Can evidence a person gives to aid an investigation then be used to prosecute that person for an unrelated crime? Consider the following scenario: a person consents to giving some evidence to aid the investigation or prosecution of a criminal,with the reasonable, good-faith assumption that the use of that evidence will be limited in scope to the particular investigation/trial. That evidence is later used by prosecution against the person who provided the evidence in a separate, unrelated case. One can easily imagine instances where this occurs: This question is inspired by the recent revelation of some police precincts of archiving DNA evidence collected in one investigation for use in later investigations. The policy in question allowed police to use DNA samples obtained during investigation of rape victims to archive the victim's DNA evidence in databases which were later searched and used to implicate the victims in unrelated crimes. This particular issue has been explored on this site here. ​ A person surrenders dashcam footage to a police officer because it contains evidence of a hit and run accident. The footage is later used as evidence against the person because it shows that he or she was speeding earlier that day. Police solicit tips/evidence in the search for a suspect in a violent crime. A person gives an eyewitness account of the crime in a good-faith attempt to aid in the investigation. The eyewitness account implies that the person was in a location and time in violation of their parole, which is later used against them in a separate trial. (edit: I understand that the Exclusionary Rule doesn't generally apply to parole revocation hearings, but the sentiment is the same and one could easily modify the scenario to be about a different secondary crime). What policies or statutes govern the use of evidence past its original intended use? Does consent to surrender evidence in once case amount to surrendering that evidence for all uses, forever? My prima facie assumption would be that the Exclusionary Rule would apply here because the evidence was obtained in a somewhat disingenuous / coercive manner (good-faith assumption that the evidence was only being provided to aid in investigation of a particular crime) and that such a bait-and-switch collection of evidence amounts to a violation of the 5th Amendment.
There are essentially no such limits on the use of such evidence. The police are free to use evidence from one case in whatever other cases it may be helpful, and criminals have no right to turn over evidence to the police on the condition that it not be used against them. The Exclusionary Rule has no application here, because it only governs evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because the defendant here consented to producing the evidence, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Nor does the Fifth Amendment prohibit the use of this evidence. The right against self-incrimination only applies to compelled self-incrimination; if a defendant wants to voluntarily confess or turn over inculpatory evidence, he is free to do so.
If someone was charged with 15 counts of a crime but was only indicted on 2 counts, can the prosecutor introduce evidence at sentencing of charges that the person was not indicted on? In federal court, yes. This has been the case since Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) which held that evidence such as counts and conduct upon which the defendant was not charged or indicted may still be considered in a sentencing hearing. Since U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), the prosecutor can even introduce evidence at sentencing of charges upon which the person was acquitted by a jury. See generally here. This remains good law although it is controversial both in academic writing and in political discussions and among many sitting federal judges. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor constitutional provisions related to evidentiary matters (e.g., the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment) apply at sentencing. Therefore, the court may consider hearsay and other types of information that would not be admissible during a trial. However, the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission has stated that information considered by a court at sentencing must have “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, the court “must — for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter — rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” In resolving factual disputes, the court ordinarily applies the preponderance of the evidence standard. From here. The quote above cites the following authority: FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (“This Court has long recognized that sentencing judges ‘exercise a wide discretion’ in the types of evidence they may consider when imposing sentence and that ‘[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.’ Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246– 247 (1949). Congress codified this principle at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that ‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information’ a sentencing court may consider ‘concerning the [defendant's] background, character, and conduct,’ and at § 3553(a), which sets forth certain factors that sentencing courts must consider, including ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant,’ § 3553(a)(1).”). USSG §6A1.3(a). FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(B). USSG §6A1.3, comment.; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (holding that due process does not require sentencing factors to be proved by more than a preponderance of the evidence). Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 states (emphasis added): Rule 1101. Applicability of the Rules (a) To Courts and Judges. These rules apply to proceedings before: · United States district courts; · United States bankruptcy and magistrate judges; · United States courts of appeals; · the United States Court of Federal Claims; and · the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. (b) To Cases and Proceedings. These rules apply in: · civil cases and proceedings, including bankruptcy, admiralty, and maritime cases; · criminal cases and proceedings; and · contempt proceedings, except those in which the court may act summarily. (c) Rules on Privilege. The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case or proceeding. (d) Exceptions. These rules — except for those on privilege — do not apply to the following: (1) the court’s determination, under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary question of fact governing admissibility; (2) grand-jury proceedings; and (3) miscellaneous proceedings such as: · extradition or rendition; · issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; · a preliminary examination in a criminal case; · sentencing; · granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and · considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. (e) Other Statutes and Rules. A federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court may provide for admitting or excluding evidence independently from these rules. Given the immense personal importance of a sentencing hearing which can exercise discretion over a range of many decades of possible prison time, and which is frequently the only meaningful opportunity for a person who is easily proven guilty to distinguish himself or herself from other defendants, it is really very stunning and counterintuitive that this is the case. And if so isn't that denying the defendant his or her due process because that person was not indicted on those charges? Under current U.S. Constitutional law, the maximum sentence that can be imposed must be based upon convictions by a jury or judge based upon charges upon which indictments were brought, which were proved beyond a reasonable doubt based upon admissible evidence. The leading case in support of this proposition is Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). But, at sentencing, the judge's exercise of discretion up to the maximum sentence established at trial may be made based upon a preponderance of the evidence and that evidence is not subject to the same procedural safeguards.
