In what cases has the High Court of Australia held a federal law unconstitutional and invalid? The High Court of Australia has the power of judicial review of legislation, including federal legislation made by the Parliament of Australia, for conformity with the Constitution of Australia, and therefore the court may declare any law unconstitutional and invalid. Is there a list of cases in which the High Court of Australia has used this power and declared a federal law invalid?
Judicial review As always, Inigo Montoya, is correct - declaring a law unconstitutional is not judicial review in Australia, although it may be a consequence of a judicial review. Judicial review is the power of the courts (the judiciary) to review decisions of executive government e.g. a decision of a council in a development application or the decision of the Minister in an immigration case. Of course, in American English, which is not the kind the High Court of Australia uses, judicial review does mean what you think it means - so you’re only wrong in most of the World rather than all of it. Unconstitutionality The High Court of Australia, like all common law courts, cannot veto legislation nor does it give advisory opinions. It exists only to decide controversies between litigants or in criminal cases, either as part of its original jurisdiction or as the final appellate court (since 1975) for all Federal, State and Territory law. In deciding a case it can decide that Parliament has exceeded its Constitutional power and deem legislation ultra vires. This Parliament House web page gives the following representative list: Petroleum and Minerals Authority case—The High Court ruled that the passage of the Petroleum and Minerals Authority Bill through Parliament had not satisfied the provisions of section 57 of the Constitution and was consequently not a bill upon which the joint sitting of 1974 could properly deliberate and vote, and thus that it was not a valid law of the Commonwealth. McKinlay’s case—The High Court held that (1) sections 19, 24 and 25 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, as amended, did not contravene section 24 of the Constitution and (2) whilst sections 3, 4 and 12(a) of the Representation Act 1905, as amended, remained in their present form, the Representation Act was not a valid law by which the Parliament otherwise provides within the meaning of the second paragraph of section 24 of the Constitution. McKellar’s case—The High Court held that a purported amendment to section 10 of the Representation Act 1905, contained in the Representation Act 1964, was invalid because it offended the precepts of proportionality and the nexus with the size of the Senate as required by section 24 of the Constitution. Postal allowance case—The High Court held that the operation of section 4 of the Parliamentary Allowances Act 1952 and provisions of the Remuneration Tribunals Act 1973 denied the existence of an executive power to increase the level of a postal allowance—a ministerial decision to increase the allowance was thus held to be invalid. Roach’s case—The High Court found in 2007 that amendments to section 93 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, to remove the entitlement to vote from all persons serving a sentence of imprisonment, were invalid, being inconsistent with the system of representative democracy established by the Constitution. Rowe’s case—During the 2010 general election campaign, the High Court declared invalid amendments to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 which had reduced the time available for updating the electoral rolls after the issue of writs. Cases involving Commonwealth expenditure—in Combet (2005) the High Court rejected arguments that the broad terms of statements in an Appropriation Act were such that the Parliament could not be said to have authorised certain expenditure. The effect was that it was recognised as a matter for the Parliament, and not the courts, to determine the level of detail in such provisions. In Pape (2009) the Court held that a parliamentary appropriation was a prerequisite for the lawful availability of money for expenditure, but not in itself authority for expenditure; and that authority for Commonwealth expenditure must be found in the executive power or in legislation under a head of power in the Constitution. In this case the Court upheld the validity of the Tax Bonus for Working Australians Act (No. 2) 2009, but in Williams (2012) and Williams (No. 2) (2014) the Court held that the Commonwealth did not have the power to make payments under funding agreements (in this instance in relation to school chaplaincy) without the legislative authority to do so.
