Is there a law in the UK that makes possession of specific publications illegal? I just read the following in an article in The Guardian (emphasis mine): In prison they met their co-defendant Rahman, 32, one of nine men prosecuted in connection with a plan to attack the London stock exchange, who was serving five years for owning copies of an al-Qaida magazine. On the witness stand, Hussain said Rahman was “domineering, paranoid, weird and had a lot of contact with MI5”. Is there really any law that makes it illegal to own copies of a publication? We punish thoughtcrime, these days? Is this an error in the newspaper or is there actually a law that permits people to be prosecuted (and even jailed for years!) for simply possessing a document? Please note that I am not asking about cases where the possession of the document was presented as evidence of someone's worldview when they have been caught committing a crime. I am asking if the possession of a document1 can ever be considered criminal. 1Obviously, I am not talking about stolen documents or even certain classes of pornography whose very existence (photographs) implies an illegal act took place.
"Is there really any law that makes it illegal to own copies of a publication?" I couldn't find exact confirmation of which law Rahman was prosecuted under, but an article from 2012 describes it as "possessing an article for a terrorist purpose". A BBC article from 2007 uses the same phrase, with regard to "Section 57 of the Terrorism Act", which appears to refer to the Terrorism Act 2000: 57 Possession for terrorist purposes. (1)A person commits an offence if he possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. (2)It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that his possession of the article was not for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. (3)In proceedings for an offence under this section, if it is proved that an article— (a)was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or (b)was on premises of which the accused was the occupier or which he habitually used otherwise than as a member of the public, the court may assume that the accused possessed the article, unless he proves that he did not know of its presence on the premises or that he had no control over it. (4)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— (a)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years,* to a fine or to both, or (b)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both. *Interestingly, the maximum term of imprisonment appears to have originally been 10 years, but was increased in 2006. That law's not specific to publications, but in an attempt to answer your question more fully there does seem to be at least one law that "makes it illegal to own copies of a publication": the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, for example, renders possession of 'extreme pornography' illegal, and the definitions do not require (to reference your footnote) that the materials "imply an illegal act took place". Rather, the materials are illegal because (to quote a government consultation, via the Wikipedia page linked above) such material may encourage or reinforce interest in violent and aberrant sexual activity to the detriment of society as a whole That may or may not bother you from a freedom of speech point of view, but it leads me nicely onto a discussion of the underlying ethics/morality/rights debate that you impled in your question: "We punish thoughtcrime, these days?" As far as I understand, Rahman was in physical possession of the magazine. So no &ndash; not "thoughtcrime". Merely thinking about the magazine &ndash; or believing the views expressed in its contents &ndash; would not, of itself, be illegal. Indeed, as the article points out in its description of main case under discussion (i.e. the "Three Musketeers" case, not Rahman's prior conviction), the prosecution described as the defendants’ “hateful beliefs” – but the judge, Mr Justice Globe, told them they could not convict based on “mindset evidence” alone. However, like hate speech (speech, not thought), or conspiracy to commit a crime (which is what the men in the Three Musketeers case were being charged with), saying (or writing) certain things is, quite reasonably, illegal, if the intent of those words is incitement to commit a crime. Restrictions on free speech exist everywhere, and any (political) debate around it generally centres less on an absolute right to free speech, and more on where the line should be drawn. Even in the US &ndash; which tends to draw the line at the permissive end of the spectrum &ndash; speech intended solely to cause damage is not immune from reproach. The classic example is "[falsely] shouting fire in a crowded theater": The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger Similarly, the publication of a magazine, the sole purpose of which is to (inspire or facilitate) damage, can be illegal. It would then seem reasonable for supplying that magazine to others to be illegal. Possession with a clear intent to supply (like with drugs) would also, reasonably, be illegal. And if drug possession, with no intent to supply, can be illegal, then why not possession of illegal material, even if there's no intent to supply? I make no attempt here to justify (nor even to outline fully) the exact details of English law when it comes to these matters; however, there's an important distinction between freedom of speech (with regard to which nearly everyone accepts some restriction or regulation) and freedom of thought or conscience. To the best of my knowledge, there's no law (in Britain) that restricts either of those.
Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies.
