Does Montana&#39;s law to ban TikTok violate Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution? The State of Montana has passed SB419 which bans TikTok within Montana. This Washington Post article indicates that TikTok could avoid the ban provided its ownership was not based in, &quot;any country designated as a foreign adversary&quot; by the bill's effective date of January 2024. This seems like this would constitute a bill of attainder which is expressly prohibited by Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution. Is this accurate or does the bill's contingency clause for voiding create a loophole to avoid becoming a bill of attainder?
There are potential constitutional challenges to the bill, but as noted by the answer from user6726, a bill of attainder challenge would not be a very strong one. Better arguments that the legislation is unconstitutional would include (in approximate order of legal strength) arguments that: it violates the &quot;dormant commerce clause&quot; by unduly regulating interstate commerce, it is pre-empted by federal statutes which have &quot;occupied the field&quot; of social media regulation (e.g. with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act), it purports to make foreign policy which is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government (in connection with its &quot;any country designated as a foreign adversary&quot; provision), it is effectively regulating conduct outside the territorial scope of the state's authority to regulate conduct (a new SCOTUS case law doctrine from the California pork regulation case decided this month), and it unduly burdens free speech since TikTok is analogous to a modern magazine or newspaper and is regulated more heavily than non-expressive content on a non-content neutral basis.
No, such a restriction is not effective. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, and other sections as well, provides otherwise. This was settled early on in the history of US Jurisprudence In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) Justice Johnson wrote for the majority at 10 U. S. 136 (et seq) and 10 U. S. 139: The validity of this rescinding act, then, might well be doubted, were Georgia a single sovereign power. But Georgia cannot be viewed as a single, unconnected, sovereign power, on whose legislature no other restrictions are imposed than may be found in its own Constitution. She is a part of a large empire; she is a member of the American Union; and that Union has a Constitution the supremacy of which all acknowledge, and which imposes limits to the legislatures of the several States which none claim a right to pass ... ... It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the Court that, in this case, the estate having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, the State of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which are common to our free institutions or by the particular provisions of the Constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void. (See also the Wikipedia article on the case The court this case (for the first time in US history) held a state law unconstitutional, and nothing in the ruling suggested that this was a unique power of the Supreme Court: rather it was and is a power, in proper cases, of every general Federal court, whether a District Court, a Circuit Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. Indeed in Fletcher v. Peck, the Supreme court in the passage just quoted was upholding a district court decision to the same effect, thus clearly indicating that the power to strike down state laws as contrary to the Federal Constitution is found at the district court level. In the case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) Justice Story wrote for the Court (at 14 U. S. 328 et seq): The third article of the Constitution is that which must principally attract our attention. The 1st. section declares, The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such other inferior Courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The 2d section declares, that The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law or equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under the grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. It then proceeds to declare, that in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make. Such is the language of the article creating and defining the judicial power of the United States. It is the voice of the whole American people solemnly declared, in establishing one great department of that Government which was, in many respects, national, and in all, supreme. It is a part of the very same instrument which was to act not merely upon individuals, but upon States, and to deprive them altogether of the exercise of some powers of sovereignty and to restrain and regulate them in the exercise of others. ... ... it is manifest that the judicial power of the United States is unavoidably, in some cases, exclusive of all State authority, and in all others, may be made so at the election of Congress. ... ... ... The exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited by the terms of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt that Congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of which it may vest appellate as well as original jurisdiction. The judicial power is delegated by the Constitution in the most general terms, and may therefore be exercised by Congress under every variety of form of appellate or original jurisdiction. And as there is nothing in the Constitution which restrains or limits this power, it must therefore, in all other cases, subsist in the utmost latitude of which, in its own nature, it is susceptible. As, then, by the terms of the Constitution, the appellate jurisdiction is not limited as to the Supreme Court, and as to this Court it may be exercised in all other cases than those of which it has original cognizance, what is there to restrain its exercise over State tribunals in the enumerated cases? The appellate power is not limited by the terms of the third article to any particular Courts. The words are, &quot;the judicial power (which includes appellate power) shall extend to all cases,&quot; &amp;c., and &quot;in all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.&quot; It is the case, then, and not the court, that gives the jurisdiction. If the judicial power extends to the case, it will be in vain to search in the letter of the Constitution for any qualification as to the tribunal where it depends. ... (See also the Wikipedia article on the case This case makes it particularly clear that the &quot;judicial power of the United States&quot; extends to all general federal courts (as opposed to limited courts such as the Tax Court or the Court of Claims). If the Supreme Court can make a given ruling, so can any district or circuit court (aside from the limited class of cases where the Supreme court has original jurisdiction). Rulings by lower courts may be taken to the Supreme Court, but are binding until and unless overruled or modified by a higher court. A state may not validly hold in one of its laws that it will obey a judgement by the Supreme Court, but not by a lower Federal court that has proper jurisdiction of the case. I have quoted these two early cases from the Marshall Court because this is a matter that was settled early, and rarely if ever disputed afterwards.
Neither of the posters in question would constitute a &quot;true threat&quot; which can be subjected to legal sanctions consistent with the First Amendment. The nature of the communication, in the context provided in the question, is clearly metaphorical. The U.S. Supreme Court, incidentally, will be hearing arguments in the case of Counterman v. Colorado on April 19, 2023, pertinent to this question, in which the issue presented is: Whether, to establish that a statement is a &quot;true threat&quot; unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective &quot;reasonable person&quot; would regard the statement as a threat of violence. This would, however, be a far closer case under British law, as illustrated by a recent case in which a British teenager was sentenced to 11 year years in prison for inflammatory Internet postings that it was established were a major factor that pushed the people who carried out mass shootings at a Buffalo, New York grocery store and a Colorado Spring gay nightclub to carry out their attacks. As reported by CNN: Daniel Harris, 19, from Derbyshire in northern England, posted videos shared by Payton Gendron, who pleaded guilty to the shooting in Buffalo, as well as videos linked to Anderson Lee Aldrich, the suspect accused of killing five people in a mass shooting at an LGBTQ nightclub in Colorado Springs, Colorado, last November, the court heard, according to PA. Sentencing Harris in court in Manchester, northern England, Judge Patrick Field was quoted by PA as saying, “What they did was truly appalling but what they did was no more than you intended to encourage others to do when publishing this material online.” The postings made by Daniel Harris which led to his conviction would almost certainly not have been actionable under U.S. law which has much stronger First Amendment protections than the U.K.
In US Law, banning speech based on its content is called &quot;Content-based&quot; speech regulation (shocking, I know), as opposed to &quot;Content-neutral&quot; speech regulation like requiring all protests to end before a specific time. Content-based speech regulation can be constitutional if it passes strict scrutiny, but in the case of banning swastikas, it would fall under an even narrower subset of content-based speech regulation called &quot;viewpoint regulation.&quot; I haven't found a case where the swastika or Nazi flag was banned in particular, but we can find reasoning that appears to safely protect the peaceful display of the Nazi flag and ideology from government restriction in Police Dept. of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), a case in which Chicago banned picketing within 150 feet of a school except in the case of labor disputes related to the school. The Supreme Court found that this amounted to viewpoint-based discrimination, writing in the majority opinion: But, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an &quot;equality of status in the field of ideas,&quot; and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone. As with all rights restrictions, a particular restriction may be Constitutional if it passes &quot;strict scrutiny,&quot; namely, it: is necessary to a &quot;compelling state interest&quot;; is &quot;narrowly tailored&quot; to achieving this compelling purpose; and uses the &quot;least restrictive means&quot; to achieve the purpose. In general, a ban on the peaceful display of Nazi imagery or promotion of Nazi ideas would fail the first test, as the government does not have a compelling interest to suppress ideas which might be distasteful to some or even the majority of people. I have seen an argument that because the Nazi regime's stated goal included genocide, that promoting that ideology amounts to advocating violence. Speech which advocates violence or criminality may be criminalized, but only under a specific &quot;imminent lawless action&quot; test expressed in Brandenburg v. Ohio: Freedoms of speech and press do not permit a State to forbid advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. This case was brought against a KKK member who advocated various violent acts at a rally. The main distinction is that his speech did not call for specific violence, but merely advocated for it in general. This almost exactly mirrors the rationale for banning the Nazi ideology based on its advocacy of violence, and shows that a ban on such grounds would be unconstitutional. &quot;Imminent&quot; was clarified in Hess v. Indiana to mean that the action must be intended to produce actual lawless action at a specific point in the future, not simply advocate for it in general. Hess was a protester who was being forced off a street by police, said &quot;We'll take the fucking street later&quot; and was convicted of disorderly conduct for it, which the court reversed as his statement &quot;amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time&quot; and was therefore protected by the First Amendment.
