Does a ban on plea bargaining still permit defendants to plead guilty? From my understanding, plea bargaining is the process where a defendant can plead guilty to a reduced charge. This means there is no trial, but a lesser sentence. I also know of fact bargaining - where a defendant says a certain fact is true in exchange for the prosecutor not using other facts in the case. From this definition, I assumed that abolishing plea bargaining meant that defendants could no longer plead guilty at all. However, then I read the following quote from a book: "The evaluation also revealed that, contrary to predictions that defendants would refuse to plead guilty and that the Alaska criminal justice system would grind to a halt, guilty pleas did not decrease and trials did not increase dramatically". This is in reference to the Alaska ban on plea bargaining. Here's the full paragraph for added context: Image: https://i.stack.imgur.com/v4PGv.jpg Text (OCR): Given the controversy surrounding plea bargaining. it is not surprising that a number of jurisdictions have attempted to restrict, or even to eliminate. it. In 1975, for example, the Alaska attorney general issued an order that banned all forms of plea bargaining. Under this policy. prosecutors could not reduce charges or dismiss counts in exchange for guilty pleas; they also were not supposed to ask the court to impose a particular sentence if the defendant agreed to plead guilty. The attorney general imposed the ban on plea bargaining in an effort to increase convictions and restore public confidence in the justice system (Carns 8c Kruse, 1992). An evaluation of the impact of the ban found that explicit sentence bargaining disappeared and that charge bargaining continued for a few months and then “dried up" (Rubinstein 8: White. 1979). The evaluation also revealed that, contrary to predictions that defendants would refuse to plead guilty and that the Alaska criminal justice system would therefore grind to a halt, guilty pleas did not decrease and trials did not increase dramatically. Although the authors of the study concluded that the Alaska experience showed that “the incidence of plea bargaining can be substantially reduced without wrecking a criminal justice system," they also cautioned that the results of the Alaska reform could not necessarily be generalized to other. larger jurisdictions (Rubinstein 8: White, 1979, p. 382). My question is, if there was a ban on plea bargaining in Alaska, then how could defendants still plead guilty, and why would they choose to do so? How could charge and sentence bargaining "dry up", but guilty pleas still exist?
The 1975 ban by the attorney general prohibited prosecutors from offering to reduce charges, dismiss counts, or request a particular sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. (Ad hoc exceptions were allowed, initially only by the AG, later by the head of each local office. For a while, there was also judicial bargaining). The AG's ban was on quid pro quo arrangements by his office, and the AG has absolutely no power over the plea by an accused, so that is how an accused could still plead guilty. The following quote is from the first page of Rubenstein &amp; White: On July 3, 1975, the Attorney General of Alaska, Avrum Gross, issued written instructions forbidding all district attorneys and their assistants from engaging in plea bargaining. This prohibition extended to all felony and all misdemeanor prosecutions filed as of August 15. They could not offer to reduce charges or dismiss counts in multiple-count complaints, informations, or indictments as a quid pro quo for guilty pleas. Nor could they request the court to impose any stated sentence; they could only recite the facts. I can't locate a copy of the actual memo, but also see this quote, esp. "...negotiations with defendants designed to arrive at an agreement for entry of a plea of guilty in return for a particular sentence...". A guilty plea is much cheaper for a defendant than paying an attorney and getting convicted, so if you're actually guilty and the evidence is good, it could be a wiser move to plead guilty. There is little reason to engage in a futile act. It apparently also caused a change in the prosecutorial standard for charging, from probable cause to beyond a reasonable doubt – consequently, the chances that the accused is actually guilty goes up. The re-evaluation study also found evidence some evidence that sentencing was lighter in the case of a guilty plea, and it would be sufficient for the accused to believe that he could get a lighter sentence as a reward for a guilty plea to nudge a person in the direction of a guilty plea.
In the US, the prohibition against double jeopardy provides a hard restriction against re-trial and appeal of an acquittal. The government cannot appeal an acquittal (U.S. v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, Ball v. U.S., 163 U.S. 662), and a verdict of acquittal without judgment is also a bar to re-prosecution. The exception is that if the defendant was never in jeopardy – the judge had been bribed – then there can be a new trial (Harry Aleman v. Judges of the Criminal Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois). However, Adam does not take Dave to court. Adam may make an accusation that motivates the prosecutor to file criminal charges. When Adam sues Dave (not a criminal matter), there is no acquittal or conviction, or guilt. There may be a finding of liability, or not. Either side can appeal to the top, as long as there is a legal basis for the appeal. If Adam is found not liable because the judge makes a legally erroneous ruling, if Dave objected properly to the ruling, Dave can appeal if successful, the court could then change its mind and find Adam liable.
According to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 (c)(1), there are two different ways that such a plea deal could be negotiated: Paragraph B: the prosecution agrees to recommend a particular sentence or range. Such a recommendation is not binding on the court, but would probably be followed in most cases. Paragraph C: the prosecution agrees that a particular sentence or range is the appropriate disposition of the case. If the court accepts this type of plea deal, they have to impose the agreed sentence. The court does have the power to reject the agreement altogether, but in that case the defendant can withdraw their guilty plea and proceed to trial (or go back to the bargaining table with the prosecution). So it depends on which type of deal was in place. For (B), the movie's course of events would be possible. For C, it would not.
In the overwhelming majority of criminal trials for felonies, and a very large share of misdemeanor and traffic trials, criminal defendants, following the advise of their criminal defense attorneys – who have a good knowledge of the system – overwhelmingly choose jury trials. (Even though criminal defense attorneys may personally have reasons to prefer bench trials which take less preparation as criminal defense attorneys are usually spread very thin with many clients and limited resources.) This is primarily for one very good reason. A jury is six times more likely to acquit than a judge and, unlike a judge, can also deadlock (resulting in a mistrial followed by a retrial or more lenient plea bargain in most cases), if the facts are at all susceptible to more than one interpretation. Judges and juries agree on the verdict in roughly 78% of criminal jury trials where a verdict is entered, but judges are much less likely to acquit defendants than juries do, (3% v. 19%+) (see the sources cited in this previous Law.SE answer). The National Center for State Courts conducted a survey of hung jury rates using felony case data from all federal courts and 30 state courts in 75 of the most populous counties. The NCSC project found that state courts in large urban areas had an average hung jury rate of 6.2%, with substantial variation across courts, ranging from a low of 0.1% in Pierce County, Washington to a high of 14.8% in Los Angeles County, California. Federal hung jury rates were found to be particularly low, averaging about 2% of all federal jury trials: federal civil trials had lower rates than federal criminal trials. (Source.) On average a criminal defendant is eight times more likely to avoid a criminal conviction in a state court criminal case in a trial before a jury than in a bench trial. In federal court, there is a 38% chance of bench trial acquittal (12% of all federal criminal trials are bench trials while 88% are jury trials), some of which are for misdemeanors and traffic cases, and a 14% chance of jury trial acquittal. But only 2% of federal criminal cases go to trial (roughly 99.6% of cases presented to federal grand juries result in indictments) with the remainder plea bargained (90% of cases charged) or dismissed (8% of cases charged, sometimes due to a state court conviction), and only about 2% of all U.S. criminal cases are filed in federal court. So, federal criminal bench trials are very rare and atypical. Secondarily, there is lots of highly prejudicial and legally irrelevant information (e.g., the criminal history of the defendant, or evidence excluded for 4th Amendment violations) that a jury will not know, but a judge will know. Jurors almost never disregard evidence that they are told to disregard, and often give it undue weight, and judges aren't any better. The real question should be: Who chooses a bench trial and why, notwithstanding these facts? Some situations in which someone might consider a bench trial rather than a jury trial include: A bench trial can be easier for a pro se defendant, which is one not represented by counsel either because the defendant is not indigent and hence not entitled to counsel, or because the proceeding is one in which there is no right to counsel (usually traffic cases). In these, usually low stakes, matters the cost of counsel does not justify the expenditure and it can be easier to do a bench trial as a pro se party than a jury trial. The vast majority of criminal or quasi-criminal bench trials are in low stakes cases (which are segregated into separate courts in state court and mixed in with more serious cases in federal court) where this is a primary consideration. A bench trial can be desirable for someone who needs a quicker trial date (e.g., someone who lives somewhere seasonally and needs to get home), especially in a low stakes case where the sentence is likely to be a fine or a sentence to &quot;time served&quot; if there is a sentence. A bench trial can be desirable when the guilt-innocence determination is largely a foregone conclusion but the defendant would still like to at least try to be acquitted, as a way to more fully tell a story of how the incident was understandable even if not a legal justification for conduct, to prepare the judge for sentencing with a more full picture of what happened than a guilty plea would provide. For example, it might be a strategy that someone who assaults (ambush style) someone who raped his sister might take, even though a tape recorded confession and video tape of the incident makes the likelihood of acquittal small (unless the defendant thinks that &quot;jury nullification&quot;, i.e. ruling in his favor notwithstanding the law, is likely). Another example would be to provide a forum in a drug possession case to show that someone in possession of a large quantity of controlled substances was really a &quot;mule&quot; and not a big time dealer. This kind of consideration drives a fair number of bench trials in federal criminal cases. A bench trial can be desirable for a defendant who thinks that a judge will be favorably inclined towards him (e.g., some law enforcement officers or public officials). A bench trial can be desirable for a defendant when a jury is likely to be biased against him (e.g., a Muslim defendant at a time when anti-Muslim sentiment is strong due to some recent news event, or a defendant in a community with lots of racist potential jurors who is before a black judge). A bench trial can be desirable for a defendant whose primary defense requires above average sophistication to understand (e.g., a defendant in some complicated regulatory or white collar case). Bench trials are more attractive in cases where the criminal defendant is a first time offender, has no arrest record, and is not relying on suppressing any evidence at trial, so that the availability of more information to the judge than the jury is not a problem. A summary of jury trials in Colorado, which is typical, shows the revealed preference for jury trials. In 2016, defendants elected jury trials in 67% of traffic cases, 69% of misdemeanor cases, 97% of state court felony cases, and 59% of federal criminal cases (which are a mix of misdemeanors and felonies).
Just to expand on what others have answered: It's important that each crime is also given its own sentence as it's possible that prisoners can be cleared of crimes if new evidence is found. This could make a significant difference to the amount of time the prisoner is serving. For example if a person was convicted for kidnap, murder, and stealing a car, all adding up to a total of 120 years, but later was found to be a car thief who was in the wrong place at the wrong time, and proven innocent of the kidnap and murder charges, that person would then only face the sentence from the car theft. If one life sentence had been issued for the three crimes, a new sentence would have to be worked out.
Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record.
How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.
Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself).