Does the 4th Amendment have a Miranda-like precedent? The Supreme Court decided in Miranda v. Arizona that people had to be told their rights under the 5th and 6th Amendments, since if people don't know that they have those rights, they don't really protect them. Those rights, of course, can be waived, as can the right not to be searched without a warrant. If a police officer comes to your house without a warrant, says that they think you have illegal drugs, and asks if they can enter to search the property, do they have to disclose that it isn't legally required since there isn't a warrant? A reasonable person may feel as though they don't have a choice.
There is no search analog to the Miranda requirement. The Supreme Court in Miranda didn't just decide that people had to be told their rights, for all rights in all contexts. Miranda applies just to 5th and 6th Amendment rights, in case a person is being held coercively. If you are free to go, you need not be apprised of your rights: so, if the police are just asking questions when you are not being held, they are not required to give a rights warning. Likewise, they are allowed to request permission to conduct a search. It is true than many people do not understand that a request is distinct from an order. A useful phrase to remember is "Am I free to go?". If the answer is no, you are busted and they can search you. If the answer is yes, you don't have to let them search you (to avoid the ambiguity of silence, refusing permission to search is not a bad strategy, unless you want then to search you – e.g. if you want to get on the plane).
Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop &amp; account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop &amp; Search and Arrest covered by the OP.
Warrants are issued upon probable cause The Supreme Court defined this in 1964 in Beck v. Ohio as: whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense In the context of warrants, the Oxford Companion to American Law defines probable cause as: information sufficient to warrant a prudent person's belief that the wanted individual had committed a crime (for an arrest warrant) or that evidence of a crime or contraband would be found in a search (for a search warrant) In Brinegar v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court defines probable cause as: where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed In the scenario that you describe the testimony of the child almost certainly gives rise to probable cause. A warrant issued on that basis is likely to be broad enough for the investigation to follow the path that you suggest - if the child claims there were inappropriate photos sent to them and there was evidence of subsequent deletion, law enforcement are entitled to trace that back to wherever it leads.
There are a variety of situations like border crossings, entry into official buildings, etc. in which there is a general right for law enforcement to demand identification on a suspicionless basis, none of which seem to apply in this case. But, the most common justification for demanding ID is to make what is called a Terry stop (after the name of the U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld the legality of these stops in the face of 4th Amendment limitations on searches and seizures). Wikipedia accurately summarizes the law in this area as follows. A Terry stop is: a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. The name derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that police may briefly detain a person whom they reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity; the Court also held that police may do a limited search of the suspect's outer garments for weapons if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person detained may be "armed and dangerous". To have reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, police must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts" that would indicate to a reasonable police officer that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity (as opposed to past conduct). Reasonable suspicion depends on the "totality of the circumstances", and can result from a combination of facts, each of which is by itself innocuous. The search of the suspect's outer garments, also known as a patdown, must be limited to what is necessary to discover weapons; however, pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, police may seize contraband discovered in the course of a frisk, but only if the contraband's identity is immediately apparent. In some jurisdictions, persons detained under the doctrine of Terry must identify themselves to police upon request. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the Court held that a Nevada statute requiring such identification did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, nor, in the circumstances of that case, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self incrimination. New York is one of the many states that has a stop and identify statute, that allows an officer to insist on presentation of an identification any time there is a legal basis for making a Terry stop. The New York stop and identify statute is N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §140.50. This says: 1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 2. Any person who is a peace officer and who provides security services for any court of the unified court system may stop a person in or about the courthouse to which he is assigned when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. 4. In cities with a population of one million or more, information that establishes the personal identity of an individual who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer, such as the name, address or social security number of such person, shall not be recorded in a computerized or electronic database if that individual is released without further legal action; provided, however, that this subdivision shall not prohibit police officers or peace officers from including in a computerized or electronic database generic characteristics of an individual, such as race and gender, who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer. In this particular case, if the law enforcement officer were more clever, he would have said that he was concerned that the crew might be using the drone to case the property in order to commit a crime there in the future. And, if he had said that, this would surely pass muster for reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and would have provided a legal justification for demanding ID. The "about to commit a crime" justification for a Terry stop makes it, in practice, much broader than probable cause for an arrest, which requires that the police believe that a crime has actually already been committed or is in progress, not just that someone is about to commit a crime (a person may be subjected to a Terry stop even if his actions which tend to show he is about to commit a crime have not yet progressed to the level of an attempted offense for which someone may be convicted and are not truly imminent). (Actually, strictly speaking, the officer is only entitled to determine the information that an ID would reveal, and not to insist that someone actually have the ID on his person, under state law, although a local ordinance or court interpretation of the law could possibly give him the authority to actually demand an ID to determine this information. For example, California courts have held that a duty to provide basic information implies a duty to provide it in a verifiable manner.) The fact that the law enforcement officer failed to articulate any legal basis for the stop, yet went on to arrest the individuals, weakens the case that the stop was valid considerably, because generally, at least in theory, a law enforcement officer is supposed to be able to articulate the reasonable suspicion for the stop at the time that the stop is made and not days later after the fact. In addition to stop and identify laws, some states (including Colorado) have held that failing to provide an ID on demand, under the "totality of the circumstances" can sometimes constitute obstructing a police officer and provide a basis for an arrest. It isn't inconceivable that a law enforcement officer in this situation could make that argument and prevail at least in showing probable cause for arrest on that basis, even if it wasn't a sufficiently solid argument to give rise to an obstructing a police officer conviction.
