distinction between law maker and law interpreter like &#39;Law maker should not be law interpreter&#39;? The following could be answered simply by the separation of judicial and legislative branches in places such as the US but here goes: I could swear I once heard this legal maxim/quote/aphorism/idk that goes something like Law maker should not be law interpreter However I was not able to find anything like this on an initial google search, except this. But I think I get the idea that like congress makes laws and then it's up to courts (and juries, if applicable) to apply the made laws in specific cases. Question: Is there any such kind of maxim/quote/aphorism/idk? Update: I dug up where I got this. Here's (part of) the original quote Lawmaker should not be interpreter: I also learned that one of purposes of the separation of powers (executive, legislative, and judiciary) is that the lawmaker cannot interpret his own laws. A third party, i.e. the judiciary or the court, does that. You won't be able to find this online or anything. This was written by a now-lawyer but not in the US, and this was written while the person was not yet a lawyer but was already a graduate of law school. For anonymity, privacy, etc, I hope I need not provide much of the context. Related: 1 Academia SE: Do students have the right to see how their papers were graded? I'll briefly point out (re: &quot;How will any student get feedback&quot;) that the education people have a theory of formative-vs-summative assessment, which in its extreme form, argues that you shouldn't ever give feedback and a grade on the same assignment. by Daniel R. Collins 2 SciFi Fantasy SE: Looking for Philip Pullman quote re imaginary numbers and possibly daemons/dæmons - death of the author!
I believe that you will find something similar to this idea in the philosophy of John Locke. Locke was an early advocate of the governmental separation of powers, and his political works significantly influenced several of the framers of the US Constitution. (See Gary Willis, Explaining America for more on this.) There was also a maxim, several times quoted in The Federalist That &quot;no man should be judge in his own cause&quot;. This meant that, insofar as possible, the rights and powers of any person or institution should be determined and limited by some other person or body. This is part of the &quot;checks and balances&quot; theory of the US Constitution. All these are, at best, rules of thumb for the design of governmental systems and legal structures. Such maxims are not themselves enforceable law, and they are not invariably followed.
I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.
By producing sufficient evidence at trial. In this case, the most likely sources of evidence would either be eye witnesses (if someone witnessed the forgery) or expert testimony (i.e., handwriting experts). Any experts would have done an analysis and would testify about the results of their analysis. Any eye witnesses would testify to what they personally observed. Judges are not handwriting experts. They don't evaluate signatures. Judges are law experts. They evaluate evidence. Sworn testimony (subject to cross-examination) by a qualified handwriting expert stating so would be evidence of a forged signature. The handwriting expert would conduct all the necessary analysis, then provide a conclusion and their testimony in exchange for a fee. Also, patterns of deceptive conduct (that can be found during discovery) could be introduced as evidence to impeach the credibility of the testimony of any witness (including your counterparty). I am not an attorney. I am not your attorney. Please do not do anything based on anything I have written because I really don't know what I am talking about. I'm just stumbling around in the dark like everybody else. If you need help with a case, please hire a real attorney and even offer to pay them for their time and expertise.
Separate law? Is a separate law needed to prohibit people to whom Section 3 applies from taking office, or to remove such people from office? Griffin’s Case There is some reason to think so. In 1869 there was Griffin’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 7, 2 Am. Law T. Rep. U. S. Cts. 93; 8 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 358. This was tried by Chief Justice Chase, in his role as a Circuit Justice, not as a Supreme Court case. One Caesar Griffin was accused of shooting with intent to kill, tried before a Virginia state court, convicted, and sentenced to two years in prison. He then filed a writ of Habes Corpus claiming that his imprisonment was unlawful, because the jusge before whom he was tried, Hugh W. Sheffey, (in the words of Justice Chase): in December, 1849, [Sheffey] as a member of the Virginia house of delegates, took an oath to support the constitution of the United States, and also that he was a member of the legislature of Virginia in 1862. during the late Rebellion, and as such voted for measures to sustain the so-called Confederate States in their war against the United States; and it was claimed in behalf of the petitioner, that he thereby became, and was at the time of the trial of the petitioner, disqualified to hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state ... Several other people tried and convicted before Judge Sheffey in the circuit court of Rockbridge county, including some convicted of murder, filed similar Habes Corpus petitions, claiming that Sheffey was prohibited by Section 3 from holding office, and that therefore their convictions were invalid. Judge Sheffey had been appointed to the office of Judge after the end of the US Civil War by the reorganized government of Virginia, the one recognized as valid by the Federal Government. He was appointed before the ratification of the 14th Amendment. There was no dispute that he fit the letter of the group of prohibited persons in Section 3. Justice Chase wrote: The general question to be determined on the appeal from this order is whether or not the sentence of the circuit court of Rock-bridge county must be regarded as a nullity because of the disability to hold any office under the state of Virginia, imposed by the fourteenth amendment, on the person, who, in fact, presided as judge in that court. Justice Chase rejected the suggestion that all official actions by Sheffey and anyone in a similar position were automatically void and of no authority because of sectio0n 3. He wrote that: The proposition maintained in behalf of the petitioner, is, that this prohibition, instantly, on the day of its promulgation, vacated all offices held by persons within the category of prohibition, and made all official acts, performed by them, since