Why do some people argue that contingency fees increase lawsuits? I've seen this argument from a number of people, such as this New York Times article. Most countries do not allow contingent fees ... Allowing contingent fees increases the number of suits. I have trouble following the logic. Shouldn't the use of contingent fees reduce the incentive to start lawsuits that one is likely not going to win? Shouldn't that reduce pointless lawsuits?
Contingency fees are arguably designed to increase lawsuits; or more accurately, they are designed to increase access to legal representation for those without resources, or whose resources are disproportionate to their legal opponent, which can increase the number of lawsuits. Some of these lawsuits may be &quot;good/valid&quot; lawsuits, and some may be &quot;bad/nuisance&quot; lawsuits. The idea of a contingency fee is that rather than an hourly rate, the lawyer is entitled to a percentage of any award or settlement the defendant receives. Generally, such a percentage converts to a much higher amount than what a lawyer would receive on a per-hour basis. It also aligns a plaintiff and attorney's finical interests together, in terms risk and reward (e.g. accept a settlement for quick and sure cash now, or continue on to trial for a potentially larger award, but risk losing). There is a disincentive for lawyers to take on meritless cases, because they often receive little to no compensation in the event of a loss. However, the contingency fee system can increase the number of lawsuits, including nuisance suits, by incentivizing lawyers to take on &quot;long-shot&quot; cases or just trying to grab quick settlement offers, which can potentially be in the best interest of a legitimate plaintiff, but equally could be abused by lawyers searching for quick settlements, rather than victorious judgements. Lawyers are incentivized to take &quot;weak&quot; cases, regardless of validity, if their portion of the awards are sufficiently large. For example, imagine a hourly-fee case A, and a contingency-fee cases B and C. Case A can be estimated to accrue $200,000 in lawyer fees, regardless of outcome, but cases B and C each have a 30% contingency, and a 20% chance of victory/settlement. Case B is estimated to yield a settlement/judgement of $5,000,000, and Case C is estimated to yield a settlement/judgement of $50,000,000. Case B's &quot;expected return&quot; to the lawyer is $300,000 (5 million * 0.20 * 0.30), a 50% increase, while Case C's &quot;expected return&quot; is 3,000,000, an order of magnitude larger than the hourly-fee case. (Numbers are just for illustration purposes.) For an example of such &quot;fishing for settlements&quot;, see the Prenda Law case (with the caveat that those abuses would not be affected by the presence or absence of contingency fees, since the Prenda Law &quot;plaintiffs&quot; were the lawyers themselves). https://www.popehat.com/tag/prenda-law/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prenda_Law https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/07/prenda-law-porn-troll-saga-ends-with-prison-for-founder/
It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question.
Two reasons that spring to mind: The Respondent wanted the appeal to proceed so that they would have definitive case law from a higher court. That is they thought they would win and, quite possibly, the appellant thought they would win too. Rolling the dice on a losing proposition is not so bad if you have no skin in the game so the Respondent is encouraging the appeal. Its a commercial PR decision - it looks bad in the press if you use your money and power to prevent someone from pursuing their legal rights. This way, they can put their hand on their hearts and say "we gave them every opportunity to prove us wrong".
Threat of lawsuit can't be illegal It is a basis of functioning legal systems, that if you have a case, you can sue. However, nothing in any such legal system requires them to sue. Instead, offering a resolution out of court - like arbitration or offering to relinquish a claim for payment - is legal. Adding pressure by saying &quot;This is my offer, otherwise I sue&quot; is not extortion, because after the suit is filed, it is with the courts. Should the claimant file a frivolous lawsuit, then the court will deal with it - dismissing the case and sanctioning the claimant and their lawyer. See also these questions: Why is threatening to sue not considered extortion? Why should one never threaten to sue? What is the point of sending a demand letter?
If it's not in the lease agreement, then you did not agree to it. Even in the absence of the law prohibiting the late fee, the landlord would not be able to impose it because it is not in the lease. It is of course up to you whether you want to test it. It may be more trouble than it is worth. Then again, it's probably not worth the landlord's trouble to begin eviction proceedings over a late fee. Paying late and refusing to pay the fee would probably sour your relationship with the landlord, which is usually something you want to avoid. If you do pay late at some point, you may want to point out to the landlord the relevant provision of Massachusetts law. The matter would probably end there: either the landlord doesn't know about it, or the landlord is hoping that you don't know about it. Pointing it out in a polite manner will inform the landlord of the law and that you are acquainted with the law. Unless the landlord is quite unreasonable, that should take care of it. Whether there is any law prohibiting landlords from announcing an intention to take a prohibited action is indeed a different question. Is there any legal reason for me to bring this up and get the landlord to formally acknowledge that they will not in fact charge illegal late fees? No. You have a contract with the landlord that already says you are going to move in. He cannot modify that contract simply by sending you a letter.
There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.
Each side paying for their own litigation costs is called the American Rule. As you noted in your question, it contrasts the English Rule where the losing party pays the winning party's litigation costs. In the United States, there are literally thousands of specific exceptions to the American Rule but they can be divided into these general categories: Contracts that say the losing party pays. This is one you pointed out in your question and is pretty common. Common Fund Doctrine. This is legal principle that courts have applied where it would be unfair for a plaintiff to pay their legal fees because it would be ultimately coming out of their pocket. Some classic examples are: A beneficiary suing a trustee for violating his fiduciary duties; shareholders suing the management of a company; and some types of class-action and antitrust cases where the efforts of the attorneys benefited the "common good". Contempt proceedings. See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923). This would only apply where one party is asking the Court to hold an opposing party in contempt, not where a judge initiates a contempt proceeding. Today, most states and the federal system have court rules that would likely apply here as well. Bad Faith litigation. As you noted in your question. This would be bad-faith/frivolous lawsuits and action in litigation that needlessly delay or increase the expenses of the opposing party. Statutes. This is by far the largest category. There are too many statutes to list but here is a sample of some broad categories: Civil Rights Cases (Civil Rights Act, Voting Rights Act, housing discrimination, Americans with Disabilities Act, Etc.) Consumer Protection cases (Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt Collection Act, etc.) Landlord-Tenant cases Environmental Protection Cases Open Records Law cases (Freedom of Information Act and similar state statutes) The statutes that contain fee-shifting provisions are generally ones where litigation is thought to be in the "public interest." The idea is that the legislature wants to encourage the private enforcement of certain laws. Allowing the recovery of attorney's fees provides financial incentives for lawyer to take cases where the ultimate damages award is small and might be less than their legal fees. There is a good law review article in the American University Law Review called The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice on this topic. While it's 20 years old, the policy considerations and historical perspective remains accurate.
I've never heard the phrase used this way, and it wouldn't make any sense, anyway; &quot;indemnity&quot; is security against a consequence, so the existence of civil and criminal consequences would be a double non-indemnification. Maybe ask the lecturer for a published example of this usage.