Can the conduct of a victim after the act has occured have any bearing on the guilt of the accused? Suppose someone causes grievous injury or harm to someone but the victim and accused later on reconcile voluntarily. Can the accused still be prosecuted for the act? Specifically in jurisdictions where states can take cognizance of an offence without a complaint, like in Malaysia, Singapore or India/Pakistan/Bangladesh? If yes then are there exceptions for special classes such as women and children?
england-and-wales No. Reconciliation between victim and attacker has no bearing on the guilt of the attacker. It may have a bearing on the decision to prosecute: A victim can be forced to testify, but they may well not make a very convincing witness if they are. Also, in past times (when the police were the prosecutors for most crimes), they often had a &quot;least said, soonest mended&quot; approach to domestic violence. It may also have a bearing on the sentence. Note: England and Wales is a jurisdiction where prosecutions can occur without a complaint (in general).
england-and-wales Scenario 1: If a person is acquitted of an offence, and evidence later shows that someone else committed it instead then there's nothing in law preventing that second person being prosecuted - assuming all the relevant conditions are met. Scenario 2: If a person has been convicted of an offence, but evidence later shows that someone else may have committed it (independently and in isolation rather than as a co-conspiritor), then in all likelihood the former defendant may have grounds for an appeal on the basis that they have suffered a miscarriage of justice. One option is for their case to be reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission who may refer the case back to the court to determine whether the conviction should be quashed in light of new and compelling evidence. Scenario 3: &quot;Infinite&quot; indictments are theoretically possible (in as much as infinity is possible) but only if there is enough evidence against each and every person to justify them being indicted. If prior indictments resulted in convictions, then loop back to Scenario 2.
Yes In general, default judgements can be set aside for good cause. If the defendant can show that they had a legitimate reason for being unable to respond to the cause of action, then the judgement can be set aside and a new hearing scheduled. However, “good cause” encompasses things both unforeseen and unforeseeable and includes having good cause why the court and/or plaintiff/prosecutor could not have been advised of the incapacity before default judgement was entered. In most jurisdictions, they also need to show that they have a prima facie defence such that a different result is possible. The “superior sovereign” is not really germane: good cause can include a sudden illness or injury, police detention (be they superior, inferior, same-level or foreign sovereign), natural disaster etc.
It depends on the jurisdiction, but generally speaking, this will not permit you to evade criminal responsibility. In Ohio, for instance, the complicity statute treats the conduct you're describing as equivalent to soliciting another to commit an offense or to aiding and abetting another in committing an offense: No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: (1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; (3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 2923.01 of the Revised Code; (4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense. The penalty for complicity is the same as for the underlying offense, so you don't really get any kind of break for running your offense through an innocent party; you just get a pissed off witness who can testify against you.
First we should be more specific about a person being &quot;accused&quot; – we should disregard lunatic rantings, and limit our attention to a person who has been officially, legally accused of a crime (which is the class of acts to which the concept &quot;guilt&quot; applies). In all jurisdictions, a formal accusation must be supported with some evidence. In light of that, by definition it is possible that the accused is guilty. The fact-finders will then weigh that evidence and conclude that the evidence meets the standard of proof for guilt, or does not. It is then logically incoherent to deny that guilt is a possibility, unless the intent is that all accused persons should be found innocent irrespective of the evidence. The finder of fact must allow both possible outcomes. The reason for the &quot;innocent until proven guilty&quot; viewpoint is that it puts a specific burden of proof on the government: the government has to not just knock down all of the accused's defenses, it has to conjure up a certain level of sufficiently-convincing evidence proving guilt. This is to avoid the situation that characterizes totalitarian regimes where the tyrant can accuse a person of a random crime, offer no evidence, then insist that the accused somehow prove their innocence.
