In Iowa why is there are harsher punishment for causing serious injury without intent than with intent? In Iowa under §708.2 an assault (which is not distinct from battery in Iowa) with the intent to inflict a serious injury upon another§708.2(1) is an aggravated misdemeanor, which is punishable for up to two years in jail with a fine of $625-6,250§903.1(2). An assault which causes bodily injury or mental illness§708.2(2) is a serious misdemeanor, which is punishable for up to one year jail with a fine of $315-1,875§903.1(1). But if one commits assault without the intent to inflict serious injury, but who causes serious injury§708.2(4) they are guilty of a class &quot;D&quot; felony, which is punishable for up to five years in jail with a fine of $750-7,500§902.9(1)(e). This is in contrast to homicides where less intent generally results in a lesser sentence. For instance murder in the first degree is committed by willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills another person§707.2(1)(a) which is a class &quot;A&quot; felony, which is punishable only by a mandatory life sentence, without the possibility of parole or probation§902.1(1). Second degree murder is committed when someone still has malice aforethought, but doesn't meet the requirements of first degree murder. This is a class &quot;B&quot; felony which is punishable with up to 50 years in jail§707.3. Voluntary manslaughter is committed when a person causes the death of another person, under circumstances which would otherwise be murder, if the person causing the death acts solely as the result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a person and there is not an interval between the provocation and the killing in which a person of ordinary reason and temperament would regain control and suppress the impulse to kill§707.4(1). which is a class &quot;C&quot; felony, which is punishable up to 10 years in jail, with a fine of $1,000-$10,000§902.9(1)(d). Involuntary manslaughter which unintentionally causes the death of another person by the commission of a public offense other than a forcible felony or escape§707.5(1)(a). is a class &quot;D&quot; felony, while involuntary manslaughter which unintentionally causes the death of another person by the commission of an act in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury§707.5(1)(b). is an aggravated misdemeanor. So why is it that lacking intent to inflict serious injury, but causing serious injury nonetheless has a harsher punishment than inflicting serious injury with outright intent?
I think you should read this section in conjunction with 708.4: Any person who does an act which is not justified and which is intended to cause serious injury to another commits willful injury, which is punishable as follows: A class “C” felony, if the person causes serious injury to another. A class “D” felony, if the person causes bodily injury to another. So a person who commits an assault with the intent to inflict serious injury, and actually does inflict serious injury, will not get away with a 708.2(1) aggravated misdemeanor. They may instead be convicted under 708.4(1), a class C felony, punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a fine of $1,000-$10,000. This is a more serious crime than the class D felony of 708.2(4) for someone who does not intend to cause a serious injury but does so anyway. As an exercise, you can make yourself a 3x3 grid of all possible combinations of intent and result among &quot;no injury&quot;, &quot;bodily injury&quot;, &quot;serious injury&quot;, and I think you'll find that the severity increases with either worse intent or worse result.
Neither with or without a warrant, if the confession is all there is. For a felony, the question is whether there is probable cause (4th Amendment). This is true whether the police arrest you, or they get a warrant – the difference being that in the latter case the warrant is issued by a guy with much greater knowledge of what constitutes probable cause. The question then would be whether a confession alone constitutes probable cause. There is a venerable rule, the corpus delecti rule (300+ years old) that requires there to be independent evidence of a crime, the point of this rule being to to prevent mentally ill people from being convicted of a crime that never even happened. Under that rule, a confession alone would not be probable cause (but a confession and a bloody glove could be). This article reports that at the federal level and in 10 states, there is a lower bar of mere "corroboration" without the need to argue that there was an actual crime. Exemplifying this relaxing of the traditional rule, in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, the court held that "[a]n accused's extrajudicial admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, made subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions, and corroboration by independent evidence is required". However, "[t]he corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti" and "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth; but those facts plus the other evidence must be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". In such jurisdictions, courts take a "totality of circumstances" approach focusing on whether the confession is trustworthy.
Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.).
IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed.
