What is the name of a U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that government cannot conspire with private companies to censor protected speech? There was a supreme court decision that said that the government can't conspire with private companies to censor. Can anyone tell me the name of the case?
I'm not convinced that there is a U.S. Supreme Court case with such a clear holding. For example: May a private entity running a public access channel ban speakers based on the content of their speech—something a government entity running the same channels could not do? Yes, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion in Manhattan Community Access Corporation v. Halleck (2019). Why? Because the First Amendment doesn’t apply to private entities in this instance. You may be looking for one of the cases discussed in Halleck which notes (in the official syllabus) that: &quot;A private entity may qualify as a state actor . . . when the entity exercises “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.” Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 352 [1974]. The Court has stressed that “very few” functions fall into that category. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U. S. 149, 158 [1978]. Per the official syllabus in the link above, Jackson held that: The convergence between the actions of a state and a heavily regulated private utility company do not rise to the level of state action if the utility company has a partial monopoly in providing electrical service and uses a procedure that the state utilities commission finds to be appropriate under state law in terminating service to customers. As the linked material explains: A private entity performing a public function can be classified as a state actor, but merely being regulated and overseen by the state does not equate to performing a public function if the company is managed by private actors. In this decision, the Court placed limits on the public function doctrine, which otherwise could have grown into a massive exception permitting the inference of state action. Thus, heavy state regulation of a private entity still doesn't constitute state action which can violate a constitutional right, in this case, even though if the state has had greater control over the nominally private entity (e.g. appointing its board of directors), the private entity's actions would be state action. Per the official syllabus in the link above, the primary holding of Flagg Bros. was that: A warehouseman's proposed sale of goods entrusted to him for storage, as permitted by [New York State's Uniform Commercial Code] § 7-210, is not &quot;state action,&quot; and since the allegations of the complaint failed to establish that any violation of respondents' Fourteenth Amendment rights was committed by either the storage company or the State of New York, the District Court properly concluded that no claim for relief was stated by respondents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In reaching this conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that: The challenged statute does not delegate to the storage company an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign. Other remedies for the settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors (which is not traditionally a public function) remain available to the parties. Though respondents contend that the State authorized and encouraged the storage company's action by enacting [the statute], a State's mere acquiescence in a private action does not convert such action into that of the State. In other words, enactment of a state statute authorizing private action is not state action that can violate a constitutional right.
most likely The government can't compel people to some sort of speech under the 1st amendment. Forcing a company to host people is compelled speech by the company. It is well established that the government can't compel a newspaper to host its messages as it wants. The key case might be Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo 418 US 241 (1974). In this case, it was deemed unconstitutional that a newspaper would need to host speech of a political candidate the newspaper didn't like in the same amount it had used to disparage that candidate. While the Miami Herald brought the newspaper into the line by the action of the newspaper, Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705 (1977) held that the state could not force any citizen to host its motto. Or for the matter, any message. The State may not constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. Pp. 71717. Forcing a public web page to host advertisement or speech from any government - or under the threat of the government action - is compelled speech and violates the rulings of Miami Herald, Wooley and other cases. However, there is a little light for the government under PruneYard, Turner Broadcasting and Rumsfeld. However, all of them don't cut here: Turner Broadcasting was about a service provider for radio that did not host its own speech. PruneYard is a shopping center that doesn't host its own speech and is only useful in California as there is a California constitution issue. And Rumsfeld dealt with military recruitment, which always is special. A similar Florida law was deemed to be very likely unconstitutional by the (federal) Northern District of Florida (Injunction Text) Addendum A joint lawsuit by NetChoice &amp; CCIA was filed against Texas on 22nd September 2021 (Complaint), asking for a preliminary injunction. NetChoice puts its filings on their website. Further reading: Ken White - Make No Law podcast #11: Deplatformed Ken White - Section 230 Is The Subject of The Most Effective Legal Propaganda I've Ever Seen 01st December 2021 Update Indeed, the relevant parts of HB20 were put out of enforcement via injunction on December 1st, 2021, reasoning that: Social media platforms have a First Amendment right to moderate content disseminated on their platforms. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1932 (2019) (recognizing that “certain private entities[] have rights to exercise editorial control over speech and speakers on their properties or platforms”). Three Supreme Court cases provide guidance. First in Tornillo, the Court struck down a Florida statute that required newspapers to print a candidate’s reply if a 13 newspaper assailed her character or official record, a “right of reply” statute. 418 U.S. at 243. [...] In Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &amp; Bisexual Grp. of Bos., the Supreme Court held that a private parade association had the right to exclude a gay rights group from having their own float in their planned parade without being compelled by a state statute to do otherwise. 515 U.S. 557, 572– 73 (1995). [...] Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that California could not require a private utility company to include a third party’s newsletters when it sent bills to customers in Pac. Gas &amp; Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of California, 475 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1986). HB 20 compels social media platforms to significantly alter and distort their products. Moreover, “the targets of the statutes at issue are the editorial judgments themselves” and the “announced purpose of balancing the discussion—reining in the ideology of the large social-media providers—is precisely the kind of state action held unconstitutional in Tornillo, Hurley, and PG&amp;E.” Id. HB 20 also impermissibly burdens social media platforms’ own speech. Id. at *9 (“[T]he statutes compel the platforms to change their own speech in other respects, including, for example, by dictating how the platforms may arrange speech on their sites.”). For example, if a platform appends its own speech to label a post as misinformation, the platform may be discriminating against that user’s viewpoint by adding its own disclaimer. HB 20 restricts social media platforms’ First Amendment right to engage in expression when they disagree with or object to content. For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the State’ s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 23), is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, (Dkt. 12), is GRANTED. Until the Court enters judgment in this case, the Texas Attorney General is ENJOINED from enforcing Section 2 and Section 7 of HB 20 against Plaintiffs and their members. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), Plaintiffs are required to post a $1,000.00 bond. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ motion to strike, (Dkt. 43), is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT.
The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White &amp; Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen).
The right to free speech is a right that is guaranteed against the federal and state governments only. It is not a right that is secured against private individuals and corporations. It is also neither absolute nor unconditional, as there are a number of exceptions/limits. Alex Jones could not walk into your home and start "exercising free speech" and leave you with no recourse whatsoever to remove him from your home. If you don't consent to him being there, you may legally tell him to leave and have him removed by force if he fails to comply. Facebook etc. are the "homes" of the relevant corporations. They simply told Alex Jones to get out and go somewhere else. He retains his right to free speech; he simply never had a right to speak wherever he wanted. An always relevant XKCD.
The best course of action for Barr would be to file an objection to the subpoena in the proper court (probably the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) under or by analogy to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) (which governs disputes over subpoenas in civil cases in the federal courts), if he thinks that there are matters he cannot lawfully divulge or thinks it is improper to divulge even if they are not privileged, and to let a judge decide. Generally speaking, in a civil action, you can only object to a subpoena by following this process and Congress has increasingly used the civil lawsuit discovery process as a benchmark. Failure to file an objection with the proper court, or at least in a response to Congress by the date required in the subpoena to produce the materials, will generally constitute a waiver of the objections that might otherwise have been asserted to the subpoena. Simply not responding without explanation by the due date would be a pretty clear case of Contempt of Congress which is the basis for both a civil action and criminal contempt charges. For example, in the Lynch case, cited below, the Court stated with respect to information that was withheld without any claim of privilege: Failure to provide any grounds for withholding particular records does not comply with the order or enable the Court to resolve defendant’s privilege claims as to those documents. Accordingly, defendant must produce the material withheld without any proffered justification. This said, in any dispute between Congress and the Executive Branch there is always some uncertainty, and the courts strongly favor negotiation and conferral between the parties before bringing these matters to a head. A general discussion of Congressional subpoenas can be found here, recognizing, however, that while there are a variety of grounds for redaction asserted in the Mueller report case, "Executive Privilege" is not among them and so the special considerations that apply to an assertion of executive privilege do not apply. The authority of the judicial branch to resolve these issues has been upheld, for example, in the cases of United States v. Nixon (U.S. 1974) and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Lynch (D. D.C 2016) (both of which involved the more difficult scenario of an assertion of executive privilege in addition to the more ordinary assertions of privileges like the grand jury privilege). Not infrequently, the judge will review the unredacted material in camera (i.e. privately in chambers without showing it to the requesting