Are authorities allowed to use technology to read your mind? If a technology that reads minds existed, would it be legal for authorities in the United States to use that technology to extract incriminating information from a defendant's mind against their will? Although mind reading technology is currently limited, it is improving rapidly. See, for example, the following article in MIT technology review: https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/03/17/1069897/tech-read-your-mind-probe-your-memories/ and the following wikipedia article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain-reading I was inspired to ask this question after reading the related question: Why is knowledge inside one&#39;s head considered privileged information but knowledge written on a piece of paper is not?
In the US at least, there is no mention of &quot;mind reading&quot; in the Constitution. But should such a technology be developed and actually used to read someone's mind and then that information was used against them in court, I can certainly see an appeal on at least 5th Amendment grounds. It's also possible that should such a technology become viable, that state legislatures and even the US Congress passing prohibitions on using it under certain circumstances.
More generally, the university gets to set whatever rules it wants, unless there is a law limiting what it can do. For example, in the US a government university (qua arm of government) cannot require you to have a particular religion or profess a particular creed, but a private one can. An employer could require you to be in your office from 9 to 5, even though it is legal to not be in an office from 9 to 5. The general principle is that the institution can set its own rules for operation, unless those rules violate the law. Generally, the owner of property has the right to say how it can be used. It is quite common for universities to have variable policies regarding access to their books (e.g. "anybody can walk in and do things with the volumes, which are out in the open, except they have to have borrower's permission to take it out of the building" to "you cannot enter at all, and must have special permission to inspect the book -- nobody can take the books out of the building"). My experience is that UK libraries have a tighter rein on their holdings than do US universities (the sampling problem here is non-trivial). In some cases, the absolute control of the property owner is somewhat overridden by law, especially if the institution is a state-run university (not in the UK). Another possibility is that access to books is a contractual right (some kind of "terms of service" that you and they are bound to). Even in the case of US state universities, I cannot imagine a government having a law declaring the right to copy books to be such a fundamental right that a university cannot deny you that right. The most likely scenario for enforcement is as a contractual matter. A complete analysis of the relationship between the individual and the institution would be way too broad for here, but here is a sample of the questions that could arise. What is the source of your right to access books? Perhaps you are employed as a faculty person: do you have a contract? Can you be fired for breaking rules: are there any limits on what acts can lead to firing? What procedures if any are specified for termination, and what avenue of internal appeal exist? The government would not overrule the institution's decision unless they didn't follow the contractually-governed procedures for termination. Apart from the legal question, a perfectly coherent reason to prohibit scanning books whose copyright has expired is that the act of scanning them may damage the book.
As far as I know, the leading case on the matter is Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43. There, the court explains While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, a corporation is a creature of the State, and there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. There is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation, and the latter, being a creature of the State, has not the constitutional right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State; and an officer of a corporation which is charged with criminal violation of a statute cannot plead the criminality of the corporation as a refusal to produce its books. The court specifically denies that corporations have 5th Amendment rights: The benefits of the Fifth Amendment are exclusively for a witness compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, and he cannot set them up on behalf of any other person or individual, or of a corporation of which he is an officer or employe. This contrast with protection against unreasonable searched of corporations, per the 4th Amendment: A corporation is but an association of individuals with a distinct name and legal entity, and, in organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no appropriate constitutional immunities, and, although it cannot refuse to produce its books and papers, it is entitled to immunity under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, where an examination of its books is not authorized by an act of Congress, a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of practically all of its books and papers is as indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms. Similarly, in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, the constitutional privilege against testifying against himself cannot be raised for his personal benefit by an officer of the corporation having the documents in his possession. ... An officer of a corporation cannot refuse to produce documents of a corporation on the ground that they would incriminate him simply because he himself wrote or signed them, and this even if indictments are pending against him. Likewise, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 ("The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals") and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85: Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination held not available to member of dissolved law partnership who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the partnership's financial books and records, since the partnership, though small, had an institutional identity and petitioner held the records in a representative, not a personal, capacity. The privilege is "limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." So only natural persons can plead the fifth.
