Working in high school while concurrently enrolled I'm a homeschooled high-school sophomore, concurrently enrolled at a local community college taking advanced math classes. My Calculus instructor asked me to take a job as a supplemental instruction next year for his Calc 1 class, not knowing that I was in high-school. When I told him that I was still only 15 (I would be 16 by the time the job actually started), he said that he would try to figure out a way to make it work still, but after talking to the top person in the hiring chain, was told that I could not take the job before graduating high-school. When I asked if it was a school regulation, he said that it was California state law that prohibited me from taking the job. This seems strange to me, because according to all the research that I've done, if I can get a working permit, I should be allowed to work even during school hours up to 4 hours a day once I am 16. It doesn't make sense that I would have to have a high-school diploma before I can get a job. So my question is, is there some specific restriction that applies because I am concurrently enrolled, or is their simply some misunderstanding either on my part or on the part of the school? If I get a chance to talk to someone on the hiring chain, what should I tell them, I don't want to act like I know more about employment law than them, but it seems like what they told my instructor does not fit with everything I've read.
If you are truely home-schooled, and your parents (or teacher) has not formed some kind of private school in which to teach you, then you cannot obtain a work-permit. In the State of California, the school or private school satellite program issues work permits for the students. Issuing work permits is dependent on meeting certain school criteria (grades, academic record, attendance, whatever the school wants). California has decided that parents may not issue work permits for home schooled kids. You can read more about it on The HomeSchool Association of California's website along with the California Department of Education. The Employer can also decide not to hire minors (there is quite a bit of record-keeping, possible fines, and lengthy record-retention policies). You may be able to work out something to be a tutor unaffiliated with the school, which would fall under the self-employment exemption for a work permit.
The law upheld by the decision is a New York law, and thus only applies in the state of New York. Its current text reads in relevant part: No person shall be employed or authorized to teach in the public schools of the state who is... Not a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, however, to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed, provided such teacher shall make due application to become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a citizen. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply, after July first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, to an alien teacher employed pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education permitting such employment. The citizenship requirements of this subdivision shall not apply to an alien teacher now or hereafter employed whose immigration status is that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and who would otherwise be eligible to serve as a teacher, or to apply for or receive permanent certification as a teacher, but for the foregoing requirements of this subdivision. The last sentence of that will no longer be effective starting Nov 30 2022. So, this law only says they are prohibited in New York public schools. And even then, they are allowed if they are applying to be a citizen, if they are hired pursuant to regulations adopted by the commissioner of education, or (until 2022) if they are a lawful permanent resident of the US. Other states may have other laws, of course.
The general rule is that the author of the software owns the copyright, so that would be the student. This is regardless of whether the student writes the code for fun, or for a thesis. If a student is hired to write that code, then it kind of depends on the university rules, and who hires the student. In the case of a "work for hire", the employer owns the copyright. However, it is non-trivial to determine whether that principle is applicable in the case of a student hired by the university. In part, it depends on which country this is in because work for hire laws are not exactly the same everywhere, and in part it depends on the details of the employment my a university. In a typical US institution RA appointment, it would come down to university policy – some universities declare that copyright in all student-written software is retained by the student. You would need to look for something resembling an "IP Policy" – here is a sample, note that such policies are subject to revision.