Under Article VI of the US Constitution, the federal constitution and valid federal laws are the supreme law of the land, and judges in every state are bound to apply them regardless of anything in the laws or constitution of any state.* If a state legislature passes a law banning same-sex marriage, a state court is required under the federal constitution to instead apply the federal constitution (as interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges) and rule as though same-sex marriage is legal. When it comes to a federal court, things are even easier: a state cannot command a federal court to do anything. A federal court’s authority is laid out in Article III of the federal constitution and in federal statute, which (per Article VI) is supreme over anything in the laws or constitution of any state. There have been times where states attempted to challenge federal supremacy. Normally, this is handled by going to federal court. Decisions in state courts can ultimately be appealed to the US Supreme Court, which can reverse them if they incorrectly applied federal law. Most of the time, that’s the end of matters: when a federal court rules, state officials comply. Occasionally, that’s not enough. If a state disobeys the orders of a federal court, they can be enforced by federal agents. If even that isn’t enough, the President can deploy the armed forces to uphold federal authority. * There are situations which are more complicated, like when something is a federal crime but not a state crime. I can do more research on that if you want, but for now I’m going to leave it at “it’s more complicated.”
How is banning such events constitutional with the freedom of assembly? The rights created by the First Amendment are not absolute. They are subject to reasonable restrictions as to time, place and manner, especially if those restrictions are content neutral. Restrictions narrowly tailored to protect against genuine threats public health and safety fall within the exception of the First Amendment even if they are not strictly content neutral, that is commonly described by the rubric that you don't have a right to falsely cry "fire" in a crowded theater (causing a riot that could harm people). For example, suppose that a rope bridge over a deep gorge can only support the weight of ten people, and three dozen people want to hold a protest there. A regulation that prohibited more than ten people from engaging in the protest would be constitutional. Even then, however, a lack of content neutrality (e.g., restricting punishment to false statements likely to incite a riot) can't also be a lack of ideological neutrality (e.g. restricting punishment to anti-Catholic but not anti-Jewish statements likely to incite a riot). If it were a political protest/gathering would this change? Generally speaking political protest/gatherings are still subject to content neutral regulations of time, place or manner, and those narrowly tailored to protect genuine threats public health and safety. So, for example, if there is a genuine COVID-19 risk that public health officials are trying to address, and the regulation of gatherings is not viewpoint or content based, it would be upheld as constitutional in the face of a First Amendment freedom of assembly limitation. But, if the regulation applied, for example, only to Republican and not Democratic party protests or gatherings, which is a viewpoint or content based restriction, it would not survive a First Amendment freedom of assembly challenge.
In English law during the late Medieval and early modern period (from 1321 to 1798), it was possible for Parliament to pass a "Bill Of Attainder". This declared a person guilty of a crime, often treason, by legislative act, without any trial or other legal process. See the Wikipedia article for more detail. Often a Bill of Attainder not only decreed that a person (or people) was guilty, but also confiscated the convicted person's property, preventing his (or rarely her) heirs from inheriting, and possibly rendering those heirs ineligible to hold public offices or peerages. The heir would also be prevented from inheriting through the attainted person. For example, property held by the father of the attainted person would not pass to the child of the attainted person. This was called "corruption of the blood", and was viewed with particular horror by many during the colonial period and before. It effectivly treated the heirs of the attainted person as illegitimate. Attainder was usually followed by execution, possibly by torture. The bill might specify the specific fate of the person attained. The US constitutional provision prohibits declaring people guilty of crimes by legislative act, and prohibits sentences for crimes that take property or rights from the family or heirs of the convicted person, even in cases of treason. At least that is how it has been interpreted. Fines may be levied, but may only fall on the actual property of the person convicted. The US Supreme Court has dealt with this clause in several cases: Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866) (law requiring lawyers to swear that they had not supported the confederacy held unconstitutional); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) (Law requiring an oath that the person had not supported the confederacy for a professional license held unconstitutional); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (a state law barring convicted felons from practicing medicine upheld); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889), (a state law newly requiring that practising physicians must have graduated from a licensed medical school upheld); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (federal law which declared three specific persons "subversive" and barred them from federal employment overturned); American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) (federal law which required elected labour leaders to take an oath that they were not and had never been members of the Communist Party USA, and that they did not advocate violent overthrow of the U.S. government upheld); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965) (law which made it a crime for a former communist to serve on a union's board overturned); and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (law seizing Nixon's presidential papers upheld).
It may &quot;seem[] normative&quot; that &quot;a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions.&quot; But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of &quot;Peter Pan&quot; whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed.