How Do States [Arizona] Amend the Federal Constitution? How do states (specifically Arizona) amend the United States federal constitution? How do states amend the federal constitution without permission/cooperation from the US federal congress? What is the process in Arizona for amending the federal constitution (with and without federal congress approval)? Are there any statutes or mentions in the Arizona state constitution that details the process that Arizona has for amending the federal constitution? Bypassing federal congress could be really useful in areas of politics like congressional term limits, reducing federal taxes (allowing states to tax more), states having more land (Arizona/Nevada/New Mexico/Western United States barely have state land), reducing federal government control and getting state legislature representation back in the federal senate. EDIT: I know that Arizona cannot amend the federal constitution by itself, but how does Arizona become the first, or one of the states? What is the process to become one of the states to try to amend the constitution, without federal congress?
No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to &quot;get a convention started&quot;: This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates.
Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively &quot;amend&quot; through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment.
None. The federal government is allowed to prohibit coffee drinking under its power to regulate interstate commerce. Prohibition would not have required a constitutional amendment under modern constitutional jurisprudence either. By analogy, this would be no different (constitutionally) than a law prohibiting putting lithium in sodas (something that used to be done in 7 Up) or putting cocaine in sodas (something that used to be done in Coca-Cola). Conceivably, the law might have to allow a religious exemption in certain circumstances under the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause, but while many faiths prohibit drinking coffee (most notably, offshoots of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints), none of which I am aware require it as a matter of religious doctrine sincerely espoused.
Regarding the second part of your question: The 7th Amendment does not apply in state court, so any right to a jury trial there would depend upon the constitution of the State of Texas (specifically Article I, Section 15 of the Texas Constitution). This is the case because the Bill of Rights applies by its terms only to the federal government. Under the Selective Incorporation doctrine, the 14th Amendment causes some of the Bill of Rights to apply in state court but not all of it. In particular, the 7th Amendment is one of the parts that does not apply in state court as determined in the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Minneapolis &amp; St. Louis R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) and Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877). The 11th Amendment would probably bar a federal lawsuit over this matter, since the proper defendant would probably be the State of Texas which is immune from suit in federal court except by another state or the United States. You would still have a right to assert your substantive federal constitutional rights in any state court litigation, however.
Since the US Federal government didn't try to pass any such law (nor would it have been politically possible in the period shortly before the US Civil War), there is no way to know with assurance how such a hypothetical law would have been addressed by the Supreme Court of the day, nor by the various states. Congress legally could have prohibited the importation of slaves after 1808, the constitution specifically grants this power. Congress legally could have prohibited interstate commerce in slaves. Congress could have repealed the Fugitive Slave Act. Congress legally could have imposed heavy taxes on the ownership of slaves. If heavy enough these could have been a de facto abolition. A series of Presidents could have appointed Justices inclined to overturn the Dred Scott decision (denying the possibility of citizen ship for most Negros, and denying that a "free" state could free slaves temporarily resident there). Congress could have passed laws requiring negro votes to be counted in federal elections. Various of the above hypothetical measures might have made slavery less economic, and thus less common, in time. Note that it is not likely that any actual Congress would have passed most of them. But I do not see how, absent a constitutional amendment, and absent a war, a simple Federal statute could have constitutionally abolished slavery de jure throughout the US. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was legally justified as a war measure, a confiscation from those in rebellion. It did not affect loyal slave states, such as Maryland. And it was never seriously tested in court anyway.
Does a treaty have to be compatible with the US constitution to be implemented? Yes. A treaty that is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution is void to the extent it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (&quot;The treaty is . . . a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States.&quot;); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870) (&quot;It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument.&quot;); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (&quot;It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids.&quot;); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (&quot;The treaty-making power of the United States . . . does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.’&quot;) (quoting De Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (&quot;This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.&quot;).
As much as they like Most pieces of legislation have a “dictionary” detailing, for the purposes of that legislation (or generally) what specific words and phrases mean. This can broaden (or narrow) the definition compared to how they are used in normal English. The purpose of this is not to set a trap for the unwary, although this may happen, but to introduce precision and to allow a short defined term to be used in the drafting rather than having to explain what is meant verbosely every time it’s used. Of course, they can’t redefine terms so that they give themselves jurisdiction when they otherwise wouldn’t have it. For example, in australia, the Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws about, among other things, “external affairs”. A law that tried to define “external affairs” more broadly than the Constitution does (which it doesn’t, so we fall back on what it means in English) would be invalid.
No. Whatever clauses and terms existed in this contract, a second contract between the parties could modify it to remove such a clause, or to directly make such an amendment, or to annul the contract entirely. You can make it a requirement that amendments be unanimous among the parties (as opposed to e.g. unilateral, allowing one party to make certain changes, variously without approval or without notice). Such a clause may also be unenforceable for another reason, but this doesn't fit any of the general points for unenforceability, except perhaps being against public policy if a jurisdiction happened to regulate contracts to that degree.