Can gender fraud be used to nullify a marriage in India? Hypothetical A is a male who married B, a woman, in India under Hindu religion. A had never met B, and relied on photographs and the efforts of third parties. The marriage is less than 2 months old. A is of the opinion that B has a masculine appearance and acts in a characteristically male manner. A currently lives in the U.S. A wants a divorce and anticipates that B will resist his efforts to divorce. Questions Can A successfully file for divorce or have the marriage annulled? What defenses can B assert to stop a divorce or annulment?
First, it is quite unlikely that a US court would take on the case. Someone will have more details, but for example in EU law if you move away from the place you last lived together, you can only file for divorce in the country where your partner is living (in this case, India). Annullment is a much more serious matter than divorce, so I doubt any American court would take this case: Annulment would mean that a US court would have to decide that an Indian registry office didn't do its job right. Second, A needs convincing evidence. Frankly, "masculine appearance" and "typical masculine voice" are just opinions and therefore not evidence. Even if the court were convinced that B has a "masculine appearance" that's not evidence for being a male. A has to show the evidence, and as half of us know and the other half learned in their biology lessons, there is some pretty convincing evidence that someone is a man which A didnt' mention. And I'd ask anyone not to edit this out, because it is quite essential to the case. B doesn't have to visit a doctor and get a statement that she is a woman (which would destroy any case immediately), because based on the available evidence, A will lose the case anyway. On the other hand, after that court case has finished, B can at any time (after appropriate waiting times according to US law) come to the USA and file for divorce.
Privilege May Be Irrelevant In Your Case In a criminal case in the U.S., a criminal prosecution is moot and dismissed if the criminal defendant dies (or even if the criminal defendant is convicted and the case is still on appeal). (Pending divorce cases also abate upon the death of a spouse, but most other civil cases do not.) Caveat: Your Mileage May Vary Privilege law is established on a state by state basis and at the federal level based upon federal law, so it can vary. Confidential Communications v. The Testimonial Privilege There are really two privileges. The privilege for confidential communications between a husband and wife survives the marriage (although it does not impose a duty on a spouse not to disclose confidential communications outside court testimony) and may be asserted by either party to the communication. The testimonial privilege allows someone facing criminal charges or a civil claim in court to prevent a current spouse from testifying against them whether or not the current spouse wishes to testify. Exceptons To Spousal Privilege Both privileges generally exclude criminal and civil claims between the spouses and sometimes certain other crimes, and often also ongoing crimes and an intent to commit a future crime. In Colorado, the privilege extends to crimes allegedly committed against children, however, although this would not be true in all states. The detailed example of the Colorado statute on this point is set forth below. The 5th Amendment Alternative To The Testimonial Privilege Note that even when the testimonial privilege does not apply because a marriage has ended due to death, divorce or annulment, the former spouse may still be able to claim a 5th Amendment privilege out of concerns about prosecution, for example, for aiding and abetting, conspiracy, or accessory liability, if the witness is not given immunity (which is usually available only in criminal cases, not in civil cases brought by a private party who does not have authority to grant immunity). Spousal Immunity Contrasted With Spousal Privilege Spousal immunity is a very different concept from spousal privilege. Historically, you were immune from criminal liability for most crimes committed against your spouse (except murder), and had immunity from civil liability from all civil lawsuits brought by or on behalf of a spouse against the other spouse (e.g. breach of contract, personal injury, property disputes), except a suit for dissolution or annulment of a marriage or legal separation. If you have immunity from criminal or civil liability, testimony is irrelevant. You can't be found guilty period. The criminal liability immunities were lifted for all crimes other than rape long ago, and relatively recently for marital non-consent rape (there is still generally immunity from statutory rape or person in position of trust rape committed during the marriage). The civil liabilities were mostly eliminated many decades ago. The Example Of Colorado's Spousal Privilege Statute In Colorado, the spousal privilege statute reads as follows (later parts of the statute apply to other privileges): Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-90-107. Who may not testify without consent - definitions (1) There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the law to encourage confidence and to preserve it inviolate; therefore, a person shall not be examined as a witness in the following cases: (a)(I) Except as otherwise provided in section 14-13-310(4), C.R.S., a husband shall not be examined for or against his wife without her consent nor a wife for or against her husband without his consent; nor during the marriage or afterward shall either be examined without the consent of the other as to any communications made by one to the other during the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other, or a criminal action or proceeding against one or both spouses when the alleged offense occurred prior to the date of the parties' marriage. However, this exception shall not attach if the otherwise privileged information is communicated after the marriage. (II) The privilege described in this paragraph (a) does not apply to class 1, 2, or 3 felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401(1) (a) (IV) and (1) (a) (V), C.R.S., or to level 1 or 2 drug felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401.5(2) (a), C.R.S. In this instance, during the marriage or afterward, a husband shall not be examined for or against his wife as to any communications intended to be made in confidence and made by one to the other during the marriage without his consent, and a wife shall not be examined for or against her husband as to any communications intended to be made in confidence and made by one to the other without her consent. (III) Communications between a husband and wife are not privileged pursuant to this paragraph (a) if such communications are made for the purpose of aiding the commission of a future crime or of a present continuing crime. (IV) The burden of proving the existence of a marriage for the purposes of this paragraph (a) shall be on the party asserting the claim. (V) Notice of the assertion of the marital privilege shall be given as soon as practicable but not less than ten days prior to assertion at any hearing. (a.5)(I) Except as otherwise provided in section 14-13-310(5), C.R.S., a partner in a civil union shall not be examined for or against the other partner in the civil union without the other partner's consent, nor during the civil union or afterward shall either be examined without the consent of the other as to any communications made by one to the other during the civil union; except that this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other, a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other, or a criminal action or proceeding against one or both partners when the alleged offense occurred prior to the date of the parties' certification of the civil union. However, this exception shall not attach if the otherwise privileged information is communicated after the certification of the civil union. (II) The privilege described in this paragraph (a.5) does not apply to class 1, 2, or 3 felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401(1) (a) (IV) and (1) (a) (V), C.R.S., or to level 1 or 2 drug felonies as described in section 18-1.3-401.5(2) (a), C.R.S. In this instance, during the civil union or afterward, a partner in a civil union shall not be examined for or against the other partner in the civil union as to any communications intended to be made in confidence and made by one to the other during the civil union without the other partner's consent. (III) Communications between partners in a civil union are not privileged pursuant to this paragraph (a.5) if such communications are made for the purpose of aiding the commission of a future crime or of a present continuing crime. (IV) The burden of proving the existence of a civil union for the purposes of this paragraph (a.5) shall be on the party asserting the claim. (V) Notice of the assertion of the privilege described in this paragraph (a.5) shall be given as soon as practicable but not less than ten days prior to assertion at any hearing. (VI) For the purposes of this paragraph (a.5), "partner in a civil union" means a person who has entered into a civil union established in accordance with the requirements of article 15 of title 14, C.R.S. The reference to C.R.S. § 14-13-310(4) is to the section on child-custody hearings. How Serious Are The Crimes To Which Testimonial Privilege Does Not Apply In Colorado? Class 1, 2 or 3 felonies to which the confidential communication husband-wife privilege applies but not the testimonial husband-wife privilege apply in Colorado are quite serious offenses. Class 1 felonies in Colorado have a mandatory minimum sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole (or life with possibility of parole after 40 years if the offender is a minor). Class 1 felonies include first degree murder for which the death penalty is available in some cases and aggravated kidnapping where death is presumed because the victim has not be released alive. Class 2 felonies in Colorado are punishable by eight to thirty-six years in person (eight to twenty-four years if non-violent, sixteen to thirty-six if violent). Class 2 felonies would include second degree murder, kidnapping involving the rape or robbery of the victim, gang rape, rape committed with a deadly weapon, rape causing serious bodily injury, theft of more than $1,000,000, and attempted Class 1 felonies. Class 3 felonies are punishable by four to eighteen years in prison (four to twelve if non-violent, eight to eighteen years if violent). Class 3 felonies would include heat of passion murder, aggravated armed robbery, aggravated armed burglary, aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury or disfigurement or a permanent disability (and not in the heat of passion), human trafficking for involuntary servitude or sexual servitude (including keeping slaves), kidnapping for ransom or with a deadly weapon, forcible rape, rape committed by incapacitating someone with drugs, or rape caused by a credible threat of "imminent death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain, or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone", arson of a building, and theft of $100,000 or more but less than $1,000,000. A class 1 drug felony is punishable by eight to thirty-two years in prison. A class 2 drug felony is punishable by four to eight years in prison. These involve drug dealing of large amounts of drugs and/or drug dealing to children. Among the crimes to which the marital privilege would be still apply would be manslaughter, assault not causing serious bodily injury, theft of less than $100,000, unarmed burglary, unarmed robbery, kidnapping without a weapon and without asking for ransom, drug dealing in moderate amounts to adults, statutory rape, rape by a person in a position of trust, rape without consent but without use of physical force (e.g. by blackmail not involving physical violence threats), or arson of property other than a building. Of course, by charging a serious crime, one may cause the privilege to evaporate even if it is unlikely to result in a conviction for that crime.
The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well.