It is premature to judge the particular case because the facts are not all available. But we can address the general principles. The Model Penal Code 3.04(2)(a) sets out the general principles clearly. A person has the right to self-defense against unlawful force. But, the use of force is not justifiable to resist an arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, although the arrest is unlawful. But more specifically under (b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat However, there is a further condition that force is not justifiable if the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain from any action which he has no duty to take Then finally, §3.05 says that this goes for people using force in defense of others. The short version is that the common law right to resist illegal arrest has been supplanted by a statutory requirement to submit to police authority, for example in California and New York. In Ewumi v. Georgia, defendant was illegally arrested and physically defended himself, which resulted in a battery charge and conviction. The battery charge was overturned because the arrest was illegal ab initio. If one resisting an authorized arrest, where an officer's force is likely to result in unjustifiable great bodily harm, the question is whether a reasonable person would find it necessary to resist in self-defense. It is unusual for the courts to find that to be the case. Minnesota law says that reasonable force may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other's consent when the following circumstances exist or the actor reasonably believes them to exist: (1) when used by a public officer or one assisting a public officer under the public officer's direction: (a) in effecting a lawful arrest Other sections say that a person who is not a public officer may use force to effect an arrest, or, "(3) when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person". Being arrested by the police is not an offense, and none of the other justifications for use of force apply.
I'll use Washington state as my source, but laws will be similar in other states. RCW 9A.76.020 outlaws obstructing a law enforcement officer, which this would be: it is a gross misdemeanor. In using lethal force, you would have committed first degree murder, under RCW 9A.32.030. There is a defense that can be used, per RCW 9A.16.050, that homicide is justified when: In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his or her presence or company, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being accomplished. Law enforcement officers have access to justifiable homicide defenses as well under 9A.16.040, for example (b) When necessarily used by a peace officer to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty or (c) When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the officer's command and in the officer's aid: (i) To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to commit a felony The outcome of the case would hinge in part on whether the officer's arrest and use of force was lawful. To take two extremes, if the guy on the ground had just killed a dozen people and was aiming to rack up another dozen kills, the officer's arrest would almost certainly be held to be legal and his degree of force justified. Your personal belief that the suspect was compliant and unarmed might be refuted by the facts. On the other hand, if the guy on the ground had slept with the officer's sister and the officer wanted to rid the world of this vermin, then the arrest and force would almost certainly be held to be not legal. It can be legal to use deadly force to resist unlawful arrest. See John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, where the court held that if a party resisted arrest by an officer without warrant, and who had no right to arrest him, and if, in the course of that resistance, the officer was killed, the offence of the party resisting arrest would be reduced from what would have been murder, if the officer had had the right to arrest, to manslaughter The court also said where the officer is killed in the course of the disorder which naturally accompanies an attempted arrest that is resisted, the law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction when the officer had the right to make the arrest from what it does if the officer had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show that no offense had been committed. This ruling has been somewhat eroded, in US v. Simon: We recognize that law enforcement officers are frequently called on to make arrests without warrants and should not be held, so far as their personal security is concerned, to a nicety of distinctions between probable cause and lack of probable cause in differing situations of warrantless arrests. It is for this reason we believe that the force of John Bad Elk has been diminished The upshot of this is that (assuming no warrant), leeway is granted to officers in assessing probable cause (I'm not sure anybody really knows at a general conceptual level what constitutes "probable cause". The court seems to imply that the remote hearsay used as the basis for the arrest would not have been sufficient for a warrant, but it was "reasonable grounds" for believing accused had committed a crime). Your premise that the officer is about to shoot would have to be substantiated by some fact, such as a declaration "I'm gonna kill you". Otherwise, your belief that the officer was about to commit unjustified murder would itself be unjustified. With better fleshing out of the circumstances, you could manufacture a justified-homicide scenario.
If someone attacks your dog, or the dog of a third person, you may use force to defend property rights, see ORS 161.205 and ORS 161.229. This does not apply to a person attacking their own animal. Force may also be used to effect an arrest by a private person (ORS 133.225) – you &quot;may arrest another person for any crime committed in the presence of the private person if the private person has probable cause to believe the arrested person committed the crime&quot;. You would need to study up on ORS 167.320. Assuming that the abuse is less than causing death, for first degree animal abuse, it is when one &quot;causes serious physical injury to an animal&quot;. The child actually becomes relevant because the misdemeanor becomes a felony when The person knowingly commits the animal abuse in the immediate presence of a minor child. For purposes of this paragraph, a minor child is in the immediate presence of animal abuse if the abuse is seen or directly perceived in any other manner by the minor child. So in fact, no amount of force can legally be used to prevent a person from hitting their dog. Force can be used to arrest a person (which prevents any further beating), if the person causes serious physical injury to the dog.
Criminal cases The answer in the case of criminal charges in the federal system and in the vast majority of U.S. states is that you can almost never recover legal fees you incur defending a criminal action. There is such a thing as a lawsuit for malicious prosecution, and there is such as thing as a lawsuit for a civil rights violation caused by bringing baseless charges, but in both circumstances one must demonstrate that the charges were brought without probable cause. But, in most cases of serious criminal charges like this one, either a grand jury probable cause finding, or a preliminary hearing probable cause finding, both made well prior to a trial, will conclusively preclude a malicious prosecution or civil rights lawsuit. (Also, prosecutors have absolute immunity for their discretionary prosecution decisions, and judges have absolute immunity for their judicial decisions, and you can't sue jurors unless they accepted a bribe or something like that.) But, the standard of proof necessary to establish probable cause is much lower than the standard of proof necessary to convict. A very small minority of states allow for reimbursement of fees upon an acquittal, but even then, it is often necessary to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that you were actually innocent, so a dismissal on procedural grounds or an acquittal at a criminal trial where the prosecution must show beyond a reasonable doubt that you are guilty, is not sufficient to show that it is more likely than not that you are innocent. Likewise, you are not entitled to recovery for indirect financial damages caused by criminal charges. As you correctly imply, this is a very harsh rule that can mean that wrongful criminal charges can ruin you. On the other hand, if you are unable to afford an attorney, and a public defender is appointed for you by the state, you do not have to reimburse the state for the public defender's fees if you prevail and are acquitted. A minority of states, however, require that you reimburse the state for the public defender's fees if you are convicted along with other court costs, fines and restitution awards. For what it is worth, only about 1% of criminal charges brought result in an acquittal at trial. Most cases are resolved through a pre-trial plea bargain, a voluntary dismissal by a prosecutor who acknowledges that there is no case against you prior to trial, or a conviction of at least something at trial. About 10% of cases go to trial and about 10% of cases that go to trial result in an acquittal or hung jury (in very round and approximate numbers that vary greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and by type of case). Also, probably at least 10% of acquittals are of people who were factually guilty, because juries get it right something on the order of 90% of the time when cases go to trial. But, the vast majority of acquittals result in a vast injustice to the defendant (although not as great as when a judge uses the factual basis of the events from which you have been acquitted to enhance the sentence against you on other charges which is done from time to time in both the federal and state legal systems in a practice that is unfair but not necessarily sufficient to overrule those sentences on appeal). Civil cases The situation in a civil case is different and too broad to answer in one question. There are some civil cases where a prevailing defendant is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs, while there are others where a prevailing defendant is not. The default rule, called the "American Rule" is that a prevailing attorney is not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs of a defense. But, there are myriad exceptions to that rule that vary by type of case, by the particular details of how a case was prosecuted, and by legal jurisdiction within the United States, that are not easily summarized. For example, in Colorado civil cases, some of the more common grounds for an award of attorneys' fees to a defending party are: (a) a two-sided contractual fee shifting term, (b) dismissal of the case before filing an answer for failure to state a claim when tort claims were asserted, (c) a determination that the suit was groundless, frivolous or vexatious, (d) violation of certain rules relating to disclosure of information to the other party, (e) a statutory fee shifting provision in the case of a claim based upon a statutorily created right which is present in some statutes but not others.