Giving Someone Money Because of a Criminal Act? I was wondering what laws, if any, restrict donating money to criminals who have committed crimes which you support and want to encourage (lets assume the motivations are not necessarily so explicitly stated). Musings: On the one hand this seems basically the same as paying someone to commit a crime. But on the other hand, accused criminals get donated money all the time to fight the ensuing court battle. Which seems like something that is clearly legal. This is in response to the recent flurry of donations and 100K bail given to the man who assaulted Dylann Roof. And was just wondering how exactly the law applies to such unique situations.
There is usually a law that could be stretched to cover such a case. In Washington, RCW 9A.28.030 says A person is guilty of criminal solicitation when, with intent to promote or facilitate the commission of a crime, he or she offers to give or gives money or other thing of value to another to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such crime or which would establish complicity of such other person in its commission or attempted commission had such crime been attempted or committed. The "intent" of the law is to punish people for saying "I'll give you $5000 to kill Smith". But just looking at the text, if you give someone money to encourage them to engage in a specific kind of criminal conduct (e.g. beating people up), then you've violated the law. So, handing a guy $5,000 and saying "I think you should be rewarded for your act" could easily be construed as promoting the future commission of the same or similar crime.
Yes, but that doesn't make the theft not theft At the time of the crime, Joe committed theft. The state can prosecute Joe for that theft. Alice's subsequent gift does not change this although it would prevent her from suing for recovery. As a practical matter, if Alice was willing to lie and say that the gift preceded the theft or she had given permission for the item to be taken, this would almost surely create reasonable doubt in any prosecution. However, on a pure &quot;these are the facts&quot; basis, the theft is a theft.
Barela was convicted of robbery affecting interstate commerce and faces a sentence of up to 20 years and $250,000 in fines. I assume your issue is that you think this is too high (although I don't see what it has to do with the 14th or 6th Amendments). Fortunately, it's also almost completely unrelated to the actual sentence. The number that was quoted is the statutory maximum for robbery or extortion affecting interstate commerce. It represents the maximum amount that any defendant under any circumstances could receive for one count of that crime. A career criminal who threatened to kill an armored car guard in order to steal $10,000,000 would face the same 20-year statutory maximum as someone with no record who threatened to give COVID to a store clerk in order to steal $90. In some situations, things like the amount stolen or the defendant's criminal record affect the actual crime the defendant is convicted of. At the federal level, that's mostly not the case. Robbery affecting interstate commerce doesn't have degrees or statutory enhancements. Instead, a judge decides what sentence is appropriate. The judge can, in theory, pick anything between the statutory minimum (here there is none) and the statutory maximum (here it's 20 years). 18 U.S. Code § 3553 lays out the factors for the court to consider. In practice, federal courts generally sentence within the range given in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. While the statute itself doesn't distinguish between stealing $90 by threatening to cough and stealing millions by threatening to shoot, the Guidelines do. Courts don't have to follow the Guidelines range but typically do. If they don't, it's much more likely their sentence will be overturned as unreasonable on appeal. Popehat has a good blog post on the Guidelines, how they work, and why press releases quoting statutory maximums are basically straight-up lies. Sentencing.us has an unofficial calculator you can use to estimate the Guidelines range for a particular crime. If you plug in 18 U.S. Code § 1951 (which translates to the &quot;Robbery&quot; guideline) and enter in $90 stolen, no weapon used, no threat of death, and no criminal record, then you get a range of 33-41 months and/or a fine of $7,500 to $75,000. This is basically the lowest Guidelines range possible for robbery. For comparison, under California state law robbery is punishable by two, three, or five years in state prison. Robbery is a serious and violent crime, so a sentence of multiple years would not be considered unreasonable. But it takes a lot for the Guidelines range to approach the statutory maximum of 20 years.
We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.
It is certainly possible to give gifts to your relatives (or to anyone really). But, the harder question is whether or not it is really a gift. A characterization of a transaction as a gift is less likely to be questioned if it is between related parties, and it is less likely to be questioned if it isn't obviously a quid pro quo. If you told your brother that you would make a gift to him of all of the appreciation in the house, if he made the guarantee in advance, it would be a guarantee fee (or an equitable or nominee ownership) rather than a gift. But, with the timing and motives described in this post, it is certainly a closer call. The fact that the "gift" amount exactly matches the appreciation casts doubt on the theory that this is really a gift, but doesn't absolutely clearly require the conclusion that it is not. This could end up being resolved either way, and ultimately, could be very dependent upon the detailed facts and how they are presented to the person determining if tax is owed.
Indiana Code § 5-2-6.3-3 requires a person charged with a felony to remit 90 percent of any income derived &quot;directly or indirectly from a felony&quot; to the state's crime-victims fund. So if the defendant's crime was not a felony, the law does not purport to have any effect on the mugshot transaction. But even if it was a felony, the law does not actually prohibit the mugshot sale, it merely imposes a tax on transactions related to that offense. But the law is unconstitutional, as the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that these &quot;Son of Sam&quot; laws violate the First Amendment: We conclude simply that, in the Son of Sam law, New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income. The State's interest in compensating victims from the fruits of crime is a compelling one, but the Son of Sam law is not narrowly tailored to advance that objective. As a result, the statute is inconsistent with the First Amendment. Simon Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991).
If what that quote says is actually true, no that is obviously not a crime. Sending law enforcement to stop a crime is not a crime, no matter who benefits. In fact turning a blind eye and letting someone benefit would have been the crime. But this is not a legal matter. People are upset because the person saying this has a track record of saying things that are actually not true and that is why many people suspect a crime. Because if any part of this sentence turns out to be not true (and based on this persons history, that chance is very high), then yes, a crime may have been committed. If any predecessor had said &quot;I sent the FBI to stop child kidnapping and it stopped immediately&quot;, nobody would question that that is obviously not a crime. They would applaud him for it. Because with any predecessor, people would have believed their words to be true, at least in the very broad sense.
Nobody so far has discussed Electoral law e.g. Representation of the People Act 1983 There are various clauses that may be relevant, one of which is: A voter shall be guilty of bribery if before or during an election he directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person on his behalf receives, agrees, or contracts for any money, gift, loan or valuable consideration, office, place or employment for himself or for any other person for voting or agreeing to vote or for refraining or agreeing to refrain from voting. Subsection 2 similarly makes it an offence to offer employment to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting but somewhat less concisely. I believe this would make such a contract unenforceable.