Presidential pardon: What does &quot;except in Cases of Impeachment&quot; mean? Article II, Section 2, of the United States Constitution establishes the presidential pardon power as follows. The President shall ... have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. This question is about the caveat "except in Cases of Impeachment". Consider the following hypothetical sequence of events. Vice president Smith commits a federal crime. Smith is impeached and removed from office for this crime. President Miller pardons Smith for his crime. Miller leaves office at the end of his term. Smith is charged in federal court over the crime he committed (event #1). Now presumably Smith will argue that since he was pardoned, the charges should be thrown out. However, the prosecution can argue that the presidential pardon power does not apply in cases of impeachment and, since Smith was indeed impeached and removed from office because of this crime, it does not apply here. My question: Would this argument succeed? That is, could Smith be convicted despite the pardon? To be clear, the question is not whether Smith can remain vice president due to the pardon. It is only about whether he can face criminal consequences for the crime he was impeached and pardoned for. Perhaps a less hypothetical version of the question would be "If Nixon had been impeached and removed from office (rather than resigned), would Ford's pardon still protect him from criminal prosecution?" I don't expect that it is possible to definitively answer this question, since it is entirely hypothetical. However, I would like to know if there is any relevant precedent or legal analysis.
He will be thrown out of office (the "except in case of impeachment" clause means the president cannot immunize a person against impeachment); because he was pardoned by POTUS, he will not be charged of the crime that he was pardoned for – the prosecution does not get a chance to argue anything. They might however prosecute him for some other offense not covered by the pardon (if POTUS forgets a sweeping statement like "any and all crimes related to X"). I don't think a prosecutor is likely to try to argue that the Constitution means "the president cannot pardon a person who has been impeached".
There is a legal doctrine of executive privilege, where the executive branch can resist subpoenas, but that privilege is limited (US v. Nixon). Neither the doctrine of separation of powers nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. SCOTUS pointed to the kinds of cases where such privilege would be valid Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of Presidential communications is not significantly diminished by producing material for a criminal trial under the protected conditions of in camera inspection, and any absolute executive privilege under Art. II of the Constitution would plainly conflict with the function of the courts under the Constitution. But otherwise, when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice Decades later, Harriet Miers claimed executive immunity (as White House counsel) to a subpoena to testify before the Committee on the Judiciary, and the district court ruled rebuffed that claim There are powerful reasons supporting the rejection of absolute immunity as asserted by the Executive here. If the Court held otherwise, the presumptive presidential privilege could be transformed into an absolute privilege and Congress's legitimate interest in inquiry could be easily thwarted. if the Executive's absolute immunity argument were to prevail, Congress could be left with no recourse to obtain information that is plainly not subject to any colorable claim of executive privilege. However, executive privilege has been invoked dozens of times since Nixon – there are no other SCOTUS decisions. We should set aside current political posturing. POTUS might claim executive privilege, and then the question is whether the courts would order Banon to testify. We don't know the basis for such privilege, but we can assume that it would involve national security issues (thus might be within the penumbra of the Nixon ruling). Traditionally, executive privilege has involved the person who is president, not the person who ended up becoming president, so it would be extremely surprising if the courts upheld immunity in a pre-election matter.
In the United States, a contempt finding can be wiped out by: The judge who issued it. United States v. Jerry, 487 F.2d 600, 605 (3d Cir. 1973) (“[S]o long as the district court has jurisdiction over the case, it possesses inherent power over interlocutory orders, and can reconsider them when it is consonant with justice to do so.”) An appellate court with juridiction over the judge who issued it. This was what happened with several of the contempt orders in the case depicted in The Trial of the Chicago 7. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 401 (7th Cir. 1972) (“Therefore, the contempt convictions of appellants are reversed and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.”) For convictions on charges of criminal contempt in federal courts, the president of the United States may issue a pardon that nullifies the conviction. This was what happened in the case of Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who was convicted of defying a court order to stop harassing Hispanic people. For convictions in state courts, a governor may be able to issue a pardon.
