Is it error of law to judge on less relevant case law when there is much more relevant one? A judge in a civil case makes a judgment justifying it by similar decision made in somewhat relevant case. A party to the case is dissatisfied with the judgment. They find a more recent and, more importantly, much more closely related case (same court) in which the decision was the opposite. Can what the judge did be called "error of law" for the purposes of appeal?
On an issue of pure law, an appellate court decides if the trial judge got it right or wrong from scratch, and if there is a case that is a better match than the one that the judge used that leads to a different outcome in the case, then an appellate court is likely to find that the trial court's ruling is a reversible error. On an issue of mixed fact and law, or on a legal issue where a judge has more discretion in how the law is applied (like many evidentiary issues), a judge is given more deference, and the judge will generally only be reversed if no reasonable judge could have applied the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them, and then, only if an application of the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them would have changed the outcome of the case. There are a couple of ways that this standard of review is described, one of which is called "abuse of discretion" review.
Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial.
None of the above! What you describe almost never happens. That's not because statutes never contradict each other. Statutes contradict (or appear to contradict) each other all the time – lawyers take advantage of this, arguing the statute that seem to favor their client is the relevant one. What almost never happens is that a court finds that two statutes (or even two parts of the same statute!) really do contradict each other. Courts can do this because almost every statute can be interpreted in different ways. When statutes appear to conflict, courts interpret those conflicts away. The logic that courts use to justify interpreting statutes this way is simple. They start by assuming that it would be insane for a legislature to pass laws that conflict. Imagine what would happen in Massachusetts if the legislature said, &quot;In Massachusetts, divorce is legal and illegal.&quot; To prevent such chaos, courts presume that legislatures are not insane, so they &quot;presume&quot; the laws only appear to contradict each other because they are being misinterpreted. Court use this presumption to correct those misinterpretations by showing that, when interpreted correctly, the statutes are consistent, not contradictory. To do this, the courts make use of what are known as canons of statutory interpretation. As one law professor put it, &quot;Canons are simply interpretive guidelines which, by dint of judicial repetition, take on the appearance, if not the reality, of a legal rule.&quot; There are canons explaining how to deal with everything from the words in a list to conflicts between statutes. Some canons are so commonly used that they are known by their nicknames, such as the “canon against superfluity&quot; or the &quot;last-antecedent rule.&quot; (Many are in Latin: &quot;expressio unius,&quot; &quot;noscitur a sociis&quot; or &quot;ejusdem generis&quot;. As Amon and Trish point out in the comments to the OP, there are two canons that are often used when statutes appear to conflict: Generalia specialibus non derogant: If there is a conflict between a general law and specific rule, the specific rule prevails. Newer laws amend older laws. What if two laws really are contradictory? In that case, the court should refuse to enforce either law. If the court picked one of the laws, it would effectively by making law. Under our system of separated powers, legislatures, not courts, legislate. How to find out more about canons The canons are a hot topic in law right now, largely because of Justice Scalia's insistence on the primacy of the text. His last book, &quot;Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts,&quot; discusses the canons at length. (You can see a list of the canons he discusses here.) Unfortunately, reading a list of canons, or articles about them, without seeing how they are used, is about as helpful as reading the rules of baseball without ever watching a game. The best way to learn how canons are actually used is to read a law school casebook. For canons, the best choice is Williams Eskridge's &quot;Legislation&quot; casebook. It devotes an entire chapter to the canons, including many (edited) examples of real decisions using them. And, since the canons change only slowly, you don't need the latest edition -- earlier editions are available for almost nothing ($3.51) online!
When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.
That depends what the issue is. On constitutional issues, and on issues of federal law (which do come up in state cases) , they are binding precedent, at least in that circuit for an appeals court opinion, and in the whole US for a Supreme court opinion. District court opinions are not generally binding unless upheld on appeal. On matters of state law, the state's own highest court is the final word, but a federal opinion could be at least as persuasive as one from a different state. to the best of my understanding one does not use the term &quot;estoppel&quot; to describe the effect of a previous judgement by a different court. If it is in the same case and not on appeal, the term is Res judicata (&quot;A thing (already) judged&quot;). If it is a general matter of adhering to clear precedent, the term Stare decisis (“to stand by things decided.” ) would be used.