party) to determine if the claim of privilege or other basis for redaction is really valid (e.g. maybe something that was redacted under the label grand jury testimony is not, in fact, grand jury testimony). But, there is case law to support the notion that Congress would have to demonstrate some specific reason why it doubts the accuracy of the assertions of the executive branch regarding redactions in this particular case to make it necessary for there to be an in camera review. In the Lynch case (which is a non-precedential opinion itself) the Court said: As for whether the redactions are what they purport to be, the Court notes that counsel for even the most disputatious parties are often called upon to trust each other, and that the judiciary relies regularly on declarations by the executive branch that matters redacted from FOIA productions are what they are described to be in the Vaughn index. See Loving v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that district court had not abused its discretion by relying on agency’s Vaughn index and declaration in determining whether a disputed document contained segregable portions); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The reviewing court may rely on the description of the withheld records set forth in the Vaughn index and the agency’s declaration that it released all segregable information.”). The Court has been provided with no reason to believe that its assistance is needed to verify for counsel for one branch of government assertions made in pleadings by an officer of the court representing another, equal branch of government. If in the end, a neutral is required to read each individual redaction and confirm that what the Department claims is simply a name or a telephone number is in fact a name or a telephone number, the parties can arrange for that on their own. These discretionary issues are likely to be influenced by the partisan leanings of the particular judges involved. Another question is to whom a subpoena could be directed. While attorney-general Barr is one possible person to whom it could be directed, Mueller himself is another possible person to whom a subpoena could be directed and that might lead to a more tractable counter-party in the lawsuit and might simplify some of the conflicts of interest present in a subpoena of the attorney-general himself that in criminal contempt cases is enforceable by his subordinates, i.e. U.S. attorneys, who are required by law to bring such charges.
Because the nations that made the list (which was modified at the time of the SCOTUS hearing) were selected based on their ability to provide the US with documentation for vetting of immigrants (or rather their lack of an ability), not religion, and the courts give the legislature (Congress) and the executive branch (President) wide discretion when matters of security are involved as they are related to foreign relations where the Judiciary have very limited powers. The specifics of the law which the Executive order modifies do not limit the President beyond a bona fide reason for which the selection was made. The court also ruled that the document contains no mention of any religion specifically or any matters pertaining to religion, and that several nations on the list have no Muslim Majority (they cite 2, but I am only aware of Venezuela being on the list). Additionally, the nation of Chad was removed from the list after their standards were brought up to scratch. In the original opinion, they did say that the campaign remarks were considered in that they pointed to the plaintiff's standing in the case (you need to show a potential harm is inflicted on you by the law in order to get a court case. Or in other words, I cannot ask the court to hear a case on rights of a vampire, because I am not a vampire) but found that the request to probe for malice in the minds of the President and his staff was not an area they could tread as there was a good reason for the law and several prominent Muslim Majority nations were not included. Basically, if the government could show that the order was made by some objective standards that neither favored nor disfavored a religion, then it is not a violation of the first amendment. For five of the justices, the government satisfied this requirement.* *Note, I am still reading through the ruling... my PDF of it keeps crashing and I lose my place.
Publishing source code is protected under the First Amendment. Therefore the US government cannot stop anyone from publishing open source software, and once it is available from a web site it is impossible to stop anyone else getting it. However any kind of support contract (such as this) or other commercial arrangement would fall under the definition of "trade" and be banned. Update in response to comments about ITAR. The USA International Traffic in Arms Regulations still cover cryptographic software. However any attempt to prosecute an open source project for publishing cryptographic software would run up against the First Amendment. In 2008 the 9th Circuit found that open source cryptographic software is covered under the First Amendment, and hence the use of ITAR to restrict its publication is unconstitutional. The US government declined to push this case to the Supreme Court, and no other similar cases have arisen since. In the meantime strong open source cryptographic software has been made widely available from within the USA without US government permission (Linus Torvalds is resident in the US). In theory the US government might launch a case against an open source project, win the appeal in another circuit, and hence create a circuit split which the Supreme Court would have to resolve. However they have now had over 10 years to try this, and the longer they wait the less likely such a case is to succeed.
In the united-states, the First Amendment right to freedom of speech generally protects an adult who contacts a minor seeking contact information for her parents. Although there are several exceptions to the right to free speech, this speech falls within none of them.