What is the intra-brief equivalent of judicial estoppel? Judicial estoppel prevents a party from arguing two opposite positions in separate proceedings. Is there a similar doctrine that applies to argumentation in the same brief? Or is this so basic as to just be “common sense”? Concrete example: There is a dispute over which of two separate arbitration agreements, with material differences, are applicable to a pending arbitration. Agreement A delegates threshold questions such as the &quot;applicability, existence, scope, or validity&quot; of the agreement to the arbitrator. Agreement B does not. One party goes to court and asks for a declaration that Agreement A is applicable to the arbitration and Agreement B is not, relying on the language of the agreements. But it seems there is a catch-22. If Agreement A is applicable, then the court has no authority to decide the request. But if Agreement B is applicable, then the court has authority to decide the request, but the request is necessarily moot.
Judicial estoppel prevents a party from arguing two opposite positions in separate proceedings. Is there a similar doctrine that applies to argumentation in the same brief? No. The general rule is that a party is permitted to argue inconsistent positions in the alternative within a brief. When a party does so without expressly saying so, it is assumed that they are arguing in the alternative unless the party clearly indicates otherwise (and is just being illogical). But the law in the context of arbitration is a special case that doesn't align perfectly with the general rule, and makes different distinctions sometimes. Under the substantive law of arbitration clause validity, sometimes a party can be forced to arbitrate even if there is a possibility that the underlying contract is unenforceable, with the arbitrator making that decision. But, a party cannot be forced to arbitrate in every case where the validity of the underlying alleged agreement is in doubt, simply because an agreement, on its face, contains or references an arbitration agreement. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, certain preliminary decisions are vested in the courts even if a written arbitration purports to provide otherwise, if a party choses to raise those issues. A dispute over which of two significantly different competing arbitration agreements applies to an issue between the parties could be such a circumstance. Thus, a term that provides that &quot;delegates threshold questions such as the 'applicability, existence, scope, or validity' of the agreement to the arbitrator,&quot; is partially void as a matter of public policy under the Federal Arbitration Act, although some of its retains its validity. For example, you can't delegate the question of the existence of an arbitration agreement to an arbitrator if that question is disputed, even if the contract says otherwise. In arbitration cases, there is a rather elaborate jurisprudence governing what issues are for a court to decided and what are for an arbitrator to decision when the right of a party to arbitrate, and/or the validity of the underlying contract, are disputed, that makes some very fine distinctions between different kinds of arguments. For example, if a party claims that he never had dealings with a party that presents an unsigned document that is a contract and also asserts that this party is bound to an arbitration agreement, that question can be decided by a court. But, if a party signed an agreement with a plain vanilla arbitration clause but claims it is unenforceable because it was induced by duress or undue influence, the arbitration will usually go forward with the arbitrator deciding the validity of the contract. When a decision is decided by a court, or by an arbitrator, is not easily summarized or manifestly obvious without a review of the relevant case law which is voluminous and intricate. See, e.g., Samson v. NAMA Holdings, LLC, 637 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2011); Santich v. VGG Holding Corp., 2019 CO 67 ¶ 6 (June 24, 2019); N.A. Rugby Union, LLC v. U.S. of Am. Rugby Football Union 2019 CO 59, ¶¶ 20-22, 442 P.3d 859, 863-864 (June 17, 2019);;;
It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.
(My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair &amp; Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof.
The company can't force you to settle out of court. But if it pays you what it says you owe it in an unconditional payment, it can cause your claim to fail on the merits at trial for a lack of damages. A company might want to do this to avoid the collateral estoppel consequences of a judicial determination of your liability. The doctrine of collateral estoppel would make judicial determinations on the merits on particular issues resolved in the case against it binding on the company in future lawsuits against other plaintiffs. A company cannot simply pay to defeat a claim on the merits, however, in a class action suit, without paying all of the amounts owed to all members of the proposed class. Some states also have procedural penalties such as costs or attorney fee shifting when a settlement offer is refused and the outcome at trial is not significantly better than the settlement offer, but I don't know if Florida has such a provision. If it did, your net win could easily be converted to a net loss.
India does not have a constitutional court, which is a term usually reserved for a court which has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions and is usually limited to deciding constitutional questions. India has a (mostly) unitary court system capped by the Supreme Court of India, but its jurisdiction is not limited to constitutional questions, and it is not the only court in India that can interpret and apply the Constitution of India. When a component of a decision decided by the Supreme Court of India is not necessary for resolution of the case before it, that portion of the decision is called dicta and is not binding precedent although it is still persuasive authority before lower courts as it is a good indication of how the Supreme Court of India would resolve a case in future litigation. The same distinction between portions of a ruling that are binding precedents and those that are mere dicta also applies in all other appellate courts in a common law legal system such as India's. Also, a portion of a court decision is not dicta merely because it is far reaching. A binding precedent can be broad or narrow in the deciding court's discretion. What makes &quot;dicta&quot; distinct is that it is literally &quot;off topic&quot; and not literally controlled by the potentially broad principles used to decide the case before the Court. What determines whether a part of the ruling is &quot;off topic&quot; is the exact scope of the issue that the court states that it is resolving. For example, if the Court states that it is resolving the question of &quot;due process in an admiralty case&quot; and remarks on due process in an ordinary non-admiralty case, the later remarks are dicta. But if the court states that it is resolving the question of &quot;due process in a legal proceeding&quot; then the same statement is not dicta.
Do newer contracts superceed prior ones? It depends on whether the contracts conflict with each other. That is why many contracts contain language akin to &quot;This contract supersedes and replaces any previous or contemporaneous agreements between the parties&quot;. The parties would need to adapt such clause if the contracts are compatible and they intend to maintain them. I have seen many contracts saying tgis &quot;this will happens unless agreed in writing to do something else&quot;.However many contracts do not have this in written. The main purpose of that language is to specify that any amendments to the contract shall be in writing. That precaution makes it easier to ascertain whose version of the contract is binding, such as where party A alleges an oral amendment and party B denies that such amendment was agreed upon. Your outline of the agreements between A and Z is incomplete. At the outset, the contracts are not necessarily incompatible: The first contract does not provide a deadline for payment; it is unclear when the 2nd contract will be in force; there is not enough information to discern whether the 2nd contract is an amendment of the 1st one, or an independent agreement involving unrelated considerations; there is no indication that the 2nd contract replaces and supersedes the 1st one; and if Z is the draftsman in both contracts, the doctrine of contra proferentem could favor A's legal position. Therefore, the matter of superseding contracts depends on various factors.
We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf
what responsibilities/liabilities does/will his company have given that it's in possession of my property? None. There is no contract (implicit or otherwise) between the owner and you. The owner receives no consideration from you in exchange for storing your goods, and an essential element of contracts is an exchange of considerations. Thus, he has no obligation to continue storing your goods. Another essential element in contract law is that the agreement --meaning the conditions thereof-- be entered knowingly and willfully. Since the time of making the arrangement and up to now, you were reasonably unaware of the likelihood of an obligation to pay the owner. This preempts the owner's right to start billing you. If anything, you would need to prove special circumstances to avail yourself of a viable claim of promissory estoppel. See Havens v. C &amp; D Plastics, Inc., 124 Wn.2d 158, 171-172 (1994): To obtain recovery in promissory estoppel, plaintiff must establish (1) [a] promise which (2) the promisor should reasonably expect to cause the promisee to change his position and (3) which does cause the promisee to change his position (4) justifiably relying upon the promise, in such a manner that (5) injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. However, the viability and duration of any relief pursuant to promissory estoppel seems very unlikely in the situation you describe. The hardship you are undergoing --and which prompted you to store your goods there-- is unfortunate. But generally speaking, a third party (such as the owner) who is unrelated to the causation or prolongation of that hardship cannot be lawfully forced to aid you for free.