Would this be considered as Theft under the UK&#39;s jurisdiction? So say you have a car, and I steal your car, but with the intention to return it back to you after 2 years. It means I do not wish to "permanently deprive" you of your car. I will treat the car with care, so that when I return it back to you, it will remind as intact as possible. Therefore, the "goodness or virtue" of the car remains. Intention permanently to deprive is one of the two main requirements of mens rea for theft. I know in practice the verdict is not always predictable, as judges sometimes distort the clear wording of the act to achieve justice. But according to clear wording of the act, the defendent in the scenario doesn't have the sufficient mens rea right? So would this still be regarded as theft? Even tho common sense tells you it does?
Theoretically speaking, this is not theft. You are correct in that theft requires specific intent: to permanently deprive someone from the use and enjoyment of one of their lawful possessions. In real life, it is a matter of evidence of course. Saying you were only borrowing can be proven otherwise based on your actions. I should also mention that if you "borrow" something an there were obligations attached to that borroeing (e.g. "you can borrow it but you mustnt use it like this, or you must return it in a week") then failing to abide by those obligations can be sufficient to show intention to deprive. Furthermore "borrowing something" and consuming its entire usefulness for yourself counts as the permanent deprivation of the use of the possession from the owner. E.g. "borrowing" concert tickets and returning them after a concert (see s.6 Theft Act 1968) R v Lloyd, Bhuee &amp; Ali [1985] QB 829 also tells us that the condition of something borrowed once returned may be indicative of whether there was an intention to permanently deprive someone of their rights to property.
"Is there really any law that makes it illegal to own copies of a publication?" I couldn't find exact confirmation of which law Rahman was prosecuted under, but an article from 2012 describes it as "possessing an article for a terrorist purpose". A BBC article from 2007 uses the same phrase, with regard to "Section 57 of the Terrorism Act", which appears to refer to the Terrorism Act 2000: 57 Possession for terrorist purposes. (1)A person commits an offence if he possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. (2)It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that his possession of the article was not for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. (3)In proceedings for an offence under this section, if it is proved that an article— (a)was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or (b)was on premises of which the accused was the occupier or which he habitually used otherwise than as a member of the public, the court may assume that the accused possessed the article, unless he proves that he did not know of its presence on the premises or that he had no control over it. (4)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— (a)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years,* to a fine or to both, or (b)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both. *Interestingly, the maximum term of imprisonment appears to have originally been 10 years, but was increased in 2006. That law's not specific to publications, but in an attempt to answer your question more fully there does seem to be at least one law that "makes it illegal to own copies of a publication": the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, for example, renders possession of 'extreme pornography' illegal, and the definitions do not require (to reference your footnote) that the materials "imply an illegal act took place". Rather, the materials are illegal because (to quote a government consultation, via the Wikipedia page linked above) such material may encourage or reinforce interest in violent and aberrant sexual activity to the detriment of society as a whole That may or may not bother you from a freedom of speech point of view, but it leads me nicely onto a discussion of the underlying ethics/morality/rights debate that you impled in your question: "We punish thoughtcrime, these days?" As far as I understand, Rahman was in physical possession of the magazine. So no &ndash; not "thoughtcrime". Merely thinking about the magazine &ndash; or believing the views expressed in its contents &ndash; would not, of itself, be illegal. Indeed, as the article points out in its description of main case under discussion (i.e. the "Three Musketeers" case, not Rahman's prior conviction), the prosecution described as the defendants’ “hateful beliefs” – but the judge, Mr Justice Globe, told them they could not convict based on “mindset evidence” alone. However, like hate speech (speech, not thought), or conspiracy to commit a crime (which is what the men in the Three Musketeers case were being charged with), saying (or writing) certain things is, quite reasonably, illegal, if the intent of those words is incitement to commit a crime. Restrictions on free speech exist everywhere, and any (political) debate around it generally centres less on an absolute right to free speech, and more on where the line should be drawn. Even in the US &ndash; which tends to draw the line at the permissive end of the spectrum &ndash; speech intended solely to cause damage is not immune from reproach. The classic example is "[falsely] shouting fire in a crowded theater": The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger Similarly, the publication of a magazine, the sole purpose of which is to (inspire or facilitate) damage, can be illegal. It would then seem reasonable for supplying that magazine to others to be illegal. Possession with a clear intent to supply (like with drugs) would also, reasonably, be illegal. And if drug possession, with no intent to supply, can be illegal, then why not possession of illegal material, even if there's no intent to supply? I make no attempt here to justify (nor even to outline fully) the exact details of English law when it comes to these matters; however, there's an important distinction between freedom of speech (with regard to which nearly everyone accepts some restriction or regulation) and freedom of thought or conscience. To the best of my knowledge, there's no law (in Britain) that restricts either of those.
Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition.
Theft is universally a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Insofar as a state has a criminal code and a functioning judiciary, theft will always be a crime. It is also a basic legal principle that theft is a tort as well (in other words, a civil wrong incurring damages to an individual that can be remedied in a court of law). A key part of the problem in failing to make theft a crime, is that in the absence of a substantive penalty in terms of a fine or imprisonment, theft becomes a low-risk, high-reward activity where the maximum penalty is simply the repayment of stolen goods (with relatively minimal loss). This fails to provide an effective deterrent to this socially frowned-upon activity, and rates of crime would skyrocket. It is appropriate, therefore, to make theft a crime (and all jurisdictions do so), as all pillars of criminal justice immediately apply. Edit: As @/JBentley correctly points out, penalties do in fact exist in civil law. That said, the power of incarceration, perhaps in this case the ultimate deterrent, is largely unavailable in civil cases. The ultimate point - that theft is rendered a more sound and legitimate enterprise based largely on gambling - remains the same. Additionally, not all individuals have the time or effort to file small claims and follow cases to the end. Making theft a tort-only offense would cause extraordinary difficulties in enforcement as many would consider the loss of perhaps a small article relatively insignificant compared to filing in small claims court.
Fault, in English law, is &quot;blameworthiness&quot;. While it covers both the act and the mental state of the defendant, it cannot equate to the subjective criminal intent of the defendant known as mens rea. In other words, you can be at fault for negligence without having the requisite intent to commit a criminal act. This is perhaps best pointed out by the next sentence after the one in bold: It would be perfectly possible for a criminal code to provide separate crimes of negligence, with lower maximum sentences, at appropriate points in the hierarchy of offences. There are also examples of such offences in English law already. For example, careless, and inconsiderate, driving (&quot;driving without due care and attention&quot;) contrary to Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is an offence that requires fault without mens rea. The defendant merely has to be careless and inconsiderate — they do not have to be in the state of mind where they know or believe that what they are doing is criminal in some way. In contrast, dangerous driving contrary to Section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 has the implied requirement of mens rea because of the word &quot;dangerously&quot;. This implies the defendant must have a subjective belief that what they are doing is dangerous (or otherwise be reckless about it), and therefore criminal.
switzerland &quot;Gutgläubiger Erwerb gestohlener Dinge&quot; (buying of stolen goods in good faith) is a big topic in law. Different jurisdictions handle it differently, but most European (civil law) systems have some kind of rule that accept the ownership of a buyer in such a case. Here is a good article that compares different jurisdictions on exactly such an issue. Luxury watches are a kind of art. According to Swiss law (Art 934 ZGB), the item must be returned when discovered within 5 years of the theft. However, the rightful owner must pay for any expenses you had. Since the theft was more than 5 years ago, the watch is, in my opinion, rightfully yours. Since Blancpain is in Switzerland, they are obviously bound to Swiss law. Also, they are not the police, so they cannot seize an item. They can only safekeep it and report to the authorities. I would also contact a lawyer for help. It seems to me like a case you should win.
No, filing a police report in good faith does not expose you to liability Of course, making false allegations or allegations where you are recklessly indifferent to the truth to police is both a serious crime in itself and defamation. Of course, breaking a contract is not a crime and the police are unlikely to take any action. If you borrow money from the bank and don’t pay it back, that’s not stealing or fraud unless it can be proven that you had no intention of paying it back when you borrowed it. This is a civil matter for the bank, not a criminal matter for the police.
Is a robbery that includes smashing a car window with the driver inside considered a non-violent property crime? Robbery is classified as a violent crime. Whether or not this fact pattern would count as robbery as opposed to burglary or theft and vandalism would depends upon California's penal statutes. Burglary is sometimes considered a violent crime (e.g. an armed home invasion burglary) and sometimes not considered a violent crime (e.g. an unarmed theft from an unoccupied residence). Theft is generally not considered a violent crime and if small in amount may not even be a felony. So is vandalism (i.e. the malicious destruction of property, rather than the taking of it). Robbery is defined in California Penal Code § 211 as &quot;the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.&quot; There is a very solid argument that this fact pattern constitutes robbery, a violent crime, under California law, but it could be argued either way. The close issues would be &quot;immediate presence&quot; and &quot;by means of force or fear&quot; (which by implication mean force or fear directed at persons rather than things). The OP fact pattern is probably not burglary under California Penal Code § 459 because while theft from a car can be burglary when someone is living in the car, this does not appear to be the case here. So, if a jury did not find that this constituted robbery, it would probably be the crime of theft (for the things taken) and vandalism (for the damage to the car windows), both of which are property crime misdemeanors. If the cars were unoccupied, this would clearly be merely theft. If the police witnesses such a robbery does it have the duty to intervene? No. The leading case for U.S. Constitutional law is Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). I am not aware of any California law to the contrary. Failure to intervene might be grounds for the chief of police to fire them, but it is not a crime and not a basis for a lawsuit against anyone. The police have effectively absolute discretion to refrain from enforcing the law. Is it true that if the victim fights back in such situation and injures the assailant the robbery victim may be prosecuted for using violence against the robber? No. A victim may use reasonably necessary force in self-defense, so long as the situation continues to be a self-defense situation. Usually, deadly force would be justified in self-defense or defense of others from a violent robbery, although a jury would have to determine that the use of force was actually necessary or that the threatened crime was actually a genuine threat, according to the statutory standard for self-defense and defense of others. The relevant statutes include California Penal Code § 197 which provides in pertinent part that: (1) When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person. (2) When committed in defense of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein. (3) When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a spouse, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant of such person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; but such person, or the person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he or she was the assailant or engaged in mutual combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed. But, the circumstances under which force can be used to arrest or stop a fleeing criminal are much more narrow, particularly in the case of a citizen's arrest as opposed to an arrest made by law enforcement. The U.S. Supreme Court case of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) narrows the scope of the lawful use of force in these circumstances beyond what California's statutes authorize on their face. For example, suppose the robber threatens you with a knife unless you give him his wallet. You or a bystander could probably lawfully shoot him at that point to prevent the robbery. But, suppose that at that point, the robber tosses the knife on the sidewalk and runs away. If someone shot the robber in the back to stop him from fleeing (unaware of any other crimes that the robber may have committed and unaware of any other weapons that the robber may have), the person shooting the robber would be guilty of aggravated assault if the robber lived, and of manslaughter or murder, if the robber died. The facts in this case are a bit muddy on whether self-defense should have been available or not, and different hypothetical uses of force could come out different ways within this fact pattern.