The statute reads (emphasis mine): A person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Suppose Alvin has sex with Betty while Betty is married to Charlie. Does Alvin's conduct satisfy the elements of the crime? Alvin engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (namely Betty) at a time when the other person (Betty again) had a living spouse (namely Charlie). So yes, Alvin has violated this law. Betty has also violated the law (the first clause instead of the second). Betty engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (Alvin) at a time when he (Betty; the pronoun "he" is meant to be gender-neutral in the statute's style of writing) had a living spouse (Charlie). However, this law is effectively unenforced in modern times. According to https://www.dbnylaw.com/adultery-is-still-a-crime-in-new-york-state/: It is extremely rare for anyone to be arrested just for adultery. Indeed, since 1972, only 13 persons have been charged with adultery. Of those 13 persons, only five actually were convicted of the crime. In virtually every one of those cases, there was some other crime that was committed and the prosecuting attorney added adultery as just one of many crimes committed. If Charlie files a complaint regarding the affair, it is almost certain that the police and prosecutors will ignore it, and that nobody will actually be charged with anything.
What you are talking about here is the tort of negligent misstatement, a subset of the tort of negligence. First, there is no presumption in any jurisdiction that I am aware of that anyone is or is not a lawyer (or doctor, or engineer etc.). If people knew that you were, however, then it is reasonable that they would give your statements more weight then if they did not know. It may also be reasonable if they suspected you were. The practical purpose of such a disclaimer is to ensure that they know you aren't. For the specific facts you give, you would certainly be in a better position if you said: "But I'm not a lawyer, so you should seek professional advice"; not so much because you told them you weren't a lawyer but rather because this changes your advice to "seek professional advice". It's impossible to be wrong with that advice! The standard form in Australia is: "this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice". If the statement is limited to "I'm not a lawyer" or if your neighbour knew you were, for instance, a dog catcher with no professional qualifications, then you could still potentially be liable. Your neighbour would need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; by giving advice you potentially do, however, a for negligent misstatement there must be a 'special relationship' [Hawkins V Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, MLC Assurance V Evatt]. You breached that duty; the advice given was "unreasonable". There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your advice there would have been no loss. There was a legal (proximate) cause; damage to the neighbour as a result of the advice must be foreseeable. Harm; the neighbour must suffer real loss. The main point of the disclaimers is on the 2nd point: what is "unreasonable" for a professional is different than for a "lay person". Oh, and by the way: this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice.
Does &quot;duty to rescue&quot; apply to a child that one has no direct responsibility for? And I am, certainly under English law, guilty of a crime. No, not necessarily, because a failure to act does not automatically create criminal liability in England and Wales. Most offences require a combination of a physical act and the intent to carry it out - often referred to as the coincidence of actus reus and mens rea. If one or both of these elements are missing (or cannot be proved) then there is no offence unless there is a specific Duty of Care imposed by law which obligates a person to prevent, or mitigate the risk of, harm coming to someone or something. There is a simple mnemonic that may assist with identifying whether or not there is such a DUTY Dangerous situation created... In R v Miller [1983] 2 AC 161 Miller fell asleep while smoking a cigarette, then woke up to see his matress smouldering. Instead of calling for help or doing anything about it, he went to sleep in another room so was convicted of arson - not for setting the fire but for failing to do anything about it. This would be analogous with someone tampering with the signs to incorrectly say that the deep end of the pool is the shallow end thus causing the child to be out of his depth and drown. Under statute, contract or by public office... In R v Dytham [1979] QB 722 a police officer was convicted of misconduct in a public office because he stood by and did nothing as a man was beaten to death. For the OP: a lifeguard will have a duty of care, under contract, to act in order to rescue the child in the OP. Take it upon oneself... In R v Stone &amp; Dobinson [1977] 1 QB 354 the defendants took on the responsibility for caring for a vulnerable person who later died due to their neglect. In the OP's scenario, this might equate to someone announcing they will act as an impromptu lifeguard but then do nothing to save the child from drowning. Young persons... Anyone who has a parental relationship with a child has a legal obligation to look after the health and welfare of that child. In the OP's scenario, if the parent was absent, too drunk etc so could not raise the alarm this may be a breach of this duty of care and make them liable for the death of their child.