Does congress exempting themselves violate Article 1 Section 9(8) of the Constitution? Article 1 section 9 part 8 says: No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State. I would argue, logically, that when congress exempts itself from laws and taxes that all other citizens and legal residents of the US are required to comply with, based solely on their position of authority in the government this is a defacto title of nobility. The problem that the founders sought to counter with the prohibition on granting titles of nobility was not the honorific, but rather the special rights and benefits that would be conferred to those people that set them apart from, and make them above the laws that every one else is required to follow. Can a valid arguement be made in court that is in fact a violation of the Constitutional ban on awarding titles of nobility? Has this ever been tried before?
Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.
No &quot;No taxation without representation!&quot; was a slogan of the US war of independence, but it was never put into the Constitution. Indeed, the residents of the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico now pay Federal income tax, but are not represented in the Congress that sets the taxes. National debt has some of the same economic effects of a tax, but it is not a tax in form nor in constitutional law. Constitutional limits on tax legislation (such as the rule against unapportioned direct taxes) do not apply to congressional borrowing. &quot;Representation&quot;, in the sense you mean, has never been applied to representatives of future generations, or even of people not yet of voting age. Was the idea of pushing debt onto future generations so unthinkable that it is a constitutional blind spot? Quite the reverse. Borrowing was initiated quite early, while many of the framers were still in government. In several places in the Federalist Papers, Hamilton emphasized the need for an unlimited power to tax, for, among other purposes, paying any national debts, and made it clear that such debts would be incurred, from time to time. See particularly Nos 30 and 41. In The Federalist No 30 Hamilton wrote: In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who would lend to a government that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited in their extent as burdensome in their conditions. This is part of a longer argument to the effect that a lack of power by the Federal Government to levy individual taxes would be disastrous. Here Hamilton certainly seems to contemplate the Federal government borrowing in case of war or other emergency, and repaying such loans by future taxes. In The Federalist No 41 Madison wrote; The powers falling within the FIRST class [Security against foreign danger] are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money. Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. ... If a federal Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety. This again seems to contemplate an unlimited power of borrowing money by the government (or limited only by its available credit) to be repaid from taxes. Thus at least two of the founders considered this issue, and it was in now way part of a &quot;blind spot&quot;. When he became the first Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton embarked on his famous program of encouraging manufactures, funding needed &quot;improvements&quot; (of roads and harbors, in particular) largely by borrowing. These proposals were openly, widely, and heatedly debated both in Congress and out of it, before Congress authorized them. The argument that such debts would have to be repaid out of future tax revenue was indeed advanced, although not, as far as I know, precisely in the terms this question uses. But the issue was generally considered by the public, which was in no way blind to the future effects of present borrowing by the government. It was not a later innovation, unthoguht-of by the founders and early governments of the US. In short the Constitution does not contain any requirement such as the question suggests, and was never intended to do so, because the founders felt it essential to allow the government an unlimited power to borrow money, limited only by the needs of the case and the sound judgement of Congress.
As an example, POTUS does not undertake the entire pardon process on his own, instead they are preliminarily processed by the Department of Justice, which makes a recommendation. Only POTUS can "grant" the pardon, and we lack substantive information on how deeply he gets involved (does he just sign documents based on staff recommendations? does he do his own research?). I don't know what physical form Clinton's 450 pardons on January 20, 2001 took, but a president might use an autopen (Obama did use such a device). Questions have been raised and definitive answers from SCOTUS are lacking as to whether hand-to-paper signatures are demanded by the Constitution. DoJ at one point thought it was okay. This article lists the Constitutional functions which cannot be delegated: reporting to the Congress on the state of the Union; convening either or both Houses of Congress and adjourning Congress; signing and vetoing bills; receiving ambassadors and public ministers (recognition); appointing and removing ambassadors, ministers, and certain other public officers; nominating federal judges; and making recess appointments However, the Constitutional function of negotiating treaties or numerous functions as commander in chief of the armed forces is generally delegated, within the executive branch. Numerous statutory functions can be delegated (and Congress may say explicitly that some function can be delegated, in passing the law). The matter of implied power to delegate statutory function is the topic of a couple of centuries of litigation, but as an example in Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. 290 SCOTUS held that a law prohibiting the advance of public money in any case whatsoever to the disbursing officers of government except under the special direction of the President does not require the personal and ministerial performance of this duty, to be exercised in every instance by the President under his own hand. SCOTUS has not established bright lines regarding the extent of permissible delegation.
