Is it legally required for districts to be contiguous? I was reading about Shaw v. Reno, a case about a congressional district that was altered on the basis of the race of its voters. Is there a law (precedent or statutory) which requires congressional districts to be contiguous? I was thinking that you could gerrymander much more effectively if you could make up a district from multiple unconnected parts. The oddly shaped district in question:
No; only 23 states require their congressional districts to be contiguous. See Reapportionment and Redistricting in the West by Gary F. Moncrief: Only 23 states have [contiguity] requirements for their congressional districts, although as a practical matter most congressional districts will be contiguous; the relative dearth of legal limits is a manifestation of the fact that few states have provided any express legal constraints on congressional districting at all. But that's not to say more states don't have contiguous districts. On Profesor Justin Levitt's website, he observes that: Many states require contiguity only "to the extent possible," and courts generally accept anomalies that otherwise seem reasonable in context. I am having a difficult time finding a list of states with such requirements; I will update if I find it.
It is well established that the federal government has complete control over immigration. See especially Arizona v. US which holds that States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. De Canas v. Bica (1976), 424 U.S. 351 is also relevant to the application of field preemption to INA. In this case, the courts found that Congress had not (at that point) entered the field of employment of unauthorized workers, so state laws were not preempted by federal law. Laws can change, and with them, potential state powers. In Arizona the court held that Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” and with respect to issues of immigration, Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 adds provisions to the Immigration and Nationality Act, including employment-related law, thus Congress has entered the field of regulating immigration with respect to employment. Current 8 USC §1324b arises from various amendments to the INA, where the present expression &quot;protected individual&quot; was inserted, by Public Law 101-649, to replace earlier &quot;citizen or intended citizen&quot;. Congress also introduced Temporary Protected Status in §302 of the law, which has specific (more restricted) provisions regarding employment. The evidence clearly indicates that Congress intended to include employment issues w.r.t. their supreme power regarding immigration. These discrimination provisions are in the field of immigration, and not discrimination legislation (where Congress has not preempted the field). Congressional silence must, in the light of what Congress did say, be interpreted to mean that the US immigration policy only offers certain specific protections, and states cannot add to or subtract from those protections.
Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.
A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.
The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.
From Roberts' dissenting opinion: Although the policy arguments for extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring such an extension are not. The fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a State change its definition of marriage. And a State’s decision to maintain the meaning of marriage that has persisted in every culture throughout human history can hardly be called irrational. In short, our Constitution does not enact any one theory of marriage. The people of a State are free to expand marriage to include same-sex couples, or to retain the historic definition. (The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of every right that should inhere in an ideal system.) In my opinion, this quote speaks as much to the second question as the first. Assume (hypothetically) for a moment that question one was not at issue. If a state defined marriage as only between opposite sexes, and the right to make a state change its definition of marriage is not in the Supreme Court's purview (in our hypo), then the state is as free to reject the validity of marriages abhorrent to its laws, performed elsewhere, as it is to deny the right to marry under its theory of marriage.
Widely accepted answer: no, state courts are not bound by circuit precedent The near-consensus is that state courts need not follow the rulings by federal courts of appeal.1 State courts are coordinate and coequal with the lower federal courts on matters of federal law.2 Only United States Supreme Court precedent binds state courts on matters of federal law. And state courts are supreme, even relative to the Supreme Court of the United States, on matters of state law.3 See this summary from the Georgetown Law Writing Centre (pp. 4-5). Amanda Frost says that the &quot;conventional wisdom&quot; is that &quot;lower federal court precedent cannot bind state courts&quot; (&quot;Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?&quot; (2015)): Most state courts assert that they are free to reach their own conclusions about the meaning of federal law, even when doing so creates a conflict with the federal court of appeals presiding over the geographic region in which they sit. Several federal circuits have conceded that their decisions are not binding on state courts... A number of federal courts scholars have declared that state courts need not follow lower federal court precedent because state courts are &quot;coordinate&quot; with lower federal courts and not &quot;subordinate&quot; to them. Frost presents several state-circuit splits. For example (as of 2015): In 2000, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the Fifth Amendment requires only that law enforcement inform a suspect that he has a right to counsel prior to interrogation, without specifying that counsel may be present during the interrogation. That decision is in direct conflict with the 1968 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that a suspect must be informed that he has a right to counsel