The parties are generally entitled to present their case as they see fit, as long as they stay within the rules of evidence. If they want a straight yes or no, the court will often require the witness to provide one, which keeps lawyers happy, makes the answers clear for the jury, and limits the parties' grounds for appeal. If a yes or no answer is not as accurate as a more qualified answer, the other lawyer would typically have an opportunity to invite the witness to provide a fuller answer on redirect. If a yes or no answer is inappropriate because of assumption embedded in the question -- as in your &quot;beating his wife and kids&quot; example -- the question should quickly elicit an objection from the defense attorney, who would note that the question lacks foundation or assumes facts not in evidence. Assuming there isn't any evidence of domestic violence, the court should sustain the objection, in which case the witness would not need to answer at all.
There is virtually no chance this would be admissible. When a defendant argues that abuse at the hands of third party led to a mental defect that excuses her from culpability, the prosecution is free to rebut that argument. However, the prosecution's evidence must be relevant, i.e., it must have a tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less likely to be true. Here, none of the proffered evidence has any real bearing on any fact of consequence: The fact that the defendant is taller than the alleged abuser does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. The fact that the defendant's &quot;fake&quot; voice (what does that even mean?) is deeper than the alleged abuser's does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. The fact that young white women have more Tinder matches than middle-aged Indian men does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. Even if you could find some thin reed on which to hang the relevance of these racial and gender stereotypes, the evidence would likely still be excluded under Rule 403, as the probative value would be so trivial that it would be outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.
The first thing to note is that your question is kind of the wrong way around. US states are sovereign and generally have the ability to make any kind of laws they want, unless they violate some specific tenet of federal law or the US Constitution. You suggest, for instance, that arguments which are "culturally founded" have no place in the law, but that's just your opinion, and there isn't generally anything preventing a state from making law based on such things, should its elected legislature see fit to do so. (Indeed, one could argue that nearly all laws are in some sense "culturally founded", since they are based on some notion of what kind of behavior is or is not appropriate, and those tend to be culturally based.) So legally speaking, the states aren't, by default, obligated to give any sort of justification for the laws they made. The burden of proof is on the other side. Someone seeking to overturn those laws would have to convince a court that the laws violated some specific provision of the Constitution (or another superior law). If they couldn't convince a court of this, the law would stand. From what I have read, before the US Supreme Court's 2015 legalization of same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, the previous precedent was set in 1971 by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Baker v. Nelson. The decision itself is quite short and is worthwhile to read. Quoting Wikipedia's summary, the plaintiffs claimed that Minnesota's restriction of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated several provisions of the US Constitution: First Amendment (freedom of speech and of association), Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), Ninth Amendment (unenumerated right to privacy), and Fourteenth Amendment (fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause and sex discrimination contrary to the Equal Protection Clause). The Minnesota court determined that none of the plaintiffs' objections were valid. Again, I'll refer you to the decision for the details, but the court mainly focused on their Fourteenth Amendment arguments (the others may have been addressed by the trial court, whose opinion I can't find online). They wrote: The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the due process clause, is not offended by the state's classification of persons authorized to marry. There is no irrational or invidious discrimination. They specifically rejected any analogy to bans on interracial marriage, which had been held unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia: But in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex. Baker appealed to the US Supreme Court, but his appeal was dismissed "for want of a substantial federal question," without any further explanation. (Nobody quite seems to understand what they meant by that, but here is an essay discussing the situation in a little more depth.) The effect of the dismissal was that the Minnesota court's decision became binding precedent upon the whole nation - laws against same-sex marriage didn't violate those provisions of the Constitution. And that was how matters stood for 44 years until Obergefell. (Of course, there was nothing to stop individual states from deciding to allow same-sex marriage, and some in fact did so in the meantime.) You have suggested that laws against same-sex marriage were religiously motivated. This might suggest an argument that they would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs in Baker didn't raise that point, so it wasn't considered in the Minnesota court's opinion. I don't know whether any other courts have considered it; no such argument was mentioned in the opinion in Obergefell.
To answer the last question, the court cannot order a DNA test, see Kumar v. Gupta, on privacy grounds: &quot;such tests impinge upon the right of privacy of an individual and could also have major societal repercussions&quot;. This is not a hard line, but it would be safe to conclude that in a case like the present, the Court’s decision should be rendered only after balancing the interests of the parties, i.e, the quest for truth, and the social and cultural implications involved therein See Puttaswamy v. India, the landmark case that established the constitutional right to privacy. DNA evidence is not absolutely barred, see Banarsi Dass V. Teeku Dutta and citations therein, finding most importantly that There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. Various rulings have clarified that Section 112 establishes a defeasible presumption, and not a mindless bar to evidence: It is rebuttable presumption of law that a child born during the lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that access occurred between the parents. In other words, yes and no. As summarized in that ruling, tests cannot be ordered routinely or as a form of discovery, &quot;There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act&quot;, the court must balance the consequences of ordering such a test (&quot;branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman&quot;), and a person cannot be compelled to give a blood sample.
The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court.