Is &quot;Official guidance&quot; actually supported by UK statute law? In the UK, I want to know whether a government publication marked &quot;Official Guidance&quot; has any weight in statute law; and if so, which law(s)? Specifically, I am referring to the following document: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/wuhan-novel-coronavirus-infection-prevention-and-control/covid-19-guidance-for-maintaining-services-within-health-and-care-settings-infection-prevention-and-control-recommendations ... although this is a wider question about other guidance. Basically, if somebody were to break this &quot;guidance&quot;, then would there be any legal basis for prosecution?
I cannot recall an example where a breach of such guidance in-and-of-itself is an offence: it's when the underlying legislation is contravened that one is committed. Note that the cited article say this: this guidance is of a general nature. Employers should consider the specific conditions of each individual place of work and comply with all applicable legislation and regulations, including the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. This guidance does not supersede existing legislation or regulations across the UK More broadly, and away from the NHS, the relationship between guidance and statute was examined in The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) v Arch Insurance (UK) Ltd &amp; Ors [2020] EWHC 2448 (Comm) where adherence to social distancing measures impacted on safe working practices on building sites, causing delays and an increase in costs. The court determined that: It follows that government advice or recommendations, whether before or after either set of Regulations came into effect, cannot have imposed or ordered a denial of access or a hindrance in access, however strongly worded the advice or recommendations were, since they did not have the force of law.
It goes without saying that muggle law supersedes any of the &quot;weird people&quot; law. In Harry Potter's world, the Queen and the Prime Minister of the U.K. have expressly and knowingly delegated legislative authority over the Wizarding world in secret legislation to self-governance by its own authorities, and also maintain a mandatory rule of silence about that world's existence. So, there would be no remedy in the ordinary courts of the U.K. Any remedy would have to come from Wizarding world authorities.
You are indeed thinking of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. This codified a portion of existing customary international law on diplomatic immunity. It is the result of several years of legal negotiations at establishing a common set of rules that would be generally acceptable. The basic concept of immunity for ambassadors is very ancient, and there is still a body of customary international law that was not codified. For example, the 1961 Convention only deals with permanent missions, not temporary ones like for multinational summits. The history and practice are also helpful for interpreting the Convention itself, such as when considering the scope of diplomatic duties which are protected, as opposed to extracurricular activities which might not be. In the UK, the Convention is implemented by the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. This mostly repeats the relevant parts of the Convention text, in Schedule 1, and also includes sections integrating those provisions with domestic law. As far as the courts, section 4 says that If in any proceedings any question arises whether or not any person is entitled to any privilege or immunity under this Act a certificate issued by or under the authority of the Secretary of State stating any fact relating to that question shall be conclusive evidence of that fact. This means that what happens procedurally in a UK court is that someone wanting to claim immunity must come with a letter from the Foreign Secretary attesting that they are a real diplomat and not just making it up. The court then considers, from that fact, what legal consequences follow, depending on the type of diplomat involved (e.g. heads of mission have broader protection), the nature of the case (criminal case where the diplomat is accused? civil case where they are the respondent?), etc. That is a matter of interpreting the Convention, plus maybe customary international law - it doesn't mean the diplomat gets to wave their certificate and end the proceedings. The purpose of section 4 is to avoid the court entering its own fact-finding process about whether someone is a real diplomat. That is felt to run the risk of the court causing diplomatic offence by accident - consider Israel and Palestine and China and Taiwan for potential pitfalls. The doctrine of &quot;one voice&quot; obliges the courts to follow the executive's lead. Prior to the Act of 1964, diplomatic immunity was covered by several other enactments, but with the same basic model for implementing immunities in court. There were different regimes for Commonwealth countries and others, which is not the case any more. The first such Act was passed in 1708 after an embarrassing situation with the then ambassador from Russia, who was imprisoned for his debts, angering the Tsar. In general, domestic courts in the UK can take account of customary international law if it is relevant. They can also look at treaty texts, even ones the UK has not signed, to help interpret international law. (In the same way, they can look at academic articles, travaux préparatoires, etc., which have no formal status as law.) If the UK signed the 1961 Convention but did not pass the 1964 Act, then courts might be able to treat the Convention as &quot;background&quot; - but would still be bound by the 1708-1955 Acts on the topic, as far as the actual procedure and rules to follow. A diplomat would not be able to avail themselves of their specific 1961 rights, unless perhaps there was some gap or ambiguity in the domestic law where they could squeeze in an argument that the Convention supplied the proper interpretation of whichever point of customary international law was involved.
