Smallest claim settled by SCOTUS, inflation adjusted? This is similar to this question, but for the US Supreme Court. What is the smallest claim, adjusted for inflation, settled by the SCOTUS?
In Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski (2021), the US Supreme Court addressed a case that sought one dollar in nominal damages. I'm assuming you mean only claims involving money damages as a remedy, because there are many claims every year involving no literal money damages and the remedy sought is some other kind of relief (although such relief would still have practical or economic value).
Does the Supreme Court simply rubberstamp the prevailing social consensus? No. Structurally, The Supreme Court Is Designed To Lag Behind Social Consensus U.S. Supreme Court justices are political appointees with discretion over how laws are interpreted and enforced in the U.S. that cannot be reviewed by any other body, in the case of constitutional law, and can only be second guess by Congress and the President acting together, in the case of statutory law. Since U.S. Supreme Court justices serve for life, they tend to be lagging indicators of the political preferences of past Presidents. Plessy v. Ferguson was influenced by post-Reconstruction judicial appointments trying to salvage what it could from the end of the slavery regime for former slave states, although Congress could have overruled it with new legislation if Senators from Southern states hadn't filibustered that kind of legislation in the U.S. Senate. Still, while the law changes slowly, and the U.S. Supreme Court is often a lagging indicator of the prevailing social consensus, it is not frozen in time either, both because legal norms change over time, however slowly, because statutes and constitutional amendments change the environment in which the U.S. Supreme Court operates, and because sometimes the law commands them to do so. For example, in 8th Amendment jurisprudence (the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments), the &quot;unusual&quot; part of &quot;cruel and unusual&quot; has always incorporated prevailing social consensus, by design and by virtue of the express constitutional text. Precedent Still Matter Precedents also matter, however. U.S. Supreme Court Justices, while they may be influenced by a political ideology that had a lot to do with why they were nominated in the first place, are not simply legislators in robes. While the U.S. Supreme Court is well known for its partisan split votes on close political issues, there are many areas of law where the U.S. Supreme Court is still far less partisan than elected officials, and often, split decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court on less politically charged issues are not along partisan lines. U.S. Supreme Court Justices cross partisan lines far more often than elected officials do, and the amount of partisan line crossing that takes place in courts below the Supreme Court that have a legal duty to follow the precedents of courts superior to them is even greater. At the time of Dred Scott and until the 13th Amendment was passed in the wake of the U.S. Civil War, slavery was legal and its legality had never been seriously doubted in U.S. legal precedents. Precedents at the time, including a series of highly sensitive legislative and constitutional compromises already agreed to by other parts of the government, supported this ruling, whether or not it was good policy. Obergefell v. Hodges, followed a nearly unanimous groundswell of support for the position that the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately took from state courts and lower federal courts, applying a variety of precedents already in place going back to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which affirmed that the fundamental rights found in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause &quot;extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs,&quot; but the &quot;identification and protection&quot; of these fundamental rights &quot;has not been reduced to any formula,&quot; and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), invalidating laws prohibiting interracial marriage. The lesser known cases of Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating a Wisconsin law limiting the right of non-custodial parents to remarry), and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (allowing prison inmates to marry without state permission) had also established a constitutional right to marry. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado law that barred local governments from protecting gay rights. In 2003, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas struck down Texas’ sodomy law - and in turn invalidated sodomy laws in 13 other states - making private, consensual, adult sexual activity between same-sex couples legal across the U.S. In United States v. Windsor (2013), the Supreme Court held that a same sex couple legally married in Canada could not be denied the federal estate tax spousal deduction invalidating Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act as unconstitutional. The same day, in Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013), the Supreme Court held that California Proposition 8 (note that a majority of voters in this very liberal state passed this measure in 2012 suggesting that allowing same sex marriage was not the prevailing social consensus) which prohibited California from recognizing same sex marriages lawfully entered into after a couple prevailed in a 2009 court fight to secure same sex marriage rights under prior California law was unconstitutional. In 2015, SCOTUS responded not to a public opinion social consensus, but to a legal consensus among U.S. appellate judges driven by its own precedents. Many states in which judges struck down same sex marriage bans before the U.S. Supreme Court took up the issue did so in states where same sex marriage was not popular, because fifty years of accumulated precedents from 1965 to the present strongly pointed in that direction. As a result, on the eve of the Obergefell decision, 37 states and the District of Columbia already recognized same-sex marriage, and only 13 states had bans. Those bans were mostly struck down as a result of lower courts interpreting existing U.S. Supreme Court precedents like the ones mentioned above, and as a result of legislators seeing the writing on the wall and wanting to take credit for the inevitable. The act of nationalizing the right to same-sex marriage also reflected the reality that even though the constitution allocated regulation of marriage to the states rather than the federal government, as a general matter, that allowing a particular couple's marriage to be recognized in some U.S. states and not others, was basically unworkable in a country with freedom of travel between states. SCOTUS Often Establishes The Prevailing Social Consensus Also, while sometimes the U.S. Supreme Court does give official recognition to the