Why don&#39;t Habitual Offender Laws violate rule against double jeopardy? Some countries have rules against double jeopardy, yet the same countries also may have rules stipulating more severe punishment to habitual offenders (or practice less severe punishment if the defendant is not convicted before). Why are these both allowed? Suppose a person commits an offence, for example robbery, and is sentenced to jail for one year. After serving his time he does the same thing again and now is sentenced to two years' imprisonment instead of one just because of the earlier crime. The extra year he is required to serve is just because of the first crime, but he has already been charged, sentenced and served his time for that crime.
Habitual offender laws are written such that they represent distinct crimes. In your given example, the trier of fact will be asked to judge two distinct crimes: Did the defendant rob the bank Did the defendant break the habitual offender act An example from California, Penal Code Section 193.7 defines habitual offenders for traffic offenses: A person convicted of a violation of subdivision (b) of Section 191.5 that occurred within seven years of two or more separate violations of Section 23103, as specified in Section 23103.5, of, or Section 23152 or 23153 of, the Vehicle Code, or any combination thereof, that resulted in convictions, shall be designated as an habitual traffic offender subject to paragraph (3) of subdivision (e) of Section 14601.3 of the Vehicle Code, for a period of three years, subsequent to the conviction. The person shall be advised of this designation pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 13350 of the Vehicle Code. The conviction of being an habitual traffic offender is applied an underlying statute's sentencing guidelines. In the case of California's Vehicle Code 14601.3(e)(3): Any habitual traffic offender designated under Section 193.7 of the Penal Code or under subdivision (b) of Section 23546, subdivision (b) of Section 23550, subdivision (b) of Section 23550.5, or subdivision (d) of Section 23566 who is convicted of a violation of Section 14601.2 shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for 180 days and by a fine of two thousand dollars ($2,000). The penalty in this paragraph shall be consecutive to that imposed for the violation of any other law. In this case, there is enhanced sentencing if one is convicted of the crime of driving under a suspended or revoked license if the person is also convicted of being an habitual traffic offender. The jury instruction template used when determining if an enhanced sentence is warranted requires that the defendant be found guilty of the underlying crime as well as the additional allegation of the sentencing factor: If you ﬁnd the defendant guilty of the crime[s] charged in Count[s] _________________[,] [or of attempting to commit (that/those) crime[s]][ or thelesser crimes[s] of ], you must then decide whether[, for each crime,] the People have proved the additional allegation that &lt;insert description of enhancement, sentencing factor, or factual issue>. [You must decide whether the People have proved this allegation for each crime and return a separate ﬁnding for each crime. To prove this allegation, the People must prove that: &lt;Insert elements required.> The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must ﬁnd that the allegation has not been proved. The person in your example is not being punished again for the first crime; they are being sentenced to a year for robbing the bank the second time and receiving a sentencing enhancement of a year for breaking the habitual offender statute.
Is such legislation that effectively overrules a court imposed sentence even allowable? Yes. Amnesty legislation is allowed. For example, the U.S. Congress recently passed such legislation with regard to crack cocaine sentences. Legislation changing sentences for crimes is presumed to be prospective only, but this presumption can be overcome with clear statutory language to the contrary. As a political matter, however, district attorneys usually lobby strenuously against amnesty legislation, feeling that it sets a bad (political) precedent. an existing NH truth in sentencing statute would seem to conflict with the notion that any such change is possible. In the event of a direct conflict between an older statute and a newer statute that can't be resolved by any other interpretive method, the newer statute prevails over the older one, even if this result isn't expressly identified in the legislation.
