Can an author get commission if he writes books from prison? I'm reading the Anti-Tech Revolution by Ted Kaczynski, the following is noted in the front matter: Theodore John Kaczynski does not receive any remuneration for this book This led me to wonder, what are the regulations behind taking commissions when writing from prison in US, or was it the authors choice?
While a convicted felon can legally receive royalties for writing about his crime (in light of the unconstitutionality of Son of Sam laws), a court can also order seizure of assets for victim restitution. Thus the case of US v. Kaczynski where the 9th Circuit upheld a plea deal that included a restitution provision of $15,026,000. The federal government wanted to just take his writings, he sued to have them returned, he prevailed. The court noted (fn. 13) that Any effort by Kaczynski to publish or otherwise profit from this property following any return to him will, of course, remain subject to the $15 million restitution lien.
Federal law governing copyright, and state and federal law governing trademark, do not make any stipulations about the person enjoying the particular property right. In lieu of a specific restriction, the person may be an alien, a prisoner, a public employee, a corporation, or an astronaut. There are limits on minors and contracts, but no contract is required to write a book, make a sculpture, or create a distinctive business mark. (Those limits potentially raise questions about a minor signing away their author's rights if they create a work for hire, which you didn't ask about. A contract is typically necessary to profit off of such a creation, but not always). The copyright office even says that you can register copyright (important, registration is necessary to get maximal protection). There is a bit of an issue that a minor has limited ability to sue (for infringement), so in Utah Rule 17 you would need a guardian to sue for you, likewise in federal court (same number!).
In the U.S, at least for some time in our not too distant history, there were a substantial number of jurisdictions that allowed people to "read in" to a law degree, meaning exactly what @cpast said in his comment - that people who were so inclined and with the intellectual aptitude to understand old english common law and modern stare decisis (essentially, appellate precedent), as well as statuary and regulatory texts, could simply study their way to a law degree. It was assumed (quite rightly) that if one could manage to pass a 2-4 day bar examination that they should be considered eligible to apply for a license to practice through admission to the bar just as legitimately as those people who earned their juris doctorate. This is keeping in mind that passing the exam does/did not guarantee licensure/being sworn in, as in depth background checks and ethical fitness analysis are also conducted which form the final determination for fitness to be admitted. California was, for a long while, known as the most challenging state's bar exam to pass. For a long while, it was a true "read in" state, meaning anyone had the right to take the bar exam. Because of this, the California Penal system actually turned out quite a few amazing street-smart criminal lawyers; men, who spent years in prison reading the law, who came out to take and pass the bar exam. It is also true that in CA, as well as other states, conviction of crime (even felonies) does not necessarily mean exclusion from licensure based on failure to pass the background/fitness inquiry (it can, but it isn't automatic if you can establish rehabilitation). Excluding crimes of moral turpitude, such as perjury, embezzlement, certain thefts where a fiduciary duty existed (those were the only crimes that were considered automatically exclusionary), one could be allowed to make a plea of rehabilitation to the Board of Bar Overseers ("BBO"). Crimes that account for the bulk of prison sentences, like aggravated violence, drug dealing/trafficking, etc. are not crimes of moral turpitude. However, there are no longer any states in the U.S. where you can truly "read in" to the law. @Jason Aller is exactly right, that in the early 80's the ABA, as well as the association of accredited legal institutions (not to be robbed of their mortgage of the mind) lobbied and cajoled the practice right away. There are still the states that allow an education of apprenticeship, whereby rather than being self-taught, you are allowed to be mentored by a senior attorney with a certain level of experience, where they would attest that you worked a certain number of hours (usually each week or month &ndash; typically something akin to full time) under their tutelage. Each of the states Jason Aller cites has some form of this. After a certain number of years, those individuals are allowed to sit for the bar. However, that does not mean they can be lawyers ... even if they pass. I recently read a journal article discussing how each year more and more states seem to further delimit who can be lawyers, for the sole purpose of not wanting to create too much competition in the profession. Background analysis now puts a great focus on financial responsibility: meaning if one's credit score isn't up to par they can be shut out of the practice because it's argued that if they cannot be financially prudent with their own finances, they cannot be trusted to manage client funds. About a quarter of all people who take the bar on the first shot fail. Those who don't pass by the 3rd try usually never do, and if they do, they are unlikely to practice as they are unlikely to get jobs (unless they hang out a shingle, so to speak). Most states require having graduated from an accredited law school. Massachusetts has at