What exactly is a &quot;title of nobility&quot; under the US Constitution? Article 1, sections 9 &amp; 10 of the US constitution prohibit granting titles of nobility by the federal government or the states. What exactly is a title of nobility for these purposes? Why is (say) the title of "Kentucky Colonel" not considered a title of nobility as opposed to some theoretical knighthood that could be granted by the state of Kentucky?
Overview Generally speaking the Titles of Nobility clauses in Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the U.S. Constitution, were aimed at barring hereditary grants of special privileges which is what it means by "Titles of Nobility". In particular, it was mostly aimed at preventing a monarchy from arising in the U.S. This said, there is extremely little case law directly interpreting the the Titles of Nobility clauses, mostly because neither the federal government in the United States, nor any state, has shown much inclination to grant titles of nobility. Most cases discuss the Titles of Nobility clauses in order to interpret other clauses of the constitution (usually in dissenting opinions as part of a parade of evils). A Titles of Nobility amendment to the U.S. Constitution was also proposed in 1810, but never adopted, although many conspiracy theories claim that it was adopted and is in force. This would have automatically revoked the citizenship of anyone awarded a title of nobility. As Wikipedia explains: It has been claimed that the Titles of Nobility Amendment became part of the Constitution. It was erroneously referred to as the Thirteenth Amendment in some early 19th century printings of the Constitution.2[9] Between 1819 and 1867 the statutory law code of Virginia included it as well.[10] The term "Thirteenthers" has sometimes been used in recent years to refer to those who mistakenly believe this amendment was ratified in the 1810s, and also for those who today wish to see this amendment adopted.2 This misconception has become significant because it is yoked with another misconception—that a lawyer's use of the word or abbreviation of "Esquire" after his name is a title of nobility acquired from a foreign power—and so some litigants and others have tried to assert that lawyers have lost their citizenship or are disqualified from public office. Consistent with the discussion below, the title "Esquire" for lawyers as used in the United States, is not a title of nobility because it cannot be passed on to the children of the people who hold it (in either English or American usage) and because it does not, in U.S. usage, at least, confer legal privileges on a hereditary basis. (In 19th century English usage, certain sons of nobles who do not have a noble title themselves were properly addressed "Esquire" and some minor privileges may go with that title, so in that context it may have historically been a Title of Nobility even though this has never been part of the American use of the term "Esquire.") Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines "Nobility" as follows: In English law, a division of the people, comprehending dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, and barons. These had anciently duties annexed to their respective honors. They are created either by writ, i.e. by royal summons to attend the house of peers, or by letters patent, i.e. by royal grant of any dignity and degree of peerage; and they enjoy many privileges, exclusive of their senatorial capacity. Letters patent still exist in both English and American law and primarily refer to document in the nature of a deed that transfers real estate from the sovereign to a private individual. The connection is that most (although not all) titles of nobility were personal rights incident to being the feudal owner of a parcel of land (the right to say who inherits land from an individual was originally entirely governed by law without the discretion of the owner to give it to someone else, but this was reformed gradually in the "early modern" period of English history and was fully reformed by the Victorian era except as to the titles of nobility historically associated with the land). Titles of Nobility are hereditary. An appointment to a position for life (the moral equivalent of a "Life Lord" in England or a Senator in the Canadian Parliament, or a federal judgeship in the U.S.) is not prohibited. But, no rights, other than citizenship or a right to an inheritance (in the absence of a will providing otherwise), that is hereditary may be granted. The Framers of our Constitution lived at a time when the Old World still tolerated in the shadow of ancient feudal traditions. As products of the Age of Enlightenment, they set out to establish a society that recognized no distinctions among white men on account of their birth. See U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States"). Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 448 U.S. 448, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) dissenting opinion at Footnote 13 (overruled on other grounds). This case discusses citizenship issues. And similarly: Such pure discrimination is most certainly not a "legitimate purpose" for our Federal Government, which should be especially sensitive to discrimination on grounds of birth. Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are, by their very nature, odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100. From its inception, the Federal Government has been directed to treat all its citizens as having been "created equal" in the eyes of the law. The Declaration of Independence states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." And the rationale behind the prohibition against the grant of any title of nobility by the United States, see U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8, equally would prohibit the United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a citizen at birth. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 427 U.S. 495, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976) dissenting opinion at footnote 3. This case discusses illegitimacy discrimination. Some state constitutions use the phrase "no title of nobility or hereditary emolument, shall be passed," which emphasizes the hereditary component. Titles of Nobility confer legal privileges. Titles of Nobility in U.K. law at the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1789, among other things, conferred immunity to a trial by an ordinary jury and instead gave rise to a jury of one's peers (i.e. other nobles of the same rank or higher) if one was charged with a crime. This was enshrined in the Magna Carta of 1215 CE. This logic is still retained on a residual basis in U.S. courts-martial where a court martial proceeding of an officer can only be tried by other officers (who must be of equal or greater rank, if possible). 