Are Rule of law and qualified immunity doctrines compatible? Are qualified immunity doctrines compatible with &quot;rule of law&quot; -- the notion of the law giving equal rights and obligations to citizens? Can things like death penalty or immunity from prosecution be justified under rule of law?
&quot;Rule of law&quot; is one thing, &quot;giving equal rights and obligations to citizens&quot; is another. Qualified immunity, both in doctrinal and statutory form, are statements of law, e.g. saying that a police officer has the power to use force in a manner that others may not. &quot;Equal rights and obligations&quot; are actually &quot;equal, as defined in the law&quot;, for example a 6 year old has no obligation to comply with contract that that may have formed – there is an exception to the otherwise general rule, which is recognized by the law.
While it is true that jury instructions are typically less than optimal, it is ideological hyperbole or cynicism to claim that instructions are purposely confusing. The ultimate source of the confusion is that the legal system has to assume (pretend) that it has clear-cut rules that any reasonable person can easily understand and automatically apply. In order to maintain uniformity of the law, there is an externally-defined instruction that a judge may read (rather than giving his personal spin on what "reasonable doubt" means or what the relationship is between "reasonable doubt" and convicting a defendant). Once the relevant body of government (committee of judges and lawyers) has established the apparently correct formula for expressing the applicable legal concept, they don't mess with it, until SCOTUS overturns decisions enough times based on crappy instructions. Legal professionals are trained to carefully scrutinze language so as to achieve a single interpretation of a given clause (never mind the fact that there turn out to be many such interpretations). Since they can apply these interpretive rules, it is assumed that anyone can apply them. But in fact, we know that people don't just use literal semantic principles to reach conclusions – but the law resist pandering to that imperfection in human behavior. There is a huge literature on problems of jury instructions, some of the better of which relies on psycholinguistic experimentation to establish that a given instruction is confusing or gives the wrong result. See for example Solan's "Refocusing the burden of proof.." (and references therein) that addresses the problem of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction, which has the unintended consequence of implying that the defense has an obligation to create a doubt (which is not the case, and allows conviction if there is the weakest imaginable evidence which hasn't been refuted). But who gets to decide what the improved instructions should say? The instructions have to correctly state what the law holds (where "the law" means not just statutes, but the trillions of relevant court decisions and applicable regulations). Thus there is massive inertia, and improved jury instructions will not come about quickly.
There is no one answer, but here are some examples. India is famous for deriving general principles of more important constitutional law concepts that can be used to find constitutional amendments to be unconstitutional. The U.S. has not gone to that extreme but does derive constitutional protections for the overall scheme of the constitution and from the legal context of the nation when constitutional provisions were enacted that don't obvious flow from the text of the legislation (e.g. the 11th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution) has been interpreted to establish state sovereign immunity that the text of that amendment does not expressly provide for). Another somewhat weird source of law in the U.S. (constitutional at the federal level and usually common law at the state level) is that the 21st century right to a jury trial in a civil case depends upon whether the claim would have been litigated in England in 1789 in the courts of law or the courts of chancery in England. Customary international law is a thing. It also often arises from international practices or diplomatic norms, rather than tribunal adjudications. In the jurisprudence of the legislative process and some aspects of federalism, historical practices that have not been litigated are frequently resorted to as a source of law. For example, the question of whether a legislature is in recess has been resolved based upon historical practice. Prior to the French Revolution, customary practice was an important source of law in France. Customary practice was an important source of the English common law. In many British colonies and former British colonies (e.g. South Africa and Kenya and Sudan), lower tribal or village courts were often expressly permitted to apply local custom in their decision making. In the U.S., a collection of secondary authority texts compiled by the American Law Institute, an affiliate of the American Bar Association, called the Restatements, which summarize in codified form, various subjects in common law, are often used by courts as a source of law where there is no case law on point in a jurisdiction. In civil law countries, the leading legal treatises of law professors are an important source of interpretive authority of the civil code and other major codification of the law. Most Islamic countries provide in their constitutions that Islamic law is the highest authority and supersedes any secular law including other provisions of the constitution to the contrary. In many parts of the United States, mostly in the west, but also in Florida and Louisiana, property rights arising under Spanish/Mexican law, or under Native American law continue in force even though they derived from legal systems other than U.S. statutes and common law. See, for example: Tribe: We have &quot;aboriginal title&quot; to these lands in New Mexico because we had exclusive occupation of them from around 1300 to 1650, and then still used them a lot since then. Further, the &quot;sovereign&quot; (the U.S.) has never properly taken them away, so they're still ours. District court: No. Tribe on motion to reconsider: How about just these bits of the lands? District court: Still no. Tenth Circuit: There's still a claim for one of the bits. Concurrence 1: No bits for you. Concurrence 2: Two bits. (Source)
