What was The initial state of the statute book, and how was it seeded? If one was to successively roll back each most recent act of Parliament until the earliest traceable one in the chain, when would that act have been from, and what was the state of the statute book at the time when that initial act was passed? Obviously unlike in the U.S. there is no constitution establishing the framework of law making and keeping, the powers of the parliament and crown, etc. So then also how is the whole system of government and separations of powers etc in England and the U.K. defined? Does the answer to this differ between different parts of the U.K.?
Organically rather than by design, laws and courts preceded the theoretical constitutional basis. Kings developed a practice of legislating in council, rather than solo, meaning that their edicts went out not as &quot;the King decrees XYZ&quot; but &quot;the King, with the assent of the archbishops, bishops, abbots, barons, etc., decrees XYZ&quot;. This eventually became the Parliamentary system, wherein only Parliament could make laws (especially about raising taxes) and the King alone could not. Because of the gradual evolution, it's not easy to point to the first such statute or even the first proper &quot;Parliament&quot;. The form was not settled. Nowadays we expect Acts to start with a set &quot;enacting formula&quot;, to be published in a set way, and to be called &quot;Acts&quot; at all. Earlier laws lacked these elements. It was common for Parliaments to transact a variety of business, such as appointing officials or distributing money, without strictly distinguishing a category of what we would now call a &quot;public general Act&quot;, something setting out broadly applicable rules under the tenor of law. To take an early example, the Domesday Book was undoubtedly commissioned by William I in council in 1085, but we could argue for a long time whether that really counted as a law made by the King alone or through a proto-parliamentary approach. The Assize of Clarendon in 1166 is closer - we have the text and it refers to the counsel of all the barons - but still not obviously &quot;an Act&quot;. Magna Carta came in 1215 and was repeatedly confirmed by successive monarchs in slight variations; only the 1297 version is currently deemed to be an Act still partially in force. At the same time as this legislative activity, a bewildering array of courts applied essentially customary law for local cases. If you commit a murder in Durham in 1300 and would like to not be executed, then you would be appealing (I think?) to the mercy of the Prince-Bishop in his own court. A few dozen miles away and the process and authority was different. Things gradually became more uniform and systematized, and by the sixteenth century there was enough critical mass of legal philosophy to try to &quot;explain&quot; the legal system more formally and in recognizably modern terms. We may as well take Edward Coke's Institutes of the Laws of England (1628-1644) as a turning point: four volumes setting out a comprehensive view of what English law was all about. In contrast, take Bracton's similar work of 1235, which was the first real analysis of case law in England. Bracton was writing in a context without a general idea of precedent, and where the binding extent of Roman civil law was not clear. By Coke's time that was well established. But they are both trying to make sense of the law as they found it: giving explanations for the data, if you like. (A parallel course was taking place in Scotland with its institutional writers, although they ended up with a different system from England's. They were equally trying to explain what they saw.) Some of the early modern authors contributed to figuring out which decisions of past Parliaments or councils should be taken to be Acts, as such. Coke, in particular, also set out the criterion that an Act should purport to have been made by all three of the King, Lords and Commons. Our modern consolidated versions of the statute book derive from this time, and on legislation.gov.uk you can see the oldest Act still in force, The Statute of Marlborough 1267. That's different from the oldest Acts ever made, as discussed above, a more slippery concept. Ideas such as the separation of powers are reverse-engineered in this way. Indeed, it's not obvious that Britain has that separation. It may not be the right way to understand the governmental and legal order that has developed. John Locke might have thought it would be a good idea, but Walter Bagehot denied it was a useful frame for analyzing the interrelationships of various public bodies.
