what is the process for overturning a Michigan Supreme Court ruling? It occurred to me that a long-standing Michigan Supreme Court ruling might possibly be incorrect; the case involves interpreting the Michigan Constitution [although, as pointed out below, this technically isn't possible as the MSC, by definition, has the final say-so in interpreting the constitution]. What is the process for having the issue re-heard? Details: the case is Butcher v. Township of Grosse Ile, which deals with Article IX, Section 9 of the Michigan constitution. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution, the total amount of general ad valorem taxes imposed upon real and tangible personal property for all purposes in any one year shall not exceed 15 mills on each dollar of the assessed valuation of property as finally equalized. Under procedures provided by law, which shall guarantee the right of initiative, separate tax limitations for any county and for the townships and for school districts therein, the aggregate of which shall not exceed 18 mills on each dollar of such valuation, may be adopted and thereafter altered by the vote of a majority of the qualified electors of such county voting thereon, in lieu of the limitation hereinbefore established. These limitations may be increased to an aggregate of not to exceed 50 mills on each dollar of valuation, for a period of not to exceed 20 years at any one time, if approved by a majority of the electors, qualified under Section 6 of Article II of this constitution, voting on the question. The foregoing limitations shall not apply to taxes imposed for the payment of principal and interest on bonds approved by the electors or other evidences of indebtedness approved by the electors or for the payment of assessments or contract obligations in anticipation of which bonds are issued approved by the electors, which taxes may be imposed without limitation as to rate or amount; or, subject to the provisions of Section 25 through 34 of this article, to taxes imposed for any other purpose by any city, village, charter county, charter township, charter authority or other authority, the tax limitations of which are provided by charter or by general law. In any school district which extends into two or more counties, property taxes at the highest rate available in the county which contains the greatest part of the area of the district may be imposed and collected for school purposes throughout the district. Among other things, the court in Butcher found that the phrase "The foregoing limitations shall not apply ..." at the beginning of the second paragraph obviates the "... aggregate of not to exceed 50 mills ..." in the first paragraph for cites, et. al. My very careful reading of the text makes me question whether this interpretation is correct. The first paragraph says "... the total amount of general ad valorem taxes imposed upon real and tangible personal property for all purposes in any one year shall not exceed 15 mills ... . Under procedures provided by law, ... , separate tax limitations for any county and for the townships and for school districts therein, the aggregate of which shall not exceed 18 mills ... , in lieu of the limitation hereinbefore established." [emphasis added] That is, the 18-mill "limitation" replaces ("in lieu of") the 15-mill limitation. The text then says, "... These limitations ..." What "limitations"? The 15- and 18-mill limitations just described. The text then continues "... may be increased to an aggregate of not to exceed 50 mills ..." Notice the wording here is "an aggregate of not to exceed", with no mention of the word "limitation." In other words, the "15- and 18-mill "limitations" may be increased up to 50 mills;" but "50 mills" itself isn't a "limitation," the text quite plainly calls it "an aggregate," as opposed to a "limitation." Now, onto the second paragraph with begins "The foregoing limitations ..." What exactly are the "foregoing limitations"? That would again be the 15- and 18-mill "limitations" described in the first paragraph; but not "... aggregate of not to exceed 50 mills ..." as that is not a "limitation." The assumption has always been that "50 mills" is also a "limitation," and thus the second paragraph excludes any "... city, village, charter county, charter township, charter authority or other authority, ..." from the 50-mill aggregate.
Background I will note that the case you cite was decided in 1972 and has been cited by other cases that relied on its precedents in all appellate decisions in Michigan, and one federal trial court decision in Michigan over the last 44 years. The losing party tried to appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal later in 1972 because there was no issue of federal law involved. Ultimate Conclusion There is pretty much no way to change the holding of that decision other than to amend the provisions of the Michigan Constitution in question by the procedures set forth in the Michigan State Constitution. Indeed, the basic premise of your question, "a long-standing Michigan Supreme Court ruling might possibly be incorrect" is basically definitionally wrong. When the Michigan Supreme Court interprets a provision of the Michigan State Constitution, its decision is, by definition, the correct interpretation of that language. It isn't terribly uncommon for authoritative court decisions to conclude for a variety of reasons that the literal plain reading of constitutional text actually means something quite different than what the words actually say. For example, the judicially interpeted meaning of the 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution (which is that states are entitled to sovereign immunity unless it is waived by the state or authorized by the United States or another state) is quite different from what the wording of the amendment says ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."), which on its face simply slightly narrows federal court jurisdiction and says nothing on its face about sovereign immunity. What you think those words should mean based upon a plain reading of the constitutional text is completely irrelevant. Amending Michigan's State Constitution Amending the state constitution is not easy in Michigan. It has been done only eight times since the current state constitution was adopted in 1963 - seven times pursuant to proposals made by the state legislature and ratified by the voters, and once in 1972 as a result of a citizens petition. It has been amended only twice since 1972. Several methods can be employed to propose and ratify amendments. Section 1 of Article XII states that: Amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the senate or house of representatives. Proposed amendments agreed to by two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in each house on a vote with the names and vote of those voting entered in the respective journals shall be submitted, not less than 60 days thereafter, to the electors at the next general election or special election as the legislature shall direct. If a majority of electors voting on a proposed amendment approve the same, it shall become part of the constitution and shall abrogate or amend existing provisions of the constitution at the end of 45 days after the date of the election at which it was approved. This is the easiest way to amend the state constitution if there is a bipartisan consensus to amend it. Section 2 of Article XII says: Amendments may be proposed to this constitution by petition of the registered electors of this state. Every petition shall include the full text of the proposed amendment, and be signed by registered electors of the state equal in number to at least 10 percent of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor at the last preceding general election at which a governor was elected. Such petitions shall be filed with the person authorized by law to receive the same at least 120 days before the election at which the proposed amendment is to be voted upon. Any such petition shall be in the form, and shall be signed and circulated in such manner, as prescribed by law. The person authorized by law to receive such petition shall upon its receipt determine, as provided by law, the validity and sufficiency of the signatures on the petition, and make an official announcement thereof at least 60 days prior to the election at which the proposed amendment is to be voted upon. Any amendment proposed by such petition shall be submitted, not less than 120 days after it was filed, to the electors at the next general election. Such proposed amendment, existing provisions of the constitution which would be altered or abrogated thereby, and the question as it shall appear on the ballot shall be published in full as provided by law. Copies of such publication shall be posted in each polling place and furnished to news media as provided by law. The ballot to be used in such election shall contain a statement of the purpose of the proposed amendment, expressed in not more than 100 words, exclusive of caption. Such statement of purpose and caption shall be prepared by the person authorized by law, and shall consist of a true and impartial statement of the purpose of the amendment in such language as shall create no prejudice for or against the proposed amendment. If the proposed amendment is approved by a majority of the electors voting on the question, it shall become part of the constitution, and shall abrogate or amend existing provisions of the constitution at the end of 45 days after the date of the election at which it was approved. If two or more amendments approved by the electors at the same election conflict, that amendment receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail. There were 3,156,531 votes cast for all candidates in the most recent election for Governor in Michigan in 2014. This means that 315,653 valid signatures would have to be on a petition requesting a constitutional amendment and experience in states where initiatives are common suggest that significantly more signatures than that would have to be collected in order to get that many valid signatures. Section 3 of Article XII says: At the general election to be held in the year 1978, and in each 16th year thereafter and at such times as may be provided by law, the question of a general revision of the constitution shall be submitted to the electors of the state. If a majority of the electors voting on the question decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, at an election to be held not later than six months after the proposal was certified as approved, the electors of each representative district as then organized shall elect one delegate and the electors of each senatorial district as then organized shall elect one delegate at a partisan election. The delegates so elected shall convene at the seat of government on the first Tuesday in October next succeeding such election or at an earlier date if provided by law. The convention shall choose its own officers, determine the rules of its proceedings and judge the qualifications, elections and returns of its members. To fill a vacancy in the office of any delegate, the governor shall appoint a qualified resident of the same district who shall be a member of the same party as the delegate vacating the office. The convention shall have power to appoint such officers, employees and assistants as it deems necessary and to fix their compensation; to provide for the printing and distribution of its documents, journals and proceedings; to explain and disseminate information