What does &quot;reasonable grounds&quot; mean in this Victorian Law? In Victoria Australia, this piece of legislation exists: PARLIAMENTARY PRECINCTS ACT 2001 - SECT 16 An authorised officer may direct a person to leave or not to enter the Parliamentary precincts if the authorised officer believes on reasonable grounds that the direction is necessary for the good order and security of the Parliamentary precincts. My question is, under Victorian or relevant Australian law, what constitutes &quot;reasonable grounds&quot; and what does &quot;good order&quot; mean? My other question is, can this law be used in a preemptive manner in that an &quot;authorised officer&quot; may give directions based on the past behaviour of the directee in unrelated circumstances outside of parliamentary grounds?
It has a common meaning across Australia “Reasonable grounds” requires the existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind (e.g. belief, suspicion) in a reasonable person (George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104; Walsh v Loughnan [1991] 2 VR 351). So, the officer must have the state of mind &quot;that the direction is necessary for the good order and security of the Parliamentary precincts&quot; and that a reasonable person in their position would also have arrived at that state of mind. “Good order” means able to function normally. The directive can clearly be preemptive because the instruction can be to &quot;not enter&quot;.
Is it illegal to open carry Hinged Handcuffs? england-and-wales No, but there use may constitute an assault or false imprisonment if one cannot justify their application was reasonable, proportionate and necessary in the circumstances. A civilian can lawfully use reasonable force if the conditions of s.3 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 are met: (1) A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.
It refers to whoever the judge reasonably says it refers to. The referent of that specific clause N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(b)(6) is not analyzed in any court ruling that I have been able to locate, but case law such as State v. Krueger, 241 N.J. Super. 244 has addressed other discretionary provisions of the statute, and has upheld the propriety of such discretionary acts as ordering restitution &quot;as long as (1) there is a reasonable relationship between the restitution and the defendant’s rehabilitation, and (2) there is a factual underpinning supportive of the restitution&quot;. The court concludes that we are entirely satisfied that the debarment was reasonably designed to “assist” defendant in “leading] a law-abiding life” and was thus permitted under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-la....The condition of probation was substantially related to an appropriate penological and rehabilitative objective followed by numerous citations.
The segment of the video I watched is wrong or misleading in several ways. The speaker apparently claimed to be performing a &quot;citizen's arrest&quot; on a police officer on the basis of s.5 of the Public Order Act 1986. The question above also talks about s.26 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2013, which deals with an offence of improperly exercising the powers of a constable. Somebody who is not a police officer is allowed to arrest somebody else without a warrant only under tightly defined circumstances. These are given in s.24A of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (inserted by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005). The elements include that the offence be indictable, which does not mean as claimed in the video that &quot;you can get sent to prison for it&quot;, but refers to the mode of trial. Some summary offences are imprisonable. Since the offence under s.5 of the 1986 Act is a summary one, rather than indictable, we fall at the first hurdle. A further qualifiction is that this power of arrest can only be exercised if the person believes it would be impractical for a constable to do it instead, and that the arrest is necessary to stop the arrestee from escaping, hurting themselves or someone else, or damaging property. In the video, the police officer does not look like he is doing any of those things, and there is another officer right next to him. Thus it would be hard to argue that there are reasonable grounds for arresting the officer in this way. Also, while members of the public may object to the conduct of police officers, that does not always amount to an offence under s.26 of the 2013 Act. The offence there is about corruption, exercising the powers of a constable for personal benefit. That personal element does not seem to be shown in the video. There are some other mistakes in the part I watched. A lawful arrest cannot be effected just by using the words &quot;I am arresting you&quot;. The arrestor has to take or imply some directive action as well, or else there is no arrest at all: just two people continuing to stand awkwardly. This also goes to the point about needing to stop the arrestee from causing injury (etc.) - if you aren't actually taking steps to restrain them then you can't say you're preventing the harm. The point of the provision is to take the fact of an arrest (I am stopping you from getting away) and make it a legal arrest; it can't conjure up an arrest where none exists. In a citizen's arrest there is no need to give a warning about &quot;anything you say may be used against you&quot; or whatever. This is applicable to the police when they are questioning suspects, which is not what is happening here. Indeed, while the police can arrest somebody without warrant because they want to investigate whether they've committed a crime, a regular person can't. Although there is a statutory requirement to tell somebody why they've been arrested, coming from ECHR as well as domestic common-law principles, the police are not expected to cite the law with precision. It's OK to say &quot;I'm arresting you for selling heroin&quot; rather than &quot;I am arresting you because I have reasonable grounds to suspect you of supplying a controlled substance to another without lawful authorisation, contrary to section 7 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971&quot;. While there are more rules that kick in during pre-charge detention or questioning, the law recognizes that the operational circumstances of an arrest make a briefer explanation more appropriate. Indeed, more formal language would defeat the point of the rule, which is that the arrestee should know what's going on. &quot;You can only arrest a cop for an indictable offence&quot; is not quite right. You (a non-constable) can only lawfully arrest anyone for such an offence, and if the other conditions are met. A constable can be arrested for any kind of offence: there's no special immunity for summary offences. As to the general question of &quot;How can one arrest a police officer?&quot;, the usual way is to become a police officer yourself. Almost all arrests, especially those involving police misconduct, are done by the police. For corruption it is likely that an arrest would be made after a long investigation and after the issue of a warrant, rather than on the spur of the moment. As a normal person, wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty is an offence (Police Act 1996, s.89), and affecting an arrest may amount to assault on the officer. That does not make it impossible to arrest an officer in this way, just fraught with future difficulty.
You are responsible It is unlikely that the arrangement you had with the sitter amounts to a contract. Even though there was consideration on both sides, at first blush it seems unlikely that both of you intended to create legal relations. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Notwithstanding, if there is a contract it is silent on who is responsible to for injury to the pet so it would fall back on the law of negligence anyway. For the sitter to be responsible, she must have been negligent. She wasn't. See Is there liability for pure accidents? Looking at the elements: a duty to the plaintiff, such a aduty probably exists. breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), she didn't (see below). the plaintiff must have suffered actual harm, no question that you have. the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of that harm, and that harm was foreseeable, probably it wasn't (see below). Here are the facts: She took the dog on public transport - not unreasonable, many people do. The fact that you wouldn't is irrelevant since you did not communicate this prohibition to the sitter. She took it to an off-leash park - not unreasonable, that's what they are for. She rode an escalator - it is unclear if she carried the dog or expected the dog to ride the escalator itself. The first is clearly reasonable, the second may or may not be depending on the size of the dog etc. She noted the injury and had it treated - eminentely reasonable. So, in general, she has acted as a reasonable person would. It is also far from clear to me how any of the decisions made would result in foreseeable harm to the dog. Remembering that the standard is would a reasonable person foresee that there was a risk of harm barring extraordinary circumstances. By the way, the legal reasoning is exactly the same if you had entrusted her with your child or your car.
(I am not your lawyer. I am not here to help you. If you are reading this because someone has died, please stop and instead read the Scottish Courts and Tribunals guide to dealing with a deceased's estate in Scotland, or contact a solicitor.) Yes, in general. Section 1 of the Wills Act 1963, which is in force in Scotland, specifies that "[a] will shall be treated as properly executed if its execution conformed to the internal law in force in the territory where it was executed." Furthermore, Section 4 states that "[t]he construction of a will shall not be altered by reason of any change in the testator’s domicile after the execution of the will." "Construction" here refers to interpreting the language and effect of the will. So if the will was validly executed in England, it should also be in force in Scotland, and a Scottish court will give it the same meaning it would have had under English law. Furthermore, the same rule of validity seems to apply in both England and Scotland: Wills Act 1837 section 9. There may be other Scottish laws affecting the disposition of the estate that differ from English law. Relevant statutes include Succession (Scotland) Act 1964, section 21A, which seems consistent with Wills Act 1963. (I am trained in U.S. rather than English or Scottish law; I'm trusting the accuracy of the UK's excellent online legislation archive for the proposition that the statutes cited are in force in Scotland. I haven't checked the case law for contrary interpretations.)
Because HRA1998 says so, but it's not an absolute limit and is subject to discretion by the court: (1)A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may— (a)bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or (b)rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings,but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act. (5)Proceedings under subsection (1)(a) must be brought before the end of— (a)the period of one year beginning with the date on which the act complained of took place; or (b)such longer period as the court or tribunal considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances,but that is subject to any rule imposing a stricter time limit in relation to the procedure in question.
In case there is no way of knowing, thus no way to sue, would this seem like a loophole that practically abolishes the 4th amendment ? The 4th amendment only means that the officer needs a probable cause/reasonable suspicion to detain you. It absolutely does not mean that he has to tell you what that is. In fact, not telling you what the probable cause is is often a part of the officer's job because, if you are indeed a perpetrator, letting you know what the suspicions are could make you do things that would allow you to escape justice. There is certainly always a way to sue i.e. file a lawsuit, for which you do not need to know what the probable cause was. Instead, you contend that there was not any. And from this point the officer has to tell the court what it was, if any. If he fails to provide one, you win and get redressed for harassment — this is how your 4th amendment rights work. If he does provide a good probable cause, you lose because in this case you either: actually did something suspicious and knew there was a probable cause; OR jumped to the conclusion that the officer harassed you when he was simply doing his job.