Legality of forcibly overthrowing the government of New Hampshire The constitution of the state of New Hampshire recognizes a "right of revolution". Has anyone used Article 10 as the legal justification for something they have done? In how many cases has it been successfully so used, and in how many unsuccessfully? What happened? [Art.] 10. [Right of Revolution.] Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.
Article 10 of Part I of the Constitution of New Hampshire (Article 10, Part II relates to classification of town governments) is mentioned in five reported appellate cases in the history of New Hampshire since it was adopted in 1784 that I could locate. It has never successfully been effective to protect the rights of anyone invoking it. (It is possible that it has been argued in a trial court on a jury nullification theory, but such cases wouldn't produce reported cases as criminal acquittals cannot be appealed by the government.) The cases, and the pertinent part of each ruling, are as follows: Orr v. Quimby, 54 N.H. 590, 619 (1874), it was held to create a moral rather than a legal right: The legal idea of a bill of rights is a declaration of private rights, annexed to and made a part of a constitutional grant of governmental power. Reservation is, in general, the purpose and legal meaning of such declaration. For exceptional reasons, applicable to the construction of article 10, the right of insurrection there declared is evidently a moral right, not reserved as a legal one. But many of the most important constitutional rights are reserved in terms much less imperative than "shall" and "shall not." The right of petitioning for a redress of grievances (the plaintiff's sole remedy, if the plea is good) is reserved by a simple declaration of the right, without a word literally signifying a command or prohibition. It was also addressed in the case Opinion of the Justices, 144 N.H. 374, 746 A.2d 981 (1999) where it was found to not invalidate a means of raising revenue for a municipal electrical utility: Question two inquires whether HB 536 "violate[s] the constitutional provision that government is instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men under part I, article 10 of the New Hampshire constitution?" We answer this question in the negative. Part I, Article 10 provides: Government being instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly [746 A.2d 987] endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind. This provision of our constitution has commonly been regarded as enumerating a citizen's right to reform an ineffectual or manifestly corrupt form of government. See City of Claremont v. Craigue, 135 N.H. 528, 533-34, 608 A.2d 866, 869 (1992); Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 50, 105 A.2d 756, 770 (1954). We have recognized for over one hundred years, however, that this provision is imbued with "[t]he principle of equality [that] pervades the entire constitution," State v. Pennoyer, 65 N.H. 113, 114, 18 A. 878, 879 (1889), and as such, Article 10 provides support for the maxim that "[t]he law cannot discriminate in favor of one citizen to the detriment of another." Id. Thus, Part I, Article 10 has been recognized as providing for more than a "right of revolution"; rather, it is one of many provisions in our Bill of Rights that forms the basis for a citizen's right to equal protection. See, e.g., Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 64, 67, 489 A.2d 600, 602 (1985) (zoning ordinance violated equal protection rights guaranteed by Part I, Articles 1, 2, 10, 12, and 14); Gazzola v. Clements, 120 N.H. 25, 29, 411 A.2d 147, 151 (1980) (statute violated equal protection rights guaranteed by Part I, Articles 1, 10, 12, and 14). Pursuant to the principle of equality inherent in Article 10, this court found that the raising of tax revenue to aid an electric utility would violate Part I, Article 10's mandate that government is "instituted for the common benefit ... of the whole community, and not for the private interest or emolument of any one man, family, or class of men." Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. 484, 489, 190 A. 425, 429 (1937). Aid to a utility is forbidden except in protection of the public welfare and interest. And the protection must be in a needed service furnished the public by the utility as a condition of the aid. Without the condition the protective principle is inapplicable. Unconditional aid is not a proper charge of government to be met by the taxpayers. 144 N.H. 382 Id. at 488-89, 190 A. at 428. The court noted that the existing public utilities already provided sufficient power to service State customers, and that any additional supply was sent out-of-state. Id. at 489, 190 A. at 429. The court reasoned that because the transmission of additional electric energy outside the State served no public purpose, and thus the need for public funds for additional development was a private, not public, purpose, the proposed aid was unconstitutional. Id. In this case, however, the legislature is proposing to create a tax exemption, rather than directly raising tax revenue to subsidize private purposes. Cf. Opinion of the Justices (Mun. Tax Exemptions for Indus. Constr.), 142 N.H. at 101, 697 A.2d at 124 (finding determinative under Part II, Article 5 that there was not direct expenditure, but rather a uniform exemption of state-wide application). Moreover, even if one views an exemption as simply a form of direct grant, see Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gilsum, 84 N.H. 1, 9, 146 A. 511, 515 (1929) (exemptions are "in effect, a compulsory payment of money, by those who bear their shares of the common burden, to the privileged person who does not bear his share"), the public benefit gained by this legislation is sufficient to render it constitutional. Our constitution does not require absolute equality of burden in the case of exemptions. "The resulting inequality or discrimination against unexempted property is not fatal to the constitutionality of the exemption," Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 490, 491, 178 A. 125, 126 (1935), provided "it advances a public purpose," Opinion of the Justices, 95 N.H. at 550, 65 A.2d at 701, and is "properly within the legislature's discretion in acting for the welfare of the state," Opinion of [746 A.2d 988] the Justices, 87 N.H. at 491, 178 A. at 126. As stated above, the benefit to be gained by HB 536 is increased competition and customer choice, and not necessarily the need for additional power. Further, deregulation of the electric utility industry is "properly within the legislature's discretion in acting for the welfare of the state," id., and it is proper for the legislature to enact exemptions that promote the economic well-being of the State, see Opinion of the Justices (Mun. Tax Exemptions for Indus. Constr.), 142 N.H. at 100, 697 A.2d at 123. Accordingly, the tax exemption is properly granted under the legislature's "constitutional power to provide for the common benefit, protection and security," Opinion of the Justices, 88 N.H. at 487, 190 A.2d at 428, and does not violate Part I, Article 10. To the extent that question two implicates additional equal protection guarantees under Part I, Article 10, cf. Gazzola, 120 N.H. at 29, 411 A.2d at 151, we conduct our analysis concurrently with the next question you posed; namely, whether HB 536 improperly classifies taxable property such that the burden of taxation is inequitably distributed, cf. Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 320-21, 197 A. 701, 706 (1938) (constitutional issue of classification decided under Part I, Article 10). For the reasons stated below, this part of question two is answered in the negative. In another case, City of Claremont v. Craigue, 135 N.H. 528, 608 A.2d 866 (1992), it was argued unsuccessfully, that voter approval cleansed an improperly adopted budget of the taint of improper steps taken prior to the vote: Finally, the respondents cite part I, article 10 of the New Hampshire Constitution, known as the right of revolution, as a general right to self-determination. Part I, article 10 provides in pertinent part that "whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, [135 N.H. 534] or establish a new government." Without in any way detracting from the continuing validity and truth of part I, article 10, we find that none of [608 A.2d 870] the conditions specified in that article have been met in this case. Prohibiting voter ratification of a city's budget hardly "perverts" the ends of government or manifestly endangers public liberty, so long as the city's voters retain the right to elect their local representatives. Moreover, the defendants have not exhausted all other legal means of redress, since, as we noted above, the legislature has set forth a statutory procedure for charter revision, and that option remains available to the voters of Claremont. Therefore, the respondents' proposed revisions to the Claremont city charter are invalid, and of no effect. It was brought up, without success, in In re Town of Bethlehem, 154 N.H. 314, 911 A.2d 1 (2006), but I don't have access to that particular opinion in which an environmental regulation was challenged. It was raised in Nelson v. Wyman, 99 N.H. 33, 105 A.2d 756 (1954) where the court concluded that it did not invalidate a McCarthy era law: It is also strongly urged by the plaintiff that the Legislature of this state cannot proscribe activities looking to the overthrow of government by force or violence because of Article 10 of the Bill of Rights which provides, in part, that ‘whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought, to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind’. With this interpretation we cannot agree. The right reserved to the people by this Article is not such a broad and unlimited right of insurrection and rebellion as to permit any group which is dissatisfied with existing government to lawfully attempt at any time to overthrow the government by force or violence. It is not claimed by the plaintiff that ‘the ends of government’ are now ‘perverted’, ‘public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress * * * ineffectual’ but it is only when those conditions prevail that the right to resist and to ‘reform the old, or establish a new government’ exists. The right possessed by the people of this state as a protection against arbitrary power and oppression cannot be utilized to justify the violent overthrow of government when the adoption of peaceful and orderly changes, properly reflecting the will of the people, may be accomplished through the existing structure of government. 99 N.H. 51 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501, 549, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137. To require a government representative of the people, in the face of preparations for revolution by force, to refrain from acting to curb the [105 A.2d 771] outbreak of violence and to confine itself solely to holding answerable those persons who have committed crimes of violence and terrorized the community in the name of revolution must result in anarchy. Dennis v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. 501, 71 S.Ct. 857. Article 10 was not intended to accomplish this result. So far as the circumstances of this case have required an examination of the 1951 act, we conclude that it is constitutional upon its face, so as to furnish a basis for the resolution of 1953.
