In the US are jurors actually judging guilt? Is it true that in US law jurors are not actually judging guilt, but rather whether the case against a person has been made in accordance with the concepts of all reasonable doubt? This meaning that US laws allows the possibility for an innocent person with an inept defense to be found guilty and also a guilty person faced with an inept prosecution being found innocent. Is this concept discussed somewhere in the US Constitution maybe?
Short answer, yes, jurors will typically render a decision of guilt vs. innocence. This is pretty common in nations where the legal system is derived from British Common Law (about 2 billion people world wide live in a Common Law nation). The U.S. is unique in that it uses juries for Civil Trials as well as Criminal Trials. The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution in which the 6th amendment guarantees the right to trial by impartial jury (contrary to popular opinion, it is not a jury of peers, as this alludes to the Peerage systems, which the U.S. never adopted). That line is from the Magna Carta which was influential in the drafting of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. A jury usually consists of a panel of 12 people pulled from the locality of the crime, unless a change of venue has been granted because the alleged crime is so well known an impartial jury cannot be seated from the population. The jury will hear all the evidence from both sides, as well as opening and closing arguments. They will be provided &quot;jury instructions&quot; by the judge and must find if the evidence presented (The Facts) meet the criteria for a conviction of a charged crime (The Law). In all Jury Trials, a Jury fills the role of &quot;Trier of Fact&quot; while the Judge fills the role of &quot;Trier of Law.&quot; While the judge has the education background to understand what the law says constitutes a crime and how to find that law as well as how to make sure the defense and plaintiff/prosecution make fair arguments, any random group of 12 people can understand facts and put together whose story they believe, the defense's or the prosecution's. In the case of an innocent person being convicted due to inept defense, this does happen and is horrible, but there are recourses in the form of appeals courts, which can overturn a trial and order that a new one be held (a mistrial, essentially, the original trial never happened and the person is legally innocent. Try again and do it proper this time.) Ineffective assistance of counsel is a valid grounds for appeal of a conviction and does happen. In the other scenario, an inept prosecution, this does happen as well and it's not the fault of the jury that the guilty person went free, but for the prosecution. The prosecutor is at a disadvantage in every criminal case to balance out the fact that their office has more resources to bring to bear then most defendants. Among these handicaps is that their &quot;story&quot; about what happened must not have any &quot;plot holes&quot; in it (beyond a reasonable doubt evidentiary standard of proof) and that the prosecution has to convince 12 people that their story is the only way this could happen (try convincing 12 random people to agree to anything more complicated than &quot;the sky is blue and grass is green&quot;) and they only have one shot to do it (Double Jeopardy essentially bars the prosecutor's office from initiating the appeals process... and blocks someone who is declared innocent from doing it because why the hell would you want to?!). Here, the problem is that the Prosecutor doesn't have to charge the accused right away and has a bit of generous time to investigate (depends on statute of limitations on particular crimes) ... but the right to a speedy trial means that once charges are filed, the clock starts on how long the prosecution has to bring the case. Delay to long and the judge will give a directed verdict that the person is innocent because the prosecution wasn't ready. The importance of this fact that is a staple belief of Common Law is in the &quot;Blackstone Ratio&quot; which states: Better that 10 guilty people go free than a single innocent person suffers So the jury finding the prosecution inept is certainly the prosecutor's problem, not the jury's problem. It's a feature not a bug. If an innocent person does suffer, then we have a bug and we must see that it is corrected. As a final note, the jury also has the power of Jury Nullification of the Law. In the U.S. it's not really certain if Jury Nullification invalidates the law completely but in effect, it allows the Jury to declare a person innocent because, while they believe the prosecution's story that the defendant did what they were accused of, they don't believe this person should be convicted because they believe the crime they're accused of should have never been a crime in the first place.
