In the state of Michigan, can an employer be legally liable if an intoxicated employee hits and kills someone driving into work? Under the doctrine of &quot;respondeat superior&quot;, can an employer in Michigan be legally liable if an (intoxicated) non-salary employee hits and kills a person on their way to work? Would the employer's legal responsibility change if the vehicle was owned by the company?
Under the doctrine of &quot;respondeat superior&quot;, can an employer in Michigan be legally liable if an (intoxicated) non-salary employee hits and kills a person on their way to work? Probably not. For most purposes, under principles originally established for minimum wage laws under the Portal to Portal Act, you are not at work and acting within the scope of your employment when you leave home to go to work (i.e. when you are commuting) or when you leave work to go home at the end of the day. Would the employer's legal responsibility change if the vehicle was owned by the company? Not on a respondeat superior theory. The employee still isn't acting within the scope of employment. But, Michigan does impose statutory liability upon vehicle owners which is vicarious liability even though it isn't respondeat superior liability, under a theory similar to (but broader than in some respects since it applies to non-family too, and narrower than in other respects since it is limited to vehicle owners) the common law family car doctrine. Specifically, Michigan Vehicle Code § 401(1) states (the balance of the section pertains to leased vehicles): This section shall not be construed to limit the right of a person to bring a civil action for damages for injuries to either person or property resulting from a violation of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or her agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by common law. The owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. It is presumed that the motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of the owner if it is driven at the time of the injury by his or her spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, or other immediate member of the family. So, unless the employee had a company car without the express or implied consent or knowledge of the employer, the company is responsible for harm caused by negligence. There might be an argument that criminal activity (driving while intoxicated) which was intentional or reckless, is beyond what the employer gave express or implied consent to do and was not done with employer knowledge (I haven't reviewed the case law to examine that theory), in the same way that the employer would probably not have liability if the employee, while sober, intentionally murdered his ex-wife by driving over her with the company car. But, at first blush, it looks like the employer would be on the hook if it was a company car, since drunk driving is a traffic statute that was violated for which the negligence per se liability referred to in the statute would apply. The fact pattern of the question is notable because it catches a case where there is statutory liability in Michigan, despite the fact that neither the family car doctrine, not respondeat superior, nor a negligent entrustment theory would impose liability on employer at common law. (There are negligent entrustment cases at common law in Colorado and elsewhere where negligent entrustment liability is imposed when an employer allows a drunk employee to leave work in a company car that the employer could have forbidden the employee to use because the employee was drunk.)
once employed, if you revealed in conversation your true beliefs, and they ran counter to what you wrote down, could this give the employer just cause in termination? Texas is by default an at-will employment. Thus, absent a contract establishing termination for just cause, the employee may be terminated for anything (except when that contravenes public policy) or even for no reason at all. But you specifically ask whether the employee's eventual disclosure constitutes just cause. It depends on whether the employment contract specifies that "the employee would be employed for so long as he satisfactorily performed his duties". Hardison v. A.H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167 (1952). In that event, the sole discovery that employee lied about that at the interview is not evidence that the employer was dissatisfied with the employee's work performance. In a context of termination for just cause, Porter v. United Models, Inc., 315 S.W.2d 340, 344 (2008) states that where performance is to be the satisfaction of one of the parties, his dissatisfaction must be founded on facts such as would induce action on the part of a reasonable man. He may not act arbitrarily or without reason in the matter, and the law will say that he is satisfied with that with which he ought to be satisfied. Ultimately, an employer seeks to be satisfied with the employee's actual work performance, rather than with a screening process aimed at predicting the person's work performance on the basis of the employee's personal values.
The "felony murder" doctrine, which applies in most of the U.S. (including California), holds criminals engaged in "dangerous felonies" responsible for any deaths that occur during the commission of such crimes. In the given example, the hostage taker and anyone who is an accessory to that aggravated assault would, if convicted, also be guilty of murder for deaths that occurred in connection with the incident, regardless of their intent.
Yes Assuming you were assaulted (with or without battery) and you suffered injury (physical or otherwise) during that assault you are entitled to damages. The injury has to flow from the assault but not necessarily from the assaulter. For example, if you fled across the road and were struck by a car you could sue your attacker. Because assault is an intentional tort, it is not necessary for you to prove that actual financial loss was suffered - this is not negligence. The court can assess economic loss, non-economic loss and exemplary (punitive) damages.
In Michigan, the government says, there are circumstances where as a Michigan resident you can be sued, if you are in an accident with a non-resident driving a non-Michigan vehicle. Erie is a "compliant" company, which under MCL 500.3163(2) means that they have an upper limit of $500,000 in benefits to an out of state party (even though they don't write insurance in Michigan).
I can't find any law that would prevent an employer from requiring this. Under current Florida law, an employer can even demand passwords and access to an employee's social media accounts. A bill was proposed to prohibit this, but it hasn't passed. Generally, an employer can require anything they want as a condition of employment, as long as it is not illegal. Florida has at-will employment so the employer could certainly fire the employee if they don't comply.
In the US, obscenities, insults, racial slurs and so on are legal, owing to the First Amendment. An actual, believable threat to maim you would not be legal, under Cal. Penal 422, but "I oughta punch you" would not be a criminal threat. Some forms of aggressive driving constitute reckless driving, if they are driving "in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property". It is also against the law to follow too close (you must follow reasonably and prudently). Exceeding the speed limit is a violation of Veh. Code 22352, even if it's to pass a guy on a bike. Of course, we can't tell if you are obeying the law, but even if you were doing something illegal in your biking such as blowing away a stop sign, "the other guy was bad" is not a defense against a citation for illegal driving.
Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.&lt;1&gt; While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.&lt;2&gt; Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of &quot;the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights&quot; that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a &quot;novation&quot; of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured&lt;3&gt;), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes &lt;1&gt; At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. &lt;2&gt; The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. &lt;3&gt; The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation.