Where to find brief for Jaffe vs Roberts I am interested in finding the brief of the petitioner in the US Supreme Court case "Robert J. Jaffe, Petitioner v. John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, et al." The case number is 16-1181. Here is the Supreme Court online docket for the case Where can I find the petitioner's brief? Moreover, I am also unable to find the petition and the opinion of the lower court (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit). I surfed the Ninth Circuit website and searched for the case num. 15-56328 (number taken from the above mentioned SCOTUS online docket), but no results were found.
There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.
It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment&mdash;specifically the ratio&mdash;that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today)
Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked &amp; answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false &amp; misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.
canada The appellant would still be expected to file within the required time limits (30 days after the would-be appellant's judgment in the lower court). A judge of the court of appeal has the discretion to extend time, but this is subject to established criteria. For example, the criteria in British Columbia are (Morden v. Pasternak, 2022 BCCA 268; citing Davies v. C.I.B.C. (1987), 15 B.C.L.R. (2d) 256 (C.A.)): Was there a bona fide intention to appeal? When was the respondent informed of the intention? Would the respondent be unduly prejudiced by an extension of time? Is there merit in the appeal? Is it in the interest of justice that an extension be granted? If the highest court in the country had recently issued a decision clearly favouring the appellant, I predict this would weigh in favour of granting an extension of time under the &quot;merit in the appeal&quot; factor. However, that factor is not dispositive, and it will not excuse a long delay. This might seem harsh, but there is an interest in finality and a concern about prejudice to the respondent. And if the appellant thought they had an argument on appeal, they could have appealed within the time limit to potentially challenge the precedent themself.
One such case is People in interests of EB, 2022COA8 (Colo. App. 2022). The official syllabus of the case states: In this dependency and neglect proceeding, father appeals the juvenile court judgment terminating his parent-child legal relationship with his child. Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a continuance after it learned that he was having technical difficulties participating in the termination hearing, which was being conducted via Webex videoconference due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. A division of the court of appeals concludes that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was an abuse of discretion to deny the requested continuance. Accordingly, the division reverses the termination judgment and remands the case to the juvenile court for further proceedings. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to the case are substantially identical to the parallel Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the same number. Harmless error analysis is fairly similar in criminal cases and civil cases, although not quite identical. In theory, the standard in a criminal case to ignore harmless error is stronger than in a civil case. In practice, lots of seemingly significant matters in criminal cases are discounted as harmless error anyway. The court doesn't explicitly make a harmless error or lack thereof determination, but its analysis makes clear that the error was not harmless. Issues related to a remote hearing are also discussed in People in Interest of R.J.B., 2021 COA 4 (Colo. App. 2021), which is cited in this case. The official syllabus to that case tangentially discusses the issue: In this dependency and neglect proceeding, mother appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal relationship following a remote termination hearing via Webex. She claims that the court should have granted her a continuance so an in-person hearing could have been held, and the remote hearing didn’t afford her due process or equal protection of the law. The division concludes that the court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying the continuance. The court’s need to conduct the termination hearing via Webex didn’t establish good cause to continue the hearing when a judge presiding over a hearing held via Webex can address any technical difficulties with sound, video feed, or broadband issues as they arise; any delay in making an objection can be redressed by the court disregarding improperly admitted evidence; the court had extensively tested the virtual lobby and didn’t allow a sequestered witness to hear any of the proceeding; Webex, as a real-time videoconference platform in which all participants may view one another, allows the court and all counsel to observe a witness’s demeanor, determine if the witness is relying on documents or other information, and view admitted exhibits as well as other documents that may be used for impeachment; and the court ensured that an official record of the hearing was made in the same manner as during an in-person hearing. The division also rejects mother’s assertions that the remote hearing procedure failed to afford her due process and equal protection of the law. The division concludes that the juvenile court ensured that mother was provided substantially similar and fundamentally fair procedures as would have been available at an in-person termination hearing. So conducting the termination hearing via Webex afforded mother due process. The division didn’t consider mother’s equal protection claim because it is merely a bald assertion without argument or development. It is worth mentioning that many cases applying the harmless error standard don't expressly reference Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52. Not infrequently, cases don't even mention the buzzwords &quot;harmless error&quot;, even though the case makes an analysis that implicitly addresses the issue. Probably the best place to look for relevant case law would be under annotations to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 which governs motions for new trials.
