Famous case involving stacking the deck in a standards body When I first got involved in telecommunications standards back in the 1980's, some standards old-timers gave me an old case to read about one company stacking the deck in standards for steam boilers (I think). As I remember it (30+ years later, so probably incorrectly) the company hired a bunch of independent consultants to represent their position without the consultants admitting they were paid to do so. So one company controlled the majority of the votes. The stacked deck passed a shoddy standard and people ended up dying and a lawsuit was decided against the company that stacked the deck. Note I'm an engineer, not a lawyer, and was given the case to point out you should always declare who is paying you to avoid being liable like the boiler company was. I'm looking for the case to pass on to some others. My question is - what was the case? who was the boiler company? What year?
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v Hydrolevel Corp. (1982) may be the case you are referring to. From here: Hydrolevel developed a mechanism that included a time delay in its fuel cutoff system, claiming that this would ensure a more reliable determination of water level in boilers whose water is in motion. ASME's BPVC Boiler and Pressure Vessel Committee was headed by prominent representatives of two companies then dominating the market. Unknown to Hydrolevel, a letter was circulated that insisted that low-water fuel cutoff mechanisms should operate immediately. By the time Hydrolevel discovered the existence of this letter, it had suffered serious market losses. It seems that one company (McDonnell and Miller) requested clarification from the committee on a standard, and received a reply from the volunteer chairman of the committee who was also an employee of another company (Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company) and then used that clarification as a way to boost their sales at the expense of Hydrolevel. Some more background from here: T.R. Hardin, chairman of the ASME committee and employee of the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company in Connecticut, wrote the original response to McDonnell and Miller's inquiry. ASME's interpretation was used by McDonnell and Miller salesmen as proof of Hydrolevel's noncompliance. Subsequently, Hydrolevel never acquired sufficient market penetration for sustaining business, and eventually went bankrupt. From Wikipedia: Hydrolevel sued McDonnell and Miller, the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company and ASME arguing that two ASME subcommittee members acted not only in the self-interest of their companies, but also in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. It doesn't quite fit your memory, as it doesn't seem to have been brought about because of any loss of life (at least from what I have read about it so far), and I also didn't see any qualitative determination on whether the interpretation of the standard by ASME was any better or worse than Hydrolevel's implementation, but it does 1) Concern steam boilers, and 2) Involve a conflict of interest on a standards body. Also, I should also note that the only one found liable was ASME. The two companies settled with Hydrolevel out of court. ASME was found liable for $4.75 million in damages, though after the Hydrolevel CEO died of a heart attack after being informed of a Jury's verdict in his favor in lower court.
When a court is required to decide whether someone is professionally “qualified” or “competent,” it will generally consider the opinion of expert witnesses from that profession. For example, in Stothers (M &amp; E) Ltd v Leeway Stothers Ltd [2011] NIQB 35, a building contractor claimed that an electrical contractor had breached a contract requiring work to be done by “qualified electricians.” Two of the electricians had no formal qualifications, but through experience, had acquired “grandfather rights” entitling them to work as electricians. The four experts disagreed as to whether these electricians were “qualified.” After hearing from the experts, the judge decided that the electricians were not “qualified,” for the purpose of that specific contract, because they had not fulfilled the requirements of an objective standard. It is not possible to say, in general, if someone who “believes … they have demonstrable experience working as an electrician, have adequate insurance and hold qualifications from a recognised institution” is “competent to undertake the inspection and testing required” in a particular case. The person’s belief may be incorrect or unreasonable. The inspection and testing required may be unusually complicated. Expert witnesses can give evidence about this. If there are conflicting opinions, the court must make a decision based on the facts of the particular case and the purpose of the legal requirement, as occurred in Stothers. The Electrical Safety Standards in the Private Rented Sector (England) Regulations 2020 require that a “qualified person” be “competent” to work “in accordance with the electrical safety standards,” namely the Wiring Regulations, BS 7671: 2018(3). This article in Professional Electrician &amp; Installer analyses regulation 621.5 of BS 7671, which requires that “periodic inspection and testing shall be undertaken by a skilled person … competent in such work.” Such analysis of a specialised industry standard, if presented by an appropriate expert, could be adopted by the court.
You could first look for a force majeure clause in the lease which says something about natural disasters and the like. If there is a clause which says e.g. "Landlord will not be held responsible for problems arising from ice storms", that doesn't help you, but maybe it specifies e.g. rent reduction of $2/day for lack of electricity. That doesn't mean he can ignore the law. However, in this situation, a particular reading of the law ("there must be an infallible supply of electricity") imposes an impossible requirement on the landlord, and the courts probably won't require a landlord to do the impossible. It is not clear that your situation violates either the letter or the spirit of the law. Take clause (d): your "heating facilities" presumably conformed to applicable law at the time of installation and have since been maintained, and they are adequate, but they don't work if the grid doesn't supply power (and that is not a matter under the landlord's control). In other words, he provided the "infrastructure", and the problem is on the power company's end. Likewise "electrical lighting with wiring and electrical equipment" -- an ordinary interpretation of that clause is "wires and fixtures", and doesn't include "flow of electrons", which is supplied by your local power company.
What §670 BGB basically says is that the default is that companies have to reimburse you for expenses that you incurred for interviewing with them. If they don't want to reimburse you, they have to tell you so in writing before you incur any costs. That way it's your decision if you still want to go if you have to pay for expenses yourself. It does not mean your expenses have to be paid, it means you should know beforehand whether they will be paid. So what I take from your story is that you never actually asked the company for reimbursement, expecting the Agentur für Arbeit to pay that for you. Well, no company is going to pay your expenses if you don't ask for it. And that's not a crime. You also never told the Agentur für Arbeit that you were not informed beforehand that your expenses would not be paid. They asked for proof, you delivered proof. It's not their job to find out how or when you got handed this written statement and if that constitutes a violation of §670. And as a little reality check: paying your expenses (probably something along the lines of a cab fare or bus ticket?) is way more cost effective for the AA than suing a small company for the same amount. Just the time of the lawyer filing the suit will probably cost more than your public transportation ticket for the next year.
The provisions of the credit card account agreement will be governed by Delaware law, except to the extent to North Carolina public policy overrides it. The provisions of the online services agreement will be governed by New York law, except to the extent to North Carolina public policy overrides it. The electronic communications agreement will be governed by the law of the place with the most significant connection to any disputed issues arising under it. It could also be considered to be an extension of the online services agreement rather than a separate agreement. UDAP is an acronym referring the state deceptive trade practices acts. The unfair act involves non-receipt of paperless billing statements. Even with this level of detail, I don't believe it is possible to know in advance which of the agreements is implicated and which state's laws will be held to apply (or if the differences between the laws of the candidate states is even material on the issue in question). These issues are decided on a case by case basis when there is a mishmash of facts and the outcomes are not terribly predictable. It also isn't obvious that there is a provision covering the conduct in question in any of the three potentially relevant states. The Delaware Deceptive Trade Practices Act doesn't appear to clearly apply to financial services at all. New York's application to financial services is quite narrow and subject to an exception for conduct in conformity with federal law. A failure to provide an invoice, without more, isn't necessarily a deceptive trade practice at all. All in all, there isn't a straightforward or easy answer to this question that can be reached from the information provided.
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, there has to be an agreement for there to be price fixing. If the parties do not agree to engage in price-fixing or other anti-competitive behavior, there is no violation. There does not needed to be a written, explicit contract memorializing the agreement, but there does need to be more than just encouragement to change prices. Telling one person to charge more isn't price-fixing, because the person making the suggestion could then just leave his own prices in place and enjoy the competitive advantage. But if that person were to say, "We should raise our prices," and then they both did, you'd probably have a pretty good Sherman Act case.
Your framing of the issue is basically wrong. There is an exemption, which varies from state to state, from unsecured creditors (but not creditors that take the goods as collateral) in bankruptcy and in debt collection outside of bankruptcy (not always the same exemption), for tangible personal property owned by the debtor which constitutes the debtor's tools of the trade, but that varies from state to state, is a creature of state statute (and the bankruptcy code), is not universal, and is usually limited in dollar amount. Moreover, the exemption only applies when the tradesman actually owns the tools of his trade which is customary in some professions, but not automatic. It is only the case when the tradesman buys his own tools. There is no generic v. non-generic distinction. In the software field, education and the public domain can always be accessed. But, intellectual property, that can be protected, that is developed for the employer, is usually work for hire and belong to the employer. This default rule is subject to the terms of the agreements between the parties entered into contractually.
According to Wikipedia Vicarious Liability is a type of liability under the doctrine of "Respondeat Superior" (an employer is responsible for the actions of employees performed within the course of their employment). Now, in the first case that you have mentioned, the employee was on duty and was supposed to be under the supervision of the supervisor. Therefore, any mishap that might happen would be considered to be during the course of employment. Thus, attracting Vicarious Liability for the employer. While in the second case, an independent contractor (or a third-party) was put to work. This contractor is not an employee of the Rail company, but rather someone who is under a contract to fulfill a particular task. This essentially means that the Rail company cannot have complete control over the actions of the contractor, as it is not governed by the rules of the rail company as set out for its employees. But because both the parties were under some contract, the contracting party (that wanted to have a task accomplished) should have supervised in some manner, which translated to the Rail Company's personal liability.