court is officially undecided on an issue. You ask: if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? This is commonplace. For many matters, the US Supreme Court is undecided (new statutes, novel circumstances, etc.). In order for a matter to even get to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is often the case that a lower court ruled on a question for which the Supreme Court had not previously announced its opinion. I know you are asking about the circumstance where the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal but has not yet issued judgment. However, with respect to precedential value, it is the same until the time of judgment.