that day, null and void. After pointing out that many of the offials of the reconstructed governments of the sothern states were withign the terms of the prohibition of section 3, Chae went on to write: If the construction now contended for be given to the prohibitive section, the effect must be to annul all official acts performed by these officers. No sentence, no judgment, no decree, no acknowledgment of a deed, no record of a deed, no sheriff’s or commissioner’s sale — in short no official act — is of the least validity. It is impossible to méasure the evils which such a construction would add to the calamities which have already fallen upon the people of these states. As a further reason not to construe section 3 as instantly and automatically removing all such officials, Chase wrote: Now it is undoubted that those provisions of the constitution which deny to the legislature power to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or to pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto, are inconsistent in their spirit and general purpose with a provision which, at once without trial, deprives a whole class of persons of offices held by them, for cause, however grave. It is true that no limit can be imposed on the people when exercising their sovereign power in amending their own constitution of government. But it is a necessary presumption that the people in the exercise of that power, seek to confirm and improve, rather than to weaken and impair the general spirit of the constitution. ... Is there, then, any other reasonable construction? ... The object of the amendment is to exclude from certain offices a certain class of persons. Now, it is obviously impossible to do this by a simple declaration, whether in the constitution or in an act of congress, that all persons included within a particular description shall not hold office. For, in the very nature of things, it must be ascertained what particular individuals are embraced by the definition, before any sentence of exclusion can be made to operate. To accomplish this ascertainment and ensure effective results, proceedings, evidence, decisions, and enforcements of decisions, more or less formal, are indispensable; and these can only be provided for by congress. ... [I]t seems to put beyond reasonable question the conclusion that the intention of the people of the United States, in adopting the fourteenth amendment, was to create a disability, to be removed in proper cases by a two-thirds vote, and to be made operative in other cases by the legislation of congress in its ordinary course. Chase also note that, 2 months after the conviction of Griffin: in February, 1869, congress adopted a joint resolution entitled “a resolution respecting the provisional governments of Virginia and Texas.” In this resolution it was provided that persons, “holding office in the provisional governments of Virginia and Texas,” but unable to take and subscribe the test oath prescribed by the act of July 2, 1862 [12 Stat. 502], except those relieved from disability, “be removed therefrom;” and that this indicates that such people were regarded by Congress as having remained in office and not beign automatically removed. Griffin's Case seems to establish that some proceeding is needed to establish when a person falls under the exclusion rule of Section 3 of the 14th. In 1869 this was done by military order. In 1870 Congress passed a statute providing for criminal proceedings in such cases. This was repealed at the end of Reconstruction. Currently 18 U.S. Code § 2383 makes &quot;rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof,&quot; a crime, and provides that anyone convicted of it &quot;shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States.&quot; This is not quite the same as the section 3 disqualification. One the one hand, it does not depend on a prior oath to support the constitution, and on the other it does not appear to ban holding a state or local office. But it shows how a similar law could be drafted by Congress. Legislative declaration Can a Congressional resolution, or a Federal statute declare that specific people have so engaged? This is probably prohibited as a Bill of Attainder, that is, a legislative declaration, without trial, that particular persons are guilty of particular crimes. Other Proceedings What proceedings would be needed to establish that a person had &quot;engaged in insurrection or rebellion&quot;? If a person subject to the section 3 disqualification was elected to either house of Congress, that house could refuse to seat such person, or expel him or her, as the Constitution permits. Most state legislatures have similar powers over the seating and expulsion of their own members. If a person is convicted under 18 USC § 2383 or any similar law, that person would clearly be excluded. Congress could pass a law establishing a special tribunal for determining when a person was subject to Section 3 of the 14th. But it has not done so. See also See also: this leglal blog post This article in Constitution Daily 14th Amendment's Section 3 Gets New Look as Democrats Weigh Measures Against Trump from the National Law Journal
Not necessarily. The right to a translator is derived from the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments, and the prohibition against discrimination based on national origin (the Civil Rights Act). However, SCOTUS noted in Perovich v. US, 205 US 86 that appointment of a translator is a discretionary matter for the court (this was simply mentioned, without details as to why a translator was asked for). There is a federal law (applicable to federal cases) that sets up an infrastructure for providing interpreters, but this does not create a right to an interpreter. In US ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F. 2d 386, defendant was not afforded a translator throughout the trial, and the court found that The least we can require is that a court, put on notice of a defendant's severe language difficulty, make unmistakably clear to him that he has a right to have a competent translator assist him, at state expense if need be, throughout his trial The question which the court has to ask and answer is whether the defendant is capable of competently assisting in his defense were the trial conducted in English. If a person is perfectly bilingual in English and Mien but decides to testify in Mien to be annoying, the court will not pander to the defendant's desire to be annoying. If the person has a weak grip on English and can more effectively testify in Mien, then (after cogent arguments to that effect) the defendant should be provided a translator. The question that the court has to address is necessity.
