Could Congress create a court higher than the Supreme Court? Could Congress create a court that could overrule SCOTUS decisions?
No The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. Any courts the Congress creates are, by definition, inferior. Of course, Congress can overrule a SCOTUS decision by passing a law to that effect,unless the decision defines a right under the Constitution. So they couldn’t overturn Roe but they could overturn Dobbs. It’s largely the gutlessness of Congress in grappling with controversial issues that has put SCOTUS in the position of lawmaker.
Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.
Your gut feeling is reasonably close, but not precisely correct. The Constitution sets the baseline rules for the powers of and interactions among the branches of the federal government, as well as the powers of and interactions between the state and federal governments. With only one exception (the dilution of a state's representation in the Senate), the Constitution can be amended to basically anything. It can make anything legal and it can make anything illegal. It generally addresses fairly high-leval legal principles, but there's no reason that it couldn't be amended to include a 9,000-page law specifically addressing every conceivable aspect of the regulation of nuclear energy. As it stands now and as it always has, the Constitution permits the federal government to write laws only with respect to certain topics. The states, meanwhile, retain authority to write laws on virtually any other topic. There are a variety of legal and historical reasons why prohibition took the form of a constitutional amendment while drug laws are handled legislatively, but one important consideration is the scope of Congress's power to regulate &quot;interstate commerce.&quot; At the time of prohibition, it was not clear that Congress could regulate commercial activity that took place entirely within a single state. So if you grew all the ingredients for your whiskey in Kentucky, and you distilled those ingredients in Kentucky, and then you sold your whiskey in Kentucky exclusively to residents of Kentucky, it seemed that your conduct was outside the reach of Congress, and that any attempt to regulate it would be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. The solution, therefore, was to amend the constitution and give that authority to Congress. About a decade after prohibition ended, though, the Supreme Court decided that the power to regulate interstate commerce includes not just transactions that cross state lines, but also any conduct that “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). This broadens the Commerce Clause authority to cover virtually any economic activity. So even if you buy marijuana seeds from your next door neighbor, plant them in your own back yard, grow them for strictly personal use in your own home, and never sell anything to anyone, the courts will hold that your conduct affects the interstate market for marijuana, and is therefore subject to federal regulation. This standard substantially lowers the bar for Congress to act without a constitutional amendment, which is a big part of the reason there hasn't been an amendment to address narcotic use.
Technically, there is no such thing as an unconstitutional law. There are laws which have been passed, but whose unconstitutionality has not been discovered yet. But once a law is legally deemed to be unconstitutional, it stops being a law. The constitution is a recipe for running the government. If Congress enacts legislature which it has no authority to enact, the courts have the authority to discover this and reveal it in an opinion.
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, says (at p. 24): The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. That indicates to me that there is probably a majority on the court that thinks same-sex couples should have the same adoption rights and other tangible benefits as opposite-sex couples, but that would have to be tested in court. Regarding level-of-scrutiny, this opinion says nothing on the issue. But, given that Justice Kennedy follows a fundamental rights analysis, it could be argued that it is likely strict scrutiny, or at least a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 631 (1996) (emphasis added, internal punctuation removed): If a legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold it so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.
Yes It's legal: but that's more of a bug than a feature. The Constitution says this about the appointment of Supreme Court judges: he [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges of the Supreme Court, ... In the Federalist Papers: No 76, Hamilton had this to say: But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal. and in No 78: It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that &quot;there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.&quot; He was wrong about the first but right about the second. Now, this is only the way he saw it and others no doubt had other views but he was focused solely on balancing the powers of the executive and the legislature. There is no consideration of what would happen if, for whatever reason, including partisanship, the executive and the legislature were tightly aligned or hopelessly opposed. Even for the time, this view seems overly idealistic and hopelessly naive. However, these are the same people who thought it would be a good idea for the runner-up in the Presidential race to be the vice-President. Indeed, Hamilton saw and was an integral part of the intense partisanship that arose in the 1790s between the Federalists and the Republicans and the first rejection of a Supreme Court nominee happened during George Washington's Presidency. This analysis shows that the confirmation rate when the White House and Senate are politically aligned is 87.2% but only 47.2% when they are different. That said, most (78%) nominees have been confirmed with the last decade being about average. The US Supreme Court has always been partisan. Indeed, it's only since the Second World War that the idea that it shouldn't be has taken root. In earlier days, the Supreme Court was not populated by jurists - it was the domain of politicians, some of whom moved back and forth between the bench and the Capitol. In Brown v Board of Education 4 of the 9 judges had been Congressmen or Governours and some had never been on the bench of any court before their appointment to SCOTUS. So, yes its totally legal but no, it probably isn't what the founders intended but yes, it has ever been thus.
There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict­ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter.
Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review (Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions.