Can the Prisoner&#39;s Dilemma be solved with a civil contract? The Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-known game theory problem that translates well into our real life experience. The idea is that two people who will optimize their individual and collective outcomes by cooperating can, under specific circumstances, decide not to cooperate. Can the two prisoners solve their dilemma by mutually binding each other to silence with an enforceable civil contract of the nature of a Non-Disclosure Agreement? Prisoner's Dilemma Description Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in solitary confinement with no means of communicating with the other. The prosecutors lack sufficient evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge, but they have enough to convict both on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the prosecutors offer each prisoner a bargain. Each prisoner is given the opportunity either to betray the other by testifying that the other committed the crime, or to cooperate with the other by remaining silent. The offer is: If A and B each betray the other, each of them serves two years in prison If A betrays B but B remains silent, A will be set free and B will serve three years in prison (and vice versa) If A and B both remain silent, both of them will only serve one year in prison (on the lesser charge). Edit I don't think the following analysis applies: It would not &quot;solve&quot; the problem, because the contract would not be enforceable. See this question on enforceability. In particular, Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Company, 457 F.2d 850 A bargain, performance of which would tend to harm third persons by deceiving them as to material facts, or by defrauding them, or without justification by other means is illegal. But I do not think that analysis applies because there is no deception or fraud involved. Both parties have a fifth amendment right to not self-incriminate. The agreement would be for both parties to exercise their constitutionally protected rights by remaining silent. Prosecutors often solve this with immunity agreements for &quot;unindicted co-conspirators&quot; plus subpoenas to compel testimony and otherwise cooperation with investigation. However, I don't think that tactic can displace an individual's constitutionally protected right to &quot;remain silent.&quot;
The contract is almost certainly not valid. The answer you linked references the 2001 Federal Circuit case Fomby-Denson v. Dept of the Army. The court, in its opinion, quoted from the 1948 Supreme Court case Hurd v. Hodge: [t]he power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the United States . . . . Where the enforcement of private agreements would be violative of that policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions of judicial power. It is clear that, in the case you propose, the enforcement of such a contract would go against the public interest. Quoting from the 1972 Supreme Court case Branzburg v. Hayes, the Fomby-Denson decision said: it is obvious that agreements to conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy. It further notes this clause from the First Restatement of Contracts: [a] bargain in which either a promised performance or the consideration for a promise is concealing or compounding a crime or alleged crime is illegal.
Miranda rights do not attach until the suspect is subject to custodial interrogation. "Custody" means that the suspect reasonably believes that he is not free to leave the conversation. "Interrogation" means that the officer is engaging in direct questioning or other conduct that would reasonably be expected to elicit a response. A suspect is free to waive his Miranda rights and begin speaking without a lawyer, but a waiver must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary. "Voluntary" means that the waiver is obtained without coercion (torture, threats or promises) by the government. None of the five scenarios indicate that Clyde ever believes he is in custody, so he has no Miranda rights in any of them, making his confession admissible in all of them. But to play it out further, let's assume that Officer Olivia arrives and immediately slaps handcuffs on Clyde: No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. Miranda rights attached at the beginning of questioning. Clyde waived by confessing. Reading the Miranda rights established that the waiver was knowing. We don't have any facts suggesting the waiver was not intelligent. The waiver was not obtained by government coercion, so it was voluntary. The waiver was effective, so the confession is admissible. Same as 3. No interrogation, no Miranda rights. The confession is admissible. The key thing to keep in mind here is that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was to avoid misconduct by the government, and it has generally been implemented only to that end. The key case here is Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), which involved a guy who approached a police officer and asked to talk about a murder he had committed. The officer Mirandized him, and he told them all about the murder and where he buried the body. It turned out that he was a chronic schizophrenic and was going through a psychotic break at the time of the confession, which he had only offered because "God's voice" told him to. As with your truth serum scenario, the question became whether the Miranda waiver satisfied the voluntariness requirement. The Colorado Supreme Court held that "capacity for rational judgment and free choice may be overborne as much by certain forms of severe mental illness as by external pressure." But the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that neither the defendant's due-process rights nor his right against self-incrimination are offended by non-governmental influences, even when they undercut the defendant's free will. Since then, other courts have relied on Connelly to hold that voluntariness was not defeated by: a suspect's flu, hangover, hunger, or exhaustion, U.S. v. Elwood, 51 F.3d 283 (9th Cir. 1995); a suspect's heroin use, Elliott v. Williams, 248 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001); a suspect's heroin withdrawal, U.S. v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1992); a suspect's orders from his father, N. Mariana Islands v. Doe, 844 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1988); or a suspect's unusual susceptibility to suggestion or intimidation, U.S. v. Guerro, 983 F.2d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 1993). tl;dr: Because the truth serum was not administered by the government, the confession is admissible in all five scenarios.
