What does &quot;may&quot; mean when used as a verb in a text of law in the US? Possibility or guarantee? What does &quot;may&quot; mean when used as a verb in a text of law in the US? For example, if the law say &quot;X may do Y&quot;, is it guaranteed that X can do Y, or does that mean that perhaps the judge or whoever has the decision power will grant the X the right to do Y, but not this isn't sure at all? Actual example from 8 C.F.R. 316.5(c)(1)(i) (see emphasis): (c) Disruption of continuity of residence - (1) Absence from the United States - (i) For continuous periods of between six (6) months and one (1) year. Absences from the United States for continuous periods of between six (6) months and one (1) year during the periods for which continuous residence is required under § 316.2 (a)(3) and (a)(6) shall disrupt the continuity of such residence for purposes of this part unless the applicant can establish otherwise to the satisfaction of the Service. This finding remains valid even if the applicant did not apply for or otherwise request a nonresident classification for tax purposes, did not document an abandonment of lawful permanent resident status, and is still considered a lawful permanent resident under immigration laws. The types of documentation which may establish that the applicant did not disrupt the continuity of his or her residence in the United States during an extended absence include, but are not limited to, evidence that during the absence: (A) The applicant did not terminate his or her employment in the United States; (B) The applicant's immediate family remained in the United States; (C) The applicant retained full access to his or her United States abode; or (D) The applicant did not obtain employment while abroad. In this example, if one satisfies A, B, C, or D, is one guaranteed not to disrupt the continuity of my residence for the purpose of naturalization?
&quot;May&quot; means &quot;is possible&quot; and not &quot;is necessary&quot;. The specific law does not say anything about a person doing A, B or C and it does not say that if you do one of A, B or C then something mandatorily follows. It asserts that certain types of documentation &quot;can&quot; be used as evidence supporting the proposition that the applicant did not disrupt continuous residence, but it also asserts (without giving any further hints) that other things may be used. This law does not state necessary or sufficient conditions for establishing undisrupted continuous residence. It is not hard to construct a scenario where a person moves back to their home country and ran for public office there, but failed to quit the US job. In light of compelling evidence that they actually moved back home, failure to quite your US job is not proof that you remained in the US. Proof resides in the totality of evidence, not just the admissibility of a single fact. Doing one or more of (A-D) is no guarantee of anything.
Both the Due Process Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause impose meaningful limits on states' ability to tax income on residents. The Due Process Clause requires &quot;minimum contacts&quot; between the state and the taxpayer. Under the Due Process Clause, states may only tax a nonresident's income when there is a &quot;some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” North Carolina Dept. of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2019). Despite the word &quot;minimum,&quot; there isn't any fixed threshold at which contacts become sufficient to permit a state to impose a tax. Instead, the courts will ask whether the state's assertion of jurisdiction to tax the person offends &quot;traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.&quot; A critical question in this analysis will be whether the taxpayer enjoyed the &quot;benefits and protection&quot; of the state in connection with the subject of the tax. In your examples, then, you can probably guess how the courts would view each transaction. If you are a Connecticut resident but perform a $5,000 job in New York, you have physically entered New York, likely conducted business with another New York entity, and you can go to the New York courts if the other party breaches the contract by which you earned the money. You have meaningful contacts with the state and enjoy the protection of its laws, so the state is permitted to impose a tax on the income from that transaction. But if you drive from New York to California, your presence in each state is likely highly transient. You pay tolls for using the highways and sales taxes for lunch or something, but you aren't generating any income from those transactions. Your presence in New Jersey would not, for instance, entitle you to go into New Jersey courts to sue for a breach of your New York contract. New Jersey has no meaningful connection to that income, so it may not tax it. But contrast that with your lunch purchase, which creates sufficient connections to New Jersey to permit it to tax that transaction: you are physically in New Jersey, you are protected by New Jersey's food-safety laws, and you can go into New Jersey courts if Burger King intentionally poisons you. So the state can impose a sales tax on that transaction, but not income tax on out-of-state transactions. The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing the &quot;unfair burden&quot; of double taxation on interstate commerce. The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits the states from regulating, restricting, or substantially burdening interstate commerce without the consent of Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear time and time again that income taxes violate the Dormant Commerce Clause when they create a risk of double taxation that doesn't exist for taxpayers with no out-of-state business: Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) (“Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids.”) Gwin, White &amp; Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 440 (1939) (“Such a multiplication of state taxes, each measured by the volume of the commerce, would reestablish the barriers to interstate trade which it was the object of the commerce clause to remove.”) Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801-2 (2015) (“The tax schemes held to be unconstitutional ... had the potential to result in the discriminatory double taxation of income earned out of state and created a powerful incentive to engage in intrastate rather than interstate economic activity.”) So even though New York and Connecticut have sufficient contacts from a due-process perspective to permit both of them to tax your business, they many not tax all of your income if not all of it if another state has a claim to it as well. This has of course led to debates over exactly how much of your income New York and Connecticut is entitled to, and the question only gets more complex for businesses with larger footprints. Amazon, for instance, is doing business in every state and territory, so how do we divide its income among the 50+ entities looking to take a bite of those hundreds of billions of dollars in income? For quite a long time, most states used a three-factor calculation that apportioned income among the states based on how much of they taxpayer's property, payroll, and sales were in each state. Oversimplified, this means that if you had 5 percent of your property in New York, 40 percent of your payroll in New York, and 15 percent of your sales in New York, that would average out to 20 percent, so you would pay New York taxes on 20 percent of your income. Over time, the three-factor apportionment method has fallen out of favor, and many states adopted other methods -- especially calculations that more heavily weight the sales factor -- to encourage economic development. Because most large companies have only a small portion of their sales in almost any given state, they can substantially reduce their tax bills by setting up their headquarters in a state that is going to ignore the value of their real estate, equipment, and payroll when calculating their tax bills. tl;dr: Under the Due Process Clause, a state can't impose tax on anything it doesn't have some meaningful connection to. Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the states have to find a way to make split up taxes that they might share a claim to.
The law only addresses possible legal consequences, from which you could surmise what actually happens. If a person stops paying rent, the landlord institutes eviction proceedings, and may sue for the remainder of the rent for the term of the lease: they have an obligation to try to find a replacement tenant, to mitigate the damage. Some relief is available to the landlord in the deposit, from which the unpaid rent might be deducted, but let's assume that after that, the actual damage suffered is $5,000. When you sue a person in your home state, the court serves official notice that the defendant must appear to answer the charges, and the state has jurisdiction over the respondent because they are in that state. Giving notice and collecting on a judgment across jurisdictions can get complicated and expensive, so it would depend on what kind of treaties exist between the countries. There is the Hague Service Convention which may simplify the business of giving notice to parties, which works if the respondent fled to Norway or India but not if they fled to Somalia or Turkmenistan. Since it turns out the US is not party to any multinational treaty recognizing foreign judgments, that country is not obligated to care about a US judgment, so unless the person left assets in the US, you may not be able to collect. You could sue in the person's country (hire a local attorney to pursue the matter). The main legal question would be whether there is any conflict between the lease and local law: while the basic idea of a lease is universally recognized, there may be peculiar conditions or procedures applicable in that country. (Norway has some laws pertaining to "shared utilities" which don't exist in the US, which might put a US lease at odds with Norwegian law, and there are rent-raising rules that don't exist here). It might be necessary that you appear in court in that country to swear under oath that the lease was agreed to voluntarily, or the court may require a special form of 'notarization' not available in the US. None of that renders international litigation impossible, though a favorable judgment might be unlikely in some courts. The cost of litigation might be much higher than what would be awarded by a court.
A good starting point would be the SCOTUS opinion, or everything on SCOTUSblog, especially the application for injunctive relief filed on Aug. 30. There is a long sequence of petitions and orders which ask the courts either to issue an injunction preventing the law from taking force, or to vacate an administrative stay of proceedings by the lower court regarding petitioner's challenge. The lower court denied the petitions, therefore petitioners turn to SCOTUS to get an injunction against the law. Then you can turn to the SCOTUS opinion to see what the reasons were, for and against the petition. The majority position is that an applicant must carry the burden of making a “strong showing” that it is “likely to succeed on the merits,” that it will be “irreparably injured absent a stay,” that the balance of the equities favors it, and that a stay is consistent with the public interest. The majority concludes that The applicants now before us have raised serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the Texas law at issue. But their application also presents complex and novel antecedent procedural questions on which they have not carried their burden. Immediately after this the court comments that federal courts enjoy the power to enjoin individuals tasked with enforcing laws, not the laws themselves. However, it is unclear whether the named defendants in this lawsuit can or will seek to enforce the Texas law against the applicants in a manner that might permit our intervention The law states that Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who and the named respondents (government workers of various sorts) all appear to be precluded from filing an action – thus an injunction against the judge is superfluous since he cannot file a lawsuit anyhow. It is also unclear whether SCOTUS can issue an injunction against state judges asked to decide a lawsuit under Texas’s law. When SCOTUS say &quot;it is unclear&quot; in this context, they mean that petitions did not adequately demonstrate that the court can in fact issue such an injunction. It's not that SCOTUS cannot decide such matters after extensive consideration of the facts / arguments and discussion, it's that the standards for an emergency action require something that the court found lacking in the petition: we cannot say the applicants have met their burden to prevail in an injunction or stay application. In reaching this conclusion, we stress that we do not purport to resolve definitively any jurisdictional or substantive claim in the applicants’ lawsuit.
