Does the &quot;natural born Citizen&quot; requirement for presidency violate the ICERD? Article two, clause five of the United States Constitution states: No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; The USA signed the ICERD (International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination) in 1966, and ratified it in 1994, making it a State Party to the convention. To me, various articles in this convention seem to be at odds with the constitution clause. For instance, ICERD article 5, clause (c) reads (emphasis mine): In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: [...] Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for election-on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service; Regardless of the original intent of the convention, it seems to me that the quoted US Constitution clause distinguishes citizens by national/ethnic origin when it comes to the political right of participating in Government, and thereby violates this article of the ICERD. Am I misunderstanding something about treaties in this case? Is the quoted clause from the US Constitution compatible with the ICERD?
The ICERD would not apply to the natural born citizens clause by its own definitions. Part 1, Article 1, secs 2 and 3 read: This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.
The Section 34 of Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand says (highlight mine): […] No person of Thai nationality shall be deported or prohibited from entering the Kingdom. The referenced document points to the most recent 2017 Constitution. So the naive answer is No, however some legal gap may be found by the Constitutional Court (Section 27). More specifically, it would depend on the legal equivalence of terms "Thai citizens" and "person of Thai nationality".
The US Constitution doesn't say one way or the other how a state's representatives are to be chosen, so until this law was passed in 1841, a state could have all of their representatives elected at-large, without districts. It is only recently that SCOTUS has gotten involved in redistricting questions: here is a summary of leading redistricting rulings. A recurring theme in these rulings has been the Equal Protection Clause, where certain redistricting plans (or non-plans) were found to violate that clause (especially ordering a state to redistrict when it refused to do so with the result being that population changes diluted the vote of those living in certain districts). Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 held that The constitutional requirement in Art. I, § 2,that Representatives be chosen &quot;by the People of the several States&quot; means that, as nearly as is practicable, one person's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's thus redistricting is a justiciable question, answerable with respect to the federal government's need to enforce the 14th Amendment. It is not necessary to amend the Constitution further to specify a means of enforcing that clause.
There is no basis for the view that requiring a driver's license is unconstitutional. First, it's critical to realize that a right to travel has nothing whatsoever to do with licensing drivers. A right to travel does not in any way mean there's a right to travel in a particular way. Likewise, using a car does not mean you're traveling. Schactman is about the right to obtain a passport, which is a requirement to travel overseas. Kent is likewise about international travel. Freedom of movement means the government cannot, without good cause (like being on parole), prevent you from traveling within the US, living where you choose, or working where you choose. Likewise, there's a right to international travel that means that without good cause, the government can't stop you from leaving the US or re-entering if you're a citizen. Requiring a drivers license to use public roads doesn't stop you from doing that -- there are other ways to travel. The Thompson v. Smith decision explicitly supports the idea that requiring drivers licenses is allowed. To quote a more representative section from the case: STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen of Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles. -- The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day. This right is not a mere privilege which a city may permit or prohibit at will. STREETS AND HIGHWAYS -- Right of Citizen to Travel and Transport Property -- Use of Ordinary Vehicles -- Police Power. -- The right of a citizen to travel and transport property and to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day may, under the police power, be regulated by the city in the interest of public safety and welfare; but the city may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. AUTOMOBILES -- Drivers' Permits -- Arbitrary Revocation. -- The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking under rules of general application permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to others of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions. While Chicago Motor Coach doesn't seem to be available online, searching it finds other sites stating that the real issue was a commercial operator licensed by the State of Illinois, and whether Chicago, as a municipality within Illinois, could require them to also be permitted by the city. Another line from it seems to be &quot;Even the Legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience.&quot; To quote more recent precedent, Miller v. Reed from the 9th Circuit (a federal court of appeals, not a state court) states that The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right. (incidentally: Drivers licenses are not required by federal law. They are required by state laws.)