In other words, what thoughts regarding freedoms and rights from the founders of a nation support a leader taking supreme power over its Congress? Generally speaking, one doesn't take "supreme power over Congress", one instead, disregards laws duly enacted by Congress or express mandates of the Constitution, including those related to cooperation with Congress. The most notable recognized deviations from Congressional direction that are recognized (at least by some people) are: The authority of the President to direct the military as commander-in-chief, and to a lesser extent, to conduct foreign policy. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. This power is balanced with the power of Congress to declare war and regulate the military via the War Powers Resolution of 1973 which has never really been tested in a "when push comes to shove" kind of way so far. The War Powers Resolution (a.k.a. the War Powers Act) requires the President to seek Congressional approval for new conflicts that arise that could become wars and predominantly Presidents have done so without necessarily acknowledging that they are obligated in a constitutionally valid way to do so. The closely related power to unilaterally employ military force to ensure a Republican form of government or to respond to an invasion or insurrection or at the request of a governor, "domestic violence" without Congressional authorization. U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. Related to this is the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9: The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. In practice, however, this theoretically unilateral power of the President has never been very meaningful, because no President has ever sought to invoke it in circumstances in which he didn't already have solid and prompt legislative support from Congress. For example, the suspension of habeas corpus by President Lincoln during the U.S. Civil War was backed by legislation from Congress, the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act of 1863. But, the emergency power to limit the right of habeas corpus has been significantly restricted by U.S. Supreme Court case law: In ex parte Milligan, the United States Supreme Court held that the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act [of 1863] did not authorize military tribunals, that as a matter of constitutional law the suspension of habeas corpus did not itself authorize trial by military tribunals, and that neither the Act nor the laws of war permitted the imposition of martial law where civilian courts were open and operating unimpeded. The emergency powers of the President to use the military domestically are also limited by the Posse Comitatus Act and related legislation, which prohibits the use of the military to enforce civilian laws domestically in most circumstances, absent an invasion or insurrection. The authority to pardon someone who has violated the law. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2. The authority to veto legislation subject to Congressional override. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7. The authority to not spend all funds that are authorized by Congress for a purposes that are not entitlements. This is implied in case law subject to limitations in a 1974 Act of Congress. This is called "impoundment of appropriated funds." But, one of the strongest limitations on Presidential power is that the President may not spend any money not appropriated by law by Congress. The President can constitutionally spend less than is appropriated by Congress, subject to the Impoundment Act of 1974, but not more. Since the Constitution prohibits many kinds of long term binding contracts and prospective appropriations that would bind future Congresses (except for the Naval contracts), see U.S. Constitution, Article I, this leaves the President on a fairly short leash and fairly accountable to Congress. The authority to exercise discretion in not fully enforcing all violations of the law. This is implied in case law, especially, the law of prosecutorial discretion. The prosecutor's broad discretion in such areas as initiating or foregoing prosecutions, selecting or recommending specific charges, and terminating prosecutions by accepting guilty pleas has been recognized on numerous occasions by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 762 (1997); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); United States v. Fokker Services B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 741 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Powell v. Ratzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965). This discretion exists by virtue of the prosecutor's status as a member of the Executive Branch, and the President's responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that the laws of the United States be "faithfully executed." U.S. Constitution, Article II § 3. See Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Complete executive branch control of prosecutorial discretion, however, has been limited by the creation of independent agencies within the federal government and by the enactment of laws authorizing the appointment of a special prosecutor, like Robert Mueller, in cases where there is a risk of a conflict of interest from the President. The authority to refrain from enforcing laws determined to be unconstitutional when that determination is not contrary to the controlling judicial branch ruling. This is implied in case law and in the duty to faithfully execute the constitution. U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 1. This is closely related to prosecutorial discretion. Sovereign immunity as applied to executive branch officials including the President, is mostly a product of case law although it has some statutory acknowledgement in relatively pedestrian claims like lawsuits for ordinary tort liability against the United States seeking money damages which must usually be brought in the U.S. Court of Claims, if they are allowed at all (with an important exception established in the Bivens case). Case law has also recognized an "executive privilege" against forced disclosure of certain information by the executive branch although the scope of this privilege, which arises only from case law, is disputed. Only a handful of cases have addressed this, the most famous of which is United States v. Nixon discussed at the link. There is also an unanswered question regarding when, if ever, a President's actions are clear and intentional violations of the law, and yet still might not constitute impeachable offenses set forth in U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 4, or what remedies are available when an impeachable offense is committed but Congress is unwilling or unable (perhaps due to Presidential action) to conduct impeachment proceedings. Other than these circumstances, the U.S. Constitution does not contemplate that the President has emergency powers of any kind. There are few precedents in which the President has defied the law and the will of Congress more generally based upon a claim of emergency powers. The emergency powers of the President, in particular, and government, in general, are qualitatively and quantitatively, different from emergency powers in most other countries, which are, generally speaking, more expansive and have more formal recognition in the governing documents and laws of the countries in question. For example, while a bipartisan coalition in the U.K. suspended elections during World War II, the United States has never, ever, under any circumstances suspended an election (except during the U.S. Civil War in the Confederate States, where the Confederacy that was the de facto regime there held its own elections instead). Specific Legislation Despite its name, the National Emergencies Act of 1976, doesn't really address the question. Analytically, this is just a law authorizing the President to do certain things under certain circumstances, just like any other law, and not a law that gives the President "supreme power over Congress". It is more like the laws governing disaster relief, which authorize the President, subject to specific criteria, to determine that a situation is a national disaster, upon which determination certain federal assistance is authorized. This is why, even though scores of "emergencies" have been declared, many of which are still in force, they don't feel, to the general public, like "emergencies." To the extent that the National Emergencies Act purports to go further, in ways not expressly authorized by the U.S. Constitution, it is an unconstitutional violation of the non-delegation doctrine and isn't a valid law. So, for example, Congress cannot delegate all of its law making power to the President via regulations. The Supreme Court ruled in J. W. Hampton, Jr. &amp; Co. v. United States (1928) that: "In determining what Congress may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination." So long as Congress "shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power." For example, Congress is not constitutionally permitted to give the President line item veto power. Clinton v. City of New York (U.S. 1996). Isn't the executive branch supposed to just execute? I.e. Execute the bills proposed by the party he represents, as supported by that party's allies? The Executive branch is supposed to "execute" although it has considerable discretion in how it does so and has some express instances of unilateral power like the veto power and the pardon power. But, the Executive branch is supposed to "execute" the laws enacted by Congress, not "the bills proposed by the party he represents, as supported by that party's allies." From a legal and constitutional perspective, until a bill is passed by Congress and duly enacted as a law, the Executive branch not only can, but must, ignore them, in any capacity other than as one more lobbyist before Congress among others, on a hypothetically equal footing as everyone else (except that the President has the veto power and the VP can cast tie votes in the Senate, per Article I of the U.S. Constitution).
Before the election, can a lawsuit prevent the amendment question from being put on the ballot? No. Generally speaking, the constitutionality of an otherwise procedurally proper ballot initiative is not ruled upon until after it has passed (eliminating the need to rule unnecessarily on the constitutionality of failed initiatives). Of course, if someone tried to put it in the ballot when the existing law conditions for putting it on the ballot were not met (e.g. because a deadline for doing so wasn't met) that could be challenged in court by a party with standing to do so. If passed into the constitution, would a court still have the ability to rule the restrictions unconstitutional? Probably not. The constitution as newly adopted doesn't sound like it would forbid doing that. This seems to be the whole point of the constitutional amendment in the first place and it the amendment to the constition is approved, that requirement is gone.
Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.
No, there is no obligation to repeal It is common for statutes held to be unconstitutional to be left on the books decades later, and for others which quite likely would be so held if anyone tried to enforce them to be similarly left for even longer periods. It is somewhat less common for state constitutional provisions, but it does happen, and as those commonly take more than a simple legislative act, there is even less motivation to go through the troublesome process in such cases. There are even a few provisions in the US constitution which have become obsolete, but not actually amended away. For example, the so-called 'three-fifths compromise', which counted slaves as worth 3/5ths of a person for computing representation, was effectively repealed by the Civil War and the 13th amendment, but was not formally removed. That section was actually formally replaced by the 14th.
Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes.
The Magna Carta acted as an origin of many legal concepts of today, includng the English, and thus US, common law system. It clearly affected the Founders' views of government and was instrumental in creation of the US constitution. But no provision of the Magna Carta would be considered on its own to be valid US law.
You are deeply confused, probably by the blogs of a conspiracy theorist (perhaps discussing the Sovereign Citizen Movement mentioned in the comments), whom it would be helpful for you to reference. In fact, people with and without lawyers claim common law rights in the ordinary courts of the UK every day, in the lion's share of civil lawsuits. For example: There is a common law right to sue for damages when someone breaches a contract by not paying a bill that they owe. A defendant, meanwhile, has a common law right to defend against such a suit on grounds, for example, that the debt has been paid or that the debt is not owed because there was no agreement to pay in the first place. The substantive right of an owner of real property to evict a tenant who breaches a lease arises at common law, even though statutes spell out the process for enforcing that right. Furthermore, the way that ownership of real property is established (i.e. through a chain of title involving purchases by deeds) likewise arises at common law. The defendant meanwhile has a common law defense to a claim for rent for the remainder of the period in a lease after an eviction for failure of the landlord to mitigate damages if the landlord does not make a reasonable effort to find a new tenant. The right to sue someone who negligently caused an accident that injured you is a common law right.