Wire tap law - Better Call Saul At the season finale of Better Call Saul: Season 2. Chuck records Jimmy admitting to committing a felony. The recording was obtained without Jimmy's permission (the tape recorder was hidden). Wouldn't this recording be inadmissible in court as it violates the wire tap law?
Better Call Saul is set in New Mexico where as long as one-person involved in the conversation is aware that it is being recorded, it is legal. Known as "one-party consent". This varies state to state. http://www.detectiveservices.com/2012/02/27/state-by-state-recording-laws/ http://www.aapsonline.org/judicial/telephone.htm If neither Jimmy nor Chuck knew the conversation was being recorded, then it would be illegal.
Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.
In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible.
The answer is, "No, it will not default to the state where the recording device is located." Whether your recording is legal or not may depend on where the device is located, but it may depend on other things as well. For example, to sue under Florida law, "the persons bringing suit must be Florida residents or the improper "interception" must have occurred in Florida." Thus, if the someone from NY is recorded while in Florida by someone in NJ, Florida law does not apply. The rules used to determine which state's laws apply under which circumstances are explained thoroughly here. The issue of which state's laws apply is what is known as "conflict of laws." The basic idea is simple: Because you and the insurance company are citizens of different states, you have "diversity of citizenship." If the laws in your states differ, the court must decide whose law applies -- is it the state you called from, the state you called to, or federal law? Unfortunately for you, choice of law is hard even for lawyers to get a handle on. There are several different approaches states use to answer questions about conflict of law. Which approach a state uses to settle conflicts of law will determine whose law that state's courts will apply. To get a correct answer, you need to talk to an attorney who understands conflict of law and the admissibility of wiretaps.
IANAL, and as @GeorgeBailey suggests, you should ask one. That said, some aspects of your question are directly addressable with what we know. Does US law states anything about this? Yes. Federally this falls under the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §2511. Workplace monitoring generally falls under either the "System Administrator Exception" or under Consent. In general, continuing past a banner constitutes consent. Does company policy enforcement with such a warning over ride the right to not be subject to surveillance? In general, yes. You don't need to use the companies network if you don't want to consent - and they don't need to hire you if you don't want to use their network. But it's their network, and their rules apply. There are some nuances, and courts have found that the wording of the notice has made a difference in some cases, but overall, if the systems are properly posted with banners, then the employer may capture communications. See the "Bannering and Consent" section of this article from cybertelecom.org, e.g.: Even if no clicking is required, a user who sees the banner before logging on to the network has received notice of the monitoring. By using the network in light of the notice, the user impliedly consents to monitoring pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d). Note that stored data is covered by different laws than communications. It's a nuance. Is it ethical to sniff all the data without giving any other warning than the logon banner? "Ethical" is a very different question than "Legal", and largely more subjective. Most employers require signed consent for monitoring as a condition of employment, and use banners thereafter. That is ethical by my definition, in that it meets or exceeds the requirements of the law, and does not mislead or use subterfuge. The tone of your question suggests you find it distasteful, and therefore probably it violates your personal code of ethics.
The defense has an opportunity to question the witness the prosecution had called to provide foundation for the evidence, and in this case the defense's perspective is that the prosecution was trying to introduce evidence that they had improperly digitally manipulated. Part of their questioning was trying to figure out how the witness had manipulated the image prior to offering it as evidence. It's the prosecution's burden to prove that the evidence they are offering is accurate, the defense's purpose in asking the witness questions he could not answer is to try to prove to the judge that the prosecution has not laid proper foundation for the evidence because it has been manipulated from its original form in a way the prosecution cannot explain or justify as remaining fair and accurate to the events captured by the original footage. This case in particular had a lot of video evidence, and most of these issues were handled in motions in limine before the trial started. However, the drone evidence in question was dropped at the prosecutor's office after the trial started, so the prosecution did not really have time to hire and voir dire an expert witness on Amped 5 (keeping in mind that the defense similarly had little time to review and account for the new evidence in the middle of trial). Since the defense in this case were cross-examining the witness, they have some leeway to present an argument with their questioning like they chose to do with the red/blue pixel drawings. As I recall the judge allowed the evidence as-is, so it does not appear that the defense's arguments were persuasive to the judge.
