Why is Miller&#39;s case titled R (Miller)? Why is Miller's case titled R (Miller)? R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union The meaning of R is Regina (Queen). This is confusing me. Wasn't the case brought by 'an individual(s) v the government'? Why is the title 'government (individual) v government'?
The Queen (or King) is not the government; she represents the State. The difference is often ignored by ministers, but is important particularly in constitutional cases. Miller began as Miller v Home Office, a judicial review case. When it became clear that the question was what powers the government actually had in a certain situation, the Supreme Court decided that constitutional points should be argued by, effectively, an amicus curiae on behalf of the state, with government lawyers defending their own viewpoint (and other interested parties intervening). This made it, in their view, a case of the state versus the government, with 'Miller' being either an acknowledgement that the applicant remained a party or a means of distinguishing this case from all the other "R. -v- Government" cases over the years, depending on your point of view.
Does this create precedent? NO This was a Crown Court case, only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal can set precedent which it did with similar circumstances in R v Hill 1989
As a matter of law, the Duchy is correct, because a superior court of record agreed, and dismissed the arguments made on the other side. The cited claims from Republic come from a case in the First-Tier Tribunal (EA/2010/0182) about whether the Duchy was a &quot;public authority&quot; for the purpose of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. The FTT said that it was, since either the Duchy or the Duke were carrying out certain functions of public administration (as the harbour authority for St Mary's Harbour on the Isles of Scilly), and whichever one it was, the Duke was in charge of the Duchy; and meanwhile, the Duchy appeared to have some elements of legal personality, as cited in the question above. This decision was appealed to the Upper Tribunal, The A-G for the Prince of Wales v the IC and Mr Michael Bruton [2016] UKUT 0154 (AAC), which disagreed as to the Duchy being a body with its own separate identity - see paragraphs 71-102 - and reversed the ruling below. The basic issue is that the Duchy of Cornwall was brought into being by a royal charter of 1337. It predates modern common-law or statutory developments about bodies corporate, income tax, corporation tax, and so on. It also precedes the not-exactly-modern developments of the limited scope of royal authority and the prerogative, norms of statutory construction, the Crown as separate from the royal person, and other apparatus of constitutional monarchy. It is true that it sits uncomfortably in the modern world, as a sui generis feudal creation that is not something we would create today. However, as a matter of law, the UT said that what counts is what the Duchy is, not what it ought to be. Figuring out the law means looking at the actual law as opposed to ancillary indications, such as what Duchy officers have said from time to time, or administrative actions of the Health and Safety Executive. Parliament has had the opportunity to consider the position of the Duchy several times and has so far declined to change it. The charter of 1337, which was deemed to be an Act of Parliament by a court case in 1606 (!), grants land and privileges to the Duke of Cornwall, whoever that might be from time to time, and with a reverter to the Crown when there is no Duke. The UT found that this &quot;creates something that has similarities to a trust, but without trustees&quot; (there was a nascent body of law relating to trusts in 1337, but it was nowhere near its modern flourishing). Unlike with the creation of the Duchy of Lancaster, this charter does not incorporate the Duchy as an entity in its own right - the &quot;Duchy&quot; is just a word used to describe the possessions of the Duke or King held under the charter. If it is a separate entity then that is not because of the charter. The UT examined various of the claims made in the FTT but rejected them, saying that &quot;such examples cannot create such an entity or body and each investigation of the submissions based on them that took place before me showed such statements or implications to be wrong (e.g. that the Duchy owns Highgrove was shown to be wrong by the production of the Land Certificate).&quot; It also rejected the idea that the people who administer the Duchy could be regarded as some form of partnership or unincorporated association, finding that they had not come together in that fashion. It said that therefore, the only remaining route to the Duchy being a corporation would be if the other primary legislation dealing with its management had created it as such by &quot;necessary implication&quot;. Those Acts, of 1844, 1863 and 1982, deal with accounting and management for the Duchy of Cornwall. From their context and content, the UT said that they seem to envisage the property in question as belonging to the Duke (not the Duchy) as &quot;the legal owner of the assets etc. comprising the Duchy estate&quot;, and that &quot;the relevant officers and employees work for the Duke, or the Duke’s guardian when he is a minor, or the Sovereign when there is no Duke, and not for an entity or corporation called the Duchy.&quot; Therefore: [T]he Duchy of Cornwall or the Duchy is no more than a name that has been used correctly to describe the possessions of the Duke of Cornwall (the Duchy estate), or to the Duke (or his title), or collectively and conveniently to describe the officers and persons who from time to time act for and on behalf of the Duke as the owner of the Duchy estate. Save to the extent that it is a reference to the Duke as a natural person the Duchy of Cornwall has no legal personality and is not a person, body or entity that has its own functions and powers or a separate identity of its own. Although this was not before the UT, it would seem to follow for tax purposes that if the Duchy is not a body corporate, then it is not liable for corporation tax under the Corporation Tax Act 2010 - see section 1121, which defines &quot;company&quot; for that and the companion Corporation Tax Act 2009. It also does not fall within section 443, &quot;Companies controlled by or on behalf of Crown&quot;, firstly because if it's not a company, then that section fails immediately, and secondly because &quot;Crown&quot; here refers to the Crown in the sense of governmental public functions, not the Queen (or her family members) personally.
