Why are Roe v Wade and Planned Parenthood v Casey abbreviated as Roe and Casey? The Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization ruling says: ...Roe and Casey are overruled... Why is Roe v. Wade abbreviated as Roe, while Planned Parenthood v. Casey is abbreviated as Casey? Shouldn't they be Roe and Planned Parenthood or Wade and Casey?
There isn't any kind of legal reason for the distinction; it's just a matter of custom and convenience. The normal rule is that you would shorthand a case name by referring to the first-named party, but there are lots of times where that is not the case. With Casey, the issue is that Planned Parenthood is a serial litigant, so if you were to just refer to &quot;Planned Parenthood,&quot; there would be some ambiguity as to whether you were referring to Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), or Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), or any of the many other cases Planned Parenthood has litigated in the circuit and district courts. For the same reason, criminal cases are typically named after the defendant, as we would otherwise have tens of thousands of cases named &quot;California&quot; or &quot;New York&quot; or &quot;United States.&quot;
District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008) is the Supreme Court's latest and clearest interpretation of the 2nd Amendment. The majority's analysis is almost entirely a textualist/original-meaning interpretation. They took the following to be the text of the 2nd Amendment: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. The capitalization differences were treated as inconsequential in the analysis. The opinion refers to "the phrase “the militia” in the prefatory clause", with no capitalization when mentioning it. In interpreting the object of "keep and bear Arms", "Arms", the opinion immediately removes capitalization in its own discussion of the term. They even explicitly rule out the possibility that "keep Arms" has any special meaning: No party has apprised us of an idiomatic meaning of “keep Arms.” Thus, the most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have weapons.” The opinion also refers to Vermont's adoption of Pennsylvania's "right to bear arms", calling any differences in capitalization or punctuation inconsequential: In 1777, Vermont adopted the identical provision, except for inconsequential differences in punctuation and capitalization. Neither of the two dissents make anything of the difference in capitalization. None of the 68 amicus briefs mentioned the difference in capitalization. It did not come up in oral argument. The Brief for the Professors of Linguistics (in support of Petitioners) says: The Amendment’s first and third commas signal a pause for breath and can be omitted without affecting the meaning. They say that the second comma is consequential, but that comma is consistent between the two variants that you quoted.
You are correct that "narrow tailoring" and "least restrictive means" are often treated as synonyms.1 For example, Professor Volokh describes narrow tailoring as having four components: advancement of the compelling governmental interest, no over-inclusiveness, the least restrictive alternative, and no under-inclusiveness.2 However, he says that the first "three components are closely related, and all of them could be subsumed within the 'least restrictive alternative' inquiry."3 The Supreme Court has sometimes equated strict scrutiny with the "least restrictive alternative" formulation, saying, "Unquestionably we have held that a government practice or statute which restricts 'fundamental rights' or which contains 'suspect classifications' is to be subjected to 'strict scrutiny' and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available."4 The court has also distinguished between narrow tailoring and a "least restrictive alternative" test, at least with respect to laws that infringe on speech: "Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests, but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so."5. The dissent in that same case described the majority's view as a "serious distortion of the narrow tailoring requirement", and said, "Our cases have not, as the majority asserts, 'clearly' rejected a less-restrictive-alternative test. [...] The Court's past concern for the extent to which a regulation burdens speech more than would a satisfactory alternative is noticeably absent from today's decision. The majority requires only that government show that its interest cannot be served as effectively without the challenged restriction."6. Some statutes remove any ambiguity, prescribing the "least restrictive alternative" test.7. In summary, certain areas of law (free speech, religious freedoms, affirmative action) have their own idiosyncratic treatment of strict scrutiny, narrow tailoring, and the "least restrictive alternative" test. It is always best to read the particular line of case law in the field you are interested in to see exactly what formula the court has established in that area. 1. Winkler, Adam, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts. Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 59, p. 793, 2006; UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 06-14. At 800: "Narrow tailoring requires that the law capture within its reach no more activity (or less) than is necessary to advance those compelling ends. An alternative phrasing is that the law must be the “least restrictive alternative” available to pursue those ends." 2. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. Pennsylvania L. Rev. 2417 (1997). 3. Ibid. 4. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Opinion of Justice Brennan, Justice White, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.) 5. Ward v. Rock Against Racism 491 U.S. 781 (1989) 6. Ibid. 7. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, implemented in part in 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(b): "Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest."
Your analysis is correct. Hobby Lobby would be irrelevant insofar as health benefits are concerned (although the general religious objection doctrine would still have relevance in other contexts, e.g. pharmacy operators), in a Medicare for all single payer system where health insurance did not involve an employer. And you are likewise correct that a government could not assert a religious objection, although the Medicare for All program could decide what it would and would not cover and would not have to cover reproductive health services at all.
No Only the ratio decidendi of a case sets binding precedent. By definition, that has to be in the decision of the court’s majority because that’s what decided the case. If a minority decision disagrees with the majority on ratio, then the majority is the binding precedent. If the point is obiter, then it’s merely persuasive, not binding, irrespective of where it is.
There's really no difference. Quoting from here, What if I change the person's name? To state a defamation claim, the person claiming defamation need not be mentioned by name—the plaintiff only needs to be reasonably identifiable. So if you defame the &quot;government executive who makes his home at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue,&quot; it is still reasonably identifiable as the president. What does the whole thing depend on? It depends on how easy it is to identify the pseudonym-using plaintiff. They don't have more recourse, per se - nor do they have more protection under the law - but it may be harder for them to win the case. On the upside, the statement might not cause them as much harm when compared to a person using their actual name.
No To declare that a parent is &quot;unfit&quot; in the US requires at least a decision by a government agency (often called &quot;child protective services&quot; or &quot;child welfare&quot; depending on the state) usually confirmed by a judge. Medical testimony may be persuasive, but neither doctors nor hospitals may make such determinations.
The plain meaning of "any" is "all". That does not mean that that is how the word is interpreted under current US law: that can only be determined by inspecting the case law. In US v. Alabama 443 Fed. Appx. 411 (No. 11-14532-CC), fn. 2 states "Pursuant to § 1304(e), every alien eighteen years of age and older must carry a certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card", thus this court has suggested that the meaning is actually "some". However, the case was not ruling on the interpretation of "any" here, so this could be a slip. The case involves an Alabama law, which as reported in the opinion's summary of the part of Alabama law being challenged by the US states: Section 10 creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)..." indicating that the Alabama statute refers to "some" (which could influence the interpretation of "any", since "some" and "any" are often mixed up in legal drafting). That is, it is possible that the court in the footnote read "any" as "some" because the state law in question, which is parallel to the federal law, says "an". In US v Arizona 641 F.3d 339, the court weakly suggests a "some" interpretation as well, saying: Determining Congress' purpose, and whether Section 3 poses an obstacle to it, first requires that we evaluate the text of the federal registration requirements in in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306. These sections create a comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration, including penalties for failure to carry one's registration document at all times.. Again, the meaning of "any" is not the central issue: in using "one's registration document" in the singular, the court must have been interpreting "any" as "some". US v. Daubon 334 Fed.Appx. 167 (2009), another case that invokes the law but does not rule on the meaning of "any", rephrases the law: 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) requires every alien over eighteen to carry his permanent resident card at all times. which is at odds with the possibility of there being two such documents: it suggests that an I-766 is not good enough. Lexis-Nexis returns 18 cases that cite this statute, and only Arizona v. US which was about the preemption issue was decided by SCOTUS. None of these opinions rules on the meaning of "any", so the matter has not yet been decided.