Can co-owner of an apartment prohibit tenants to use bathroom (wc). Is it a violation of the right of adequate housing (UN HABITAT)? Can co-owner of an apartment prohibit tenants to use bathroom (wc). Is it a violation of the right of adequate housing (UN HABITAT)? Can co-owner evict tenants without providing an alternative accommodation? Use it's rights to abuse rights of another co-owner who provided a room of an apartment for tenants Please note rooms are isolated and aren't shared property of the two co-owners. Co-owner cannot prohibit to rent an room of apartment Common areas (bathroom, kitchen) are shared property. Can co-owner (who want to evict) refuse of fair compensation?
The right to adequate housing is a political question, the content of which is unclear in the UN's fact sheet. What they say is: All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, clean drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, food storage facilities, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services. Sanitation facilities are not completely ignored, so there is a theoretical basis to start from. However, that list of desiderata is not legally enforceable, so it would depends on the laws of the particular jurisdiction. In the state of Washington (US), a rental that lacked any sanitary facility (toilet) would be a violation of the health code: even hot water is required by law. In other countries, esp. where running water is not ubiquitous, there may be no legal obligation for a landlord to provide a toilet with running water. Whether legal action could be taken against the landlord depends on local law. A property owner can evict a tenant, subject again to local law. Usually, it requires a legal process where the owner petitions the court to evict the tenant, and in case the tenant has a contractual right to be there, the owner has to show cause (tenant breached the terms of the lease). A landlord does not generally have an obligation to find alternative housing for a tenant, but perhaps there is such a law somewhere, related to tenant tenure. The mention of a co-owner is a bit confusing. If A is the sole owner of a property, A can exercise landlord rights. If A and B both own the property, either of them can exercise landlord rights. However, if they disagree, i.e. A wants to evict tenant C and B wants to let C stay, the dispute between A and B must be resolved, and if they cannot come to an agreement then B can cause a delay of the eviction until the dispute is resolved in court. Again, the details on this would depend on the jurisdiction, and in part whatever landlord-tenant laws there are.
As Paul Johnson says, this is a planning permission thing. The parking places your landlord has leased you are real; they exist. They just don't have planning permission for all of them. It's no different to if the landlord got planning permission for a building of four flats, and built a block of six flats. Building those two additional flats would illegal, and the planning authority could take enforcement action against the landlord for it; however, letting those two additional flats out is perfectly legal. Similarly letting those parking places is legal; it's just that the planning authority may take action against the landlord to force two of the parking places to be removed. At that point the landlord would have to break the contract with the tenants of the parking places, and would be liable for damages. In practise, unless there are some activist neighbours, the planning authority won't take any enforcement action (spending money on legal action for two parking places is not high on their list of priorities). Even if there are some activist neighbours, they probably won't bother. Finally, any development becomes lawful after ten years, and if the development is used as dwellings, after four years. It is not clear to me whether the parking spaces would be considered as a separate development to the flats (and hence have a ten year limit), or whether they are ancillary to the dwellings (and hence have a four year limit). My suspicion is that the landlord was asked to sign an application for a Lawful Development Certificate (which essentially just certifies that the development is out of time for planning enforcement). If so, that means that ... the development is out of time for planning enforcement, so you have no need to worry. Incidentally, if I am right, your friend doesn't have any need to worry either, and is probably being put off the purchase by an overly cautious conveyancer. (Note: I am not a lawyer, and in particular, I am not your friend's lawyer.)
The B.C. Human Rights Code exempts age restrictions for 55+ in relation to tenancy. See Human Rights Code, s. 10. The subsection prohibiting discrimination in tenancy on the basis of age &quot;does not apply&quot;: if the space is a rental unit in residential premises in which every rental unit is reserved for rental to a person who has reached 55 years of age or to 2 or more persons, at least one of whom has reached 55 years of age Further, as to condominium bylaws, in 2022, the Province enacted Bill 44, the Building and Strata Statutes Amendment Act, which makes any strata age restriction below the age of 55 invalid (which you have quoted a portion of). Human Rights Tribunal The Human Rights Tribunal can only provide remedies for claims arising under the Human Rights Code. Given that the Human Rights Code does not provide a basis for discrimination claims in tenancy when the age of distinction is 55+, any valid strata by-law relating to age of residents will by definition fall outside of the scope of a Human Rights Code complaint. And even when the Strata Property Act allowed all sorts of age restrictions, the BC Human Rights Code does not provide a remedy when the distinction is authorized by another act (see s. 41(2); Hallonquist v. Strata Plan NW307 and another, 2014 BCHRT 117): Nothing in this Code prohibits a distinction on the basis of age if that distinction is permitted or required by any Act or regulation. Constitutional challenge in a court You also ask about a challenge in a court. I assume you consider that the challenge would be based on s. 15(1) of the Charter (equality rights). There are three potential targets of the challenge: the strata by-law that restricts residency to people aged 55+; the provincial statute prohibiting strata by-laws from imposing any age restriction unless it is an age restriction based on an age not less than 55 years; the carve-out in the Human Rights Code for tenancy restrictions for ages 55+ The Charter challenge to the strata by-law itself would face the barrier that a British Columbia court has held that stratas are not &quot;government&quot; for the purpose of the Charter, so are not subject to Charter challenges: Strata Plan NW 499 v. Kirk, 2015 BCSC 1487. I have quickly added this final portion in response to a clarification of the question, but there is more to say. I will return to explain the law relating to partially ameliorative legislation.
