How can you have a &quot;quorum of 11&quot; when the Grand Chamber requires 15 judges? Nigel Foster. EU Law Directions 6 ed. 2018. p. 60 2.5.1 Composition and organisation The CoJ presently consists of 28 judges, one for each member state (as from 1 July 2013) and 11 Advocates-General (AGs) (as from 7 October 2015) (Article 252 TFEU), nominated and appointed by unanimous agreement by the governments of the member states for a renewable period of six years. ... The Court can sit as a full court with a quorum of 17 judges, a Grand Chamber of 15 judges with a quorum of 11 to hear cases involving either member states or Union institutions, or in chambers of three or five judges and of which there are 10 in total. Alina Kaczorowska-Ireland. European Union Law 4 ed. 2016. p. 98. Both text-books imply that the Grand Chamber requires 15 judges. See Foster – isn't the &quot;quorum&quot; 15? How can there be a &quot;quorum of 11&quot;? See Alina – If you have a chamber of 5 judges, how can quorum be 3? If quorum is 3, then you have a chamber of 3, not 5!
A quorum is the minimum number of members of a deliberative assembly (a body that uses parliamentary procedure, such as a legislature) necessary to conduct the business of that group. So the Grand Chamber is 15 members, if at least 11 turn up they can conduct their business, if 10 or less turn up, they can’t. Similarly, there are 28 judges in the full court of which 15 need to turn up. Quorum are extremely common - they allow the business of the body to proceed even if some of their members are sick, or on holiday, or stuck in traffic, or slept through their alarms etc.
As far as I know, no single president has ever been in office long enough to see all supreme court judges retire, resign or die. So waiving his right to appoint new judges would just achieve two things: He would have less judges in his favor than if he'd just appoint a new one. He would help the next president, possibly from the other party, who could then appoint more judges to his taste, or possibly reap the rewards by not doing so. I guess no sane president would do that (and no insane president, either).
The answer is going to vary from state to state and, even within a state, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, in general terms, non-judicial court officers, such as clerks of court and prothonotaries, will have specific tasks delegated to them by the court; they can make decisions on matters that the legal system does not consider to require judicial discretion and judgment. These are often described as "ministerial." They may include significant decisions with significant consequences: for example, dismissing a case, or granting judgment against a party, where a party has missed a deadline. In some if not all cases, these decisions can be appealed to a judge, but are unlikely to be overruled. There are also another class of non-judges, such as magistrate judges and administrative law judges, who take on more traditional, non-ministerial judicial roles, acting and making decisions that call for the exercise of judgment; again, these are generally appealable to a regularly appointed or elected judge. The short answer, then, is: Clerks of court cannot do everything a judge can do, but they can act on their own discretion when the matter falls within their ministerial authority. This authority can include, in appropriate cases, deciding who wins and who loses a lawsuit.
Most likely, they chose enough victims to ensure a long prison term while having plenty of additional victims to charge if something went wrong at trial. Plus limiting the number of victims limits the amount of repetitive testimony and evidence the prosecutors had to introduce proving the death of each victim. If you charge with 19 counts when there are 492 victims and something goes wrong at trial, whether you think but can’t prove that the mob paid off a juror or whether you just get an oddball juror that votes to acquit, you can always pick some of the remaining 473 victims to bring charges. The prosecutors could have failed in 24 straight trials for 19 charges of manslaughter and still been able to bring charges a 25th time (though that would have been highly unusual). If you charge a defendant with manslaughter, you have to prove the death of a particular person. So there has to be evidence that Bob Smith went to the club, Bob Smith’s body was recovered and identified, Bob Smith was autopsied and the cause of death was smoke inhalation, etc. That gets repetitive after a time and jurors start thinking of the victims as numbers rather than people. Limiting the number of charges makes it much easier to make the victims seem like distinct humans to the jury. You can show pictures of the victims at trial and jurors can recognize particular individuals not just “1 of 492 dead people”.