10 U.S.C. § 825. The historical link between the two concepts is that the British aristocracy derives mostly from grants of feudal rights to members of the conquering Norman army in 1066 CE proportionate to military rank and in accord with military hierarchy with modest modifications over time. The goal of the prohibition of Titles of Nobility was to prohibit titles of nobility that gave someone an unequal status in law in this fashion. So, a mere honorary recognition would be distinguished from a title that gave someone rank and privilege (on a hereditary basis). A dissent in the famous Dred Scott case, to which the birthright citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment enacted less than a decade later was a response, illustrates the concern: It is, in effect, whether the Constitution has empowered Congress to create privileged classes within the States, who alone can be entitled to the franchises and powers of citizenship of the United States. If it be admitted that the Constitution has enabled Congress to declare what free persons, born within the several States, shall be citizens of the United States, it must at the same time be admitted that it is an unlimited power. If this subject is within the control of Congress, it must depend wholly on its discretion. For, certainly, no limits of that discretion can be found in the Constitution, which is wholly silent concerning it; and the necessary consequence is, that the Federal Government may select classes of persons within the several States who alone can be entitled to the political privileges of citizenship of the United States. If this power exists, what persons born within the States may be President or Vice President 60 U.S. 578 of the United States, or members of either House of Congress, or hold any office or enjoy any privilege whereof citizenship of the United States is a necessary qualification, must depend solely on the will of Congress. By virtue of it, though Congress can grant no title of nobility, they may create an oligarchy, in whose hands would be concentrated the entire power of the Federal Government. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 15 L.Ed. 691, 60 U.S. 393, 577-578 (1857) dissenting opinion (majority opinion subsequently overruled and superseded by constitutional amendment). In this infamous case: The United States Supreme Court decided 7–2 against Scott, finding that neither he nor any other person of African ancestry could claim citizenship in the United States, and therefore Scott could not bring suit in federal court under diversity of citizenship rules. Moreover, Scott's temporary residence outside Missouri did not bring about his emancipation under the Missouri Compromise, which the court ruled unconstitutional as it would "improperly deprive Scott's owner of his legal property." The primary concern was that the United States not become a monarchy. In the debates of the Federal Convention Benjamin Franklin discusses his "apprehension" that the government of the States may "end in a Monarchy" and describes this possibility as "Catastrophe." See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 32 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (1927) at 53. John Dickenson, although noting the merits of limited monarchy, stated: "A limited Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times-the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable." Id. at 56-57. Edmund Randolph noted that the "permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy," id. at 58, and argued against a single executive, regarding it "as the foetus of monarchy." Id. at 46. Conclusion Since a Kentucky Colonel, or a Prom King, or an Apple Butter Queen or what have you, are merely honorary without conferring legal rights and privileges, and are not hereditary, they do not constitute true Titles of Nobility in the constitutional sense. This is so even though a Kentucky Colonel is appointed by Letters Patent in a manner that apes the process by which Titles of Nobility were awarded in English law at the time that the Titles of Noblity Clause was enacted.
Before getting into the technical answer to this question it is worth noting that when matters of a constitutional nature are involved then in practice it is not just a matter of a technical &quot;legal&quot; answer. Students and academics like to pose hypothetical questions such as &quot;What would happen if the Queen refused assent to a Bill?&quot; or &quot;If Parliament is supreme, could it abolish the courts?&quot; etc. The practical reality is that a liberal democracy, such as ours, ultimately relies on those in positions of power to respect the democratic conventions and preserve the constitution. When there is a legal angle to some constitutional issue the courts will play their part but, whatever legal analysis their judgments may contain, they will always have in mind the importance of maintaining our democratic system. It is also worth noting that where an Act contains an &quot;ouster&quot; clause (saying that a certificate of X shall not be questioned in any court of law) the courts always find a way to interpret that so that it does not apply in any case where the courts think they should adjudicate! Those preliminaries out of the way, I think the technical legal answer to your question is that first of all the Speaker decides and provides a certificate under s.2(2). You will see that s.2(1) deals with &quot;any other bill&quot; (your third bullet point) and s.2(2) requires a certificate from the Speaker that &quot;the provisions of this section have been duly complied with&quot; (i.e. that it is indeed in the &quot;any other bill&quot; category). Of course there is a further question of whether, if the Speaker gets it wrong, the courts could intervene and exactly how that might happen (the so-called &quot;John Bercow question&quot; of what if a Speaker goes rogue), but the initial technical answer to you question is &quot;the Speaker of the House of Commons&quot;.
