How is an animal defined as in rule 286 of the UK highway code? This came up in the comments thread of this question so it was suggested to ask it. Is a fly an animal? Perhaps it must be one that is kept and thus keepable as chattel?
Is a fly an animal? Not in the context of the Highway Code Rule 286, as the underlying legislation at section 170 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 states: (8) In this section “animal” means horse, cattle, ass, mule, sheep, pig, goat or dog.
england-and-wales The law on this point in England and Wales has recently changed. The main statute here is section 4 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, amended in 2019 to add an exception relevant to police dogs. Under subsection (1), you commit an offence if you cause a dog (as an example of a &quot;protected animal&quot;) to suffer unnecessarily. The necessity conditions in subsection (3) include the example of protecting yourself or someone else, in (3)(c)(ii), but this list is not exhaustive. Nonetheless, that specific defence is excluded by the new subsection (3A) in the case when the dog is a police dog being used by an officer &quot;in a way that was reasonable in all the circumstances&quot;. This exception was added precisely to cover the example of a police dog being used to apprehend a suspect, to stop people from claiming self-defence; it's known as &quot;Finn's Law&quot; after a police dog who was stabbed in those circumstances. If this came up in practice, for the scenario you suggest, then the court would have to deal with (among other things): Was the officer's conduct reasonable in all the circumstances? Could the person have avoided harming the animal? Was the level of harm to the animal proportionate? The answers would depend on the exact facts involved, so it's not possible to say in a vacuum whether the elements of the offence could be proved. Note that the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which might otherwise apply to the officer in charge of the dog for letting it be &quot;dangerously out of control&quot;, actually does not by virtue of section 10(3) so long as it is being used &quot;for a lawful purpose&quot;. Meanwhile, as a civil matter, there is a strict liability provision in the Animals Act 1971 which might catch police dogs. That Act distinguishes between animals of a dangerous species, where the liability always applies, and others where it only applies if the animal meets certain conditions. These have attracted some criticism by senior judges over unclarity in their drafting - see for example Ford v Seymour-Williams [2021] EWCA Civ 1848 and Mirvahedy v Henley [2003] UKHL 16 - but on the basis of those decisions, one could argue that the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species in the case of a police dog specifically trained to attack on command. However, on the other side, whether the claim is under the Animals Act, or for battery, etc.: The police may argue that the damage was due to the suspect's own fault. An example I found cited in Street on Torts is Dhesi v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2000] WL 491455. A claimant bitten by a police dog was held to have accepted the risk of sustaining damage when he refused to come out of his hiding place, after being warned a dog would be sent in to flush him out; this engaged section 5(1) of the Animals Act and defeated strict liability. The police can argue that their use of force was reasonable for the purpose of preventing crime and/or arresting a suspect. (The same argument by which human officers can use force.) The police can argue that the dog was no more dangerous than an ordinary dog, that the officer did not know it could cause such severe damage, etc., thus removing it from the category of animals where strict liability applies. The police have some protection from civil suit, known as &quot;Hill immunity&quot; after the case Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1988] UKHL 12, which is not absolute but is very likely to defeat claims where officers were not unusually negligent, not acting outside the bounds of their duties, exercised reasonable care and skill, or did the best they could in a fast and confusing situation. See the recent judgements in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, a case where officers arresting a suspect accidentally hurt an elderly lady, for a very thorough discussion of duty to bystanders and police negligence in general. So again, it all depends on the fact pattern in the specific case, but you may or may not be able to win a civil claim against the police based on the harm done to you by a police dog, even when you didn't hurt the dog.
There is no case law as yet However, the most likely situation is that there is no copyright in the original works because they are computer-generated. There is certainly copyright in the code that created the art but the output of that code, the art itself, would probably not be subject to copyright. Copyright only exists in art created by humans. The US Ninth Circuit has held that animals cannot create copyrighted works. Subsequently, the US Copyright office has rejected applications for registration (a prerequisite to a suit in the US) of computer-generated art because it “lacks the human authorship necessary to support a copyright claim.” While this position has not been tested in the courts, I don't think they are any more likely to grant copyright to a program than they were to a monkey. What's going on? The OP states that there is litigation: there isn't. What there is, is a DCMA takedown request from Larva Labs. If this is complied with that will be the end of the matter; if it isn't then there may be litigation. However, before Larva Labs could sue CryptoPunks in the US they would first need to get a writ of mandamus to force the USCO to register it. If they try and fail then there will be a legally binding court decision that Larva Labs don't own the copyright in any of their computer-generated art. Which kills their business model and, presumably, them. This would be a very high-risk move. They may choose to sue in a jurisdiction where registration is not a prerequisite, however, that court would still need to be satisfied that there was a copyright that could be breached. So that's just a different take on the same problem. I have ignored the issue of NFTs as these are legally problematic in their own right and irrelevant to the main question. However, the NFT and the artwork are not the same thing.
