Is due process a civil right or liberty? Civil liberties are rights afforded to people that the government cannot impose upon. Civil rights govern government processes in an attempt to make them fair. Is due process a civil right or liberty?
Your distinction between civil rights and civil liberties does not enjoy support from the legal perspective. Typically, the law addresses rights, and "liberty" is invoked only in rhetorical flourishes (at least in the US legal context). "Right" is about the relationship between a person and actions. Liberty may be a consequence of certain rights. Government protection of rights typically takes the form of forbidding the government to do certain things (things that interfere with a person's right to do certain things). The right to due process protects your right to live your life free from government interference, except when certain conditions are present (as stated in a law). Due Process (as a procedural requirement on government action) is neither a right nor a liberty, it is a restriction addressed to government power. Its purpose is to protect the rights of individuals.
1. Are this and similar ordinances constitutionally valid? Yes. Some future court might decide the law is invalid at some future time. But that possibility is hypothetical and speculative. Therefore, as of now, the law is valid unless and until it is challenged and overturned. 2. What defenses could a government make if challenged? It depends on what grounds the law is challenged. Your question about possible defenses is highly dependent on the nature of any challenge — which you have not specified in your question. The U.S. Constitution, for example, prohibits laws respecting a number of things such as freedom of the press, speech, religion, peaceful assembly, bearing arms, etc. to list just a few of the most notable ones. But your question does not assert the law in question violates any specific or particular prohibition against it. Although the question mentions "restricting free movement as well as targeting only a specific demographic," it does not specify any part of any constitution that prohibits these things. Therefore, your question is unclear as to what might present a constitutional problem for the law. It is also unclear which constitution you think might contain prohibitive language. Is it a federal constitutional issue that concerns you? Or is it a state constitutional matter? In either case, which issue specifically concerns you? Your question needs to address these specifics in order to analyze it and respond in a meaningful way. Look at it like this... just as it is impossible to prove a negative, so is it impossible for anyone to conclude with absolute certainty that any law is not unconstitutional because no one can predict with certainty every possible future challenge a law might face. There are just too many possibilities to (pre-emptively) exhaust them all with certainty. Also, no one can predict with certainty how any future court might rule on the future challenges (which themselves are unpredictable as previously argued). Therefore, one can only say I think the law is unconstitutional and here are my reasons. Then others can analyze the law and the reasons; then offer an opinion. Further, based on precedent, would they likely be successful? See above answer to question numbered 2. Laws aren't required to be "justified" by the constitution. Constitutional justification for a law is a meaningless phrase. There is no requirement for a law to be "justified" by any constitution other than that the legislature is empowered by the constitution to make laws. That's all the justification any law needs. Beyond that, however, no law can violate the constitution as determined by a Supreme Court (or the last court to rule) if challenged.
Yes. Operating under those assumptions, this would be a First Amendment violation under controlling law in D.C. The starting point is Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977), which held that &quot;denial of a pass potentially infringes upon first amendment guarantees.&quot; In that case, the Nixon White House refused to issue a press pass to a reporter for a liberal magazine, but refused to explain why beyond citing &quot;reasons of security.&quot; The D.C. Circuit said that if the White House intended to open itself to the press, it needed to do so in ways that did not offend the First Amendment. White House press facilities having been made publicly available as a source of information for newsmen, the protection afforded newsgathering under the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press requires that this access not be denied arbitrarily or for less than compelling reasons. Not only newsmen and the publications for which they write, but also the public at large have an interest protected by the first amendment in assuring that restrictions on newsgathering be no more arduous than necessary, and that individual newsmen not be arbitrarily excluded from sources of information. Given these important first amendment rights implicated by refusal to grant White House press passes to bona fide Washington journalists, such refusal must be based on a compelling governmental interest. Clearly, protection of the President is a compelling, “even an overwhelming,” interest... However, this standard for denial of a press pass has never been formally articulated or published. Merely informing individual rejected applicants that rejection was for “reasons of security” does not inform the public or other potential applicants of the basis for exclusion of journalists from White House press facilities. Moreover, we think that the phrase “reasons of security” is unnecessarily vague and subject to ambiguous interpretation. Therefore, we are of the opinion that appellants must publish or otherwise make publicly known the actual standard employed in determining whether an otherwise eligible journalist will obtain a White House press pass. Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129–30 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In a nutshell, Sherrill is saying that when the government is granting press credentials to some and denying them to others, First Amendment principles require it to meet basic due-process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, those denied with an explanation for the denial and an opportunity to contest that denial. In this case, it's not clear whether the White House has provided Acosta with a hearing and notice at all, which would itself be a violation if that situation continues for too long. But even if it does, the White House could not use the procedure to punish Acosta for exercising the First Amendment principles that the procedure is designed to protect. If the opposite were true, i.e., Acosta &quot;laid hands&quot; on the intern, I'd guess that that would be enough to revoke his credentials, assuming the White House went through the appropriate procedure. Sherrill explicitly recognizes protecting the President and his family as a valid basis for denying access, and I assume the courts would extend that protection to White House staff, especially if the White House were to argue that an assault on staff suggests that the person can't be trusted around the president himself.
This is known as the rule of lenity. A common formulation of the rule of lenity is as follows: If a federal criminal statute is grievously ambiguous, then the statute should be interpreted in the criminal defendant's favor. Importantly, the rule of lenity does not apply when a law merely contains some ambiguity or is difficult to decipher. As this Court has often said, the rule of lenity applies only when “ ‘after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,’ ” the statute is still grievously ambiguous. The rule “comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.” Kavanaugh J., concurring, in Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. ___ (2022), citing Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. 282, 295, n. 8 (2016), internal citations removed.
Foreign citizens are just as entitled to Fourth Amendment protections against search and seizure as American citizens are. The case you cited was, in fact, a South Korean citizen who successfully had evidence suppressed from an unjustified border search.
No. While the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment doesn’t apply to the federal government, the Supreme Court has read the same requirements into the 5th Amendment. This is generally considered to have started with Bolling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (in this case, &quot;the Court began in earnest to fold an &quot;equal protection&quot; guarantee into the concept of &quot;due process.&quot;” United States v. Madero, No. 20-303, at *9 (Apr. 21, 2022)), and as Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92 (1976) put it, Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The government must have reasonable suspicion to stop you and ask you questions. The government must have probable cause to arrest you. The government cannot question you if you have invoked your 5th Amendment rights The government must release you if you post bail which is set by a magistrate in some cases but can be posted without conferring with a magistrate for many minor offenses for which the amount is set in advance. Also, you can only be constitutionally held for a certain period of time without appearing before a court for an initial appearance at which you are charged and typically you have an attorney assigned for you if you cannot afford one. Generally speaking a lawyer for a defendant will either post bail on behalf of the client, or will seek to invoke the client's 5th Amendment right to silence and 6th Amendment right to counsel (including the right of a lawyer to visit his client in jail) making further detention much less useful, while challenging law enforcement to articulate probable cause for the arrest with the implication that a civil lawsuit and suppression of evidence and loss of credibility with the local judge could follow if they fail to do so. If the client is not brought before a court by the constitutional deadline (unusual, but not unheard of), the lawyer can bring this to the attention of the court and have the court demand that his client be brought before the court. Of course, strictly speaking the defense lawyer can't force the police to do anything. Instead, the defense lawyer persuades the police to do something based upon what a court is likely to do, or has already done, as a result of their conduct so far. Also, of course, it isn't always possible for a lawyer to get his client out of jail. If the police do have probable cause and the offense is not one for which bail is set in advance, it is not possible for the client to be released until bail is set by a judicial officer such as a magistrate and bail (if granted at all) is posted, which may be beyond the client's means in the case of a serious offense, particularly if the client is considered by the magistrate to be a flight risk. On TV and books, the person that the police have arrested is usually someone that the police had no probable cause to arrest but suspect of a crime anyway, and the police usually fold when called on the fact that they lack probable cause by the lawyer. Less commonly, on TV and in books, the lawyer facilitates the payment of bail on behalf of his client.
There is a police power exception to the 5th and 14th Amendment rights to not taking property without due process of law and just compensation. In a similar case arising in Greenwood Village, Colorado, an innocent homeowner was denied any relief at trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, or on appeal to the 10th Circuit, after his house was trashed by SWAT teams trying to catch a guy accused of mere theft and fleeing police officers. (The U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case sometime after the linked article was written.) But, there does appear to be a circuit split on the issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit in a case appealed from a U.S. District Court decision in Texas reached a contrary conclusion in a case between Vicki Baker and the City of McKinney, Texas decided earlier this month in March of 2023 in which it affirmed a U.S. District Court ruling in favor of the homewoner. The fact that there is now a circuit split on the issue increases the likelihood that the U.S. Supreme Court would consider a Petition for Certiorari from the 5th Circuit decision in the Texas case, although it is far from a sure thing as only about 1% of Petitions for Certiorari presented to the U.S. Supreme Court (about 80 out of 7,000 to 8,000 per year) are granted. The key issue distinguishing these two rulings is the question of whether the police power exception to the eminent domain obligation of a government applies to cases in which the person whose property is taken is innocent of any wrongdoing and any legally relevant connection to a wrongdoer. Both circuits would agree that a government does not have eminent domain liability under the constitution if, for example, the property destroyed belongs to someone who committed a crime and has their house destroyed in the process of trying to arrest the criminal. Also, neither of the decisions disputes that police may, under the police power exception, destroy property in connection with efforts to apprehend a criminal or to prevent a crime, without seeking court approval in the usual situation where there are exigent circumstances that can't wait for the slow process of conducting a court hearing on the question. The question, instead, is whether an innocent property owner has a right to bring an &quot;inverse condemnation&quot; lawsuit to remedy the damage that the innocent property owner has experienced.