Can the federal government tell San Francisco that they cannot allow non-citizen immigrants to vote San Francisco passed a law allowing non-citizens to vote in school board elections. Representative Jeff Duncan introduced a bill that would strip all federal funds from any locality that allows non-citizens to vote. From his webpage, The Eliminating Foreign Intervention in Elections Act has two key components: Empowers the U.S. Census Bureau to collect and publish information on which States or localities have noncitizen voting policies in place. Defunds localities that allow noncitizens to vote in elections for State or local office. Is this constitutionally allowed? My research The constitution has several prohibitions against denying certain people the right to vote. For example the fifteenth amendment &quot;prohibits the federal and state governments from denying a citizen the right to vote based on that citizen's 'race, color, or previous condition of servitude'.&quot; wiki However I can't find any positive statements of who gets the right to vote, or any mention of who decides that. I assume that because the tenth amendment gives the powers not delegated to the federal government to the states or the people, that this is up to the states to decide. Technically, Duncan's bill doesn't actually prohibit San Francisco from making this law, it just imposes very coercive penalties for doing so. The case of South Dakota v. Dole lays out five criteria for considering if withdrawal of federal funds is unconstitutionally coercive. The last criteria is &quot;The condition must not be coercive.&quot; The debate around this fifth criteria seems to center on how much money is being withdrawn. This question might hinge on whether San Francisco gets enough money to count as &quot;irresistable pressure.&quot; I have a somewhat tenuous chain of logic laid out here. Any one of the links could be flat out wrong, or I could be just completely missing the point.
In National Federation Of Independent Business v. Sebelius, the court addressed the matter of withholding funding, with respect to obligatory expansion of Medicaid, where ACA required states to expand Medicaid coverage, or lose all federal Medicaid funds. The effect, as described in the ruling was "[t]he threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget", which constitutes "economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion", and "The Medicaid expansion thus violates the Constitution by threatening States with the loss of their existing Medicaid funding if they decline to comply with the expansion". A law which withholds more than Medicaid funding would therefore clearly be at least as coercive as ACA. It is some interest that the ACA ruling put specific comparative numbers on the effect of the highway funding law underlying SD v. Dole, which they decided was "less than a half a percent" of the state budget. In contrast, in the case of Medicaid funding, their estimate was that Medicaid costs are about 20% of a state's budget, and the federal government pays 50%-80% of that. That means, picking low numbers, the effect of withholding Medicaid funding would be about 10% of a state's budget. The line between persuasion and coercion then seems to lie between .5% and 10%. The presumably introduced bill is here, for reference. The core paragraph is (a) None of the funds made available in any Act may be used to make payments to any unit of local government that permits individuals who are not citizens of the United States to vote in elections for State or local office. However, the introductory clause identifies the purpose as being To prohibit Federal payments to a unit of local government that allows individuals who are not citizens of the United States to vote in elections for State or local office, and for other purposes. The substantial difference is that propositions are not offices: the bill introduces ambiguity in legislative intent (the words of the statute say one thing, the potentially enforceable sections introduced into US Code say something else). The bill does not define "unit of local government", so we could search for existing definitions of that term. 31 USC 6701: primarily "a county, township, city, or political subdivision of a county, township, or city, that is a unit of general local government as determined by the Secretary of Commerce for general statistical purposes" (I don't think school, fire, hospital and water districts count). Alternatively 42 USC 12746: a city, town, township, county, parish, village, or other general purpose political subdivision of a State; the Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, the Marshall Islands, or a general purpose political subdivision thereof; a consortium of such political subdivisions recognized by the Secretary [HUD] in accordance with section 12746(2) of this title; and any agency or instrumentality thereof that is established pursuant to legislation and designated by the chief executive to act on behalf of the jurisdiction with regard to provisions of this Act. To get the desired effect, the sponsor wants the definition in 2 CFR 200.64, which includes school districts (and that chunk is about federal grants, thus apt for the bill). The statutory authority for this interpretation is 31 USC 503.
