Tax year for spending when bank transfer begins and ends in separate years As a business expense, Alice initiates a bank transfer to a company on 30 Dec 2022 and the money reaches the company some business days later, in 2023. For U.S. tax purposes - assuming Alice files using the cash basis - can Alice claim the deduction on her 2022 tax return?
Since Alice uses &quot;CASH ACCOUNTING&quot; expenses are accounted for when they are paid by her, not when someone else receives it. So in your hypothetical, when she initiated the transfer would be the date that the payment is considered to be made. On the other hand, &quot;ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING&quot; means that Alice would account for the expense when it was made. Generally this would be earlier than the CASH date. But either way, she would account for it in 2022 based on what you said above.
There is no such thing as an "implicit" out clause in a contract like this. The onus was clearly on them to consider all the facts before agreeing to lock in an interest rate. The facts have not changed since the lock and you did not misrepresent the facts so they should honor their agreement or pay you damages. Your options are to take the deal, get a new deal elsewhere or take them to court to enforce the deal or recover damages. Those aren't particularly great options but that's the situation.
As explained in more detail here: The IRS instructions on Form 1099-MISC are pretty clear as to when and how you must file that. You don't need to file a 1099-MISC if total payments to an entity in a tax year are under $600. And if you don't need to file tax forms, you don't need to request a W-9. (If in doubt as to the entity receiving the money, you demand a W-9 from whomever is receiving a payment and use that as the basis of reporting payments.) Furthermore, if you transmit the funds using a payment settlement entity who will report the transaction on a 1099-K, then you don't need to report the payment on a 1099-MISC. (See "Form 1099-K" ibid.) PayPal is a payment settlement entity, so you don't need to worry about reporting payments you send through them ... with one big exception: PayPal does not report "payments to friends and family," and so if you're using that to avoid their fees then the IRS would consider you liable for reporting those payments on a 1099-MISC.
Disclaimer: I was the person who originally had the debate with the OP which prompted this question. My answer is based on the UK jurisdiction. Short answer (TLDR) If the action is deliberate, then under UK law it is likely that a crime of theft has been committed. Under the statutory definition of theft, five elements need to be established: dishonesty, appropriation, property, belonging to another, and intention to permenantly deprive. The first four are easy to satisfy. To establish intention, it is not necessary that the money be spent. It is only necessary to establish that at the moment that the recipient realised the mistake, they intended not to return the money. Even if they do plan to eventually return the money, it can still amount to an intention to permenantly deprive. In A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983), the Court of Appeal held that theft could be committed in a case where an employer had mistakenly paid £74.74 to an employee for hours they had not worked. The obligation to return the money arose at the moment the employee realised the mistake. Whether or not the money was spent was not an issue (it was not even raised). Full answer I'm starting from the assumption (stated in the question) that the action is deliberate, as opposed to the recipient simply not noticing they have received the money. If it was accident or unnoticed then it is unlikely a crime has been committed as the necessary intention will be lacking. By deliberate I mean the person notices the money being received, realises it was an error, knows who the sender was (or can reasonably find out), and does nothing to rectify it. If the action is deliberate then this is likely to amount to the crime of theft under the Theft Act 1968 ('TA 1968'). Note, whether or not the prosecution could actually prove the crime is a separate matter. The question is not asking how easy it is to prove the elements, only whether or not the crime has been committed. Statute Theft is defined as &quot;dishonestly appropriat[ing] property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it&quot; (Section 1(1) TA 1986). Your motivations for appropriating the property (including whether or not you spend it) are not a relevant factor: &quot;It is immaterial whether the appropriation is made with a view to gain, or is made for the thief’s own benefit.