Can the board of a company gamble on bitcoins without the consent of the shareholders? Can the board of a company invest in bitcoins without the consent of the shareholders? Is it allowed in privately owned companies as well as publically traded companies and in what situations can the shareholders sue the company for it? I see people suing company for losing money in stocks, so I am wondering if it applies here. Assume the country is the United States.
A privately held company can generally pursue any lawful business activity unless it has led its private investors to believe otherwise with its representations. A publicly held company (i.e. one with shares or bonds traded on a securities exchange, or otherwise marketed to the general public, or having more than 500 investors and more than a certain amount of capital), must essentially disclose to its investors all foreseeable material risks associated with the investment, including the risk of losses in cryptocurrency if it makes material investments in it. Shareholder consent wouldn't be required, but disclosure of this potential investment activity to shareholders (allowing shareholders who are displeased to sell shares in the company to avoid the risk) is required in publicly held companies.
The primary distinction between gambling and non-gambling is whether something is a game of chance, and usually, the statutes of a state prohibiting gambling will expressly define it in those terms. The mere fact that there is some element of chance or probability involved, however, is not sufficient to make something gambling, and the fact that there is some skill involved in a game does not automatically prevent it from being gambling. Generally speaking, if the activity serves some commercial or economically useful purpose, like an insurance contract entered into by someone with an insurable interest in the outcome, or a contract regarding a security or commodity price, it will not be treated as gambling under U.S. law (Britain and Ireland draw the line differently). The status of prediction markets is still unresolved, but since many of them call upon the application of skill and knowledge, rather than random chance, to make predictions, and since their use, for example, by the CIA, has given them an air of legitimacy, more often than not, they are not treated as gambling. Binary options are regulated in the United States by the CFTC and gambling is regulated by each U.S. state individually. This isn't entirely true. But it does appear that the CFTC asserted jurisdiction over this particular prediction market type activity, and did not consider it to be gambling subject to state law regulation. Also, there is some federal regulation of gambling even though it is primarily a matter of state law. Indeed, this ruling was quite helpful in the long run to the prediction market industry. The case held that Polygon.com was subject to CFTC jurisdiction, which would take it out of state law gambling jurisdiction and it provided a road map to come into regulatory compliance: The platform offered off-exchange event-based binary options contracts and failed to obtain designation as a designated contract market (DCM) or registration as a swap execution facility (SEF). All it has to do is register with the CFTC as a DCM or SEF and it is in regulatory compliance (these aren't trivial undertakings and could require months of interactions with the agency and $100,000+ of legal work to accomplish, but there is a clear path to doing so). does it mean that if a company creates a question (Yes/No) on financial assets (like an option traded on an exchange) will be considered as a binary option regulated by the CFTC while a non-related financial question is considered as gambling? No. The case held that the questions, for example, about who would win the next Presidential election, constituted a &quot;swap&quot; regulated by the CFTC and not gambling. It simply said that since the CFTC has jurisdiction and since Polygon.com had not complied with CFTC rules for conducting that activity, that it had violated the law.
Directors don’t own companies - they manage them Shareholders own companies. So, if you are a director and die, the legal upshot is you are no longer a director and the company may need to replace you in accordance with its rules. If you are a shareholder, then, subject to any other contracts like a option for the company or other shareholders to buy the shares of a deceased shareholder, the shares will be distributed in accordance with your will or the laws of intestate succession if you don’t have a will. Whoever owns the shares with have the same rights as you did.
Companies have a registry of their shareholders. Anyone with at least one share registered in their name is a shareholder of record. However, the vast majority of people who consider themselves &quot;shareholders&quot; aren't actually registered owners of a stock. Instead, almost all public stock in the US is held &quot;in street name.&quot; That means that the stock is formally held in the name of a brokerage. What an individual has is &quot;beneficial ownership:&quot; the brokerage passes dividends on to the beneficial owner, will vote how the beneficial owner tells it to vote, and requires agreement from the beneficial owner before it can sell the stock. To make stuff even more complicated, the broker itself generally holds the stock in street name. Almost all public stock in the US is really owned by the Depository Trust Corporation in the name of Cede and Company (a general partnership of a few DTC officers). The reason public stock is mostly held in street name is efficiency. Transferring the legal owner of a piece of stock is a nontrivial process; until recently, it involved physically shipping stock certificates to the new owner. Even now that stock ownership can typically be transferred electronically, it's much easier to tell Cede &amp; Co. &quot;the new beneficial owner is this person.&quot; Because beneficial ownership is just a contract, you can skip all the formalities of updating the company's official register of shareholders.
No LLC or corporate entity exists around or in relation to SoftDAO. That's a bad thing, not a good thing, to those involved. Mr. Founder is obviously liable. When he wrote the DAO, he intended that it compete with IncumbentCo, and thus almost certainly intended that the software would violate the patent. And it doesn't matter that he's not the majority owner - he's still a part owner, meaning he's profiting from the infringement. Furthermore, he promoted the scheme, and according to 35 U.S. Code § 271(b), "Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." Mr. Large, and any other identifiable part owner, is liable. Mr. Large did not commit a crime himself and generally is a good citizen. Good for him. But lots of people get sued that never committed a crime. Suing Mr. Large is like suing an Enron shareholder for owning Enron shares. Typically we do not sue shareholders. But he isn't a shareholder, and that's critical. If you want the benefits of a publicly traded company, you need to actually make a publicly traded company. Mr. Large is being unfairly targeted simply because he is a public figure with association with the project due to the Fortune Magazine article. Yes, he's being sued because of the article, but so what? It's like saying the police unfairly targeted you for an underage drinking citation because you were dumb enough to post yourself on Facebook. That argument won't fly in court. IncumbentCo can pick who they want to sue. It is nearly impossible to prove that Mr. Large is the 30th largest owner of SoftCoin. Court warrant allowed the Court to find some of Mr. Large's public keys on the SoftCoin blockchain, but the blockchain says he is actually only the 100th largest owner now. It doesn't matter. He's a part owner, by his own admission and by the blockchain evidence. The developers are also liable, also potentially for the whole amount. They created software that infringed a valid patent, and profited from it. If they can't shut it down, they can't shut it down, but they're going to be paying. I'm thinking this is a case where joint and several liability applies; IncumbentCo can go after any particular one of the owners and developers for the entire amount if they feel like it, and then it would be up to that person to then sue anyone else he thinks is partially liable. If Mr. Large is a billionaire and could pay the entire judgement himself, they might just do that. They'd probably go after Mr. Founder for as much as they thought they could get out of him, though. The users are also liable, since the law provides that using a patented invention without authority is infringing. But they're only liable for their one copy, and IncumbentCo may not bother with them, at least initially. However, the SoftDAO owns no assets No, but IncumbentCo is going to seek injunctions against selling SoftCoins or running the software. Could some people slip through the cracks? Sure. People infringe copyright all the time online, and only some get caught. You could easily imagine someone selling pirated software in exchange for cryptocurrency. This would be little different.
Article 1 Section 8 appears to answer your question - only the Federal Government has the power to regulate the value of currency. Unilaterally forbidding the use of pennies as currency would be a regulation of their value (from 1 cent to 0 cents). A state government might be allowed to refuse pennies for the purpose of paying for a service in advance like a private business can, but like a private business are required to accept them as legal tender for the purpose of repaying debts, judgements, etc. Responding to the edited post, I'm inclined to say that the proposed plan is still "regulating" currency, in the same way that only the Federal government is the only entity authorized to destroy worn out currency (which it obtains by fair exchange). As Nate Eldredge points out, this may also violate the Commerce Clause of the same section, both in terms of interstate transactions and in terms of the exchange of currency between persons of different states and the implementing state. However, if it was implemented as suggested in comments, where businesses were required to exchange whatever pennies they receive with the state government for an equal amount of other currency, it might not run afoul of either of these clauses. This is probably a question the Supreme Court would have to decide, since a lot of hypothetical factors could come into play. At first glance, there doesn't appear to be any factual difference between a state holding pennies in storage indefinitely and the state holding any other currency in storage indefinitely, which they are allowed to do so long as they don't violate any part of USC Title 18, Chapter 17 (e.g., melt the pennies for the copper). On the other hand, the Federal Government could argue that the storage of pennies for the purpose of removing them from circulation is a form of currency regulation even if the action would otherwise be legal, or that the state's actions are impactful enough to affect interstate commerce even though they only directly impact commerce in the state and therefore Congress could pass a law outlawing the practice.
No Restrictions on Trading. I understand that Robinhood may, in its discretion, prohibit or restrict the trading of securities, or the substitution of securities, in any of My Accounts. Doing this is explicitly permitted by the contract.
There are two different kinds of transactions that are implicated by your question. The first is a stock stock split. This simply turns 1 share into X shares and trades out existing shares for new shares. This has no economic effect and is simply done for the convenience of trading shares for prices that are easy to work work on a practical basis, for example, in software listing stock prices. The second is an initial public offering, which, confusingly, means not just the first time that newly issued stock is sold to the public by the issuer, but any time that newly issued stock is sold to the public by the issuer. The possibility of dilution is real in this situation. Abuse of that possibility is primarily managed through the fact that the Board of Directors whose approval is required to issue new stock and sell it to the public, have a fiduciary duty to the company to sell the new stock at a price commensurate with the fair market value of the currently outstanding stock. If the Board of Directors breaches that fiduciary duty to the company, then shareholders may bring what is called a derivative action to enforce the duty that the Board of Directors breached to the company. Lawsuits of this kind make up a significant share of the total volume of cases in the Delaware Chancery Court, a state court in the U.S. state of Delaware where most large publicly held companies are organized. These cases are also often litigated in the state courts of New York State and of California, both of which are also popular states for publicly held companies to be incorporated in. Also, keep in mind that the Board of Directors is elected by the existing shareholders, and while most publicly held companies have &quot;Soviet style ballots&quot; in director elections from a pre-set slate of candidates, a proxy fight to run a competing slate of candidates is allowed is existing shareholders are unhappy with their performance. Normally, as a matter of practical reality, the Board of Directors is quite responsive to coalitions of shareholders with substantial holdings who care about the value of their shares as opposed to political issues only tangentially related to the company. A Board of Directors is usually aligned with the interests of the existing shareholders and doesn't have an incentive to screw them over by diluting the value of their shares. People who don't like how a Board is running a publicly held company usually sell their shares and invest in some other company instead, rather than risk being diluted. SEC approval and approval from state securities regulators is also required for an initial public offering (including a subsequent offering of new shares by a public company) but that approval requires only full disclosure of the transaction and the company's financial situation, and cannot be denied on the basis that the transaction is unfair to existing or to new shareholders on account of the price of the offer. It is allowed because the whole purpose of a publicly held company is to raise capital to engage in business activities. When a publicly held company needs more money to do something it has several choices: An initial public offering of corporate bonds. An initial public offering of new stock. A private loan from a bank or affluent individual. Options 1 and 3 increase the debt to equity ratio of the company and increase the company's risk of default on existing loans, while imposing a minimum cashflow requirement that it may not be able to fulfill in the event of a short term economic disruption (like the current pandemic). In the case of a very big investment, there may simply be no lender who has the capacity to lend enough money privately. Option 2 makes the company more creditworthy and can be economically desirable to existing shareholders is the shares are sold at a price that makes it a cheaper source of capital than borrowing money at the interest rates currently available to the company. If the capital raised makes possible an investment that increases profits for the company by a greater percentage than the existing shareholder's interests are diluted, it is a good deal for existing shareholders.