Effect of Duvall on Absolute Covenants in a shared property? I live in a flat in a London house. There are two other flats, so that's 3 flats with 3 leaseholders. Our old leases, which were renewed in 1992, state: Alterations: 3.9 Not to make any structural alterations to any part of the Flat nor to alter the appearance of the exterior of the Building As I understand it, this is an Absolute Covenant. There is a solicitor's document (from 1992) that accompanies the lease explaining the terms. It states: You are not permitted to make any structural alterations to the property or structural additions to the property without first obtaining the landlord’s consent in writing. This interpretation is clearly not an Absolute Covenant, and my understanding for this disparity is that these old leases commonly have these overly restrictive clauses which over the years were re-interpreted by landlords. So by 1992 it was customary to act along the lines of what the solicitor wrote. However, we have since had Duval v 11-13 Randolph Crescent Limited 2020 which determined that Absolute Covenants are precisely that, and any specified forbidden acts remain forbidden. Have I understood this correctly? We will wish to make alterations some day, but want a situation where all parties must be in agreement. Would renewing the lease and simply removing the restrictive old clause and substituting the solicitor's one (from 1992) fix the problem? This may seem obvious (it does to me) but no one seems to be able to agree. Even the solicitors currently involved. I'm hoping someone can throw some light on this?
Note that in the Duval case the landlord was prevented form approving the alterations only because there was also a provision in the leases of other tenants providing that any of them could require the landlord to enforce the agreements. In paragraph 41 of the judgement it is said that: Dr Duval accepts that, absent clause 3.19, the landlord and lessee would be free to agree a waiver of an absolute covenant or a licence to carry out a piece of work that would otherwise amount to a breach of its terms, but contends that in this case and as a result of the inclusion of clause 3.19 in each of the leases, any such waiver is precluded unless all of the other lessees agree to waive their rights. Put another way, by undertaking to enforce the covenants of the lease, the landlord has undertaken not to do the opposite, namely to license breaches of covenant. She argues that, were it otherwise, clause 3.19 would be ineffective. And this contention was eventually upheld. In paragraph 59 (the final paragraph) the court wrote: ... By contrast, clause 2.7 is directed to more fundamental works which go beyond routine alterations and improvements and are intrinsically such that they may be damaging to or destructive of the building. These are the kinds of work which it is entirely reasonable to suppose should not be carried out without the consent of all of the other lessees. In short, the landlord could have approved the work, even in the face of an absolute covenant, butr for the presence of the further covenant with other tenants to enforce the absolute covenant . Even then, the work can be done provided that all of the tenants approve. It would seem from this judgement that substituting the lawyer's statement &quot;without consent of the landlord&quot; for the older absolute form would permit such changes to be made if the landlord consents, and such consent apparently may not be unreasonably withheld. However, under the older absolute form, the consent of the other tenants might also be required, if there is a provision similar to clause 3.19 in the Duval case by which the landlord promises enforcement to other tenants. In the absence of a conflicting contract with others, a landlord and tenant can agree to modify a lease or tenancy agreement in any lawful way. In the Duval case there was such a conflicting contract.
When you tendered three pennies, that should have satisfied the debt as the landlord does not have the right in this situation to insist on payment in a money order in lieu of currency. A money order requirement is only effective as a means by which to refrain from accepting personal checks, not cash. This is the ignorance of the property manager at work. At a minimum, refusing to accept the pennies would constitute a violation of the landlord's duty of good faith: § 383.550. "Good faith" obligation Every duty under KRS 383.505 to 383.715 and every act which must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under KRS 383.505 to 383.715 imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement. Imposing a late fee in this situation may also be unconscionable: § 383.555. Unconscionability (1) If the court, as a matter of law, finds: (a) A rental agreement or any provision thereof was unconscionable when made, the court may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result; or (b) A settlement in which a party waives or agrees to forego a claim or right under KRS 383.505 to 383.715 or under a rental agreement was unconscionable when made, the court may refuse to enforce the settlement, enforce the remainder of the settlement without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result. (2) If unconscionability is put into issue by a party or by the court upon its own motion, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the rental agreement or settlement to aid the court in making the determination. This term is defined as follows in § 383.545(16): "Unconscionable" means an act or conduct which is willful and is so harsh and unjust as would be condemned or considered to be wrongful and would be shocking to the conscience of honest and fair-minded persons. The notice should not be effective to bring an eviction action because it states a demand that the landlord is not authorized to make. The notice is probably attempting to comply with this statutory requirement: § 383.660. Tenant's noncompliance with rental agreement - Failure to pay rent (1) Except as provided in KRS 383.505 to 383.715, if there is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or a material noncompliance with KRS 383.605 or 383.610, the landlord may deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement will terminate upon a date not less than fourteen (14) days after receipt of the notice. If the breach is not remedied in fifteen (15) days, the rental agreement shall terminate as provided in the notice subject to the following. If the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages or otherwise and the tenant adequately remedies the breach before the date specified in the notice, the rental agreement shall not terminate. If substantially the same act or omission which constituted a prior noncompliance of which notice was given recurs within six (6) months, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement upon at least fourteen (14) days' written notice specifying the breach and the date of termination of the rental agreement. (2) If rent is unpaid when due and the tenant fails to pay rent within seven (7) days after written notice by the landlord of nonpayment and his intention to terminate the rental agreement if the rent is not paid within that period, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement. (3) Except as provided in KRS 383.505 to 383.715, the landlord may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or KRS 383.605 or 383.610. If the tenant's noncompliance is willful the landlord may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees. By not accurately stating the non-payment, the notice may be ineffective legally. The circumstances of your case would not entitle the landlord to attorneys' fees. O'Rourke v. Lexington Real Estate Co. L.L.C., 365 S.W.3d 584 (Ky. App. 2011). My guess is that the late fee is $71.20 because there are really two components of your rent, one of which is $712 per month with a 10% late fee, and the other of which is $83.33 which is probably some passed through charge for utilities or a water and sewer bill or some sort of tax. If indeed the late fee is a percentage of the unpaid rent, then first of all, the late fee shouldn't be more than 0.3 cents (which rounds down to zero), and second of all, the unpaid portion may very well be not rent, but a passed through charge that is not subject to the late fee, depending upon what the lease says about how amounts received are to be applied. If the late fee is indeed a percentage of the amount owing, so that you owed at most 3.3 cents on the day after the rent was due, which rounds to 3 cents. Then, by tendering 3 pennies on that day, you satisfied your obligation in full and they are not living up to their obligation. If the late fee is stated as a sum certain in the lease, however, and not as a percentage, you might be obligated to pay $71.23 by the terms of the lease, even though charge a late fee of $71.20 for paying 3 cents one day late probably violated usury and consumer protection laws in Kentucky, as well as the common law related to liquidated damages which requires penalties in contractual agreements to be proportionate to the breach of the contract. The maximum legal interest rate in Kentucky is set forth at § 360.010 of its statutes is is the greater of the commercial discount rate on 90 day paper plus 4%, or 19%, which is smaller. There is a civil penalty of double the amount of the usurious interest paid. § 310.020. Still, as a practical matter, it may be easier to tender a money order for $71.23 than to deal with a bureaucratic nightmare. Honestly, this is the sort of scrooge-like behavior that TV stations love to splash on the evening news, and contacting one of them might be one of your better options. Another option may be to contact a legal aid society, or to contact the local bar association to see if they have a pro bono lawyer available to take this case. Another plausible option would be to communicate directly to the owner of the property in lieu of the property manager, setting forth the facts in writing. If I were a lawyer for the landlord, I would be embarrassed to bring a case like this one, and the judge would probably chew me out for bringing it.
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 (it was revised between 1868-1869, but enacted in 1870) applied specifically to civil cases (i.e. disputes between private parties); it's organized by topic area, and is there to keep people from having to comb through every law ever passed that has to do with civil cases. The Revised Statutes of 1870 gathered all the laws of "general character" into one place, for the same reason. The difference between the two was almost certainly an error. In general, there is one official version of the law; other versions are a convenience. The official version normally defaults to the individual laws passed by the legislature (which are organized by date, not by anything useful for finding relevant laws), but that can be changed by statute. In this case, the Revised Statutes contains section 3990, which says in so far as there may be any conflict between the provisions of this act and any provision of the said Revised Civil Code and Code of Practice, that said Code shall be held and taken as the law governing So, the Civil Code took precedence. Your revisions of 1876 and 1882 were not successor laws; rather, they were compilations of the Revised Statutes and Civil Code of 1870 with the amendments to those that had since been passed. The Revised Statutes from 1876 were really the Revised Statutes of 1870, modified by later laws (that didn't touch the divorce provisions). Likewise, the Civil Code from 1882 was really the Revised Civil Code of 1870, modified by later laws. The Civil Code of 1870 still took precedence over the Revised Statutes of 1870, so the divorce provisions of the Civil Code were authoritative.
