Is employment discrimination crime, or tort, or what? I just learned that, in the US, literally asking certain questions on a job interview (as opposed to making discriminatory decisions based on the answers to those questions) is illegal (as found here and here). It turns out, however, that asking itself is not a punishable offense. Employer can get away with asking those questions until someone uses them as evidence of discrimination in a court case. Such evidence, by its nature, is only circumstantial. That is, it does not directly show discrimination (after all, the interviewer could be simply doing small talk / assessing soft skills when asking "what is your gender identity?" — rather than having discriminatory intent in mind). But, in conjunction with other corroborating evidence (e.g. rejection despite apparent fitness to work, and acceptance of a less fit applicant who is of a different answer to those question) these questions could indeed prove discrimination. Now, what standard of proof? "Balance of probabilities" (as for a tort), or "beyond reasonable doubt" (as for a crime)? Is such discrimination a crime in the US, or tort, or what? Is it the case that those questions prove discrimination just because the statute says they do, despite that otherwise they would not (especially given that state of mind of the employer is not determinable)?
At the federal level, employment discrimination as prohibited here is at its core a tort rather than a crime. Probably the most pertinent first part of the law is Subpart B, which encompasses procedures. The EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) may receive allegations of a violation, and there is a procedure for deciding on the merits of the case. After charges are filed, there is an investigation by the EEOC, which may include a public hearing. Based on the investigation, the commission may dismiss the charge (technical flaws in the complaint); they may issue a letter of determination to that effect if they find that there was no reasonable cause for the complaint. They can also encourage a negotiated settlement. In making this determination, the commission follows its own guidelines, as encoded in the regulations. So if the commission determines by its rules that there was a violation, the courts will generally defer to that finding unless the finding is contrary to what Congress said. If there is no dismissal or settlement, then they issue a determination that there is reasonable cause (§1601.21). Then there is a procedure to rectify unlawful practices, which includes the possibility of a conciliation agreement. Finally, starting at §1601.27, we get to the point that somebody might get their day in court. If the accused still refuses to relent on whatever point was at stake, the matter can go to trial: The Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent named in a charge not a government, governmental agency or political subdivision, after thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of a charge with the Commission unless a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission has been secured But also, the aggrieved can take the accused to court at any time. The allegation then must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
The spectrum of &quot;illegal&quot; is broad. One way in which racial epithets are (indirectly) illegal is via anti-discrimination laws, indeed labeled &quot;harassment&quot; by the EEOC Harassment is unwelcome conduct that is based on race, color, religion, sex (including sexual orientation, gender identity, or pregnancy), national origin, older age (beginning at age 40), disability, or genetic information (including family medical history). Harassment becomes unlawful where 1) enduring the offensive conduct becomes a condition of continued employment, or 2) the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive. Anti-discrimination laws also prohibit harassment against individuals in retaliation for filing a discrimination charge, testifying, or participating in any way in an investigation, proceeding, or lawsuit under these laws; or opposing employment practices that they reasonably believe discriminate against individuals, in violation of these laws. If an employer tolerates racial epithets, they are likely to be the target of a harassment lawsuit. There is no limit on who utters the epithet, thus a customer can be the trigger for a suit. In cases not involving supervisory employees, liability arises if the employer &quot;knew, or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action&quot;. Analogously, racial epithets in educational institutions are actionable. Framed in terms of a random epithet by a non-employee or campus visitor (where the institution has minimal leverage over the offender), the institution must act, when it becomes aware of such circumstances arising, and cannot just say &quot;What can we do??