Does the Secret Service need warrants to search areas before protectees visit? Prior to a protectee (e.g. actual or would-be President) visiting an area, the Secret Service do a sweep of it, including any areas that might have a view on the location where the protectee will be standing and/or walking through, so as to prevent a sniper from having a chance at disrupting the event. The sweep may include even smaller openings not designed for occupation, like air ducts. Do they get warrants for those searches, and/or for any seizures that may be associated with them? What could they do against people if they found contraband? Specific examples: Handgun that is generally legal to own Hunting rifle designed for accuracy at long distances that is generally legal to own Assault weapons that are not generally legal to own A throwable explosive such as a hand grenade Other explosives Marijuana, which is federally illegal, in a state like Colorado Harder drugs like cocaine or heroin Counterfeit US currency, along with a printing press and materials for more Presumably the first five items are what they're primarily looking for, seizure of which might be consistent with the protective mission. The next two relate to law enforcement more broadly; the last is something that's clearly within the Secret Service's jurisdiction. Do they search for and/or seize these things without a warrant? Do they get a warrant, and if so who from and what does it specify? Would they (or their law enforcement colleagues) be able to prosecute people based on finding any of these things in a sweep, or use such findings in a larger investigation? In at least some cases, they probably have permission of the institution that owns and occupies the buildings being searched, and those cases are out of scope/uninteresting for this question.
According to the agency: How does the Secret Service "protect" the president? In order to maintain a safe environment for the president and other protectees, the Secret Service calls upon other federal, state and local agencies to assist on a daily basis. The Secret Service Uniformed Division, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the U.S. Park Police patrol the streets and parks nearby the White House. The Secret Service regularly consults with experts from other agencies in utilizing the most advanced security techniques. The military supports the Secret Service through the use of Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and communications resources. When the president travels, an advance team of Secret Service agents works with the host city, state and local law enforcement, as well as public safety officials, to jointly implement the necessary security measures. The same source recites this authority for Secret Service agents: Under Title 18, Section 3056, of the United States Code, agents and officers of the United States Secret Service can: Carry firearms Execute warrants issued under the laws of the United States Make arrests without warrants for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any felony recognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed such felony Offer and pay rewards for services and information leading to the apprehension of persons involved in the violation of the law that the Secret Service is authorized to enforce Investigate fraud in connection with identification documents, fraudulent commerce, fictitious instruments and foreign securities and Perform other functions and duties authorized by law The Secret Service works closely with the United States Attorney's Office in both protective and investigative matters. Additional authority is found at Section 3056A. Some of the agency's enforcement philosophy and approach is explored here. It isn't mentioned in this short blurb, but law enforcement officers, in general, also have authority to seize contraband and various money and equipment used in furtherance of criminal activity under civil and criminal forfeiture laws. See generally 18 U.S. Code §§ 981 and 983 (civil forfeiture) and 21 U.S. Code § 853 (Criminal forfeitures). Thus, a Secret Service agent really doesn't have particularly much more authority when acting in a protective capacity (Secret Service agents also serve a detectives investigating counterfeiting as a consequence of their historical ties to the Treasury Department). In particular, any special authority of a Secret Service agent acting in a protective role either: (1) flows from permission (lots of law abiding people will cooperate with the Secret Service even if they are not required by law to do so in part out of respect for the institution of the Presidency and the President's symbolic role as head of state, and most of the time the President has the express permission of a venue owner and his entourage to be present there), or (2) flows from laws that are phrased in terms of making it a crime to do certain things in the presence of the protectee or at a particular venue, rather than in terms of granting special authority to the Secret Service in particular, which makes sense as a way to structure these laws given the heavy reliance of the Secret Service on cooperation from other law enforcement agencies to do its work, for example the statute that makes it a crime to threaten certain protected persons (18 USC 871) or (3) flows from the affirmative defenses to criminal liability for conduct that is privileged for