prevailing social consensus (which is closely related to what becomes law by one means or another anyway), perhaps more often, a U.S. Supreme Court ruling establishes and changes the prevailing social consensus. Support for interracial marriage in opinion polls, which wasn't terribly high when Loving v. Virginia was decided in 1967, soared after the U.S. Supreme Court declared it to be a matter of constitutional law. A question from a 1968 international Gallup poll underscores the extent of U.S. opposition to interracial marriage during this period. This question, which asked Americans and those in 12 other nations whether they personally approved or disapproved of marriage between whites and nonwhites, found even broader U.S. opposition than the 1965 question. More than seven in 10 Americans (72%) disapproved of white-nonwhite marriages, in contrast with only 21% of residents in Sweden, 23% in the Netherlands, 25% in France, 34% in Finland, 35% in Switzerland and 36% in Greece. Opposition outweighed support in Austria, Canada, West Germany, Norway, Uruguay and Great Britain, but to a far lesser extent than in the U.S. The 1965 and 1968 U.S. reactions to interracial marriage appear contradictory, but this is because each question measures a different dimension of public opinion. The 1965 question asks for people's views on the legality of interracial marriage -- whether it should be a crime -- whereas the 1968 question merely asks Americans whether they personally approve. Americans' personal views on interracial marriage eventually changed, but it took decades for majority support to emerge. In 1978, more than a decade after the Loving case, only 36% of Americans approved, while 54% still disapproved. Not until the 1990s did public approval cross the 50% threshold, registering 64% in 1997. Gallup's latest update, in 2013, shows 87% approving. (Source) Support for same sex marriage has followed a similar pattern after Obergefell v. Hodges was decided. Roe v. Wade (creating a constitutional right to medical abortion) and Griswold before it (creating a constitutional right to contraception and clearly establishing the concept of substantive due process rights to privacy), likewise dramatically changed public opinion on these issues. So, while the U.S. Supreme Court is sometimes a lagging indicator of a social consensus that is already prevailing, its moral authority and the inability of any other political actors to overcome the legal force of its rulings has also caused it to be a major driver of social consensus going forward. For example, until Brown v. Board of Education (1954), Plessy v. Ferguson was widely accepted as a legally fair standard and the support really only entirely collapsed when the U.S. Supreme Court said otherwise. Indeed, Brown v. Board of Education probably was pivotal in shifting public opinion in a manner that led to the adoption of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 that finally put teeth into the political resolve to end racial discrimination that had begun in earnest in the Reconstruction era.
Congress can't override substantive rules of constitutional law Marbury v. Madison is a binding interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution permits or denies, and in substance, this law seeks to change that interpretation of the scope of the judicial power, so that interpretation may not be overruled except via a Constitutional amendment. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appellate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statue passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. The language in italics is jurisdiction stripping language, which I discuss below, and which is also discussed in another answer. But, the language in bold is enunciating a substantive rule of law regarding how the judicial branch may resolve a case that is otherwise properly before it. And, Congress does not have the power to change that to make the U.S. Constitution a dead letter under its Article III jurisdiction regulation powers. The language in bold language is a direct attempt to overrule a binding interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and that is beyond the authority of Congress to do, so the statute would be unconstitutional, at least, in part. Jurisdiction stripping Yes, Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to Article III, Section 2 which states: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under the Regulations as the Congress shall make. But, there are parts of Article III that apply in addition to the power of Congress to create "Exceptions" the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the power to create and modify the "inferior courts" that exist. The first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is crucial, and interacts with the Exceptions power. The default provision is that all judicial power as defined in Article III, Section 2 is vested in the "supreme Court" unless and until that power is instead vested in an "inferior Court" established under Article III that Congress creates by law. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to deny every court (or even every federal court) both original and appellate jurisdiction over any constitutionally justiciable claim arising under Article III, even if the claim is not within the express original jurisdiction of SCOTUS. If they deny every inferior Article III federal court jurisdiction over something within the constitutionally defined scope of the judicial power, then it reverts to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court even though it is not expressly made a part of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal courts collectively is defined in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and extends to all cases arising under the U.S. Constitution which would include a claim to have a provision of federal or state law declared unconstitutional as in violation of the constitution. It says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; . . . (This analysis is attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.) Now, this is not to say that Congress couldn't do something to make it harder procedurally to have statutes declared unconstitutional. For example, there would be a much harder claim of unconstitutionality if Congress vested original jurisdiction in all such cases in the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, and then only assigned one judge to that district, and denied the U.S. Courts of Appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction over those decisions. At some point, however, even this lesser restriction, rather than elimination of a judicial power would still be subject to challenge under the due process protections of the 5th Amendment. Writ jurisdiction Notably, Marbury v. Madison was a case brought in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus, under the All Writs Act, and not in connection with its appellate jurisdiction. So, Congress