Answering &quot;Do you have anything to declare?&quot; to customs in the absence of any explanation of the question On some occasions, when a traveler goes through US customs, there are electronic self-serve kiosks or paper forms with detailed customs questions about what you are carrying (currency, goods, food, etc.), and there are statements warning about penalties for not answering truthfully. On other occasions, there is none of the above, and no explanatory signs posted, and the customs officer simply asks, &quot;Do you have anything to declare?&quot; (this happened to me recently when traveling from a US territory to the US mainland) so it's not obvious what they are asking, or that there are penalties involved. Suppose somebody should have answered &quot;Yes&quot; but they answered &quot;No&quot; because they didn't understand the question, or they have never travelled before, or they didn't know or didn't remember all of the items that should be declared. In this case, it sounds like ignorance of the law could be a reasonable defense. Is it? If customs wanted the question to be legally enforceable, in the absence of any accompanying written explanations, shouldn't they say something more like, &quot;Do you have anything to declare under US customs code, section blah blah blah? Not answering truthfully can carry penalties and fines. If you don't understand the question, please ask.&quot; Update: For those wondering where my customs interaction occurred, it was at the STX airport in St. Croix, US Virgin Islands (a US territory). It's an international airport, but most outbound flights are to the US mainland. Technically, travelers leaving USVI are already in the US, but air travelers leaving the territory have to exit through US customs and immigration. Possibly it's because the USVI's borders are extra-porous so they are monitoring for illegal immigrants, and/or because USVI has certain restrictions and duties for goods going to/from the US mainland. US Customs and Border Protection in STX used to hand out Customs Declaration forms, so it was easy to understand what to declare. Now they just ask verbally, either in some detail (&quot;Are you carrying any food?&quot;) or as a broad question (&quot;Do you have anything to declare?&quot;).
The answer has two parts depending on how you get here. Airline answer: Any such question by a CBP officer is merely a last-chance option to supplement the response you gave on the declaration form. The form asks a series of specific questions which are difficult to misunderstand (if you speak English), you say yes or no, and fill in applicable details. If you remember that you put an apple in your luggage, you can verbally amend the declaration. It is not necessary or practical to recite the statutory, regulatory and case law authority to ask these questions. As I recall, the electronic version asks the same questions. All versions of the form that I have encountered over the decades have included the perjury warning. If you had an alternative experience for you did not fill in a customs declaration form, that would be unusual, and a significant failure by the CBP officer(s). Land-border answer: you are right. In this case (when no customs declaration form is filled out), they rely on every person's obligation to know and comply with the law. You are required to declare the $12,000 cash that you are bringing back, and you cannot plead &quot;I didn't know I had to declare that cash&quot;. You can always make suggestions for service-improvement to the Dept. of Homeland Security.
Yes for individuals, and yes for vehicles. They're customs laws rather than immigration laws.
You would not be liable for a fine (If you think about it, how can you be - Australia does not have jurisdiction over you as you are in New Zealand, and you have broken no NZ law - Further, you declared the item to customs so even in Australia you could not be held liable) Looking at it another way, if you had gotten on a plane with it, declared it to customs on the arrival card, they would have simply asked to see it and made a decision whether to let it in or not - they would not fine you. Customs may or may not confiscate it (ie they may let it through). I've not sent a parcel to Australia, but I have imported seeds into NZ - I made a number of calls and emails to ensure I got the process right - expected to pay quite a lot of money to do it - in the end they just came straight to me - MAF did not even examine the parcel. Being that NZ and AU are pretty similar in terms of legislation (ie both the food standards are the same) - its probably actually Ok to send it anyway - in fact the Imported Food Control At 1992 - which I believe is applicable - specifically exempts many foods imported from New Zealand from the act. The last paragraph of this AU government web page states "The only New Zealand foods that are subject to the IFIS at the border are those classified as risk foods. Equivalence determination of food safety systems covering dairy products was reached in 2007 and seafood, uncooked pigmeat, chicken meat, coconut, pepper, paprika, peanuts and pistachios were aligned in 2011. This enabled these products to be brought under the TTMRA and removed the requirement for border inspection for these products."