We have all see on TV the judge instruct jurors that during trial they are not to speak about the case with anyone, even other jurors, unless all jurors are present and they are deliberating. However, contrary to the example given about England, in the U.S., those restrictions evaporate at the end of the trial. After a trial concludes, the court has no continuing control over the jurors and could not impose lasting restrictions without it. The Constitution provides the guarantee of trial by a jury of ones peers. In the U.S. for all general civil cases and all criminal cases, we have public trials. (special courts and tribunals are created to deal with cases involving classified information and issues of national security, and the courts have mechanisms for handling trade secrets, etc. to insure that information is not presented to jurors) So in that sense, there is nothing a juror could be exposed to in during their service as jurors that would require any type of continuing restriction.
united-states This answer analyzes the question under U.S. law, although it is really generally applicable in all countries with a common law legal system. I'm not familiar with how non-common law countries address this issue at this level of granularity. Given that Alice has been instructed by the court to stop publishing the data, and given that Mallory refuses to stop publishing the data, what might Alice be obliged to do to comply with the court? Very little. This is why courts very rarely issue orders like this one. Disobedience to a court order is enforced with a contempt of court proceeding against a party that allegedly knowingly and willfully failed to comply with the court order. But an inability to comply with the court order (at least if this is not due to sabotage by the party subject to the order after that party learns of the order's existence) is a complete defense to contempt of court sanctions. Contractually, this is why most non-disclosure agreements have liquidated damages and actual money damages remedies as well as the remedy of injunctive relief. If harm that can't be unwound results from conduct taken before an injunction is in place, or as a result of a breach of an injunction that the person who was ordered to do something can't remedy, then a court imposes money damages and/or punitively imposes a criminal fine or incarceration on a party who defied a court order.
Fun one! First on the question of whether it matters if the agreement is written, I don't imagine it would make a difference in most of the US. We only require written contracts for agreements that meet certain requirements, those include contracts over a certain dollar amount, contracts involving the sale of land and contracts that cannot be completed within the year. Depending on the facts of your hypo, the writing requirement may be in play, but either way, it doesn't really make the situation more or less interesting; it's not a unique issue to this sort of contract. Second, the baseline assumption is that people can form legally binding contracts. The question is, whether something forbids the sort of contract you have in mind. I can think of a few things: It would be reasonably challenging to define what conduct is forbidden by the agreement. But that is merely a challenge not a road block. You could easily come up with a laundry list of forbidden acts to accomplish your result. Two people cannot contract to force the behavior of a third person, barring special circumstance. But again this isn't important since it's just a matter of drafting. In other words the contract probably would not say Juliet cannot go to the movies with Romeo, rather it would say Romeo cannot go the movies with Juliet. Even drafted in the less ideal way, he operative concept is whether the father could enforce a breach. So, the contract COULD be worded to say "If Juliet attends a movie while Romeo is present, Romeo must pay the father $xx dollars." Most importantly a party cannot form a contract that violates public policy. This is sometimes referred to "legality of objects", as in the object/goal of the contract must be legal. Contracts for prostitution, or the sale of a child (i.e. certain adoption contracts), or illegal products, would likely trip over this category. Here however, I can't readily think of a public policy basis to challenge the contract. Surely (some) states have stated a public policy favoring marriage, but it would likely be a challenge to contend the contract to not date (or not marry) was void because of such a policy. I can't think of any reason that the father couldn't enforce this sort of agreement. Finally, even if the contract was not enforceable, it's highly likely that Romeo could not simply take the money and breach. There are basis to demand return of the money even if no enforceable agreement exists. I am not your lawyer. Seek counsel from a lawyer in your area before taking any action. This answer is provided without research and for purely academic reasons. I have no special knowledge of this area of law.