There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.
england-and-wales - present day... Would the contents of the envelope be considered privileged? No Although it is possible to argue that the letter is a communication to the lawyer (albeit by mistake) its purpose is not in relation to seeking or receiving legal advice, so it fails to meet the definition of legal privilege: There are two forms of legal professional privilege: Legal advice privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and their clients for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal advice. Litigation privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers, clients and third parties made for the purposes of litigation, either actual or contemplated. Would the lawyer be required to divulge it if asked by the police or in a court? Yes, No, Maybe If the lawyer is a suspect/defendant then there is no requirement to answer any questions whatsoever. Similarly, there is no obligation on a witness to answer questions unless a statutory provision has been triggered, such as the lawyer being given a Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 Disclosure Notice. Would he be required to report the matter to the police on his own? Yes Although there is no general requirement to report a crime (of this nature) to the police, the lawyer's profession is in the &quot;regulated sector&quot; which requires Suspicious Activity Reports to be submitted to the authorities: ... in respect of information that comes to them in the course of their business if they know, or suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that a person is engaged in, or attempting, money laundering... What difference, if any does it make that the client apparently did not intend to send these contents to the lawyer? None that I can see ETA The status of legal privilege in 1925 seems to have been the same as now, and this Wikipedia article, under the heading History offers this in support: The common law principle of legal professional privilege is of extremely long standing. The earliest recorded instance of the principle in English case-law dates from 1577 in the case of Berd v Lovelace ([1576] EngR 10 (&amp; Ors))
I don't see the contradiction. The ACLU article you link to explains that the Supreme Court found against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in principle in the 2018 ruling. Instead they found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had taken a dismissive attitude to the religion of the bakery's owners, and that in itself was religious discrimation and a violation of their First Amendment rights. I would say the 2018 ruling paved the way for the more recent one, which is why the article you link is titled: &quot;In Masterpiece, the Bakery Wins the Battle but Loses the War&quot;
The author of the passage is telling you where the quotation comes from, using a formal case citation. Lawyers usually don't use footnotes, endnotes, or parentheses to set off these citations. Case citations are a sort of shorthand developed by lawyers and judges over the past few centuries. The goal is generally to identify the name of the case, where to locate it, when it was decided, and what court decided it. Although there are a few different styles for formal citations to cases, you don't need to learn much to cover the basics for common types of cases. How to Read It Case name Brown v. Bd. of Educ. Case names usually have a "v." in the middle. Most of the time, the plaintiff goes on the left and the defendant goes on the right. But United States Supreme Court cases are different. Almost always, the Supreme Court reviews decisions of lower courts. They do so in an unusual way: the loser in the lower court asks the Supreme Court to change the outcome. Because the loser, more formally called the "appellant," is the one initiating proceedings in the Supreme Court, they go on the left. (To learn more, look into "writ of certiorari.") Since Brown is a Supreme Court case, we can guess that Brown lost in the lower court; and indeed that's what happened in this case. There are some arcane rules about abbreviating case names. The full name of this case is "Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka." If you're a law student, especially if you're on the law review, you get to learn all about these rules. If you're not, thank your lucky stars and try not to worry about it. Volume, reporter, and page number 347 U.S. 483 This is the bit you want to copy and paste to find the case. It's a lot like a URL: the idea is to clearly identify and locate a case. If you just want to find the case on the Internet, you don't need to understand how it works, and you can skip to the next section. These three parts tell you where to find the beginning of the case in a good old-fashioned printed book. You know those yellow books in the background of lawyer advertisements? That's what we're talking about. They're called "reporters," because they originally contained somebody else's reports of what judges said in court. Now, of course, the judges write down their own decisions; but the name stuck. The middle part, here "U.S.", identifies what set of books the case is in. You can learn something about the court from this: U.S. -- United States Reports -- United States Supreme Court F., F.2d, F.3d -- Federal Reporter -- Federal Courts of Appeal F. Supp -- Federal Supplement -- Federal District Courts (trial courts) The first number is what volume the case is in. This is the number printed on the spine of the book. The second number is what page the case begins on. Pinpoint citation , 495 When somebody wants to refer to a specific place in a case, they just put the page number or range right after the case page number. Remember, "483" was the page the case starts on; "495" is the page where the court actually say what we're talking about. If you flip to page 495 of volume 347 of the U.S. Reports, you'll find the quoted sentence. Remember: usually when you see two numbers separated by a comma, like "483, 495", the first one is part of the citation to the case as a whole, and the second one says what page to look at. Date and court name (1954) This part varies a lot between the different formal styles. In "Bluebook" style, which most law journals use, the year the case was decided is enclosed in parentheses, along with anything necessary to identify the court. Here, there's no court name, because we already know from the "U.S." that it's a Supreme Court case. For lower appellate cases, this might be "(9th Cir. 2005)", meaning that it's a decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals from 2005. Dealing with short citations You may also see something like "Id. at 495". This is a short citation; "Id." means "the last thing I cited." Go back to the nearest previous citation and look that up, going to the page cited. How to Use It (aka "tl;dr") The key to actually finding a case on the Internet is to copy the three numbers in the middle--the volume, reporter name, and page number. Here, "347 U.S. 483". Don't include any pincite after a comma; Google and many search engines may be clever enough to figure out what you mean, but they may not. There are a bunch of free online services providing case texts. I prefer Google Scholar; just paste the citation in, being sure to select "case law". Other people like CourtListener, FindLaw, and Justia.com. Commercial databases like Westlaw or LexisNexis have a lot more than just the case; most importantly, they list citations to the case. Your local public law library might have a terminal for one of the services that you can walk in and use. Be sure you're reading the actual case, not a summary or "annotation." This is especially true if you're writing an answer here on Law.SE. Many case summaries, especially for famous cases, are written for first-year law students; some of them are probably written by first-year law students! They're often helpful, but they focus on what the student needs to know for class, which often isn't what the case actually said. If I find you quoting a case summary as if it's "the law," I will not be very nice to you.
Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so.