No The right to Due Process is a personal right of anyone who may come before a US court, or interact with an agency of any US government, Federal, State, or local. It is noit a national right, to be granted ort withheld depending on hoew US nationals are treated by a particular country. No one has authority to deny De Process to anyone who is physically within the US, nor to anyone who is interacting with any part of the US government/the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require the Fedferal and State governments, respectively, to grant Due process to al, and congress may not alter this by law, nor authorize any poat of the government to deny Due Process to anyone for any reason. Due Process is a somewhat flexible concept, and exactly what process is required may vary in different circumstances, but the basic elements of Due Process are not optional. All this is true no matter ow unjustly the courts or other agencies of a foreign government may treat US nationals. Such treatment may be addressed through diplomatic channels, or through economic or political pressure.
health care checks. Hotel check in. Employment? maybe. Background Checks? doesn't matter. It actually does matter, because there is sometimes a law governing the documents that may be shown for a given purpose. For example, the I-9 form, for verifying someone's eligibility to accept employment in the US, has a well defined lists of documents that an employer must accept, and the passport card is one of those documents. A similar situation exists for Transportation Security Administration screening of air passengers. On the other hand, laws concerning proof of age for buying various products will vary from state to state, and retailers may or may not be required to accept any particular document. In the case of alcohol sales in North Carolina, for example, there is a brochure that lists "acceptable forms of identification" on page 17 and explicitly says that "passports may be in the booklet or card form." But that does not seem to create a legal requirement for the retailer to accept passport cards, because page 19 outlines the retailer's right to refuse, saying among other things that "there is no legal recourse by a customer who you have refused a sale." US passport law (22 USC Chapter 4 and 22 CFR parts 51 and 53) doesn't have anything to say about the passport's or passport card's role as an identification document; it speaks only of the more specific role as a travel document. So the general answer to your question, appears to be no. There is no law generally requiring people to accept a passport card if they also accept passports or driver's licenses. But in most specific instances, there may be a general requirement such as "government-issued identification" that includes passport cards in addition to passports and driver's licenses, or there may be a list that explicitly includes passport cards along with driver's licenses and passports.
No. The Fourteenth Amendment says: nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; The Supreme Court has determined that this clause incorporates much of the Bill of Rights. The logic is mildly tortured, but it's basically that "due process of law" means "due process of a law that is compatible with the fundamental rights of a free society." This logic is known as "substantive due process," because it reads in to "due process of law" requirements about what those laws can do (as opposed to procedural due process, which is about the actual procedures being used). It's pretty settled that the Bill of Rights, after the 14th Amendment, should apply to the states. There's another possible way to get there: the 14th Amendment says "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," which Justice Thomas recently thought meant that the Second Amendment applies to the states in a concurring opinion. But as of now, substantive due process is the standard logic for it. Virtually all of the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states. There are a couple things which aren't (like juries in lawsuits, and grand juries), but the Establisment Clause is incorporated (see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not self-executing and may not be applied in U.S. courts as binding law. See, e.g., Barbara Macgrady, Note, Resort to International Human Rights Law in Challenging Conditions in U.S. Immigration Detention Centers, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 271, 300 (1997) (&quot;Since Congress has made its intent clear [by adopting NSE declarations], it is certain that the courts will not enforce these treaties in a domestic action.&quot;). See also this 1999 Yale Law Review Article. Sometimes these treaties and declarations are cited by parties in litigation, but these are always losing arguments. These arguments are made to encourage diplomatic pressure and generate PR, not to convince U.S. judges to rule in their favor. Also keep in mind that the U.S. takes the minority position that an ordinary domestic statute that conflicts with an earlier adopted Senate ratified treaty overrides the earlier adopted Senate ratified treaty. Almost no other country in the world takes this extreme position. See generally here (general background on treaties as U.S. law). The citation form for Article 3 this document under the prevailing &quot;Bluebook&quot; standard is Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), Art. 3. The link also provides citation forms for other common international human rights treaties in Bluebook form. But this would generally be used in law review articles and the like rather than in legal briefing in the courts.