How does the &quot;Plain Meaning Rule&quot; intersect with persons and corporations The Plain Meaning Rule dictates that statutes are to be interpreted using the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute. If a law is written and uses only the word &quot;person&quot; (or &quot;persons&quot;), and the law lacks a definition for the word &quot;person&quot;, and the law does not use the words &quot;natural persons&quot;, then does the law include a corporation as a person under the Plain Meaning Rule? Thanks in advance. If needed, here is some example text. In the example text, it is not clear to me whether corporations are included or excluded because (1) &quot;person&quot; is not defined; and (2) the words &quot;natural persons&quot; was not used. The best I can tell, the conduct would include corporations because the courts have interpreted persons to include corporations via hundreds of bastardizations of the 14th amendment (like the Citizens United v. FEC case). (a) A person may not follow another in or about a public place or maliciously engage in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys the other: (1) with the intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other; (2) after receiving a reasonable warning or request to stop by or on behalf of the other; and (3) without a legal purpose.
So, the plain meaning rule is a general rule, and, as with most general legal rules, there are exceptions. One such exception is that if a statute uses a word that has a commonly understood legal meaning, even if that differs from the ordinary meaning, then that legal meaning applies. &quot;Persons&quot; is commonly understood in legalese to include corporations (just take my word for it), so when used in a statute it's going to include corporations and other entities. A similar example is that the word &quot;he,&quot; when used in a statute, is not construed to only include males within its ambit. Note that there can be exceptions to this rule too. Since your example is a criminal statute, note that, under certain circumstances, criminal liability can be imputed to a corporation or other entity.
As @James K indicated in a comment: Private law involves relationships between individuals, such as the law of contracts and torts, (as it is called in the common law), and the law of obligations (as it is called in civil legal systems). It is to be distinguished from public law, which deals with relationships between both natural and artificial persons (i.e., organizations) and the state, including regulatory statutes, penal law and other law that affects the public order. In general terms, private law involves interactions between private individuals, whereas public law involves interrelations between the state and the general population. Source: Wikipedia The effect of section 156 is that anyone adversely affected by a public authority's failings under Part 11, Chapter 1 cannot sue: any redress is by way of judicial review. The Explanatory Note to section 156 offers this example: A local council fails to give due regard to the requirements of the public sector equality duty when deciding to stop funding a local women’s refuge. An individual would not be able to sue the local council as a result and claim compensation. She would need to consider whether to pursue judicial review proceedings.
The words "an Act" and "a law" are often used loosely to be synonymous in an every day conversation, but "a law" is a broader term. For example, the criminal code is "a law". But, while the original version of the criminal code may have been a single "act", the criminal code has almost certainly been amended by many other acts over the years after its original enactment as a single act. An "act" is a single enacted bill proposed in a single legislative session approved in a single Presidential assent. A law, in contrast, can be the result of multiple acts approved in multiple Presidential assents at different times and then codified into a single statute. Also, the term "a law" can be used correctly to refer to a particular holding of case law that is judicially created and not enacted by the legislature. For example, someone might correctly say, "there is a law that makes it illegal to breach a contract without legal justification", even though that is a case law principle, rather than a legislatively enacted rule. Confusingly, it isn't uncommon for the short title of a statute (i.e. a law) that is the product of multiple acts amending the original one, to be the short title of the original act that has been amended over the years. For example, in the United States, the "1933 Securities Act" which was the short title of the original act giving rise to that statute, is still described by that short title, despite the fact that it has been amended scores of times since then well into the 21st century. (A careful writer would say "the 1933 Securities Act, as amended"). I suspect that this practice is also followed in India, because the American practice of naming statutes in this fashion dates back to English practice that was in place before the American revolution and has continued to be followed since then. This isn't a hard and fast rule, however. Hence, another statute has the short title, "Statute of Frauds", even though it could have been described by the short title of the original act from the reign of Queen Anne. But, in the abstract, "an act" has its more narrow technical meaning. Incidentally, to prevent confusion, "the law" is a term much broader than either "an act" or "a law". The phrase "the law" encompasses not just a particular statute, but all statutes, all regulations that have the force of law, all treaties, the constitution, and all judicially created case law, not just statutes which come into being through the passage of bills as acts by the legislature.
&quot;Could Maine pass a law making New Mexico corporations and LLCs legally nonexistent in Maine (and removing the corporate veil in cases where Maine courts have jurisdiction)?&quot; No. The full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the dormant commerce clause doctrine of U.S. Constitutional law would both invalidate a Maine law to that effect. One might think that the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution (as opposed to the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th Amendment) might also invalidate this law (e.g., it also prohibits residents of another state from obtaining occupational licenses in a state). But, this is not the case, because the U.S. Supreme Court held in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), that corporations are not protected by the privileges and immunities clause. See generally, here. This doesn't mean that Maine couldn't regulate foreign corporations in some manner that doesn't unduly discriminate against out of state corporations. For example, most states require out of state corporations that do business in that state to pay a small fee and make a simple filing with the Secretary of State of that state authorizing them to do business in that state as a precondition to filing lawsuits or counterclaims seeking relief in their state's courts. But, this is far from a denial of the very existence of the out of state corporation and doesn't, for example, prohibit the out of state corporation from defending itself against suits brought against it in that state's courts. Likewise, it does not prohibit an out of state corporation from owning property or from affording limited liability protections to its owners.