before and during interrogation. Accordingly, the standard for Mirandizing a suspect in the state of Texas varies depending on whether the case would be tried in state or federal court. Frost goes on to argue for a change: that &quot;under some circumstances,&quot; state courts should be mandated to &quot;follow the precedent of the federal court of appeals for the geographic region in which that state is located&quot; (at p. 62). The relationship between the federal circuits and state courts is also summarized by Wayne A. Logan in &quot;A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts Disagree on Federal Constitutional Rights&quot; (2014): ... state courts have long shared a concurrent obligation with lower federal courts to interpret the U.S. Constitution and protect the rights contained in it. Cricially important as well, state courts do so independently of their federal counterparts. They need not defer to the constitutional positions adopted by federal circuit courts, including those in which they are geographically situated, which lack direct appellate review authority over them. As a consequence, on all issues other than the comparatively narrow range of questions expressly addressed by the Supreme Court, state and lower federal courts are free to disagree... One of the citations within the above passage quotes from the Fourth Circuit: Though state courts may for policy reasons follow the decisions of the Court of Appeals whose circuit includes their state, they are not obliged to do so. But the Ninth Circuit says state courts are bound; California and the Supreme Court disagree However, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is somewhat obstinate in its position that the state courts within its boundaries are bound by its precedent. California state courts disagree. And apparently, so does the United States Supreme Court. It commented on the Ninth Circuit's position in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), calling the Ninth Circuit's position &quot;remarkable.&quot; See footnote 11: The Court of Appeals questioned the wisdom of the view expressed &quot;in the academic literature,&quot; &quot;by some state courts,&quot; and by &quot;several individual justices&quot; that state courts are &quot;coordinate and coequal with the lower federal courts on matters of federal law.&quot; ... But c.f. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (&quot;state courts . . . possess the authority, absent a provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render binding judicial decisions on their own interpretations of federal law&quot;); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S&gt; 364, 375-376 (1993) (Thomas J. concurring) (Supremacy Clause does not require state courts to follow rulings by federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law). 1. Do not confuse state courts (which are entire judicial systems within each state) with federal district courts (which are the trial-level courts of the federal judiciary, necessarily distributed around the states within a circuit). Federal district courts, over which circuit courts of appeal have direct appellate review, are bound by their circuit precedent. 2. In this context, &quot;lower federal courts&quot; means federal courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States. Circuit precedent is set by their Courts of Appeals. 3. But see Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). Where the validity of a state law or the availability of a remedy for state action depends on the interpretation of federal law, including interpretation of the US Constitution, this is a question of federal law, reviewable by the Supreme Court of the United States.
I assume you are asking about horizontal stare decisis: a court following its own previous holdings or those of courts of coordinate jurisdiction (e.g. courts at the same &quot;level&quot; in the judiciary). I say this because your incredulity does not seem to extend to the notion that appellate courts can bind lower courts. You ask: why are prior judges’ powers of interpretations automatically seen to be more capable and robust than, so as to bind and prevail over, subsequent judges’ interpretative abilities? This is not the rationale for horizontal stare decisis. The doctrine is not at all based on the premise that the first court or judge to answer got it correct. Justification was given in a concurring opinion in R. v. Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33: Stare decisis promotes: (1) legal certainty and stability, allowing people to plan and manage their affairs; (2) the rule of law, such that people are subject to similar rules; and (3) the legitimate and efficient exercise of judicial authority (citations omitted). And horizontal stare decisis is not absolute. Common-law jurisdictions have developed limited avenues for departure. For example, in Canada, a lower court can depart from previous decisions of courts of coordinate jurisdiction when (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19): The rationale of an earlier decision has been undermined by subsequent appellate decisions; The earlier decision was reached per incuriam (“through carelessness” or “by inadvertence”); or The earlier decision was not fully considered, e.g. taken in exigent circumstances. Even apex courts have developed a sense of internal obligation to follow their own precedents. But departure from previous decisions may be justified where (see the Kirkpatrick concurrence at para. 202): The Court rendering the decision failed to have regard to a binding authority or relevant statute (“per incuriam”); The decision has proven unworkable (“unworkability”); or The decision’s rationale has been eroded by significant societal or legal change (“foundational erosion”). This has been viewed to &quot;strike the appropriate balance between the competing demands of certainty, correctness and the even-handed development of the law&quot; (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19). &quot;Adherence to precedent furthers basic rule of law values such as consistency, certainty, fairness, predictability, and sound judicial administration.&quot;