What is &quot;a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law&quot;? Art. 3 (3) GDPR mentions that: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where Member State law applies by virtue of public international law. What are those places?
It means places that would fall under the EU laws and rules by treaties and things like that. For example, a consulate. The GDPR also applies wherever EU Member State law applies by virtue of public international law. The Recitals provide a single example: a diplomatic mission or consular position. While that case is limited, the rule in public international law established by the Permanent Court of International Justice in Lotus is that a country has any extra-territorial jurisdiction it claims so long as there is not a public international law rule prohibiting the assumption of jurisdiction. Thus, the EU potentially could expand the GDPR scope in the future using this provision. https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-May_2017_PIF-The_GDPRs_Reach-Material_and_Territorial_Scope_Under_Articles_2_and_3.html
There are a few different grounds under which PII can be handled. Perhaps the most discussed at the moment of GDRP introduction is consent, because of the wave of consent-seeking. But there are a number of other grounds. "Necessary for contract execution" is a trivial one, to deliver a pizza you'll need an address. The relevant ground for sanctions lists is also pretty obvious in hindsight, you may process PII in order to comply with legal obligations. Note that this is still an integral part of the GDPR, not an exception to the GDPR. That means you need to apply all the basic GDPR rules. You need to explicitly store where you got the PII from, for which purpose, and you need to document how you're using it. Note that this might be hard - why do you need to store this data? Why can't you just check the list as the moment it's relevant? The GDPR for a large part depends on you justifying your actions, not just in hindsight but already up front.
Art. 17 GDPR Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies: Assuming private messages contain personal data, if at least one of the following points (a..f) applies, it would have to be deleted. (a) the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which they were collected or otherwise processed; The original main purpose was probably Article 6(1)(b) (performance of a contract). If you delete your account, that would no longer apply. However, for the receiver of the private message, Article 6(1)(f) (legitimate interests pursued by a third party) would apply. The receiver might still want to read that message. So there is still a purpose to process this data. So point (a) does not apply. (Note that a Facebook private message can be considered a hosted version of SMS messages. A receiver does not expect SMS messages to be automatically deleted after they have reached the recipient's device. A receiver expects full control of the storage of SMS messages. I think a receiver expects the same for messages on facebook.) (b) the data subject withdraws consent on which the processing is based according to point (a) of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2), and where there is no other legal ground for the processing; Data processing was not based on consent, so point (b) does not apply. (c) the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); Article 21(1) allows you to object to processing based on Article 6(1)(f), unless there are compelling legitimate grounds for the processing which override the interests, rights and freedoms of the data subject. While I think processing is based on Article 6(1)(f), I also think there are legitimate grounds to refuse your objection. As explained before, the receiver might still want to read that message. The receiver was able before to read your message, so one can assume he/she has already knowledge of the personal data in the message. As it is a private message, no one else will be able to read that message. (At least Facebook will not allow it). So if the message is not deleted, the privacy implications for you are low. That's why I think the interests of the receiver will prevail. However, in the end, a judge will be the only person which can make such a consideration. So you would have to got to court to get a final decision about this. Article 21(2) is for direct marketing, that does not apply to this situation. So I think point (c) does also not apply. (d) the personal data have been unlawfully processed; (e) the personal data have to be erased for compliance with a legal obligation in Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject; These points do not apply. (f) the personal data have been collected in relation to the offer of information society services referred to in Article 8(1). This data processing was not based on consent, so even if you are a child below the age of 16 years, point (f) does not apply. Article 17(2) and Article 17(3) wont help you either. So in my opinion Facebook is right in this case.
