Can a state impose additional qualifications for Presidential candidates wishing to appear on the ballot? Suppose, for example, that Colorado wants to pass a law that bars convicted criminals from appearing on the Presidential ballot (so Colorado voters can't vote for a Presidential candidate who is convicted of a crime) Would the Presidential Qualifications Clause of the US constitution prohibit Colorado from passing this law?
It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional &quot;qualification&quot; on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow &quot;register&quot; as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean &quot;anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born&quot;. The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree.
The US legal code regarding threatening a president is 18 U.S. Code § 871 - Threats against President and successors to the Presidency. The first clause defines how threatening the president is illegal. The second clause starts off by defining "President-elect": The terms “President-elect” and “Vice President-elect” as used in this section shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the offices of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained from the results of the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2. So the key here is that they are the "the apparent successful candidates […] as ascertained from the results of the general elections." It doesn't define this phrase though, especially the word "apparent". It appears that the prosecutors in the case mentioned in the question are arguing that Donald Trump became the apparent President-elect when, after Election Day, voting results began coming in and he was projected to win 270 electoral votes. Given the amount of stock that most Americans seem to put into the media's coverage of who wins the election (and the fact that the person in question seems to have assumed he would be president), that's unlikely to be contested.
The Indiana constitution is phrased differently to the US constitution in such a way to exclude pre-emptive pardons: (Indiana) The Governor may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases of impeachment (US constitution) he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. (my emphasis) The Indiana constitution explicitly states that the Governor may grant pardons after conviction and does not give the Governor the power to grant pardons before conviction. By contrast, the Supreme court has judged that the President may issue pardons after commission, that is after the offence has been committed, and potentially before the arrest, trial, conviction or punishment. They can't issue pardons for crimes not yet committed. The scope of pardons issued by the Governor is limited; this power is subject to regulation by law issued by the Legislature, and (if there is no regulation giving sole power of pardon to the president) the Legislature may form a council to review pardons. The council's advice and consent must be sought. In fact, the Legislature appoints the Parole Board to this role. So the Parole Board gives advice and consent to pardons issued by the Governor. In practice, therefore, the Parole Board makes these decisions, as Governors rarely refuse pardons recommended by the Board. Generally, though, pardons are rare, Mike Pence granted only three during his tenure as Governor. References: Constituion of Indiana Guide to pardons in Indiana
Article III, Section 2 of The Constitution requires that The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed Since the Idaho portion of Yellowstone is part of the state of Idaho and is not part of a non-state, ergo the trial shall be held in Idaho, according to The Constitution. One jurisdictional statute, 16 USC 24, says The Yellowstone National Park, as its boundaries now are defined, or as they may be hereafter defined or extended, shall be under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. All the laws applicable to places under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, shall have force and effect in said park. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to forbid the service in the park of any civil or criminal process of any court having jurisdiction in the States of Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. All fugitives from justice taking refuge in said park shall be subject to the same laws as refugees from justice found in the State of Wyoming. So the crime would be a federal matter. I put emphasis on a sentence that doesn't have a straightforward interpretation. There is another jurisdictional statute 28 USC 131, the problematic one, which states: Wyoming and those portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in Montana and Idaho constitute one judicial district. Court shall be held at Casper, Cheyenne, Evanston, Lander, Jackson, and Sheridan. Therefore, the crime must be tried in Wyoming. Moreover, the judicial district of Wyoming also includes that unoccupied portion of the park in Idaho. This statute conflicts with Article III, Section 2, which requires court to be held in Idaho. Since The Constitution has precedence over federal statutes, the instruction to hold court in Wyoming is unconstitutional. The 6th Amendment does not pose a particular problem, with its requirement that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law since the jury could be of Idahoans, and transported to Wyoming – the 6th addresses the nature of the jury, not the location of the trial. It is an open question what the 6th Amendment refers to in talking of "state and district", since district is not defined at a constitutional level. The only district with constitutional stature is the District of Columbia, which is not a state, and therefore there could be no "state and district" if we mean "district, as specifically mentioned in The Constitution". The Judiciciary Act of 1789 first created federal judiciary districts, signed by Washington on September 24, 1789, and the 6th Amendment was passed by Congress the next day. It is reasonable to assume that this is what they meant by "district". 28 USC 131 does say that all of Wyoming plus a sliver of Idaho are a judicial district, so one could have a jury composed of citizens of Wyoming which satisfies the "jury of the district" requirement, but that would not satisfy the "jury of the state" requirement. If anyone lived in that area, those people could constitute a "jury of the state and district", but you would still have a clash between the statutory and constitutional requirements for venue.
The US Constitution doesn't say one way or the other how a state's representatives are to be chosen, so until this law was passed in 1841, a state could have all of their representatives elected at-large, without districts. It is only recently that SCOTUS has gotten involved in redistricting questions: here is a summary of leading redistricting rulings. A recurring theme in these rulings has been the Equal Protection Clause, where certain redistricting plans (or non-plans) were found to violate that clause (especially ordering a state to redistrict when it refused to do so with the result being that population changes diluted the vote of those living in certain districts). Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 held that The constitutional requirement in Art. I, § 2,that Representatives be chosen &quot;by the People of the several States&quot; means that, as nearly as is practicable, one person's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's thus redistricting is a justiciable question, answerable with respect to the federal government's need to enforce the 14th Amendment. It is not necessary to amend the Constitution further to specify a means of enforcing that clause.
From Roberts' dissenting opinion: Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition. (The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.) In my opinion, this quote speaks as much to the second question as the first. Assume (hypothetically) for a moment that question one was not at issue. If a state defined marriage as only between opposite sexes, and the right to make a state change its definition of marriage is not in the Supreme Court's purview (in our hypo), then the state is as free to reject the validity of marriages abhorrent to its laws, performed elsewhere, as it is to deny the right to marry under its theory of marriage.
No. The Pardon Clause only extends the power to pardon &quot;offenses against the United States,&quot; which essentially means that the president can only issue a pardon in a federal criminal case. A contract claim is civil rather than criminal, and governed by state law rather than federal, so the Pardon Clause would not affect the president's liability.
The ICERD would not apply to the natural born citizens clause by its own definitions. Part 1, Article 1, secs 2 and 3 read: This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.