Both civil law and common law have civil codes, so that isn't the difference. It is common in civil law jurisdictions for these to be called civil codes and consolidated into the great big book of law. In common law jurisdictions, the civil code is scattered through legislation, regulation, administrative and case law and often not consolidated although, each piece of legislation typically deals with only one (or a related number) of topics. Adversarial vs Inquisitorial In a common law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to decide the dispute that the parties have brought to the court based solely on the arguments and evidence that they make. A judge who seeks their own evidence or decides the case based on a law the parties have not argued is making a mistake. The judge is free to say to the parties "But what about xyz law?" and let them make an argument about that but they would be denying the parties natural justice if they decided the case on xyz law if that law was not argued. In civil law jurisdiction, the role of the judge/jury is to find out the truth. They have inquisitorial power and decide the case based on all the evidence, the law that was argued and their own knowledge of the law. Precedence In common law jurisdictions, the cases decided by the courts are just as much the law of the land as the acts passed by parliament. When a court hands down a decision on a certain fact pattern, then all courts lower in the hierarchy must make the same decision when presented by a similar fact pattern. These are binding precedents. In addition, decisions of same level or lower courts (where not actually the ones being appealed) as well as decisions in "parallel" jurisdictions are persuasive precedents. A parallel jurisdiction is anything where the law is close enough that it makes sense to use it: Australian courts will tend to look first to other Australian states, then to England &amp; Wales, Canada, New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries then the United States of America and then to civil law jurisdictions. There is nothing nativist in this, it is just that these are the jurisdictions where the laws are "closest" to one another: partly because the courts have historically done this (which tends to lock the common law together), partly because there has been governmental will in creating harmonized laws in Australia (i.e. enacted in each state and territory but essentially the same law - often word for word) and partly because parliaments, when drafting legislation, nick ideas from other parliaments. If the Supreme Court of Western Australia has made a decision on a similar fact pattern under a similar law, a District Court judge in New South Wales had better have some damn good reasons for deciding this case differently but they wouldn't automatically be wrong if they did. However, if the precedent had been set in the Supreme Court of New South Wales than the District Court judge would be wrong to decide differently. Naturally, a lot of argument in common law courts is about why the facts of this case are sufficiently similar/distinct that the precedent should/shouldn't apply. Also, common law judgments emphasize the reasoning that led the judge from the evidence to the conclusion and include detailed analysis of the case each party presented - this is because they need to be understandable to a wide audience. Court hierarchy can be quite complex, this is the one for NSW, Australia: In a civil law jurisdiction, courts are not bound by the rules of precedence - each judgement is a first principles analysis of the facts and the law. This is not to say that civil law judges do not use other judgments in their analysis but they are not required to do so. Broadly speaking, the common law approach promotes consistency, the civil law approach promotes individualized justice.
Marbury V. Madison did not establish judicial review. It was simply the first case where that power was used. It was clearly spelled out in The Federalist #78 that this power would exist in the new constitution, and those who voted to ratify it understood, or should have understood, that it would exist. All that Marbury V. Madison decided was that the Supreme court did not have original jurisdiction to issue Writs of Mandamus That could be overturned, or the constitution could be amended to grant such jurisdiction to SCOTUS. That would not have any major effects on the US judicial system as far as I can tell. I suppose that the constitution could be amended so as to deny the power of judicial review to the courts. But I think the resulting system would be potentially unstable, and this would require a far more fundamental change than simply &quot;overruling Marbury V. Madison&quot; As #78 of The Federalist said: By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. (emphasis added) The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. . . . [W]here the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental. . . . [W]henever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the former.
No. Under U.S. Jurisprudence, any vagueness in a criminal law must be given an interpretation favorable to the people, rather than the government, since the government had the opportunity to make their intentions clear when drafting the law. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution has what is called the &quot;Vagueness Doctrine&quot; which renders vague laws at any level of government to be unenforceable (Found in the 5th and 14th Amendment as an interpretation of the Due Process clauses). The quickest way to overturn the court's ruling is for a legislature to pass an amended law that defines the vague terms in terms that are better understood and can give the courts a proper interpretation of what should happen, however, no one who was charged under the law can be recharged under the new definition.
The quickest way to get the text of Australian judgements is through AustLII. Reading the citation Parties: Tame v New South Wales In this case, the parties are (Clare Janet) Tame and (the State of) New South Wales. Year: [2002] or (2002) There is a subtle distinction between the above years: in brackets [] is generally (but not always) the year that the judgement was made, which may or may not be the year that the case was reported, which appears in parentheses (). This case was both decided in, and reported in this law report, in 2002. Court HCA Where the citation includes brackets - [] - the abbreviation that follows is the unique court identifier of the court where the judgement occurred. This case was decided in the High Court of Australia. For a list of courts and abbreviations, see AustLII's table of Australian case law. This is called a medium-neutral citation. Some reports are organised by year - unfortunately, there is no pattern to this - and they will have the year in brackets also. If more than one volume of a report of this kind is produced in this year, the volume number will appear between the year and the abbreviation as below. Report number and series 211 CLR Where the year appears in parentheses - () - and a number, then an abbreviation follows, these are the volume and abbreviation of the law report. In this case, it is the 221st volume of the Commonwealth Law Reports. Pinpoint reference Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35 Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 The final number is the pinpoint reference. In a medium-neutral citation, this is the judgement number - the nth judgement that year. In all other cases, it is the page on which the judgement commences in the law report. Authorised and authoritative law reports All law reports are authoritative and can be employed in court, however the authorised law reports of a court are the official law reports - there is only one for each court. Judgements that highlight a novelty or a particular point of law are generally reported in the authorised law report. How to use a citation The practical upshot of this is that AustLII provides LawCite, which is a free case citator - you can search for cases. All you need is either: The year, court abbreviation, and judgement number, or The volume, report abbreviation, and page number In the above examples, these would be 2002 HCA 35, and 211 CLR 317 ... respectively. This is referred to in the citator as the citation (which is confusing because the entire thing is a citation). LawCite provides, for your convenience, a table of: Cases that cite the case your case, Law reform reports referring to your case, Law journals referring to your case Legislation cited in the case your case, and Cases and articles cited in your case. These are extremely useful in finding related cases during your research.
Short Answer Yes, Supreme Court decisions apply everywhere right away. (Unless the decision says it doesn't.) No, we do not have to wait until new laws are passed. Explanation Judicial Review Marbury v. Madison (1803) established the principle of judicial review under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. This allows the court[s] to interpret laws passed by legislatures. And this is the basis for applying the ruling everywhere (in the U.S.) immediately. From Marbury at 178: if a law be in opposition to the Constitution [...] the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. [...] the Constitution of the United States confirms [...] that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. Judicial Restraint (Nominally) courts either interpret or invalidate existing law. In the former case, the law will persist (with the new clarity added by the decision). In the latter, the law will be struck as unconstitutional and, therefore, no longer exist.
Do I correctly understand that Federal employees, notably including the Armed Forces, pledge their duty first to the Constitution of the United States and only secondarily to carry out legal orders? And that they have no legal obligation to execute an illegal order? What process allows a subordinate to defy an illegal order if a superior gives the order? What legal protection does the subordinate have? All officers of the United States government (and for that matter also all officers of state and local governments) including soldiers in the armed forces are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Members of the armed forces are not only allowed to disregard illegal orders, they are obligated to not carry out illegal orders. Operationally, disobeying an order due to the fact that it is unconstitutional is a defense to an effort to fire or discipline a federal government civil service employee who may only be fired for good cause after due process. In the military, the issue would usually present itself in the form of a defense in a court martial for refusing to obey a lawful order of a superior. Of course, it would hardly be unprecedented for someone's firing from a job that was unlawful, or for a wrongful court-martial conviction, to be upheld on appeal. Suppose the Congress holds someone in contempt. The Congress, as I understand it, goes to a court to enforce the contempt charge. The court turns to Federal law enforcement to bring action. What if the President directs Federal law enforcement to ignore the court order? What if law enforcement complies with the President? The U.S. Justice Department is charged with bringing contempt of Congress cases at the request of Congress. But, an