In the United States . . . Scope of Search Warrant: To what extent can they search you and your belongings? The scope of a search is limited by what is stated in the warrant. Not only must a warrant be supported by probably cause, it must also describe with particularity, "the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." See U.S. Const. Amend. 4. For example, they cannot search a house if the warrant specifies the backyard, nor can they search for weapons if the warrant specifies marijuana plants. However, that doesn't mean that officers can seize only those items listed in the warrant. If, in the course of their search, police officers come across contraband or evidence of a crime that is not listed in the warrant, they can often seize it. When it comes to containers, the police are allowed to search anything that items could be inside. So, if they're looking for stolen TV's, they can't search a jewelry box or under the floor boards. However if they looking for something small, like bomb parts, just about everything is fair game. To search you, the warrant would need to authorize the search of your person, or the police would need an independent justification to search you. For example, if they found explosives that were illegal to posses, they could conduct a search incident to arrest. Can they search your entire computer? Yes, assuming computers are within the scope of the warrant. Compelling people to produce passwords of encryption keys: If they find encrypted files can they detain you until you decrypt them? This depends on your jurisdiction as it is a developing area of law and deal with 5th amendment. This is something that would not be done through a search warrant and would involve a separate proceeding. In this situation, constitutional privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Const. Amend. V, may be implicated. Case where Court held producing passwords violated the 5th Amendment: The government's postindictment grand jury subpoena ordering the defendant to provide all passwords associated with his computer in order to secure evidence of child pornography allegedly contained in the computer, which spawned the three counts contained in the indictment, required the defendant to make a "testimonial communication," and thus the subpoena violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination, where the government was not seeking documents or objects but instead was requiring the defendant to divulge through his mental processes his password that would be used to incriminate him, the district court in U.S. v. Kirschner, 823 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Mich. 2010), held. The court explained, an act is "testimonial," and thus protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the accused is forced to reveal his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the government. It is the extortion of information from the accused, the attempt to force him to disclose the contents of his own mind, that implicates the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, the court said. Case where Court held producing passwords did not violate the 5th Amendment: The district court in U.S. v. Fricosu, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Colo. 2012), recognizing that production of a document may fall within the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination since it acknowledges that the document exists, that it is in the possession or control of the producer, and that it is authentic, held that the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not implicated by requiring her to produce the unencrypted contents of a computer where the government knew of the existence and location of the computer's files; a preponderance of the evidence established either that the computer belonged to the defendant or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she had the ability to access its encrypted contents; and the government had offered her immunity, precluding it from using her act of producing those unencrypted contents against her. The court determined, also, that a preponderance of the evidence, in a motion to compel production of the unencrypted contents of the computer, found during a search of the defendant's residence, showed that either the computer belonged to her or that she was its sole or primary user, such that she could access its encrypted contents, supporting the decision to compel her to produce those unencrypted contents, where the defendant acknowledged, during a telephone conversation with her ex-husband, that she owned or had such a computer, the contents of which were accessible only by entry of a password, and the computer, which was found in her bedroom, was identified with her name. This issues probably will not be decided one way or the other until the supreme court rules on it. If they find a password safe can they force you to give them a password and >then can they log into all accounts you have stored in it? When you say password safe, I am assuming you mean password management software. If so, see above. If you don't give them the password but they find it written down somewhere, can they still use it? Yes, assuming their warrant allows them to search papers or it is in plain view. Out of curiosity, do police ever actually do this? Find a password protected file on a computer and go through all the papers in the desk and try all possible passwords until they find one? I'm not sure, but it wouldn't surprise me. Even if they don't have a warrant that covers papers, police have been known to bend the rules. I think someone with police experience could have a better answer for this.