This paper describes a website created to test the hypothesis that nobody bothers to read the TOS, and it contained a privacy clause saying that &quot;we may share everything, and a clause that by agreeing to these Terms of Service, and in exchange for service, all users of this site agree to immediately assign their first-born child to NameDrop, Inc. If the user does not yet have children, this agreement will be enforceable until the year 2050. All individuals assigned to NameDrop automatically become the property of NameDrop, Inc. No exceptions. Since this was not a real webpage, there was no attempt to enforce. TOS is just another kind of contract, so the question is which kinds of contract conditions are enforceable and which kinds are not. It depends on whose laws you are operating under, which explains the use of expressions like &quot;void where prohibited by law&quot;. There are innumerable conditions that could be included in a contract which are unenforceable. A contract requiring a person to commit a crime is unenforceable. Many jurisdictions have laws prohibiting a person from waiving certain rights, for example you cannot sign away your right to be represented by legal counsel in a dispute. There are related &quot;unfair / deceptive&quot; practices laws, which might include meta-conditions that any clause disclaiming liability must be prominently displayed. These are terms that a reasonable person would clearly know in advance are illegal and unenforceable. There is also a concept of &quot;unconscionability&quot;, a finding that a certain condition favors the business to the point of &quot;shocking the conscience&quot;, which may take a deeper legal analysis to evaluate. A requirement to litigate small disputes in California might be deemed unconscionable for a customer in an East Coast state, but it might not be. A typical characterization of an unconscionable contract is one that &quot;leaves one party with no real, meaningful choice and is unreasonably advantageous to the other party&quot;, especially when due to asymmetrical negotiation power. For example, Ellis v. McKinnon , 18 Cal. App. 4th 1796 (employment contract for a salesman, commissions were forfeit if company had not received payment from the customer by the termination of employment). The main case law in the US in this area is Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, where a customer bought furniture on credit, with a clause allowing repossession of all of the furniture in case of default by the customer. The doctrine is encoded in UCC 2-302. However, &quot;unconscionable&quot; does not mean &quot;I don't like it&quot;. In lieu of statutory price controls, a customer probably cannot avoid paying an agreed on exorbitant price for a product ($100 for a dozen rolls of toilet paper). Here is a bit more legal analysis of unconscionability, which focuses on three factors: one-sidedness, oppressiveness, and likeliness to result in unfair surprise.
In the common law (The legal system used by the U.S. among many other nations), courts are &quot;adversarial&quot; as opposed to &quot;Inquisitorial&quot; like in Civil Law systems. What this means is that when in court the prosecutor and defense are pitted against each other in debating the questions of the case. All questions can be boiled down into questions of law and questions of fact. This is opposed to an inquisitorial system, where the prosecutor, defense, and judge are working to answer these questions in a fact finding forum. Because of this, in Common law, the judge takes the role of &quot;Trier of Law&quot;, i.e. he is the arbiter of what the law says. The Jury will talk the role of &quot;Trier of Fact&quot;. Essentially, if the prosecutor and defense attorneys are in a competition against each other, the judge will serve as the referee and decide whether something is allowed to be discussed in trial and whether the jury should count it. Because of this, the judge cannot call out objectional behavior by one side or the other as it would call into question his/her ability to be neutral in his assessment of the law. Thus it is the burden of the opposing party to object to something that is objectional. Failure to object means that the the side that should object is okay with this activity by opposing counsel, so the judge must allow it. Sometimes, objections are raised at trial for the sole reason that they will be part of the appeal of the case. Appeals can only call raise Questions of Law, which again, is the judge's domain. Thus the judge can't object, since we operate on the fact that the judge is neutral. If the judge is not neutral, than the case can be overturned easily by an appellant court. Essentially, the &quot;Objection&quot; is similar to a coach playing sportsball asking a ref to review a play on the sportsball field. Under this game rule, however, the judge is there to make the call if and only if he/she is asked to make it. Otherwise the objectionable action is permitted to stand.
The decoder is aware that someone might read the combination, open the lock, and go into the locked area ...Has the person committed a crime? england-and-wales Maybe not a criminal offence, but the decoder might be liable civilly under the Tort of Negligence, which is: a legal wrong that is suffered by someone at the hands of another who fails to take proper care to avoid what a reasonable person would regard as a foreseeable risk. In many cases there will be a contractual relationship (express or implied) between the parties involved, such as that of doctor and patient, employer and employee, bank and customer, and until relatively recently it was necessary for such a contractual relationship to exist in order for a claim for negligence to succeed. But the civil law relating to negligence has evolved and grown to deal with situations that arise between two or more parties even where no contract, written or implied, exists between them. Is it legal to obtain and publish that information, if no physical damage is done to the object when deriving the information? One scenario where this might be a criminal offence is if the information is protected with a Government Security Classification marking (i.e. spying). See Section 1, Official Secrets Act 1911: (1) If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State— (b) makes any sketch ... which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; or (c) ... communicates to any other person any secret ... sketch ... which is calculated to be or might be or is intended to be directly or indirectly useful to an enemy; he shall be guilty of felony Section 12 states that: The expression “sketch” includes any photograph or other mode of representing any place or thing;