Child Sexual Abuse - is a religious leader required to automatically report such accusations or confessions? All religious organizations seem to have some kind of a process for handling &quot;sin&quot;, i.e. some process where a religious leader is spoken to when someone has done something wrong. My understanding is that in United States, statements made in a confession to a religious leader are privileged and confidential. However, how does it work when the sin involves child sexual abuse? Is a religious leader responsible to automatically report accusations (claims that someone else did something) or confessions (admissions of quilt by a person present)?
Testimonial Privilege There is a tradition, embodied in law in many jurisdictions, that a religious confession, is not subject to compelled disclosure in court or to other legal process. This arose from the Catholic practice of confession, but has been long sine extended to the similar practices of other religious organizations. Note that in most jurisdictions this applies only to confessions that a person makes about his or her own actions. It does not apply when a person reports some other person's actions to a religious authority. It also usually applies only to a formal, religiously mandated or authorized communication, not to an informal chat or counseling session. In the US this is usually a matter of state law. Let's look at the relevant law in California, which is tagged as the relevant jurisdiction. (Laws in other US states are usually similar on this subject.) Such a privilege usually applies only to actual testimony under oath, in a court or as part of court proceedings such as a deposition. The law concerning an initial report of possible child abuse is different. According to the California Evidence Code, Sections 1030-1034: Subject to Section 912, a penitent, whether or not a party,has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a penitential communication if he or she claims the privilege. Subject to Section 912, a member of the clergy, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose a penitential communication if he or she claims the privilege. This means that neither the clergy-person, nor the person disclosing information to the clergy-person (the &quot;penitent&quot;) can be required to provide court testimony about the content of the confession. (Note that this is part of the evidence code which governs what evidence is admissible in court.) Also, the penitent may forbid such testimony from the clergy-person. Note that the privilege must be explicitly invoked, it is not automatic. Questions may be asked about the confession, and only if the penitent or the clergy-person objects and invokes the privilege does it apply. The previous three sections (included in the linked page) limit the privilege somewhat. Section 1030 states that: a &quot;member of the clergy&quot; means a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or of a religious denomination or religious organization. Section 1031 states that: &quot;penitent&quot; means a person who has made a penitential communication to a member of the clergy. Section 1032 states that: &quot;penitential communication&quot; means a communication made in confidence, in the presence of no third person so far as the penitent is aware, to a member of the clergy who, in the course of the discipline or practice of the clergy member's church, denomination, or organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear those communications and, under the discipline or tenets of his or her church, denomination, or organization, has a duty to keep those communications secret. So the privilege only applies when the communication or confession was made one-to-one, with no other person present, is part of the regular religious practice of the church or group involved, and the clergy-person has a religious duty to keep the communication secret. All this is normally true of Catholic confessions. It may or may not be true of confessions or communications in other religious organizations, depending on their traditions and practices. Also code section 912(a) provides that: the right of any person to claim a privilege ... is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has legal standing and the opportunity to claim the privilege Mandated Reporting In recent decades laws have bee passed requiring people in various positions of trust, or positions where such people are likely encounter evidence of child abuse, to report to law enforcement when they know or reasonably suspect such abuse. Such people are called &quot;mandated reporters&quot;. A failure by a mandated reporter to make such a report when the mandated reporter has knowledge or reasonable suspicion of abuse is a crime. Note that, in most jurisdictions, mandated reporting applies to all forms of child abuse, not just sexual abuse, but also physical and emotional abuse and neglect. Therefore in this answer &quot;abuse&quot; is not limited to sexual abuse. In the US, this is a matter of state law. What positions carry mandated reporter status, what circumstances trigger a mandated report, an what the penalties are for failing to make a report all vary significantly from state to state. Mandated reporter (MR) status is separate from the testimonial privilege described above in this answer. However, circumstances that would trigger the testimonial privilege may also trigger an exception from mandated reporting. Mandated Reporting in California In California Penal code section 11165.7 (a) (32) and (a) (33) list clergy members (defined as &quot; priest, minister, rabbi, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church, temple, or recognized denomination or organization.&quot;) and &quot;any custodian of records of a clergy member&quot; as mandated reporters (MRs). However section 11166 (d) (1) provides an exception. Knowledge or suspicion acquired &quot;during a penitential communication&quot; need not be reported. For this purpose a &quot;penitential communication&quot; is defined as: a communication, intended to be in confidence, including, but not limited to, a sacramental confession, made to a clergy member who, in the course of the discipline or practice of the clergy member’s church, denomination, or organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear those communications, and under the discipline, tenets, customs, or practices of the clergy member’s church, denomination, or organization, has a duty to keep those communications secret. Note that only if the &quot;church, denomination, or organization&quot; imposes on the clergy member a duty to keep the communication secret is the communication a &quot;penitential communication&quot;. If there is no such duty, the exception does not apply. Normally, a &quot;penitential communication&quot; concerns the actions of the person making the communication, not of some other person. However in the course of a communication about him- or herself, a person may mention the actions of another person. That mention would, as I understand this law, be part of the penitential communication and thus subject to the exception in section 11166 (d) (1). When is a Report Mandated? Section 11166 (a) provides that: (a) Except as provided in subdivision (d), and in Section 11166.05, a mandated reporter shall make a report to an agency specified in Section 11165.9 whenever the mandated reporter, in the mandated reporter’s professional capacity or within the scope of the mandated reporter’s employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect. ... [The paragraph goes on to define the time and manner of reports.] Section 11166 (a) (1) defines &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot;: For purposes of this article, “reasonable suspicion” means that it is objectively reasonable for a person to entertain a suspicion, based upon facts that could cause a reasonable person in a like position, drawing, when appropriate, on the person’s training and experience, to suspect child abuse or neglect. “Reasonable suspicion” does not require certainty that child abuse or neglect has occurred nor does it require a specific medical indication of child abuse or neglect; any “reasonable suspicion” is sufficient. For purposes of this article, the pregnancy of a minor does not, in and of itself, constitute a basis for a reasonable suspicion of sexual abuse. 11166 (a) mentions a MR's knowledge of or observation of the possibly abused child. It is not clear to me if a discussion with a third party, such as another adult, would be sufficient to raise a &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot; such that a MR would be required to file a report, if there is nothing that the MR has personally observed that would raise or tend to confirm such a suspicion. However section 11166 (g) provides that: Any other person who has knowledge of or observes a child whom the person knows or reasonably suspects has been a victim of child abuse or neglect may report the known or suspected instance of child abuse or neglect to an agency specified in Section 11165.9. For purposes of this section, “any other person” includes a mandated reporter who acts in the person’s private capacity and not in the person’s professional capacity or within the scope of the person’s employment. {Emphasis added.} Thus the person who makes a penitential communication to a clergy member may (but need not) report directly to Law Enforcement, and the clergy member may urge such a person to do so. Note that 11166 (i) (1) provides that: (i) (1) The reporting duties under this section are individual, and no supervisor or administrator may impede or inhibit the reporting duties, and no person making a report shall be subject to any sanction for making the report. However, internal procedures to facilitate reporting and apprise supervisors and administrators of reports may be established provided that they are not inconsistent with this article. An internal policy shall not direct an employee to allow the employee’s supervisor to file or process a mandated report under any circumstances. Note that 11166 (i) (3) provides that: (i) (3) Reporting the information regarding a case of possible child abuse or neglect to an employer, supervisor, school principal, school counselor, coworker, or other person shall not be a substitute for making a mandated report to an agency specified in Section 11165.9. Specified Scenario In a comment on an earlier version of this answer, the original poster of the question (OP) asks: So if there was a situation where church member X tells to a religious leader L (no other persons present) that church member Y has abused a child, then the legal responsibility for the leader to inform authorities depends primarily on state law and secondarily on what the religious traditions of that religious org state? Would this be correct? Yes, the responsibility of L in that situation depends on both the state law of the state where this occurs, and on the rules and traditions of the the church or other religious organization are. There are several questionable points in that scenario under California law: When X tells L about the abusive actions by Y, is that a &quot;penitential communication&quot; under the traditions of the relevant religious organization? For instance, in Catholic practice, a confession is about oneself, and any mention of the misdeeds of others is not confidential unless it would reveal the contents of the actual confession. Does religious law, tradition or practice impose a duty of secrecy on L? If not, the exception does not apply and a report is mandated if the other conditions for a report apply. My understanding (not confirmed) is that the Catholic church, for example, has in recent years changed its canon law so that a persistent course of action, showing no indication of repentance nor effort to stop the sinful action where there is a likelihood of future harm to others relives a priest from the duty of secrecy. When there is no religious duty of secrecy, the exception does not apply. Does the report by X give L &quot;knowledge&quot; or &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot; of abuse? If not, no report is mandated. If there is not at least corroboration through direct observation of the child in question, then the wording of 11166 seems to me to imply that no report is mandated, but I have not found case law confirming or opposing that conclusion. Also, under 11166 (a) (1) suspicion must be &quot;objectively reasonable&quot; to trigger a mandated report. If X is known for making unfounded accusations, X's report might not be grounds for &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot;. Thus the detailed facts about the situation, and about the rules or traditions of the church or religious organization will matter.
