Why haven&#39;t jurists corrected the ambiguity of &#39;civil law&#39;? Source: A Brief Introduction to Law in Canada (Mar. 2017). p. 39 Bottom. Box 2.3. &quot;Common Law&quot; and &quot;Civil Law&quot;: Alternate Meanings As we have seen, some legal expressions have different meanings in different contexts. It addition to referring to legal systems, the phrases &quot;common law&quot; and &quot;civil law&quot; can have other meanings, too. The phrase civil law is sometimes used as a synonym for private law—in other words, laws governing the relationship between persons (as opposed to public law, which deals with the legal relationship between a state and its individual members). Private and public law are generally recognized distinctions in both common law and civil law systems (except perhaps in some so-cialist countries). Therefore, somewhat confusingly, there could be a reference to civil law (where the context means private law) and its application in a common law jurisdiction. Adding to the confusion is the fact that in many civil law countries, their civil codes are primarily concert*d with private, or civil, law matters as opposed to public law ones. Criminal law and other areas of public law are frequently dealt with in other &quot;non-code&quot; statutes. However, the key features of civil law systems—such as the inquisitorial approach of judges and the lack of precedent—usually apply to these legislated areas as well. The phrase common law, apart from its reference to the legal system that originated in England. can also refer to decisions by courts exercising their &quot;common law&quot; jurisdiction (used in contradistinction to decisions by courts exercising their &quot;equitable&quot; jurisdiction), and to case law generally (used in contradistinction to legislation, or enacted laws). This polysemy of 'civil law' (e.g. our &quot;civil-law&quot; tag) can be easily untangled, if 'civil law' is restricted to mean only private law OR only continental law, or if 'civil law' is abandoned and overriden with the latter two terms. So why haven't jurists (lawyers and judges) done so?
The English language does not have the equivalent of the French Academy to officially regulate questions of spelling, grammar, punctuation and word meaning. Jurists don't control how the language is used and for the most point don't bother to try to do so. Also, context almost always clarifies this particular ambiguity.
Why do you expect different courts to determine different laws in the same way? The Czech and UK laws that implement the GDPR are necessary different because they are the products of different legislative and legal traditions and are written in different languages. The differences may be minor but they will exist. Particular cases will have different factual and legal nuances and be interpreted by different courts with very different judicial traditions. Czech courts set no precedents in UK courts and vice-versa. It’s no surprise that there will be different outcomes. Even jurisdictions with much closer legal traditions like US Federal Circuit Courts and Australian states often have divergent precedents on similar (or the same) legislation.
tl;dr No, it won't be a viable defense. Background Touch has an established interpretation at common law. The common law is judge-made law. If an offense involving touch existed at common law, then the meaning of touch is "defined" by the judicial opinions themselves. As the comments have noted, you'll be able to find hundreds of years worth of opinions where judges have, by example, determined what qualifies as touching. Putting your hand on someone, yes. Spitting on someone, yes. Blowing from a distance, no. These examples make up the common law definition of touch. But how, you may ask, would the common law evolve to include new information? The answer is clear. Say Jill purposely hits Jack in the face with a shovel. When appearing before the judge, she says, "we have a new understanding of atomic proximity, so technically the atoms in the shovel never made contact with the atoms in Jack!" The judge will say, "that's interesting, but it seems irrelevant to what we're trying to accomplish with the law: Jack still had to go to the hospital. Judgment for Jack." Now the common law has incorporated the new information (...at Jill's expense). Touch isn't defined at the atomic level when interpreting a statute. Some offenses are defined, not by judges, but by statutes enacted by legislatures. If the language in the statute is ambiguous, courts have to interpret its meaning. This is often done by looking at the purpose of the statute or by looking at the plain meaning of the language. Statutory interpretation: purpose Where a court does not employ the plain meaning approach, it will often look for evidence of the drafter's intent. In this case, the court would ask what the purpose of a law like battery is. They'd probably conclude it has to do with preventing harm and offense. In fact, they probably included things like that in the statute itself. So they'd wonder if defining contact at an atomic level would help to prevent harm and offense; that seems unlikely. In so doing, the court may analyze the legislative history. It may look at events that happened around the time the law was enacted: did the legislature propose it because people were hitting each others' faces with shovels? It might even appeal to the state of the common law at the time the statute was enacted for the proper definition. Statutory interpretation: plain meaning First, it might help to look at an example from District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). There the Court was tasked with interpreting some Second Amendment text. In doing so it said, "we are guided by the principle that '[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.' Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings." Id at 576-77. Statutory interpretation also makes use of this plain meaning approach. As stated by the Court, "where the language of an enactment is clear, and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended.” United States v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929); see also Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). This is bolstered by the practice of explicitly defining words with technical meanings in a definitions section of the statute. For example, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code employs a number of terms in a technical sense, and 9-102(a) defines 81 words that are intended to take on a technical meaning. Another example is the Illinois battery statute, 720 ILCS 5: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual or (2) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature with an individual. The statute doesn't have a technical definition for "physical contact." So under plain meaning we'd construe it in its common sense. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary (a favorite of U.S. courts) defines touch as, "to bring a bodily part into contact with especially so as to perceive through the tactile sense." That definition implies that tactile sensation is what triggers (2), not any atomic concept of proximity. If you're interested in further reading, proper interpretation of the term "physical contact" came up in the insurance contract setting in Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Busby, 219 Cal. App. 4th 876 (2013). united-states
In legal systems descending from English law, the term equity refers to an aspect of those legal systems that has origins distinct from positive law and the traditional common-law writs. Equity traces its origin to the Court of Chancery. Much of what follows can be found in Snell's Equity. Equitable remedies (equitable relief) are those remedies available through rules and principles of equity, today applied by courts of unified jurisdiction. Some distinctions Equity as part of law: equity is certainly part of law in the sense that it is part of the legal system, applied by courts, and can result in equitable remedies. &quot;Equity in this sense has been a feature of many legal systems from ancient times&quot; (Snell's Equity, §1-002). Equity versus law: equity is distinct from &quot;law&quot; (or common law) in the sense that equitable remedies are meant to supplement &quot;legal rights.&quot; The common law and equity operated in their own areas of specialisation. Even in cases where common law and equitable rules touched on the same subject matter, the rationale of equitable intervention was not to conflict with the common law. The Chancellor's jurisdiction over the parties was in personam and enforceable by specific remedies, unlike those of the common law which were generally for the orders for the payment of money. (Snell's Equity, §1-012). Legal and equitable remedies: &quot;The division between legal and equitable remedies is an accident of history which cannot be explained in any other terms. No defining characteristic sets the remedies developed in Chancery, as a class, apart from the remedies developed by the common law courts.&quot; (Snell's Equity, § 14-001) History and the present A well-accepted unifying feature of &quot;equity&quot; and &quot;equitable remedies&quot; is their origin in the Court of Chancery of specialist equitable jurisdiction (Snell's Equity, §1-003). Even though today, this distinction in jurisdiction has been abolished by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, equity still means that body of law with its origins in Chancery. While equitable rules and principles have certainly continued to evolve, they all trace their pedigree to the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (Snell's Equity, § 1-004). Equitable doctrines have retained their distinctiveness as &quot;secondary&quot; to legal rights. They impose an overlay: that &quot;primary legal rights should be exercised consistenly with good conscience&quot; (Snell's Equity, § 1-033). This view from Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton &amp; Co., [1991] 3 SCR 534 highlights the messiness and debate about the confluence and remaining distinctiveness of equity and law: I am aware that reservations have been expressed in some quarters about this fusion or, perhaps more accurately, mingling of law and equity... But no case was brought to our attention where it has led to confusion, and there are many cases, some of which I have discussed, where it has made possible a just and reasonable result. It simply provides a general, but flexible, approach that allows for direct application of the experience and best features of both law and equity, whether the mode of redress (the cause of action or remedy) originates in one system or the other. There might be room for concern if one were indiscriminately attempting to meld the whole of the two systems. Equitable concepts like trusts, equitable estates and consequent equitable remedies must continue to exist apart, if not in isolation, from common law rules. But when one moves to fiduciary relationships and the law regarding misstatements, we have a situation where now the courts of common