uk law, private prosecutions and the consent of the DPP In the UK, suppose you are bringing a private prosecution against some individuals. I believe that the person bringing the prosecution may terminate the case at any time. However, if the (DPP) charges are serious enough, you have to obtain the consent of the Director of Prosecutions. Does this mean, in such a case, the person bringing the prosecution gives up the right to terminate the case? Certainly (for something like say murder or perverting the course of justice) it would seem me to be odd that if the DPP gives consent for the case to go forward, then it must believe there is evidence for the crime.
The Crown Prosecution Service can always take over a private prosecution, regardless of whether consent was needed at an earlier stage. So they could always force it to proceed, or to stop (subject to whatever judicial control is in play for the stage of the proceedings). There are different ways of halting it depending on how far it has progressed and in which court, but the main point is that once the CPS has taken over, the original prosecutor is out of the picture. Where criminal proceedings are instituted in circumstances in which the Director is not under a duty to take over their conduct, he may nevertheless do so at any stage. (Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s.6(2); &quot;the Director&quot; is the Director of Public Prosecutions, who heads the CPS) But by current policy, the act of seeking the DPP's consent will mean that the CPS will either take over the prosecution and run with it, or else refuse consent so that it doesn't go forward anyway: If an offence requires the DPP's consent to prosecute, the private prosecutor must seek that consent. If the proposed prosecution passes the Full Code Test, the CPS will take over the prosecution. Conversely, if the proposed prosecution fails the Test, the DPP's consent to prosecute will not be given. The &quot;Full Code Test&quot; is an assessment of whether there is enough evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, and of whether prosecution would be in the public interest. This appears to be functionally the same policy for offences that need the DPP's consent (which can be delegated to other officials) or his personal consent (which can't). Some offences can only be prosecuted with the Attorney General's consent. The AG also has power to halt any prosecution, by entering a declaration of nolle prosequi, so could certainly terminate a prosecution to which she had previously consented. Additionally, I would expect that if someone sought the AG's consent for a private prosecution, she'd also refer it to the CPS to take over. If she didn't, but then wanted it to proceed after the original prosecutor had changed his mind, she could contact the CPS at that stage.
Whether or not one holds the opinion that the adult morally should be prosecuted, there are only two legal questions – can the adult be prosecuted, and must the adult be prosecuted? The easiest question to answer is the &quot;must&quot; one – prosecution by the government is always discretionary. It is settled law that the government can decline to prosecute a crime. The decision to prosecute is entirely political. It seems likely that the government can prosecute, if they conclude that the action was not legally justified under §418 of the Crimes Act 1900, as defense of another against a criminal assault. The government won't prosecute if they conclude that such a defense is likely to succeed.
It depends on the particular law in the particular jurisdiction in which you are charged. Most statute laws enumerate the defences that are available. In common law countries there is a general defence that (except in strict liability offences) the perpetrator must well ... perpetrate the criminal act; what you describe does not appear to meet that requirement. Other jurisdictions would not be so forgiving.
This is normal. It only seems imbalanced because only the prosecutor has been able to call witnesses so far. Under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 611: Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions. At this point, only the prosecution has put on its witnesses, so it hasn't had an opportunity cross examine anyone, and the defense has been able to lead because it has only been able to cross examine. Were the prosecutor to call the defendant's wife or mother or something like that, he would probably be permitted to use leading questions. And when the defense puts on its case, the roles will reverse: the defense attorneys will have to use open-ended questioning for any witness he calls, and the prosecutor will be able to use leading questions.
Even before the police have any idea who did it, Bob is guilty of whatever wrong he did. However, if you want this to be a legal question and not a moral one, we should assume that you really want to know "Can Bob be convicted of murder, if the evidence proves that he did do it?". Yes, he can. See Morris v. State, 214 S.W.3d 159. The critical question was whether the defendant understood the charges (he did) and whether he could assist in his defense (he could). The desideratum of being able to assist in your own defense only goes so far. On the other hand, maybe no, per Wilson v. US. A government expert witness "testified that appellant had permanent retrograde amnesia and would not be able to aid in his own defense in terms of remembering any of the acts alleged in the indictment". The crucial difference seems to be whether one just has loss of memory, vs. loss of memory connected with some other mental disorder. [Addendum] Per Dusky v. United States 362 U.S. 402, competence to stand trial depends on whether the accused has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. I am not aware of any exceptions e.g. whether this is not the case with strict liability crimes like statutory rape, and since it is generally held that "competency" is a requirement mandated by the due process clause, I don't think there could be an exception.
The governing law would be the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961). The relevant part is Article 29. Diplomats must not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. Diplomats are also immune from civil and criminal prosecution. Technically, it wasn't a US diplomat but a family member, but by Article 37 they have the same protection. The linked article suggests that her diplomatic immunity ended, but that's a bit of a non-issue. The host nation (the UK in this case) can declare anyone, diplomats or family to be persona non grata which indeed ends diplomatic immunity, but only after the person is allowed to leave the host nation. And when the act happened, the immunity was in place. Immunity cannot retroactively be withdrawn by the host nation.
I assume you mean to ask whether the guilt of the victim affects the validity of a crime-of-passion defence. canada In Canada, the only crime-of-passion type defence is provocation, today codified at s. 232 of the Criminal Code. Provocation is only relevant to a count of murder. If the person who committed what would otherwise be murder &quot;did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation,&quot; then the conviction is reduced to manslaughter. Current codified defence: victim must have done something that would be an indictable offence punishable by five or more years of imprisonment One of the statutory requirements for a successful provocation defence is that the victim must have conducted themselves in a way that &quot;would constitute an indictable offence under this Act that is punishable by five or more years of imprisonment.&quot; This is an objective element of the defence, not dependent on the perception of the accused. One court has found this limitation to the defence to be unconstitutional (R. v Simard, 2019 BCSC 531). However that court would still require that the &quot;conduct of the victim [to be] of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control...&quot; The common law and the previous codified defence also required provocative conduct by the victim Both the common law and the pre-2015 codification of the provcation defence required that the victim's provocative conduct be &quot;of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control&quot; (R. v. Cairney, 2013 SCC 55 at paragraphs 24-35). Burdens for establishing this defence The provocation defence is an &quot;air of reality&quot; defence (R. v. Cinous, 2002 SCC 29, paragraph 57). This means that there is an initial evidential burden on the accused. There must be evidence on the record that, if believed, could lead a reasonable properly instructed jury to acquit (or, in the case of provocation, to convict of manslaughter instead of murder). Once the accused meets this burden, then the defence is properly in play and will be successful unless the Crown disproves any element of the defence beyond a reasonable doubt.
It seems to not be allowed for a UK police to lie. The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 makes it illegal for the police to mislead a suspect in order to make them believe that the police have evidence which they do not or that the evidence they have is stronger than it is, or that there is a possibility of leniency (for example in return for ‘cooperation’) where none exists. Realistically, there is no reason that a police officer might lie to a suspect during interview. Also see from innocenceproject.org: The law does not allow lying to suspects, under any circumstances.