Who would be legally responsible for the application of mainstream wrong psychological/psychiatrist therapies? Several times has happened that the definition of mental disorders/ psychological-psychiatrist therapies/theories have been proven wrong. Yet they have been applied over people causing them problems and harm in their lives. Usually graduated psychologists/ psychiatrists are ignorant which is the supposed proof of these theories. They've been told they have been proven sometimes, sometimes they've been given some details, and they don't know they don't have a real basis behind them until it's massively accepted they are wrong. Personally, I see little to no responsibilities in them. In the other hand, governments and states promote these theories in secondary schools, they teach them and form professionals in national universities, and they hold the power to treat people in trials and to internate someone for being ill under these theories. Some other organizations, which I'm not very aware who they are, but I assume they might be colleges or agrupations of psychiatrists/psychologists regulate their professional's activities, and I assume they might be the ones giving the content to national universities for the formation of professionals under these theories. When one of these theories/therapies are proven wrong and have caused harm over people, who is the legal responsibility? I assume there aren't many cases like this, but I make the parallelism with biological sciences. If an association or group produces a medicament which is proven harmful for people later, and that association teaches doctors to give this medicament to people, with the approval and fundings/places of national government created universities, it would be pretty much the same. Then, in the case stated in the topic question, who would be legally responsible for the application of these mainstream wrong psychological/psychiatrist therapies?
Your question is almost too general to answer, but the basic answer is; being wrong is not a crime. Negligence is, but applying generally accepted medical diagnoses and treatments is not negligent. Malpractice is also a crime (or at least reason to suspend a medical licence); but evolving a theory based on experimental evidence, submitting it to peer review and having it generally accepted, and then later seeing it superseded by another theory is not malpractice, it is the normal scientific method. And no definition has ever been "proven wrong" since a definition, like an axiom, is neither verifiable nor falsifiable. The definitions of disorders vary betweeen countries, and most certainly change over time, but that is not because of any discovery or proof.
Not that I am aware of. A person who 'owns' a domain is entitled to utilize that domain including for the purposes of receiving emails. With physical mail, it is a crime in most countries to intentionally interfere with mail that is not addressed to you. For example - Australia. However, this is statute law and as such does not extend to emails - even if it did, if you own the domain then you are the person to whom it was addressed. I note that you seem to misunderstand "confidential" - this only arises in the context of a special relationship between the person transmitting the information and the person receiving it. Usually this is a contractual obligation between A and B but it can be imposed by law (e.g. doctor-patient, banker-client, lawyer-client, GDPR etc.). If A sends confidential (as between A &amp; B) information to C, C is under no general obligation to keep it confidential if C has no relationship of confidentiality with A or B. If C discloses it and B suffers damage, B sues A for breach of confidence (or the government prosecutes A for breaking the law); B has no case against C. For your situation, where B has allowed A to send the information to an obsolete address then B has contributed to the breach to an extent that B would be extremely unlikely to succeed in a suit against A.
Intent is an element of the offense of murder. If the prosecution can't prove the required level of intent for murder, the defendant may still be convicted of a &quot;lesser included offense&quot; like Manslaughter or perhaps Criminally Negligent Homicide, or even an offense that doesn't require an actual death like Aggravated Assault or an offense that doesn't require proof of an injury like Deadly Conduct. If the defendant is claiming that the intent was not voluntary because of some hypnotic effect then that is basically an insanity plea. Defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity face an indefinite commitment to a mental hospital, which can amount to decades of involuntary hospitalization. To learn more about this situation, read about the case of John Hinckley Jr. I personally doubt any jury would actually believe a hypnosis defense, especially without a woo-woo jury foreman, some outstanding work by the defense attorney, and a team of expert witnesses that includes an unrelated hypnotist and a psychologist who didn't believe in hypnosis until examining the defendant in this case... so a Mulder and a Scully.
When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.
Are police required to contact a real lawyer if you ask? give opinions from a number of lawyers and police in different jurisdictions. The basic consensus is that in most jurisdictions, such behavior will get the case thrown out of court and often get the police officer who tried this fired. HOWEVER there was a case where this was tried and while the case was thrown out on appeal, it was not as simple as the postings in the above article may have made it appear. This story shows a case where the Tennessee police actually did this. While the lower court allowed it because the defendant was "gullible", the appeals court rejected this argument. [T]he conduct of the law enforcement officers in this case, and in particular Detective Henry, is so egregious that it simply cannot go unchecked. That Detective Henry would illegally pose as an attorney and arrange the circumstances of the defendant’s case to make it appear as though he had successfully undertaken legal representation of the defendant is abhorrent. That the detective would specifically instruct the defendant not to communicate the relationship to his appointed counsel, in what we can only assume was an effort to enlarge the time for the detective to gain incriminating information from the defendant, renders completely reprehensible the state action in this case. Given the unconscionable behavior of the state actors in this case and the fact that the defendant was essentially prevented from proving prejudice through no fault of his own, we have no trouble concluding that the only appropriate remedy in this case is the dismissal of all the indictments.
If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked.
Any society that makes rules will make rules that generally favor the people in power. Police are an essential component of a system that is built to maintain power for the people who are powerful, and there are few incentives for politicians, prosecutors or judges to punish them for maintaining order, even when they do so in ways that most people would think are not civil. Anyone involved in creating the law therefore builds systems to protect themselves -- and each other -- from accountability. The police fail to meaningfully investigate themselves, the legislature erects barriers to accountability (Sec. 614.022, for instance), and the courts routinely provide them immunity for their wrongdoing. So yes, there is a difference in how our legal system treats law enforcement and how it treats everyone else. I don't know anyone with any experience in the law who would even try to pretend otherwise.
This is an objective test When a law requires “worry” (or any other state of mind), it is usually not the state of mind of the particular person but of a reasonable person in the same circumstances. The law does not ask “Were you worried?”, it asks “Would a reasonable person in your situation have been worried?” The fact that you have cynophobia is irrelevant if a reasonable person in your circumstances would not have it. Now, if this occurred at a facility for cynophobia treatment then the circumstances change from a reasonable person taken from the general population to a reasonable person who is attending such a facility; in those circumstances the reasonable person would be someone suffering from cynophobia. By the way, this test (worry or fear of harm) is essentially the same as the criteria of assault between humans.