What is the legal difference between loitering and loafing? I have seen this sign below on a few United States Post Offices in my area of Virginia. The sign prohibits 3 acts: NO SOLICITING NO LOITERING NO LOAFING No soliciting is obvious. However, loitering and loafing are nearly synonymous in dictionaries. I have to assume there is a difference between the two. Why else would both be listed? Is there a legal distinction between loitering and loafing?
In most states or localities "loitering " has a specific statutory meaning. For example in Prince Georges County. MD Section 14-139.03 provides: (a) In this Section, "loiter" means for a person to: (1) Remain on a public street, sidewalk, or pathway, including one privately-owned but used by the public in general, so as to obstruct the free passage of a pedestrian or vehicle after a regular or special police officer has notified the person that the action is unlawful and has requested the person to move; (2) Remain in or on a vehicle on a public street, sidewalk, or pathway, including one privately-owned but used by the public in general, so as to obstruct the free passage of a pedestrian or vehicle after a regular or special police officer has notified the person that the action is unlawful and has requested the person to move; (3) Refuse or fail to leave a private business, commercial establishment, or parking lot that is posted with conspicuous "No Loitering" signs if the business or establishment is not open for business, and the person has been requested to leave by the owner, the owner's agent, or a regular or special police officer, unless the person: (A) Has written permission from the owner, lessee, or operator to be present; or (B) Is window-shopping under conditions and at a time of the day or night that would be considered conducive to that activity; (4) Refuse or fail to leave a private business or commercial establishment that is open for business, or a parking lot of the business or establishment, after having been requested to do so by the owner or the owner's agent; (5) Refuse or fail to leave a public building, public grounds, or a public recreational area, or a parking lot of a public building, public grounds, or a public recreational area, after being requested to do so by a regular or special police officer or by a regularly employed guard, watchman, or other authorized employee of the agency or institution responsible for the public building, public grounds, recreational area, or parking lot if the circumstances indicate that the person has no apparent lawful business or purpose to pursue at that place; (and so on) I do find that at one time New York state (and some other states) had an "anti-loafing law" which required all men between the ages of 18 and 50 to be “habitually and regularly engaged in some lawful, useful, and recognized business, profession, occupation, trade, or employment until the termination of the war.” This was passed during World War I (1918) and the then NY Governor said: The purpose … is to force every able-bodied male person within the State to do his share toward remedying the conditions due to the present shortage of labor. This is confirmed at https://andrewchernoff.wordpress.com/tag/anti-loafing-laws/ I don't know if it was ever challenged on constitutional grounds. Other than that, I cannot find any published law defining loafing.
The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.
Residents agree that the receipt of mail by any individual not listed as a Resident or Occupant in this Agreement at the Leased Premises shall be proof of occupancy of that individual and a violation of this Agreement. I assume that the lease states that only the listed individuals can reside in the unit. Maybe they think that this says that receipt of mail by an unlisted person is a further violation of the lease, I don't think that is clearly enough stated that the courts would agree that receiving mail is itself a violation of the lease. Instead, it seems to be intended to say something about an existing clause – you can't have other people living there. The courts would look at the requirements of the lease, and ask "did you comply"? The question of whether you did a certain thing is a question of fact that has to be resolved in court. However, the revised lease language does not state that all mail must be addressed to Johnny Johnson – it only addresses receipt by a person not on the lease. You are (apparently) on the lease, so you may receive mail there. Nothing in the lease controls how such mail can be addressed. If you receive mail addressed to Tommy Thompson, your defense is that you received the mail, and you are on the lease, so you will not have violated the new clause.
A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.
The question for trespassing is whether the trespasser has been adequately notified of the possession interest that another person has in the property. Although it is legal to evangelize door-to-door without a permit, most jurisdictions will require you to leave promptly if the owner asks you to leave. In the absence of such verbal requests, you have a legally protected interest in engaging in conversation with your neighbors. Based on the law as I understand it, it is likely that your jurisdiction will recognize a right to proselytize to your neighbors door-to-door regardless of a no trespassing or private property sign. However, for the sake of certainty, here’s a little bit about trespass law. Typically, states have statutes that define what it takes to make a sign “conspicuous” enough to create grounds for prosecution. Such laws include specifications for the thickness of markings and the sign’s distance from the ground. Arkansas statutes have established that a person who enters or remains unlawfully on property has committed trespass, which means that the person must enter or remain in or upon the premises when not licensed or privileged to enter or remain in or upon the premises. Communication is key. Arkansas law provides that if the property is unimproved and apparently unused, and is not fenced or otherwise “enclosed in a manner designed to exclude an intruder,” the person entering the property does so with license and privilege. Generally, however, if a person unlawfully enters property that has been improved, he has trespassed regardless of a sign on the premises devoid of some religious purpose for his visit. Thus, there really is not a significant difference between the “No Trespassing” sign and the “Private Property” sign. Both would communicate to any potential intruder that the property he is about to enter is presently being possessed by another person and thus would likely be sufficient to provide grounds for claiming notice in court if a property owner should choose to bring a suit.
