Is it legal to pay a ransom? While kidnapping and extortion are illegal, is it legal to pay such criminals for the release of the person or thing being held? Are there particular circumstances of the payer or payee that make it legal in some circumstances and illegal in others?
In the UK, broadly speaking it is not illegal to pay a ransom. However, there may be circumstances such that arranging or paying a ransom constitutes a terrorist financing offence - although a prosecution might be deemed against the public interest. I'm not aware of any such prosecutions. Section 15 (3) of the Terrorism Act 2000 makes it an offence for a person to provide money or other property if he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism. Section 17 makes it an offence for a person to enter into or become concerned in an arrangement as a result of which money or other property is made available or is to be made available to another, and the person knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism. Section 17A makes it an offence for an insurer to make a payment under an insurance contract against kidnapping and ransom if he knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that the money or other property has been, or is to be, handed over in response to a terrorist demand. Section 18 makes it an offence for someone to enter into or become concerned in an in an arrangement which facilitates the retention or control by or on behalf of another person of terrorist property. If a person becomes aware in the course of his trade, profession or business (e.g. the banker assembling the money) that someone may be arranging a ransom to pay a terrorist, section 19 makes it an offence for that person to not disclose to a constable as soon as reasonably practicable his belief or suspicion and the information on which it is based. In terms of maritime piracy kidnappings in the area of Somalia for example, although the Government has tried to link them to terrorism there is no direct evidence of systematic links. But if it became known that such a connection exists, then the knowledge or suspicion element of the terrorist financing offences might be provable. In Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member [2011] EWCA Civ 24 (a case partly about whether ransom payments by shipowners to pirates were as a matter of English law against public policy) the Court of Appeal was not aware of illegality in the payment of ransoms under international law. The UK Government supported the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2133 in January 2014, which among other things "Calls upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefiting directly or indirectly from ransom payments or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages".
Yes When you enter the jurisdiction of a country, you are subject to its laws. You are not, in general, subject to punishment for things you did before you entered its jurisdiction but if possession of bitcoin (or anything else) is illegal in that country, then possessing that thing makes you subject to prosecution.
The section you quote as clearly saying a thing is not clearly saying the thing. However: you cannot pass on or resell any license keys seems to say a thing clearly. However, one could argue that it's the sharer of the account who is in the wrong, and not the person receiving and passing on the account. I'd say that that piece of the agreement, combined with this: must not... let other people get access to anything we've made in a way that is unfair or unreasonable says that, yes, they are out of bounds.
When a person unlawfully kills someone else they have committed a crime against the state (murder, manslaughter etc.) and a civil wrong (a tort) against the victim (specifically, the tort of wrongful death). The state responds with charging the perpetrator with a crime and attempting to prove that they did the deed "beyond reasonable doubt". If convicted the criminal is "punished" by incarceration or death or a fine or community service etc. The victim (through their estate) or other affected people (family, dependents etc.) can respond by suing the perpetrator for compensation (money) for the damage they caused. If the plaintiff proves their case "on the balance of probabilities" the perpetrator will owe the plaintiffs whatever damages the court awards. There are many crime/tort mirrors (many have the same name): theft and conversion, trespass and trespass, fraud and fraud, kidnapping and false imprisonment etc. Because of the different threshold of proof between criminal and civil liability, it is much easier to win a civil case.