For land ownership records and other similar scenarios such as business directors, the requirement for these to be public will be in legislation rather than a contract - this provides the legal basis, see GDPR Article 6(1c). Additionally when government departments are doing it they also have 6(1e) as lawful basis: "1. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: ... (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; ... (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" -- GDPR, Article 6(1c,e). I'm not familiar enough with the specific legislation that will apply here but pretty sure this will be the case, and having said this you may well find public registries also become less public going forward. The reason ICANN has come under fire, is partly because under GDPR privacy is a protected fundamental right and therefore to comply personal data should be kept private by default and privacy never something you would be required to pay extra for. Any contract ICANN have in place with their registrars will not override legislation, it is in fact the other way around. "2. The controller shall implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible without the individual's intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons." -- GDPR, Article 25(2). This doesn't stop ICANN from maintaining a register of domain name owners (registrants), but it does mean they can't just publish all records upon request to anyone anymore - whether people will be granted access to personal data will now depend on if they have a lawful basis for this, and in these cases their processing of the personal data will be limited to those purposes. Being nosey doesn't count! "When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of the contract." -- GDPR, Article 7 (4) - Conditions for consent. What this means essentially, is that if the consent is conditional for the contract it will not be treated as freely given, and therefore not valid - it will no longer be acceptable to contractually bind the provision of a product or service with consent to publish personal data or any other form of processing such as marketing mailing lists. Looking now at the specific points you have raised: "GDPR article 6 allows for processing of personal data on a contractual basis (section 1b)" Whilst this is true, this is only part of it - it doesn't allow for unlimited processing for any purpose and sharing it with any people, if you look at Article 5(b) it states that the information is collected for specific explicit legitimate purposes. Each purpose requires its own legal basis and needs to be compatible with the principles of GDPR. Without consent, ICANN currently does not have a legal basis to make the WHOIS records public for EU citizens and should have adopted some technical controls to require them to opt-in if they wish to be included in the public register. They're coming under fire for non-compliance having been given 2 years to prepare and change their systems/processes. "processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;" Again whilst this is true, not all processing is necessary for the performance of a contract. In the same way people must give consent to receive marketing communications, they must freely give consent for their information to be shared/published (separate to the contract for provision of service) in the absence of other lawful basis for this processing. "Also section 1c, processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject;" There is no legislation which requires them to publish the personal data of domain name registrants. In this paragraph 'legal obligations' refers to those required by legislation (i.e. statutory obligations), not contracts (or non-statutory obligations) which are covered under Article 6(1b). "And finally section 1e, processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;" ICANN has no official government-assigned authority, and publishing the personal data globally is not in the interests of the data subject's or others' welfare or well-being - this is what is meant by 'public interest'. As far as I can see what ICANN are actually doing to comply seems to be accepted by the European Data Protection Board, they are only 'under fire' as you say because they are late in doing so. The deadline was 25th May 2018 and they had 2 years to prepare like all other organisations.
The university has a legal obligation to collect certain data from attendees, including employees an visitors. It has decided to keep these records in digital form, and offers a smartphone app as a convenience. The university has outsourced the data processing activity to a third party. This is perfectly legal under the GDPR, if that third party is contractually bound to only process the data as instructed, and not for their own purposes. Whereas the university acts as a data controller (Verantwortlicher), the third party would be a data processor (Auftragsverarbeiter). I have some doubts though whether an app or a website is indeed the solution that offers the best data protection, especially taking into account the GDPR's data minimization principle. Requiring updates when entering or leaving any room is potentially excessive. Given the sensitivity of the data, the university should have performed a data protection impact assessment to weigh the consequences of this measure. At least for employees, the measure would likely have to be approved by the union (Personalrat) as well.
It seems clear that this is personal information under the GDPR. If you are subject to the GDPR, you need to have a "lawful basis" to store or process such information. (You are subject to the GDPR if you are locates in the EU, or if your users are. My understanding is that it is location at the time the app is accessed that matters, not a user's citizenship. I am not totally sure about that, however. Unless your app is limited to non-EU access, it it probably safest to comply with the GDPR) The degree of precision of your location data will not matter -- a specific city is quite enough to make it personal data if it can be tied to a specific person. There are various lawful bases that may be relied on for processing and storage, but explicit consent is probably the one with the widest applicability. To use consent as the lawful basis, you must present an OPT-IN decision to the user, and record the results. If the user does nothing, the result must record lack of consent. You may not use a pre-checked consent box or another mechanism that has the effect of an opt-out choice. You should be clear about what information will be stored, and how it will or might be used. You will also need to consider how your app will function for those who do not consent, and how to handle requests to withdraw consent. So if an app obtains user consent to store location data in a manner that complies with the GDPR, it may store user location data. The consent should make the possible uses of the data clear. If the data is to be shared, the consent should make the possible extent of sharing clear. Some previous questions and answers here on law.se dealing with GDPR consent that seem possibly relevant: User consent required under GDPR What provisions should I make regarding GDPR consent when users do not sign themselves up? GDPR - Withdrawn user consent Opt Out Consent under GDPR
