How are cryptocurrencies not illegal by the US Constitution? The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8 reads in part, The Congress shall have Power To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin. From this passage, I understand that only Congress has the power to create and regulate currency (a means of payment and a store of value) in the United States. Congress may also delegate some or all parts of this power, which they have done in favor of the Federal Reserve. By that understanding, any instrument used as a means of payment and a store of value not produced by Congress or under Congressional mandate violates Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. A recent example of such a violation is the Liberty Dollar, a privately minted coinage distributed and redeemable within the United States and backed by precious metals. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies?
The Constitution only regulates the powers of the government; it doesn't directly say what the people can and can't do. In particular, it doesn't say directly that nobody except Congress can coin money. However, it does give the government the power to make laws, which are binding on the population. So Congress possibly could make a law forbidding cryptocurrencies, or at least regulating them, under the "regulating the value thereof" clause. However, they haven't done so. In the case of the Liberty Dollar, there are some specific laws that apply. They were convicted of violating 18 USC 485, which forbids the making of physical gold or silver coins that resemble US or foreign money, and 18 USC 486, which forbids creating or passing any physical metal coins as money (as well as other conspiracy charges, aiding and abetting, etc). None of these laws apply to cryptocurrency because they are not physical metal coins. Given that Congress has been explicitly given the power to coin and regulate the value of money in the United States, how are cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Basis created, distributed, and redeemed such that they have not been found unconstitutional? The power to regulate includes the power to not regulate. As a slight tangent, what laws allow for the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies? In a free society, "everything is permitted that is not forbidden". We don't need a law specifically allowing the creation and distribution of cryptocurrencies; it's sufficient that there is no law that forbids it.
Yes. In Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 17-24500-CIV-KING/SIMONTON, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100720 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2018), the plaintiff brought class-action securities claims against the developers of a cryptocurrency app. The defendant sought to force the plaintiff into arbitration instead of litigation, but the court held that the smart contract through which the plaintiff had purchased the defendant's cryptocurrency did not require arbitration.
See Article VI of the Constitution: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. This seems to me that it pretty clearly establishes the Constitution as taking the place of any previous laws. In particular, Article XI of the Articles is in conflict with Article IV Section 3 of the Constitution ("New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union"). The Constitution says that Congress's action is required to create a new state, and doesn't mention any exceptions. The Constitution's terms presumably take precedence. If Canada wanted to become a state, it would have to be admitted by Congress under Article IV Section 3.
If I was sued and had to pay a debt to someone in court, could I use my commemorative coins to pay off part of the debt? Yes, in to a court. As per your quoted section from the Royal Mint's Legal Tender Guidelines: ... a debtor cannot successfully be sued for non-payment if he pays into court in legal tender. And further down it says: We receive a lot of enquiries about our popular silver commemorative coins (including £5 crowns, £20, £50 and £100 coins) and their legal tender status. Each issue is authorised by Royal Proclamation in accordance with the requirements laid down by the Coinage Act 1971. This means that in common with coins in general circulation these coins have legal tender status. [my emphasis]
See Golan v. Holder 565 U. S. ____ (2012). The question was whether Congress could pass a law that caused works in the public domain to regain copyright. The Supreme Court held that: The text of the Copyright Clause does not exclude application of copyright protection to works in the public domain. ... Historical practice corroborates the Court’s reading of the Copyright Clause to permit the protection of previously unprotected works. So, yes, works can come out of public domain and into Copyright protection. What about people who had been relying on the works not having copyright (i.e. people who had created derivative works, etc.)? That depends on how Congress intends the hypothetical law to apply to them. In the law in question in Golan v. Holder, Congress planned ahead for this, and included provisions for it in the law (quoting from Golan v. Holder): Reliance parties may continue to exploit a restored work until the owner of the restored copyright gives notice of intent to enforce—either by filing with the U. S. Copyright Office within two years of restoration, or by actually notifying the reliance party. After that, reliance parties may continue to exploit existing copies for a grace period of one year. Finally, anyone who, before the URAA’s enactment, created a “derivative work” based on a restored work may indefinitely exploit the derivation upon payment to the copyright holder of “reasonable compensation,” to be set by a district judge if the parties cannot agree. Last, could Congress extend copyright for 10,000 years? In principle, the Supreme Court has not said anything against this, but they have indicated that there is some line beyond which a copyright term would no longer be considered a &quot;limited time&quot; as required by the Constitution. In Golan v. Holder they mention in passing hypothetical successive re-applications of Copyright to a work after it expires, calling it &quot;legislative misbehavior&quot;: the hypothetical legislative misbehavior petitioners posit is far afield from the case before us. And in Eldred v. Ashcroft, they mention in passing hypothetical unlimited successive extensions of copyright, each of limited time, again calling that &quot;legislative misbehavior&quot;: Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together an unlimited number of &quot;limited Times,&quot; the court stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. I could imagine a court holding that the &quot;limited times&quot; clause in the Constitution does not permit Congress to extend copyright for 10,000 years, which is longer than the existence of the U.S. or any countries or even civilizations that the founders were aware of at the time of the Constitution's writing.
The authority for the ban is laid out here: all that is required is putting the company on the Commerce Department's entity list. More specifically, under 50 USC 1701 there must be an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat If that condition is satisfied (and it has been: we have the emergency), then 50 USC 1702 grants POTUS broad economic powers, including prohibiting transactions in foreign exchange, or any kind of transaction involving any right regarding any property. Under that order, one implementational step for putting a company on the list is an executive review involving the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, the Director of National Intelligence, the Administrator of General Services, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and, as appropriate, the heads of other executive departments and agencies There must be a determination that the transaction involves information and communications technology or services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied, by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary and that the transaction &quot;is a threat&quot;. This last requirement is the tallest hurdle that a Twitter-ban would face, namely establishing that Twitter is controlled by a foreign adversary.
Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France