The burden for proving claims in civil actions is "preponderance of evidence," i.e., merely that "more than 50% of the evidence favors a conclusion." However, the standard for conviction of any crime is "beyond a reasonable doubt." I.e., if the defense can raise reasonable doubt about one's guilt then the defendant should be acquitted. There is quite a bit of space between the two standards, which is compounded by prosecutorial discretion to even bring criminal charges.
If this judge is truly biased, won't the litigants be all the more glad to have a jury of their peers? You are proposing to abandon your duty to others. At trial you serve the community, not the judge. Back on scope for Law SE: If you refuse to serve on a jury, that could be a separate offense or general criminal contempt, for which you (this all depends on your jurisdiction) could get 30-90 days in jail. Edit: like several others have pointed out, I would not expect much trouble if you politely told the court that you felt you would be biased b/c of past connections. Even if the judge doesn't dismiss you, one of the litigants is likely to strike you. P.S. In most states, no one except a prosecutor (sometimes another state employee) can "take someone" to a criminal court. Individuals can only take someone to civil trial, where one cannot be sentenced, only ordered to pay a judgement.
Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself).
Are there any legal constraints on the number of times that a defendant can be retried following mistrials due to hung juries? No. A fairly recent case in Louisiana, for example, involved someone who had been tried perhaps half a dozen times resulting in a mix of hung juries and reversals of convictions on appeal. Or is the only practical constraint the willingness of the prosecutor to expend government resources (and perhaps political capital) pursuing a conviction? Yes. This is the only practical limitation.
Can defense request findings of fact before resting? Is it possible for the Defense to avoid presenting affirmative defenses (like Self Defense) before the Court has found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime? If so: How? No, no and not applicable. A verdict is a singular declaration by the jury (or judge) that the state has or has not proved their case. Affirmative Defence These are all affirmative defenses which defeat or mitigate the consequences of the unlawful conduct and the onus of proof lies with the Defence, not the Prosecution. An affirmative defence must be pleaded in a timely manner. If the Prosecution fails in their burden to prove the unlawful conduct the affirmative defence does not get engaged. This is a threshold decision point for the trier of fact and the judge should so instruct the jury. Of necessity, affirmative defences require some admission of fact, however, these facts may not be in contention anyway. Where they are in contention, it requires a strategic choice by the defendant as to whether to use the affirmative defence or not. Is there some theory or principle that illuminates why this is not considered a violation of the Defendant's fifth-amendment rights? Because the defendant is not compelled to make these defences.
united-states Procedures differ on such things. The closest I know of to an outcome of "not enough evidence" is the classic "scotch verdict" of "Not Proven. In the US, the prosecutor can wait to proceed with a criminal case while s/he does (or has done) as much investigation as s/he thinks is advisable. But once the trial starts, it normally proceeds to a conclusion. If there is not enough evidence to convict, the result should be "not guilty" and that will bar any future trial of the same person for the same offense under the doctrine of Double Jeopardy. Circumstantial evidence, as described in the question, can be enough to convict, if the jury (or judge in a bench trial) is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. Exactly how much evidence it takes to convince a Jury varies, and there is not a clear standard other than the phrase " beyond a reasonable doubt". The judge, or a later appeals court, can set aside a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, but only by finding that no reasonable jury could have convicted on the evidence pre3sented, taking it in the light most favorable to conviction. Judges are reluctant to set aside jury verdicts unless they appear badly wrong. If further evidence is found during the trial, which tends to show the accused is not guilty, the prosecutor can request that the trial be halted. This may or may not bar a future re-trial of the same defendant, depending on whether the dismissal is 'without prejudice", a decision the Judge makes. But once evidence has been started to be presented, dismissals are usually "with prejudice" meaning that double jeopardy applies. The defense can also request a dismissal, most often at the end of the prosecution case. In rare circumstances the Judge may dismiss without a request from either prosecution or defense. These will most often be "with prejudice" It is possible for the trial to be recessed while new evidence is evaluated or sought, but this is rare and usually only for a short time -- a day or two, perhaps. In general a prosecutor is not supposed to schedule a trial if there is any reasonable chance of additional evidence coming to light. It can and does happen, but the system tries to avoid it, and does not easily accept that it has happened. This answer is US-Specific, and different answers may apply in other places.
Without being omniscient, it is impossible to pin down an exact percentage, and there are a lot of context specific reasons why some kinds of &quot;easy&quot; cases are more likely to go to trial than others. But, there have been quite a few serious efforts to answer this question with data (putting aside the normative issue of whether you should go to trial when you are likely to lose). One of the best statistical estimates comes from an analysis of criminal jury trials in Sarasota, Florida and the race of the jurors on the jury pool. Based upon that study, it is possible to infer statistically that an average juror of either race would reach the same aquittal or conviction decision in about 55% of cases involving black defendants and about 68% of cases involving white defendants. But, there are many other cases that are close enough on the merits given the likely available that the outcome depends upon the race of the jury, which basically means that the evidence can be reasonably viewed in different lights to reach different conclusions based upon your predispositions before seeing it. For the sample as a whole, about 68% of cases where convictions results and a minimum of 14% of cases that produce acquittals, are sufficiently clear than the racial composition of the jury doesn't matter. Given that something like 90% of cases produce plea bargains generally, and that plea bargains are usually made before a jury pool is drawn, the random impact of the racial makeup of the jury pool that is selected for a case in Sarasota, Florida only directly matters in about 2% of all criminal prosecutions. My criminal procedure professor from law school made one of the most comprehensive surveys of data pertinent to estimating wrongful conviction rate ever prepared. He concludes that wrongful conviction rates for murders and rapes are on the order of 2.3%-5%, and that wrongful conviction rates for other serious felonies are probably somewhat lower (since weak cases are less often pursued) but that it is harder to determine precisely what error rate is involved since the legal process and civic activism rarely takes the time and resources necessary to consider wrongful juvenile convictions or wrongful convictions for less serious crimes. Other sources have suggested that wrongful conviction cases, and studies comparing jury outcomes with conclusions of the presiding judges in the cases regarding where the jury does and does not agree with the judge regarding the correct outcome generally speaking point to a similar level of uncertainty in decision making accuracy. suggest that as many as 10-20% of jury determinations are erroneous, although this is to some extent a product of samples biased for cases with a high risk of wrongful convictions. For example, analysis of a special set of state court cases in 2000-01 from four jurisdictions in a study by the National Center for State Courts (Hannaford-Agor et al 2003) suggested that approximately 17% of jury verdicts were inaccurate, 7% of the all jury verdicts were wrongful convictions and 10% of all jury verdicts were wrongful acquittals, with corresponding rates of 10% wrongful convictions and 1% wrongful acquittals for the judges' verdicts (Spencer 2007). Similarly, an abstract of one study stated that: &quot;I examine . . . how the criminal system in the United States handled the cases of people who were subsequently found innocent through post-conviction DNA testing. . . . The leading types of evidence supporting their wrongful convictions were erroneous eyewitness identifications, faulty forensic evidence, informant testimony, and false confessions. . . . . few innocent appellants brought claims regarding those facts, nor did many bring claims alleging their innocence. For those who did, hardly any claims were granted by appellate courts. . . . courts often denied relief by finding error to be harmless on account of the appellant's guilt. Criminal appeals brought before they proved their innocence using DNA yielded apparently high numbers of reversals—a fourteen percent reversal rate. However, . . . the reversal rate is indistinguishable from the background rate in appeals of comparable rape and murder convictions[.]