Does Mens rea need to be concious? Mens rea or &quot;guilty mind&quot; is the mental element of a person's intention to commit a crime; or knowledge that one's action or lack of action would cause a crime to be committed. It is a necessary element of many crimes. Consciousness is a tricky concept, but most/all of us recognise it in ourselves. It is uncertain exactly how much effect it has on our behaviour, with the famous Libet experiments indicating that in some situations at least it may not be involved in decision making that is otherwise assumed to be conscious. One thing we can agree on is that it is a function of the higher brain, the cerebrum, rather than the lower and more primitive parts of the brain that control things like our heart. Does a Mens rea need to be a conscious guilty mind to be found responsible for a crime, or does an unconscious mind have the capacity to be guilty? The case that I was thinking about was abortion, and the criminal liability that between elective and spontaneous abortion. If we regard the implications of the spontaneous abortions that occur following traumatic events, and we assumed that certain currently unknown scientific facts were determined: Consciousness does have an effector role on behaviour The spontaneous abortions that occur following traumatic events are mediated by the brain stem, ie. defiantly in the subconscious part of the brain This effect can be triggered consciously, perhaps by thinking about stressful things every few hours for a few days Given that causing an abortion is illegal in the jurisdiction considered, what would constitute a guilty mind in this situation? An abortion triggered by an extraneous stress (such as 9/11 as in the study), because the mind was involved? An abortion triggered by an internal stress, perhaps the decision to change jobs or move house? An abortion triggered by intentional stress, generated for the purpose of causing the abortion?
england-and-wales Automatism If a defendant ... can show that they committed a crime as the result of an involuntary act they may be able to plead the defence of automatism. Note that: It is up to the jury to decide whether the defence is made out and that the defendant was acting involuntarily due to an external factor.
There are numerous what-ifs. Society’s moral values and thus laws may change. Or the unlikely death of your wife makes this question moot. (Let’s hope not.) Yes, failure to render assistance is punishable under § 323c Ⅰ StGB. Everyone can commit this crime (Allgemeindelikt). However, this section concerns accidents, contingencies or other unplanned adverse events. In your specific case there is no element of “surprise” though, quite the contrary. Your wife does not even need to be aware of the circumstances; the assessment “is there an accident” is made objectively. Having said that, unfortunately there’s a difference of opinion how courts judge (case law) and how “legal scientists” (at law school) think. Ultimately it depends on what evidence investigators find. Frankly, § 323c Ⅰ StGB is a “minor issue” here. You can get at most “just” a one-year-sentence. And there’s the option to consider one’s own spouse’s death as poena naturalis, thus refrain from imposing any penalty because the grieving widow “won’t learn anything” from that, § 60 1 StGB←§ 153b StPO. I’d worry more about §§ 211 ff. (murder, manslaughter, etc.): To kill someone means, a) any short‑term shortening of lifetime through action, or b) in the case of § 13 StGB, any failure to potentially prolong the lifetime. § 13 StGB, Garantenstellung, also applies to spouses, cf. § 1353 Ⅰ 2 BGB. It could be argued that failure to take, say, a loaded firearm away from you constitutes manslaughter. Or, worse, maybe you’re particularly wealthy and she’ll inherit your assets. This could be construed as greed, an aggravating circumstance. At any rate it’s necessary that the omitted action makes a difference, i. e. prevents or at least inhibits the crime’s success (your death). At some point, with terminally-ill patients, you might say “he’ll die tomorrow anyway”. Then your wife could attend your suicide. Finally, for a legally airtight plan I’d seriously consider to change the jurisdiction though, e. g. by going to Switzerland. Everything happening here is subject to German criminal law, § 3 StGB. PS: Marriage can be viewed as a kind of contract. In principle you are completely free in formulating its terms. However, you cannot make provisions concerning termination of life (nichtdisponibles Rechtsgut).
