On what Constitutional basis does the federal government regulate radio? From reading the constitution, it appears that regulation of radio is outside the scope of Congress's powers, and should therefore be determined by states. Why is radio federally regulated?
Commerce Clause US Constitution Article I Section 8: The Congress shall have power [...] To regulate commerce [...] among the several states [...] This was explicitly used as the justification for federal regulation of radio, going all the way back to the Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. 62-263 (37 Stat. 302): Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That a person, company, or corporation within the jurisdiction of the United States shall not use or operate any apparatus for radio communication as a means of commercial intercourse among the several States, or with foreign nations, or upon any vessel of the United States engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, or for the transmission of radiograms or signals the effect of which extends beyond the jurisdiction of the State or Territory in which the same are made, or where interference would be caused thereby with the receipt of messages or signals from beyond the jurisdiction of the said State or Territory, except under and in accordance with a license, revocable for cause, in that behalf granted by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor upon application therefor ; Nearly every meaningful radio transmission has an effect that extends beyond state lines, so this covers practically everything. This has been upheld by the Supreme Court: Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Bond &amp; Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933): &quot;No question is presented as to the power of the Congress, in its regulation of interstate commerce, to regulate radio communications. No state lines divide the radio waves, and national regulation is not only appropriate, but essential, to the efficient use of radio facilities.&quot; Fisher's Blend Station, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 650 (1936): &quot;By its very nature, broadcasting transcends state lines, and is national in its scope and importance -- characteristics which bring it within the purpose and protection, and subject it to the control, of the commerce clause.&quot; As a general rule, any time you wonder why the federal government is allowed to regulate something that isn't explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, nine times out of ten the answer will be &quot;Commerce Clause&quot;.
The First Amendment says that the government cannot pass law restricting speech. It does not say that everyone is compelled to take actions that enable others to speak. The First Amendment would tend to work against your plan, because Congress generally can't pass a law to force people to &quot;speak&quot; in a certain way, and Congress cannot pass a law forcing you to provide your soapbox to your opponents. As an expressive matter, Google is expressing its right to &quot;speak&quot; in a particular manner, one that happens to not agree with how Apple talks (which is their right). However, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution is widely invoked as a means of compelling businesses to do something. If the government has a compelling interest in a certain end, Congress might pass a law that forces companies to do something. The political part, which you'd have to undertake, is persuading Congress that... the government has a compelling interest in [fill in the blank] w.r.t. phones, or computers, or what-have-you. Congress sometimes leaves such matters to the market, so that a competing company that unifies all communication could have a competitive advantage and could be more successful than a company that was more proprietary (although, at a certain point that advantage becomes a disadvantage and anti-trust actions take place). It's just a matter of persuading enough Congressmen to pass an appropriate law that does what you want done. By reference to the Commerce Clause, other considerations of constitutional rights can usually be finessed, although Google and Apple's First Amendment rights can't trivially be swept away by saying &quot;effecting interstate commerce&quot;.
Generally speaking the &quot;blessings of liberty&quot; phrase from the preamble to the US Constitution is not relied on for anything. It does not grant additional power to Congress or the Federal government as a whole, neither does it restrict the Federal government beyond the restrictions already included in the body of the Constitution. Congress often accepts hearsay when it takes testimony before a committee. Such testimony need not comply with the rules of evidence that apply in court. I am not clear what you mean by &quot;to pretext privacy and the right to try&quot;, please clarify this. I am not aware of any &quot;right to try&quot; under the Federal or State governments. The word &quot;pretext&quot; is not usually used as a verb in this way. Edit The link on &quot;right to try&quot; goes to a Quora question about laws passed by Congress later being held to be unconstitutional. That does happen. but I have never herd it called &quot;the right to try&quot;. The link on &quot;pretext&quot; goes to a security.se question about a &quot;convict internet&quot;. I don't see what that has to to with the preamble to the Constitution. 2nd Edit The &quot;blessings of liberty&quot; phrase from the preamble has nothing to do with laws against discrimination, neither authorizing nor restricting such laws.
Contract law involves a number of parts, the most relevant here being the formation of a contract, and the enforcement of its terms. There are various rules about formation, such as that you cannot hold a gun to a person’s head to force them to say yes (the courts would then say there was no contract), and then under other conditions a term in a contract might be illegal, for instance the courts will not order a person to commit a crime as one of the conditions of a contract. In the scenario that you propose, no term of the contract involves an illegal action, the only presumed illegality is in the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract. Duress is illegal, because there is no voluntary mutual assent. That’s not the case here. So there is no established legal impediment to finding that a contract was formed. There are ample opportunities to test the theory that an element of illegality in the formation of a contract makes the contract void, for example if a physical instrument used in creating or transmitting the contract was used illegally (the paper was stolen, the paper was used without permission of the owner); the assent was made while trespassing; the contract language infringes copyright. Given the court’s very strong commitment to recognizing and enforcing contracts, it is highly unlikely that the courts would reject a contract over a technicality of this type §97.113 of the FCC rules states the prohibited transmissions, the two relevant clauses being that the prohibited list includes (2) Communications for hire or for material compensation, direct or indirect, paid or promised, except as otherwise provided in these rules; (3) Communications in which the station licensee or control operator has a pecuniary interest, including communications on behalf of an employer, with the following exceptions… (2) is not clearly applicable, since the communication is not for material compensation (e.g. A is not paying B to make a transmission). (3) is more likely applicable, since the parties each have a pecuniary interest in the communication. The exceptions involve being compensated for making a communication, or one can on an irregular basis offer amateur radio apparatus for sale or trade. Since the FCC regulations only provide bare languages and no explanatory texts, and they decline to provide any examples (this seems to be a policy thing), and there is substantial unclarity as to what the restrictions mean, see this analysis. A finding of letter-of-the-law violation in this case cannot be made by the court in which breech of contract would be litigated. Instead, the FCC would have to first make a finding of law-breaking, then a party would have to prove in a separate cause of action that because of illegality in the circumstances surrounding formation of the contract, there never was an agreement.
No. It is an often repeated misconception that "Freedom of Speech" means that no one can restrict speech ever. This is not the case. Let us look at the US Consitution's First Admendment, which contains the "Freedom of Speech" clause: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press... (Emphasis mine) As one can see, the First Amendment only restricts government actions. (It also stops other branches of government from restricting speech, because those branches are innately weak with very few powers granted to them by the constitution; the majority of executive or judicial branches powers are granted to them by a law passed by Congress, and Congress cannot give a power to another party that they do not possess). A Home Owner Association (HOA) is not a government or government agency; it is a private organization (and it is not the same as the "private management company" that manages the condominium, which is probably in the employ of the HOA; which also means that emailing the manager is not emailing the HOA board). Their power stems from a contract, one that your friend signed when they bought the property (one of the conditions agreed to is that a member who sells or gifts their HOA-member property can only do so to someone who also agrees to the contract). That said, HOAs can be horribly abusive and many states have laws that restrict what kinds of rules and penalties can be applied by an HOA. But that is not a constitutional matter (at either the Federal or State level), nor a question of "Freedom of Speech", but rather a limitation on the kinds of behaviors that can be enforced by contract.
No. Imagine, for instance, that you're a dairy and poultry farmer in Ohio. You grow a small crop of wheat every year to feed your animals. From whatever is leftover, you take enough to make flour for yourself and your family. After that, you sell whatever is left to someone locally. You could argue that your wheat-related activities would not be interstate, that they would not be commerce, and that they would have at most indirect effects on interstate commerce. But the Supreme Court would reject that argument, as it did in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Even if appellee's activity be local, and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as "direct" or "indirect." So the general rule is that any activity that has a "substantial economic effect" on interstate commerce -- by reducing demand, for instance -- is within the reach of the federal government's authority to regulate. While there continues to be controversy over this broad interpretation of Commerce Clause authority, it's a well-settled principle, and everyone recognizes that practically speaking, there's virtually no commercial activity that Congress cannot regulate.
None. The federal government is allowed to prohibit coffee drinking under its power to regulate interstate commerce. Prohibition would not have required a constitutional amendment under modern constitutional jurisprudence either. By analogy, this would be no different (constitutionally) than a law prohibiting putting lithium in sodas (something that used to be done in 7 Up) or putting cocaine in sodas (something that used to be done in Coca-Cola). Conceivably, the law might have to allow a religious exemption in certain circumstances under the 1st Amendment's free exercise clause, but while many faiths prohibit drinking coffee (most notably, offshoots of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints), none of which I am aware require it as a matter of religious doctrine sincerely espoused.
