What can a lawyer do if the client wants to be acquitted of everything despite serious evidence? Alex the accused has been charged with a series of crimes. The list of charges is long (beating up his wife, speeding while drunk, trafficking...) and for most crimes, the evidence presented by the state attorney is very strong. Dave the defense attorney, seeing the evidence, suggests his client should follow the &quot;I'm sorry, it will never happen again&quot; strategy to get a small, maybe even suspended sentence. But Alex is very stubborn and sympathizes with the &quot;Reichsbürger&quot;-Movement, so he asks his attorney to plead for innocence, saying that it's his wife, so he can do with her what he wants, and traffic laws, given he is a good driver, won't apply to him etc. Dave is very certain that with this strategy, Alex will not only be convicted and given not only a long prison sentence, but maybe even a long-term preventive detention. What can Dave do to follow the wishes of his client while still representing him as best as he can?
In several civil law systems, including in Switzerland, the involvement of a defence lawyer can be mandatory, even against the will of the accused. If the accused does not appoint a lawyer, a duty lawyer must be appointed by the director of the proceeding (the prosecutor or the judge depending on the stage of the proceedings). The obligation to have a lawyer may extend to important civil cases in some countries before higher courts to avoid wasting judicial resources. In criminal cases, this is also to ensure the accused's rights to a competent, diligent and effective defence. The accused is responsible for the costs of the lawyer, within their financial circumstances and subject to government legal aids, if they are found responsible for procedural costs. All lawyers at bar in a canton are required to accept mandates assigned to them due to obligatory provisions of law, provided that they are competent to do so. This is regulated by art. 130 to 135 of the federal Criminal Procedure Code, in particular, A defence lawyer must be appointed to represent the accused if: a. the period on remand including the period when under arrest has continued for more than 10 days; b. the offence concerned carries a custodial sentence of more than a year or a custodial measure or may result in expulsion from Switzerland; c. the accused is unable to safeguard his or her interests in the proceedings adequately due to his or her physical or mental condition or for other reasons, and his or her statutory representative is unable to do so either; d. the prosecuting lawyer is appearing in person before the court of first instance or the court of appeal; e. accelerated proceedings (Art. 358–362) are being conducted. Essentially, all serious offences are subject to this obligation. Until now this is not a direct answer to the question posed, but it is a factor that shows the relationship between the lawyer and the client is not a simple one. Now going back to your question. In Switzerland, or indeed in most legal systems, the lawyer is to ensure that the accused receives a competent, diligent and effective defense. Indeed, if the public prosecutor or the judge believes or reasonably ought to have believed the defence is clearly incompetent or otherwise negligent in their professional duties, the proceedings must be suspended until a suitable defence is appointed by choice of the accused or by the proceeding director. so he asks his attorney to plead for innocence, saying that it's his wife, so he can do with her what he wants, and traffic laws, given he is a good driver, won't apply to him etc. The lawyer is a professional that must exercise their professional judgement. They are also a 'servant of the law' and a 'collaborator in the administration of justice' and bear responsibility for the correct functioning of the justice system (Federal Court rulings 106 IA 100, 130 II 270). In general, they are not allowed to induce the justice and the authorities in error. Thus, they cannot simply present baseless arguments before the judicial authorities. Dave is very certain that with this strategy, Alex will not only be convicted to a long prison sentence, but maybe even to a long-term preventive detention. What can Dave do to follow the wish of his client while still representing him as best as he can? If the lawyer is convinced that the strategy imposed by the client is clearly contrary to the client's interest, they may decide to withdraw from the mandate, if they can do so without seriously prejudicing the client's interest. This is the case when the accused had chosen their own lawyer, who under contractual law must follow the client's instructions and the recourse to avoid unprofessional conducts is withdrawal. For the duty defence lawyers, the accused cannot waive the right to a defence lawyer, indeed, it is an obligation on the accused, the lawyer and the judicial authority. While the law provides for replacement of the lawyer if the mutual trust between the lawyer and the client is seriously compromised, this is not simply so because the client says so. Loss of confidence on subjective grounds alone does not constitute a reason to change a duty lawyers unless the attitude of the lawyer is seriously prejudicial to the interests of the accused (Federal Court ruling 1B_307/2012). For lack of a better analogy, the duty defence lawyer would proceed to represent the interests of the accused as if the accused was mentally deficient or otherwise incompetent (not that the accused is recognized as so with respect to their criminal responsibility, but that the accused is unable, or in this case unwilling, to cooperate fully with the lawyer on their own defence). The duty lawyer can impose their own defence strategy and must do so if they sincerely believe it is in the best interests of their client (https://www.penalex.ch/faq-avocats/mon-avocat-doffice-peut-il-mimposer-sa-strategie/). Of course, the accused still has a right to be directly heard by the court, but such right is not unlimited. They can make their own representations and may note their disagreement with the defence counsel, but the accused does not have the right just ramble for two hours in the court. As it is not an adversarial system, the decision maker will take all circumstances into account and the disagreements between the client and their own counsel (despite being imposed by the law and the state) are not as much of an issue as in an adversarial common law trial. Note that an acquitted accused may still be found responsible for procedural costs (including for any obligatory defence fees) if they had deliberately caused the penal procedure to be opened unlawfully or wrongfully (even if &quot;criminally&quot; not guilty), or that they had deliberately made the proceeding more difficult (e.g. through multiple unjustified requests to change lawyers, or indeed possibly, presenting the arguments of Reichsbürger with insistence). Other consulted references: L'avocat dans la défense pénale : de l'obligation de dire la vérité à un droit de mentir, Flavien Morard https://sui-generis.ch/article/view/sg.53/661
The victim of domestic violence is referred to as the complaining witness. Domestic violence arrests will result in a criminal investigation. It is not up to the complaining witness to determine if charges are brought against the one who was arrested - this is up to the prosecutor. Here is a good article at Findlaw that discusses the process. If the complaining witness recants, the prosecutor may decide to drop the charges. The prosecutor may, though, decide to continue the charges and prosecute the case. The complaining witness in recanting may face charges as well - for example, for making a false police report. If the prosecutor presses the case and your husband is convicted then, yes, it will be on his record. Seeking the advice of a New York attorney who specializes in these matters is the best course of action. EDIT: Here is additional information regarding New York Criminal History Records: New York State law does specify that, unless the court orders otherwise, arrest records are sealed when criminal actions are terminated in favor of the accused - dismissed, found not guilty, etc. This is spelled out in Criminal Procedure Law 160.50. Arrest records are part of the public record until disposition of the case is completed. At New York State's Court web site, you can read about how to get criminal records of anyone - they are public record so anyone can make a request about anyone. There is a fee of $65. Records can be ordered online and the results can be emailed to you. Searches are processed by an exact match of name and date of birth. From their web site you will see that criminal cases transferred or removed to Family Court are not reported. Neither are records for people who had a single misdemeanor conviction over ten years ago or pending criminal cases categorized as Youthful Offender Eligible. Generally speaking, New York criminal cases are part of the public record and are available to anyone unless they meet certain criteria or have been sealed under New York State law. Note that sealing records doesn't mean the record goes away. It just means that the record is not available to the general public without a court order unsealing the record. Here is the link to on-line direct access to records requests: http://www.nycourts.gov/APPS/chrs/onlinedirectaccess.shtml
Judges do not decide, jurors do (however, if a judge is the fact-finder, then the judge makes such a determination). The main input that the decision-maker gets is a jury instruction. In order to unify "reasonable doubt", "reasonable price", "reasonable delay" and so on, appeal is often made a mythical being, "the reasonable man", so reasonable force would be the degree of force the reasonable man would use in a given situation. I will draw from California criminal instructions ('cuz I have them) but similar instructions can be found across jurisdictions. For example, one instructions says "A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes". Or from a negligence instruction "A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk". More detailed appeal to The Reasonable Person is found