Yes: It is legal to deny someone a job as a priest because he is an atheist. Churches are allowed to discriminate in employment based upon religion. See, for example, the EEOC compliance manual. This says, in the pertinent part (citations included after the quoted material): C. Exceptions Religious Organizations Under Title VII, religious organizations are permitted to give employment preference to members of their own religion.[42] The exception applies only to those institutions whose “purpose and character are primarily religious.”[43] That determination is to be based on “[a]ll significant religious and secular characteristics.”[44] Although no one factor is dispositive, significant factors to consider that would indicate whether an entity is religious include: Do its articles of incorporation state a religious purpose? Are its day-to-day operations religious (e.g., are the services the entity performs, the product it produces, or the educational curriculum it provides directed toward propagation of the religion)? Is it not-for-profit? Is it affiliated with or supported by a church or other religious organization? [45] This exception is not limited to religious activities of the organization.[46] However, it only allows religious organizations to prefer to employ individuals who share their religion.[47] The exception does not allow religious organizations otherwise to discriminate in employment on protected bases other than religion, such as race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability.[48] Thus, a religious organization is not permitted to engage in racially discriminatory hiring by asserting that a tenet of its religious beliefs is not associating with people of other races. Similarly, a religious organization is not permitted to deny fringe benefits to married women but not to married men by asserting a religiously based view that only men can be the head of a household. EXAMPLE 7 Sex Discrimination Not Excused Justina works at Tots Day Care Center. Tots is run by a religious organization that believes that, while women may work outside of the home if they are single or have their husband’s permission, men should be the heads of their households and the primary providers for their families. Believing that men shoulder a greater financial responsibility than women, the organization pays female teachers less than male teachers. The organization’s practice of unequal pay based on sex constitutes unlawful discrimination.[49] Ministerial Exception Courts have held, based on First Amendment constitutional considerations, that clergy members cannot bring claims under the federal employment discrimination laws, including Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Equal Pay Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, because “[t]he relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood.”[50] This “ministerial exception” comes not from the text of the statutes, but from the First Amendment principle that governmental regulation of church administration, including the appointment of clergy, impedes the free exercise of religion and constitutes impermissible government entanglement with church authority.[51] Thus, courts will not ordinarily consider whether a church’s employment decision concerning one of its ministers was based on discriminatory grounds, although some courts have allowed ministers to bring sexual harassment claims.[52] The ministerial exception applies only to those employees who perform essentially religious functions, namely those whose primary duties consist of engaging in church governance, supervising a religious order, or conducting religious ritual, worship, or instruction.[53] The exception is not limited to ordained clergy,[54] and has been applied by courts to others involved in clergy-like roles who conduct services or provide pastoral counseling. However, the exception does not necessarily apply to everyone with a title typically conferred upon clergy (e.g., minister).[55] In short, in each case it is necessary to make a factual determination of whether the function of the position is one to which the exception applies. The relevant footnotes: [42] Section 702(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a), provides: This subchapter shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities. Section 703(e)(2) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) provides: it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion. While Congress did not include a definition of the § 702(a) term “religious corporation” in Title VII, at least one judge has argued that the legislative history indicates that Congress intended “the § 703(e)(2) exemption to require a lesser degree of association between an entity and a religious sect than what would be required under § 702(a).” See LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr., 503 F.3d 217, 237 (3d Cir. 2007) (Rendell, J., dissenting). Executive Order 13279, Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations, issued on December 12, 2002, provides that certain faith-based organizations that provide social programs can deliver those services and make hiring decisions on the basis of their religious beliefs even if they receive federal funding. See 67 Fed. Reg. 77,141 (12/16/02). The Guidance to Faith-Based and Community Organizations on Partnering with the Federal Government, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/guidance_document_01-06.pdf (last visited July 2, 2008), issued by the White House Office of Faith Based and Community Initiatives, explains that while religious organizations that receive federal funds to provide social services may choose to hire persons of the same religion, they are also subject to federal, state, and local employment and anti-discrimination laws, such as Title VII. [43] Townley, 859 F.2d at 618; accord Hall v. Baptist Mem. Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624-25 (6th Cir. 2000) (college of health sciences qualified as a religious institution under Title VII because it was an affiliated institution of a church-affiliated hospital, had direct relationship with the Baptist church, and the college atmosphere was permeated with religious overtones). [44] Townley, 859 F.2d at 618; see also Killinger v. Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1997) (Baptist university was “religious educational institution” where largest single source of funding was state Baptist Convention, all university trustees were Baptists, university reported financially to Convention and to Baptist State Board of Missions, university was member of Association of Baptist Colleges and Schools, university charter designated its chief purpose as “the promotion of the Christian Religion throughout the world by maintaining and operating institutions dedicated to the development of Christian character in high scholastic standing,” and both Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Department of Education recognized university as religious educational institution). [45] Townley, 859 F.2d at 619 (manufacturer of mining equipment, whose owners asserted that they made a covenant with God that their business “would be a Christian, faith‑operated business,” is not a religious organization because it is for profit; it produces mining equipment, a secular product; it is not affiliated with or supported by a church; and its articles of incorporation do not mention any religious purpose). Cf. EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir. 1993) (non-profit school not “religious” for Title VII purposes where ownership and affiliation, purpose, faculty, student body, student activities, and curriculum of the schools are either essentially