In the U.S., the common way to address this would be called a servitude among academics and legal scholars, although it would typically be titled either an &quot;easement&quot;, or more likely a &quot;covenant&quot; (which is the customary name at common law for a promise that runs with the land). It would typically be reduced to writing and executed by both parties and recorded with the same formalities as a deed (i.e. it would typically be signed and acknowledged before a notary public, would contain a legal description, and would be coded with both parties in the grantee-grantor index). In New Zealand, I suspect that the process would be similar. One complication in New Zealand that might make the formalities different is that, New Zealand has a title certificate based system of real property recording called a Torrens Title system which it adopted in 1870, rather than the less formally structured race-notice recording system that, in principle, allows almost anything to be recorded without requiring that it fit in a particular box of types of documents that are permitted. Since 2017, in New Zealand, valid legal interests in law do not arise unless they are recorded. Since 2017, the New Zealand system's official copies are also now entirely electronic. Covenants are governed by Sections 240-250 of the Land Transfer Title Act of 2017 and seem to correspond to the kind of contract described in the question.
The agent/landlord responsibility is to ensure that the residents have &quot;quiet enjoyment&quot; of the property during the period it is let. As long as your friend has access to the flat he has that. He can ask, but the agent/landlord have no obligation to provide it. Could your friend appoint someone else to go and get their property? There is no reason why he has to do it in person. He should provide this person with a signed letter of authority (just &quot;I, Joseph Bloggs, hereby authorise John Doe to collect my belongings from 123 Cherry Tree Crescent on my behalf&quot;, signed and dated) and also send a copy to the agent. Your friend must have a contract with somebody. If he paid a deposit then it should have been kept in a proper deposit protection scheme, and he should have paperwork to that effect. If that wasn't done, then he can sue the person he has the contract with for (in effect) punitive damages in addition to getting his deposit back. You say your friend was &quot;not the lead tenant&quot;, so it sounds like one of the tenants was sub-letting, but its not clear; it may be that this &quot;lead tenant&quot; was just acting as a point of contact for stuff like rent collection. Your friend should have some kind of written tenancy agreement; he can sue the person or company named named on that. If the tenancy was a verbal contract then he can sue the person he handed the deposit to.
It depends; Permission may be Required This depends on both the facts on the ground, and the laws of the relevant jurisdiction. Residential fences are often governed by specific local laws at the municipal or county level in the US, so no generally applicable answer is possible, short of a book giving laws for each locality. Common-Law Rules Under the common law, followed by many but far from all US jurisdictions, the key question is whether a fence is a &quot;partition fence&quot; or not. A partition fence is one built on or near the property line that is owned jointly by the owners of the properties it divides. A fence near the property line is probably a partition fence if: The two property owners jointly built or paid for the building of the fence; Parts of the fence are on each side of the property line; The owners have agreed that the fence is common property; or Both owners &quot;use&quot; the fence, as by connecting it to another fence running in a different direction, or by relying on it to contain domestic animals. A Fence is probably not a partition fence if: It is entirely clear of the property line; Only the owner on whose property it rests maintains it; and Only the owner on whose property it rests uses it. The owner of one of the properties may not remove, demolish, or modify a partition fence without permission from the other. Removing or modifying a partition fence without the permission of the owner of the adjacent property is a tort, and can lead to damages for the value of the fence begin awarded. The owners must each maintain a partition fence, often each caring for his or her side. Failing to do so may be a tort. If a fence is not a partition fence, the owner of the land is also the sole owner of the fence, and may modify or remove it without permission from, or notice to, the owner of any adjacent or nearby property. However, the above common-law rules may be modified by local laws, and one would be wise to check, or consult a lawyer who knows how to check, before making any demands. Sources The page &quot;Removal or Destruction of Fences&quot; from US legal reads: A fence is an enclosure creating an adequate blockade around a particular land for the purpose of prohibiting intrusions from outside. A landowner can remove a fence, separating his/her land from that of his/her neighbor, when such fence is located wholly upon his/her own land. However, a landowner is not empowered to remove a partition fence without the adjacent landowner’s consent. A partition fence is the joint property of adjacent landowners. A fence erected on the line between the lands of adjoining owners generally belongs to the parties as tenants in common. Generally, a partition fence is built equally on both sides of the line. Until the contrary is shown, the partition fence is presumed to be the common property of both owners. An owner of adjoining land can remove a partition fence upon formal notice to adjacent landowners. For an improper removal of a partition fence, an aggrieved party can bring an action for damages. The standard for measuring damages for such removal or destruction is its value at the time. The value is determined