Does the Supreme Court simply rubberstamp the prevailing social consensus? In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) the US Supreme Court ruled that slavery was legal. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the US Supreme Court ruled that segregation was legal. In Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), the US Supreme Court ruled that same sex marriage was a constitutional right. In all these cases, it seems that the Supreme Court makes its ruling only according to the prevailing social norm. It would be unthinkable for the US Supreme Court to make the Obergefell decision in 1800, for example. So what exactly is the role of the US Supreme Court? Is it to make decisions based on timeless, universal principles? Or is it simply to rubberstamp the prevailing social consensus?
Does the Supreme Court simply rubberstamp the prevailing social consensus? No. Structurally, The Supreme Court Is Designed To Lag Behind Social Consensus U.S. Supreme Court justices are political appointees with discretion over how laws are interpreted and enforced in the U.S. that cannot be reviewed by any other body, in the case of constitutional law, and can only be second guess by Congress and the President acting together, in the case of statutory law. Since U.S. Supreme Court justices serve for life, they tend to be lagging indicators of the political preferences of past Presidents. Plessy v. Ferguson was influenced by post-Reconstruction judicial appointments trying to salvage what it could from the end of the slavery regime for former slave states, although Congress could have overruled it with new legislation if Senators from Southern states hadn't filibustered that kind of legislation in the U.S. Senate. Still, while the law changes slowly, and the U.S. Supreme Court is often a lagging indicator of the prevailing social consensus, it is not frozen in time either, both because legal norms change over time, however slowly, because statutes and constitutional amendments change the environment in which the U.S. Supreme Court operates, and because sometimes the law commands them to do so. For example, in 8th Amendment jurisprudence (the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments), the &quot;unusual&quot; part of &quot;cruel and unusual&quot; has always incorporated prevailing social consensus, by design and by virtue of the express constitutional text. Precedent Still Matter Precedents also matter, however. U.S. Supreme Court Justices, while they may be influenced by a political ideology that had a lot to do with why they were nominated in the first place, are not simply legislators in robes. While the U.S. Supreme Court is well known for its partisan split votes on close political issues, there are many areas of law where the U.S. Supreme Court is still far less partisan than elected officials, and often, split decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court on less politically charged issues are not along partisan lines. U.S. Supreme Court Justices cross partisan lines far more often than elected officials do, and the amount of partisan line crossing that takes place in courts below the Supreme Court that have a legal duty to follow the precedents of courts superior to them is even greater. At the time of Dred Scott and until the 13th Amendment was passed in the wake of the U.S. Civil War, slavery was legal and its legality had never been seriously doubted in U.S. legal precedents. Precedents at the time, including a series of highly sensitive legislative and constitutional compromises already agreed to by other parts of the government, supported this ruling, whether or not it was good policy. Obergefell v. Hodges, followed a nearly unanimous groundswell of support for the position that the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately took from state courts and lower federal courts, applying a variety of precedents already in place going back to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which affirmed that the fundamental rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause &quot;extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs,&quot; but the &quot;identification and protection&quot; of these fundamental rights &quot;has not been reduced to any formula,&quot; and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), invalidating laws prohibiting interracial marriage. The lesser known cases of Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a Wisconsin law limiting the right of non-custodial parents to remarry), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (allowing prison inmates to marry without state permission) had also established a constitutional right to marry. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado law that barred local governments from protecting gay rights. In 2003, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas struck down Texas’ sodomy law - and in turn invalidated sodomy laws in 13 other states - making private, consensual, adult sexual activity between same-sex couples legal across the U.S. In United States v. Windsor (2013), the Supreme Court held that a same sex couple legally married in Canada could not be denied the federal estate tax spousal deduction invalidating Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional. The same day, in Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013), the Supreme Court held that California Proposition 8 (note that a majority of voters in this very liberal state passed this measure in 2012 suggesting that allowing same sex marriage was not the prevailing social consensus) which prohibited California from recognizing same sex marriages lawfully entered into after a couple prevailed in a 2009 court fight to secure same sex marriage rights under prior California law was unconstitutional. In 2015, SCOTUS responded not to a public opinion social consensus, but to a legal consensus among U.S. appellate judges driven by its own precedents. Many states in which judges struck down same sex marriage bans before the U.S. Supreme Court took up the issue did so in states where same sex marriage was not popular, because fifty years of accumulated precedents from 1965 to the present strongly pointed in that direction. As a result, on the eve of the Obergefell decision, 37 states and the District of Columbia already recognized same-sex marriage, and only 13 states had bans. Those bans were mostly struck down as a result of lower courts interpreting existing U.S. Supreme Court precedents like the ones mentioned above, and as a result of legislators seeing the writing on the wall and wanting to take credit for the inevitable. The act of nationalizing the right to same-sex marriage also reflected the reality that even though the constitution allocated regulation of marriage to the states rather than the federal government, as a general matter, that allowing a particular couple's marriage to be recognized in some U.S. states and not others, was basically unworkable in a country with freedom of travel between states. SCOTUS Often Establishes The Prevailing Social Consensus Also, while sometimes the U.S. Supreme Court does give official recognition to the prevailing social consensus (which is closely related to what becomes law by one means or another anyway), perhaps more often, a U.S. Supreme Court ruling establishes and changes the prevailing social consensus. Support for interracial marriage in opinion polls, which wasn't terribly high when Loving v. Virginia was decided in 1967, soared after the U.S. Supreme Court declared it to be a matter of constitutional law. A question from a 1968 international Gallup poll underscores the extent of U.S. opposition to interracial marriage during this period. This question, which asked Americans and those in 12 other nations whether they personally approved or disapproved of marriage between whites and nonwhites, found even broader U.S. opposition than the 1965 question. More than seven in 10 Americans (72%) disapproved of white-nonwhite marriages, in contrast with only 21% of residents in Sweden, 23% in the Netherlands, 25% in France, 34% in Finland, 35% in Switzerland and 36% in Greece. Opposition outweighed support in Austria, Canada, West Germany, Norway, Uruguay and Great Britain, but to a far lesser extent than in the U.S. The 1965 and 1968 U.S. reactions to interracial marriage appear contradictory, but this is because each question measures a different dimension of public opinion. The 1965 question asks for people's views on the legality of interracial marriage -- whether it should be a crime -- whereas the 1968 question merely asks Americans whether they personally approve. Americans' personal views on interracial marriage eventually changed, but it took decades for majority support to emerge. In 1978, more than a decade after the Loving case, only 36% of Americans approved, while 54% still disapproved. Not until the 1990s did public approval cross the 50% threshold, registering 64% in 1997. Gallup's latest update, in 2013, shows 87% approving. (Source) Support for same sex marriage has followed a similar pattern after Obergefell v. Hodges was decided. Roe v. Wade (creating a constitutional right to medical abortion) and Griswold before it (creating a constitutional right to contraception and clearly establishing the concept of substantive due process rights to privacy), likewise dramatically changed public opinion on these issues. So, while the U.S. Supreme Court is sometimes a lagging indicator of a social consensus that is already prevailing, its moral authority and the inability of any other political actors to overcome the legal force of its rulings has also caused it to be a major driver of social consensus going forward. For example, until Brown v. Board of Education (1954), Plessy v. Ferguson was widely accepted as a legally fair standard and the support really only entirely collapsed when the U.S. Supreme Court said otherwise. Indeed, Brown v. Board of Education probably was pivotal in shifting public opinion in a manner that led to the adoption of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 that finally put teeth into the political resolve to end racial discrimination that had begun in earnest in the Reconstruction era.