Because they are only apparent with hindsight The judge writing the judgement does not decide what is dicta and what is obiter - that is for some future judge considering a different case and deciding if they are looking at a binding (dicta) or persuasive (obiter) precedent. First of all, the vast majority of cases follow precedent; they do not set it. If you are trying to disentangle dicta and obiter then you are usually looking at the case of an appeal, not a trial judgement. Most trials turn on the facts, not precedent-setting points of law - usually, there is no dispute about the law at all. Even then, most appeal decisions don't set a precedent either and sink into obscurity until at some point in the far future when a lawyer doing research on a particularly tricky case has an &quot;ah-ha&quot; moment and says &quot;Look at what Justice Bozo said in paragraph 365 of this 56 page judgement about a tangentially related issue between different people at a different time in a different place - I need to spin this as dicta.&quot; Meanwhile, the lawyer on the opposite side has a different precedent from a different case that contradicts this one - one of them must be wrong. So a trial judge faced with this paradox has to resolve it; they don't get to say &quot;this is too hard&quot;. Basically they have 2 methods of doing so: The decide that one (or both) are obiter and make the decision based on the precedent that remains. They decide that both are ratio and write a judgement that they know has to be appealed because they have to follow both precedents and they can't. At least in Australia, this is becoming more and more common. The judge basically says &quot;I have two conflicting binding precedents, I pick this one for [reasons]. Now go off to the Court of Appeals to see if I got it right. I look forward to finding out.&quot; Of course, the winner isn't going to appeal and it may not be in the loser's commercial interest to do so. So maybe the question just gets kicked down the road for some other poor bloody judge to have to deal with.
It is difficult to quantify in a useful way. Part of the issue is that calling the courts &quot;dispute resolution forums&quot; is misleading. Courts are &quot;rights enforcement forums.&quot; They are designed to provide remedies to people whose rights have been violated, not to neutrally resolve disputes between parties. And, most lawsuits are mostly one sided, not circumstances where both sides have legitimate grievances for which they seek redress. The vast majority of cases brought in courts, by raw number, are debt collection actions, evictions, and foreclosures. These cases are overwhelmingly brought by landlords against tenants and by lenders (mostly banks and big businesses that extend credit) against borrowers. I'll note those in bold. For example, in Colorado, in 2010, there were 116,346 civil cases filed in District Court in Colorado (the state trial court of general jurisdiction). Summary mortgage foreclosure actions accounted for 39,404 of those cases. State tax lien filings accounted for another 45,528 filings. These case make up 73% of the district court civil docket. There were 30,236 cases of other types on the District Court civil docket in the state. About 5,809 are claims that fit in the heartland of tort law: cases involving personal injuries including worker's compensation cases that end up in court) and wrongful deaths, breach of warranty, public nuisance, sexual harassment cases, fraud cases and malpractice cases (of all kinds) as well as motions to approve transfers of structured settlements. About 3,527 involve judicial efforts to establish title to or possession of specific pieces of property often in connection with the collection of a debt. A big portion of the remainder of the cases, 13,165 involve contractual disputes or rights in real estate or other property (a fair share of which are basically debt collection cases such as mechanic's lien foreclosures and large dollar non-payment of contractual debts that aren't seriously disputed). There were 722 appeals from municipal or county courts and 72 cases to confirm arbitration awards. There were 5 public utility cases, 236 cases reviewing acts by local governments and by government officials, and 31 special district cases, 470 declaratory judgment cases, 583 injunctive relief cases, 1,484 cases classified simply as &quot;other&quot;, 29 restraining order cases, and 334 contempt of court cases. These courts also handle divorces, child custody cases, paternity cases, probate cases, felony cases, and post-trial collateral attacks on criminal convictions. County courts in Colorado (at the time state courts with a $15,000 jurisdictional limit) had 148,425 debt collection money claims, 42,689 eviction cases, 531 cases to repossess personal property, 13,257 restraining order cases, 1,496 name change petitions, 27 purely administrative registrations of foreign judgments, and 529 cases classified as &quot;other.&quot; These courts also handle misdemeanors and traffic violation cases. About 93% of civil cases in county courts in Colorado are debt collection and eviction cases. Overwhelmingly, the landlords and money lenders win these laws and are more wealthy than the tenants and borrowers who overwhelmingly lose these lawsuits. A very larger share of the time these cases are lost by default. In very large share of the cases in which there is a default, it is because there is no viable defense: the promissory note or credit card was not paid as agreed, usually because the debtor was unable to pay it. In eviction cases, usually, the rent was not paid on time, often for the same reason. When there is not a default, there is usually a settlement or payment plan. We focus on the very rare cases that go to trial, but those are edge cases. There are good studies that show that defendants in debt collection and eviction lawsuits secure better results for themselves when they are represented by counsel, which they usually aren't, than when they are not. But defendants in debt collection and eviction lawsuits who are represented by counsel still usually lose anyway, just on somewhat less harsh terms. So, to do any nuanced analysis of the role played by affluence and wealth in litigation, you need to start by having a fairly sophisticated sense of what is and is not a win, and this is far from obvious. In contrast, tort lawsuits for personal injury are usually brought by ordinary individuals from all walks of life who get injured due to bad luck against either other ordinary individuals backed by the resources of an insurance company to defend and settle their cases, or against property owners, or against businesses. There is typically not an affluence divide in these cases, or if there is, the injured person is less affluent, and the injured person usually secured money from the person who they claim caused the injury, either at trial, or far more often, in settlement reached in the shadow of what would have happened if they case went to trial. Lawyers rarely commence personal injury lawsuits were there isn't a good argument that their client should win. Personal injury tort cases make up a thin sliver of cases filed and judgments entered relative to debt collection and evictions lawsuits. These cases make up about 2-3% of the total court system docket (but account for about 75% of civil jury trials). There is litigation other than debt collection, eviction and personal injury litigation. But in some of those kinds of cases, like probates and divorces and bankruptcies, where determining who is the winner and who is not is even more challenging. Indeed, in many such cases that are actively litigated, everyone ends up losing and no one ends up winning. In the law and economics literature, the classic study (Leeson 2011) looked at who won disputed land title disputed in medieval England in the days of trial by combat. It turns out that back then, the wealthier party, who could afford to hire better champions in a trial by combat, usually won. The question asked feels like it is trying to build on that model and determine if that kind of law and economics finding can be applied to modern day litigation with the controlling factor being who hires the best lawyers to go to trial for them, rather than who hires the best champion in trials by combat. Many cynical people think that this is how the legal system works now. But overwhelmingly, at the threshold of who gets any relief relative to the status quo from a court in litigation, the answer is almost always the person who brings the lawsuit, 95%+ of the time, either in a settlement, or at trial, and whether the person bringing the lawsuit is usually more affluent or less affluent than the defendant is dominantly a function of what basis for the lawsuit, while whether the parties have lawyers, and if so, how good they are, are only second or third order considerations. None of this is to say that hiring good lawyers, who, on average, are more expensive than mediocre lawyers, doesn't improve one's outcomes at the margins, or that affluent people are more able and willing, on average, to hire good lawyers than less affluent people. But, to see the difference, you need to think about relative degrees of winning or losing, and you need to recognize that the nature of the lawsuit matters. Along the same lines, studies comparing people who have private criminal defense counsel (because they can afford to do so) with people who have public defenders (who are by definition indigent defendants), usually show that the outcomes at the guilt-innocence phase are very similar between the two, although public defendants pay much less attention to their clients and provide much less &quot;customer service&quot;. The divide in those cases is not mostly on guilt-innocence outcomes, but in the ability of affluent defendants with expensive criminal defense lawyers to have more satisfying lawyer-client relationships and experiences, and to take better advantage of alternative sentencing options, rather than just getting thrown in jail or prison. To some extent, this is a long winded way of saying that the research you are looking for, in the plainest terms as stated in the question, doesn't really exist. This is, in part, because in many contexts at a shallow level, it is obvious, and in part, because, viewed more deeply, it is extremely subtle and requires very rich data to discern which makes it hard to gather and hard to compare.
There are times when having a large law firm work on a case can be an advantage. It is rare for the number of lawyers working on a particular case to be more than three or four plus a few paralegals, even in a case where there are virtually unlimited resources at a party's disposal. In those cases, the primary benefit of having a large law firm at your disposal is that by paying top dollar for those attorneys, you may (but certainly don't always) get particularly competent attorneys at firms that have good systems in place. If you are willing to spend the money you can also have the attorney and paralegal team work exhaustively to leave no stone unturned in terms of legal research, style and proofreading, &quot;wild goose chase&quot; factual and legal research of matters like trial court arguments from other cases that the opposing counsel has participated in, and trial presentations with lavish presentation quality. For example, in one case where my firm was litigating against a large law firm in state supreme court arguments, the firm had seven law firm partners who had served as clerks in that court earlier in their careers participate in mock oral arguments to help the appellate lawyer who would be presented the case in oral arguments to the Colorado Supreme Court prepare (with four members of your core team and seven mock justices plus some paralegals participating this was a $5000+ per hour activity). A typical run of the mill appellate brief prepared competently might take 100 hours, while a large firm might devote 800 hours to the same task (both of these are hypothetical round numbers suggested just to get the point across). This incredibly intense working up of cases, moreover, often involves attorneys who aren't really starting from scratch as they has handled many similar cases before in their careers, while their smaller firm competition may have only encountered the issues presented for the first time. You are also paying for connections and experience. For example, a large law firm may have an easier time retaining the most decorated expert witnesses to