What are the simplest ways to gain a Property/Proprietary Interest in equity shares held by a defendant? I don't understand how someone can have &quot;a property interest that is not a security interest&quot;. I'm assuming the example below, of a claimant havinmg &quot;a priorietary interest in shares that are held by the defendant&quot; instantiates a property interest that's NOT a security interest? But how can someone acquire &quot;a proprietary interest in shares that are held by the defendant&quot;? What does this mean exactly? Secondly, where the claimant has a property interest that is not a security interest, if the property in which the claimant has the interest has increased in value, the claimant will get the benefit of that increase. So, for example, if the claimant has a proprietary interest in shares that are held by the defendant, the claimant will be able to gain both the benefit of any dividends paid in respect of the shares and any increase in the value of the shares. Of course, if the claimant has a property interest in shares that have fallen in value, it may be preferable for the claimant to pursue a personal rather than a proprietary claim. So, for example, if the defendant trustee has misappropriated £200,000 from a trust fund which was held for the claimant beneficiary, the claimant will have a proprietary claim against the defendant to recover the £200,000 that was misappropriated and, alternatively, a personal claim for the amount misappropriated. If the defendant used the £200,000 to buy a house, the claimant will be able to claim the house instead of the money.71 But, if the value of the house has fallen to less than £200,000, it will be preferable for the claimant to rely on the personal claim to recover the amount of £200,000. In reality, in such a case it is unlikely that the defendant will have enough money to repay the claimant in full. The defendant may well be insolvent and so the claimant, who would be treated as an unsecured creditor as regards their personal claim, will have an equal claim with all the defendant’s other creditors to the defendant’s assets. It may, therefore, still be worth pursuing a proprietary claim to recover the value of the house, even though it is less than what the defendant actually owed to the claimant. Virgo, The Principles of Equity &amp; Trusts 2020 4th edn. Page 16. All boldings and italics are mine.
A security interest is an interest that only extends as a security, i.e. &quot;Property that is given or pledged to guarantee the performance of an obligation&quot;. So for example, a bank mortgaging a house has a security interest in the property, allowing them to do things such as force a foreclosure sale in certain circumstances, as well as claim their money immediately if the property is sold; likewise, a car title loan issuer has a security interest in the car their loan is based off of. This doesn't have to be a loan debt; it can be a performance bond, such as a bail bond to appear in court. A security interest does not extend to the property itself, merely the obligation. So, for example, if you default on a home loan, the mortgage company can foreclose and force a sale, but they cannot claim all of the money of the sale, only the portion corresponding to the debt (e.g. if you default on a debt that is currently 100k, secured by one's house, and the house sells in foreclose for 200k, the bank can only keep 100k (plus allowed fees); the remainder must be paid to the former owner). A property interest that is not a security interest is an interest in the property itself. So for example, owning a portion of a house, via an inheritance, is a property interest; because it is not a guarantee for anything, it is not a security interest. Or in other words, a property that is not a security interest is the &quot;default&quot; state, with said property interest only becoming a security interest if it is pledged in some manner.
It’s your house You can’t be forced by a co-owner to pay rent for a property you own. You can’t be forced by a co-owner to sell if you don’t want to. You can’t be forced by a co-owner to pay to maintain the property.or to pay utilities. Of course, if no one maintains the property or pays the rates then eventually you won’t have a property but you can’t be forced to. This applies to her as much as it applies to you. It’s possible, even likely, that your mediation agreement meets the requirements of a contract. If it does, then breaching it will allow the aggrieved party to sue for damages. The good news is, you can get on with your life right now - sign over the house to your sister and walk away. Except you can’t because your interest in the house needs to be dealt with in the divorce. If you want your “fair share” and your idea of what that is is bigger than hers then you have to fight for it - lawyer up.
In Civil law jurisdictions, the heir of a deceased person will generally inherit all the possessions, rights and obligations - this may include debts. So if a borrower passes away, the lender will typicall find out who is the heir, and ask them to pay. The heir will be required to pay, and the creditor can use the usual channels (reminders, collection agencies, court judgements) to make them pay. However, if the inheritance is &quot;under water&quot; (has more debts than assets), there are ways to avoid having to pay the debts: In Civil law jurisdictions, acceptance of an inheritance usually means being liable for all the debts, too. Details vary between jurisdictions - in Germany, for example, acceptance of an inheritance is automatic, and a heir must file a document to refuse it (this is called disclaiming the inheritance). In France, in contrast, the default is to disclaim the heritage, but certain interested parties (such as creditors) can require a heir to formally make a choice, then the default is acceptance (https://www.service-public.fr/particuliers/vosdroits/F1199). In contrast, in the United States (which generally uses Common law), creditors are paid first, and the heirs only inherit what is left, in a process called probate. In that case, a heir need not explicitly disclaim an inheritance that is &quot;under water&quot; - they will simply not inherit anything. Note that the heir may choose to inherit certain debts in exchange for keeping certain assets - for example, if a home with a mortage is part of the inheritance, the heir may either choose to sell the home and pay the mortage, or keep the home and accept the mortage as debt. Notes: Even if inheritance is not automatic, the system usually allows a heir to disclaim it. There are other reasons for disclaiming an inheritance apart from debts, for example tax advantages, or the desire to grant the inheritance to a different relative. If a heir disclaims the inheritance, no matter the reason, the inheritance automatically passes to the next heir in line. If all potential heirs disclaim in turn (as would typically happen if the inheritance has more debt than assets), the inheritance will usually fall to the state. Then, the assets will be divided up among the creditors (similar to insolvency proceedings). As an exception to the rule above, the state does not have to pay outstanding debts - so that money would be lost for the creditors.
While I am a U.S. attorney, the U.K. and U.S. are essentially the same on these issue in practice: "reasonable wear and tear" is a classic issue of fact to be decided by the judge (unlike the U.S. there are never juries in U.K. landlord-tenant disputes) based upon the evidence presented to him and his or her good judgment if the case goes to court. There won't be a lot of case law that is specific enough to provide guidance in your particular case (if any) because cases like these aren't worth appealing and creating case law on and because the law intentionally vests judges with great discretion on these issues and only intervenes in appellate decisions when a judge is deeply out of line. The legal definition of "reasonable wear and tear" is basically vacuous and don't provide much meaningful guidance. I know you are joking, but no, do not set it on fire. You will find yourself incarcerated for arson, with a felony criminal record and a restitution judgment in the amount of the damages and a fine and court costs as well, and your credit record will be screwed and no one will rent to you ever again if they find out by doing a cursory background check. Your mum probably won't even invite you to Christmas dinner this year. If they charge your security deposit and you don't think you owe it, you would have to sue them for a return of the part of your security deposit you don't owe, knowing that you face a risk of paying their legal fees if you lose, but will get your fees if you hire a lawyer and win (caveat: there are more nuances to fee shifting in the U.K. courts than I spell out here which are rather technical). If they say you owe more than your security deposit and you don't pay, they can sue you for the balance, knowing that they face a risk of paying your legal fees if they lose, but will get their fees if they win. In practice, it doesn't really make economic sense for either party to hire an attorney because the amount of the fees is so high relative to the amount of money at stake. The security deposit is 2-4 hours of legal time, and the amount claimed is maybe 7-14 hours of legal time, neither of which is sufficient to address the respective issues economically in a fully litigated hearing. Short of going to court, you can provide them documentation and your video to show that you are right and to discourage them from docking your security deposit (in full, anyway) or suing you, ideally A.S.A.P. before they are too committed to taking legal action. You could also propose a compromise and see if you can get them to agree to it with neither party facing the risk of going to court.
No An LLC that didn’t exist at the time of the act or omission that caused the loss being sued over is not a valid defendant. They would sue you personally and all of your assets, including the LLC, would be available to the creditor.
Check your local law. In Washington, the chapter RCW 63.21 says what you are supposed to do. The first part of the law has apparently been satisfieds: Any person who finds property that is not unlawful to possess, the owner of which is unknown, and who wishes to claim the found property Then you need to get a signed appraisal stating current market value from a qualified person engaged in buying or selling the items, or by a district court judge (I have no idea where district court judges get their qualifications to appraise bricks), then within 7 days, report this to the cief LEO where the stuff was found (and surrender it, if requested). You also have to serve written notice upon that officer stating your to claim the property. The burden now shifts to the government, which must publish notices in a local newspaper at least weakly, for 2 weeks. The notice might be publishable in a no-cost venue, in case the publication cost is greater than the value of the stuff. If the owner appears and establishes ownership, that's the end of the finder's potential interest. If the owner does not show up, the property will be released to the finder once he has paid the government's publishing expenses plus $10, but if the goods are appraised at less than publishing cost, there is no fee. As a finder, you have 30 days after that 60 days to pay required costs, otherwise it goes to the government. There are some exceptions, things not subject to finders-keepers (crab pots, secured vessels, motor vehicles, unclaimed property in the hands of a bailee). If you do not comply with these requirements, you forfeit any right to the property and you are liable to the property owner for the value of the bricks. Under the definition of theft, you have a defense that The property or service was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable since you presumably intend to claim ownership of the bricks under the lost property statute.