&quot; (Section 1(2) TA 1986). The important thing is whether or not the five elements of theft are present. These elements appear in the statutory definition of theft and are further elaborated in the Act: dishonesty (section 2 TA 1986), appropriation (section 3 TA 1986), property (section 4 TA 1986), belonging to another (section 5 TA 1986) and intention to permenantly deprive (section 6 TA 1986). Dishonesty: Defences include believing there is a legal right to deprive the other of the property, believing there was consent, or believing that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be reasonably discovered (section 2(1) TA 1986). None of these exceptions apply here, given the premise of the question. However if one of these beliefs were instead present, it is worth pointing out that &quot;belief&quot; is assessed using the subjective test (what the defendant genuinely believed), not the more common objective test (what a reasonable person would have believed in the circumstances) (R v Robinson. [1977] Crim LR 173). If none of the exceptions apply, then there is two-stage test for dishonesty: an objective test and a subjective test. However, if the objective test is passed then the subjective one is likely to as well: &quot;In most cases, where the actions are obviously dishonest by ordinary standards, there will be no doubt about it. It will be obvious that the defendant himself knew that he was acting dishonestly. It is dishonest for a defendant to act in a way which he knows ordinary people to consider to be dishonest, even if he asserts or genuinely believes that he is morally justified in acting as he did.&quot; (R v Ghosh, [1982] QB 1053). Appropriation: &quot;Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner.&quot; (emphasis added) (section 3(1) TA 1986). That very clearly applies here. Property: &quot;'property' includes money [and] things in action&quot; (Section 4(1) TA 1986). A bank balance is not money but a &quot;thing in action&quot; (a debt from the Bank to the customer) (A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369). Belonging to another: &quot;Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof, then to the extent of that obligation the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, and an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds.&quot; (Section 5(4) TA 1986). Note that it is not necessary that the customer be under a contractual obligation to return the money to the bank. Such an obligation can arise anyway under the law of restitution. It also arises in the law of equity - a person who gives property by mistake retains an equitable interest in that property (Chase Manhattan Bank v Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch 105). This principle has specifically been applied to bank errors (R v Shadrockh-Cigari [1988] Crim LR 465). Intention to permenantly deprive: &quot;A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal.&quot; (Section 6(1) TA 1986). There are two important things to note here: firstly, an intention to take and then return an item can still amount to theft. Secondly, it is the intention at the time of the appropriation which matters. If the person intended to keep the money (in our case, by hoping it will never get asked for) at the time they became aware of the mistake then it doesn't what their later intention is after the event (e.g. they later decide to return the money because they have been asked for it). See also the reference to intention above in relation to &quot;belonging to another&quot;. Other relevant case law Hibbert McKiernan [1948] 1A, ER 860: Property can cease to belong to another if abandoned. However the threshold for this is very high. Property is not abandoned just because the owner has stopped looking for it. You are therefore unlikely to be helped by the fact that the bank does not attempt to recover the money. R v Scott [1987] Crim LR 235: The defendant stole a pair of curtains from a shop but planned to return them the next day (to claim a fraudulent refund). Held: intention to permenantly deprive was present at the moment they were taken from the shop since the defendant treated the item as theirs to dispose of (see statutory definition of intention above). It didn't matter that defendant intended to return the item, even within a short timespan. Now you may argue that on the face of it it appears that you don't treat the bank balance as yours to dispose of because you leave it untouched. But remember you are under an obligation to return it as soon as you notice the error, which you fail to do. A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369: the defendant (R), a police officer, was mistakenly paid by bank transfer £74.74 for overtime she had not worked. The police made no demand for repayment. Held by the Court of Appeal: (1) section 5(4) TA 1986 applicable, (2) the legal obligation to return the money commenced as soon as R became aware of it, (3) satisfactory proof that R had no intention of making restoration to the police would be proof of an intention permanently to deprive. Note that whether or not the money is spent is not a factor (nor was it examined in the case): it is the intention that matters. Judgment excerpts: 186: &quot;There was some evidence before the jury that she had decided to say nothing about this unsolicited windfall which had come her way, and had decided to take no action about it after she discovered the error. No demand for payment of the sum was made by the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police or anyone else.