What authority do governors exercise to impose mask mandates? Context: https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wisconsins-covid-19-outbreak-continues-grow/story?id=73429395&amp;cid=clicksource_4380645_4_heads_hero_live_headlines_hed I come from a scientific background (not political \ legal) and seek to understand whether the governor (under that authority of the state of WI) has properly exercised state authority in a bid curb viral spreading.
There are 50 separate answers: here is the answer for Wisconsin, which you specifically asked about. The order is here: it cites the fact that Section 323.12(4)(b) of the Wisconsin Statutes authorizes the Governor to issue &quot;such orders as he or she deems necessary for the security of persons and property'' during an emergency. The entire section says (4) The governor may do all of the following during a state of emergency declared under s. 323.10: (a) Declare priority of emergency management contracts over other contracts, allocate materials and facilities in his or her discretion, and take, use, and destroy, in the name of the state, private property for emergency management purposes. The governor shall keep records of that action. Those records shall be evidence of a claim against the state. The claim against the state shall be referred to the claims board under s. 16.007. (b) Issue such orders as he or she deems necessary for the security of persons and property. (c) Contract on behalf of the state with any person to provide, on a cost basis, equipment and services to be used to respond to a disaster or the imminent threat of a disaster. (d) Suspend the provisions of any administrative rule if the strict compliance with that rule would prevent, hinder, or delay necessary actions to respond to the disaster. (e) At his or her discretion, waive any fee required by the state for the replacement of a permit, license, approval, or other authorization for a person who resides or is headquartered in the area to which the governor's executive order under s. 323.10 applies and whose permit, license, approval, or other authorization is lost or destroyed in connection with the state of emergency. Thus this is a matter of &quot;security&quot;. The chapter does not define &quot;security&quot;. That order has expired. The state of emergency declaration has been renewed, but there is not yet a replacement mask order on his executive order's page. There are some media claims that the mask order was extended, such as this, which provides no evidence, so it is not clear whether there is any current order (the article also sketches legal issues with renewing the state of emergency). The mask order is only good under a valid state of emergency, which requires legislative approval for an extension (which has not happened).
There is a line in airports between the secure zone and the public zone. TSA has broad authority over the secure zone (a post 9-11 fact), and has mandated wearing a mask in its zones of authority. Because federal law supercedes state law, TSA rules override what the state or city may say. This is in fact an implementation of an executive order by Biden. Outside the secure zone, there is a CDC order requiring masks &quot;at transportation hubs&quot;. Again, since airports are part of the interstate transport system and the federal government regulates anything that is interstate, the federal rules override any local rules. These things are &quot;orders&quot;. Mandate is a popular term. A regulation is a rule constructed by an executive agency to implement some act of Congress. The act of Congress is popularly how people see &quot;the law&quot;, though the details of implementation as specified in a rule (regulation) are also &quot;law&quot; at least in the view of legal scholars. Typically, POTUS gives a general order which results in some action by a federal agency, which may in turn issue its own orders.
Legally obtain employee’s covid vaccination status without employee’s consent? No Request employee to provide one. On grounds of what law? Anyone can ask anyone anything, however, I presume you are asking when they can demand to see your certificate. Employers have a general right to issue reasonable and lawful instructions to employees and failing to comply is misconduct. The direction to show a certificate is certainly legal and almost certainly reasonable given the employer’s obligations under Work Health and Safety law. More directly, all businesses in NSW are required to have and update a COVID-Safe Plan. It is perfectly reasonable for them to require employees to divulge their vaccination status. In certain workplaces it may be appropriate for them to mandate vaccinations. Also, there are various Public Health Orders under the Public Health Act 2010 that mandate vaccinations for health care workers, aged care workers (and visitors), child care and care workers. An employer has a legal obligation to check this. In addition, there are requirements under the Public Health (COVID-19 General) Order 2021 under the Public Health Act 2010 requiring some business to check in all visitors to the premises (including employees) including checking their vaccination status. This is what a status check looks like. There are 45 types of premises and events in this category listed in Schedule 5. Terminate employment should employee decide not provide this information or openly declare that they do not want to get vaccinated? What is the law allowing to discriminate the employee on their vaccination status? This is a typical office environment, nothing to do with health care or public sector. Yes. More specifically, refusing a lawful and reasonable instruction is misconduct and, if persistent, may warrant dismissal. If they refuse vaccination in a workplace where vaccines are legally mandated or where the employer has required them (and the requirement is reasonable to protect the legitimate interests of the business), they are similarly disobeying a lawful and reasonable direction. Case law in industries where flu vaccines are mandated is clear - refusal to have them is a legitimate reason for dismissal. There is no doubt this will be good law for COVID vaccines. Decisions on whether an employer not in a mandated industries can make vaccines mandatory have only been made at the Tribunal level so no precedents have been set but the general thrust of these decisions is if it is a reasonable precaution to protect other employees or the public (e.g. if social distancing and PPE is impractical or not likely to be effective): yes. So far, no employee has been successful in an unfair dismissal claim.
No rights are absolute. In particular, Charter s. 1 specifies rights are &quot;subject only to reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.&quot; Generally speaking, when rights are infringed the courts will consider it a justifiable infringement if it serves a substantial purpose while proportionate, rational and minimally infringing (Oakes test, though there's a heap of subsequent case law refining the test). While the exact order text isn't yet available, determining constitutionality would typically be a detailed analysis a judge would have to perform after hearing arguments from parties to a case (I assume the order will eventually be published here). In my own opinion, I would imagine such an order without appropriate medical exemption would be unconstitutional. It would seem to be disproportionate to deny freedom of movement to a presumably very small number of persons who could do little to remedy their medical condition. As a similar example from another province, a Quebec court ruled that a Covid-19 curfew requiring people to remain inside at night would not apply to homeless people due to discriminatory and disproportionate effect. Assuming the order to be similar in nature to existing BC orders on gatherings and mask-wearing, I would imagine lack of religious exceptions to be constitutional, as those orders have already been challenged and upheld against religious objections (though I believe appeals are still possible). The nature of the identified infringements against religious groups was considered reasonably proportionate, rational and minimal enough when weighed against the legitimate governmental need to contain the spread of Covid-19. P.S. The Canadian Bill of Rights has in practice been largely superseded by the Charter. Furthermore, it is completely inapplicable here as it is a federal statute with no effect on provincial matters.
It was decided back in 1905 in the case of Jacobson v Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, that mandatory vaccination laws are constitutional in the US (the specific example being mandatory smallpox vaccination - through vaccination, this illness was eradicated globally). The court observed that in every well ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. An American citizen, arriving at an American port on a vessel in which, during the voyage, there had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, although apparently free from disease himself, may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will on board of such vessel or in a quarantine station until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has disappeared. The power of the government to protect is not totally unfettered: its actions must be necessary. Smallpox being prevalent and increasing at Cambridge, the court would usurp the functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the State, to protect the people at large was arbitrary and not justified by the necessities of the case. We say necessities of the case because it might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all, might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons. An attack on a mandatory vaccination law would probably focus on the question of necessity.
Summary: Constitutionally, the power of provinces to control liquor sale and to apply sales tax to those same sales are distinct. There must be sufficient presence in a province for its taxation power to apply. This is categorically not the case for sales aboard aircraft. For trains, case law is scant but a case-by-case analysis has so far been favoured. Independently, HST still applies according to the origin province, as that tax is backed by federal power. Liquor control—including sale—is far more complex and is probably an open question. Federal jurisdiction over aviation and railways does not remove provincial powers with respect to control of liquor sale. However, those provincial powers might not apply in this context on their own merits, especially with regards to aircraft. 0. Answer overview Due to the particularities of Canadian federalism, each combination of taxation &amp; liquor control with respect to aircraft &amp; trains could in theory have different answers. I've essentially reframed your specific questions into analysis of these four cases, though I provide direct answers at the end. I'm going to start with sales tax on aircraft since that has the strongest case law available. Then, I'll extend the reasoning to each of the other three cases. Note that to avoid excessive caveating and further lengthening this answer, I've mostly avoided specifying how confident I am in my interpretations of the legislation and case law available. While I'm relatively well-read with respect to the Canadian constitution, I would not consider myself very knowledgeable in the areas of tax, commerce, transportation or liquor. Please make your own judgments based on the strength of the citations and arguments I present. In writing this answer, I generally got less and less confident the further along I was, the exact opposite of what happens after each drink aboard an aircraft (so I'm told). 1. Sales tax Parliament is granted a very broad taxation power by the Constitution Act, 1867 s. 91(3), while provincial taxation power is limited to &quot;within the Province&quot; by s. 92(2). In practice, sales tax in Canada is a mess mix of systems. Parliament has established a federal sales tax, the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Concurrently, all provinces except Alberta have some form of provincial sales tax applied. None of the territories levy an additional sales tax. Further complicating matters, Parliament has developed a Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) whereby participating provinces have ceded their authority in favour of the federal government administering a single sales tax and remitting a percentage which the provinces specify. Currently participating are Ontario and the Atlantic provinces. In Quebec, the arrangement is mostly reversed with Quebec generally administering both federal and provincial sales taxes. The remaining provinces have separately administered federal and provincial sales taxes. 1.1 Sales tax aboard aircraft There are two especially on-point Supreme Court cases, both involving specifically the sale of liquor in-flight. In The Queen (Man.) v. Air Canada, [1980] 2 SCR 303, the court found that: Merely going through the air space over Manitoba does not give the aircraft a situs there to support a tax which constitutionally must be &quot;within the Province&quot;. In the case of aircraft operations, there must be a substantial, at least more than a nominal, presence in the Province to provide a basis for imposing a tax in respect of the entry of aircraft into the Province. In reaching this finding, similar American jurisprudence was cited specifically noting that &quot;No question of legislative jurisdiction over air space was involved.&quot; This reasoning was then extended to include stopovers. In Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1133, this was further declared to apply to flights entirely within a single province. Therefore, provinces have no constitutional authority to tax sales in-flight as being in the air does not count as &quot;within the Province&quot; for taxation purposes. However, the federal government is not so restricted. While GST is straightforward, things get interesting with HST. It is legislated for in the Excise Tax Act Part IX s. 165(2). Despite the remittance to the participating provinces, it is de jure a federal tax which can therefore still be constitutionally levied. The attached New Harmonized Value-added Tax System Regulations states in s. 23: If a supply of property or a service (other than a passenger transportation service) is made to an individual on board a conveyance in the course of a business of supplying passenger transportation services and the property or service is delivered, performed or made available on board the conveyance during any leg of the journey that begins in any province and ends in any province, the supply is made in the province in which that leg of the journey begins. Therefore, if the leg of a journey beings in an HST province, the sale of liquor in-flight is taxed according to the origin HST. Otherwise, only GST could be charged per constitutional reasons above. Note that Quebec falls in the non-HST category. While it administers both federal and provincial sales taxes, they are still separate taxes unlike the HST. 1.2 Sales tax aboard trains The question is now whether sales aboard trains, and more generally, land-based transport are sufficiently &quot;within the Province&quot; to fall within provincial taxation power. Case law is scant, but four of the five applicable cases I could find have refused to mechanically apply the result from aircrafts, preferring to undertake a factual analysis on whether sufficient presence is established. They are Ace-Atlantic Container Express Inc, Re, 1992 CanLII 7103 (NL CA), Canpotex Ltd. v. British Columbia, 1999 CanLII 5844 (BC SC), Pétromont and Company Limited Partnership v. Ontario (Finance), 2008 CanLII 5980 (ON SC), Dow Chemical Canada Inc. v. R., 1992 CanLII 1019 (BC CA) and Lynden Transport Inc. v. British Columbia (Finance), 1981 CanLII 785 (BC CA). Notably, Lynden involved only transit through the province and directly applied the result from R. (Man.) v. Air Canada to find that the province could not apply its taxation power in this instance. Canpotex also involved transit only, engaging in some analysis before considering itself bound by Lynden. The other three are all similar fact patterns and results. Most operations of the taxed companies were transit through the province, but not exclusively. The non-transit operations were found to be a sufficient enough presence to allow the province to apply a general tax. Pétromont at para. 79 notably emphasized length of time railcars spent in the province as a reason for departing from R. (Man.) v. Air Canada. Unfortunately, none of these are directly analogous to sale of liquor aboard a train. They were all about whether tax could be applied to the land transport vehicle or the goods contained therein. There are hints in some of these cases and their citations of CPA Ltd. v. BC that this may make a difference, but nothing anywhere near definitive. Constitutional questions about provincial taxation power aside, I can find no statutory difference between planes and trains with respect to the applicability of HST per the Excise Tax Act regulations cited in the previous section (all cases cited here are pre-HST in the participating provinces). 2. Liquor control There is no singular &quot;liquor&quot; power in the constitution. This has resulted in liquor control having an extraordinary amount of possible constitutional bases for both Parliament and the provincial legislatures. To maintain a degree of sobriety (I'm sorry), I will focus my analysis on the provincial power to control sale of liquor which typically applies within their borders and whether federal jurisdiction over aircraft and railways impede this power. To fully understand the scope of the constitutional complexity of liquor, I strongly recommend reading in full the lecture paper The Effect of Alcohol on the Canadian Constitution ... Seriously (2011) by the Honourable Morris J. Fish (Supreme Court justice 2003-2013) though it is not strictly necessary for this answer. Note there are a few paragraphs in French, they aren't crucial to overall understanding. 2.1 Liquor control aboard aircraft As you point out, Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) [1997] 2 SCR 581 at least to some extent confirms that airlines can still be subject to provincial liquor control. Specifically, the court found at paras. 72-76 that provision of onboard liquor is not a core part of the federal aviation power. Therefore, this opens the door for provincial liquor sale law to be applied in-flight. However, this provincial power must be grounded (again, I'm sorry) in a constitutionally granted power. In Air Canada v. Ontario the court acknowledged that a possible consequence of their main result was that provinces could impose importation fees on liquor that merely passed through their airspace (paras. 63-66). However, this is clearly dicta and was partially due to a very specific lending of federal power that isn't generally applicable here (or currently, as the involved federal statute has since been amended). I mainly wished to point out that the fact provincial airspace is not within provincial taxation jurisdiction does not imply provincial airspace is immune from all provincial authority. Moving on to powers specifically granted to the provinces by the constitution, there are three different bases that justify the provinces' ability to locally control liquor sale enumerated in the Constitution Act, 1867 (emphasis mine): In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, [...] Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes. [...] Property and Civil Rights in the Province. [...] Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province. Those familiar with the constitution will recognize the latter two powers as the &quot;default&quot; ones which allow the provinces do most things within their territory. Indeed, Air Canada v. Ontario acknowledges that 92(16) authorizes the provincial liquor monopolies (para. 54). In addition to the two usual suspects, there's 92(9) which by its wording likely doesn't amount to full control, but certainly allows imposing licences on liquor sale. The main question is whether any of them can apply extra-provincially or in provincial airspace. As you can probably guess by my added emphasis, extra-provincial legislation is generally not allowed (see eg. Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act [1984] 1 SCR 297 at pg. 332). Yes, this does mean I'm extremely suspicious of WestJet's assertion tying their policy to a single province's laws, though I can certainly understand wanting to be in compliance with the liquor licences issued by your home province. As for airspace, Air Canada v. Ontario appears to be the most recent Supreme Court decision addressing provincial airspace jurisdiction. All we can note is that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the possibility of provincial influence on their airspace. It's additionally possible that even if provinces do in fact have jurisdictional control, aircraft might not be found to be &quot;in&quot; the province much like they are not &quot;within&quot; for taxation purposes. Should the provinces not have liquor control jurisdiction on the aircraft, this jurisdiction would default to Parliament through the Constitution Act, 1867 s. 91 peace, order, and good government clause. On the other hand, if the provinces have the necessary aircraft liquor control jurisdiction, it might be possible for Parliament to encroach on that jurisdiction, though I will decline detailed analysis. I would mainly be wildly speculating, and since your question concentrated on provincial power, I am content having found the necessary conditions for provinces to exercise their local liquor control power when there is no encroachment. I'll just briefly gloss the general constitutional principles: Parliament could not encroach by passing effectively provincial liquor control legislation and saying it's allowed because of their aviation power (pith and substance doctrine), though it's possible they could find a way through paramountcy or a separate power under s. 91 (in particular if sale aboard inter-provincial transport constitutes inter-provincial trade), since liquor control is complex and constitutionally divided. Finally I'll quickly comment on Porter Airline's FAQ you cite. They partially attribute their in-flight drinking age to the Canadian Aviation Regulations. It's an incredibly lengthy regulation so it's very possible I missed something, but I can't find any basis for this attribution. Perhaps telling is that in the very next FAQ question on drinking limit, they state: Under Canadian Aviation Regulations (602.04), cabin crew is expected to stop serving alcohol to a passenger who appears to be intoxicated. A specific section of the regulations is cited, now that one definitiely exists! Also, this is a good example of a federal regulation I would guess to be constitutionally valid through pith and substance &amp; paramountcy doctrines (again, assuming provincial liquor control jurisdiction to begin with). Avoiding having unruly intoxicated passengers can reasonably be tied to the federal aviation power and so would displace any provincial legislation contrary to that. 2.2 Liquor control aboard trains While federal jurisdiction over aircraft is long established through the Aeronautics Reference, the basis for federal jurisdiction over trains is slightly more complex. The Constitution Act, 1867 s. 92(10)(a) confers federal jurisdiction over inter-provincial and international railways and s. 92(10)(c) allows Parliament to issue a declaration that a railway falls under federal jurisdiction, both in conjunction with s. 91(29). If Wikipedia is to be believed, railways are the majority reason for a 92(10)(c) declaration. The Queen v. Board of Transport Commissioners, [1968] SCR 118 confirms that the federal jurisdiction over railways extends to any train on those railways. I don't think it's controversial to state that provincial liquor sale law applies on trains outside federal jurisdiction. For those in federal jurisdiction, I don't see a reason why the legal reasoning in Air Canada v. Ontario wouldn't also apply, as well as the constitutional principles I covered in reference to it (substituting &quot;airspace&quot; for &quot;railspace,&quot; I suppose). For trains, I would just add that as land-based transport, they might be more likely found to be &quot;in the Province&quot; and therefore under provincial liquor control. Indeed, it's difficult to imagine that if they can be &quot;within the Province&quot; for taxation purposes, they wouldn't also be &quot;in the Province,&quot; as that appears to be a less stringent requirement per the line of case law established by the cited R. (Man.) v. Air Canada, CPA Ltd. v. BC and Air Canada v. Ontario (though frustratingly, never an absolute direct constitutional confirmation). 3. Answers to your main questions Do provincial laws on sales and supply of liquor apply to services of alcohol on board a plane or a train subject to federal jurisdiction? If so, which province's law apply, and to what extent? Open question, more likely yes on trains. If the province's law applies at all, it would apply within its borders and probably close to full extent. Does the law treat aircrafts (in air) and trains (on ground) differently? Does it matter if the plane or train makes any stop in the province? Aircraft and trains can be treated differently for sales tax and maybe for liquor control as well. Essentially this comes down to land-based transport being &quot;closer&quot; to usual provincial jurisdiction. For aircraft, stops matter only for determining whether HST applies. For trains, stops could additionally contribute to them being found to be more fully in the jurisdiction of the province they stop in. Which province's sales tax (HST/PST/QST), if any, apply to in-flight and on-train purchases? I would assume the destination since that's the assumed place of consumption, but it seems that it would be very complicated for trains. For travel by either mode, only origin HST (or federal GST) can be applied for each leg of the journey. PST and the provincial portion of QST are constitutionally barred from applying on flights. Provinces might be able to charge on-train sales tax within their borders given sufficient company presence.
If a person A, speaking by telephone to an election official B in Georgia, attempts to influence that official to improperly alter an election result in a way that would constitute frauds or otherwise be a violation of Georgia law, then the person A has committed a crime in Georgia. There are various ways to commit a crime in a place without being physically present in that state. Since there is no question what was said on the telephone call in question (because it was recorded) the question to be determined would seem to be whether it constituted a crime under Georgia law, and whether the Georgia officials think it is worth prosecuting. It is true that a trial for a criminal accusation is normally held in the state where the crime was committed (or allegedly committed). But that need not be in a state where the person was ever physically present. If a person living in State C does business is state D, and is requires to file a tax return with the authorities in D, and it is alleged that the return was false, then the person is being accused of a crime in D, committed when the false return was received in D.
As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.