1.a) Is there any states in the U.S. where stolen property is statutorily (and/or by case law) mandated to be returned to the legal owner from an equitable owner in the above scenario or in cases where the victims’ footings are more balanced? Yes 1.b) Which are they? All of them. The relevant cause of action is the common law tort of detinue: The gist of an action in detinue is that the defendant is wrongfully in possession of personal property which belongs to the plaintiff ... In modern practice, detinue has been superseded almost entirely by statutory actions for the recovery of personal property. 2.a) Is there anything else whatsoever than the law (statutory or decisional) that Alice may plead to bind the court to issue a mandatory injunction ordering Charlie to return the violin to Alice if Alice is willing to forgo any and all damages in return of such injunctions? Alice is not seeking an injunction for the return of the violin; she is seeking a judgement ordering the return. An injunction is an interim order to preserve the status quo. She might seek an injunction that Charlie be restrained from using, damaging or disposing of the violin while the case is ongoing and that might be granted but one ordering the return where ownership is yet to be established would not. However, given that monetary damages are a suitable recompense for Alice's loss in this instance, the court might not issue an injunction. 2.b) If there is, how does it overcome Ebay? Ebay is not applicable to the final judgement. If the violin is found to be Alice's, the court will order its return (not an injunction). If Alice does seek an interim injunction, then Ebay will apply. Hence why I suggest that some types of injunctions might be granted and others will not. 3.) Which states, if any, in the U.S. punish the knowing possession of stolen property as opposed to punishing the knowing receipt thereof? None as far as I know. What is happening between Alice and Charlie is not a state punishment - it is the resolution of a civil dispute about ownership. Most states do have forfeiture laws that might allow them to confiscate the violin irrespective of if Alice succeeds in proving ownership but, again, that is not punishment of Charlie - his loss was at the hands of Bob, not the state or Alice.
No, One cannot lawfully do this in Ohio Historic Common Law In English common law, granting a share of a future legal judgement was prohibited as Champerty According to the Wikipedia article just linked: Champerty (from Old French champart) is the financial support, by a party not naturally concerned in the suit, of a plaintiff that allows them to prosecute a lawsuit on condition that, if it be brought to a successful issue, the plaintiff will repay them with a share of the proceed from the suit.{&quot;Oxford English Dictionary&quot;. www.oed.com. Oxford University Press. Retrieved 14 January 2021.} In Giles v Thompson{ UKHL 2, [1993] 3 All ER 321 (26 May 1993)} Lord Justice Steyn declared: &quot;In modern idiom maintenance is the support of litigation by a stranger without just cause. Champerty is an aggravated form of maintenance. The distinguishing feature of champerty is the support of litigation by a stranger in return for a share of the proceeds.&quot; At common law, maintenance and champerty were both crimes and torts, as was barratry (the bringing of vexatious litigation). This is generally no longer so1 as, during the nineteenth century, the development of legal ethics tended to obviate the risks to the public, particularly after the scandal of the Swynfen will case (1856–1864).2 However, the principles are relevant to modern contingent fee agreements between a lawyer and a client and to the assignment by a plaintiff of his rights in a lawsuit to someone with no connection to the case. Champertous contracts can still, depending on jurisdiction, be void for public policy or attract liability for costs. In any common-law jurisdiction that inherited the common law of England (which includes all US states other than Louisiana) champerty will remain unlawful unless a) a specific stature has removed or altered this part of the common law, b) a general statute has done away with the common law entirely, replacing it with statutory law generally (in which case a similar prohibition may or may not be in statute), or c) an appellate court has declared that champerty is no longer unlawful in that jurisdiction. Ohio In Ohio a case precisely on point was Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St.3d 121, 2003-Ohio-2721.. In that case a Ms. Rancman, who had a valid claim against an insurance company, did not wish to wait for the resolution of her case, and contracted with Interim Settlement Funding Corp. for an advance against the settlement of $6,000, in return for a promise of an amount ranging from $16,800 to $27,600, depending on how soon the case was resolved. If she lost the case, she would owe nothing according to the terms of the contract. When her insurance case settled for $100,000, she refused to pay as specified in the contract, instead offering to return the money advanced plus interest at eight percent per year. The lower courts upheld the eight percent rate as valid, The Ohio Supreme Court, however, held (at ¶19}) that: The advances made to Rancman constituted champerty and maintenance. Consequently, the contracts requiring their repayment are void and shall not be enforced. Apparently this left Interim Funding not even getting their principal back. Given this relatively recent holding (2003), one doubts that funding companies would be willing to advance money on future Ohio claims. In the Rancman opinion Justice O’Connor wrote: {¶9} It is unnecessary for the resolution of this case to determine the threshold level of risk necessary for a contingent advance to be treated as an investment rather than a loan. The advances here are void as champerty and maintenance regardless of whether they are loans or investments. {Emphasis added} {¶10} “Maintenance” is assistance to a litigant in pursuing or defending a lawsuit provided by someone who does not have a bona fide interest in the case. “Champerty” is a form of maintenance in which a nonparty undertakes to further another’s interest in a suit in exchange for a part of the litigated matter if a favorable result ensues. 14 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1995), Champerty and Maintenance, Section 1. The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were developed at common law to prevent officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by vexatious and speculative litigation which would disturb the peace of society, lead to corrupt practices, and prevent the remedial process of the law.” 14 Corpus Juris Secondum (1991), Champerty and Maintenance, Section 3. See, also, Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A. (2000), 94 N.Y.2d 726, 709 N.Y.S.2d 865, 731 N.E.2d 581. {¶11} The ancient practices of champerty and maintenance have been vilified in Ohio since the early years of our statehood. Key v. Vattier (1823), 1 Ohio 132, 136, 1823 WL 8. We stated in Key that maintenance “is an offense against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and contention, and perverts the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppression.” Id. at 143. We have held the assignment of rights to a lawsuit to be void as champerty. Brown v. Ginn (1902), 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N.E. 123, paragraph two of the syllabus. We have also said that the law of Ohio will tolerate no lien in or out of the [legal] profession, as a general rule, which will prevent litigants from compromising, or settling their controversies, or which, in its tendencies, encourages, promotes, or extends litigation. (Davy v. Fid. &amp; Cas. Ins. Co. (1908), 78 Ohio St. 256, 268-269, 85 N.E. 504.) {¶12} In recent years, champerty and maintenance have lain dormant in Ohio courts. Historically, champertors and maintainors were attorneys, and these practices by attorneys have been regulated by DR 5-103 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 36, 553 N.E.2d 1082. Nonetheless, the codification of these doctrines for attorney discipline did not remove them from the common law. “[T]he doctrines of champerty and maintenance appear in numerous Ohio cases as contract defenses * * *.” Tosi v. Jones (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 396, 400, 685 N.E.2d 580, appeal dismissed upon the application of appellant in (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 1430, 676 N.E.2d 535. ... {¶18} ...[A] lawsuit is not an investment vehicle. Speculating in lawsuits is prohibited by Ohio law. An intermeddler is not permitted to gorge upon the fruits of litigation Ohio Conclusion To be clear, noting that I found in Ohio law makes such an agreement a crime, even though it was on under ancient common law. In the Rancman case, it seems that no one was criminally prosecuted. Such an agreement is not legal in Ohio only in the sense that the court will not enforce it. Thus no funding company who checks the law would, I expect, enter into such an agreement and risk the same fate as Interim Settlement, not even getting the money advanced back when the suit had been won by the plaintiff. Nor is this case obscure -- a simple google search found it via the Wikipedia article, and other simple searches probably would also. Notes Abolished by Part II of the [UK] Criminal Law Act 1967, except as regards embracery, abolished by section 17 of the Bribery Act 2010. Pue, W. W. (1990). &quot;Moral panic at the English Bar: Paternal vs. commercial ideologies of legal practice in the 1860s&quot;. Law and Social Inquiry. 15 (1): 49–118. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.1990.tb00275.x