Do changing social norms change the definition of &quot;defamation?&quot; One hundred years ago, if you said that &quot;Miss X is not a virgin,&quot; when in fact she was, that would be grounds for a defamation suit. The reason is that because 80%+ of unmarried American adult women were, in fact, such (before the advent of the &quot;Pill&quot; in the 1960s). Someone made the observation, &quot;today, you would more likely be sued for defamation if you alleged (wrongly) that Ms. X IS a virgin,&quot; implying that she is sexually inexperienced. The issue is that 90%+ of unmarried adult women are not virgins today. One way of interpreting the above is that a statement that &quot;Ms. X is a virgin&quot; would not be &quot;highly offensive to a reasonable person.&quot; That is, you are praising Ms. X for her &quot;chastity.&quot; But another way of looking at it is that you are alleging, in 2021, that Ms. X is deviating from the prevailing norm by being a virgin, whereas in 1921, NOT being a virgin would represent a deviation from the norm. Would alleging that someone was &quot;out of line&quot; with prevailing norms in the above fashion be grounds for defamation even though these norms have changed over time?
The definition of defamation, itself, doesn't change. What may change is whether certain kinds of false statements are &quot;so bad&quot; that it is not necessary to prove that the person was actually damaged by the statement, i.e. is defamation per se. In California this is Charges any person with crime, or with having been indicted, convicted, or punished for crime; Imputes in him the present existence of an infectious, contagious, or loathsome disease; Tends directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to him general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to his office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits; Imputes to him impotence or a want of chastity; Hence, being falsely claimed to be a virgin is not defamation per se, but if you can show that you were actually damaged by the claim then you can be compensated for those damages. This is long-standing law (Tonini v. Cevasco (1896) 114 Cal. 266), which makes it difficult to erode in lieu of a change in statutory language (as in the case of the California Civil Code, amended in 1948). Barnes-Hind v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377 provides a loophole, that the reader of a libel will recognize it as such. If no reasonable reader would perceive in a false and unprivileged publication a meaning which tended to injure the subject's reputation in any of the enumerated respects, then there is no libel at all. If such a reader would perceive a defamatory meaning without extrinsic aid beyond his or her own intelligence and common sense, then (under section 45a and the cases, such as MacLeod, which have construed it) there is a libel per se. But if the reader would be able to recognize a defamatory meaning only by virtue of his or her knowledge of specific facts and circumstances, extrinsic to the publication, which are not matters of common knowledge rationally attributable to all reasonable persons, then (under the same authorities) the libel cannot be libel per se but will be libel per quod. A &quot;reasonable&quot; reader would not recognize a claim of non-virginity as having a defamatory meaning, but would likely recognize being a professional incompetent as having a defamatory meaning. In other words, even false statements statutorily listed as being potential defamation per se will be subject to a &quot;reasonable man&quot; test: but proving actual damage is still an option.
The term &quot;defamation&quot; describes an untrue statement that’s been presented as fact and causes harm to the character of the person it describes. In some jurisdictions an admittedly true statement can still be defamatory. See Can true statements or statements of opnion be libel or defamation in any country? If A claimed that B defamed A, but a court rules that there was no defamation, this might make A's statement legally false. But it will not be defamatory unless it also harms B's reputation. Statements made in court, and in legal filings, have absolute privilege and may not the be basis of a defamation action. Public statements by A accusing B of defamation might be the basis of such an action.
I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation.
Not in this case First, we are having an appeals court case that is filed against the dismissal of the real case - there had been no trial. It's a research into if there was a clear error of the court, not who would have won. The Appeals court decided to send it back to the district court with pretty much a direct order to have a trial and solve the issiue, as the very last paragraph of the file shows: We conclude that Schwake stated a Title IX claim against the University because he plausibly alleged gender bias. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s order and judgment dismissing the claim with prejudice, and remand for further proceedings. Now, back to your quote. As this is an appeal case, the standard is different than in the district court. In this case, it tries to see if there might have been a case, which was dismissed erroneously. Page 15 and 16, where you cite, states (emphasis mine): Schwake’s allegations of a pattern of gender-based decisionmaking against male respondents in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings make that inference plausible. He alleged that “[m]ale respondents in student disciplinary proceedings involving alleged sexual harassment and misconduct cases at [the University]” “are invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” Schwake further alleged that he was “aware of recent [University] disciplinary cases against male respondents in alleged sexual misconduct cases who were all found guilty regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” The district court was not free to ignore this non-conclusory and relevant factual allegation. [your quote] The absence of this level of detail from Schwake’s complaint does not render Schwake’s allegation conclusory or insufficient. There is no heightened pleading standard for Title IX claims. See Austin, 925 F.3d at 1137 n.4. That point is particularly apt here. It may be difficult for a plaintiff to know the full extent of alleged discrimination in decisionmaking before discovery allows a plaintiff to unearth information controlled by the defendant. This sheds much more light upon the situation of the case: Schwacke sued and alleged something. The University alleges the contrary in their reply brief and asks the court to dismiss the claim. The court dismissed in March 2018. This was before any discovery has taken place: nobody was subpoenaed, nobody had to testify in court, nobody had to turn over any documents. We have only statements from either side. As the next step, Schwacke appealed the dismissal, and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, as it found clear error in the handling in dismissal, as one can see in the last paragraphs from each claim's section: Here, we are satisfied that Schwake’s allegations of contemporaneous pressure and gender-based decisionmaking establish background indicia of sex discrimination relevant to his Title IX claim. Considering the combination of Schwake’s allegations of background indicia of sex discrimination along with the allegations concerning his particular disciplinary case, we conclude that sex discrimination is a plausible explanation for the University’s handling of the sexual misconduct disciplinary case against Schwake. This is sufficient for Schwake’s Title IX claim to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage. Now it is up to Schwacke to get into discovery, subpoena the information from the university and go into the courtroom trial... Unless the parties settles. Sidenote By the way, the quote of the university refers to a different case from the 6th Circuit (where Ohio is), which they try to pull up as a model standard. This case is not binding for the 9th Circuit (where Arizona is) but could have been used as a model. Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) is somewhat similar to Schwacke, as it had been previously dismissed. However, the Title IX was restored by the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit and it was sent back to the lower court to have a trial. Here too, the standard was reasonable expectation or plausibility: Plaintiff “allege[d] facts showing a potential pattern of gender-based decision-making that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal’ circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination.”
It depends, in part, what is meant (and what can be proven) by D's intent: no apparent motivation to harm V Revenge porn, or more accurately, &quot;Disclosing, or threatening to disclose, private sexual photographs and films with intent to cause distress&quot; contrary to section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 which states: (1)A person commits an offence if— (a)the person discloses, or threatens to disclose, a private sexual photograph or film in which another individual (“the relevant individual”) appears, (b)by so doing, the person intends to cause distress to that individual, and (c)the disclosure is, or would be, made without the consent of that individual. If there is no intent, then the offence is not committed. If there is intent to cause distressto V, then setion 35 needs to be considered, especially subsection (2): Meaning of “private” and “sexual” (1)The following apply for the purposes of section 33. (2)A photograph or film is “private” if it shows something that is not of a kind ordinarily seen in public. (3)A photograph or film is “sexual” if— (a)it shows all or part of an individual's exposed genitals or pubic area, (b)it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual because of its nature, or (c)its content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual. I cannot find and caselaw or guidance on the particular issue - i.e. whether or not V's commercial sales of her own images would fall within this definition - and as D's intent is not clear, it would probably be a matter for a jury to decide.
Socially the woman has become a &quot;kept woman&quot;. It would not be rape, at least in most jurisdictions, because the officer is using neither force nor threats of force. The duress is from her economic and general circumstance, and most jurisdictions would not consider that to be rape. At least technically, this is a form of prostitution, but a form very rarely prosecuted. Maryland maryland is a not untypical jurisdiction as US law goes in such matters. § 3-303 of the Naryland Criminal Code (Rape in the first degree) provides that: (a) Prohibited. -- A person may not: (a) (1) (a) (1) (i) engage in vaginal intercourse with another by force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other; or (a) (1) (ii) engage in a sexual act with another by force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other; and (a) (2) (a) (2) (i) employ or display a dangerous weapon, or a physical object that the victim reasonably believes is a dangerous weapon; (a) (2) (ii) suffocate, strangle, disfigure, or inflict serious physical injury on the victim or another in the course of committing the crime; (a) (2) (iii) threaten, or place the victim in fear, that the victim, or an individual known to the victim, imminently will be subject to death, suffocation, strangulation, disfigurement, serious physical injury, or kidnapping; (a) (2) (iv) commit the crime while aided and abetted by another; or (a) (2) (v) commit the crime in connection with a burglary in the first, second, or third degree. Section 3-304 (Rape in the first degree) provides that: (a) A person may not engage in vaginal intercourse with another: (a) (1) by force, or the threat of force, without the consent of the other; (a) (2) if the victim is a mentally defective individual, a mentally incapacitated individual, or a physically helpless individual, and the person performing the act knows or reasonably should know that the victim is a mentally defective individual, a mentally incapacitated individual, or a physically helpless individual; or (a) (3) if the victim is under the age of 14 years, and the person performing the act is at least 4 years older than the victim. Sections 3-306 thru 3-307 have similar provisions but they mention &quot;sexual act&quot; rather than &quot;intercourse&quot; and they do not define the crime as &quot;rape&quot; but as &quot;sexual offense&quot;. But the emphasis on force or threat of force, and lack of consent is much the same. So it seems that under Maryland law, at least, the situation described in the question would not be legally &quot;rape&quot; nor a &quot;sexual offense&quot;. Maryland Criminal code § 11-301 (2018) defines prostitution in subsection (c) which reads: (c) Prostitution. -- &quot;Prostitution&quot; means the performance of a sexual act, sexual contact, or vaginal intercourse for hire. Whether the provision of food, shelter, and protection by one person to another in return for sex would be considered &quot;for hire&quot; is arguable. In practice such arrangements, even if they also involve cash payment, are rarely if ever prosecuted.
If you sue a person for a tort X, one of the things you have to prove is that the defendant did do X. A baseless belief that it must have been so-and-so will do you no good. You do not have to have iron-clad evidence of your allegations, for a civil suit, but you have to show with a preponderance of evidence that the claim is true. A combination of "hates me" and "provably did this a number of times in the past" could well suffice. As for damages, it depends on what harm you actually suffered. If you get fired and you show that it was because of a false allegation, you would probably have to take this to the big court, since small claims court handles amounts in the $5,000 range (jurisdiction-specific).
(Standard disclaimer: I am not your lawyer; I am not here to help you.) Under American common law, the distinction here would relate to the harm to B: either a damages issue or a "special harm" issue. The Restatement elements of defamation are falsity, publication, fault, and inherent actionability or special harm. See Rest. 2d Torts § 558. The last element captures the traditional doctrine that slander (not libel) is only actionable if it falls into one of four or five specific categories ("slander per se"), or if it actually causes economic injury. Your example doesn't seem to fit into any of the special categories. But see Rest. 2d Torts § 573 (imputations affecting business or office). If the statement to C is oral rather than written, and C doesn't believe it or otherwise nothing comes of the statement, B may not be able to prove special harm and therefore fail to recover anything. If D, on the contrary, avoided doing business with B, B may be able to show special harm supporting a claim. Similarly, C's disbelief or D's belief may be relevant to determining the actual damages B suffered and is therefore entitled to recover from A.