Is there a law against carrying items with an intent to use them in such a way? england-and-wales Yes The offence is possession of an offence weapon in a public place contrary s.1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 (1) Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable— (a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding £200, or both; (b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding four years or a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds, or both. “offensive weapon” means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to the person, or intended by the person having it with him for such use by him or by some other person. There are similar provisions (with subtle differences) in scotland and northern-ireland at s.47 of the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995 and s.93 of the Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 respectively.
It is almost certainly illegal. I was unable to find UK provisions but the penalties for stealing an Australian passport are 10 years imprisonment or a fine of up to 1,000 penalty units (at time of writing a penalty unit was $170 so, $170,000) (Section 32(4) of the Australian Passports Act 2005). Under this law, the crime is knowingly having it in your possession when you know it isn't yours. Obviously, normal familial relationships would not be prosecuted (i.e. one member of the family carrying all the family's passports). Certainly, if the true owner asked for it and the possessor refused, that would trigger the crime. Furthermore, it is completely pointless - all the original owner has to do is report it stolen and apply for another one.
There are 196 sovereign nations in the world (more or less); each of them has its own copyright laws. 168 are signatories of the Berne Convention which requires them to extend to foreign copyright holders at least the same rights that they would have domestically. It relies from this on the concept of country of origin. Assuming that the book was originally published in the UK (as it has a London based publisher) then the applicable copyright law is that of the UK. Exceptions to copyright can be found here. The relevant exemption is the first part of the Teaching section: the copying of works in any medium as long as the use is solely to illustrate a point, it is not done for commercial purposes, it is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement, and the use is fair dealing. Acknowledgement is pretty straightforward but fair dealing as a legal concept means: There is no statutory definition of fair dealing - it will always be a matter of fact, degree and impression in each case. The question to be asked is: how would a fair-minded and honest person have dealt with the work? Factors that have been identified by the courts as relevant in determining whether a particular dealing with a work is fair include: does using the work affect the market for the original work? If a use of a work acts as a substitute for it, causing the owner to lose revenue, then it is not likely to be fair is the amount of the work taken reasonable and appropriate? Was it necessary to use the amount that was taken? Usually only part of a work may be used The relative importance of any one factor will vary according to the case in hand and the type of dealing in question. If the work had been simultaneously or previously published in the USA the relevant consideration is fair use rather than fair dealing. Fair use typically gives the copier much greater latitude than fair dealing does. As to the specifics of posting on stack exchange. Extracts on SE are unlikely to affect the original market (they may even enhance it by serving as advertising) so providing that you have used the minimum amount necessary to illuminate your answer it is probably fair dealing (and fair use). This would probably be true even if, across tens of thousands of questions, the entire book were quoted. Notwithstanding, if the copyright owner issued SE with a take down notice they would take it down because they are not in the business of fighting protracted copyright cases even if they are in the right.
Invasion of privacy and false light torts would probably not be applicable here. Very few states have adopted the false light tort because of its conflict with First Amendment principles and there was no agreement or even request to keep the text private. The copyright issue is trickier. First all, the TOS may provide that the copyright belongs to the text service provider or that there is a license. But, even in the absence of an express license, sending someone a message which is equivalent to sending them a letter, probably gives rise to an implied license that the person to whom it is sent can use the message that arises merely from the act of sending it without restriction or qualification. Implied license and fair use also heavily overlap. Publishing the text exactly as it was sent to you protects you from defamation liability because it is true. On the whole it would be extremely unlikely for there to be any legal liability for publishing a text from someone that they sent to you. Of course, one can imagine exceptions. If the person receiving the text was in an attorney-client relationship, or priest-parishioner making confession relationship, or was communicating regarding classified national security matters, or there was a non-disclosure agreement in place, among other possibilities, an evidentiary privilege and duty of confidentiality could apply and disclosing the material without the permission of the privilege holder could breach a duty of confidentiality and give rise to liability. If the picture was a nude picture of a minor, there could be a criminal and/or civil liability issue, and some states have also made posting "revenge porn" a criminal offense and/or a basis for civil liability. If the disclosure was effectively a way to facilitate insider trading that could be a problem. If the contents of the text were accurately transmitted but known to be false and were disseminated without disclosure of its falsity for the purpose of defrauding a third party, that could be a problem. But, no facts that obviously flag any exception are identified in the question. The mere fact that the posting may be embarrassing, or hurt someone's reputation, or was made without someone's express consent, in general, would not be a basis for liability.
