Could the U.S. Federal government constitutionally enact laws that duplicate the de facto regional differences caused by circuit splits? Circuit splits have the effect of treating people in America differently with regards to the law depending on where they live, due to differing interpretations of the same statute. Some of these differing interpretations involve what seems like major questions of rights that such as in these cases about warrentless seizures of a person based on suspicion of the person having committed a misdemeanor. Would it pass constitutional muster for the U.S. code to enact de jure laws that have these de facto effects, i.e. a law that says in Texas police have this power and in Florida they do not, etc.? If not, is there any legal scholarship arguing that whatever legal principle would prevent the law from being made intentionally should also preclude the de facto situation being allowed to stand rather than having some forcing mechanism for resolution, whether through congress or the Supreme court? I know this obviously isn't the case now as circuit splits do exist and have these effects, just wondering if anyone in the Academy is putting forth arguments against it.
(The original title of your question suggested you might think that federal circuit precedent binds state courts: it generally does not, even on matters of federal law.) But regardless, Congress would not be able to legislatively lower the constitutional floor. If a certain police act is prohibited by the Constitution, Congress cannot legislatively allow that act, whether in a single state or uniformly across all states. That means that if the Fifth Circuit has decided that the use of some new investigatory tool is a search under the Fourth Amendment, no law that Congress passes could affect that holding. When congress creates laws that result in different effects for different people (e.g. people in Texas vs. people in Florida, as in your hypothetical), the distinction must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Many of the enumerated powers allow for local distinction, some prohibit it. Some examples where Congress has distinguished between states include: localized agricultural programs, time zones, voting rights protections, and various others listed in ohwilleke's review. Some distinctions between states could also intrude on principles of federalism and state sovereignty (e.g. the Supreme Court has said that the Voting Right Act does this). Maybe I am unimaginative, but I cannot think of a legitimate federal government purpose that would call for the powers that police have against the people to vary from state to state. Any such variation would have to come from the states themselves: from their state constitutions, or legislative choices to provide heightened protections. Discord between circuits is problematic (see a list of examples of existing splits), and this is why the Supreme Court of the United States will often hear an appeal where there is a circuit split on a question of constitutional rights.
The UK has parliamentary sovereignty, not separation of powers Unlike, say, the United States, where the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive have co-equal power in their respective spheres, in the UK, the judiciary and the executive are subordinate to Parliament. The courts have no power to nullify an Act of Parliament for being unconstitutional like they do in jurisdictions where a written constitution gives them such a power like the USA, Canada, or Australia. The purpose of the Declaration of Incompatibility is to advise Parliament that the law they have passed contradicts the HRA and they should think about that and decide if that’s what they really wanted to do. That means that the UK Parliament could pass the Arbitrary Bollock Removal Act 2023 (ABRA) tomorrow and it would be valid law. The courts can still provide judicial review of the actions of the executive under ABRA but they cannot declare the law a nullity. That is, the Minister’s actions can be scrutinised to ensure they followed the ABRA and other established principles such as procedural fairness and, if they didn’t, declare the executive actions void. However, if they did follow the law, off come your nuts.