I'll start with a list of issues presented and also note at the outset that the question correctly notes that both the school district (which is an entity distinct from the county), and the superintendent of schools, are protected from civil liability to a significant extent by the doctrine of sovereign immunity which is outlined here. Two specific provisions bear particular note: an exclusion of liability for someone who has reported a suspected child abuse case, and immunity for a school teacher who acts in good faith with regard to supervision, care and discipline of students. 1. What duty does a public school board in the U.S., or do specific employees of that school board, have to prevent a violent crime from being committed by one student against another student, when that student has no prior history of serious misconduct? Short of malice directed at a victimized student there is no liability under state law. There is also no well established constitutional right violated that could give rise to civil rights liability. Students commit crimes against each other all of the time and school officials are almost never responsible for those crimes. 2. What duty does a public school board in the U.S., or do specific employees of that school board, have to prevent a violent crime from being committed by one student against another student, when that student has a history of prior serious misconduct? The legal standard is the same but the practical analysis might be more fact intensive. Still, outright malice directed towards a victim would pretty much be the applicable legal standard and is unlikely to be present in this case, absent awareness, for example, of conditions of probation or pre-trial release after the first case that weren't enforced. 3. Is a public school in the U.S. permitted or required by law to advise parents of students at the school that student transferring into the new school has a history of violent criminal conduct? Juvenile justice law and educational privacy laws profoundly limit the extent to which a public school, or its officials are allowed to disclose that a student transferring into a school has a history of violent criminal conduct. There is no clear duty of the public school in the U.S. to disclose this fact broadly. 4. Is a statement by a superintendent to parents in a public school district that transgender girl does not pose a threat to cis-gender girls in restrooms an actionable fraud (and does it matter if there is a history of prior misconduct by a particular student in this case of which the superintendent was aware)? The statement is not, in general, false. If it was made after knowledge of this particular student, that might be a different matter, but as noted above, there are severe legal limitations on what the board is allowed to say. It isn't inconceivable that the school board or superintendent could have said more than it did to at least some people. But there isn't a clear legal duty to do so. It also isn't clear what the superintendent actually knew when he made a report to the school board even tough the information should have been shared with him. It is possible that only a lower level official in the school system had actual knowledge at that time. 5. What crime, if any, did the father of the first rape victim commit for trying to warn the parents about someone who attacked his daughter? This is partially speculation, but the father appears to have been arrested for the manner in which he acted disturbing the peace, speaking out of turn, and refusing the leave a meeting when requested, rather than sharing the information per se. 6. Did the school superintendent commit a crime somehow connected to the second rape by concealing the risk posed by the student in question? The school superintendent has a duty to report child abuse to authorities and failure to do so (if it was not done) would be minor crime. My impression of the fact is that the first rape was reported to juvenile justice system officials and resulted in action being taken. So, it does not appear that this duty was breached. According to the article: The boy was arrested and charged for the first assault in July but released from juvenile detention while prosecutors waited for DNA rape kit evidence to come back. Loudoun County Commonwealth's Attorney Buta Biberaj says at the time they had no reason to believe the boy should have stayed in juvenile detention. “If that case had gone forward and we were not able to substantiate beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations that were made by the victim, he would've been out anyway,” she said. “The best decision was made with the facts that were known.&quot; This does not, however, give him criminal liability for a subsequent rape of one student by another in which he had not involvement sufficient to constitute criminal conspiracy to commit sexual assault which was the case here. 7. Does the school board have defamation liability for calling the father of the victim of the first rape a transphobe? No. The school board has sovereign immunity from suits for money damages seeking to establish liability in relation to statements made in their official capacity, apparently in good faith. It also isn't clear that the statements made were actionable in the first place, or that such statements were even made by them. The school board also does not appear to have had actual knowledge of what happened until a decisive school board meeting after the second assault. 8. Does the public have any power to remove an appointed official such as the superintendent in this context? No. The political remedy is to elect a new school board that would select a different superintendent.