&quot; 189: &quot;there was a legal obligation upon the respondent to restore that value to the receiver when she found that the mistake had been made&quot; 189: &quot;once the prosecution succeed in proving that the respondent intended not to make restoration, that is notionally to be regarded as an intention to deprive the receiver of that property which notionally belongs to him.&quot; Other points raised in the question &quot;merely failing to inform the bank of its own mistake does not rise to the level of intent to deprive, and no crime is committed unless/until the customer takes further action (such as spending the money). Am I wrong?&quot; Yes. For most crimes (other than absolute or strict liability crimes), you need to establish two things: actus reus (an action) and mens rea (a state of mind). A failure to inform the bank is part of the actus reus (it is an action, not a state of mind). It therefore has nothing to do with intention. The intention is the reason why you carried out the action. In our case it is the part in bold here: &quot;they decline to mention this to the bank, hoping that the deposit will not be reversed&quot;. It is that hope which establishes intention. &quot;Even if it is technically illegal, as a practical matter I assume that no bank would pursue this over merely reclaiming the funds.&quot; It is not necessary for a civil entity to pursue a criminal conviction. That is handled generally by the Crown Prosecution Service or by other government agencies that are empowered to prosecute. The bank's co-operation is only needed if their evidence is required to prove the case. Even then, a witness can be compelled to assist the case against their will (section 2, Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 and Part 17, Criminal Procedure Rules and Practice Directions 2020). Note that it is unlikely that a bank would refuse to cooperate. In any case, whether or not a crime will actually be prosecuted is not relevant to whether or not a crime has been committed (see my opening remarks about proving a case). &quot;Is there any precedent for someone being punished purely for failing to report a bank error?&quot; There are plenty of cases reported in the media involving convictions for failing to report and then spending money resulting from a bank error. See 1, 2, 3 for some examples. I was unable to find any precedents specifically relating to cases involving a bank error where the money was not spent. However, A-G's Reference above is essentially the same scenario, just involving an employer instead of a bank. In any case, the lack of an identical precedent does not mean that the courts would acquit a person in these circumstances. What matters is the statutory rules and whether or not the court would apply the existing precedents to the facts.
In the United Kingdom there is a law that for any online purchase or other purchase away from the businesses own premises, including insurance policies, that you have a 14 day cooling off period to cancel without penalty. The applicable parts of the law are the Consumer Contracts Regulations and if there is any form of credit agreement involved the Consumer Credit Act. It is a point of the law that the purchaser must be clearly made aware of these provisions.
It may be illegal under product labelling regulations that apply to that kind of product (or under a general deceptive trade practices act), but even then, only if you are interpreting the numbers, whose meaning is not clearly spelled out, correctly. But, to be actionable as fraud it must, among other things, be a misrepresentation as to a material fact (which if the goods, such as cordless drills, are not perishable it probably isn't) and the recipient of the misrepresentation must have justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation (which is necessary not true in the case of a representation that it was made in December 2018 on a product sold no later than July of 2018). It is also not entirely clear that this is a "made on" date. It could refer, for example, to the the twelfth batch or lot or shipment of products made in 2018, and not to the month of December, or it could refer to a product made in 2018 at factory number 12. @NateEldredge in the comments also makes the plausible observation that it could be a week number which is a common system in manufacturing which would put it in a more reasonable March 2018 time frame. You probably shouldn't do anything, because you haven't been harmed by this cryptic string of numbers embossed on the product, and even if you were, your damages would not be worth the time or money involved to pursue it as anything other than part of a class action lawsuit.
It doesn't seem as if the bank is discriminating in the way you suggest. They offer two types of account: (A) accrues or charges interest and (B) does not accrue or charge interest. The bank says you can choose A or B whatever your religion. You the customer choose A or B, possibly depending on your religion. So I do not see what cause of action you have or what damages you have suffered. Therefore I don't think you could sue them.
