How can section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the US constitution be enforced? This arises out of Can state lawmakers who participated in the Capitol riot be removed through the 14th Amendment? The 14th Amendment, section 3, says: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. Is a separate law needed to prohibit people to whom Section 3 applies from taking office, or to remove such people from office? What proceedings would be needed to establish that a person had &quot;engaged in insurrection or rebellion&quot;? Can a Congressional resolution or a Federal statute declare that specific people have so engaged? Is a criminal conviction required? Can a private person take steps to enforce this section?
Separate law? Is a separate law needed to prohibit people to whom Section 3 applies from taking office, or to remove such people from office? Griffin’s Case There is some reason to think so. In 1869 there was Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 2 Am. Law T. Rep. U. S. Cts. 93; 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 358. This was tried by Chief Justice Chase, in his role as a Circuit Justice, not as a Supreme Court case. One Caesar Griffin was accused of shooting with intent to kill, tried before a Virginia state court, convicted, and sentenced to two years in prison. He then filed a writ of Habes Corpus claiming that his imprisonment was unlawful, because the jusge before whom he was tried, Hugh W. Sheffey, (in the words of Justice Chase): in December, 1849, [Sheffey] as a member of the Virginia house of delegates, took an oath to support the constitution of the United States, and also that he was a member of the legislature of Virginia in 1862. during the late Rebellion, and as such voted for measures to sustain the so-called Confederate States in their war against the United States; and it was claimed in behalf of the petitioner, that he thereby became, and was at the time of the trial of the petitioner, disqualified to hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state ... Several other people tried and convicted before Judge Sheffey in the circuit court of Rockbridge county, including some convicted of murder, filed similar Habes Corpus petitions, claiming that Sheffey was prohibited by Section 3 from holding office, and that therefore their convictions were invalid. Judge Sheffey had been appointed to the office of Judge after the end of the US Civil War by the reorganized government of Virginia, the one recognized as valid by the Federal Government. He was appointed before the ratification of the 14th Amendment. There was no dispute that he fit the letter of the group of prohibited persons in Section 3. Justice Chase wrote: The general question to be determined on the appeal from this order is whether or not the sentence of the circuit court of Rock-bridge county must be regarded as a nullity because of the disability to hold any office under the state of Virginia, imposed by the fourteenth amendment, on the person, who, in fact, presided as judge in that court. Justice Chase rejected the suggestion that all official actions by Sheffey and anyone in a similar position were automatically void and of no authority because of sectio0n 3. He wrote that: The proposition maintained in behalf of the petitioner, is, that this prohibition, instantly, on the day of its promulgation, vacated all offices held by persons within the category of prohibition, and made all official acts, performed by them, since that day, null and void. After pointing out that many of the offials of the reconstructed governments of the sothern states were withign the terms of the prohibition of section 3, Chae went on to write: If the construction now contended for be given to the prohibitive section, the effect must be to annul all official acts performed by these officers. No sentence, no judgment, no decree, no acknowledgment of a deed, no record of a deed, no sheriff’s or commissioner’s sale — in short no official act — is of the least validity. It is impossible to méasure the evils which such a construction would add to the calamities which have already fallen upon the people of these states. As a further reason not to construe section 3 as instantly and automatically removing all such officials, Chase wrote: Now it is undoubted that those provisions of the constitution which deny to the legislature power to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or to pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto, are inconsistent in their spirit and general purpose with a provision which, at once without trial, deprives a whole class of persons of offices held by them, for cause, however grave. It is true that no limit can be imposed on the people when exercising their sovereign power in amending their own constitution of government. But it is a necessary presumption that the people in the exercise of that power, seek to confirm and improve, rather than to weaken and impair the general spirit of the constitution. ... Is there, then, any other reasonable construction? ... The object of the amendment is to exclude from certain offices a certain class of persons. Now, it is obviously impossible to do this by a simple declaration, whether in the constitution or in an act of congress, that all persons included within a particular description shall not hold office. For, in the very nature of things, it must be ascertained what particular individuals are embraced by the definition, before any sentence of exclusion can be made to operate. To accomplish this ascertainment and ensure effective results, proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable; and these can only be provided for by congress. ... [I]t seems to put beyond reasonable question the conclusion that the intention of the people of the United States, in adopting the fourteenth amendment, was to create a disability, to be removed in proper cases by a two-thirds vote, and to be made operative in other cases by the legislation of congress in its ordinary course. Chase also note that, 2 months after the conviction of Griffin: in February, 1869, congress adopted a joint resolution entitled “a resolution respecting the provisional governments of Virginia and Texas.” In this resolution it was provided that persons, “holding office in the provisional governments of Virginia and Texas,” but unable to take and subscribe the test oath prescribed by the act of July 2, 1862 [12 Stat. 502], except those relieved from disability, “be removed therefrom;” and that this indicates that such people were regarded by Congress as having remained in office and not beign automatically removed. Griffin's Case seems to establish that some proceeding is needed to establish when a person falls under the exclusion rule of Section 3 of the 14th. In 1869 this was done by military order. In 1870 Congress passed a statute providing for criminal proceedings in such cases. This was repealed at the end of Reconstruction. Currently 18 U.S. Code § 2383 makes &quot;rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof,&quot; a crime, and provides that anyone convicted of it &quot;shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.