New Jersey has jurisdiction under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-10 provided that at the time the cause of action arose, either party was a bona fide resident of this State, and has continued so to be down to the time of the commencement of the action; except that no action for absolute divorce or dissolution of a civil union shall be commenced for any cause other than adultery, unless one of the parties has been for the 1 year next preceding the commencement of the action a bona fide resident of this State; (which if you undo the contorted writing, mean one of you must be a resident for a year, except if the cause is adultery). Under this scenario, the wife did not continue to be a resident of NJ, so it is crucial that the husband be a bona fide resident. The problem is that there is no general law defining residency for all legal purposes, instead, residency is defined on a law-by-law basis (or, not defined). 52:14-7 which imposes a residency requirement on state employees says that a person may have at most one principal residence, and the state of a person's principal residence means the state (1) where the person spends the majority of the person's nonworking time, and (2) which is most clearly the center of the person's domestic life, and (3) which is designated as the person's legal address and legal residence for voting. The husband is apparently an NJ resident under (1) and probably (2), and possibly (3). It would not matter whether he was living in that particular house, the question was whether he was living in the state (presumably yes since otherwise you would have said "he moved out of the state"). Voter registration, another measure of residency, requires 30 days living in NJ (and is itself proof of residency). Another way of determining residency is via state income tax. You are a full time resident if New Jersey was not your domicile, but you maintained a permanent home in New Jersey for the entire year and you spent more than 183 days in New Jersey or New Jersey was your domicile for the entire year, as long as it's not the case that You did not spend more than 30 days in New Jersey You did maintain a permanent home outside New Jersey You did not maintain a permanent home in New Jersey Under tax law, the husband is a resident. Failure to get an NJ license is itself against the law, so that would not be a valid argument that the husband is not a resident. Owning a business in another state also does not negate residency.
Can a state make a law that deputizes individuals to sue individuals in other states? This question (apart from the question below that implicates federalism concerns about a sister state court process in the secondary question below) would be resolved by the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and choice of law. A state can have a law that authorizes a lawsuit for non-judicial system conduct against a non-resident of the state if it meets the requirements of &quot;long arm jurisdiction.&quot; The most succinct description of this requirement is that the person being sued &quot;personally availed themselves&quot; of the laws of the state whose law authorizes the lawsuit, in a manner that would reasonably be understood to subject that person to the state's legal authority. This could involve a lawsuit against someone outside the state arising from an incident that took place in the state. It could also involve a lawsuit against someone who took tortious action directed at a state or people in a state that caused harm, or a lawsuit arising from a business transaction that could reasonably be considered doing business in the state imposing that law. Constitutional law requirements on &quot;choice of law&quot; require that the state or foreign jurisdiction whose law is applied to a question in a dispute must have some meaningful connection to the disputed issue (subject to the backdrop rule that the law of a jurisdiction other than the forum where a case is litigated is presumed to be identical to that of the law of the state where the case is being litigated if no party provides any evidence or legal authorities to the contrary). Case law on state level qui tam litigation (which involve statutes that empower private individuals to sue someone who has wronged the government on its behalf for a share of the amount recovered for the government), the case law regarding private criminal prosecutions that are available in a handful of U.S. states, and some California consumer protection laws (which authorize suits without personal showing of actual damages in some cases when there are fraudulent advertisements) might also be relevant. So would the authority granted to bail bondsmen that is similar to law enforcement authority but limited to people authorized a person posting a bail bond for a criminal defendant who is subject to that authority. Concretely, if the constitutionality of the Texas law was upheld&lt;1&gt;, Texas probably can authorize a lawsuit against a California resident who would be involved in an abortion that took place in Texas that was illegal under Texas law. And, a judgment from a Texas court in a case like that would probably be entitled to full faith and credit in California. But, Texas probably couldn't constitutionally authorize a lawsuit against a California resident in connection with an abortion that took place in California. There would be, of course, many edge cases with no close past precedents, where the application of constitutional jurisdiction and choice of law limitations would be far less clear. &lt;1&gt; The majority opinion by five conservative justices other than the Chief Justice deciding not to stay enforcement of the law specifically limits itself to whether the proper parties were joined to the request to enjoin the statute and states &quot;this order is not based on any conclusion about the constitutionality of Texas’s law, and in no way limits other procedurally proper challenges to the Texas law, including in Texas state courts.