would also have to repeal or amend the "All Writs Act" to pull off the intent of the proposed statute, because the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends by statute to writs that are not appellate in nature even though this power is very rarely exercised. A writ is a court order directed at a government official directing that government official to do something, or to refrain from doing something. But, there are many ways to back door a seemingly private cause of action, particularly one related to constitutionality, into a writ. And, if a court has jurisdiction over a writ, it has jurisdiction to entertain requests by litigants to have such writs issued. Congress can't remove a state court forum It is worth noting that every single state court from traffic court on up has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, and that state courts frequently do declare state statutes to be unconstitutional. Congressional jurisdiction to regulate jurisdiction is largely limited to regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It can put a federal question (e.g. copyright enforcement or disputes with the IRS) in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but there are no cases in which Congress has been permitted to place a federal law in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts while also denying any federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under that law. Otherwise, state court jurisdiction isn't regulated by Congress. And, the Constitution specifically requires all federal, state and local officials to swear to uphold the U.S. Constitution which arguably provides an independent basis for state court jurisdiction over constitutionality claims arising under the U.S. Constitution. This is a really important point. For example, suppose that someone who lives in the same state as you do sues you entirely under state law in a state court, and that state's courts require you to bring any claim you have against that person in state court over which that state court has jurisdiction as a counterclaim or you forfeit that claim forever. If you have federal claims against the person who sued you in state court, and your claims are not one of the handful of issues (e.g. copyright enforcement) that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you must enforce your federal claims against that person as counterclaims in that state court case, or you will lose them forever. For example, suppose that your employer sues you in state court for conversion (i.e. stealing company property) and you have a right to sue the employer for not paying you the right amount for your overtime work under federal law. Then, you must bring your federal overtime claims in state court as counterclaims to the conversion action, rather than in federal court. Similarly, even though state criminal charges are always brought in state courts, a criminal defendant in a state court criminal case, can raised arguments arising under the U.S. Constitution including a determination that a state criminal law is unconstitutional, in state court as a defense, even though the only federal court recourse a criminal defendant has is through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought in federal district court after all state direct appellate relief is exhausted, after petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court, and after all state post-conviction relief (including petitioning the final state order to the U.S. Supreme Court) is exhausted. In practice, this means, criminal defendants have no meaningful access to the federal courts other than two petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which are discretionary, until they have been incarcerated wrongfully for five or ten years. But, federal defenses can and routinely are raised in the state court trial (and indeed, federal defenses that could be raised in a state trial court may not be raised in a habeas corpus petition in federal court unless they were first raised in or before the original state court trial). N.B.: Federal claims in the exclusive original jurisdiction of state courts The extremes to which jurisdiction stripping is allowed are explored in the handful of claims arising under federal law that are expressly not within the scope of the jurisdiction of any federal trial court or intermediate appellate court, or within the express non-appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most notable of these are affirmative private individual civil lawsuits against offenders under the federal robocall and junk fax law (a.k.a. the Telephone Consumer Protection Act a.k.a. the TCPA a.k.a. 47 U.S.C. § 227), which do not not require a writ, which may only be brought in state court, subject to an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But, the federal courts have exclusively jurisdiction over litigation many kinds of claims other than private civil actions arising under the TCPA. This law is much less constitutionally concerning than the one proposed in the question, however, because while Congress can't repeal the U.S. Constitution, it doesn't have to pass a law giving private individuals a private cause of action when they receive robocalls or junk faxes at all. It could pass a law that was enforceable by the FCC alone, for example, and in the case of the TCPA, there are persons, including the FCC and regulated persons who want to challenge a regulation issued by the FCC, who are entitled to utilize the federal courts to enforce the TCPA or to dispute it. For example, there is no private cause of action to enforce most federal criminal laws (as such, not just involving the same harm) with a civil lawsuit by the victim against the criminal, in either federal court or state court, but that is not unconstitutional. This is because federal criminal laws can be enforced by government prosecutors and defended against by private individuals, in Article III federal courts. Also, even private causes of action under the TCPA are subject to ultimate U.S. Supreme Court appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court is an Article III federal court.
I would like to give you a clear definitive answer, but there isn't one. This depends entirely on the scope of the easement which is determined on a case by case basis in light of the facts and circumstances. It is frequently ambiguous. These cases come up frequently and usually either get resolved fairly quickly via mediation or negotiation, or escalate into very ugly lawsuits that can last years. I have a case like this that has been pending eleven years, is on a final appeal to the state supreme court, has involved about $800,000+ of legal fees between all parties involved, has been to the court of appeals following about six times so far, and has led to five evidentiary hearings in addition to depositions, motion practice, etc. Obviously, this is an extreme example, but long, costly litigation if a negotiated resolution isn't reached is pretty common.
It's supposed to be carte blanche, i.e. "blank check". The quotation has left out several words. You can find the full decision at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/176/case.html. The complete sentence is: It thus seems that the dissent would give the courts carte blanche to impose upon the States whatever burden their various judgments indicate should be imposed.
UPDATE: There is now a definitive answer. There Is No Binding Judicial Precedent Adjudicating The Key Standing Issues Raised That Are Factually Squarely On Point This is a novel argument. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any state has ever sought judicial relief arising from another state's election administration, so it is a case of first impression not directly governed by a factually similar precedent. Thus, rather than being governed by a precedent that resolved the exact standing question presented, we must result to more general principles. Because it is a novel argument, it is impossible to be completely sure how it will be resolved. General Considerations In Standing Law The General Rule Standing requirements require that there be a particularized actual injury to a legally recognized interest of the person suing. Standing is a subcomponent of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is one of the things that must be present for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is evaluated with reference to the merits. It exists if there is a recognized legal theory which, if proven, there has been a particularized injury to the person bringing the claim. Most standing cases involve legal claims for relief that it is clear that someone validly has and the question is whether this particular person can assert them. But a minority of standing cases involve the question of whether there is a recognized legal claim of the type asserted at all. No one has standing to assert a non-justiciable claim (i.e. a claim beyond the jurisdiction of all courts), or a claim for relief for which the courts do not legally recognize a remedy (e.g. a claim for not being chosen by a particular person to marry). As a result, standing can overlap with the argument that someone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generalized Grievances Don't Impart Standing Even if the law is perfectly clear that a law has been violated, that doesn't necessarily mean that anyone has standing to seek a remedy from a court for that violation of the law. To the extent that one has merely a generalized grievance shared in common with everyone (e.g. an interest in a correct outcome of a Presidential election, or a desire to have the government follow the law) that would not ordinarily suffice to establish standing. Texas does not have an interest in the outcome of a Pennsylvania or Georgia Presidential election that is any different from the interest of a citizen of Texas or me, a citizen of Colorado. But citizens of a state other than the one in which the election was conducted who aren't candidates in that election clearly don't have standing to challenge the outcome of an election in another state. If the Texas argument for standing is accepted, any voter in any state would have standing the contest the election results of every other state in every Presidential election (although not in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court). The Argument For Standing Offered By Texas And Its Flaws The Texas Argument For Standing The Complaint argues for standing as follows in paragraph 18: In a presidential election, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. The constitutional failures of Defendant States injure Plaintiff States because “‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II). In other words, Plaintiff State is acting to protect the interests of its respective citizens in the fair and constitutional conduct of elections used to appoint presidential electors. The Bush v. Gore Precedent Doesn't Establish Standing Here But Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II) relied upon in the Complaint is not on point. Indeed, Reynolds v. Sims (which established a one man, one vote principle for state and local legislative redistricting) expressly recognized that the federal constitution would be illegal if a parallel system like the electoral college or U.S. Senate were enacted at the state level, but declined to hold that the 14th Amendment invalidated this portion of the U.S. Constitution (in part, because a valid constitutional amendments can't alter the equal representation of a U.S. state in the U.S. Senate without its consent). Bush v. Gore likewise was an intrastate election dispute alleging that the equal protection rights of voters in one part of a state were abridged by the voters in another part of the state having different election rules applied to them in a lawsuit between two candidates in the race who clearly did have standing (although not original jurisdiction standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, which is limited with other exceptions inapplicable here, to lawsuits between two states). The Claim That Texas Has A Legally Cognizable And Justiciable Interest In The Overall Result Of A Presidential Election Is Unprecedented And Dubious The Complaint's assertion that in a presidential election, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States, citing Anderson, is also problematic. First of all isn't technically true. The United States has 51 elections for Presidential electors, it doesn't have a &quot;Presidential election&quot; of ordinary voters. Perhaps an elector has standing to assert vote dilution, but an elector voting in that election, or a candidate, but they are not U.S. states and as a result, they can't bring lawsuits in the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional original jurisdiction. In the same way, Texas can't sue Florida alleging that a U.S. Senate or U.S. House election in Florida was conducted incorrectly, because every U.S. Senate or U.S. House election impacts which party has a majority in that house of Congress. Instead, the Constitution, recognizing that the courts offered no national judicial election remedy to people outside a state with a disputed election, created a legislative one by vesting resolution of disputed Congressional elections in Congress, rather than the Courts. Hundreds of disputed Congressional elections have been adjudicated that way. Indeed, the only case of a genuinely disputed Presidential election outcome, the election of 1876, which is the closest precedent, is one in which Congress, rather than the Courts resolved the dispute regarding the overall Presidential election result based upon allegations of irregularities in a particular state. One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court bar members concurs with this analysis: Texas has no legal right to claim that officials elsewhere didn't follow the rules set by their own legislatures. The United States doesn't have a national election for president. It has a series of state elections, and one state has no legal standing to challenge how another state conducts its elections any more than Texas could challenge how Georgia elects its senators, legal experts said. &quot;This case is hopeless. Texas has no right to bring a lawsuit over election procedures in other states,&quot; said SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, a Washington, D.C., lawyer who argues frequently before the court. Second of all, it is irrelevant. Anderson didn't authorize one state to sue another state over its administration of an election. Even if the outcome of elections in other states have a de facto impact on other states, this doesn't mean that Texas has a legally cognizable interest in how another state selects its electors which is reserved to the legislature of the other state under the constitution. There are no precedents for one state having a legally recognized interest in the outcome of another state's election. It did not participate in the election as a voter or an administrator of that election or as a candidate. It doesn't even cast a vote for President in any case, the electors that it elected do that. The votes of the Texas electors are not diluted by the existence of electors in other states beyond the status quo expectation with no wrongdoing. Texas gets the same number of electoral votes relative to the total number of votes cast, regardless of who the electors of four other states cast their votes supporting. There is no allegation that another state got too many electoral votes. In contrast, Texas might have standing to sue if it was allocated just 12 electoral votes, when, the census results showed that it was actually entitled to 38 electoral votes. Being denied the right to cast the full number of electoral votes that Texas gets to cast probably is an actual injury and does not hinge on how another state administers its election of its Presidential electors. Links to the briefs filed by each of the four defendant states found here further detail the standing analysis in addition to other arguments. For example, Michigan summarizes its standing argument as follows: Texas lacks standing to bring its Electors Clause claim where its asserted injury is nothing more than a generalized grievance that the Clause was violated. The standing section in the Georgia brief explains that: Texas lacks Article III standing to pursue its claims. Texas alleges two types of injuries—a direct injury to the State and a supposed injury to its Electors, whom Texas seeks to represent in a parens patriae capacity. Neither is cognizable. A. Texas argues that it has suffered a direct injury because “the States have a distinct interest in who is elected Vice President and thus who can cast the tiebreaking vote in the Senate.” Mot. for TRO 14–15 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 15 (arguing that a “Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election”). Under governing precedent, that is not an injury in fact. A State—like any plaintiff—has standing only if it alleges an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also id. (injury in fact is the “[f]irst and foremost” of the standing elements) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). But Texas has no cognizable interest specific to Texas in how the Vice President votes. Texas’s interest is in its own representation in the Senate; Georgia has not impaired that interest. Texas still has two Senators, and those Senators may represent Texas’s interests however they choose. Even by its own logic, Texas has suffered no injury. In any event, Texas’s speculation that the Vice President may one day cast a tie-breaking vote is not a cognizable injury. . . . Indeed, certain Vice Presidents—Mr. Biden, for example—never cast a tie-breaking vote during their tenure. Texas’s alleged injury is not the type of imminent, concrete, or particularized injury that Article III demands. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id. (standing theory that “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”). Texas’s alleged injury is also not cognizable because it is a generalized grievance—the kind of injury “that is ‘plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440– 41 (2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); id. (The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (the alleged injury must be “distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government’” (quoting Lance, 549 U.S. at 439)). The injuries that Texas alleges on behalf of its citizens are injuries that would be common to not only every citizen of Texas, but also every citizen of every state. Cf. Lance, 549 U.S. at 440 (“To have standing . . . a plaintiff must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public.” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1962))). And in all events, by Texas’s logic any State would have standing to pursue the alleged claims because every State purportedly “suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election” (Mot. for TRO 15). So Texas’s injury is specific neither to its citizens nor to Texas as a State. An injury unique to no one is not an injury in fact. Texas cites no case supporting its assertion that it has suffered an injury in fact. Texas cites Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency for the proposition that “states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are ‘entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis’” (Mot. for TRO 15 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)), but Texas strips that language of its context. The Court there explained that Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis because a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign territory” and because Congress had afforded “a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining context of the Court’s reasoning). Neither thing is true here. In any case, Massachusetts involved a State’s loss of coastal property from rising sea levels, which is nothing like Texas’s alleged injury (a speculative tie-breaking vote by the Vice President). Texas has not alleged a direct injury in fact. B. Nor does Texas have standing to raise claims for its electors in a parens patriae capacity (cf. Mot. for TRO 15). A State may sue parens patriae only if it proves that it has Article III standing (see, e.g., Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178), which Texas hasn’t done. But even if it had, Texas would lack parens patriae standing because that concept applies only when a State seeks to vindicate the interests of more than a discrete and identifiable subset of its citizens (most often in the health and welfare contexts). See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp &amp; Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents . . .”); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665 (a State may not sue parens patriae when it is “merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens”). Here, Texas purports to represent the interests of only thirty-eight people (its Electors). But Texas’s problems run even deeper. This Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp &amp; Son, 458 U.S. at 607; see also Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178 (same). That is not the case here. Under our federalist system, Texas could never “address through its sovereign lawmaking powers” how another State elects its Electors. Texas lacks parens patriae standing. C. Texas also lacks standing because it asserts the rights of third parties. A plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” unless the plaintiff establishes (1) a “close” relationship with the third party and (2) a “hindrance” preventing the third party from asserting her own rights. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). Otherwise, the plaintiff fails to present a “particularized” injury. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”). . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars Texas citizens from bringing such claims against Georgia in federal court, so Texas cannot circumvent that bar when asserting such individual rights in a parens patria capacity. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 465 (1945) (“By reason of the Eleventh Amendment the derivative or attenuated injuries of that sort are not enough for standing. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Pennsylvania opposition brief's section on standing explains that: Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). That same jurisdictional limitation applies to actions sought to be commenced in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). To establish standing, the demanding party must establish a “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). More specifically, that the plaintiff has suffered injury to a legally protected interest, which injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a favorable ruling.” AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 736. This Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. For invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction, this burden is even greater: “[t]he threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” People of the State of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Texas fails to carry this heavy burden. First, Texas cannot establish it suffered an injury in fact. An injury in fact requires a plaintiff to show the “invasion of a legally protected interest”; that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and that the injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). According to Texas, the alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Election Code undermined the authority granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly under the Electors Clause.8 Motion at 3, 10-11, 13-15. But as the text of the Electors Clause itself makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution. AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800 (legislature claimed that it was stripped of its responsibility for redistricting vested in it by the Elections Clause). The State of Texas is not the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019) (noting the “mismatch between the body seeking to litigate [the Virginia House of Delegates] and the body to which the relevant constitutional provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting authority [the General Assembly]”). Second, Texas’s claimed injury is not fairly traceable to a violation of the Electors Clause. As discussed above, each of Texas’s allegations of violations of Pennsylvania law has been rejected by state and federal courts. Third, Texas fares no better in relying on parens patriae for standing. It is settled law that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. The state, thus, must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp &amp; Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Baez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). In other words, “the State must be more than a nominal party.” Ibid. That, however, is exactly what Texas is here. Texas seeks to “assert parens patriae standing for [its] citizens who are Presidential Electors.” Motion at 15. Even if, as Texas claims, the presidential electors its citizens have selected suffered a purported injury akin to the personal injury allegedly sustained by the 20-legislator bloc in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), which they did not, that does not somehow metastasize into a claim by the state rather than those presidential electors. The 20-person bloc of legislatures in Coleman sued in their own right without the involvement of the State of Kansas. Ibid. Texas has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest at stake. It is a nominal party, at best. 8 In its motion, Texas disclaims a “voting-rights injury as a State” based on either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Motion at 14. Rather, Texas claims that its legally protected interest arises from “the structure of the Constitution” creating a federalist system of government. Ibid. As discussed infra, to the extent Texas relies on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, those “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. Wisconsin's standing arguments are as follows: At a minimum, to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, Texas must demonstrate that it has “suffered a wrong through the action of the other State.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1981). But Texas is unable to allege that Wisconsin itself did anything to directly injure Texas’s sovereign interests. Instead, Texas advances a far more attenuated theory of injury—that the other States’ supposed violations of their elections laws “debased the votes of citizens” in Texas. Mot. for P/I at 3. This speculative logic is not nearly enough to carry Texas’s burden to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” a “threatened invasion of [its] rights” “of serious magnitude,” New York, 256 U.S. at 309. Indeed, Texas’s allegations fall far short of what would be required by Article III in any federal case—that is, a showing that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). It is well settled under the Court’s original jurisdiction cases that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). Apart from attempting to rely on the “personal claims of its citizens” as electors or voters, Texas struggles to identify any traditional sovereign injury to support its claim under the Electors Clause. Instead, Texas proposes that this Court recognize a new “form of voting-rights injury”—an injury premised on the denial of “‘equal suffrage in the Senate’” somehow caused by the election of the Vice President. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14 (quoting U.S.Const. art. V, cl. 3). Texas makes no freestanding constitutional claim to this effect. In any event, this argument makes no sense. Texas does not (and cannot) argue that it now has fewer Senators than any other state. By definition, therefore, it maintains “equal suffrage in the Senate.” Texas’s attempt to garner standing for its claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses fares no better. These “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. If Texas’s theory of injury were accepted, it would be too easy to reframe virtually any election or voting rights dispute as implicating injuries to a States and thereby invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. New York or California could sue Texas or Alabama in this Court over their felon-disenfranchisement policies. . . . . This case does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement. Texas speculates that Wisconsin’s facilitation of mail-in voting during the pandemic may have increased the likelihood that third parties would engage in instances of voter fraud in Wisconsin. Texas does not offer a shred of evidence that any such fraud occurred. And Texas does not allege that Wisconsin directed or authorized any individual to engage in voter fraud. Nor would any such allegation be plausible. In any event, this Court long made clear that its original jurisdiction does not extend to “political disputes between states arising out of [the alleged] maladministration of state laws by officials to the injury of citizens of another state.