&quot;. A second (remote) possibility is through the fighting words doctrine, that the government can limit speech that is &quot;likely to incite immediate violence or retaliation by the recipients of the words&quot;. This arose initially in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire – one of the holdings was that The Court notices judicially that the appellations &quot;damned racketeer&quot; and &quot;damned Fascist&quot; are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace. There have been numerous refinements of the doctrine over the decades, so the mere utterance of a racial epithet would not run afoul of properly-restrained &quot;breach of peace&quot; laws. One of the two most-relevant current opinions is Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, where the court held that the government cannot forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action but uttering an epithet is not advocacy of force or law violation. The second is R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 US 377 where defendant was charged with violating an ordinance that prohibits the display of a symbol which one knows or has reason to know &quot;arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender&quot; SCOTUS ruled that &quot;the First Amendment does not permit a state to use content discrimination to achieve a compelling interest if it is not necessary to achieve that interest&quot; (emphasis added), holding that A few limited categories of speech, such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting words, may be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content. However, these categories are not entirely invisible to the Constitution, and government may not regulate them based on hostility, or favoritism, towards a nonproscribable message they contain. Thus the regulation of &quot;fighting words&quot; may not be based on nonproscribable content. It may, however, be underinclusive, addressing some offensive instances and leaving other, equally offensive, ones alone, so long as the selective proscription is not based on content, or there is no realistic possibility that regulation of ideas is afoot. A further holding is that the law is is facially unconstitutional because it imposes special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on the disfavored subjects of &quot;race, color, creed, religion or gender.&quot; At the same time, it permits displays containing abusive invective if they are not addressed to those topics. Moreover, in its practical operation the ordinance goes beyond mere content, to actual viewpoint, discrimination. The court has not clearly identified a context in which a law against a racial epithet would be constitutional, they have simply identified other bars that would have to be cleared for such a law to be permissible. No utterance, devoid of context, is illegal, so to discover where such an utterance could be part of a prosecutions, we would need a lot of specific context in the hypothetical.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 regulates employers and employees. The prohibition on employer practices says it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. You are not an employer, which is a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person For completeness, an employee is an individual employed by an employer, except that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States. The federal law prohibits refusing to hire any individual (i.e. they don't have to be an employee), so you can't use the argument "a barber is not an employee". However, in case some law is stated in terms of "employees", a barber is not generally an employee under the law. The literal words of the law state that if a person happens to employ 15 or more people in a business that affects commerce (whatever that might be), then because of that aspect of their life, they can never discriminate in the selecting a barber, etc. That is, the law does say "an employer cannot discriminate in that very business whereby they are legally deemed to be an employer". However, so far the federal government far has not gone after an employer hiring 15+ people for discrimination in barber selection. State laws are also relevant and may have lower thresholds. The Washington threshold is 8.
Unless your employer agreed in a contract to not discuss your employment, then there is no legal restrictions on them discussing anything about your employment. If they say things that are untrue you could sue them for defamation.
The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies only in criminal trials, but it permits a witness to refuse to answer a question in either criminal or civil cases, including in a deposition. If he had committed crimes or thought that his answers might have incriminated him, he should have declined to answer. I'm not terribly familiar with this case, but it occurs to me that a lot of the allegations against Cosby go pretty far back; it could be that he was talking about something so far back that he wasn't exposed to any criminal liability. In a case like that, it may even be that a judge had already ordered him to answer the question. Assuming that he voluntarily answered the question, he has waived his right against self-incrimination and the testimony is generally admissible.
It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law.
There is no hard rule that a strip search cannot be performed by a different-gendered officer. The hard rule is that the search must be reasonable (as required by the 4th Amendment) , which means that there have to be sufficient reasons for the search. Depending on the circumstances, a search of a male by a female, or in view of a female, could be reasonable – and in other circumstances it could be unreasonable. As the court in Cookish v. Powell, 945 F. 2d 441 said, In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted There are trends in the law which speak in favor of inmates right to privacy from cross-gender strip searches. Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors is a recent decision where given the circumstances, a cross-gender search was found to be unreasonable. Cookish v. Powell is one where it wasn't unreasonable. This resource file assembles numerous court rulings, classifying them for judicial circuit, gender of staff vs. gender of inmate, sorting according to who prevails. The "rule" would be that the more intrusive the staff conduct is, the less reasonable the search is: but the more of an emergency there is, the more reasonable the search is.
I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.