Other Authorities You are missing at least several important sources of authority, which include: (1) The United States Constitution; (2) the set of regulations issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations at Title 37, Chapter I; (3) applicable international treaties; (4) case law with the most important being the U.S. Supreme Court, followed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, followed by U.S. District Court cases on point; and (5) case law from the administrative bodies of the PTO. All of the above and the sources you mention are "primary sources". These are interpreted collectively in "Treatises" on patent law which are often cited on issues where primary authority is either too thin, or so numerous that it is not easily summarized merely by resort to primary authority. A number of them are listed here. Chisum on Patents is the leading treatise in the field and should usually be your first destination. It will mention most of the relevant primary source authority in the subject area you are researching. Priority of Authorities The CFR is superior to the MPEP but inferior to Title 35. Treaties are co-equal with Title 35 with conflicts resolved by the date of enactment. Case law of the U.S. Supreme Court trumps everything (even, in practice, the language of the United States Constitution). Case law from the U.S. Court of Appeals from the Federal Circuit trumps everything except the U.S. Supreme Court. Given the very long string of recent reversals of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit by the U.S. Supreme Court (almost one or two a year for the last decade or so), however, every Federal Circuit case should be analyzed to determine if it has been implicitly overturned or limited by the applicable U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. The United States Constitution trumps everything except U.S. Supreme Court cases and cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (these cases impliedly provide definitive interpretations of the United States Constitution). Case law from a U.S. District Court is not binding on anyone but the parties to the case, but is highly persuasive and in practice is about on a par with the MPEP, but subordinate to the CFR and administrative case law of PTO bodies. One complicated aspect of case law is that it is only binding when it resolves a question of law necessary to resolve to decide the case before it. Sometimes opinions go off on tangents which discuss other questions of law not before the court and that is called "dicta" which is persuasive on that point of law, but not binding and not as authoritative. It is not always obvious what constitutes the binding portion of a court decision and what constitutes dicta. Another complexity in case law involves concurring or dissenting opinions in cases. Dissenting opinions, obviously, are not binding on anyone but sometimes clarify the scope of the majority opinion. If there is a plurality opinion and a concurring opinion in a case, they have equal weight and neither opinion's rule is definitive except to the extent that they agree. Generally speaking a majority opinion will be binding relative to a concurring opinion in the same case, but that status isn't really definitive and a concurring opinion should be considered even when it accompanies a majority opinion even though the concurring opinion shouldn't be considered binding in that situation. Of course, all case law (and for that matter all other authority) can be made obsolete by subsequent amendments to Title 35 or by the adoption of new treaties. A treatise isn't binding on anyone, but a well reasoned passage from a leading treatise like Chisum will, in practice, be given weight a little below a U.S. Court for the Federal Circuit case, but often greater than any lesser source of authority on a topic. A well reasoned passage in a lesser treatise is typically given a weight comparable to a U.S. District Court case that is on point. Loose Ends One of the important sources for prior art is the compendium of all patents ever issued by the United States (the vast majority of which have expired and entered the public domain). You can get them all for a very reasonable cost in electronic form. The compendium of patents which have not expired is obviously relevant when attempting to determine if a potential patent or technique or process of a client infringes on any existing patent. There are also some patent issues (e.g. jurisdiction and venue in patent disputes) which depend upon other Titles of the United States Code and have the same priority as Title 35 of the United States Code. There are circumstances in which the procedural rules of various courts which issue relevant case law are relevant. Each type of court has its own rules of procedure, and each particular court has its own local rules. (This is not hypothetical, I've had a case involving patent law in which three-quarters of the motion practice in the heavily litigated case depended upon the local rules of practice in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.) Precedents of U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, and precedents from U.S. Court of Appeal for Circuits other than the Federal Circuit, are sometimes relevant as well (e.g. interpreting procedural court rules, rules of evidence, or very general principles of law that aren't restricted to patent law such as the ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution). But, for the most part, patent case law arises in U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court and the administrative tribunals of the PTO. Issues related to the relationship between an attorney and a client in patent law cases (e.g. attorney malpractice law in patent cases) is a question of state law rather than federal law.