Does the order barring entry of certain aliens into the US properly apply to permanent residents? The President of the United States has invoked his power under the INA to proclaim that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and [...] suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such persons for 90 days from the date of this order [...]. The relevant section of the INA is at 8 U.S.C. 1182(f): (f) Suspension of entry or imposition of restrictions by President Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. [...] This question is about the phrases "immigrant entry" and "entry as immigrants." In particular, there are reports of aliens from these countries, who have already been admitted to the United States for permanent residence, who are in possession of their "green cards," having been denied entry to the US, or at least having been denied boarding by airlines. The question, therefore: Is re-entry of a green card holder properly within the scope of "immigrant entry"? In particular, has any court ruled on the question? I have not found any other part of the executive order that could be read as barring green card holders from entering the US, but I may have overlooked something. Is there another part of the order that is relevant to the entry of permanent residents?
The order refers in sec. 3(c) to "immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12)". That section specifically names Iraq and Syria, plus "points to" potential areas of concern, as identified by the Sec'y of State and Sec'y of Homeland Security. The full list extends to Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, and is set forth at 81 FR 39680. The cited authority is 8 USC 1182(f), a section about inadmissible aliens, which says Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate. Thus he has authority to exclude permanent residents from re-entry (they are aliens, and re-entry is a subcase of entry), and has done so for 90 days. In the case of Syrian nationals, under sec 5(c) of the order, they are excluded until the order is changed. Sec. 5(c) of the order specifically declares Pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f), I hereby proclaim that the entry of nationals of Syria as refugees is detrimental to the interests of the United States and thus suspend any such entry until such time as I have determined that sufficient changes have been made to the USRAP to ensure that admission of Syrian refugees is consistent with the national interest. The long-term ban on Syrians also specifies "as refugees", so "such entry" might not be interpreted to refer to entry of refugee or non-refugee Syrian nationals who are permanent residents. The 90-day ban in 3(c) ("immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens") does not include any further restrictors, apart from the various government-official visas that are exempted, so there would be no basis in the order for excluding permanent residents. Whether this will be strictly enforced is a separate question, though in the period when the order was active (a day), it was applied to permanent residents. Sec. 3(g) allows exceptions "on a case-by-case basis, and when in the national interest". A recent (Saturday the 28th) White House briefing says that green card holders "will need a case by case waiver to return to the United States". The ban includes immigrants and non-immigrants, so it doesn't particularly matter how "immigrant" is defined – what matters is what an alien is. Still, "immigrant" is defined in 8 USC 1101 (15) as any alien, except a bunch of categories such as diplomats, tourists, business visitors, people in transit, students, and fashion models and similar, working temporarily here. Any permanent resident has an immigrant visa (but at any rate is an alien, and is either an immigrant or a non-immigrant). Returning to the words of the order, neither 3(c) nor 5(3) limit the ban to issuance of visas, it refers to entry. Not all entry by foreign national requires a visa. The word "visa" is mentioned, so it is possible to construe that mention as contextually restricting the ban to visas, however 3(a) which is entitled "Suspension of Issuance of Visas and Other Immigration Benefits to Nationals of Countries of Particular Concern" orders the review "to adjudicate any visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA" which indicates that there is no such limitation. 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(C) does say that a permanent resident is not "regarded as seeking an admission into the United States". Admission itself is defined in 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(A), when applied to an alien, as "the lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer". While a permanent resident is not seeking admission (and is not applying for admission), it would still be consistent with the law to forbid admission (legal entry). If you read 8 USC 1101(a)(13)(C) as granting permanent residents widest latitude to enter without restriction, then that has the absurd consequence that permanent residents are subject to no scrutiny at all. The absurdity is avoided if "seeing admission" is a step prior to and is distinct from "being admitted" i.e. "lawfully entering".
You can be extradited from Country A to Country B even if you are a citizen of neither. What matters is whether B can convince A to do it, which is typically on the basis of a treaty between them as well as provisions of both country's domestic criminal law. If you committed a crime in B, then fled to A, your nationality is relevant to the extent that: A might not extradite its own citizens, if you are a citizen of A A might have an agreement with C, if you are a citizen of C, that C should have the chance to proscute you instead of B. (This is the Petruhhin doctrine in the case where A and C are EU countries and B is not.) But you do not have to be a national of B in order for it to have jurisdiction over you in B's domestic criminal law - just as if you were still in B, they could arrest you in the normal way. They are thus entitled to request A's authorities to arrest you in A, and transfer you to B. If your alleged crime was not in B, then their claim over you has to be on the basis that their domestic criminal law allows prosecution extraterritorially. This was the case when B was Spain, A was the United Kingdom, and the criminal was former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet; while his status as a former head of state was relevant, as was whether the crimes were extraterritorial offences in the UK as well, his lack of Spanish nationality was not. A more topical example is B being the United States, A the United Kingdom, and the arrestee being Julian Assange, an Australian who is alleged to have committed various crimes under U.S. law (while not necessarily having been present in the U.S. at the time). While all extradition relationships are different, a common thread of the criminal law in general is that what matters is the circumstances at the time of the alleged acts. Retroactively making you a citizen of B may not be satisfactory to A, to the extent that A's criminal law disallows making anything illegal retroactively. The supposed nationality grant by B might trigger provision's of A's domestic extradition law concerning requirements of due process, lack of political interference, and so on, and block the action. But equally, renouncing your citizenship of B does not extinguish B's claim over you for acts you did while you were a citizen of B. This is again a feature of typical criminal law.
