Is there a definition of &quot;biological sex&quot; in U.S. law? According to MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT / SUBJECT: Military Service by Transgender Individuals: • Transgender persons with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria are disqualified from military service, except under the following limited circumstances: (1) if they have been stable for 36 consecutive months in their biological sex prior to accession; (2) Service members diagnosed with gender dysphoria after entering into service may be retained if they do not require a change of gender and remain deployable within applicable retention standards; and (3) currently serving Service members who have been diagnosed with gender dysphoria since the previous administration's policy took effect and prior to the effective date of this new policy, may continue to serve in their preferred gender and receive medically necessary treatment for gender dysphoria. • Transgender persons who require or have undergone gender transition are disqualified from military service. • Transgender persons without a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria, who are otherwise qualified for service, may serve, like all other Service members, in their biological sex. (emphasis mine) So this seems to rely heavily on one's biological sex, but a US legal definition of biological sex is not something that's easy to find online. Is there one at all? If so, what's the text?
I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.
germany Is there any act of husband or wife which can be considered as rape? The paragraph for sexual offences is §177 StGb. Obviously there are nuances between those offences, not everything is &quot;rape&quot;, but all of it is illegal. To answer your question, yes, the same acts that are considered rape when they are not husband and wife. While marriage had been an exception, this was considered archaic by many and this exception was removed in 1997: Vergewaltigung in der Ehe ist seit Juli 1997 strafbar. Mit dem 33. Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz wurde das Merkmal außerehelich aus dem Tatbestand der Vergewaltigung, § 177 StGB, gestrichen, sodass seitdem auch die eheliche Vergewaltigung als ein Verbrechen geahndet wird. Translation: Marital rape has been punishable since July 1997. With the 33rd Criminal Law Amendment Act, the characteristic &quot;extramarital&quot; was removed from the definition of rape, § Section 177 of the Criminal Code, so that since then marital rape has also been punished as a crime. There is no mention of how consent is to be expressed or even that it needs to be expressed explicitely.
The only real answer is that the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the constitution, and specifically the argument that the 13th Amendment prohibits a draft for compelled military services has totally rejected that argument. For many years now the US has not used a draft, and it is obviously possible for the US to have an enduring and powerful military without any draft, which was perhaps not apparent to the Justices in 1918. A draft had been common in this country from the colonial period, through the Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In reaction to the problems during the Vietnam War, and the great opposition to any draft at that time, the US has not used a draft since, although it retains a legal requirement to register for a possible draft, and the legal authority to impose one should it be thought wise. Note that this was not because of the 13th Amendment. Note also that compelled service by the citizens (or residents) in a locality, particularly to fight fires and floods, when the usual forces are inadequate to that end, has been commonly used. Such compulsory service has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th Amendment. Also, as mentioned in comments, citizens can be compelled to do jury duty, which could in theory be considered &quot;involuntary servitude&quot; but has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th amendment. The answer by Trish (now deleted) thoroughly described the many differences between a slave and a drafted soldier. Still, drafted military service might be thought to be a form of involuntary servitude. But the Court (and the laws and other courts as well) have not treated it as such. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) the Court thought the idea that compulsory military service constituted involuntary servitude was so wrongheaded that it thought a very brief mention sufficient to refute this contention. It wrote (at 245 U. S. 390): Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement. It is clear from the text of that opinion that the justices thought that the existence of a power to draft soldiers was essential to the implementation of the constitutional power (article I section 8): To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; The opinion discusses the history of compelled military service in the United States, in the colonies before there was a United States, and in Great Britain before that. The opinion says that: Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right of the government to compel it. and Further, it is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. One may disagree, but that is the law of the land as interpreted by the final body authorized to make such interpretations, the Supreme Court, and it remains good law today.
The law upheld by the decision is a New York law, and thus only applies in the state of New York. Its current text reads in relevant part: No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the state who is... Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education permitting such employment. The citizenship requirements of this subdivision shall not apply to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed whose immigration status is that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and who would otherwise be eligible to serve as a teacher, or to apply for or receive permanent certification as a teacher, but for the foregoing requirements of this subdivision. The last sentence of that will no longer be effective starting Nov 30 2022. So, this law only says they are prohibited in New York public schools. And even then, they are allowed if they are applying to be a citizen, if they are hired pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education, or (until 2022) if they are a lawful permanent resident of the US. Other states may have other laws, of course.
There is a report about a male-to-female transgender woman here: http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/lawreport/2017-06-27/8651398#transcript She managed to do the following: 1. While legally being a male, she got a preliminary passport as a woman so she could travel to Thailand, have an operation, and not run into trouble returning with a male passport and a female body. 2. While legally still being male, but with a female body, she married a woman in Australia. That was fine because legally she was male. 3. She has received a passport as a female. 4. She was refused a change of her birth certificate as long as she is married. So the current state is: She is (in fact, biologically) a woman. She is married to a woman in Australia. That marriage is perfectly legal, however, it is officially a marriage between a man and a woman. She has a woman's passport. The Australian government cannot and doesn't want to do anything to make her marriage illegal. BUT she cannot change her birth certificate without getting divorced first, and if she got divorced and changed her birth certificate, she couldn't remarry the same woman, or any other woman.
At the federal level, employment discrimination as prohibited here is at its core a tort rather than a crime. Probably the most pertinent first part of the law is Subpart B, which encompasses procedures. The EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) may receive allegations of a violation, and there is a procedure for deciding on the merits of the case. After charges are filed, there is an investigation by the EEOC, which may include a public hearing. Based on the investigation, the commission may dismiss the charge (technical flaws in the complaint); they may issue a letter of determination to that effect if they find that there was no reasonable cause for the complaint. They can also encourage a negotiated settlement. In making this determination, the commission follows its own guidelines, as encoded in the regulations. So if the commission determines by its rules that there was a violation, the courts will generally defer to that finding unless the finding is contrary to what Congress said. If there is no dismissal or settlement, then they issue a determination that there is reasonable cause (§1601.21). Then there is a procedure to rectify unlawful practices, which includes the possibility of a conciliation agreement. Finally, starting at §1601.27, we get to the point that somebody might get their day in court. If the accused still refuses to relent on whatever point was at stake, the matter can go to trial: The Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent named in a charge not a government, governmental agency or political subdivision, after thirty (30) days from the date of the filing of a charge with the Commission unless a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission has been secured But also, the aggrieved can take the accused to court at any time. The allegation then must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.
Only in the “most unusual and extraordinary circumstances” &quot;conceivable&quot; Respect for the chain of command is central to the armed services. As a result, lower ranked officers generally cannot relieve a higher ranked officers of command. Instead, they must work through the chain of command, taking their complaints to their superior's superior. To do otherwise is usually considered mutiny. As far as I know, the only service that has made formal provisions for this is the Navy. This makes sense, given that ships at sea may be out of contact for extended periods. The Navy regulations involving a subordinate can relieve a superior of command are found in § 1088. Relief of a Commanding Officer by a Subordinate of Chapter 10: Precedence, Authority and Command of the US Navy Regulations, issued by the Secretary of the Navy. Here is what that sections says: In the “most unusual and extraordinary circumstances,” a commanding officer can be relieved only by the “next in succession to command.” The problem must be so “obvious and clear” that any “reasonable, prudent and experienced officer” could reach only a “single conclusion:” that leaving the officer in command would “seriously and irretrievably prejudice the public interests.” Unless it is a “undoubtedly impractical,” the subordinate cannot act “without the approval of…higher authority...” The subordinate can act only after “much careful consideration” and after an “exhaustive investigation of all the circumstances…” The decision “must be based upon…substantial evidence,” and supported by “the official views of others in a position to form valid opinions…” Any subordinate who relieves a superior will “bear the legitimate responsibility for…such action,” and “must be prepared to justify…” it.