When does a person lose diplomatic status? Ahmed Ali Muthana, father of Hoda Muthana, "claims" that he was no longer working as a diplomat at the time of his daughter's birth, thereby insisting that his daughter was born a US citizen under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. His statement suggests that he was at one time employed in a diplomatic function (and that assumes that he had diplomatic "papers" because of his employ), how does one lose that status, and is there any action that he is required to take to relinquish that status? Further more, if he failed to take some action to relinquish that status, has he committed some crime?
His statement suggests that he was at one time employed in a diplomatic function (and that assumes that he had diplomatic "papers" because of his employ), how does one lose that status, and is there any action that he is required to take to relinquish that status? Diplomatic personnel with official diplomatic status under the relevant treaties and for purposes of U.S. naturalization laws are credentialed by the U.S. Department of State. When an embassy and consulate wants to bring in a new diplomat, it provides their credentials to the State Department, which must approve the grant of diplomatic status to the person, although this decision is given very broad deference in practice. The State Department could decline to credential someone due to an individualized history of prior misconduct (e.g. a known serial killer or war criminal who escaped prosecution due to diplomatic immunity), because the regime seeking to have the diplomat credentialed is no longer recognized as legitimate by the United States (e.g. the Assad regime of Syria), or because the total number of diplomats is excessive (e.g. if Luxembourg wanted to credential 1000 diplomats in the U.S.). Mostly, however, the credentialing process is important because a diplomat's credentials can be revoked. This is usually done either in response to the individualized conduct of a particular person (for example, the person is discovered to be a spy with a diplomatic cover who is actively stealing key secrets from the United States), or as a symbolic form of sanctions for conduct of the diplomat's country of which the United States does not approve. For example, many countries revoked the credentials of many Russian diplomats after Russia assassinated a former Russian spy in Britain. When a diplomat ends a tour of service in the United States, that diplomat's credentials are supposed to be withdrawn, in part, to prevent the number of credentialed diplomats from their country in the U.S. from being excessive. A credentialed diplomat is not required to be in the U.S. 24/7 while the credentials are in place. But, the country has some mild incentives not to have too many absentee diplomats. (The U.S. State Department could also unilaterally revoke the credentials of a diplomat known to be a long time absentee.) It isn't clear to me in this case, if this individual's credentials had actually been formally withdrawn yet, or if he and his family were in the gap period between terminating his employment in the U.S. with the embassy and formally having his credentials withdrawn by his home country. In the former case, his children born in the U.S. are definitely U.S. citizens pursuant to the 14th Amendment and U.S. citizenship and naturalization laws. In the later case, the rule is less clear and it may be an issue of first impression not resolved by any prior case law regarding an issue that is arguably ambiguous under the statute. Vox has a good description of the underlying facts in the case, in addition to a lot of analysis that I omit from the quoted material below: Hoda Muthana’s father, Ahmed Ali Muthana, came to the US from Yemen in 1990 to serve as a diplomat representing his home country at the United Nations, whose headquarters are located in New York City. However, he lost that job — and thus his diplomatic immunity — as the result of the Yemeni civil war in the mid-1990s. The question is exactly when he lost his diplomatic privileges — and whether that happened before Hoda was born, on October 28, 1994, or after. The US government has told Ahmed Ali Muthana (according to his lawsuit) that its records show he held diplomatic status until February 6, 1995 — that is, until after Hoda’s birth — and therefore that Hoda was born while he was still a diplomat and thus is not a US citizen, but a Yemeni one. Ahmed Ali Muthana, on the other hand, claims in a lawsuit that he surrendered his diplomatic identity card on June 2, 1994 — months before his daughter was born. Legal experts I spoke to said that that wouldn’t necessarily mean he officially lost his diplomatic status on that date, though. Steve Vladeck, a law professor at the University of Texas at Austin, said that under US law, ex-diplomats who are still in the country enjoy some “residual immunity” while they pack their bags and prepare to head back home. But the Muthanas weren’t just wrapping up their affairs before returning to Yemen; they were settling in the country for good. Since the Muthanas credentials with the State Department weren't officially withdrawn until February 5, 1995, after his daughter was born, the question of whether he was a diplomat or not when she was born isn't a cut and dried one. A lot of the argument in the case pertains to how the United States government treated this case before it was at issue when his daughter sought to travel to the United States as would be her right if she was a U.S. citizen. But, ultimately, all of this portion of the factual background is only pertinent to the extent that it sheds light on the official interpretation of the legal issues that the United States understood to be the case before the dispute arose. But, the United States government's interpretation of the law regarding when someone has diplomatic immunity, while it can be considered as persuasive authority, does not determine definitively if the United States government's previous interpretations of this law as applied to this case were legally correct. Either