The law works in the opposite direction of what you seem to be imagining. State courts generally have jurisdiction to hear lawsuits based on federal law, even without &quot;authorization&quot; from Congress. It is therefore perfectly normal to see lawsuits under Section 1983 , the Privacy Protection Act, or the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Protection Act being litigated in state court. Instead, when Congress authorizes a private right of action, it includes explicit language when it does not want cases heard in state court. This is the case with copyright, patent, and bankruptcy litigation, for example.
Generally, a managing member of an LLC cannot speak for the LLC in court. The LLC needs to hire a licensed lawyer to do that. The general rule is that entities may not represent themselves "pro se" through non-lawyer officers and must have a licensed attorney represent them in any court matter (in practice, a court will usually allow an officer or manager to write a letter to the court asking for a brief extension of time to a deadline to obtain a proper lawyer, even though that is logically inconsistent). If an entity does not hire a lawyer, a default judgment will enter against it. In other words, a CEO or manager or managing member of a company isn't allowed to speak for it in court. This rule is almost universal in the world of legal systems descended from English common law, although sometimes there are narrow statutory exceptions. The manager of an LLC is a person to whom legal process may be directed to begin a lawsuit, but that isn't the same as representing the LLC in court. Wyoming does have an exception to the general rule for small claims court cases at Wyoming Statutes § 1-21-202(b), which states: Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter 5 of Title 33 of the Wyoming Statutes, in small claims court, the state, governmental entities, natural persons, corporations, partnerships, associations or other organizations may litigate actions on behalf of themselves in person or through authorized employees, with or without an attorney, provided that if an attorney appears, the opposing party is entitled to a continuance for the purpose of obtaining an attorney of its own. Keep in mind, however, that small claims court only governs claims of $6,000 or less, and only in cases where the Plaintiff has elected to file a suit using small claims court procedures. I note that this question is tagged "small claims court" but it isn't clear from the circumstances set forth in the question whether this is merely a claim for a small amount of money or is truly a claim that was filed using the special small claims court procedures in which an attorney is not required. Wyoming Statutes § 33-5-101 et seq. is the law regulating attorneys which prohibits the unauthorized practice of law that is the basis for the general rule at Wyoming Statutes § 33-5-117 which states: It shall be unlawful, and punishable as contempt of court, for any person not a member of the Wyoming state bar to hold himself out or advertise by whatsoever means as an attorney or counselor-at-law. This statute isn't perfectly clear on its face, but is understood to codify the universal common law rule so it isn't ambiguous in any way.
This article goes into Miranda variants in some detail. The basic answer is that there are no SCOTUS-mandated formal requirements on the warning, and there exist up to 900 variants of the warning. The court only requires clear communication of those rights and appropriate waiver of them. The specific requirements, if any, are set by the jurisdiction. Since this is a constitutional issue, every jurisdiction must satisfy SCOTUS (and not the state's legislature). Some jurisdictions include a statement about providing a lawyer &quot;if and when you go to court&quot;, which was found in Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 to not render the warning inadequate (although it suggests that you only get a lawyer when you go to court). This gives rise to variants in New Jersey, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Alaska (but apparently not in Indiana where the warning originally arose). The city of Seattle policy is stated here. When advising a person of Miranda, officers will include the following statements: “You have the right to remain silent.” “Anything you say can be used against you in a court of law.” “You have the right at this time to talk to a lawyer and have your lawyer present with you while you are being questioned.” “If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before questioning, if you wish.” Officers will establish that the suspect understands in one of two ways: By asking “Do you understand” after each of the four Miranda warnings, or By asking, “Do you understand each of these rights?” after reading all the warnings. Officers may then begin asking questions. If the arrestee makes a comment that causes the officer to believe that the arrestee might be requesting an attorney, officers will ask the arrestee to confirm, with a “yes” or “no” answer, whether the arrestee is requesting an attorney. There is no verbatim text that must be strictly adhered to, and the officer just has to &quot;include the statements&quot;. The following section speaks of including an additional clause when &quot;reading&quot; Miranda to juveniles, but the previous section does not say that you have to literally read the warning from a card. Analogously, pattern jury instructions are theoretically read verbatim from a script, and yet they are not (always?, ever?) transcribed into the record exactly as dictated by the jury instruction committee. In general, verbatim language is not legally required, especially in speech.
First, the clearly redundant phrase is “applicable laws” - these apply to everything. Second, some acts, particularly consumer protection or sale of goods acts imply provisions into a contract, create obligations that sit beside the contract or create equitable remedies. Many of these can be limited or excluded but this needs to be done explicitly. Third, in legal writing, clarity is preferred to brevity - nice if you can get both but if not, be clear rather than brief. Fourth, the contract is not the document. The document is a record of the “meeting of the minds” that formed the contract. In the event of a dispute, it may be useful to know that particular laws were specifically considered by the parties. Fifth, in legal writing, just as all writing, some people are better than others.