Article IX, Section 5 of the constitution says: Removal by impeachment or address. Every person holding any civil office under this State, may be removed by impeachment, for misdemeanor in office; and every person holding any office, may be removed by the Governor on the address of both branches of the Legislature. But before such address shall pass either House, the causes of removal shall be stated and entered on the journal of the House in which it originated, and a copy thereof served on the person in office, that the person may be admitted to a hearing in that person's own defense. This provides at least some mechanism for removing an AG. A subcomittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Maine Legislature reports here on the broader question of tenure of office. p. 5 opines that "Many members of the executive branch of Maine government hold their offices at the pleasure of the Governor and may be removed from office by the Governor's direction to vacate". p. 6 then holds that "For civil officers whose tenure is set by the Constitution, removal from office may only occur through impeachment or address," and the Attorney General is enumerated as one of those Constitutional Officers (referencing Article IX Section 11). The State of Maine web page says that there are three branches of government plus three constitutional officers (state, treasurer, AG) and one statutory officer, thus the AG is not part of the executive branch (and thus the AG does not serve at the pleasure of the Governor).
The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it.
5 CFR 2635.102 provides definitions for 5 CFR Part 2635 (which contains 5 CFR 2635.502). (h) Employee means any officer or employee of an agency, including a special Government employee. It includes officers but not enlisted members of the uniformed services. It includes employees of a State or local government or other organization who are serving on detail to an agency, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 3371, et seq. For purposes other than subparts B and C of this part, it does not include the President or Vice President. Status as an employee is unaffected by pay or leave status or, in the case of a special Government employee, by the fact that the individual does not perform official duties on a given day. Subparts B &amp; C pertain to gifts and range from §2635.201-304, whereas the section you are asking about is in Subpart E. So §2635.502 expressly does not apply to the VP. The "why" part is more challenging. The statutory authority invoked for these regulations is 5 USC 7301, 7351, 7353, 5 USC App, acts passed by Congress. The rule-making rationale is in 57 FR 35042, which does not overtly invoke any specific statutory authority for this specific item. In contrast, Subpart B is the implementation of 5 USC §7353, which governs gifts to federal employees, and (d)(2) of that section says the term "officer or employee" means an individual holding an appointive or elective position in the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of Government, other than a Member of Congress. In other words, the mixed definition of "employee" (the VP is an employee only for subparts B, C) under the regulations is because Congress passed some laws that included the VP, but did not pass a law that required non-appearance of conflict. Such a regulation would be within the authority given the president in 5 USC 7301, which simply says that "The President may prescribe regulations for the conduct of employees in the executive branch". Since there is no Congressional authority to subject the VP to 5 CFR 2635.502, it is written to exclude that person (also the president).
As the article suggests, this is called adverse possession. This seems to have occurred because the original owner did not make use of the property, nor monitored for adverse possession. The reason this method of acquiring title exists is for a number of reasons, including the prudent use of land, as well as being analogous to a limitation on the time period during which a claim can be brought. It would be reasonably easily avoided if the original owner had made use of the property, or monitored it and took action to eject the adverse possessor prior to their fulfilment of the necessary conditions.
From Roberts' dissenting opinion: Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition. (The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.) In my opinion, this quote speaks as much to the second question as the first. Assume (hypothetically) for a moment that question one was not at issue. If a state defined marriage as only between opposite sexes, and the right to make a state change its definition of marriage is not in the Supreme Court's purview (in our hypo), then the state is as free to reject the validity of marriages abhorrent to its laws, performed elsewhere, as it is to deny the right to marry under its theory of marriage.
It's supposed to be carte blanche, i.e. "blank check". The quotation has left out several words. You can find the full decision at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/176/case.html. The complete sentence is: It thus seems that the dissent would give the courts carte blanche to impose upon the States whatever burden their various judgments indicate should be imposed.