Yes. In 1872 President Grant was stopped for speeding (on horseback, mind you). The officer, observing that he had stopped the President of the United States, initially let him go with nothing but a verbal warning. Later the same day, the same officer stopped Grant again speeding in the same place. The officer then informed Grant that he would have to be taken in, to which Grant gave a reply encouraging the officer to do his duty. Grant was then taken to the police station where he was charged with speeding, and held until he paid a $20 fine, at which point he was released. In summary, POTUS was: Charged with an offence Deprived of his liberty for committing said offence Held until he served his punishment (paying $20) ... all without impeachment. Now, this was a long time ago. I think that today, this is unlikely, since Secret Service would (legal or not) shield the President from arrests (national security reasons). However if a state level authority did manage to arrest the President for a crime and refused to let him go, then the Vice President and cabinet would invoke the 25th Amendment (on the grounds that the President is unable to discharge his duties due to imprisonment), so that the imprisoned person would now be a former president.
First of all, there is a distinction between being impeached and being convicted. Trump was impeached when the House voted to adopt an Article of Impeachment. That happened while he was still in office. He will not be convicted until the Senate votes to convict him by a 2/3rds vote, if it ever does. In the case of Nixon, the House had not yet voted to adopt Articles of Impeachment when he resigned. They had been introduced and debated, but not yet finally approved. Moreover, we don't know what would have happened if the House had proceeded to pass such articles after Nixon had resigned. The House of that time did not choose to proceed. There was no court ruling saying that they could not do so. There are some precedents saying that the Senate can proceed with a trial after an official resigns or is expelled after impeachment. None of these are at all recent, none are clear cut, none involved an official whose term had ended, none involved a President, and none that I am aware of led to a conviction. And this issue has never been tested in a Federal court. Specifically, there is the case of William Belknap. Belknap was Secretary of War under US President Grant. He was accused of improperly profiting from military contracts. The House started impeachment proceedings. Grant interviewed Belknap, who confessed to Grant and resigned on the spot. The house none the less pass five articles of impeachment after Belknap resigned. When the Senate took up the case, there was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Senate did not have jurisdiction because of Belknap's resignation. By a vote of 37–29 the Senate held that it had jurisdiction and that a trial should proceed. The vote to convict Belknap was 35 for conviction, 25 against it. This was five votes short of the required 2/3rds to convict. Most of the Senators voting against conviction were on record as doing so because they did not agree that the Senate had jurisdiction. Thus a majority vote of the Senate held in that case that such a trial was proper, but less than 2/3rds. (Most also indicted that they thought the charges true.) There was also the case of William Blount. Blount, a Senator, was impeached by the House in 1798. (In fact this was the first impeachment ever under the US Constitution.) The Senate voted to expel him. When the articles of impeachment came up in 1799, the Senate voted to dismiss the impeachment, on the ground that the impeachment process did not extend to members of the Senate, but not on the grounds that the expulsion rendered the proceedings moot. Should Trump be convicted by the Senate (which now seems unlikely) he might bring a court case claiming that such a conviction was unconstitutional. There is no knowing how a court would handle such a case. And if Trump is not convicted, no such case will be brought this time, either. This Washington Post opinion piece by two Constitutional scholars claims that such a trial would be constitutionally proper. It also claims that it would not have been proper had the vote to adopt articles of impeachment occurred after Trump had left office. Others have taken different positions. Whether a Senate trial of an impeachment is constitutional after the person impeached has left office is a hotly debated question at the moment. There has never been a court ruling on the point, and neither of the precedents is of a situation quite matching the current impeachment of Trump. No court has ruled on the matter. The Senate did not vote for a motion to dismiss the impeachment on those grounds, although if every senator who voted for the motion voted to acquit, Trump would not be convicted. From the comments I wish that any downvoters would leave a comment indicting what thy think is wring with this answer. In the absence of a comment, I cannot improve the answer, others cannot use the reasons to write better answers, and readers have no idea why someone objects to the answer. Such a downvote seems pointless. I have updated this answer with a discussion of the Blount and Belknap precedents. In neither case did the Senate actually vote to dismiss the articles because the accused was no longer in office, although that seems to be a major reason why 25 senators voted against convicting Belknap.
With regard to subpoenas, the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Trump v. Vance makes it clear that states can issue subpoenas to sitting presidents. (The case in question involved a subpoena to a third party for the president's records, not to the president himself, but the opinion makes it clear that the court would apply the same reasoning in either situation.) The questions of what actions a state may take to enforce such a subpoena if it is not complied with, or of arrest / indictment / trial by a state, have never arisen and thus have not been resolved by courts.
How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.
No. The Pardon Clause only extends the power to pardon &quot;offenses against the United States,&quot; which essentially means that the president can only issue a pardon in a federal criminal case. A contract claim is civil rather than criminal, and governed by state law rather than federal, so the Pardon Clause would not affect the president's liability.