Are agencies controlled by the President or not? How much control is enough for a textualist to accept the Chevron doctrine? In this video, at 11:20 Justice Scalia says: Congress created a series of agencies insulated from presidential control In the same video, at 57:06, in answering a question about the Chevron doctrine, Justisce Scalia says: The question is: if I think that agencies are not such doggone experts, why should I defer to them this way? I'm not deferring to them because they are experts. I'm deferring to them because their President, who ultimately controls them, has been elected. Doesn't the last statement contradicts the first one? Are agencies controlled by the President or insulated from his control? How much control of The President is enough for a textualist to accept Chevron doctrine? What if he could hire them but not fire them? What if he could suggest them what to do but not order them what to do?
Doesn't the last statement contradicts the first one? Are agencies controlled by the President or insulated from his control? These statements aren't contradictory. They just reflect a somewhat complex reality (although the new post-Scalia ultra-conservative supermajority on the U.S. Supreme Court has pushed the notion of a &quot;unitary executive&quot;, a long time conservative goal, that casts doubt on the constitutional validity of the structures discussed below that previously went unchallenged). Especially starting around the time of the New Deal (the 1930s), Congress started to vigorously utilize the concept of an &quot;independent agency&quot; such as the National Labor Relations Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Postal Service Board (formed in the 1970s), Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and myriad other &quot;alphabet agencies.&quot; (The Federal Reserve Board was one the first). Congress also experimented with structures like that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the FBI) whose director serves for a seven years term, even though the director is a single person rather than a collective board. Generally speaking, these agencies are run by the Presidentially appointed and U.S. Senate confirmed directors or boards with appointee who serve for fixed terms. As Presidential appointees, they are ultimately controlled by the Presidency as an institution, even if not by the current sitting President. But, since these appointees have fixed terms of office and aren't merely employees at will who may be fired on demand by the President like cabinet secretaries, these appointees have some measure of insulation from direct Presidential direction on a day to day basis in the minutia of decision making. How much control of The President is enough for a textualist to accept Chevron doctrine? What if he could hire them but not fire them? What if he could suggest them what to do but not order them what to do? The Chevron doctrine really has nothing to do with the amount of authority that the President exercises over independent agencies and the civil service. Instead, the Chevron doctrine is a separation of powers doctrine that provides that courts should defer to the executive branch (which is ultimately directed by the President, who has near absolute authority over agencies in some cases, and less authority over agencies in other cases), rather than interpreting laws from a blank slate, in cases where a federal agency has adopted an authoritative interpretation of a federal law that is not precluded by a fair reading of the statue in question, even if the court would have interpreted the statute differently in the absence of federal agency input. The Chevron doctrine tilts the balance between courts and the President in favor of the President, making the President stronger than the President would otherwise have been in the absence of this doctrine. (And, keep in mind that all regulations and litigation of the federal government goes through the Justice Department, which the President does directly control, to a great extent, even when agencies are independent and have significant autonomy.) The authority of the President to direct tenured civil servants who are not political appointees who can be hired and fired at will, or with U.S. Senate approval, is an entirely different issue with far less of a constitutional dimension until the last couple of years when a conservative supermajority captured the U.S. Supreme Court and has tried to push the non-textual and non-originalist &quot;unitary executive&quot; doctrine.
Art II, Sec 2, Cl 1 of The Constitution says of the president "and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment". The Constitution does not state any further restrictions on the presidential power, and there are no statutory limits, because, as observed in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 The power of pardon conferred by the Constitution upon the President is unlimited except in cases of impeachment. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. The power is not subject to legislative control. Accordingly, presidents have written pardons on and with numerous different writing instruments. Insofar as there are no constitutional restrictions beyond the aforementioned, it is not required that a pardon be signed, or that it be on a tangible semi-permanent medium. It is impossible to know what such a pardon tweet would look like, beyond the limit on length. The one place where a presidential signature is required is under the Presentment Clause, that when presented with a bill that passed the two houses of Congress, "If he approve he shall sign it". Such a signature need not be actually written by the president, it may and often is written by an autopen. The question of the legality of autopen signatures for bills has not been presented to SCOTUS, but the Department of Justice has issued an opinion (July 7, 2005) that it is legal. I have failed to locate a repository of presidential pardons (the actual documents), so I do not know if, so far, all presidential pardons were written down and signed, though I would expect it to be so. The Arpaio pardon was signed (or auto-signed), likewise Obama's final mass-pardon on Jan 17, and previous Obama pardons were, but pre-Obama, DOJ does not provide any document.
In general, a person may appoint as many agents as s/he wishes for a particular purpose. The principal is responsible for the actions of all such agents, unless they exceeded their powers or instructions, and in some cases even then. In this particular case all such accesses would have to be &quot;reasonable&quot; taken together, and if the various agents fail to coordinate their requests for access, the result may be an unreasonable burden on the tenant. But as far as I can determine there is no formal process that a Kansas landlord must go through to appoint an agent, nor any specific limit on the number of agents appointed. The general law of agency is flexible on such matters. A tenant would be justified in asking for proof (or at least evidence) that a person is in fact acting as a landlord's agent, or in confirming with the landlord. The complex management is clearly the landlord's agent.
Why has this never been interpreted by SCOTUS? It has never been interpreted by any court, because the interpretation you're advocating is nonsensical, and nobody has ever tried to advance it in any court. Therefore, no court has had an opportunity to rule on it. Congress, however, has (at least implicitly) interpreted this clause to mean that all natural-born citizens are eligible to be president if they also fulfill the other requirements, regardless of when they were born, so that is the prevailing interpretation unless someone manages to challenge the interpretation either before congress or in a court. If such a challenge is made then there will be an explicit ruling.
Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
From Clinton v. Jones 520 U.S. 681 (1997): Deferral of this litigation until petitioner's Presidency ends is not constitutionally required. [...] The separation-of-powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. [...] Nixon v Fitzgerald provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 731 (1982): Petitioner, as a former President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts. [...] The President's absolute immunity extends to all acts within the &quot;outer perimeter&quot; of his duties of office.
Trump was an officer of the government, and Twitter wasn't. The First Amendment forbids the government and its agents from viewpoint discrimination, but private companies are not bound by it and can discriminate as much as they please. (There was a question as to whether such discrimination might affect whether the company enjoys a shield from liability under 47 USC 230, but even so they have the right to block and censor as they wish if they are willing to risk that liability.)
No. They could be, but the &quot;nullification&quot; wouldn't be automatic. That is because, as the Congressional Research Service says in its excellent &quot;Executive Orders: An Introduction&quot;: &quot;Once issued, a valid executive order has the force and effect of law. Executive orders do not, by default, expire when the issuing President leaves office. Instead, an issued executive order remains in effect until it is either struck down in court, modified, or revoked.&quot; Because executive orders persist but can be easily changed, one of the first orders of business of a new administration is to revoke, modify or re-issue inherited executive orders. As far as your hypothetical, most commenters agree that when the President is expected to return to office quickly, the Acting President's job is simply to &quot;keep shop.&quot; However, in extreme cases, such as the one you outline, they also agree the Acting President can exercise the full-range of Presidential powers. Thus, the Acting President could revoke the problematic orders. (This is discussed in Yale Law School's in the Yale Law School's &quot;Reader's Guide&quot; to the 25th Amendment.) If you want to know more, the Wikipedia page on Executive Orders gives a short (and harmless) summary. For more detail, see either the CRS pamphlet cited above, or their earlier pamphlet,&quot;Executive Orders: Issuance, Modification, and Revocation.&quot;