Could the President abolish the Supreme Court? Article II, Section 2, of the US Constitution states: [The President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law[.] At some point, most presidents have probably gotten annoyed by something the Supreme Court did. Could the President decide to stop appointing Supreme Court judges, in violation of this duty ("shall"), even to the point where no judges remain? This seems like it would be harder to do legally than the Senate abolishing the Court (see question on that over here). Alternatively, could the President satisfy his duty while still reaching the same end by nominating only candidates who (s/)he knows will never be confirmed (e.g. because they are nowhere near qualified)? Could is intended to refer to legally could; political feasibility considerations would be at Politics, not Law. A much narrower related question: Could President Obama do as Sen. McConnell says and leave the SCOTUS nominations to the next President?
As far as I know, no single president has ever been in office long enough to see all supreme court judges retire, resign or die. So waiving his right to appoint new judges would just achieve two things: He would have less judges in his favor than if he'd just appoint a new one. He would help the next president, possibly from the other party, who could then appoint more judges to his taste, or possibly reap the rewards by not doing so. I guess no sane president would do that (and no insane president, either).
No punishment followed because those policies are not the law, and, even it was found out earlier, no Inspector General would have the authority to dismiss Mrs. Cliton, it's POTUS's prerogative, as I understand it. That is true for maybe 10 people max in a government department. For the tens or hundreds of thousands of employees who weren't appointed by the President to serve at their pleasure, violating policies can lead to suspension, fines, or dismissal.
The pardons would stand and continue to be valid. There is a minority view that the &quot;except in cases of impeachment&quot; language in the pardon clause of the U.S. Constitution deprives a President of the pardon power after impeachment until there is a U.S. Senate non-conviction. But the majority view is that this clause merely states that the loss of political office and prohibition on seeking future political office resulting from a U.S. Senate conviction in an impeachment trial cannot be removed via the pardon power. In the majority view, a President has all of the powers and authority of the office, including the pardon power, until the moment of a U.S. Senate conviction following a impeachment by the U.S. House (or the end of his term of office due to resignation or expiration of the President's term of office). Neither view, of course, has ever been resolved authoritatively in the courts because it has never come up before historically. Also, a group pardon would not absolve the President himself of criminal liability. The majority view (again never tested because no President has ever attempted to do so) is that a President may not pardon himself at all. But all other persons who benefit from the pardon would be relieved of criminal liability as a result.
There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict­ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter.
Yes. In some common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and even some U.S. states, the government may under some circumstances refer a legal question to the appropriate Supreme Court (Privy Council in the U.K.) for an advisory opinion. These opinions are non-binding, but have large influence because they are often made by the same judges that would otherwise end up dealing with the question should it occur in a case. One common law country in particular stands out in this field: Ireland. Under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may, with some exceptions, refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. The referral is optional, but once made, the Supreme Court's decision is binding. The relevant portion: 3 1° In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill. [...] 3° In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced. This power was last used successfully in 2004.
The other answer is incorrect. In fact, the question you're asking turns on the meaning of the phrase &quot;the whole number of electors appointed.&quot; This could be interpreted either way, and as far as I know this ambiguity has never been considered by a court or by congress. It would only matter under the following conditions: Some states appoint fewer electors than the number to which they are entitled. The candidate with the greatest number of votes has more votes than half the number of electors actually appointed, but less than or equal to half the number of electors that should have been appointed. One way to look at this ambiguity is that it depends on how you parse the structure of the amendment. It could be either: a majority of (the whole number of electors) (appointed) a majority of the whole number of (electors appointed) In the first case, &quot;appoint&quot; refers to the sentence in Article 2 that specifies, determines, or &quot;appoints&quot; the number of electors. This reading is supported, for example, by the first definition of appoint at Merriam-Webster online, which is to fix or set officially, as in &quot;to appoint a trial date.&quot; However, if you look at Article 2, it says Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress. Here, appoint is used in its second sense, to name officially. This suggests that a failure by any state to appoint any elector to which it is entitled reduces &quot;the whole number of electors appointed&quot; because some available places in the Electoral College have not had anyone appointed to fill them. I favor the second interpretation, but I suspect that if the conditions outlined above actually did arise, Congress would choose the politically expedient interpretation. That is, if the candidate with the most votes was of the party in control of Congress, they would take the second interpretation, and if that candidate of the other party, they would take the first. I further suspect that the courts would not get involved.
Article IX, Section 5 of the constitution says: Removal by impeachment or address. Every person holding any civil office under this State, may be removed by impeachment, for misdemeanor in office; and every person holding any office, may be removed by the Governor on the address of both branches of the Legislature. But before such address shall pass either House, the causes of removal shall be stated and entered on the journal of the House in which it originated, and a copy thereof served on the person in office, that the person may be admitted to a hearing in that person's own defense. This provides at least some mechanism for removing an AG. A subcomittee of the Judiciary Committee of the Maine Legislature reports here on the broader question of tenure of office. p. 5 opines that "Many members of the executive branch of Maine government hold their offices at the pleasure of the Governor and may be removed from office by the Governor's direction to vacate". p. 6 then holds that "For civil officers whose tenure is set by the Constitution, removal from office may only occur through impeachment or address," and the Attorney General is enumerated as one of those Constitutional Officers (referencing Article IX Section 11). The State of Maine web page says that there are three branches of government plus three constitutional officers (state, treasurer, AG) and one statutory officer, thus the AG is not part of the executive branch (and thus the AG does not serve at the pleasure of the Governor).
Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple | Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.”