least one unaccredited law school (it was two, but I believe one just got accredited). A grad of that school can only be licensed in MA, nowhere else, except maybe one or two other states. More and more states are also deciding not to let lawyers from other states practice in their jurisdictions by "waiving in", which is where you can pay to get licensed and transfer your scores (instead of experienced lawyers having to take the bar again) from reciprocal states. It is a club where membership is purposely limited and continues to be more and more exclusive (and not in a good way). You can probably see from all these trends that there is a big push to keep people out, for no other reason than fear of competition. If this trend holds, it seems likely that the apprentice's right to "read in" will sooner, rather than later, become altogether a thing of the past too. Law school education is undoubebly valuable in that it teaches you how to learn in a socratic way. It shows you how to spot issues and understand archaic text, and helps you to understand the rules of procedure in a theoretical and comprehensive way. However, for most, what it does not do is teach you how to practice law. When I was in law school, I was lucky enough to go to a school with the choice of a clinical semester or year (I also broke the rules and worked full time as a law clerk, year round, from year one). Many schools had no clinical programs. Students who weren't able to do these things didn't know what a pleading was or how to draft one, had never seen a motion for summary judgment, had no idea how to take or defend a deposition &amp;ndash all things lawyers must be good at doing and that are not taught in law school. At that time, over a decade ago, the machination of legal scholars had contemplated adding yet another year to law school curriculum, to require a clinical year, so that graduates did have a clue what practicing law was all about. Opponents argued that instead the 3L elective year should just be traded from classroom to clinical (rather than adding another year and another 40-70 thousand tuition dollars). Neither side could agree so neither has become the norm. But what has happened since then is that more and more states have limited the right to take the bar exam by right, from having learned the law thru the practice of "reading in", which had already become the highly regulated practice of "documented apprenticeship". My guess would be that those persons who learned by apprenticeship may not be as adept at picking apart cases or legal research as a law school grad (but may be), but they would almost certainly be more informed in the actual practice of law. Here is a fairly comprehensive article about the U.S. states that allow it, and what their rules are for completing the apprenticeship "degree". It cites that of nearly 90k people taking the bar, 60 took this route. From the perspective of a practicing lawyer with what I like to call "a mortgage of the mind", I find this trend pretty disheartening. One shouldn't need to pay a quarter-million dollars to gain the knowledge and right to sit for the bar.
The modern rule in the UK is that copyright lasts until the end of the calendar year following 70 years after the death of the author. So if the author died in or later than 1953, it would be under copyright under this general rule. However, this wasn't always the rule and the museum speaks of a copyright revived in the 1990s. So I went down that rabbit hole of historical UK copyright legislation. I personally find it interesting, but it turned out to not be entirely determinative. It all turns on publication date and date of death of the artist, neither of which I can find, with the museum only stating the artist was active in the 1930s. But even assuming the most favourable facts for this to still be copyright under a &quot;revived&quot; copyright, the latest date I can find for copyright to still remain under that regime is end of 2015. Per Copyright Act 1956 s. 3(4)(a): in the case of an engraving, if before the death of the author the engraving had not been published, the copyright shall continue to subsist until the end of the period of fifty years from the end of the calendar year in which it is first published; For the fact pattern I'm outlining, we must assume the author died before publication. As for the engraving bit, s. 48 defines that lithographs are engravings, and while I am far from an expert in this field, skimming the Wikipedia article on lithography, it does seem quite possible the poster could be a lithograph. I'll note here since you bring up who precisely would be the owner of the original copyright, that it does seem likely that the poster was a work for hire, following the provisions of s. 4(2). As such, the copyright would have indeed ultimately transferred to British Rail. Jumping ahead a bit, the more precise year which the museum states is &quot;the 1990's&quot; is 1995 (we'll get to why). So in order for copyright to have first expired as per the museum's statement and the authors active years, we must assume a publication date between 1930-1945 (or thereabouts, I'm not being super careful in this answer about the months things happen in, so there may be accumulation of off-by-one errors). Because of those years, I now have to quickly address why the Copyright Act 1911 isn't relevant. The transitional provisions outlined in the Seventh Schedule reveal that only for photographs are the copyright duration provisions maintained from the 1911 Act. Now we can jump into the modern law, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA). The transitional provision in the Schedule 1 s. 12(2)(b) directly maintains the 1956 copyright duration in this case which given our