Does Canadian law differ from US law concerning undue influence of jurors? According to Reuters, the judge in the murder trial of Derek Chauvin today sharply criticized Maxine Waters' comments on the case, saying she might have given the defense grounds for appeal in the event of a conviction. He also said: &quot;I wish elected officials would stop talking about this case, especially in a manner that's disrespectful to the rule of law and to the judicial branch and our function.&quot; Source: https://www.reuters.com/business/legal/judge-blasts-us-rep-maxine-waters-abhorrent-comments-about-chauvin-trial-2021-04-19/ I've heard that there are stronger protections against the improper influence of sitting jurors in Canada than in the U.S. I'm interested in how they work.
Ultimately this raises a question of balancing two fundamental rights: The right of the accused to a fair trial within due process of law &amp; the right to freedom of expression (or in the case of press publications as in most of the cases cited by this answer, the very related freedom of the press). Both the US &amp; Canada safeguard these rights in their constitutions (Amendments I, V, XIV &amp; Charter ss. 2(b), 11(d) respectively) so any differences would be in their approaches to balancing these rights. United States I've found Some Aspects of the Law of Contempt of Court in Canada, England, and the United States (Jacob S. Ziegel, 1960) to be highly informative on the historical development of contempt of court and provided a good baseline understanding. In reference to Bridges v. California 314 U.S. 252 (1941), it states Although the Court recognized that &quot;free speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization&quot; and that &quot;it would be a trying task to choose between them&quot;, it held nevertheless that an abridgment on the freedom of the press was only permitted by the Constitution when there was &quot;a clear and present danger&quot; that the offending publication would actually interfere with a fair and impartial trial. The majority opinion rejected the &quot;reasonable tendency&quot; test which had been applied by the lower courts, and still is the yardstick by which such publications are measured in England and Canada. I'd also like to quote the following paragraph from Bridges as it raises two points I'd like to comment on: What finally emerges from the &quot;clear and present danger&quot; cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious, and the degree of imminence extremely high, before utterances can be punished. Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law &quot;abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.&quot; It must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow. The first point is that due to its broad language, the court gives a certain priority to the First Amendment. The second point involves the age of my citations: the &quot;clear and present danger&quot; test is from Schenck v. United States, largely considered to be overruled by the more stringent Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969) &quot;immediate lawless action&quot; test. This does raise the question of whether Bridges can then be considered good law. I unfortunately can't find any good references discussing Bridges in a post-Brandenburg context, however, I would argue it is still valid. While the Schenck test has been overruled, the Bridges citation I gave in fact foreshadows the Brandenburg test by using the language of &quot;imminence&quot; and stating the Schenck test was not necessarily the limit of the First Amendment, but just a minimum bar. I would then argue that Bridges can quite easily be considered good law by simply substituting the Schenck test with the Brandenburg one without really affecting the court's ratio decidendi. Canada Ziegel's article is even more out-of-date when it comes to Canada as it is pre-Charter. For a modern Canadian overview of out-of-court contempt of court I've found A Comment on &quot;No Comment&quot;: The Sub Judice Rule and the Accountability of Public Officials in the 21st Century (Lorne Sossin &amp; Valerie Crystal, 2013). The article cites Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. [1994] 3 SCR 835 as directly tackling the balance of these rights. In it the court acknowledged the pre-Charter common law of giving deference to the accused's right to a fair trial, but noting that the Charter now requires a balancing of these rights The traditional common law rule governing publication bans -- that there be a real and substantial risk of interference with the right to a fair trial -- emphasized the right to a fair trial over the free expression interests of those affected by the ban and, in the context of post-Charter Canadian society, does not provide sufficient protection for freedom of expression. When two protected rights come into conflict, Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that fully respects the importance of both rights. A hierarchical approach to rights must be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when developing the common law. The common law rule governing publication bans must thus be reformulated in a manner that reflects the principles of the Charter and, in particular, the equal status given by the Charter to ss. 2(b) and 11(d). Ultimately, the court concluded that a balance of these rights was the following test: A publication ban should only be ordered when: (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. While Dagenais more clearly explains the balancing of these two rights, the article also cites R. v. Vermette [1988] 1 SCR 985 which is a much more similar situation to Maxine Waters commenting on an ongoing trial. The article summarizes as follows: While the trial was ongoing, the premier of Quebec, René Lévesque, denounced one of the defence witnesses in the National Assembly, despite warnings by the Speaker that such comments would be prejudicial to the accused. The trial decision even contains the following comment from the judge: When speaking in the National Assembly, however, the Premier enjoyed the privilege of Parliamentary immunity. Had it not been for this immunity, he could have been cited for contempt of court. Comparison At a constitutional level, it can be seen that the balancing of these two rights are not the same in the US and Canada. The US gives much greater weight to freedom of speech, while Canada allows restriction of speech if doing so more greatly benefits another Charter right and there is no reasonable alternative. On a practical level, there are also differences in how jury trials are run, maybe even as a direct result of the constitutional differences. In Dagenais, the court quotes the following: Generally speaking, however, the approach taken in the United States seems to be to allow for the widest possible latitude in media reporting of events transpiring prior to and during the course of the trial of an accused person. This is counterbalanced, in the interests of ensuring an impartial and unbiased jury, in a number of ways including, during the jury selection process, by an often searching examination into the attitudes, biases and even the personal and financial affairs of potential jurors and, after the jury selection process has been completed, by the sequestration of the members of the jury while the trial is in progress to reduce the risk of their exposure to the media and other publicity generated by it. In Canada, by contrast, the process of jury selection is neither as prolonged nor as exhaustive as a general rule; indeed the kind of questioning and probing into the affairs of potential jurors that is sometimes seen in the United States would be unlikely to be permitted under our system. Moreover, in Canada the sequestration of jurors throughout a trial occurs only exceptionally. The strong bias of our system is to prevent the dissemination before the conclusion of the trial of media publicity that might be prejudicial to the accused's fair trial. The US &amp; Canada simply follow different constitutional approaches here and have slightly different priorities when it comes to balancing rights.
There's nothing illegal about the media discussing your case. In fact most media outlets don't hold back many details about the accused, because it's all public information that anyone curious about it can get from the court clerk's office for free and with no reason specified. If jury selection hasn't started yet, then asking each juror about what they might know about the case is a pretty standard question that any competent defense attorney would be asking, even without knowledge of media coverage. If they already know about the case and say they can't put that knowledge aside when rendering a verdict, they are almost always dismissed. If you're concerned your defense attorney isn't aware of the media coverage, that's something you need to bring up with them. If jury selection already took place, and nobody bothered to ask them if they had prior knowledge of the case, then there's pretty much nothing you can do. A judge might ask the jury if anyone's seen the coverage, but it usually results in nothing happening. The media talking about your case is not grounds for a mistrial; it's rarely even grounds for a change of venue. Getting a mistrial would require you to prove a specific juror engaged in misconduct somehow.
Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.
tl;dr No, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan established the actual malice standard in the context of defamation. It is not illegal for a public figure to claim the sun revolves around the Earth unless some other law intervenes (maybe something fact-dependant like fraud or lying under oath). Background Here's an example of how N.Y. Times would work in California. Under California law, slander, along with libel, are the defamation torts. See Cal. Civ. Code. § 44. The First Amendment limits California’s slander law by requiring public figures prove actual malice when they want to sue someone for defaming them. Khawar v. Globe Int’l, 19 Cal. 4th 254, 262 (1998). (The Supreme Court got involved in N.Y. Times in the first place because of the First Amendment implications on the States' defamation laws.) In turn, "actual malice" means a statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false." Khawar, 19 Cal. 4th at 275 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)). As to knowledge, California courts consider only actual—not constructive—knowledge. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 398 (2001). In turn, actual knowledge "consists in express information of fact." I.E. Assoc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 3d 281, 285 (1985). This is a bunch of lawyer-speak, but it basically sets up a pretty high bar for the public figure who is trying to prove defamation. Again, N.Y. Times doesn't have to do with barring public figures from making non-defamatory false statements. You'd have to look to other areas of law about false representations or lying under oath for a claim against the politician. california
Judges simply do not supervise each other in a courtroom in terms of keeping each other "honest." That's simply not how the courts work. Judges are independent in order to not be influenced by bias. A judge would look very unkindly upon a lawyer who requested another judge be in the courtroom in an extra-judicial sense, or in some sort of legal sense as (wrongly) perceived by the lawyer. A lawyer is an officer of the court, and as such, knows what is legal in an administrative sense, and would simply not request another judge be in the courtroom. A lawyer can request a different judge be assigned or take over a case, but the request must generally have a legitimate reason that has a legal basis, i.e., a documented conflict of interest on the part of the judge, or evidence of racial bias. And it is up to the court to grant a change. Yes, judges have been found to be corrupt and have been removed from the bench. But that doesn't happen very often, and that removal is part of the judicial process to keep judges honest and get rid of "bad" judges. Yes, judges do issue rulings that are struck down on appeal; that's why there is an appeal process. That is the legal mechanism to keep judges "honest." So, the remedy for what is perceived as an unfair judge or a biased ruling is an appeal to a higher court.
Yes It's not uncommon. In fact I am aware of at least one case where the trial judge referred it to appeal before he made his decision on the basis that whichever way he decided the law was so unsettled that grounds for appeal would occur. In that case the court of appeal called up the trial judge to sit on the 3 judge appeal a) because he knew the case and b) because you don't get to not make a decision because it's hard sonny-jim.
The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White &amp; Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen).
Perjury is not 'not telling the truth'. It requires (in most jurisdictions) being proven to have deliberately lied under oath. As Xavier pointed out, you are not on oath when entering a plea (among other reasons, you would be required to incriminate yourself). Secondly, "I am not guilty" could mean anything from "the prosecution wrongly think that what I did is illegal" to "this law is unconstitutional" even if the facts are not in dispute; either may be mistaken without being a lie. If the facts are in dispute, the jury will have to deliver a verdict that implies (it does not state, let alone prove) that they disbelieve one party; deliberate falsehood, whether by a defendant or a police officer, would be several steps beyond that.