by replacement costs minus depreciation for age and use. Moreover, when someone builds a fence on another person’s land without any authority to do so, the landowner can remove or destroy such fence. A person is liable for removing, destroying, or injuring a fence belonging to another person just as one who commits such acts against any kind of property belonging to another is liable[i]. Such person is considered a tortfeasor. However, an individual cannot remove or destroy a fence on another individual’s land without his/her consent. The page &quot;Property Line and Fence Laws in Maryland&quot; from FindLaw reads, in relevant part: Maryland doesn't have specific rules dealing with fences. Instead, the state follows the common law practice that a fence built along a boundary line is owned in common by both property owners when both use the fence, unless otherwise agreed. A property owner is said to use a fence when they &quot;hook-up&quot; to the fence with another row of fence, or keep animals in the enclosure created by the fence. A fence built and used only by the builder is that person's sole property. When you purchase a new home, you take a property with an existing fence built and used by prior owners. Simply put, if you buy a property with a co-owned fence, you likely need to continue your maintenance of the fence. The page &quot;Is it legal for the neighbor to remove a fence on our shared property line?&quot; from Justia's &quot;Ask a Lawyer&quot; feature reads: If both landowners paid to install a fence directly on a property line in the past, then yes, they need your permission to remove or replace the fence. Many fences are not built on a property line, but are instead just on one property or the other. If you have had your land surveyed, you may be able to determine your exact property line. You or your neighbor are free to build new fences without permission as long as neither the fence nor any construction or excavation encroaches on the other's property. Fences are a common property dispute, and can have long term effects. If a fence encroaches significantly on someone else's land for many years, this can actually become the new legal property line in some cases. According to the &quot;Fences&quot; section of the page &quot;Disputes between your neighbours&quot; from th New Zealand Law Society: In New Zealand this is regulated by the Fencing Act 1978. Except where modified by individual agreements: Fences must be on the boundary line, though there is provision for give and take where the true boundary is difficult to fence. The cost of building or repairing a fence is borne equally between adjoining owners, unless one owner damages it, in which case the cost of repairs will fall on that owner. You can compel your neighbour to contribute to the cost of the fence bordering your two properties by following the procedures set out in the Fencing Act ... Developers of new subdivisions usually exempt themselves from contributing to the cost of a fence. Under the Property Law Act 2007, it is possible to apply to a District Court for an order to remove or alter a fence that is detrimentally affecting land or obstructing a view. Usually the cost of any removal falls on the person applying for the order. The Booklet &quot;Fences and the Law from the Legal Services Commission, South Australia states, on page 2: Fences should be regarded as a joint asset between neighbours. Even if your neighbour has not paid for the fence they are still a joint owner. This is because a fence on the boundary is legally considered to be part of the land on each side. If you intend to remove or alter an existing fence, you should have your neighbour’s permission or a court order. If you want to put up a fence where there has not been one before, your neighbour has a right to object. It makes no difference if you intend to pay the total cost
Can landlord backbill 4.5 years worth of utilities that were never billed to us bimonthly as directed in the lease? Yes, since the bimonthly billing issue appears to be within the LA statute of limitations for claims of breach of contract: 10 years (see here). But you might want to check the actual legislative language of the statute referred therein and the prior or consecutive ones --all pertaining to statutes of limitations-- so as to ascertain the accuracy of information in the first link (navigating through the bunch of LA two- or three-line statutes for this and that gets annoying). They are desperate to get me to move out since it is a rent-controlled unit and I feel like they have done this to cause issues and force me to default on rent. Is this a legal practice? I am not knowledgeable of state legislation particular to rent-controlled units, but I highly doubt it is lawful for them to proceed that way. Other details you describe reflect that the company has been --or is being-- malicious or grossly negligent. If so, strictly speaking, the company's conduct (1) ought to weaken its position or merits in trying to force you out, and (2) tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing (see below). If your lease mentions any statutes regarding rent-controlled units, you may want to search for case law at leagle.com to see how the statutes are applied. Without knowing the terms of your lease, I think your priority should at all times be the rent itself so as to avoid eviction. Does the "billing every two months" in the lease have any hold on this issue if they breached their own lease? Maybe not. The repeated, yet sole, failure to send you the bimonthly billings falls short of landlord's breach of contract. For your argument on breach of contract to prevail, you would have to prove that the landlord knowingly/deliberately let the water bills pile up prior to demanding you to pay everything at once. That would prove that the landlord is not meeting the covenant of good faith and fair dealing that is prerequisite in contract law.
You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right.