Judges do not decide, jurors do (however, if a judge is the fact-finder, then the judge makes such a determination). The main input that the decision-maker gets is a jury instruction. In order to unify "reasonable doubt", "reasonable price", "reasonable delay" and so on, appeal is often made a mythical being, "the reasonable man", so reasonable force would be the degree of force the reasonable man would use in a given situation. I will draw from California criminal instructions ('cuz I have them) but similar instructions can be found across jurisdictions. For example, one instructions says "A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes". Or from a negligence instruction "A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk". More detailed appeal to The Reasonable Person is found in the justified homicide instruction: Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified. When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true. There is no explanation of what it means to be "a reasonable person". Since nobody believes that they themselves are unreasonable, a simple and also wrong way of judging the matter is to subjectively judge whether you yourself would do the same thing, if you were in that situation. Very often, instructions do not even bother to say what "reasonable" means, so (re interpreting expert testimony) "You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence"; (re corpus delicti) "That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed"; "Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty", "when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable" The closest the law has come to articulating an objective characterization of "reasonableness" is in "reasonable doubt" instructions. One characterization is in People v. Feldman, 71 N.E. 2d 433. It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the commission of a serious crime A somewhat improved characterization is the Calcrim instruction Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt There is room for improvement, but it points in the right direction. On rare occasions, a law is written that actually includes a definition. The Gas Price Spike Act HR 3784 said The term ‘reasonable profit’ means the amount determined by the Reasonable Profits Board to be a reasonable profit on the sale. It is then up to the board to subjectively determine what that profit is. (BTW this did not become law). [Addendum] It's actually very difficult to determine what reasoning judges use in those cases where they are the determiners of fact. They will likely call on their knowledge of law, asking "are these circumstances sufficiently like past circumstance A where the defendant was convicted, or more like B where the defendant was acquitted".
In the U.S are judges, attorneys, physicians, teachers, professors, politicians, administrative officers liable for ordinary negligence? In the U.S., judges, prosecuting attorneys and legislators have absolute immunity from civil liability (but not from criminal liability) for legislative and judicial acts in their official capacity. Attorneys have absolute immunity from civil liability from some claims from some people (e.g. defamation claims from non-clients for statements made in connection with representing someone) and qualified immunity from civil liability from others (e.g. most claims of non-clients) for their acts as lawyers, but are liable to their clients for ordinary negligence. Physicians are liable to their patients for ordinary negligence in the nature of medical malpractice. Some acts taken by physicians that would otherwise constitute false imprisonment or assault or homicide are excluded from the definition of those crimes. Elected officials in the executive branch including mayors, law enforcement officers and the attorney general have qualified immunity from civil liability for their official non-judicial acts. This means that they are only liable for intentional violations of constitutional rights that are clearly established in the law. Subject to narrow exceptions (e.g. driving or medical malpractice) they are not liable for ordinary negligence. It is hard to know what kind of liability is contemplated for teachers and professors or administrative officers to answer. The answer would not be the same for all kinds of claims. Teachers of minors generally have the same immunities as a parent with respect to the use of physical force towards their students in order to maintain order in the educational process. The liability of teachers and professors also depends upon whether they are employed by public or private institutions. Those in public institutions often have more protections from liability, but also have exposure to civil rights claims that those in private institutions are not. Contractual waivers can also influence liability in these circumstances. Everyone has liability for ordinary negligence in their unofficial capacity and for many acts (e.g. driving a car) while on duty but not involving activities particular to their professional responsibilities. They are not employees or workers so that they could be reasonably absolved for ordinary negligence. We expect employees to be obedient so they have no moral responsibility, if we held them liable we would harm the market people would be reluctutant to enter a contract of employeement. In the private sector, employees are usually liable for ordinary negligence that they personally commit, even though the employer is also liable. Judges are employees and arguably workers as well. And, for their non-judicial acts, judges have the same liability as every other employee for their ordinary negligence. For example, if a judge gets in a car accident while driving from one courtroom to another, and harms another through negligence, the judge has personal liability for the judge's ordinary negligence and the judicial branch has vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, the judge. In all these of judges etc cases they receive more than enough indenization for assuming responsibility. By freeing them from ordinary negligence we are making them negligent. Other than political economics why would the legislator free them from such responsibility? Analysis of why the law is the way it is, or what it should be, are really better suited for Politics.SE than for Law.SE. I discussion of the why's of judicial immunity is appropriate for Politics.SE. A discussion of "judges etc" is probably to broad for either forum.
"Double jeopardy" applies to a criminal proceeding, that is one that needs to be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt," and involves criminal sanctions such as jail time. Once OJ was acquitted of criminal charges, he couldn't be tried again as a "criminal." The second trial was a civil trial, with a "lesser" standard of proof (preponderance of evidence), and lesser "damages" (money, not jail time). So even though the facts were the same, OJ was accused of violating a different standard, that is a different "law" so to speak. He could be tried for a "tort" just not a crime. Or put another way, "wrongful death" is not the same as murder. The latter requires intent. Wrongful death suggests "tortious" negligence, but not necessarily intent.
Does that mean that the &quot;reasonable person&quot; standard also changes over time? The reasonable person standard changes every time a new finder of fact, either a judge or a jury, considers a case. To a great extent the whole point of a &quot;reasonable person&quot; standard is to inject irreducible uncertainty into the question of what conduct someone can be held liable for, thereby giving juries (or judges in bench trials) discretion to evaluate complex factual situations and consider those situations in light of the fact finders' collective moral judgment. There are seemingly objective tests by which reasonableness can be measured, such as the &quot;Learned Hand test&quot; which compares the risk of harm caused by not taking a precaution times the likelihood that the harm will manifest itself. But ultimately, this is very rarely so clear a standard that it overcomes the broad discretion of the finder of fact to determine what is and isn't reasonable under a particular set of circumstances.
There may be a purpose to have laws which are impossible to follow. (I'm neither a lawyer nor a politician, following points are what I like to call qualified hearsay - they come from qualified people I know personally but were given as a remark or during a chat over a cup of coffee and therefore are not easily substantiable with rigorous sources. You can treat them as a hypothetical ideas for your thought experiments.) Everybody is implicitly guilty Confident citizens and transparent law is the worst enemy of totalitarian regime. You learn to live with ingrained feeling that there surely is something you are guilty of. Merely being addressed by police makes you nervous and malleable; should you stand up against oppression, it is easy for the state apparat to detain or convict you of one or more default offenses. A good example would be the law present in many, if not all, socialist bloc countries saying that knowing of a comrade having commited an offense or merely planing to and not reporting it to authorities is an offense in itself. Whether you did or did not know would be determined by the authorities. Make your laws very strict with a hope thay they will be followed at least to a degree Not laws in themselves, but standards (technical norms) regarding nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union were strict to the point where they were technically impossible to follow given the state of the art. For example the standards for manufacture of high pressure pipes would state very low level of material impurities that when the actual manufactured material contained twice the level of impurities the pipe will still be very safe to operate. In a centrally planned economy with ever more ambitious production projections and declared zero need for contingency this was one of several ways how to create a bit of a wiggle room. (Source: I once worked for a nuclear power research institute supporting Soviet technology and was told this by an expert on stainless steel.) So there you have a bit of an illustration what may happen if a law is intentionally impossible to follow. Since you labelled your question 'United States', I believe the follow-up question is why would anyone want to propose such a law.