As explained here, this arises from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 and the Data Protection Act 1998. There is a concept of a &quot;spent&quot; conviction, where a person convicted is not reconvicted of a serious offense for years, and then the person is (statutorily) &quot;rehabilitated&quot;, and under §4 of the law, they &quot;shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for the offence [s] which were the subject of that conviction&quot;. The law also criminalizes certain disclosures of spent convictions, mainly unauthorized disclosures by officials. The reasoning is that &quot;the public interest in rehabilitation outweighs the public interest in continuing publication and knowledge of the offense&quot;. The warning is actually not directed at Bob, it is directed at the prosecutor.
At common law, parliamentary privilege does not extend to the republication of words spoken in Parliament: Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 112 ER 1160. To overcome this, Parliament passed the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840, which provides absolute privilege for a report published “by or under the authority of either House of Parliament” (ie. Hansard). Section 3 of the Act provides qualified privilege for publishing an “extract or abstract” of Hansard. In relation to statements made under parliamentary privilege in breach of a court order, the Committee on Super-Injunctions wrote in its report on Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice (May 2011): In order to obtain the benefit of the immunity from civil or criminal proceedings under section 3, the individual must prove, before a jury, that the relevant material was published in good faith and without malice. It is an open question whether publication of any extract from or abstract of Hansard which had the effect of frustrating a court order and was deliberately intended to do so would be held to be in good faith and without malice … Where media reports go beyond, or fall outside, the ambit of protection provided by the 1840 Act, it is the common law which determines whether there is any protection from contempt proceedings for breach of court orders. Mr Woolf noted that while Wason v Walter (1868) 4 QB 73 established a limited common law protection in defamation proceedings for honest, fair and accurate reporting of Parliamentary proceedings, there was ‘no reported case which authoritatively decides the extent of protection against proceedings for contempt available in respect of fair and accurate reports of proceedings of Parliament’ … It therefore appears to be an open question whether, and to what extent, the common law protects media reporting of Parliamentary proceedings where such reporting appears to breach the terms of a court order and is not covered by the protection provided by the 1840 Act. What is clear is that unfettered reporting of Parliamentary proceedings (in apparent breach of court orders) has not been established as a clear right. In its report on Parliamentary Privilege (June 2013), the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege said that the Parliamentary Papers Act would generally not apply to the contemporary media, and that the defence of qualified privilege was limited to defamation actions: An “abstract” was defined by the 1999 Joint Committee as a “summary or epitome”. Thus media reports of what goes on in Parliament, even if they draw on documents published by order of the House, such as Hansard, do not generally enjoy the (qualified) protection afforded by section 3 of the 1840 Act—a point confirmed by Sarah McColl, Solicitor Advocate in the BBC Editorial Legal Department, in her oral evidence on behalf of the Media Lawyers Association … Outside the field of defamation, it does not appear that media reports of parliamentary proceedings (as opposed to extracts or abstracts) enjoy legal protection. This arises most obviously in the case of breaches of court injunctions … The Joint Committee recommended that the law should be reformed: On balance, we do not support extending absolute privilege to all reports, including media sketches and summaries, of proceedings in Parliament … we consider that the existing protection of qualified privilege—that is, that all fair and accurate reports are protected, unless they can be proved by the claimant to have been made maliciously—already provides a robust defence of press freedom … At the same time, we acknowledge that the media need clarity and certainty. The Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 provides qualified protection for all “extracts and abstracts” of parliamentary publications (including broadcasts), but as we have already said these terms do not appear to cover media reports or editorial comment … We endorse the recommendation of the 1999 Joint Committee that [the] Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 should be replaced by modern statutory provisions … We recommend that these new provisions should … establish that qualified privilege applies to all fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings in the same way as to abstracts and extracts of those proceedings; provide that in all court proceedings in respect of such fair and accurate reports, extracts or abstracts, the claimant or prosecution shall be required to prove that the defendant acted maliciously … However, it appears that Parliament has not taken up the Joint Committee’s recommendation, and the extent of any common law protection remains an open question. Accordingly, the article linked in the question states that “The BBC is not naming Soldier F for legal reasons.”