Why don&#39;t Nordic countries have codes of private law? I'm aware that there are some major differences between Scandinavian law systems and other European systems, e.g., the fact that Roman Law had very little influence in Scandinavian countries. But why has the idea of a general civil code like the BGB or the Code Civil been rejected? Why resort to case law or legal doctrine instead, considering that, in many EU countries, they aren't even considered sources of law?
Sweden and most of the other Scandinavian countries once had a civil code based upon the Civil Code of 1734. Generally speaking, this code is in turn derived from the German Civil Code (as opposed to the French Civil Code), which is written in a more carefully defined, lawyer oriented manner than the French Civil Code which sought to be written in common French for use by the ordinary French citizen. In general, Scandinavian law is originally quite similar to the German law upon which it was modeled, and the systems have continued to influence each other intellectually. For example, Scandinavians followed the lead of the Germans (or vice versa) in adopting &quot;day-fines&quot; as a major means of criminal punishment in the time period following World War II. Both the French and German civil codes, in turn, were derived from Roman law. But, at some point prior to the end of World War II, the Scandinavians departed from the German model substantially. All civil law jurisdictions resort to doctrine from legal treatises as a major source of authority and the Scandinavians are no exception. Leading law professors in civil law countries have an influence on how the law is interpreted comparable to that of leading appellate court justices in common law countries. But, unlike other civil law countries, Scandinavians rely upon case law more than Continental Europeans do as binding authority in the form of judge made law. It appears that the typical Continental European pattern that was in place at one point in Sweden's modern history has been supplanted by a system that does indeed give more weight to case law and is more systematic. This European Commission source confirms this account in the private international law context, stating: Private international law in Sweden is codified only in part, and consists of a combination of statute and case law. The statute law is for the most part aimed at giving effect to international conventions to which Sweden is a party. This book, however, notes that Sweden is in the process of drafting a more comprehensive and systematic civil code for itself and made significant progress towards that goal with a 2009 report, in furtherance of the goal of better harmonizing the private law of EU and EFTA members. The very thin Wikipedia article in English on the Law of Sweden, upon which I relied, appears to be inaccurate, or at least, misleading, on the key points. Based upon your comments and the information gathered while updating this answer, I have updated the Law of Sweden article to make it more accurate. It isn't clear from sources available to me, however, precisely when Sweden began to deviate from the German model other than to say that it was sometime well after 1734 CE and was not later than the end of World War II, which as a two century range admittedly isn't very specific. Skimming the material, a lot of the reforms apparently take place in the late 20th century. The scholar in the linked power point presentation suggests that Sweden's legal system is neither in the Civil Law tradition nor the Common Law tradition, contrary to my understanding until your comments brought more information to my attention. Not having my histories of Sweden or Finland easily at hand, it is hard to tell how or why this happened. But, I appreciate your comments and question which have brought this information to my attention and would strongly suggest that you prepare an answer of your own as you appear to be very knowledgable about the details of Swedish law and may be better equipped than I to get to the bottom of the question. This journal article discussing the Swedish tort statute adopted in 1972 suggests that following World War II there was a concerted international effort of the Scandinavian countries to engage in legal cooperation producing more or less uniform laws in the region related to private law with tort law high on the agenda for reform and homogenization although turning that into concrete legislation apparently took 27 years and many commissions and negotiations.
Why is a business allowed to refuse a customer? Because also freedom of contract is a right. Except for discrimination on the basis of protected categories, a person or entity is entitled to discretion on whether or with whom to do business and enter contracts. The last sentence in your post reflects a misconception of "completely different set of values and laws" between the USA and members of the EU. Clearly there are many differences, but a comparison of the Wikipedia link you posted and, for instance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 reflects an overlap of protected categories in the laws of the Netherlands and of the US, such as religion, sex, race, or national origin/nationality. One would need persuasive evidence to support a finding of unlawful discrimination in the two examples you have experienced. Assuming the bank responded to your GDPR inquiry truthfully, the bank's refusal to open an account might have stemmed from profiling or decision-making that (1) does not precisely require specific data about you, and/or (2) uses information the bank does not need to log for purposes of compliance with the GDPR. Note that the GDPR does not outlaw algorithmic decision-making. Since legislation in the EU (as in the US) portrays an approach of market economy, both bank and landlord are entitled to made decisions on the basis of their inner policies for risk management. The policies might be unclear to you, but that does not necessarily mean they contravene principles of equal opportunity.
