Does the President of the United States really have powers of arrest, as per &quot;Designated Survivor&quot;? A scene in the TV show &quot;Designated survivor&quot; shows the President (Kiefer Sutherland) arresting a state governor for treason. Is this really a thing? Can the POTUS really arrest citizens for crimes? And are there limits on this? Is it (as with Presidential Pardons) something which applies only to federal/serious crimes, or can Trump arrest a teenager for jaywalking if he feels like it?
There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest.
How many indictments does it take for Donald Trump to be imprisoned? An unlimited amount. Imprisonment is usually authorized as a result of a conviction rather than from an indictment. Pretrial detention following an indictment but prior to a conviction is permitted, but discretionary in the judgment of the judge. Also, there is a right to post a judicially determined reasonable bond to obtain release from pretrial detention after one is indicted and before one is convicted in the vast majority of cases (including the ones that President Trump is facing). Can a person who is indicted, before running for president, become president? Yes. Indeed, the majority view of legal scholars (it is has never been tested in a real case) is that someone who is convicted and serving prison sentence can still become President if that is who the voters choose. What's the purpose of indicting Mr. Trump if indictments are only an accusation? An indictment is a pre-requisite to trying someone for a felony in federal court. To convict someone of a crime one needs to first indict them, then have a jury trial, and then have a jury unanimously vote to convict a person, before they can be convicted of a crime and sentenced for it. Even after conviction, there is a statutory (but not a constitutional) right to a direct appeal of that conviction to an appellate court. Also, an indictment is more than a mere accusation. An indictment in a determination of a grand jury that probable cause exists to believe that the person indicted committed the crime charged. In the federal court system grand juries are composed of 16 to 23 members and 12 members of the grand jury must concur in a decision to indict a defendant on a charge for there to be an indictment on that charge. This prevents people from enduring criminal prosecutions on charges that a majority of a grand jury finds are so baseless that there is not sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the defendant committed that crime. The grand jury must base its decision to indict or not on actual evidence in support of the charges in the form of sworn witness testimony and exhibits, not just the allegations of the prosecutor. As a practical matter, the standards of professionalism in federal criminal prosecutions is so high that almost all charges sought by federal prosecutors from grand juries result in indictments on those charges (federal grand juries refuse to indict approximately one in 16,000 times). But, in state courts that use grand juries, which can't pick and choose only the best cases to prosecute, grand juries routinely refuse to indict defendants on a substantial share of charges brought to them by prosecutors (on the order of one in 20). One source notes: Statistical figures showing a higher prevalence of grand jury reluctance to follow the government in ages past are almost nonexistent. However, a table of felony arrests in New York County between 1900 and 1907 found on page 111 of the 1926 book The Prisoner at the Bar by Arthur Train provides some rare illumination. In those seven years, some 5,214 out of 57,241 people were arrested by the police on felony charges whom New York state grand jurors decided not to indict. Grand juries are especially likely to decline to indict defendants in cases involving celebrities, politicians, law enforcement officers, and other high profile cases with political implications. See also Kaeleigh Wiliams, &quot;Grand Juries Should Not Hear Police Misconduct Cases: Grand Juries will Indict Anything, but a Police Officer&quot; SLU Law Journal Online 79 (2021).