In new-jersey, the offence of perjury is defined at 2C:28-1 of the Code of Criminal Justice A person is guilty of perjury, a crime of the third degree, if in any official proceeding he makes a false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a statement previously made, when the statement is material and he does not believe it to be true. The Code also provides an opportunity for retraction. Assuming that the statement is material, whether answering &quot;no&quot; is perjury will depend on the witness's understanding of the question and his belief about the truth of the answer. If we assume that the witness understands the question to be about parentage in general, including by adoption, and if we assume that they know they have an adopted child, the answer &quot;no&quot; would be perjury. If instead we assume that the witness understood the question to be narrowly about biological parentage, or if they had forgotten at the time of their answer that they had an adopted child, then the answer &quot;no&quot; would not be perjury.
That depends on several things: Do the authorities have solid evidence of what happened? Authorities in which country? A screenshot is not evidence, that would be easily faked. It takes access to the metadata. Does the country where the perpetrator lives consider it a serious crime? Note that when two people exchange such messages, who is the criminal and who is the victim can depend on the ages of both, and the exact rules of who is guilty of what may differ from country to country. There are countries which prosecute child abuse by their citizens or residents abroad once they come back. So it may be that nothing happens, or it may be prosecuted.
There are no small sexual assaults Indecent assault/sexual assault/sexual touching Different jurisdictions have different definitions but, wherever you are, the behavior you describe is a criminal offense and the appropriate course of action is to report it to both your employer and the police. The fact that the perpetrator is under the professional care of the victim does not change this although, if the positions were reversed, this would be an aggravating factor. That is, assuming you are willing to make a statement to the police and, ultimately, testify before a court. It may not come to that - the police may not press charges. You can also civilly sue for the damage you have suffered. Work Health and Safety Your employer has an obligation to provide a reasonably safe workplace. If this is a not uncommon occurrence then they should have analyzed the risk and determined appropriate mitigation strategies and trained you in these. Have they?
In addition to David's answer - it's more than acceptable for a witness to say that they don't know the answer; it's a requirement of their oath / affirmation to say &quot;I don't know&quot; if they are telling: ...the truth, the whole truth, and nothingbut the truth..
