Is there ever any consultation between judiciary and legislative draftspeople? Often one sees judges attempting speculatively to infer legislators' intents by reasoning about their language. Yet nonetheless the objective seems to be to ascertain the legislators' original intentions. If they really wanted to do this, it seems as though the most reliable and non-speculative method would be simply to ask the authors of the language what had been meant. While the purpose of a separate judiciary is independence and checks and balances to ensure rule of written law, it would seem fair for the judiciary to quiz and challenge the authors as to the plausibility of their clarifications, given the actual written and assented words, in order to prevent them from misadvising the judges if it suits their political purposes after the fact. So my question is simply: in any jurisdiction, but particularly common law ones like the UK and US, is it ever heard of for a judge to ask legislative authors for clarifications? Why, or why not?
For the same reason you can’t ask the parties to a contract what they meant Legislation, once enacted, stands on its own independent of the people who drafted it, introduced it to Parliament and voted for or against it. These are not the same people in any event and since the legislation might have been passed anywhere between the 13th and 21st centuries, a lot of them will be dead. There’s a fundamental issue of fairness here. The people who are obliged to comply with the law (you and I) can’t ask the politicians so neither can the judges who have to decide if we did. Further, the judiciary cannot interact with the executive or the legislature in this way without violating the principle of separation of powers. Imagine you are charged with a crime and your guilt or innocence turns on the interpretation of the statute. Do you really want politicians who are looking at how the case plays out on Twitter telling the judge which interpretation to use i.e. effectively telling them whether you are guilty or not?
The concept of &quot;ignorance&quot; of laws isn't about the individual. It's about administratibility of the system. The argument is that a system with a wide-ranging ignorance defense would struggle to produce results—just or otherwise. So the American system presumes knowledge of the law and then carves out narrower exceptions, such as mistake of law. For example, the law wasn't published, or it had been overruled. Alas, the question about why there isn't a hotline belongs on another site.
It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.
(I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.)
This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling.
The alternative is the same whether just one lower court or many lower courts ignore SCOTUS precedent. An aggrieved parts will appeal the lower court ruling, and the matter will work its way up the ladder until SCOTUS directly rules on this application of the law. This sort of happens all the time, when lower courts don't apply the ostensive "final ruling" because they find that there is some other overriding consideration ("that rule only applies to businesses employing more than 50 people"). Where the case to be remanded to lower courts for further proceedings consistent with SCOTUS opinion and still the lower courts refuse to comply, i.e open rebellion, SCOTUS could rule that non-compliance by lower courts constitutes contempt, and an order could be issued for the removal (in some form) of offending parties (we may presume, the justices of the lower court). The statute outlining court power allows on order of imprisonment for "disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command". Federal marshals would then arrest non-compliant judges, unless the marshals too are in open rebellion. If the judges in question were federal judges, the marshals would have to decide whether to obey the order of SCOTUS vs. the order of the district or circuit court. Since under the US Constitution states that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", it is objectively established that SCOTUS rulings are superior, so provided that the marshals elect to uphold their oath of office, they will enforce the SCOTUS ruling. However, citizen action becomes irrelevant once SCOTUS has made its ruling, and the matter has moved from legal determination of fact to enforcement of established fact.
You are confusing a few concepts. One is the distinction between what are known as &quot;common law&quot; jurisdictions derived from the English legal system, and &quot;civil law&quot; jurisdictions derived from one of the continental European legal systems that is ultimately derived from Roman law. Another is the distinction between determining the meaning of ambiguous legislation, which all courts do by definition, and the power of judicial review, which overturns legislation which is invalid for some reason rather than merely trying to interpret an ambiguous provision. Ambiguous means &quot;unclear&quot; or &quot;capable of being interpreted in more than one way&quot; and every time every court encounters unclear legislation it must decide what it means, even if it is not invalidated. In contrast, some judiciaries that have the power of judicial review and those that do not. Judiciaries that can declare a law to be invalid have the power of judicial review. Judiciaries that cannot declare a law to be invalid do not have the power of judicial review. Every state and federal U.S. Court at every level (not just the U.S. Supreme Court) has the power and obligation to declare that a law violated the U.S. Constitution. In many countries, no court, or only a &quot;constitutional court&quot; has the power to make declare legislation to be invalid by exercising judicial review. Every time that a legislature passes a statute on a subject covered by common law (i.e. judge-made law derived from case decisions that serve as precedents), it shrinks the scope of common law relative to statutes. And, in principle, almost all of the common law could be replaced by statutes without all that much difficulty. But, in civil law countries, statutes are frequently comprehensive and are the sole source of legal authority about their subject matter superseding all case law, while in common law countries, statutes are often piecemeal tweaks to a common law background that is assumed by the statute. For example, every civil law country would have a comprehensive statute setting forth the principles of contract law, while a typical common law jurisdiction might have a statute that declares that certain contracts must be in writing but does not comprehensively set forth the law of contracts in all circumstances. There are some features of civil law countries, such as the absence of jury trials, which cannot be constitutionally changed to the civil law system, even in jurisdictions such a Puerto Rico and Louisiana in the United States which have civil law roots prior to joining the U.S. (at least in criminal cases and in the federal courts). The power of judicial review (i.e. the power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional and void) is also inherent in the U.S. Constitutional system of government and could not be removed without a constitutional amendment. There are common law countries, e.g., England, which did not historically have the power of judicial review, which was an innovation for a common law countries such as the United States when it was first invoked. (For what it is worth, India goes one step further; its Supreme Court asserts and exercises the right to declare portions of its own constitution to be unconstitutional.) There are other aspects of civil law legal systems which would probably also be declared unconstitutional in the United States as well, such as the lack of a prohibition on the introduction of hearsay evidence in criminal trials which violates a provision of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights known as the &quot;confrontation clause.&quot; It is unclear to me whether the principle that case law precedents have binding legal effect in future cases, which is part of the common law system that is absent in the civil law system, has a constitutional dimension or could be displaced by law. But, most aspects of a civil law legal system could be adopted in the United States if the relevant legislatures so desired. Indeed, many aspects of the U.S. legal system have moved in that direction. For example, only a handful of U.S. states now recognize the concept of a &quot;common law crime&quot;. Almost all states now only allow criminal sanctions for crimes codified by statute, which was not the case at the time of the American Revolution, when few crimes were codified. Obviously, with a constitutional amendment, almost any change to the U.S. legal system is possible.
At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.