Can you be made a citizen against your will and extradited? Can someone who does not consider himself a US citizen be extradited and punished for a US felony crime due to a US citizenship? I was fascinated by the above linked question. Most of the material in response seemed to be about the idea that a person committed a crime in fact rather than by intention, and so their belief that they were not a US citizen was not legally important. But, I wondered, since it was also stated that whether you are a citizen of a country is not a matter of your own opinion but of the laws of the country - could the US make a person a US citizen specifically to be able to charge them with a crime and possibly extradite them. I think I am asking: is it really entirely up to the country to proclaim someone a citizen? When can you renounce citizenship? Einstein famously renounced German citizenship in 1896 when he was still a minor. One of the comments had an example that is spot on --The Lord Haw-Haw case after the 2nd WW. An American who became a Naturalized German, was tried for and convicted of treason as a British citizen because the British declared that he was one. The moral justification for this does not concern me here. Just, that that was the legal ruling. He got the death penalty. So that pretty much covers the spectrum here.
You can be extradited from Country A to Country B even if you are a citizen of neither. What matters is whether B can convince A to do it, which is typically on the basis of a treaty between them as well as provisions of both country's domestic criminal law. If you committed a crime in B, then fled to A, your nationality is relevant to the extent that: A might not extradite its own citizens, if you are a citizen of A A might have an agreement with C, if you are a citizen of C, that C should have the chance to proscute you instead of B. (This is the Petruhhin doctrine in the case where A and C are EU countries and B is not.) But you do not have to be a national of B in order for it to have jurisdiction over you in B's domestic criminal law - just as if you were still in B, they could arrest you in the normal way. They are thus entitled to request A's authorities to arrest you in A, and transfer you to B. If your alleged crime was not in B, then their claim over you has to be on the basis that their domestic criminal law allows prosecution extraterritorially. This was the case when B was Spain, A was the United Kingdom, and the criminal was former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet; while his status as a former head of state was relevant, as was whether the crimes were extraterritorial offences in the UK as well, his lack of Spanish nationality was not. A more topical example is B being the United States, A the United Kingdom, and the arrestee being Julian Assange, an Australian who is alleged to have committed various crimes under U.S. law (while not necessarily having been present in the U.S. at the time). While all extradition relationships are different, a common thread of the criminal law in general is that what matters is the circumstances at the time of the alleged acts. Retroactively making you a citizen of B may not be satisfactory to A, to the extent that A's criminal law disallows making anything illegal retroactively. The supposed nationality grant by B might trigger provision's of A's domestic extradition law concerning requirements of due process, lack of political interference, and so on, and block the action. But equally, renouncing your citizenship of B does not extinguish B's claim over you for acts you did while you were a citizen of B. This is again a feature of typical criminal law.
This is the cited article. Thankfully, the interviewee provided a scan of the police letter he received, so the rest of this question is relatively easy to answer. He was specifically charged with Störung der öffentlichen Ordnung (lit. Disturbance of the public order) persuant to &sect;&nbsp;81(1) of the Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, which reads (after putting it through Google Translate): Who by a behavior that is likely to arouse legitimate annoyance, disturbs public order, commits an administrative offense and is punishable by a fine of up to 500 euros, unless the behavior is justified, in particular by the use of a constitutionally guaranteed right , In the event of aggravating circumstances, instead of a fine, imprisonment can be imprisoned for up to one week, or up to two weeks for repeated offenses. This law is almost certainly constitutional as it specifically allows exercise of constitutional rights. Note this also includes human rights, as Austria has included the European Convention on Human Rights as part of its constitution. Given that, I'm guessing if the interviewee had wanted to, he would have had a decent shot at having this charge dismissed.
