Overly Broad Sports Facility Liability Waiver The University of California, Berkeley introduced a new liability waiver this Fall Semester. If students refuse to sign the waiver, they'll be barred from using the campus gym and other sports facilities starting this September. Here's the waiver in question: In consideration of permission to use, today and on all future dates, the property, facilities, staff, equipment, services, and programs of the Recreational Sports Department, I, for myself, my heirs, personal representatives or assigns, do hereby release, waive, discharge, and covenant not to sue The Regents of the University of California, its directors, officers, employees, and agents from liability from any and all claims including the negligence of the Recreational Sports Department Facilities and Programs resulting in personal injury, accidents or illnesses (including death), and property loss arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. The part that concerns me is "I... do hereby release... The Regents of the University of California... from any and all claims including [claims related to use of the RSF]." By my reading, this is very broad, releasing the University from all legal claims. I have two questions: Is my reading correct? We've had a discussion on my department mailing list about whether "including" here acts as a qualifier that limits the scope of "all claims" to just those involving use of the RSF. Or, does "including" only strengthen "all claims," such as to explicitly include those arising from negligence? Is signing this waiver likely to impact students' legal claims against the university concerning matters unrelated to use of the RSF? Do California or Federal Law, respectively, provide any protections that would make parts of this waiver unenforceable? Suppose a graduate student has a spat with the university over intellectual property, or suppose a student is injured due to university negligence around a construction site. Could this impact their right to sue, etc.?
I think that the language In consideration of permission to use, ... Recreational Sports Department ... arising from, but not limited to, participation in activities, classes, observation, and use of facilities, premises, or equipment. would be read as limiting the waiver to cases in some way connected with the RSF. Even so limited it is rather broad, and may not be enforceable. In particular public facilities are not always allowed to obtain a waiver of otherwise valid negligence claims. If it were interpreted to mean "all claims on any matter, even ones having nothing at all to do with the RSF" then I think it would be so broad as to be unenforceable as unconscionable, and as misleading, so that there was no meeting of minds.
Yes. HIPPA does not apply to exchanges of information between professors and students, it only governs disclosures of medical information by medical providers and insurance companies. Educational privacy laws might prohibit the professor from sharing that information with someone outside the educational institution, but that is a different question entirely, than whether this information can be requested from a student. If you have a disagreement with the professor's decision, your remedy would be to ask the department chair, or the dean with jurisdiction over that professor, or provost (a.k.a. the chief academic officer) at the institution to reconsider this decision (ordinarily, in that order).
united-states The Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutional right to self-representation in Faretta v California, but in Godinez v. Moran, the court injected the logically prior question of competence, rejecting a mixed-bag approach to competence. The court held that when a defendant seeks to waive his right to counsel, a determination that he is competent to stand trial is not enough; the waiver must also be intelligent and voluntary before it can be accepted. While States are free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky formulation, the Due Process Clause does not impose them. The specific issue in this case is competence to plead guilty. In Indiana v. Edwards, the court stated that there is no absolute right to self-representation if one is competent to stand trial. It is held that The Constitution does not forbid States from insisting upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. One conclusion to be drawn from this is that states may but are not required to insist on a specific competence to self-represent, so there can be multiple standards of competence. Second, the Edwards court put the issue more in the realm of questions of insanity, where the limit imposed on a technical minor would have to be a substantial finding of incompetence, and not just a statutory declaration that anyone below the age of 18 is ipso facto incompetent to legally defend themselves but they can be competent to stand trial. In Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, the court further held that nothing &quot;requires a State to recognize a constitutional right to self-representation on direct appeal from a criminal conviction&quot;. This study indicates that individual states have not eagerly cleared the path to minor self-representation, noting that &quot;Many states permit waiver by a juvenile after cursory inquiry by the court&quot;, but &quot;Others require that the juvenile consult with a parent, lawyer or other adult&quot;. Nevertheless, &quot;waiver of counsel is, almost without exception, connected to an 'admission,' or guilty plea&quot;, simply asserting that &quot;Juveniles do not represent themselves at trial&quot;, and what minors waive is the right to trial. There is a lack of relevant case law citations in this study, in that no ruling is cited where the court affirms that minors are automatically incompetent to represent themselves in a criminal trial. The specifics of the qualifier &quot;almost without exception&quot; would be very relevant to this question.
I think the question answers itself : what's being put forward as a problem (that official organisations can cover their members' liability at events) is actually their main advantage. Liability doesn't go away - assuming your friend's lawyer's advice was accurate, it might have been better phrased as &quot;liability will be on the participants&quot;. I'm not sure it's entirely right (though it might just be overly specific) in the way it's been reported - if there was anything that could be considered incitement to, or encouragement of, unlawful activity, there may be an additional liability on the person whose name is attached to the group, and possibly the platform used (though this is a young area of law at the moment). What's covered by the insurance will be dependent on the policy, so that's not a question that The Bloke On The Internet can answer. In terms of discounts, I don't see any reason these couldn't be offered on a social media group - or that there would be a significant difference between a social media group, an official or unofficial website, or coupons published in a magazine or distributed in flyers on a street corner. It's worth bearing in mind that distributors don't do this out of kindness - it's just advertising. If an official club, or the associated manufacturer (the owner of the brand), believed there was quantifiable loss - primarily financial, but possibly reputational - there may be grounds to demand any unofficial group cease and desist, irrespective of where (social media, websites, physical premises) they had a presence. But perhaps the greatest advantage (though I'm drifting off topic for this SE) for an official group is that it can use whichever medium it considers most useful at the time, or a combination of several. One tied to a specific social media platform will always be limited in its longevity.
It depends upon how the service works. A "scrivner" is permitted, but "legal services" are not. If, for example, it asks you the questions on a state approved form and asks you to fill in answers and the compiles the answers into a complaint with the proper typesetting, this would be permissible. It could also have "educational materials" which you could read that could discuss small claims court. But, if it provides individualized assistance on a case by case basis on how to answer the questions, for example, prodding you to say something about each element of a cause of action if you fail to do so, this might very well constitute the practice of law and be illegal.
As someone who acts for both landlords and tenants I would say that I have never seen exclusions for personal injury or death in a commercial lease. I would recommend that you have the whole lease reviewed by a solicitor dealing in commercial property, particularly as, as has been stated in another reply, exclusion of liability for personal injury or death is prohibited by UCTA. This would suggest there may be other provisions which, if not prohibited, are unreasonable and you should be aware of the commitments you are taking on prior to signing This pure speculation, but the fact that those clauses would not be in a standard lease precedent does make me wonder if the landlord has done a DIY job and produced a lease from the internet suitable for another jurisdiction.
I was swimming in a college owned pool... That's one of the important details; you're either college students or visitors on a campus, and you are bound by the student conduct code or other safety laws set in place by the college that dictate behavior on the college campus. Check with the college about the rules that involved the pool. Campus laws and regulations can differ greatly, depending on if the college is private or a public institution. The other detail is that the lifeguard has been given authority to control behavior in the pool as an agent of the owner of the facility (the college) with all authority that the college has to regulate the pool. Be using the pool, you have entered into an agreement with the owners of the pool (the college) and that the lifeguard has authority in that area. Look around for a sign near the pool or in the locker rooms that outlines the rules and regulations of using the pool.
The matter is not clear-cut (and the university lawyers are presumably relying on that fact). The bold part and following overstates the situation, especially the unconstrained &quot;publishing anything&quot; edict. You can publish whatever you want that the university doesn't have a legal interest in. The clause that says &quot;If you have co-authors or co-researchers you must ask their permission before publishing, and include their names&quot; is true, and defines a limit on their control. If you don't have co-authors, it's none of their legal business. (There can be issues regarding publishing an affiliation, so let's put that on hold). They can, however, prohibit you from claiming an affiliation with Pod U, unless you submit your works to some internal vetting organization. This requirement should, however, be stated somewhere perhaps in the rules of the graduate school (not just the student handbook); or the other legally-enforceable rules. You should also pay attention to the exact words that they use. You must ask permission to publish work done with a co-author (that's a fact: it's a standard requirement in universities). It is important to be sure that the information you publish is correct (clearly that is not in dispute). They are allowed to ask you to get X's approval. The First Amendment does not prohibit them from urging you to follow a course of action.