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al, Supreme Court Practice 10-6 (11th ed. 2019); see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)) (“Jurisdiction over controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and, where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion and judgment.”). It is hard to imagine a case that more clearly runs afoul of that principle than a dispute over the outcome of the presidential election, premised on the alleged maladministration of state election law. The Existence Of A Legally Cognizable Interest Needs To Be Evaluated In The Context Of The U.S. Constitution As A Whole The question of first impression concerning whether a state has a legally cognizable interest in the administration of an election in another state needs to be evaluated in the context of the U.S. Constitution as a whole. The Constitution says a fair amount about election administration and disputed elections that in context disfavors the notion that one state has a legally cognizable interest in how another state administers an election administration. All federal elections in the United States (outside the District of Columbia) are administered by the states and by the local governments and agencies created by the states. State election laws must conform to federal requirements, and candidates participating in elections or voters in that state have standing in many cases to litigate whether those state and federal laws were conformed to by state election administrators. Each election of electors is separate and prior to 1852, Presidential elections weren't even held on the same day even though the Congress had the authority to mandate a single Presidential election date. The process of determining a total outcome of the election by aggregating state electoral college votes is vested in Congress by the constitution, not in the judicial branch, and so there can be no legally cognizable interest in this non-justiciable issue. Therefore, not only does Texas lack standing to bring this suit on the theory asserted that Texas is injured by an aggregation of electoral votes including votes allegedly made by improperly certified electors. No one has standing to do so in any court of law.
Unless you are an ambassador or one of the US states, SCOTUS doesn't have original jurisdiction over your lawsuit, so they can't hear it either. If you've named all the judges of all the courts that do have jurisdiction, then one of them will handle it anyway, under the doctrine of necessity noted before. For cases that do fall within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, a jury trial is theoretically possible, but it appears it has not occurred since the 1790s, and only one has surviving records: Georgia v. Brailsford in 1794. See &quot;Special Juries in the Supreme Court&quot; by Lochlan F. Shelfer, Yale Law Journal 123:1, 2013-2014. Otherwise, non-jury original jurisdiction cases are usually delegated to a special master, a sort of &quot;contract judge&quot; who hears all the evidence and recommends a judgment that the full court typically rubber-stamps.
Background I will note that the case you cite was decided in 1972 and has been cited by other cases that relied on its precedents in all appellate decisions in Michigan, and one federal trial court decision in Michigan over the last 44 years. The losing party tried to appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the appeal later in 1972 because there was no issue of federal law involved. Ultimate Conclusion There is pretty much no way to change the holding of that decision other than to amend the provisions of the Michigan Constitution in question by the procedures set forth in the Michigan State Constitution. Indeed, the basic premise of your question, "a long-standing Michigan Supreme Court ruling might possibly be incorrect" is basically definitionally wrong. When the Michigan Supreme Court interprets a provision of the Michigan State Constitution, its decision is, by definition, the correct interpretation of that language. It isn't terribly uncommon for authoritative court decisions to conclude for a variety of reasons that the literal plain reading of constitutional text actually means something quite different than what the words actually say. For example, the judicially interpeted meaning of the 11th Amendment to the United States Constitution (which is that states are entitled to sovereign immunity unless it is waived by the state or authorized by the United States or another state) is quite different from what the wording of the amendment says ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."), which on its face simply slightly narrows federal court jurisdiction and says nothing on its face about sovereign immunity. What you think those words should mean based upon a plain reading of the constitutional text is completely irrelevant. Amending Michigan's State Constitution Amending the state constitution is not easy in Michigan. It has been done only eight times since the current state constitution was adopted in 1963 - seven times pursuant to proposals made by the state legislature and ratified by the voters, and once in 1972 as a result of a citizens petition. It has been amended only twice since 1972. Several methods can be employed to propose and ratify amendments. Section 1 of Article XII states that: Amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the senate or house of representatives. Proposed amendments agreed to by two-thirds of the members elected to and serving in each house on a vote with the names and vote of those voting entered in the respective journals shall be submitted, not less than 60 days thereafter, to the electors at the next general election or special election as the legislature shall direct. If a majority of electors voting on a proposed amendment approve the same, it shall become part of the constitution and shall abrogate or amend existing provisions of the constitution at the end of 45 days after the date of the election at which it was approved. This is the easiest way to amend the state constitution if there is a bipartisan consensus to amend it. Section 2 of Article XII says: Amendments may be proposed to this constitution by petition of the registered electors of this state. Every petition shall include the full text of the proposed amendment, and be signed by registered electors of the state equal in number to at least 