Under the present constitution . . . Are there any consequences of the fact that the Constitution of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States use two different names for that state? No. Lots of the language in the United States Constitution is no longer in place or in common usage or is invalid due to subsequent amendments, and that language is still effective as originally intended. The U.S. Constitution has never been "amended and restated" and can't be understood properly without annotations to its raw text. Might a federal statute be needed for some states (e.g. Vermont, because of what is noted above) but not for others, because of differences in the federal statutes that admitted the state, or because of the lack of any need for admission by Congress in the case of the original thirteen states? Not really. Every state's name is embedded in myriad federal laws and regulations in addition to the statute that admitted the state to the United States, e.g. laws assigning names to post offices, laws allocating judgeships, laws purchasing property, laws appropriating funds, laws assigning states to various districts for purposes of executive branch departments and the judiciary, tax laws (e.g. the Obamacare tax credit), etc. Would a state statute suffice? Would a state constitutional amendment suffice? Would a federal statute suffice without a state statute or a state referendum? Would a federal constitutional amendment be needed? A federal constitutional amendment would not be needed. The Constitution vests Congress with the authority to admit states and to change their boundaries with the permission of the affected states. This would be within the power over states that could be inferred from those powers. A state and the federal government could each pass a statute to call itself something different for various purposes. For example, the official name of the state of Rhode Island is "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" but various state and federal statutes authorize the use of the short form of the "State of Rhode Island" for most purposes. As a practical matter a state constitutional amendment would probably be desirable on general principles to officially change the name of a state, whether or not it was strictly required, in part, because a state constitution usually sets forth an official name of a state in its body text. It would be possible for a state to change its constitution and statutes and change its name in a move that the federal government did not accept, and if that happened, the federal government and its officials would probably continue to use the old name and the state government and its officials would probably use the new name. I think it is as a practical matter, unlikely that a standoff like this would persist, but I think that this is the most likely outcome. A federal government move to change a state's name without its consent proactively, however, would probably be struck down as violating federalism concerns. Of course, all of this is speculative, because there are really no precedents for disputes over the changing of a state's name. Context would influence the outcome of any such case.
Advisory opinions violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The "case or controversy" clause helps enforce this separation. The judicial branch is responsible for resolving legal disputes by interpreting and applying existing law. In doing so, it may incidentally modify or extend the law. Courts are only supposed to do this to the extent necessary to resolve disputes. Outside a legal dispute, the legislative branch is solely responsible for making changes to the law. If courts were allowed to issue advisory opinions, they would be effectively be altering the law without addressing an actual dispute. As such, advisory opinions violate the separation-of-powers doctrine. The "case or controversy" requirement exists to ensure that the judicial branch does not usurp the powers of the legislative branch. Relevant quote from page 45 (PDF page 10) of Separation of Powers: An Old Doctrine Triggers a New Crisis: [...] one of the major arguments [...] against advisory opinions is that they violate the separation of powers doctrine. Judicial power, it is said, should be limited to deciding litigated cases. When justices issue opinions on contentions that have not yet been the subject of legal dispute, these justices approach the status of lawmakers.
Double jeopardy applies to the same facts, not to the same sorts of crimes. Say if you are tried and acquitted of murder of person A, that won't later save you from being tried for murder of person B. Same applies to your question: if the documents/testimony on the second occasion are different from the first occasion, there is no protection. If they are the same, there is.
Yes and No. The Federal U.S. Government as well as each individual state and territory claim Soverign Immunity to a limited degree. In the case of Federal Government, they claim Soverign Immunity to a near limitless degree (more on this in a moment), while States and Territories claim &quot;State Soverign Immunity&quot; which grants them immunity with respect to all soverign powers granted under the U.S. Constitution. To clarify, each U.S. State is seperately soverign in all matters not explicitly allocated to the Federal Government by the U.S. Constitution and all constitutionally written laws. Where the Constitution does not in writing claim a power for the federal government nor reserver a power for the state government, the power is assumed to be state government. So a State can claim immunity for a police situation but not a law it makes regarding immigration or foriegn policy, since that is the exclusive wheelhouse of the Feds. Per the 11th amendment, states can only be sued in state court by citizens of the state, while non-state citizens wishing to sue a state must sue in the Federal Court (Which for the purposes of the trial may adopt the defendant State's laws and regulations for the purposes of questions of fact and law brought up in the suit). All U.S. States and the Federal Goverment additionally wave Soverign Immunity under specific conditions outlined in laws. In the case of the Federal Government, the laws governing when this immunity is waived are governed by the Federal Torts Claims Act (1946) and the Tucker Act (1887). The FTCA covers intentional torts by the Federal Government, while the Tucker Act typically covers matters related to contractual obligations or monitary interactions with the federal government. Things that may be sued for include but are not limited too: Intentional Torts committed by Government Agents in their Official Capacity (i.e. When the FBI violates your rights or maliciously investigates you). Contractual disputes where the Government is a party to the Contract, either in written or implied terms. Constitutional Claims (i.e. The Government may have violated the Constitution. These tend to be for non-monitary relief such as mandemuses, though the 5th Amendment's Taking Clause can be invoked of the government took property and does not justly compensate.). Individual Agencies of the Government when the monitary claim is not drawn from the U.S. Treasury (the agencies own allocated budget is used to pay). Refund for taxes paid In all cases, a Judge will determin if the Government, under the laws, can be sued. If in the example of a government employee being sued, the Justice Department will first make a determination if the employee was acting as an agent of the government when they committed the tortious act, and then will declare themselves Respondent Superior through the agency of employement. From there, the case becomes a suit against the Federal Government and FTCA immunity waiver is determined by a Judge. For example, lets say you (Mr. Rapt) sue Special Agent Jimmy Jones of an intentional tort that he committed in the course of his duty as an FBI agent. The DOJ will first declare that they are Respondent Superior in the case of Rapt v. Jones, thus turning the case to Rapt v. United States Government, Department of Justice, Federal Beura of Investigations, and Jones (Rapt v. United States, et. al.). From here, the Judge who gets the case then determins if the U.S. Government under FTCA can be sued by Rapt, based on Rapt's citizenship status (usually permanent legal residents are covered as citizens for this point, but I can say for certain in this particular law), ripeness (the suit must be filed within 2 years of the incident or first knowledge), and immunity waiver under FTCA. In the case of the State Government, they should have similar laws, but I'm not going to identify all 50 individual laws here. Additionally, the 11th Amendment permits U.S. Congress to waive a State's immunity to suit in certain cases (mostly comes up with the Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment.). As a fun point, in all cases where a government appears as a defendant in a suit, it is automatically a Bench Trial, as the government usually include a waiver of their right as defendant to a jury trial. The thinking here is that, as a country that was founded by rebelling against the government, a jury of 12 of the government's citizens aren't going to give them any slack at trial, where as a judge (who they pay) is much more likely. TL;DR: Both questions are yes. The immunity is waived under federal law for certain cases, but it is a judge who will make the ruling if the specific case meets the aformentioned waived immunity.
To the title question, yes, of course, Justices are subject to the law same as anyone else is (at least in theory; whether actual practice bears that out is another matter). Chief Justice Roberts (and the rest of SCOTUS, and a good chunk of the judiciary to boot, and then some) was a named defendant in the case Shao v. Roberts that was appealed to SCOTUS. The Justices all recused themselves rendering the court short of a quorum and leaving the prior appellate court decision to dismiss the case sua sponte in place. However, Justices essentially police themselves. As the head of the judicial branch they are largely independent of Congressional or Executive attempts to control how they go about their business. Recent calls to create a legal code of ethics for Justices exist because such a code perhaps cannot, and currently does not, exist under the current constitutional order. As such Justices make their own decisions on when to recuse (see my answer here for further details). Your hypothetical justice would do the same, and the court would proceed as it always does whether they do or don't.
No. The Fourteenth Amendment says: nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; The Supreme Court has determined that this clause incorporates much of the Bill of Rights. The logic is mildly tortured, but it's basically that "due process of law" means "due process of a law that is compatible with the fundamental rights of a free society." This logic is known as "substantive due process," because it reads in to "due process of law" requirements about what those laws can do (as opposed to procedural due process, which is about the actual procedures being used). It's pretty settled that the Bill of Rights, after the 14th Amendment, should apply to the states. There's another possible way to get there: the 14th Amendment says "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," which Justice Thomas recently thought meant that the Second Amendment applies to the states in a concurring opinion. But as of now, substantive due process is the standard logic for it. Virtually all of the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states. There are a couple things which aren't (like juries in lawsuits, and grand juries), but the Establisment Clause is incorporated (see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1).