united-states In the U.S., this would be attempted murder. While Scotland and the U.S. have laws that differ in many respects, this is not an issue upon which I would anticipate that there would be difference between Scottish law and U.S. law. And what punishment would she face? According to Wikipedia: Attempted murder is a crime at common law in Scotland. Attempted murder is the same as the offence of murder in Scottish law with the only difference being that the victim has not died. The offence of murder was defined in Drury v HM Advocate: “[M]urder is constituted by any wilful act causing the destruction of life, by which the perpetrator either wickedly intends to kill or displays wicked recklessness as to whether the victim lives or dies.” Intention can be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Wicked recklessness is determined objectively and is &quot;recklessness so gross that it indicates a state of mind which falls to be treated as wicked and depraved as the state of mind of a deliberate killer.&quot; As with all common law offences in Scotland, the maximum punishment available is life imprisonment. Despite the maximum punishment available, I suspect that the Scottish courts would be more lenient than U.S. Courts in similar circumstances, on average. Sentencing judges have broad discretion and that would be informed by the circumstances and reasoning involved. Under U.S. law, in most states, crimes are typically graded into various classes of felonies and lesser crimes (Colorado, for example, has five grades of felonies, and three grades of lesser offenses, with a variety of special enhancements and reductions for particular crimes.) And, attempts are typically one grade lower than the crime attempted, although some U.S. states follow the Scottish rule and treat attempts and the crimes themselves as of the same grade.
It's a &quot;greater offense&quot; -- sometimes also called a &quot;greater included offense.&quot; But you're generally going to be mistaken about whether the defendant can be re-charged after an acquittal on the lesser-included offense. In the United States, at least, the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit that prosecutorial strategy. One could still face new charges for the same conduct, but those charges have to pass the Blockburger test.
None, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike burglary which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a protected site - neither of which isn't evident from the question. Note, for both offences, the actus reus is entry - there is no requirement for any form of &quot;breaking&quot; Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of criminal damage
In the US, the prohibition against double jeopardy provides a hard restriction against re-trial and appeal of an acquittal. The government cannot appeal an acquittal (U.S. v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, Ball v. U.S., 163 U.S. 662), and a verdict of acquittal without judgment is also a bar to re-prosecution. The exception is that if the defendant was never in jeopardy – the judge had been bribed – then there can be a new trial (Harry Aleman v. Judges of the Criminal Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois). However, Adam does not take Dave to court. Adam may make an accusation that motivates the prosecutor to file criminal charges. When Adam sues Dave (not a criminal matter), there is no acquittal or conviction, or guilt. There may be a finding of liability, or not. Either side can appeal to the top, as long as there is a legal basis for the appeal. If Adam is found not liable because the judge makes a legally erroneous ruling, if Dave objected properly to the ruling, Dave can appeal if successful, the court could then change its mind and find Adam liable.
Laws vary by state, of course. In Wisconsin, according to the 1993 case State v. Neumann: the offense of second-degree sexual assault by sexual intercourse does not require proof of intent and therefore someone who claimed to be too drunk to know what he was doing was still guilty. Although that was a case involving adults and therefore a different statute, I think the statutes are similar enough to produce a similar result in a case involving a minor. But even though intent isn't required, according to the 2007 case State v. Lackershire she's still be not guilty in Wisconsin. It flat out says that: If the defendant was raped, the act of having sexual intercourse with a child does not constitute a crime. Additionally, in your case, there was a gun to her head. Under Wisconsin law, the woman could not be guilty of statutory rape, because of this law: 939.46 Coercion. (1) A threat by a person other than the actor's coconspirator which causes the actor reasonably to believe that his or her act is the only means of preventing imminent death or great bodily harm to the actor or another and which causes him or her so to act is a defense to a prosecution for any crime based on that act, except that if the prosecution is for first-degree intentional homicide, the degree of the crime is reduced to 2nd-degree intentional homicide. The paper you link to mentions several possible defenses like coercion, and how each defense is not applicable in some states. I don't think it ever clearly establishes that there is a state where there is no defense. The example you (and the paper) give occurred in Florida. I couldn't find an applicable statute in Florida law, but that appears to be because it's in common law instead of a statute. According to the 1981 Florida case Wright v. State: Florida has recognized the common law defense of duress as a defense to crimes other than homicide so I don't think the woman would have been guilty under Florida law, either. The paper states that she was in fear for her life and that of her daughters, and it is extremely apparent in hindsight that her fear was reasonable. I imagine that if the author was able to find an actual case where a victim was prosecuted under similar circumstances (or even one where the victim clearly could have been prosecuted under the law of that state) he would have used that case as his example instead. It seems that he couldn't... and that might tell you something. He probably used this example because it was sensational, but it doesn't seem that the woman was guilty under applicable law.
While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.