How do the US Supreme Court justices decide to deny an application for injunctive relief? On Dec 8 2020 the US Supreme Court denies Sen. Mike Lee's emergency application for injunctive relief to vacate the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision on Nov 25 2020. The US Supreme Court order to deny the application comes as &quot;Order in pending case&quot; containing one sentence: The application for injunctive relief presented to Justice Alito and by him referred to the Court is denied. This denial was reported by NPR, Wall Street Journal and CNN without specifying any details on HOW the decision was arrived at, whether all 9 justices voted, or whether the order itself implies a unanimous consent. For example, NPR only added: ... said the court's one-sentence order, which did not suggest any dissent among the nine justices. while WSJ only noted: The U.S. Supreme Court’s order came shortly after it finished receiving written legal arguments from the parties on Tuesday afternoon. and CNN noted: Tuesday's one-line order was issued with no noted dissents or comment from any of the nine justices. The Question: What is the official procedure / process that the US Supreme Court uses to deny an emergency application for injunctive relief like this? Do all 9 justices required to vote? Do other denials contain more details of the voting result in the order?
Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.
The question to be answered is &quot;did the state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt&quot;, the answer to which should have no reasonable doubt. The interests of the defendant are sufficiently protected by the basic burden of proof requirement. The alternative that a single vote of not guilty exonerates the defendant would seriously hobble the interests of the people, and the alternative of automatic mistrial would make trials prohibitively expensive. The unanimity requirement does mean that in case of initial disagreement, parties have to re-think their positions, which is not a bad thing. The question of whethar a supermajority of guilty votes suffices for conviction was decided in a recent case, Ramos v. Louisiana, allowing conviction with a 10-2 vote. The court takes unanimity to be a basic common law right from the 14th century. Louisiana and Oregon had unconventional schemes allowing less than unanimous decisions: the reasoning behind the unanimity requirement is discussed extensively in that opinion. Since Alito, Roberts and Kagan dissented in part, the rationale for the other view is also spelled out.
Must/may the court give that instruction? No. It would be error for the court to give that instruction. The only privilege for which an adverse inference instruction is generally authorized in civil litigation is the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This is because when you invoke it, you are implicitly asserting that your testimony could be used against you, if you gave it, to show that you were guilty of a crime, and because a relevant question will be about events pertinent to the lawsuit. An adverse inference is also not allowed for invoking the 5th Amendment when you are a defendant in a criminal case because that would undermine its purpose in the the criminal justice system. An invocation of a marital privilege, in contrast, merely implies that you are married, which is not something that would normally and naturally suggest that you did something for which there is civil liability. One could probably imagine a fact pattern in which being married was a disputed issue that could give rise to liability (e.g. under the &quot;family car doctrine&quot;), of course, in which the invocation of the privilege would estop A from asserting a defense on the ground that he isn't married to A's wife (either at the time of the communication if the confidential communication privilege is raised, or at the time of the testimony, if the right to not testify against a spouse privilege is raised, as the case might be). Tricky cases would involve people who were unmarried at the time of the accident but subsequently married. But, outside very unusual facts, people generally don't deny that they are married in a lawsuit and then try to assert the marital privilege in a lawsuit. Does the answer change depending on whether it is the litigant or the spouse who invokes the privilege? No.
The local authority has indicated two things: It wishes to apply for an urgent interim care order. The application for this order should be dealt with at a hearing other than the case-management hearing. Therefore, the parties should talk about the following things, and their discussions should be focused on any order or direction that might be applied for: the purpose of the hearing; any directions that will be applied for; whether any part of the hearing will be contested; and the length of the hearing. The local authority shall inform the court in writing by 1.5.19.
It's complicated. Rule 53 states Except as otherwise provided by a statute or these rules, the court must not permit the taking of photographs in the courtroom during judicial proceedings or the broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom. This is applicable not just to the Supreme Court, but to all federal courts. Rule 53 applies to criminal cases, not civil suits. Over time, Rule 53 has been expanded. It has changed from merely &quot;photographs&quot; to include television and related cameras. Furthermore, The Judicial Conference of the United States prohibits the televising, recording, and broadcasting of district trial (civil and criminal) court proceedings. Under conference policy, each court of appeals may permit television and other electronic media coverage of its proceedings. Only two of the 13 courts of appeals, the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals, have chosen to do so. So courts have the ability to choose whether or not they want to have their proceedings broadcaster/televised. It is technically allowed in the Supreme Court by all other legislation . . . but the decision ultimately rests in the hands of the justices. In the 109th Congress, five bills appeared that would change existing rules, at some level: H.R. 1751 H.R. 2422 H.R. 4380 S. 829 S. 1768 H.R. 4380 and S. 1768 would apply to the Supreme Court; the others would apply to federal district and appellate courts. Both bills would make television coverage is mandatory, unless the justices collectively vote against it. So, once more, the power rests in the hands of the Court. H.R. 4380 is brief, and would be merely an addendum to Chapter 45 of title 28, United States Code. S. 1768 is also brief, and would amend the same statute. Title 28, in all its glory, can be found here (Chapter 45). The proposed additions are noticeably absent, as § 678 is not there. So, addressing some quotes from your question, Are there any reasons against cameras restricted to the Supreme Court, but that don't apply to courts that already allow cameras (such as the UK Supreme Court)? There are no special laws, no. To wit, does the allowance of cameras in other highest courts refute arguments against cameras in the Supreme Court of the United States? Nope. It's purely the decision of the Court. The rationale of the justices themselves against cameras is outside the scope of the law.