In the case of United States vs Wong Kim Ark 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (a 6-2 decision), the Supreme Court wrote: [T]he real object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, &quot;All persons born in the United States&quot; by the addition &quot;and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,&quot; would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words (besides children of members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government, unknown to the common law), the two classes of cases -- children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State -- both of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England and by our own law from the time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country. ... [T]he Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory, in the allegiance and under the protection of the country, including all children here born of resident aliens, with the exceptions or qualifications (as old as the rule itself) of children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers, or born on foreign public ships, or of enemies within and during a hostile occupation of part of our territory, and with the single additional exception of children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes. The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born, within the territory of the United States, of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States. ... To hold that the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution excludes from citizenship the children, born in the United States, of citizens or subjects of other countries would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States. In short the phrase “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” excludes three and only three groups of people: Children born to foreign diplomats here on diplomatic business, who have diplomatic immunity to US Law; Children of members of an invading army that has occupied and controlled some part of US territory, born on that occupied area, who are obviously not subject to US Law (which has rarely happened in the US, although Guam was occupied during WWII, and parts of Alaska, and small parts of Maine during the War of 1812); and Members of Native American tribes, subject to the jurisdiction of their tribal governments, who do not pay US taxes. (This was true when the 14th amendment was passed, but it no longer is. See section below on the act that changed it in 1924.) Any other person born in the proper US or in incorporated US territory is a citizen, no matter who his or her parents are or were. (The case is less clear for unincorporated US territory.) See also the Wikipedia article on the case This view was confirmed in 1995 in an opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel written by then-Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, taking the position that this rule could not be changed by legislation, only by Constitutional Amendment, writing: My office grapples with many difficult and close issues of constitutional law. The lawfulness of this bill is not among them. This legislation is unquestionably unconstitutional. The Fourteenth Amendment declares that “[a]ll persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The unmistakable purpose of this provision was to constitutionalize the existing Anglo-American common law rule of jus soli or citizenship by place of birth and especially to extend it to persons of African descent and their descendants. In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) the Supreme Court of the United States struck down both a state statute denying funding for education to children in the United States illegally and a municipal school district's attempt to charge an annual $1,000 tuition fee for each student. The case upheld the same principle that the constitutional phrase &quot;within the jurisdiction&quot; applies to the children of people who had entered the US illegally. According to the Wikipedia article on the case: Texas officials had argued that illegal aliens were not &quot;within the jurisdiction&quot; of the state and thus could not claim protections under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court majority rejected this claim, finding instead that &quot;no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment 'jurisdiction' can be drawn between resident immigrants whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident immigrants whose entry was unlawful.&quot; The dissenting opinion also rejected this claim, agreeing with the Court that &quot;the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to immigrants who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically 'within the jurisdiction' of a state.&quot; Thus the question of whether such aliens were &quot;within the jurisdiction&quot; of the US was very much at issue in Plyler v. Doe EDIT: Since the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 was passed, all Native Americans born within the US have been citizens by birth, and the third class of exceptions noted in the earlier cases non longer exists. Prior to this act Native Americans were in many ways treated as foreigners by the US. They were not citizens by birth, and their tribes had some but not all of the attributes of independent nations. The text of the law is: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all non citizen Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens of the United States: Provided That the granting of such citizenship shall not in any manner impair or otherwise affect the right of any Indian to tribal or other property. (End edit on Indian Citizenship Act of 1924) Edit: On reading through the decision of the case of Wong Kim Ark I find one more small exclusion: persons born on board a foreign naval ship, even though present in US waters in time of peace, are not citizens of the US because of their birth location. This is apparently not a usual case, but is premised on the ground that a military vessel remains the territory of the nation it belongs to. Such persons might of course be citizens by inheritance if one or both parents are US citizens, and the statutory conditions are complied with. (The term &quot;public ship&quot; in the 1800s was used to mean a national ship, that is a military ship.) (End edit on naval ships) I just learned that some parts of the State of Maine were occupied by the British during the war of 1812. I do not know if anyone was born during that occupation whose citizenship might have been affected.
Only for certain parts of the constitution, and not for the parts you are asking about. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has squarely stated that neither the First Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment "acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens."13 For more than a century, the Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause is "universal in [its] application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to differences of ... nationality."14 The Court has repeatedly stated that "the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."15 When noncitizens, no matter what their status, are tried for crimes, they are entitled to all of the rights that attach to the criminal process, without any distinction based on their nationality.16 Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As Citizens? - David Cole, Georgetown University Law Center
united-states A &quot;penalty of perjury&quot; statement includes not just the warning about penalty of perjury, the person signing avows that the statements are true to the best of their knowledge. If you lie on such a statement, and if the &quot;penalty of perjury&quot; statement is legally allowed (typically, mandated), then the person can be prosecuted. However, XYZ cannot arbitrarily inject the risk of perjury, that requires some legal authorization. An example would be if XYZ is employing the person under a Defense Department contract that requires a sworn statement. The federal perjury statute characterises this as being when &quot;a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered&quot;. The only effect of notarization is that it decreases the probability that the person could effectively argue &quot;I never even signed this statement, that's a forgery&quot;.
