Phone Recording and phone routing - USA I am pretty familiar with the legalities of USA one-party and two-party recording laws, but there is one piece of the puzzle that doesn't seem clear. For some background, I received a call from a Missouri number (landline). We discussed some things and figured out how we wanted to handle them. I then asked if the call was being recorded. The caller said &quot;yes&quot; and he was located in Kansas. I told them that was illegal (I will get into the why in a moment). I was in Missouri at the time the call (cell:T-Mobile) initiated. (Both are one-party consent states.) Now for the &quot;why&quot;. At the surface, this looks legal. But my understanding is that if the call is routed by the phone companies through a state that is a two-party state (e.g., California), it must follow the two-party consent rules of recording. Since all calls are digital and managed by computer network routing algorithms, it is completely feasible the call could be routed through a two-party state. Since they failed to state that the call was being recorded at the beginning of the call (and there were no distinctive beeps), I believe they are in violation of the law (as it would be nearly impossible to prove where the call was routed without tons of digging through multiple phone company records, switch logs, discovery, etc). When I have posed this question to lawyers I have worked with in the past, they get that glassy-eyed look and don't really know how to respond. So I figured a larger audience with a more technical understanding of routing, might be a better fit for my question. Thank you for your time. Update 5/21/21: I found an occurrence (from the Hobbs Act info @bdb484 provided) where a call in Georgia was routed to Florida then back to Georgia. Here's the source information: https://casetext.com/analysis/interstate-offenses United States v. Drury, 396 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2003) The initial panel decision in this case held that use of a telephone to make an intrastate phone call was not sufficient to create federal jurisdiction under the 2002 version of 18 U.S.C. § 1958, the murder for hire statute. Though the telephone system is an instrumentality in interstate commerce, the statute, as construed by the Eleventh Circuit, requires a call that actually travels in interstate commerce. The element was actually satisfied in this case, because the cell phone call relayed the signal from a place in south Georgia, to a tower in north Florida and then back to the recipient of the call in south Georgia. Though the caller and recipient of the call were in Georgia, the signal actually traveled in interstate commerce. The statute was subsequently amended to specifically provide for a conviction if a facility of interstate commerce was used – i.e., a telephone – even if the call was purely intrastate. While it doesn't answer my question, it is interesting that it was important to recognize that the call &quot;relayed the signal&quot; through a two-party state.
The courts of Washington will not apply the law of Tennessee in an action somehow involving something about Tennessee, they will apply the laws of Washington. If neither end of the conversation is in an all-party state, no party has standing to sue under the laws of some other state. If a person in Idaho calls a person in Oregon and the call is routed through Washington state, neither party can sue under Washington law. In all 50 states, there is an &quot;exception&quot; to the consent requirement when the &quot;interception&quot; is due to routing / switching, otherwise it would be illegal to call from house to house if you don't have a single wire between the houses (never the case). No state has a law that imposes two-party state law in calls that pass through a two-party state. The federal wiretapping law say you may not intercept any wire, oral, or electronic communications without consent, then sets up the definitions to encode the exceptions. For example, &quot;aural transfer&quot; is a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception (anticipating the need for connections), and &quot;intercept&quot; means &quot;acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device&quot; (a hearing aid is a device). But then &quot;electronic, mechanical, or other device&quot; is further defined to exclude a hearing aid, or also they exclude any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties which is a good thing since the telephone is a device, and the switching system is a system used to make a phone call possible, but it intercepts under the ordinary meaning of intercept. Intercept has a specific, narrow meaning. The law of Florida is very similar
In this specific case and location, the precise location of the incident was explicitly made a public space via state law not too long before this actual event. They therefore most certainly have no right to privacy. What is interesting to me though is the other side of this, does someone have the right to record others in public spaces, or is it simply not illegal? For instance if I non-destructively and non-violently "jam" your camera by shooting a low-power IR beam at your lens, have I abridged a legal right of yours? I don't think it would be illegal to do this. I am not even positive its against the 1st Amendment. The 1st Amendment relates only to the dissemination of information, not the collection of it. The Constitution doesn't seem to compel the gov't to make information available, or even to make things/events/spaces observable. The various "sunshine" laws after-all had to be enacted, it wasn't part of an interpretation of the 1st Amendment. To put a finer point on it, is recording events in public spaces legal or merely lawful?
