Is being harassed or provoked a valid defense for assault? Earlier this year, Mike Tyson was recorded assaulting another airplane passenger after the victim &quot;harassed&quot; and threw a water bottle at Tyson. The victim apparently needed medical attention; however, no charges were filed: Authorities will not file criminal charges against former heavyweight champ Mike Tyson after he was recorded on video punching a fellow first-class passenger aboard a plane at San Francisco International Airport last month, prosecutors announced Tuesday. The San Mateo County District Attorney's Office said it has closed the case and decided against pursuing charges based on &quot;the circumstances surrounding the confrontation.&quot; Does this mean that if someone is harassing me, if I retaliate and assault him, the law will side in my favor because I was provoked? And if so, to what extent do I need to be &quot;harassed&quot; for assault be considered justified defense?
The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions &quot;based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'&quot;, which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.
The First Amendment does indeed guarantee the freedom to express any idea or viewpoint, the limitation being incitement to immediate lawless action, recently reaffirmed in Snyder v. Phelps (many free speech cases have been about criminal restrictions on speech, this applied even to a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress). There isn't a clear line that distinguishes "advocating violation of the law" and "inciting to immediate lawlessness". Saying "(You should) shoot The Man whenever you see him" would be protected expression, but "There's a cop, somebody kill him" would be incitement. It also has to be a "credible" incitement, so saying "Kill him now!" to a room full of pacifist nuns would not constitute incitement. Things said to an angry mob would be more along the lines of incitement.
Maybe, but we'll probably never know for sure. Officially, of course, he was not punished for his speech. He was punished for selling explosives without a license, which he admitted to. (He was also charged with illegally storing explosives and illegally mailing 'injurious material," but those charges were dropped in exchange for his guilty plea on the first count.) Whether those charges were a pretext to retaliate is probably unknowable. While it's a well-known fact that law enforcement frequently retaliates against people for exercising their right to free speech, this guy's story doesn't sound very credible. There is precedent for a prosecution for distributing Pest Control Report 2000, including the prosecution of white supremacist Leo Felton, a sad-sack loser who used the same material to build a bomb around to incite a "racial holy war" the same time. And just about a month after Ver's conviction, the man who owned the company that manufactured the product was convicted of violating federal explosives and transportation laws. Several months after that, he and his company entered into a consent decree with the Consumer Product Safety Commission ordering them to stop manufacturing Pest Control Report 2000.
Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) ... do we have to pay the $$ to &quot;lawyer up&quot; if we want to be safe? If you get sued, you will definitely want a lawyer. If you don't get sued, well, in that case you're safe. So your first question is whether the supposedly aggrieved party will actually sue. Your second question is, if they sue, do they have a good case? That question will be useful in deciding whether to settle. If the threats are empty then you might want to hire a lawyer to call their bluff. Otherwise you may have to endure the continual empty threats. This is especially true if the libel case is weak. Your lawyer can write a letter that explains why there is no case. If they do sue, they will have to identify the specific libelous statements, so you will at that point be able to refute the claims. But you'll also want a lawyer at that point, so you won't have to be directly concerned with the details; your lawyer will take care of them. As suggested in a comment, do keep in mind that a true statement cannot be libelous, by definition. To the extent that you can prove that every statement in the piece is true then you don't have much to worry about. But even then you'll want a lawyer's advice, because even if you know yourself that everything is true, you don't know what it will take to prove that in court. (Another aspect of the element of falsity is that statements of opinion are generally not defamatory.) To learn for yourself about the elements of libel you can start with Wikipedia or a bit of internet searching. To get a thorough analysis of the facts of your case in light of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, you will need to engage a lawyer. It might not cost as much as you fear.