party is free to dispute any previous interpretation given to the law that was not established in a a disputed court case on the merits of the dispute. The facts are also illuminated and complicated by a point made by @user6726 in his answer which points out that UN representatives don't have the full diplomatic immunities enjoyed by other diplomats. Further more, if he failed to take some action to relinquish that status, has he committed some crime? He has not committed a crime. First of all, upon the termination of his diplomatic status, he could have received a tourist visa which is available for several months, as a matter of course, to citizens of many nations who arrive in the U.S. without prior issuance of a visa. Second, even if he and his family are present in the United States without any legal visa or citizenship authorizing them to be present in the United States, this merely means that as a civil (i.e. non-criminal) matter, he and his family may be deported. Overstaying a visa is not a crime. Also, even he had committed a crime because, for example, after his diplomatic status ended he trafficked sex slaves to pimps in the U.S. in a manner that evaded a port of entry after having previously been convicted of the same offense (which would be a felony), this would not prevent his child, born in the United States while he did not have diplomatic credentials from being a U.S. citizen. Birthright citizenship under the 14th Amendment is available even to people who are illegally present in the United States and are deportable and even if that presence arose from a crime. FOOTNOTE ON PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS Naively, this case also seems to raise some interesting issues of civil procedure and subject-matter jurisdiction. Most questions related to immigration and nationalization law are heard in the first instance in Article II (Executive Branch) immigration courts which are administrative law courts, subject to appeal to an appellate Article II administrative law court called the BIA (Board of Immigration Appeals). Appeals from the BIA, in turn, are to the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit, an Article III (Judicial Branch) intermediate appellate court, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court. A handful of questions related to immigration and naturalization law are, or may be, raised in the United States District Courts (an Article III trial court), subject to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit, an Article III (Judicial Branch) intermediate appellate court, and then to the U.S. Supreme Court. (I don't have the technical expertise to quickly and accurately summarize which cases belong in Article II immigration courts and which belong in Article III U.S. District Courts without considerable further research, but this isn't necessary to understand the jurisdictional conundrum posed by this case.) But, court cases in which diplomats are parties are also in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The pertinent language of Section 2 of Article III of the United States Constitution states: The judicial Power shall extend . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Counsuls . . . In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. But, because the case law has held that this portion of the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court clause vests concurrent rather than exclusive jurisdiction over these cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, this is not the barrier that it would naively seem to be. Therefore, if the case were filed originally in the U.S. Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction, the U.S. Supreme Court could instead transfer the matter to another appropriate federal trial court, or could dismiss the case without prejudice on prudential grounds rather than because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear original proceedings in the case. If this had not been the case, it would have been tricky to resolve in this case, because the crux of the dispute is whether or not the father of the child was a diplomat at the relevant time, which is also the central fact that needs to be determined when one attempts to discern which court has jurisdiction over the case. (Also, had this been an issue, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104, the evidentiary rules that apply to a preliminary determination regarding whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction are different that the normal evidentiary rules that apply to subsequent reconsiderations of the subject-matter jurisdiction question and the decision on the merits.) Since the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding diplomatic matters is not exclusive, it does not raise complicated issues of subject matter jurisdiction, because both the U.S. Supreme Court and the ordinary trial court in cases like these both have subject matter jurisdiction. There is also no doubt that the questions presented in this case are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts as opposed to state and local courts, unlike most federal questions over which the federal courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction. SECOND FOOTNOTE RE POSSIBLE LOSS OF U.S. CITIZENSHIP Another potential issue in this case is whether the daughter took actions that amounted to a voluntary renunciation of her U.S. citizenship in as an adult in connection with her alleged involvement with ISIS and loyalty oaths that may have been taken by her at that time. If she swore an oath of loyalty to ISIS that included an express renunciation of all claims she might have to citizenship in any other country or to any other sovereign, that could operate as a renunciation of her U.S. citizenship even if she was a citizen at birth. So far as I know, the litigation has not yet progressed far enough for this issue to be ripe for consideration yet, because you can't determine if someone has renounced their U.S. citizenship until you figure out if that person was a U.S. citizen in the first place.
