If I don&#39;t get a water/sewage/garbage bill in the mail for over 4 years, can the city now force me to pay it all? I live in Layton, UT, USA and I have a neighbor who owns a home he rents out. For the last four years he hasn't seen a water/sewage/garbage bill for the property. He assumed that it was getting sent to the rental address instead of his personal one, and that the tenants must have been taking care of it because he never got a notice saying that his account was over due. Well now the city is saying he owes over $4,000 in back pay for all the water and services over the past four years on the rental property. He found out that four years ago the city switched to a new utility billing software. It turns out that during the migration, his utility account for the rental property was lost, thus resulting in the lack of bills and over due statements. Can the city legally force him to pay the full amount that he should have paid even though it is clearly the city's fault? I tried to find laws about this sort of thing, but my Google-fu is lacking when it comes to legal questions.
Up to any time bar in a statute of limitations: yes By using the services, your neighbour incurred the debt. The debt did not become due and payable until the bill was issued. It doesn’t matter when the bill was issued. In most jurisdictions, there is a statute of limitations with a time limit on how long after a debt was accrued it can be pursued. For Utah, the limit is 6 years so your neighbour is liable for all of the past 4 years. Given the circumstances, the utility may look favourably on proposals for discounts and time to pay but that will be a commercial decision, not a legal obligation.
No. An eviction notice served while someone is an owner of record of a house would not be enforced. But, generally speaking, a divorce court retains jurisdiction to enforce its decrees after they are entered, and to clarify its existing orders. Obviously I will need to refinance it and pay him his share of the equity to get the deed solely in my name, which will take time. Usually, the ex's duty to get the deed in your name would precede the duty to refinance it. A deed from one owner of real estate to another co-owner doesn't violate a due on sales clause of a mortgage or deed of trust, and the fact that both of you are on the mortgage or deed of trust does not mean that both of you need to own it. Unless the decree says otherwise, the ex would usually have to transfer the property even if the mortgage is not yet refinanced. But, not all decrees and not all separation agreements have the same requirements and provisions. The exact language in the governing document would matter. If the decree doesn't say who gets to occupy the house, you could and probably should go to the court to have that issue clarified. Since violating a clear court order can give rise to contempt of court sanctions of incarceration or fines, often someone will comply with it without having to have the police intervene to remove someone. Conceivably, if the ex did not leave, you could seek to hold the ex in contempt of court for violating the divorce decree if it implies that the ex's right to occupy the house has ended. If the ex is found by the court to have willfully violated a court order following notice to the ex, an arraignment and a hearing if the violation was not conceded at the arraignment, the ex could face incarceration and/or fines (contempt proceedings are rather complicated and exactly how you do this is beyond the scope of a simple answer). You could also seek to hold the ex in contempt of court for not promptly signing the quitclaim deed (assuming that the decree does not condition the duty to do this on the refinancing of the house), but this would not be the best solution to that problem. This is because you could also go to the court and have it appoint the clerk of the court as the husband's agent to sign the quitclaim deed on behalf of the ex (assuming again that the decree does not condition the duty to do this on the refinancing of the house), if the ex failed to do so as required by the divorce decree by the deadline set forth in the decree, or a new court order, or within a reasonable time if not deadline is set. Then, after you were in title, you could bring an eviction action if necessary. It is much easier and faster to get an order directing the clerk to sign something on behalf of a party to a lawsuit than it is to hold someone in contempt of court. You could also ask the court to issue a protection order prohibiting him from occupying the house at any time prior to the title being put into your name pursuant to the decree. This could take effect as soon as the protection order signed/authorized by the judge is served upon the ex. A protection order (in most states) is directly enforceable by the police, unlike most court orders which are only enforceable by bringing contempt of court charges in the court that issued the order. But, a court would usually be reluctant to issue a protection order unless there was a clear and present risk of physical harm, or severe emotional harm to you from a violation of the decree. Also, while the ex wouldn't be committing the crime of trespassing by occupying the house, it wouldn't be unprecedented for you to persuade a police officer to remove the ex from the house after explaining the situation to prevent a breach of the peace between you, or because the ex's conduct in overstaying his right under the decree to be in the house constitutes "disorderly conduct" or "loitering" or "harassment" or some other minor offense in the opinion of the police officer, even if that charge might not hold up if prosecuted in court. But, there is really no way to compel a police officer to do that and it is close to the boundary of what a police officer does and doesn't have the authority to do. Most of these remedies would take several weeks, at a minimum, to complete. A protection order could be done in a day or two, subject to a prompt follow up hearing within a week or two after the fact. A court might also rule on a clarification order on an expedited basis by setting a shorter than usual deadline for the ex to respond given the urgency of the matter.
If a contract does not say what one of the parties wishes it would say, before signing it they should renegotiate the lease. Once the parties have an agreement as witnessed by signatures, a party cannot change the terms of the contract by declaring that some provision of the lease is a "typo". If they want to renegotiate the terms of the contract after the fact, they can, if the other party is willing to give in on the particular point. So as it stands, it seems that the landlord is in breach of contract. This section of Maryland's landlord-tenant law is relevant to this situation. (b) In general. -- A tenant may deduct from rent due to a landlord the amount of payments made to a utility service provider for utility service if: (1) An oral or written lease for an affected dwelling unit requires the landlord to pay the utility bill; and (2) (i) The tenant pays all or part of the utility bill, including payments made on a new utility service account; or (ii) The tenant pays any security deposit required to obtain a new utility service account. (c) Waiver not permitted. -- A tenant's rights under this section may not be waived in any lease. There is no provision under the law whereby the landlord can be penalized for the inconvenience that you've suffered. This section of the public utilities law addresses the problem of the landlord's debt, in particular: (c) If utility service at an affected dwelling unit is subject to the threat of termination or actual termination, a tenant residing in the affected dwelling unit: (1) may apply for a new utility service account in the tenant's name; and (2) may not incur liability for charges due on the landlord's account. In particular, (d)(3) says A utility service provider may not refuse or otherwise condition a tenant's ability to establish a new utility service account in the tenant's name because of arrearages on the landlord's account. So the utility company is wrong, and so is the landlord.
The historical record on the question is probably too thin to yield a well-supported answer as to the due diligence and the underlying "what were they thinking" question, that is, I doubt there is any record of any original debate where one side demands resolution of the contradiction, and how that charge was answered. The American Law of Taxation: As Determined in the Courts of Last Resort gives a summary of the ensuing case law relationship between taxation and compensation, as of 1884 (p. 31 of the book, p. 100 in the PDF): Taxation differs from the power of eminent domain in this: that it has no thought of compensation by way of return for that which it takes and applies to the public good, further than all derive benefit from the purposes to which it is applied; in other words, that the support of government and other objects of public utility promoted by taxation are supposed to return to the individual the same which has been taken from him, as his share of the public burden and The limitation in the constitution that private property shall not be taken for public use, refers solely to the right of eminent domain, and not to taxation or special assessments for local benefits. (both quotes with long lists of supporting state law citations). The New York case People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 apparently overturned its prior ruling (I think the citation is 6 Barb. 214, which I can't track down), commenting on the earlier ruling on an assessment. The supreme court reversed and annulled the assessment, holding... That money is property; that it can not be taken from a citizen for public use by the right of eminent domain, without just compensation; and that the enhancement in value of the relators' lands, by the grading and paving of Flushing avenue, is not that just compensation within the meaning of the constitution. The later court gets out of this, noting that Taxation exacts money, or services, from individuals, as and for their respective shares of contribution to any public burden. Private property taken for public use by right of eminent domain, is taken not as the owner's share of contribution to a public burden, but as so much beyond his share. Special compensation is therefore to be made in the latter case, because the government is a debtor for the property so taken; but not in the former, because the payment of taxes is a duty and creates no obligation to repay, otherwise than in the proper application of the tax. Taxation operates upon a community or upon a class of persons in a community and by some rule of apportionment. The exercise of the right of eminent domain operates upon an individual, and without reference to the amount, or value exacted from any other individual, or class of individuals. In other words, the Takings and Just Compensation clauses are understood to be about the power of eminent domain, which specially burdens the individual, and that is distinct from the general burdening of society that is taxation. There are, as far as I know, no finely-tuned SCOTUS rulings on the relation between the Just Compensation clause and the tax and spend clause. There is case law that holds that there is no contradiction between the power to tax and the Fifth Amendment. For example McCray v. US, 195 U.S. 27: While both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments qualify, insofar as they are applicable, all the provisions of the Constitution, nothing in either of them operates to take away the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, and that power being unrestrained except as limited by the Constitution, Congress may select the objects upon which the tax shall be levied, and, in exerting the power, no want of due process of law can possibly result, and the judiciary cannot usurp the functions of the legislature in order to control that branch of the Government in exercising its lawful functions. And Brushaber v. Union Pacific, 240 U.S. 1: So far as the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment is relied upon, it suffices to say that there is no basis for such reliance, since it is equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other words, that the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring, upon the one hand, a taxing power, and taking the same power away, on the other, by the limitations of the due process clause. This however says that taxation laws do not violate the due process requirement.
Landlord or tenant responsible for the furnishing damaged after a flooding? This brief analysis of Scandinavian Contract Law explains the difficulty of addressing with certainty matters of Swedish contract law. Despite the legal and factual ambiguities, it seems to me that the contract terms and landlord's conduct preclude his entitlement to a reimbursement from you. (Disclaimers: I have never litigated in Sweden's courts; I do not purport to be knowledgeable about Swedish law; and it is unclear to me whether Swedish contract law has evolved since the date of the publication of Ramberg's criticism of Scandinavian contract law) First, it appears that the landlord was negligent by waiting several days to ask tenants to remove moldering furnishings (as these were starting to smell). If that was the landlord's earliest reaction to the flooding, then the delay might evidence [landlord's] failure to mitigate damages. In other legal systems, failure to mitigate damages is an obstacle to recovery from the sued party. Second, the landlord's unqualified instruction to throw everything away --in response to your proposal of checking for salvage-- might forfeit his entitlement to reimbursement. In this regard, page 4 of the aforementioned publication points out that [t]he Swedish Supreme court [...] generally stated that a contract containing the standard terms was deemed to have been concluded due to the parties' behaviour. Obviously, not all of the contract would be void, but only the application of the clause about tenant's financial responsibility for missing or damaged items in this particular context of landlord's delay and reckless response to your proposal. Third, in the clause regarding tenant's financial responsibility "to replace missing or damaged items", I would say that the qualifier "missing" is key. Here, the usage of "missing" connotes a deliberate act of taking items away in violation of the landlord's proprietorship, regardless of whether it was the tenant or a third party who removed/stole them. That same connotation of deliberate act should govern the very next qualifier, "damaged", absent any language that expands the latter's connotation of causality. Also a criterion of negligence would fail, because you were not notified that a flooding occurred. The contract's clarification that their "insurance doesn't cover [your] personal belongings" opens --albeit weakly-- the door to the possible interpretation that instead the policy covers the counterparty's (that is, the landlord's) belongings. On the other hand, the landlord could avail himself of arguments such as (1) tenant should have made arrangements prior to leaving for the holidays; and (2) landlord's bed &amp; mattress were not intended to be stored in the basement, and instead should have been notified toward procuring an appropriate storage for them. It is hard to make a more precise assessment without knowing more about the terms of the contract and the circumstances. Therefore, the best thing to do is to look at the subtleties in the language of the contract (as I did above regarding the deliberate nature inherent to the adjective "missing" and its interpretative effect on the adjective "damaged").
Unrecorded sewer easements seem to be a major category of such problems: the easement may only be recorded on the government sewer map, and not against the property. Likewise underground gas and electric. There is also a prescriptive easement, like adverse possession, though in that case the issue would be that the property owner may not know that he was granting an easement by allowing the use of the land.
