Is a gun in the waistband with a tucked-in shirt concealed or open carry in Michigan? I generally carry my gun concealed, inside the waistband with a shirt or jacket over it. If I were to tuck said shirt in, the grip will show. Is this now considered open carry, or does the whole gun have to be showing?
It will hinge on the specific facts, but if the pistol is not discernible by casual observation it will most likely be regarded as concealed. Michigan Open Carry Inc's FAQ #11 asks: Can I open carry with an inside the waistband/inside the pants (IWB) holster? The Michigan Court of Appeals appears to answer this in People v Curtis Phillips (1996) (unpublished): In the case, officers observed Mr. Phillips standing on a nearby porch with the butt of a gun protruding out of his waistband. The Court held that the pistol was not visible under &quot;ordinary observation” and therefore &quot;A casual observer may not have discerned the object in defendant’s waistband.&quot; Essentially, it's up to the &quot;trier of fact&quot;, meaning open to interpretation for a judge in a bench trial, or a jury in a jury trial. The FAQ goes on to quote The Michigan Court of Appeals per curiam in People v Curtis Phillips (1996) Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he “concealed” a handgun because the arresting officers could see the butt of a gun protruding from his waistband. We disagree. To determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). A conviction for carrying a concealed weapon without a license requires proof that the accused concealed a dangerous weapon. People v Pickett, 21 Mich App 246, 248; 175 NW2d 347 (1970). Concealment is a question of fact and exists when the weapon is “not discernible by the ordinary observation of [those] coming in contact with [the accused], casually observing him, as people do in the ordinary and usual associations of life.” People v Johnnie W Jones, 12 Mich App 293, 296; 162 NW2d 847 (1968). While searching the area for gunmen after a reported shooting, the arresting officers observed defendant standing on a nearby porch with the butt of a handgun protruding from his waistband. They were able to identify this object as the butt of a handgun based on their training and experience. The officers were not “casually observing” defendant “in the ordinary and usual associations of life,” and this was not “ordinary observation” because the officers were searching for armed suspects. A casual observer may not have discerned the object in defendant’s waistband. Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude there was sufficient evidence that defendant concealed a gun in his waistband.
CO Rev Stat § 18-12-105.5(1) says that A person commits a class 6 felony if such person knowingly and unlawfully and without legal authority carries, brings, or has in such person's possession a deadly weapon as defined in section 18-1-901 (3) (e) in or on the real estate and all improvements erected thereon of any public or private elementary, middle, junior high, high, or vocational school or any public or private college, university, or seminary... but there are exceptions such as presenting an authorized demonstration, or for some authorized extracurricular reason. The meme about under 3.5 inches derives from the general statute pertaining to concealed weapons, where CO Rev Stat § 18-12-101 defines "knife" as being over 3.5 inches long (and it is a misdemeanor to carry a concealed knife). We'll come back to this. The applicable part of the definition of "deadly weapon" in the school-specific law is (II) A knife, bludgeon, or any other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. This raising a question that I encourage you not to test, whether the school deadly weapon definition excludes knives that are longer that 3.5 inches. The definition section for Article 12 starts by saying (1) As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires so that means that "knife" is redefined in a special way (in terms of length), and that is for the entire article which includes the school weapon section. The actual definition of "knife" in the definitions section of Article 12 is (f) "Knife" means any dagger, dirk, knife, or stiletto with a blade over three and one-half inches in length, or any other dangerous instrument capable of inflicting cutting, stabbing, or tearing wounds, but does not include a hunting or fishing knife carried for sports use. The issue that a knife is a hunting or fishing knife must be raised as an affirmative defense. The modifier "with a blade over three and one-half inches in length" might be thought to refer to all of the preceding terms, or just the last one – stiletto. These is a rule of legal interpretation that a modifier should be interpreted as referring to the last antecedent, meaning that the length limit pertains to stilettos. The punctuation (lack of comma) supports the interpretation "stiletto with a blade over three and one-half inches in length", meaning that a knife is a knife. Whether or not a literal knife with a blade under 3.5 inches long constitutes a redefined knife, it certainly constitutes a "dangerous instrument capable of inflicting cutting, stabbing, or tearing wounds". In the context of a specific law restricting the possession of weapons (concealed or not) in schools, the context requires that the definition explicitly mentioned in 18-1-901(3)(e), which is outside Article 12, is being referred to. The reason the law was explicitly written to refer to that definition was so that the general definition in article 12 would be overridden. My point is that this is a not atypical example of the problem of legal definitions, which can get rather convoluted. If someone has told you that a knife under 3.5" is legally not a knife, you probably now know why they would say that, but also you should know what that's simply not true when it comes to weapons in school. I omitted one complication, which in this instance is not applicable, namely the kirpan exception. In Singh v. Thompson, 36 F.3d 1102, it was ruled that a prohibition against knives (in school), in that instance, violates the Free Exercise clause (the kirpan must be worn at all times). On the other hand, TSA does forbid taking a kirpan into the secure zone, a matter which has so far not been litigated.
The first passage quoted appears to be from the North Carolina General Statutes section 14-269.2 (Weapons on campus or other educational property) The roughly corresponding section of South Carolina law is SECTION 23-31-215 (Issuance of permits.) subsection (M) (5). It is quite different in both wording and content. I do not find the second quoted passage in an online search, and I presume it is of the school's own writing. If you were in elementary school &quot;about 10 years ago&quot; it would seem that you are probably in high school or college now. Rules for those institutions are often quite different from elementary school and from each other. I have no way to evaluate what the school regulations on such subjects might be, but it is probably safer to leave your empty casing at home, although no rule you have quoted or that I can find online would prohibit it. An expended cartridge or casing is not a &quot;gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind&quot; and so this provision of NC 14-269.2 would not apply, even in North Carolina. An expended cartridge is not likely to be defined as a &quot;weapon&quot; either, and so the second quotes passage should not apply, although it is possible that the school regulations define &quot;weapon&quot; differently so that an expended cartridge is included. I have no way to know what other provisions the school regulations might include that would be relevant.
The Supreme Court considered and rejected some related interpretations in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The entire opinion, and the dissents, are well worth reading, if you wish to get a clearer understanding of how the Court has most recently interpreted the Second Amendment. A few specific comments: "The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia" (p. 1). The Court does not agree that "militia" should be understood as synonymous with "National Guard": The “militia” comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved. (p. 2) The Court, citing U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, holds that the weapons protected are "those in common use for lawful purposes". There is some discussion on pages 55-56, in which the majority seems to explicitly deny that the Second Amendment grants a specific right to possess military weapons. Instead, they reason that historically "the militia" would have reported for duty with the sort of firearms they normally had at home, whether or not those were the preferred weapons for fighting a war, and so therefore the Second Amendment protects the right to bear "household" weapons, not military weapons. They seem to agree that laws banning "dangerous and unusual weapons" are constitutional, even if those weapons are in military use. They specifically mention M-16 rifles as a type of weapon that can be banned.
This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.
An affirmative defense is a way of avoiding conviction by acknowledging you did the act claimed, but that such act was among the exceptions provided by the law which makes such acts otherwise an offence. That is, you affirm (acknowledge, admit) your action of using the device, but you are claiming that your use of the device (handsfree as a GPS guide) is okay, and therefore you should not be convicted. For all intents and purposes in this situation, your "2" and "3" are the same thing. The device is supported by something other than you holding it, and you are able to keep both hands on the wheel while using it in this way. Finally, a plain language reading of the definition for "hands-free accessory" suggests that using an object in the car to support the device where it can be seen, or using a feature of the device that speaks directions which you can hear, neither of which requires moving your hands off the wheel, will be considered such an accessory. It is also worth pointing out that such usage of a device (placed in a cradle or on the dashboard or turned up so it is heard) will be well-known to the legislators, and there is a reasonable interpretation of the law that would allow such usage. If this ever went to court, and somebody used this defence for this situation, they would probably be okay.
Since no jurisdiction is specified, I decided to search in maryland in the united-states As far as I can tell, there is no state or federal law which prohibits a private individual from owning a decommissioned military tank. Most public highways and roads have weight limits, and many tanks would exceed them. Most tanks, or at least most older tanks, are not in any case &quot;street legal&quot; not having required headlights, brake lights, air bags, and other safety devices. Treads must be modified to avoid road damage. None of this would be relevant if the tank was kept on private land and not used on public roads or streets. If somehow the main gun or a mounted machine gun were still in place, and not disabled, permits would be required that are almost impossible to obtain. Specifically: &quot;State Laws and Published Ordinances – Maryland Statutes current through chapter 18 of the 2020 session lists Code section 4-401 which provides that: (c) Machine gun. &quot;Machine gun&quot; means a loaded or unloaded weapon that is capable of automatically discharging more than one shot or bullet from a magazine by a single function of the firing device. Section 4-402: (a) Evidence of possession. The presence of a machine gun in a room, boat, or vehicle is evidence of the possession or use of the machine gun by each person occupying the room, boat, or vehicle. ... (c) Registration of possession. (1) A person who acquires a machine gun shall register the machine gun with the Secretary of State Police: (i) within 24 hours after acquiring the machine gun; and (ii) in each succeeding year during the month of May. Section 4-501 (b) Destructive device. (1) &quot;Destructive device&quot; means explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material that is: (i) combined with a delivery or detonating apparatus so as to be capable of inflicting injury to persons or damage to property; or (ii) deliberately modified, containerized, or otherwise equipped with a special delivery, activation, or detonation component that gives the material destructive characteristics of a military ordnance. (2) &quot;Destructive device&quot; includes a bomb, grenade, mine, shell, missile, flamethrower, poison gas, Molotov cocktail, pipe bomb, and petroleum-soaked ammonium nitrate Section 4-503 (a) Prohibited. A person may not knowingly: (1) manufacture, transport, possess, control, store, sell, distribute, or use a destructive device; or (2) possess explosive material, incendiary material, or toxic material with intent to create a destructive device.
The police performed an &quot;open air sniff&quot;. Federal and Pennsylvania law differ on this. Under Federal law, this is not considered a search and can be done on any vehicle- usually to get cause for a more invasive search. (Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005).) Under Pennsylvania law, an open air sniff requires reasonable suspicion. This is lower than probable cause- all it requires is that a reasonable person could suspect from the facts that a crime may have or could be committed. Being overly nervous during a routine traffic stop driving someone else's car could potentially be considered reasonable suspicion- as I only have your second-hand account, I won't speculate further. If there was no reasonable suspicion, any evidence found by that search, or evidence found by a search justified by it would be suppressed. Fourth Ammendment rights also apply here. The police cannot detain someone solely for the purpose of waiting for a sniffer dog. They have ways and techniques to waste time for this purpose, but if the stop was concluded before the dog arrived, your husband would be free to leave. Again, I have only your second-hand account so I won't speculate on whether this happened. He should speak to his lawyer about specifics of the case.