If the law specifically disallows a criminal charge under a condition, does it still go before a jury if the condition is met? I have a friend who has been charged with criminal threatening. This kind of law is not supposed to be applied when a person makes a threat against someone attacking them. In NH the phraseology is as follows: 631:4:IV. A person who responds to a threat which would be considered by a reasonable person as likely to cause serious bodily injury or death to the person or to another by displaying a firearm or other means of self-defense with the intent to warn away the person making the threat shall not have committed a criminal act under this section. The situation was that the accused had his house broken into by the police doing a "wellness check", and he was unaware that they were police and he threatened them verbally thinking they were intruders. The case would clearly seem to be covered by the exception to the law above. So, the question is: when an exception like this is explicitly called out in the statute, is it still necessary for the case to be heard by jury, or can a judge simply dismiss the charges on the grounds of IV above? If such a dismissal is moved by the defendant's attorney, does it need to be done at the arraignment or can it be done later, for example, in a pre-trial brief?
This is an example of an affirmative defense In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Where the law provides an exception that amounts to if you do X you commit a crime unless Y, the defense has to prove (to a lower burden) that Y happened. An affirmative defense only kicks in if the prosecution has proved their case; which is usually because the defense concedes it if they are relying on an affirmative defense. An affirmative defense also must be introduced as soon as possible; preferably before charges are laid but, if not, at the commital/arraignment - courts take a dim view (up to excluding them entirely) if they are introduced late. As to whether a case like this goes to trial that depends on the evidence available to support Y and the weight that the prosecutor and then the committal/arraignment judge/grand jury gives to that evidence. If they believe that a jury would believe it, they will not take it trial; if they don't, they will.
An act in self defense is legal (StGB §32): &quot;(1) Whoever commits an act in self-defence does not act unlawfully&quot;. However, &quot;(2)'Self-defence' means any defensive action which is necessary to avert a present unlawful attack on oneself or another&quot; – removing a trespasser is not necessary to avert an unlawful attack. This does not apply to removing an annoying person. Under §223, physically assaulting a person is a punishable offense. Pushing a person is one form of assault (so is punching them or pummeling them, perhaps a more severe form depending on the physical damage done). However, the response is also criminal because it goes past that which is necessary to avert the assault (a push is not a license to commit mayhem). Under §§33-35 there are defenses for excessive self-defense (&quot;Whoever exceeds the limits of self-defence due to confusion, fear or fright incurs no penalty&quot;), which don't seem applicable in this situation (rage is not the same as fright).
The short answer is &quot;yes&quot;. There is U.S. Supreme Court authority that supports this position, In particular, United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 599 (1965), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), stand for the proposition that a defendant may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurances that he will not be punished for those actions. If the U.S. Department of Justice (or a U.S. Attorney with jurisdiction over the place the offense was committed) (hereinafter DOJ) says this, people who reasonably rely on that pronouncement can't be prosecuted until a different policy is announced and people who acted in reliance on the previous DOJ position are given a reasonable opportunity to change their conduct in response to the newly announced policy. The statement does have to be a publicly announced policy (or a policy personally communicated to the defendant or his counsel), and not just a de facto reality in terms of prosecutions not being brought in the past, or a secret, unannounced policy (or, for example, an unofficial and offhand statement of the U.S. Attorney General at a party that does not amount to a policy statement). Of course, the defense doesn't protect you if the DOJ says it won't prosecute if you do X, but you do X times Y which goes beyond the safe harbor created by the DOJ pronouncement. For example, the DOJ might say that they will not prosecute conduct involving marijuana offenses that is legal under state law, if it does not violate any other laws, and also meets certain conditions found in federal law (e.g. no offenses within 1000 feet of a school) that the DOJ chooses not to refrain from enforcing. But, if the DOJ then publicly says that it will start enforcing federal law without exceptions on July 1, 2021 and has rescinded its prior policy, a reasonable time in advance, then this defense ceases for conduct after that date. What constitutes reasonable notice would depend upon the facts and circumstances. The DOJ can also reach a binding agreement not to prosecute a particular instance of conduct by a particular person irrevocably in connection with plea bargaining type agreements, with respect to offenses of which the DOJ has jurisdiction (but not necessarily prosecutions by a different government such as a state government or the government of another country, for which the DOJ is not an authorized representative). For example, suppose that a mail carrier is killed by a resident of a home claiming to have acted in self-defense in Denver, Colorado. The DOJ could reach an irrevocable agreement with the resident to accept a plea bargain to a misdemeanor charge of not paying the tax due on the sale of the firearm from a non-compliant gun shop, dismissing forever the charge of murder of a federal post office employee. But that agreement would not bar the District Attorney in Denver from bringing murder charges twenty years later under state law prohibiting murder of human beings in the State of Colorado. For the defendant resident to prevent that from happening definitively, an agreement from the State of Colorado's District Attorney in Denver, or the Colorado Attorney General, would also be required.
