Is my employer allowed to make me work without pay? As the title says: A coworker and I had recently made a mistake at work. In response to this, our manager decides we have to work for two extra hours on our next shifts unpaid. Is this legal? I work in the State of Georgia in the US, by the way.
This is illegal, under the Fair Labor Standards Act, assuming you are not an &quot;exempt&quot; employee, which is primarily a salaried employee (your pay isn't based on how many hours you work). There are details about the complaint process here. It is useful to know that retaliation against an employee filing a legal complaint is also illegal.
It depends on the nature of the strike. If a strike is &quot;protected&quot; (allowed under the NLRA), you cannot be fired but if the strike is illegal, you can be. If the strike is legal and was at least in part over an unfair labor practice, you must be immediately reinstated after the strike ends. If the strike is over economic issues, you might have been replaced with a permanent employee so you are placed on a preferential hiring list. However this right to reinstatement can be lost if you engage in serious misconduct in connection with the strike or picketing.
You can be fired in Canada for criticizing the employer, or even complaining about the weather. There is a distinction between Termination Without Cause and Termination With Cause. In the latter case, which requires a serious reason related to the employee's conduct, you can be fired without advance notice and with no severance pay. If the employees actions are fundamentally inconsistent with their obligation to the employer or are substantially prejudicial to the business in a way that damages employer's business or reputation, they may be terminated with cause. Examples of cause would include insubordination, theft, or abusing customers. If you want to fire a person without cause (and assuming that this is an indefinite employment contract as opposed to a fixed-term contract), you have to give "reasonable notice". There is a statutory minimum, but the courts usually apply a higher common law standard which means that you need to hire a labor lawyer to know what that period is, though 24 months is apparently a relatively safe figure (not always safe). The factors entering into that decision are described here (kind of job, length of service, age, availability of similar jobs; plus, how the termination was handled). You may also owe severance or termination pay, related to length of service and wages. Here is a calculator for Ontario. This article covers some instances in Québec where social media criticism did result in successful suspension, indicating that the employee's duty of loyalty is not entirely null when it comes to social media. In the BC case of Kim v. ITU, the court found that the dismissal over social media posts critical of the company was not for cause. However, part of the company's failure in this case was that they failed to respond immediately to what they saw as inappropriate behavior (boorish Twitter behavior). Assuming that the statements made are accurate and expressed respectfully, the prospects for Termination With Cause are significantly diminished. The prospects for some disciplinary action (suspension for a period of time) remains high -- multiple terminations were modified to long suspensions.
Yes If you look at the law pertaining to the work week and opting out of the maximum, which is also in The Working Time Regulations 1998 (with my emphasis in bold): 4.—(1) Subject to regulation 5, a worker’s working time, including overtime, in any reference period which is applicable in his case shall not exceed an average of 48 hours for each seven days. ... (3) Subject to paragraphs (4) and (5) and any agreement under regulation 23(b), the reference periods which apply in the case of a worker are ... So if we go to 23(b): A collective agreement or a workforce agreement may— (a)modify or exclude the application of regulations 6(1) to (3) and (7), 10(1), 11(1) and (2) and 12(1), and (b)for objective or technical reasons or reasons concerning the organization of work, modify the application of regulation 4(3) and (4) by the substitution, for each reference to 17 weeks, of a different period, being a period not exceeding 52 weeks, in relation to particular workers or groups of workers.
Virginia employer terminated employee and wants signing bonus returned Can the employer legally keep his last check and send the employee a bill for the remainder ? No, unless (1) the employee resigned and (2) his resignation does not amount to constructive termination. The employer may withhold the remaining $7,000 only if the employee did not meet the condition of "30 days of employment with xxxxx". Absent any language to the contrary, the requirement of "1-year commitment" is to be construed as the consideration expected from the employee (namely, "not to quit") in exchange for the bonus. Termination by the employer is self-defeating in the sense the employer himself made it impossible for the employee to fulfill the consideration that was expected from the employee. Therefore, the employer forfeits his entitlement to reimbursement. In the event that the employee met the condition of "30 days of employment with xxxxx", he would be entitled to the remaining $7,000 as well. Virginia labor law has no provision for treble damages (this is in response to one of the comments, per the OP's suggestion). The statutory provisions are only a civil penalty no greater than $1,000 for each violation, a portion of attorney's fees, and "all wages due, plus interest at an annual rate of eight percent". See Code of Virginia at § 40.1-29 A.2, F, and G. Item E of that statute determines which violations are misdemeanors and which are felonies. This statute would be applicable only if (1) the employer disavows the employee's entitlement to the remaining $7,000, and/or (2) the employer withholds a portion of the employee's earned compensation in an attempt to recover the initial payment of $3,000.
Can an employer apply one-off pay cuts via forced contributions? No. This type of issues pertains to state law, and many (if not all) jurisdictions in the U.S. have statutes prohibiting forced deductions that are neither ordered by court, nor pursuant to bargaining agreements, nor as required or expressly permitted by law. See, for instance, MCL 408.477 and .478. The case of the CEO's book sounds in clear violation of MCL 408.477(2) since the user who asked on Workplace SE mentions that the employees did not consent to that deduction. Even if an employee consents to the deduction, it is important to discern between (1) his altruistic consent, and (2) his concession for the sake of continuation of employment. Unless the consent is altruistic, the clause(s) allowing for the deduction might be rendered null and enforceable by virtue of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 178(1) in relation to the aforementioned statutes. Any form of deductions as a permissible sanction (as fining when the employee gets late to work) would have to be provided in the agreement between employer and employee. Otherwise it is unlawful.
If the employment was at will, the most the company could have done was fire her. If the employment has already been ended on good terms, the most the company can do is refuse to rehire her and/or give bad references. As you point out, no contract existed and they'd have a devil of a time proving damages anyway.
Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.&lt;1&gt; While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.&lt;2&gt; Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of &quot;the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights&quot; that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a &quot;novation&quot; of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured&lt;3&gt;), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes &lt;1&gt; At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. &lt;2&gt; The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. &lt;3&gt; The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation.