If an allegation is approved, does it mean that the statistics cited in the allegation is correct? For an example excerpt, see the Schwake v. Arizona case, page 15: The University contends that the allegations of genderbased decisionmaking are conclusory because they lack the detail of the allegations in Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018). The plaintiff’s allegations there included: (1) “every male student accused of sexual misconduct in the Fall 2013 and Spring 2014 semesters was found responsible for the alleged violation,” (2) “nearly ninety percent of students found responsible for sexual misconduct between 2011 and 2014 have male first-names,” (3) an affidavit from an attorney who represented “many students in Miami University’s disciplinary proceedings” who “describe[d] a pattern of the University pursuing investigations concerning male students, but not female students,” and (4) the plaintiff’s allegation that the university investigated him rather than the complainant. Id. at 593–94. Also on page 15, Schwake alleged that &quot;male repondents in the student disciplinary proceedings involving alleged sexual harassment and misconduct cases at Arizona Univ are invariably found guilty regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.&quot; I am not a law student so I am assuming that, as the allegation is &quot;plausible&quot; (see the last page of the document), the statistics cited in those allegations must be objectively correct or well-supported?
Not in this case First, we are having an appeals court case that is filed against the dismissal of the real case - there had been no trial. It's a research into if there was a clear error of the court, not who would have won. The Appeals court decided to send it back to the district court with pretty much a direct order to have a trial and solve the issiue, as the very last paragraph of the file shows: We conclude that Schwake stated a Title IX claim against the University because he plausibly alleged gender bias. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s order and judgment dismissing the claim with prejudice, and remand for further proceedings. Now, back to your quote. As this is an appeal case, the standard is different than in the district court. In this case, it tries to see if there might have been a case, which was dismissed erroneously. Page 15 and 16, where you cite, states (emphasis mine): Schwake’s allegations of a pattern of gender-based decisionmaking against male respondents in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings make that inference plausible. He alleged that “[m]ale respondents in student disciplinary proceedings involving alleged sexual harassment and misconduct cases at [the University]” “are invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” Schwake further alleged that he was “aware of recent [University] disciplinary cases against male respondents in alleged sexual misconduct cases who were all found guilty regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” The district court was not free to ignore this non-conclusory and relevant factual allegation. [your quote] The absence of this level of detail from Schwake’s complaint does not render Schwake’s allegation conclusory or insufficient. There is no heightened pleading standard for Title IX claims. See Austin, 925 F.3d at 1137 n.4. That point is particularly apt here. It may be difficult for a plaintiff to know the full extent of alleged discrimination in decisionmaking before discovery allows a plaintiff to unearth information controlled by the defendant. This sheds much more light upon the situation of the case: Schwacke sued and alleged something. The University alleges the contrary in their reply brief and asks the court to dismiss the claim. The court dismissed in March 2018. This was before any discovery has taken place: nobody was subpoenaed, nobody had to testify in court, nobody had to turn over any documents. We have only statements from either side. As the next step, Schwacke appealed the dismissal, and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, as it found clear error in the handling in dismissal, as one can see in the last paragraphs from each claim's section: Here, we are satisfied that Schwake’s allegations of contemporaneous pressure and gender-based decisionmaking establish background indicia of sex discrimination relevant to his Title IX claim. Considering the combination of Schwake’s allegations of background indicia of sex discrimination along with the allegations concerning his particular disciplinary case, we conclude that sex discrimination is a plausible explanation for the University’s handling of the sexual misconduct disciplinary case against Schwake. This is sufficient for Schwake’s Title IX claim to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage. Now it is up to Schwacke to get into discovery, subpoena the information from the university and go into the courtroom trial... Unless the parties settles. Sidenote By the way, the quote of the university refers to a different case from the 6th Circuit (where Ohio is), which they try to pull up as a model standard. This case is not binding for the 9th Circuit (where Arizona is) but could have been used as a model. Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) is somewhat similar to Schwacke, as it had been previously dismissed. However, the Title IX was restored by the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit and it was sent back to the lower court to have a trial. Here too, the standard was reasonable expectation or plausibility: Plaintiff “allege[d] facts showing a potential pattern of gender-based decision-making that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal’ circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination.”
The general rule is that force may be legally used in defense of self. I will draw on RCW 9A.16.020, other jurisdictions say essentially the same thing. The relevant parts are: (3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary Curated internet videos don't tell the whole story, but for the sake of argument I will assume that Mr X chucked a bottle at Tyson, and Tyson proceeded to punish him with his fists. Both parties thus committed a crime. The new report indicates that there will be no prosecutions &quot;based on 'the circumstances surrounding the confrontation'&quot;, which I take to include all of the available evidence. Prosecution for a crime is discretionary. There is no requirement at a prosecutor file charges in every instance where (in the prosecutor's professional opinion) a conviction can be secured. The abstract law is clear: both parties committed a crime. The abstract law is also clear that a prosecutor has discretion to decide whether to prosecute.
There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle.
Two lawyers in a (administrative) hearing suggested that I would have to "lay a foundation" in order to introduce an email as evidence. Is this a general rule of evidence? “Laying the foundation” is a term of art used to explain the process of meeting the requirements for having particular types of evidence admitted. Most courts, administrative bodies, and other tribunals require that all evidence they admit be relevant and authentic. This applies to all types of evidence including oral testimony and to physical pieces of evidence that a party is trying to admit (such as printed e-mails). The rules of evidence that most states have adopted are modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules are a codification of evidence law principles designed to only have relevant and authentic evidence admitted in hearings. So, as general rule, you must ask a witness questions to show how his testimony is relevant and authentic. For example, to meet the relevance requirements, a prosecutor in a DUI case would ask a police officer questions that showed he was the one who pulled over the person accused of drunk driving. His testimony about why he pulled over the suspected drunk driver is relevant because “it has [a] tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact [he is testifying about] is of consequence in determining the [case].” Fed. R. Evid. 401 (the test for relevant evidence). This evidence would meet the authenticity requirements in evidence law by having the witness: 1. Be competent to testify. Fed. R. Evid. 601. 2. Take an oath to testify truthfully. Fed. R. Evid. 603. AND 3. Testify about what they personally observed and not speculate. Fed. R. Evid. 602. There are more specific foundational rules for: hearsay evidence (see Fed. R. Evid. 801 through 807) and physical pieces of evidence such as voice recordings, documents, and e-mails (see Fed. R. Evid. 901 through 1008). If so, could someone explain when it applies, and what in particular is necessary to satisfy the rule? As you explained in the comments to your question, this hearing is a special education impartial hearing in New York State. According to New York State Regulations of the Commissioner of Education § 200.5(j)(3)(xii)(c), the rules of evidence do not apply. This regulation explains that a more relaxed standard applies: The impartial hearing officer may receive any oral, documentary or tangible evidence except that the impartial hearing officer shall exclude evidence that he or she determines to be irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable or unduly repetitious. The impartial hearing officer may receive testimony by telephone, provided that such testimony shall be made under oath and shall be subject to cross examination. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, to admit your e-mails under this standard, you only need to show the administrative law judge that the evidence is relevant, material, reliable, and not unduly repetitious. A much easier standard task than having those e-mails admitted under the Rules of Evdience. The best thing to do would be have the person who received or sent the e-mails present at your hearing and able to testify as a witness. Then, do the following: Before the hearing, have your witness print a paper copy of the e-mails. Provide a copy of the e-mails to the opposing side at least 5 business days before the hearing. See § 200.5(3)(xii) (“Each party shall have the right to prohibit the introduction of any evidence the substance of which has not been disclosed to such party at least five business days before the hearing.”). Mark the e-mails with an exhibit number or letter (usually the plaintiff uses numbers and the defense uses letters). At the hearing, call your witness and have him/her sworn in. Ask to the judge/hearing officer to approach the witness, and give a copy to the e-mails to him. Also give a copy to the judge/hearing officer and opposing counsel. Show the e-mails to the witness. Ask the witness if he recognizes the exhibit you handed him. Have the witness explain how he recognizes it. His testimony should explained the following: That these are e-mails he printed. When and how he printed them. Who they were sent to and sent from. Who the e-mail addresses belong to (many times this is indicated in a person's e-mail signature). What the e-mails are about and why they are important at the hearing--to show that they are relevant.
Yes, a statement made to only a single other person can be defamation, at least in the US (you don't mention the jurisdiction that you or the accused person are in, and it may matter). Only the accused person can normally sue, and that person would need to establish that the statement was made, and that it was false. In most cases actual damage to reputation also needs to be established. However, a few limited categories are considered defamatory per se. these include an accusation that a person is guilty of a serious crime. (The exact line for defamation per se will depend on the jurisdiction.) If a statemant is defamatory per se actual damage need not be proved. Strictly speaking saying that someone "is a pedophile" only says that that person is sexually attracted to children, but it is usually taken to mean that the person has in fact sexually abused children, which is a crime, and would I am sure be considered defamatory per se. Even so, proof of actual damage to the reputation of the person defamed might be important to the measure of damages to be awarded. often the number of people to whom an accusation is made is relevant to the degree of damage to the reputation, and thus to the damages to be awarded, but the relation is not always 1-to-1. Particularly with a very serious accusation, the damage to reputation could be significant, even if only one or a few people heard the false statement. By the way, the word is spelled "pedophile" (or paedophile in UK English), it is from two Greek words meaning literally "lover of the young". A now obsolete related term is "pederast", with much the same meaning.
Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.
In law there are two different concepts: admissibility of evidence and the weight of that evidence. Your question concerns both. I will begin by discussing a little bit about what both these two terms mean. Admissibility means that this evidence may go before the trier of fact. Typically the trier of fact is the jury, however, if both parties have waived their rights to jury trials (particularly the defendant) the judge is the trier of fact as well as the law. When documents or testimony by witnesses is admissible, the trier of fact can consider it in reaching a decision. Weight of evidence is a different concept. The weight of evidence is what someone believes. For example if two witnesses who were bystanders testify that the light was red, but the defendant testifies that the light was green, most people would believe the bystanders. However, in this case the evidence by the defendant that the light was green is admissible, but the trier of fact may not afford it much weight. Now let's consider these logs. In the United States all statements made out of court, whether verbal or written, are considered hearsay (with some exceptions, a couple will be discussed later). Hearsay is generally inadmissible; however, there are many hearsay exceptions. One exception is a record of a regularly conducted activity. The requirements are (summarized, you may refer to the federal rules of evidence 803-6.) for the full text): (A) the record was made at the time of the event by someone who knew about what happened (B) the record was kept in the course of this regularly conducted activity (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness (E) neither the opponent does not show that the source of information nor or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. Now if these logs fit these requirements you can most likely use them in court. If they don't you probably will not be able to use to in court, unless one of the following applies: 1.) you are being sued by someone (or you are suing them) who made the logs and you are offering the logs against them (this is referred to in legal settings as party-opponent statements) OR 2.) the other party has offered evidence that you are lying and you are offering this logs to show you are telling the truth. Most likely the only admissible evidence would be the testimony of the employee and the employer. This leads to a he said she said scenario and the legal results will be highly ambiguous. The credibility of both witnesses will be likely assessed by the trier of fact and the trier will consider who has a higher incentive to lie. If there are more witnesses saying one thing versus another, it is likely they will be believed unless there is a reason all of them are lying. Although this is not legal advice, my suggestion for an employee in such a situation is to gather evidence that an employer asked you to commit a crime as part of your job. Print out emails, get written requests from the employer, and have witnesses present at the time of the request. Then the employee should refuse to perform the act. If as a result the employee is fired, one can sue. All these statements of the employer can be admitted as party-opponent statements. Additionally I suggest that you advocate for your company to adopt policies which require record keeping, which will satisfy the hearsay exception given above.
It seems like callous behavior which leads to a foreseeable death deserves a bigger punishment than just firing of the administrator. The starting point of the analysis is that no one is legally responsible, civilly or criminally, for a suicide unless that person intended that the person who committed suicide do so, which is almost certainly not true in this case. As a matter of law, a suicide caused by merely callous behavior not intended to cause someone to commit suicide is not foreseeable. And if the only actions brought are civil, then the University would be the defendant and the actual individuals who were involved would not themselves even face any trial. This is not accurate. It would be routine to bring suit against anyone personal involved (probably both the administrator and the gay student who allegedly colluded), as well as the University, and indeed, the likelihood of a recovery against one or both of the individuals would be greater than the chance of recovery against the University. To recover against the University it would be necessary to show that the Title IX violation occurred pursuant to an officially approved policy or practice of the University, but this case seems to have at its heart, a failure to an administrator to follow a policy of the University. It might be possible to sue the University or someone involved in the process for a violation of his civil rights, but generally speaking, his death would not constitute recoverable damages in a such a suit. Also, generally speaking, a Title IX claim requires that any party held liable to have had an intent to violate someone's civil rights, rather than that the person was merely mere inept or negligent in implementation or non-implementation of a bureaucratic policy or dispute resolution procedure. This is alleged by the Plaintiff, probably in part because it has to be to prevent the case from being dismissed on the pleadings, but is quite implausible that this really happened that way, and this is difficult to prove unless there is some really hard evidence backing up the alleged collusion. Generally speaking, the fact that a hearing board comes up with a wrong conclusion after allegedly not following proper procedure, is not actionable for damages and certainly wouldn't constitute fraud. UPDATED RESPONSE TO EDIT 2: there maybe other victims, in similar situations, who are not protected by the criminal justice system if nothing of what is alleged to have transpired is deemed illegal It is a common fallacy that if something is not a crime, that it is not illegal or that there are no remedies. A civil lawsuit is a common and often appropriate remedy for all manner of wrongs, and the compensatory and injunctive remedies for civil wrongs such as a breach of contract and torts such as the intentional infliction of emotional distress are often significant. This said, as a government entity, the University of Texas and its employees are probably immune to many tort causes of action that would be available against a private party engaged in the same conduct. In this case, probably the only viable causes of action against the University of Texas itself, as opposed to the responsible individuals in a particular case, would be for breach of contract for not actually carrying out its policies as impliedly promised, and for injunctive relief under Title IX insisting on new policies that would prevent misconduct in disciplinary proceedings. Generally speaking, a criminal law remedy is less victim oriented than a civil remedy and is outside the control of the victim, which can be traumatic for a victim who would prefer not to be involuntarily dragged into the criminal justice process. The notion that settlement is not possible in the criminal justice system is likewise mostly incorrect. There is a reason why we don't handle rapes (for example) in civil courts. Criminal justice system exists to make sure that, at least in theory, those who commit heinous acts cannot buy their way out of consequences of those actions. In fact, one can bring a cause of action for a rape in a civil court. I've done it. And, the lower threshold of proof, the lack of a right to remain silent without legal consequences under the 5th Amendment, the greater focus on compensation for the victim, and the greater level of control of the victim are all good reasons to pursue this route. Many cases of rape by people able to afford to pay compensation are also cases of actionable sexual harassment. In general, criminal law is the solution that is usually resorted to not so much because the acts committed are heinous, but because the typical person who violates a law that is criminally prosecuted is judgment proof and unable to pay compensation that is even remotely proportionate to the harm done, so a civil remedy does not discourage that behavior. Your typical rapist who is prosecuted in the criminal justice system isn't capable of paying meaningful compensation to a victim, although there are always exceptions. Preventing people from buying their way out of their wrongdoing is almost never advanced by criminal justice scholars as a reason for a criminal justice remedy. And, when I have clients who have been harmed, for example, by fraud, most would far prefer to receive compensation from the wrongdoer, than to see the perpetrator punished without receiving any meaningful compensation for their own injuries, which is the usual result in the criminal justice process. Most people think of the criminal justice system as more of a last resort when all other options fail than as a good first choice which it rarely is even when it is the least bad option. So back to the main question, what, if any, criminal charges can be leveled against the administrator and the false accuser if the alleged facts of the case can be confirmed to be true? In the fact pattern presented, where a public official at the University of Texas conspires with a student with whom the official has a pre-existing personal relationship to produce an intentionally inaccurate result in a University disciplinary hearing harming a defendant in that process, there are several university statutes that might form a basis for criminal action against either the public administrator or the conspiring student on the offense identified or conspiracy to commit the offense identified. In no case are any criminal charges against the University of Texas a plausible option in this fact pattern. Each of the offenses is a misdemeanor under Texas law. The best fit is "improper influence". Texas Penal Code § 36.04. This involves reaching an outcome in an adjudication for a reason other than one legally allowed due to someone's application of influence other than a bribe or kickback. The section states: (a) A person commits an offense if he privately addresses a representation, entreaty, argument, or other communication to any public servant who exercises or will exercise official discretion in an adjudicatory proceeding with an intent to influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations other than those authorized by law. (b) For purposes of this section, “adjudicatory proceeding” means any proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal rights, powers, duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined. (c) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor. Two other possibilities are "abuse of official capacity", Texas Penal Code §39.02, or "official oppression" Texas Penal Code § 39.03. These sections and a related one, read as follows in the pertinent or potentially pertinent parts: Sec. 39.01. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: (1) "Law relating to a public servant's office or employment" means a law that specifically applies to a person acting in the capacity of a public servant and that directly or indirectly: (A) imposes a duty on the public servant; or (B) governs the conduct of the public servant. . . . Sec. 39.02. ABUSE OF OFFICIAL CAPACITY. (a) A public servant commits an offense if, with intent to obtain a benefit or with intent to harm or defraud another, he intentionally or knowingly: (1) violates a law relating to the public servant's office or employment . . . (b) An offense under Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor. . . . 39.03. OFFICIAL OPPRESSION. (a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: . . . (2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or (3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment. (b) For purposes of this section, a public servant acts under color of his office or employment if he acts or purports to act in an official capacity or takes advantage of such actual or purported capacity. (c) In this section, "sexual harassment" means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a person's exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either explicitly or implicitly. (d) An offense under this section is a Class A misdemeanor . . . Also, in all three of these cases, the fact that someone committed suicide afterwards is basically irrelevant legally.