A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high.
Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.
colorado In the U.S., this is largely a question of state law and while similar from state to state, it is not identical. In Colorado, which basically follows the majority rule, there are a couple of justifications that could be available: (1) the use of force justified for defense of property, and (2) the use of force justified for a citizen's arrest. In the case of defense of property, the rule is as follows: Use of physical force in defense of property A person is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent what he reasonably believes to be an attempt by the other person to commit theft, criminal mischief, or criminal tampering involving property, but he may use deadly physical force under these circumstances only in defense of himself or another as described in section 18-1-704. Colo. Rev. Statutes § 18-1-706. In the case of a citizen's arrest, the rule is: A private person acting on his own account is justified in using reasonable and appropriate physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to effect an arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody of an arrested person who has committed an offense in his presence; but he is justified in using deadly physical force for the purpose only when he reasonably believes it necessary to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-707(7). Can the victim shoot the pickpocket and claim heat of passion as a defense? No. Deadly force is not authorized against a pickpocket, and shooting someone almost always counts (often by definition) as a use of deadly force. The &quot;heat of passion&quot; defense only downgrades a murder charge to manslaughter and probably wouldn't apply in any case in these circumstances. Can the victim grab, tackle, or punch the pickpocket? Can the victim say, &quot;Give back my wallet or I will punch you&quot;? Does the answer vary depending on which of the two people would be at an advantage in a physical confrontation, based on size, age or gender? The law doesn't answer these question at this level of specificity. Whether the force used was &quot;reasonable and appropriate&quot; and was &quot;reasonably believed to be necessary&quot; are determined after the fact on a case by case basis by the finder of fact (i.e. the judge in a bench trial, or the jury in a jury trial).
I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").
This is a great question because it's a useful vehicle for understanding a cross-cutting principle of law: baselines and exceptions. I find that thinking of law as a system of baseline rules and exceptions to these rules is a great way to organize and make sense of the mess that is 'the law.' A police officer testifying about what you told them, whether it helps you or hurts you, is hearsay. So, as you correctly pointed out, the baseline assumption is that that testimony can't come in. But, the hearsay rule is famous for having a ton of exceptions to it. Two relevant exceptions here are: (1) statements against interest, and (2) prior inconsistent statements. If what you told the police officer was a direct admission of liability, or a statement that contradicts the theory of the case that you're presenting to the jury, either or both of these exceptions are going to kick in and make that hearsay admissible. These exceptions are not going to kick in, however, for hearsay statements that help you. A humorous, but related, aside, is that there's some jurisdictional differences in how far the 'statements against interest' exception goes. In some jurisdictions it only applies to admissions of liability, but in other jurisdictions it also applies to simply embarrassing statements. My evidence professor illustrated this by, out of the blue, mind you, saying, in class, &quot;I stopped wetting the bed when I got to college,&quot; and then explaining that in the latter type of jurisdiction, that statement would be admissible. He then paused after the class had finally stopped laughing and said &quot;that's not true, by the way...I stopped in high school.&quot;