As a matter of law, the Duchy is correct, because a superior court of record agreed, and dismissed the arguments made on the other side. The cited claims from Republic come from a case in the First-Tier Tribunal (EA/2010/0182) about whether the Duchy was a &quot;public authority&quot; for the purpose of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. The FTT said that it was, since either the Duchy or the Duke were carrying out certain functions of public administration (as the harbour authority for St Mary's Harbour on the Isles of Scilly), and whichever one it was, the Duke was in charge of the Duchy; and meanwhile, the Duchy appeared to have some elements of legal personality, as cited in the question above. This decision was appealed to the Upper Tribunal, The A-G for the Prince of Wales v the IC and Mr Michael Bruton [2016] UKUT 0154 (AAC), which disagreed as to the Duchy being a body with its own separate identity - see paragraphs 71-102 - and reversed the ruling below. The basic issue is that the Duchy of Cornwall was brought into being by a royal charter of 1337. It predates modern common-law or statutory developments about bodies corporate, income tax, corporation tax, and so on. It also precedes the not-exactly-modern developments of the limited scope of royal authority and the prerogative, norms of statutory construction, the Crown as separate from the royal person, and other apparatus of constitutional monarchy. It is true that it sits uncomfortably in the modern world, as a sui generis feudal creation that is not something we would create today. However, as a matter of law, the UT said that what counts is what the Duchy is, not what it ought to be. Figuring out the law means looking at the actual law as opposed to ancillary indications, such as what Duchy officers have said from time to time, or administrative actions of the Health and Safety Executive. Parliament has had the opportunity to consider the position of the Duchy several times and has so far declined to change it. The charter of 1337, which was deemed to be an Act of Parliament by a court case in 1606 (!), grants land and privileges to the Duke of Cornwall, whoever that might be from time to time, and with a reverter to the Crown when there is no Duke. The UT found that this &quot;creates something that has similarities to a trust, but without trustees&quot; (there was a nascent body of law relating to trusts in 1337, but it was nowhere near its modern flourishing). Unlike with the creation of the Duchy of Lancaster, this charter does not incorporate the Duchy as an entity in its own right - the &quot;Duchy&quot; is just a word used to describe the possessions of the Duke or King held under the charter. If it is a separate entity then that is not because of the charter. The UT examined various of the claims made in the FTT but rejected them, saying that &quot;such examples cannot create such an entity or body and each investigation of the submissions based on them that took place before me showed such statements or implications to be wrong (e.g. that the Duchy owns Highgrove was shown to be wrong by the production of the Land Certificate).&quot; It also rejected the idea that the people who administer the Duchy could be regarded as some form of partnership or unincorporated association, finding that they had not come together in that fashion. It said that therefore, the only remaining route to the Duchy being a corporation would be if the other primary legislation dealing with its management had created it as such by &quot;necessary implication&quot;. Those Acts, of 1844, 1863 and 1982, deal with accounting and management for the Duchy of Cornwall. From their context and content, the UT said that they seem to envisage the property in question as belonging to the Duke (not the Duchy) as &quot;the legal owner of the assets etc. comprising the Duchy estate&quot;, and that &quot;the relevant officers and employees work for the Duke, or the Duke’s guardian when he is a minor, or the Sovereign when there is no Duke, and not for an entity or corporation called the Duchy.&quot; Therefore: [T]he Duchy of Cornwall or the Duchy is no more than a name that has been used correctly to describe the possessions of the Duke of Cornwall (the Duchy estate), or to the Duke (or his title), or collectively and conveniently to describe the officers and persons who from time to time act for and on behalf of the Duke as the owner of the Duchy estate. Save to the extent that it is a reference to the Duke as a natural person the Duchy of Cornwall has no legal personality and is not a person, body or entity that has its own functions and powers or a separate identity of its own. Although this was not before the UT, it would seem to follow for tax purposes that if the Duchy is not a body corporate, then it is not liable for corporation tax under the Corporation Tax Act 2010 - see section 1121, which defines &quot;company&quot; for that and the companion Corporation Tax Act 2009. It also does not fall within section 443, &quot;Companies controlled by or on behalf of Crown&quot;, firstly because if it's not a company, then that section fails immediately, and secondly because &quot;Crown&quot; here refers to the Crown in the sense of governmental public functions, not the Queen (or her family members) personally.
Interesting question. I routinely write wills that authorize the executor to destroy property that has no significant economic or sentimental value, but I've never encountered a case where a testator or testatrix has directed that property be destroyed and I've never seen a reported case (or even a news report) in which that has happened. To the extent that an estate is solvent, there is no reason that a creditor could complain and if the destruction was done in a safe manner (as opposed to burning down a house or something like that without consulting the fire department) I'm not sure that there would be a public interest in doing so either. There are many religions that had a practice historically of burying someone with grave goods, so there are reasonable First Amendment freedom of religion arguments for allowing such a practice if it had a religious basis. And, if no interested party objected, I don't see how anyone could stop the executor from acting, unless the property to be destroyed was, for example, evidence of a crime, in which case it would be a crime to destroy it and the provision of the will would be void because it was a crime to carry it out. If an executor sought permission from a court to carry out this instruction, the court might require a public notice of the planned destruction to give notice to any third party who might claim an ownership interest in the property allegedly belonging to the decedent. On the other hand, usually, all interested parties in an estate can agree to act contrary to a will by unanimous consent, in which case no one would have standing to fight for the provision in court (unless it was considered a charitable bequest, in which case a state attorney general or an advocate appointed by the court with the "will" as the client could defend it). Given the strong public policies in the law disfavoring "waste" (i.e. useless destruction of property) such a provision could be held to be void as against public policy (similarly, bequests contingent upon marriage decisions are now void as against public policy).
That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., &quot;The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.&quot; In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.
Desuetude is the wrong concept. Desuetude relates to laws as a whole falling out of use; it doesn’t relate to individual cases. There is no question that the UK actively enforces their bail laws so they are not falling out of use. There is a statute of limitations that applies to non-major crimes within which the state must initiate prosecution. However, in this case the prosecution for bail violation has been initiated and Mr Assange is “on the run” so this is not relevant. Neither is the fact that the original charges that led to his arrest has been dropped- he is wanted for escaping lawful custody under English law for which the penalty is pretty stiff. I will also venture an opinion that the case against him is as open and shut as it comes. TL;DR When he dies.
They still have the power They generally don’t because: Most activities of a criminal nature no matter how novel can be shoehorned as a new instance of an existing crime. Parliament is much more pro-active in its legislative agenda. The judicial system moves much more slowly.
There may be a purpose to have laws which are impossible to follow. (I'm neither a lawyer nor a politician, following points are what I like to call qualified hearsay - they come from qualified people I know personally but were given as a remark or during a chat over a cup of coffee and therefore are not easily substantiable with rigorous sources. You can treat them as a hypothetical ideas for your thought experiments.) Everybody is implicitly guilty Confident citizens and transparent law is the worst enemy of totalitarian regime. You learn to live with ingrained feeling that there surely is something you are guilty of. Merely being addressed by police makes you nervous and malleable; should you stand up against oppression, it is easy for the state apparat to detain or convict you of one or more default offenses. A good example would be the law present in many, if not all, socialist bloc countries saying that knowing of a comrade having commited an offense or merely planing to and not reporting it to authorities is an offense in itself. Whether you did or did not know would be determined by the authorities. Make your laws very strict with a hope thay they will be followed at least to a degree Not laws in themselves, but standards (technical norms) regarding nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union were strict to the point where they were technically impossible to follow given the state of the art. For example the standards for manufacture of high pressure pipes would state very low level of material impurities that when the actual manufactured material contained twice the level of impurities the pipe will still be very safe to operate. In a centrally planned economy with ever more ambitious production projections and declared zero need for contingency this was one of several ways how to create a bit of a wiggle room. (Source: I once worked for a nuclear power research institute supporting Soviet technology and was told this by an expert on stainless steel.) So there you have a bit of an illustration what may happen if a law is intentionally impossible to follow. Since you labelled your question 'United States', I believe the follow-up question is why would anyone want to propose such a law.
1. You need to read and utilize law textbooks, the MOST UPDATED editione. Try to access a library of a university that has a law faculty. Failing that, try a local library — but local libraries may not stock (pricey) law textbooks, or their most updated edns. I scanned Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law Text Cases Materials (2020 9 edn), beneath for you. But the NEWEST edn is 2022, 10 edn, as at May 23 2022. Herring updates his book every 2 years. Two other leading textbooks are Smith, Hogan, and Ormerod's Criminal Law (2021 16 edn), and Smith, Hogan, &amp; Ormerod's Text, Cases, &amp; Materials on Criminal Law (2020 13 edn). 2. Look up the Act of Parliament in the Table of Legislation. See scan beneath. 3. Finally, you shall find the cases expatiated in the body, and cited in the footnotes! See scan beneath.