Why isn&#39;t stalling an impeachment considered an obstruction of justice? First and foremost, is it correct to consider the process of impeachment and removal, in the US Constitution, a process of justice, but one administered in a political context? (That is, the opposite of a "recall election".) If it is so, then how is a refusal to "send" an impeachment to the Senate not an act that obstructs justice?
The most relevant federal Obstruction of Justice type is from 18 USC 1505: Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress— I'm not sure if passed Articles of Impeachment count as an "inquiry", and I'm not sure whether failing to "send" them to the other house is "corruptly impeding". Even if those two conditions are met, members of Congress are immune to judicial process for acts taken while they are in session, as part of the Speech or Debate clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1): ...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So, if the person in question is not a member of Congress acting in their official capacity and intentionally endeavors to prevent passed Articles of Impeachment from being sent from the House to the Senate (e.g. a courier intentionally failing to deliver them, or an IT person preventing the electronic form from being copied into the Senate's database), I do not know whether that could be considered Obstruction of Justice, as I doubt such a situation has ever been adjudicated. Given the publicity of the proceedings, such an impediment would probably be found out or overcome so quickly that no one would be inclined to do more than fire the perpetrator.
First of all, there is a distinction between being impeached and being convicted. Trump was impeached when the House voted to adopt an Article of Impeachment. That happened while he was still in office. He will not be convicted until the Senate votes to convict him by a 2/3rds vote, if it ever does. In the case of Nixon, the House had not yet voted to adopt Articles of Impeachment when he resigned. They had been introduced and debated, but not yet finally approved. Moreover, we don't know what would have happened if the House had proceeded to pass such articles after Nixon had resigned. The House of that time did not choose to proceed. There was no court ruling saying that they could not do so. There are some precedents saying that the Senate can proceed with a trial after an official resigns or is expelled after impeachment. None of these are at all recent, none are clear cut, none involved an official whose term had ended, none involved a President, and none that I am aware of led to a conviction. And this issue has never been tested in a Federal court. Specifically, there is the case of William Belknap. Belknap was Secretary of War under US President Grant. He was accused of improperly profiting from military contracts. The House started impeachment proceedings. Grant interviewed Belknap, who confessed to Grant and resigned on the spot. The house none the less pass five articles of impeachment after Belknap resigned. When the Senate took up the case, there was a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Senate did not have jurisdiction because of Belknap's resignation. By a vote of 37–29 the Senate held that it had jurisdiction and that a trial should proceed. The vote to convict Belknap was 35 for conviction, 25 against it. This was five votes short of the required 2/3rds to convict. Most of the Senators voting against conviction were on record as doing so because they did not agree that the Senate had jurisdiction. Thus a majority vote of the Senate held in that case that such a trial was proper, but less than 2/3rds. (Most also indicted that they thought the charges true.) There was also the case of William Blount. Blount, a Senator, was impeached by the House in 1798. (In fact this was the first impeachment ever under the US Constitution.) The Senate voted to expel him. When the articles of impeachment came up in 1799, the Senate voted to dismiss the impeachment, on the ground that the impeachment process did not extend to members of the Senate, but not on the grounds that the expulsion rendered the proceedings moot. Should Trump be convicted by the Senate (which now seems unlikely) he might bring a court case claiming that such a conviction was unconstitutional. There is no knowing how a court would handle such a case. And if Trump is not convicted, no such case will be brought this time, either. This Washington Post opinion piece by two Constitutional scholars claims that such a trial would be constitutionally proper. It also claims that it would not have been proper had the vote to adopt articles of impeachment occurred after Trump had left office. Others have taken different positions. Whether a Senate trial of an impeachment is constitutional after the person impeached has left office is a hotly debated question at the moment. There has never been a court ruling on the point, and neither of the precedents is of a situation quite matching the current impeachment of Trump. No court has ruled on the matter. The Senate did not vote for a motion to dismiss the impeachment on those grounds, although if every senator who voted for the motion voted to acquit, Trump would not be convicted. From the comments I wish that any downvoters would leave a comment indicting what thy think is wring with this answer. In the absence of a comment, I cannot improve the answer, others cannot use the reasons to write better answers, and readers have no idea why someone objects to the answer. Such a downvote seems pointless. I have updated this answer with a discussion of the Blount and Belknap precedents. In neither case did the Senate actually vote to dismiss the articles because the accused was no longer in office, although that seems to be a major reason why 25 senators voted against convicting Belknap.
A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.
This is a good question, although it discusses crimes. This answer generalizes the question by giving a response for civil violations. In the united-states, where federal civil-procedure is followed and provided the tape isn't solely for impeachment purposes (i.e. it also documents other elements), there are certain disclosures required at the beginning of discovery governed by Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). If a party withholds one of these disclosures, under Rule 37(c)(1), the court is able to take a number of actions, including throwing the evidence out. This could, of course, result in the withholder's conviction. Yet, if the court does not go to that extreme, it may impose the sanctions in Rule 37(b). So the withholder's attorney might try to make a case that the evidence is, indeed, solely for impeachment purposes.
It says if some portion of the electorate is deprived of the right to vote then the state looses an equal proportion of its representation in Congress (and therefore electoral college votes). There is an exception &quot;rebellion, or other crime&quot;. So if a state disenfranchises X% of the population for rebellion or crime they do not lose X% of their representatives/electors.
Your interpretation is correct. The constitution says that judges stay in office "until and unless they are impeached." That means that congress cannot impose a time limit on any judge's term of office. If it did so, it would be contrary to the constitution. The only grounds for removal are those to do with misbehavior. Therefore, judges have life tenure.
I think we're talking about In re Hennen, which dealt with the removal of the clerk of the district court in Louisiana: It all these departments power is given to the secretary, to appoint all necessary clerks; 1 Story, 48; and although no power to remove is expressly given, yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their office at the will and discretion of the head of the department. It would be a most extraordinary construction of the law, that all these offices were to be held during life, which must inevitably follow, unless the incumbent was removable at the discretion of the head of the department: the President has certainly no power to remove. These clerks fall under that class of inferior officers, the appointment of which the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the head of the department. The same rule, as to the power of removal, must be applied to offices where the appointment is vested in the President alone. The nature of the power, and the control over the officer appointed, does not at all depend on the source from which it emanates. The execution of the power depends upon the authority of law, and not upon the agent who is to administer it. And the Constitution has authorized Congress, in certain cases, to vest this power in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of departments; and all inferior officers appointed under each, by authority of law, must hold their office at the discretion of the appointing power. Such is the settled usage and practical construction of the Constitution and laws, under which these offices are held. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259–60, 10 L. Ed. 138 (1839) (emphasis added).
First, there is no definitive correct answer to this question because it has never happened over the course of 45 Presidencies. But, it certainly could come up. If the President purports to pardon himself for a federal crime and is then prosecuted, the judicial branch would have to decide if the pardon was valid. But, I would disagree with the answer from @user6726, and would instead take the position that the concept of a pardon inherently implies that one is pardoning someone else. This is why President Nixon, when he resigned, had Vice President Ford, when he became President upon Nixon's resignation, pardon him, rather than pardoning himself. President Bush, in connection with the Iran-Contra scandal also took the position that he did not have the power to pardon himself. Basically, a pardon is an event that is ordinary conceived of as involving two persons, a giver of the pardon and a recipient. Also, recognizing the power of a President to pardon himself or herself would be to give him or her impunity to disregard the law not just in areas where he or she has Presidential immunity, but in anything that he has ever done in his life. (Also, the President can only pardon federal crimes, not state crimes.) There is, of course, an academic literature on the subject (which none of the answers in the PoliticsSE refer to and which the other answer here does not refer to). The two leading law review articles addressing the question are: Brian C. Kalt, &quot;Pardon Me: The Constitutional Case against Presidential Self-Pardons&quot; 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996-1997) (obviously adopting my position). An expanded version of this article became a chapter in a book called &quot;Constitutional Cliffhangers: A Legal Guide For Presidents and Their Enemies&quot; by the same author. Robert Nida and Rebecca L. Spiro, &quot;The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power&quot; 52 Okla. L. Rev. 197 (1999) (closed access). It opens with the following language (in part): [C]an the President pardon himself for criminal acts committed while or before holding office? Article II of the Constitution prohibits a President from using the pardon power to overturn an impeachment.5 The Framers of the Constitution placed only this limitation on the ability of the President to exercise his pardon power,6 and the only sanction for the abuse of the pardon power is the removal of the President through impeachment.7 The Constitution is silent, however, as to whether the President may grant himself a pardon from prosecution and, if so, when such a pardon may be issued.8 In the over 20,000 instances that Presidents have used this exclusive power,9 no President has used this power to pardon himself.10 One viewpoint is that a presidential self-pardon is inherently inconsistent with &quot;natural law,&quot; which proclaims that one may not judge oneself.11 This article is cited in Comparative Executive Clemency by Andrew Novak who calls it an unresolved question but believes many legal scholars believe that it is possible. Leading Constitutional law scholar Adrian Vermeule analyzes but does not resolve the issue in his book &quot;The Constitution of Risk&quot;. A 2017 Vox review from 15 legal experts is here. Their views are mixed and nuanced. A 2017 op-ed in the Washington Post from a former member of Congress who was involved in the impeachment proceedings for President Nixon says &quot;no.&quot; Another review of expert opinion in 2017 can be found here. This also noted a dispute within the realm of academic legal opinion. There has also been debate over whether treason is treated differently for pardon power purposes than other federal crimes, but the precedent of the pardons issued after the U.S. Civil War pretty definitively resolved this question in favor of the power of the President to pardon treason, so the nature of the federal offense wouldn't matter. Note also that the pardon power is not limited to cases where criminal charges have been brought or convictions have been obtained. This issue is irrelevant to a President's self-pardon power.