What case was it where Clarence Thomas sided with the liberal justices in order to remain consistent with a previous ruling? I have a memory of a case but I can't seem to find it. What I remember is that there was a case in which the court split along partisan lines. Then, a few years later, a similar case came before the court except that the decision from the previous case, if consistently applied, would now result in the opposite party benefiting. All the justices flip-flopped except for Clarence Thomas, with the result being that the liberals "won". Does anyone know what (two) case(s) I'm talking about?
I found the case in an episode of Amicus (podcast). Mark Joseph Stern was on the show and Dahlia Lithwick referred to an article he had written about the subject. Here is a quote from the article: In the 1990s, Thomas disapproved of race-conscious redistricting designed to empower black Democrats; today, he objects to race-conscious redistricting designed to empower white Republicans. In the 1990s, all the conservative justices voted to not allow taking race in to account to create solidly black districts. All the liberals said that it would be ok. Now (in Cooper v. Harris) all the liberals are saying it is not ok to take race in to account when destroying Democratic districts through gerrymandering and the all the conservatives said it would be ok, save Clarence Thomas, who remained consistent with the previous ruling, giving the liberal justices a victory.
There is no higher court which can overturn a SCOTUS decision, so in theory (or, imaginarily) they can rule any way they please. The ruling could then be overturned by a later court, as happened in these cases. However, justices of the Supreme Court can be impeached (impeachment is not subject to judicial review), so the individuals responsible for such a ruling could be impeached. Or, if the sitting president is favorable and the enabling legislation has been passed, additional members of the Supreme could be added, as was unsuccessfully attempted during the Roosevelt administration. The court could not write specific enforceable statutes defining the crime and imposing a penalty. They could rule that there is such-and-such right which is protected by the Cconstitution, and that that right must be protected by the states (for instance, a state may not pass a law that prohibits practicing the Pastafarian religion). It would be unprecedented, though, for SCOTUS to order a legislature to pass particular legislation. That would not mean that a ruling could not be written which mandated that, but it would be a huge break from tradition and a clear breach of the separation of powers. Legislatures could respond "they have made their decision; now let them enforce it". Decades ago, existing state death penalty laws were declared unconstitutional as defective with respect to the 8th Amendment, meaning that there was no death penalty in many states for some time. Homicide statutes could likewise be struck down en masse, perhaps as an Equal Rights violation, which would means that either homicide is now legal, or the Equal Rights violation in those statutes must be eliminated. All that SCOTUS would have to do is rule that a fetus is a person. Recall Roe v. Wade: If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. A model for how this might take place is McCleary v.Washington, where the Washington Supreme Court ordered the legislature to act to fund public education, on constitutional grounds that the legislature has an obligation to do certain things. The leverage imposed by the court was a large daily contempt fine that went up to over $100 million. However this was symbolic (lifted when the legislation was passed), and it took 3 years to implement the order.
Maybe, probably not. The leading case would appear to be Raines v. Byrd, 521 US 811, where 6 congressmen sued over a line-item veto law (later held to be unconstitutional). The court notes the established legal fact that To meet the standing requirements of Article III, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief". where that court added the italics; and the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable. This requires, among other things, that the plaintiff have suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized" In this case, the court find that "appellees have not been singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective bodies", and they are claiming institutional injury, arising "solely because they are Members of Congress...If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead". The court did, however, uphold standing in one legislative case, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, where there was an issue over whether the legislature had ratified a constitutional amendment when the Lt. Governor of Kansas cast a tie-breaking vote on the question (the allegation was that this was improper). The court held that the legislators "have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes", finding that their votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient to de- feat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. The Raines court finds that legislators "have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified" – but that was not the case in Raines (the line-item veto act had clearly passed). Applied to the Oprah hypothetical, senatorial vote would arguably have been completely nullified by the proposed process: that is the argument made in the present complaint, para 33-34. The end of sect. III of the Raines opinion gives extensive historical analysis of the fact that branches of government do not generally have standing to sue each other, closing with the note that Our regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts, well expressed by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974): "The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),] lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests. There is a very narrow window through which the Senate might have standing to sue POTUS and otherwise, the answer is "no". The Oprah case is distinguished from Raines in that there is no political recourse to simply ignoring the appointments clause, except impeachment, and the courts might see such an action as equivalent to vote-nullification.
Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' &amp; judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.
Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be &quot;yes, they make exceptions&quot; even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office.
Finding Certainty There is only one way for certain: Do the supposedly unlawful thing Get sued (civil) or prosecuted (criminal) Go to court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose, appeal to the next appellate court in the chain In one of those courts refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal Repeat as necessary until you reach the Supreme Court - if you win it wan't illegal If you lose or the Supreme Court refuses to hear your appeal - it was illegal. Of course, this whole cycle will take a few years and quite a lot of money. Not certain but persuasive Consult a lawyer: their area of expertise is knowing what the law is and how it will likely apply to your circumstances. Of course, they can be wrong about this because - see above. Why is this so hard? Common law jurisdictions, of which Florida is an example, do not have a "Code of Laws" where you can look things up and see if they are legal or illegal. The Common Law in Florida is partially enacted law (by the US, Florida, County, City and finally your housing corporation) and partially unenacted law (decisions made by courts about both the enacted and unenacted law). In fact, enacted law is usually quite ambiguous until it has a body of unenacted (or case) law that surrounds it and provides guidance on how the courts will interpret it. Part of a lawyers skill is knowing (within their area of expertise) what the relevant case and statute law is with respect to the specific facts of the case, or knowing how to research them. Publish and be damned! You can always take the Duke of Wellingtons approach. In common law jurisdictions, everything is legal unless there is a law (enacted or unenacted) that makes it otherwise. If you do not believe that the action you wish to take is illegal then advise the other party that you will give them 24 hours to come back with a court injunction to prohibit it, otherwise you will proceed. You can't call a bluff harder than this!
Thus being a fundamental question of constitutional law, this translates into asking how SCOTUS would likely rule given a certain situation where e.g. there was no confession and the two-witness requirement is not satisfied. In the case of Cramer v. US, 325 U.S. 1, the direct testimony of two or more witnesses established that "Cramer met Thiel and Kerling on the occasions and at the places charged; that they drank together, and that they engaged long and earnestly in conversation", but "There was no proof by two witnesses of what they said, or in what language they conversed; no showing that Cramer gave them any information whatever of value to their mission, or that he had any to give; no showing of any effort at secrecy, they having met in public places, and no evidence that Cramer furnished them shelter, sustenance, or supplies, or that he gave them encouragement or counsel, or even paid for their drinks". The ruling (in favor of the defendant) focused on the fact that what was suffiently witnessed was not treasonous (drinks and conversation are not overt acts of treason). The court assigns some significance to the testimony of a single witness Kopp, stating that To the extent that his conviction rests upon such evidence, and it does to an unknown but considerable extent, it rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness not without strong emotional interest in the drama of which Cramer's trial was a part. The fact that the evidence was uncorroborated is dispositive in this case. There has not been a case where a conviction was supported only by circumstantial evidence, and the language of the Constitution plus the meaning of "testimony of a witness" is clear enough that it would be a major break with legal tradition to say that circumstantial evidence can substitute for direct evidence (testimony). A video recording cannot testify, only a person can testify. A person can testify that they watched a video, but they cannot testify that they directly witnessed defendant making a certain statement. Rather they can testify that they inferred from watching the video that defendant made a statement. This is not to say that some SCOTUS could not find a path for conviction based on circumstantial evidence, but that would be a significant break from existing tradition.
what reasoning would the court use to evaluate the competing claims? Absent a verifiable contract, the dispute would require assessment of the extrinsic evidence and/or of other aspects reflecting the parties' credibility. Those types of factors would help for discerning whose position is meritorious. You are right in that Bella's co-signing of the loan is likely to render her hypothetical allegation of gift not credible. Bella's history of defaulting on her debts as well as her failure to keep up with insurance &amp; tags are examples of prior act evidence. As such, these might be inadmissible for proving that she entered the contract with Abe. However, they are admissible both for proving Bella's pattern of missing her commitments and possibly for detecting inconsistencies in Bella's allegations (thereby weakening Bella's credibility). Unless Bella is able to point greater inconsistencies or weaknesses in Abe's credibility, a competent and honest court (where available) would rule in favor of Abe.