Illegal US Constitutional amendment making itself impervious to judicial review There are two scenarios where it appears the consideration of the validity of a constitutional amendment would previously require a ruling that it is unconstitutional. Scenario 1: the amendment is kinda similar to the eleventh amendment, and it prevents the judicial system from challenging the constitutionality of an amendment once it's recognized as part of the Constitution by the Archivist of the United States. Let's say the Congress adopts this amendment, leaving it in instance before the states, but before any state has taken action on the amendment the Archivist registers it as part of the Constitution. Let's say a suit is filed by some entity having standing on the matter (somehow): the amendment is invalid, because the process of adopting it was illegal, but to even consider its possible invalidity, you have to contradict the amendment's provisions, which means pre-judging it as invalid. Which is kind of a paradox. Scenario 2: the amendment deprives three particular states (Maine, Vermont and Illinois for example) of suffrage in the Senate, and it also prevents the judicial system from taking into account the contents of an amendment when challenging its validity. Let's also assume these two points somehow are written in such a way that it's impossible to separate one from the other without entirely changing the amendment. This time, the Archivist does nothing as absurd as in the first case, but he files the amendment as part of the Constitution when 3/4th of the states (not including Maine, Vermont or Illinois) have ratified it. Same issue: the content of the amendment makes it invalid due to the last clause of Art. 5 of the Constitution, which forbids amendments preventing equal representation of states in the senate without their consent, but recognizing that implies the same paradox as in scenario 1. In these scenarios, what could or would the judicial system do? Would it have been possible for the amendment to be blocked between the time it is proposed and the time it's ratified (or considered as such by the Archivist in s.1), or would that be contrary to legislative immunity?
Scenario 1. It doesn’t matter what it says. If it was not legally ratified, it is not legally in force. There is no absolutely no paradox at all. It is essentially just a draft amendment and would be thrown out if any attempt was made to enforce it and challenged.
The actual method of amending the Constition is spelled out in Article V – originalism would reject the position that there are other ways to amend it. We can see the result in the ratified amendments. Originalism is a theory of interpretation, not a theory of drafting, and it hold that the words of the law, be it the Constitution or a particular statute, are to be understood as would be understood by people originally. (There are numerous versions of originalism, so one can't be more precise than than until you decide whether you mean original understanding or original intent, the latter now being a minority viewpoint). It does not hold that new laws should be drafted in the language as it existed in the 18th century, as indeed they are not. Thus the 26th Amendment is written in contemporary style befitting the fact that it was drafted recently, and the 27th Amendment is written in older style befitting the fact that it was drafted in 1789. As for "changing values", each ratified amendment represents some change of values, whereby originally a right was not recognized (or was), and by the amendment, that value changes. The 18th Amendment represents on change in values, and the 21st reflects a change in that value, though not back to the status quo.
The method of proposing an amendment by way of Convention has never been used. Thus, procedural aspects such as how members of such a convention would be chosen have also not been settled: In the modern era, scholars have debated various issues, including: (1) how delegates to the convention should be chosen; (2) whether Congress, state legislatures, or the delegates should set rules of procedure for the convention; (3) the vote threshold would be required to propose an amendment in convention; and (4) how voting rights on a proposed amendment should be apportioned among the states. (Constitution Annotated, &quot;ArtV.3.3 Proposals of Amendments by Convention&quot;)
Technically, there is no such thing as an unconstitutional law. There are laws which have been passed, but whose unconstitutionality has not been discovered yet. But once a law is legally deemed to be unconstitutional, it stops being a law. The constitution is a recipe for running the government. If Congress enacts legislature which it has no authority to enact, the courts have the authority to discover this and reveal it in an opinion.
Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions.
This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts.
Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes.
1911-1913 very shady time in USA political history. They could amend the Constitution to make a law Constitutional. There's nothing shady about that in the least. In fact, it is the point of constitutional amendments: to provide a mechanism to change the constitution when it prohibits something that an overwhelming majority of people -- well, of congress and of state legislatures -- think should be allowed. A constitutional amendment can reverse the provisions of Article I; it can reverse a constitutional ruling by a court (or at least reverse the ruling's effect); and it can certainly overcome arguments by Jefferson and Jackson, which have very little legal weight if any. Wasn't the whole point of the revolutionary war ... It doesn't matter what the point of the war was. What matters is that the constitution controls what the government can and can't do, and the constitution can change. The constitution countenanced slavery until it didn't. The constitution required senators to be chosen by state legislatures until it didn't. The constitution forbade income tax until it didn't.