You do need to know the location of both parties. U.S. Federal law (18 USC 2511(2)(d)), which prohibits the interception of wire and electronic communication, states: It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. California Penal Code 632 requires the consent of all parties to a confidential communication in order for the conversation to be recorded. The statute defines a "confidential communication" as follows: The term “confidential communication” includes any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. Once AT&amp;T, or anyone else for that matter, states that the communication is being recorded, it is no longer considered a confidential communication requiring the consent of all parties in order for any party to record it. Part of the California Civil Jury Instructions for this code requires that the plaintiff must prove, among other things, that the plaintiff had a "reasonable expectation that the conversation was not being overheard or recorded." You can see the full jury instructions here: https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/1800/1809.html
The opt-out option is exercised by hanging up the phone. The federal wiretapping law 18 USC 2511 would contain any specific restrictions on recording federal employees, and there are no such restrictions. Each state has their own laws as well, so if either party is in a two-consent state such as Florida, consent from the other party would be required. The federal law only requires one party consent. It is possible that the individual expanded a separate rule that s/he may have heard of, one prohibiting recording of an IRS due process collection hearing that is conducted by telephone, as ruled in Calafati v. Commissioner. In that case, petitioner owed taxes and penalties and there was a process where the IRS was going to take his stuff, which requires a hearing. There is a federal statute 26 USC 7521 allowing the in-person hearing to be recorded, but no mention of recording telephone hearings. The Tax Court has taken the position that if it is not explicitly allowed, the IRS can forbid it: but this is in a very specific context, i.e. a specific legal hearing.
You are right that this is probably a private space; you are wrong in thinking it is your private space; it isn't. The space belongs to your employer and they can do whatever they want with their space unless there is a law that says they can't. As to what type of "hidden surveillance" is allowed that depends on your particular circumstances including what state and federal laws apply and the employment contract you are covered by. As a starting point, if this was happening in Australia then: If you gave permission, all would be legal If you did not give permission: it would be illegal to record anything taking place across a public telecommunications system (i.e. phone tapping) it would be legal for anyone to make an audio recording (not phone tapping) of any conversation to which they were a party it would be legal to make a video recording without sound.
Absent a specified jurisdiction, I'm going to assume the US state of New York. This conduct falls squarely within the definition of extortion under New York Penal Law section 155.05(2)(e): A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will: [...] (iv) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; There is a defense under section 155.15(2): In any prosecution for larceny by extortion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that he or another person would be charged with a crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that his sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such threatened charge. However, in your hypothetical, the customer is just seeking a payout. This defense is meant for situations like a theft victim telling the thief "give me back my property or I'll call the cops;" unless paying the customer is actually a reasonable action to make up for the crime, the customer can't use this defense. If the crime is a federal one, this is also blackmail under 18 U.S. Code &sect; 873: Whoever, under a threat of informing, or as a consideration for not informing, against any violation of any law of the United States, demands or receives any money or other valuable thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. If interstate communications are involved, 18 U.S. Code &sect; 875(d) can also apply: Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
From what I understand, courts occasionally use &quot;sound&quot; recordings in place of stenographer records. The original recording is not made available to the public but transcripts are. When, where, and why is this done? In Colorado this is done in all limited jurisdiction court proceedings (i.e. the courts where misdemeanors and smaller money claims and evictions involving premises with fairly low rents are tried), and in most general jurisdiction court proceedings unless the parties pay for live transcription at their own expense. Transcripts are made when there is a sound recording only upon a request submitted to the court that then outsources the request to independent contractor transcriptionists. This is a fairly recent development and there may be live stenographers (also known as court reporters) in some general jurisdiction courts still today in Colorado, but it is profoundly less expensive to tape record a hearing or trial and just transcribe them upon request at the expense of a party, than it is to have a live stenographer make a verbatim record of every hearing or trial. In limited jurisdiction courts typically only about one in a hundred cases is appealed, and in general jurisdiction courts typically about one in ten cases are appealed. The marginal cost of an audio recording that isn't transcribed, once the courtrooms are wired for sound, is negligible (perhaps $10 per day (or less) for storage media). The marginal costs of a live stenographer or transcriptionist per day is on the order of $240+, which adds up over the course of a year. In the limited jurisdiction court, live court reporting would cost about $24,000 per day of trial in cases that are actually appealed (since only about 1% of cases are appealed and those cases would have to bear the entire cost of the transcription system). In general jurisdiction courts, live court reporting would cost about $2,400 per day of trial in cases that are actually appealed (since only about 10% of cases are appealed and those cases would have to bear the entire cost of the transcription system). In contrast, with sound recordings, the cost per day of trial actually appealed in limited jurisdiction courts would cost $1,240, and in general jurisdiction courts it would cost $340. These are judicial