Does Biden OSHA vaccine mandate apply to remote workers? Does Biden vaccine mandate apply to remote workers? I am programmer full-time employee working from home. Our company was fully remote before the pandemic in 2019.
The emergency temporary standard requires either vaccination, or testing with masks for unvaccinated workers, for employees of an employer with 100 or more employees but has exceptions for employees working alone or exclusively outdoors. According to 1910.501 - Vaccination, testing, and face coverings: 1910.501(b)(3) The requirements of this section do not apply to the employees of covered employers: 1910.501(b)(3)(i) Who do not report to a workplace where other individuals such as coworkers or customers are present; 1910.501(b)(3)(ii) While working from home; or 1910.501(b)(3)(iii) Who work exclusively outdoors.
Overview An executive order cannot make new law. However, most executive orders are based on powers granted by law to the President, or to some executive agency or department. Others are based on laws that come under the general power and duty of the President to &quot;take care that the laws are executed&quot; and announce some policy for how laws will be interpreted and enforced. Announced mandates In the case of the mask and vaccine mandates announced but not yet issued by the Biden administration, they apparently claim to exercise powers granted under various laws, particularly the Occupational Health and Safety Act. It is likely that once such regulations are formally issued they will be challenged by those opposed to such mandates. If they are upheld, (or are somehow not challenged and thus assumed to be valid) they will carry the force of the laws under which they are issued, and thus the Supremacy Clause will apply to those laws, and to the orders as ways to enforce those laws. Other Precedents The question says: Currently, the only precedent to enforce fines and vaccine mandates (at a state level) that I am aware of is a 1905 decision by the Supreme Court, Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197 US 11 (1905)), where it allowed Massachusetts to fine an individual for refusing to comply with vaccine mandates set by the state. This is not quite correct. Jacobson is the leading case on this issue, but there have been some others. In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) the US Supreme Court held that a local ordinance mandating vaccinations for school attendance did not violate federal constitutional rights, citing Jacobson and calling the matter settled law. Note that the ordinance in Zucht applied to both public and private schools without exception. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) the Supreme Court opinion included (at 166) the statement that: Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state, as parens patriae, may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243. The catalogue need not be lengthened. It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare, and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction. (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted) Prince v. Massachusetts was a child labor case, not a vaccination case, and the above comment was technically obiter dictum (not binding precedent). But because of it Prince has several times been cited in later vaccination cases alongside Jacobson and to show that Jacobson is still good law. Note that Prince, like Jacobson and Zucht, was a case supporting state law against a 14th amendment challenge. Supremacy Clause An Executive Order that is not backed by any valid law would not be the &quot;Supreme law of the land&quot; under the supremacy clause, and might well be simply held invalid for lack of Presidential authority to issue it, depending on the subject of the order. But orders claiming to make law on the President's own authority are quite rare. Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the steel seizure case) invalidated such an order. In that case the President not only did not have the backing of a specific law, but failed to follow the procedures set out in a relevant law. In Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer the concurring opinion by Justice Jackson has proved influential in later cases and in later congressional drafting of laws. The key passage of that opinion starting at 343 U. S. 635 reads: Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government, as an undivided whole, lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather than on abstract theories of law. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. Into which of these classifications does this executive seizure of the steel industry fit? It is eliminated from the first by admission, for it is conceded that no congressional authorization exists for this seizure. That takes away also the support of the many precedents and declarations which were made in relation, and must be confined, to this category. Can it then be defended under flexible tests available to the second category? It seems clearly eliminated from that class, because Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field, but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure ... Would a vaccine mandate or mask mandate that goes beyond any law passed by Congress fall into Jackson's &quot;zone of twilight&quot;? In the absence of a court ruling, no one can say.
This is covered by the page Job Applicants and the ADA from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. There it is said: I have a disability and will need an accommodation for the job interview. Does the ADA require an employer to provide me with one? Yes. Employers are required to provide &quot;reasonable accommodation&quot; -- appropriate changes and adjustments -- to enable you to be considered for a job opening. Reasonable accommodation may also be required to enable you to perform a job, gain access to the workplace, and enjoy the &quot;benefits and privileges&quot; of employment available to employees without disabilities. An employer cannot refuse to consider you because you require a reasonable accommodation to compete for or perform a job. The page mentions as plausible required reasonable accomodations: providing written materials in accessible formats, such as large print, braille, or audiotape providing readers or sign language interpreters ensuring that recruitment, interviews, tests, and other components of the application process are held in accessible locations providing or modifying equipment or devices adjusting or modifying application policies and procedures. The page goes on to say that: You must inform the employer that you need some sort of change or adjustment to the application/interviewing process because of your medical condition. You can make this request orally or in writing, or someone else might make a request for you (e.g., a family member, friend, health professional, or other representative, such as a job coach). A letter from a doctor is not automatically required. But in some cases a prospective employer might reasonably insist on nsuch a letter. The page says: If your disability and need for accommodation are not obvious, the employer may ask you for reasonable documentation explaining the disability and why an accommodation is needed. There is no specified evidence or form that an employer need provide in rejecting a request for an accommodation. The employer is only required to provide &quot;reasonable&quot; accommodation, and is not required to provide any accommodation if it would cause &quot;undue hardship&quot; to the employer. If several possible accommodations would reasonably allow the potential employee to apply the employer may choose which one or ones to offer. It need not offer the one preferred by the prospective employee. All this also applies to accommodations for an employee after s/he has been hired or has a job offer.