in the justified homicide instruction: Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified. When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true. There is no explanation of what it means to be "a reasonable person". Since nobody believes that they themselves are unreasonable, a simple and also wrong way of judging the matter is to subjectively judge whether you yourself would do the same thing, if you were in that situation. Very often, instructions do not even bother to say what "reasonable" means, so (re interpreting expert testimony) "You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence"; (re corpus delicti) "That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed"; "Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty", "when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable" The closest the law has come to articulating an objective characterization of "reasonableness" is in "reasonable doubt" instructions. One characterization is in People v. Feldman, 71 N.E. 2d 433. It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the commission of a serious crime A somewhat improved characterization is the Calcrim instruction Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt There is room for improvement, but it points in the right direction. On rare occasions, a law is written that actually includes a definition. The Gas Price Spike Act HR 3784 said The term ‘reasonable profit’ means the amount determined by the Reasonable Profits Board to be a reasonable profit on the sale. It is then up to the board to subjectively determine what that profit is. (BTW this did not become law). [Addendum] It's actually very difficult to determine what reasoning judges use in those cases where they are the determiners of fact. They will likely call on their knowledge of law, asking "are these circumstances sufficiently like past circumstance A where the defendant was convicted, or more like B where the defendant was acquitted".
Bob will be convicted if he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Now it is a logical fact that he cannot be guilty of both crimes, but it is entirely possible that his first conviction was incorrect and he is guilty of murder. His defense would point out that the first conviction creates reasonable doubt about his guilt in the murder case. The prosecution would have to show how it doesn't, for example by finding a police officer who forged the evidence in the first case. And then the defence would point out that the fact that evidence against Bob was forged once means reasonable doubt for the evidence in the second case. Fact is, the prosecution must show guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the murder, and the fact that Bob was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for a different crime, and that he cannot have committed both crimes, makes the prosecutions task a lot harder. Now what if the prosecution finds a second criminal who is an exact visual match for Bob? On the positive side, this would explain how there are two videos apparently showing Bob committing two crimes in different places. It would put the prosecution into the difficult position to have to prove which one is the murderer. And they can't say &quot;Bob is in jail already, so it must have been Bill&quot;, because now Bob's first conviction looks very unsafe.
How can a person with a similar experience with the defendant, help the plaintiff in a lawsuit? You may bring Joe as witness or present some sworn testimony from him. That could be in the form of affidavit, deposition transcript, or by testifying in court. In what way can I use Joe's story? Joe's testimony will be relevant to the extent that it proves the defendant's pattern of conduct or system for doing a thing. Many (if not all) jurisdictions in the U.S. had a provision similar to Michigan Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1): Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts [...] may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act [...] when the same is material, whether [they] are contemporaneous, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case. Thus, Joe's testimony would not prove your entire claim, but it can discredit important aspects of defendant's foreseeable denials in your matter. In some way the suggestion in the other answer makes sense, but I would discourage you from bringing suit together with Joe. That is because, despite all similarities, your claim are Joe's claim are different instances: Each cause of action stemmed from a separate contract; each contract/cause involves a different plaintiff; the statute of limitations of each wrong started running at different times; and your history with the defendant might differ from Joe's history with him on relevant aspects in a way that could prejudice you. Furthermore, if the defendant requests that the suits be separated, you and Joe would have no persuasive arguments on why your matters should remain consolidated. Lastly, the mere fact that a complaint is filed by two or more plaintiffs will not prompt a judge to act with honesty or with competence.
