Do the Postmaster&#39;s actionsviolate 18 U.S. Code &#167; 595. Interference by administrative employees of Federal, State, or Territorial Governments? According to the US Code Title 18 Section 595: Whoever, being a person employed in any administrative position by the United States, or by any department or agency thereof...uses his official authority for the purpose of interfering with, or affecting, the nomination or the election of any candidate for the office of President, Vice President, Presidential elector, Member of the Senate, Member of the House of Representatives, Delegate from the District of Columbia, or Resident Commissioner, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. I'm not a legal expert, but as far as I can tell, Postmaster DeJoy is a person employed by the United States government, is using his official authority as leader of the USPS, for the purpose of affecting the 2020 presidential elections by reducing the capabilities of the USPS to process mail-in ballots. Am I missing something here, or are his actions indeed a violation of federal law?
Probably not There's a difference between knowing DeJoy is guilty, and proving he is guilty. The first is a matter of your personal views on epistemology; the second is a matter of law. The statute says an official cannot use &quot;his official authority for the purpose of interfering with...&quot; In other words, in order to charge DeJoy, the government needs evidence that he is making these changes for the purpose of interfering with the election. According to news reports, DeJoy claims his purpose is legitimate: To balance the USPS budgets. He claims the PO is losing so much money that drastic cuts are required unless Congress increases funding. Given that the USPS is running a deficit, it will very hard to prove that DeJoy's explanation is just a smokescreen, that his real purpose is to screw up the election. So, unless there is a smoking gun, it seems likely he would not be charged, let alone found guilty. Note: Edited for clarity in light of comments
Art II, Sec 2, Cl 1 of The Constitution says of the president "and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment". The Constitution does not state any further restrictions on the presidential power, and there are no statutory limits, because, as observed in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 The power of pardon conferred by the Constitution upon the President is unlimited except in cases of impeachment. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. The power is not subject to legislative control. Accordingly, presidents have written pardons on and with numerous different writing instruments. Insofar as there are no constitutional restrictions beyond the aforementioned, it is not required that a pardon be signed, or that it be on a tangible semi-permanent medium. It is impossible to know what such a pardon tweet would look like, beyond the limit on length. The one place where a presidential signature is required is under the Presentment Clause, that when presented with a bill that passed the two houses of Congress, "If he approve he shall sign it". Such a signature need not be actually written by the president, it may and often is written by an autopen. The question of the legality of autopen signatures for bills has not been presented to SCOTUS, but the Department of Justice has issued an opinion (July 7, 2005) that it is legal. I have failed to locate a repository of presidential pardons (the actual documents), so I do not know if, so far, all presidential pardons were written down and signed, though I would expect it to be so. The Arpaio pardon was signed (or auto-signed), likewise Obama's final mass-pardon on Jan 17, and previous Obama pardons were, but pre-Obama, DOJ does not provide any document.
You aren't allowed to open it or destroy it. (18 USC 1702). USPS says (at http://faq.usps.com/): If the mailpiece is delivered to the correct location but the recipient on the mailpiece does not reside at the address: Write &quot;Not at this address&quot; on mailpiece. Don't erase or mark over the address. Provide the mailpiece to your mailperson or drop into a Collection Box receptacle. Destroying mail that was not intended for you may be prohibited by US laws. Willfully destroying mail is an act that may be punishable by the Federal Government.
It isn't a double negative, although it is a bit of an usual phrasing. The context that you are overlooking is that the United States Constitution does not say who is or is not allowed to vote because that authority is not vested in the federal government. There is no affirmative right to vote in the United States Constitution, there is merely a right not to be denied the right to vote for certain particular reasons. Responsibility for determining who is allowed to vote is vested in state governments. The right to vote for the House of Representatives is derivative of that decision pursuant to Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution which states: The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature. The 19th Amendment prohibits state's from denying the right to vote on account of sex, but does not prohibit states from denying the right to vote on account of other grounds not specified in the 19th Amendment, such as property ownership, education, criminal record, possession of identification, etc. When the 19th Amendment was ratified, in 1920, some states (e.g. Colorado) already allowed women to vote, while others did not. Similarly, when the 15th Amendment was ratified some states prevented people from voting based upon race and others did not. And, so on. In practice, the modern trend is for states to enact laws allowing all U.S. citizens age eighteen or over to vote, subject primarily to limitations that vary quite a bit based upon criminal record or incarceration status. But, historically, when the power to set the franchise was vested in the states, race, gender, property ownership, age (in excess of eighteen), poll tax payments, and "civics" tests, have all been used at sometime or another to limit the right to vote. There is, however, some incentive for states not to be restrictive, because certain kinds of restrictions reduce the population of the state under the U.S. Constitution for purposes of allocated members of Congress and electoral votes. This is set forth in Section 2 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution (ratified in 1868) which states: Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. (Incidentally, there are no longer any people who qualify as "Indians not taxed" in the U.S. due to federal legislation that was adopted after 1868.) This set a presumptive baseline that males twenty-one years of age not disqualified by a criminal record are allowed to vote, but with a penalty for not doing so imposed at the state level in apportionment rather than in the form of a prohibition against doing so, before express prohibitions against certain kinds of restrictions of the franchise were adopted in the 15th, 19th, 24th and 26th Amendments. It is also useful to compare the examples of the 15th Amendment (ratified 1870), the 24th Amendment (ratified 1964) and the 26th Amendment (ratified 1971), which are parallel to the 19th Amendment and wouldn't make sense against a backdrop that the population, by default, is allowed to vote. Article XV (Amendment 15 - Rights of Citizens to Vote) The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. and Amendment XXIV (Amendment 24 - Abolition of the Poll Tax Qualification in Federal Elections) The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. and Amendment XXVI (Amendment 26 - Reduction of Voting Age Qualification) 1: The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age. affects 15 2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
These all seem to be issues with how the local post office is handling your mail (and no doubt that of others). I would start by asking to see the person in charge of that office, and asking that person the same questions that you asked here. I am not sure that, under US law, the "envelope information" of your mail is protected in the way that the contents are.
