Is the U.S. entity ban against Huawei against the rule of law? Is the U.S. entity ban against Huawei against the rule of law? Huawei hasn’t been formally charged or convicted in any court of law and not a single evidence hasn’t been presented to prove Huawei devices being used to spyi or being a threat to U.S. national security, yet Huawei was heavily punished. Doesn't that violate due process laws?
I believe you are using rule of law when you mean due process. The former refers to equality before the law and the subjugation of executive government to the law while the latter refers accepted measures of justice and fairness in the administration of the law and, in the United States, to the supremacy of the judiciary over the legislature (the situation is reversed in the UK). Assuming that to be the case, the due process clause in the fifth amendment provides that "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...". That is, actions against Huawei must only be taken as permitted by the law. The law that permits the President to institute the Huawei ban is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. As such, at face value, this is a legitimate exercise in executive power. Huawei has the right to challenge the ban in US courts, as such, they have been afforded due process.
The law in every country where your service is available prevails. That means that if your servers are in Estonia, your file storage is in Lithuania, your company is in Switzerland, you are in France, you hold Thai citizenship, your users are in the USA and the signal transits through the U.K., Belgium, Germany, Canada and Poland then you are subject to the laws of each and every one of them. In addition, if China has reason to believe that the stored files contain matters relating to their citizens then they can take an interest. And so on and so forth ... A country has jurisdiction wherever it wants to have jurisdiction subject to the limits of and its ability to actually enforce its laws. What you are proposing is certainly illegal in many countries and you need to seek professional legal advice - not rely on strangers on the internet.
Summary from comments. (Hat tip @jqning) Daniel Nathan Ballard writes here: [It] is not only improper it is UNLAWFUL and may result in serious repercussions... Such a misuse may constitute false advertising... (“It is no doubt true” that affixing the ‘Trade Mark Registered U.S. Patent Office” notice on goods that are not protected by a federally registered trademark creates “a prima facie case of fraud against the public… .”). ... Such use is also a form of “unclean hands” that can bar the user’s registration of the mark. ... Such a use may also bar the maintenance of an infringement case. ... And the fraudulent use of the trademark registration symbol DOES provide other marketplace participants with standing to oppose the user’s registration of the mark. http://www.avvo.com/legal-answers/use-of---symbol-but-not-federally-registered-1125746.html
No. The Flag Code is not a criminal law, so the government is not permitted to bring criminal prosecution for violating it, and it therefore cannot secure a proper conviction for such a violation.
There are a couple of US laws that form the basis of effectively warrantless surveillance, including through tech companies: Under Executive Order 12333, US intelligence agencies issue National Security Letters. These letters compel the recipient to provide requested data. These letters do not require a warrant, and typically include a gag order for the recipient. Under Section 702 FISA, US intelligence agencies enjoy substantial powers for foreign surveillance. This surveillance has to be authorized by the FISA court, but it has been criticized for rubber-stamping requests. Proceedings at the FISA court are ex parte and lack representation for the surveillance subjects. FISA and the National Security Letters mechanism where expanded through the Patriot Act. US intelligence agencies often have creative interpretations of the governing laws. Judicial review tends to defer to executive branch interpretation if that interpretation is reasonable. Thus, there exists a secret body of quasi-law where intelligence agencies can interpret the existence of further powers. These laws have very limited checks and balances. While Americans enjoy some protections, there are basically none for non-Americans. Subjects have extremely limited options to fight this surveillance in court. FISA has to be re-authorized every few years. The true scope of surveillance under these laws became publicly known through the Snowden leaks. For example, intelligence agencies ran the PRISM program based on section 702 FISA that compelled companies to supply all data matching a “selector”. A bit of outside perspective: In 2020, the European Court of Justice ruled that EO 12333 and other laws mean that the United States do not have an adequate level of data protection, effectively forbidding further transfers of personal data into the US. While the EU's GDPR does recognize surveillance measures that are “necessary and proportionate in a democratic society”, the lack of judicial remedies for surveillance subjects are especially troubling. The ECJ wrote in its judgement (case C‑311/18): As regards judicial protection, the referring court states that EU citizens do not have the same remedies as US citizens in respect of the processing of personal data by the US authorities, since the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which constitutes, in United States law, the most important cause of action available to challenge unlawful surveillance, does not apply to EU citizens. In that regard, the referring court states that there are substantial obstacles in respect of the causes of action open to EU citizens, in particular that of locus standi, which it considers to be excessively difficult to satisfy. Furthermore, according to the findings of the referring court, the NSA’s activities based on E.O. 12333 are not subject to judicial oversight and are not justiciable. […] It follows therefore that neither Section 702 of the FISA, nor E.O. 12333, read in conjunction with PPD‑28, correlates to the minimum safeguards resulting, under EU law, from the principle of proportionality, with the consequence that the surveillance programmes based on those provisions cannot be regarded as limited to what is strictly necessary.
Enforcement against non-EU entities is difficult, and especially digital services would be impossible to shut down. Ultimately, enforcement would depend on judicial assistance between the relevant EU member state and the jurisdictions where the data controller is established or has relevant assets. Your case involves physical goods and other regulations though, so that (some amount of) compliance by the data controller is necessary in order to have continued access to the EU single market. Which instruments for enforcement of fines are available depends on the EU member state, but could e.g. involve confiscation of products or payments. A non-EU B2B service provider would also have economic incentives to comply as EU data controllers cannot share personal data unless an adequate level of protection is ensured. In reality, it is fairly unlikely that non-EU data controllers will get fined anytime soon because data protection authorities tend to prioritize more clear cut cases, and tend to stay within their jurisdiction. Of course, non-EU data controllers are usually required to register an EU representative precisely to subject them to a particular authorities' jurisdiction, but a non-compliant controller is unlikely to do that. A note on the GDPR's territorial scope: it is far less extraterritorial than some people believe. Per GDPR Art 3(2) the regulation applies to non-EU data controllers, (a) to the extent of their processing activities that relate to offering of goods and services (also unpaid services) to data subjects in the EU, or (b) when they monitor/track behaviour of data subjects as far as the behaviour takes place in the EU. For example, a B2C company would have to comply with the GDPR regarding how they handle shipping addresses of their EU customers. The EDPB has issued in-depth analysis as part of their guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope. However, the ECJ has found that some of the GDPR's effects are confined to the EU. For example, Google has to hide some results from EU searches in order to comply with the GDPR's Right to Erasure, but cannot currently be forced to hide the results from non-EU searches.
Generally not. Federal court uses a principle known as the enrolled bill rule -- in deference to the coequal status of the three branches of government, the "enrolled bill" (the thing printed on fancy paper that actually went to the President for signature) is irrebuttable evidence that the law was properly passed. The courts cannot deal with inquiries into whether legislative process was followed; it's the legislature's job to decide what the right process is. They can't even look into whether the same text passed both houses -- as a matter of law, the enrolled bill is conclusive evidence that it did. Senate rules are enforceable in the Senate. But the Senate is the body in charge of enforcing them, not the courts.
Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful.