Is it a crime in the United States to say &quot;the people want to bring down the regime&quot;? Link The said law says: Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession thereof, or the government of any political subdivision therein, by force or violence, or by the assassination of any officer of any such government; or Whoever, with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such government, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter advocating, advising, or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so; or Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof— Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense named in this section, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next following his conviction. As used in this section, the terms “organizes” and “organize”, with respect to any society, group, or assembly of persons, include the recruiting of new members, the forming of new units, and the regrouping or expansion of existing clubs, classes, and other units of such society, group, or assembly of persons. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 808; July 24, 1956, ch. 678, § 2, 70 Stat. 623; Pub. L. 87–486, June 19, 1962, 76 Stat. 103; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(N), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2148.) Reference My question is, Does saying, &quot;the people want to bring down the regime&quot; constitute knowingly or willfully advocating the &quot;overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any State, Territory, District or Possession&quot;?
It is not a crime to say, &quot;The people want to bring down the regime.&quot; This specific tweet is almost certainly not illegal. Even if this guy is subjectively trying to overthrow the government, this would probably be an impossible prosecution for a lot of reasons. First: 18 USC 2385 deals with &quot;overthrow or destruction of the government.&quot; Does &quot;regime&quot; mean the government or does it just mean the Trump administration? I'm guessing it just means the administration, and if that's the case, you're dealing with a matter of public concern rather than a true threat of overthrow. Especially because this comes right after the election, you've got strong arguments that this is commentary on a matter of public concern, e.g., &quot;the people want to end the Trump regime,&quot; or maybe &quot;the people wanted regime change and therefore voted for Trump, or that you need a change in the constitutional form of government to do away with the Electoral College.&quot; Whatever it means, commentary on a matter of public concern cannot be punished under Section 2385. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). Second: 18 USC 2385 deals with overthrow by &quot;by force or violence.&quot; To say you want to bring down the regime says nothing about how you want to bring down the regime. Third: The invocation of the Arab Spring could sort of cut in either direction, as it involved regime changes effected both through nonviolent protest and violent revolution. Fourth: Even if we interpret this as Ayloush saying that regime change would be good, that he personally wants regime change, or that other people should want or work toward regime change, that's still not enough to get you into the conduct prohibited by Section 2385, which does not prohibit &quot;doctrinal justification of forcible overthrow.&quot; Here's some relevant language from Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961): [T]he mere abstract teaching of Communist theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive to lend color to the otherwise ambiguous theoretical material. This seems like pretty solidly First Amendment-protected political speech.
Most people would refer to this as &quot;defense of others.&quot; In North Carolina, though, the relevant statute, G.S. 14-51.3, formally refers to this as &quot;Use of force in defense of person.&quot; The statute allows a defense against criminal and civil liability for non-deadly force used &quot;against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force.&quot; Note, however, that the statute does not allow you to invoke the defense when the victim &quot;is a law enforcement officer ... was lawfully acting in the performance of his or her official duties and ... identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law.&quot; This raises the question of whether the officer in this case was &quot;lawfully acting in the performance of his official duties&quot; when the relative intervened. If he was, the defense would likely be unavailable.
The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or &quot;no contest&quot; which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.
The restrictions of the First Amendment have been made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. For the right to assemble, this was recognized in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). But note that the right only protects peaceable assembly. When it is alleged that improper violence or other properly unlawful action has occurred, the state may make that criminal, and indeed laws against rioting have existed throughout the history of the US. Whether a law is criminalizing peaceful assembly or prohibiting unlawful violence is a question that depends on th wording of the law, and the way it is applied In the De Jonge opinion the Court wrote: The broad reach of the statute as thus applied is plain. While defendant was a member of the Communist Party, that membership was not necessary to conviction on such a charge. A like fate might have attended any speaker, although not a member, who &quot;assisted in the conduct&quot; of the meeting. However innocuous the object of the meeting, however lawful the subjects and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable and timely the discussion, all those assisting in the conduct of the meeting would be subject to imprisonment as felons if the meeting were held by the Communist Party. ... While the States are entitled to protect themselves from the abuse of the privileges of our institutions through an attempted substitution of force and violence in the place of peaceful political action in order to effect revolutionary changes in government, none of our decisions goes to the length of sustaining such a curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly as the Oregon statute demands in its present application. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, under the New York statute defining criminal anarchy, the defendant was found to be responsible for a &quot;manifesto&quot; advocating the overthrow of the government by violence and unlawful means. Id. pp. 268 U. S. 656, 268 U. S. 662, 268 U. S. 663. In Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, under the California statute relating to criminal syndicalism, the defendant was found guilty of willfully and deliberately assisting in the forming of an organization for the purpose of carrying on a revolutionary class struggle by criminal methods ... Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Gitlow v. New York, supra, p. 268 U. S. 666; Stromberg v. California, supra, p. 283 U. S. 368; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 707; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 243, 297 U. S. 244. The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press, and is equally fundamental. As this Court said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 92 U. S. 552: implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions -- principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 272 U. S. 316; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S. 67; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra.
The comments have already pointed out that the President of the United States is still a citizen, and all of the rights of a citizen are still protected for them. Additionally, the Administration is allowed to take policy positions which are antagonistic to a person or group's cause, even if that group is practicing their rights to express their views legally. To give a different example, the President and his administration may denounce the position of a group of Neo-Nazis marching legally. So, any argument that the President is acting in an official capacity while making antagonistic comments also probably fails, as the Administration is allowed to take a position on any issue they deem worth taking a stand on. As noted in another answer and in comments, the applicable laws appear to be 18 U.S. Code § 227, which provides for punishment of government officials who attempt to influence employment decisions through official acts for political purposes, and 42 U.S. Code § 1983, which provides for civil action when a person deprives, or causes the deprivation of, another person's rights under color of law. 18 U.S. Code § 227 likely does not apply for two reasons The President may show that his conduct was not purely for political purpose The official statements made do not qualify as official acts per McDonnell v. United States, as they are not a decision or action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy"; that question or matter must involve a formal exercise of governmental power, and must also be something specific and focused that is "pending" or "may by law be brought" before a public official 42 U.S. Code § 1983 might apply if the official statements were found to be acting under color of law, but I think the statements made so far will fail to meet the qualifications for this statute. Blair v. Bethel School District gives three qualifications for conduct that would allow recovery under this statute: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action. The President's and Administration's official speech appears to fail the second criteria. First, it is questionable whether it qualifies as an "Adverse Action" - in Blair, as well as Hartman v. Moore and Gibson v. United States, the adverse action against the Plaintiff caused actual damage or indignity. However, even if we assume the official speech qualifies as an adverse action for the purposes of the statute, it still appears to be permissible for effectively the same reasons as the first and third arguments presented in the decision: First, the adverse action Blair complains of was a rather minor indignity, and de minimis deprivations of benefits and privileges on account of one's speech do not give rise to a First Amendment claim. The actual effect of the Administration's speech has a minimal direct effect on the players it speaks against. The decision further states: The most familiar adverse actions are “exercise[s] of governmental power” that are “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature” and have the effect of punishing someone for his or her speech Official speech by the Administration is not "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." While this is not a complete definition for "adverse action," it gives a sense of severity, which official speech does not appear to meet. Additionally, the President's right to speech, and the Administration's authority and need to make official speech as directed by the President is a competing interest in this case, as was the interest of the Board in Blair: Third, it is significant that Blair isn't the only party in this case whose interests implicate First Amendment concerns. To the contrary, we assume all of the Board members have a protected interest in speaking out and voting their conscience... The decision does note that: The point isn't that the vote against Blair was protected speech simply because it was expressive. Almost all retaliatory actions can be said to be expressive, including those that are manifestly unconstitutional. But, while Blair certainly had a First Amendment right to criticize Seigel and vote against his retention as superintendent, his fellow Board members had the corresponding right to replace Blair with someone who, in their view, represented the majority view of the Board. Similarly, it's probable that a court would find that the President's right to speech and their Administration's corresponding authority to speech against the players' right to protest is equally weighted or even weightier, such that stifling the official speech is as bad or worse than the alleged chilling effect of the speech. Some examples of things that clearly would fall afoul of 42 U.S. Code § 1983 would be the President or the Administration misappropriating funds to use to pay NFL teams not to hire players who kneel during the national anthem, or signing an Executive Order preventing players who kneel during the national anthem from playing - in both cases, they are taking actions which fall outside the powers of their office, which would qualify as acts made under color of law and clearly chill the players' First Amendment rights.