possible publication years, would have led to copyright expiry sometime between 1980-1995. However, in 1995, the UK passed The Duration of Copyright and Rights in Performances Regulations 1995. This was in accordance with European legislation harmonizing copyright duration, in Directive 93/98/EEC (itself since replaced by Directive 2006/116/EC). Side Note: 1995 is a peculiar year for copyrights in Europe due to that directive and so is exactly where I started my research for this answer, because it caused weird quirks for copyright terms in some countries in some cases. For the UK, s. 5 of the regulation amended the CDPA, basically establishing the general European standard of copyrights expiring 70 years after the author's death. More importantly for our case though is the regulations own section explaining in which cases the new copyright term expires. In s. 16: The new provisions relating to duration of copyright apply— (a) [...] (b) [...] (c) [...] (d) to existing works in which copyright expired before 31st December 1995 but which were on 1st July 1995 protected in another EEA state under legislation relating to copyright or related rights. Now, I'm not going to go through and look at all the EEA contries legislation to confirm, but it seems incredibly likely that one of them would have had engravings protected for life+70 in 1995, given that's what Europe has now standardized on (since we're assuming pre-publication death for an author who was active in the 1930s). Notably, s. 17 even defines cases of expired works re-entering copyright as &quot;revived copyright&quot;, matching the terminology the museum's statement used. It would have been great if the 1995 regulation explicitly spelled out the relationship with CDPA's Schedule 1 s. 12, but in judicial interpretation, newer legislation takes priority, so the 1995 law would control. Note: The answer is getting long enough so I'm not going to fully research/cite this, but for regulations vs. legislation, we have a weird case of a regulation amending a statute. I'm fairly certain this is due to UK Acts passed for European Community membership elevating regulations to primary legislation when they are passed for compliance with European law. So given our assumed facts, the poster would have revived copyright per the 1995 Regulations. However, you may note (as I belatedly did after first posting this answer) that even given revived copyright, that revived copyright is still life+70. And the assumptions made for copyright revival under this clause requires a posthumous publication date of 1945 at the latest. This means at best any copyright under these particular circumstances would have expired in 2015. There is a bit of a middle ground here. If the poster is not a lithograph, or the publication was not posthumous, the work would have gained a life+50 term per aformentioned Copyright Act 1956 s. 3(4). But then for copyright to expire and be revived, we still have to assume a 1945 death date at the latest. Alternatively, instead of copyright revival, it could have gotten extended from life+50 to life+70 per the 1995 Regulations s. 16(c). But because we are more than 20 years from 1995, it mathematically works out that it doesn't matter anymore and we can just work with the life+70 rule. A combination of 1995 Regulations s. 16(c) and posthumous publication though does actually give another reasonable way for the work to still be under copyright. If published in 1988 before the CDPA entered into force, it would have followed the cited 1956 rules of copyright expiring 50 years after publication. The 1995 Regulations s. 16(c) specifies that longer existing terms can continue. So that results in 2038 as a latest possible year through this method. In the end I think there are two or three reasonable interpretations: The museum is correct the work is under copyright, but incorrect about the reason. It's instead because the work is under copyright because the author died after 1953 (or is still living), or The work is still covered under the 50 years after posthumous publication rule for engravings established in the Copyright Act 1956 (publication years 1973-1988 for copyright expiry at the end of calendar years 2023-2038). The museum is correct that copyright was revived, but I can't find a way for this to be true and for the work to still be under copyright (with 2015 the latest year I can find for the given facts). Note that this is my own reading of legislation, please take it with a grain of salt.
There are jurisdictions that do not allow authors to place their work in the public domain, such as Germany. Main reason is the strict monistic approach the German copyright law bases on. Key feature of this approach is the concept that, in principle, the copyright/author’s right itself can neither be transferred to another person nor waived by the author herself. The German author’s right consists of two parts, the moral rights and the exploitation rights. The moral rights are – as a rule – personal rights that are bound to the person of the creator (or, after her death, her legal heirs), i.e. they can neither be transferred nor waived. Since moral and exploitation rights are considered as inseparable parts of the author’s right as a whole (monistic approach) the exploitation rights cannot – in principle – transferred or waived by contract as well. CC0 is supposed to get you as close to the public domain as possible in your legal system. CC0 helps solve this problem by giving creators a way to waive all their copyright and related rights in their works to the fullest extent allowed by law. CC0 is a universal instrument that is not adapted to the laws of any particular legal jurisdiction, similar to many open source software licenses.