law, now the courts of equity moved forward to provide remedies where a person failed to meet the trust or confidence reposed in that person. There was throughout considerable overlap. In time the common law outstripped equity and the remedy of compensation became somewhat atrophied. Under these circumstances, why should it not borrow from the experience of the common law? Whether the courts refine the equitable tools such as the remedy of compensation, or follow the common law on its own terms, seems not particularly important where the same policy objective is sought. Equity prevails Even though equity has developed as supplemental and secondary to the common law, &quot;in a conflict between the two, equity would prevail&quot; (Snell's Equity, §1-010). For example, where a contract would be enforceable by its terms at common law, an equitable remedy developed called recission that allows for the &quot;extinction of a contract and the resotration of the parties to their original positions&quot; (Snell's Equity, § 15-001). This has been codified in some jurisdictions. See British Columbia's Law and Equity Act, s. 44: If rules of equity and law conflict, equity prevails 44 Generally in all matters not particularly mentioned in this Act in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity prevail. Where this distinction can matter This distinction can still matter. As just one example: &quot;Different rules of following and tracing have evolved at common law and in equity&quot; (Snell's Equity, § 30-052). See Citadel General Assurance Co. v. Lloyds Bank Canada, [1997] 3 SCR 805 at para. 58: In my view, a distinction should be made between the imposition of liability in “knowing receipt” cases and the availability of tracing orders at common law and in equity. Liability at common law is strict, flowing from the fact of receipt. Liability in “knowing receipt” cases is not strict; it depends not only on the fact of enrichment (i.e. receipt of trust property) but also on the unjust nature of that enrichment (i.e. the stranger’s knowledge of the breach of trust). A tracing order at common law, unlike a restitutionary remedy, is only available in respect of funds which have not lost their identity by becoming part of a mixed fund. Further, the imposition of liability as a constructive trustee is wider than a tracing order in equity. The former is not limited to the defence of purchaser without notice and “does not depend upon the recipient still having the property or its traceable proceeds”; see In re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts, supra, at p. 276. If a remedy is understood to be a legal right, then the innocent/wronged party is owed that right once the wrong is recognized by a court. However, if the remedy is understood to be equitable, no one ever has a claim as of right to the remedy, and it will always be subject to the discretion of the court to grant the remedy even if accepting the wrong underlying the claim. Some equitable remedies Wikipedia gives one list of equitable relief consistent with much of what is in Snell's Equity. Here I'll only list some of those that you'll most likely recognize: injunctions (Snell's Equity, § 18) specific performance (Snell's Equity, § 17) rescission (Snell's Equity, § 15) rectification (Snell's Equity, § 16) tracing (Snell's Equity, § 30-051) equitable estoppel (as a family of related doctrines), as distinct from common law estoppel (Snell's Equity, § 12) Maxims of equity Wikipedia also lists various maxims of equity also consistent with much of what is in Snell's Equity, § 5). I'll only highlight a few that are still widely relevant and known: &quot;He who comes into equity must come with clean hands&quot; &quot;Equity aids the vigilant and not the idolent&quot; (the principle behind laches) &quot;Equity looks on as done that which ought to be done&quot; (the principle behind equitable assignment)
Yes, a judge may use the bible when making a decision. However, the usage nearly always takes the form of citation (in the form of scholarly texts) rather than precedent. That said, the lines get blurry sometimes. In Banks v. Maxwell, 171 S.E. 70 (N.C. 1933), the N.C. Supreme Court was tasked with resolving a dispute where the plaintiff had been gored by a bull. As a means of anchoring precedent and establishing a strict liability rule when a bull has previously gored, it stated "[t]he familiar rule of liability for injuries inflicted by cattle has remained approximately constant for more than 3,000 years. This rule of liability was expressed by Moses in the following words..." The court goes on to cite Exodus 21:28-30.
You have accurately summed up the conundrum. There is little else to say. You need to accept that there is confusion, even within the law itself, and rely on context to establish in any given instance which meaning is meant. You will come to find that there are many instances of such confusion in the law. The historic technical distinction in the law (especially in tort law) between assault and battery has been collapsed in the everyday vernacular and this had made its way even into the way that the words are used even by law enforcement officers and legislators, who grew up speaking the vernacular language like everyone else. Where I live, in Colorado, the word "menacing" has been used be legislators to replace the historic sense of the word "assault" and the words "assault" and "battery" have become synonymous. But, in England, they are struck with a situation in which the meaning of the word "assault" has become context specific.
&quot;Esq&quot; Is short for &quot;Esquire&quot; which was once the lowest level of the English system of titles for nobility and gentry (originally an esquire was a sort of apprentice knight, and later it indicated that a person was a &quot;gentleman&quot; but without any higher title) Lawyers started using it to indicate that although paid professionals, they claimed a social status above that of tradesmen and shopkeepers. It is now largely obsolete, but some lawyers still use it. Most of the other initials refer to the form of business organization that a lawyer or law firm uses. More specifically: &quot;PA&quot; means &quot;professional association&quot; a form of organization which reduces the individual liability of members of the firm. See this q&amp;A A pay is in many ways similar to a corporation or an LLC. &quot;PLLC&quot; means &quot;professional limited liability company&quot; which is a version of an LLC used specifically by groups of doctors and lawyers. &quot;PLC&quot; like &quot;PLLC&quot; means &quot;professional limited liability company&quot;. The two terms are interchangeable when used for law firms, but PLC is also used for a Public Limited Company, which is a quite different sort of thing, and will not be a lawyer or law firm. APC, A.P.C., PC, P.C., and Prof. Corp. all stand for &quot;Professional Corporation&quot; a form of organization which is similar to a PLLC. &quot;LLP&quot; means &quot;Limited Liability Partnership&quot; a variation on the classic partnership organization. &quot;SP&quot; means &quot;Sole Proprietorship&quot;, that is one lawyer working alone. None of these tell you anything about the kind of law a lawyer or firm does. None except SP tell you anything about how many lawyers a firm has. And none tell you anything about how competent a lawyer is. For the most part, none of these terms is of any importance to a client or would-be client of a lawyer or law firm. Reputation of the specific firm is far more important.
france Yes, both for civil and criminal law, but in different ways. The general principle of civil law in France (and I believe every civil-legal-system jurisdiction) is that one is liable for any damage they cause through fault. Of course, details differ greatly between what is considered a damage, what are the standards to prove causation or fault, etc. Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 2, 18 janvier 2018, 16-28.392 specifically endorsed a lower court reasoning that distinguished between préjudice moral (moral damage) and préjudice psychologique (psychological damage). The latter is about quantifiable medical damage (even if mental rather than physical), while the former covers grave breaches of wellbeing. In the case at hand, a couple was assassinated when their child was two years old; the child later developed severe psychic disorders as a result of the trauma; it was found that a compensation for the préjudice moral of losing his parents at a young age did not foreclose a later suit for the préjudice psychologique of developing mental troubles (which became visible much later in his life). To be honest, I would be extremely surprised if any jurisdiction recognized no cause of action for any type of psychological damage. There might be issues of burden of proof etc. such that in practice suing for psychological damage is unviable, but a complete bar on any civil action predicated on psychic damage seems unthinkable. Regarding criminal law, many assault-type crimes are scaled by gravity. That gravity is evaluated by days of &quot;complete inability to work&quot; (search incapacité totale de travail through that section of the penal code). While the notion has been standardized by work law cases, it also applies outside a work context when the damage prevents one from doing basic life actions (children, retirees or the unemployed can be subject to a &quot;complete inability to work&quot;). Whether the damage that caused it was physical or mental is irrelevant. Two notes though: physical damage resulting from assault is more easily quantified by that scale than mental damage. If a mob boss breaks your bones, you spend one month in the hospital, and then you get out roughly healed; it’s easy to say that it cost you one month of your life. If the same mob boss kills your wife in a gruesome manner, you might be haunted for life, but still be able to work, feed yourself etc., past one or two days of shock. &quot;Low-level&quot;, long-lasting damage is not well-measured that way. quantifying the duration of a &quot;complete inability to work&quot; depends on the victim’s active cooperation with the prosecution (such as going to see a doctor to get a certificate). That is possible because the civil and criminal causes of actions are usually joined in a single trial, during which the victim will try to prove injury. (It is possible for the victim to open a separate civil trial, but that’s usually not a good idea. The same exact remedies are available by joining in the criminal trial; usually the prosecutor has the same goals as you in proving the facts, so why not let them do it and save some lawyer fees?) It would probably not be reasonable in a common-law system with separate trials. It also breaks down in certain cases (e.g.: in a good fraction of spousal abuse cases, the victim refuses to testify against the accused).