During your trial, the Supreme Court of the US agrees to hear an appeal of a relevant precedent case. What is the law that you are presumed to know? Imagine a court case in progress in the USA, specifically a case at the first level of the courts (i.e. it is a district court case and the court is a trial court, not any kind of appeal court). During the trial, the judge, plaintiff and defendant are all in agreement that a particular case is relevant as a precedent. However, that precedent case was decided at a lower level of appeal than the Supreme Court. During the district court trial case, the Supreme Court agrees to hear an appeal of the precedent case. I can imagine two opposite points of view: (1) Given that the Supreme Court is the highest appeal court in the USA, its decision will be important, and the trial should be suspended until that important decision has been made. (2) People are presumed to know the law, but it's not possible to know what future decisions the Supreme Court of the USA will make. Therefore, the existing written precedents should be relied upon in their present form, and the case at trial should continue without delay. We also have the possibility that, for example, the plaintiff anticipates, based on knowing the track records of the judges on the Supreme Court, that the Supreme Court will reverse the judgment of the first appeal court in the precedent case. If that reversal would be good for the plaintiff, then the plaintiff could use argument (1) above. If such a reversal would be bad for the plaintiff, then the plaintiff could use argument (2) above. How does the trial court judge decide whether to suspend the trial or to continue the trial without delay? What does the law say is supposed to happen?
Why does someone need to know? Supreme Court decisions are effective to all cases at trial or on direct appeal when decided, so long as the issue it resolves are raised in the trial court. Judges generally don't suspend cases because a case that could change the law is pending. If the decision comes out shortly after the trial, the judge can overturn the result in a post-trial motion. If the decision comes out later, the issue can be raised on appeal. A smart plaintiff raises favorable issues that could be decided in his or her favor in pending appellate cases to leave the door open for that possibility. If the law is unsettled, the judge makes a best guess about how the higher courts will resolve it and is effectively free to choose either outcome knowing that the result is uncertain. If there is binding precedent on an issue at the time, the judge must follow it, even if there is a likelihood that it could be reversed on appeal. People are presumed to know the law, but it's not possible to know what future decisions the Supreme Court of the USA will make. Therefore, the existing written precedents should be relied upon in their present form, and the case at trial should continue without delay. This kind of consideration is mostly relevant only in cases of &quot;qualified immunity&quot; and in certain kinds of federal habeas corpus petitions (which collaterally attack criminal convictions affirmed on direct appeal). In those cases, law enforcement conduct is not punished, and judicial decisions are not overturned, unless there was clearly established law at the time the decision was made that made the law enforcement conduct unconstitutional, or make the judicial decision a wrongly decided one. In all other contexts, what was believed to be the law at the time an action was taken, or a judicial decision was made, doesn't matter.
This is a Federal court decision There are no state courts involved. This was a ruling by the presiding judge of the original trial There is no appeal involved because the case wasn't final. This is a ruling on a Motion for Judgement of Acquittal Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure spells this out: After the government closes its evidence or after the close of all the evidence, the court on the defendant's motion must enter a judgment of acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The court may reserve decision on the motion, proceed with the trial (where the motion is made before the close of all the evidence), submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict.
The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.
The most innocent of your scenarios is "against the rules", so less innocent acts fair worse. The idea behind researching legal theory and precedent (presumably not presidents) is that surely it is good for a juror to know what the law is. But that thinking is wrong. The judge will instruct you as to what the law is, and will also instruct you that "the law" is limited to what he says it is. I will draw on the instructions for an antitrust case, Best Buy v. Toshiba, HannStar. The core instruction is: It is your duty to find the facts from all the evidence in the case. To those facts you will apply the law as I give it to you. The preliminary instructions (the pattern instructions for California civil trials) say the same basic thing: At the end of the trial, I will explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if you do not agree with the law. The judge instructs the jury that: When a party has the burden of proof on any claim or affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence, it means you must be persuaded by the evidence that the claim or affirmative defense is more probably true than not true. Your research might find alternative statements of the law out there, which seem entirely plausible. That doesn't matter: you have to set aside whatever ideas (about the law) that you've gotten from anybody besides the judge. In fact, if the judge makes a (serious) mistake and rules against a party in a manner that is contrary to established law, and you know this (it doesn't matter how), you are supposed to apply the law (including rulings during trial as to admissibility) as given to you by the judge. As for a case of a juror knowing that the judge was mistaken (specifically, knowing based on his pre-existing knowledge of statutes and case law – not based on forbidden research during a trial), we can get the "should" from the absolute instruction to follow the judges instructions. Additionally, if you read transcripts of voir dire (not a trivial task), you can observe judges probing attorneys who happen to be in the prospective pool, asking questions to determine whether that person can just do as they are told. But it would be difficult to establish a "hard rule". There never will be an instruction that says "You must follow my orders even if you know for a fact that my orders are wrong" – jury instructions never admit the possibility of judicial error.
