Under what circumstances can a military officer relieve a superior officer of command? There seem to be at least a few crimes for which a lower-ranked officer can relieve a higher-ranked officer of command, most notably treason. While the lower-ranked officer would surely be highly scrutinized for taking such an action, it does seem a legal means of removing an officer of higher rank for criminal acts. What are those circumstances/crimes/accusations under which an officer of the United States Armed Forces can relieve a higher-ranked officer, without the involvement of an officer of higher rank than the one being removed?
Only in the “most unusual and extraordinary circumstances” &quot;conceivable&quot; Respect for the chain of command is central to the armed services. As a result, lower ranked officers generally cannot relieve a higher ranked officers of command. Instead, they must work through the chain of command, taking their complaints to their superior's superior. To do otherwise is usually considered mutiny. As far as I know, the only service that has made formal provisions for this is the Navy. This makes sense, given that ships at sea may be out of contact for extended periods. The Navy regulations involving a subordinate can relieve a superior of command are found in § 1088. Relief of a Commanding Officer by a Subordinate of Chapter 10: Precedence, Authority and Command of the US Navy Regulations, issued by the Secretary of the Navy. Here is what that sections says: In the “most unusual and extraordinary circumstances,” a commanding officer can be relieved only by the “next in succession to command.” The problem must be so “obvious and clear” that any “reasonable, prudent and experienced officer” could reach only a “single conclusion:” that leaving the officer in command would “seriously and irretrievably prejudice the public interests.” Unless it is a “undoubtedly impractical,” the subordinate cannot act “without the approval of…higher authority...” The subordinate can act only after “much careful consideration” and after an “exhaustive investigation of all the circumstances…” The decision “must be based upon…substantial evidence,” and supported by “the official views of others in a position to form valid opinions…” Any subordinate who relieves a superior will “bear the legitimate responsibility for…such action,” and “must be prepared to justify…” it.
This particular list of excluded branches seems to refer to those who are able to excercise whistleblowing protections through the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. It does not mean that employees excluded by these rules would be unable to whistleblow at all. Rather, the government channels through which they are able to seek protection are likely through a different office. In so far as I can tell, USOSC might restrict the FBI from protection services because they protect employees who go to the Media. FBI agents often handle classified material which would not be allowed to be disclosed to the media and many intel agency employees are required to submit any documents they intend to publish based off knowledge aquired from their employment for a pre-publishing review to make sure no classified material is leaked, and would thus limit the way the employee could whistleblow. Just because this particular office does not provide protection services to the listed employees, it does not mean there is an agency or department that does provide them (Usually the Office of General Inspector for the particular agency in question. While they are attached to the agency they cover, they are not within the chain of command of the agency itself and are independent to them.). For that reason, just because the rules that apply to most do not cover FBI Whistle Blowers, it does not mean an FBI employee cannot become a whistle blower. They just cannot use the services of USOSC in their whistleblowing efforts.
There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest.
There is an important distinction between moral duty and legal obligation. Even if an officer should arrest a person, given some moral standard, they are not legally obligated to do so. A test for legal obligation is whether an choice results in a negative legal outcome – is the officer sued or criminally penalized for acting or not acting? Unsurprisingly, the answer to the legal question is highly dependent on jurisdiction. I only consider US jurisdiction here (which incidently is not a single coherent jurisdiction, it is a phylum of jurisdictions), though some aspects of the answer extend to other countries. The clearest cases are obligations to not act in a certain way – prohibitions. Police may not beat a suspect in order to obtain information. Period, end of story, no discretion. There is a putative bright line that police cannot cross, namely violating an individual's rights, and that constitutes a major exception to the doctrine of police immunity. If X is a clearly established right, police cannot violate that right and if they do, they can be sued or even prosecuted. Sometimes courts &quot;discover&quot; a particular right in a certain case, so the individual (plaintiff in a civil case) may be vindicated but the officer will not be subject to legal sanctions, since LEOs are not held to be appellate court justices who can divine the future discover of a legal right. 18 USC 242 statutorily describes certain circumstances where a choice is criminally proscribed, and 42 USC 1983 allows for civil suits. This pertains to things that an officer does, saying what an officer does not legally have the discretion to perform an act. Now setting aside proscriptions where &quot;you may not...&quot;, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits civil or criminal actions against the government (including LEOs) unless a specific exception has been carved out. I recommend this (open access) journal issue on Discretion in Law Enforcement. There do exist statutory obligations to act imposed on LEOs, for example see this AG legal opinion from Florida, stating that A law enforcement officer, including a police officer, has a legal duty to provide aid to ill, injured, and distressed persons who are not in police custody during an emergency whether the law enforcement officer is on-duty or acting in a law enforcement capacity off-duty. A famous case regarding (non)liability for police inaction is Castle Rock v. Gonzales. In this case, police declined to enforce a Temporary restraining order (TRO) against plaintiff's estranged husband (who then murdered the children). The Supreme Court observes that the Due Process Clause does not “requir[e] the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors” and also noted the lack of express statutory obligation to enforce that law. In Everton v. Willard, the Florida Supreme Court addressed the question of whether discretionary police power authority to make or not make an arrest and whether a decision not to take an individual into custody constitutes a basic judgmental or decision-making function that is immune from tort liability and they do hold that the decision of whether to enforce the law by making an arrest is a basic judgmental or discretionary governmental function that is immune from suit, regardless of whether the decision is made by the officer on the street, by his sergeant, lieutenant or captain, or by the sheriff or chief of police There have been disagreements on sovereign immunity, for example Huhn v. Dixie Insurance Co., 453 So. 2d 70, which held that when an individual suffers a direct, personal injury proximately caused by the negligence of a municipal employee while acting within the scope of his employment, the injured individual is entitled to redress for the wrong done (the relevant action was not arresting a person for DUI). As employees of the government, LEOs are subject to the over-arching rules of their employer. They may be ordered by their superiors to refrain from arresting a law-breaker during a riot, on the grounds that doing so will exacerbate a tense situation. The police department might be sued for such a decision, but it is unlikely that the government will be held liable for an essentially political decision. Likewise, enforcement of &quot;no public camping&quot; laws is highly variable, and the courts will most likely not sanction a city for not arresting homeless people who are camping on public property in violation of the law.
2019 Manual for Courts-Martial, Rule 916(h): (h) Coercion or duress. It is a defense to any offense except killing an innocent person that the accused’s participation in the offense was caused by a reasonable apprehension that the accused or another innocent person would be immediately killed or would immediately suffer serious bodily injury if the accused did not commit the act. The apprehension must reasonably continue throughout the commission of the act. If the accused has any reasonable opportunity to avoid committing the act without subjecting the accused or another innocent person to the harm threatened, this defense shall not apply. So, if your hypothetical soldier asserts they had a reasonable apprehension that they would have immediately suffered serious bodily injury if they didn't reveal the intelligence, then they should not be convicted by a court-martial, unless the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that this was not the case (Rule 916 (b)(1)).
The consequences for the US are perhaps better addressed at Politics; if you're really interested in those consequences, you can re-post this question there. For the police officer shooting a diplomat, the officer may be charged under state law, whatever is normal for an incident of this type; it doesn't matter whether the person is a US citizen or a diplomat or any other kind of alien, regardless of immigration status or lack thereof. If the person is a diplomat, however, the officer is also liable to be prosecuted under federal law, namely 18 USC 1116, which makes it a crime to kill, among others, a "foreign official"; the definition of that term includes any person of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United States as an officer or employee of a foreign government or international organization, and who is in the United States on official business, and any member of his family whose presence in the United States is in connection with the presence of such officer or employee. The characterization of the response "just been revoked" as "clearly legal" is inaccurate; a police officer has no power to revoke diplomatic immunity. In fact, only the diplomat's own country can waive this immunity. The United States cannot do so; it can only expel the diplomat.
There are instances when the testimony may still be admitted. For example, a deposition may be admitted at trial either for impeaching or when a witness cannot attend, which involves the circumstance of death (FRCP 32(a)(4)(a)). Additionally, regarding hearsay, there are numerous exceptions. My Evidence professor said in class "If you cannot find a way to get evidence around a hearsay objection, you are not trying hard enough." One such hearsay exception states in the committee notes: Accordingly, the committee has amended rule 803(8) to refer to the provision of [proposed] rule 804(b)(5) [deleted], which allows the admission of such reports, records or other statements where the police officer or other law enforcement officer is unavailable because of death, then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity, or not being successfully subject to legal process.
england-and-wales Initially, one should comply with the officer's instructions as he has the power under statutory Stop &amp; Search powers to detain someone for the purpose of the search (discussed here). Failure to do so may be an offence. If, subsequently, one considers the search and detention was unlawful, the first port of call is to lodge a complaint with the relevant police force who - depending on the circumstances - may escalate the complaint to the Independent Office for Police Conduct IOPC. You can complain directly to the police/other organisation (see ‘Who can I complain about?’ below for a list of the other organisations) or via the IOPC. If you complain via the IOPC, your complaint will be sent direct to the organisation involved. They will assess your complaint and contact you about how it will be handled. The IOPC will not be involved with this initial assessment of your complaint. If the complaint is found to be valid, then any offence committed by not complying with the office would (in all probability) be overturned on appeal. As well as any compensation awarded by the court, the Chief Constable may consider making an ex gratia payment (mentioned here). Note that there is no obligation to do anything if the interaction falls within the Stop &amp; Account provisions.