Which Supreme Court justices, present or historical, have ruled the most against intellectual property rights? In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of intellectual property rights, overturned more expansive rulings of the Federal Circuit, and overridden Patent and Trademark Office policies consistently. All but two the 26 U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the subject (pro or anti-IP holder) in the last 13 years (both in 2018) have either been unanimous or had only one dissenter (with no one consistent dissenting justices). The two 2018 cases with more than one dissenting justice, each involving the inter partes review of previously grated patents by the PTO under a new patent statute, implicate separation of powers and civil procedure issues that have historically been more controversial than pure intellectual property issues. Oil States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy Group (2018) (7-2 with Gorsuch and Roberts dissenting) (upholding PTO invalidation of previously granted patents); SAS Institute v. INACU (2018) (5-4 with Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissenting)(expanding scope of PTO reconsideration of previously granted patents). Matal v. Tam (2017) (unanimous) (overturning PTO policy on offensive trademarks); Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. (2017) (unanimous) (weakening patent protections vis-a-vis biologically similar drugs to patented ones); Impressions Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. (2017) (7-1 Ginsberg joining the ruling in part and dissenting in part) (weakening rights of patent holders); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC (2017) (8-0) (overruling Federal Circuit by limiting venue in patent infringement cases); SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC (2017) (7-1 with Breyer dissenting) (disallowing laches defense to patent law claims); Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple, Inc. (2016) (unanimous) (limiting damages awards in multi-component products where only some components are infringing); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health &amp; Fitness, Inc. (2014) (unanimous) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems (2014) (unanimous) (the Federal Circuit had set too high a standard for the recovery of attorneys' fees for frivolous patent prosecutions); Alice v. CLS Bank, Int'l. (2014) (unanimous) (limiting software patents); Medtronic v. Mirowski (2014) (unanimous) (burden of proof wrongly placed on someone other than the patent holder); Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) (unanimous) (invalidated patents on naturally occurring DNA sequences); Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012) (unanimous) (district court's factual findings made clear that drug monitoring device patent merely restated a law of nature and was invalid); Caraco v. Novo (2012) (unanimous) (alleged infringers right to bring counterclaims expanded); Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (2012) (unanimous) (first sale doctrine does not invalidate ban on reproducing crops grown with patented GMO seeds); Kappos v. Hyatt (2012) (unanimous)(expanding ability of applicant denied a patent to challenge the denial with additional evidence); Global-Tech v. SEB (2011) (8-1, Kennedy dissenting) (added knowledge of infringement element in claim for induced patent infringement); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership (2011) (unanimous) (presumption of validity of patent continues to apply during patent re-examination process conducted by PTO); Bilski v. Kappos (2009) (unanimous to reverse, complicated holding as to extent of new law)(limiting software patents); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. (2008) (unanimous) (disavows Federal Circuit doctrines allowing patent holders to limit use of patented device after a first sale); KSR International v. Teleflex (2007) (unanimous) (expanding obviousness defense); MedImmune v. Genentech (2007) (8-1, Thomas dissenting) (allows for contests of patent validity without risking liability by infringing patent prior to legal ruling on question); Microsoft v. AT&amp;T (2007) (7-1, Roberts dissenting) (U.S. patents laws don't have extraterritorial application); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (2006) (unanimous) (sets higher standard for obtaining injunctions once infringement is established); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (2005) (unanimous) (exemption from patent infringement applies to use of patented drugs for narrow purposes of research associated with FDA drug approval process).* Intellectual property issues have not been a partisan or ideological issue on the U.S. at any time in recent memory, and have not been a signature issue of any one justice relative to the other justices. Dissents in IP cases, where they have occurred have tended to be related to non-IP aspects of the cases.
The true answer is this is fundamentally unclear and ratification would definitely set up for a Supreme Court showdown. The Supreme Court would in my opinion need to resolve 3 issues: Are Congressionally imposed deadlines in resolutions proposing an amendment to the States for ratification binding? Does a state withdrawal of its ratification of an amendment annul its ratification of the amendment? Who decides when an amendment is ratified? For the first question this is perhaps the most unresolved question. Clearly if the deadline is imposed in the text of the amendment it is binding. For example, see the text of the 18th amendment, Section 3. What is not clear is what if any binding effect a deadline in the text of the resolution proposing an amendment has as to the validity of the proposed amendment. Article V makes no provision on such deadlines. In fact the most recent amendment ratified was submitted for ratification on September 25, 1789, but ratified May 5, 1992. In this instance the Archivist of the United States declared the amendment ratified, but Congress also acted to do so and several members scolded the Archivist for doing so before Congress acted. However, there was no resolution of who had to actually approve the ratification. For the second question there is absolutely no answer to this question except Coleman v. Miller which suggests this is a political question. This essentially means that the question should be resolved by Congress, not the courts. Lastly, for the third question see also my response to the first question. If Congress is indeed the ratifier, what happens if one Congress decides the amendment was not ratified, but a future one decides it was? Honestly, ratification of the ERA would open a whole can of worms and make it difficult to really resolve this issue. Probably the most direct method to force the Supreme Court to rule on this issue would be someone challenging their requirements to register with the Selective Service System.
In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment &quot;standing&quot;1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term &quot;standing&quot; in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis.