Can a breach of privacy occur when surveilling a public space through which 3rd parties have no choice but to pass? In an article on doorbell cameras, it is noted that a breach of privacy was deemed to have occurred through the use of a video doorbell that recorded a neighbour &quot;every time she entered or exited her property&quot;. In the judgment (Fairhurst v Woodard), point 135 mentions ... the Claimant's right to privacy in her own home, to leave from and return to her house and entertain visitors without her video personal data being captured In this case, it seems that the camera in question was pointing at the neighbour's property. However, I'm curious about where this right &quot;to leave from and return to her house&quot; comes from, and how broadly it might be construed. The scenario N.B. This is not the scenario in the aforementioned case. If a camera is pointed out into a public street on a cul-de-sac, and the field of view covers a line right across the road, so that anybody living at the end of the cul-de-sac has no option but to pass through it when leaving or returning, would that infringe on the same right? Is that right likely to outweigh the right of the camera owner to make recordings for the legitimate purpose of protecting their property? The scenario, illustrated The owner of the yellow house has installed the camera. The blue waves show the camera's field of view, covering the whole street. The owner of the green house can only reach the main road by passing through the camera's field of view. The only reasonable way for them not to be recorded, is for them to stay confined to their home (or at least, to the end of the street). Are the rights of the owner of the green house being infringed?
Yes, that might be a violation of data protection law such as the DPA 2018 / UKGDPR, but not necessarily so. It depends on the details, for example on the purpose this camera serves. Background on Fairhurst v Woodard and on legitimate interests Fairhurst v Woodard is a significant case discussing implications of use of video surveillance outside of a commercial context, but it is a complex case due to the multitude of cameras involved and due to the somewhat unrelated privacy and harassment issues. Point 135 is about the Driveway Camera, which only surveilled public property and the claimant's property, but did not view any part of the defendants property. People are free to surveil their own property, and would then be covered by the UKGDPR household exception. But for surveillance outside of their own property, defendant would have to comply with the DPA 2018 and the UKGDPR, for which defendant would have needed a legal basis. The defendant argued that they had a legitimate interest (Art 6(1)(f) UKGDPR): 134. […] The Defendant submits that all his data collection and processing was necessary for the purposes of crime prevention at his property and in the car park However, a legitimate interest always require as balancing test. The legitimate interest can be “overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject” (Art 6(1)(f) UKGDPR). It is not necessary here that these interests, rights, and freedoms are explicitly enumerated in statutory law. Here, a right is claimed without supporting legal basis: 134. […] Claimant submits that her right to privacy in and around her home overrides that purpose. However, a possible basis for this claim would be Art 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is part of UK constitutional law: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” The court balances these rights and interests very differently for the different cameras. The Ring Doorbell is mainly focused on people who would ring the defendant's doorbell, and only incidentally captures passer-bys. Here, the legitimate interest was found to be valid. On the other hand, the Driveway Camera was mostly trained on claimant's property. Here, claimant's interests, rights, and freedoms override the claimed legitimate interests. Your scenario If the camera records the people living in the Green House when they go to or from their property, then yes, it seems like their rights would be affected. But in your scenario, the context of the camera is not clear: Why was it installed? If the purpose is crime prevention, is there evidence of such crimes in the neighbourhood, or are the cameras intended to counter a speculative threat? What is its field of view? Is it mainly trained on the Yellow House's doorstep and only captures the street as a background, or does it focus on the street? Is the camera's field of view masked off as far as possible to exclude public spaces? Does the camera record continuously, or is it only activated for certain events like when a doorbell is rung or when someone enters the Yellow House property? Does the camera also record audio? All of this is important because it factors into a legitimate interest balancing test. Maybe the Yellow House camera is more like the Ring Doorbell in the above case where the incidental capture of passer-bys was found to be acceptable, maybe it is more like the Driveway Camera that served no legitimate interest. There is no absolute right to be free of all surveillance. Instead, the interests and rights of the Green and Yellow house residents must be balanced appropriately. Where there is surveillance, it must be limited to what is necessary.
With respect to 4th Amendment protections, which guard against unreasonable searches, Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 held that "A warrantless entry is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not". Cat burglar consent may be reasonable, depending on the circumstances, as could guest consent. The difference between the two is that with the cat burglar, you (as owner) can't overcome the reasonableness of the police assuming that the owner gives consent since you're not there, but with the party guest consenting, you can contradict the impression of control that the guest gave, and you can deny consent (if you are there and can contradict the guest). Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 addresses that point: "a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry renders warrantless entry and search unreasonable and invalid as to him". As far as I can tell, there is no specific obligation for police to verify that the person ostensibly consenting is authorized. They don't have to ask, and they don't have to independently verify implications (e.g. if the third party says 'our apartment', they don't have to ask 'does that mean that you live here?'). A third party could say something that would make the "occupant" assumption unreasonable.
A tenant has a right to "live in a property that’s safe and in a good state of repair". There are additional regulations possibly applicable in your situation if this is a "house in multiple occupation", summarized here. "Hazards" are explained here. However, these rules pertain to the condition of the building, not other tenants (except that "overcrowding" is also a hazard). They also say you should "report anti-social behaviour to your local council". It is legal to rent a room in the UK to a person convicted of a violent crime, so it would also be legal to rent a room to a person who hasn't committed a crime (assuming he is legally in the UK). If the person did not engage in actual anti-social behavior towards you, there is nothing to report to the local council. The landlord has no affirmative duty to disclose such a fact, and it might be illegal to do so under the Data Protection Act, since this is "sensitive personal data".
According to this article, the Malmö Administrative District Court found that the intent of the user is immaterial to whether a camera is being used for surveillance, so even if that is not why you are doing this, it counts legally as "surveillance". The law requires a permit from the länsstyrelse (county? government), according to the Kameraövervakningslag (2013:460) (article 8 states the requirement for permit, art. 16 tells you who to apply to). I believe that a tennis court would be considered a "public place", even if privately owned. Art. 17 tells you what goes into an application (there is probably a form), and art. 18 says that the kommun gets to weigh in. Presumably it would be critical to have a consent form signed before any recording happens, and you would include that in the application.
This would probably constitute illegal wiretapping and would certainly constitute a 4th Amendment search if conducted by law enforcement. Normally, the definition of whether something is "public" for purposes of an expectation of privacy is whether it could be detected by a human being unaided by technological enhancements from a place where someone could lawfully be to make that kind of observation. Some of the relevant cases are Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. (1967) (tape recorder outside a public telephone booth was a search violating the expectation of privacy) and U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. (1984) (tracking device placed in barrel by authorities violated expectation of privacy). RFID signals are not "public" even if they are not encrypted with a private code because a device, such as the ones identified in the question, is necessary to receive them. The Wiretap Act, codified by 18 U.S. Code § 2511, is a federal law aimed at protecting privacy in communications with other persons. Typically, when you think of a "wiretap," the first thing that comes to mind is someone listening to your telephone calls. But the Act protects more than that. Under the Act, it is illegal to: intentionally or purposefully intercept, disclose, or use the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication through the use of a "device." The Act provides criminal and civil penalties for violations, although it creates various exceptions to when interceptions and disclosures are illegal. From here. In this circumstance, despite being passive, one is intentionally intercepting the contents of electronic communications through the use of a device. The fact that there was not in all cases an intent to communicate through, for example, an RFID chip, on a specific occasion probably does not suffice to render it not a communication.
Yes, you can use it as evidence Canada clearly requires what is called a one-party consent for recordings. Section 184(1) of the criminal code makes it a crime to &quot;knowingly intercept a private communication.&quot; However, Section 184(2)(a), the &quot;Saving Provision,&quot; says the prohibition &quot;does not apply to&quot;: (a) a person who has the consent to intercept...of the originator of the private communication or of the person intended by the originator thereof to receive it.&quot; Because you: a) either originated the conversation or were the person your landlord intended to talk to; and b) gave your consent by making the recording; therefore, c) you are covered by this clause. For more details, you can read nice summaries by lawyers here and here.
No, one cannot safely assume that because some people have done a thing without being sued, that it is OK to do a similar thing and no suit is possible. It is possible that people who upload a video, or a section of it, have permission. It is perhaps more likely that the copyright owner does not choose to sue, for whatever reason. But a different owner of a different video might make a different choice. Uploading a video, or even a section of a video, without permission, will be copyright infringement, unless an exception to copyright such as fair use or fair dealing applies. Such an infringement gives the copyright owner valid grounds to bring a suit. But the owner can choose whether or not to sue. An owner can sue in one case of infringement but not in another, for any reason or none. If the expected damages are small, it many not be worth the time, trouble, and costs to sue. In the US, one must register a copyright before bringing suit for infringement of that copyright, and there is a fee for registration. Some owners feel strongly about the use of their work, and will sue on any pretext. Some may prefer to tacitly support uses that they approve of by not bringing suit. One cannot tell the attitude of a particular owner unless that owner has stated what his or her view is. Short films are just as protected as full-length feature films, and suit can be filed for infringing the copyright on a short film. But the more expensive a film was to make, and the more money the owner expects it to earn, the more likely it is that the owner will choose to sue. Many people infringe by uploading short films or videos, gambling that the copyright owners will never learn of this, or will not trouble to sue. Sometimes such infringers are correct, and sometimes they get sued. I do not understand what the OP means by the part of the question that reads &quot;There should be more detail and complex lines over here&quot; What additional detail is wanted? Who does the OP expect to provide it? What sort of &quot;lines&quot; does this refer to?
A reasonably analogous case is State v. Kipp, 179 Wn.2d 718. The court held that a secret recording was illegal, and the recording was of a face to face recording, using a cassette recorder. The court provides an analysis of the meaning of "private" under RCW 9.73.030, and concludes that "A communication is private (1) when parties manifest a subjective intention that it be private and (2) where that expectation is reasonable" (with appropriate in-state citations). They say that Factors bearing on the reasonableness of the privacy expectation include the duration and subject matter of the communication, the location of the communication and the presence or potential presence of third parties, and the role of the nonconsenting party and his or her relationship to the consenting party. Ultimately, the intent or reasonable expectations of the participants as manifested by the facts and circumstances of each case controls as to whether a conversation is private but in this case, Kipp manifested a subjective intention that the conversation be private. We have found subjective intent that a conversation be private even though the party does not explicitly state such an intention The court in fact rejects the state's contention that a person who confesses to child molestation should expect this information to be reported to the authorities, and therefore it is unreasonable to expect the conversation to remain private and the court reaffirms that the subject matter of the conversation in this case was not one that is normally intended to be public, demonstrating Kipp's reasonable expectation of privacy.