How far can the meanings of commonly used words be redefined by a legislature? Most people understand &quot;operating a motor vehicle&quot; as driving, until they are arrested for DUI while sleeping off in their turned off car. Most people understand &quot;loaded weapon&quot; as a gun with bullets in it, until they are charged in NYC with possession of a loaded firearm despite having the gun and the bullets in separate locked containers. How far can such redefinitions of common words divert from the common usage?
As much as they like Most pieces of legislation have a “dictionary” detailing, for the purposes of that legislation (or generally) what specific words and phrases mean. This can broaden (or narrow) the definition compared to how they are used in normal English. The purpose of this is not to set a trap for the unwary, although this may happen, but to introduce precision and to allow a short defined term to be used in the drafting rather than having to explain what is meant verbosely every time it’s used. Of course, they can’t redefine terms so that they give themselves jurisdiction when they otherwise wouldn’t have it. For example, in australia, the Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws about, among other things, “external affairs”. A law that tried to define “external affairs” more broadly than the Constitution does (which it doesn’t, so we fall back on what it means in English) would be invalid.
The general story is that one state does not have jurisdiction over an act carried out in another state. The Wiki on state gun laws claims that ownership in Illinois requires a permit, but the law is here, and in fact the law addresses possession and acquisition, but not ownership, for example 430 ILCS 65/2: No person may acquire or possess firearm ammunition within this State without having in his or her possession a Firearm Owner's Identification Card previously issued in his or her name by the Department of State Police under the provisions of this Act It is legally immaterial that the word "Owner" is in the name of the card. It is likewise claimed that Massachusetts requires a license to own a gun, but from what I can tell the requirements pertain to licenses to possess or purchase, and not just to own. So there seems to be no impediment to actual ownership in the US.
RS 14:95.2 applies to everyone, and defines a particular kind of crime. The housing contract overlaps that law in a small way: the legislature did not make it a crime for a student to possess a firearm in his dorm room. But the university makes it a lease condition, in the same way that having a pet is not a crime, but is grounds for terminating the lease.
In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.
This ultimately is a matter of Statutory Interpretation. One of the principles of statutory interpretation is that all words are interpreted in their context. For your example, that means we look at the title of 1464, "Broadcasting obscene language". From this it becomes apparent that radio is used in its common meaning of AM and FM radio broadcasts. Statutory interpretation is broader than that single rule, though. Legislative intent is another important factor, and that is rather effective in eliminating absurd arguments. Via the link above, from New Mexico's State Court: words have their ordinary meaning "as long as the ordinary meaning does not render the statute's application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust." In other words, absurdity is so bad that the court will prefer an alternative interpretation of the offending words.
In this context, the phrase &quot;use all means necessary and appropriate&quot; should be viewed as a single phrase rather than words in isolation, and it essentially simply confers discretion on the President to decide what is necessary and appropriate, rather than being a limiting direction. The word &quot;appropriate&quot; is included in the phrase to avoid a crabbed construction of the word &quot;necessary&quot; to mean &quot;only if absolutely necessary&quot;, and to instead mean &quot;related to carrying out the objective&quot; even if the means chosen are not actually the only way that the objective could be accomplished. It is a close relative of the constitutional grant to Congress under Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to enact legislation &quot;necessary and proper&quot; to carry out the enumerated powers of Congress set forth in that section, and has a very similar meaning. Taken as a whole, the primary limitation imposed by &quot;necessary and appropriate&quot; it to prohibit the President from using this statute as a grant of authority to do something completely unrelated to getting someone out of International Criminal Court custody (e.g. providing disaster relief to fire victims in California, or ignoring an environmental regulation in connection with building a border wall with Canada).
The statute of limitations sets out the period of time after a crime has been within which formal criminal proceedings must be commenced. If the police or DA were to request and receive an arrest warrant that met the requirements of the Fourth Amendment then the person would be a fugitive and time spent as a fugitive does not count. From Groh v Ramirez: The Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The requirement is that the person to be seized must be "particularly described" - that is unambiguously identified. A name will do that but so will a commonly used alias.
Generally, &quot;yes&quot;, but it isn't a constitutional or federal right. It is a right that flows from the right of the owner of real property to determine who is allowed on real property, and the fact that generally speaking, a concealed weapon carrier isn't a protected class that cannot be discriminated against. Thus, while this is the default rule in the U.S. and the predominant rule in the U.S., a state has the authority to prohibit businesses that are otherwise &quot;public accommodations&quot; from discriminating against concealed weapon holders if a state wishes to do so. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some exceptions, either for all concealed weapon holders, or for some subclass of them (e.g. undercover police officers). For example, a law review note, a.k.a. student written law review article, cited in the comments notes that some states require a business owner to post a sign prohibiting concealed carry in order to have the right to remove someone from the premises of their business for this reason.