When does it become illegal to exchange bitcoin for cash? When the transaction purposefully skips the controls in place regarding anti-money laundering. Generally speaking, the issue is not the mere involvement of cryptocurrency in a transaction, but the crimes a wrongdoer seeks to camouflage or conceal by means of cryptocurrencies. Such crimes typically involve money laundering, identity theft, stolen card numbers, and the like. As quoted in one of the links you provide, "[t]he use of bitcoins in the transactions is a new technological flourish to this very old crime". Is there any direct source or any laws with numbers? Apropos of your first link, mentioning that "a Florida judge threw out money transmitting charges against a bitcoiner" (see also here), I will point out that the court's dismissal of charges against that defendant has been reversed early this year. See State v. Espinoza, 264 So.3d 1055 (2019). Although the judges' narratives of a case are questionable and/or sloppy and to be taken with a grain of salt, the appellate decision cites language from Florida legislation as applicable to virtual currencies (and, impliedly, cryptocurrencies). You will notice that the focus in the Espinoza decision is the interpretation of Florida Statutes in its sections 560.125(1) and (5)(a) (regarding unauthorized vendors), and 560.103(21), (29) (defining monetary value as "a medium of exchange, whether or not redeemable in currency"). As usual, each legislation may present subtle and/or fundamental variations. For instance, the court in Espinoza at 1065 identified that federal law is inapplicable there in that 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) contemplates that "the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any means" (emphasis added), and Espinoza's transaction(s) did not involve a third party. By contrast, the Florida statute does not allude to third parties in that transmission of monetary value, hence preventing the statutory sanctions from being preemptively foreclosed in the matter of Espinoza. What about when someone buys with stolen money or money from illegal proceeds. Did you commit a crime if you sell bitcoin to someone and the money is stolen, or the gift cards are stolen? That also depends on the jurisdiction and the facts of the case. In Espinoza, he was allegedly informed that the cash he received (or was about to receive) in exchange for bitcoins "derived from engaging in illegal activity and that [the buyer] was planning to use the bitcoins to engage in further illegal activity", Espinoza at 1058. The court highlighted the State's argument that "dismiss[ing] a charge of money laundering is improper because money laundering requires intent" (emphasis added), which is sanctioned by section 896/101(3)(c).
What are our possibilities here? You could be sued for damages in Mexico, the country of origin of the copyright or any of the other signatories of the Berne Convention. You could also be charged with a criminal offence but that is less likely. how much can we get away with? Not a legal question. What you are proposing is illegal - how likely your getaway plan is to work is not for me to say. Is there any advantage on us being on México? No Is there any advantage on picking any either Dragon Ball or League of legends because of the country they are in? No Can they stop us from doing it? Yes
I don't know precisely what the default rate is, but I represented a bail bondsman for several years so I do have a good sense of the economics of that business. Basically, bail bond business make very little profit after their expenses (rent, payroll, licensing, cost of use of money put up as bonds, etc.) on the non-refundable fees that they charge for the bonds themselves (typically about 10% of the bond amount although prices vary on a case by case basis). Additional fees are charged for security measures taken by the bail bond company to insure the client's attendance such as ankle bracelets or fees paid to bounty hunters to recover the client if he absconds. The profits come almost entirely from seizing collateral (often motor vehicles, firearms and homes) that someone paying for a bond pledges in the event that the bail bond is forfeited, for example, because the criminal defend absconds rather than appearing at a hearing or trial, in addition to the non-refundable fee charged to provide the bond in the first place. (It is a bit like movie theaters which break even on their movie ticket revenues and make their profits by selling food and drinks.) A typical bail bond business owner will sell the motor vehicles and firearms pledged as collateral to pawn brokers and independent used car sales lots, and will keep the (typically very bottom of the market) real estate and rent it to low income tenants. In other words, most bail bond company owners eventually build wealth by becoming slum lords with real estate pledges as collateral for bonds that go bad. Another revenue stream for a bail bond business is bounty hunter work, partially for their own absconded clients which can result in a partial or full restoration of the funds provided by the bail bond company that often does not result in a refund to the client whose collateral was seized as a result of the default, and sometimes for other wanted felons upon whom law enforcement has placed a bounty