So I found information from a law firm in Florida about Hit and Run Cases. You definitely want a lawyer as it is a $500 fine and/or 60 days in jail for your case (property damage, no injury or loss of life). The good news is that if you can argue the case correctly, it's very easy to get a Not Guilty verdict. Under Florida Law, a Hit and Run must meet the following criteria to legally find someone guilty: Disputes as to the identity of the driver; Lack of knowledge that a crash occurred; Lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property; The failure to stop was not willful, but was dictated by circumstances; The defendant stopped as close as possible to the site of the accident; The other driver refused to receive identifying information The other driver became belligerent, necessitating that the defendant leave the scene to call police; The assistance rendered was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the statute. Given that you had no lack of knowledge that a crash occurred (2) AND lack of knowledge that an impact occurred with persons or property (3.) AND you would have stopped but for the circumstances of the event prevented you from recieiving knowledge of that the crash had occured (4) you already fail to meet 3 of the 8 criteria. This should be easy to argue in and of itself, but where you need a lawyer to assist is in criteria 7. While you were never fearing the other driver to such a degree that you needed to call the police, his behavior was interpreted by you as "road rage" and you had a reasonable fear to not wish to engage him. It's not rules as written, but it could be that the rules allow for leaving the scene because of the plaintiff's behavior and could be valid in other forms. I'll admit, this will vary wildly on the judge's own interpretation of that rule, BUT it's worth a try. Keep in mind with all of these, the Prosecution will be required to prove all 8 facts against you, while you only have to disprove one, to some level of doubt. As an armchair jury, I have no facts to support your story, but I have no facts to doubt it either. And when doubt happens, you must assume innocence. It would help if you had any hint of the officers attitude at the time. Was he friendly? Dismissive? Distracted? What was the guy who hit you's attitude towards the situation? Was he constantly yelling at you and the officer? Was he quiet and separated? Either way, get a lawyer because 60 days of jail time and a $500 fine is not something you want to fight by yourself. Make calls (the ticketing officer should have a work number or other contact information on the ticket.). Notify the insurance company of the fact that it was cited as hit and run but not proven... it could make the difference of who's company is to pay (It will be his if there was no Hit and Run).
Quick answer &quot;Is a lawyer allowed to follow a client's instructions to hide evidence?&quot; Probably not. I discuss this in the final section of this answer. About this specific case, the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the lawyer (Ken Murray) had intended to conceal the tapes permenantly or that he was aware of an obligation to disclose them prior to trial. As summarized by Austin Cooper, K.C.: Justice Gravely held that the concealing of the tapes for 17 months until Bernardo’s trial had a tendency to obstruct the course of justice, and therefore the actus reus of the offence was proved. On the issue of whether Mr. Murray willfully intended to obstruct justice, because it was feasible that Mr. Murray could have used the tapes for the defence and may well have believed that he had no obligation to disclose the tapes until the trial, he found the necessary mens rea was not proved. Accordingly, he found him not guilty. Deeper answer I'll first attempt to explain the trial judge's reasons (R. v. Murray, 2000 CanLII 22378 (ON SC)). At the end, I answer your more general questions. Facts February, 1993: Ken Murray was retained to defend Paul Bernardo on sexual assault charges; it was this charge for which Bernardo was already in custody at the time of the search of his home. April 30, 1993: The final search warrant of the Bernardo home expired. May 6, 1993: Ken Murray opened a letter from Bernardo that instructed the defence team to retrieve six 8mm videotapes. They located the tapes, removed them, and they committed to not tell anyone about the tapes. May 18, 1993: Bernardo was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and related offences. Murray's retainer was expanded to include defence of these charges. Bernardo authorized Murray to copy and review the videotapes and make use of them as appropriate in his defence. Two of the tapes contained evidence of sexual assault and death threats. Others contained evidence about the character and actions of a co-accused which Murray thought could be useful in Bernardo's defence. Early June 1993: Murray made a copy of the tapes and became fully aware of their contents. July 11 and 12, 1994: Bernardo told Murray he intended to deny ever having any contact with the victims that were on the tapes. He told Murray that the tapes were not to be used to contradict this position. July 24, 1994: After learning about DNA evidence and learning what the co-accused told police (all pointing to Bernardo being with the victims in the home), and after confirming that Bernardo insisted on maintaining his position that he had no contact with the victims and that the tapes were not to be used, Murray &quot;felt obliged to terminate the solicitor-client relationship&quot;. August 25, 1994: After a period of discussion with John Rosen (a lawyer from another firm), Rosen agreed to take over the defence of the first-degree murder charges. Murray did not tell Rosen about the tapes. Murray would remain defence counsel on the sexual assault charges. August 27, 1994: Rosen and Murray met with Bernardo to explain the change in counsel on the murder charges. August 30, 1994: Bernardo directed Murray to not reveal any of his materials to &quot;other counsel retained on my behalf for other offences that are currently before the Court... unless I specifically direct the release of such materials, in writing.&quot; Murray retained his own lawyer who further sought advice from the law society. The law society advised that (1) Murray remove himself as counsel for Bernardo on all matters; (2) Murray give the tapes to the judge in a sealed packet to be subect to court determination; and (3) to tell Bernardo of these steps as soon as possible. Rosen (the new defence counsel on the murder charges) became aware of these plans, learned that the tapes existed, and was concerned the tapes would be turned over without any input from him. September 21 and 22, 1994: After much discussion with Crown counsel, Rosen got instructions from Bernardo to turn over the tapes; the tapes were delivered to the Metropolitan Toronto Police and the Niagara Regional Police. The charge Ken Murray was charged with wilfully obstructing or attempting to obstruct the course of justice. The law The judge applied what is known as the &quot;tendency test&quot;. He said: Attempting to obstruct justice is construed as the doing of an act which has a tendency to pervert or obstruct the course of justice (the actus reus). &quot;Wilfully&quot; then constitutes the mens rea -- that is the act is done for the purpose of obstructing the course of justice He noted: The system functions within the broad principles of the presumption of innocence and the right to silence. The Crown must fully disclose its case. The defence has no reciprocal obligation. Application of the law Actus reus In this case, the judge found that Murray had done the actus reus of the offence: On the face of the evidence Murray's action in secreting the critical tapes had the tendency to obstruct the course of justice at several stages of the proceedings. The tapes were put beyond the reach of the police who had unsuccessfully attempted to locate them. Secreting them had the tendency to obstruct the police in their duty to investigate the crimes of Bernardo and Homolka. Further, there was no justification that negated the actus reus. This evidence on the tapes was not privilged; it was not communication between solicitor and client. The judge found that &quot;once [Murray] had discovered the overwhelming significance of the critical tapes, Murray... was left with but three legally justifiable options&quot;: (a) immediately turn over the tapes to the prosecution, either directly or anonymously; (b) deposit them with the trial judge; or (c) disclose their existence to the prosecution and prepare to do battle to retain them. Mens rea The Crown had to prove that Murray's intention was to obstruct the course of justice. The judge found that the Crown did not prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge found that Murray may have not intended to permanently suppress the tapes and that Murray may have believed he had no obligation to disclose the tapes prior to the trial. He had presented several theories regarding the potential usefulness of the tapes to the defence which would have required holding back the tapes for their tactical or &quot;surprise&quot; value. Also, the judge noted that the law in this area was confusing.1 While Murray made only a token effort to find out what his obligations were, had he done careful research he might have remained confused. The weight of legal opinion in Ontario is to the effect that lawyers may not conceal material physical evidence of crime, but how this rule applies to particular facts has been the subject of extensive discussion. Lawyers in the United States have been afflicted with the same dilemma. In the materials supplied to me by counsel, there is reference to at least 15 law journal discussions on the issue. Ethical responsibility Doesn't a lawyer have a responsibility not to defend a specific fact that they know is criminal? No. But they do have an obligation to not lie to the court or to allow their client to lie to the court. This is why Murray knew he had to withdraw from the case when Bernardo was committed to the defence that he had never encountered the victims. To answer your title question, &quot;Is a lawyer allowed to follow instructions from his client to hide evidence?&quot;, the answer today is &quot;probably not.&quot; It has even been suggested that if defence counsel is faced with this issue, they should instruct their client: It is evidence that might convict you; if you give it to me, I may have to turn it over to the prosecution. Take it away and keep it in your residence; if you destroy it, you may be guilty of a crime. The Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Professional Conduct now say (Rule 5.1-2A): A lawyer shall not counsel or participate in the concealment, destruction or alteration of incriminating physical evidence or otherwise act so as to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the course of justice. Any lawyer faced with this dilemma should probably do what Mr. Murray eventually did and retain their own lawyer and/or get advice from their law society. 1. While the maxim &quot;ignorance of the law is no excuse&quot; generally holds true, the mens rea of this offence includes an intention to obstruct justice. The judge understood this to invite an inquiry into what Murray believed the law required of him. This approach has been criticized: see Lucinda Vandervort, &quot;Mistake of Law and Obstruction of Justice: A 'Bad Excuse'... Even for a Lawyer&quot;, 2001.