As someone with ties to the "foreign" community in the United States, I see these "marriages of convenience" from time to time. In their most "legitimate" form, the couple will move to the same address and "technically" live together, but without consummating the marriage so that it can later be legally annulled. American immigration authorities counter this by asking each spouse about the other's underwear (literally!). Some "marriages of convenience" are legal, insofar as they technically conform to the marriage documents, e.g. regarding "co habitation," even while violating the spirit of the law. Others don't. Your best chance of attacking such "marriages" is not regarding the marriage itself (basically only the couple can decide what constitutes a valid marriage), but rather "compliance" with the marriage documents. That's something any law enforcement officer can understand.
You are indeed thinking of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. This codified a portion of existing customary international law on diplomatic immunity. It is the result of several years of legal negotiations at establishing a common set of rules that would be generally acceptable. The basic concept of immunity for ambassadors is very ancient, and there is still a body of customary international law that was not codified. For example, the 1961 Convention only deals with permanent missions, not temporary ones like for multinational summits. The history and practice are also helpful for interpreting the Convention itself, such as when considering the scope of diplomatic duties which are protected, as opposed to extracurricular activities which might not be. In the UK, the Convention is implemented by the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. This mostly repeats the relevant parts of the Convention text, in Schedule 1, and also includes sections integrating those provisions with domestic law. As far as the courts, section 4 says that If in any proceedings any question arises whether or not any person is entitled to any privilege or immunity under this Act a certificate issued by or under the authority of the Secretary of State stating any fact relating to that question shall be conclusive evidence of that fact. This means that what happens procedurally in a UK court is that someone wanting to claim immunity must come with a letter from the Foreign Secretary attesting that they are a real diplomat and not just making it up. The court then considers, from that fact, what legal consequences follow, depending on the type of diplomat involved (e.g. heads of mission have broader protection), the nature of the case (criminal case where the diplomat is accused? civil case where they are the respondent?), etc. That is a matter of interpreting the Convention, plus maybe customary international law - it doesn't mean the diplomat gets to wave their certificate and end the proceedings. The purpose of section 4 is to avoid the court entering its own fact-finding process about whether someone is a real diplomat. That is felt to run the risk of the court causing diplomatic offence by accident - consider Israel and Palestine and China and Taiwan for potential pitfalls. The doctrine of &quot;one voice&quot; obliges the courts to follow the executive's lead. Prior to the Act of 1964, diplomatic immunity was covered by several other enactments, but with the same basic model for implementing immunities in court. There were different regimes for Commonwealth countries and others, which is not the case any more. The first such Act was passed in 1708 after an embarrassing situation with the then ambassador from Russia, who was imprisoned for his debts, angering the Tsar. In general, domestic courts in the UK can take account of customary international law if it is relevant. They can also look at treaty texts, even ones the UK has not signed, to help interpret international law. (In the same way, they can look at academic articles, travaux préparatoires, etc., which have no formal status as law.) If the UK signed the 1961 Convention but did not pass the 1964 Act, then courts might be able to treat the Convention as &quot;background&quot; - but would still be bound by the 1708-1955 Acts on the topic, as far as the actual procedure and rules to follow. A diplomat would not be able to avail themselves of their specific 1961 rights, unless perhaps there was some gap or ambiguity in the domestic law where they could squeeze in an argument that the Convention supplied the proper interpretation of whichever point of customary international law was involved.