If it’s your pizza, yes The civil equivalent of theft is the tort of conversion, “consisting of &quot;taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession&quot;. In England &amp; Wales, it is a tort of strict liability.”
It does not need to be expressly defined in statute in order to be legally effective. Courts have no trouble interpreting ordinary words used in their conventional way. And there is no other definition that could work instead, considering the full body of law that (1) intends to apply to the whole of the United Kingdom, (2) often distinguishes between &quot;Great Britain&quot; and &quot;Northern Ireland&quot;, (3) often distinguishes between &quot;England&quot;, &quot;Wales&quot;, &quot;Scotland&quot; and &quot;Northern Ireland&quot;, (4) treats &quot;Great Britain&quot; as synonymous with England, Wales and Scotland, and (5) often uses &quot;Great Britain&quot; without further ceremony, as if it's a term that doesn't need to be explained. It is helpful that legislation (at least in the modern era) is consistent about the view that &quot;Great Britain&quot; refers precisely to England, Wales and Scotland all together. By virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978, &quot;United Kingdom&quot; means Great Britain and Northern Ireland. from which we may deduce immediately that Great Britain means the United Kingdom except for Northern Ireland. There is no sibling '&quot;Great Britain&quot; means...' clause, but construing it any other way than the normal meaning would not work. From the combined definitions of &quot;England&quot;, &quot;Wales&quot;, &quot;British Islands&quot;, etc. - which by reference, also deal with such historically doubtful areas as Berwick and Monmouthshire - there is no other way to interpret the term &quot;Great Britain&quot; without distorting the required meaning of &quot;United Kingdom&quot;. Including too much or too little in &quot;Great Britain&quot; would give the wrong result, in particular for statutory extent clauses that refer to the whole United Kingdom and ought not to accidentally leave out Cornwall or include Hanover. We do not need to go as far as the Acts of Union, which is lucky since that would entangle us in concerns about whether &quot;England&quot; includes &quot;Wales&quot;, or other historical anomalies that are not relevant in current law. I would treat the Acts of Union as giving added force to the conventional meaning, rather than being the source of that meaning, since there are uses of the term which seem to be more about Great Britain considered as a place than the political entity. For example, the Food Safety Act 1990 s.18(3) talks about &quot;any food which has not previously been used for human consumption in Great Britain&quot;, which seems to talk more about the food culture of the place, even predating the Acts of Union, than about the Kingdom of Great Britain or its successors. The term &quot;Great Britain&quot; is frequently used in statutes in the customary way. For example, The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 s.28 creates a &quot;Great Britain register&quot; and a &quot;Northern Ireland register&quot; of political parties, and s.38(1)(3)(b) provides for the &quot;Great Britain register&quot; to cover precisely England, Scotland and Wales. The Northern Ireland Act 1998 s.87 is about provisions of UK social security law that operate differently in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Electricity Act 1989 (as amended) provides for the issue of &quot;GB certificates&quot; as opposed to &quot;NI certificates&quot;, and also defines &quot;the relevant part of Great Britain&quot; as meaning either &quot;England and Wales&quot; or &quot;Scotland&quot; (s.32M(1)). The Agriculture Act 2020 s.35 provides for a &quot;red meat levy&quot; to be paid between &quot;one country in Great Britain&quot; and &quot;another such country&quot;, and goes on in 35(8) to list the levy bodies for England, Scotland and Wales. So all of this points to the same common meaning as in everyday life. In court, for example, Lord Hoffman in Serco v Lawson [2006] UKHL 3 had to consider the Employment Rights Act 1996 s.196, since repealed, which governed &quot;work wholly or mainly outside Great Britain&quot;. (And by the way, in 196(1)(b) is a listing of &quot;England and Wales&quot; and &quot;Scotland&quot; as the two possible bodies of law relating to Great Britain.) In his judgement, he says: It is true that section 244(1) says that the Act &quot;extends&quot; to England and Wales and Scotland (&quot;Great Britain&quot;). But that means only that it forms part of the law of Great Britain and does not form part of the law of any other territory (like Northern Ireland or the Channel Islands) for which Parliament could have legislated. That is, he does not find it difficult to gloss the extent provision in 244(1), which doesn't include the exact words &quot;Great Britain&quot;, as actually referring to Great Britain. Other legislation refers to &quot;Great Britain&quot; as a locale, like the Wild Animals in Circuses Act 2019 which talks about &quot;an animal of a kind which is not commonly domesticated in Great Britain&quot;. This is a straightforward reference to the kind of activities typically going on in that location, treating it as the island(s) and not the political entity. The expression does not include the territorial sea, by default; some statutes include it, like the Gas Act 1986 s.5(9) which says: For the purposes of this section a place is within the jurisdiction of Great Britain if it is in Great Britain, in the territorial sea adjacent to Great Britain or in an area designated under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964. There are several other instances of particular statutes defining &quot;Great Britain&quot; to include adjacent waters, but they do not define the core concept of Great Britain otherwise. They do not need to.
The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.
No, but the USA is special! In COMPARATIVE LITIGATION RATES from HARVARD, JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS, the authors J. Mark Ramseyer &amp; Eric B. Rasmusen argue that for routine normal cases, the US is no more or less litigious than anywhere else in the developed world, specifically, they make comparisons with Australia, Canada, France, Japan and the UK. However, they do say: Why, then, the American notoriety? It does not result from the way the legal system handles routine disputes. Instead, it derives from the peculiarly dysfunctional way courts handle several discrete types of disputes. In several discrete areas, American courts function in a manner one can only describe as disastrous. American courts have made the bad name for themselves by mishandling a few peculiar categories of law suits. In this article, we use securities class actions and mass torts to illustrate the phenomenon, but anyone who reads a newspaper could suggest alternatives. This strange and peculiarly American phenomena of courts making huge payouts for a small number of cases skews perception of risk and leads to, for example, US hotels dismantling water slides.
You can always get in trouble. Copyright is always protected by the laws of a particular nation, by the courts of that nation. Because of the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Convention, I can sue you outside of my country, and will be treated as a person of that country. The conventions don't say who has jurisdiction, that is where you have to sue, so you have to resort to conventional jurisdictional principles. If you are in Europe, under the Brussels Convention, that means I have to sue you in your country of domicile (if you reside in multiple European nations, I get to decide which country to sue you in). The English courts are slightly different in that they generally hold that you sue in the country where the act took place, but (Lucasfilm v Ainsworth) you can sue in UK courts for infringement that occurs in the US. As you can see, this can get complicated. I can't sue you in Mongolian courts (assuming neither of us has any connection at all to Mongolia), but I could sue you (being a hypothetical UK citizen) in UK courts if you did the infringing deed while in Mongolia. Mongolian courts enforce Mongolian copyright law, US courts enforce US copyright law. Therefore you first have to decide what country you plan to sue in (from the plaintiff's perspective).
There is no internationally-enforceable mechanism regarding how other people call something, or what alphabet can be uses to write a word. I can legally call that country between Bangladesh and Thailand "Burma" or "Myanmar", I can call Україна Ukraine, The Ukraine, or Ukrainia (the latter seems to be old-fashioned, but it's still legal). As a diplomatic matter, the US government seems to have settled on certain designations so that it uses the version "Myanmar" for official purposes although it includes "(Burma)" in popular communications (State Department travel advisories). If it wanted to, the US could call The Republic of North Macedonia by the name "Macedonia", though there would be political protests. The EU, NATO, UN etc. can likewise set its own rules regarding names of countries. There are many additional complications in the case of countries that are not universally / widely recognized, such as Trasnistria and the Republic of Somaliland. If the president of the Republic of Somaliland sought to address the UN, his problem would not be what people would call his country, it is that the Republic of Somaliland is not "recognized" by the UN (it has no official status), or anyone else. The question of "sameness" of language is a prominent feature of nationalist movements. Claims are made that Flemish and Dutch are "the same" or "different", likewise Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian, Montenegrin; Dari, Farsi and Tajik. Thus there is no real chance of litigating the matter of whether Moldovan and Romanian are the "same language" and which name should be used. But if the EU parliament wants to, it could rule that the language of Moldova is to be called "Romanian", or "Moldovan".