about the proposed constitution and to complete the business of the convention in an orderly manner. Each delegate shall receive for his services compensation provided by law. No proposed constitution or amendment adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the electors for approval as hereinafter provided unless by the assent of a majority of all the delegates elected to and serving in the convention, with the names and vote of those voting entered in the journal. Any proposed constitution or amendments adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the qualified electors in the manner and at the time provided by such convention not less than 90 days after final adjournment of the convention. Upon the approval of such constitution or amendments by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon the constitution or amendments shall take effect as provided by the convention The next referendum pursuant to Section 3, Article XII is in the year 2026, and any proposed amendments from a constitutional convention called under that provision would not take effect until approved by voters which could happen no sooner than the year 2028. Voters declined to call for a constitutional convention in the years 1978, 1994 and 2010. No Law Pased Only By The Legislature Can Overrule This Decision The state legislature can't pass an ordinary law that overrules a Michigan Supreme Court interpretation of the state constitution either. And, even Congress can't pass a law that reinterprets language in a particular state's constitution that has been determined to be the correct one by the state supreme court. No Other Court Can Overrule This Michigan Supreme Court Decision The federal courts including the U.S. Supreme Court cannot overrule the Michigan Supreme Court on a question of Michigan state law. The lower courts of Michigan cannot overrule the Michigan Supreme Court on any question. The Michigan Supreme Court Is Extremely Unlikely To Modify This Decision The Michigan Supreme Court is extremely unlikely to overrule itself regarding a decision that has stood and been relied upon for 44 years since questions of statutory interpretation are usually given unusually strong respect as precedents to promote certainty, although it could change its mind if it wanted to. Usually, though, a state supreme court only overrules one of its own past precedents if it becomes inconsistent with another line of cases and it eventually becomes clear that there are two or more inconsistent lines of precedents can't be reconciled with each other in some fact pattern that pits one line of cases squarely against another. For example, in Colorado, earlier this year a older case holding that a defense called "laches" could not be used in child support cases collided directly with a newer Colorado Supreme Court case involving promissory notes that held that the defense called "laches" is available in every type of case in Colorado. When confronted with the conflicting precedents in a new case this year the Colorado Supreme Court resolved the conflict in favor of the newer holding, overruling the older one which states that "laches" did not apply to child support cases. But, this is extremely unlikely to happen when the question involves the meaning of the precise wording of a highly technical property tax provision of the state constitution.
Maybe, but it is not a de jure taking. There are vast numbers of restrictions on what one can do with one's property and on businesses that one can conduct on that property. Zoning ordinances prevent me from setting up a chemical factory where I have my house; I can't build it up 4 stories and there is an obligatory setback from the property line for any extension. I can't freely build on my land, I need government permission in the form of a permit. This is allowed (Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255), when the regulatory action advances a legitimate governmental goal and therefore the action is not a taking. The government might &quot;take&quot; land by rendering it useless without the formality of condemnation (United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745). But a moratorium on evictions does not render the property useless. The tenant remains liable for rent.
A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months).
Congress can't override substantive rules of constitutional law Marbury v. Madison is a binding interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution permits or denies, and in substance, this law seeks to change that interpretation of the scope of the judicial power, so that interpretation may not be overruled except via a Constitutional amendment. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appellate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statue passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. The language in italics is jurisdiction stripping language, which I discuss below, and which is also discussed in another answer. But, the language in bold is enunciating a substantive rule of law regarding how the judicial branch may resolve a case that is otherwise properly before it. And, Congress does not have the power to change that to make the U.S. Constitution a dead letter under its Article III jurisdiction regulation powers. The language in bold language is a direct attempt to overrule a binding interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and that is beyond the authority of Congress to do, so the statute would be unconstitutional, at least, in part. Jurisdiction stripping Yes, Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to Article III, Section 2 which states: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under the Regulations as the Congress shall make. But, there are parts of Article III that apply in addition to the power of Congress to create "Exceptions" the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the power to create and modify the "inferior courts" that exist. The first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is crucial, and interacts with the Exceptions power. The default provision is that all judicial power as defined in Article III, Section 2 is vested in the "supreme Court" unless and until that power is instead vested in an "inferior Court" established under Article III that Congress creates by law. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to deny every court (or even every federal court) both original and appellate jurisdiction over any constitutionally justiciable claim arising under Article III, even if the claim is not within the express original jurisdiction of SCOTUS. If they deny every inferior Article III federal court jurisdiction over something within the constitutionally defined scope of the judicial power, then it reverts to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court even though it is not expressly made a part of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal courts collectively is defined in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and extends to all cases arising under the U.S. Constitution which would include a claim to have a provision of federal or state law declared unconstitutional as in violation of the constitution. It says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; . . . (This analysis is attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.) Now, this is not to say that Congress couldn't do something to make it harder procedurally to have statutes declared unconstitutional. For example, there would be a much harder claim of unconstitutionality if Congress vested original jurisdiction in all such cases in the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, and then only assigned one judge to that district, and denied the U.S. Courts of Appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction over those decisions. At some point, however, even this lesser restriction, rather than elimination of a judicial power would still be subject to challenge under the due process protections of the 5th Amendment. Writ jurisdiction Notably, Marbury v. Madison was a case brought in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus, under the All Writs Act, and not in connection with its appellate jurisdiction. So, Congress would also have to repeal or amend the "All Writs Act" to pull off the intent of the proposed statute, because the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends by statute to writs that are not appellate in nature even though this power is very rarely exercised. A writ is a court order directed at a government official directing that government official to do something, or to refrain from doing something. But, there are many ways to back door a seemingly private cause of action, particularly one related to constitutionality, into a writ. And, if a court has jurisdiction over a writ, it has jurisdiction to entertain requests by litigants to have such writs issued. Congress can't remove a state court forum It is worth noting that every single state court from traffic court on up has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, and that state courts frequently do declare state statutes to be unconstitutional. Congressional jurisdiction to regulate jurisdiction is largely limited to regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It can put a federal question (e.g. copyright enforcement or disputes with the IRS) in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but there are no cases in which Congress has been permitted to place a federal law in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts while also denying any federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under that law. Otherwise, state court jurisdiction isn't regulated by Congress. And, the Constitution specifically requires all federal, state and local officials to swear to uphold the U.S. Constitution which arguably provides an independent basis for state court jurisdiction over constitutionality claims arising under the U.S. Constitution. This is a really important point. For example, suppose that someone who lives in the same state as you do sues you entirely under state law in a state court, and that state's courts require you to bring any claim you have against that person in state court over which that state court has jurisdiction as a counterclaim or you forfeit that claim forever. If you have federal claims against the person who sued you in state court, and your claims are not one of the handful of issues (e.g. copyright enforcement) that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you must enforce your federal claims against that person as counterclaims in that state court case, or you will lose them forever. For example, suppose that your employer sues you in state court for conversion (i.e. stealing company property) and you have a right to sue the employer for not paying you the right amount for your overtime work under federal law. Then, you must bring your federal overtime claims in state court as counterclaims to the conversion action, rather than in federal court. Similarly, even though state criminal charges are always brought in state courts, a criminal defendant in a state court criminal case, can raised arguments arising under the U.S. Constitution including a determination that a state criminal law is unconstitutional, in state court as a defense, even though the only federal court recourse a criminal defendant has is through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought in federal district court after all state direct appellate relief is exhausted, after petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court, and after all state post-conviction relief (including petitioning the final state order to the U.S. Supreme Court) is exhausted. In practice, this means, criminal defendants have no meaningful access to the federal courts other than two petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which are discretionary, until they have been incarcerated wrongfully for five or ten years. But, federal defenses can and routinely are raised in the state court trial (and indeed, federal defenses that could be raised in a state trial court may not be raised in a habeas corpus petition in federal court unless they were first raised in or before the original state court trial). N.B.: Federal claims in the exclusive original jurisdiction of state courts The extremes to which jurisdiction stripping is allowed are explored in the handful of claims arising under federal law that are expressly not within the scope of the jurisdiction of any federal trial court or intermediate appellate court, or within the express non-appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most notable of these are affirmative private individual civil lawsuits against offenders under the federal robocall and junk fax law (a.k.a. the Telephone Consumer Protection Act a.k.a. the TCPA a.k.a. 47 U.S.C. § 227), which do not not require a writ, which may only be brought in state court, subject to an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But, the federal courts have exclusively jurisdiction over litigation many kinds of claims other than private civil actions arising under the TCPA. This law is much less constitutionally concerning than the one proposed in the question, however, because while Congress can't repeal the U.S. Constitution, it doesn't have to pass a law giving private individuals a private cause of action when they receive robocalls or junk faxes at all. It could pass a law that was enforceable by the FCC alone, for example, and in the case of the TCPA, there are persons, including the FCC and regulated persons who want to challenge a regulation issued by the FCC, who are entitled to utilize the federal courts to enforce the TCPA or to dispute it. For example, there is no private cause of action to enforce most federal criminal laws (as such, not just involving the same harm) with a civil lawsuit by the victim against the criminal, in either federal court or state court, but that is not unconstitutional. This is because federal criminal laws can be enforced by government prosecutors and defended against by private individuals, in Article III federal courts. Also, even private causes of action under the TCPA are subject to ultimate U.S. Supreme Court appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court is an Article III federal court.