argue on their behalf. These attorneys may also have handled numerous cases in front of the judge or judges who will be deciding the case (and if they haven't someone else in the large firm probably has) and thus can better predict what approach will be received best by that particular judge. The exception to the rule that the maximal economies of scale are reached with a quite small group of lawyers is that in addition to this core group of lawyers, some cases, such as class action lawsuits, or cases involving complex transactions (e.g. construction project disputes in a large project with hundreds of contractors) may require an immense amount of factual discovery in the trial court in the form of depositions of dozens or hundreds of people with relevant knowledge, and/or review of vast volumes of documents (e.g. I've had several cases with whole rooms stacked floor to ceiling with relevant documents in banker's boxes). In cases like those, you need an army of senior paralegals and junior attorneys to interview witnesses, take depositions and review and summarize documents to get to the bottom of the factual matters needed to prove a case. The down side of this approach, however, is that it is extremely expensive relative to the alternatives per task, and frequently impossible to recover your costs and attorney fees from the other party, perhaps because they aren't permitted to be awarded, perhaps because a judge would find some or all of your fees and costs to be unreasonable, or perhaps because the other side simply can't afford to pay them. So, using a firm like this really only makes sense if the stakes involved are very high, or if there are long term strategic reasons to litigate. Spending $1,000,000 on attorneys' fees and costs is a very expensive way to litigate a $100,000 one off dispute. But spending $1,000,000 on attorneys' fees and costs is perfectly sensible if there is $100,000,000 in controversy in the case at hand, or if a favorable outcome will influence the outcome of a large number of future disputed of the same type. The other dirty little secret is that lots of the work done by large law firms for which their clients pay an immense amount of money isn't done very well. One inherent down side of being large is that a large law firm is bureaucratic and prone to the kinds of mistakes that all large organizations have, for example, in diffusing responsibility for mistakes that can allow mistakes to fall through the cracks. Also, while the typical large law firm lawyer is typically more knowledgable than the typical small firm lawyer about the field at issue, this doesn't always happen. Sometimes junior attorneys get assigned too much responsibility on cases in areas where they have blind spots in their knowledge, and sometimes a large firm attorney ends up working a case due to personal connections with the client rather than because that attorney is the most qualified person in the firm to handle it. Also, while some very brilliant lawyers do indeed work at large law firms, technical competence isn' the only consideration in hiring. Successful large firm lawyers need to be team players, need to conform and function well in a large bureaucracy, and need to have the social capital to be comfortable on a day to day basis with the firm's other lawyers and their affluent and big business clients. Many large firm lawyers have those soft skills while having only competent rather than excellent legal acumen. Further, since most large law firm lawyers go straight from law school to a big firm (sometimes with a detour clerking for a judge for a couple of years), and large law firms handle mostly very big cases that are usually settled by lead attorneys before going to trial, most large law firm attorneys aren't particularly experienced at trial work. Some large law firms compensate for that by laterally hiring former prosecutors, former criminal defense lawyers and former high volume personal injury litigators to do that work, but often, large law firms have few lawyers in the courtroom with much trial experience relative to how many years they have practiced law. They may be very well prepared, but often there is no substitute for hands on trial experience. Still large law firms tend to fight extremely hard in trial, but tend to be pushovers in settlement discussions. This is driven by the reality that the client will incur huge amounts of attorneys fees and costs to go the distance, and by the fact that professionally, the worst thing that a large firm lawyer can do it to have an unexpected and unpredictable bad outcome at trial. So, large firm attorneys seek to give their clients low expectations about what is possible in litigation in order to make it possible to make cases with significant uncertainty go away with settlements larger than would really have been necessary to settle the case with a more total client litigation and settlement cost sensitive law firm.
One can argue both ways. On one side, yes, zero representation in the Senate for all states is equal suffrage in the Senate. On the other side, no, depriving all states of all representation in the Senate deprives them of their suffrage in the Senate (without needing to consider the question of whether the suffrage is equal). Since this question has never been considered by a court, we can't do much more than speculate how one might rule. There has never been an amendment proposed to modify the composition of the Senate -- at least not one that was seriously considered. The spirit of the law works in favor of the second interpretation. Furthermore, a strict application of abstract logical reasoning was probably not the intention of the framers. A strategy that might seem more likely to succeed would be to introduce amendments reducing the Senate's power in the legislative process, similar to the evolution of the House of Lords in the UK. If the goal were to sideline one state, this might work, but if the goal is to address the complaint that the Senate is undemocratic because people in smaller states have proportionally more influence there, there's no way the amendment would pass 3/4 of the states' legislatures. The number of states with one or two representatives is 13, by itself a sufficient number to block the adoption of an amendment.