Short answer: You find a country who is willing to recognize you as stateless, and issue you travel papers. At that point you can enter the U.S. by applying for a visa. The USA really does not want to create stateless people. They are laboring diplomatically to eradicate statelessness. As such, the State Department will want to see that you are secure in another country's citizenship before they will repudiate your US citizenship. Otherwise, they are very reluctant. The State Department will insist you do the repudiation in a foreign country at a US embassy. If you want to become stateless with your feet in the United States, you'll likely have a legal fight on your hands. Regardless, it will cost you $2300 in filing fees (plus, all your back taxes) :) At that point, you become the problem of the foreign country. You aren't anyone to the USA, and you have to apply for a visa just like anyone else. When a stated person enters the US, immigration's pivotal concern is whether you'll leave the US consistent with the terms of your visa, i.e. return to your country of citizenship. Being stateless increases this risk, and being a USA expat increases that risk further, since you are so familiar and comfortable in the US. If you found yourself in the kind of piccadillo that would qualify a foreigner for refugee or asylum status, the US would consider it just the same as others, since those statuses include right of residency. Some countries manufacture stateless people, e.g. Syria will not grant citizenship to a non-Muslim born there.
The comments have already pointed out that the President of the United States is still a citizen, and all of the rights of a citizen are still protected for them. Additionally, the Administration is allowed to take policy positions which are antagonistic to a person or group's cause, even if that group is practicing their rights to express their views legally. To give a different example, the President and his administration may denounce the position of a group of Neo-Nazis marching legally. So, any argument that the President is acting in an official capacity while making antagonistic comments also probably fails, as the Administration is allowed to take a position on any issue they deem worth taking a stand on. As noted in another answer and in comments, the applicable laws appear to be 18 U.S. Code § 227, which provides for punishment of government officials who attempt to influence employment decisions through official acts for political purposes, and 42 U.S. Code § 1983, which provides for civil action when a person deprives, or causes the deprivation of, another person's rights under color of law. 18 U.S. Code § 227 likely does not apply for two reasons The President may show that his conduct was not purely for political purpose The official statements made do not qualify as official acts per McDonnell v. United States, as they are not a decision or action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy"; that question or matter must involve a formal exercise of governmental power, and must also be something specific and focused that is "pending" or "may by law be brought" before a public official 42 U.S. Code § 1983 might apply if the official statements were found to be acting under color of law, but I think the statements made so far will fail to meet the qualifications for this statute. Blair v. Bethel School District gives three qualifications for conduct that would allow recovery under this statute: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action. The President's and Administration's official speech appears to fail the second criteria. First, it is questionable whether it qualifies as an "Adverse Action" - in Blair, as well as Hartman v. Moore and Gibson v. United States, the adverse action against the Plaintiff caused actual damage or indignity. However, even if we assume the official speech qualifies as an adverse action for the purposes of the statute, it still appears to be permissible for effectively the same reasons as the first and third arguments presented in the decision: First, the adverse action Blair complains of was a rather minor indignity, and de minimis deprivations of benefits and privileges on account of one's speech do not give rise to a First Amendment claim. The actual effect of the Administration's speech has a minimal direct effect on the players it speaks against. The decision further states: The most familiar adverse actions are “exercise[s] of governmental power” that are “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature” and have the effect of punishing someone for his or her speech Official speech by the Administration is not "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." While this is not a complete definition for "adverse action," it gives a sense of severity, which official speech does not appear to meet. Additionally, the President's right to speech, and the Administration's authority and need to make official speech as directed by the President is a competing interest in this case, as was the interest of the Board in Blair: Third, it is significant that Blair isn't the only party in this case whose interests implicate First Amendment concerns. To the contrary, we assume all of the Board members have a protected interest in speaking out and voting their conscience... The decision does note that: The point isn't that the vote against Blair was protected speech simply because it was expressive. Almost all retaliatory actions can be said to be expressive, including those that are manifestly unconstitutional. But, while Blair certainly had a First Amendment right to criticize Seigel and vote against his retention as superintendent, his fellow Board members had the corresponding right to replace Blair with someone who, in their view, represented the majority view of the Board. Similarly, it's probable that a court would find that the President's right to speech and their Administration's corresponding authority to speech against the players' right to protest is equally weighted or even weightier, such that stifling the official speech is as bad or worse than the alleged chilling effect of the speech. Some examples of things that clearly would fall afoul of 42 U.S. Code § 1983 would be the President or the Administration misappropriating funds to use to pay NFL teams not to hire players who kneel during the national anthem, or signing an Executive Order preventing players who kneel during the national anthem from playing - in both cases, they are taking actions which fall outside the powers of their office, which would qualify as acts made under color of law and clearly chill the players' First Amendment rights.
The ICERD would not apply to the natural born citizens clause by its own definitions. Part 1, Article 1, secs 2 and 3 read: This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.
This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen*. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. *More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such.
It's not regulated by international law. Depending on the laws of the intended destination country, it may be the case that none of the members of the family are permitted to enter, or that they can enter, but only two can enter as a "couple", while the others are legally completely separate (or even excluded from the country). According to one blog, at present in the United States, a foreign national must actually intend to practice polygamy in the United States to be ineligible for an immigrant visa. The current law does not prevent a polygamist or someone who practiced polygamy in the past or expresses a belief in polygamy from being eligible for an immigrant visa. But aliens coming to the United States to practice polygamy are barred. Before 1990, there was a law on the books by which someone who merely "advocated the practice of polygamy" could have been barred. This question has been answered on Quora for the U.S., again for the U.S. (where the question asked about "US and EU"), and for Canada. Basically, the whole family can't legally immigrate as a unit. However, determining who is the "real" wife, if any of them, would depend on the facts of the case, the specific laws of the target jurisdiction, and the purpose of the determination. It could very well be that every one of the other marriages would void a new marriage in the destination country and entitle the children to child support, but none of them would entitle the wife to a spouse's visa or the father to visitation rights after a purported divorce. See also this answer about whether it's possible for a married immigrant to commit bigamy by entering the United States pretending to be unmarried. Sure there are people who try, and it's more likely to succeed with the cooperation of the foreign spouse(s), but it's against the law and can be grounds for deportation, imprisonment, annulment of the second marriage, or exclusion of any polyspouse who is outside the country.
There are two constitutional doctrines that prohibit discrimination based upon state of residence. One is the dormant commerce clause (a court created doctrine) and the other is the privileges and immunities clause. There are actually two privileges and immunities clauses, one in Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1, which states: The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States. and the other in Section 1 of the 14th Amendment which states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Some of the leading privilege and immunities cases are reviewed here. With respect to the dormant commerce clause, per the link above: [I]n a dormant Commerce Clause case, a court is initially concerned with whether the law facially discriminates against out-of-state actors or has the effect of favoring in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests. Discriminatory laws motivated by "simple economic protectionism" are subject to a "virtually per se rule of invalidity," City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1977) which can only be overcome by a showing that the State has no other means to advance a legitimate local purpose, Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131(1986). See also Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573 (1986). Notwithstanding these constitutional protections against discrimination based upon state residence, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this discrimination is constitutional in the case Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) and reaffirmed the continuing vitality of that decision in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). The majority opinion in Vlandis v. Kline explains this authority was basically undisputed at that time: The appellees do not challenge, nor did the District Court invalidate, the option of the State to classify students as resident and nonresident students, thereby obligating nonresident students to pay higher tuition and fees than do bona fide residents. The State's right to make such a classification is unquestioned here. Some of the justification is set forth in the Saenz v. Roe (1999) decision which states: The second component of the right to travel is, however, expressly protected by the text of the Constitution. The first sentence of Article IV, § 2, provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." Thus, by virtue of a person's state citizenship, a citizen of one State who travels in other States, intending to return home at the end of his journey, is entitled to enjoy the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States" that he visits. This provision removes "from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other States." It provides important protections for nonresidents who enter a State whether to obtain employment, to procure medical services, or even to engage in commercial shrimp fishing, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). Those protections are not "absolute," but the Clause "does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States." There may be a substantial reason for requiring the nonresident to pay more than the resident for a hunting license, see Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371 (1978), or to enroll in the state university, see Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), but our cases have not identified any acceptable reason for qualifying the protection afforded by the Clause for "the 'citizen of State A who ventures into State B' to settle there and establish a home." Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). Permissible justifications for discrimination between residents and nonresidents are simply inapplicable to a nonresident's exercise of the right to move into another State and become a resident of that State. Despite fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, most notably expressed in the majority and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), it has always been common ground that this Clause protects the third component of the right to travel. Writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller explained that one of the privileges conferred by this Clause "is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State." Basically, the exception isn't logical and instead is a case of the Courts upholding a common practice that seems to make economic sense, notwithstanding that fact that it is clearly contrary to the relevant constitutional provisions and doctrines. The life of the law is not reason, it is experience. Assuming logical consistency in the law will often lead you to a descriptively inaccurate result.