Regarding concern one: I don't know much of anything about historical landmarks and how they get exempted from certain laws. However, I can tell you that the law generally prefers safety over preserving historical value. It is highly unlikely that a court would ever consider a plant that has existed for any number of years to be of more value than a pedestrian's or driver's safety, and thus requiring that the hedge be trimmed or removed to allow for that safety would be far more important. As well, your argument that cutting or removing the hedges would decrease the value of the property isn't the strongest argument. Currently, you have hedges that violate a local law. That immediately decreases the value of your property because a part of your property is in violation of ordinances that would have to be corrected in order for the sale of the property to go through, because most homeowners do not want to buy a property with a burden attached to it. Thus, a potential buyer would likely stipulate that the hedges be removed before they consider buying, or they might also stipulate a lower price so they can use the difference between buying and list price to remove the hedges themselves after the sale. Sure, if you only include the part of "this property has beautiful hedges" then the property value goes up, but once you tack on "which are also in violation of law" that value you just gained is immediately negated. Now in your specific case you mentioned that it hangs a foot over an eight-foot wide sidewalk. That is an abnormally wide sidewalk (a standard sidewalk in most places is only around three feet wide, with some extending up to five feet). I've only personally seen eight-foot or more wide sidewalks in very heavily trafficked areas, which from your "small town" description doesn't sound like the case there. You might be able to argue that in your particular case, due to the size of the sidewalk, that the hedges do not actually inhibit the safety of pedestrians and thus the ordinance shouldn't apply, but there's no guarantee that would work (it sounds like the city council already decided that they want it enforced there). However, if it is hanging over into the street in any capacity, you are pretty much out of luck. It's unlikely you would ever get an exception for that kind of violation. Regarding concern two: You're widely conflating "daily" and "excessive" to mean the same thing. Daily fines are not automatically excessive fines, and it is not in any way unconstitutional for a fine to be assessed on a daily basis. The laws you cite about excessive fines refer to the cumulative total of the fine. At a certain point of assessing a fine on a daily basis, the amount reaches a point where it is an excessive amount to pay. In a situation like that, it makes far more sense to stop increasing the fine and instead jail the person as they have shown a clear disregard for the law and a willingness not to comply with the law. Continuing to fine them has proven not to deter them any further from breaking the law, and that a massive fine does not justly punish them for the actions they have taken. A different punishment is warranted. This is the premise of the case you cite in your question. Brunk argued that a cumulative fine of over $100,000 for his violations was quite excessive and appealed on that argument. I don't know what the final outcome of his appeal was, because that particular court did not make a decision (rather they vacated the amount and sent it back to a lower court for reconsideration to determine if that amount was fair). It's entirely possible he still ended up with the same fine in the end. Regarding concern three: There is nothing remotely illegal about this. So long as there is a city ordinance that allows the officer to write such a citation, the officer is perfectly within his authority to write such fine and threaten such fine for noncompliance. A law in its natural form is a threat. The government body that created that law is issuing a threat to all of its citizens that if they do this thing, then this fine or amount of jail time will be applied to them. We just don't think of laws as threats in that regard when we talk about them. An officer reiterating that to you does not constitute anything other than them telling you what the law is and what can happen if you disobey it. Now if the officer threatened something against you that is not mandated by law, that would be a more serious concern that potentially could have some legal consequences for them. But there's no evidence that occurred here. Your situation in general: If you're hoping for some constitutional argument that you can throw in the officer's face to get him to back off, you're not going to find one. Generally that part of the constitution is only reviewed after fines have been handed down. You would first need to