Is a conditional threat still a true threat? In the US, can attaching a condition to a threat have any bearing on whether it's a true threat or not? In other words, is there are difference between the following threats, in terms of criminal law: I'll hit you! (unconditional) If you speak to me again, I'll hit you! (conditioned on something that the other person is perfectly entitled to do) If you try to steal my car, I'll hit you! (conditioned on the other person's criminal behavior) If you violate the 2nd law of thermodynamics, I'll hit you! (conditioned on something impossible)
The mere presence of a conditional isn't a determining factor, but the context of the conditional can be a contributing factor in determining whether the threat is true or not. See a more recent publication from 2003 for a better understanding of those factors. I definitely wouldn't rely on anything from the 1600s as a reliable source. Back in the old days a threat was essentially the same as an assault, but nowadays we often view threats and assaults more distinctly and have crafted more specific laws to address them. Just as an &quot;arrest&quot; was once used to describe a seizure of any kind regardless of the duration, more modern case laws have established distinctions between arrests (full-custody seizures) and detentions (temporary, short-duration seizures). Since most jurisdictions in the US now have a separate statute for addressing threats in order to distinguish them from assaults, we have to read the exact verbiage of each state to determine whether it covers the particulars of the threat. Here are a few examples. Note the similarities and differences in each: Arizona: Threatening or Intimidating Texas: Terroristic Threat New York: Menacing As you yourself pointed out, simply making a threat isn't necessarily mala en se, and there are times where the law explicitly allows for people to issue threats, particularly when it comes to defending themselves, another person, or their property. For example, in Arizona, ARS 13-407 allows a person to issue a threat of deadly force to defend their property against trespassers, but does not allow them to actually use deadly force to do so. This means that Arizonans who find themselves in a situation where they feel it necessary to issue a conditional threat to an intruder (&quot;leave my property right now or I'll shoot you&quot;), must understand that the threat is empty unless the intruder shifts his focus from mere trespassing to harming a person. (The bad guy doesn't need to know this though, and all the better if he doesn't.) Even though the threat is empty according to the issuer's knowledge, it is still a threat, albeit one that the issuer is legally entitled to make. In this situation, the threat to use deadly force is decriminalized, not because it contained a conditional, but rather because it was explicitly authorized by law. In practice, many jurisdictions, especially ones with high crime rates, have arbitrarily decided to triage threats cases based on whether they include a conditional statement or not. After all, if you have 1,000 cases a month and a team of only 30 prosecutors, you have to prioritize the cases that are easiest to prove. With that in mind, many prosecutors offices have provided direction to their law enforcement partners to only submit cases that include unconditional threats. Those agencies in turn train their officers to ignore any threats cases involving conditional threats, perpetuating the misunderstanding that a conditional automatically negates a threat as being a true threat. There are literally thousands of cases where offenders have had their convictions upheld for crimes involving conditional threats. Just think of robbery/carjacking: A man walks up to a victim in a parking lot and says &quot;give me your car or I'll kill you. Despite containing a conditional threat, there isn't a prosecutor or jury in the country that wouldn't instantly recognize this as a true threat and an element of robbery/carjacking. Conditional Intent to Kill is Enough for Federal Carjacking Conviction.
Yes. The principle caselaw is R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox 692 A husband and wife had an argument that led to the husband chasing his wife out into the street. The wife collapsed during this altercation and died. Whist the husband did not physically touch her, he did shout threats at her. The wife was found to have been suffering from an abnormality of the thyroid gland that neither was aware of that meant that fright or shock could cause death if combined with physical exertion. The husband was charged with manslaughter. [...] The husband was found guilty of manslaughter. No actual proof of violence was necessary as long as the defendant’s unlawful act, which was the threat of violence, caused her fright leading to her death. The criminal law acknowledges that an assailant must take their victim as they find them... Source And... The defendant chased his wife out of the house shouting threats at her. She collapsed and died. He did not physically touch her. She was suffering from a rare thyroid condition which could lead to death where physical exertion was accompanied by fright and panic. Both the defendant and his wife were unaware she had this condition. Held: The defendant was liable for constructive manslaughter as his unlawful act (assault) caused death. The egg shell (thin) skull rule applied. He was therefore fully liable despite the fact an ordinary person of reasonable fortitude would not have died in such circumstances... Source
It's a &quot;greater offense&quot; -- sometimes also called a &quot;greater included offense.&quot; But you're generally going to be mistaken about whether the defendant can be re-charged after an acquittal on the lesser-included offense. In the United States, at least, the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit that prosecutorial strategy. One could still face new charges for the same conduct, but those charges have to pass the Blockburger test.