attorney retained by Congress could probably bring such an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia if the U.S. Justice Department refused to do so. Contempt may be civil or criminal, and unlike ordinary criminal charges (felonies can only be brought based upon grand jury indictments and grand juries are controlled by prosecutors) either civil or criminal contempt charges can be brought by a non-governmental employee attorney. The established practice is to seek contempt sanctions against the lowest level employee who has the authority to take the action requested, or to seek contempt sanctions against everyone from that lowest level employee up through the chain of command to the responsible cabinet officer. The President is generally not named as a party against whom contempt charges are sought. Defiance of the law in the face of a binding and immediately effective court order would be a constitutional crisis and you would need to move to the realm of politics and political realities, and away from the realm of what the law says that people should or should not do, to meaningfully predict how a constitutional crisis turns out. The law assumes that all government officials will obey a lawful court order duly enforced. If government law enforcement officers start defying court orders, then there is a constitutional crisis. On the other hand, the vast majority of law enforcement officers in the United States are civil servants who aren't beholden personally to the President. They were appointed on a merit basis, they are civil servants who can't be fired without good cause and due process, they are in agencies that have an institutional culture of obeying court orders. The civil servants with more seniority (and basically all senior military officers in the U.S. military) have served under multiple Presidents of different political parties. The number of political appointees supervising them is fairly modest. Likewise, most federal judges at any given time were appointed by prior Presidents and even judges appointed by a current President will not infrequently rule against the federal government when the facts and law demand that they do so. There is less politics and there is more unity in interpretation of the law among federal judges and federal law enforcement and legal officials than is generally assumed by more cynical members of the general public. Suppose Congress orders fines. What is to be done if no one will enforce the fines? A court can order that the fines be paid out of the U.S. Treasury. The order itself can have the force of law without the cooperation of any U.S. Treasury official. Sustained defiance of such a court order would lead to a constitutional crisis. Same scenario as 1 but this time it’s impeachment and conviction: the President defies any action to remove him. What if the President simply barricades himself in the White House and orders security and military personnel to protect him? Is there a protocol in the U.S. military hierarchy to deal with this scenario? This has never actually happened, of course, so it is hypothetical. The Treasury Department, General Services Administration and Secretary of State (and all other government officials) should revoke privileges that the President has by virtue of being President and provide them to the new acting President (realistically, in the simple scenario presented, current Vice President Pence). The military should stay out of it, but should immediately start treating acting President Pence, and not the impeached incumbent as the Commander-in-Chief. U.S. military forces are indoctrinated on the Presidential succession and it is unlikely that many military officers would disregard a Presidential impeachment. The Secret Service should stop defending the former President except in an ex-President capacity. In theory, one could imagine acting President Pence bringing an eviction action in the local courts of the District of Columbia just as one would with any holdover tenant. Since the local courts in D.C. are federal, this doesn't present the federalism problems that it would if the same thing were done in a state court with respect to federal real estate, and U.S. marshals would evict him and his family like anyone else. The trickier situation in terms of creating a constitutional crisis, honestly, is really one where the President is clearly and blatantly defying the law and court orders, but the U.S. Senate refuses to convict the President in an impeachment proceeding out of partisan bias. What should common citizens do if any of these scenarios play out? Whatever they want, in a lawful manner. Ultimately, this would be a matter for federal government officials (elected and appointed alike) to figure out.
Indian Constitution provides for a Federal government in which power of states and centres are clearly enunciated. If there is a dispute over any issue Supreme Court can decide whether State government is correct, or whether Central government is correct. Any law of Parliament affects the entire population of India, and so all states are affected by that law. If any state government considers that the law is not as per constitutional norms, it can easily go to the Supreme Court for decision. So, the observation of the Supreme Court that a state is bound by the law of Parliament, is incorrect. If an individual can file such a case, a state is also entitled to file it. The Supreme Court should decide it on the basis of merit. So I think the observation of Supreme Court in this case is not correct.