For a criminal attempt, when is an act more than merely preparatory? In several jurisdictions, the actus reus of a criminal attempt is taking an act beyond mere preparation towards the completion of a criminal offence. What is the test for determining when an act is beyond mere preparation?
canada Maybe it is unsatisfying, but there is no bright line test. The statutory language The Criminal Code says: The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law. Some judicial expressions &quot;[A] precise and satisfactory definition of the actus reus is perhaps impossible.&quot; And &quot;[n]o abstract test can be given for determining whether an act is insufficiently proximate to be an attempt.&quot; See R. v. Cline (1956), 115 C.C.C. 18 (Ont. C.A.): The consummation of a crime usually comprises a series of acts which have their genesis in an idea to do a criminal act; the idea develops to a decision to do that act; a plan may be made for putting that decision into effect; the next step may be preparation only for carrying out the intention and plan; but when that preparation is in fact fully completed, the next step in the series of acts doen by the accused for the purpose and with the intention of committing the crime as planned cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as remote in its connection with that crime. The connection is in fact proximate. Here is a summary from R. v. Root, 2008 ONCA 869, citations removed: [96] The authorities have yet to develop a satisfactory general criterion to assist trial judges in making the crucial distinction between mere preparation, on the one hand, and an attempt on the other. We leave the determination of where on the continuum the conduct lies to the common sense judgment of trial judges. [97] The distinction between preparation and attempt is a qualitative one involving the relationship between the nature and quality of the act said to constitute the attempt and the nature of the substantive offence attempted in its complete form. [98] To determine on which side of the preparation/attempt divide an accused’s conduct falls, a trial judge should consider the relative proximity of that conduct to the conduct required to amount to the completed substantive offence. Relevant factors would include time, location and acts under the control of the accused yet to be accomplished. [99] Relative proximity may give an act, which might otherwise seem to be mere preparation, the quality of an attempt. Further, an act on its face an act of commission does not lose its quality as the actus reus of an attempt simply because further acts are required, or because a significant period of time may elapse before the completion of the substantive offence. [100] To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, the act of an accused need not be the last act before the completion of the substantive offence. To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, an act must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to amount to more than mere preparation to commit it. This requirement of proximity, expressed in the divide between preparation and attempt, has to do with the sequence of events leading to the crime that an accused has in mind to commit. To be guilty of an attempt, an accused must have progressed a sufficient distance (beyond mere preparation) down the intended path. An act is proximate if it is the first of a series of similar or related acts intended to result cumulatively in a substantive crime.
The concept of &quot;innocent until proven guilty&quot; is inherent in our constitutional protections for due process. As far as I know, the Supreme Court first formally recognized it as a rule in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 458-59 (1895): Now the presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn by the law in favor of the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is proven to be guilty. In other words, this presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in favor of one accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created. The key phrase -- for purposes of your question -- is &quot;sufficient evidence.&quot; At a criminal trial, sufficient evidence consists of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on “all the essential elements of guilt” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). But if the government wants to lock up a defendant pending trial, the question is not whether the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, but rather whether he poses a danger to the community and can be trusted to appear for trial. 18 U.S. Code § 3142(e)(1). And on those questions, he retains the presumption of innocence, but the government's burden of proof when arguing otherwise is substantially lower. The courts recognize both the potential of fleeing from the court and the prevention of additional crimes as legitimate bases for pretrial detention. In cases like Avenatti's, where the government is seeking pretrial detention because the defendant is a danger to the community, it needs to prove by clear and convincing evidence &quot;that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the community.&quot; 18 U.S. Code § 3142(f)(2). However, if the government is seeking to hold the defendant because it does not believe he will appear for trial, it need only prove its case on that question by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986) (“For detention to be proper, the government had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that no conditions of release would reasonably assure Martir's attendance at trial.”). As a side note, I'd agree with some of the answers that in practice, the bond system is regularly abused to the point that its underlying principles become unrecognizable. My answer is meant only to address the actual legal rules your question implicates.
Forbearance from action can be consideration, but it must be forbearance from something that is one's legal right. It is sufficient that a person has restricted their lawful freedom of action. See Hamer v. Sidway, (1891) 124 NY 538. A promise to not do something that one has no right to do in the first place is not consideration. Throughout your entire spectrum of examples: there is no contract to breach; the intitial attempted theft was an offence; absent consent, it will never be lawful for John to take the car; any money accepted by John is likely an unjust enrichment.
Exactly the same thing that stops the same rogue lawyer from putting on a mask and robbing a bank. One is the crime of fraud and the other the crime of armed robbery but they are both crimes. People commit crimes all the time; that is why nearly 1 million people in the U.S. are in jail right now - some of them may even be in there for crimes they actually committed! Were your lawyer to commit this crime he may get caught or he may not; if he does he's going away for a long time and can never work as a lawyer again. So it's simply a matter of risk assessment; oh, and ethics
No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void.
Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all &quot;completely illegal&quot; regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a &quot;criminal conviction&quot;). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been &quot;decriminalised&quot; - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority.
The Brandenburg Test This is not a &quot;general test&quot; - it's the test that applies. The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that: The speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action,” AND The speech is “likely to incite or produce such action.” The first goes to mens rea; that the person intended by their speech to incite lawless action. This is a matter of fact based on conduct before, during and after the speech act. That is, intention can be established by what the speaker said and did before they spoke, while they were speaking and after their speech concluded. The second is based on the speech act itself. Here we have no precedent as to whether the incitement must be explicit (Lady McBeth or Iago) or implicit (Marc Antony): Hence, since Brandenburg, the Court has not elaborated on whether words of incitement are a necessary condition for conviction or if, absent words of incitement, a defendant has a First Amendment defense as a matter of law. We are left only with the Court's language in Brandenburg to try to divine whether words of incitement are in fact a necessary condition for conviction. The text is ambiguous. The Court stated that the First Amendment protects a speaker unless the speaker's advocacy is &quot;directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.&quot; Professor Gunther's position, that Brandenburg adopts Judge Hand's view, is supported by its self-conscious use of the term &quot;inciting,&quot; suggesting that words of incitement are a necessary condition. No doubt, the Court was aware of Judge Hand's use of that term. But, of course, the Court did not state explicitly that a speaker has a First Amendment defense. Rather, it used an additional term, advocacy directed to &quot;producing&quot; the imminent criminal conduct. Arguably, unless the &quot;producing&quot; language was merely surplusage, the Court recognized that language not explicitly inciting lawless conduct may nonetheless be sufficiently dangerous that it should be criminalized.
Well ... the crime of fraud and the tort of deception. If you say you will do X and enter a contract on that basis knowing that you won't then that is fraud and it carries gaol time. Your bank could also revoke your contract and sue for damages.