Procedure if two separate district courts issue nationwide and contradictory injunctions? One issue that has not been conclusively decided by the courts is the constitutionality of DACA protections. For example, the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether or not DACA is constitution. Since President Obama created DACA through regulations that complied with the Administrative Procedure Act. However, the Trump administration might not have complied with this act and as a result a preliminary injunction was issued against the repeal of DACA. However, other state attorney generals, such as the Attorney General of Texas have argued that DACA is itself unconstitutional. The Attorney General of Texas filed this lawsuit in a different district court from the lawsuit seeking to keep DACA. Suppose both lawsuits successfully obtained a preliminary injunction in their favor. One injunction requires the United States Federal Government to continue accepting applications for DACA relief (and if the applicant complies with procedures offer them relief from enforcement). While the other injunction requires the Federal Government to stop offering DACA protections. Suppose that both District Courts require that their orders have nationwide effect and that a stay of the injunction is not issued immediately or by the circuit court with appellate jurisdiction (and maybe the courts are in separate circuits). With the current Supreme Court standing at 8 justices, it is plausible that the justices could be split 4-4 on the issue of granting a stay. What is the legal position the Federal Government must take (assuming the Federal Government wants to comply with orders of the judicial branch as much as possible and does not assert its authority as a separate branch of the Federal Government)? Would the government be required to continue DACA or must it stop the program? Currently this has not occurred, but I imagine it is possible for this situation to occur at some later point in time or if by chance some things change in the future.
Resolving Conflicting Injunctions This happens from time to time, frequently in cases involving child custody with dueling cases in different states, at least until recent legislative changes (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act), which set forth clear rules calculated to leave only one court with jurisdiction to enter orders in almost all cases. The very first case I worked on as a student in a law school clinical program involved this kind of jurisdictional standoff. There is no fool proof way to prevent this, although parties will often forcefully ask the court not to have contradictory injunctions imposed upon them, and courts will often take these arguments seriously. And, the parties will usually parse the language of each order to determine how both can be possibly be complied with at once. Also, impossibility is a defense to being held in contempt of court for violating an injunction, and this tends to favor honoring the first entered of contradictory injunctions since the first is not impossible to comply with but complying with subsequent orders may be impossible. When push comes to shove and the appeals in each case don't change the result, usually the case keeps going up the appellate court ladder on an emergency basis in each contradictory case until it the deadlock is resolved, or until a court with jurisdiction over all courts involved intervenes. But, as you note, there is no definitive way to prevent the highest court in the land from having a deadlock (which can happen even when there are an odd number of judges if a judge recuses). In many state supreme courts, and in appellate courts outside the U.S., deadlock in a tie breaker court is often avoiding by having a process to appoint lower court judges a substitute judges in a higher court when there is a potential for deadlock in that court. But, the U.S. Supreme Court has no such process. The Ongoing Policy Debate There is on ongoing debate in federal public law practice (i.e. in cases in which the government is a party) over whether national injunctions of the type that have been issued in the DACA case and the Muslim ban cases in the current administration are proper, or not on jurisdictional grounds (but, the propriety of the injunction is generally not a defense to being held in contempt of court for violating it). These injunctions bind the United States government, which is a single entity over which the court has jurisdiction, but the dispute is over whether these injunctions should be allowed to benefit non-parties who are similarly situated to those before the court (the prevailing rule at this time), or whether the parties seeking an injunction against the United States government only have standing to obtain relief for themselves personally, in the absence of a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which has procedures calculated to protect the interests of members of a class who are not personally before the court. The &quot;conservative&quot; position is that &quot;national&quot; injunctions against the United States should not be allowed outside of class actions, which would reduce the potential risk of conflicting orders, but would allow the United States government to proceed with conduct that had already been judicially determined elsewhere in a case against the same defendant to be unacceptable and illegal conduct. The status quo of allowing &quot;national&quot; injunctions is also important to allow a court to have the power to grant relief to individuals whose current location is not known perhaps, for example, because the United States government has concealed this information. For example, a national injunction allows a district court to grant relief to a parent whose child has been removed from the parent improperly to an unknown location in the juvenile immigration detention system for which the U.S. government lost track of 1,400+ juveniles due to poor record keeping.
According to this CNBC story the case brought by members of Congress (Blumenthal v. Trump) was dismissed for lack of standing by a three-judge panel at the Circuit Court level. As reported earlier a federal district court judge had allowed the case to proceed. This 2017 Politico story reported on the dismissal of an earlier suit on the same issue, also for lack of standing. The AP story &quot;Supreme Court ends Trump emoluments lawsuits&quot; reports that in Jan 2021 the US Supreme Court dismissed remaining cases on the issue as moot, since Trump was no longer President. In the piece &quot;Supreme Court Ducks an Opportunity on Trump Emoluments Cases&quot; by Ciara Torres-Spelliscy of the Brennan Center, the author reviewed the history of the constitutional provisions, expressed the view that rump had violated them, and suggested that new legislation should be passed to deal with any future cases of a similar sort. So far as I know, no such legislation has been introduced to date.
Lower courts are only bound by US Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law once the US Supreme Court releases an opinion on an issue. Until that point in time, the US Supreme Court is officially undecided on an issue. You ask: if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? This is commonplace. For many matters, the US Supreme Court is undecided (new statutes, novel circumstances, etc.). In order for a matter to even get to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is often the case that a lower court ruled on a question for which the Supreme Court had not previously announced its opinion. I know you are asking about the circumstance where the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal but has not yet issued judgment. However, with respect to precedential value, it is the same until the time of judgment.
Overview An executive order cannot make new law. However, most executive orders are based on powers granted by law to the President, or to some executive agency or department. Others are based on laws that come under the general power and duty of the President to &quot;take care that the laws are executed&quot; and announce some policy for how laws will be interpreted and enforced. Announced mandates In the case of the mask and vaccine mandates announced but not yet issued by the Biden administration, they apparently claim to exercise powers granted under various laws, particularly the Occupational Health and Safety Act. It is likely that once such regulations are formally issued they will be challenged by those opposed to such mandates. If they are upheld, (or are somehow not challenged and thus assumed to be valid) they will carry the force of the laws under which they are issued, and thus the Supremacy Clause will apply to those laws, and to the orders as ways to enforce those laws. Other Precedents The question says: Currently, the only precedent to enforce fines and vaccine mandates (at a state level) that I am aware of is a 1905 decision by the Supreme Court, Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197 US 11 (1905)), where it allowed Massachusetts to fine an individual for refusing to comply with vaccine mandates set by the state. This is not quite correct. Jacobson is the leading case on this issue, but there have been some others. In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) the US Supreme Court held that a local ordinance mandating vaccinations for school attendance did not violate federal constitutional rights, citing Jacobson and calling the matter settled law. Note that the ordinance in Zucht applied to both public and private schools without exception. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) the Supreme Court opinion included (at 166) the statement that: Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state, as parens patriae, may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243. The catalogue need not be lengthened. It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare, and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction. (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted) Prince v. Massachusetts was a child labor case, not a vaccination case, and the above comment was technically obiter dictum (not binding precedent). But because of it Prince has several times been cited in later vaccination cases alongside Jacobson and to show that Jacobson is still good law. Note that Prince, like Jacobson and Zucht, was a case supporting state law against a 14th amendment challenge. Supremacy Clause An Executive Order that is not backed by any valid law would not be the &quot;Supreme law of the land&quot; under the supremacy clause, and might well be simply held invalid for lack of Presidential authority to issue it, depending on the subject of the order. But orders claiming to make law on the President's own authority are quite rare. Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the steel seizure case) invalidated such an order. In that case the President not only did not have the backing of a specific law, but failed to follow the procedures set out in a relevant law. In Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer the concurring opinion by Justice Jackson has proved influential in later cases and in later congressional drafting of laws. The key passage of that opinion starting at 343 U. S. 635 reads: Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government, as an undivided whole, lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather than on abstract theories of law. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. Into which of these classifications does this executive seizure of the steel industry fit? It is eliminated from the first by admission, for it is conceded that no congressional authorization exists for this seizure. That takes away also the support of the many precedents and declarations which were made in relation, and must be confined, to this category. Can it then be defended under flexible tests available to the second category? It seems clearly eliminated from that class, because Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field, but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure ... Would a vaccine mandate or mask mandate that goes beyond any law passed by Congress fall into Jackson's &quot;zone of twilight&quot;? In the absence of a court ruling, no one can say.
