Why can colleges &quot;discriminate&quot; against students from other states by charging them more? The Constitution states that the federal government has the right to regulate commerce between the states. As shown in Gibbons v. Ogden; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S.; Katzenback v. McClung; West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, etc., essentially anything relating to other states is subject to the Commerce clause. As the American Bar site says: The Court ruled in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S. (1964) that Congress had plenty of authority under the Commerce Clause to ban racial discrimination at the hotel because the hotel catered to interstate travel­ers and it therefore affected interstate commerce. The Court ruled the same day in Katzenbach v. McClung (1964) that Congress had plenty of authority under the Commerce Clause to ban racial discrimination at Ollie’s Barbecue because a good portion of the food used by the restaurant was imported from out of state, and the restaurant therefore affected interstate commerce. This shows how almost anything serving someone from out-of-state relates to the Commerce clause. So colleges are subject to the Commerce clause. Why are colleges allowed to charge out-of-state students tens of thousands more for college, constitutionally?
There are two constitutional doctrines that prohibit discrimination based upon state of residence. One is the dormant commerce clause (a court created doctrine) and the other is the privileges and immunities clause. There are actually two privileges and immunities clauses, one in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1, which states: The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. and the other in Section 1 of the 14th Amendment which states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Some of the leading privilege and immunities cases are reviewed here. With respect to the dormant commerce clause, per the link above: [I]n a dormant Commerce Clause case, a court is initially concerned with whether the law facially discriminates against out-of-state actors or has the effect of favoring in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests. Discriminatory laws motivated by "simple economic protectionism" are subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity," City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1977) which can only be overcome by a showing that the State has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose, Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131(1986). See also Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986). Notwithstanding these constitutional protections against discrimination based upon state residence, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this discrimination is constitutional in the case Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) and reaffirmed the continuing vitality of that decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). The majority opinion in Vlandis v. Kline explains this authority was basically undisputed at that time: The appellees do not challenge, nor did the District Court invalidate, the option of the State to classify students as resident and nonresident students, thereby obligating nonresident students to pay higher tuition and fees than do bona fide residents. The State's right to make such a classification is unquestioned here. Some of the justification is set forth in the Saenz v. Roe (1999) decision which states: The second component of the right to travel is, however, expressly protected by the text of the Constitution. The first sentence of Article IV, § 2, provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Thus, by virtue of a person's state citizenship, a citizen of one State who travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is entitled to enjoy the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States" that he visits. This provision removes "from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States." It provides important protections for nonresidents who enter a State whether to obtain employment, to procure medical services, or even to engage in commercial shrimp fishing, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). Those protections are not "absolute," but the Clause "does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States." There may be a substantial reason for requiring the nonresident to pay more than the resident for a hunting license, see Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371 (1978), or to enroll in the state university, see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), but our cases have not identified any acceptable reason for qualifying the protection afforded by the Clause for "the 'citizen of State A who ventures into State B' to settle there and establish a home." Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). Permissible justifications for discrimination between residents and nonresidents are simply inapplicable to a nonresident's exercise of the right to move into another State and become a resident of that State. Despite fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, most notably expressed in the majority and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), it has always been common ground that this Clause protects the third component of the right to travel. Writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller explained that one of the privileges conferred by this Clause "is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State." Basically, the exception isn't logical and instead is a case of the Courts upholding a common practice that seems to make economic sense, notwithstanding that fact that it is clearly contrary to the relevant constitutional provisions and doctrines. The life of the law is not reason, it is experience. Assuming logical consistency in the law will often lead you to a descriptively inaccurate result.
The Supreme Court has ruled, in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, that Congress is empowered to pass the Controlled Substances Act: whether or not you agree with the ruling, that is what the current law is. Citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 and Perez v. US, 402 U.S. 146, the court held that If Congress decides that the “‘total incidence’” of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire class because Congress may conclude that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity Then comparing Raich (a medical marijuana case) and Wickard, the court held that In both cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in the national market for that commodity. and the Court has no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA While there are various differences between Wickard and Raich, the court gets to decide which similarities are most important and which differences should be set aside. The disagreement is not trivial: O'connor, Rehnquist and Thomas dissented, finding that the Commerce clause is there to protect historic spheres of state sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment and thereby to maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist system of government But it was a minority view that the states should have to power to set in-state rules for commerce.
