Is the typo in the 25th amendment significant? The fourth section of the 25th amendment to the US constitution provides for the president to be declared unfit involuntarily. The first of its two paragraphs describes the declaration itself, made by the vice president along with &quot;a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide.&quot; The second paragraph describes a mechanism for the president to resume the &quot;powers and duties&quot; of the office by declaring &quot;that no inability exists.&quot; This paragraph also establishes a mechanism for &quot;the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide&quot; to challenge the president's declaration. This question is about the difference in the designation of those whose action is required along with the vice president. The first paragraph uses the word &quot;departments,&quot; plural, and the second uses &quot;department,&quot; singular. I suppose that the second paragraph was added during the debates on the amendment, and that the use of the singular in the second paragraph is probably an error. Would courts be likely conclude that the difference is unintentional? If not, does the use of the singular change the meaning of the phrase significantly? I am especially interested in answers that look at the the legislative history of the amendment to support or refute the hypothesis that the second paragraph was an addition to the original form of the text. As far as I can tell, the relevant congressional documents are not available online for the 1960s.
Prologue, a magazine published by the National Archives, had an article about the missing S back in 2012. In short, the problem was due to a scrivener's error. Congress recognized the error at roughly the same time it submitted the amendment to the states but decided it was too late to fix it: There was a brief discussion of the possibility of recalling the joint resolution for reconsideration in each chamber, but Congress was operating under severe time pressures as it worked toward adjournment for the summer, and it was decided that the record of congressional debates and actions on successive versions of the joint resolution made the intent so clear that the missing s could not affect interpretation of the text. The proposed amendment was therefore allowed to go to the states in its imperfect form. Given the basically undisputed nature of the error, I think it would be unlikely that courts would indulge an argument that &quot;department&quot; should be interpreted differently than &quot;departments,&quot; at least in any way that would change the outcome of a dispute under the 25th Amendment.
We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf
SCOTUS suggests in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, that a subject's confession was constitutionally inadmissible if it was adduced by police questioning during a period when petitioner's will was overborne by a drug having the properties of a &quot;truth serum.&quot; In Miranda v. Arizona, it is held that If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 490, n. 14. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and we reassert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Subsequently in Colorado v. Connelly, defendant suffered from psychosis that &quot;interfered with his ability to make free and rational choices and, although not preventing him from understanding his rights, motivated his confession.&quot; The court found that Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not &quot;voluntary&quot; within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Here, the taking of respondent's statements and their admission into evidence constituted no violation of that Clause. While a defendant's mental condition may be a &quot;significant&quot; factor in the &quot;voluntariness&quot; calculus, this does not justify a conclusion that his mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional &quot;voluntariness.&quot; In the Massachusetts case Commonwealth v. Hilton, 443 Mass. 597, the Mass. Supreme Court (in the first ruling) said that We see no error in the judge's finding that the defendant's mental infirmities were such that she did not understand the Miranda warnings, and we therefore conclude that statements made after the interrogation did become custodial were properly suppressed. On remand and after in a second appear, in Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a finding that the defendant was unable to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of her Miranda rights is not enough, standing alone, to support the finding that her statements were involuntary. The court found that the defendant was competent to stand trial contrary to the trial judge's determination, and said that because we are unable to determine if the judge would have allowed the supplemental motion to suppress without the erroneous findings, we vacate the order for suppression and remand for further consideration. The point here is that being mentally disabled is not per se proof that a confession is involuntary. Turning specifically to intoxication, in Colorado v. Jewell, the trial court suppressed a confession while intoxicated &quot;based on its finding that Jewell was too intoxicated to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent.&quot; The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the suppression [b]ecause the facts do not support the trial court's determination that Jewell's intoxication was so severe that he was demonstrably unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights which leaves open the possibility that there is some such degree of intoxication. The court determined that Intoxication only invalidates an otherwise valid Miranda waiver if the court finds through a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was incapable of understanding the nature of his rights and the ramifications of waiving them. Subsequent discussion partially fleshes out how one might determine whether a waiver is unknowing or unintelligent. Citing Colorado v. Kaiser, the court suggested considering whether “the defendant seemed oriented to his or her surroundings and situation; whether the defendant's answers were responsive and appeared to be the product of a rational thought process; whether the defendant was able to appreciate the seriousness of his or her predicament, including the possibility of being incarcerated; whether the defendant had the foresight to attempt to deceive the police in hopes of avoiding prosecution; whether the defendant expressed remorse for his or her actions; and whether the defendant expressly stated that he or she understood their rights.” One issue was raised regarding &quot;cases where, as here, the intoxication is self-induced.&quot; A fundamental result of the mass of Miranda case law is that coercive actions by police invalidate a confession. Getting a suspect drunk(er) would be a clear case of a coercive police action, and presumably would be inadmissible under Townsend v. Sain.
