Does forbidden reproductive cloning prevent prescription of clomifene and similar treatments? Fertility treatments with clomifene (like Clomid) increases the birth rate of identical twins more than twice. Identical twins are a form of cloning. Does criminilization of reproductive cloning make it criminal to prescribe clomifene or similar drugs that causes increase in cloning?
No. While twins are 'natural clones', pregnancy with identical twins naturally or as a result of infertility treatment is not a form of reproductive cloning. Reproductive cloning involves a deliberate biomedical technique - transplanting the nucleus of the donor somatic cell into the host egg cell or reprogramming adult cells into induced pluripotent stem cells (&quot;iPSCs&quot;). Such a clone has one parent - unlike twins who have two parents. The law I'm aware of pertains to and prohibits the reproductive cloning of human beings. Article 3(2)(d) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union prohibits &quot;the reproductive cloning of human beings.&quot; At the national level, reproductive cloning is banned in EU member states, Switzerland, and many other countries. Also consider that there are many clinics that openly provide fertility treatment with such drugs, some funded by the public purse (e.g. via the UK's NHS), so either they operate illegally and the authorities turn a blind eye or what they do isn't illegal where they operate.
Statistics deceive courts all the time Most judges and jurors know no statistics. Most doctors and social scientists use statistics without really understanding them. Therefore, innocently or otherwise, perfectly valid statistics are introduced into courts in ways and manners that result in mistakes even before we consider the possibility of deliberate deception. Perhaps the most egregious example was that of the wrongful conviction of Sally Clark for the murder of her two children who died of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome. The conviction led to her spending 3 years in gaol and probably contributed to her premature death of alcohol poisoning in 2007. The case was flawed for two reasons: 1) evidence that clearly pointed to death by natural causes of her second child was withheld from the defence (and, to be fair, from most of the prosecution team) and 2) misuse of statistics. The expert evidence of paediatrician Dr Roy Meadow was flawed in these ways: "He claimed that, for an affluent non-smoking family like the Clarks, the probability of a single cot death was 1 in 8,543, so the probability of two in the same family was around "1 in 73 million" (8543 × 8543). Given that there are around 700,000 live births in Britain each year, Meadow argued that a double cot death would be expected to occur once every hundred years." As any undergraduate statistician (or advanced high-school mathematician) could articulate this is total bollocks. Combining probabilities by multiplying them together is only applicable if the events are independent - there is no evidence that the deaths of 2 young children with the same parents living in the same house at roughly the same time are uncorrelated and plenty of reasons for suspecting that they are highly correlated and probably in non-linear ways. Indeed, subsequent studies have shown that the risk of a second SIDS death in the same family increases by a factor of 5 to 10 - this is a very high correlation on what is still a very rare event. It is ironic and tragic that the argument that led to the charges (that the deaths are correlated by a single murderer) relies on the exact opposite (and equally vacuous) argument that led to the conviction (that SIDS deaths within a family are uncorrelated). Further to the statement, the rate of SIDS in the UK is 1 in 1,300; not 1 in 8,500. Dr Medlow factored in the non-smoking and socio-economic elements of the household that lowered the chances but failed to factor in those that increased the chances: like the fact that both children were boys who have a higher rate of SIDS than girls. Further, it's likely the court committed the Prosecutor's fallacy. Specifically, the court failed to understand the difference between conditional and unconditional probability. Double SIDS deaths are rare. But so are double infanticides. Even if Dr Medlow's figure of 1 in 73 million for double SIDS is accurate, it says nothing about the chances of double homicide (let alone double homicide by whom). We are not interested in the likelihood of 2 deaths by SIDS or homicide in the general population - we are interested in the chance of SIDS OR homicide OR something else (noting the second child likely died of a bacterial infection - so neither SIDS nor murder played a role) given that 2 deaths have occurred. For that, we need to turn to the good work of Reverand Bayes: Further examples can be found here.
