What motivated the Indian supreme court to legalize homosexuality? According to the Pew Research Center article Key findings about religion in India, 97% of the Indian population is religious. Now, in all of the popular religions like Hinduism, Christianity and Islam, homosexuality is seen as a sin/unnatural, yet in 2018 homosexuality was legalized in the whole of the country. I simply can not understand how this happened, because in my experience, people who are religious hold very tight to their beliefs, so how was such a liberal ruling instilled unilaterally on the whole country? Some commenters found it controversial that I said Islam, Christianity and Hinduism prohibit homosexuality. Here are the relevant Stack Exchange posts: Christianity on homosexuality Hinduism on homosexuality Islam on homosexuality Some people try to write this matter away by arguing that India is secular according to the constitution, for them I bring up the following facts: India has laws restricting funding from abroad for certain religions, including Christianity. See here for instance. India has laws restricting dietary traditions on religious lines. Eg: Beef ban India has blasphemy laws, 'hurt sentiments' laws. See section in Wikipedia specifically under laws restricting freedom of expression India has laws making it harder for inter-faith couples to marry/cohabit. See love Jihad laws Indian governments sometimes build temples, fund temples, and manage temples [places of religious worship, not institutions like schools/hospitals]. See funding of Ram Mandir temple, many other examples exist. On paper it is said to be secular, where the law is independent of religion, but the facts suggest to me otherwise.
Because the 1860 law that criminalised “unnatural” sex is unconstitutional In essence, Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India decided that criminalising sex between consenting adults violated the Constitutional right to equality. You have a Law in the Constitution that says people have to be treated equally. You have another law that says people in same-sex relationships are to be treated differently. The law in the Constitution wins. According to the BBC: Thursday's decision was delivered by a five-judge bench headed by India's outgoing chief justice Dipak Misra and was unanimous. Reading out the judgement, he said: &quot;Criminalising carnal intercourse is irrational, arbitrary and manifestly unconstitutional.&quot; Another judge, Indu Malhotra, said she believed &quot;history owes an apology&quot; to LGBT people for ostracising them. Justice DY Chandrachud said the state had no right to control the private lives of LGBT community members and that the denial of the right to sexual orientation was the same as denying the right to privacy. The courts in India, like they are in most common law/civil law jurisdictions are interested it questions of law. Questions of sin and morality they are happy to leave to religion.
Regarding the question of whether republicanism or opposition to monarchy is a protected belief under the Equality Act 2010, there is still uncertainty about the scope of the law, but it is quite likely it would be protected. A tribunal in 2019 found that belief in Scottish independence was a protected belief, assuming it's a deeply held belief about political sovereignty, which makes it somewhat similar to republicanism. The law doesn't cover political affiliation/party membership and it doesn't necessarily cover all political beliefs, but the judge in that case found that the law protected a belief about &quot;weighty and substantial aspects of human life&quot; and agreed that &quot;how a country should be governed is sufficiently serious to amount to a protected philosophical belief&quot;. So a serious belief in republicanism certainly could be protected; the issue would be whether it was sufficiently serious and important and deeply held, not just an opinion which is subject to change. There has been speculation on whether support or opposition to Brexit would likewise be protected, but this doesn't seem to have been tested in court yet. For the armed forces it's likewise a little unclear. Exemptions to the Equality Act apply to situations where they affect the operational capacity or combat readiness of the armed forces. It's hard to see this as directly relevant. However as the answer you cite about conscientious objectors says, their treatment is a result of customs and practices in the army, not primary legislation. Further research may identify how the army has treated individual republicans in particular circumstances. It's not grounds for being refused permission to meet the Queen or other royalty. Here's a photo of Australian republican politician Malcolm Turnbull (who campaigned for the Queen to cease being Australia's head of state) shaking hands with the Queen. She has also met Martin McGuinness who has long campaigned for Northern Ireland to escape the Queen's reign. British writer and gay rights activist Simon Fanshawe didn't let republicanism stop him accepting an OBE. Jeremy Corbyn, former leader of the Opposition met royalty on several occasions, despite earlier republican activism (while later he stated he had no plans to abolish the monarchy but did not deny his republicanism). There are many more examples, e.g. Russell Brand (who Wikipedia says is a republican). Although advocating a republic is theoretically treasonous, peaceful advocacy is allowed by the Human Rights Act: see R. (Rusbridger) v. Attorney General [2003] UKHL 38; [2004] AC 357; [2003] 3 All ER 784. (Source: Wikipedia page on Republic (political organisation))
Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.