because they are not set up to recover the subject of some of their outstanding warrants in an economically viable way. Usually, bounty hunting one's own absconding clients is more profitable than chasing reward money from law enforcement agencies for other people subject to arrest warrants. Default rates are ultimately a function of how selective a bail bond company is about the clients for whom it posts bonds and about how closely the company supervises the client who is out on bond to make sure that he (or she) complies with his (or her) pre-trial release order terms. But, even if the client absconds and the bail posted by the bail bond company is forfeited and can't be recovered within any applicable grace period, the bail bond company can still avoid losses by having collateral securing the risk of a forfeiture of the bond that is worth significantly more that the amount of the bond posted by the bail bond company. As a typical bail bond company website (which sounds more clear than it is when you really try to pin down what they are saying and for what it is worth is not my former client's website) explains: Most of the time bail collateral takes the form of property. If the court is collecting on a property-based bail collateral because of a failure to appear in court, it typically involves the seizure and sale of the individual’s home. Property bail takes weeks to collect on, and equity in the estate being sold must be determined to equal at least 150% of what is owed the court. Collateral will be returned when the case is completed, whether the the person is found innocent, the charges are dropped, the person is sentenced or bail is exonerated. If the individual for whom the bail collateral was offered fails to appear in court at the agreed upon time and date, the collateral will be seized or collected by the court or the bail bond company. The full amount of the collateral may not be returned to the individual if a premium has been put in place when using a bail bond agent. This premium is negotiated between the bail agent and the arrested party or person bailing the arrested person out. Bail collateral will typically be returned within five business days after the individual has paid off all financial obligations and their case has been concluded. Until this happens a bail bond agent can hold the bail collateral. A financial website explains the situation this way: When a defendant uses a bail bond agent to post bail, the defendant must pay the bondsman’s fee, and may also have to hand over collateral or sign a security agreement. Should the defendant comply with bond conditions, the bond agent will return the collateral or release the lien created by the security agreement upon the conclusion of the case. However, the bond agent’s fee (the 10% to 15% of the total bail amount) is not returned no matter the outcome. Bond Forfeiture and Bounty Hunters Should a defendant who used a bond agent’s services fail to appear in court or otherwise violate bail terms, the agent can usually try to find the defendant, take that person into custody, and physically take the defendant back to police custody. Courts typically grant bond agents a grace period after a defendant violates bail terms. If the agent can return the defendant to court within that grace period, the court usually will not require the agent to pay the full bail amount. As part of this process the bail bond agent can employ bounty hunters, also called bail enforcement agents, to track down and apprehend the defendant. Bounty hunters, like bail bond agents, are not government employees or law enforcement officers. They do not have general arrest powers, but can arrest a defendant who used the bail bond agent’s services. This is because as part of the contract defendants sign with the bail bond agent, defendants typically agree to allow the bond agent, or bounty hunters working for the agent, to enter their home, arrest them, or take other actions that would typically be illegal without the defendant’s consent. Note that state laws on both bail agents and bounty hunters can differ significantly, and not all states allow for bail bond agents or bounty hunters. For example, suppose that son is arrested for a felony and released prior to trial on a $20,000 bond for which his parents pay a non-refundable $2,000 non-refundable premium and sign off on a $20,000 second mortgage on their house with a $200,000 fair market value which is also subject to a $160,000 first mortgage. If son defaults in a way that triggers his parents' obligation to pay the $20,000 placed at risk by that default, and the parents don't have the money, the bail bondsman takes the house subject only to the $160,000 first subprime mortgage and nets $40,000 of equity (the $20,000 surplus would rarely be enough to cause another buyer to bid at the foreclosure sale). The bail bondsman then refinances the $160,000 first mortgage at the much lower interest rate he qualifies for with his higher net worth and better credit rating, and then rents it (often initially back to the parents who pledge the house as collateral in the first place) at a market rate, which, for a house like that is probably on the order of $2,000 a month, until he decides to resell it (perhaps assembling many similar houses on the same block over time and then selling the entire block