be fined and have a judge review the case to determine a total amount of how much you will be fined for all the cumulative violations. At that point if you believe it is excessive and in violation of the constitution, you would challenge the decision in court or appeal the decision if the case has already been closed. But even then, the fine would not be dropped. It would just be reduced to a value that some other judge reviewing the appeal thinks is a fair, non-excessive amount for a fine given the specific details of your case. Your case details do matter. For example, if you just argue with the officer the entire time and do nothing to resolve the problem identified, a judge might consider a much higher value vs if you actively worked to resolve the problem but just weren't capable of doing it fast enough. "Excessive" here is a completely subjective term that is different for every single case. No one can tell you whether something is excessive until the final number has been totaled and given out. Consider the two alternatives I just mentioned above. If both of those cases were in trial at the same time, they would both likely end up with different amounts for fines and, on appeal, one might succeed in convincing a judge that the fine was excessive and one might not. Better options: You could talk to the officer and explain to him that you are not capable of doing the work that quickly without hiring additional help, which you cannot afford. But that may only work once. If the issue arises again in the future (say next year), the officer likely won't be as forgiving since you've been warned about the hedges hanging over the sidewalks and streets before. If anything at all, it will show a court that you attempted to work out an arrangement of some sort to fix the problem, and were trying to cooperate. If it ended up in court for some reason, that interaction would be immensely helpful to you. As well, you'll want to consult an attorney for exact interpretations of the city's ordinances to make sure that this is actually against the law and how the law punishes its violation. Many cities have ordinances forbidding trees and other plants from obstructing sidewalks and roadways for safety concerns, but not all. As well, I've found it is much more common for a city to impose a single fine for a violation like that if the warning is ignored. The city would then send out its own crew to rectify the problem and then charge the resident for labor, materials, and removal costs. However, if the city does not have their own Public Works department, that may not be an option for them. If you do find more specifics about how the law is to be enforced, politely tell the officer that. It won't get you out of trouble, and he may still have the legal authority to fine you in some way according to the actual law, but knowing the exact details of your township may give you more peace of mind in knowing the actual limitations of how much you can be fined.
This is an opinion question, even if it doesn't seem like one. The life work of many professors is trying to explain the current system of review. One theory that is fairly well accepted relates to the concept of deference to other political actors. To understand this theory, we need to begin by recognizes that the Court is not unilaterally adjudicating political rights; it is one of many actors that all have some stake in making Constitutional decisions. The Court recognizes this, even if it also demands that it get last word on whether or not it gets last word. In footnote four of Caroline Products the Court laid the foundation for the modern equal protection doctrine. That text embraced a constitutional scheme whereby rights are given judicial protection primarily if they are unlikely to be given political protection by the other branches of government. Under this scheme, we care about groups that are politically weak or political distant from those with power. This equal protection jurisprudence is an example of deferential thinking; we trust the political branches generally unless there is reason to doubt the effectiveness of the political process. The deferential thinking approach to constitutional law holds that we do the same for many other area of Constitutional law. A given enumerated right is only Scrutinized strictly by the courts if the courts don't trust the other political actors (States, Legislature and Executive), to adequately protect that right. As I said, that is a theory. Not everyone agrees that this is what is going on or that this is what should be going on. Moreover, many enumerated rights are protected under a very strict level of review. Strict review and "strict scrutiny" are similar ideas, with the latter being a term of art and the former being a reasonable description of how much attention courts will pay to protecting a given right.