A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.
“Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all.
The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense.
The short answer is &quot;yes&quot;. There is U.S. Supreme Court authority that supports this position, In particular, United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 599 (1965), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), stand for the proposition that a defendant may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurances that he will not be punished for those actions. If the U.S. Department of Justice (or a U.S. Attorney with jurisdiction over the place the offense was committed) (hereinafter DOJ) says this, people who reasonably rely on that pronouncement can't be prosecuted until a different policy is announced and people who acted in reliance on the previous DOJ position are given a reasonable opportunity to change their conduct in response to the newly announced policy. The statement does have to be a publicly announced policy (or a policy personally communicated to the defendant or his counsel), and not just a de facto reality in terms of prosecutions not being brought in the past, or a secret, unannounced policy (or, for example, an unofficial and offhand statement of the U.S. Attorney General at a party that does not amount to a policy statement). Of course, the defense doesn't protect you if the DOJ says it won't prosecute if you do X, but you do X times Y which goes beyond the safe harbor created by the DOJ pronouncement. For example, the DOJ might say that they will not prosecute conduct involving marijuana offenses that is legal under state law, if it does not violate any other laws, and also meets certain conditions found in federal law (e.g. no offenses within 1000 feet of a school) that the DOJ chooses not to refrain from enforcing. But, if the DOJ then publicly says that it will start enforcing federal law without exceptions on July 1, 2021 and has rescinded its prior policy, a reasonable time in advance, then this defense ceases for conduct after that date. What constitutes reasonable notice would depend upon the facts and circumstances. The DOJ can also reach a binding agreement not to prosecute a particular instance of conduct by a particular person irrevocably in connection with plea bargaining type agreements, with respect to offenses of which the DOJ has jurisdiction (but not necessarily prosecutions by a different government such as a state government or the government of another country, for which the DOJ is not an authorized representative). For example, suppose that a mail carrier is killed by a resident of a home claiming to have acted in self-defense in Denver, Colorado. The DOJ could reach an irrevocable agreement with the resident to accept a plea bargain to a misdemeanor charge of not paying the tax due on the sale of the firearm from a non-compliant gun shop, dismissing forever the charge of murder of a federal post office employee. But that agreement would not bar the District Attorney in Denver from bringing murder charges twenty years later under state law prohibiting murder of human beings in the State of Colorado. For the defendant resident to prevent that from happening definitively, an agreement from the State of Colorado's District Attorney in Denver, or the Colorado Attorney General, would also be required.
Engaging in unlawful conduct does not completely preclude a claim of self-defense under Wisconsin law ...but it does raise the bar in some circumstances: Criminal conduct by the defendant removes the presumption that &quot;force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm&quot; when defending against unlawful forced entry to one's own property. A much higher burden on use of force is imposed if engaging in unlawful conduct that is &quot;of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack.&quot; Anyone intentionally provoking an attack by any means, lawful or unlawful, &quot;with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant,&quot; is not entitled to self-defense at all. Section 939.48 of Wisconsin law governs the standards for self-defense. 939.48(1) sets out the general standard: A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. 939.48(1m)(ar) provides presumptions in favor of the defendant and no duty to retreat when defending against unlawful entry to one's own property (an implementation of the castle doctrine), but those presumptions are removed by 939.48(1m)(b)1. if (among other things), &quot;[t]he actor was engaged in a criminal activity.&quot; More relevant to a case that occurred outside is 939.48(2), which lays out how provocation affects a claim of self-defense: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense.