Could the 14th amendment, section 3, keep Trump from holding office for a second term? It seems widely agreed upon that even if a President breaks a law, he can only be removed from office through the impeachment process. However, could an incumbent president who wins a second term be kept from being seated due to the 14th amendment (section 3)? It reads (emphasis mine): Section. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. Apologies because this is a multi-part, not-straightforward question: Does the above bolded part correspond to breaking any specific laws? That is, how would one show that a person engaged in insurrection or rebellion, or given comfort to enemies? If this could be demonstrated by finding someone guilty of a particular law, in theory couldn't someone bring federal charges against Trump for doing so? (assuming one of his many bad faith acts like cooperating with Russian election interference, or tweeting classified information appeared to be breaking said law). Couldn't this happen even if a Republican controlled senate decided not to remove him from office after being impeached? That is, even if it wouldn't cause him to be removed from office, couldn't he, separate from impeachment, be convicted of a crime while still holding office? If he was found convicted of a crime which fit the above bolded passage (and didn't engage in some shenanigans like pardoning himself), who would keep him from taking office? (i.e. enforce the law). I apologize if I'm grossly misinterpreting things here. My background knowledge is just from Wikipedia and constitution.findlaw.com, and I couldn't find any articles dealing with Trump and the 14th amendment, section 3 (all results were about him trying to unilaterally change citizenship laws, so for a different section).
I apologize if I'm grossly misinterpreting things here. You are grossly misinterpreting things here. Your mistakes aren't terribly uncommon, but you are completely and totally wrong in what you are suggesting. Does the above bolded part correspond to breaking any specific laws? That is, how would one show that a person engaged in insurrection or rebellion, or given comfort to enemies? The language intentionally mimics the only crime defined in the U.S. Constitution, which is treason, defined in U.S. Constitution, Article III. If this could be demonstrated by finding someone guilty of a particular law, in theory couldn't someone bring federal charges against Trump for doing so? (assuming one of his many bad faith acts like cooperating with Russian election interference, or tweeting classified information appeared to be breaking said law). None of the things you imagine could constitute treason. 'Enemy&quot; is a term of art that means a country that the United States is actually at war with, militarily, by providing aid and comfort to the other side that aides them in waging war with the U.S. Cooperating with Russian election interference isn't treason. Inaction isn't treason. The President probably has an absolute legal right to disclose information that is classified for national security purposes. The President is immune from civil and criminal liability for his official acts while he is President. If the President, from his private funds, and not as part of his officially duties, personally paid Taliban soldiers bounties to shoot and kill American soldiers, that might be treason (since the U.S. is at war, within the meaning of the treason statute, with the Taliban). Cooperating with Russia, despite the fact that it has done so is not treason. Even then, federal prosecutors would not press these federal charges against the President while the President was in office. And, the President would be immune, in all probability, to state treason charges for conduct while in office. So the President would have to be prosecuted after leaving office. On the other hand, Section 3 of the 14th Amendment does not require a criminal conviction to be effective. The intent of Section 3 of the 14th Amendment was to deny civil rights in the post-Civil War governments of the United States by Confederate officials and military officers. In practice, Congress used the authority it was granted to remove political disabilities from all but about 500 of the hundreds of thousands or millions of people eligible for this treatment under the 14th Amendment. Couldn't this happen even if a Republican controlled senate decided not to remove him from office after being impeached? That is, even if it wouldn't cause him to be removed from office, couldn't he, separate from impeachment, be convicted of a crime while still holding office? The federal government prosecutes treason. Ultimately, the President is the one who decides whom the federal government prosecutes. So, the President as a practical matter could not be convicted of treason while still holding office, even if he committed acts which actually constitute treason, unlike anything could be plausibly alleged in this case. If he was found convicted of a crime which fit the above bolded passage (and didn't engage in some shenanigans like pardoning himself), who would keep him from taking office? (i.e. enforce the law). A future President can pardon the crime of treason by a former President. Ford pardoned Nixon of crimes that Nixon committed, and many Presidents have pardoned treason convictions at times close to the adoption of the U.S. Constitution and to the adoption of the 14th Amendment. But this just can't come up in this case. You'd need a treason to have been committed before someone was elected.