There has never been a right to appeal directly, or discretionarily form a state trial court to SCOTUS. But, one can apply for a common law writ in SCOTUS with respect to a state trial court actions under the All Writs Act which is functionally an appeal, even though it is technically an original SCOTUS proceeding. But, original SCOTUS writs are extremely rare and I don't know if it has ever been used in the manner you describe. If so, it probably happened before the intermediate federal courts of appeal were created in the late 1800s. It isn't easy to do a search of cases to determine the answer. UPDATE WITH CORRECTION: After further consideration, I think that I have a better idea of what the question was getting at and want to elaborate on that. Most state courts (Utah, Texas and Oklahoma are exceptions to the general rule[1]), have either an intermediate court of appeal and then a state supreme court (sometimes given a different name such as "Court of Appeals" in New York State, in which the Supreme Court is the name of the trial court of general jurisdiction and the intermediate appeals court), or only a state supreme court from which appeals lie directly to the state supreme court. [1] In Utah there is an appeal of right in every civil case to the state supreme court and the intermediate court of appeals considers cases that it "kicks down" to the court of appeals rather than dealing with itself. In Texas and Oklahoma, there is a Court of Criminal Appeals in addition to the State Supreme Court, which operates much like a Supreme Court in criminal cases with the state supreme court that is nominally superior only rarely intervening in criminal cases (I don't know when precisely it can intervene in those states). In every state with an intermediate appeals court, there is an appeal of right to an intermediate appeals court which must be considered on the merits, and then a discretionary appeal to the state supreme court. Sometimes in these states there are a handful of exceptions. For example, in Colorado, there is a direct appeal of right to the state supreme court in death penalty and water law cases, and in municipal court and limited jurisdiction court cases (i.e. cases in courts limited to $25,000 in controversy or less), there is an appeal of right to what would usually be the general jurisdiction trial court and then a discretionary appeal from there to the state supreme court). But, there is still almost always one court to which there is a direct appeal of right. There are a small but non-negligible number of cases where what is usually a general jurisdiction trial court serves as an intermediate court of appeals of right for a lower trial court (e.g. a small claims court or municipal court), with appeal from there only in the discretion of the state supreme court. Those cases can and very rarely (but sometimes) do go on to be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court when a state supreme court denies discretionary review (in addition to being rare, few such cases are significant enough to justify the effort on the part of the parties to do so and are considered significant by the U.S. Supreme Court too), just as they would when an intermediate court of appeals rules and a state supreme court denies certiorari at the state level. But, in that case, the direct appeal still isn't a direct appeal of a "court of first instance" (i.e. a court where the original trial on the merits is held). But, there is no constitutional right to a direct appeal of right (there is only a constitutional right to a collateral attack via habeas corpus in criminal cases resulting in incarceration). The right to a direct appeal in state courts is a product of state law and state constitutions (in the federal courts it is a consequence of federal statutes). In some states without an intermediate court of appeals, there is also an appeal of right to the state supreme court. But, in other states without an intermediate court of appeals, appeals to the state supreme court are discretionary (much like appeals to the state supreme court from an intermediate appellate court and appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court). Thus, if you are in a state in which there is only a discretionary appeal to the state supreme court, and the state supreme court declines to consider your appeal on the merits, you can appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court once the state supreme court has declined your state level petition for certiorari. The actual pre-requisite at the state level in a direct appeal is that your state direct appellate options be exhausted. So, if you are in a state without intermediate courts of appeal in which the state supreme court reviews trial court decisions on only a discretionary basis, then you can make a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court if you have sought review on direct appeal in the state supreme court and it declined to grant certiorari to review your case on the merits. In practice, this is still very rare. States without intermediate appellate courts are universally small in population and hence have small case loads. Most states with only a single supreme court still have at least one direct appeal of right and have had that right for most of their history. And, state supreme courts usually do exercise their certiorari power in cases that are worthy of discretionary consideration in the U.S. Supreme Court. But, in this narrow situation, the U.S. Supreme Court may consider a trial court decision on a direct appeal, without it ever having been considered on the merits at the state level. This happens rarely (although the U.S. Supreme Court not infrequently, i.e. perhaps a couple of times a year, considers a case upon which there has been an intermediate direct appeal and a state supreme court has refused discretionary review), but it has almost certainly happened sometime. It is hard to devise a legal research search that would locate such a case, however, and strictly speaking, the denial of certiorari can be seen as a state supreme court ruling that is required in almost every case.
The new law wins. That's rather the point of passing a new law-- the legislature wants to change the current law of the land whether that is based on statutes or court rulings. Of course, there are caveats. Prior judicial rulings may have relied on an interpretation of a source of law that supersedes the legislature in question (i.e. based on an interpretation of the state or federal Constitution or based on a federal law that supersedes the state law). In that case the new law would be found unconstitutional or ignored. Or the new law might have an ambiguous interaction with current law that courts would have to resolve. The new law might clearly make X illegal but there may be legitimate questions about whether it intended to make previously legal action Y illegal as well. It is, after all, very difficult to write a law that covers every possible fact pattern one would encounter in the real world.