What was the significance of the word &quot;ordinary&quot; in &quot;lords of appeal in ordinary&quot;? The law lords of the House of Lords were formally known as the lords of appeal &quot;in ordinary&quot;. Most of that phrase other than the final bit is self explanatory but the use of the word &quot;ordinary&quot; just seems quite odd. What is its intended meaning?
Between 1876 and 2009, there were three ways to be a &quot;Lord of Appeal&quot;, a member of the House of Lords who was part of its committee exercising judicial functions. (Before 1948 it was not a formal committee; proceedings took place in the Lords chamber as part of the House's normal business.) You could be Lord Chancellor. The most recent LC to have done this was Derry Irvine, Lord Irvine of Lairg (e.g. in Boddington v British Transport Police [1998] UKHL 13). You could be a regular member of the House of Lords who was qualified to sit as a judge, by virtue of having held &quot;high judicial office&quot;. In principle, this would include hereditary peers who had taken a legal career path, but most often meant life peers. That would include distinguished members of the judiciary who had been given a life peerage, former holders of the office of Lord Chancellor. and (since 1889) retired Lords of Appeal in Ordinary. For example, Lord Mackay of Clashfern (LC until 1997) continued to hear cases for several years on an ad-hoc basis. There were also current former Masters of the Rolls, Lords Chief Justice, and senior Scottish judges in this category. You could be appointed as a &quot;Lord of Appeal in Ordinary&quot;, which means that you were named to the House of Lords in order to serve as a judge (and by convention, not to participate in debates and votes). The &quot;in Ordinary&quot; phrase expresses that you are a Lord of Appeal as your main job - not because it's an additional job on top of being a peer. Before the reforms of the late 19th century, any peer could participate in judicial business, at the discretion of the House in general. Some peers with legal experience were de-facto regarded as &quot;law lords&quot;, and were the ones who by consensus took charge of appeal cases. The last time a lord without this experience tried to do this was 1883, in Bradlaugh v Clarke: Lord Denman (whose father had been Lord Chief Justice but who himself had no legal qualifications) tried to vote but the Lord Chancellor ignored him. That follows a precedent of 1844 (O'Connell v The Queen) that other Lords should gracefully decline to contribute, once the Law Lords had given their opinions. Even in that century, the emerging and eventually formalized category of &quot;law lords&quot; did not capture the nuance of who was making judicial decisions. The committee was typically &quot;assisted&quot; by professional judges, drawn from the serving judiciary, who would privately give their opinions to the actual named Lords. This was also the system used in trials of peers, where the House sat as a court of first instance if a peer was charged with a felony: nominally, any lord could take part in proceedings, but in practice the process would be stage-managed by a qualified Lord, with a panel of normal judges quietly doing much of the real work.
It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment&mdash;specifically the ratio&mdash;that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today)
One direct statement about this is in White v. Tommey [1853] 10 E.R. 483, in which the House of Lords had to consider whether to allow a rehearing of a case which they had previously decided, on the basis that there had been misrepresentation the first time round which affected their judgement. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cranworth, said: What ought your Lordships to do in this state of things? It was pressed very strongly on the part of Tommey by his counsel, that your Lordships in truth have no jurisdiction; that after a matter has once been heard and adjudicated upon in this ultimate Court of appeal, there is an end of it, that there must be an end somewhere, and that if it can be said that the trustees can be heard now to come and call in question the decree of 1850, what is to prevent Mr. Tommey coming afterwards, in 1860, and praying your Lordships to reconsider it again, and so toties quoties to the very end of time? In this case, the Lords sent the case back to the Court of Chancery in Ireland, setting aside their earlier orders relating to the appeal. This did not amount to a rehearing of the merits in the House of Lords, but their correction of a mistake in the proceedings and restoring the status quo ante. In an earlier case, Stewart v. Agnew [1823] 1 Shaw 413, another Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon, observed: It is infinitely better that the matter should be here finally decided upon one hearing, even if the decision is wrong, than that there should be a new litigation unknown to our proceedings, as to this matter of rehearing; - nor can any one say where it is to stop. In general, it is to be hoped that the decisions of this House are right; but, whether right or wrong, it has been taken for granted that considerations of infinitely greater moment than the considerations which arise out of the particular mischief in particular cases, have led this House to determine, that where a matter has been heard between parties at the Bar, and the House has given its decision upon the merits discussed by those parties, the House will not rehear the cause.
Contra proferentem However, it's a principle that is rarely applied in practice since it's at the end of a long line of judicial reasoning that gets applied first. Ambiguity in contract provisions are usually resolved by the golden rule: Determine the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used Consider the context of the contract including its purpose, any &quot;recitals&quot; or &quot;background&quot; clauses and other relevant provisions If the ordinary and natural meaning is inconsistent with the context or gives rise to absurdities, modify the meaning as appropriate. In the vast majority of case, this approach will give a meaning the court adopts without needing to invoke the contra proferentem rule. However, in the minority of cases where the rule is applied it works like this. The ambiguity should be interpreted against: the party who prepared the contract (particularly for standard form contracts offered on a &quot;take it or leave it&quot; basis) the party seeking to rely on the ambiguous position (e.g. the beneficiary of a guarantee, indemnity, limitation or exclusion provision). Finally, contra proferentem may not apply because: it can be specifically excluded in the contract (which most drafters do) where the provision has been the subject of back-and-forth amendments by the parties it can be impossible to say that only one of the parties drafted it.