The specific elements of the crime in question are going to be defined by Maltese law, which appears to be a blend of a European-style civil code with English-style common law. However, under ordinary Anglo-American standards, the alleged acts do seem to meet the legal definitions of these terms. At common law, an "assault" consists of placing someone in fear of an unwanted touching, and a "battery" is a completed assault; that is, an actual unwanted touching. If Mr. Suda, as alleged, took the victim's hand and touched it to his own genitals, without her consent, he committed an assault and battery. Any touching can constitute a battery, from a tap on the shoulder to a bullet in the head. Likewise, at common law, "violence" is any degree of physical force. If he tricked her into touching his genitals, that would not be a crime of violence; if he physically moved her hand to his genitals with his own hand, then he used physical force, or violence, to commit the crime. Again, what actually needs to be proven will depend on specifics you would need a Maltese lawyer to go into--but under general common law principles, neither "assault" not "violence" are particularly surprising.
canada The law &quot;The [Criminal] Code requires 'ongoing, conscious consent' to 'each and every sexual act' and can be revoked at any time.&quot; See R. v. Sweet, 2018 BCSC 1696, citing R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28. &quot;The definition of consent for sexual assault requires the complainant to provide actual active consent throughout every phase of the sexual activity. It is not possible for an unconscious person to satisfy this requirement, even if she expresses her consent in advance.&quot; R. v. J.A., para. 66. The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to decide &quot;whether or in which circumstances individuals may consent to bodily harm during sexual activity&quot; (R. v. J.A., para. 21). However, in the context of a non-sport fist fight or brawl, one cannot consent to another intentionally applying force that causes serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm: R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714.1 And at the provincial appellate level, it has been held that &quot;consent is not a defence to a charge of sexual assault causing bodily harm in circumstances where the accused has deliberately inflicted pain or injury upon a person that gave rise to bodily harm&quot; (R. v. Quashie (2005), 198 C.C.C. (3d) 337 (Ont. C.A.)). Consent would be irrelevant in a charge of criminal negligence or manslaughter, if the activities were to escalate this far (R. c. Deschatelets, 2013 QCCQ 1948, para. 175-77). The content of advance negotiations is not relevant to whether the complainant was consenting to the impugned conduct, however, it may be relevant as evidence of expectations about how consent would be communicated between the parties throughout the conduct. See R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, para. 93 (citations omitted): For example, in some cases, prior sexual activities may establish legitimate expectations about how consent is communicated between the parties, thereby shaping the accused’s perception of communicated consent to the sexual activity in question at the time it occurred. American scholar Michelle Anderson puts it this way: “… prior negotiations between the complainant and the defendant regarding the specific acts at issue or customs and practices about those acts should be admissible. These negotiations, customs, and practices between the parties reveal their legitimate expectations on the incident in question.” These “negotiations” would not, however, include an agreement involving broad advance consent to any and all manner of sexual activity. As I will explain, a belief that the complainant gave broad advance consent to sexual activity of an undefined scope will afford the accused no defence, as that belief is premised on a mistake of law, not fact. See also R. v. Sweet, 2018 BCSC 1696, para. 141: ... consenting adults may enjoy the personal autonomy to establish rules such as “no means yes”. If so, in my view, this passage suggests a corollary requirement to establish an alternative “safe word” or other mechanism to ensure that each party is also able to maintain their personal autonomy to put an end to unwanted sexual activity. Application A contract cannot provide advance consent, therefore it is irrelevant as to proof of consent during the acts. However, advance agreements can (and several courts suggests should) set out the expectations about how consent will be communicated. Any evidence of such agreements would be relevant to establishing the defence of &quot;mistaken belief in communicated consent.&quot; None of this would assist an accused in the circumstance where a court finds that any consent was vitiated because the accused deliberately inflicted pain or injury that gave rise to bodily harm (this position has not been confirmed by the Supreme Court). If you are simply asking how to prove a fact in litigation, see this Q&amp;A. 1. Since this is a judicially-developed limit, the conception of &quot;bodily harm&quot; used here does not necessarily have to match that codified in the Criminal Code. But: &quot;The common law definition of 'bodily harm' has been substantially incorporated in s. 245.1(2) of the Criminal Code, and means 'any hurt or injury to the complainant that interferes with the health or comfort of the complainant and that is more than merely transient or trifling'&quot; (R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633).
This is an objective test When a law requires “worry” (or any other state of mind), it is usually not the state of mind of the particular person but of a reasonable person in the same circumstances. The law does not ask “Were you worried?”, it asks “Would a reasonable person in your situation have been worried?” The fact that you have cynophobia is irrelevant if a reasonable person in your circumstances would not have it. Now, if this occurred at a facility for cynophobia treatment then the circumstances change from a reasonable person taken from the general population to a reasonable person who is attending such a facility; in those circumstances the reasonable person would be someone suffering from cynophobia. By the way, this test (worry or fear of harm) is essentially the same as the criteria of assault between humans.
Intent would greatly factor into the case. As mentioned, possession of child pornography is illegal. There was a case, where a man had inadvertently downloaded such images. In the case, it was shown that there was sufficient evidence that it was accidental and without his knowledge. Presumably, if you by happenstance created an identical code through encryption/compiling, there would be a lack of evidence of intent or evidence of your intended use. For example, your stored password manager file happens to store data identical to an illegal image. The password manager output is provable and repeatable to show that it was simply circumstantial. If you have hundreds of such outputs that all "just happen to be illicit images" you would probably fall on the wrong side of reasonable doubt. As to whether you can keep the data, the programmers for the password manager would probably update their system to modify the output to avoid bad press. The general idea is that the "illegal number" is so incredibly specific that accidental cases are very unlikely to occur, and if it did, that there would be forensic evidence indicating intent and use.
In law, there is a distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law. If the law prohibits X, and you think you're doing Y, that's a mistake of fact. If the law prohibits X, and you know you're doing X, but you think the law prohibits Y, that's a mistake of law. Mistake of fact is generally a defense (although that principle is being eroded), but mistake of law is not. In your hypothetical, you clearly had the intent to sell coffee, so you had mens rea. Mens rea refers to the intent to perform the act that is illegal, not the intent to break the law. If you intend to follow the law, but intentionally perform an act that is against the law, it is the latter that forms mens rea; mens rea refers to your intent regarding the act you are performing, not your intent regarding the law.
By definition this is not an intentional crime or tort (i.e. civil wrong for which one can sue). There are several standards of intent (also called mens rea) other than knowledge that one is committing a crime or intent to commit a crime, that are commonly applied to criminal offenses and torts: Strict liability Negligence Gross negligence Willful and wanton conduct Recklessness Extreme indifference Strict liability would be highly unlikely to apply to unintentional encouragement of violence. Usually, in the criminal context, it applies to traffic offenses, like speeding or drunk driving defined by blood alcohol content. Negligence is often a basis for liability in a lawsuit or for other civil remedies (e.g. cause to fire someone from their employment), but is usually only a basis for criminal liability when a death or very severe injury results (e.g. vehicular homicide) or when the circumstances are such that there is a heightened risk involved in an activity (e.g. discharging a firearm, or treatment of a small child in one's custody). Even then, for criminal law purposes, liability is usually only imposed in cases of truly &quot;gross negligence.&quot; One could imagine highly stylized fact patterns where gross negligence encouraging violence could give rise to criminal liability (e.g. gross negligence by the commander of a military unit under military justice) but this would be a rare and exceptional situation. Willful and wanton conduct, and recklessness, don't require actual knowledge or specific intent, but do presume disregard for objectively obvious risks. Under the Model Penal Code, this is the default standard of intent that applies when no specific standard is articulated in a statute. Unintentional but reckless conduct encouraging people to be violent might very well give rise to criminal liability. Extreme indifference (also sometimes called deliberate indifference) is an extreme form of recklessness in which one acts with total disregard for the consequences when one clearly knows or should know that serious consequences are almost certain, even if the precise consequences to whom or what are not known. This level of intent is often treated as equivalent to intentional conduct and would often give rise to criminal liability. There are many potentially relevant federal and state statutes that could apply, but this is the general lay of the land regarding unintentional conduct.