Is this realistic? Yes. The dramatic performance plays out in the same way that it would in the U.S. Court system. The actual killing of the wife would be 'legal', so can he be charged for murder for something that has been done legally, only because they can prove is intent to kill her before that? Especially since he has already been acquitted of that fact. Mostly, this is an issue of causation and not double jeopardy. From a double jeopardy perspective, the crime of murder is not complete until the person dies, and they have not be tried for murder, so this is a different crime that had not occurred until after the attempted murder trial was over. Causation Issues Even if the immediate cause of the wife's death is withdrawal of life support, the shooting could still be a legally sufficient cause of the wife's death. For example, suppose that you shoot someone and the hospital can't give the victim a blood transfusion because the victim has blood type O- (universal donor) which can only receive blood from other people with blood type O-, and the hospital, due to negligence on the part of a hospital administrator, has run out out of type O- blood. The fact that the victim would not have died if the hospital has not negligently failed to have type O- blood on hand does not provide a defense to murder on the part of the person who shot her. While terminating life support is "legal" it also constitutes a non-judicial finding with legal effect on the part of the person authorizing it and the physicians signing off on the decision, the further medical care would have been futile and that the person whose life support was terminated was already dead in key material respects, even though they would not be dead for purposes of a murder charge until life support is terminated. When death is a natural and foreseeable result of action that causes physical harm, the death is caused by the act that causes the physical harm. Something else that causes death would have to be a "superseding cause" and not just an additional cause of death. Thus, the fact that life support was terminated legally does not mean that she cannot be a murder victim. Indeed, many murder victims are people who are on life support for some period of time and then have that life support terminated because it is futile to continue medical care and the person is already "brain dead" or something equivalent to that. Collateral Estoppel Issues Double jeopardy does carry with it a related concept of "collateral estoppel" which provides that facts necessarily decided in one criminal case cannot be decided differently in a subsequent, related criminal case in some circumstances. But, collateral estoppel applies only when the facts in the prior criminal case were necessarily decided on the merits in the prior criminal case. Acquittal of criminal charged does not necessarily include a determination that someone was innocent of the charges. The fact that he was acquitted of attempted murder does not mean that the jury found that he didn't attempt or intend to murder her. In particular, a dismissal of criminal charges as a result of a technicality that excluded evidence related to an element of the crime for which there was an acquittal, is not a determination on the merits that a particular element of a crime was actually absent, so it would not be binding in the subsequent criminal case for murder. An acquittal does not mean that every element of the prior criminal charges was found not to be present. Collateral estoppel arising from the double jeopardy right, in contrast, might be a ground for dismissal of the murder case, if the man's primary (and perhaps only) defense to the attempted murder case had been that he had established the affirmative defense that someone else committed the murder, or that he had an alibi that made it impossible for him to have committed the murder. Then, the jury would have found on the merits that this defense, equally applicable to the murder case, had already been established.