First of all, there is a distinction between being impeached and being convicted. Trump was impeached when the House voted to adopt an Article of Impeachment. That happened while he was still in office. He will not be convicted until the Senate votes to convict him by a 2/3rds vote, if it ever does. In the case of Nixon, the House had not yet voted to adopt Articles of Impeachment when he resigned. They had been introduced and debated, but not yet finally approved. Moreover, we don't know what would have happened if the House had proceeded to pass such articles after Nixon had resigned. The House of that time did not choose to proceed. There was no court ruling saying that they could not do so. There are some precedents saying that the Senate can proceed with a trial after an official resigns or is expelled after impeachment. None of these are at all recent, none are clear cut, none involved an official whose term had ended, none involved a President, and none that I am aware of led to a conviction. And this issue has never been tested in a Federal court. Specifically, there is the case of William Belknap. Belknap was Secretary of War under US President Grant. He was accused of improperly profiting from military contracts. The House started impeachment proceedings. Grant interviewed Belknap, who confessed to Grant and resigned on the spot. The house none the less pass five articles of impeachment after Belknap resigned. When the Senate took up the case, there was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Senate did not have jurisdiction because of Belknap's resignation. By a vote of 37–29 the Senate held that it had jurisdiction and that a trial should proceed. The vote to convict Belknap was 35 for conviction, 25 against it. This was five votes short of the required 2/3rds to convict. Most of the Senators voting against conviction were on record as doing so because they did not agree that the Senate had jurisdiction. Thus a majority vote of the Senate held in that case that such a trial was proper, but less than 2/3rds. (Most also indicted that they thought the charges true.) There was also the case of William Blount. Blount, a Senator, was impeached by the House in 1798. (In fact this was the first impeachment ever under the US Constitution.) The Senate voted to expel him. When the articles of impeachment came up in 1799, the Senate voted to dismiss the impeachment, on the ground that the impeachment process did not extend to members of the Senate, but not on the grounds that the expulsion rendered the proceedings moot. Should Trump be convicted by the Senate (which now seems unlikely) he might bring a court case claiming that such a conviction was unconstitutional. There is no knowing how a court would handle such a case. And if Trump is not convicted, no such case will be brought this time, either. This Washington Post opinion piece by two Constitutional scholars claims that such a trial would be constitutionally proper. It also claims that it would not have been proper had the vote to adopt articles of impeachment occurred after Trump had left office. Others have taken different positions. Whether a Senate trial of an impeachment is constitutional after the person impeached has left office is a hotly debated question at the moment. There has never been a court ruling on the point, and neither of the precedents is of a situation quite matching the current impeachment of Trump. No court has ruled on the matter. The Senate did not vote for a motion to dismiss the impeachment on those grounds, although if every senator who voted for the motion voted to acquit, Trump would not be convicted. From the comments I wish that any downvoters would leave a comment indicting what thy think is wring with this answer. In the absence of a comment, I cannot improve the answer, others cannot use the reasons to write better answers, and readers have no idea why someone objects to the answer. Such a downvote seems pointless. I have updated this answer with a discussion of the Blount and Belknap precedents. In neither case did the Senate actually vote to dismiss the articles because the accused was no longer in office, although that seems to be a major reason why 25 senators voted against convicting Belknap.
The Fifth Amendment would not apply, because nothing in the testimony would incriminate the doctor. Indeed nothing would be at all likely to incriminate the President either, it is not a crime to be unable to carry out Presidential duties. It is likely in such a case that the President would waive confidentiality. In that case the doctor could testify freely. If the President insisted on confidentiality, and attempted to prevent the doctor from testifying to Congress, there would be a conflict between the power of Congress to compel testimony, in this case on what is clearly a vital national issue within the scope of the needs of Congress, and traditional doctor-patient confidentiality, let alone the requirements of HIPAA. I am not sure how this conflict would be resolved. There might be an emergency application to the Supreme Court, but the SC does not usually do very well with truly urgent issues. The Pentagon Papers case and Bush V. Gore indicate some of the problems that can arise. If the doctor was prevented from testifying, that might incline members of congress to think the testimony would not be favorable to the President, and thus tend to suggest that they should not approve the President resuming or continuing his or her powers and duties. But that is rather speculative. The 25th has never been invoked, and the detailed procedure that would be followed if it were is not very clear. I am not aware of any similar situation in which medical testimony has been demanded to deal with an urgent issue, but the patient has attempted to block it. I think this case must be considered to be undecided until it actually arises and a court rules.
How can incitement of imminent lawless action not be constitutionally protected? The short answer to your question is &quot;because the Supreme Court of the United States said so.&quot; In Brandenburg v. Ohio SCOTUS found that the Constitution protects speech that calls for lawless action in the abstract but does not protect speech &quot;directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action&quot;. The court's per curiam opinion seems to treat the decision as self-evident - it's quite short after discussing the facts of the case. However, Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion (his &quot;caveat&quot;) that discussed and was critical of previous decisions in such cases, including the use of the 'clear and present danger test', so his opinion is useful for a brief history of First Amendment judgments to that point (Brandenburg). The Declaration of Independence is not law. Following &quot;a history of repeated injuries and usurpations&quot; and failures to reach political settlements it asserts a moral right to overthrow the tyranny of the British crown. It alludes to rights, it does not &quot;enshrine&quot; or create a legal right that the judiciary can interpret. Judges might refer to the Declaration in their judgments, not using it as legal authority but an articulation of fundamental values.
To become law, a bill must be passed, in identical form, by both chambers of Congress, during the same Congress that is during the two-year period between congressional elections. At the end of a congress (also called a term), any bill that did not become law (passed by both chambers and signed by the President or any veto overridden) is dead. It may be taken up in a later congress, but it starts again from the beginning of the process. See Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3 of the United States Constitution The comments correctly point out that the constitutional provision cited and linked to above does not specify the rule that a bill must pass both chambers during the same Congress (sometimes called the same term of Congress). I am confident that the rule stated above is correct. I have read news stories about bills that did not pass both chambers &quot;dying&quot; at the end of a Congress, although I have no citations to hand at the moment. I have spent several hours over the last two days searching the House and Senate websites, reading the House rules, the Senate rules, and Jefferson's Manual. Jefferson's Manual began as notes on parliamentary procedure, made for his own use by Thomas Jefferson during his tenure as Vice-President (1797-1801), based on the then-current procedure of the English Parliament. It is the original basis for the Senate rules. I understand that it is still considered an authority on the procedures of Parliament as they existed in the period 1750-1801. Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice section li (a session) (sec 588, page 316), reads: Parliament have three modes of separation, to wit: by adjournment, by prorogation or dissolution by the King, or by the efflux of the term for which they were elected. Prorogation or dissolution constitutes there what is called a session; provided some act was passed. In this case all matters depending before them are discontinued, and at their next meeting are to be taken up de novo, if taken up at all. 1 Blackst., 186. ... [Sec 590, page 317] Congress separate in two ways only, to wit, by adjournment, or dissolution by the efflux of their time. What, then, constitutes a session with them? A dissolution certainly closes one session, and the meeting of the new Congress begins another. The Constitution authorizes the President, &quot;on extraordinary occasions to convene both Houses, or either of them.&quot; I. 3. If convened by the President's proclamation, this must begin a new session, and of course determine the preceding one to have been a session. So if it meets under the clause of the Constitution which says, &quot;the Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.&quot; I. 4. This must begin a new session; for even if the last adjournment was to this day the act of adjournment is merged in the higher authority of the Constitution, and the meeting will be under that, and not under their adjournment. So far we have fixed landmarks for determining sessions. ... [Sec 592, page 318] When it was said above that all matters depending before Parliament were discontinued by the determination of the session, it was not meant for judiciary cases depending before the House of Lords, such as impeachments, appeals, and writs of error. These stand continued, of course, to the next session. Raym., 120, 381; Ruffh. Fac., L. D., Parliament. The practice of the English Parliament as set down by Mr. Jefferson seems to be the basis of the current US practice, but I can find no law, nor any provision of the current house or senate rules, explicitly adopting or codifying it, or setting it as a rule for the US. The official page How Our Laws Are Made has an extensive discussion of the progress of a bill from proposal to law, but nowhere mentions what happens to a bill not agreed to by both chambers.
It's fine, as long as it's clear that it's fiction As far as I know, titles such as &quot;Mr. President&quot; aren't specifically restricted in any way. That said, there are a few relevant laws here regarding impersonating government officials or using the seals of government offices. Generally speaking, they prohibit doing things that are intended to mislead people into thinking that you are part of or otherwise affiliated with the government. One is 18 U.S. Code § 912, which states that: Whoever falsely assumes or pretends to be an officer or employee acting under the authority of the United States or any department, agency or officer thereof, and acts as such, or in such pretended character demands or obtains any money, paper, document, or thing of value, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both. I'm not entirely clear whether the President or members of Congress are included in &quot;officers&quot; here, but it only criminalizes impersonating such officers for the purpose of fooling someone into doing something for you. More directly relevant to the Presidency and members of Congress is 18 U.S. Code § 713, which governs the &quot;Use of likenesses of the great seal of the United States, the seals of the President and Vice President, the seal of the United States Senate, the seal of the United States House of Representatives, and the seal of the United States Congress&quot;. It forbids use of the seals of those offices for the purpose of conveying, or in a manner reasonably calculated to convey, a false impression of sponsorship or approval by the Government of the United States or by any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof For official insignia or uniforms more generally, 18 U.S. Code § 716 exempts uses that are not used or intended to be used to mislead or deceive...[or are] used exclusively for a dramatic presentation, such as a theatrical, film, or television production.