In normal commercial situations there is the principle of freedom of contract where parties are free to contract with whom they choose. As a result of this principle, they are also free to not choose to contract with whom they choose (i.e. refuse to serve someone). There are limits, such as if it could be argued that by doing so contravenes other laws, such as those against discrimination on the basis of race, age or gender for example. When a public entity is involved, it is a branch of government and is governed by the rules that define the relationship between the individual and the state - the constitution, so principles of constitutional law apply. Decisions made by public bodies can therefore be subject to judicial review, where an affected party or someone with sufficient standing can take the matter to court to be reviewed by a judge.
Is it a correct inference that the right &quot;to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects&quot; extends to even a private corporation? No. It's not even a correct inference that it extends by its own terms to state and local governments. In Barron v. Baltimore (1833), the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights was enacted as part of the federal constitution and only restricts the exercise of the federal government's authority. State and local governments are instead bound by the Fourteenth Amendment, which says that No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Over the years, the courts have held that state action that deprives someone of fundamental rights deprives them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the Supreme Court held that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a fundamental right, so state action violating it is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Most of the Bill of Rights has been held to be &quot;fundamental,&quot; and people routinely say &quot;the state violated the Fourth Amendment&quot; instead of &quot;the state violated the Fourteenth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable search of the sort that would violate the Fourth Amendment if conducted by the federal government.&quot; Courts will say &quot;the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth.&quot; But the point is that the Fourth Amendment itself is not applicable to anyone except the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, only restricts the states. The Fourth Amendment only restricts the federal government. With rare exceptions, neither applies to private entities.
I suspect that the statute in question may be Section 11-104(1)(F) of municipal ordinances of the Town of Bloomsburg, PA, a university town (home to Bloomberg University of Pennsylvania, a public college) that purports to have special need for regulation based upon the large number of student rentals in the town and apparently applies primarily to house rentals to students. (If not, the ordinance in question may be modeled on this one, or this one may be modeled on the ordinance in question.) This ordinance imposes the following duties on people who have been granted landlord licenses, which the town requires of most landlords renting to students (a landlord is called the "owner" in the ordinance): The owner shall maintain a current and accurate list of the occupants in each regulated rental unit or dormitory unit which shall include their name, permanent address and permanent telephone number which shall be available to the Town for inspection upon reasonable notice. The owner shall notify the Town of changes in the occupancy within 10 days of the change and shall provide the name of the person who is not longer residing in the premises in the event a person departs and the name, permanent address and permanent telephone number of new occupants in the event a new person is added. On its face, this is probably valid. There is not a constitutional right to keep your own contact information or address, or your tenant's identity. Indeed, very similar requirements are routinely imposed upon operators of hotels and motels. And, I strongly suspect that in Pennsylvania, that towns of any reasonable population have more or less plenary authority to adopt ordinances that aren't specifically prohibited by other state or federal laws or constitutions or the town charter. I do not believe that there are any federal statutes that prohibit a town from imposing such a requirement, barring extraordinary circumstances like a duty to cooperate with national security measures, witness protection programs, or a federal organized crime investigation that don't benefit the average tenant. The kind of privacy policy and privacy disclosure laws in place at the national level apply mostly to health and financial information (and far more in Europe), but not generally to legally mandated disclosures of landlords to local governments. The requirements of a privacy policy don't apply here. The main federal privacy laws and some of the most notable state privacy laws are: The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which affects websites that knowingly collect information about or targeted at children under the age of 13. Any such websites must post a privacy policy and adhere to enumerated information-sharing restrictions COPPA includes a "safe harbor" provision to promote Industry self-regulation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires institutions "significantly engaged" in financial activities give "clear, conspicuous, and accurate statements" of their information-sharing practices. The Act also restricts use and sharing of financial information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rules requires notice in writing of the privacy practices of health care services, and this requirement also applies if the health service is electronic. The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 – Business and Professions Code sections 22575-22579 requires "any commercial websites or online services that collect personal information on California residents through a web site to conspicuously post a privacy policy on the site". Both Nebraska and Pennsylvania have laws treating misleading statements in privacy policies published on websites as deceptive or fraudulent business practices. But, most of these laws apply only to Internet sharing of information by private firms, and the Nebraska and Pennsylvania laws don't require anyone to actually have a privacy policy. Those laws certainly don't pre-empt local ordinances. There is at least one state law that should supply an exemption to this statute in Pennsylvania pertaining to confidentiality for domestic violence victims that should override contrary town ordinances. Address Confidentiality Program (ACP): Victims can get a legal substitute address (usually a post office box) to use in place of their physical address; this address can be used whenever an address is required by public agencies. First class mail sent to the substitute address is forwarded to the victim's actual address. Probably the most fruitful means by which an ordinance like this one could be challenged would be to argue that the true intent of the ordinances when adopted or as it has been subsequently applied, is to use it for a purpose that the town is not allowed to engage in, such as enforcing immigration laws, suppressing voting rights, imposing a de facto poll tax, or engaging in discrimination against a protected class in violation of state and federal fair housing laws. College students, however, the expressly stated and plausible target of the ordinance, are not generally a protected class under fair housing legislation. There are precedents upholding zoning regulations discriminating against households of "Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals" aimed at students and other kind of populations whom municipal busybodies often find to be undesirable against federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). California's courts have been more hostile to this kind of legislation. See, e.g. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 125 (Cal. 1980) (an op-ed arguing that this was wrongly decided in the L.A. Times in 1990 is here), but that isn't very helpful in Pennsylvania, and California rather than Pennsylvania is the outlier nationally on this kind of issue. The general issue over free association and privacy rights in connection with housing and unrelated individuals is discussed in an up to date manner in a 2016 Florida Law Review article. Proving an improper purpose in an as applied or legislative intent based challenge to a facially neutral statute is very, very difficult in all but the most blatant cases (e.g. when town council members openly proclaim their improper purpose is that true purpose of the law). No doubt recognizing the possibility of such a challenge to the ordinance, this particular ordinance has a particularly lengthy and detailed legislative declaration regarding its purpose that no doubt is an effort to take a position that it has a proper purpose in the event of future litigation. This states: It is the purpose of this Part and the policy of the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg, in order to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish rights and obligations of owners and occupants relating to the rental of certain dwelling units and dormitory units in the Town of Bloomsburg and to encourage owners and occupants to maintain and improve the quality of rental housing within the community. It is also the policy of the Town that owners, managers and occupants share responsibilities to obey the various codes adopted to protect and promote public health, safety and welfare. As means to those ends, this Part provides for a system of inspections, issuance and renewal of occupancy licenses and sets penalties for violations. This Part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies. In considering the adoption of this Part, the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings: A. While the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg acknowledges the significant contribution that Bloomsburg University, its students, faculty and staff makes to the culture and economy of the Town of Bloomsburg, in recent years, adverse effects of student housing on residential neighborhoods have increased and there has been an increase in destructive student behavior that threatens the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg. B. Accordingly, the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings relating to student housing and its effect on the residential neighborhoods of the Town of Bloomsburg and the effect of student lifestyles on the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg: (1) When compared to other unrelated cohabitating individuals and traditional families, groups of students have different hours, work and social habits and frequently cause noise, disturbances and problems in residential neighborhoods. (2) There is a greater incidence of violations of various codes of the Town at residential properties where owners rent such property to students. (3) There is a greater incidence of problems with the maintenance and upkeep of residential properties where owners rent such property to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (4) There is a greater incidence of disturbances which adversely affect the peace and quiet of the neighborhood at residential properties where owners rent to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (5) A concentration of student homes changes the character of a neighborhood from one with traditional family values to one that cannot maintain those and approximately 90% of the Town's student homes are concentrated in two areas of the Town which displaces middle and lower income housing by absorbing housing units and rendering the remaining units less desirable for more traditional residential use. (6) Since 1994, nine students have died as a result of fires in houses occupied by students; two students have died of alcohol overdose; one student has died as a result of exposure when he fell from a porch at a student party. (7) Since 1997, 155 reports of disruptive conduct under the Town's Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance involving student behavior have been filed. (8) Since 1996, 73 prosecutions for unlawfully occupying premises while smoke or fire detectors were not operational have been filed against students. (9) Since 1998, 295 prosecutions for underage drinking have been filed against students and 11 prosecutions were filed against non-student residents of the Town of Bloomsburg. (10) Since 1998, 43 student parties have been raided where arrests were made for underage drinking and furnishing alcohol to minors. (11) There are sufficient differences between student housing and nonstudent housing and the behavior of students and non-student residents to justify different regulations for each class of resident. (12) Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals are being modified for occupancy by two students requiring the relocating of bearing walls and the modification of utilities, sanitation facilities, means of ingress and egress and smoke and fire detection systems. (13) Inspections of dwelling units occupied by two students have revealed little or no life protecting equipment in the dwelling units such as smoke and fire alarms and detectors and fire extinguishers, over-loaded electrical services, heating systems needing servicing and the use of supplemental heaters, all of which create a dangerous living environment. (14) There is a significant occurrence of disruptive behavior in dwelling units occupied by less than three unrelated students as compared to dwelling units that are occupied by owners, traditional families or unrelated persons who are not students. (15) Students who remain in the occupancy of the premises for periods of time after they are no longer students contribute to the above-described problems. (16) Because of the demand for student housing in the Town of Bloomsburg, developers have expressed interest in developing properties for use as dormitories where students live in rooms without fixed kitchen facilities. (17) Dormitory type uses are not covered by the Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance which applies only to dwelling units. (18) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of providing the same protection and standards for students who reside in dormitories or dwelling units. (19) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of imposing the same responsibilities upon owners of dormitory units and dwelling units where students reside. (20) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg finds that Bloomsburg University has sufficient resources and interest to properly manage dormitories owned by it and there is no need to regulate such dormitories. Even though it probably isn't inherently invalid, it is unusual, so it is likely to be challenged if someone can find an angle to do so. And, I suspect that its purposes are not as pure as those formally identified in the text of the ordinance. In conclusion, while I would totally hate to have an ordinance like that one in my town, it isn't obviously invalid and would probably survive a facial challenge in the absence of evidence that is was being applied in an illegally discriminatory manner.
The direct answer is simple -- the US Constitution (Article II, Section 1, Clause 2) provides that electors are appointed in the manner that state legislatures direct -- so the answer is the state legislature decides. But state legislatures don't exist in a vacuum, and the reality is not so simple. State legislatures direct the manner of choosing electors by passing state laws, which, in the case the state decides to choose electors by holding some sort of popular election, include laws for how and when ballots can be cast or received, and how recounts are to work, etc. Normally, state laws are interpreted by state courts, and state courts can strike down or modify state laws if they find that the state laws violate the state constitution. And more fundamentally, state legislatures derive their authority from state constitutions, so in principle, state legislatures should not be able to perform any act that does not conform to the state constitution (which is interpreted by the state courts). However, the Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Gore (2000) overturned the Florida state supreme court ruling on how to conduct recounts in the Florida election for presidential electors. Normally, federal courts do not get involved in state law issues, but the decision was mostly made on equal protection grounds, and the equal protection clause is part of the federal Constitution. So federal courts can get involved if there is an issue that relates to federal law or Constitution. In the Bush v. Gore case, there was an interesting concurring opinion that said the Florida supreme court had acted contrary to the Florida legislature, but this opinion was only joined by 3 justices, so it is not binding. Recently, the issue came up again when the US Supreme Court declined to stay a decision by the Pennsylvania state supreme court that said the Pennsylvania constitution required mail ballots postmarked by Election Day but received up to 3 days after Election Day to be counted, even though the state law said they must be received by Election Day. Notably, although the US Supreme Court declined the stay, the order listed that 4 conservative justices dissented and said that they would have granted the stay. This was before Justice Barrett was confirmed, so, now that she is confirmed, depending on her legal position on this issue, there might now be a majority of 5 justices that would intervene against the state court if such an issue were to come up again. The order did not list the legal reasoning for each of the dissenting justices, so it is unclear what legal justification they had in mind in agreeing to overrule the state court.
Such a law could probably be passed under the authority of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. Price controls on various products have previously been justified under that clause.
Leonard's law says that the school can restrict speech if it is against the religious tenets of the organization. Now I don't think school uniforms fall are part of the tenets of Catholicism, so why can private schools enforce dress codes? I see there's a misunderstanding of the Leonard's law. But I fault the California legislators (not you) for that confusion, since the statutory language is ambiguous and leads to the reasonable interpretation your inquiry reflects. The statute reads: (c) This section does not apply to a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization. It is not that a religious school is allowed to restrict speech if it contravenes the tenets of that religion, but that the statute altogether is inapplicable to religious schools because it is considered an infringement of fundamental liberties to which religious institutions are entitled in the US. The [religious] school would prevail on the basis of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Dermody v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 530 S.W.3d 467, 474 (2017): The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits courts from deciding cases "dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom, or church government[.]". (Please note that I strongly disagree with the application of that doctrine in the Dermody case and I consider it impermissibly outdated for the controversy litigated therein, but that is a separate issue). A religious school could convincingly argue that the judicial review of its uniforms policy infringes matters of ecclesiastical discipline/rule/custom, aspects which ultimately "involve an internal church dispute over religious authority or dogma" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 220 (2005). Infringements of ecclesiastical abstention and akin doctrines would be outweighed only in "compelling" [cases] because "the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes is part and parcel of the government's `paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens'" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct. at 225 (brackets added in this answer). A free speech controversy such as the school's uniform policy simply does not meet that threshold.