When judges are finder of fact, the standard is one of deference to the trial court, but may be overcome if the trial court made a "clearly erroneous finding". See Concrete v. Const. Laborers, 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
A self-represented person, as a practical matter, has no choice but to engage with the court when an oral argument is conducted. A person present in a courtroom likewise has an obligation to acknowledge a judge addressing them. Usually it wouldn't be contemptuous to fail to appear at oral arguments of a fully briefed matter (e.g. a motion for summary judgment, or an appeal), but it would generally be viewed negatively. One could respond to a question from the court with &quot;I don't really have anything more to say, my brief speaks for itself.&quot; And, sometimes a court would leave it at that, but if the court insists there is really no other option than to clarify and explain yourself. Most often, this helps more than hurts a pro se party, although I've certainly seen cases with ghost written pleadings (which are authorized if disclosed in many jurisdictions) where this isn't the case. A fairly common tactic in civil litigation is the take a deposition of a party, or to call a party to the witness stand, and to ask them if they really want the relief that their filed legal documents says that they do, as a way to narrow the scope of the claims brought against the questioning lawyer's client. But, this is less of an issue with a pro se party when the person who drafted the legal documents and the person engaging in oral arguments are the same person. This can't be done in criminal litigation, but I could see a prosecutor trying to do something similar in oral argument, although usually in that context, the judge and not the prosecutor, is asking the questions.
The decision of a court consists of several things: The orders made A summary of the evidence The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the facts of the case are The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the law applying to those facts is The judge's reasoning from those findings of facts and law to the orders that were made (ratio decidendi) Reasoning on how things might have been decided otherwise (or the same way) if the facts or the law were different (obiter dicta). We hope that the judge is articulate enough that we can tell which is which. Where there is more than one judge there is more than one opinion. However, there is still ratio decidendi and obiter dicta across all the opinions. Typically, a dissenting judge disagrees with the ratio decidendi in whole or part and his reasoning about that is obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi – "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the principle that the case establishes" – creates binding precedent. The obiter dicta creates persuasive precedent. A binding precedent is just that – it binds the decisions of lower ranked courts in the hierarchy. If the facts of the current case match the facts of the precedent then the judge must follow the precedent even if they disagree with it – indeed there are many decisions where the judge expresses their disagreement with the precedent in no uncertain terms. In addition, there can be conflicting precedent, for example, where the High Court of Australia has made a decision on a piece of legislation that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of NSW on an essentially similar provision in a different Act. A wise judge in such a situation should do what McDougal J did in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190 and issue orders referring it to a court that can overturn one (or both) of the precedents. A persuasive precedent can influence the decisions of other courts – they are an authority a judge can look to in formulating their reasons but they are free to consider and reject them even if the facts match. Obiter dicta from same level or higher courts in the hierarchy is persuasive precedent as is ratio decidendi and obiter dicta from same level courts and courts in other jurisdictions.
I assume you are asking about horizontal stare decisis: a court following its own previous holdings or those of courts of coordinate jurisdiction (e.g. courts at the same &quot;level&quot; in the judiciary). I say this because your incredulity does not seem to extend to the notion that appellate courts can bind lower courts. You ask: why are prior judges’ powers of interpretations automatically seen to be more capable and robust than, so as to bind and prevail over, subsequent judges’ interpretative abilities? This is not the rationale for horizontal stare decisis. The doctrine is not at all based on the premise that the first court or judge to answer got it correct. Justification was given in a concurring opinion in R. v. Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33: Stare decisis promotes: (1) legal certainty and stability, allowing people to plan and manage their affairs; (2) the rule of law, such that people are subject to similar rules; and (3) the legitimate and efficient exercise of judicial authority (citations omitted). And horizontal stare decisis is not absolute. Common-law jurisdictions have developed limited avenues for departure. For example, in Canada, a lower court can depart from previous decisions of courts of coordinate jurisdiction when (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19): The rationale of an earlier decision has been undermined by subsequent appellate decisions; The earlier decision was reached per incuriam (“through carelessness” or “by inadvertence”); or The earlier decision was not fully considered, e.g. taken in exigent circumstances. Even apex courts have developed a sense of internal obligation to follow their own precedents. But departure from previous decisions may be justified where (see the Kirkpatrick concurrence at para. 202): The Court rendering the decision failed to have regard to a binding authority or relevant statute (“per incuriam”); The decision has proven unworkable (“unworkability”); or The decision’s rationale has been eroded by significant societal or legal change (“foundational erosion”). This has been viewed to &quot;strike the appropriate balance between the competing demands of certainty, correctness and the even-handed development of the law&quot; (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19). &quot;Adherence to precedent furthers basic rule of law values such as consistency, certainty, fairness, predictability, and sound judicial administration.&quot;