At time of answering, the question is: What's the most crucial issue when deciding Senator Cruz's citizenship? The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, Section 1, states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States[.] Cruz did not go through a naturalization process. He was also not born within the territorial limits of the US. If either of those facts were different, those would be the crucial issue. Since they are not, we then look to the Naturalization Act of 1790, passed by the first Congress, which states that children born to citizen parents outside the United States are also citizens, specifically: The children of citizens of the United States, that may be born beyond sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens[.] (emphasis added) According to the Wikipedia article and/or sources it cites, this is the only legislation to use the phrase "natural born citizens" and it seems clear this is intended to refer to Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution which states a requirement: No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty five years, and been fourteen Years a resident within the United States. (emphasis added) The 1790 Act was repealed and replaced in 1795, but the new law also contained the language (lacking "natural born"): The children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United States[.] The specific laws have been further changed, as the naturalization process has, reintroducing ambiguity about the "natural born" requirement, but birthright citizenship from parents is not in question and the "natural born" aspect is not in this question. So, to answer the question directly, the most crucial issue is: Were Cruz's parents citizens when Cruz was born? Cruz's Wikipedia page says his father was not naturalized until later, but his mother was born in Wilmington, DE, which is in the United States, and so unless she renounced her citizenship she would have been a US citizen at the time of Cruz's birth. This means there's a crucial issue: Did Cruz's mother renounce her US citizenship before Cruz was born? "Kaithar" commented on this answer with speculation that she voted in a Canadian election at a time (1947-1977) when Canada didn't recognize dual citizenship in that it required its own citizens to give that up if they acquired foreign citizenship; "user102008" refutes that. However, if we don't want to end this issue-identifying answer at that question, let's assume the answer is "no" and that Cruz's mother was a US citizen when Cruz was born. Then we have to see if birthright citizenship from parents extends to Cruz. For this, we can look to Public Law 414 (66 Stat. 236), passed June 27, 1952, especially section 301(a)(7): The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: [&hellip;] A person born outside the geographical limits of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is an alien, and the other a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, was physically present in the United States or its outlying possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than ten years, at least five of which were after attaining the age of fourteen years: Provided, That any periods of honorable service in the Armed Forces of the United States by such citizen parent may be included in computing the physical presence requirements of this paragraph. Side note: Section (4) (modern (d)) would matter if Cruz's father were considered a noncitizen national of the US, slightly relaxing the requirements so that the mother only had to spend only one continuous year in the US prior to the birth. The armed forces exemption was broadened Nov. 6, 1966 to cover the parent (or their parent's) nonmilitary employment by the US government or certain international organizations. If that's relevant, this answer can be edited to expand on this point. Section 309 of that law addresses children born out of wedlock, and says that section 301(a)(7) (quoted above) applies directly as if the parents were married, "if the paternity of such child is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation." To the best of my knowledge, section 301(a)(7) applies to Cruz. If I were wrong on that, we'd look to Section 309(c): A person born, after December 23, 1952, outside the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of such person’s birth, and if the mother had previously been physically present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of one year. The equivalent of the first quote today is in 8 U.S. Code § 1401(g) if parents are married at the time of a child's birth, replacing "ten years, at least five" with "five years, at least two" (Nov. 14, 1986; see Section 12 in this law). The quote from 309(c) is now 8 U.S. Code § 1409(c). So then the crucial question is: Did Cruz's mother spent the requisite period of time in the US before Cruz was born? Apparently she did, regardless of marital status, and if that's true it means Ted Cruz is a US citizen and has been since at least birth*. Again, the "natural born" aspect is omitted from this now-answered question. The answer to the question you meant to ask (perhaps "What's the most crucial issue when deciding if Senator Cruz's citizenship makes him eligible for the Presidency?") is "What does the phrase 'natural born citizen' mean in context of Article II, Section 1 of the US Constitution?" (*) Which may mean that he hasn't been a citizen his whole life, using a Cruz definition for when life begins. That's a separate discussion, though, and not very relevant to this one.
You're completely misreading the goals and purpose of the Export Controls Office - Overview. They regulate the transfer of US regulated information and technology, commodities, and software in the interest of national security and economic growth. Transfer and export are not the same as the use of technology that personal devices contain. The simplest thing to do is simply call the Export Controls Office, and they will explain the difference, and tell what you need to do and what is not required of you when traveling. Some countries do prevent the use of some personal tech or Apps, i.e. Russia and Signal, the encrypted phone app; but that has nothing to do with UC.
You are right, the entry and exit photos are only evidence that you were there. This is something they need to prove so the photos may only be for that. Their statement that you didn’t display a valid ticket/permit is, at present an unevidenced assertion. If you contest this, they will provide evidence that you didn’t (e.g. the actual records they refer to) and you would provide evidence that you did and, if it goes to court, the judge will decide what evidence they prefer. As this is not a criminal matter, they need to prove the offence on the balance of probabilities. However, there are almost certainly administrative remedies which will allow you to contest the fine without going to court. This would involve you sending them a copy of the permit and them assessing whether their belief that you didn’t display it is justified or not.
My own answer to the question is yes, but not directly. As with many other laws it would take a court ruling to definitively spell out how international agreements are applicable to a given situation. Unfortunately it doesn't seem that such a court ruling was ever produced so far: Google Scholar fails to list any US court cases relevant to the Convention on Road Traffic. The only somewhat relevant case is Busby v. State in which the court rules that one cannot drive in Alaska with an IDP after having been previously restricted from driving in Alaska. The court does stress out that: The Convention does forbid a signatory country (or subsidiary state) from imposing or enforcing license revocations in a manner that discriminates against residents of other signatory countries. But Busby does not claim that he was the victim of such discrimination. Busby's license was revoked for conduct that would have led to license revocation if committed by an Alaska resident. (Indeed, Busby's license was revoked while he was an Alaska resident.) And Busby does not claim that he was singled out for prosecution because he was a resident of a foreign country—i.e., that the State would not have charged him with the offense of driving with a revoked license if he had still been an Alaska resident. This could possibly mean that the court believes that the Convention only applies to foreign residents, but its not spelled out specifically. Searching for Canadian court cases likewise doesn't turn up anything useful. The only relevant case is R. v. Lawend where the person in question was trying to drive in Ontario on a foreign license after previously having had their Ontario license suspended. Here the court rules similar to the decision in Alaska in that having a foreign license does not allow one to circumvent locally imposed license restrictions. Searching for UK case law doesn't turn up any relevant court cases. Australian case law is likewise mute on the subject. There is also a relevant legal opinion by the Department of State quoted in the Digest of United States practice in International Law, 2002: Reading these provisions as a whole, we believe that the State of Georgia, consistent with the CRT, (1) must permit an alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license issued by a country party to the CRT only if the alien has been lawfully admitted to the United States; (2) must permit a lawfully admitted alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license of a CRT party only during the first year after the alien’s admission; and (3) may, in accordance with Georgia’s residency laws, require an alien resident in Georgia to obtain a Georgia driver’s license as a condition for continued authorization to drive. By the same token, nothing in the CRT would prevent the State of Georgia from applying more liberal rules with respect to the driving privileges of aliens. In Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 2014 the author further analyses how the 1949 Geneva Convention is applicable within the United States. First, to settle the definition of "international traffic": Nonetheless, the United States ultimately accepted that “the purpose of chapter II was to establish, in effect, an international code of minimum safety requirements. By indirection, the rules of the road set forth in the convention would apply to the pattern of domestic as well as to international traffic. The author the meaning behind Article I of the Convention: Article 1 states in part that no party “shall be required to extend the benefit of the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous period exceeding one year.” This provision, on its face, indicates that the parties recognized that the treaty would benefit individuals. In no way does this recognition compel a conclusion that the Convention is self-executing, but it does suggest that the treaty is of a type that the Senate might have understood to be directly enforceable. And finally on the issue of whether or not the treaty is "self-executing": For these reasons, it is likely that courts will continue to treat the Geneva Convention as self-executing. Nonetheless, a court might conclude that, with respect to section II’s rules of the road, the governmental obligation is merely to “take appropriate measures” and that such an obligation is too vague to be enforced judicially. So it seems absolutely clear that the Convention intended for participating countries to allow foreign drivers to drive abroad for up to one year. However international treaties are not self-executing by default in Canada, unlike the US: Canada is bound by the terms of treaties that it enters into and breach thereof may give rise to international claims. However, in Canada treaties are not self-executing; they do not constitute part of the law of the land merely by virtue of their conclusion. So even though British Columbia is violating the 1949 Geneva Convention one cannot directly rely on said international agreement to enforce their rights. But another state party could theorethically sue Canada on behalf of its citizen to request that Canada rectifies its laws with accordance to the agreement.
This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.