According to the agency: How does the Secret Service "protect" the president? In order to maintain a safe environment for the president and other protectees, the Secret Service calls upon other federal, state and local agencies to assist on a daily basis. The Secret Service Uniformed Division, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the U.S. Park Police patrol the streets and parks nearby the White House. The Secret Service regularly consults with experts from other agencies in utilizing the most advanced security techniques. The military supports the Secret Service through the use of Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and communications resources. When the president travels, an advance team of Secret Service agents works with the host city, state and local law enforcement, as well as public safety officials, to jointly implement the necessary security measures. The same source recites this authority for Secret Service agents: Under Title 18, Section 3056, of the United States Code, agents and officers of the United States Secret Service can: Carry firearms Execute warrants issued under the laws of the United States Make arrests without warrants for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any felony recognizable under the laws of the United States if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed such felony Offer and pay rewards for services and information leading to the apprehension of persons involved in the violation of the law that the Secret Service is authorized to enforce Investigate fraud in connection with identification documents, fraudulent commerce, fictitious instruments and foreign securities and Perform other functions and duties authorized by law The Secret Service works closely with the United States Attorney's Office in both protective and investigative matters. Additional authority is found at Section 3056A. Some of the agency's enforcement philosophy and approach is explored here. It isn't mentioned in this short blurb, but law enforcement officers, in general, also have authority to seize contraband and various money and equipment used in furtherance of criminal activity under civil and criminal forfeiture laws. See generally 18 U.S. Code §§ 981 and 983 (civil forfeiture) and 21 U.S. Code § 853 (Criminal forfeitures). Thus, a Secret Service agent really doesn't have particularly much more authority when acting in a protective capacity (Secret Service agents also serve a detectives investigating counterfeiting as a consequence of their historical ties to the Treasury Department). In particular, any special authority of a Secret Service agent acting in a protective role either: (1) flows from permission (lots of law abiding people will cooperate with the Secret Service even if they are not required by law to do so in part out of respect for the institution of the Presidency and the President's symbolic role as head of state, and most of the time the President has the express permission of a venue owner and his entourage to be present there), or (2) flows from laws that are phrased in terms of making it a crime to do certain things in the presence of the protectee or at a particular venue, rather than in terms of granting special authority to the Secret Service in particular, which makes sense as a way to structure these laws given the heavy reliance of the Secret Service on cooperation from other law enforcement agencies to do its work, for example the statute that makes it a crime to threaten certain protected persons (18 USC 871) or (3) flows from the affirmative defenses to criminal liability for conduct that is privileged for self-defense or the defense of others by a law enforcement officer, or (4) with regard to searches, but not necessarily seizures, there are national security doctrines that authorize searches for purposes of intelligence or national defense purposes (which protecting a protected person would normally include) as opposed to for the purpose of preventing or investigating a crime. Usually information secured by a search under this kind of authority would not be admissible at trial in a criminal case based upon information discovered in such a search, but the Secret Service may not really care if it can get a valid conviction on the basis of that particular evidence so long as it can protect the protected person at that moment in time, or (5) in cases of ambiguity or lack of very specific legal precedents, Secret Service agents have "qualified immunity" from civil rights liability (which is all they need if they are not seeking a criminal conviction) for their actions since they are not violating clearly established law. So, they have the capacity to press their advantage in cases where they no that no court has ruled on a factually specific situation similar to their own. Also, keep in mind that Secret Service agents acting in the course of their federal duties are generally immune from civil or criminal liability under state law and can only be criminally prosecuted under federal law if the Justice Department (which reports ultimately to the President who has a vested interest in having the people that the Secret Service provides protection to being kept safe and has a special relationship with federal law enforcement agents), in its sole and absolute discretion, decides to prosecute the Secret Service agent. The President also has the power to pardon a Secret Service agent for a federal crime. Thus, the only practical means of enforcement of limitations on a Secret Service agent's authority that a President approves of is a civil rights lawsuit under 28 USC 1983 brought in federal court (to which the qualified immunity defense will often applly). Also law enforcement employers routinely indemnify and defend their agents when they are sued for civil rights violations where the employer don't personally think that the agent deserves to be sued even though this is not a binding obligation unless a union contract says so (I don't recall if Secret Service agents are unionized or not). Permission is buttressed by the criminal provisions of Section 3056(d) which state: Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs, resists, or interferes with a Federal law enforcement agent engaged in the performance of the protective functions authorized by this section or by section 1752 of this title shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. This criminal provision was enacted in 1971. Some states, such as Colorado, also give Secret Service officers by virtue of state law all of the rights and privileges of a state law enforcement officer to enforce state laws. I suspect, but do not know, that there are regulations issues by the Department of Homeland Security and/or the Treasury Department where the Secret