Does International Law only apply to countries that ratify treaties and accept the law? As far as I understand there are certain laws that compose a body of law called International Law. These laws arise from treaties and political bodies. To provide an answer on this network aside from other controversial questions of politics and law when people make statements like the following, And of course, there is no such thing as a &quot;banned weapon&quot;. There are treaties that state signatory states aren't supposed to use certain weapons, but those are only valid if the country is a signatory and has ratified that treaty. – jwenting And this, Has Israel ratified any treaties which ban the use of DIME, AP bombs or WP? If not, then there's no &quot;international law&quot; for them to follow. BOTTOM LINE: the term &quot;international law&quot; is highly misleading. [...] - RonJohn And this, Well, you keep using the phrase international law, like it's a thing. If it's not the UN, then it is de-facto some random group of countries, and if Israel isn't a party to that group, it doesn't apply. If the UN (or some UN org) has actually made a law which is supposed to apply to all member nations outlawing DIME, AP and WP, then maybe Israel is beholden to follow it. My suspicion is there are no such &quot;international laws&quot;. – CGCampbell Is specifically the part in bold correct or not? It is my understanding that those that ratify these treaties do not merely accept them on behalf of themselves, but accept the responsibility to impose the law against others regardless of acceptance. Would someone that has not ratified the Geneva Convention be immune to charges that the convention describes?
Law, as such, is not a moral or a philosophical construct. It can be based on moral constructs and often it is. And, of course, the process of writing laws is often informed by philosophy. But law as such is neither one of those. Law is a set of behaviors which are known to be acceptable to the powers &quot;that be.&quot; This maybe an unsettling idea. But it is true nonetheless. The phrase that summarizes this is &quot;any law is only as good as its enforcement mechanism.&quot; What makes it seem untrue is that in the modern tradition laws are written down. And, when there is a need to resolve doubt as to whether something is illegal or not, they are carefully considered through a deductive process. Within countries, there is little question who &quot;the powers that be&quot; happen to be. But when it comes to laws governing actions between nations, it is more complicated. Yes, treaties make it clear, ahead of time, what types of expectations exist. Predictability (even in war) allows for long-term planning. And even laws of war are usually followed because wars are fought with the expectation that at some point they will end. And predictability allows to set end-goal conditions. Notably, entities which have no clear end-goals in sight are the ones least likely to follow any laws. The idea of any group of countries sitting in court of another group of countries is mostly a political theater. There is no possibility of predictable outcomes from entities which have not made commitments to those outcomes. So whether some countries have to follow &quot;laws&quot; set out for them by other countries (or non-government entities) is largely a result of those countries or entities being in positions of power to dictate their will. This is not the same as international laws being strictly de facto. Agreed-upon restrictions and restrictions which have been dictated from the top-down, by those with more power, are de jure because they create predictable boundaries on behavior. De facto restrictions are the ones which have come to be the case without any prior agreement or fiat.
Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.
The U.S. law rule is that treaties and laws are co-equal and that one does not supersede the other. In the U.S., the rule is that the last passed law or treaty prevails, over earlier passed laws or treaties if they conflict. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, "Treaties as laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes" 80 Indiana Law Journal 319 (2005) citing cases including Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888). But, this is not self-evident, Indeed, it is a minority rule of law to the point of pretty much being an outlier. In the vast majority of countries other than the U.S., domestic laws are subordinate to treaties, and there is some hint in the structure of the U.S. Constitution and the discussions of the Founders regarding the treaty power, that this how the Founders assumed that conflicts between treaties and domestic statutes would be interpreted, even though the U.S. Supreme Court ended up interpreting the constitution differently. Few countries in the world give so little legal effect to international treaties and international law, more generally, as the U.S. does. In contrast, in Europe, many human rights protections arise from international treaty obligations that override domestic laws, rather than from their own domestic constitutional law. Also, while this rule seems simple and mechanical, it rarely presents in the fashion, because there are a variety of tools, such as interpreting treaties and statutes in a manner that avoids a conflict (particularly with respect to questions such as whether a treaty should be considered "self-executing" or not, and a rule of construction that one enactment that does not expressly overrule another should not be deemed to do so implicitly unless there is no interpretation that can resolve the conflict otherwise), that muddy the waters. As Ku, explains in the law review article linked above: Although the Constitution declares that treaties are the "supreme Law of the Land,"the status of treaties in the American legal system is plagued by uncertainty. A court considering a private individual's claim under a treaty must first consider a number of complex questions such as whether the treaty is "self-executing," whether the treaty's effect is otherwise nullified by conditions placed on it during ratification, whether the treaty exceeds constitutional limitations on the exercise of the treaty power, and whether the treaty conflicts with inconsistent federal and state law.... For instance, in recent years the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has twice found that U.S. domestic law limiting habeas corpus appeals violated U.S. treaty obligations to guarantee consular notification rights to foreign nationals charged with capital crimes.' The ICJ found a conflict between the treaty and U.S. law even though the U.S. government offered a plausible alternative interpretation of the treaty that avoided conflict with domestic law. (Despite these findings, the U.S. did not enforce the alleged treaty obligation.) A good example of this is the case of Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. ___ (2014) (note that it is important to provide a year when discussing the Bond case, because the U.S. Supreme Court made two successive rulings in this case and also established an important precedent in an unrelated case with the same name). Wikipedia's summary of the case explains how the case avoided having to resolve constitutional issues in the case (references to Holland are to State of Missouri v. Holland, linked and discussed below): Carol Anne Bond is a microbiologist from Lansdale, Pennsylvania. In 2006, her best friend became pregnant. When Bond discovered that her husband was the child's father, she attempted to poison her former friend by putting organoarsenic and potassium dichromate on the woman's door knob. Bond was caught, and was convicted under the Chemical Weapons Act. In her appeal, she argued that applying the chemical weapons treaty to her had violated the Tenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals ruled that Bond lacked standing to make a Tenth Amendment claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed by stating that individuals can bring Tenth Amendment claims. The Court then remanded the case for the Third Circuit to decide the case on the merits. On remand, the Third Circuit found that "because the Convention is an international agreement with a subject matter that lies at the core of the Treaty Power and because Holland instructs that 'there can be no dispute about the validity of [a] statute' that implements a valid treaty, we will affirm Bond's conviction." Bond again appealed to the Supreme Court, asking the court to overrule Holland or to find that her actions were not covered by the CWA. The case attracted a great deal of attention, with US Solicitor General Donald Verrilli arguing for the government and former Solicitor General Paul Clement arguing for Bond. Senator Ted Cruz wrote an essay for the blog of the Harvard Law Review, urging the Court to overturn Bond's conviction. Chief Justice Roberts opened his opinion by vividly describing John Singer Sargent's life-sized painting of mustard gas victims. Roberts closed by noting, "There are no life-sized paintings of Bond's rival washing her thumb." In its judgment, the Court unanimously concluded that the convention was not meant to cover local activities such as Bond's poisoning attempt. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts declined to define the scope of Treaty Clause powers, invoking constitutional avoidance. Because the Chemical Weapons Convention is not self-executing and because it requires implementation by a signatory to be "in accordance with its constitutional processes," Roberts focused his attention on statutory interpretation of the federal criminal code. According to Roberts, one of the key "background principles of construction" is federalism; there must be a "clear indication" by Congress if it intends to "dramatically intrude upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction." The Court concluded that there was no such clear indication in the text of the criminal statute. Roberts rejected the Solicitor General's interpretation of the statute, noting that the government's reading would make it a federal offense to poison children's goldfish and that state authorities are fully capable of punishing burrito poisoners. Finally, Roberts briefly responds to Justice Scalia's interpretation by noting that adopting "the most sweeping reading of the statute would fundamentally upset the Constitution's balance." A well-known line from his opinion is at the end: "The global need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard, or to treat a local assault with a chemical irritant as the deployment of a chemical weapon." Thus, rather than ruling that a law implementing a valid treaty was unconstitutional, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the law implementing the treaty in a manner that did not mean something that would potentially make the law unconstitutional. The question states: Obviously, the Constitution supersedes both laws and treaties This is mostly correct under U.S. law (although it took many decades before that rule was established in precedent), but it was not obvious under U.S. law, it is not true in every country, and it is not entirely settled law in the U.S. even today. A plurality of the justices Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), which enforced the Fifth and Sixth Amendments against a contradictory treaty, stated: There is nothing in this language which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. A plurality decision, however, is not controlling authority that must be followed by lower courts. But, in State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) had previously reached an arguably contrary conclusion. The official syllabus to that decision noted that: Protection of its quasi-sovereign right to regulate the taking of game is a sufficient jurisdictional basis, apart from any pecuniary interest, for a bill by a State to enjoin enforcement of federal regulations over the subject alleged to be unconstitutional. The Treaty of August 16, 1916, 39 Stat. 1702, with Great Britain, providing for the protection, by close seasons and in other ways, of migratory birds in the United States and Canada, and binding each power to take and propose to their lawmaking bodies the necessary measures for carrying it out, is within the treaty-making power conferred by Art. II, § 2, of the Constitution; the Act of July 3, 1918, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755, which prohibits the killing, capturing or selling any of the migratory birds included in the terms of the treaty, except as permitted by regulations compatible with those terms to be made by the Secretary of Agriculture, is valid under Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, as a necessary and proper means of effectuating the treaty, and the treaty and statute, by bringing such birds within the paramount protection and regulation of the Government do not infringe property rights or sovereign powers respecting such birds reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. With respect to right reserved to the State, the treaty-making power is not limited to what may be done by an unaided act of Congress. Many legal scholars expected that Bond (2014) would resolve the tension between Reid and Holland, but instead, the U.S. Supreme Court punted, and declined to reach that issue in that case. Arguably, Reid and Holland are not truly in conflict, because Holland addresses the scope of the treaty power in light of federalism concerns, which isn't necessarily identical to the scope power of Congress to enact domestic laws pursuant to U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8 in light of federalism concerns, while Reid concerns constitutional provisions which have been interpreted to flatly prohibit the government from abridging certain individual rights at all. U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8 limits the authority of Congress to enact domestic laws to certain enumerated subjects (with all other powers reserved to the states), while the treaty power is not limited to any particular subject-matter (in part, because states are not permitted under the constitution to enter into international treaties, so the federal government needs to handle treaties involving both national and state level concerns, while states have plenary power to enact domestic laws in all circumstances where they are not expressly prohibited from doing so).
US troops deployed to Germany would be covered by the Status of Forces Agreement, which governs jurisdiction. Your question also ignores the nature of the prosecution services in Germany, which do not allow a rogue junior official to file charges at a whim. You would have to assume that at least a state government, if not the federal government, actively pushes the case. (And the federal government could probably take the case away from any state which had such ideas.) If you look for precedents of legal jeopardy, look at the case of Anwar Raslan, a Syrian official convicted of torture in Germany. It is also a closer parallel to the Pinochet case. Finally, the principles underlying such prosecutions were established in Germany but not by Germany. I'm talking of the Nuremberg trials. If German courts were to find the US Army to be a criminal organization, then individual members would be at risk. But as a political scenario, that is absurd.
The main treaty here is the Outer Space Treaty and its implementation in US law. For your purposes, the relevant sections of the treaty are Article II: Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. Article VI: States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities...The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty... and Article VIII: A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such an object, and over any personnel thereof... Article II means that setting up your colony doesn't give you ownership over the land it sits on (and Article XII permits anyone to stop by for a visit at any time), but it doesn't outlaw setting up a permanent base. And I hope your "all the resources" includes a small army of lawyers. Between them, Article VI and Article VIII make the United States government responsible for anything you do in space, so there's a lot of paperwork involved in getting permission to do anything above the Karman line.
The term "enemy" in the U.S. Constitution's definition of treason is generally considered to be a term of art that means a party against whom Congress has authorized the use of military force or a declared war. The only such country in existence at this time, to the best of my knowledge, is North Korea. Terrorist organizations which had affiliated involved in the 9-11 attacks (including ISIS and Boko Haram) are also covered. Russia is not an "enemy" of the United States, within the meaning of the constitutional definition of treason. Neither are any individuals or corporations in Russia, unless they are affiliated with a 9-11 terrorist organization. An important statutory definition of "enemy" might also be considered informative to a court presented with this question, which is slightly broader (as it requires "hostilities" but does not require a full fledged war and does not require Congressional action): According to 50 USCS § 2204 [Title 50. War and National Defense; Chapter 39. Spoils of War], enemy of the United States means any country, government, group, or person that has been engaged in hostilities, whether or not lawfully authorized, with the United States; (3) the term "person" means (A) any natural person; (B) any corporation, partnership, or other legal entity; and (C) any organization, association, or group. In this context, "hostilities" would generally mean physical warfare acts like shooting Americans, or blowing up American property, in a warlike manner.
According to the detractors, the Humans are using the POWs as Human Shields (or Meat Shields), claiming this is no different from placing POWs around a SAM battery emplacement (and that even forcing a captured enemy combatant to open a bio-metric lock is a war crime). Everything I can find talking about Human Shields only talk about civilians and use examples of placing said civilians next to military assets to stop the enemy from attacking the assets. The question in this case is really an unresolved open question. First of all, there is not moral consensus on whether sentient aliens are entitled to &quot;human rights&quot;. Secondly, the POWs are not really being used as human shields. There is no contemplation that their presence will prevent the opponents from attacking in order to show mercy on their compatriots. Instead, the POWs are being used to deceive the enemy's automated systems that the attacking force is friendly despite the implausibility of that given their actions. It is really more analogous to forcing a prisoner to write a misleading letter or make a misleading phone call, while under duress. While the use of fraud and deception in warfare may be dishonorable, usually actual war crimes involving POWs entail mistreatment of a POW or putting a POW in harm's way (even if presenting only a risk of death or injury). Also, of course, much of the Geneva Convention's requirements regarding the treatment of POWs is a treaty imposed obligation, binding morally because both combatants at one point consented to it, rather than necessarily being a universal and mandatorily applicable component of customary international law. The fact that the Geneva Convention might be violated in some detail, if true, doesn't automatically make it a war crime in this context. In the same vein, the Geneva Conventions make a distinction between the treatment of uniformed and non-uniformed combatants, but this distinction, established by a treaty agreed to by many nations, is not necessarily inherently relevant to determining if something is a war crime in a war with a non-signatory. It is a provision that relies of cultural meaning that is shared by the treaty signatories, but may not make sense vis-a-vis non-human sentient aliens. In the same vein, one wouldn't think that in a war with intelligent dragons, the fact that the dragons were or were not wearing uniforms, when dragons customarily fight naked, was significant, unless the dragon nation agreed to the Geneva Conventions in a duly ratified treaty.
Not all weapons are protected by the Second Amendment. There is a "dangerous and unusual weapons" exclusionary clause established by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller, which excludes pretty much anything that's incredibly dangerous (obviously we wouldn't want our people to have the right to keep bombs in their house) or not considered a normal weapon (encryption/cryptography would probably fall under this). One case currently being considered under this exclusion is the stun gun, which is going to the Supreme Court to determine whether it qualifies as an unusual weapon and whether it is protected by the Second Amendment.