Can Congress enforce an overturned Supreme Court decision? Democrats in Congress have mentioned codifying Roe v. Wade into law (whatever that means). However, I was under the impression that Congress couldn't overturn a Supreme Court decision on a Constitutional question (in this case, the question of abortion rights in the US). The overturning Dobbs decision, therefore, remains intact and there's nothing Congress can do, short of &quot;packing the court.&quot;
They can't overturn the decision; but they don't have to. The holding in Dobbs was that the US Constitution does not provide a right to an abortion, and so a state law prohibiting abortions is not unconstitutional. Congress can't &quot;overturn&quot; it in the sense that they can't make the Constitution provide such a right, short of a constitutional amendment. But that in itself doesn't stop them from providing such a right in other ways, e.g. through ordinary legislation. Under the Supremacy Clause, such a law would supersede any state bans; provided that it falls within the scope of Congress's enumerated powers, which assertion would itself probably be challenged in court. If it's within their legislative power, then there's no conflict with Dobbs. To give a more mundane example, nobody thinks that there is a constitutional right to have an airline ticket refunded within 24 hours of purchase. If the Supreme Court ever had occasion to rule on the question, they would surely hold that nothing in the US Constitution says that people have this right. But Congress does have the power, under the Commerce Clause, to pass legislation that confers such a right on consumers. They have done so, and this law would not in any way conflict with the aforementioned hypothetical Supreme Court ruling.
Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly.
Art. 1 Sect 5 of the Constitution empowers both houses to make their own rules. That means that they can articulate rules regarding what or how you can talk on the floor. It is held that the president of the senate can issue a ruling, and the ruling can be overridden by majority vote. If the Constitution were amended to be more specific about rules of conduct, then some such Senate rules might be unconstitutional and SCOTUS could invalidate the rule. The only specific constitutional requirement on conducting business is that a majority constitutes a quorum.
Note the following argument: the landmark 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which ruled that state officials cannot obstruct “the measures of a government [the federal government] created by others as well as themselves.” “In other words,” Kalt and Amar summarize, “a single state cannot use its power to derail the functioning of the United States.” (Amar is a Yale constitutional law professor, Kalt, his student) On the other hand, you have the argument by a Hofstra constitutional law professor that the 25th amendment can be applied when the President is occupied with a criminal case, ergo, the functioning of the United States can be carried on unimpared. At the end-of-the-day there is no absolute answer as it is still being argued academically and has never been specifically settled by the courts.
There is no &quot;different legal procedure&quot; for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling.
The powers of the President are contained in Article II of the constitution; this is a fair summary. The power to make executive orders stems from Section 1 "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." When the Supreme Court considers the legality of an executive order (which only happens when someone brings a case that the court agrees to hear) they use Justice Jackson's Test from Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v Sawyer (1952). The first amendment specifically forbids congress from making laws about these matters. Therefore the express will of congress (as the amendment required a 2/3 majority of Congress) is that there shall be no law about these matters. Since the President would be acting against the express will of Congress he would drop to the third limb of Jackson's test: When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.... Since, this is not a power that the President is given by the constitution it is likely that the Court would decide that he doesn't have such power.
Any precedent can be overturned by any court at the same or higher level in the hierarchy So, for your example of a High Court precedent, it can be overturned at Supreme Court, Court of Appeal or High Court levels. However, the longer a precedent is in place, the less likely it is to be overturned because one of the objectives of the legal system is to provide certainty - a system that routinely overturns precedent doesn’t do that. Also, a precedent that is often cited with approval is more compelling because it’s no longer just one judges reading of the law, many other judges agree. Also, the judiciary tends to be conservative in overturning precedent. Most judges see it as their role to interpret law made by the legislature. If the people/legislature think their interpretation is wrong then the judiciary tends to feel that the legislature is the body who should change the law. That said, really old common law precedent that hasn’t been cited for a long while may be readily overturned if it comes up because social expectations may have changed.
There is no parallelism between the Texas decision and the proposed lawsuit. In the anti-mifepristone lawsuit, there exists a statute granting the FDA authority to regulate and review new drugs, and a petition procedure whereby citizens can state ground for the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to consider a regulatory action. There is no statutory basis on which a ban of meat-eating could be created by executive action. Congress cannot be sued for not passing a law (failure or refusal of Congress to pass a particular law is not justiciable). If, for example someone were to submit a petition to the FDA urging such a regulation, the petition would have to be denied because the FDA does not have statutory authority to issue such a regulation. As argued here, the anti-mifepristone plaintiffs lack standing in that case, so one can expect that to be a substantial issue in the subsequent appeal.