Why there are no sanctions against head of state if his/her country violates the International law by performing illegitimate acts of war? Assume that there is head of state that is elected in elections that are fully recognized in his/her country and that is at least partially recognized as a elected head of state by other countries and to whom (notwithstanding previous disputes) the other countries have conferred the full diplomatic privileges that are associated with his/her status as a legitimate head of state. Assume that this head of state takes decision to perform act of war against the other sovereign country and this act of war therefore violates the International law. Assume that other countries issue financial, economic personal sanctions against some persons of the country which performed acts of war. My question is - why there are never the sanctions against this head of state (decision maker) but why the sanctions are directed only towards the lesser functionaries? I have heard that the his/her status of diplomat provides the full immunity against such sanctions, but - I can not understand - whether or not the diplomatic immunity and privileges are preserved when his/her orders violates the International law? And in what cases (what laws additionally should be breached) the head of state is subject not only to the personal financial sanctions but he/she can be made captive (prisoner) and tried in the court or outright executed without trial?
Your question is based on an incorrect premise Heads of State can be and have been held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity. For example: Germany Japan Yugoslavia Rwanda
You cannot stop the claim. But the good news is that claims of jurisdiction by many countries are routinely ignored by many other countries. So enforcement attempts might fall short. I've written things here that might get me into real trouble with the authorities of North Korea if I ever traveled there and if they were able to match my real-world identity with this account. But I don't plan to travel there. Likewise, before I went to Turkey I should probably review what I've written about their government, and then wonder if it is worth the risk. Probably yes, it wasn't very incendiary. But my home country and those I tend to visit (if there is no pandemic ongoing) would not extradite me for what I wrote.
First, there is no definitive correct answer to this question because it has never happened over the course of 45 Presidencies. But, it certainly could come up. If the President purports to pardon himself for a federal crime and is then prosecuted, the judicial branch would have to decide if the pardon was valid. But, I would disagree with the answer from @user6726, and would instead take the position that the concept of a pardon inherently implies that one is pardoning someone else. This is why President Nixon, when he resigned, had Vice President Ford, when he became President upon Nixon's resignation, pardon him, rather than pardoning himself. President Bush, in connection with the Iran-Contra scandal also took the position that he did not have the power to pardon himself. Basically, a pardon is an event that is ordinary conceived of as involving two persons, a giver of the pardon and a recipient. Also, recognizing the power of a President to pardon himself or herself would be to give him or her impunity to disregard the law not just in areas where he or she has Presidential immunity, but in anything that he has ever done in his life. (Also, the President can only pardon federal crimes, not state crimes.) There is, of course, an academic literature on the subject (which none of the answers in the PoliticsSE refer to and which the other answer here does not refer to). The two leading law review articles addressing the question are: Brian C. Kalt, &quot;Pardon Me: The Constitutional Case against Presidential Self-Pardons&quot; 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996-1997) (obviously adopting my position). An expanded version of this article became a chapter in a book called &quot;Constitutional Cliffhangers: A Legal Guide For Presidents and Their Enemies&quot; by the same author. Robert Nida and Rebecca L. Spiro, &quot;The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power&quot; 52 Okla. L. Rev. 197 (1999) (closed access). It opens with the following language (in part): [C]an the President pardon himself for criminal acts committed while or before holding office? Article II of the Constitution prohibits a President from using the pardon power to overturn an impeachment.5 The Framers of the Constitution placed only this limitation on the ability of the President to exercise his pardon power,6 and the only sanction for the abuse of the pardon power is the removal of the President through impeachment.7 The Constitution is silent, however, as to whether the President may grant himself a pardon from prosecution and, if so, when such a pardon may be issued.8 In the over 20,000 instances that Presidents have used this exclusive power,9 no President has used this power to pardon himself.10 One viewpoint is that a presidential self-pardon is inherently inconsistent with &quot;natural law,&quot; which proclaims that one may not judge oneself.11 This article is cited in Comparative Executive Clemency by Andrew Novak who calls it an unresolved question but believes many legal scholars believe that it is possible. Leading Constitutional law scholar Adrian Vermeule analyzes but does not resolve the issue in his book &quot;The Constitution of Risk&quot;. A 2017 Vox review from 15 legal experts is here. Their views are mixed and nuanced. A 2017 op-ed in the Washington Post from a former member of Congress who was involved in the impeachment proceedings for President Nixon says &quot;no.&quot; Another review of expert opinion in 2017 can be found here. This also noted a dispute within the realm of academic legal opinion. There has also been debate over whether treason is treated differently for pardon power purposes than other federal crimes, but the precedent of the pardons issued after the U.S. Civil War pretty definitively resolved this question in favor of the power of the President to pardon treason, so the nature of the federal offense wouldn't matter. Note also that the pardon power is not limited to cases where criminal charges have been brought or convictions have been obtained. This issue is irrelevant to a President's self-pardon power.
Was International Law Violated? When it used chemical weapons to kill large numbers of civilians in his own country, Assad's regime in Syria was violating its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, an international treaty obligation that the regime acknowledged was binding upon it in 2013 when at U.S. insistence and with Russian supervision, the Assad regime purported to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles. It was also an action violating generally recognized standards of the customary international law of war that have been recognized since they were first clearly articulated in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 that took effect in 1928. This kind of action has also been recognized as a crime against humanity under customary international law, and this principle is why international criminal tribunals set up after crimes against humanity occur are not considered to be applying ex post facto laws. Also, since early on in the Syrian Civil War, during the Obama Administration, the U.S. ceased to recognize Assad's regime as the legitimate government of Syria. According to official U.S. policy, since 2012, the Syrian National Council, and not Assad's regime, has been the legitimate government of Syria. So, rather than being an attack on a sovereign regime, this was an act in defense of a different sometimes allied regime recognized as legitimate, with whom the U.S. is not at war. Moreover, given that fact that the U.S. now has a artillery combat ground troop unit deployed in Northern Syria as of earlier in 2017, in support of a Congressionally authorized military action in the same theater of conflict, the U.S. has a legitimate interest in protecting its own troops, as well as those of allies it supports in the part of the conflict that it is involved in under the 2001 AUMF, from chemical weapons attacks in Syria by preemptively disabling the Assad regime's ability to deploy those weapons, even though they were not directed at somewhat nearby U.S. forces in their most recent utilization this week. So, while there may not be entirely clear international legal authorization for this particular remedy for the Assad regime's clear violation of international law, there is not a clear prohibition on doing so either, and the general rule is that sovereign states have wide discretion to take military action in support of their perceived interests, particular when violations international obligations of the offender targeted for military action provide a justification for the use of military force under international law. This is because the main way of punishing a violation of international war while a conflict is still pending is called a reprisal which the Syrian strike fits to a tee. A reprisal is a limited and deliberate violation of international law to punish another sovereign state that has already broken them. . . . Reprisals refer to acts which are illegal if taken alone, but become legal when adopted by one state in retaliation for the commission of an earlier illegal act by another state. Article XII(3) of the Chemical Weapons Convention authorizes those remedies allowed under customary international law of which reprisal is one. Did The President Have Authority To Make The Strike Under U.S. Law? This said, the harder issue is whether this strike was legal under U.S. law, and not international law, which really has no meaningful binding enforcement mechanism other than politics, diplomacy and domestic law anyway. While the U.S. does not recognize the Assad regime as legitimate, it is not actually at war with that regime because the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) from 2001 that has been the main legal authorization for the "war on terror" against ISIS, pretty clear does not extend to Assad's regime in Syria. ISIS has been declared to be a successor to a branch of the organization the launched the 9-11 attack upon which the AUMF declared war. But, the formerly legitimate government of Syria (Assad's regime) is very difficult to treat as coming within that definition. However, while Congress has not authorized the use of military force by the U.S. against the Assad regime in Syria in this manner, Congress has approved appropriations to fund and support anti-Assad rebels, even though it may have been a bit of a fiasco, which at least provides some tacit evidence of Congressional consent to some sort of involvement in the Syrian civil war by the United States government against Assad's regime. In absence of an authorization of use of military force against the Assad regime, one alternative source of legal authority to make this strike is legislation (whose constitutionality has often been questioned, but has never actually challenged, was determined by the Justice Department to be constitutional in 1980, and which is arguably not justiciable) called the War Powers Act of 1973. This Act, on its face, purports to give the President the authority to make limited use of military force for short periods of time. Specifically (per the link): It provides that the U.S. President can send U.S. Armed Forces into action abroad only by declaration of war by Congress, "statutory authorization," or in case of "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." The War Powers Resolution requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action and forbids armed forces from remaining for more than 60 days, with a further 30-day withdrawal period, without a Congressional authorization for use of military force (AUMF) or a declaration of war by the United States. The question of whether this incident is within the scope of the War Powers Act is disputed with U.S. Senator Rand Paul arguing the conditions triggering its use such as an attack on U.S. forces or the United States, have not been met. The issues presented by this incident under the War Powers Act are similar to those presented in the missile strike and follow up airstrikes made by the U.S. in Libya in 2011. There is also legitimate room for dispute regarding where the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution ends, and where the power of Congress to declare war and to enact other legislation pertaining to the U.S. military under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution begins. Arguably, directing U.S. forces to make an isolated military strike from a location where they are already lawfully deployed in support of an AUMF authorized military mission in the region, in exigent circumstances, against a military force that is not recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of Syria, does not constitute a true act of war and is instead merely day to day management of the operations and discipline of the United States military that is within the Commander in Chief's authority, particularly when Congress has already tentatively recognized the Syria's Assad regime is an enemy of the United States in legislation short of an authorization for use of military force. Moreover, given that President Trump surely has majority support in both houses of Congress for this strike, the possibility that Congress may end up granting forgiveness rather than making much of the fact that he didn't ask for permission, may be mostly a formality in this case. Generally speaking, even if this issue is justiciable (i.e. amenable to resolution through the court system), court action to enforce separation of powers questions must be authorized, at least, by a resolution of a majority of one of the two houses of Congress. Generally speaking, taxpayer standing or just plain U.S. citizen standing, does not exist to enjoin or seek a remedy from a separation of powers violation.
You could almost define a country as, "an entity that can defend itself against invasions." Non-sovereign entities are indeed generally prohibited from deploying lethal autonomous defense systems like booby-traps. But governments and state-like actors, as a matter of practice, choose their own rules. laws-of-war and international-law are not like "regular" law: When it comes down to it, states only follow international conventions and treaties to the extent that they consider it to be in their own interest to do so. If you start mining your property, you will probably be forced to stop by local law enforcement. If a warlord starts mining his borders, he's going to get away with it until someone with more power convinces or forces him to stop. Was it "illegal" for Turkey to shoot down a Russian military aircraft? One could cite all sorts of laws and conventions to answer that question. But in practice the consequences of that act are limited to whatever Turkey allows, or to what Russia and its allies can impose on Turkey.
Documents from countries which did not sign (or to be received by non-signatory countries) must be certified by the foreign ministry of the source country (or its equivalent) and then further certified by the foreign ministry of the receiving country, before such documents can be used in legal proceedings. The Wikipedia article says: A state that has not signed the Convention must specify how foreign legal documents can be certified for its use. Two countries may have a special convention on the recognition of each other's public documents, but in practice this is infrequent. Otherwise, the document must be certified by the foreign ministry of the country in which the document originated, and then by the foreign ministry of the government of the state in which the document will be used; one of the certifications will often be performed at an embassy or consulate. In practice this means the document must be certified twice before it can have legal effect in the receiving country. For example, as Canada is not a signatory, Canadian documents for use abroad must be certified by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in Ottawa or by a Canadian consular official abroad, and subsequently by the relevant government office or consulate of the receiving state. This seems to answer the question rather completely.
The most commonly used definition for statehood is the declaratory theory, codified by the Montevideo Convention. This says that statehood doesn't depend on recognition by other states; it merely requires four things: A defined territory A permanent population An effective government The capacity to enter into relations with other states. You immediately run into issues around the defined territory (you don't really have one) and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. But let's ignore those for a second. Meeting these requirements in some abstract world doesn't mean you get treated like a state. If no one else agrees with your claim to statehood and they act inconsistently with it, you have little recourse. You might get them not caring enough to do anything about it, but if they decide you're not a country you're out of luck. You have some misconceptions about statehood as well. A country is allowed to forbid trade with any foreign country, even ones it recognizes as sovereign states. See: US embargo on Cuba. It is also entitled to deny foreign ships access to its ports. Ships flying the flag of a sovereign state are entitled to innocent passage through territorial waters of another state, but not to the use of that state's ports. A country can certainly allow people to be killed and still be a country. See: the US, which has the death penalty for certain crimes. But if you're killing nationals of a foreign country, that foreign country is likely to take a keen interest in your activities. If the killings are judicially-ordered executions based on violations of your penal laws, that's one thing -- Australia might consider it awful that an Australian citizen was shot by Indonesia for drug smuggling, but they recognize that Indonesia is a real country with its own laws that it has a right to apply. If it's just lawless there, the keen interest might culminate in a travel warning. But in more extreme cases, or where the killings are of people who didn't willingly enter your territory, you're looking at potential military action.
The original country laws by default, but that can change. Once a country(let's say Elbonia) takes unconstested control of a town/region(let's say Silvania), it becomes an occupying power and has the obligation of ensuring the safety and well-being of its population. It usally also has the practical need of ensuring that the zone does not plunge into chaos, as it is usually detrimental to using that zone resources to support the war effort and may force the occupying force to deploy troops needed elsewhere. To that effect, an Elbonian occupation authority is established and usually a proclamation issued and distributed informing the inhabitant of the new authority and its decisions1. While by default the original laws will be in effect2, the occupying force has the ability to issue new laws and to enforce them in order to conduct its activities.3 The paramount example would that of treason: a Silvanian citizen caught acting against the Elbonian occupation forces can be tried and punished by the Elbonian authorities, even if Silvanian laws allowed or even asked for Silvanian citizens to attack Elbonian forces. At a practical level, if Elbonia follows the rules of war then the occupation of the zone is temporal (as wars of conquest are forbiden) and it is usually easier to let civilians handle themselves as long as it does not affect the war. In any case, a situation of war is often traumatic enough that even without occupation its effects will be felt; in your example Silvania's government could just decree a 90 kph speed limit in order to save fuel, establish fuel rationing, or even require government authorization to use highways in order to free them for military transports, setup checkpoints every few kms... And of course, remember that for some people inter arma enim silent leges. 1There are some explicit prohibitions against laws forcing the inhabitants to directly support the occupying power, like forcing the civilians to enrol in its army or to build military equipment. 2Art 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all offences covered by the said laws. The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of communication used by them. 3Art 65 of the Fourth Geneva Convention: The penal provisions enacted by the Occupying Power shall not come into force before they have been published and brought to the knowledge of the inhabitants in their own language. The effect of these penal provisions shall not be retroactive. This answer the &quot;how would one know if one has been conquered?&quot; part of your question.