You are quoting standards that are applicable during an appeal. So in this case, the defendant was brought to trial, was found guilty by a jury, and is now appealing that conviction. During that initial trial, the evidence was supposed to have been weighed neutrally. In an appeal, the appellate court is not attempting to re-litigate the entirety of the case. That would be costly and slow in addition to burdensome on witnesses that might have to be called again to testify. Instead, it defers to the trial court for things like the determination of facts. The standards you quote show that an appellate court is only going to overturn a lower court's verdict as insufficient if the lower court's ruling is manifestly unjust. The prosecution and the defense presented evidence on a particular element of the crime at trial. The jury determined that the prosecution met its burden, and proved the element beyond a reasonable doubt. The appeals court is not going to substitute its judgement for that of the jury particularly when the jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of different witnesses that may not be possible from a simple text-based transcript. If the trial court convicted and the appeals court determines that the conviction was reasonable if the evidence was viewed from the standpoint most favorable to the prosecution, then the sufficiency standard would be met and the appeal would be denied. The appeals court would only overturn the verdict as insufficient if no reasonable juror could possibly have concluded that the state met its burden of proof given the evidence presented.
Yes. Juries aren't terribly accurate. There is an irreducible chance that no matter how clear the outcome should be that the jury will get it wrong. Based upon a review of the academic literature on wrongful convictions and inaccurate acquittals, I generally tell my clients that this is about 10%. Many people think that this is a low end estimate. Also, sometimes a jury will acquit a defendant in a case where they think that the defendant was actually legally guilty because of extraordinary circumstances, and so the jury will disregard the law and acquit. This practice is called &quot;jury nullification.&quot; And, as other answers have noted, sometimes the prosecution or the judicial system screws up for reasons that are unforeseeable, after a not guilty plea, in a way that makes proving your guilt difficult or impossible. Basically, if you &quot;roll the dice&quot; there is some non-zero chance you will be acquitted, while if you plead guilty, there is none. Also, sometimes court decisions will change the law in way favorable to you after the trial, and as long as your case is still on direct appeal from the conviction, you can benefit from those changes in the law, which you cannot if you simply plead guilty without any concessions. Likewise, if you are innocent and the evidence is currently strongly against you, but you wish to preserve the ability to later attack the conviction based upon future newly discovered evidence, not pleading guilty is generally necessary to preserve that option. Another circumstance where going to trial but losing can still be worth it, is where there are extenuating circumstances that make your conduct understandable, even if it is not a legally valid defense. Getting these facts in front of the judge in a fuller fashion, as a trial can make possible, can convince the judge that while you are legally guilty, that you deserve leniency. Going to trial typically results in a longer sentence, even without a plea bargain, however, so going forward with a hopeless trial is rarely a good move.
I will only address this part of the question: Who would be able to authoritatively decide the constitutionality of such a question, with all Supreme Court justices having clear conflict of interest on the matter? The Supreme Court could still hear such a case, as the justices make their own decisions about when to recuse themselves. In particular, they might decide to hear the case based on the "Rule of Necessity", which says roughly that a biased judge is better than none at all: a judge can hear a case, even in the presence of a conflict of interest, if there is no other way for it to be heard. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), in which the Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that federal courts could try a case related to the salaries of federal judges. Another possibility is that the case could be brought in a lower federal court, say District Court. There is a question here: the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" (US Constitution, Article III, Section 2), and I do not know whether Supreme Court justices are "public Ministers". However, if a lower court did have jurisdiction, it could rule on the constitutionality of the question, since a District Court judge would not have a significant conflict of interest. The relevant Circuit Court of Appeals could presumably hear an appeal. If the Circuit Court's ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court felt that they all had conflicts of interest (and decided not to invoke the Rule of Necessity), then they could simply not vote to grant certiorari, in which case the Circuit Court's ruling would stand.