branch expenses small enough to be financed with court filing fees. Depositions prior to a trial are often handled by a live stenographer and sometimes handled by a videographer as well, but almost never conducted with sound only recordings in the absence of extreme circumstances like a blizzard that makes it impossible to secure the court reporter's attendance (in part because there is almost always a desire to have a transcript made and because the stenographer can confirm spellings and ambiguous sounding words with the deponents and counsel during breaks avoiding errors in the final product). Are court proceedings ever filmed or otherwise visually recorded? Depositions and court proceedings are sometimes filmed. A video of a deposition can be presented to a judge or jury in lieu of testimony when the witness is not available or to impeach the testimony of the witness. It is unusual in Colorado for court proceedings to be visually recorded. But, in Alaska, there is a state constitutional right to participate in most kinds of court proceedings and legislative hearings by video conference (because geographically, Alaska is about a third the size of the continental U.S. and thinly populated with large roadless areas), so I presume that in Alaska, court proceedings are routinely videotaped. Some courts in the U.S. do initial appearances and arraignments in many criminal cases by closed circuit television from the jail, before a judge in the court house, in order to reduce the need to transport prisoners from the jail to the court house for a perfunctory five minute hearing which is not evidentiary, and there may be video recordings of those proceedings as well. Many federal courts and some state courts do status conferences and similar minor procedural hearings by telephone conference call and those are usually audio recorded without a live court reporter. In Colorado, all oral arguments in appeals (except those rare cases that are secret such as juvenile cases and rare cases involving the details of trade secrets) are live streamed and podcast over the Internet. Many other appellate courts (but not the U.S. Supreme Court) do this as well. But, transcripts of oral arguments at the appellate level are rarely considered in further appeals. The video (or in the case of U.S. Supreme Court hearings, previously transcripts only and now audio as well) are released for PR reasons and for public transparency, reflecting appellate court's role as law making institutions, not for the litigants themselves. It seems that facial expression, hand motions, vocal intonations, etc. are part of the body of evidence on which a judge or jury decides a case. So is this type of record ever made available, and if so, when? A deposition or other videotape provided as evidence in a case at trial is part of the record on appeal that an appellate court may consider. And, a judge or jury may consider things like facial expressions, hand motions, vocal intonations, etc. in those cases. But, video of the court proceeding itself is simply a basis for preparing a transcript that will become part of the court record. Appellate courts in common law systems are forbidden from considering things like facial expressions, hand motions, vocal intonations, etc. of witnesses testifying in a trial. This is part of the credibility evaluation function that is reserved entirely to the judge or jury who is the trier of fact in a case. The only time a video of a trial court proceeding itself would be considered would be as evidence in a different trial arising out of events that took place in the courtroom itself. For example, suppose that a court bailiff goes berserk and starts shooting jurors for no reason in the middle of a trial that was being videotaped. That videotape could be considered in a criminal trial of the court bailiff for assault with a deadly weapon or murder, or in a civil case brought by the jurors or their surviving next of kin, for battery or wrongful death. The appellate court of the criminal or civil trial of the bailiff could consider the videotape, but an appellate court considering an appeal of the proceeding that was being videotaped could not. This is basically just a historical artifact. If videotape had been in existence at the time of the Norman invasion in 1066 CE, appellate courts in common law countries would no doubt have the right to review questions of both fact and law, rather than merely law as they do today. In civil law countries, such as those of continental Europe, judges take notes regarding evidence, but there is no verbatim record of the proceedings and any assertion that the judge was mistaken about the facts is resolved by retrying the disputed facts over again in a second instance court proceeding, a process reflecting even more rudimentary court resources than those existing prior to tape and video recording were invented.
There is a relevant law, Title 18 section 907 which states that "A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally". So possession of lock picks is not a crime per se. In Com. v. Gendrachi 389 A.2d 604 we are reminded that "intent need not be directly proved, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the incident out of which the charges arise". The accused was busted in mildly suspicious circumstances at 5:20 am in the dead of winter, urinating. The court notes that "There is no evidence that appellant's hands were on the door or that he made an attempt to extract the tools from his pocket and apply them to the door. In fact, there is no act or statement by appellant that would lead one to infer that he intended to use the tools at that time", and that "appellant is a certified locksmith and it is not unreasonable to find the tools of his trade in his pocket, especially when he is wearing his work attire". Note that this is on appeal: he was convicted initially. The point is that there is a lot of slop in cashing out the legal concept of "intent". Pennsylvania does not, apparently, have any specific laws that refer to lock picks. It does have a statute that addresses having criminal tools, which are defined as (including) "Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have". Mr. Gendrachi had those very tools, and the appeals court did not say anything to suggest that the tools were not "criminal tools" (and in FN 5 they actually point out that the Commonwealth cannot say that the tools were weapons, a ludicrous proposition never raised by anyone – so by failing to deny that lock picks are criminal tools, they are adoptively admitting that they are criminal tools). Thus I conclude that there is a law in PA, that lock picks are burglary tools, and that the government would have to prove intent to use criminally.