Let's back up. It's premature to say that SB 8 &quot;avoids the constitutional restrictions on banning abortions&quot;. The constitutionality of SB 8 has not been resolved; the Supreme Court said so explicitly (page 2). In fact there is good reason to think that is unconstitutional under existing interpretation of the Constitution per Roe v. Wade and the like. (Whether the court will actually follow existing interpretation is another question, of course.) But the courts do not determine the constitutionality of laws just because someone asks them; they only do so when it needs to be decided to resolve a particular case. For instance, if a person is charged with a crime, they can challenge the constitutionality of the law under which they are charged, and courts will address that question unless the case is resolved some other way. There are also ways that a person who wants to violate the law can pre-emptively sue the government to prevent them from enforcing the law, if they can show such enforcement is likely to affect them. The issue in SB 8 is that since it wouldn't be the government enforcing the law, it's unclear who an abortion provider can pre-emptively sue. In Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, they tried to sue the State of Texas, its courts, and a private party who they thought might be likely to sue them. The SCOTUS majority found that none of those defendants were relevant. However, if and when an abortion provider actually does get sued, there'll be a clear case which has proper parties and is ripe, and courts then will have to consider whether SB 8 is constitutional or not. So if your hypothetical gun control statute were treated similarly, the law might avoid pre-emptive challenges, with a chilling effect on gun sales. But sooner or later, someone would probably violate the law (maybe deliberately as a test case), and the courts would consider whether it was constitutional or not. Under prevailing interpretations of the Second Amendment, they'd probably find that it wasn't. A key difference, of course, is that abortions are much more time-sensitive than gun purchases; being temporarily blocked from having an abortion is much more consequential in most cases than being temporarily blocked from buying a gun. The other subtext is that, although SCOTUS said their decision in Whole Woman's Health is not based on the constitutionality of SB 8, it's widely suspected that several of the justices are not all that keen on the constitutional right to abortion found in Roe v. Wade, and might look to overturn Roe when it comes up. As such, they may not be very motivated to look for procedural avenues to block SB 8 in the short term, since they might be inclined to uphold it in the long term. The dissenters in Whole Woman's Health certainly thought those avenues were available. But in the case of your hypothetical gun control bill, if a majority of justices were pretty convinced that the law was unconstitutional, they might try harder to come up with grounds to block it pre-emptively.
If the pill contained a harmful or noxious substance, this is battery, which is a crime in Lousiana ("the intentional administration of a poison or other noxious liquid or substance to another"). There is a specific crime in LA, battery of a teacher, which is dealt with somewhat more severely than non-teacher battery. It is not a crime to observe a crime being committed and not warn the victim, but it is a crime to aid the commission of the crime (for example to help the perp remove the lid, to supply the drug). Under section Title 17, a teacher battered by a student can file a school-system internal complaint which may lead to the student being expelled (this is ultimately covered by district-specific procedure). This is independent of criminal charges.
Governments have a significant interest in controlling pathogens and preventing outbreaks: they are dangerous to dense &amp; unimmunized populations. Can a government legally prevent me from intentionally infecting myself with a virus? Yes, governments have the broad authority to enact laws. The US prohibits and regulates pathogen experimentation (self-infection). There are also rules regarding shipping and export (ITAR). Furthermore, in the US, there are (FL, NY state) laws that prevent patients from being tested unless the order is given by an authorized health care professional. Hopefully, you do live in a state that does not have this regulation (AZ). While I do believe in one's right to do as one sees fit with one's own body, there is the counter-argument: there must be limits when it comes to unnecessarily exposing the community to pathogen risk. I hope that this question is theoretical and that nobody actually believes the immunity supposition without a credible peer-reviewed scientific publication. Unfortunately we live in an age where misinformation is propagated at novel speed and scale. I wish the OP well. That being said, I have concerns regarding the underlying assumptions of the question. While I am comfortable with the OP question, the underlying assumptions give me great pause. UPDATE IMHO: I hope that no reader will seriously consider amateur experimentation in self-infection in the hope of conferring immunity. Giving a pathogen uncontrolled safe-haven to propagate and possibly infect others seems irresponsible. I doubt that the government cares if any individual manages to puts themselves in an early grave, however, it does care if amateurs create an unnecessary pandemic risk. I would think that any government would view pathogen experimentation much like nuclear device experimentation, because of the mass casualty risk. I hope that readers understand the implications of an amateur uncontrolled experiment.
Note that "pedophilia" is a psycological or social term, and not a legal term. What laws prohibit is the creation, distribution, and possession of child pronography Under 18 U.S.C. § 2251- Sexual Exploitation of Children: Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed. This means that there is no offense if no real child is involved, and this is also true of the various other US laws on child porn. Since the case of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) erotica which appear to depict a minor engaging in sexual activity, but which are not depictions of any actual child are protected speech under the US First Amendment and are therefor not criminal. So called "furry cub porn" might include modified images of actual minors, in which case it would seem to be covered under US laws against child porn. But if the character is totally invented, or is based on an adult rather than a minor, then it would seem to come under the rule of Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. Note, the law in other countries is significantly different. In particular in the UK a realistic drawing may be considered to be a "pesudo-photograph" even if not based on an actual person, and may be punishable in the same way as an actual photo of an actual minor. Note also, the making, distribution, or posse ion of 'child porn' is a very serious criminal offense. I am not a lawyer, and one should not rely on this post to determine what acts are and are not legally safe. If there is any question, consult a lawyer. Note also that under the above statute (18 U.S.C. § 2251), something may be "child pornography" if the person involved is a minor, even if that person is old enough under local law to consent to sexual activity, and even if the person did in fact so consent, and even if there was no intent to distribute the image or video. So a person taking, say, a cell-phone video of him- or herself having sex with a 17-year-old, intended for personal watching only, in a state where the age of consent to sex is 16, can still be found guilty under this law, and such cases have occurred.