Is this actually true? Not really although there may be figments of truth woven in. First, the GDPR does not prevent tax authorities from determining layers of corporate ownership or investigating tax fraud. Second, your substantive tax liability depends upon the tax laws of the countries in question. If you owe taxes under a country's tax laws but the country can't find it, that makes you a tax criminal, and doesn't mean you don't owe the tax. Third, the exact rules on what triggers tax liability in mixed country fact patterns are highly technical and not fully uniform. If you actually do business abroad within the meaning of a country's tax laws in a way that is not subject to its taxes, then it is legal. But this scheme probably doesn't meet that standard under most country's tax laws. So you hire two local directors, as contractors, from country B. On the contract signed, they oversee the day to day operations and work for you as advisor since you're the only shareholder. So their existence, the contract and the structure show that the company is managed in country B, run in country B and has economic substance in country B. This way the offshore company isn't taxed in country A. This allows you to get dividends from the company tax free (after paying corporate taxes in country B) to your account in country A. A few thoughts on this specific example. If you truly are nothing but a passive source of funding for a company, then owning shares in this company is no different from owning shares in a public held company (e.g. BMW). The notion that dividends from the company are tax free in county A in that situation is very likely incorrect. Usually, dividends and other intangible income is taxable income in the country where they are received. Most likely, the dividends are income subject to taxation in country A. There is a concept in tax law which U.S. tax lawyers call the &quot;Economic Substance Rule&quot; which is also true, but with different names (most of these countries don't have English language tax terminology anyway) which means that when someone is going through the motions of conducting a transaction in a tax favored form when in substance, something different is really going on, the tax authorities can choose to tax the substance rather than the form of the transaction. So, if the really valuable work is being done by the shareholder without visible compensation, rather than by the local directors and managers, you the shareholder might be taxed on &quot;imputed income&quot; representing the fair market value of the services rendered, or treated as the true manager of the company in country B. Similar issues can arise when valuable intellectual property is transferred to the company without being duly reflected in a fair market value purchase of equity interests, a sale at fair market value, or a licensing agreement for royalty payments. Tax officials aren't limited to looking at paperwork. They can and do interview the human beings involved in interviews that those human beings are legally obligated to attend and cooperate with and to provide truthful information in with legal consequences for lying in those interviews. Even if no official documentation or public statements would tip off tax officials, a significant share of tax evasion cases are driven by whistleblowing by disgruntled former employees, ex-spouses, jilted significant others, mistreated business partners, and revengeful angry children who feel that they have been mistreated by their parents. Nothing in the GDPR prevents whistleblowing to tax authorities. Background In E.U. countries, closely held company ownership must be declared and recorded in a notary public's &quot;public records&quot; or a corporate register (unlike, for example, the United States, where, this information was only contained in the internal records of the company in most cases, although a new law called the Corporate Transparency Act effective January 1, 2022, or later if initial regulations aren't adopted, changes this status quo). E.U. directives expressly requires much more public disclosure by private companies than the U.S. more generally. For example, a recent Dutch overhaul of its rules for disclosing beneficial ownership of companies is a model of contemporary modern European legislation on the subject. This affords access to this information as follows (UBO is the Universal Beneficial Ownership registry and FIO is the Fiscal Intelligence Agency, an anti-money laundering agency): The public can only access the publicly accessible UBO-information with a valid registration and in exchange for a fixed fee. The identity of those persons that access the UBO-register will be registered with the Dutch Chamber of Commerce and UBOs may inquire as to how often their information has been consulted. The Chamber of Commerce may register the Citizen Service Number (Burgerservicenummer) of persons who access the register. The FIU and other competent authorities will, upon request, have access to that information. The FIU and other competent authorities may perform a search in the UBO-register based on the name of an individual, thus listing all connections of that individual, while the public will only be able to search the UBO-register for the UBO(s) of a specific entity (and not for the name of an individual). Even though this limitation to search options was presented as a measure to protect the privacy of UBOs, it is generally expected that commercial platforms that register company information will enable searches based on the name of individuals. The FIU and competent authorities have access to both the publicly and not publicly accessible UBO-information. In the Netherlands, the following institutions are, amongst others, qualified as competent authorities with unlimited access to the UBO-information: the Dutch Central Bank; the Authority for the Financial Markets; the Financial Supervision Office; the Dutch Gaming Authority; the Tax &amp; Customs Authorities; the National Police; the Public Prosecutor’s Office; the Dutch intelligence agencies; and the Tax Intelligence Agency. As this example illustrates, taxing authorities are given express statutory authority to gather information pertinent to tax collection. The Dutch situation, prior to the recent reform, collected essentially similar information, but at a decentralized basis in the offices of the notary handling the incorporation of the entity in question, with similar parties having access to the information. The E.U.'s General Data Protection Regulation generally, affirmatively extends to the provision of a good or service to an E.U. person subject to the regulation, something that would not include tax collection. See Article 3(2). Also, mutual assistance treaty obligations between E.U. countries to share information, which would include many tax treaties between E.U. countries, and criminal investigations (which would include criminal tax fraud cases) are expressly exempted from its scope.