Applicability of Fair Housing Act to cooperative housing In Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com, the 9th circuit held that the Fair Housing Act did not apply to the selection of roommates. The gist, if I read correctly, is that FHA was not intended to govern relationships inside of a home, and that sharing living space constitutes an "intimate human relationship" of the sort that the Constitution protects from regulation. How far does that go? For example, suppose a house has many bedrooms, but tenants share a kitchen, bathrooms, and other common space, and decisions are made by a vote of the members. Would the roommate exemption in Fair Housing Council still apply? It's still clearly a single dwelling, but the larger size and institutional character makes it look less like a conventional household. What factors might a court consider in determining the applicability of FHA to such a situation?
From the opinion in Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com (2012): There's no indication that Congress intended to interfere with personal relationships inside the home. Congress wanted to address the problems of landlords discriminating in the sale and rental of housing, which deprived classes of housing opportunities. But a business transaction between a tenant and landlord is quite different from an arrangement between two people sharing the same living space. And, also from the opinion: Nothing in the language of the statute provides that a "housing accommodation" includes shared living quarters. Applying the ruling to your question it seems that if a landlord rents an entire house to a group then the group may make any determination they wish as to who will be members of the group sharing the living quarters, no matter how many bedrooms the dwelling has. On the other hand, if the landlord rents individual bedrooms as part of individual rental agreements that includes shared facilities such as kitchens and bathrooms, then the landlord may not discriminate in the renting of the individual bedrooms.
Yes, see section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985: (1)In a lease to which this section applies (as to which, see sections 13 and 14) there is implied a covenant by the lessor— (a)to keep in repair the structure and exterior of the dwelling-house (including drains, gutters and external pipes), (b)to keep in repair and proper working order the installations in the dwelling-house for the supply of water, gas and electricity and for sanitation (including basins, sinks, baths and sanitary conveniences, but not other fixtures, fittings and appliances for making use of the supply of water, gas or electricity), and (c)to keep in repair and proper working order the installations in the dwelling-house for space heating and heating water. ... (6)In a lease in which the lessor’s repairing covenant is implied there is also implied a covenant by the lessee that the lessor, or any person authorised by him in writing, may at reasonable times of the day and on giving 24 hours’ notice in writing to the occupier, enter the premises comprised in the lease for the purpose of viewing their condition and state of repair. Also see the dot.gov guidance, especially the section entitled &quot;Your responsibilities&quot;: You should give your landlord access to the property to inspect it or carry out repairs. Your landlord has to give you at least 24 hours’ notice and visit at a reasonable time of day, unless it’s an emergency and they need immediate access.
This law regulates employers, and New York City only has jurisdiction over employers in New York City, so this law would not protect residents of New York City seeking employment outside of New York City. Generally speaking, the law of a jurisdiction can only apply to someone who has "personally availed themselves" of the benefits of operating in that jurisdiction such that it is foreseeable that they would be subject to the laws of that jurisdiction. An employer not operating in New York City seeking employees at large wouldn't meet that requirement. While this concept is usually applied in the context of the personal jurisdiction of a court, it is also not irrelevant to choice of law questions. As with any law, there are edge cases that could be challenging in which the applicability of the law could be unclear. For example, it isn't clear whether this rule would or would not apply to an employer looking for an employee in its Chicago office (e.g. working for the Chicago Mercantile Exchange) that conducts interviews and makes hiring decisions for the job at a job fair intended for NYU Alumni that is conducted at its New York City campus, even though it doesn't have offices for the conduct of its primary business in New York City and the staff conducting the job fair are based in Chicago. It might. But, suppose that the law did apply to the conduct of the employer at the job fair. Would it also apply to a follow up interview in Chicago, or to employees interviewing for the same job at a similar job fair on the Stanford University campus? In these cases, probably not.
With respect to 4th Amendment protections, which guard against unreasonable searches, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 held that "A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not". Cat burglar consent may be reasonable, depending on the circumstances, as could guest consent. The difference between the two is that with the cat burglar, you (as owner) can't overcome the reasonableness of the police assuming that the owner gives consent since you're not there, but with the party guest consenting, you can contradict the impression of control that the guest gave, and you can deny consent (if you are there and can contradict the guest). Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 addresses that point: "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him". As far as I can tell, there is no specific obligation for police to verify that the person ostensibly consenting is authorized. They don't have to ask, and they don't have to independently verify implications (e.g. if the third party says 'our apartment', they don't have to ask 'does that mean that you live here?'). A third party could say something that would make the "occupant" assumption unreasonable.
The co-tenants in any real property are entitled to possess and enjoy the entire property, &quot;unless otherwise&quot;. The conveyance might say otherwise (it's on the deed), and it is most likely that you are equal co-owners. You and your brother could take exclusive possession of the property for some period of time, meaning that you can legally exclude your sister from the property during that time – if you all agree to that (I assume you didn't, maybe you did). In that case, your right to possess the property could be contingent on the prior agreement to pay rent (again, I assume there is no such agreement). Your sister also has the same right live in the house without paying rent. She cannot throw you out of your own house if you don't pay rent. The primary question is whether from a legal perspective, you and your brother have exclusive possession of the property, under the laws of your jurisdiction, so in a few jurisdictions you might have to pay rent. That's not the same as &quot;living there&quot;.
I believe that under federal law, the franchise owner cannot avoid overtime in this way. A similar case was considered by the Labor Department in 2005 (FLSA2005-17NA): This is in response to your request for an opinion concerning the application of the overtime requirements of section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to employees who work at two different health care facilities operated by one management company. It is our opinion that all hours worked at any of the facilities must be combined for the purpose of calculating hours worked under the FLSA. The letter explains the logic pretty clearly, with citations. When an employee is "jointly" employed by two or more employers, then the hours are all combined for overtime purposes. 29 CFR 791.2(b) explains how "jointly" is determined: Where the employee performs work which simultaneously benefits two or more employers, or works for two or more employers at different times during the workweek, a joint employment relationship generally will be considered to exist in situations such as: (1) Where there is an arrangement between the employers to share the employee's services, as, for example, to interchange employees; or (2) Where one employer is acting directly or indirectly in the interest of the other employer (or employers) in relation to the employee; or (3) Where the employers are not completely disassociated with respect to the employment of a particular employee and may be deemed to share control of the employee, directly or indirectly, by reason of the fact that one employer controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the other employer. Paragraph (1) applies: the two employers (the two restaurants) have an arrangement to share the employee's services (the owner is explicitly dividing their hours). Paragraph (3) also applies: both employers are under common control, since the same person owns both. They certainly are "not completely dissociated". The same logic would seem to apply even if the two locations are different restaurants, or different types of businesses. The 2005 letter explains further: Factors that are relevant in finding joint employment include, for example, whether there are common officers or directors of the companies; the nature of the common management support provided; whether employees have priority for vacancies at the other companies; whether there are any common insurance, pension or payroll systems; and whether there are any common hiring seniority, recordkeeping or billing systems. These also seem likely to apply in your hypothetical cases.
Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional.
Excluding "ridiculously unacceptable conditions", it is legal to have "non-uniform" contract terms (where a company treats different classes of individuals differently), provided that the basis for distinction is not statutorily prohibited (race, religion, age, sex... depending on jurisdiction). There is a extremely slim chance that apparently legal income-discrimination can be a proxy for another form of illegal discrimination. However, "ridiculously unacceptable conditions" are unlikely to be found to be enforceable, regardless of any demographic properties associated with the condition. E.g. a clause requiring the surrender of a first-born female child would be unenforceable as "unconscionable". The specific circumstances surrounding such a finding by the court can't easily be summarized, since it relies heavily on prior case law, statutes, and legislative declarations. The underlying premise behind using the doctrine of unconsionability in such a case is that the clause in question is not something that a reasonable person would agree to, but they have no power to disagree. In the US, the case Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture is the leading case on this view. The clause in question was about a payment plan for furniture and the condition that no furniture could be paid off until all of it was. The consequence of the clause was that all of the furniture could be repossessed if any payment was missed, regardless of how much had already been paid. Various factors went into the court's ruling (that the condition was unenforceable), such as "absence of meaningful choice", "terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party", :gross inequality of bargaining power". In the circumstance that you allude to, it is not obvious that the courts would follow Williams in making their ruling – it would depend on the extent to which one could reasonable conclude that the customer understood and freely accepted the term. There are upper limits on what a court can enforce, so a contract requiring a party to commit suicide would be utterly unenforceable (in most countries), and a contract requiring a party to break the law would be likewise.