You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey.
I think you are very likely wrong in believing that if you return the water further downstream it doesn't count as illegal abstraction. Government guidance says: If you want to build a new hydropower scheme, you need to apply to the Environment Agency for: an abstraction licence - if you divert or take water from a river or watercourse Admittedly, guidance isn't law. However, your position is quite close to arguing that taking and borrowing are two different things, and I wouldn't want to try to argue it.
The statement that cats cannot commit trespass is technically true, but is also a misreading of ss.4 and 4A of the Animals Act. Those sections replace a common-law doctrine called &quot;cattle trespass&quot;, which was a specific tort (a civil wrong) concerning what happens when my cattle stray onto your land. Both old and new rules apply only to livestock, so not just cows but other kinds of farm animals as well - but not to dogs or cats. Horses are a special case (s.4A). Since cats are not livestock, they cannot be the subject of cattle trespass and are not covered by section 4. Further, since they are animals, they cannot commit the tort of trespass at all. Animals themselves are not liable at law. As the keeper of cows, it would be me who was liable in a case of cattle trespass, not the cow. The point of s.4, and its predecessor in common law, is to make me liable for damage done to your property by my cows, regardless of whether I was negligent in the way I looked after them (it is a &quot;strict liability&quot;). The mere fact that they've strayed onto your land and done damage is enough. Because cats are not cows, this particular rule does not apply. That does not mean that cats can't be the subject of other torts. In particular, cats could be involved in the tort of nuisance, which covers all sorts of potential scenarios - noise, smells, etc. This has typically happened when there are lots and lots of cats. And under the Animals Act, the keeper of any animal may be liable for damage that it does, including physical injury or damage to property. Section 2 of the Act establishes a statutory distinction between whether I am liable for the damage, or strictly liable. In a scenario where I am strictly liable, you do not have to prove that I was negligent in my management of the animal. Broadly, that applies if the animal belongs to a dangerous species, or is unusually dangerous in itself. (There has been very complex litigation on this point which I am not discussing here.) If my cat is not a real vicious bastard of a cat, but just a regular cat, then I can still be liable for damage that he does: it's just not automatic. Following Rachael Mulheron's Principles of Tort Law (CUP, 2nd ed., 2016), for an action in negligence there are several key points - Proving that D, the owner/keeper of an animal, owed C a duty of care, where C was injured by that animal, has been a straightforward task. The court must be satisfied that a reasonable person in the position of D, the keeper of the animal, would foresee a real risk of injury to C arising from D's particular acts or omissions in dealing with the animal. Otherwise, in the absence of that foreseeability, a reasonable D would have done nothing different in response to the risk posed by his animal. To fall below the standard of reasonable care as a keeper of an animal, D must have failed to do that which a reasonable keeper would have done (to supervise/fence/control, etc, the animal), or have done something which a reasonable keeper would not have done. In damage-by-animals cases, C must prove that, as in the usual negligence action, D's failure to supervise/handle/care for the animals caused C's injury on the balance of probabilities. As in other negligence cases, there are various defences; if you hassled my cat and it scratched you, then that's your fault and not mine. From the material quoted above, we can see that for a normal cat in the UK, where the owner is not doing anything unusual by letting it roam freely outdoors (as is typical for UK cats), it is going to be hard to meet the tests. Things may be different if D knows that C is allergic to cats, or that the cat has been eyeing up C's delicious prize goldfish, or has a bone to pick with D's own cat and is likely to attack her, or something. Most of the big cases under the Animals Act have involved animals who are more likely to cause damage, such as dogs, horses and cows; a cat is only legally different because (1) unlike for dogs, horses and cows, there are no special rules applying to cats, and (2) factually, most cats don't do much harm. To that point, even if D is liable in the way described, C may not get very much out of them by way of damages. Defecation in C's garden is not pleasant, but is probably not worth a lot of money either.
The article is public domain. The pictures aren’t If this was first published in the British Empire (as it then was), then The UK is the place of first publication. What follows is its status under UK law, other jurisdictions may have different results. The original article is public domain because H. C. P. Bell died in 1937 meaning copyright on everything he wrote expired 31 December 2007. If he’d lived until 1951 or later it would still be under copyright (in 2021). However, this isn’t the original article because: Text on this page extracted from an original copy of Annual Report. The photographs were taken when I visited the site in 1991, and again in November 1995. The bits that this unknown author added, including the photographs, are their copyright. Since they were clearly alive in 1995 (due to the well known pirate aphorism “dead men take no photos”) the copyright in those is still current.
This is a duck You can label it a chicken if you like but you won’t fool anyone who knows about ducks. The FDA knows about diagnostic devices; calling it something else isn’t going to fool them.