How to affirm when asked to swear In many jurisdictions, scenarios requiring an oath can alternatively require an affirmation. However, what happens if an official asks, &quot;Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?&quot; but, for religious reasons or otherwise, you'd rather affirm such, without coming across as difficult or making a scene? Instead of saying &quot;Yes,&quot; is a simple &quot;I affirm to do so&quot; possible, for example? (Also, I assume the answer would apply whether in court, getting a driver's license, or any other scenario in which you're put under penalty of perjury. If not, however, then how would the answer change?)
According to the Wikipedia article &quot;Affirmation&quot;, in the UK: A right to give an affirmation has existed in English law since the Quakers Act 1695 (An Act that the Solemne Affirmation &amp; Declaration of the People called Quakers shall be accepted instead of an Oath in the usual Forme; 7 &amp; 8 Will. 3 c. 34) was passed. The text of the affirmation was the following: &quot;I A.B. do declare in the Presence of Almighty God the Witnesse of the Truth of what I say&quot;.[1] The right to give an affirmation is now embodied in the Oaths Act 1978, c.19, which prescribes the following form: &quot;I, do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm&quot; and then proceed with the words of the oath prescribed by law, omitting any words of imprecation or calling to witness. ... The cause for such a right is exemplified R v William Brayn (1678). William Brayn was charged with the theft of a horse from Quaker Ambros Galloway. Brayn pleaded 'not guilty'. One witness testified that the horse was owned by Ambros Galloway, and another witness said that he [probably Galloway] bought it from Brayn. As Galloway was a Quaker, he would not, &quot;for conscience-sake&quot;, swear and so could give no testimony. The court directed the jury to find Brayn 'not guilty' for want of evidence and committed the Quaker &quot;as a concealer of Felony&quot; for &quot;refusing an Oath to Witness for the King&quot; bout the US, the same article states: The original 1787 text of the Constitution of the United States makes three references to an &quot;oath or affirmation&quot;: In Article I, senators must take a special oath or affirmation to convene as a tribunal for impeachment; in Article II, the president is required to take a specified oath or affirmation before entering office; and in Article VI, all state and federal officials must take an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution. Another reference appears in the Fourth Amendment, which specifies that all warrants must be supported by evidence given under oath or affirmation. Rule 63 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness’s conscience. and the notes to this rule read: The rule is designed to afford the flexibility required in dealing with religious adults, atheists, conscientious objectors, mental defectives, and children. Affirmation is simply a solemn undertaking to tell the truth; no special verbal formula is required. As is true generally, affirmation is recognized by federal law. “Oath” includes affirmation, 1 U.S.C. §1; judges and clerks may administer oaths and affirmations, 28 U.S.C. §§459, 953; and affirmations are acceptable in lieu of oaths under Rule 43(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Perjury by a witness is a crime, 18 U.S.C. §1621. Rule 6.10(b) of the Court Rules of North Dakota reads: (b) Affirmation. A person must be allowed to make an affirmation instead of taking an oath, by substituting the word &quot;affirm&quot; for the word &quot;swear&quot; and substituting the phrase &quot;under the pains and penalties of perjury&quot; for the phrase &quot;so help you God.&quot; Other stastes have similar ruless If asked by an official: &quot;Do you solemnly swear that ...?&quot; one may simply reply &quot;I so affirm&quot;. This has the same legal effect as &quot;I do&quot; while not making an oath in a religious sense.
