What legal grounds exist to dispute the benefits received by the assignee? Let's suppose A provides some type of services to B in exchange for a monthly payment. A assigns the benefit of all payments it is entitled to receive from B, to C, in exchange for £1. Under what circumstances could either A or B seek to recover any payments made to C by B? Assume the governing law is that of England and Wales. My understanding.. Recovery by A: Upon A receiving the consideration of £1 from C, I'm assuming there are no legal grounds for A to recover any payments made by B to C. Recovery by B: I'm assuming there are no legal grounds for B to recover any payments made by B to C, as C has no obligations to B under the agreement between A and B. I'm ignoring clawbacks in the event of insolvency. If B was to stop making payments to C that were due and payable, I'm assuming only C has the right to take legal action against B for the late payments?
The question is a little confusing because it’s unclear why any of the payments should be refunded. If A has not provided the services, and B wants a refund, then B can sue A for breach of contract. A assigned its right to be paid to C, but it cannot assign its obligations to C (this would be a novation rather than an assignment, which would require both B and C’s consent). If C also agreed with A to perform A’s obligations to B (a subcontract), then A could sue C for any damages A was liable to pay B, but B cannot sue C directly. If A regrets its decision to assign the contract for £1, and wants to recover larger payments made by B to C in discharge of B’s contractual obligations to A, it can’t. A shouldn’t have assigned the benefit of the contract to C. If B has not paid, B can be sued under the contract which still exists between A and B. C can file this claim as assignee of the contract. While A could also potentially file the claim, it would be inconsistent with the assignment for A to receive any benefit from it, which would be held on constructive trust for C.
If the creditor has lodged a caveat on the title to the property, then the debtor will not be able to transfer ownership of the land. The land titles office will refuse to register any attempted transfer of the land while the caveat stands. If the creditor has registered a charge on the title of the property, they will still be able to liquidate it to cover the debtor's debt regardless of whether the property changes hands. If the security is not registered but the transferee of the land knows about the security, then the creditor can still recover from the transferee. If the creditor can't recover from the transferee under their security, they may be able to make the debtor bankrupt and, under bankruptcy law, unwind or claw back the transfer of the property. That puts the property back in the possession of the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, who will sell it to pay the creditor.
Civil Procedure Rule 19.3 provides Provisions applicable where two or more persons are jointly entitled to a remedy: (1) Where a claimant claims a remedy to which some other person is jointly entitled with him, all persons jointly entitled to the remedy must be parties unless the court orders otherwise. (2) If any person does not agree to be a claimant, he must be made a defendant, unless the court orders otherwise. (3) This rule does not apply in probate proceedings. My reading is that it is a technical device to deal with circumstances where a number of people are severally jointly entitled to a remedy or redress but not all wish to make a claim for some reason or another. Imagine the simplistic scenario (but hopefully not too simplistic that it loses its meaning) where Dave the defendant destroys an asset jointly and severally owned by Alice, Bob and Carol thus causing a loss to all three. Carol does not wish to be a party to the claim so she becomes a co-defendant next to Dave, but she remains a joint and several owner - for now anyway. If Alice's and Bob's claim is successful one potential outcome is that an order is made to award Carol's &quot;share&quot; ownership of the asset jointly and severally over to Alice and Bob - in effect removing Carol from the equation. Dave is then ordered to pay Alice and Bob damages. One example of joint ownership is joint tenants who... ...have equal rights to the whole property – neither one [of you] has a specific “share” in the property
Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise.
The most minimal elements of theft are: An unauthorised taking or use of another's property; and An intent to permanently deprive that person of that property or its use You've authorised the fee as per the terms of service that you agreed to. If you didn't read the terms of service, you are deemed to have read it. As the first element is not satisifed, no, it's not theft. As to what that fee is for, it's not really a question of law, but because they're a business and they are entitled to recover the costs of providing products or services and make a profit when you use their products or services, I fairly confidently would say that they're charging you to recover the costs of providing you their products and services as well as to make a profit from your use of their products and services. But again, not a question of law.
Yes, company A is liable for that; ignorance is not a defence. For this reason, a prudent company A would put an indemnification clause in their contract with company B so that if A is sues then company B pays. This is, of course, completely useless if company B is out of business at the time of the suit.
If it is a multi-party contract, generally all parties to the contract have liability for its breach regardless of who is supposed to receive payment. It is possible to contractually negotiate for limitations of liability in a contract, but not all liability and only with clear language to that effect. Further, if the CorpA and Corp B and Corp C all anticipated at the outset that if there was liability that CorpB incurred that it would not be paid, that would constitute both common law fraud and a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act by everyone involved (entities and individuals) because one is anticipating incurring future liability in an entity with no anticipated capacity to pay it. The circumstances would also plausibly justify &quot;piercing the corporate veil.&quot;
This is not a "if you breach the contract we may sue you" clause. This is a clause which says "if we find you trying to breach the contract, we can ask a court to stop you from doing so (even though you may not have actually breached the contract at that point in time)". The provision entitles the aggrieved party to specific relief - in this case, by the way of an injunction. Specific relief means relief of certain determined nature or of a specific kind, rather than a general relief or damages or compensation. Essentially, the clause that provides that if the receiving party of the confidential information threatens to disclose such information, the disclosing party shall be entitled to ask the court to specifically order the receiving party not to disclose the confidential information (as opposed to post-facto asking for damages for the harm caused by reason of such disclosure). In the absence of this provision, a court may rule that the disclosing party has no locus to take pre-emptive legal action, as no damage has been caused yet by the other party.