It is not correct to say that drugs are, for example, broadly illegal in many western countries Some specific drugs, or specific categories of drugs, are illegal in certain circumstances, by specific statutes. Which ones vary by jurisdiction. So the analogy breaks down. As for the main question, if by &quot;software cracking&quot; is meant creating a modified version of the software that operates differently, for example by-passes authentication, or allows unlimited &quot;lives&quot;, that would most probably be creatign a derivative work of the software. Creating a derivative work, even if it is never distributed, is copyright infringement under US law: 17 USC 106 (2) lists as one of the exclusive rights of the copyright holder the right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; This also covers the right to authorize preparation such works. So merely creating a &quot;cracked&quot; version of the software is technically infringement. However, infringement (of this sort) is not a crime, and no border officer or other government official will care about it in the slightest. It is up to the copyright owner to take legal action, normally by filing suit. If the modified software is never distributed nor advertised, it seems unlikely that the owner will ever even learn of it, and less likely that the owner will sue if s/he does learn of it. Damages in such a case, if the owner brought one, would probably be small, indeed not enough to make it worth the owner's time and trouble. If the cracker starts with an instance of the unmodified original software,m and edits it in place, never making a new copy, s/he is still preparing a derivative work, and (unless permission was obtained, or the work constitutes a fair use) it is still, copyright infringement If the modified software were posted online, the owner could send a takedown notice to the hosting site. If it were being sold, then a suit would be more likely. If what the cracker creates is not a modified version of the software, but instructions for modifying it, it is less clear that that would even be infringement. If the instructions are for evading an access control mechanism, that might be unlawful under 17 USC 1201 the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. But again it would be up to the owner to take legal action, the government will not care until and unless the owner takes action. (a) The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully. (b) The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material. The above answer is specific to the united-states but on this point the laws of other North American and European countries are, i believe, similar, as is the Berne Copyright Convention, at least on the matter of derivative works.
I think there are a couple of different ways to look at this. Deduplication is a technical detail that's irrelevant here While the data may be deduplicated on a technical level, the files remain logically distinct. If users 1 and 2 upload identical files, and then one user edits or deletes their file, this will not affect the other user's data. Users cannot tell whether their files are duplicates of someone else. From the user's perspective, it makes no difference whether or not the storage uses deduplication, except perhaps via the cost of the service. Because there is no user-perceptible difference, it would be difficult to interpret some GDPR significance into this scenario. Whose personal data is it anyway? Personal data is any information that relates to an identifiable data subject. The files here are likely to be their uploader's personal data. Thus, the uploaders would also have a right to have their uploaded files erased. In case of deduplicated storage, this would affect their logical copy. The contents of the uploaded files might also be personal data relating to a third party. Then that third party might have a right to get the file contents erased. But this right must be invoked with the data controller for that processing activity, which might be company A, company B, or the uploaders, depending on context. Which leads us to the next aspect: Company A is not responsible for handling erasures From your description, it sounds like company A is a data processor providing services on behalf of company B. In turn, B might be a processor acting on behalf of the uploaders. In any case, it seems that A would not be the data controller for these processing activities. Data subject rights like erasure must be invoked against the controller, as only the controller can understand whether such a request should be granted. The right to erasure is not absolute, and depends a lot on why that data is being processed. In particular: Personal data need not be erased if it is still necessary For example, a person might very well be the data subject of some of these files, and might then ask for erasure. But if the files are being stored because they are going to be needed as evidence in legal proceedings, the data subject can't use this GDPR right to destroy evidence. The data controller would be allowed to refuse a request in such cases. It could now happen that two different users of this deduplicated storage are storing the same file, but for entirely different purposes. Blanket deletion of all copies of a file could be quite problematic. Note that deletion is also a &quot;processing activity&quot; and needs a legal basis under the GDPR. Unexpected data loss could be a data breach. One user's erasure could be another user's reportable data breach incident. Thus, I would strongly expect such requests to be handled on a logical file level, not on the deduplicated storage level. Caveat: public access and cloned files If the (logical) file is made available to the public who can then clone or copy this file, and if the &quot;original&quot; is taken down due to an erasure request (or copyright takedown notice), it might be appropriate to remove logical clones as well. Again, this might not involve deleting the contents on the deduplicated storage level, but it might affect other users' copies. In a GDPR context, the grounds for this would be the Art 17(2) right to be forgotten: Where the controller has made the personal data public and is obliged pursuant to paragraph 1 to erase the personal data, the controller, taking account of available technology and the cost of implementation, shall take reasonable steps, including technical measures, to inform controllers which are processing the personal data that the data subject has requested the erasure by such controllers of any links to, or copy or replication of, those personal data. But this depends crucially on who those other controllers are. If A is the sole controller, the logical files could probably be deleted directly. If B or the end users are controllers, it could be more appropriate to forward the erasure request to them.