How does lawyers&#39; duty of fidelity to court work? Rules of conduct and client care for lawyers say in Chapter 13: The overriding duty of a lawyer acting in litigation is to the court concerned. Subject to this, the lawyer has a duty to act in the best interests of his or her client without regard for the personal interests of the lawyer. (This is in New Zealand, but I assume there will be a similar rule in many other countries). What difference does that rule make? If it did not exist, what would have happened? Specifically, I am interested in the contrast with self-represented non-lawyer litigants who, obviously, do not have that duty of fidelity. Both lawyers and non-lawyers are allowed to litigate and are supposed to be treated equally by the courts — only their points of law should matter who wins, not their status/duties to the court. If so, why have the duty at all? Conversely, if the duty is required, why allow to litigate without signing to it? And one related question: what are examples of &quot;overriding&quot; — when a lawyer has to be not entirely honest to his client because he first has to be honest to the court?
When it comes to the obligation to tell the truth, there isn't all that much difference between a lawyer's obligations and those of a pro se litigant -- at least as far objective truth. But not every question has a single truthful answer. Professionalism rules impose some higher standards on lawyers in cases that are a bit murkier than just asking, &quot;Were you at the Capitol on January 6?&quot; In the United States, the analogous rule lays out some bright-line rules. Rule 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. (b) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. (c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. (d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse. Subsection (a)(1) gives a good example of where the duties of honesty diverge for lawyers and pro se parties. If a plaintiff tells the court honestly -- but mistakenly -- that he lost $1 million in profits, but later discovers that he only lost $100,000, his lawyer has a clear obligation to correct that statement for the court; the pro se plaintiff's obligation is not clear. Similarly, if a plaintiff tells the court that he is entitled to those lost profits if he can prove elements A, B, C, and D, but later learns that the Supreme Court has also imposed a requirement that he prove E, the lawyer has an obligation to notify the court of this development; the pro se plaintiff does not. On the &quot;overriding&quot; language: I don't read it as generally having any effect on a lawyer's duty to be honest to his client. Instead, it means that the lawyer's duty to the court overrides the lawyer's duty to the client. In either of the above hypotheticals, for example, the lawyer acted honestly and ethically in presenting his evidence and argument, even though his statements turned out to be false. Correcting the record on either point would reduce or possibly eliminate his client's likely recovery and be against his client's best interests. Once the lawyer discovers the error, he is therefore faced with a conflict of interest: he has a duty to act in his client's best interest, but he also has a duty of honesty to the court. Chapter 13 says that his duty to the court overrides his duty to his client.
Its difficult to tell without seeing the exact paperwork, and the exact meaning of without prejudice varies by jurisdiction (I think UK is the same as here in NZ though). If an agreement is reached through communications marked "without prejudice" it should be valid in court to the extent that it shows an agreement was reached and what the agreement was (but the court will not generally look at the documents marked without prejudice for other reasons &ndash; e.g. admissions made &ndash; if no agreement is reached). There are a couple of other relevant things to mention &ndash; although not strictly part of your question: Lawyers are officers of the court, and have duties to the court, which include acting ethically. So, provided it's a reputable law firm, it is reasonable to (somewhat) trust their solicitors in procedural matters. My understanding is that courts encourage anything that will help settle a matter out of court &ndash; hence the whole idea of "without prejudice" letters being valid. I believe that the court will uphold an agreement reached through communication of without prejudice emails as it's in their interests. If you have these kinds of concerns, you can raise them with their solicitor, suggesting that you would prefer the final document to not be without prejudice, even if it only refers to the matter and agreement, without sensitive stuff. I imagine they would be only to happy to oblige, as they can bill their client for another letter!
"Without prejudice" does not, of itself, create an obligation of confidentiality What it does do is prevent the contents being used against the author in any future proceedings - by this litigant or anyone else. The purpose of civil litigation is to resolve disputes. There is another, better, cheaper and more commonly used mechanism - parties agreeing on their own resolution through negotiation. The purpose of the without prejudice rule is to allow parties to have a full and frank negotiation without the risk that what they say will bite them on the ass in court. If they do not settle, then the court cannot and will not know about any concessions or negotiating positions that either party made or took. Adding "save as to costs" means that after the case is resolved, a party may introduce any offers they made that were better than what was won in order to show that costs should be mitigated - basically that because there was a better offer on the table the litigation was needless and the costs unnecessary. You can share it with whoever you like - they won't be able to use it in court.
What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles.
This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.
Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581.