self-defense or the defense of others by a law enforcement officer, or (4) with regard to searches, but not necessarily seizures, there are national security doctrines that authorize searches for purposes of intelligence or national defense purposes (which protecting a protected person would normally include) as opposed to for the purpose of preventing or investigating a crime. Usually information secured by a search under this kind of authority would not be admissible at trial in a criminal case based upon information discovered in such a search, but the Secret Service may not really care if it can get a valid conviction on the basis of that particular evidence so long as it can protect the protected person at that moment in time, or (5) in cases of ambiguity or lack of very specific legal precedents, Secret Service agents have "qualified immunity" from civil rights liability (which is all they need if they are not seeking a criminal conviction) for their actions since they are not violating clearly established law. So, they have the capacity to press their advantage in cases where they no that no court has ruled on a factually specific situation similar to their own. Also, keep in mind that Secret Service agents acting in the course of their federal duties are generally immune from civil or criminal liability under state law and can only be criminally prosecuted under federal law if the Justice Department (which reports ultimately to the President who has a vested interest in having the people that the Secret Service provides protection to being kept safe and has a special relationship with federal law enforcement agents), in its sole and absolute discretion, decides to prosecute the Secret Service agent. The President also has the power to pardon a Secret Service agent for a federal crime. Thus, the only practical means of enforcement of limitations on a Secret Service agent's authority that a President approves of is a civil rights lawsuit under 28 USC 1983 brought in federal court (to which the qualified immunity defense will often applly). Also law enforcement employers routinely indemnify and defend their agents when they are sued for civil rights violations where the employer don't personally think that the agent deserves to be sued even though this is not a binding obligation unless a union contract says so (I don't recall if Secret Service agents are unionized or not). Permission is buttressed by the criminal provisions of Section 3056(d) which state: Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or interferes with a Federal law enforcement agent engaged in the performance of the protective functions authorized by this section or by section 1752 of this title shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. This criminal provision was enacted in 1971. Some states, such as Colorado, also give Secret Service officers by virtue of state law all of the rights and privileges of a state law enforcement officer to enforce state laws. I suspect, but do not know, that there are regulations issues by the Department of Homeland Security and/or the Treasury Department where the Secret Service was previously housed, that interpret its statutory authority broadly and are entitled to deference in interpretation of ambiguous aspects of federal laws under the Chevron doctrine. My suspicion is based, for example, on the way that the agency handled the GOP National Convention in Cleveland, but I can imagine other paths (e.g. putting pressure on event organizers) that could have led to the same result. In general, the Secret Service gets to have final say when multiple agencies are involved, on designing security procedures for events and for individuals within their jurisdiction. This has the following source: The Secret Service’s authority to do this stems from a 2012 change to US Criminal Code, 18 US Code § 3056 (e) (1), which reads, “When directed by the President, the United States Secret Service is authorized to participate, under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at special events of national significance, as determined by the President,” and Presidential Decision Directive 22, a secret directive issued by President Obama in 2013. In the linked story, it used its authority to establish a press credentialing and background check process at events where protected persons would appear. With regard to your specific questions: Do they get warrants for those searches, and/or for any seizures that may be associated with them? What could they do against people if they found contraband? Secret Service agents have the authority to request and enforce search warrants, which must be issued by a judge on the basis of an affidavit or declaration establishing probable cause of a search. But, there are a variety of exceptions to the warrant requirement of the 4th Amendment (e.g. "Terry stops" which require mere reasonable suspicions, searches with permission, searches and arrests for crimes committed in the presence of the officer, searches incident to an otherwise lawful arrest (either due to a warrant or based upon probable cause to arrest even if the offense itself does not have incarceration as a potential punishment), searches based upon probable cause when exigent circumstances make it impossible to obtain a timely warrant which often apply in "active shooter" or hostage situations and to most searches of cars). Handgun that is generally