Why&#39;d the 1st Amendment (US Constitution) &#39;become a weaker shield&#39; if it &#39;is an all-purpose shield for journalists&#39;? Original: Dworkin. A Matter of Principle. p. 385 Middle. First Slighted: Legal Writing in Plain English (2nd edn, 2013). p. 85 Middle. But this strategy of automatic appeal to the First Amendment is, I think, a poor strategy, even if the press is concerned only to expand its legal powers as far as possible. For if the idea becomes popular that the Amendment is an all-purpose shield for journalists, warding off libel suits, deposi- tions, and searches as well as censorship, then it must become a weaker shield [bold mine], because it will seem obvious that so broad a power in the press must be balanced against other private and social interests in the community. What will then suffer is the historically central function of the First Amendment, which is simply to ensure that those who wish to speak on matters of political and social controversy are free to do so. Perhaps the surprising weakness of the First Amendment in protecting the defendants in The Progressive and Snepp cases, for example, is partly a consequence of the very effectiveness of the press in persuading the courts, in an earlier day, that the power of the First Amendment extends well beyond straight cen-sorship cases. I don't understand how the greyed phrase explains the bolded.
Basically, the author is saying that if the First Amendment were interpreted in the way described, as an all-purpose shield -- and therefore, journalists were not subject to libel laws, and could not be searched or deposed -- then journalists, being all but above the law at that point, would have a tremendous amount of power. There would need to be checks and balances to that power for the sake of justice, personal privacy, etc, lest we end up ruled by the press. The implication, and the point of the bolded part, is that these checks and balances must inherently weaken the protection offered by the First Amendment. So the Amendment can be seen as either an all-but-inviolable protection of the specific freedoms enumerated within, or as a general get-out-of-jail-free card that can be voided as community interests demand. It can not reasonably be both strong and overly broad.
Your ability to assert your Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not limited to cases where you are on trial or have been accused of a crime. Your ability to assert that right is also not an absolute bar against being ordered to testify: if you are given immunity, you can be forced to testify. Alice cannot hold Bob in contempt – only the judge can. Bob can explain to the judge why a simple truthful "yes" or "no" answer is not possible, if he knows how to do that (does he understand the notion of a false presupposition, or unclarity?). He could for example assert truthfully that he does not understand the question (pointing to the distinction between "Charlie's body falling on the vase, causing it to fall and break", and "Charlie acting with apparent intent to break the vase", since it's not patently obvious that the former scenario constitutes "breaking the vase"). However (changing the scenario a bit), he has to understand that if the question is "Did Charlie shoot Delilah?" and the fact is that Ethan forced Charlie to shoot Delilah, saying "No" based on a theory of blame is not reasonably interpreted as truthful testimony. Taking the 5th, without setting forth your basis (not understanding the question) runs the risk that the prosecution will grant immunity from prosecution, and therefore you don't get to avoid answering the question. Immunity covers various things except that it does not cover prosecution for perjurious testimony. See US v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115: the Fifth Amendment does not prevent the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial for false swearing because, at the time he was granted immunity, the privilege would not have protected him against false testimony that he later might decide to give. Immunity is conferred under the control of some applicable statutory law, such as 18 USC 6002 which says that no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
This page lists the highlights of case law regarding prior restraint and the First Amendment. Two pertinent cases are New York Times Co. v. United States, where the court held that despite the potential harm of publishing the revealed information, the prior restraint doctrine was more important (the government cannot prohibit speech before it happens). Reno v. ACLU affirms that even if a publication might cause harm to a class of people, that (limited) harm does not justify universally prohibiting the speech. There is no criminal penalty arising from the government censoring speech. A civil lawsuit – &quot;section 1983&quot; – is possible against an official who illegally attempts to suppress expression contra the First Amendment. The award might be just a dollar if the person so oppressed cannot prove actual damage. Technically, the sky is the limit, and it just depends on how outrageous the jury finds the government's action. If the government were to order suppression of opposition to its policies, we could easily be in the territory of world-record awards for violation of civil rights.
The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.
The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.
Neither of the posters in question would constitute a &quot;true threat&quot; which can be subjected to legal sanctions consistent with the First Amendment. The nature of the communication, in the context provided in the question, is clearly metaphorical. The U.S. Supreme Court, incidentally, will be hearing arguments in the case of Counterman v. Colorado on April 19, 2023, pertinent to this question, in which the issue presented is: Whether, to establish that a statement is a &quot;true threat&quot; unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective &quot;reasonable person&quot; would regard the statement as a threat of violence. This would, however, be a far closer case under British law, as illustrated by a recent case in which a British teenager was sentenced to 11 year years in prison for inflammatory Internet postings that it was established were a major factor that pushed the people who carried out mass shootings at a Buffalo, New York grocery store and a Colorado Spring gay nightclub to carry out their attacks. As reported by CNN: Daniel Harris, 19, from Derbyshire in northern England, posted videos shared by Payton Gendron, who pleaded guilty to the shooting in Buffalo, as well as videos linked to Anderson Lee Aldrich, the suspect accused of killing five people in a mass shooting at an LGBTQ nightclub in Colorado Springs, Colorado, last November, the court heard, according to PA. Sentencing Harris in court in Manchester, northern England, Judge Patrick Field was quoted by PA as saying, “What they did was truly appalling but what they did was no more than you intended to encourage others to do when publishing this material online.” The postings made by Daniel Harris which led to his conviction would almost certainly not have been actionable under U.S. law which has much stronger First Amendment protections than the U.K.
That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., &quot;The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.&quot; In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.
It is not decided whether such, in areas, filming can be prohibited. In a &quot;public forum&quot;, First Amendment rights are maximally protected, and this includes filing (Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78 in particular §A(1) for a summary of the law on this question). In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 the court refined public forum doctrine to distinguish quintessential, limited, and nonpublic fora. In a nonpublic forum, the government may &quot;reserve the forum for its intended purposes&quot;: but, such a reservation must be viewpoint-neutral. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 states that &quot;The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time&quot;. In a nonpublic forum, demonstrations can be forbidden, especially when demonstrations are incompatible with the purpose of the forum (example: military bases). The particular question you raise has not ended up in court. One may be tempted to reason that First Amendment rights can be arbitrarily curtailed in a non-public forum, but such a restriction would have to have appropriate justification – the restriction would be subject to strict scrutiny. Simply saying &quot;We don't want people filming inside the holding area&quot; is not a valid justification. But, the police are not required to announce their legal argument in advance. If you get busted and film, and they make you stop, you can sue for violation of your First Amendment rights. Your attorney would then need to make a good argument that this restriction is to be subject to strict scrutiny, and that it fails.