The 14th amendment guarantees equal protection under the law for all citizens of the US. It's my understanding that this means from the Federal Government, and doesn't exactly apply when it's a &quot;states' rights&quot; kind of issue. Your understanding is incorrect. The primary original purpose of the 14th amendment was to prevent states from passing laws that treated former slaves differently from other citizens, and indeed to clearly declare that they were in fact citizens, thus reversing the decision in Dred Scot v Sandford 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). That decision held that black people could not be US citizens and had no rights granted to citizens under the US Federal Constitution. Of course the amendment is applied in a much wider scope than merely granting citizenship to the former slaves freed by the 13th amendment. The Equal Protection Clause** generally requires that laws not make arbitrary and unjustified distinctions between people, nor treat different people in the same legal situation differently. The clause does not, however, prevent laws from treating who are in some significant legal sense in different positions differently. What is and is not a violation of the clause has been the subject of many legal cases and much debate. The clause requires &quot;state action&quot; to be invoked. and is generally only applies to state and local governments, and those in their employ or acting on their behalf. However, the US Supreme Court held in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) that the 5th amendment imposes a similar requirement of equal protection on the Federal government. The amendment, and the equal protection clause, do not guarantee any particular outcome in judicial cases. It is not clear from the question what equal protection issue, if any, might be at issue in the particular matter described. If the issue is one of treatment under the laws of a country other than the US, even though the people involved are US citizens, the US constitution, including the amendment will not apply.
The only way that a member of the House of Representatives, or a U.S. Senator can be removed from office (other than by resignation, death, or expiration of a term of office without being re-elected) is by a two-thirds vote of the chamber removing that member. The relevant provision of the United States Constitution is Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 which states: Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. So, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives may be removed by a two-thirds vote of the U.S. House, and a U.S. Senator may be removed by a two-thirds vote of the U.S. Senate. This has been done five times since 1789 in the U.S. House, most recently in 2002. It has been done fifteen times since 1789 in the U.S. Senate (the most recent 14 times in 1861 and 1862 in connection with the U.S. Civil War). The case of William Blount in 1797 established the precedent that expulsion of a member by a chamber, rather than impeachment, is the proper process to remove a member of Congress. Members of Congress may not be recalled, and are not automatically removed from office upon conviction of a crime. Apart from the expulsion process, there is no way for voters or states to remove U.S. Senators not from their own state, something that doesn't make sense to be possible in the overall context of the structure of the United States government under the U.S. Constitution. Senate Rule XXIII in part provides that ``if the impeachment shall not, upon any of the articles presented, be sustained by the votes of two-thirds of the members present, a judgment of acquittal shall be entered;'' A quorum of the full Senate and not just those sworn in for the trial is required. The Senate rules in the case of an expulsion of a member are analogous.
Yes and No. The Federal U.S. Government as well as each individual state and territory claim Soverign Immunity to a limited degree. In the case of Federal Government, they claim Soverign Immunity to a near limitless degree (more on this in a moment), while States and Territories claim &quot;State Soverign Immunity&quot; which grants them immunity with respect to all soverign powers granted under the U.S. Constitution. To clarify, each U.S. State is seperately soverign in all matters not explicitly allocated to the Federal Government by the U.S. Constitution and all constitutionally written laws. Where the Constitution does not in writing claim a power for the federal government nor reserver a power for the state government, the power is assumed to be state government. So a State can claim immunity for a police situation but not a law it makes regarding immigration or foriegn policy, since that is the exclusive wheelhouse of the Feds. Per the 11th amendment, states can only be sued in state court by citizens of the state, while non-state citizens wishing to sue a state must sue in the Federal Court (Which for the purposes of the trial may adopt the defendant State's laws and regulations for the purposes of questions of fact and law brought up in the suit). All U.S. States and the Federal Goverment additionally wave Soverign Immunity under specific conditions outlined in laws. In the case of the Federal Government, the laws governing when this immunity is waived are governed by the Federal Torts Claims Act (1946) and the Tucker Act (1887). The FTCA covers intentional torts by the Federal Government, while the Tucker Act typically covers matters related to contractual obligations or monitary interactions with the federal government. Things that may be sued for include but are not limited too: Intentional Torts committed by Government Agents in their Official Capacity (i.e. When the FBI violates your rights or maliciously investigates you). Contractual disputes where the Government is a party to the Contract, either in written or implied terms. Constitutional Claims (i.e. The Government may have violated the Constitution. These tend to be for non-monitary relief such as mandemuses, though the 5th Amendment's Taking Clause can be invoked of the government took property and does not justly compensate.). Individual Agencies of the Government when the monitary claim is not drawn from the U.S. Treasury (the agencies own allocated budget is used to pay). Refund for taxes paid In all cases, a Judge will determin if the Government, under the laws, can be sued. If in the example of a government employee being sued, the Justice Department will first make a determination if the employee was acting as an agent of the government when they committed the tortious act, and then will declare themselves Respondent Superior through the agency of employement. From there, the case becomes a suit against the Federal Government and FTCA immunity waiver is determined by a Judge. For example, lets say you (Mr. Rapt) sue Special Agent Jimmy Jones of an intentional tort that he committed in the course of his duty as an FBI agent. The DOJ will first declare that they are Respondent Superior in the case of Rapt v. Jones, thus turning the case to Rapt v. United States Government, Department of Justice, Federal Beura of Investigations, and Jones (Rapt v. United States, et. al.). From here, the Judge who gets the case then determins if the U.S. Government under FTCA can be sued by Rapt, based on Rapt's citizenship status (usually permanent legal residents are covered as citizens for this point, but I can say for certain in this particular law), ripeness (the suit must be filed within 2 years of the incident or first knowledge), and immunity waiver under FTCA. In the case of the State Government, they should have similar laws, but I'm not going to identify all 50 individual laws here. Additionally, the 11th Amendment permits U.S. Congress to waive a State's immunity to suit in certain cases (mostly comes up with the Due Process Clause in the 14th Amendment.). As a fun point, in all cases where a government appears as a defendant in a suit, it is automatically a Bench Trial, as the government usually include a waiver of their right as defendant to a jury trial. The thinking here is that, as a country that was founded by rebelling against the government, a jury of 12 of the government's citizens aren't going to give them any slack at trial, where as a judge (who they pay) is much more likely. TL;DR: Both questions are yes. The immunity is waived under federal law for certain cases, but it is a judge who will make the ruling if the specific case meets the aformentioned waived immunity.