&quot; A decision that has not been resolved on the merits. The Courts have merely declined to stay enforcement of the law pending the current litigation over the law's validity. Upholding the law on the merits would require courts to overturn existing precedents related to abortion restrictions and other legal issues. Is there any extra legal barrier that would prevent states with pro-choice legislatures from passing laws designed to counter the anti-abortion deputies? For example, California could pass a law that deputizes private California individuals to sue people who sue abortion providers, and could reimburse their court costs up to $10,000. This seems to be a separate question from the question in the title. A law of this character would probably not be upheld. Basically, it would make a state authorized legal process in one state's courts, actionable as illegal in another state. Generally speaking, interference in another state's legal process would either violate the &quot;dormant commerce clause&quot;, or the &quot;full faith and credit clause&quot;, or constitutional limits on jurisdiction and choice of law, or constitutional standing limitations (even though they don't apply in the same way in state courts as in federal courts, or the &quot;due process clause&quot; of the 5th or 14th Amendments, or the &quot;privileges and immunities clause.&quot; The exact legal theory isn't clear because there is really not history of litigation over this kind of legislation and you'd need to resort to vaguely analogous cases. The effort of Texas to litigate Pennsylvania election law administration following the 2020 election was recently dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court for lack of standing and that is suggestive of how this case might be resolved, even though it isn't strictly analogous. It is also informed by the long standing common law rule, that could conceivably have constitutional dimensions, that litigants participating in a court process in good faith are immune from collateral litigation in another lawsuit over their conduct in the original lawsuit. There isn't a lot of precedent one way or the other with laws having this kind of purpose, and none on a law exactly in this form. Indeed, a dissenting opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday by the Chief Justice and two of the liberal justices (with which the third liberal justice states he agrees without formally joining that opinion) stated that: The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unusual, but unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the populace at large. The last time there was significant litigation of laws with a similar purpose that were adjudicated was in the pre-U.S. Civil War period in abolition of slavery oriented legislation. But, the post-Civil War amendments to the U.S. Constitution and subsequent development of constitutional case law would render most precedents from that time period infirm.
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that such a change could be made by executive order, or indeed by legislation, rather than by amendment, yes, the change could and would have to have an effective date, and apply only to persons born after that date. Indeed that would still be true if such a change were made by constitutional amendment. Consider, people whose parents (or one of whose parents) are US citizens, but who are born outside of the US, are or may become citizens (by statute), but only if the citizen parent complies with certain rules specifying a minimum period of residence in the US, and other conditions. Those periods and conditions have changed over the years, and each such change had an effective date. If such a change could be made but could not be made with an effective date, then it would apply retroactively, and deprive people who are already citizens of their citizenship. There is no valid equal protection claim, because the same rules apply to both individuals, they merely give different results for the different birth dates. (See my answer to this question for why I do not think such a change would be valid except by Constitutional Amendment.) EDIT: I suppose such a changed interpretation, if made at all, might take the position that such births never did validly convey citizen ship, and all people whose parents were not validly in the country had never been citizens. That strikes me as even less likely to pass judicial review, but one cannot know what the Supreme Court will do when faced with a truly novel situation.
A question like that is impossible to answer in general, but your question includes some incorrect assumptions. Many countries try to prevent visitors to become de-facto residents through repeated visits. For instance, the Schengen area limits visitors on short-stay visa to 90 days out of every 180-day rolling window, and the UK seems to give their immigration officials more discretion on every re-entry. Many countries give political asylum to people who are persecuted in their home country. A pandemic, or generally bad living conditions, do not count as persecution. Many countries give refugee status to people who have to flee war or disaster in their home country. The default case for these rules is a person who is in danger and wants to travel to a safe country. Then there are rules for force majeure when a person in the country is forced to overstay through no fault of their own. How that is handled usually depends on how cooperative the visitor was at securing a timely return or a visa extension. During the early days of the pandemic, there have been blanket extensions in some countries. As travel re-opened, these have run out. One of the differences between the last three bullet points is how long the stay is permitted. Political asylum tends to be for the long term, refugee status lasts until the end of the disaster, and a force majeure exception might just last a few days. So if this is not just a hypothetical question, contact a lawyer or the immigration authorities where you are now. Generic answers on Stackexchange cannot replace specific, professional advice.