Service was previously housed, that interpret its statutory authority broadly and are entitled to deference in interpretation of ambiguous aspects of federal laws under the Chevron doctrine. My suspicion is based, for example, on the way that the agency handled the GOP National Convention in Cleveland, but I can imagine other paths (e.g. putting pressure on event organizers) that could have led to the same result. In general, the Secret Service gets to have final say when multiple agencies are involved, on designing security procedures for events and for individuals within their jurisdiction. This has the following source: The Secret Service’s authority to do this stems from a 2012 change to US Criminal Code, 18 US Code § 3056 (e) (1), which reads, “When directed by the President, the United States Secret Service is authorized to participate, under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at special events of national significance, as determined by the President,” and Presidential Decision Directive 22, a secret directive issued by President Obama in 2013. In the linked story, it used its authority to establish a press credentialing and background check process at events where protected persons would appear. With regard to your specific questions: Do they get warrants for those searches, and/or for any seizures that may be associated with them? What could they do against people if they found contraband? Secret Service agents have the authority to request and enforce search warrants, which must be issued by a judge on the basis of an affidavit or declaration establishing probable cause of a search. But, there are a variety of exceptions to the warrant requirement of the 4th Amendment (e.g. "Terry stops" which require mere reasonable suspicions, searches with permission, searches and arrests for crimes committed in the presence of the officer, searches incident to an otherwise lawful arrest (either due to a warrant or based upon probable cause to arrest even if the offense itself does not have incarceration as a potential punishment), searches based upon probable cause when exigent circumstances make it impossible to obtain a timely warrant which often apply in "active shooter" or hostage situations and to most searches of cars). Handgun that is generally legal to own Hunting rifle designed for accuracy at long distances that is generally legal to own These kinds of searches and seizures would have to rely on (1) a prohibition of a venue owner in which case trespassing would provide a criminal law violation, (2) a statute particular to acts in the presence of a protected person, or (3) creative interpretation of laws that, for example, prohibit "menancing" with a weapon or involve "attempted assault or attempted murder" on the theory that under the possession of the weapon in the known and anticipated presence of the protected person was a concrete step towards an intended use of harming the protected person or another person. Note that a Secret Service officer cares about the arrest much more than the conviction given his or her mission, so they care more about having "probable cause" that an attempted crime is being committed, which is grounds for a lawful arrest or lawful, than about being able to prove that a crime was committed beyond a reasonable doubt. The definition of probable cause is beyond the scope of this answer but is a much lower standard than even a preponderance of the evidence that applies in non-criminal cases incluing civil forfeiture cases. Assault weapons that are not generally legal to own A throwable explosive such as a hand grenade Other explosives The Secret Service has authority to both investigate and enforce criminal laws pertinent to its mission including a law enforcement right to make civil seizures of contraband. All of these things would generally be illegal to possess without special licensing that may itself impose restrictions on its use. Marijuana, which is federally illegal, in a state like Colorado Harder drugs like cocaine or heroin These are federal crimes that any federal law enforcement officer can enforce, except that there are temporary budgetary restrictions that prohibit using federal funds to enforce marijuana law violations that comply with state law. Since these are outside the mission of the Secret Service, it can't actively investigate these violations but can use all of the authority of any law enforcement officer including seizure of contraband when encountered in the course of other activities within their jurisdiction or if in a particular case enforcing the law would further the purposes of their jurisdiction. Counterfeit US currency, along with a printing press and materials for more This is contraband in violation of criminal laws that can be searched for and seized, and is within the jurisdiction of the Secret Service for investigative purposes.
No. Arizona tried passing a law that, among other things: criminalized failure to comply with federal alien registration requirements, criminalized working without being authorized to work in the United States, and authorized state officers to arrest aliens without a warrant if they had probable cause that the alien had committed a crime that made them deportable. All three provisions were struck down in Arizona v. United States. The federal government has &quot;occupied the field&quot; on most immigration issues. That means they've regulated it so extensively that there is zero room for states to act independently. One of Arizona's laws that was struck down exactly duplicated a federal criminal statute, but even that went too far by allowing the state to apply its own enforcement priorities and prosecute cases the federal government would not. If a state made it a crime to be unlawfully present (which is not a federal crime), that intrudes even further on the federal immigration scheme. This doesn't mean a state can't alert the federal government to people who are unlawfully present. It doesn't necessarily mean state officers can't arrest for federal immigration crimes: a previous Ninth Circuit decision held that Arizona officers could arrest for federal immigration crimes on the same basis that they could arrest for state crimes, and the Supreme Court in Arizona v. US explicitly didn't address the question. However, if state officers make an arrest for a federal crime, the federal government still gets to decide whether or not to prosecute. What you're asking about would remove that federal control, so it is preempted by federal law.
Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, &quot;the unitary executive theory&quot;. The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may &quot;act against the rule of law&quot;, but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take.
