Does a sex-for-food/protection arrangement qualify as rape? The situation I'm thinking of is the one depicted in A Woman in Berlin. The setting is the end of World War 2 with Soviet armies in Berlin engaging in mass rapes. The woman in question, after being raped several times, decides to seek protection from a Soviet officer. The officer protects her from being raped by common soldiers, and also provides &quot;bacon, butter, sugar, candles, canned meat&quot;. Does the officer engage in rape? The woman thinks no: she writes that &quot;By no means could it be said that the major is raping me&quot; and that she is &quot;placing [herself] at his service of [her] own accord&quot;. However, can it be argued she is acting under duress? I am most interested in modern law, although if anyone knows about what the laws were like in 1945 Germany that would be interesting too. Related: Why must victims of 'sex-for-rent' arrangements be legally defined as prostitutes to seek justice? which indicates that the woman becomes a prostitute in the eyes of the law (something considered by the author as well), but doesn't clarify if the officer engages in rape.
Socially the woman has become a &quot;kept woman&quot;. It would not be rape, at least in most jurisdictions, because the officer is using neither force nor threats of force. The duress is from her economic and general circumstance, and most jurisdictions would not consider that to be rape. At least technically, this is a form of prostitution, but a form very rarely prosecuted. Maryland maryland is a not untypical jurisdiction as US law goes in such matters. § 3-303 of the Naryland Criminal Code (Rape in the first degree) provides that: (a) Prohibited. -- A person may not: (a) (1) (a) (1) (i) engage in vaginal intercourse with another by force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other; or (a) (1) (ii) engage in a sexual act with another by force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other; and (a) (2) (a) (2) (i) employ or display a dangerous weapon, or a physical object that the victim reasonably believes is a dangerous weapon; (a) (2) (ii) suffocate, strangle, disfigure, or inflict serious physical injury on the victim or another in the course of committing the crime; (a) (2) (iii) threaten, or place the victim in fear, that the victim, or an individual known to the victim, imminently will be subject to death, suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical injury, or kidnapping; (a) (2) (iv) commit the crime while aided and abetted by another; or (a) (2) (v) commit the crime in connection with a burglary in the first, second, or third degree. Section 3-304 (Rape in the first degree) provides that: (a) A person may not engage in vaginal intercourse with another: (a) (1) by force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other; (a) (2) if the victim is a mentally defective individual, a mentally incapacitated individual, or a physically helpless individual, and the person performing the act knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a mentally defective individual, a mentally incapacitated individual, or a physically helpless individual; or (a) (3) if the victim is under the age of 14 years, and the person performing the act is at least 4 years older than the victim. Sections 3-306 thru 3-307 have similar provisions but they mention &quot;sexual act&quot; rather than &quot;intercourse&quot; and they do not define the crime as &quot;rape&quot; but as &quot;sexual offense&quot;. But the emphasis on force or threat of force, and lack of consent is much the same. So it seems that under Maryland law, at least, the situation described in the question would not be legally &quot;rape&quot; nor a &quot;sexual offense&quot;. Maryland Criminal code § 11-301 (2018) defines prostitution in subsection (c) which reads: (c) Prostitution. -- &quot;Prostitution&quot; means the performance of a sexual act, sexual contact, or vaginal intercourse for hire. Whether the provision of food, shelter, and protection by one person to another in return for sex would be considered &quot;for hire&quot; is arguable. In practice such arrangements, even if they also involve cash payment, are rarely if ever prosecuted.
No The argument is vacuous in any event because AFAIK all jurisdictions that enforce sex discrimination laws have parental leave (paid or unpaid), not maternity leave so a man is just as likely to need it as a woman. This, of course, raises the issue of discrimination by marital status (on the basis that unmarried people are arguably less likely to have children) or age (on the basis that people outside 'childbearing' age are less likely to have children; fortunately these types of discrimination are also illegal. Notwithstanding, the loopholess you think there are in the laws are simply not there. For example s14 "Discrimination in employment or in superannuation" of australia Sex Discrimination Act 1984 starts with: (1) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, breastfeeding or family responsibilities: Later in s30 "Certain discrimination on ground of sex not unlawful" it says: (2) (a) the duties of the position can be performed only by a person having particular physical attributes (other than attributes of strength or stamina) that are not possessed by persons of a different sex from the relevant sex; If the job requires excessive strength or stamina, then you test your recruits for the level of strength or stamina the job requires.
Can a state declare: &quot;any violence against insert a group here shall not be prosecuted,&quot; which is pretty much what Nazis and Communists did, and then claim non-involvement in the violence that would ensue? This would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. https://www.justice.gov/crt/guidance-regarding-use-race-federal-law-enforcement-agencies goes into exhaustive detail on the topic of what may constitute an illegal abuse of selective enforcement. A key quote is highly relevant to your question: [T]he Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. There is a lot of case law on this topic. This is frequently discussed in the context of race (especially profiling).