This is from an opinion piece (albeit by Law profs.) so you'll have to bear/excuse the tone and check the details... but seemingly there some similar laws introduced earlier this year, on different topics though: But the subversion of private enforcement laws to restrict individual rights goes far beyond abortion. Since the beginning of this year, Tennessee has authorized students and teachers to sue schools that allow transgender students to use the restrooms that match their gender identity; Florida has followed suit, with a law that allows students to sue schools that permit transgender girls to play on girls’ sports teams. My opinion is that the comparison falls short on (2), as the [plaintiff] students seem to have to be from the same school, so it's not as broad as SB.8., in terms of who can sue. (N.B. found a more in-depth news article on the Florida sports law. Some of the writeups on this aren't totally clear on that though, just saying &quot;another student&quot; can sue. I couldn't find the exact text of the law insofar.) The promoter of SB.8, actually gave some inspirational examples in an interview, and they are somewhat older: And this is ground that's been ploughed before - under current Texas law under Medicaid fraud, for example. Any person who discovers Medicaid fraud can bring a civil case to bring that forward. The Chick-fil-A law, Senate Bill 1978 from last session about your religious freedom, that also allowed any person to bring a civil action. So it's not a new concept in Texas law, and if elected officials won't follow the law, we'll empower the people of Texas to do it, and we think it makes sense. (Hat tip to a Politics.SE answer for this latter quote.) Again, I didn't check the details... I suspect there may be some divergence from the strict letter of the (1) requirement. I bet (Medicaid) fraud is criminal as well. It seems the Chick-fil-A law failed to do its (immediately) intended job because it was attempted to be used against a city municipality, but the suit was dismissed (on appeal) due to governmental immunity... The private enforcement of the Medicaid fraud issue was apparently passed because of the huge backlog that existed at one point in the state/agency enforcement in Texas: The Office of Inspector General was lambasted in a state review last year [2015--seemingly] for, among other things, a massive backlog of cases and a failure to recover significant tax dollars from providers it accused of fraud, sometimes incorrectly. N.B., these are referred to as qui tam cases, but they don't quite entirely substitute the plaintiff, at least not in the insurance cases that were won: So-called qui tam cases allow whistleblowers to file lawsuits alleging fraud on behalf of the government. If the claims turn out to be legitimate, state and federal laws award a finder’s fee of between 15 and 25 percent of the total settlement or judgment. Interestingly higher awards are possible if the government declines to intervene, but they are still not 100% going to the private initiator (under the False Claims Act)--from Wikipedia: If the government does not decide to participate in a qui tam action, the relator may proceed alone without the Department of Justice, though such cases historically have a much lower success rate. Relators who do prevail in such cases may potentially receive a higher relator's share, to a maximum of 30%. As Wikipedia also notes, some such laws that entirely left the prosecution to a private entity were found unconstitutional, at the federal level e.g. In 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the False Marking Statute was unconstitutional. Judge Dan Aaron Polster determined that it violated the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution, because it represented &quot;a wholesale delegation of criminal law enforcement power to private entities with no control exercised by the Department of Justice&quot;. Of some note, the FCA requires that the complaint actually be served on the government and not the actual defendant. This basically ensures that the gov't is notified of all such actions. The Texas-specific legislation on qui tam fraud cases actually seems to mirror the federal one pretty closely: A whistleblower under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act [TMFPA] may be entitled to an award between 15% -25% if the state intervenes in the case. If the state chooses not to participate in the litigation, then a whistleblower may be entitled to an award between 25% – 30% of the amount recovered. Nonetheless, a court may reduce the award if the court finds that the action is based primarily on information disclosed by someone other than the person bringing the action. [...] Note: Changes to the Texas laws were enacted by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1 (S.B. 219).
Indian Constitution provides for a Federal government in which power of states and centres are clearly enunciated. If there is a dispute over any issue Supreme Court can decide whether State government is correct, or whether Central government is correct. Any law of Parliament affects the entire population of India, and so all states are affected by that law. If any state government considers that the law is not as per constitutional norms, it can easily go to the Supreme Court for decision. So, the observation of the Supreme Court that a state is bound by the law of Parliament, is incorrect. If an individual can file such a case, a state is also entitled to file it. The Supreme Court should decide it on the basis of merit. So I think the observation of Supreme Court in this case is not correct.
This was asked and answered by KPD on the Politics stackexchange. This issue came up in a decision from an appeals court, with a judge dying before the opinion was released, leading to the following SCOTUS opinion. The short of the answer: that Judge's vote is voided. If the result of negating the deceased Justice's vote is a 4-4 tie, then the usual procedure for a 4-4 tie is invoked, which is addressed in the Q&amp;A you link. Of course this assumes that SCOTUS will apply this to themselves, but the issue appears to be non-controversial, as it was a fairly recent decision with no dissents noted. So this assumption seems safe.
Let's back up. It's premature to say that SB 8 &quot;avoids the constitutional restrictions on banning abortions&quot;. The constitutionality of SB 8 has not been resolved; the Supreme Court said so explicitly (page 2). In fact there is good reason to think that is unconstitutional under existing interpretation of the Constitution per Roe v. Wade and the like. (Whether the court will actually follow existing interpretation is another question, of course.) But the courts do not determine the constitutionality of laws just because someone asks them; they only do so when it needs to be decided to resolve a particular case. For instance, if a person is charged with a crime, they can challenge the constitutionality of the law under which they are charged, and courts will address that question unless the case is resolved some other way. There are also ways that a person who wants to violate the law can pre-emptively sue the government to prevent them from enforcing the law, if they can show such enforcement is likely to affect them. The issue in SB 8 is that since it wouldn't be the government enforcing the law, it's unclear who an abortion provider can pre-emptively sue. In Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, they tried to sue the State of Texas, its courts, and a private party who they thought might be likely to sue them. The SCOTUS majority found that none of those defendants were relevant. However, if and when an abortion provider actually does get sued, there'll be a clear case which has proper parties and is ripe, and courts then will have to consider whether SB 8 is constitutional or not. So if your hypothetical gun control statute were treated similarly, the law might avoid pre-emptive challenges, with a chilling effect on gun sales. But sooner or later, someone would probably violate the law (maybe deliberately as a test case), and the courts would consider whether it was constitutional or not. Under prevailing interpretations of the Second Amendment, they'd probably find that it wasn't. A key difference, of course, is that abortions are much more time-sensitive than gun purchases; being temporarily blocked from having an abortion is much more consequential in most cases than being temporarily blocked from buying a gun. The other subtext is that, although SCOTUS said their decision in Whole Woman's Health is not based on the constitutionality of SB 8, it's widely suspected that several of the justices are not all that keen on the constitutional right to abortion found in Roe v. Wade, and might look to overturn Roe when it comes up. As such, they may not be very motivated to look for procedural avenues to block SB 8 in the short term, since they might be inclined to uphold it in the long term. The dissenters in Whole Woman's Health certainly thought those avenues were available. But in the case of your hypothetical gun control bill, if a majority of justices were pretty convinced that the law was unconstitutional, they might try harder to come up with grounds to block it pre-emptively.
To the title question, yes, of course, Justices are subject to the law same as anyone else is (at least in theory; whether actual practice bears that out is another matter). Chief Justice Roberts (and the rest of SCOTUS, and a good chunk of the judiciary to boot, and then some) was a named defendant in the case Shao v. Roberts that was appealed to SCOTUS. The Justices all recused themselves rendering the court short of a quorum and leaving the prior appellate court decision to dismiss the case sua sponte in place. However, Justices essentially police themselves. As the head of the judicial branch they are largely independent of Congressional or Executive attempts to control how they go about their business. Recent calls to create a legal code of ethics for Justices exist because such a code perhaps cannot, and currently does not, exist under the current constitutional order. As such Justices make their own decisions on when to recuse (see my answer here for further details). Your hypothetical justice would do the same, and the court would proceed as it always does whether they do or don't.
When you get married is possible to have contract renouncing both parties right to a divorce. No. That clause would be redundant, materially indistinguishable from breach of contract, and otherwise unenforceable. It is redundant because the legal definition of Marriage (Black's Law Dictionary) states that it is "A contract, according to the form prescribed by law, by which a man and woman [...] mutually engage with each other to live their whole lives together in the state of union which ought to exist between a husband and a wife". Thus, the perpetuity as expressed in the term whole lives preempts the conceiving of an eventual separation. Insofar as marriage is legally cognizable as a contract (see legal definition), it might specify or imply remedies in the event that one or both spouses decide(s) that substance of marital relationship no longer exists; that is, in the event that a breach of that contract occurs. A court may order to the breaching spouse performance of certain acts (for example, alimony) in accordance to statutory law or common law. However, a prohibition to divorce goes beyond the scope of what is legally permissible. The U.S. Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984) helps explaining why a prohibition to divorce would be unenforceable: "In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty." If that is not possible how much can you limit the right to a divorce with a contract or something similar? There is no possible limit or requisite duration of a marriage, as that would inherently infringe a person's fundamental element of personal liberty mentioned in the Roberts case.
The Fifth Amendment, and all the other amendments in the "Bill of Rights" (numbers 1-10) were universally understood when passed to be restrictions on the Federal Government only. The courts treated them that way through the end of the US Civil War. This was made definite in the US Supreme Court case Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the courts have decided that most of the provisions of the bill of rights also apply to actions by the states. A few do not apply, such as the requirement that indictments be by a grand jury, and the Third Amendment ban on quartering soldiers in private dwellings. This was done through a somewhat roundabout mechanism -- the Supreme Court decided that the protections of the Bill of Rights were included in the Due process clause of the 14th. As a result not all the provisions were made applicable at the same time. (Most were held to be incorporated during the period from 1925-1985. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) thru Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). Modern legal opinions sometimes discuss incorporation as if it was a fact from the passage of the 14th in 1868. But the actual gradual process is clear in the case law. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases was first incorporated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), but only for death penalty cases, and only if "special circumstances" existed, such as a defendant who was illiterate, far from home and support, or feeble-minded. Later cases gradually found "special circumstances" in more and more fact patterns, and in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the Court extended the right to all felony cases. It has later been extended to misdemeanor cases if jail time is a possible result. A similar history could be spelled out for the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, or for the Fourth's against search and seizure, particularly the "exclusionary rule". I, and a number of legal scholars who have better rights to an opinion, think that the 14th's "Privileges and Immunities" clause would have been a more sensible means to this end, but for various reasons that isn't how it was done. Justice Thomas seems to be trying to reverse this -- he has made comments in a number of opinions of late that various things should be protected under the Privileges and Immunities clause of the 14th, rather than the Due Process clause.. Even if the Court adopts this theory, it probably won't change many outcomes. That is how the Fifth, and other Bill of rights Provisions like the Fourth (search and seizure) and the First (free speech and religion) have been applied to restrict the states. None of these provisions directly restrict private individuals. In some cases, courts have said that while individuals may not be forbidden to do things that are forbidden to governments under the Bill of Rights, the courts will not help you do such things, such as by enforcing contracts to do them. No person shall be held to answer for a... crime "held to answer" here means prosecuted in court. Only governments do that. That provision forbids criminal court cases that do not start with a grand Jury indictment. it is one of the few Bill of Rights provisions which the Supreme Court has held do not apply to the states. But in any case it is purely procedural. It doesn't say that crimes may not be prosecuted, nor that they must. It says only "if you want to try someone for a crime, this is a step you must go through." The other provisions of the Fifth all do apply to the states, such as the ban on double jeopardy, and the protection against self-incrimination. does that mean that government can declare it legal for citizens to kill a particular person? No. That would violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause if don3 by the Federal Government, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause and its Equal Protection clause if done by a state. It would probably also violate the provision against Bills of Attainder, and perhaps the provision against cruel and unusual punishment. Once upon a time, several hundred years before the US was founded, the government of England did just that. It was called "outlawry". For certain crimes, the punishment was to be put "outside the law". An "outlaw" (in this older sense) was not protected by the law. Anyone could kill an outlaw, or steal from one, and the legal system would do nothing about it. The US has never used outlawry.