The main rules in a civil case are the rules of evidence, the rules of civil procedure, and a set of largely unwritten rules governing issues such as the order in which matters are presented in a trial and courtroom conduct. Basically, the rules of evidence are really a subset of a larger set of written and unwritten rules about courtroom conduct the unwritten parts of which are assumed to be known by people using them. Robert's Rules of Order do not apply to courtroom proceedings. The judge also has the "direct contempt" power to summarily punish disrespectful conduct in the courtroom without a trial, with fines or incarceration, even if it wouldn't be a crime outside the courtroom. But what if a party to the proceedings who does not "have the floor" wishes to do things like the following: Obtain a restatement (perhaps because it was unintelligible, or perhaps as a ploy for emphasis) of something uttered by another. If you are a party asking a question (or more likely an attorney for a party asking a question on behalf of a party) it is not improper to say, "I'm sorry, I couldn't hear you." It is also not generally improper for a non-questioning party to interject and state that they can't hear a witness to a judge. Obtain clarification of a statement. This can be done by a party only when it is the party's turn to cross-examine or redirect as the case may be. A judge can ask for clarification, but a party cannot do so when it is not their turn. Determine or clarify the purpose of an ongoing statement or line of questioning Generally the party not asking a question objects and the court asks the party asking the question to clarify the reason. Sometimes, in a jury trial, the party asked to clarify will say "may we approach the bench" and a private discussion will be held between counsel for both sides and the judge regarding an ongoing issue. Determine whether the judge will allow something later in the proceedings. (E.g., "At some point I hope to speak to point X. May I do that now? Or will I be afforded that opportunity at some later point before the conclusion of this hearing?") Lawyers are expected to know this for the most part without having to ask. Also, usually before the court starts to take evidence, and at breaks, the judge will ask "are there any preliminary matters that need to be addressed?" or "are there any procedural matters that need to be addressed?" and questions such as this can be raised at that time.
Quick answer &quot;Is a lawyer allowed to follow a client's instructions to hide evidence?&quot; Probably not. I discuss this in the final section of this answer. About this specific case, the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the lawyer (Ken Murray) had intended to conceal the tapes permenantly or that he was aware of an obligation to disclose them prior to trial. As summarized by Austin Cooper, K.C.: Justice Gravely held that the concealing of the tapes for 17 months until Bernardo’s trial had a tendency to obstruct the course of justice, and therefore the actus reus of the offence was proved. On the issue of whether Mr. Murray willfully intended to obstruct justice, because it was feasible that Mr. Murray could have used the tapes for the defence and may well have believed that he had no obligation to disclose the tapes until the trial, he found the necessary mens rea was not proved. Accordingly, he found him not guilty. Deeper answer I'll first attempt to explain the trial judge's reasons (R. v. Murray, 2000 CanLII 22378 (ON SC)). At the end, I answer your more general questions. Facts February, 1993: Ken Murray was retained to defend Paul Bernardo on sexual assault charges; it was this charge for which Bernardo was already in custody at the time of the search of his home. April 30, 1993: The final search warrant of the Bernardo home expired. May 6, 1993: Ken Murray opened a letter from Bernardo that instructed the defence team to retrieve six 8mm videotapes. They located the tapes, removed them, and they committed to not tell anyone about the tapes. May 18, 1993: Bernardo was charged with two counts of first-degree murder and related offences. Murray's retainer was expanded to include defence of these charges. Bernardo authorized Murray to copy and review the videotapes and make use of them as appropriate in his defence. Two of the tapes contained evidence of sexual assault and death threats. Others contained evidence about the character and actions of a co-accused which Murray thought could be useful in Bernardo's defence. Early June 1993: Murray made a copy of the tapes and became fully aware of their contents. July 11 and 12, 1994: Bernardo told Murray he intended to deny ever having any contact with the victims that were on the tapes. He told Murray that the tapes were not to be used to contradict this position. July 24, 1994: After learning about DNA evidence and learning what the co-accused told police (all pointing to Bernardo being with the victims in the home), and after confirming that Bernardo insisted on maintaining his position that he had no contact with the victims and that the tapes were not to be used, Murray &quot;felt obliged to terminate the solicitor-client relationship&quot;. August 25, 1994: After a period of discussion with John Rosen (a lawyer from another firm), Rosen agreed to take over the defence of the first-degree murder charges. Murray did not tell Rosen about the tapes. Murray would remain defence counsel on the sexual assault charges. August 27, 1994: Rosen and Murray met with Bernardo to explain the change in counsel on the murder charges. August 30, 1994: Bernardo directed Murray to not reveal any of his materials to &quot;other counsel retained on my behalf for other offences that are currently before the Court... unless I specifically direct the release of such materials, in writing.&quot; Murray retained his own lawyer who further sought advice from the law society. The law society advised that (1) Murray remove himself as counsel for Bernardo on all matters; (2) Murray give the tapes to the judge in a sealed packet to be subect to court determination; and (3) to tell Bernardo of these steps as soon as possible. Rosen (the new defence counsel on the murder charges) became aware of these plans, learned that the tapes existed, and was concerned the tapes would be turned over without any input from him. September 21 and 22, 1994: After much discussion with Crown counsel, Rosen got instructions from Bernardo to turn over the tapes; the tapes were delivered to the Metropolitan Toronto Police and the Niagara Regional Police. The charge Ken Murray was charged with wilfully obstructing or attempting to obstruct the course of justice. The law The judge applied what is known as the &quot;tendency test&quot;. He said: Attempting to obstruct justice is construed as the doing of an act which has a tendency to pervert or obstruct the course of justice (the actus reus). &quot;Wilfully&quot; then constitutes the mens rea -- that is the act is done for the purpose of obstructing the course of justice He noted: The system functions within the broad principles of the presumption of innocence and the right to silence. The Crown must fully disclose its case. The defence has no reciprocal obligation. Application of the law Actus reus In this case, the judge found that Murray had done the actus reus of the offence: On the face of the evidence Murray's action in secreting the critical tapes had the tendency to obstruct the course of justice at several stages of the proceedings. The tapes were put beyond the reach of the police who had unsuccessfully attempted to locate them. Secreting them had the tendency to obstruct the police in their duty to investigate the crimes of Bernardo and Homolka. Further, there was no justification that negated the actus reus. This evidence on the tapes was not privilged; it was not communication between solicitor and client. The judge found that &quot;once [Murray] had discovered the overwhelming significance of the critical tapes, Murray... was left with but three legally justifiable options&quot;: (a) immediately turn over the tapes to the prosecution, either directly or anonymously; (b) deposit them with the trial judge; or (c) disclose their existence to the prosecution and prepare to do battle to retain them. Mens rea The Crown had to prove that Murray's intention was to obstruct the course of justice. The judge found that the Crown did not prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. The judge found that Murray may have not intended to permanently suppress the tapes and that Murray may have believed he had no obligation to disclose the tapes prior to the trial. He had presented several theories regarding the potential usefulness of the tapes to the defence which would have required holding back the tapes for their tactical or &quot;surprise&quot; value. Also, the judge noted that the law in this area was confusing.1 While Murray made only a token effort to find out what his obligations were, had he done careful research he might have remained confused. The weight of legal opinion in Ontario is to the effect that lawyers may not conceal material physical evidence of crime, but how this rule applies to particular facts has been the subject of extensive discussion. Lawyers in the United States have been afflicted with the same dilemma. In the materials supplied to me by counsel, there is reference to at least 15 law journal discussions on the issue. Ethical responsibility Doesn't a lawyer have a responsibility not to defend a specific fact that they know is criminal? No. But they do have an obligation to not lie to the court or to allow their client to lie to the court. This is why Murray knew he had to withdraw from the case when Bernardo was committed to the defence that he had never encountered the victims. To answer your title question, &quot;Is a lawyer allowed to follow instructions from his client to hide evidence?&quot;, the answer today is &quot;probably not.&quot; It has even been suggested that if defence counsel is faced with this issue, they should instruct their client: It is evidence that might convict you; if you give it to me, I may have to turn it over to the prosecution. Take it away and keep it in your residence; if you destroy it, you may be guilty of a crime. The Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Professional Conduct now say (Rule 5.1-2A): A lawyer shall not counsel or participate in the concealment, destruction or alteration of incriminating physical evidence or otherwise act so as to obstruct or attempt to obstruct the course of justice. Any lawyer faced with this dilemma should probably do what Mr. Murray eventually did and retain their own lawyer and/or get advice from their law society. 1. While the maxim &quot;ignorance of the law is no excuse&quot; generally holds true, the mens rea of this offence includes an intention to obstruct justice. The judge understood this to invite an inquiry into what Murray believed the law required of him. This approach has been criticized: see Lucinda Vandervort, &quot;Mistake of Law and Obstruction of Justice: A 'Bad Excuse'... Even for a Lawyer&quot;, 2001.