You're largely correct, though there's some vocabulary you're using that could go either way in terms of proper understanding. My comments on your understanding, presuming we're dealing with two Berne countries (UCC is largely irrelevant these days): My understanding of copyright is that it grants the author an exclusive right to distribute their work in whatever manner they'd like for some amount of time (determined by the copyright duration in a country). Generally correct though there can be many exceptions here (fair use, technical/temporary copying, first-sale doctrine, etc.). Can a person in Country A legally use the adapted work? I'm assuming no [...], Basically correct, whoever holds rights to the original work could theoretically still assert their rights in Country A on any portion of the derivative work that was part of the original. [...] does that mean that the author of the work created in Country B does not technically have all the rights to the work they created, since they have no control over whether their work can be distributed in Country A? This is splitting hairs, but while the derivative author has the rights given to them by copyright law, they aren't absolute. In particular in this case, regardless of which country, they still don't have any inherent exclusive rights over the original work. With respect to country B, those exclusive rights have expired so they don't bind the derivative author, but they haven't expired in country A. If that is the case, then would these rights be &quot;granted&quot; to the author of the adaptation when the copyright finally expires in Country A? Again splitting hairs, but its more helpful to express that no rights are actively granted by the expiration of copyright in Country A, it's just that no one holds those rights anymore (here there might be a language issue too, generally in copyright law &quot;rights&quot; refers to those exclusive actions that may be taken by the copyright holder, and not always to the &quot;right&quot; i.e. &quot;freedom&quot; for someone to do something).
Many jurists do accept that it is appropriate to attempt to ascertain the &quot;legislative intent&quot; as part of the exercise of statutory interpretation, but legislative intent is not an aggregate of the subjective intentions of individual legislators. I am not aware of any question of statutory interpretation that was informed by testimony from staffers or legislators who drafted, debated, or enacted a law. For some rationale, see Judge Easterbrook's foreward to Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner's Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts: Legislative intent is a fiction, a back-formation from other and often undisclosed sources. Every legislator has an intent, which usually cannot be discovered, since most say nothing before voting on most bills; and the legislature is a collective body that does not have a mind; it &quot;intends&quot; only that the text be adopted, and statutory texts usually are compromises that match no one's first preference. If some legislators say one thing and others say something else... how does the interpreter choose which path to follow? canada Even evidence of what was said in Parliamentary debate is treated cautiously (R. v. Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761): First, the intent of particular members of Parliament is not the same as the intent of the Parliament as a whole. Thus, it may be said that the corporate will of the legislature is only found in the text of provisions which are passed into law. Second, the political nature of Parliamentary debates brings into question the reliability of the statements made. Different members of the legislature may have different purposes in putting forward their positions. That is to say the statements of a member made in the heat of debate or in committee hearings may not reflect even that member's position at the time of the final vote on the legislation. Legislative intent is determined by looking at the words, the scheme, and the object of the provision (R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19, paragraph 16).
Legalese The purpose of a legal document is to set out the rights and responsibilities so that: they can understand them, a third party (e.g. a judge) can rule on them in the event of a dispute. These two requirements are often in tension. We have about 1,000 years of legal precedent where certain words and phrases (sometimes in Latin rather than English) have developed very clear and precise meanings. This serves very well for the 2nd point but it can be confusing to lay people especially where: the word as used in everyday speech has a broader meaning than the way it is used in the law (e.g. shall), the word is no longer used in everyday speech (e.g. thou), or the damn thing is in Latin (e.g. certiorari). For example: "Thou shall not kill" is a legal prohibition - killing by you must not happen. However, "Killing is illegal" is merely an observation. TL;DR There is no reason why an agreement cannot be expressed in plain English. However, when put in front of a judge, that plain English must be interpreted; maybe it is better to use words that have clear and unambiguous legal definitions? An anecdote, probably untrue In the spirit of never letting the truth get in the way of a good story. The legal fraternity's love of opaque language supposedly dates from the 1600s. In those days a lawyer was paid by the folio - a large piece of paper. As a consequence lawyers used very big handwriting. Parliament, justifiably, thought that this was a rort and legislated that lawyers must be paid by the word. So now we have "in the event that" instead of "if" because 400 years ago it was worth four times as much. Parliaments do this kind of thing a lot.