secular, or neutral as far as religion is concerned). [46] See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (a nonprofit church-run business does not violate Title VII if it refuses to hire anyone other than members of its own religion, even for enterprises or jobs that are not religious in nature). [47] Killinger, 113 F.3d at 200 (School of Divinity need not employ professor who did not adhere to the theology advanced by its leadership); Tirpanlis v. Unification Theological Seminary, 2001 WL 64739 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2001) (seminary operated by Unification Church cannot be sued for religious discrimination by Greek Orthodox employee who was allegedly terminated for refusing to accept the teachings of the Unification Church). [48] Ziv v. Valley Beth Shalom, 156 F.3d 1242 (Table), 1998 WL 482832 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 1998) (unpublished) (religious organization can be held liable for retaliation and national origin discrimination); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993) (religious institutions may not engage in age discrimination). [49] EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986) (religious school violated Title VII and the Equal Pay Act when it provided “head of household” health insurance benefits only to single persons and married men). [50] McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-60 (5th Cir. 1972); see also Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying ministerial exception to bar claim by resident in hospital’s pastoral care program who alleged disability discrimination); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying ministerial exception to bar age discrimination claim brought by Catholic Diocese music director who was terminated following a dispute with the bishop’s assistant regarding what to play during the Easter Mass); Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying ministerial exception to bar age discrimination claim); Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (barring claim because court could not determine whether an employment decision concerning a minister was based on legitimate or illegitimate grounds without entering the constitutionally impermissible realm of internal church management); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ministerial exception barred Title VII sex discrimination claim brought by tenured member of Catholic University’s department of religious canon law); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993) (ministerial exception inapplicable to parochial school teacher’s age discrimination claim because employer’s contention that teacher was terminated specifically for failing to attend Mass and to lead his students in prayers could be evaluated without risk of excessive entanglement between government and religious institution); Guianan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, 42 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (ministerial exception inapplicable to parochial school teacher’s age discrimination claim, even though teacher taught at least one class in religion per term, and organized one worship service per month, since vast majority of teacher’s duties involved teaching math, science, and other secular courses). [51] Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh‑Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985). [52] Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (Title VII race discrimination claim by African-American Catholic priest challenging denial of promotion and subsequent termination was barred by the ministerial exception); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (ministerial exception bars Title VII sex discrimination claim by female Catholic chaplain against school, alleging that she was forced out as chaplain after she advocated on behalf of alleged victims of sexual harassment and spoke out against the school’s president regarding alleged sexual harassment and discrimination against female employees); Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conf. of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004) (ministerial exception barred minister’s claim against church for failure to accommodate his disabilities). However, some courts have ruled that the ministerial exception does not bar harassment claims by ministers, but rather only applies to claims involving matters such as hiring, promotion, and termination. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (ministerial exception does not bar sexual harassment claim by minister), reh’g denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2005) (two concurring and three dissenting opinions); Bollard v. California Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999) (novice’s sexual harassment claim could be maintained without excessive entanglement between church and state because religious order did not offer a religious justification for the alleged harassment, and plaintiff did not seek reinstatement or other equitable relief); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Kan. 2004) (First Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses did not preclude minister from pursuing Title VII sexual harassment claim against her church, because claims did not involve choice of clergy); see also Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 657-59 (10th Cir. 2002) (although “employment decisions may be subject to Title VII scrutiny, where the decision does not involve the church’s spiritual functions,” minister’s Title VII harassment claim was subject to dismissal because it was based on communications protected by the First Amendment under the “church autonomy” doctrine; the doctrine is broader than the ministerial exception and bars civil court review of internal church disputes involving matters of doctrine and church governance). [53] Geary v. Visitation of Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993) (lay teacher at church‑operated elementary school not a minister); Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990) (lay teachers of private religious schools who “perform no sacerdotal functions [nor] serve as church governors [and] belong to no clearly delineated religious order” are not ministers despite their sincere belief that theirs is a ministry); but see EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ministerial exception barred Title VII sex discrimination claim brought by tenured member of Catholic university’s department of religious canon law). [54] Alicea‑Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003) (ministerial exception applied to Communications Director who was responsible for crafting the Church’s message to the Hispanic community); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh,213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000) (ministerial exception applies to cathedral’s director of music ministry and part-time music teacher); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168 (ministerial exception applies to associate pastor who had completed seminary training but was not ordained); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999) (ministerial exception barred Americans with Disabilities Act claim by church choir director). [55] EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[w]hile religious organizations may designate persons as ministers for their religious purposes free from any governmental interference, bestowal of such a designation does not control their extra‑religious legal status”). This exemption has a constitutional dimension under the First Amendment free exercise clause so this rule cannot be changed, even by statute.
Yes, they can ask Provided you attendance is voluntary and there are no negative repercussions (other than missing the learning opportunity) for not attending. If you have to go, they have to pay you.
I can only speak from experience for Pennsylvania, but this is how it works there: When you are working as a 1099 contractor you are "unemployed" for purposes of claiming unemployment. As you learned the hard way: you should apply for unemployment as soon as you lose your W-2 job. Every time you go to claim unemployment compensation the agency will ask if you have any earned income for the period you are claiming. That's where you would declare your 1099 income. Your unemployment compensation for the period will be adjusted accordingly. Basically you want to keep your unemployment claim "open" until either you secure full-time W-2 employment, or until you have exhausted your unemployment benefits. The system isn't setup to deal with any other scenario very gracefully. Of course, never omit or falsify information provided to the unemployment agency!
The IRS does not care, the only people who will care are your employers. If they find out, they may fire you. Whether or not this rises to the level of fraud whereby they could sue you depends on what false thing you said to get the job offer. You might get a good idea by reading the employment contract to see what makes you think this is a &quot;9-to-5&quot; job, and exactly what you are supposed to do. For example if both contracts say that you will work exclusively on the assignments by company A / B between 9 and 5 EST, M-F, and you agree to this, then you have materially misrepresented what you will do, which is fraud. But if the contract simply says that you will get the job done and will &quot;make yourself available&quot; for some of those hours, then it's not obviously fraud. Still, they can fire you if they don't like what you're doing. An alternative is that you could ask if they would allow you to burn the candle at both ends, which avoids any issue of fraud. If you're that good, you can offer one or both of them a week of trial dual-employment for a reduced rate, to persuade them.
I've litigated cases like these before. The IRS enforcement reaction is swift and severe. Penalties for the employer are heavy and rarely waived. It would be rare for a business like this to stay operational long enough to issue a W-2. A business like this would probably be shut down by the IRS and have the people responsible for the payroll function, at a minimum, promptly burdened with tax liens, within four to six months. These cases also constitute a significant share of all criminal tax prosecutions. The odds of someone doing this spending several years in federal prison is high. Generally speaking, if the wrongdoing is fully on the part of the employer without the collusion or knowledge of the employee, the IRS will not force the employee to double pay the taxes that should have been withheld by the employer in this situation. Instead, this IRS will try to recover the amounts that were withheld from the employees but not delivered to the IRS. It will seek to recover these amounts from the employer and also from other responsible persons in the organization (and from outsourced professionals) with the authority to pay the IRS who did not do so. There may be circumstances, if push comes to shove, where the IRS could collect from the employees in a case like this one (I've never had occasion to need to research that issue), but that would be the rare exception and not the rule, in practice. On the other hand, if the employer simply does not withhold taxes or prepare W-2s at all, and either 1099s people who should have been classified as employees (or files no information tax returns at all), the IRS will generally insist that the employee pay income taxes on the full amount owed and that they pay the employee part of payroll taxes. It will also pursue the employer for the employer's share of payroll taxes. The employer will also be jointly and severally liable for any taxes that should have been reported and subjected to withholding that are not paid by the employee (perhaps because the employee spent all the money). Sometimes cases like this are also criminally prosecuted, but it is less common to do so.