&quot; Another way to judge the ratio of easy to hard cases is to look at conviction or verdict rates in cases that go to trial. While the vast majority of criminal charges brought result in conviction of something and the vast majority of civil cases brought result in a judgment for the Plaintiff, in an hypothetical ideal world where the lawyers and parties on both sides of cases are rational actors with the best available information and there is no bias in the availability of information, you would expect pre-trial settlements to resolve, on average, all of the cases with an objective lean one way or the other, leaving only the cases that are, on average, coin flips left to go to trial, with 50-50 outcomes, regardless of the mix of cases originally filed. And, that model isn't horrible. Less than 2% of civil cases and less than 10% of criminal cases go to trial. Civil case outcomes vary by type of case, but the overall result in those the go to trial is close to 50-50. But, in criminal cases, convictions greatly outnumber acquittals, because &quot;easy cases&quot; where a conviction is likely often still go to trial, because neither side is paying for their lawyers from their own funds in most cases, because there is little incentive to offer favorable settlements in close cases, and because, as discussed below, there is a significant irreducible risk of an inaccurate outcome. In federal criminal cases that actually go to trial, the Pew Research Center’s data shows that defendants who pursue a trial experience different outcomes based on whether they choose a bench or jury trial. The acquittal rate in bench trials is 38% (a very small and unrepresentative sample), whereas it’s 14% for juried trials (the vast majority of cases). This would suggest that about 72% of federal jury trials are &quot;easy&quot; cases, while about 28% are &quot;hard&quot; cases, in line with the Sarasota study in order of magnitude. Note that this is different from &quot;conviction rates&quot; which compare the percentage of cases charged that produce guilty verdicts or plea bargains, rather than conviction rates in the subset of cases that go to trial. The percentage of people charged with some federal crime who end up being convicted of something is very, very high, compared to state court, but that is almost entirely due to the ability of federal prosecutors to cherry pick strong cases with high mandatory minimum penalties and to secure plea bargains as a result, rather than from different rates of criminal jury trial outcomes. Still, in &quot;2018, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that among defendants charged with a felony, 68% were convicted (59% of a felony and the remainder of a misdemeanor)&quot; and the conviction rate at trial is lower than the conviction rate of all people charged criminally with felonies, since plea bargains are more common than unilateral government dismissals of all charges. But, in almost every court system, more than 50% of criminal trials result in convictions. So, the percentage of &quot;easy&quot; criminal cases going to trial in state courts is still significantly lower than in federal courts. Maybe the percentage of state criminal cases going to trial that are &quot;easy cases&quot; in the range of 5%-20% in this kind of analysis (which is quite a bit lower than the more rigorously designed Sarasota study). The challenging thing, of course, is knowing in advance which cases judges or juries will get wrong. I typically conceptualize the issue as a certain irreducible uncertainty of outcome any time you actually roll the dice on going to trial on the order of 10%-20% whether you are in front of a judge or a jury, and an additional uncertainty in cases where there is some specific reason to think that the outcome is a close call, or that special risk factors for inaccurate verdicts (like heavy reliance on cross-racial eye witness identification of suspects) is present. From the perspective a client, even in a seemingly secure case, this impacts how plea bargains and settlement offers are evaluated. If your client is actually in the wrong and facing very severe punishment and there are no offers to settle that don't also involve very severe punishment, going to trial and hoping to benefit from the irreducible inaccuracy of trial determinations can be rational even in a quite weak case. Likewise, in either a civil or a criminal case, if getting some win is much more important for the person bringing the case, than getting a &quot;home run&quot; maximal win, making a lenient deal even in a fairly solid case can make sense to avoid the risk of rolling the dice and the irreducible risk of error any time there is a trial. Also, of course, lots and lots of parties to both criminal and civil cases are not rational actors and make bad decisions. These characteristics of parties to legal cases frequently play a large part in the fact that these parties ended up having to deal with the legal system in the first place. One of the difficult systemic and institutional issues, however, is that the behavior of people who are irrational because they are dumb or crazy, and the behavior of people in the system who are innocent and have excessive but not necessarily unreasonable trust in the accuracy of the judicial process, can look very similar. People who are factually innocent systemically insist on going to trial even in the face of lenient plea bargains at rates much higher than people who are factually guilty, even in cases that seem to have identical strength before a neutral third-party, and are, as a result, over represented in the ranks of people who actually go to trial.