Affirmative authority that this particular use (incorporation of the format of another program's textual data files into your own program) is protected is somewhat elusive in the US system; however there's a lot of observable evidence that reverse engineering data file formats without a license is widespread. My sense is that this would be analyzed under the same rubric as other kinds of reverse engineering and/or fair use. I'm sure there are others here who are better able to clearly and concisely explain that law than I am. However there may be limits — it seems Microsoft was able to prevent VirtualDub's use of the ASF format by patenting it. That said, it's hard to see how an unencrypted, unencoded ASCII data file file could be patentable (i.e. where the ASCII strings are the data, generated in response to user input, and the format is just their order and separators, etc). For the European arena, there is recent authority in SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Limited that the format of a program's data files are not protected by copyright when reverse engineered without the source code. The following is from the digest and application of the CJEUs decision by the English court that referred it, in its subsequent judgment: The judgment of the CJEU On 29 November 2011 Advocate General Bot delivered his Opinion on the questions referred... Questions 1-5 The Court dealt with these questions together. It interpreted this court as asking "in essence, whether Article 1(2) of [the Software Directive] must be interpreted as meaning that the functionality of a computer program and the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and may, as such, be protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive": see [29]. Having referred to recital (14), Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the Software Directive, Article 2 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 9(2) and 10(1) of TRIPS, the Court went on: ... 39. [...] it must be stated that, with regard to the elements of a computer program which are the subject of Questions 1–5, neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program for the purposes of Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250. 40. As the Advocate General states in point 57 of his Opinion, to accept that the functionality of a computer program can be protected by copyright would amount to making it possible to monopolise ideas, to the detriment of technological progress and industrial development. 41. Moreover, point 3.7 of the explanatory memorandum to the Proposal for Directive 91/250 [COM(88) 816] states that the main advantage of protecting computer programs by copyright is that such protection covers only the individual expression of the work and thus leaves other authors the desired latitude to create similar or even identical programs provided that they refrain from copying. 42. With respect to the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program to interpret and execute application programs written by users and to read and write data in a specific format of data files, these are elements of that program by means of which users exploit certain functions of that program. 43. In that context, it should be made clear that, if a third party were to procure the part of the source code or the object code relating to the programming language or to the format of data files used in a computer program, and if that party were to create, with the aid of that code, similar elements in its own computer program, that conduct would be liable to constitute partial reproduction within the meaning of Article 4(a) of Directive 91/250. 44. As is, however, apparent from the order for reference, WPL did not have access to the source code of SAS Institute's program and did not carry out any decompilation of the object code of that program. By means of observing, studying and testing the behaviour of SAS Institute's program, WPL reproduced the functionality of that program by using the same programming language and the same format of data files. 45. The Court also points out that the finding made in paragraph 39 of the present judgment cannot affect the possibility that the SAS language and the format of SAS Institute's data files might be protected, as works, by copyright under Directive 2001/29 if they are their author's own intellectual creation (see Bezpecnostní softwarová asociace, paragraphs 44 to 46). 46. Consequently, the answer to Questions 1–5 is that Article 1(2) of Directive 91/250 must be interpreted as meaning that neither the functionality of a computer program nor the programming language and the format of data files used in a computer program in order to exploit certain of its functions constitute a form of expression of that program and, as such, are not protected by copyright in computer programs for the purposes of that directive." Regarding the idea that the user has rights to access their output of a program held in a proprietary data file format there is some additional discussion in the that might be helpful in paragraphs 48 - 62 (of the CJEU opinion), discussing the right of a licensee to 'study and observe' the 'underlying' 'ideas and principles' of a program to accomplish 'acts of loading and running necessary for the use of the computer program.'
Yes In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (aka the Pentagon Papers case) The court specifically permitted public disclosure in national newspapers of information that had been officially classified. This was, of course a request for an injunction, not a criminal proceeding, but it is hard rto imagine that a criminal proceeding could have succeeded after the decision, and in fact no prosecution was attempted. At the start of the unsigned opinion, the court wrote: We granted certiorari in these cases in which the United States seeks to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled &quot;History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.&quot; (emphasis added) This makes it clear that the content of the &quot;papers&quot; wa officially classified. In concurrence, Justice Black (joined by Douglas) wrote: I adhere to the view that the Government's case against the Washington Post should have been dismissed, and that the injunction against the New York Times should have been vacated without oral argument when the cases were first presented to this Court. I believe that every moment's continuance of the injunctions against these newspapers amounts to a flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment. The question asks: I am wondering if everyone who leaks classified military documents are going to be charged criminally by the U.S. government Even when such charges are constitutionally permitted, the government has the authority not to proceed with them, if it so chooses, for whatever reason it sees fit. Specific laws 18 USC § 793 prohibits conveying various information about the national defense, military equipment, or preparations for war: with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation § 793 does not refer to classification status at all, and it has no explicit excptions, but it would not apply where ther is no &quot;intent or reason to believe&quot; the information will harm the US or help another country. 18 USC § 794 has an intent requirement simialr to that of 793, but covers different kinds of information. Some of its provisions apply only in wartime, and then the required intent is that the information &quot;will be communicated to the enemy&quot;. Again classification is not mentioned. 18 USC § 795 Covers making images of &quot;vital military and naval installations or equipment&quot; protected by order of the President. Permission of the relevant military commander is required. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 796 is similar to § 795 but limited to images obtained by use of aircraft. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 797 prohibits publication of images taken in violation of § 795, unless approved by a censor. It is in form a prior restraint. No exceptions are listed. 18 USC § 798 Prohibits disclosure of information about cryptographic systems. No exceptions are listed, but I think there is caselaw limiting the coverage of this section. 18 USC § 799 prohibits violation of NASA security regulations.
Yes, there is legal precedent against this that would only apply to a government employee. First, let's discuss the private sector. In this case, you are a private employee that comes to your place of work and accuses you of "stealing the cookies from the cookie jar" which is a serious criminal offense. They wish to talk and your boss is in the room. You plead the 5th, but your boss says you're fired if you don't talk to the cops. This is legal because you still have the right to refuse to talk, you just lose your job. A private employer has the right to free association, and wants nothing to do with cookie thieves, alleged or actual. However, in the government employ, your boss is an agent of the government. This same situation is different because the government pays the boss and the agent... so in essence the government is saying talk or be fired. This is unconstitutional as the government cannot retalitate against you for your refusal to talk. Generally, in order to talk to you, the investigator would need either a signed Garrity Statement or a Signed Kalkines Statement. The former is a statement saying that they are investigating a wrong doing but you cannot lose your job if you refuse to speak to the investigators, where as Kalkines says you must talk but you are granted immunity for your part in the wrong doing, so long as you make truthful statements. For more on this, check this legal blog. There is also the matter that a false accusation (and let me be clear... this is academic, I'm not saying the accusation in the real life topic is false, nor am I saying that the defense is false... we're merely discussing a possibility) is made to your employer and they do not offer the job on the basis of the accusation alone, this is grounds for defamation actions... and in certain jurisdictions, it's criminal defamation, so there could be jail time. It's interesting you mentioned teachers, because this happens alot. Kids do know that there are certain things that get a teacher fired quickly, so teachers do get the occasional false accusation of sexual assault (I know one teacher who has had multiple accusations over the course of her career). One of the few good things I can say about the Teachers Union is they cover the legal defense of accused teachers. The accusations do get the teacher removed from the class for sometime, but they don't lose their jobs over this matter. It's followed up but the accusation doesn't immediately lead to the teacher getting fired..
It is legal for a manufacturer to sell a device which is capable of being misused. For example, a wifi-capable router can be sold even if it is &quot;open&quot; by default. A Bluetooth device has a shorter range than wifi, but in principle can connect to any other device. An owner's legal liability is not different given wifi vs. Bluetooth. Whether or not there is criminal liability for a third person who connects to the device also does not specifically depend on whether the device uses Bluetooth technology, as opposed to some other technology. 18 USC 1030 is the general federal law prohibiting &quot;unauthorized access&quot;. In the case of a bed, two legal question arise: is it a &quot;computer&quot;, and is it &quot;protected&quot;? It is an electronic high speed data processing device which performs logical, arithmetic, storage and communications facilities, i.e. it is a computer (in the legal sense). It probably is not protected, because it is not &quot;used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication&quot;, that is, it is not connected to the internet (unless it is). State laws tend to be broader, not having the &quot;interstate commerce&quot; limitation, so accessing the bed would violate Washington's analog of the federal law. However, under Washington law, the access is probably not &quot;without authorization&quot;. That term is defined as knowingly circumvent technological access barriers to a data system in order to obtain information without the express or implied permission of the owner, where such technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include white hat security research or circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer. The term &quot;without the express or implied permission&quot; does not include access in violation of a duty, agreement, or contractual obligation, such as an acceptable use policy or terms of service agreement, with an internet service provider, internet website, or employer. The term &quot;circumvent technological access barriers&quot; may include unauthorized elevation of privileges, such as allowing a normal user to execute code as administrator, or allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code. One question is whether there is any technological access barrier that the user circumvents (I don't know if it is possible to circumvent &quot;hidden mode&quot;). Since the term &quot;may include ... allowing a remote person without any privileges to run code&quot;, and since playing music on speakers involves running code, then the remote user may be criminally liable. On the third hand, the language of that paragraph (&quot;technological access measures are specifically designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from obtaining such information, but does not include ... circumventing a technological measure that does not effectively control access to a computer&quot;) clearly indicates a legislative intent to address deliberately overcoming active access barriers and not accidentally connecting to an unprotected, open system. Plus, the law also says that you are accessing the computer &quot;in order to obtain information&quot;, but that is not the purpose of transmitting sound to speakers.