The circuits all over the place on this one but I don't see these facts fitting according to the strictest rule. It is within the discretion of the police to decide whether delaying the arrest of the suspect will help ensnare co-conspirators, as exemplified by this case, will give the police greater understanding of the nature of the criminal enterprise, or merely will allow the suspect enough "rope to hang himself." U.S. V. Garcia 79 F.3d 74 (7th Cir. 1996) See also Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293 (1966) A suspect has no constitutional right to be arrested when the police have probable cause. The police are not required to guess, at their peril, the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction. EDITING THE ANSWER in light of some comments. Florida recognizes sentence manipulation and outrageous government conduct as defenses. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) Outrageous government conduct and sentencing factor manipulation focus on the government's behavior. Outrageous government conduct occurs when law enforcement obtains a conviction for conduct beyond the defendant's predisposition by employing methods that fail to comport with due process guarantees. Under this standard, the conduct must be so outrageous that it is fundamentally unfair. See United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir.1987) In the Ciszkowski case, the defendant was charged with murder for hire as part of a sting. As part of the sting, the government provided Ciszkowski with the gun. The gun had a silencer, the silencer converted his crime to a more serious offense. Ciszkowski argued that he did not know the gun had a silencer and accused the government of sentence manipulation. He lost. The court tells us that the standard for establishing that the government's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to constitute sentencing factor manipulation is high as gives us some cases where the court declined the finding. See United States v. Bohannon, 476 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir.2007 (government's selection of age of "minor" victim for sting operation was not manipulation even though the selected age resulted in enhancement under guideline); United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1370-71 (11th Cir.2006) government's purchase of crack cocaine rather than powder cocaine was not manipulation despite sentencing differential); United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1412-13 (11th Cir.1998) (government informant's selection of a fictitious amount of drugs to be stolen by defendants was not manipulation of the quantity) Now, about this doctor. The reason this is might be troubling is that this doctor might have entrapped the suspect. For example, if the suspect went to the dr and just wanted some aspirin but the dr convinced him to ask for vicodin and pain killers in some excessive amount (I don't know, I do not want to make up facts). This could be entrapment by a citizen acting purely on his own; if this is the case there is no entrapment. See Worley v. State, 848 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) However, when the person making the inducement is acting as an agent of the government, courts may allow an entrapment defense. The government is responsible for the actions of its agents. But keep in mind that you still need to establish both elements of entrapment. Per United States v. Isnadin, No. 12-13474 (Feb. 12, 2014): The entrapment defense involves two separate elements : (1) Government inducement of the crime, and (2) lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant. The defendant bears an initial burden of production to show that the first element, Government inducement, is met. Once the defendant makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. For any of these defenses to work, the guy who was filling the prescription can not have been predisposed to commit the crime except for the actions of the government and its agents inducing him.
That remains to be determined. This article (100 Tex. L. Rev. 56 (2021)) discusses the possibility. To start, the Constitution does not directly say that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted. The lack of an express presidential immunity and the fact that an attempt by Madison to create such an immunity is an indication of &quot;original intent&quot;. The view that an incumbent president cannot be indicted, prosecuted, convicted or punished is a policy stance set forth by the Dept. of justice, but is not constitutional law. Alito in Trump v. Vance points to some apparently negative consequences of allowing indictment of a sitting president, but this was in a dissenting opinion. Practical considerations of policy might argue for not prosecuting a sitting president, but the Constitution itself does not expressly forbid it. As we know from numerous SCOTUS rulings, the court is also capable of finding implicit support for a rule in the Constitution. For example theimpeachment provisions do not demand or even hint that impeachment must precede trial and punishment. An argument that prosecution would &quot;incapacitate&quot; the president is met with the fact that there is a provision for replacing an incapacitated POTUS with VPOTUS as acting president. The idea that a trial interferes with a person's ability to do their job (or that they can't adequately participate in their defense if they are doing their job) has not actually prevented ordinary people with jobs from being prosecuted for their crimes.
Art. 1 Sec. 9(8) says two different things. The first says that "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States". That means that the US cannot grant a title (hereditary or otherwise) like "Duke of Detroit", "Prince of Princeton". It does not prohibit the practice of speaking of POTUS as "His Highness, the President of the United States", likewise "His Elective Majesty" or "His Excellency", but early discussions in the Senate put paid to even calling a president this, and instead he is just called "Mr. President" (just as judges are called "your honor"). An appellation such as "Chief Justice" is not a title of nobility, it is a job description. We don't have titles of nobility granted by the government. There is a constitutional amendment, the Titles of Nobility Amendment, which was considered but not ratified, which is stricter on the anti-nobility statce. Then there is second thing, that prohibits officials from "accept[ing] of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state", without Congressional approval. Accordingly, the president, sec'y of state or a congressman cannot accept a gift, such as a car, from a foreign power, unless it is approved by Congress. Every congressional "exception" was approved by Congress; moreover, such benefits are not from a foreign power. The Speech or Debate Clause Art. I, Sec.6(1) in fact gives congressmen a privilege (immunity from arrest) which ordinary citizens do not have. So there is no connection between titles of nobility and free bean soup or whatever legal exemptions Congress may give itself.