Lots of reasons The citing case may be in a higher court than the cited case but might not actually add anything. You always go for the highest authority on record. From time to time, a case makes a big review and consolidation of all the case law on a particular point. It is then easier to cite that case rather than half a dozen cases that it summarised. More recent cases are worth more, all else being equal. A case from 2002 shows the law hasn’t changed since the decision in 1997. Repeated precedents are worth more, all else being equal. By using the citing case you get the weight of two judges (or more for multi-judge appeals) for the price of one. Some judges write better than others. Citing their cases may better clarify the point.
In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment &quot;standing&quot;1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term &quot;standing&quot; in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis.
Here are the opinions I found which do not explicitly state that Regina is fictitious. University of Utah Hospital and Medical Center v. Bethke, 611 P.2d 1030, 101 Idaho 245 (Idaho, 1980) ...in my judgment, the majority seriously errs in using an esoteric, artificial and strained construction of the phrase "in Idaho" to hold that the legislature intended that phrase to mean "outside Idaho." When confronted with such linguistic legerdemain, I cannot but recall the unreported case of Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim.L.Q. 137 (Toronto 1965), wherein the court converted a pony, fortuitously saddled with a feather stuffed blanket, into a small bird, thus falling within the provisions of the Ontario Small Birds Act. Midland Management Co. v. Helgason, 630 N.E.2d 836, 158 Ill.2d 98, 196 Ill.Dec. 671 (Ill., 1994) Justice HEIPLE, dissenting: This case illustrates the resourcefulness of the judicial mind when confronted with the application of a rule of law which produces a result deemed to be undesirable. The straightforward approach to such a dilemma offers but two possibilities. The first option is to apply the law to the case and let the painful result occur. The second option, available to a court of last resort at least, is to change the rule of law. Make a new one. However, if neither of these two options is attractive, the resourceful judicial mind has yet a third option. It can redefine the terms so that the rule does not apply to the case at hand. This approach was chosen by the majority in the instant case. The application of this technique is well illustrated and perhaps reached its zenith in the Canadian case of Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Criminal Law Quarterly 137 (Toronto, 1965) in an opinion rendered by Blue, J. Doe v. See, 557 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir., 2009) We hierophants of the law are adept at redefining ordinary concepts, but it is no more appropriate to declare that religious services are commercial activities than it would be to declare that ponies are small birds. See Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim. L.Q. 137 (Oct. 1965). Retail Flooring Dealers v. Beaulieu of America, 339 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir., 2003) Again, this creation of an intracircuit split is obscured with a fuliginous cloud made up of the conceit that the attorney here (allegedly unlike the attorneys in Estate of Bishop and Cabrera) is truly a party. It comes as no surprise to me that the legal mind is perfectly capable of reaching a result by declaring a non-party to be a party, just as it can declare a pony to be a small bird. See Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim. L.Q. 137 (Oct. 1965). While I am often taken by, sometimes even filled with admiration for, manifestations of scholastic mental agility, I think that agility is frequently misdirected. It is here. Thus, I respectfully dissent. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky., 1975) This one is different because the asterisk points to another case which identifies Regina as "entirely fictional." It is readily apparent that the meaning of the equal protection clause cannot be ascertained from what it says, nor even from what the Supreme Court has said about it. As in Regina v. Ojibway* a pony was found to be a small bird, so under the 14th Amendment an illegitimate child may be either a speckled bird or a jackass, depending on its current aspect as (and when) viewed by the keeper of the royal secrets of the Constitution. Indeed it appears that here is a corner of the world Alice in Wonderland would not find unfamiliar. Here is a case which refers to Regina and acknowledges that the case's fictitious nature is not always understood. U.S. v. Van Fossan, 899 F.2d 636 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 1990) See also Regina v. Ojibway, 8 Crim.L.Q. 137 (1965), convicting a person under the Small Birds Act, despite the fact that the animal involved was a horse and the defendant was unaware that Ontario defines horses as birds. (The horse in question was an animal "covered with feathers" because its rider used a pillow as a saddle. Although it is a tour de force of statutory "construction", Ojibway is mercifully fictitious, something not always understood. United States v. Byrnes, 644 F.2d 107, 112 n. 9 (2d Cir.1981).