How (and how effectively) is complete corporate self-ownership prevented? Corporations are not supposed to be able to have no ultimate beneficial owners. If A Inc. holds 100% of B Group, B Group is not supposed to be able to own 100% of A Inc. How effectively are these dead-end loops in corporate ownership prevented, especially when the involved entities are in different jurisdictions that might not communicate? If such a loop is discovered to have occurred, how is it usually unwound, and by whom? Who ends up with the assets? This isn't about whether or not the arrangement is allowed, it is about what is done about it if it manages to arise or how it is prevented from arising.
Usually, the only reason to set up an &quot;ownerless&quot; corporation is to set up a non-profit. Non-profit corporations can have self-perpetuating boards and are very similar to charitable trusts. If it ends up without any board members and has a self-perpetuating board, any person affected by the corporation or a suitable government representative (in the U.S., usually a state attorney general in the place of incorporation) can apply to a court to have new board members appointed. In a &quot;for profit&quot; context, this generally doesn't happen because the people investing in the company want to be able to profit from it and/or obtain a return of their investment. So, the question is largely hypothetical in that case.
As the article suggests, this is called adverse possession. This seems to have occurred because the original owner did not make use of the property, nor monitored for adverse possession. The reason this method of acquiring title exists is for a number of reasons, including the prudent use of land, as well as being analogous to a limitation on the time period during which a claim can be brought. It would be reasonably easily avoided if the original owner had made use of the property, or monitored it and took action to eject the adverse possessor prior to their fulfilment of the necessary conditions.
I am not knowledgeable about UK law, but since almost everywhere in the U.S. employment is at-will by default, in all three scenarios Company B is entitled to terminate the employee very easily. The assumption that the employee was accurately found guilty of harassment elsewhere precludes more interesting analyses where matters such as defamation and public policy are involved. If the contract between the employee and Company B establishes that termination will be for good cause, the employee has only a mild chance of not being terminated for what he did in Company A. However, I say "mild chance" because in most cases Company B can reasonably argue that it seeks to protect its other employees and/or customers from the possibility that the employee's misconduct may occur in the current workplace. A very detailed analysis of the factual circumstances might be required for discerning whether Company B's decision to terminate the employee is merited. Additionally, in cases where The Employee is a publicly visible figure and a figure of authority having a management role there could be a concern that the employee's misconduct elsewhere may harm the image of Company B.
Contracts are generally assignable, meaning that one company can assign their rights, duties and obligations under the contract. Assignment may be specifically barred by the contract, or it may have certain terms (prior written consent, etc.) attached, but if not, a contract is likely freely assignable. Though a contract is not necessarily "automatically transferred" the reason Company C buys Company A is for its ability to earn Company C over time, which includes the contract between A &amp; B. So unless the original contract has a "no assignments clause" or if an assignment is otherwise impossible or illegal, it is likely that A can freely assign the contract to C.
You mean like Unilever, and countless others do? Yes. Many, many companies control a stable of brands, often of competing products. This is particularly prevalent in grocery lines (cleaning, food, beauty products) and motor vehicles (there are dozens of brands of motor vehicle but only a handful of automotive companies). Clearly, these products have different features (improvements) – you are entitled to segment your market anyway you like. If they are actually produced by the same company, keeping that secret would be virtually impossible. If they were separate companies (even with licencing agreements etc.), well, they are not the same company even if they have common ownership. As for having a monopoly: if you hold a patent you are allowed to have a monopoly, if you don't, expect to see knock-off rocket boots on the shelf in a week.
It's essentially a legally enshrined incentive for high net worth investors to supply capital, which is consistent with the other entities that qualify in § 230.501. It tends to come with increased access to riskier offerings, where the risk ensues from exempted registration. While nominal dollar thresholds typically get eroded away by inflation, they needed a line in the sand to represent financial sophistication. Speculation: I suspect the initial number was a ballpark attempt to approximate the point at which individuals (at that time) tended to be involved in more complex projects (e.g. certain hedges and ventures).
Not as a shareholder The entire point of limited liability companies is that the shareholders are protected from the losses of the company - they can only lose the amount they paid (or still owe) for their shares. The directors and officers of a company have various duties that they owe to the company and can be held liable if they breach those duties. Those duties are: the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, the right to rely on certain information, the business judgment rule, and fiduciary duties in the context of insolvency, corporate opportunities, and interested director transactions (or insider transactions) &quot;[I]ntentional or reckless poor management&quot; would, on the face of it, appear to breach the duty of care and the business judgement rule and could expose the directors to liability. However, Bob is a shareholder; not a director or officer. If he is not involved in the company beyond appointing the directors, he is not liable. If he points himself as a director or becomes an officer by telling the directors what to do, then he could be liable.
If a business literally has an &quot;exact change only&quot; policy, that can't be enforced in post-pay situations. But if they have a &quot;you are free to overpay, but we won't give you change back&quot;, that's different, especially if it's communicated from the beginning. If they tell you they don't give change, then you're taking their goods/services implicitly agreeing to their terms.