You have not committed a crime or a violation of non-criminal law when you swear something under oath believing in good faith that what you are saying is true, and you are mistaken. The law does not expect omniscience. Also, making a false statement under oath is only sanctionable if you make a false statement of a &quot;material fact.&quot; Whether or not you have a Social Security number is not a &quot;material fact&quot; in the context of a passport application where the material facts are that you are the same person as the person described in your birth certificate, that the parents there are to the best of your knowledge your parents, that the birth certificate is authentic, and that you have not renounced U.S. citizenship. The question about a Social Security number is there for administrative convenience, not to make any determination about your right to a passport. You should apply for a Social Security number. If you already have one, your actions consistent with not having one will only corroborate the fact that you were ignorant of that fact when you applied for a passport, and you will have your existing Social Security number provided to you. As a practical matter it is unlikely that you have one. There are no forms that your non-U.S. parents would have to be filled out that would have required one, and you know that you haven't applied for one in the past. Before Social Security numbers of dependents were required on U.S. tax forms, most people didn't get Social Security numbers until they got their first job.
Constitutionally, a person is only required to be granted U.S. citizenship if they are born in the United States. Any other form of citizenship is as provided by statute. So, 8 U.S.C. § 1409 makes some people citizens who would not otherwise be citizens in its absence. In that sense, it grants citizenship. Meanwhile, 8 U.S.C. § 1409(g) supports the proposition, which is a legal fiction in some cases, that someone is a &quot;natural born citizen&quot; of the United States, and hence eligible to run for President someday, and is retroactively considered to have been a citizen in the meantime for myriad other purposes, despite the fact that in the case of an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father, this right is not vested and could never come into being if the required actions aren't taken after the fact. Incidentally, this statute has been upheld against constitutional challenges. Miller v. Albright, 520 U.S. 420 (1997). So, while you would like to clearly distinguish between someone having citizenship granted and having citizenship revoked, Congress, in its wisdom, has not been so accommodating and has declined to clearly distinguish between the two interpretations. This statute is a bit like the question of Schrödinger's cat, who is indeterminately alive and dead at the same time until there is a measurement of its state, in quantum physics. A person with an unmarried non-citizen mother and a citizen father is both a U.S. citizen from birth and always has been, and has never been a citizen of the U.S., until the situation is resolved with an actual determination of the question in accordance with the requirements of the statute.
See https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/who-can-and-cant-contribute/, the section on "Foreign Nationals". The Commission stated, in AO 1998-14, that the use of any surname on a contribution check (or similar instrument) would not, by itself, give any reason to inquire as to the person’s nationality. Nonetheless, the Commission advised the committee to take the following minimally intrusive steps to ensure that the contributions it received did not come from foreign nationals: Ensure that public political ads and solicitations directed to audiences outside the U.S. contain a summary of the foreign national prohibition of 52 U.S.C. § 30121. Make further inquiry into the nationality of the contributor if the committee receives a contribution postmarked from any non U.S. territory. Make further inquiry into the nationality of the contributor if the committee receives a contribution indicating that either the bank or the account owner has a foreign address. In all of the these instances, if the contribution is submitted along with credible evidence (for example, a copy of a valid U.S. passport) that the contributor is a U.S. citizen, a U.S. national or a permanent resident alien, no further inquiry need be made. However, if the committee has actual knowledge that the contributor is in fact a foreign national, it may not rely on these documents as a defense. So, if the donor has been informed of the rules and gives a US address, the campaign can assume that they are eligible to donate, unless the campaign has actual knowledge that they aren't. If they give a non-US address, the campaign is supposed to get some other proof of nationality. By the way, that page also explains that the first part of your question is slightly wrong. It isn't only US citizens who are allowed to donate - US nationals (a rather rare category consisting mostly of people from certain US territories) and permanent residents are also eligible.