Is it possible to enact legislation eliminating life without parole without first repealing an existing truth in sentencing statute? I would like to advocate for legislation within my home state of New Hampshire which would allow for a parole hearing for anyone having served 25+ years. Such a law would eliminate life without parole for present and future such convictions. Is such legislation that effectively overrules a court imposed sentence even allowable? (I realize there have been supreme court actions to constrain the death penalty but perhaps that's different because it's a constitutional matter(??)) To complicate matters further, an existing NH truth in sentencing statute would seem to conflict with the notion that any such change is possible.
Is such legislation that effectively overrules a court imposed sentence even allowable? Yes. Amnesty legislation is allowed. For example, the U.S. Congress recently passed such legislation with regard to crack cocaine sentences. Legislation changing sentences for crimes is presumed to be prospective only, but this presumption can be overcome with clear statutory language to the contrary. As a political matter, however, district attorneys usually lobby strenuously against amnesty legislation, feeling that it sets a bad (political) precedent. an existing NH truth in sentencing statute would seem to conflict with the notion that any such change is possible. In the event of a direct conflict between an older statute and a newer statute that can't be resolved by any other interpretive method, the newer statute prevails over the older one, even if this result isn't expressly identified in the legislation.
You'd be confessing to committing a crime. I'm not a lawyer, but I wouldn't recommend trying it. Sure, if this trick worked, you might be able to clear yourself of civil remedies, but there's a much bigger problem with this: with the repeal of Roe vs Wade, Texas once more criminalised abortion, and so this tactic would, by necessity, require confessing to a crime in a court of law. While that law expressly prohibited the levying of penalties against the pregnant woman, the law allowing for lawsuits against people who &quot;aid and abet&quot; abortions didn't seem to apply to them either. As such, you'd be opening yourself up to fines of tens of thousands of dollars and a maximum prison sentence of life in jail.
An example is that a person eventually convicted of a crime has made a false statement in pleading &quot;not guilty&quot;. 1001a would compel confessions, because you cannot legally conceal a material fact. In a judicial proceeding, the analog that prevents certain kinds of &quot;lying&quot; is the law against perjury, which is much stricter than the broad language of 1001.
There are a number of specific limitation on what can be made criminal in US law, derived from constitutional protection. Specific Rights Expressions of free speech, for example, cannot be made criminal, although there can be laws which regulate or impact speech to a degree. Similarly, the establishment clause of the First Amendment prohibits a law requiring people to attend a particular church, and he free Exercise clause prohibits any criminal penalties for any religious practice or lack of practice. Most of the other provisions of the Bill of right would impose similar limitations. The legislature cannot criminalize what people have a constitutional right to do. Thre are also specific limitations not in the bill of rights, such as the prohibition of Ex Post Facto laws, the right to trial by jury, and the constitutional limitation of Treason laws. Rational Basis Beyond that the Due Process clause of the 5th and the parallel clause of the 14th impose limits on criminal law generally. Criminal laws must have (at least) a rational basis. The legislature cannot just prohibit picking up papers because they felt like it, they must have articulated a problem and a plausible reason why a given law would address it. If they don't the law may be overturned as unconstitutional. If a law is challenged as being unconstitutional, it will currently either be subject to rational basis analysis, or to one of the stricter levels. However a law which cannot pass rational basis analysis will not survive intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny either. Laws which appear to invade one of the enumerated rights, or a right that the Court has deemed &quot;fundamental&quot; are normally tested under either strict or intermediate scrutiny. According to the the Wikipedia article: Courts applying rational basis review seek to determine whether a law is &quot;rationally related&quot; to a &quot;legitimate&quot; government interest, whether real or hypothetical. The higher levels of scrutiny are intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. ... laws implicating unenumerated rights that the Supreme Court has not recognized as fundamental receive rational basis review. ... In modern constitutional law, the rational basis test is applied to constitutional challenges of both federal law and state law (via the Fourteenth Amendment). This test also applies to both legislative and executive action whether those actions be of a substantive or procedural nature. The rational basis test prohibits the government from imposing restrictions on liberty that are irrational or arbitrary, or drawing distinctions between persons in a manner that serves no constitutionally legitimate end. ... A court applying rational basis review will virtually always uphold a challenged law unless every conceivable justification for it is a grossly illogical non sequitur. (See Killian, Johnny H., George A. Costello, &amp; Kenneth R. Thomas, co-eds., The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation: Analysis of Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 28, 2002, by Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (Senate Document No. 108-17, 108th Congress, 2d Session) and specifically Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) at 635) Rational Basis analysis became accepted after the demise of &quot;substantive Due Process&quot;, mostly in a civil, rather than criminal context. A version of it was suggested in Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905), in the dissent by Justice Holmes. It was adopted as governing in [*Nebbia v. New York * In United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 413 U.S. 528 (1973) The Court overturned, on a rational basis scrutiny, a law excluding households consisting of unrelated people from the Federal Food Stamp program, writing: [A] bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. Specific cases In Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) a law that criminalized the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons was overturned on a rational basis review. Similar cases are now generally treated with intermediate scrutiny. In James v. Strange 407 U.S. 128 (1972). a Kansas law reclaiming payments for public defenders was overturens on rational basis review as “an impermissible burden on the right to counsel established in Gideon v. Wainwright.&quot; In Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986), rational basis analysis was employed to sustain a statute criminalizing homosexual activity. However, this was later overturned.. Vagueness Also under Due Process, vague laws are prohibited. If a reasonable person cannot tell from the law what is or is not illegal, the law can be overturned for vagueness. Procedural protections Then there are procedural limits, also largely derived from the Due Process clause(s). A law cannot automatically convict people without a genuine hearing, in which a person can present a defense to an independent, impartial judge or jury. A law cannot impose duties which are flatly impossible to perform. A law cannot impose punishments which are considered unreasonable for the seriousness of the crime (as evaluated by judges). Other Limits There are other limits as well, it would take a book to list them all in detail. But those are some of the more frequently applied ones.
This is interesting because things get extremely different on state and federal levels. Quoting this, Under modern U.S. law, suicide is no longer a crime. Some states, however, classify attempted suicide as a criminal act, but prosecutions are rare, especially when the offender is terminally ill. The &quot;some states&quot; part is much more important than was emphasized there, however. A case that reached the Virginia Supreme Court, Wackwitz v. Roy (referred to in Wikipedia) pivoted about the legality of suicide. From the decision: We are aware of only one legislative enactment that addresses suicide as a crime. Code § 55-4 provides that &quot;[n]o suicide ... shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.&quot; Thus, although the General Assembly has rescinded the punishment for suicide, it has not decriminalized the act. Suicide, therefore, remains a common law crime in Virginia as it does in a number of other common-law states. See, e.g., Southern Life &amp; Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29 Ala.App. 207, 194 So. 421 (1940); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877); State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961); State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 55 A. 44 (1903); State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1891), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C.1991). To constitute suicide at common law, however, a person who takes his own life &quot;must be of years of discretion, and in his *865 senses.&quot; 5 William Blackstone, Commentaries *189; accord Plunkett v. Supreme Conclave, 105 Va. 643, 646, 55 S.E. 9, 10 (1906) (&quot;`To constitute suicide at common law the person must be of years of discretion and of sound mind.'&quot;). This common law rule comports with a contemporary definition of suicide. Suicide is defined as &quot;the deliberate and intentional destruction of his own life by a person of years of discretion and of sound mind.&quot; Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2286 (1981). I believe that the &quot;only one legislative enactment&quot; refers merely to Virginia state law, not nation-wide law. Thus, in Virginia, and other states, suicide could be treated as a common-law crime. However, in United States v. Hudson, it was ruled that such common-law convictions are not allowed at the federal level. I'm not always a fan of Google Answers, but the last one here provides a fairly well-documented section on common-law rulings about suicide. Note that in many states, this is not enforced, as common-law rulings are increasingly rare.
Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself).
In general, yes. 1 USC 109 states that: The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. Translated into plain English, this means that if you were to smoke marijuana in a Yellowstone National Park campground today, and Congress were to pass an act saying &quot;28 USC 841 is repealed&quot; tomorrow, you could still be arrested and convicted for possession of a controlled substance next week. However, if the act instead stated &quot;28 USC 841 is repealed and no retroactive prosecutions shall take place&quot;, then you can't be convicted. (The other half of 1 USC 109 is basically the same thing, applied to temporary laws: if a temporary law expires, you can still be prosecuted for actions taken while the law was in effect, unless the law states otherwise.)
Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record.