to a developer who wants to scrape the houses to build an apartment building on the entire block instead, at a significant premium). Even if I a mistaken and the collateral can only be seized when the bond is actually forfeited and not merely when it is placed in peril by a failure to appear when the grace period has not yet run, or if the actual amount of the bail bond debt is repaid after the collateral has been foreclosed upon and sold to a third party, insuring that there is sufficient collateral to back the full amount of the bond if it has to be repaid to the bail bondsman, this still prevents the bail bondsman from losing any money in the worst case scenario if the bond is forfeited. Indeed, this will usually make the bail bondsman a healthy profit because the value of the collateral is generally significantly in excess of the value of the bond, at the cited bail bond company at least 150% of the amount potentially owed (also providing a cushion if the fair market value of the collateral has been overestimated), but not so high relative to the value of the bond that another bidder will bid at a foreclosure sale. So the bail bondsman will sometimes make a profit on the collateral seizure and sale to a third-party, even if the bond debt ($20,000 in this example) is ultimately repaid to the sponsors of the client because the client is returns to court custody before the grace period expires. Sometimes a bail bondsman will also take a guarantee of repayment of the bond amount if there is a default, in place of some or all of the collateral if the guarantors' incomes are sufficient to comfortably be able to pay the full bond amount, at least in installments over time, even if the guarantor has few assets of value to pledge, but this is much more common for small bonds of, for example, $500 or $1,000 or $2,000 than it is for a medium bond amount for a felony of about $10,000 or a higher amount of $25,000 or $100,000 for serious felonies when the court is worried that the client is a flight risk, where the bail bondsman will typically post bond only of the client's supporters can offer sufficient collateral to cover the full amount. This is very similar to the reason that a hard money lender doesn't worry too much about the ability of the people borrowing from the hard money lender to pay during the typically short loan term because any unpaid loan balance can be recovered by seizing collateral for the hard money loan which is worth significantly more than the value of the loan. The New Yorker interviewed a bail bondsman who claimed that less than 1% of his clients defaulted, in 2013, but in my experience this is highly implausible and unusual (as the story notes, even prime secured mortgage loans have a higher default rate than that most of the time), even though it certainly isn't impossible if one is very selective about who one takes on as a client. The more likely possibility is that the bail bondsman is actually talking about clients who abscond or violate bond conditions who are not returned to the court within the grace period, or about the percentage of transactions in which the bail bondsman actually loses money after foreclosing on collateral and collecting from guarantors, if necessary. A New York Times in a 2018 article does not provide a forfeiture rate figure, but does explain that as long as the client is returned to law enforcement authorities within a grace period that can vary from a few months to two years on a state by state basis, the forfeited bond will usually be returned to the bail bond company. One company cited in the 2018 New York Times article with $800 million of revenues had zero losses as a result, a data point that I strongly suspect reflects not a zero bond forfeiture rate but a complete recovery of forfeited bonds from bond collateral and guarantors, with profits on some bond collateral seizures exceeding, on average, losses from bonds extended with insufficient collateral or with guarantors who can't make good on their obligations or go bankrupt. According to this 2018 New York Times article, California is one of the only states that requires a premium refund when a client is re-incarcerated voluntarily during the grace period. This policy white paper from the Obama Administration notes that: Though failure-to-appear rates declined from 25 to 17 percent between 1992 and 2009, pretrial re-arrest rates actually increased from 14 to 16 percent for released felony defendants in large counties. This 15-17% failure to appear rate is a much more accurate estimate of bond defaults prior to before considering grace periods. A law review article from 1994 explores the economics that drive the bail bond industry in more detail than is possible in a Law.SE answer.
This is a good example of the life of the law being experience and not reason. While there is a logical argument that this isn't theft, in reality, this conduct would universally be considered an open and shut case of shoplifting and anyone who tried this would surely be convicted of a crime with consequences far more severe than creating a tort debt for conversion of the property. Also, you do intend to permanently deprive the store of its property. The fact that you intend to remedy that by paying for it doesn't change that. You aren't borrowing the property with an intent of returning it.