Does a state governor have the power to prevent immigration into their state? In response to the recent Paris attacks, the governor of Alabama recently said this: Alabama governor Robert Bentley is refusing to allow Syrian refugees to relocate to Alabama. “After full consideration of this weekend’s attacks of terror on innocent citizens in Paris, I will oppose any attempt to relocate Syrian refugees to Alabama through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. As your Governor, I will not stand complicit to a policy that places the citizens of Alabama in harm’s way,” Governor Bentley says in a statement released by his office. (Source.) Does the governor of Alabama have the power to prevent the federal government from resettling immigrants in their state? If they don't have the power to do this directly, could they accomplish the same thing in some indirect way, or with the help of the state legislature?
tl;dr No, entrance decisions are the purview of the federal government. Governors do have the ability to lobby the federal government. Background The courts have found that State attempts to restrict resident or non-resident aliens encroach upon the federal government's exclusive control over entrance of aliens. Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). It is important to note that State scrutiny levels dealing with undocumented immigrants may be context specific See, e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children and education). The federal government's authority over immigration is further solidified by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Const. Article VI. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967).
She does not assume a power to pardon for state crimes. The main impediment is the practical one, since a vague order regarding victimless crimes may not be enforceable. POTUS has historically granted general amnesties, such as Lincoln's Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction which did not specify particular laws that were violated or individuals who violated the laws. Some degree of resistance to such an order (by prison officials and the judiciary) is to be expected, to the extent that the scope of an amnesty is ambiguous. The Lincoln proclamation is clear enough in its scope (it was triggered by taking an oath of allegiance and the persons to whom this remedy was not available are clearly-enough described). There are on the order of 70,000 federal criminal convictions with sentencing every year, so probably over a million cases would be subject to review. She would need to sharpen the criteria, presumably by enumerating the applicable statutes. This may include or exclude convictions for perjury or lying to a federal officer. In an individual case, it could be argued that in this case, lying did not violate the rights of another person, but in that case it did – case by case review could be required. Violation of 18 USC 228 (Failure to pay legal child support obligations) might be considered to have a victim, or not, so just saying &quot;non-violent victimless crimes&quot; leaves open the question whether interstate refusal to pay child support is in the pardoned set. Targeted amnesties such as violation of the Controlled Substances Act could be specific enough that they could be enforced.
I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.
Here are the Washington state proclamations with legal force, for example this proclamation amending proclamation 20-05. The legal authority is the paragraph starying &quot;NOW, THEREFORE, I, Jay Inslee, Governor of the state of Washington&quot; and what follows is what is legally proclaimed, in this case the effect is to &quot;waive and suspend portions of Title 79 RCW that require in-person meetings&quot;, pertaining to Dep't. of Natural Resources. Here is 20-25, the original stay-home proclamation. It claims Chapters 38.08, 38.52 and 43.06 RCW as authority, and prohibit[s] all people in Washington State from leaving their homes or participating in social, spiritual and recreational gatherings of any kind regardless of the number of participants, and all non-essential businesses in Washington State from conducting business, within the limitations provided herein. 43.06.220 is the main hammer that the governor can wield. The powers granted by the legislature include: (1) The governor after proclaiming a state of emergency and prior to terminating such, may, in the area described by the proclamation issue an order prohibiting: (a) Any person being on the public streets, or in the public parks, or at any other public place during the hours declared by the governor to be a period of curfew; (b) Any number of persons, as designated by the governor, from assembling or gathering on the public streets, parks, or other open areas of this state, either public or private; (c) The manufacture, transfer, use, possession or transportation of a molotov cocktail or any other device, instrument or object designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion; (d) The transporting, possessing or using of gasoline, kerosene, or combustible, flammable, or explosive liquids or materials in a glass or uncapped container of any kind except in connection with the normal operation of motor vehicles, normal home use or legitimate commercial use; (e) The sale, purchase or dispensing of alcoholic beverages; (f) The sale, purchase or dispensing of other commodities or goods, as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace; (g) The use of certain streets, highways or public ways by the public; and (h) Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace. One could argue that some order is not reasonable, and perhaps it would fail strict scrutiny, if anyone sued. At present, though, there is no legal order. There is a guidance, a statement of best practices. There may well be a formal proclamation on this topic, which would wrap this in the legalities of other official proclamations. It boils down to RCW 43.06.220(1)(h).