This answer is based upon united-states law. Outside the United States that law may, and indeed, is likely to, differ, as the legal analysis in U.S. law is unusual in multiple respects with regard to these issue. The premise of the question is basically incorrect. There is not a stark legal definitional distinction between physical abuse and psychological abuse. Child abuse and neglect are defined by Federal and State laws. At the State level, child abuse and neglect may be defined in both civil and criminal statutes. This publication presents civil definitions that determine the grounds for intervention by State child protective agencies. At the Federal level, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) has defined child abuse and neglect as &quot;any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caregiver that results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse, or exploitation, or an act or failure to act that presents an imminent risk of serious harm. CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-320), 42 U.S.C. § 5101, Note (§ 3). (Source). This definition and other definitions were contained in the 2010 amendments to the Act, but were not codified in the United States Code's text. State definitions very considerably, but significantly overlap with the CAPTA definition. For example, a non-exclusive list of conduct that constitutes misdemeanor or low level felony child abuse in Colorado if you engage in it includes: you are in a position of trust in relation to the child, and you participate in a continued pattern of conduct that results in the child’s malnourishment; you fail to ensure the child’s access to proper medical care; you participate in a continued pattern of cruel punishment or unreasonable isolation or confinement of the child; you make repeated threats of harm or death to the child or to a significant person in the child’s life in the presence of the child; you commit a continued pattern of acts of domestic violence in the presence of the child; or you participate in a continued pattern of extreme deprivation of hygienic or sanitary conditions in the child’s daily living environment. (The criminal child abuse statute, Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-6-401, is somewhat tricky to parse). Some of this conduct causes emotional harm more than physical harm. As is typical, this only moderately overlaps with the civil standard for termination of parental rights in Colorado pursuant to Colorado Revised Statutes §§ 19-3-102 and 19-5-105 which state in the pertinent parts: C.R.S. § 19-3-102: (1) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the child or has subjected him or her to mistreatment or abuse or a parent, guardian, or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring; (b) The child lacks proper parental care through the actions or omissions of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (c) The child's environment is injurious to his or her welfare; (d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical care, or any other care necessary for his or her health, guidance, or well-being; (e) The child is homeless, without proper care, or not domiciled with his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the control of his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian; (g) The child tests positive at birth for either a schedule I controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-203, C.R.S., or a schedule II controlled substance, as defined in section 18-18-204, C.R.S., unless the child tests positive for a schedule II controlled substance as a result of the mother's lawful intake of such substance as prescribed. (2) A child is neglected or dependent if: (a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has subjected another child or children to an identifiable pattern of habitual abuse; and (b) Such parent, guardian, or legal custodian has been the respondent in another proceeding under this article in which a court has adjudicated another child to be neglected or dependent based upon allegations of sexual or physical abuse, or a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that such parent's, guardian's, or legal custodian's abuse or neglect has caused the death of another child; and (c) The pattern of habitual abuse described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) and the type of abuse described in the allegations specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2) pose a current threat to the child. C.R.S. § 19-5-105: (3) If, after the inquiry, the other birth parent is identified to the satisfaction of the court or if more than one person is identified as a possible parent, each shall be given notice of the proceeding in accordance with subsection (5) of this section, including notice of the person's right to waive his or her right to appear and contest. If any of them waives his or her right to appear and contest or fails to appear or, if appearing, cannot personally assume legal and physical custody, taking into account the child's age, needs, and individual circumstances, such person's parent-child legal relationship with reference to the child shall be terminated. If the other birth parent or a person representing himself or herself to be the other birth parent appears and demonstrates the desire and ability to personally assume legal and physical custody of the child, taking into account the child's age, needs, and individual circumstances, the court shall proceed to determine parentage under article 4 of this title. If the court determines that the person is the other birth parent, the court shall set a hearing, as expeditiously as possible, to determine whether the interests of the child or of the community require that the other parent's rights be terminated or, if they are not terminated, to determine whether: (a) To award custody to the other birth parent or to the physical custodian of the child; or (b) To direct that a dependency and neglect action be filed pursuant to part 5 of article 3 of this title with appropriate orders for the protection of the child during the pendency of the action. (3.1) The court may order the termination of the other birth parent's parental rights upon a finding that termination is in the best interests of the child and that there is clear and convincing evidence of one or more of the following: (a) That the parent is unfit. In considering the fitness of the child's parent, the court shall consider, but shall not be limited to, the following: (I) Emotional illness, mental illness, or mental deficiency of the parent of such duration or nature as