Could one house of Congress completely shut down the other house by passing a large number of frivolous bills? Suppose that for some reason, the House of Representatives wants to stop the Senate from doing anything. Could they accomplish that by passing hundreds of frivolous bills, so the Senate would be stuck wasting time voting on those bills? Of course, the House couldn't do anything else during this time either. In other words, can one house of Congress run a denial of service attack against the other house by flooding them with bills?
No, because neither House nor Senate is obliged to consider each and every bill brought to it.
Yes, explicitly. It even laid out the procedure and method (i.e. on equal footing) of these new states. Specifically, Article IV, Section 3, the &quot;Admissions Clause&quot;: New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. Note that many of the things in your quoted section are forbidden to the States, but are explicitly granted to the Federal Government (in various sections). So it's not &quot;this shall not be done&quot;, but rather &quot;the individual states shall not do these things; Federal Government shall be the only one to do these things if they can, as else where they may be banned from doing so&quot;.
No, it can't unilaterally scrap such schemes Immigration is a shared competence between the Union and Member States under Article 4(2)(j) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This means that the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. However, it is predicated on a triad: the Commission (proposer of legislation), Parliament (co-decision maker), and the Council of the European Union (co-decision maker). The Parliament would not be able to propose and enact legislation scrapping the schemes by itself. The matter of proposing legislation would fall to the European Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. Such a proposal would go before the Parliament and the Council of the European Union for a &quot;co-decision&quot;. Either side may amend, accept, or reject the proposal. While the Parliament may accept any proposed legislation from the Commission, the Council is unlikely to agree. This is because the Council is comprised of government ministers from each Member State. In the matter of immigration, it is likely that the Home Affairs minister of each Member State would meet as the Council to consider the proposed legislation. Given the obvious conflict of interest for each &quot;golden visa&quot; scheme, it seems unlikely that the Council would agree to curtail or scrap the system given the advantages it provides that Member State, and the need to be &quot;competitive&quot; with other Member States (even though such competition should not really exist, to ensure the harmony of the Union). Therefore, the Council would likely reject the proposed legislation and assuming the subsequent conciliation committee cannot get both the Parliament and the Council to agree on the matter, the proposal will be abandoned.
can it be construed as a violation of 66F clause 2 if we try to circumvent the rate limit even though the information is on public domain? No, unless the element of intent to threaten [...] or strike terror can be proved. I'm assuming that by &quot;clause 2&quot; you mean the excerpt you posted. Although circumventing the limit of API calls sounds in &quot;exceeding authorised access&quot; and might even lead to DOS, it does not imply an intent to threaten the security/sovereignty/etc. or strike terror. The statute is premised on such intent. The fact that the information(packets) is(are) on public domain is irrelevant. For instance, an intent to strike terror and/or actually causing a DOS can involve [targeting] a public domain.
Mr. Comey answered this in his testimony. LANKFORD: Okay. Fair enough. If the president wanted to stop an investigation, how would he do that? Knowing it is an ongoing criminal investigation or counterintelligence investigation, would that be a matter of going to you, you perceive, and say, you make it stop because he doesn't have the authority to stop it? How would the president make an ongoing investigation stop? COMEY: I'm not a legal scholar, but as a legal matter, the president is the head of the executive branch and could direct, in theory, we have important norms against this, but could anyone be investigative or not. I think he has the legal authority. All of us ultimately report in the executive branch to the president. LANKFORD: Would that be to you, or the attorney general or who? COMEY: I suppose he could if he wanted to issue a direct order could do it anyway. Through the attorney general or issue it directly to me. This issue also came up in United States v Texas. The obligation to refrain from interference with the FBI is a norm, not a legal requirement. And, like many executive powers, an act that is sometimes legally permitted can become illegal given an improper motive. It is also possible for Congress to find legal acts to be untenably corrupt.
The law works in the opposite direction of what you seem to be imagining. State courts generally have jurisdiction to hear lawsuits based on federal law, even without &quot;authorization&quot; from Congress. It is therefore perfectly normal to see lawsuits under Section 1983 , the Privacy Protection Act, or the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Protection Act being litigated in state court. Instead, when Congress authorizes a private right of action, it includes explicit language when it does not want cases heard in state court. This is the case with copyright, patent, and bankruptcy litigation, for example.
You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right.
The First Amendment says that the government cannot pass law restricting speech. It does not say that everyone is compelled to take actions that enable others to speak. The First Amendment would tend to work against your plan, because Congress generally can't pass a law to force people to &quot;speak&quot; in a certain way, and Congress cannot pass a law forcing you to provide your soapbox to your opponents. As an expressive matter, Google is expressing its right to &quot;speak&quot; in a particular manner, one that happens to not agree with how Apple talks (which is their right). However, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution is widely invoked as a means of compelling businesses to do something. If the government has a compelling interest in a certain end, Congress might pass a law that forces companies to do something. The political part, which you'd have to undertake, is persuading Congress that... the government has a compelling interest in [fill in the blank] w.r.t. phones, or computers, or what-have-you. Congress sometimes leaves such matters to the market, so that a competing company that unifies all communication could have a competitive advantage and could be more successful than a company that was more proprietary (although, at a certain point that advantage becomes a disadvantage and anti-trust actions take place). It's just a matter of persuading enough Congressmen to pass an appropriate law that does what you want done. By reference to the Commerce Clause, other considerations of constitutional rights can usually be finessed, although Google and Apple's First Amendment rights can't trivially be swept away by saying &quot;effecting interstate commerce&quot;.