Yes, One Can In the United States, one may assert the Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify or otherwise give information that might tend to implicate the speaker in a crime. This is true in any court proceeding, civil or criminal, whether the person asserting the privilege is an accused, a witness, or a party to a civil case. It may be asserted in a Grand Jury or trial proceeding. One may also assert the privilege under police interrogation, or in an administrative proceeding. One may also assert it when testifying before Congress, a state legislature, or any local legislative body. One may also assert it when testifying before a government agency, such as the Interstate Commerce Commission. Asserting the privilege is often informally called &quot;pleading the Fifth&quot;, although strictly speaking &quot;pleading&quot; is something that only an accused does (as in &quot;I plead not guilty&quot;). The availability of the privilege in civil cases has been true at least since the Saline Bank case of 1828 (see below). The privilege is not available when no criminal prosecution is legally possible, such as when the statute of limitations has expired, or when the law invoked has been held unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, and no other valid law applies. Thus, if an authorized government official (usually a prosecutor) offers a grant of immunity, the privilege is no longer available on matters covered by the grant, and the person asserting it must then testify on such matters. The privilege may be asserted when the person doing so is actually guilty, or when the person is not guilty, but has a reasonable belief that the statements asked for might be used against the speaker in some current or future criminal proceeding. A person who has been tried for a crime nut had the case end in a mistrial, or a dismissal without prejudice, could still be re-tried for that accusation, and so may assert the privilege. Any assertion must be clear, but need not use a specific form of worfs. The standard form advised by many lawyers is I decline to answer on the grounds that the answer might tend to incriminate me. but less formal wording such as 'I take the Fifth&quot; will also serve to assert the privilege. When the privilege is asserted in a court case, the Judge may question the person asserting it in private, off the record, to determine whether the fear of incrimination is reasonable. Case Law Saline Bank (1828) In the case of United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. 100 (1828) Chief Justice Marshall wrote: It is apparent that, in every step of the suit, the facts required to be discovered in support of this suit would expose the parties to danger. The rule clearly is that a party is not bound to make any discovery which would expose him to penalties, and this case falls within it. [This case was cited in Murphy, below] Saline Bank was a civil suit by the US treasury in Federal curt against an apparently unincorporated bank, but a Virginia state law of the time made it a crime to operate or participate in a bank without a proper charter. Thus the Marshall Court held that a witness in a civil suit could assert the privilege against the future possibility of a state criminal proceeding. Kastigar (1972) In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) the US Supreme Court wrote (footnotes omitted): It [the privilege against self-incrimination] can be asserted in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory, and it protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used. This Court has been zealous to safeguard the values that underlie the privilege [Citing the Miranda case in a footnote]. (Kastigar was a case in which people subpoenaed before a Grand Jury asserted the privilege, were granted immunity, and still refused to testify, alleging that the grant of immunity was not enough to revoke the privialge. They were held in contempt, appealed, and the Court held that the immunity was sufficient to allow the witnesses to be compelled to testify. In the court of its opinion, the Kastigar Court reviewed the history of the privilege and of immunity statutes in some detail.) Murphy (1964) In Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) the US Supreme Court wrote: We have held today that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination must be deemed fully applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1. ... Petitioners were subpoenaed to testify at a hearing conducted by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor concerning a work stoppage at the Hoboken, New Jersey, piers. After refusing to respond to certain questions about the stoppage on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminated them, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution under the laws of New Jersey and New York. [Footnote 2] Notwithstanding this grant of immunity, they still refused to respond to the questions on the ground that the answers might tend to incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of immunity did not purport to extend. [This case was cited in Kastigar above.] McCarthy v. Arndstein (1924) In McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (footnotes omitted, boldface added) The US Supreme Court wrote: The case is now before us on rehearing, granted in order to permit argument of the proposition, not presented by counsel before, that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to an examination of the bankrupt made for the purpose of obtaining possession of property belonging to his estate. ... The contention now is that the privilege against self-incrimination ought to have been disallowed because, under the Constitution, it does not extend to the examination of a bankrupt in a bankruptcy proceeding. The government insists broadly that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant. It protects likewise the owner of goods which may be forfeited in a penal proceeding. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 142 U. S. 563-564. The government urges more strongly a narrower contention. It claims that the constitutional privilege does not relieve a bankrupt from the duty to give information which is sought for the purpose of discovering his estate. It asserts that, in England, such an exception to the common law privilege prevails, and that the exception had been established there prior to the Declaration of Independence. Whatever may be the rule in England, it is clear that, in America, the constitutional prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination has not been so limited.
england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: &quot;Infinite&quot; indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.
A fact cannot by itself constitute reasonable suspicion; the word &quot;reasonable&quot; describes not only the relationship between the fact and the possible existence of a crime, but also the officer's knowledge about the fact. The officer must not only sincerely believe the truth of the facts constituting reasonable suspicion, but must also reasonably believe it. I do not know whether a hallucinatory experience may be found reasonable for this purpose; I suspect that it would be a matter of dispute at trial. The first example is perhaps more straightforward, as there are probably a few possible explanations for the officer's failure to notice the turn signal. Still, are they reasonable? If the officer could not see the turn signals because something blocked the line of sight, it would not be reasonable for the officer to conclude that the driver had failed to use the signal. Rather, the officer has no evidence one way or the other, and absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The question deals in hypotheticals, where we can assume that the officer is sincere. But in a trial, the jury (or judge in a bench trial) cannot do that. They will look at the evidence, including the officer's testimony, and assess the officer's credibility. They will form an opinion about whether the belief was sincere and reasonable before they look at whether the facts, as the officer believed them to be, reasonably indicated that a crime was being committed or was imminent.
Is mere accusation without evidence other than testimony of the accuser, grounds for arrest in the UK? It depends on the circumstances, especially when dealing with non-recent allegations where independent and corroborative evidence may be difficult to locate and/or recover, but in my experience it is very rarely an option to arrest soley on the say-so of one complainant unless there is a compelling reason to do so. It's also fraught with potential risks - Operation Midland being a prime example of when it can go horribly wrong. Also, no-one can &quot;call the police and have someone arrested&quot; in the united-kingdom - the police are under a duty to carry out a &quot;proportionate investigation&quot; in to allegations of crime and then make their own minds up on how to proceed based on the available intelligence and evidence. Focussing on england-and-wales, the most commonly used power of arrest* is at s.24 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 which, along with PACE Code G, requires an officer to: Reasonably suspect that an offence is being, has been or will be committed. On a scale of 0 to 10 - with 10 being total knowledge and 0 being no opinion at all - suspicion may be as low as 2 or 3 whereas belief starts at 7 or 8. And reasonably believe an arrest is necessary. One commonly used mnemonic for the Necessity Test under s.24 is: ID COP PLAN: Investigation - prompt and effective investigation of offence or conduct Disappearance - prevent prosecution being hindered by disappearance of a person Child / Vulnerable person - protection of Obstruction of highway Physical injury to themselves or someone else Public (in)decency Loss or damage to property Address not know Name not known I cannot say why the officer did not make an arrest in the OP's case. I surmise that he did not deem it necessary based on the above mandatory criteria but rather considered that a voluntary attendance interview would be the most appropriate course of action given the circumstances and information available to him at the time. *There are other statutory and common-law powers of arrest, but they all follow the same procedures as above
In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge.
Short Answer No. Double jeopardy of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits someone from being prosecuted more than once for the same factually specific crime (i.e. "the same offense"). The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The original acquittal was correct, because it was for a crime that did not happen. The later trial is for a different crime that actually did happen at a different time. In the same way, an acquittal for a DUI committed on Tuesday does not bar prosecution of the same defendant for a different DUI committed on Thursday. So, double jeopardy does not apply in the scenario presented. A Similar But Harder Case The analysis would be trickier if: A shoots B. A is tried and acquitted for the murder of B. B was only presumed dead but was actually alive. After being acquitted for Bs murder, B dies of the gunshot wound from A in (1). A is later arrested and tried for Bs murder (a second time). This is a much trickier question, because A was actually tried and acquitted of a crime that hadn't been completed at the time of trial, but in which A's involvement had terminated at the time. (To make it even more complex if you are inclined, in a first degree kidnapping case, the death penalty applies unless the defendant can prove the affirmative defense that the victim didn't die, and a first degree kidnapping acquittal would probably not bar a later murder conviction because the offenses have elements sufficiently different from each other, even though the death penalty or life in prison without parole sentence for that offense is based on the conclusive presumption that the victim died in law, rather than in fact.) Issue Preclusion This might depend upon the nature of the evidence at trial - if A did not raise the failure of the prosecution to provide corpus delecti (i.e. a dead body) or the misidentification of an alleged victim's body as a defense and instead, for example, argued an alibi defense (e.g. he was in jail at the time of the alleged shooting). This narrow fact pattern would be a particularly close question and I wouldn't be surprised to see a court deviate from the usual precedents and general rules under these circumstances. There is a substantial body of case law on whether prosecution for a crime with elements A, B, and C bars prosecution for a crime with different elements arising from the same facts and circumstances (e.g. if acquittal of a lesser included offense whose elements must all be proved to convict on the more severe offense