What you're describing is generally permissible in the United States. The photographer has copyright in the photograph itself, not in the items photographed. This means that they have copyright in the way that they composed the photograph -- what background they placed it against, lighting, camera placement, etc. -- but not in the ancient manuscript. If you are strictly transcribing the text of the script, you're not infringing on anything that's copyrighted. If you make a sketch, there's more potential for infringement, but I suspect that you would not be working to faithfully copy the angles of the shadows as much as you would working to faithfully copy the image and condition of the artifact. Even if you were, calling that a copyright infringement would require that the image truly be copyrighted, and I'm not 100 percent convinced that they would be. Copyright is only available to original works of authorship, and that means that the author has to make some meaningful efforts to create something new out of the copyrighted elements discussed above. But what has the photographer done in that picture of the Coronation Oath? It appears that they've photographed the book head-on, as it's displayed by the museum, with lighting as provided by the museum, in an effort to recreate the display one would see while visiting the museum. Is that really sufficiently "original" to merit copyright protection that could be invoked to prevent someone from drawing a duplicate? I doubt it. But that picture of the Ge'ez book may be different. Someone appears to have grabbed the book, opened it up under weird lighting, kept their hands in the photograph, and otherwise actually composed a photograph that may not be particularly artistic, but is nonetheless difficult enough to duplicate that it can be considered original. So let's be generous to the copyright trolls and assume that the sketch you're imagining is protected. Even then, that only raises the question of whether the copy is a fair use. You haven't said anything about how the hypothetical copier would be using these materials, but I have a hunch that the idea isn't to launch a multimillion dollar merchandising enterprise. If the idea is more academic or cultural, you'd have a better claim to fair use. Again, you can review this fair-use explainer to get a better idea.
The relevant question for libel under US law is "would a reasonable person understand this to be a statement of fact about the plaintiff, or to imply a statement of fact about the plaintiff." It doesn't directly matter if the name was changed or not; what matters is if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are talking about an actual person (the plaintiff) and are stating (or implying) actual facts, or if a reasonable person would think the statements in question are pure fiction and don't say anything factual about the plaintiff. Changing the name tends to make it seem more like fiction, but that's not always enough: suppose I write a long fictional story about Theodore Bau, who is active on the Pile Market series of online Q&amp;A sites, particularly a history one and a board games one, who published an economics book in 2004 and was an econ and history double major, and fills in more details from Tom's SE bios, and in the book talk about how Mr. Bau stole money from clients; I then send thto potential clients of Tom Au. The fact that I changed the names and said "this is a work of fiction and any similarities are coincidental" isn't exactly an automatic get-off-scot-free card. On the other hand, if I'm telling a story about Tom Au that uses a fair bit of your backstory, with no disclaimer that any similarities are pure coincidence but Mr. Au lives a secret life as a legitimate supervillain, a reasonable person is unlikely to conclude that I'm saying that you actually have a volcanic lair and that you are actually plotting to capture a US and a Russian missile sub to provoke a nuclear war. In this case, the court determined that a reasonable person familiar with the context could understand the book to be talking about the plaintiff's actual behavior, instead of just talking about a fictional character. The fact that it was fiction and the names were changed suggested that it wasn't talking about the real plaintiff, but the details of the book could make it go the other way.
Overview Under Near v. Minnesota it is very hard to &quot;legally restrict&quot; any publication in the US. The &quot;Banned books&quot; linked to in the question have, in some cases, been removed from particular school curricula or from library collections. A few have been challenged as obscene, but none of them are unavailable to the general public at this time. A work can be &quot;legally banned&quot; or &quot;legally restricted&quot; under US law for only a few reasons: Security A work that is actually classified cannot be lawfully distributed. However, referring to it or quoting from it would be legal unless the quoted content includes actual classified information. A problem with this is that one often does not know just what aspects of a document are in fact classified, short of asking the government. In many cases the restrictions on distributing classified material apply only to those who have accepted a security clearance or otherwise agreed to be bound by the classification system. However under the Espionage Act and the Atomic Energy act, and perhaps other laws, in some cases people who never accepted a clearance may be enjoined from disclosure, or possibly held criminally liable. This was challenged in United States v. Progressive, Inc. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (The &quot;H-bomb Secret&quot; case). But that case was dropped as moot when the information was published by others, and the DoE announced that they would not prosecute anyone involved. No final binding decision on the issues was made. A\n attempt to enjoin publication of classified information was famously overturns in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the &quot;Pentagon Papers&quot; case). In that case the material sought to be classified was historical, not of current operational importance. Obscenity A work found obscene under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) is illegal to distribute. But it is legal to refer to such a book. It is legal to quote it, unless the quoted section is itself obscene under Miller. Note that content will not be found obscene under Miller unless it violates a specific law, usually a state law. Unless there is such a law, a prosecution does not pass the Miller test. This means that generalized laws such as &quot;disturbing the peace&quot; cannot be used to punish allegedly obscene content. Laws may prohibit content not obscene under Miller from being knowingly provided to minors, or shown in movie theaters under ratings which would permit minors to enter. A work containing child pornography is unlawful to create, distribute, or possess under 18 U.S.C. §2251 and subsequent sections. Quoting a part that includes child pornography as defined under those laws would be equally illegal, but quoting a part that does not include such content would not. Referring to such a book would not be illegal. Note that in the US only actual images of real children constitute child pornography. Drawings or computer images not based on any real child, and text, may not be banned under these laws. In some other countries, such content may be highly illegal. Defamation Republishing a work found to be defamatory would in many cases be defamation also, and could give rise to a successful lawsuit, but it is not a crime. A quote that did not include any of the defamatory statements would be lawful. A quote that did include defamatory statements may be protected under some circumstances, such as news reporting of the court case. It is lawful to refer to such a work. Criminal Libel Criminal libel was once common, but prosecutions for it are now very rare. According to the ACLU: Twenty-four states have laws that make it a crime to publicly say mean things about people, with penalties ranging from fines to imprisonment. These laws violate the First Amendment and are disproportionately used against people who criticize public officials or government employees. The ACLU has filed a lawsuit challenging the law in New Hampshire. According to Wikipedia: Criminal libel is rarely prosecuted but exists on the books in many states, and is constitutionally permitted in circumstances essentially identical to those where civil libel liability is constitutional. According to The First Amendment Encyclopedia's article: Although libel or defamation is now primarily a civil claim, it once was primarily a criminal offense, prosecuted by the government and punishable by imprisonment or a fine. In the United States, courts have based decisions regarding slanderous or libelous statements on the First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom of the press. ... There was also a growing sentiment against criminal libel, which led the drafters of the 1962 American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code specifically to exclude the crime of criminal defamation. ... [The US Supreme] Court ruled, in Garrison v. Louisiana (1964), that truth must be an absolute defense to criminal libel. The Court also held that the actual malice requirement in Sullivan applied to criminal libel prosecutions stemming from statements about public officials ... The Court’s most recent ruling regarding criminal libel was Ashton v. Kentucky (1966), which held that Kentucky’s unwritten, common law crime of libel was too indefinite and uncertain to be prosecuted. This ruling effectively eliminated common law criminal libel. In short, while criminal libel still exists in the US it is of very limited importance and rare occurrence. referring to a document publishing a criminal libel is not an offense. Quoting such a document could be an offense if the quotation includes the allegedly libelous statement(s). Copyright Infringement Distributing unauthorized copies of a work, or copies of an unauthorized derivative work, may be copyright infringement and be grounds or a successful infringement suit. Referring to such a work is lawful. Linking to an infringing work may in some cases be held to be contributory infringement. Quoting from such a work will in most cases be lawful, unless the quotation itself constitutes infringement. Quoting an excessive amount may itself be infringement. Note that a valid defense of fair use may mean that distributing copyrighted content is lawful, so that a suit will not succeed. Fair use issues are highly fact-driven, and no clear bright line can be drawn between what is and is not permitted. This seems to be by legislative intent. Fair use was originally a judge-made doctrine, incorporated into the Copyright Act of 1976. Note also that copyright infringement is usually a civil matter, so that if the copyright holder does not file suit, there is no enforcement. Only in willful bulk commercial infringement are criminal charges brought. Trade Secrets It is unlawful to publish, distribute, or use a trade secret to which one has gained improper access. Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), specifically section 1.4: &quot;Trade secret&quot; means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. &quot;Improper means&quot; of learning a trade secret (under the USTA, sec 1.1) include: theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other means. &quot;Proper means&quot; include: discovery by independent invention, reverse engineering, licensing arrangement, and published literature. The 2016 US Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1836) and the earlier US Economic Espionage Act of 1996 offer protection to trade secrets on a federal level. Note that like copyright, violation of a trade secret is a civil matter, not a crime. If the owner of a trade secret does not file a suit or take other legal action, there is no enforcement. It is not unlawful to refer to a trade secret or a document that discloses one. It is not unlawful to disclose a trade secret that has already become public knowledge, although an actual document may well be protected by copyright. Conclusion Simply referring to a work is almost never unlawful. Quoting from a work that is actually legally restricted will generally only be unlawful if the quoted content alone violates the same law or is on its own the same tort.