It looks like this is covered by article 34 of the criminal code you linked: ARTICULO 34. - No son punibles: [...] El que obrare en defensa propia o de sus derechos, siempre que concurrieren las siguientes circunstancias: a) Agresión ilegítima; b) Necesidad racional del medio empleado para impedirla o repelerla; c) Falta de provocación suficiente por parte del que se defiende. Se entenderá que concurren estas circunstancias respecto de aquel que durante la noche rechazare el escalamiento o fractura de los cercados, paredes o entradas de su casa, o departamento habitado o de sus dependencias, cualquiera que sea el daño ocasionado al agresor. Igualmente respecto de aquel que encontrare a un extraño dentro de su hogar, siempre que haya resistencia; English (my translation, no guarantees): ARTICLE 34 - Not punished are: [...] Someone who acts in self-defense or in defense of their rights, as long as the following circumstances apply: a) illegitimate aggression b) a rational need for the means used for preventing or repelling the aggression c) a lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender It is understood that these circumstances apply with respect to someone who during the night defends from a housebreaking or a breach of the enclosure, the walls or entrances to their home, or the home of their dependents, no matter what damage is caused to the attacker. Reading these rules, which look quite similar to the law in most other countries, I'd say shooting an armed intruder would be covered. It would probably already be covered under the general rules ( a) to c) ): There is an illegitimate aggression, and shooting is necessary for stopping the agressor, because no milder means is practical in the situation. Additionally, the last paragraph would apply, which provides additional protection to someone defending their home, so even if a judge decided that normally shooting someone attacking with a knife is not necessary for protection, it would still be ok for home defence.
IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed.
Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop &amp; account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop &amp; Search and Arrest covered by the OP.
You cannot be successfully sued nor charged with a crime in the US merely because a movie, book, or other work is violent. Consider the rape scenes in the movie Deliverance, or John Hersey's The Wall, a 1950 novel which describes in detail the Warsaw Ghetto and the massacre and torture of its inhabitants by the Nazis during WWII. Or Plevier's Stalingrad, a 1940s novel about the aftermath of the Battle of Stalingrad, also during WWII, and the suffering of both Russian and German soldiers and civilians there. (Both novels were later filmed in less violent versions.) Many other examples could easily be mentioned. Triggering anxiety or PTSD in a reader or watcher would not be grounds for a suit either -- attempts to bring such suits have been dismissed. Claims that violent works inspire or encourage crime or anti-social acts have led to attempts to regulate such works, from comic books in the 1950s to video games in the 1990s. None of these works have prevailed. The so-called Comics Code Authority survived for a time because it was a strictly voluntary process -- some publishers never submitted content to the CCA censors. The Motion Picture Production Code was similarly voluntary, as is the current system of movie ratings. Works that defame someone can be the subject of libel suits. But to win such a suit in the US, the plaintiff must show that statements were made that were false, and not matters of opinion. The plaintiff must also show that such statements were &quot;of and concerning&quot; the plaintiff, that is that they were specifically about the plaintiff. The plaintiff must in most cases further show actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation, unless the false statements were of the limited category known as per se libel, which give rise to a presumption of harm. These include false claims of improper business or professional conduct, false claims that the plaintiff committed a serious crime, or false claims of sexual improprieties. Moreover, in many cases in the US the plaintiff must show actual malice, that is that the defamer made the false statements knowing them to be false, or with reckless disregard for whether or not they were true. This applies when the person bringing suit is a public official or public figure. Mere general violence will not be grounds for a libel suit. Incitement Several comments have asked if violent depictions could constitute incitement and therefore be unlawful. The current rule in the US is that speech (or writing) can only be punished as incitement if it is &quot;directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action&quot;. This language comes from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and has thus been stable for over 50 years. Prior to that the US Supreme Court used the &quot;clear and present danger&quot; test, first adopted in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) The actual passage from Schenck was: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. In Brandenberg the Supreme Court held Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute unconstitutional, because that law generally criminalized simple advocacy of violence. Under neither test would a book or movie that simply depicted violence be subject to legal action simply for that reason. A work would have to specifically advocate violence. Under the current Brandenberg test the work would have to urge people to violent lawbreaking right away, when it is read or watched. and actual lawbreaking would need to occur, or be reasonably likely to occur, for legal action to be constitutional. Actions against incitement under this test have been largely aimed at speeches before crowds or groups, urging them to riot or take other violent and unlawful action right then. While a book, movie, or video could be incitement under this test, it would need to be much more than just violent, it would need to strongly advocate present unlawful violence. That is not what the question asked about.