Can courts consider hansard transcripts in interpreting statutes? When a court is trying to decide the meaning of a law, can it consider the discussions which begot it?
united-kingdom Yes. The landmark case in the UK is Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart, where the House of Lords*: established the principle that when primary legislation is ambiguous then, in certain circumstances, the court may refer to statements made in the House of Commons or House of Lords in an attempt to interpret the meaning of the legislation. Before this ruling, such an action would have been seen as a breach of parliamentary privilege *Strictly speaking, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which functioned as the UK's highest court before the creation of the Supreme Court.
The language "I therefore place you on notice that" in your proposed missive is superfluous and adds nothing that is legally relevant. Flourishes like that are common among former paralegals, court clerks, common law country notaries, and other non-lawyers who want to sound legalistic but don't really have the relevant legal knowledge. It is common to say "I put so and so on notice that" in a legal opinion or a summary of a case, but mildly uncommon and not necessary to put those magic words in the notice itself in a situation like this where there is no prescribed statutory language that must be used on a specific legal form. In this situation the important thing is that the person is actually made aware of the situation, not that you conform to a statutory form. Also does it add anything to have stated the effect if they do not do so ("This may be detrimental..."), if the matter proceeds to a court case? If they complain of a lack of an opportunity to inspect in a later court case, it allows you to say, "I told you so and I gave you a chance to do something about it" which might be fairly convincing to a judge and would probably overcome any arguments that you engaged in spoliation of evidence.
What makes something a take-it or leave-it contract? The lack --be it essential or literal lack-- of opportunity to negotiate the terms of a contract. That is also known as adhesion contract. And (if I am the one taking it), are unclear clauses categorically interpreted in my favor? Rather than "categorically [interpreted]", a more accurate characterization is to say "reasonably [interpreted]". Among the reasonable interpretations of a contract, the adopted one is that which favors the party who was not the draftsman of the contract. This is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem and is cognizable in jurisdictions of the U.S. and in many others world-wide. The doctrine of contra proferentem is sought to compensate for the gap of parties' bargaining power. In an adhesion contract, the fact that one party may only accept the contract "as is" (or reject, which would render this a moot issue) evidences that the draftsman of that contract has significantly more bargaining power. A contract need not be one of adhesion in order to trigger the doctrine of contra proferentem, though. In the case of negotiated contracts, the doctrine may apply selectively so as to interpret ambiguous clauses against the party who ultimately caused the ambiguity in those clauses. Some jurisdictions are more emphatic about this aspect of contract law, which at first glance may seem a departure from the principle of interpretation [literally] against the draftsman. There could be scenarios where a party (the non-draftsman) suggests a clause, and the draftsman incorporates that clause but devises some wording to render the contract unclear in that regard. The doctrine would apply not merely by virtue of the latter party being the draftsman, but because he in his capacity of draftsman tweaked the clause arguably in an attempt to frustrate the other party's interest in --or purpose for-- that clause.
Clarity is always better than ambiguity in drafting a contract. Conflicts about contracts are always easier to resolve when they are formed then when they are on foot. If you are concerned that the clause can be interpreted in the way you suggest (and it is not a groundless concern) raise it now and have the clause redrafted to remove the ambiguity.
Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow.
if these questions and answers are found to be legally binding ... They aren’t. Therefore the premise of your question is flawed. It’s like asking “If my dog was a cat ...”. Well, since your dog isn’t a cat we don’t need to hear the rest of the question.
I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.
I do not know whether anyone has ever tried it, but it would not take much for a judge to conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of a speed limit sign is that the speed is to be measured relative to the surface of the road or to any other object that is stationary in that frame of reference. Does there exist provisions in any legal system to fix this legal loophole? Most rules for interpreting legal texts fix &quot;loopholes&quot; of this sort by providing for the consideration only of interpretations that are reasonably likely to have been intended, or that a reasonable person might arrive at. The interpretation that the speed limit could be measured against any frame of reference (or indeed any one other than that of the Earth's surface) is not reasonable.