No You can outsource if you don't disclose Confidential Information (as defined in the agreement), or if you have the principal's permission to disclose it to the third-party contractor. The clause only applies to confidential information - a subset of all information. I know that independent contractors should have the freedom to complete the work in whatever way they want Not at all. George Clooney, the actor, is an independent contractor - he can't outsource. Of course, this is an example of a personal services contract but, more generally, while the starting position in contracting is that either party may delegate their obligations (although they remain responsible for them) the parties are free to structure their contract however they like. If they want to prohibit outsourcing, they can. If they want to specify that certain personnel must be used (or not used), they can.
Parents have very wide latitude to make their children do what they are told, especially when the action is mandated by law. Vaccinations for school children are mandatory, and that could include covid vaccinations. A child is not eligible for an exemption on their own (only the parent can request a non-medical exemption). Force can be used on the child to get them to comply with a mandatory vaccination, per RCW 9A.16.100. It is the policy of this state to protect children from assault and abuse and to encourage parents, teachers, and their authorized agents to use methods of correction and restraint of children that are not dangerous to the children. However, the physical discipline of a child is not unlawful when it is reasonable and moderate and is inflicted by a parent, teacher, or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. Any use of force on a child by any other person is unlawful unless it is reasonable and moderate and is authorized in advance by the child's parent or guardian for purposes of restraining or correcting the child. However, that does not mean that the shot-provider is willing to tie the child down on parental say-so, so it is reasonably likely that a court order would be necessary. If the child has been legally emancipated, they are the ones who would have to consent to a vaccination, so their parents can't make them get shots.
It looks like your PTO already met the legal qualifications for the law were met by your PTO policy prior to the law's enactment. The linked material lists the exemption for full time employees. You should have a leave balance in your pay stub (and if not, you should talk to your company's payroll department to find out your balance(s)) and can use leave that you have for sick leave (they just aren't calling it sick leave it). Likely your leave is valid for sick or vacation leave combined or you have two pools (sick and vacation) that you can use any leave pool for sick days (typically, sick leave will be paid out on departure from the company and has no caps on banking it (if you have X amount of hours per year and don't take sick days at all, you can add that to the sick leave you get next year) so you can retire early by using the sick leave to cover the time you would have remaining to work before retirement benefits can take over. Vacation or Annual may also payout but has a cap on banking (often this bank will be the days per year value of the year. If in year one you take no vacation days, you can still have X vacation days banked in addition to year 2's days, but you need to use that same amount by the end of year two or you will lose the hours banked in year one. Basically amounts to longer Christmas Break for a lot of people).
Usually, a clause like this is used in contracts of full time managerial or professional employees of a business who are employed on a salaried or commissioned, as opposed to an hourly basis, in positions that are exempt from overtime requirements. It basically prohibits moonlighting with a second job while employed at your current job. A non-competition clause, in contrast, would typically prohibit working for a competitor for some period of time after ceasing to work at your current employer. This is concerned about spreading your time and efforts too thin, rather than competition. You could violate it even if your moonlighting job has no direct impact (other than loss of some of your full time services) on the firm that employs you in your primary job. It does not prohibit you from having a personal life (e.g. going to the dentist, visiting family, watching a movie, etc.). Normally, this is used as a backstop against gross abuses, with performance based evaluation as the primary means by which the employee is evaluated. The line between personal investment activity and moonlighting or an intensive hobby can be vague and it is usually only enforced in extreme cases.
In germany, this is called Friedenspflicht. Both employers and employees (and their unions) are required to refrain from strikes and lockouts in disputes on issues which are covered by a currently valid collective bargaining agreement. The agreement may also stipulate that there will be no labor actions on issues which are not covered, as long as the agreement is in force, but that is not necessary. Example: There is a collective bargaining agreement on wages, which is still running. Strikes for higher wages are prohibited. Strikes to get better staffing for the night shift would be allowed, if the agreement doesn't say how many employees should be on duty even during slack hours.