There is no clear rule on this matter, but there is a reasonable prospect for using an entrapment defense in this case, when deliberate deception is employed. There are two tests for entrapment: the subjective test and the objective test. The former focuses on the defendant's state of mind: whether the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime without law enforcement pressure. The latter is where the officer uses tactics that would induce a reasonable, law-abiding person to commit the crime. It depends in part whether the jurisdiction recognizes one of these defenses. An example of objective entrapment: &quot;A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted into committing prostitution for a substantial sum of money like $10,000.&quot; Similarly, applicable to this question: A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted to undertake a pleasurable action having been assured that the action is actually legal. Where the subjective test applies: The fact of asking about the legality of an action is evidence that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime.
Sexual contact that is not consented to is a crime. Physical contact where the receiver is under the apprehension of imminent risk is the crime of battery. However, spanking in the context of a consensual sexual encounter does not have that apprehension and is therefore not battery. It is akin to the consent given by people who take part in a contact sport. Contracts cannot permit criminal actions. The permission given by the submissive in this agreement would be valid only at that point in time that the contract was made and could be revoked at any time: such revocation could be explicit or implicit. As continuous consent is required for a sexual act and revocation of permission would introduce the apprehension of harm. Whenever the permission was revoked the agreement would be unenforceable. At best, you have a agreement that is enforceable when the permissive wants it to be and not otherwise: more likely, you have a totally unenforceable agreement. More generally, contracts that involve sex acts as consideration are enforceable to the extent that prostitution is legal in the jurisdiction. However, an order for specific performance would not be granted where either of the parties was no longer consenting to the sex act because that would be a court order to commit a crime. Other remedies for breach like damages would be available. For example, if you contracted with a prostitute and refused to pay for services delivered, you could be successfully sued for the fee, any damages, costs and interest.
Breaking and entering, just by entering a private premise without permission. Causing bodily harm, possibly grievous harm, depending on what consequences it has for the victim and how the jurisdiction defines grievous harm. A prosecutor might also insinuate that the defendant had a sexual motive, so they might also add some sexual assault charges In addition to criminal charges, the victim could also press civil claims as compensation for the physical injury and the psychological trauma they experienced from a stranger entering their home at night and drinking their blood. A possible defense which the vampire could use is to claim that they are no longer a human, so human laws do not apply to them. But this would be a rather dangerous strategy, because if human laws don't apply to them, then by the same argumentation human rights might not apply to them either. If they insisted on being tried as an animal, then the court could very well reason that the best way to deal with a dangerous animal that can not be controlled and can not be kept away from humans is to euthanize it.
I think it's important to keep in mind the essence of your actions. @Mowzer gave a great answer on the matter in hand, but I'd like to add a point of view. Is it illegal to eat while driving? Like pointed out by @Mowzer, if no law prohibits it, it's allowed by default (lots of countries have this premise). But what about the consequences of your actions? Maybe there's no law against eating in the car, but there sure is one in my country that specific says that you are not allowed to drive without using both hands in the wheel. The only exception to this rule is to take out your hand from the wheel to use the stick to change gears. Another point of view to add is the liability. Let's say you're minding your own business while driving and a lunatic trying to commit suicide jumps in front of your car. It's a pretty straight-forward case, you have no reason to be blamed. Now, let's add to the same scenario your snack; with a small change, you are now facing a accident that may have been caused by reckless driving (another thing commonly illegal). To sum up, the law is not really like math that have axioms that determine true or false statements without any distinguishment. That's why every case is single handled in the law by it's particularities.
canada You have tagged this 'criminal law', so I will stick to that, and avoid non-criminal anti-discrimination regimes. Criminal Code, s. 319 makes it an offence to wilfully incite or promote hatred against an identifiable group. It does not matter whether the person that is being communicated to is a member of the identifiable group (meaning &quot;any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin&quot;). What matters is a strict mens rea requirement that the communication was done with the intent of promoting or inciting hatred against such a group. If the accused holds such intent, it is no defence that they mistook the person they were communicating with as not being a member of such a group. See generally, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. Hypothetical laws If instead you are asking about what a hypothetical law could require (since you ask, &quot;If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism...&quot;), then as a matter of statutory interpretation, the law could be written in a way that makes the mistake you describe a defence or it could be written in a way that does not allow that defence. E.g. &quot;Any person who assaults another, knowing that the other person is X, commits an offence...&quot; This phrasing of the law clearly would require the accused to know that the person they have assaulted is in the category X in order for the assault to fall within this specific variant of assault. E.g. &quot;Any person who assaults a person that is X, regardless of whether they know the other person to be X, commits an offence...&quot; Under this phrasing of the law, knowledge of the status of the target of the assault clearly does not matter. However, Canadian law has constitutional minimum mens rea requirements for elements of crimes that bring risk of imprisonment. If the offence is punishable by imprisonment, then the variant that essentially removes the mens rea from the element relating to the target's status would be unconstitutional.