&quot; This is not quite the same as the section 3 disqualification. One the one hand, it does not depend on a prior oath to support the constitution, and on the other it does not appear to ban holding a state or local office. But it shows how a similar law could be drafted by Congress. Legislative declaration Can a Congressional resolution, or a Federal statute declare that specific people have so engaged? This is probably prohibited as a Bill of Attainder, that is, a legislative declaration, without trial, that particular persons are guilty of particular crimes. Other Proceedings What proceedings would be needed to establish that a person had &quot;engaged in insurrection or rebellion&quot;? If a person subject to the section 3 disqualification was elected to either house of Congress, that house could refuse to seat such person, or expel him or her, as the Constitution permits. Most state legislatures have similar powers over the seating and expulsion of their own members. If a person is convicted under 18 USC § 2383 or any similar law, that person would clearly be excluded. Congress could pass a law establishing a special tribunal for determining when a person was subject to Section 3 of the 14th. But it has not done so. See also See also: this leglal blog post This article in Constitution Daily 14th Amendment's Section 3 Gets New Look as Democrats Weigh Measures Against Trump from the National Law Journal
1911-1913 very shady time in USA political history. They could amend the Constitution to make a law Constitutional. There's nothing shady about that in the least. In fact, it is the point of constitutional amendments: to provide a mechanism to change the constitution when it prohibits something that an overwhelming majority of people -- well, of congress and of state legislatures -- think should be allowed. A constitutional amendment can reverse the provisions of Article I; it can reverse a constitutional ruling by a court (or at least reverse the ruling's effect); and it can certainly overcome arguments by Jefferson and Jackson, which have very little legal weight if any. Wasn't the whole point of the revolutionary war ... It doesn't matter what the point of the war was. What matters is that the constitution controls what the government can and can't do, and the constitution can change. The constitution countenanced slavery until it didn't. The constitution required senators to be chosen by state legislatures until it didn't. The constitution forbade income tax until it didn't.
Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? No. Generally speaking, the constitutionality of an otherwise procedurally proper ballot initiative is not ruled upon until after it has passed (eliminating the need to rule unnecessarily on the constitutionality of failed initiatives). Of course, if someone tried to put it in the ballot when the existing law conditions for putting it on the ballot were not met (e.g. because a deadline for doing so wasn't met) that could be challenged in court by a party with standing to do so. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? Probably not. The constitution as newly adopted doesn't sound like it would forbid doing that. This seems to be the whole point of the constitutional amendment in the first place and it the amendment to the constition is approved, that requirement is gone.
The Supremacy Clause makes Federal laws superior to state laws and even state constitutions, but that is only true for Constitutional federal laws. If Congress passed a law seeking to restore the effect of the now overruled Roe decision, there would be a question as to what provisions of the constitution empowered Congress to do so. Such a law might be challenged, and if no convincing source of congressional authority to pass such a law was cited, it could plausibly be overturned. One supposes that the members of the majority in Dobbs would be reluctant to see that decision superseded by a new Federal law. One hopes that they would take a principled stance, and only overturn such a law if there was good legal reason to do so. Without seeing the text of such a law, and the constitutional arguments for and against it, there is no legitimate way to judge if it would be within the power of Congress. As a political matter, I doubt that the current Congress will pass such a law.
Art. 1 Sect 5 of the Constitution empowers both houses to make their own rules. That means that they can articulate rules regarding what or how you can talk on the floor. It is held that the president of the senate can issue a ruling, and the ruling can be overridden by majority vote. If the Constitution were amended to be more specific about rules of conduct, then some such Senate rules might be unconstitutional and SCOTUS could invalidate the rule. The only specific constitutional requirement on conducting business is that a majority constitutes a quorum.
The most relevant federal Obstruction of Justice type is from 18 USC 1505: Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress— I'm not sure if passed Articles of Impeachment count as an "inquiry", and I'm not sure whether failing to "send" them to the other house is "corruptly impeding". Even if those two conditions are met, members of Congress are immune to judicial process for acts taken while they are in session, as part of the Speech or Debate clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1): ...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So, if the person in question is not a member of Congress acting in their official capacity and intentionally endeavors to prevent passed Articles of Impeachment from being sent from the House to the Senate (e.g. a courier intentionally failing to deliver them, or an IT person preventing the electronic form from being copied into the Senate's database), I do not know whether that could be considered Obstruction of Justice, as I doubt such a situation has ever been adjudicated. Given the publicity of the proceedings, such an impediment would probably be found out or overcome so quickly that no one would be inclined to do more than fire the perpetrator.
There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest.
Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.