10 percent of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor at the last preceding general election at which a governor was elected. Such petitions shall be filed with the person authorized by law to receive the same at least 120 days before the election at which the proposed amendment is to be voted upon. Any such petition shall be in the form, and shall be signed and circulated in such manner, as prescribed by law. The person authorized by law to receive such petition shall upon its receipt determine, as provided by law, the validity and sufficiency of the signatures on the petition, and make an official announcement thereof at least 60 days prior to the election at which the proposed amendment is to be voted upon. Any amendment proposed by such petition shall be submitted, not less than 120 days after it was filed, to the electors at the next general election. Such proposed amendment, existing provisions of the constitution which would be altered or abrogated thereby, and the question as it shall appear on the ballot shall be published in full as provided by law. Copies of such publication shall be posted in each polling place and furnished to news media as provided by law. The ballot to be used in such election shall contain a statement of the purpose of the proposed amendment, expressed in not more than 100 words, exclusive of caption. Such statement of purpose and caption shall be prepared by the person authorized by law, and shall consist of a true and impartial statement of the purpose of the amendment in such language as shall create no prejudice for or against the proposed amendment. If the proposed amendment is approved by a majority of the electors voting on the question, it shall become part of the constitution, and shall abrogate or amend existing provisions of the constitution at the end of 45 days after the date of the election at which it was approved. If two or more amendments approved by the electors at the same election conflict, that amendment receiving the highest affirmative vote shall prevail. There were 3,156,531 votes cast for all candidates in the most recent election for Governor in Michigan in 2014. This means that 315,653 valid signatures would have to be on a petition requesting a constitutional amendment and experience in states where initiatives are common suggest that significantly more signatures than that would have to be collected in order to get that many valid signatures. Section 3 of Article XII says: At the general election to be held in the year 1978, and in each 16th year thereafter and at such times as may be provided by law, the question of a general revision of the constitution shall be submitted to the electors of the state. If a majority of the electors voting on the question decide in favor of a convention for such purpose, at an election to be held not later than six months after the proposal was certified as approved, the electors of each representative district as then organized shall elect one delegate and the electors of each senatorial district as then organized shall elect one delegate at a partisan election. The delegates so elected shall convene at the seat of government on the first Tuesday in October next succeeding such election or at an earlier date if provided by law. The convention shall choose its own officers, determine the rules of its proceedings and judge the qualifications, elections and returns of its members. To fill a vacancy in the office of any delegate, the governor shall appoint a qualified resident of the same district who shall be a member of the same party as the delegate vacating the office. The convention shall have power to appoint such officers, employees and assistants as it deems necessary and to fix their compensation; to provide for the printing and distribution of its documents, journals and proceedings; to explain and disseminate information about the proposed constitution and to complete the business of the convention in an orderly manner. Each delegate shall receive for his services compensation provided by law. No proposed constitution or amendment adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the electors for approval as hereinafter provided unless by the assent of a majority of all the delegates elected to and serving in the convention, with the names and vote of those voting entered in the journal. Any proposed constitution or amendments adopted by such convention shall be submitted to the qualified electors in the manner and at the time provided by such convention not less than 90 days after final adjournment of the convention. Upon the approval of such constitution or amendments by a majority of the qualified electors voting thereon the constitution or amendments shall take effect as provided by the convention The next referendum pursuant to Section 3, Article XII is in the year 2026, and any proposed amendments from a constitutional convention called under that provision would not take effect until approved by voters which could happen no sooner than the year 2028. Voters declined to call for a constitutional convention in the years 1978, 1994 and 2010. No Law Pased Only By The Legislature Can Overrule This Decision The state legislature can't pass an ordinary law that overrules a Michigan Supreme Court interpretation of the state constitution either. And, even Congress can't pass a law that reinterprets language in a particular state's constitution that has been determined to be the correct one by the state supreme court. No Other Court Can Overrule This Michigan Supreme Court Decision The federal courts including the U.S. Supreme Court cannot overrule the Michigan Supreme Court on a question of Michigan state law. The lower courts of Michigan cannot overrule the Michigan Supreme Court on any question. The Michigan Supreme Court Is Extremely Unlikely To Modify This Decision The Michigan Supreme Court is extremely unlikely to overrule itself regarding a decision that has stood and been relied upon for 44 years since questions of statutory interpretation are usually given unusually strong respect as precedents to promote certainty, although it could change its mind if it wanted to. Usually, though, a state supreme court only overrules one of its own past precedents if it becomes inconsistent with another line of cases and it eventually becomes clear that there are two or more inconsistent lines of precedents can't be reconciled with each other in some fact pattern that pits one line of cases squarely against another. For example, in Colorado, earlier this year a older case holding that a defense called "laches" could not be used in child support cases collided directly with a newer Colorado Supreme Court case involving promissory notes that held that the defense called "laches" is available in every type of case in Colorado. When confronted with the conflicting precedents in a new case this year the Colorado Supreme Court resolved the conflict in favor of the newer holding, overruling the older one which states that "laches" did not apply to child support cases. But, this is extremely unlikely to happen when the question involves the meaning of the precise wording of a highly technical property tax provision of the state constitution.