Yes. US Constitution, at Article two, Section two, provides that the President has the power to nominate the justices and appointments are made with the advice and consent of the Senate. There is nothing restricting the President from doing this on any particular day from beginning to end of his term, and also no restriction on when the Senate may give their advice and consent.
It says if some portion of the electorate is deprived of the right to vote then the state looses an equal proportion of its representation in Congress (and therefore electoral college votes). There is an exception &quot;rebellion, or other crime&quot;. So if a state disenfranchises X% of the population for rebellion or crime they do not lose X% of their representatives/electors.
18 USC 1752: (a) Whoever— (1) knowingly enters or remains in any restricted building or grounds without lawful authority to do so; [...] shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). (b) The punishment for a violation of subsection (a) is— (1) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, if— (A) the person, during and in relation to the offense, uses or carries a deadly or dangerous weapon or firearm; or (B) the offense results in significant bodily injury as defined by section 2118(e)(3); and (2) a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, in any other case. (c) In this section— (1) the term “restricted buildings or grounds” means any posted, cordoned off, or otherwise restricted area— (A) of the White House or its grounds, or the Vice President’s official residence or its grounds; [...] An ex-president does not have &quot;lawful authority&quot; to occupy the building. They may be not only removed, but also arrested and criminally prosecuted. &quot;Squatter's rights&quot; or other eviction protections would come from the District of Columbia's local laws, over which federal law takes precedence. So they would not apply here.
Charged: yes. Another answer has mentioned incitement to riot in 18 USC 2101. There is also incitement to insurrection in 18 USC 2383. This carries with it upon conviction a prohibition on holding office under the United States, both in the federal law itself and also via Amendment 14 of the Constitution of the United States. There are laws under which charges could be brought, and there is certainly no impediment to bringing them after M. Trump's term of office ends. Bringing them before then raises questions of presidential immunity, but I strongly doubt that speaking at the start of a &quot;Save America March&quot; can be construed as an action in any official Presidental capacity. Convicted: only maybe. M. Trump's statements have to extend beyond what is protected by Amendment 1 and actually be incitement to insurrection. Although there is a strong case that seeking to kill the Vice President of the United States (&quot;Where's Mike Pence?&quot; as people shouted) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives (&quot;Tell Nancy we're coming for her!&quot;), seeking to obstruct the function of the Congress, and seeking to remove the Electoral College certificates, are indeed insurrection; as possibly is whatever the woman who refused to stop brandishing a knife at the door of the building was intending to do; reading the transcript of the whole speech given at the start of the &quot;Save America March&quot;, it is difficult to point to where M. Trump specifically incited any of those things. One can make circumstantial arguments, but the words actually uttered then and there merely encouraged marchers on a &quot;Save America March&quot; to march to the Capitol and cheer people on, &quot;demand&quot; that congresspeople &quot;do the right thing&quot;, and &quot;make your voices heard&quot;. This is in contrast to M. Trump's son and daughter in law who explicitly mention &quot;fight&quot;, &quot;fighter&quot;, and &quot;fighting&quot;, 7 times by Eric Trump by my count and 4 times by Lara Trump. And of course Rudy Giuliani not only said &quot;fight&quot; but also proposed &quot;trial by combat&quot;. In more potential criminal trouble than even them is lawyer and prominent Trump supporter, L. Lin Wood, who explicitly called, without equivocation, several times over a period of days, on Twitter and on Parler, for the Vice President of the United States to be executed by firing squad. There will certainly be mixed fortunes in the Trump family from this. Whilst there may be a case against Eric and Lara, and possibly Donald Sr.; Ivanka Trump did not speak beforehand that I know of, and is reported afterwards to have asked her father to go and speak to the mob about stopping, which she also did directly, albeit ineptly (&quot;American Patriots — any security breach or disrespect to our law enforcement is unacceptable. The violence must stop immediately. Please be peaceful.&quot;), herself via Twitter for a short while.
Yes the Senate could adopt a secret ballot rule, but other constitutional provisions combined with high partisanship make it practically impossible that the final results will be done through secret ballot. As other answers have mentioned, Article 1, Section 3, provides for the Senate to have sole power of trying impeachments. Similarly by Article 1, Section 5, each House may adopt its own rules. That means that yes the Senate can create its own rules that say the conviction vote will be done by secret ballot. However, adopting these rules only achieves a pyrrhic secret ballot. The very same section that provides for each house to make its own rules (Article 1, Section 5) also states: ...and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the Journal. This means that if any vote is taken including this secret ballot vote, after doing so any member can ask for the Yeas and Nays of all members to be put into the Journal. The journal is the official record of each House. Thus while the vote was first taken in secret at least any member of the Senate will have access to the subsequent recorded vote, provided at least 1/5 of the Senate wishes to have a recorded vote. While not all is lost, the Senate could declare that this record itself is to remain secret, all 100 Senators and most likely many of their staff members will know how each Senator voted. Additionally, the Speech and Debate Clause states that: for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. Thus if a Senator were to publicly read the vote results into the record of a public committee hearing or during a filibuster or for really any other procedure (as rules of germane debate are very very lax in the Senate, but that is an issue for another question) that information could easily become public record. So while yes the rules can be changed to use secret ballot, a fifth (20 Senators currently) could ask for the Yeas and Nays to be entered on the Journal and this defeats the purpose of the secret ballot. So the only reasonable way to keep a secret ballot as the final dispositive record of a vote is to convince more than 4/5ths of the Senators to not ask for a recorded vote. In this sense it is certainly allowed and possible for the Senate to vote by secret ballot.
An oath of office cannot be legally enforced through the courts, other than to demand that officials take it in order to take office, and to bar people who have taken it and then engaged in treason or sedition from holding public office in any federal, state, or local office, military or civilian, in the United States. This is something which is required of all federal and state and local public officials under the U.S. Constitution, which states in the third paragraph of Article VI: The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States. The U.S. President's parallel oath of office is found in the last paragraph of Section 1 of Article II of the U.S. Constitution. It states: Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation: — &quot;I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.&quot; But, while taking the oath is required, it is also the case that: An oath is not justiciable. The FBI cannot investigate adherence to oaths because they are not enforceable as codified law. A prosecutor cannot establish that an oath has been broken by proving certain legal elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and a judge cannot adjudicate it. There is one exception to this rule, however. Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. So, an oath of office does impose a justiciable duty to not engage in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or give aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States, upon pain of not being able to hold any state or federal, military or civilian public office without a two-third majority waiver from Congress (in addition to any other consequences that may flow from this conduct without regard to having taken an oath). But, this is a very slight slap on the wrist indeed for committing treason or engaging in sedition (which are criminally punishable by decades in prison or death) after having sworn this oath. Justice Joseph Story noted in his &quot;A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States&quot; (1842) that: A President, who shall dare to violate the obligations of his solemn oath or affirmation of office, may escape human censure, nay, may even receive applause from the giddy multitude. But he will be compelled to learn, that there is a watchful Providence, that cannot be deceived; and a righteous Being, the searcher of all hearts, who will render unto all men according to their deserts. Considerations of this sort will necessarily make a conscientious man more scrupulous in the discharge of his duty; and will even make a man of looser principles pause, when he is about to enter upon a deliberate violation of his official oath. The purpose of an oath of office is simply to deny public offices to people who are not willing to publicly state that the legal system in which the people taking them will operate is legitimate. An oath to support the constitution is the modern equivalent of the feudal European ritual of &quot;bending the knee&quot; to one's legitimate feudal superior. This ritual was highlighted, for example, in the Game of Thrones books by R. R. Martin, which is based loosely on the fights over legitimacy in 15th century England's &quot;War of the Roses&quot;. Another legacy of this historical tradition is the duty of someone in military service to salute his or her superior officer. As a historical note, these seemingly toothless rituals have, historically, been surprisingly effective a screening out hard core extremist leaders trying to bring down a government based upon claims that the whole system is illegitimate when new regimes are established, and following civil wars and insurgencies. Many regimes, democratic and non-democratic, in Western political history, have imposed similar requirements. When they have done so, this has seriously influenced the political tactics used by factions that deny the legitimacy of the state and its incumbent leaders. Simply taking the oath undermines one's credibility as an insurgent leader, even if one does so in bad faith. In the United States, oaths of office were also key preconditions to the post-conflict settlements if the Whiskey Rebellion, the Civil War, and some of the lesser known episodes of a century of Indian Wars. As a more recent example, the requirement of an oath of office has materially influenced the 20th and 21st century political tactics of Sinn Féin, a political movement in Ireland, seeking to make the U.K. political subdivision known as Northern Ireland, which it deems illegitimate, a part of the Republic of Ireland. Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), distinguished between a Congressional determination that someone has not satisfied the constitutionally established requirements to have an oath of office administered to them after they have been elected, which can be made by majority vote, and a Congressional determination that a member of Congress should be expelled by a two-thirds majority vote of the house of Congress to which the member of Congress has been elected. A Congressional vote to expel a member of Congress is a non-justiciable question that is not tied to the content of the member's oath of office. Similarly, judicial and executive branch officials in the federal government may be impeached by Congress, and removed from office through that process, only for &quot;high crimes and misdemeanors&quot; and not merely for otherwise failing to live up to their oath of office in a non-criminal manner (although what constitutes &quot;high crimes and misdemeanors&quot; is also a non-justiciable political question). Some legal authorities, however, have held that in some contexts, the oath of office does reflect an intent to empower executive branch officials to refuse to enforce what the President believes to be unconstitutional legislation, when its constitutionality has not yet been definitively adjudicated yet. But, courts have also held, for example, that a member of the U.S. military does not have standing to bring a suit claiming that military action in which he is involved was unconstitutionally authorized. This decision was reached on the grounds that the claim that the service member was forced to violate that service member's oath of office does not constitute a justiciable &quot;injury in fact&quot; to that member for standing to sue purposes. Smith v. Obama, No. 16-843, 2016 WL 6839357 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2016) at page 10 (as discussed here).
First, the practical answer is no: even if they ordered the President to go to war, the President can just refuse. The military is generally in the habit of listening to orders from the President, particularly if the question is "do we or do we not go to war;" the courts do not have the power to command the armed forces. They could try issuing an injunction instructing the military to go to war, but the injunction would be ignored. They could try holding people in contempt, but the President is in charge of almost all federal law enforcement (and can pardon criminal contempt), so that's not going to work. And even if the President could be punished for contempt, if he thinks intervening will result in the annihilation of the human race in a thermonuclear war, he will not issue the orders. But that's assuming the courts would even try to intervene. They wouldn't. Courts don't generally want to issue orders that they know will be ignored. In this case, the relief being sought (i.e. an order to do something) is a kind of relief that is up to the discretion of the court. So even if a court would be legally justified in issuing that order, they have an easy out. (For damages claims, Congress can just refuse to appropriate any money to satisfy them; no federal money can be spent unless Congress appropriates it). There's an even earlier out, though. Courts are not political branches of government; one of the basic rules of jurisprudence is that courts should not get involved in deciding something that's really up to the elected branches. Baker v. Carr had a list of factors to consider: a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Foreign relations in general is very often grounds for deference, as is military strategy. Courts are utterly unqualified to determine proper diplomatic or military actions to take, or to evaluate whether the President's actions were enough to meet the requirement of "do what's necessary to restore security;" foreign policy is a case where a country needs a unified face (because other countries aren't particularly willing to deal with US internal politics), and where the courts could easily screw up what the government is doing; and whether to send Americans to war is a question that is clearly a matter for those accountable to the people. So, federal courts cannot analyze this question to decide whether or not the government has done anything wrong; it's for the other two branches to decide.