Oregon decriminalized possession of certain drugs. Is the act of buying still illegal? Oregon decriminalized &quot;the possession&quot; of certain drugs. But the act of manufacturing and selling drugs is still illegal, according to this article: https://www.opb.org/article/2020/11/04/oregon-measure-110-decriminalize-drugs/ My question is: is the act of &quot;purchasing&quot; these legal drugs still an offense? The measure says: A &quot;yes&quot; vote supported making personal non-commercial possession of a controlled substance no more than a Class E violation (max fine of $100 fine) and establishing a drug addiction treatment and recovery program funded in part by the state's marijuana tax revenue and state prison savings. It says &quot;possession&quot; is now a minor violation. But what if you get caught in the act of &quot;purchasing&quot; it? Is that still a crime? I couldn't find any mention of it.
It's still illegal to sell most drugs like that in Oregon Oregon did not pass the law to make the state a haven for drug users. It’s still illegal to purchase, carry, and consume illicit substances in the state of Oregon. Measure 110 will change the laws around the possession of decriminalized substances. Under the new law, carrying small amounts of any of these drugs is a civil violation that is punishable by a fine. Before, having any quantity of illicit drugs was a misdemeanor and was automatically punishable by jail time. It is, however, legal to grow and sell marijuana, provided the seller is licensed to do so.
Theft in Oregon (and elsewhere, substantially the same) is defined statutorily: A person commits theft when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property to the person or to a third person, the person: (1) Takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof... The car is James' property and it is not John's, even though James is dead. There is a legal process by which at some point in the future the car could become John's, but criminal acts are defined in terms of what is the case at the time of the act, not what might happen in the future. James' intent as expressed in the will notwithstanding, it is not guaranteed that John will become the car owner. So until John is actually the owner of the car, John is taking the property of another, and this is theft.
Giving someone a drug without their consent can be considered infliction of bodily harm in various jurisdiction. When it caused a negative effect on the person the perpetrator did not anticipate, it might be grossly negligent (if that effect was likely to occur) or just negligent (if one could not reasonably expect that this effect would occur). Details depend on jurisdiction and the mood of the judge. It might also be a factor if the court rules that the defendant acted in bad faith (for example, by expecting that the drug would make the injured party consent to something they wouldn't have consented to otherwise, regardless of if this actually happened). Additionally, if the intention was to cure the injured party from a medical ailment (as implied by "pill with beneficial effect") it could theoretically be possible that the perpetrator also gets charged for practicing medicine without a license (if that is illegal in the jurisdiction). Should the perpetrator have a medical license, they will likely get charged with medical malpractice, because in most jurisdictions it is illegal to treat a patient without their consent (if the patient is in a condition which makes informed consent possible). Regarding adding something to your own drink and inadvertently poisoning someone else who drinks from it: In most societies, drinking from the glass of someone else is considered against social etiquette, so a possible defense could be that the perpetrator could not reasonably expect that the person would do that. But it could still be judged as infliction of bodily harm through negligence depending on the circumstances and how likely it was to happen. For example, in an environment where many glasses with similar-looking drinks stand on a table, the risk that glasses get mixed up is quite high. Details - again - depend on jurisdiction.
If such conversations are reported, it can place the suspect in a dilemma. Consider a man who appears to have overdosed on illegal narcotics. He is taken to the hospital, and the doctor asks what kind of drugs he took, in order to plan his treatment. If the man thinks that what he says could be used to prosecute him, he might lie to the doctor. Then he would not receive proper medical treatment, putting his health at risk. Lawmakers or police authorities might decide that it is better for society for people to always be able to speak freely to their doctors and receive proper treatment, even if it means that it will sometimes be harder to prosecute criminals. That would be one possible rationale for a rule like this.
Your argument is: The 21st amendment repealed the prohibition of alcohol. Alcoholic drinks deliver one type of drug (alcohol) Therefore, the 21st amendment repealed the prohibition of all drugs. That is an logically invalid argument. It is equivalent to: If A then B If A then C Therefore, if C then B. Further, the court has never held that the government lacks the power to regulate and prohibit drugs. It is hard to prove a negative, but see Gonzales v. Raich 545 U.S. 1 (2005): Congress’ Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law. As this was a constitutional question, had the 21st amendment prevented Congress's prohibition, that would have likely come up in this case.
Possibly: remember that we have 50 different states and their laws plus the federal government. Alabama criminal code §13A-9-9 define the crime of &quot;possession of a forgery device&quot;, which is when one makes or possesses with knowledge of its character any plate, die or other device, appliance, apparatus, equipment or article specifically designed or adapted for use in forging written instruments with intent to use it himself, or to aid or permit another to use it for purposes of forgery. Selling is covered under the fact of possession. Arizona has a similar law, referring to the situation when a person Makes or possesses with knowledge of its character and with intent to commit fraud any plate, die, or other device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article, material, good, property or supply specifically designed or adapted for use in forging written instruments. Makes or possesses any device, apparatus, equipment, software, access device, article, material, good, property or supply adaptable for use in forging written instruments with intent to use it or to aid or permit another to use it for purposes of forgery. Federal law would be covered here: §474 covers any plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, from which has been printed, or which may be prepared by direction of the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of printing, any obligation or other security of the United States, uses such plate, stone, or other thing, or any part thereof, or... but this could not be reasonably interpreted to include a printing press, and would not cover a gadget that forges passports (Dept. of State, not Treasury). There isn't a federal statute with the breadth of the Alabama law. Any such law would have to include an &quot;intent to forge&quot; element.
The state can decriminalize all drugs under state law, no problem. They merely have to repeal their version of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act and all related legislation. However, the federal drug statutes, contained in 21 U.S.C. 13, still apply because of the principle of dual sovereignty (if a state tried to explicitly overrule them, the Supremacy Clause would come into play). Let's take a look at some of the statutes under Title 21, Chapter 13, of the U.S. Code. Section 801 of that chapter described Congress's findings in enacting the Controlled Substances Act. §801(3) through (6) provide the basis for federal authority to regulate intrastate affairs with respect to drug trafficking and possession. The section claims that intrastate drugs "contribute to swelling the interstate traffic," and concludes that "federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic." Thus, the federal government will continue to enforce the federal controlled substances laws regardless of state legalization. A notable exception is the Rohrabacher-Farr amendment, which bans DOJ from using federal funds to prosecute medical marijuana programs legal under state law. However, the federal government isn't always successful in (and doesn't always attempt) regulating intrastate behaviors using its interstate commerce authority. For example, the original Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (since amended and complemented by a 1994 law using the condition-of-funding approach), was struck down by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The law, banning possession of handguns near schools, was found to be an overreach of the Commerce Clause authority. But it was amended by adding the additional interstate nexus of the gun having been moved interstate, which was a very minor limitation in practice. Since it only exempts individuals with a license issued by the state where the school is, it has significantly limited the ability of states to pass "constitutional carry" laws and allow for CCP reciprocity, because many highways and homes fall within its reach. So, if a state is willing to lose all of its federal funding, then Congress can't ever force it to create, maintain, or enforce a state law. But in many ways, the federal government can still enforce its will through criminal law on a number of intrastate activities.
California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.