Is It Too Late To Collect The Bill? Probably not. There is a statute of limitations for collecting unpaid medical bills that varies in length in different jurisdictions, and the age of the bill in the question is approximate, so it is hard to know for sure if this one is too old. The relevant statutes of limitations in most U.S. states would be at least three years and in some it could be as much as ten or twelve years. If I recall correctly, in Canada, the relevant statute of limitations would be determined at the provincial level. Given that this was &quot;a couple of years ago&quot; realistically, it is probably not barred by the statute of limitations yet. Are Interest Charges Allowed. Generally yes. Most jurisdictions allow for pre-judgment interest at a statutory rate from the date due in the absence of a contrary agreement and if the provider's paperwork with you provided for another interest rate, that would apply instead. So charging interest is allowed. The existence of a dispute wouldn't change this result, although it would, of course, mean that if some portion of the bill was disallowed in a later lawsuit that interest would be owed only on the portion that the court found was actually owed. The Provider's Remedies A Lawsuit If these bills are not paid, they can sue. Statute of limitations, or errors in billing, or failure to seek reimbursement from the police as arranged with them, would all be legitimate defenses in lawsuit brought by the provider. Given the modest amount allegedly owed and the existence of defenses, this might not be a very attractive one for the provider to choose to bring suit to collect. Credit Reporting On the other hand, in lieu of suing, the provider could simply report it as a bad debt with a credit reporting agency through their collections company. This would look bad on your credit (for up to seven years in the U.S., although you could insist on filing a rebuttal statement as part of your credit report, I don't know how disputes about credit reporting work in Canada). Paying them would almost admit that there was a late payment for credit reporting purposes, but also might prevent the incident from entering the credit reporting system at all.
Overview The question sates that &quot;stuff&quot; was left behind on the day that the lease was terminated. It does not saw whether the tenant notified the landlord of this stuff, much less sought permission to leave it. It does not say when or if the tenant removed the stuff, how much stuff there was, or whether the landlord would have had to remove it before the premises could be cleaned and rented to a new tenant. The exact provisions of the lease are going to matter a great deal here. Chapters 91 and 92 of the Texas Property Code cover statewide laws on residential leases and landlord-tenant relation in Texas. These may be supplemented by county or municipal or other local laws, which may impose additional obligations on either party. In many areas the effect of the Texas law depends on what agreements there may be between landlord and tenant, particularly the provisions of any lease. Texas Property Code Texas Property Code 91.001 covers notices of termination of a lease. It provides that: (b) If a notice of termination is given under Subsection (a) and if the rent-paying period is at least one month, the tenancy terminates on whichever of the following days is the later: (b)(1) the day given in the notice for termination; or (b)(2) one month after the day on which the notice is given. ... (d) If a tenancy terminates on a day that does not correspond to the beginning or end of a rent-paying period, the tenant is liable for rent only up to the date of termination. (e) Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) do not apply if: (e)(1) a landlord and a tenant have agreed in an instrument signed by both parties on a different period of notice to terminate the tenancy or that no notice is required; or (e)(2) there is a breach of contract recognized by law. A failure to remove the tenant's belonging and leave the dwelling in &quot;broom-clean&quot; condition may well be &quot;a breach of contract recognized by law.&quot; Code section 92.104 provides that: (a) Before returning a security deposit, the landlord may deduct from the deposit damages and charges for which the tenant is legally liable under the lease or as a result of breaching the lease. (b) The landlord may not retain any portion of a security deposit to cover normal wear and tear. Code section 92.109 provides that: (a) A landlord who in bad faith retains a security deposit in violation of this subchapter is liable for an amount equal to the sum of $100, three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld, and the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit to recover the deposit. (b) A landlord who in bad faith does not provide a written description and itemized list of damages and charges in violation of this subchapter: (b)(1) forfeits the right to withhold any portion of the security deposit or to bring suit against the tenant for damages to the premises; and (b)(2) is liable for the tenant’s reasonable attorney’s fees in a suit to recover the deposit.