Can you use definitions for adverbs instead of nouns and personal nouns in a legal context? Legal definitions where nouns and persons are defined are common place reality of legal writing. We also see often times events and conduct be subject to definitions, and be referred to by a shortened reference. Is it possible to describe the manner of an event or conduct by defining such manner and using such definition as reference later? For example: Can you say negligently and/or tortuously hereinafter described as &quot;Actionably&quot;, and use &quot;Actionably&quot; in lieu of the other 4 words thereafter throughout a legal document? I'm interested in any examples, primarily under U.S. law, but also would be interesting to see if other jurisdictions accepted such languages or Actionably denied. :)
Yes though usually adverbs are not subject to statutory definition, so case law resolves most interpretive questions. But, 18 USC 1515: (b) As used in section 1505, the term “corruptly” means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information. The Model Penal Code defines a number of adverbs: this is applied in Kentucky.
england-and-wales &quot;Lead defendant&quot; is not used, unless colloquially by some, but a comparable term would be &quot;principal defendant&quot; which is more than mere style as it becomes important when establishing the hierarchy of defendants for, say, culpability and at sentencing (i.e. it has some legal implications). It could also relate to the first-named on the indictment (see rule 3.32(1)(b)(ii) Criminal Procedure Rules 2020) and often this is the principal, but the prosecutor has discretion on the order of names on the indictment, because: It is important to bear in mind that defendants are called to give evidence in the order in which their names appear on the indictment. This means that a tactical decision may need to be made as to the order of defendants on the indictment, bearing in mind the evidence and the nature of the case. Source Although tagged united-states, I have followed the guidance from the LawSE Help Centre: &quot;Even if you supply a jurisdiction tag, we expect and encourage answers dealing with other jurisdictions ... please tag your answer using the tag markdown: [tag: some-tag]&quot;
I'm not sure what jurisdiction you're referring to, but here are the state involuntary manslaughter laws. Broad brush, the elements tend to be: Someone was killed as a result of act by the defendant. The act either was inherently dangerous to others or done with reckless disregard for human life. The defendant knew or should have known his or her conduct was a threat to the lives of others. However, you're really backwards planning from a jail vs. army decision, so you might actually be after something like felony hit and run, which can most certainly result in incarceration. The elements of felony hit and run generally include leaving the scene of an accident regardless of fault (hit and run typically becomes a felony when someone was injured in the accident). Since the elements vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it makes sense to look them up wherever the accident will take place in the book. If it takes place in the U.S. this is a state-by-state compendium. Then you can tweak the story to satisfy the applicable elements and induce the jail vs. army decision (even if army policy prohibits it, it's still pretty common fiction!).
united-states But what is that legal reason? Why would an organization not be able to state their position with respect to the issue, such as &quot;We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court&quot;? Is there a law saying that commenting a court case is illegal? Who does this apply to? Or is this just some guideline or established advice to avoid problems (which ones)? Legal Ethics Considerations There are circumstances when commenting publicly on litigation violates the ethical rules for lawyers related to trial publicity See Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (the numbering system for professional conduct rules for lawyers is uniform nationally in the U.S. although the substance of the rules can differ in detail from state to state - Colorado's rule is fairly typical). Mostly this rule calls for avoiding statements that could prejudice a jury unless the other side has already done so and those statements need to be rebutted. This rule states (in its Colorado version): (a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter. (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may state: (1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved; (2) information contained in a public record; (3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress; (4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation; (5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto; (6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and (7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6): (i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused; (ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and (iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation. (c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) and Rule 3.8(f), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity. (d) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a). Statements such as &quot;We believe we acted correctly, but this will be decided in court&quot; are allowed and are not terribly uncommon. But, making a comment about something that can be easily inferred from the publicly available documents filed in court provides little or no positive advantage for a litigant. Also, one doesn't have to say much to create at least a colorable Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 issue that a mediator can raise in settlement talks, or that a judge can be forced to analyze. Even if the claim of unethical trial publicity ultimately doesn't hold water, it still muddies the waters and distracts lawyers and litigants from dealing with the substance of the dispute. The Risk That A Statement Will Be Used Against You Usually, the main concern is similar to the concern about talking to police: Anything you say can and will be used against you at trial. For example, this week former President Trump's public statement about his knowledge of classified documents, which are the subject of an ongoing federal criminal investigation of him, seriously harmed his position legally. (His statement was made quite a while ago in a semi-private forum, but at a time when the possibility of a criminal investigation still should have been on his radar screen.) In the civil rape-defamation case against him (as noted, for example, in this Law.SE answer), Trump's decision to continue to speak publicly about matters that were the subject of active litigation against him in an earlier case resulted in an extended statute of limitations and an opportunity to refile the case without having to worry about Presidential immunity from liability for statements he made while in office. It isn't just former President Trump that does things like this, but his conduct provides good textbook examples of what lawyers worry about when their clients talk about cases that are being litigated. Social media statements about pending cases by litigants routinely provide powerful evidence against them in trials. Some clients (particularly politicians and many senior executives of big and medium sized businesses, but also more ordinary people with big egos) are &quot;forces of nature&quot; who can't resist running their mouths, usually to their detriment, when given the least leave to do so. It is easier to teach them to say &quot;no comment&quot; across the board about pending litigation, than to transmit the depth of understanding necessary to comment without saying something potentially harmful. Lawyers spend many hours and sometimes days preparing their clients for depositions for a reason. Avoiding Annoyance To Opposing Counsel, Parties, And Judges Making a comment about pending litigation has the potential to aggravate opposing counsel and can emotionally influence non-lawyer opposing parties with whom a negotiated settlement will be reached 90%+ of the time (only about 1-2% of civil cases go to trial, but some are resolved by default judgments or on motion practice as opposed to by settlement). It can also irritate a judge who frequently prefers to be out of the public spotlight when necessary, even when the statements made aren't prohibited, and judges in the U.S. have lots of discretionary authority.
if someone claims to have &quot;taken advice&quot;, and the advice they received was from a non-lawyer, is the claim misleading? No. The language &quot;taken advice&quot; does not imply &quot;taken legal advice&quot;, let alone one arising from an attorney-client relation or taken from someone purporting to be a lawyer. The language &quot;taken advice&quot; in and of itself leaves the advisor's capacity unspecified. For instance, the non-lawyer might be an accountant whose advice goes beyond a lawyer's scope or expertise. That being said, it is unclear whether adding that expression is useful at all.
Here is a list of language-regulating bodies. There is none for English, but they exist for Spanish (Real Academia Española), French (Académie française) and Swahil (Baraza la Kiswahili la Taifa for Tanzania, Chama cha Kiswahili cha Taifa for Kenya). No language regulator addresses the issues which arise in the interaction between natural language and the needs of legal interpretation. Instead, these bodies generally strive to maintain the historical "purity" of the language. Rather than "define" a word like "sandwich", they decide whether to outlaw (or disparage) the word because it comes from English. The vast majority of language-related problems in law which arise in common-law countries pertains to characteristics of common law and the practice of establishing precedent. There are philosophical conflicts, for example between those to adhere to the text versus those who try to discern original intent. If we had an official agency that precisely defined what a "weapon" is, we would still have the struggle over interpretive philosophies which renders moot any rulings from the national language regulator. In the US, part of the problem of word-definition is the widespread practice of localized redefinition in statutes – the laws that say "In this subsection, 'weapon' has the meaning defined in 18 U.S. Code §920" (fictitious: §921 defines "firearm" undefined "weapon"). Tracking the scope of definition and range of variation of a word within a body of codified law is very difficult. The rule in common law is that words that are not statutorily defined are given their "ordinary" meaning. There is no authoritative resource for "ordinary meaning" in English (there is no such thing as "the" dictionary). In the US, it would require a constitutional amendment to immutably impose a particular dictionary standard for deriving word meaning (e.g. Webster's Fourth New International Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged, forthcoming) and there would be ensuing political protests. A legally precise definition of "repair" would be very difficult to understand, and would require hiring a lawyer in order to engage in the activity of "repairing broken windows", from a legally-safe perspective. And that is just word meaning. Ambiguity in sentence-meaning cannot be resolved by listing the sentences.
Words cannot be copyrighted. Copyright law does not protect names, titles, or short phrases or expressions. Even if a name, title, or short phrase is novel or distinctive or lends itself to a play on words, it cannot be protected by copyright. The only intellectual property protection that might be afforded to such things is trademark.
Language is contextual. When the meaning of a communication is at issue in litigation, that meaning is gleaned from the totality of the evidence, not from any presumption of what a word means in isolation. &quot;Okay&quot; can mean &quot;yes&quot;, it might mean only that you understand, it might communicate coerced acquiesence falling short of actual consent. See the discussion in R. c. Byers, 2018 QCCQ 4673: [81] Regarding the petitioner’s pretention claiming that she “clearly express her wish to consult an attorney”, the Court considers that the answer “OK” does not show a clear intention to consult a lawyer. [82] At the most “OK” could mean that she understood, that she heard them and also could [have] signified “Yes, I would like to consult an attorney”. [83] In the decision Ellis, the Court of appeal had to analyze the meaning of the words “OK” as part of evidence of purchasing a firearm, the Court considered that this had an equivocal meaning. [84] Moreover, the Court wrote: “[40] (…) Viewed in the context of the whole of the evidence, we consider it a reasonable inference that the two responses “Ok ok” signified nothing more than an acknowledgement of the prices quoted.” [85] For analysis purpose, the Court will consider that the answer “OK” means “yes”. See also R. v. Potvin, 2012 ONCA 113: The pertinent facts known to the appellant were straightforward. The complainant repeatedly said “no” to sex and then appeared to say “yes” by uttering the word “okay”. Viewed in the context of all that preceded it, we agree with the trial judge that the complainant’s use of the word “okay” was ambiguous. In the absence of further inquiry by the appellant, a single “okay” after five refusals over a sustained period of time was simply insufficient to ground a reasonable but mistaken belief in consent.