legal to own Hunting rifle designed for accuracy at long distances that is generally legal to own These kinds of searches and seizures would have to rely on (1) a prohibition of a venue owner in which case trespassing would provide a criminal law violation, (2) a statute particular to acts in the presence of a protected person, or (3) creative interpretation of laws that, for example, prohibit "menancing" with a weapon or involve "attempted assault or attempted murder" on the theory that under the possession of the weapon in the known and anticipated presence of the protected person was a concrete step towards an intended use of harming the protected person or another person. Note that a Secret Service officer cares about the arrest much more than the conviction given his or her mission, so they care more about having "probable cause" that an attempted crime is being committed, which is grounds for a lawful arrest or lawful, than about being able to prove that a crime was committed beyond a reasonable doubt. The definition of probable cause is beyond the scope of this answer but is a much lower standard than even a preponderance of the evidence that applies in non-criminal cases incluing civil forfeiture cases. Assault weapons that are not generally legal to own A throwable explosive such as a hand grenade Other explosives The Secret Service has authority to both investigate and enforce criminal laws pertinent to its mission including a law enforcement right to make civil seizures of contraband. All of these things would generally be illegal to possess without special licensing that may itself impose restrictions on its use. Marijuana, which is federally illegal, in a state like Colorado Harder drugs like cocaine or heroin These are federal crimes that any federal law enforcement officer can enforce, except that there are temporary budgetary restrictions that prohibit using federal funds to enforce marijuana law violations that comply with state law. Since these are outside the mission of the Secret Service, it can't actively investigate these violations but can use all of the authority of any law enforcement officer including seizure of contraband when encountered in the course of other activities within their jurisdiction or if in a particular case enforcing the law would further the purposes of their jurisdiction. Counterfeit US currency, along with a printing press and materials for more This is contraband in violation of criminal laws that can be searched for and seized, and is within the jurisdiction of the Secret Service for investigative purposes.
Where the President explicitly tells a newspaper that they should reveal their sources. Is this not illegal in the US? It is not illegal. Well, it would be a U.S. Attorney, rather than the President himself. You're thinking of shield laws, but no such law exists at the federal level. Moreover, although some people might think that the First Amendment ("freedom of the press") would protect a journalist in such a case, the Supreme Court has held that it doesn't, though the government is required to "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest". So if a reporter were subpoenaed in federal court to reveal a source, and they couldn't convince a court to quash the subpoena under the Branzburg test, they'd have to either reveal their source or be held in contempt. In practice, many reporters have chosen the latter, and served time in jail rather than reveal the source. For instance, Judith Miller. There've been a number of proposals to create such a federal law, but so far Congress hasn't seen fit to do it. According to the Wikipedia article, every state except Wyoming has some sort of shield protection for journalists, either in statute or case law, though the protections are not necessarily absolute. So a state court or prosecutor would find it much more difficult to enforce such an order.
Sure: No Constitutional rights are totally unencumbered. Even natural rights like the "right to life" are legally "infringed" through various theories (e.g., self-defense, capital punishment, warfare). The Second Amendment has been interpreted as a right to keep and bear weapons that would reasonably be used in self-defense or in military service. You don't have to go to strategic weapons like nukes to find "reasonable infringement" of that right. For example, even though the military and even police routinely use explosives, individuals are absolutely subject to the whims of a federal regulatory agency (the BATFE) as well as state restrictions if they want to keep and bear detonators. Also, I'm not aware of an absolute prohibition on the possession of nuclear devices by non-government entities. E.g., various government regulators oversee private entities that operate commercial and research nuclear reactors and other activities that put them all-but in possession of nuclear arms. If an individual really wanted to legally keep and bear a nuclear weapon it could probably be done with enough money and oversight. (Amendment: Except, as cpast points out in the comments, that there is a law against private possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S. Which just goes back to the broad answer to your general question: In practice there are no unencumbered rights. Constitutional "rights" might better be called things that require "strict scrutiny" and "narrow tailoring" of government infringement.)
This question is framed such that it could include myriad different scenarios that could lead to a search of one's personal computer. You seem to gear the bulk of your inquiry toward when the government can search, but then move to when a corporate entity has the right to do so, which is a very different thing. These are different issues with different concepts and rules that dictate when this can occur lawfully. You might want to narrow your question a bit. By way of generalization: the citizens of the U.S. have an implied right to privacy as construed through the Bill of Rights, even though there is no explicit right written into the constitution. The most common way to conduct a search in the U.S. is with probable cause through a search warrant. There are questions and answers both on here, as well as resources all over the internet, pertaining to constitutionally accepted forms of search and seizure such that you could get that information fairly easily. However, as with the U.K., and despite any rights (explicit or implicit), there are many ways your computer could be searched by the government - both known to the owner and unknown - and even remotely, that use means less common to the standard search warrant. As you've probably heard from the revelations of Edward Snowden (Wikileaks), the governments of the world have been shown to search metadata and other electronic records without a warrant under laws aimed toward protecting national security. In the U.S. the Patriot Act gave wide reaching powers to invade the privacy of individuals that required no oversight or basis for doing so. Corporations that deal with the transmission of data work with government entities to to accomplish this end. As one individual has already noted, you subject yourself to search (which includes your computer) upon entry to the country through customs. There are many ways that the government can and does engender to search computers, computer files, emails, metadata, etc. A corporation may search your personal computer under a contractual relationship you create with it (for instance if you work from home and elect to use your home computer, and to do so you elect to agree to allow the entity to inspect your computer for their intellectual property in certain circumstances). They can also do this pursuant to a civil lawsuit, which can allow for the inspection of your computer through the process of discovery. These are just some of the ways your information can become subject to inspection (search) by government or corporate entities. Again, your question would need to be limited more to address any one situation more fully.
The question that you pose can't be answered in the abstract and the conceptual framework you introduce in the section entitled &quot;Resume&quot; is largely unsound from a legal perspective, even if it may have some political theory usefulness. Indeed, even the framework of &quot;relative power&quot; doesn't really work. The question almost always presents itself in a binary fashion. Either a law enforcement officer has authority to do some particular thing, or the officer doesn't. Frequently, there are multiple law enforcement officers in different agencies who all have the authority to do a particular thing, and whoever gets there first may do so. In U.S. law, law enforcement is highly decentralized. There are hundreds of distinct federal law enforcement agencies, dozens of distinct law enforcement agencies in every single state, and almost every local government (sometimes even school districts, water boards, and park districts) have their own law enforcement agencies. All told, the number of independent law enforcement agencies in the U.S. is in the low tens of thousands. Something on the order of 90%+ of those law enforcement officers report to local governments like cities and counties and have no direct chain of authority that goes up beyond that point. The remainder are split roughly equally between the state level and the federal level, but highly fragmented within each such level between different agencies within each state and with the federal government. The most common kind of law enforcement officer in the federal government is not the stereotypical F.B.I. agent. Instead, it is a federal park ranger. A few small states are more centralized (e.g. Hawaii), but massive decentralization is the norm. The law enforcement officers in every single one of those agencies has a statutorily defined jurisdiction. Rather than being a neat hierarchy in which one law enforcement agent is always superior to another law enforcement agent, one has to analyze the circumstances in light of a particular grant of jurisdiction. There are general trends in how these grants of authority are made, but they are far from uniform. Most grants of authority include both territorial and subject matter elements. State police can typically arrest anyone for a violation of state law within their state, but not for violations of federal law or the laws of another state under circumstances where a citizens arrest is not authorized and where there isn't a warrant outstanding. A state game warden can arrest you for violating hunting laws in his geographic area, but not for violating state tax laws or federal immigration laws. A village constable in a tiny hamlet in rural Tennessee can arrest the chief of police for the Tennessee Valley Authority's law enforcement agency (the TVA is a federally charted independent government agency), for drunk driving in that constable's village. In contrast, an F.B.I. special agent doesn't have the authority to make that arrest, but could arrest either the village constable or the TVA chief of police for taking a bribe contrary to federal anti-corruption laws. There are law enforcement officers who specialize in investigating crimes by other law enforcement officers (often in the same agency). In state and local police agencies these are usually called &quot;internal affairs officers&quot;, with a unit in the state police or state bureau of investigation that works closely with a unit of the state attorney general's office having a secondary role in this task. In the federal government, the Inspector General's office in each cabinet department is typically charged with primary responsibility for these kinds of investigations. In the military, improprieties by active duty soldiers in connection with their implementation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice would usually be investigated by the criminal investigation service in each cabinet level department (i.e. the Army, the Navy (including the Marines Corps), and the Air Force) within the Department of Defense. But in neither case is the conceptual issue one of authority. Usually any law enforcement officer in a particular agency has authority to arrest any other law enforcement officer from the same agency (with the possible exception of their direct superiors). It is a question of focus and job responsibilities, not of legal authority. There is a notion of federal supremacy under the U.S. Constitution. In a bald showdown of authority between federal law enforcement officers and state law enforcement officers, say, over who is entitled to custody of a non-law enforcement officer criminal who has been arrested, the federal law enforcement officers will prevail. But, these showdowns are rare, and interagency conflicts within state governments and the federal government respectively, if not reconciled sooner, are more often resolved by a Governor or President, through a chain of management command authority within that governmental entity, than in the courts. Even when there is no one shared chief executive between law enforcement officers, usually these disputes are resolved by negotiation between the chiefs of the respective officers, rather than through legal channels. This is much less true in most countries other than the U.S. Most countries have far fewer independent law enforcement agencies, and have more clear and hierarchical lines of authority between them. This distinction is illustrated by your professor's example: If the Queen of England pointed a gun at the President of America and the President of America pointed a gun at the Queen of England, could you prosecute and/ or charge any of them? In the U.K., nobody has the authority to arrest the Queen, and the authority to arrest the U.S. President would be highly limited by diplomatic treaties relating to the treatment of foreign heads of state. In the U.S., the question is tricker and quite fact specific. The President has immunity for his official acts, but not for his private acts. If this standoff with guns breaks out on the floor of the U.N. in the context of a breakdown of negotiations, the President hasn't committed a U.S. crime. On the other hand, suppose that the President and the Queen have been having a private tryst at a bed and breakfast at our small village hamlet in Tennessee where they have managed to escape their respective security details. (Pardon me for bringing such an icky vision into your head, this is purely for educational purposes and you should censor your own thoughts as you imagine it. I blame the questioner's professor for presenting a scenario that has this possible aspect to it.) The village constable can arrest the President for this crime in violation of Tennessee law (assuming that the President doesn't have legal justification for his acts such as self-defense) since this act was conducted in an unofficial capacity. But he probably can't arrest and charge the Queen under diplomatic treaties that the U.S. has with the U.K. In contrast, a U.S. Secret Service agent would have authority to seize the Queen sufficiently to disarm her and prevent her from being a threat to the President, even if he couldn't charge her with any crime.
The pawn shop has the "use of property" of their own premises. The pawn shop has obviously the right to examine the gun to determine its value, for example, or to clean it if it needs cleaning to avoid damage, or to show it to a potential customer. And the pawn shop is allowed to let the police onto their own premises, even without a search warrant.
Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.
Almost certainly, there is no such right. It's illegal under 18 USC 831 to possess "nuclear material" without specific authorization. 18 USC 832 forbids the possession of a "radiological weapon". If there is intent to use the device to cause death, serious bodily injury, or damage to property or the environment, that's also a violation of 18 USC 2332i. I don't think these laws have been explicitly tested against the Second Amendment, but related cases suggest they would hold up (if the challenge wasn't simply dismissed as frivolous). The Second Amendment doesn't grant a blanket right to own weapons. Federal law, 18 USC 922 (o) makes it unlawful to own a "machinegun" (as defined in the statute), and in the case of Hollis v. Lynch, the Fifth Circuit held that this law was constitutional, because, as they said, the Second Amendment only protects weapons that are in "common use [...] for lawful purposes like self-defense." This case doesn't seem to have been appealed further, but the reasoning cited by the Fifth Circuit comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in D.C. v. Heller. If machineguns aren't in "common use", and therefore not protected, surely the same would apply to nuclear weapons.