Does the word &quot;allegedly&quot; shield from defamation claims? If Bob publicly says &quot;Rob killed Alice&quot;, Rob could sue (and win) Bob for defamation — unless Rob gets convicted for that crime. But if Bob instead says &quot;Rob allegedly killed Alice&quot; then Rob would have no defamation case — at least so long as Rob has been charged with that crime. This is how the media reports ongoing criminal cases. Does that magic of the word &quot;allegedly&quot; disappear when Rob has not been charged? In other words, can Bob always avoid defamation liability just by saying &quot;I allege Rob did that&quot; instead of just &quot;Rob did that&quot;, or does that work only when Rob is being prosecuted? (Any jurisdiction)
There is no magic about the word &quot;allegedly&quot;. &quot;Rob allegedly killed Alice&quot; simply means &quot;Someone said that Rob killed Alice&quot;. It implies that the person reporting this is not claiming that it is true or false, but just reporting what someone else has said. If in fact some person did say that, such a statement is true, and quite probably not defamatory. However, if the original claim is unreliable, and it is being repeated in a way that serves to lend it credibility, it could still be considered defamation by implication. If Rob has been charged, or accused by a credible source, or multiple such sources, reporting on that accusation will normally not itself be defamation. Saying &quot;I allege that Rob killed Alice&quot; is just saying that &quot;I claim that Rob killed Alice&quot; and might well be defamatory if Rob did not in fact do so. Again there is nothing magic about any particular word here. It is the overall meaning of the statement that makes it defamatory or not, as that meaning would be reasonably understood by readers or listeners. Any statement that will be understood as carrying a defamatory meaning may be an act of defamation. There is also nothing magic about Rob having been formally charged. Such a charge is a fact that can be freely reported on. Widespread or credible claims that Rob is the killer are also facts, and can also be reported. But if the only source is an anonymous vid on YouTube, with no supporting evidence, that is not a credible claim. Reporting it in a way that makes it sound far more credible than it is may cause people to believe the false accusation, and thus be defamatory. Again the overall meaning of the statement is important.
Defamation of public figures is governed by the "actual malice" standard: the person making the statement must either have known that it was false at the time they said it, or must have been acting with reckless disregard for the truth (meaning they had serious doubts that the statement was true at the time they said it). The First Amendment bars a public figure from winning a libel suit unless they demonstrate that the defendant fell in one of those categories, because any lesser requirement would discourage people from speaking on topics of public concern for fear that they might say something wrong and be sued for it. The standard was first applied for public officials in New York Times v. Sullivan, and later cases have extended it to public figures in general. If someone genuinely thinks Obama was born in Kenya, it is not libel for them to say that. Even though you could argue that any reasonable person should know that's wrong, it's not enough -- the defendant had to have known it was wrong or seriously doubted it. Even if your sole basis for claiming he was a gay prostitute is that you heard a rumor from a friend, if you actually believed them, you can say he was. You aren't required to check Clinton's book to verify a quote before repeating it; if you read it on a website and had no reason to think they were lying, you can say that the quote was in there. It is extremely difficult for a public figure in the United States to win a defamation lawsuit. This is the system working as designed; a public figure who wants to correct lies being told about them can put out the correct information (which is easier for them than for most people), which is preferable to government action (and libel judgments are government action, because they involve a government officer ordering you to pay someone else money and/or do and/or not do something).
He cannot enter a Guilty Plea until he has been charged with a crime. He would only be charged with a crime if the Prosecution believes they have enough evidence for a conviction. If they believe &quot;the true culprit is still out there&quot;, they would not arrest or charge or attempt to prosecute &quot;Bob&quot;. He can hire an attorney, and go on TV and say he is guilty, and beg to be prosecuted. The District Attorney (or similar Office) can simply respond, &quot;We are aware of the claims by Bob. At this time, we do not have enough evidence to support charging Bob with a crime. The investigation continues.&quot; Somewhat ironically, if they have substantial evidence that Bob is not the murderer, he can then be charged with Making a False Report.
My understanding is that defendants in Britain have to prove statements true by the preponderance of evidence, whereas in the U.S. the standard of evidence is "compelling" (a lower standard). This is not the case. Preponderance of the evidence can still be the burden of proof in the United States (in a civil libel case, although it must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal libel case). But, the difference is in what has to be proved. In Britain, it appears to be necessary to show that the statements are true in order to prevail. In the U.S., it is merely necessary to show in a case like this one (because it involves a matter of public concern) that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false, or with reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the statements made. A factual basis for believing the statements made to be true is a defense if the basis is at all reasonable, and is a complete defense if the factual basis for making the statement is disclosed and that is true or believed to be true by the speaker. It is not necessary for the statements to actually be true under U.S. law in a case such as this one, although actual truth is also a defense, which is not the case in all circumstances in U.K. law, and was not the case under the historical common law. Historically, defamation claims could be brought for statements critical of the monarch, for statements pointing out the natural infirmities of someone for example by mocking a person with low IQ, or for speaking ill of the dead. Furthermore, the U.S. has a variety of doctrines that make it hard to find that a false statement was made in the first place. For example, statements of opinion are not actionable and many of the alleged falsehoods in the McLibel case would be considered to be statements of opinion in U.S. law rather than statements of fact. Similarly, U.S. law does not require that statements be literally true, and instead recognizes that a defendant may have been engaged in using hyperbole, or may have gotten the gist of the accusation right even though strictly speaking the exact statement made is not technically true (e.g. someone might say that a company paid a "penalty" when it actually paid a settlement amount in a lawsuit seeking a penalty or paid an amount representing compensatory damages only rather than a penalty amount). In the same vein, it must be clear from the context of the statement that the person making it intended it to be received as a truthful account and not a mere parody or satire which was intended to be understood as false. For example, I couldn't sue someone who made a knowingly false statement that I assassinated King George V, who died several decades before I was born, or that I was telepathically controlling my uncle because I had a space alien parasite in my spine. Those claims are so absurd that they would be inferred to intended to be fictional on their face. Certain kinds of falsehoods (e.g. lying about one's military record in a a political campaign) are simply not actionable as a matter of law, no matter what, as the harm is not concrete enough. There is not, however, necessarily a defense under U.S. law to defamation liability if the defendant said many things that were true, but something else that would be defamatory in isolation. For example, even if everything else were true, if the defendant had also stated that the CEO of the Plaintiff was convicted of leading a Nazi concentration camp and killed millions of people, which would have been possible given the CEO's age, knowing perfectly well that the person with a similar name to the CEO who did so was someone else who died an untimely death decades ago, that statement might be defamatory and actionable (at least by the CEO personally and probably by the company if it was alleged that he was hired despite the fact that the company was aware of this circumstance).
The fuller statement is reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement. The reckless disregard for truth element in defamation claims requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant had serious doubts about the accuracy of the material. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968). A summary of the holding of this U.S. Supreme Court case explains its holding: Recklessness requires a higher level of proof than ordinary negligence, so the reasonable-care standard is not appropriate. The defendant cannot avoid liability by testifying that he had a subjective belief that the statements were true. Instead, the jury must find through its consideration of all of the relevant evidence that the statements had been made in good faith. There was no evidence in this situation that St. Amant had entertained serious doubts about the veracity of Albin's accusations. The absence of an effort to check their facts did not rise to the level of actionable conduct. This decision clarified the requirement of malice in defamation lawsuits regarding matters of public concern. It does not mean ill will but rather knowledge of the information's falsity or reckless disregard of the truth. This means that if you just make something negative up without having any idea whether it is true or not, you can be guilty of defamation if it turns out to be false under U.S. law. But, reliance on a third-party whom you believe to have a basis for their allegations and republishing the third-party's claim is not reckless disregard for the truth if you have any reason to believe that the third-party is credible. One doesn't have to have personal knowledge of the facts. One can also have a reasonable factual basis for having a belief without knowing for sure that something is true from evidence that would be admissible in court or would definitely prove the allegation. For example, if the chess player's moves were atypical of that chess player's previous plays and showed insights that player had not shown before, that would provide a basis for the statement that would overcome a reckless disregard claim.
Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice.
A lawyer is obligated to accurately state the law as stated in the jury instructions in closing argument (and also not to make a clear and deliberate misstatement of the facts presented at trials, and also not to express personal knowledge of the facts based upon anything other than what the jury has seen). But a certain amount of poetic license is allowed so long as the closing argument is not so misleading, as a whole, that it is likely to lead the jury astray. In this case, the prosecutor is alluding, with poetic license, to the idea that an aggressor or interloper can't assert self-defense. You can't &quot;look for trouble&quot; and then be shielded by that doctrine. A more full quote from that prosecutor makes that more clear: you lose the right to self-defence when you’re the one who brought the gun, when you’re the one creating the danger, when you’re the one provoking other people I have no opinion concerning whether his statement does or does not cross the line. I'm not sufficiently immersed in the case, and don't have enough context from having heard the closing arguments as a whole, to have a confident opinion on that point. If there is an acquittal we'll never know. If there is a conviction and appeal and this is an issue raised on appeal, we might find out. Opposing counsel has a right to object in closing argument if it goes too far, and appealing an argument that a closing argument is objectionable is challenging unless it is preserved with a timely objection at the time. Particularly if the prosecution makes a misstatement in their initial closing, rebutting it in the defense closing may be more effective than objecting. But, if the prosecutor makes a misstatement in a rebuttal period to which the defense can't offer a corrective statement, an objection may be wise in order to preserve an issue for appeal.
Yes Loss of income that is directly attributable to a loss of reputation can be part of the damages in a libel case. However, the plaintiff must prove the connection, must show that had the libel and the resulting loss of reputation not occurred, the income would have been received. This can be hard to establish. Testimony from specific people who say that they would have hired the plaintiff or done business with the plaintiff but for the libel is a common way to establish this kind of damage. Showing a sudden drop of income after the libel can also help such a case. And of course, the plaintiff must establish the other elements of libel: (in the US) a negative factual statement, communicated to others, the falsity of the statement, and a resulting loss of reputation.