Basically, the privilege does apply to other members of the firm including non-lawyer staff, although the analysis that gets you there can be a bit involved in some cases. The Duty of Confidentiality As @DavidSiegel notes, there is a distinction between the duty to not reveal client secrets subject to certain exceptions, that in all U.S. jurisdictions arises primarily under Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6, Rule 5.1 regarding partners and supervisory lawyers in law firms, Rule 5.2 regarding subordinate lawyers in law firms, and Rule 5.3 governing how the rules apply to non-lawyer assistants in a firm. The Attorney-Client Privilege There is a separate body of law that heavily overlaps that governs the attorney-client privilege which is the right to refuse to disclose confidential information of a client to third-parties even in the face of a court order of subpoena that would otherwise compel someone legally to disclose information. The attorney-client privilege has a couple of components. One is the privilege for confidential communications between a lawyer and a client (which extends to disclosures to other attorneys and staff in the firm with a need to know and people with whom there are joint defense agreements) and the other is the work product privilege which protects work done for a client by a lawyer or the lawyer's law firm in the course of a legal representation of the client (which is almost as strong but has some narrow exceptions that don't apply to the confidential communications privilege). The work product privilege, like the confidential communications privilege, is not waived or impaired because attorney work product (or attorney staff work product) is shared within lawyers and legal staff in a law firm as necessary to represent a client. An attorney-client relationship that gives rise to the privilege extends directly from the client to every lawyer in a law firm that works on their case in any way, or is made privy to the attorney-client privileged material regarding the client in any way. In Colorado, where I primarily practice (which is entirely typical in this regard), this is mostly codified by statute in Colorado Revised Statute § 13-90-107(1)(b) (at pdf page 544) which expressly extends its protections to legal staff by stating: An attorney shall not be examined without the consent of his client as to any communication made by the client to him or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor shall an attorney's secretary, paralegal, legal assistant, stenographer, or clerk be examined without the consent of his employer concerning any fact, the knowledge of which he has acquired in such capacity. There is also a great deal of case law interpreting this statute. The case law establishes, for example, that the privilege belongs to the client and not the attorney or the employees of the attorney. In federal courts when dealing with questions of federal law, the attorney-client privilege is governed not mostly by state statutes and case law but by the federal common law authorized and developed under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and Federal Rule of Evidence 502. FRE 501 states: Rule 501. Privilege in General The common law — as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and experience — governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision. FRE 502 states: Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product; Limitations on Waiver The following provisions apply, in the circumstances set out, to disclosure of a communication or information covered by the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection. (a) Disclosure Made in a Federal Proceeding or to a Federal Office or Agency; Scope of a Waiver. When the disclosure is made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency and waives the attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, the waiver extends to an undisclosed communication or information in a federal or state proceeding only if: (1) the waiver is intentional; (2) the disclosed and undisclosed communications or information concern the same subject matter; and (3) they ought in fairness to be considered together. (b) Inadvertent Disclosure. When made in a federal proceeding or to a federal office or agency, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal or state proceeding if: (1) the disclosure is inadvertent; (2) the holder of the privilege or protection took reasonable steps to prevent disclosure; and (3) the holder promptly took reasonable steps to rectify the error, including (if applicable) following Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b)(5)(B). (c) Disclosure Made in a State Proceeding. When the disclosure is made in a state proceeding and is not the subject of a state-court order concerning waiver, the disclosure does not operate as a waiver in a federal proceeding if the disclosure: (1) would not be a waiver under this rule if it had been made in a federal proceeding; or (2) is not a waiver under the law of the state where the disclosure occurred. (d) Controlling Effect of a Court Order. A federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court — in which event the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state proceeding. (e) Controlling Effect of a Party Agreement. An agreement on the effect of disclosure in a federal proceeding is binding only on the parties to the agreement, unless it is incorporated into a court order. (f) Controlling Effect of this Rule. Notwithstanding Rules 101 and 1101, this rule applies to state proceedings and to federal court-annexed and federal court-mandated arbitration proceedings, in the circumstances set out in the rule. And notwithstanding Rule 501, this rule applies even if state law provides the rule of decision. (g) Definitions. In this rule: (1) “attorney-client privilege” means the protection that applicable law provides for confidential attorney-client communications; and (2) “work-product protection” means the protection that applicable law provides for tangible material (or its intangible equivalent) prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.
There is a legal dictum, de minimis non curat lex, which might lead to an exasperated court official refusing to issue your lawsuit (with or without providing the $1 out of his own pocket to save everybody's time); I recommend you look it up. But there is no official term for what you suggest, although many lawyers might off the record provide colourful descriptions. If you wish to waste your money on such a claim, then obviously in your view it is worth pursuing. Clients often say "the principle is more important than the money", though they say so more often before they receive the bills than after.