It does matter if you invoke your right to silence. First, if you do, that affects what police can do (they have to stop interrogating you). Second, it plays a role in &quot;adoptive admissions&quot;. If the police are asking you questions (you are not under arrest) and they make some statement that implies that you committed a crime, your silence can be used against you: it can be taken to be a form of admitting that you committed the crime. The premise is that if they imply that you murdered X, such an accusation if false would be so outrageous to a reasonable, innocent person that they would protest, therefore your lack of protest (denial) is tantamount to a confession. However, you can protect yourself by preemptively invoking your right to silence. See Salinas v. Texas: a witness who “ ‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’ ” at the time he relies on it... the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” not an unqualified “right to remain silent.” Since any right can be waived, at any time, there is no magic expression that you can utter that nullifies a future waiver of a Constitutional right. The closest that you can come is asserting that you hereby exercise your right to an attorney and that you will not speak until you have consulted with your attorney (then you better shut up). Lawyering up only prevents them from further interrogating you. Don't hedge: say &quot;I am asserting my right to silence and refuse to speak without a lawyer&quot;. &quot;I think I should...&quot; is not a definitive assertion of your rights. If you are (briefly) stopped, police may ask if they can search you or your property. If they have a warrant or probable cause, there's really no point in saying anything. In the case that consent is required, you just have to remember to not consent, and it would not be a bad idea to explicitly deny consent. Each and every time they ask. The same with their statement &quot;It would really help us if you would come to the station to answer a few questions&quot;. If you are under arrest, then you have to go with them: ask &quot;Am I free to go?&quot;. You can say &quot;I do not consent to any search&quot;. Your proposed declaration of rights is pretty vague. Exactly what rights are you talking about? Your right to freedom of religion? Your right to bear arms? Your right to not have to quarter soldiers in your house? Your right to an education? Many detainee statements have been found by the courts to be ineffective because they were unclear. You could give it a shot and see if the Supreme Court accepts your &quot;universal assertion of rights&quot; as effectively invoking your specific 4th and 5th amendment rights. Unless you have something in mind (like, the 6th amendment), the most effective statement is a very specific one. Silence, lawyer, no search.
In the US, they would not be automatically prosecuted. The prosecutor would have to find out about the testimony, decide to prosecute, and go through all the normal processes they otherwise would, but they have an additional piece of evidence. Per the 5th Amendment to the US Constitution, a witness cannot be forced to answer a question that would incriminate them. If the question was objected to on this ground and the objection overruled, the witness' answer would not be admissible against that witness at trial, and the prosecutor would have to prove the case using other evidence.
Yes. At international borders and international airports (because those are the equivalent of a border), US customs officers may do searches of people and belongings without a warrant and without any particular reason to think they'll find contraband. This includes the authority to do some level of disassembly of the car, if they then reassemble it. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149. This is known as the "border search exception." Moreover, police normally don't need warrants to search your car if it was mobile when they found it and if they have probable cause to believe they'll find contraband. This is known as the "automobile exception" or the "motor vehicle exception." It was established in Carroll v. US, 267 U.S. 132. Individual states may have stricter requirements on police searches, but the Fourth Amendment doesn't require police to get a warrant to search your car if, say, you drove it up to a checkpoint and they have probable cause. The difference at a border is that they don't need probable cause and the car never had to be mobile: they can search you on a hunch.
In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17).