Is there any legal precedent for suing a city to amend or terminate an agreement due to fiscal nonfeasance? There is not really any legal precedent for prevailing in such a lawsuit. Obviously, of course, the detailed facts and circumstances matter. If a state statute prescribed other terms, for example, and expressly gives someone standing to enforce the statute, then that is another matter. In many states, standing to enforce violations of municipal laws governing their finances and contracts is vested by statute or the state constitution in the state attorney general. Is there any legal recourse for a resident who believes their city is committing financial nonfeasance? Probably not. Certainly not in court. Usually, individual citizens or taxpayers do not have standing to bring suit related to acts which affect all citizens or taxpayers equally or proportionately, but do not constitute an individualized injury to the particular taxpayer. Municipal governments have broad discretion to enter into contracts with other municipalities on rates that they deem fit which do not have to approximate cost or be profit maximizing. Some states and cities allow citizens to petition to have legislation that has been adopted (agreements are generally adopted by city ordinance) to be placed on the ballot for a vote if a sufficient number of people vote on it within a sufficient time of the ordinance or law being passed (this is called a "referendum power"). But, most do not. Otherwise, your sole recourse is to get a majority elected to city council and a new mayor, to change the policy when the agreement expires. wouldn't the city have to prove that there IS a benefit to the city? No. Assuming for sake of argument that someone suing the city had standing to sue, the burden of proof is always on the person bringing the lawsuit. Ordinances are presumed valid unless this is disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. For example: It is an axiom of our judicial system that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. Parties attacking their validity carry a heavy burden of proof: invalidity must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt People v. Beaver, 549 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Colo. 1976) The constitutional test in the face of an equal protection challenge (assuming for sake of argument that there was standing) would be a "rational basis test" and there would be a rational basis for (1) saying that the city benefit from its neighbor not having adequate fire protection which could spread to them, (2) on the basis that the marginal cost might be low, and (3) on the basis that the municipality probably has a legal duty to aid a neighboring municipality if it has the ability to do so in the absence of an agreement without necessarily having a right to compensation under a doctrine called mutual aid when the proper conditions are met (sometimes formalized by agreements and/or governed by state statutes such as the Tennessee's Mutual Aid and Emergency and Disaster Assistance Agreement Act of 2004, Tennessee Code Annotated § 58–8–101, et seq.,). The rational basis test is met if you can describe some rational reason why the law might make sense for the city to pass (which is not expressly prohibited by law or a constitutional right), even if the rational reason is not empirically correct, and even if the rational reason wasn't the actual reason for passing the law. This ordinance would almost certainly pass the rational basis test. In general, a disagreement over the price term of an agreement being too high or too low almost always fails. A municipality is not obligated to negotiate a "fair market value" or "fair" price for services that it provides to other municipalities.