The US election authorities already record who voted in which elections, and that information is a matter of public record. When I was active in politics some years ago, and at one point a candidate for local office, my campaign and others routinely purchased from the state a &quot;voter list&quot; for each district. This list showed each registered voter, with that person's name, address, age (to the nearest year), party of registration if any, and in which of the last several (I think 10) elections that person had voted. These were delivered in electronic form, and could be sorted and analyzed in whatever way the purchaser pleased. I understand that similar lists are available in every US state, I think from a legal point of view, a picture would reveal no more information than these already-public lists, and since they have not been successfully challenged as unconstitutional, I don't see that the pictures would be subject to such a challenge, unless it could be shown that taking such pictures had a chilling effect, that is, that taking them made certain categories of voters, such as minority voters, less likely to vote. I am not aware of any specific federal or state laws on taking pictures of voters. But if there were a chilling effect, that would probably violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Fourteenth amendment. That clause has been central, or at least significant, in most challenges to voter restrictions, both successful and unsuccessful. But since, as far as I know, no state or other US jurisdiction has tried this, there is no caselaw on point, and one cannot be sure how such a case would be resolved. Whether this would be good policy is a very different question, and where it would be politically acceptable is yet another. Neither of those are on topic here on Law.se, although they might be on Politics.SE.
The Commander-in-chief powers are quite broad. The War Powers Resolution limits his ability to engage unilaterally in military action, by requiring him to report to Congress within 48 hours, and if Congress disapproves, troops must be removed after 60 days. However, this law pertains to armed forces, and would not apply to remotely-launched missiles. Additionally, it is unknown if the resolution is unconstitutional (presidents say it is). No law at all requires POTUS to obtain permission from someone else, in order to engage in a military action. Article 90 of the UCMJ states that it is a punishable offense to "willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer". The manual also states that An order requir­ing the performance of a military duty or act may be inferred to be lawful and it is disobeyed at the peril of the subordinate. This inference does not apply to a patently illegal order, such as one that directs the commission of a crime. Murder of a civilian is an example. It also says The lawful­ness of an order is a question of law to be deter­mined by the military judge. "Shocking the conscience" is not a grounds allowing disobedience. One can only conjecture how a military judge would evaluate the lawfulness of a presidential order, when there is not a shred of legal evidence that such an order is in fact illegal: I conjecture that the order would be found to be lawful.
The presidential line of succession is governed by the U.S. Constitution, specifically Article II section 1: In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The 25th amendment reinforces this and says "Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress." So, after the vice president, the constitution lets Congress pass laws governing the rest of the succession. This is governed by the Presidential Succession Act. 3 U.S. Code Chapter 1, Section 19 lays out the rest of the line of succession: Next come the Speaker of the House of Representatives (subsection a) and the President pro tempore of the Senate (subsection b) and "then the officer of the United States who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security" (subsection d). So you have the Attorney General at number 7. However, the next subsection says the following (emphasis mine). (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve upon them. I think the bolded text answers your question. The Acting Attorney General has not been confirmed by the Senate, so is not in the presidential line of succession. Now there is potentially room to argue that, if the Acting Attorney General has been confirmed by the Senate for some other office (most likely Deputy Attorney General), then they qualify. Of course, there is no case law to clarify this, since the presidential succession has never gone beyond what is listed in the constitution. However, I don't think it's a very compelling argument, particularly for the current Acting Attorney General who was not appointed on the basis of his previous confirmation. (Interestingly, a Bill was introduced to the House in 2003 that would have explicitly removed acting officers from the line of succession. Ultimately, that Bill did not progress.)