TL:DR Not really possible, no This is from the website of Allen Allen Allen &amp; Allen, a Virginia-based legal firm. (NOTE I will not be including links within the quotes, you may view their website for more information.) In order to prevail in a personal injury lawsuit arising from the Coronavirus, the plaintiff will need to establish: (1) that the wrongdoer had a legal duty to the plaintiff (i.e., that the wrongdoer had a responsibility not to expose the plaintiff to the Coronavirus); (2) that the wrongdoer breached their legal duty; (3) that the wrongdoer’s actions caused the plaintiff to get sick; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered damages (i.e., illness, medical expenses, lost wages or death). First, there is Legal Duty, which they show as: In Virginia, every person has a duty to exercise due care to avoid injuring others. The scope of the duty varies with the circumstances of each case, but as a general rule, everyone owes a duty to every person within reach of their conduct. This duty “arises from that basic and necessary regulation of civilization which forbids any person because of his own convenience, to recklessly, heedlessly or carelessly injure another.“ Before imposing liability against a defendant, the court will examine whether the defendant knew, or should have known, that his conduct placed others at risk of harm. Virginia courts have imposed liability against a farmer who allowed his cow to wander into traffic (which caused a crash) and a manufacturer whose employees wore their work clothes home (which exposed their family members to asbestos fibers and caused them to develop asbestos-related diseases). Similarly, any person who knows that they have the Coronavirus and exposes others to it could, in theory, be held liable. Next, we have causation, which would be the major sticking point. Under Virginia law, plaintiffs are required to prove that the defendant caused their injury. In Coronavirus cases, if the plaintiff cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence (that it is more likely than not) that the defendant was the source of the disease, the plaintiff will not prevail at trial. Virginia courts allow plaintiffs to pursue claims against defendants who caused them to become sick or develop disease. Unlike the cases described above, where the source of the exposure was known and easily determined, proving causation in Coronavirus cases is challenging because an individual who is exposed to the virus might not develop symptoms for up to two weeks, and the Coronavirus can survive on surfaces for several days. Therefore, a plaintiff who did not practice social distancing or limit his or her exposure to others could find it difficult to establish that the defendant was the source of the virus. I have left out two example cases that they show within the above paragraphs, for brevity. Both are related to passing AIDS from an HIV-positive person to a healthy person. Finally, they talk about did the person know they have COVID-19 (positive screening for the virus) and did they take reasonable precautions: In litigation arising from the COVID-19, courts will consider whether the defendant knew or should have known that they had the virus, and whether they knew or should have known that they would (or could) spread it to others. Certainly, anyone who intentionally and deliberately spreads the virus to others could be held liable and might face criminal penalties, as well. In some cases, individuals who have been officially diagnosed with the virus could potentially be held liable if they do not take reasonable steps to prevent spreading it to others. However, it is unlikely that a court would impose liability against any person who was not officially diagnosed with COVID-19. It is also unlikely that a court would impose liability against individuals who take reasonable steps to prevent spreading the virus to others. So, in my example from my question, if I don't know that my neighbor was diagnosed, or more importantly, if they don't know, then the case would go nowhere. If they received notification of a positive result of a test AND they went out shopping and did not wear a mask, then PERHAPS this requirement would be met. However, the real sticking point here is number 2, causation. I would have to prove that I caught the virus from that person and not from any other people I may have come into contact with. So, while I am not a lawyer, I can understand that it would be next to impossible to prevail with this lawsuit, unless I were able to show that I came into close proximity with only one person, and that that person has the virus, and knew they had the virus, and purposefully did not use precautions to protect others. That seems an awful lot to overcome.
The statutory requirement for sentencing guidelines are at section 120 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which includes: (2) A sentencing guideline may be general in nature or limited to a particular offence, particular category of offence or particular category of offender. Therefore, not every offence etc requires - or has - its own specific sentencing guideline. (Presumably as there are far too many offences to easily cover, so limited resources might need to be focused on the more common ones.) Note that at the foot of the Sentencing Council's explantory materials is this link: Where there is no guideline for an offence, refer to the General guideline. Which states it is for: sentencing offences for which there is no offence specific sentencing guideline... So this General guideline is the one to be applied when dealing with a s.53 RIPA offence. (I've not reproduced it here to save space)
It depends on the particular law in the particular jurisdiction in which you are charged. Most statute laws enumerate the defences that are available. In common law countries there is a general defence that (except in strict liability offences) the perpetrator must well ... perpetrate the criminal act; what you describe does not appear to meet that requirement. Other jurisdictions would not be so forgiving.
In summary, At the time of writing, Michael Gove has overall ministerial responsibility for making planning regulations, with a good part of the role delegated to Rachel Maclean as Minister of State for Housing. The detail of regulatory verbiage is the work of civil service lawyers, based on policy formed within the department as a result of the general political process. There are various rules for how these functions arise and get transferred around government, described below. The Secretary of State can make regulations about flag display These pieces of secondary legislation, as their names suggest, are made under the authority of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Several sections of the Act empower regulations to be made by &quot;the Secretary of State&quot;, e.g. in s.220(1) we read Regulations under this Act shall make provision for restricting or regulating the display of advertisements so far as appears to the Secretary of State to be expedient in the interests of amenity or public safety. and the full Parliamentary procedure for making them is spelled out in s.333. This comports with the regulatory preambles, e.g. for the 2007 regulations, saying: The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 220, 221, 223(1), 224(3) and 333(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, makes the following Regulations &quot;The Secretary of State&quot; means a specific Secretary chosen by the Prime Minister Note that the Act just said &quot;the Secretary of State&quot;, whereas we have just read about a specific Secretary. What's going on here is that primary legislation just wants to say &quot;whoever in Cabinet has a job that is most relevant&quot;, since functions get transferred around, departments created or abolished, etc., and nobody really wants to update a zillion Acts every time that happens. Instead, there is a framework pattern where powers will be given to &quot;the Secretary of State&quot; generally, but will be executed by a specific one according to the division of responsibilities in the government of the day. That will sometimes be just a matter of agreement within Cabinet, but at other times be encoded in secondary legislation - a &quot;Transfer of Functions Order&quot;. Those Orders are also needed to handle special situations like - transferring property and legal obligations when departments are created, merged, split or abolished making amendments to legislation which did happen to mention a specific minister ministers who are not a &quot;Secretary of State&quot; as such, but hold another ministerial title, such as &quot;Lord Privy Seal&quot; These Orders are made under the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975, and are in the form of orders of the King on the advice of the Privy Council - which is to say, that the Prime Minister decides who does which jobs. Historically, this is something of an accident, since the number of Secretaries of State has increased along with the scope of government, and it was convenient to appoint lots of people to the same formal office rather than invent fresh jobs - especially in the days before ministers were paid. In any case, flag decisions would currently be made under the authority of the minister responsible for planning affairs, the Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, Michael Gove. That comes from a 2021 order when that position was created, inheriting all functions from the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government. Those in turn derive from a 2018 order taking them from the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, and so on back in time. SoS authority can be exercised by other people who work for him Additionally, the SoS can delegate functions to junior ministers; for example, the 2021 regulations state that they are Signed by authority of the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government Christopher PincherMinister of StateMinistry of Housing, Communities and Local Government Intra-departmental delegation of functions also requires the agreement of the Prime Minister, although some functions must be performed by the Secretary of State personally. That relates to the so-called &quot;Carltona doctrine&quot;, named for a 1943 court case Carltona Ltd v Commissioners of Works [1943] 2 All ER 560, which establishes that a minister is generally responsible for his whole department, and that when some function is conferred on the Secretary of State, it usually doesn't mean that he has to do it himself. Most administrative functions are like that, although the actual laying of secondary legislation before Parliament has to be done by a member of Parliament, i.e. a member of the ministerial team. Following the downfall of Mr Pincher, the junior minister responsible for planning is currently Rachel Maclean, so she would be likely to be taking lead responsibility for putting through planning regulations. So all this doesn't mean that Mr Gove personally decides which flags fall into which category, although observers of his career know that we can't rule that out. But he is responsible for the actions of his department, and the secondary legislation would be laid before Parliament in his name and on his instructions. On the making of flags and sausages Regarding &quot;how and on what considerations&quot; these decisions are made, I have no specific knowledge for flag-related policy. But in general, the secondary legislation is written by civil service lawyers on the basis of government policy, and then approved (or at least not disapproved) by Parliament. For example, after Brexit, the EU flag was removed from the list. The mechanism would be that various people who had never heard of the Town and Country Planning Act became upset about flying of the EU flag, and either wrote to ministers or were Cabinet ministers already. Internally to the department, there would have been a mandate to stop the flag being flown, civil servants would figure out the legal steps, and draft the statutory instrument. In the end we get a regulation saying In Class H in Schedule 1, in paragraph (b) of column (1) omit the words &quot;the European Union,&quot;. even though only planning experts would know or care about &quot;Class H in Schedule 1&quot;. Similar remarks apply to the companion regulation giving prominence to the Union flag over the Scottish flag, which was a political reaction in Westminster to the SNP-led government in Scotland. Someone who is upset about a regulation, or just wants it to be different, may be able to challenge it through the political process in the same sort of way. There are also avenues for judicial review, if regulations have been made in a way which is irrational, or exceeding the scope of what the original Act allowed, or other similar reasons - but these are difficult to pursue in court. For example, it is more than three months since the 2021 regulations were made, so it is now too late to mount a judicial challenge.
It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched.