If sexual consent is gained by deceit or misapprehension, is the resulting sex legally a rape? In Arthurian legend, the wizard Merlin magically disguises Uther Pendragon to look like his enemy Gorlois, enabling Uther to sleep with Gorlois' wife Lady Igraine; thus conceiving the child that would grow up to become King Arthur. From a legal perspective, would this act count as rape? (Looking for UK based answers, as the story is based in the UK, but happy to hear from other countries too). According to the Metropolitan Police, The legal definition of rape is when a person intentionally penetrates another's vagina, anus or mouth with a penis, without the other person's consent. They link to the &quot;Consent is Everything&quot; site, which states: Sexual consent is where a person has the ability and freedom to agree to sexual activity. Whilst Igraine freely agrees to sex, she is under the misapprehension that Uther is her husband; would that make her legally incapable of giving informed consent? In the legend, Uther is deliberately deceiving Igraine; but would the situation be different if there was no deception? One can imagine a situation where two identical twins were separated at birth. Twin A gets married, but whilst he is out of town Twin B happens to meet his wife, and they end up having sex. The wife believed she was sleeping with her husband; Twin B believed it was an innocent one night stand. Since the wife's consent was contingent on a misapprehension, was she unable to freely consent, and thus the act was a rape?
If sexual consent is gained by deceit or misapprehension, is the resulting sex legally a rape? england-and-wales YES The impersonation of Gorlois in this way under today's law would be considered as rape contrary to section 1 Sexual Offences Act 2003 (with person (A) being Uther Pendragon, and person (B) Lady Igraine): (1) A person (A) commits an offence if— (a) he intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another person (B) with his penis, (b) B does not consent to the penetration, and (c) A does not reasonably believe that B consents. (2) Whether a belief is reasonable is to be determined having regard to all the circumstances, including any steps A has taken to ascertain whether B consents. (3) Sections 751 and 76 apply to an offence under this section. (4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for life. Consent is defined at section 74 as: For the purposes of this Part2, a person consents if [s]he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice. section 76 provides a conclusive presumption that Lady Igraine did not consent and Uther did not reasonably believe that she consented: (1) If in proceedings for an offence to which this section applies it is proved that the defendant did the relevant act [i.e. rape] and that any of the circumstances specified in subsection (2) existed, it is to be conclusively presumed— (a) that the complainant did not consent to the relevant act, and (b) that the defendant did not believe that the complainant consented to the relevant act. (2) The circumstances are that— (a) the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the relevant act; (b) the defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to the relevant act by impersonating a person known personally to the complainant. 1section 75 refers to the use / threat of violence, incapacitation etc and does not seem applicable here according to the facts given. 2 &quot;this Part&quot; means Part 1 of the Act - i.e. sections 1 to 79
The question is definitely specific to a jurisdiction. I think this is legal in the jurisdiction you specify. Wikipedia shows incest in New York defined as: Persons known to be related to him or her, whether through marriage or not, as an ancestor, descendant, brother or sister of either the whole or the half blood, uncle, aunt, nephew or niece. I don't think "our children have married" means the couple is related "as brother and sister through marriage". In England and Wales, this would definitely be legal. Wikipedia lists the relationships that cannot marry, and co-parents-in-law are not on the list. (The table is probably out of date, in that the "for men" and "for women" column should almost certainly be merged.)
The Fifth Amendment protection relates to a repugnant act, that of forcing a person to testify against themselves, and it is not about ways of looking at &quot;information&quot;. The relevant (legally-ancient) distinction is between a general inquiry and an accusation. The courts have always had the power to make a general inquiry, but there have been limits on the ability of the courts to make accusations. It is a fundamental requirement of law that there must be an accuser, if there is to be a criminal proceeding. But is it also considered to be morally repugnant to force a person to accuse themselves. The difference lies not in the informational content in question, it is in what act – compelled self-accusation – is excluded from the legal system.
IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed.
This article1 directly addresses the question, "If a juvenile rapes an adult, does the adult thereby commit statutory rape?" It concludes: When an adult is raped by a juvenile, the offense of statutory rape imposes criminal liability on the adult for the same intercourse by which the adult is a victim of rape. In this way, the offense of statutory rape criminalizes being raped; it criminalizes being the victim of rape. It criminalizes the failure to prevent or resist being raped by a juvenile. And neither defenses specific to statutory rape nor defenses of general application satisfactorily preclude liability. 1. Christopher, Russell L. and Christopher, Kathryn H. (2012) "The Paradox of Statutory Rape," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 87: Iss. 2, Article 1.
canada You have tagged this 'criminal law', so I will stick to that, and avoid non-criminal anti-discrimination regimes. Criminal Code, s. 319 makes it an offence to wilfully incite or promote hatred against an identifiable group. It does not matter whether the person that is being communicated to is a member of the identifiable group (meaning &quot;any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin&quot;). What matters is a strict mens rea requirement that the communication was done with the intent of promoting or inciting hatred against such a group. If the accused holds such intent, it is no defence that they mistook the person they were communicating with as not being a member of such a group. See generally, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. Hypothetical laws If instead you are asking about what a hypothetical law could require (since you ask, &quot;If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism...&quot;), then as a matter of statutory interpretation, the law could be written in a way that makes the mistake you describe a defence or it could be written in a way that does not allow that defence. E.g. &quot;Any person who assaults another, knowing that the other person is X, commits an offence...&quot; This phrasing of the law clearly would require the accused to know that the person they have assaulted is in the category X in order for the assault to fall within this specific variant of assault. E.g. &quot;Any person who assaults a person that is X, regardless of whether they know the other person to be X, commits an offence...&quot; Under this phrasing of the law, knowledge of the status of the target of the assault clearly does not matter. However, Canadian law has constitutional minimum mens rea requirements for elements of crimes that bring risk of imprisonment. If the offence is punishable by imprisonment, then the variant that essentially removes the mens rea from the element relating to the target's status would be unconstitutional.
I will use Washington law to lay the landscape for a rape charge. First degree rape is sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion, either with kidnapping, (apparent) threat of a deadly weapon, beating the victim, or feloniously entering the building of vehicle where the victim is. This is not the case under discussion. What does potentially apply is second degree rape, which is sexual intercourse by other types of forcible compulsion, or (b) When the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, or various similar descriptions of diminished capacity (a developmental disability plus perpetrator supervisory authority, etc). Subparagraph (b) is crucial here, and we turn to the definitionL &quot;Mental incapacity&quot; is that condition existing at the time of the offense which prevents a person from understanding the nature or consequences of the act of sexual intercourse whether that condition is produced by illness, defect, the influence of a substance or from some other cause. Also to be clear on &quot;forcible compulsion&quot;, &quot;Forcible compulsion&quot; means physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped In the case of intercourse with an intoxicated person, the government must prove that the victim's condition prevented them from understanding the nature or consequences of intercourse. Now compare the law in Minnesota, otherwise analogous, but with a different definition of &quot;mentally incapacitated&quot; (subd. 7): &quot;Mentally incapacitated&quot; means: (1) that a person under the influence of alcohol, a narcotic, anesthetic, or any other substance, administered to that person without the person's agreement, lacks the judgment to give a reasoned consent to sexual contact or sexual penetration; or (2) that a person is under the influence of any substance or substances to a degree that renders them incapable of consenting or incapable of appreciating, understanding, or controlling the person's conduct. (italics indicate the differences of interest). The second clause in the Minnesota definition states the same idea as the Washington definition, but also adds &quot;inability to control&quot; as a form of incapacity. The first clause states a different standard of inability, lowered from &quot;incapable of deciding&quot; to &quot;lacking judgment&quot;, but only when the condition arises without the person's consent. The point here is that prosecution and conviction do not just depend on a generic and universal concept of &quot;consent&quot;, it very much depends on the exact words selected by the legislature in establishing these laws. Minnesota's legislature made one set of choices, Washington's made another. The Washington legislature made another choice when it came to intoxication: per RCW 9a.16.090, No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his or her condition, but whenever the actual existence of any particular mental state is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of his or her intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining such mental state. So an voluntarily drunk person cannot defend themselves saying &quot;I was drunk, I didn't know what I was doing&quot;, but intoxication can be relevant to the important question of &quot;knowledge&quot; as an element of culpability. This is a principle of law specifically set by the legislature. Prosecutors don't decide based on a hypothetical &quot;how drunk&quot; scale, instead they compare the facts with what the applicable law says. There is no &quot;knowingly&quot; requirement for prosecution for rape, therefore one cannot argue that because of intoxication the accused &quot;lacked knowledge&quot; of their act owing to intoxication. Being intoxicated according to the .08 driving standard does not (generally) render a person incapable of understanding &quot;intercourse&quot;.
I know of no cause of action related to &quot;misrepresentation of intellectual property&quot; (I believe it may be a phrase used colloquially in the context of academic integrity). If such a cause of action exists, I'll leave it to another answer to discuss. This answer approaches your question through the lens of copyright infringement and moral rights. A reproduction is an infringement if it substantially reproduces the original. Short quotes, properly attributed, will often be fair use, even if exactly reproduced. If an exact reproduction is not an infringement (e.g. because it copied too short a phrase) or if it is fair use, then a slightly altered reproduction a fortiori would also not be an infringement or would be fair use. In jurisdictions that recognize moral rights, there may be circumstances where an alteration, even to spelling, would be a violation of an author's moral rights. But to make out a violation of an author's moral rights based only on a spelling alteration, the spelling would have to be critical to the integrity of the work (e.g. perhaps the choice of dialect) and the alteration would have to be prejudicial to the author's honour or reputation.