&quot;Discrimination&quot; is in some way treating people differently from other people. Much discrimination is a sound idea. Not letting someone fly a plane who does not have pilot training is discrimination, but not a bad kind. So is not allowing someone to do surgery who has not trained as a doctor. Unlawful discrimination is discrimination that a particular law in a particular country declares to be forbidden. Different countries have different laws for what kinds of discrimination is unlawful under what circumstances. Discrimination on a basis not forbidden by law is legal, even if immoral. For example, a restaurant could, in most if not all countries, ban left-handed people from being served there. This might be immoral, but would not be illegal, because no law has made it illegal. Commonly, discrimination on the basis of religion, ethnicity, national origin, sex, or political opinion is unlawful. In some jurisdictions discrimination on the basis of disability is unlawful. Other bases may be unlawful in some places. There may be exceptions. Employment discrimination may not have the same standards as housing discrimination, and admission to public places or ability to run for public office may be different yet. All this will vary based on the particular laws of particular places. Note that some of these protected classes are things about which people have no choice, such as sex and national origin, others are matters of choice such as religion and political opinion. Laws may create a protected class on any basis. Note also that many things about which people have little or no choice, such as height, handedness, or intelligence, are not protected categories in most places. To the best of my understanding being vaccinated or not is not a protected class in most if not all of Europe, so legal distinctions may be made based on vaccination status. In such jurisdictions, discrimination in favor of those who are vaccinated is legal, although some may think it wrong. A few US states have made it unlawful to restrict various public or private services or access to places on the basis of vaccination status. I am not aware of any country in Europe that has such a law.
The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937 apparently sets no lower limit on marriage for Muslims. The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act 2006 then defined a child as a female under 18 and a male under 21, and a child marriage is one where at least one party is a child. The law then says that "Every child marriage is voidable at the option of the contracting party who was child at the time of solemnization of marriage". The punishment (not at the discretion of the child) for a male offender is rigorous "imprisonment which may extend to two years" or a fine of 100,000 rupees (or both). While the political question of modifying the law to allow Sharia and Nikah to prevail for Muslims, the current law does not allow this. The crime is a cognizable offense (section 15), meaning that no court order is required for police to arrest without warrant, and bail is not available.
One can find contradictory claims out there. Here is an English version of the marriage law. There is a surprising amount of legal rigamarole (in Norway, as well) pertaining to clearing "impediments". Assuming that the parties have done their part, then we move to Chapter 4. Article 16: Marriage may take place before a minister of the church, a representative of a registered religious organization empowered to perform such ceremonies, cf. Article 17, or before a civil official so empowered So turning to Article 17: Religious solemnization of marriage shall be performed by the ministers of the National Church, and priests or other representatives of registered religious organizations in Iceland who have been empowered to perform such ceremonies by the Ministry of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs and that is now part of the Ministry of the Interior. I can't find any indication that ULC has been approved. There are 49 religions officially listed by Statistics Iceland, including Siðmennt, a secular humanist organization which gained official status on May 3rd, 2013 when the organization was officially registered as a secular life stance organization under a law passed in the Icelandic Parliament on January 30th of that year. A formal ceremony was held by the Interior Minister Ögmundur Jónasson who had strongly supported our cause, to mark this historical event. As a result, Siðmennt gained the same legal and funding status as religious life stance organizations in Iceland. Weddings conducted by Siðmennt celebrants since then are legal and couples no longer have to go to government offices for that purpose. In light of the fact that Siðmennt is officially listed and ULC is not listed, I would conclude that you did not accidentally marry anyone, even if they had dealt with the impediments.
Yes, certainly. A prominent example was Lawrence v. Texas. The defendants were charged in state court with "deviate sexual intercourse". They moved to dismiss on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. Their motion was denied and they were convicted and fined; the denial was upheld by the state's court of appeals. They then appealed to the US Supreme Court, which eventually ruled that the statute was indeed unconstitutional. A defendant likely wouldn't have standing to sue the state for enforcing the law in general, only for enforcing it on the defendant himself.
Caveat about the &quot;Grainger test&quot; as applied to veganism Grainger plc v Nicholson is a 2010 employment discrimination case. It established a five-point test for whether a philosophical belief triggers the protection of the Equality Act 2010. See the judgment here, §24. A 2020 preliminary hearing in Casamitjana v The League Against Cruel Sports found that the claimant (= plaintiff, for US readers) held a belief in ethical veganism that did meet the five-point test. I would note that Casamitjana’s beliefs are much stronger than &quot;simple&quot; veganism. The judgment at §17-§22 enumerates a list of Casamitjana’s behaviour, much of which goes well beyond what the average vegan undertakes, such as avoiding the use of bank notes (manufactured from animal products) or public transportation (buses kill insects). I would assume that &quot;simple&quot; vegan beliefs could still meet the &quot;philosophical belief&quot; test, but I can see obvious differences with the Casamitjana case and would not advise anyone to rely solely on it. The restaurant case I refer to this excellent answer regarding a different hypothetical. The key question is whether the restaurant’s choice of menu is &quot;a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim&quot;. In that case, the restaurant might argue that they chose what dishes to offer based on the cook’s ability, on a commercial strategy of selling only high-end dishes, or other similar considerations. (Note that I have not practiced law in E&amp;W, and any real-world respondent would do well to consult a qualified sollicitor before relying on that argument.) As a non-legal answer, I would also argue that such an application of the Equality Act 2010 would be extremely burdening. For instance, ethical vegans could sue any restaurant offering any non-vegan options at all (regardless of whether there are vegan options on the menu, they would not want to patronize such a restaurant), or transportation company using leather seats in their vehicles; Orthodox Jews might sue any business open on Saturdays; and so on. However, I do not know how that objection could be worked into a legal argument.