From what I can determine, there has not been a legal challenge to the practice that reached a high enough level to get on my radar, so it's not clearly prohibited or allowed. Turning to the relevant federal regulations, the implementation of the Fair Housing Act, the law hinges in part on an Aggrieved person includes any person who— (a) Claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or (b) Believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur. In order to sue a university because they offer sex-separated halls, floors or rooms, a plaintiff would have to show that they have been harmed by being given such a choice. Reading the prohibitions in §100.50, there is no obvious "Discriminat[ion] in the terms, conditions or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities", and it does not "otherwise makes unavailable or denies dwellings". Cases like McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (a case putting an end to the "separate but equal" doctrine) include reference to the fact that appellant was harmed ("The restrictions imposed upon appellant impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession"). Analogously, the relatively rare black-only residences of UC Davis and Cal State LA might be targeted in a discrimination suit, if plaintiffs can make the required legal argument that there is harm.
There are no squatters Neither Bob nor Sue are squatters: Bob was there with the owner's permission and Sue was there with Bob's. Adverse possession requires possession that is, well, adverse: against the wishes of the true owner. Bob was almost certainly a tenant, paying rent in services rather than cash. Clearly, the terms of that tenancy are unclear and may not be legal but that is more likely to rebound against the landlord rather than the tenant. So long as the rent (whatever it is) continues to be paid the estate’s tenancy should continue. However, the landlord could start procedures to end the tenancy (probably requiring 1 months notice) at any time.
The default rule is that a landlord can refuse to rent to anyone for any reason, in which case the landlord can refuse to rent in this case. There are civil rights laws that limit this discretion in the case, for example, of discrimination based on race, or family status. But, those laws often have exemptions for owners of small amounts of property (e.g. a unit in their own home), which can't easily be determined from the question. If a civil rights law applies, the landlord must choose among potential renters on a non-discriminatory basis - the landlord doesn't have to rent to anyone in particular, but can't use the prohibited reasons to make the choice. If the default rule does not apply because a civil rights law unrelated to immigration bars discrimination against a tenant, someone's undocumented immigrant status probably doesn't provide an absolute defense to the civil rights law, but might be one factor among many that a landlord could consider in choosing among available tenants in much the same way that credit ratings, income, and a prospective tenant's criminal record, and other factors might be considered.
A "limited license housing agreement" may be an interesting attempt to get around landlord-tenant laws, typically associated with official student housing (e.g. this from Queens College CUNY). This facility near WMU is not overtly related to the university, but might be subcontracting for the university. At any rate, there is no special provision under Michigan law that exempts landlords from the provisions of the law in case they declare the contract to be an agreement as opposed to a lease. It is possible that this is copy-and-paste law that erroneously relies on provisions in landlord-tenant laws that exempt university housing agreements from provisions of a state's landlord-tenancy law. You do not need to be informed that you should / could consult an attorney before signing a legal document: this knowledge is presupposed. It is also assumed that when you sign a document, you read the document. It is reasonably likely that the lease contained language like the following (from the above contract): I have carefully read, fully understand and voluntarily sign this Housing Agreement. Once fully signed, this is a binding contract and is intended to be enforceable under its terms. I have had the opportunity to seek independent legal advice The disclaimer "This Housing Agreement is not a lease and no tenancy, leasehold, possessory or other property interest in any specific apartment or bedroom is created" has dubious legal status. The rights given by the landlord-tenant act cannot be waived, under the Truth in Renting Act, so saying "this is not a lease" does not make the lease not a lease. In Michigan there is a duty on landlords to mitigate loses when a premise is abandoned. The case Fox v. Roethlisberger, 85 N.W.2d 73 mentions such a possible duty in the context of tenancy is often cited on the web as establishing such a duty, but I disagree. Froling v. Bischoff, 252 N.W.2d 832 however establishes that there is such a general duty for any breach of contract (and even applies it to breach of a rental agreement). So whether or not you call it a lease, there is still a duty to mitigate losses. In the scenario where you abandoned the unit and the landlord waited until the end of the year to file an action for breach of contract, they could have failed in their duty to mitigate their losses (but see Fox v. Roethlisberger, where landlord did make an effort to re-rent, and simply was not able to for 9 months).
You say that you have a joint lease. This means that you and your roommate are jointly (together) and severally (individually) responsible for fulfilling the terms of the lease. From the landlord's position there is only one tenant - both of you together constitute the tenant. If you want to change this so that the tenant from date X is your roommate and someone else you have 2 options: Jointly give notice, ending the current lease and triggering the return of the deposit. Your roommate and your replacement are then free to negotiate a new lease with its own deposit. The landlord would conduct a final inspection on your lease and an initial inspection on the new lease. With the landlord's permission, substitute the new person for you on the existing lease. This does not end the lease and does not trigger the return of the deposit. The landlord is not obliged to do anything. You can negotiate whatever deal you like about the security deposit with whoever you like.