No, it does not follow. Mostly, because that's not what is actually happening with sanctuary cities. First, there is no actual definition of a sanctuary city, neither in the law or, more specifically, in immigration policy. Here's what happens in sanctuary cities. Section 1373(a) of Title 8 of US Code states that local and state governments are prohibited from enacting laws or policies limiting the exchange of info re: citizenship w/Department of Homeland Security. So if you work for the local Department of Human Services, and someone shows up to sign up for public benefits and you find out they are undocumented immigrants, if you wanted to report that person to ICE, no government could forbid you from doing so. Conversely, the federal government can't force you to report that undocumented immigrant. Likewise, the detainers that ICE issues, which are requests to the local government to inform them when a given undocumented immigrant is to be released, are not mandatory. If that action is taken, the jail can hold the undocumented immigrant up to 48 hours for ICE to act. If ICE doesn't act, the person must be let go. A report by the DOJ's inspector general looked at a random sampling of cities that receive federal funding and found that each of them had certain policies in place that limited cooperation with ICE and ICE's detainers. However, the same inspector general found that Section 1373 is not applicable to detainers. In sum, the IG determined that, although there were no explicit policies forbidding state or local employees from cooperating with ICE, non-compliance with detainers in some jurisdictions at the very least were "inconsistent with ... the intent of Section 1373." Legal arguments abound. One argument is that the administration is interpreting Section 1373 too broadly in order to include both types of sanctuary cities. Another is that Section 1373 violates the anti-comandeering doctrine of the 10th Amendment. I guess the real answer is, "stay tuned," but for now, no it does not follow that it is a violation of federal law for a government official to declare a state/city to be a "sanctuary city."
The president has the power to issue an executive order, which must either be supported by the Constitution or by some act of Congress. If a president were to apparently overstep his authority, someone would have to sue him and the Supreme Court would decide whether he did have that authority. For example, Truman thought that he had the power to nationalize steel mills, but Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 determined otherwise. There have been few cases where courts have overturned an executive order. Matters of immigration are not outside of the executive power of POTUS. Obama issued a dozen orders aimed at stopping deportation of illegal immigrants. The matter ended up in SCOTUS, which tersely declined to overturn the lower court ruling (that he didn't have that power). Congress can restate the law to clearly take away a power (assuming it is not a constitutional power, and immigration is not a constitutional power / duty). In this sense, the president can "write laws" the same way that various federal regulatory agencies can "write laws", or how courts can "write laws". The subject matter of such laws is limited, so while an act of Congress is limited only by the Constitution, executive-branch law has further underlying statutory limits. Only Congress can unilaterally pass a statute: the power to write law is available to pretty much all branches of government. As for immigration statutes, 8 USC 1182 provides the general hook for such a presidential decree – the code would require major rewriting to clearly take away that power. It has to be remembered that Congress creates laws and cannot enforce them: the executive branch enforces them. Any law whatsoever restricting immigration therefore involves the president.
The validity of the NDA is not an easy question, but a related one is more clear. A lawyer in the U.S. in most states is not permitted to threaten criminal or administrative action (e.g. reporting someone to immigration or tax officials), to gain advantage in a civil case. You can unilaterally bring criminal charges or take administrative action, but it is deemed to be unethical and against public policy to refrain from bringing criminal charges or taking administration action to gain civil advantages. An NDA of the type described arguably violated the same public policy and might be invalidated as a result. Put another way, there is a privilege to make certain reports to public officials without legal consequences and such an NDA might violate that privilege. Some of these privileges found in what are called "whistle blower" statutes specifically prohibit this kind of agreement as to some specific kinds of illegal conduct, but not others. There isn't a general rule. This said, it is not black and white. For example, a private NDA can't prevent someone from testifying under subpoena, but can prevent someone from voluntarily testifying in the absence of a legal compulsion to do so such as a subpoena. Suppose a woman is sexually assaulted at work, and is given an NDA to sign. Can the company legally require her not to disclose the conduct of an illegal activity? I can imagine this example coming out different ways in different jurisdictions. For example, some states have a legal duty (rarely enforced) that requires people to report felonies, and an NDA in this case would contradict that affirmative legal duty, while others do not. Another source of gray in the analysis is that there is a difference between not reporting a sexual assault that actually happened, and, as part of a larger settlement, executing an affidavit stating under penalty of perjury and under oath that a sexual assault didn't happen. The first is potentially an NDA that is void as a matter of public policy. The other, in principle, is a settlement that the person signing the affidavit can only enter into if it is true. There is nothing, in general, wrong, about requiring someone to confirm that certain representations are true as part of a business transaction or contract and allowing the contract to go forwards only if certain facts are true. The gray gets deeper, because whether a sexual assault happened or not is not always a subjectively black and white clear issue of pure fact. (It is subjective because an affidavit or affirmation is made to the best of the declarant or affiants' knowledge and belief, not as a matter of objective fact.) For example, someone may not have perfect memory of what happened, or there could be doubt over the question of whether the perpetrators acted recklessly (the Model Penal Code intent requirement for sexual assault) or merely with criminal negligence (which would not be sexual assault under the Model Penal Code). A statement made under oath about whether a sexual assault happened to the best of your knowledge, thus, might be a mixture of factual issues (A penetrated B at a certain date and time) and legal or not perfectly factually known ones (A acted with X intent regarding consent during that act). So, in a case where there was some room to argue either way about how to characterize what happened and about what actually did happen, there might be some room for a settling party to make a non-perjured statement consistent with the settlement and then to agree not to a true NDA, but instead to not make statements which, if the affidavit is true, would be false. In a plea bargain in a criminal case, one can plead "no contest" without agreeing that the crime factually happened, but that isn't really possibly in the context of an affidavit about what really happened, with an NDA limited to not disclosing the incident since it was already agreed as a matter of sworn fact that there is nothing to disclose that rises the level of a crime.
At the federal level, employment discrimination as prohibited here is at its core a tort rather than a crime. Probably the most pertinent first part of the law is Subpart B, which encompasses procedures. The EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) may receive allegations of a violation, and there is a procedure for deciding on the merits of the case. After charges are filed, there is an investigation by the EEOC, which may include a public hearing. Based on the investigation, the commission may dismiss the charge (technical flaws in the complaint); they may issue a letter of determination to that effect if they find that there was no reasonable cause for the complaint. They can also encourage a negotiated settlement. In making this determination, the commission follows its own guidelines, as encoded in the regulations. So if the commission determines by its rules that there was a violation, the courts will generally defer to that finding unless the finding is contrary to what Congress said. If there is no dismissal or settlement, then they issue a determination that there is reasonable cause (§1601.21). Then there is a procedure to rectify unlawful practices, which includes the possibility of a conciliation agreement. Finally, starting at §1601.27, we get to the point that somebody might get their day in court. If the accused still refuses to relent on whatever point was at stake, the matter can go to trial: The Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent named in a charge not a government, governmental agency or political subdivision, after thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of a charge with the Commission unless a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission has been secured But also, the aggrieved can take the accused to court at any time. The allegation then must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.