The 25th amendment §3 says Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. Nothing in the Constitution deprives the Vice President of his powers / duties when he is also Acting President. Alternatively, the VP can become acting President under §4, without presidential cooperation, by declaration of the VP and a majority of the cabinet. Then either the President asserts that there is no inability, or Congress decides there is. But: unless the president dies or resigns, or is impeached, the VP is Acting President and actual Vice President, and therefore breaks ties in the Senate. Note that under §4, the VP plus cabinet must declare POTUS unable, and must do it again if POTUS denies the inability. That means that there must still be a VP, who along with the cabinet re-affirms the disability.
I have never heard of anything like this. I guess when you say "registered in that place" you are referring to Russian resident registration. The US doesn't have such a system, so this sort of certificate wouldn't even make sense.
Sure, but Qatar is not in the jurisdiction of the ECHR! For the ECHR to apply in a jurisdiction, Qatar would need to have signed it or be in the EU or at least have been in it. It never has been. In fact, not even Den Haque would have power over Qatar unless they allowed it to - and that court rules on matters of war crimes... Qatar does not guarantee the same rights you might be familiar with from most western countries. In fact, not even all western countries are the same. In America, you can use the Sieg Heil gesture, in Germany, you can end in jail for it.. Same for Propaganda materials.
Let’s look at the full paragraph Neither the President nor Congress nor the Judiciary can disturb any one of the safeguards of civil liberty incorporated into the Constitution except so far as the right is given to suspend in certain cases the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. So what it actually says is: you can’t unless you can. The Constitution says this to say about habeas corpus: The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. The case decided that military commissions (and the denial of habeas corpus) were constitutional where there was no civilian court available. Because Indiana had never been in rebellion and civil courts continued to function there, military tribunals could not be used. However, they could be uses in states that had been in rebellion. You can’t unless you can. This is specifically about rights guaranteed in the Constitution In this particular case, the right of habeas corpus. There is no equivalent right applicable to face masks so a law mandating them in certain circumstances does no more infringe a Constitutional right than mandating the wearing of clothes in public. You can’t unless you can. Breaking the law doesn’t cause you to lose your job The second quote, the origin of which is unknown and definitely not in the case, is total fantasy. Even if a law against face masks was unconstitutional, the authors of that law have overreached and the remedy is to go to a court to have it declared unconstitutional. They don’t lose their jobs as a result. Even if they wrote the law with criminal intent, they must be removed from office in accordance with the normal procedures such as impeachment for the President, by a two-thirds majority vote of their house for a Congressperson etc.
There is no internationally-enforceable mechanism regarding how other people call something, or what alphabet can be uses to write a word. I can legally call that country between Bangladesh and Thailand "Burma" or "Myanmar", I can call Україна Ukraine, The Ukraine, or Ukrainia (the latter seems to be old-fashioned, but it's still legal). As a diplomatic matter, the US government seems to have settled on certain designations so that it uses the version "Myanmar" for official purposes although it includes "(Burma)" in popular communications (State Department travel advisories). If it wanted to, the US could call The Republic of North Macedonia by the name "Macedonia", though there would be political protests. The EU, NATO, UN etc. can likewise set its own rules regarding names of countries. There are many additional complications in the case of countries that are not universally / widely recognized, such as Trasnistria and the Republic of Somaliland. If the president of the Republic of Somaliland sought to address the UN, his problem would not be what people would call his country, it is that the Republic of Somaliland is not "recognized" by the UN (it has no official status), or anyone else. The question of "sameness" of language is a prominent feature of nationalist movements. Claims are made that Flemish and Dutch are "the same" or "different", likewise Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin; Dari, Farsi and Tajik. Thus there is no real chance of litigating the matter of whether Moldovan and Romanian are the "same language" and which name should be used. But if the EU parliament wants to, it could rule that the language of Moldova is to be called "Romanian", or "Moldovan".