The general rule is, anything is allowed unless it is forbidden (and not that you can only do things that are expressly permitted). The logical structure of law may be a bit more challenging than procedural programming logic, since it may require a global knowledge and evaluation of the entire code (typically but not absolutely, the scope of the search for "unless otherwise" conditions is restricted to "in this chapter"). In other words, the law is a set of propositions which must all be true, and unlike actual execution of instructions in a sequence, law is to be interpreted simultaneously but hierarchically (that is: the order in which clauses are written is not significant). The appearance that the law is self-contradictory is largely illusory, though the resolution of the conflict may require a careful reading of the law and knowledge of jurisdictional hierarchy (federal law is superior to state law, which entails a particular resolution of the apparent conflict). Sometimes there are real conflicts, which usually result from using words in conflicting ways (note the practice of re-defining words "in this chapter/section/title"). The reason why law is not a science is that law is normative, not descriptive: it dictates what is allowed (a determination made through the political process), and does not attempt to discover what independently is. The reason why the legal process cannot be implemented in software is that software does not yet correctly interpret natural language, and law is written in natural language following interpretations based on judgments of what choices a reasonable would make. Perhaps if you propose a piece of law that you think is contradictory, it would be possible to show how the contradiction is illusory.
I don't know of a specific legal term but such clauses are quite common in contracts which consist of more than one document. The English words "priority", "prevail" and "precedence" have the meaning you want, however, "precedence" runs the risk of being confused with "precedent" which does have a very specific legal meaning. A clause similar to: If there is any inconsistency or ambiguity between the English and Japanese language versions of the contract, the English version shall prevail. You need to make very sure that this clause can be translated unambiguously into Japanese!
It is the tenant's responsibility to understand the written contract. Oral statements about the contract do have to be consistent with the written contract (that is, in the context where you ask the landlord what a particular clause means before signing -- not in the case where you are modifying an existing contract). If I were renting a room and the contract says "Du må betale $1000 hver dag", which I don't understand because my Norwegian is terrible, I would ask about this, and the landlord might say that it means "You must pay $1000 every month", which could be a decent deal. Actually, the clause says "You must pay $1000 every day". When the reality of the situation becomes clear, then it is obvious that we didn't have an agreement in the first place. Perhaps he mis-spoke, or his English is as bad as my Norwegian, but I would not be held to rate in the written contract, assuming that I could back up my claim that he gave me that interpretation: the lease would probably be voided, as not an actual agreement. The underlying principle is that there has to be a "meeting of the minds" where the parties understand what they will get and what they must give, and there was a demonstrable failure of understanding. On the other hand, if I sign a contract without really reading it carefully, and there is a clause in English (which I speak) saying that I have to pay $1000 a day, but I didn't really think about the clause so that in a sense I didn't understand what I had agreed to, well, I may still be on the hook. (On the third hand, a court would probably say that's a ridiculous rent and void the contract on policy grounds). In general, "not my first language" is not a get-out-of-contract card, though attempts to trick people into signing documents in languages that they really have no understanding of won't be successful. Virtually nobody but a lawyer actually understands contractual language, yet contracts are enforced all the time. A contract can be explicitly modified by verbal agreement, or can be entirely verbal, but oral agreements face evidence problems, namely, what exactly did A and B say? It's scientifically well established that parties can be morally certain that the conversation went "A" (for one person) and "Not A" (for the other person). Using "could" rather than "would" in speech makes a huge difference in interpretation. There is a rule, the parol evidence rule, which essentially says that unless there is a good reason to not do so, the contract as written is what is enforced. Even if the conversation had been written into the contract, there's no basis in the contract for objectively determining whether a thing is old and "just broke". So even as an additional clause in the contract, it doesn't afford you a clear escape hatch. You might be able to prove with expert testimony that indeed the pipes had been corroding for a hundred years, and you could not have caused the pipes to burst.