I'm sorry to deflate what is clearly a very philosophically interesting question, but the law is straightforward here. The truth, essentially, is the set of facts that you believe to be true. Yes. It means that you will not lie by omission, and that you will provide the relevant facts. No, you don't need to recount history since the first instant of the big bang. Only expert witnesses may answer by giving their opinion or evaluation. This is presumed accurate by their experience and where it is not accurate, the other side may present opposing expert witnesses to contest their conclusion or evaluation. Laypeople are permitted to answer only with their recollection of facts. Lawyers may not ask them what their opinion is, although by your definition every question is about opinion, since perception and memory is limited. But the question "What colour was Mr Smith's house?" and "What architectural style informed the facade of Mr Smith's house?" require different amounts of expertise and opinion. "Truth" isn't jargon, or even technical language here. I generally aim to be truthful, and so when someone asks me what time it is, I don't feel compelled to answer to the nano/picosecond. Would you call me a liar? Am I lying by omission? Similarly, if someone asks me what colour a car is, I don't feel compelled to say "I can't possibly know, because my perception may differ from yours. If you honestly feel that when someone asks you to be truthful about something, then you must either be lying, or lying by omission if you don't start your answer with the first instant of the big bang, your problem is not one of law.
That sounds a lot like the German Antragsdelikt (literally "crime by request"). That is a crime (defined in the criminal code), that can only be prosecuted if the victim requests it. Antragsdelikt mostly applies to less serious crimes, such as slander or petty theft, while "serious" crimes, such as robbery or assault must always be prosecuted (Offizialdelikt). Also, there are many minor crimes (relatives Antragsdelikt) which are usually only prosecuted by request, but where the prosecution can also decide to press charges if it is in the "public interest" (usually because the act is deemed a serious infraction). Similar concepts exist in Austria and Switzerland.
He has this phrased like it's the ability to decide which laws you follow, and that it's an ability being withheld from the general public (although I seriously doubt that at least the former is the case). This is yet another false claim made by "freemen" or those who claim "common law defences". Notice of Understanding has no legal meaning unless the context demands that it evidences a meeting of the minds for the purposes of contract formation. It is a well-settled principle of common law that in order to be bound by a contract, there must be an agreement. Put simply, I cannot bind someone simply by sending them a Notice unless it is a right conferred on me by some earlier statute or legislation, or legally binding agreement. I tried searching for a solid definition, but all I could find was people/organization's Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights. The reason you've found nothing official about the terms Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights is that there is nothing official or legal about those terms. They are ordinary terms with ordinary meaning being bastardised by deluded people who believe they can fine the government and refuse to be bound by the law of the land. Of course, none of this holds up. What is the purpose of declaring your Notice of Understanding and Intent and Claim of Rights? It might make you feel better, even though it has no legal, practical or other effect.
Because rituals are important You might well ask what is the point of the ceremony of the Black Rod: Black Rod is best known for their part in the ceremonies surrounding the State Opening of Parliament and the Speech from the throne. They summon the Commons to attend the speech and lead them to the Lords. As part of the ritual, the doors to the chamber of the House of Commons are slammed in the approaching Black Rod's face. This is to symbolise the Commons' independence of the Sovereign. Black Rod then strikes the door three times with the staff, and is then admitted and issues the summons of the monarch to attend. Societies are not run by laws - they are run by convention and custom. Take the universe and grind it down to the finest powder and sieve it through the finest sieve and then show me one atom of justice, one molecule of mercy. and yet... and yet you act as if there is some ideal order in the world, as if there is some... some rightness in the universe by which it may be judged. Terry Pratchett, Hogfather The purpose of Royal Assent is to preserve the convention and custom that the United Kingdom is ruled by a King to avoid dealing with the reality that it's ruled by the people just like you and me which is and should be a truly terrifying thought. This is not a dig at politicians, judges, and civil servants: it applies equally to your doctor, the engineer who designed your house and the plumber who fitted your toilet. What would happen if it was refused? Well, a constitutional crisis would happen. The UK and most other Commonwealth countries have had a few; they seem to find a solution. However, it's a crisis primarily because no one knows how it will be resolved in advance. This particular crisis is unlikely to arise: the last time it happened was in 1708 by Queen Anne who was acting on the advice of her ministers (who were answerable to Parliament for their actions). the last time it happened against the wishes of the government was in 1696 by William III. the last time a monarch considered it was in 1914 by George V who decided it should not be done without &quot;convincing evidence that it would avert a national disaster, or at least have a tranquillising effect on the distracting conditions of the time&quot;.