Generally, the legislature is not restricted to passing laws that are a good idea. This has been remarked on by the Supreme Court (in Justice Stevens's concurrence, emphasis added): But as I recall my esteemed former colleague, Thurgood Marshall, remarking on numerous occasions: “The Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.” There are some limits: for one thing, the law must pass the rational basis test, which, while extremely favorable to the legislature (Congress could probably ban coffee consumption, for instance), does impose some limits and might result in at least some of your examples being struck down—I cannot imagine a court finding that the government had a rational basis for taxing everyone 120% of their income, for example. However, the states do have a recourse in many cases, especially if Congress were to reduce the penalties for crimes: most &quot;common&quot; crimes (assault, battery, murder, theft, etc.) are state crimes, so Congress wouldn't have the power to change the penalties for those. Most cases where these things become federal crimes involve conduct affecting multiple states, and the person committing the crime would likely also commit at least one state crime. States also aren't required to assist the federal government in its enforcement of federal law. For instance, quite a number of states believe that the federal prohibition of marijuana is unjust, and won't enforce those laws within their boundaries.
For the US, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act provides that just about any US citizen living abroad who has previously resided within the US is entitled to vote in federal elections as though they still lived at their last US address, provided they'd be eligible to vote if they still lived at that address. If you're overseas on duty in a uniformed service of the United States or as a spouse or dependent of such a person, it's based on your legal residence instead. This is a right of US citizenship; dual citizenship doesn't affect it. This State Department website has details; there's a special process you can generally use instead of the state absentee process. UOCAVA applies to all federal elections (including primaries); state and local election eligibility is up to the state. For Canada, citizens of Canada living there seem to have the right to vote regardless of any possible loyalty issues with another country. Canadians living outside Canada for over five years can't vote, but if you live there it seems as though it is allowed. So, the answer is seemingly "yes." For a definitive answer, contact the US consulate and Canadian election officials.
The law is not settled and will shortly be before the High Court (sitting as the Court of Disputed Returns) but theoretically: yes! The provision on Disqualification is s44, specifically subsection (i): Any person who: (i) is under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience, or adherence to a foreign power, or is a subject or a citizen or entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject or a citizen of a foreign power, shall be incapable of being chosen or of sitting as a senator or a member of the House of Representatives. Which, on the face of it, makes eligibility to sit in the Australian parliament dependent on the citizenship laws of every other country in the world: all 195 of them. Indeed, right now, any citizen of Australia (which is itself a qualification by virtue of s16 or s34), is allowed to live and work in New Zealand, and to vote after a year's residence - that is they are &quot;entitled to the rights or privileges of a subject [but not a citizen] of a foreign power&quot;. Therefore, interpreted that way, no Australian is entitled to sit in parliament. Of course, a simple referendum1 could change the Constitution to fix that - except, a referendum must be called by parliament and we no longer have one. Personally, I think it is unlikely2 that the High Court will rule in such a way that would plunge the nation into a constitutional crises by deciding no one can sit in parliament or that who can sit is determined by the laws of foreign nations. Notwithstanding, at present there are 5 MPs who have been referred to the High Court (2 of whom have already resigned), 2 more who will be referred when parliament resumes in September, 21 known to have been born overseas who have not confirmed that they have renounced any foreign citizenship they might have and an unknown number who may have foreign citizenship by descent. Each of the cases is distinct: some were born overseas, some have foreign citizenship by descent, one is a 3rd generation Australian whose mother registered him as an Italian citizen when he was a child (17) and he claims he never knew. How the High Court will rule will almost certainly vary with the particular circumstances but its anyone's guess what they will decide. However, it appears that the drafters of the constitution intended that it should capture all dual-citizens, not just those who sought dual-citizenship by a deliberative act. If a person is found to be ineligible then different things happen depending on if they ware a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives. For a Senator, the High Court would recount the results of the election - because of the strange way voting works for the Senate, only educated guesses can be made about who would replace whom (especially since the same citizen issue may apply to other candidates on the ticket). For a Member of the House of Representatives, a by-election would be held - because the Liberal/National government has a majority of 1 and 3 of their members are in the gun the results will be ... interesting. 1 Referenda in Australia are not simple. The Australian Constitution is specifically designed to be difficult to change while at the same time granting broad powers to parliament. It takes a nationwide vote and must be carried by a majority of voters nationwide and a majority in a majority of the six states (i.e. 4 or more). Since federation in 1901 there have been 44 referenda of which only 8 have been carried. In is generally accepted that a referendum is impossible to pass unless it has bi-partisan support: and sometimes not even then. 2 And by &quot;unlikely&quot; I mean &quot;impossible&quot; - a conclusion that the constitution must be read in such a way that parliamentary democracy becomes impossible would be contrary to law. Update in light of the High Court’s ruling: No Providing a potential parliamentarian has taken “all reasonable steps” to renounce foreign allegiance they are permitted to serve even if the foreign power refuses to allow them to renounce citizenship. In practice, this means writing to the foreign embassy and renouncing citizenship.