to render the parent unlikely, within a reasonable period of time, to care for the ongoing physical, mental, and emotional needs of the child; (II) A single incident of life-threatening or serious bodily injury or disfigurement of the child or other children; (III) Conduct toward the child or other children of a physically or sexually abusive nature; (IV) A history of violent behavior that demonstrates that the individual is unfit to maintain a parent-child relationship with the minor, which may include an incidence of sexual assault, as defined in section 19-1-103 (96.5), that resulted in the conception of the child; (V) Excessive use of intoxicating liquors or use of controlled substances, as defined in section 18-18-102 (5), C.R.S., that affects the ability of the individual to care and provide for the child; (VI) Neglect of the child or other children; (VII) Injury or death of a sibling or other children due to proven abuse or neglect by such parent; (VIII) Whether, on two or more occasions, a child in the physical custody of the parent has been adjudicated dependent or neglected in a proceeding under article 3 of this title or comparable proceedings under the laws of another state or the federal government; (IX) Whether, on one or more prior occasions, a parent has had his or her parent-child legal relationship terminated pursuant to this section or article 3 of this title or comparable proceedings under the laws of another state or the federal government. (b) That the parent has not established a substantial, positive relationship with the child. The court shall consider, but shall not be limited to, the following in determining whether the parent has established a substantial, positive relationship with the child: (I) Whether the parent has maintained regular and meaningful contact with the child; (II) Whether the parent has openly lived with the child for at least one hundred eighty days within the year preceding the filing of the relinquishment petition or, if the child is less than one year old at the time of the filing of the relinquishment petition, for at least one-half of the child's life; and (III) Whether the parent has openly held out the child as his or her own child. The items in bold have, or could sometimes have, a significant emotional well-being component. In practice, however, this is limited by the constitutional right to raise one's children without undue government interference in circumstances where there is not an imminent risk of serious harm, under the substantive due process doctrine dimensions of the 14th Amendment due process clause, This is especially true when one's child rearing methods of a religious basis implicating the Free Exercise clause of the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as incorporated against the states through the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. While these constitutional defenses can be asserted in both cases of alleged physical abuse and alleged psychological abuse, these defenses are particularly hard to penetrate in cases of psychological abuse. In particular, In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the &quot;Supreme Court also recognized a substantive due process right 'to control the education of one's children', thus voiding state laws mandating for all students to attend public school.&quot; It said: We think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. These are sometimes described as &quot;privacy rights&quot; (and also include the right to legal contraception and the abortion rights of Roe v. Wade), but in this context, a &quot;privacy right&quot; is not the right to keep something unknown to the general public in the literal sense of the words. Instead, it is a privacy right in the less common sense of the words meaning a right to autonomy and freedom of conscience of a parent, associated with the underlying purposes of other constitutional rights that protect more literal forms of privacy. The other issue is that there is less of a consensus concerning what constitutes psychological abuse sufficiently clearly that it is publicly sanctionable, than there is concerning what constitutes physical abuse. Striking a child for reasons other than to improve a child's behavior is usually considered physical child abuse. Intentionally undermining a child's self-esteem, in contrast, for example, can be justified in myriad ways.
Defamation laws do not distinguish between charitable organizations and others: however, in the US there are special considerations for "public figures" (they are not afforded as much protection). The medium does not matter -- texting, blogging, letter-writing, whatever. The defamatory statement need not have been received by a wide audience – it suffices that the message was received by one person other than the person being defamed. A single defamatory act is all it takes: there is no requirement of there being an established and repeated practice of defaming. One way to defend against a charge of defamation is to show that the statement is true. An alternative is to show that the statement is incapable of being proven true or false (e.g. calling someone a "jerk" doesn't assert a factual proposition). A careful scrutiny of the actual statement, performed by an attorney specializing in such matters, is really the only way to know whether words like "may", "possibly" would make a statement an expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact. A person suing for defamation would have to have suffered a loss, but there is a category of false statements, per se defamation, considered to be so injurious that damage need not be proven. That included allegations of criminal activity and allegations of professional incompetence, either of which could be applicable in the context you are describing. The First Amendment provides much protection against such suits, which may not exist in other countries. Because of this, a law was recently passed in the US, 28 USC 111, which says that domestic courts will not enforce a foreign defamation judgment that is inconsistent with the First Amendment. [Addendum] This part is crucial: "The only people I've expressed my concerns to, aside from the organization itself, is my parents and my wife's parents. However, they have shared with a few friends...". If you alleged illegal behavior to your parents, that's a problem. If you only said e.g. "I have concerns", that's not a problem. It would also matter in what way you tried "to disclose to a U.S. based organization details of the foreign organization they are supporting that indicate it might not be on the up and up".