provides double jeopardy protection), that wouldn't be directly applicable in my alternative scenario because the offense tried the first time and the second would have exactly the same elements. This depends upon when a concept analogous to the principle of collateral estoppel (also known as "issue preclusion") in civil cases, in which facts previously litigated can bind a party in a later lawsuit, with or without constitutional double jeopardy dimensions, applies in criminal cases. As a general rule, there was historically no doctrine of collateral estoppel in criminal cases as noted in a 1967 law review article. But, the U.S. Supreme Court has also adopted a limited version of the principle of collateral estoppel under the guise of the double jeopardy clause in criminal cases as it noted in Yeager (discused below) a few years after that article was written. [I]n Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U. S. 436 (1970). . . we squarely held that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the Government from relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial. The hard question is determining what a jury's acquittal "necessarily decided" in particular facts and circumstances, given that a jury verdict in a criminal case typically only determines if the jury convicted, acquitted, or hung on each of the charges presented to it in the indictment and not dismissed before tiral. This analysis requires the court to assume that the jury acted rationally, even if extraneous facts allow us to know that it did not act rationally, and to determine that a prior acquittal was logically inconsistent with a new conviction. In Yeager v. U.S. (2009), however, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted Ash v. Swenson narrowly. It held that hung juries on counts should be ignored for constitutional purposes as if that the trial of that count never happened. When Is A Murder Committted? There would also be a question of when the crime of murder is committed (i.e. when the acts are taken or only once someone dies). Generally, murder is not a complete crime until someone dies. For example, if you were prosecuted for murder before someone died and acquitted because they were alive, you could be prosecuted again for murder later if they died of their injuries. (The more usual case is that someone is tried and convicted of assault, then the victim dies, and they are retried for murder, which is allowed since a conviction for assault is not logically inconsistent with a conviction for murder.) Similarly, if you were convicted of murder after a fair trial and presented the live body of the victim as newly discovered evidence, there is a good chance that you could have the original conviction vacated. If, however, you were convicted, and the Court found that you knew that the victim hadn't died at the time of trial, but you did not raise the fact that the victim wasn't dead, it isn't clear if you could have the original conviction vacated because it was a fair trial and you knew evidence sufficient to get yourself acquitted (which you may have refrained from presenting to avoid conviction on a lesser charge like kidnapping or aggravated assault), and the status of an "actual innocence" grounds for vacating a conviction after trial is hotly disputed, conservatives like the late Justice Scalia generally say "no", liberals generally say "yes", moderates like to say "yes" but make it almost impossible to establish except in rare cases like one where a live person walks in when there was a murder conviction for killing that actually living person. Obviously this doesn't come up all that often because usually prosecutors don't bring murder cases until they find a body and identify it and aren't in a rush to do so because there is usually no statute of limitations for murder. Conclusion In The Harder Case My overall conclusion is that double jeopardy would not apply even in the much closer case. This is because a belief that the victim was not dead could have been a basis for the original verdict notwithstanding a presumption to the contrary. The jury knows that a death is a element of murder and might have acquitted not based upon the reasons presented to it at trial but based upon their own personal view that the failure to present a body left them with reasonable doubt for some reason or another, which is a perfectly plausible scenario. If this happened, an acquittal the first time and conviction the second time wouldn't be inconsistent, even if no one argued about a lack of a body in their trial presentation. Ironically, if A was acquitted of aggravated assault of B in the first trial, that would be far more likely to bar a conviction when B later dies, than an acquittal from a charge of murdering B, because murder is logically inconsistent with an acquittal of aggravated assault in most circumstances, but a previous murder acquittal based upon lack of proof of a dead body is not inconsistent with proof of a later death. But, this would still be a close case that could come out either way on the double jeopardy issue. A court could conceivably argue that if the death of B was not contested at trial, that the first murder acquittal would be inconsistent with a murder conviction upon the death of B later on from the events that formed the basis of the first prosecution. Tactical Considerations Of course, even if prosecution of A for B's murder the second time was not be barred by double jeopardy, it is still likely that the prosecution would agree to lesser charges or not prosecute because the first acquittal showed it was a weak case, and the fact that A would now also be able to argue that the gunshot was not the proximate cause of B's death (and that it was instead, for example, due to medical malpractice or was a de facto suicide due to refusal of adequate treatment). Scope Of Analysis This reasoning would apply anywhere in the U.S. and is not specific to a particular state or territory as double jeopardy is a principle of U.S. Constitutional law that applies directly in federal courts (including the courts of territories and commonwealths) and indirectly through selective incorporation against the states via the 14th Amendment.