This article goes into Miranda variants in some detail. The basic answer is that there are no SCOTUS-mandated formal requirements on the warning, and there exist up to 900 variants of the warning. The court only requires clear communication of those rights and appropriate waiver of them. The specific requirements, if any, are set by the jurisdiction. Since this is a constitutional issue, every jurisdiction must satisfy SCOTUS (and not the state's legislature). Some jurisdictions include a statement about providing a lawyer &quot;if and when you go to court&quot;, which was found in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 to not render the warning inadequate (although it suggests that you only get a lawyer when you go to court). This gives rise to variants in New Jersey, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Alaska (but apparently not in Indiana where the warning originally arose). The city of Seattle policy is stated here. When advising a person of Miranda, officers will include the following statements: “You have the right to remain silent.” “Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law.” “You have the right at this time to talk to a lawyer and have your lawyer present with you while you are being questioned.” “If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before questioning, if you wish.” Officers will establish that the suspect understands in one of two ways: By asking “Do you understand” after each of the four Miranda warnings, or By asking, “Do you understand each of these rights?” after reading all the warnings. Officers may then begin asking questions. If the arrestee makes a comment that causes the officer to believe that the arrestee might be requesting an attorney, officers will ask the arrestee to confirm, with a “yes” or “no” answer, whether the arrestee is requesting an attorney. There is no verbatim text that must be strictly adhered to, and the officer just has to &quot;include the statements&quot;. The following section speaks of including an additional clause when &quot;reading&quot; Miranda to juveniles, but the previous section does not say that you have to literally read the warning from a card. Analogously, pattern jury instructions are theoretically read verbatim from a script, and yet they are not (always?, ever?) transcribed into the record exactly as dictated by the jury instruction committee. In general, verbatim language is not legally required, especially in speech.
The IRS requires taxpayers to swear under &quot;penalties of perjury&quot; to their statements and figures given concerning their income. Since obviously this constitutes a potential incrimination The privilege against self-incrimination applies to giving testimony that reveals that you have committed a crime, not to doing something prospectively in a way that does not violate criminal laws. The solution is that you may truthfully report the amount of income that you have on your tax return. Ordinarily, the information that you had a certain amount of income, without a specific description of its source, would not in and of itself be incriminating. So, it is not &quot;obvious that this constitutes potential incrimination[.]&quot;, at least in the general case. There might be some circumstance in which merely filling out the information on a tax return required by law and signing it under penalty of perjury would be incriminating, although this is far more narrow that your question suggests. In those circumstances, the solution would be to file an unsigned tax return accompanied by a disclaimer stating that you are not signing it under penalty of perjury as it would be potentially incriminating for you to do so would on a signed and attached explanation that explicitly claims the 5th Amendment privilege. There is actually an IRS form for doing that or similar things on: IRS Form 8275. This would result in serious civil tax penalties, but would probably protect you from a criminal tax law violation (at least for the failure to file offense, not necessarily from the failure to pay offense).
Willfully telling an untruth or making a misrepresentation under oath is perjury; the reason you do so or the substance of it is irrelevant. It is the act of perjury itself that is an offense and led to the impeachment.
It does matter if you invoke your right to silence. First, if you do, that affects what police can do (they have to stop interrogating you). Second, it plays a role in &quot;adoptive admissions&quot;. If the police are asking you questions (you are not under arrest) and they make some statement that implies that you committed a crime, your silence can be used against you: it can be taken to be a form of admitting that you committed the crime. The premise is that if they imply that you murdered X, such an accusation if false would be so outrageous to a reasonable, innocent person that they would protest, therefore your lack of protest (denial) is tantamount to a confession. However, you can protect yourself by preemptively invoking your right to silence. See Salinas v. Texas: a witness who “ ‘desires the protection of the privilege . . . must claim it’ ” at the time he relies on it... the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” not an unqualified “right to remain silent.” Since any right can be waived, at any time, there is no magic expression that you can utter that nullifies a future waiver of a Constitutional right. The closest that you can come is asserting that you hereby exercise your right to an attorney and that you will not speak until you have consulted with your attorney (then you better shut up). Lawyering up only prevents them from further interrogating you. Don't hedge: say &quot;I am asserting my right to silence and refuse to speak without a lawyer&quot;. &quot;I think I should...&quot; is not a definitive assertion of your rights. If you are (briefly) stopped, police may ask if they can search you or your property. If they have a warrant or probable cause, there's really no point in saying anything. In the case that consent is required, you just have to remember to not consent, and it would not be a bad idea to explicitly deny consent. Each and every time they ask. The same with their statement &quot;It would really help us if you would come to the station to answer a few questions&quot;. If you are under arrest, then you have to go with them: ask &quot;Am I free to go?&quot;. You can say &quot;I do not consent to any search&quot;. Your proposed declaration of rights is pretty vague. Exactly what rights are you talking about? Your right to freedom of religion? Your right to bear arms? Your right to not have to quarter soldiers in your house? Your right to an education? Many detainee statements have been found by the courts to be ineffective because they were unclear. You could give it a shot and see if the Supreme Court accepts your &quot;universal assertion of rights&quot; as effectively invoking your specific 4th and 5th amendment rights. Unless you have something in mind (like, the 6th amendment), the most effective statement is a very specific one. Silence, lawyer, no search.
The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court.
First, no, given the wording of the question: &quot;by demanding identity first&quot;. US courts have never held that citizens must immediately comply with non-emergency orders free of back-talk. Let's assume that the refusal is conditional: &quot;I won't comply until you show me your ID&quot;. In most (?) jurisdictions, there is no obligation imposed on police to show ID, though I am excluding home searches. There is a policy requirement in Seattle (§7) that Employees may use a Department-issued business card that contains their name and serial number to satisfy the request for the information. Employees will also show their department identification card and badge (sworn) when specifically requested to do so. Exception: Employees are not required to immediately identify themselves if: An investigation is jeopardized A police function is hindered There is a safety consideration Massachusetts has a law saying that &quot;Such identification card shall be carried on the officer's person and shall be exhibited upon lawful request for purposes of identification&quot;. In the domain of search and seizure law, the court reasoned in Doornbos v. Chicago, regarding a seizure by plainclothes police that Absent reasonable grounds to think that identification would present an unusual danger, it is generally not a reasonable tactic for plainclothes officers to fail to identify themselves when conducting a stop. The tactic provokes panic and hostility from confused civilians who have no way of knowing that the stranger who seeks to detain them is an officer... it is usually unreasonable for a plainclothes officer to fail to identify himself when conducting a stop or frisk As you can see, this identification requirement is tied to constitutional search and seizure limits for which there is voluminous case law regarding what is &quot;reasonable&quot;. The scenario that you propose is fairly far from the kind of case identified in Doornbos: is the order from a uniformed officer in a police vehicle? That seems to be what you're describing. Now we must inquire as to the legality of the order. Picking on Washington state law, RCW 46.61.015 requires that No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any duly authorized flagger or any police officer or firefighter invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. RCW 46.61.021 requires a person driving to stop for a LEO, and to identify himself: failure to comply is a misdemeanor. There is no statutory provision that a person can refuse to obey these (or similar sections in the motor vehicle title) until the officer provides ID. A police officer (in Washington: and I suspect any other state) does not have unrestricted authority to give people orders, there are specific statutory circumstances giving police the power to order people to do things. Obstructing a police officer is a crime, but obstructing an officer is where one &quot;willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties&quot;, and not &quot;doesn't cooperate&quot;. There is a provision, RCW 9a.76.030 where A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer and the &quot;knows to be a peace officer&quot; clause implies either that the officer is uniformed, or has provided identification. Finally, we have &quot;failure to disperse&quot; when a person congregates with a group of three or more other persons and there are acts of conduct within that group which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any person, or substantial harm to property; and (b) He or she refuses or fails to disperse when ordered to do so by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law. These laws are attuned to emergency needs, thus outside the penumbra of your scenario. In short, the primary question must be, when can police lawfully give you an order that you must obey, which narrows the matter down to traffic-related matters. The seizure must be reasonable: it is reasonable to require a person to stop for a uniformed officer. Reasonability does not entail that all officers must produce ID when effecting a seizure, but this may be the case with plain-clothes officers. Even when in Seattle with a departmental policy requiring officers to identify themselves, an officer's failure to identify does not render the seizure illegal.
An example is that a person eventually convicted of a crime has made a false statement in pleading &quot;not guilty&quot;. 1001a would compel confessions, because you cannot legally conceal a material fact. In a judicial proceeding, the analog that prevents certain kinds of &quot;lying&quot; is the law against perjury, which is much stricter than the broad language of 1001.