This is interesting because things get extremely different on state and federal levels. Quoting this, Under modern U.S. law, suicide is no longer a crime. Some states, however, classify attempted suicide as a criminal act, but prosecutions are rare, especially when the offender is terminally ill. The &quot;some states&quot; part is much more important than was emphasized there, however. A case that reached the Virginia Supreme Court, Wackwitz v. Roy (referred to in Wikipedia) pivoted about the legality of suicide. From the decision: We are aware of only one legislative enactment that addresses suicide as a crime. Code § 55-4 provides that &quot;[n]o suicide ... shall work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.&quot; Thus, although the General Assembly has rescinded the punishment for suicide, it has not decriminalized the act. Suicide, therefore, remains a common law crime in Virginia as it does in a number of other common-law states. See, e.g., Southern Life &amp; Health Ins. Co. v. Wynn, 29 Ala.App. 207, 194 So. 421 (1940); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422 (1877); State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961); State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 55 A. 44 (1903); State v. Levelle, 34 S.C. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1891), overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315 (S.C.1991). To constitute suicide at common law, however, a person who takes his own life &quot;must be of years of discretion, and in his *865 senses.&quot; 5 William Blackstone, Commentaries *189; accord Plunkett v. Supreme Conclave, 105 Va. 643, 646, 55 S.E. 9, 10 (1906) (&quot;`To constitute suicide at common law the person must be of years of discretion and of sound mind.'&quot;). This common law rule comports with a contemporary definition of suicide. Suicide is defined as &quot;the deliberate and intentional destruction of his own life by a person of years of discretion and of sound mind.&quot; Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2286 (1981). I believe that the &quot;only one legislative enactment&quot; refers merely to Virginia state law, not nation-wide law. Thus, in Virginia, and other states, suicide could be treated as a common-law crime. However, in United States v. Hudson, it was ruled that such common-law convictions are not allowed at the federal level. I'm not always a fan of Google Answers, but the last one here provides a fairly well-documented section on common-law rulings about suicide. Note that in many states, this is not enforced, as common-law rulings are increasingly rare.
Charged: yes. Another answer has mentioned incitement to riot in 18 USC 2101. There is also incitement to insurrection in 18 USC 2383. This carries with it upon conviction a prohibition on holding office under the United States, both in the federal law itself and also via Amendment 14 of the Constitution of the United States. There are laws under which charges could be brought, and there is certainly no impediment to bringing them after M. Trump's term of office ends. Bringing them before then raises questions of presidential immunity, but I strongly doubt that speaking at the start of a &quot;Save America March&quot; can be construed as an action in any official Presidental capacity. Convicted: only maybe. M. Trump's statements have to extend beyond what is protected by Amendment 1 and actually be incitement to insurrection. Although there is a strong case that seeking to kill the Vice President of the United States (&quot;Where's Mike Pence?&quot; as people shouted) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives (&quot;Tell Nancy we're coming for her!&quot;), seeking to obstruct the function of the Congress, and seeking to remove the Electoral College certificates, are indeed insurrection; as possibly is whatever the woman who refused to stop brandishing a knife at the door of the building was intending to do; reading the transcript of the whole speech given at the start of the &quot;Save America March&quot;, it is difficult to point to where M. Trump specifically incited any of those things. One can make circumstantial arguments, but the words actually uttered then and there merely encouraged marchers on a &quot;Save America March&quot; to march to the Capitol and cheer people on, &quot;demand&quot; that congresspeople &quot;do the right thing&quot;, and &quot;make your voices heard&quot;. This is in contrast to M. Trump's son and daughter in law who explicitly mention &quot;fight&quot;, &quot;fighter&quot;, and &quot;fighting&quot;, 7 times by Eric Trump by my count and 4 times by Lara Trump. And of course Rudy Giuliani not only said &quot;fight&quot; but also proposed &quot;trial by combat&quot;. In more potential criminal trouble than even them is lawyer and prominent Trump supporter, L. Lin Wood, who explicitly called, without equivocation, several times over a period of days, on Twitter and on Parler, for the Vice President of the United States to be executed by firing squad. There will certainly be mixed fortunes in the Trump family from this. Whilst there may be a case against Eric and Lara, and possibly Donald Sr.; Ivanka Trump did not speak beforehand that I know of, and is reported afterwards to have asked her father to go and speak to the mob about stopping, which she also did directly, albeit ineptly (&quot;American Patriots — any security breach or disrespect to our law enforcement is unacceptable. The violence must stop immediately. Please be peaceful.&quot;), herself via Twitter for a short while.
united-states Simply insulting someone without saying something false is not defamation in the U.S. (historically it was the subject of criminal defamation liability to might light of someone's disabilities or call them out in an insulting way, but later U.S. constitutional law jurisprudence interpreting the First Amendment in the late 20th century rendered these laws unconstitutional). If a statement might damage someone's reputation if taken literally, and the statement is false, it can be defamatory and give rise to civil liability (or criminal liability in the few states that still have criminal defamation statutes), if the people to whom the statement is &quot;published&quot; (i.e. the audience of the statement) could reasonably believe that the statement was intended to be taken literally. Whether a statement can be taken literally is an &quot;all of the facts and circumstances&quot; analysis. Statements meant only as hyperbole or parody or metaphorically, if a reasonable audience person would understand the statements in that sense, do not impose liability based upon what they would mean if taken literally. Other Countries As noted in the question itself, not all countries treat statements like this the same way. Germany imposes criminal liability for all manner of insults. England and Wales imposes defamation liability in many circumstances when U.S. law would not. And, many countries in Asia are closef to the German model of liability for insulting speech than they are to the U.S. model.