The U.S. Constitution - Article 1, Section 10 is titled "Powers Prohibited of States," and it reads: No state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. The title of the section, Powers Prohibited of States, tells us that this clause is directed to the states and prevents the states from enacting any state laws that retroactively impair obligations and rights between two contracting parties. In New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co, the court held that a law passed by the state legislature must be the cause of a contract's obligations to have been impaired in order for relief to be sought under this clause. The Heritage Guide to The Constitution has a good article explaining the history of this clause. A central provision of the Northwest Ordinance, which established the Northwest Territory, stated: In the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud, previously formed. While operating under the Articles of Confederation between 1777 and 1789 when the U.S. Constitution was adopted, some state legislatures were passing laws relieving well-connected people from debts for which they had contracted. As the Heritage Guide explains, the obligation of contracts section was added to the clause of the Constitution which prevented states from printing money and making treaties. Initially, the clause was meant to prevent state legislation that retroactively changed the terms of private contracts. But as cases worked their way through the courts, the Supreme Court eventually set that standard that the obligation of contracts clause also prevented states from undoing contracts to which the state was a party where the obligation of the contract had been completed. (As opposed to breach of contract claims for uncompleted contracts.) Ogden v Saunders, in 1827, held that the obligation of contracts clause doesn't apply to contracts that did not exist at the time a statute was passed. Those states with their own Obligation of Contracts Clause may have had them before the U.S. Constitution was written (Virginia's original constitution was enacted in 1776) or may have added them as an amplification of the prohibition found in the U.S. Constitution.
Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.
Questions about whether a certain action is "just" tend to be maters of opinion, politics and philosophy, but it can be addressed from the perspective of legal theory (especially following the model of common law, where legal principles are based on concepts of just and proper action). Whether or not a certain action is actually legal in a certain jurisdiction depends on the laws of that country -- I suspect that the answer is different for the US versus China. The first question would be whether those government officials have the legal authority – I assume they do. Such authority is generally governed by some specific circumstances, for example, "poses an imminent and grave threat to public health". It is basically not a legal question whether quarantining in the face of this viral threat is necessary from a public health perspective, that is a medical question. What the law would say is that if this is a serious threat, then a person's liberty can be curtailed to a limited extent, because a person does not have the right to harm others because they don't want to do some thing that protects the rights of others (be vaccinated, stay in quarantine until it is safe). However, principles of legal justice also say that the government's response should be proportionate, e.g. shoot-on-sight in response to a sneeze is not proportionate. Quarantining has long been recognized as a valid, just and legal response to such extreme medical threats. Historically speaking, quarantining used to be the only effective action that a government can take against e.g. smallpox, plague, Spanish flu, Ebola.
The US does not &quot;have to&quot; take in any refugees. There is a provision under US law pertaining to asylum. First, the person has to be in the US, including &quot;having arrived at&quot;. The principle underlying a grant of asylum is that a special exception is made if not allowing the person into the US and repatriating them to their country of citizenship would make then &quot;unsafe&quot; in specific ways. If that can instead be repatriated to a safe third country (e.g. were granted asylum in Norway then decided to move to the US), then they are not eligible for asylum in the US unless the Attorney General determines that it is in the interest of the US. There are various provisions whereby a person from Eritrea (for example) would not be admissible, such as having participated in the repression or being a criminal. This article gives a detailed analysis of the criteria for asylum, which reduce to unwillingness to return to one's home country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion You would have to decide what a &quot;climate refugee&quot; is to see how the law applies. For example, if you mean &quot;a climate-change denier who is subject to persecution for expressing their skepticism&quot;, that would be covered by the protected category of political opinion. The actual climate in a country is not grounds for granting asylum.