The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it.
No, all text of the Canadian constitution is of equal force. The 1993 Supreme Court case New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly) makes this clear: It is a basic rule, not disputed in this case, that one part of the Constitution cannot be abrogated or diminished by another part of the Constitution: Reference re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148. So if the privilege to expel strangers from the legislative assembly is constitutional, it cannot be abrogated by the Charter, even if the Charter otherwise applies to the body making the ruling. This raises the critical question: is the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers from its chamber a constitutional power? The opinion went on to determine that the privilege of the legislative assembly to exclude strangers was an unwritten constitutional principle which could not be abrogated by the written constitutional Charter (though they did not specifically call it an unwritten constitutional principle at the time, this is retroactively so through Reference Re Secession of Quebec para. 52). Edit: Following Toronto (City) v. Ontario (AG) 2021 SCC 34, it's not entirely clear New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. is still good law as the majority relegated unwritten principles to interpretive aids and filling structural gaps of the written Constitution, without referencing this case. The rule that the (written) Constitution cannot contradict itself seems logical though, and the cited Reference re Bill 30 does indeed state at para. 62 that the written Charter cannot override other parts of the Constitution (presumably we should read that as specifically written parts, since that's what was at issue in the reference).
Constitutionally, a person is only required to be granted U.S. citizenship if they are born in the United States. Any other form of citizenship is as provided by statute. So, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 makes some people citizens who would not otherwise be citizens in its absence. In that sense, it grants citizenship. Meanwhile, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(g) supports the proposition, which is a legal fiction in some cases, that someone is a &quot;natural born citizen&quot; of the United States, and hence eligible to run for President someday, and is retroactively considered to have been a citizen in the meantime for myriad other purposes, despite the fact that in the case of an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father, this right is not vested and could never come into being if the required actions aren't taken after the fact. Incidentally, this statute has been upheld against constitutional challenges. Miller v. Albright, 520 U.S. 420 (1997). So, while you would like to clearly distinguish between someone having citizenship granted and having citizenship revoked, Congress, in its wisdom, has not been so accommodating and has declined to clearly distinguish between the two interpretations. This statute is a bit like the question of Schrödinger's cat, who is indeterminately alive and dead at the same time until there is a measurement of its state, in quantum physics. A person with an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father is both a U.S. citizen from birth and always has been, and has never been a citizen of the U.S., until the situation is resolved with an actual determination of the question in accordance with the requirements of the statute.
Schiff is not immune from treason - he has not committed treason. Treason, under US law: Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. Even if the circumstances were as you claim, Schiff has not committed treason.
Probably.* Congress has wide latitude to dictate the procedures of "inferior courts" -- the district courts and circuit courts of appeal. Those courts only exist because Congress created them, so Congress can generally set the terms on which they continue to exist. That power is limited in several important ways by the Constitution, including the terms and compensation of the judges, and standing to address cases, and then further limited by separation-of-powers principles. But the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Criminal Procedure are a good example of how Congress has already -- and largely unobjectionably -- imposed these types of demands on the judiciary. The rules are generally drafted by the judicial branch, but Congress approves them and gives them the force of law. In both sets of rules, you can already see some requirements on how decisions are worded: Criminal Rule 23 requires the court to "state its specific findings of fact" after a bench trial; Criminal Rule 32 requires the court to "set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence" in judgments of conviction; Civil Rule 52 requires the court to "find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately"; Civil Rule 58 requires that "every judgment and amended judgment ... be set out in a separate document"; Civil Rule 59 requires the court to "specify the reasons [for granting or denying a motion for a new trial] in its order"; and Civil Rule 72 requires magistrates to enter "a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact." The rule you're proposing seems to go well beyond these requirements, but I don't see how it would run afoul of constitutional constraints. I could imagine an argument that this somehow encroaches on the courts' inherent authority, but I'm not really convinced that that authority protects against this. For more information, you can read the Congressional Research Service report on "Congressional Authority Over the Federal Courts." *This answer only applies to Article III courts, but even then does not apply to the Supreme Court, which is co-equal and generally has the authority to set its own rules. When it comes to Article I courts, though, Congress would probably have virtually unlimited discretion to impose the kinds of requirements that you're talking about, and even to say that the court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutionality at all. Congress might even get away with imposing these kinds of requirements on state courts through the Spending Clause