The United States enforces laws on its citizens. This is not true and never has been in the United States or pretty much any other country. Countries exercise authority over anyone in their territory, and over their citizens even if outside their territory. Sometimes countries agree to waive their authority over a tiny number of diplomats voluntarily while retaining the right to expel them from their country, but that is the rare exception and not the rule. So, which country comes closest to actually preserving people’s right to opt out of the state and have a natural right to at least some land? There really aren't any, and the claim that this is a &quot;natural right&quot; is, at a minimum controversial and not widely held. Many countries have areas that they control which are subject to different regulations than most of the country. For example, until recently, Hong Kong was subject to different laws by different authorities than the rest of China, and there continue to be some laws generally applicable in the rest of China which are not applicable in Hong Kong. Until recently, the Panama Canal Zone was a similar example of control of territory within one country being temporarily ceded to another sovereign authority. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is a third example. Similarly, and with some of the same conceptual framework behind it, the laws that apply in places such as the Channel Islands or the Cayman Islands or Scotland, which are subordinate in legal and political theory to the same King as England is, are permitted by the King and treaties and organic statutes established with the King's symbolic approval, to have laws that are different from those that apply in England. Ultimately, this is simply a form of federalism, although when the extent that the central government's otherwise generally applicable laws can be disregarded quite completely is high, it feels like something more than mere federalism, and is often called a dependency or colonial relationship. Similarly, many countries have &quot;free ports&quot; or &quot;duty free zones&quot; in which their usual taxes don't apply. For example, the U.S. taxation regime that applies in Puerto Rico is different from the U.S. taxation regime that applies within U.S. states. But, even in these cases, there is not an individual right to opt out of laws, there is permission granted by a higher level government for a subordinate level government to adopt laws different from the generally applicable laws of the higher level government. Sometimes the alternative government is democratic, sometimes it is not. Hong Kong, for example, was not self-governing in a meaningful sense until not long before China regained control of the territory at the end of a 99 year concession to the United Kingdom. Some jurisdictions give people subject to their jurisdiction more ability to reach their own legal arrangements contrary to the default rules of law than others. For example, Delaware affords people who create limited liability companies there more authority to deviate from Delaware's default rules of law for limited liability companies than any other U.S. jurisdiction. But this is a far cry from granting people subject to Delaware's jurisdiction generally, freedom to displace mandatory rules of Delaware law in other legal domains such as criminal law. Similarly, sometimes the government will tolerate deviation from binding national laws even when they technical still apply. This has been the story of marijuana legalization in the U.S. and of prostitution legalization in Perth, Australia. But, again, this is an isolated act of tacit toleration in a single subject area, and not a general disavowal of legislative authority.
The GDPR is wide in scope, and flexible in application. Therefore it is not possible to give an absolute yes/no as to whether masking text with asterisks is or is not lawful. We can gain a deeper insight by looking at the GDPR itself. Firstly, the definition of processing (Art. 4 lit. 2): any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction As mentioned by amon, the principles relating to processing of personal data (Art. 5) are highly relevant, insofar as the activity constitutes processing. In particular, purpose limitation: [Personal data shall be] collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes ...and data minimisation: [Personal data shall be] adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed I would argue that making available the personal data on an invoice is processing. There are two separate operations: Making the data available to authenticated users; and Making the data available to non-authenticated users The purpose of making it available to authenticated users may be different to the purpose of making it available to non-authenticated users. Again acknowledging amon, the necessity of making the data available to non-authenticated users must be examined, as too must the means by which a non-authenticated user gains access to an invoice: are they using a URL that contains a token of some kind? Is this unique in some way? It could be that the presentation of a token itself constitutes authentication and thus authorisation to view the entire invoice, in which case further redaction may not be necessary if there is a clear necessity to disclose the entire contents to such a user. Whether the token expires or is limited to a certain referrer would be part of complying with the integrity and confidentiality principle and Art. 32 (Security of processing) by implementation of technical measures. When considering pseudonymisation and anonymisation, you will note that the redaction of name and address data from a certain view of the invoice, while nevertheless displaying the invoice number, constitutes pseudonymisation, since it would be possible with unfettered access to the remaining data, to determine the name and address from the invoice number, but not for the non-authenticated user whose view is redacted. In such a case, I fail to see how or why the replacement of a string with the same number of asterisks, or starting with the real character is secure or even practical, when the entire field could simply be replaced with a fixed-width string of asterisks or other filler, thus providing the user with no right or necessity to view the personal data with no further insight into what the personal data may or may not be.