How many times had Trump been arraigned before his presidency? News articles today (such as this one) have been saying that the former president Trump has only been indicted and arraigned twice (4 April 2023 at the Manhattan state court of New York, and 13 June 2023 at a federal district court in Miami, Florida) despite the dozens of lawsuits that have been filed against him since he was elected president. Wikipedia says that before he was elected president Donald Trump and his businesses entities were involved in over 4,000 legal cases. I wonder how many of these were criminal charges against Mr. Trump personally (as opposed to his business entities), and how many among them resulted in arraignment? I came across this Huffpost blog article written before the 2016 election: Trump's Criminal History Should Be Front and Center. Although on quick reading it seems most of these charges were against Trump's business / non-profit entities, might there be among them criminal charges filed against him personally? There is also a CREW report listing 56 &quot;credible&quot; criminal offenses since Trump launched his campaign in 2015. My question is: If there were criminal charges against him personally but zero (0) arraignment, then these 2 arraignments (with a few in the works) will be new territory for him. It's a testament to his lawyers that he could have those previous cases settled / dismissed. It would be nice if the answer can list them. If he has been arraigned before, what were the charges and when?
Arraignments are only used for criminal matters. While Trump has been involved in many lawsuits, as have his businesses, only one prior case to his Presidency was criminal or quasi-criminal and might have involved an arraignment (although not necessarily): In 2006, the Town of Palm Beach began fining Trump $250 per day for ordinance violations related to his erection of an 80-foot-tall (24 m) flagpole flying a 15-by-25-foot (4.6 by 7.6 m) American flag on his property. Trump sued the town for $25 million, saying that they abridged his free speech, also disputing an ordinance that local businesses be &quot;town-serving&quot;. The two parties settled as part of a court-ordered mediation, in which Trump was required to donate $100,000 to veterans' charities. At the same time, the town ordinance was modified allowing Trump to enroll out-of-town members in his Mar-a-Lago social club. Some municipal ordinance violations are treated procedurally like traffic tickets, and some are treated more like misdemeanor criminal offenses (which do generally involve arraignments). After his Presidency, one of his business entities was convicted of rare criminal charges against an organization: On December 6, 2022, Trump's company The Trump Organization was convicted on 17 criminal charges. Lawsuits do not give rise to arraignments. This isn't part of the civil lawsuit process. It is estimated that 70 to 100 million Americans have criminal records because they have been convicted of at least one criminal offense. This is about one in three or one in four American adults. The number of Americans who have even been arraigned for a crime, in a case that is not currently pending, who have never been convicted of a crime, is probably on the order of 1 million to 10 million. Probably tens of millions of Americans who have never been arraigned, however, have been arrested but never charged with any crime, in addition to those who have been arraigned and not convicted with no charges pending, those who have been arraigned only in cases that are still pending, and those who have been convicted of crimes. Lots Of Crimes That Are Committed Are Never Prosecuted There is also a CREW report listing 56 &quot;credible&quot; criminal offenses since Trump launched his campaign in 2015. These are cases in which there is there are credible allegations that Trump acted in ways that could have been the basis for committing a crime. But, CREW is not alleging that any of these circumstances (other than the 2022 Trump Organization conviction and the two felony cases upon which Trump has been arraigned in 2023) have resulted in any court action being taken to press criminal charges. It is possible that Trump or one of his businesses was the subject of criminal investigations that did not result in charges being brought, but there is really no way to know that this is the case. And, there is nothing terribly dishonorable about being investigated for a crime but not ultimately charged with any criminal offense. By analogy, if you are speeding, you are committing a traffic offense. The vast majority of the time, you are not ticketed for speeding even if a law enforcement office's radar gun tells the law enforcement officer that you were going slightly over the speed limit. Eventually, after the statute of limitations for traffic offenses (which is quite short) runs, you can't even be charged with those offenses. In the same way, while unlawful sexual contact or sexual assault is a crime, if charges are not brought within the statute of limitations (something we know empirically to be quite common) then it doesn't result in criminal charges even though the offender committed a crime. Likewise, most civil fraud lawsuits allege conduct that could have been prosecuted as a crime if authorities sought to do so. But, in practice, criminal prosecutors with limited resources most often chose not to bring criminal fraud prosecutions in cases where a civil fraud lawsuit could bring complete relief to the party who was harmed by it. Not All Illegal Conduct Is Criminal Many kinds of conduct that can give rise to civil lawsuits cannot generally give rise to criminal charges at all. These include breaches of contract, negligently but unintentionally causing a personal injury, disagreeing over the interpretation of the tax laws in a way that cause the government to allege that you failed to pay the full amount of the taxes that you owe, employment discrimination, and many kinds of housing discrimination. Big Businesses Are Usually Parties To Many Lawsuits Business entities, large and small, are routinely involved in lots of civil lawsuits, sometimes as plaintiffs and sometimes as defendants, and the number of lawsuits is, more or less, usually roughly proportional to the economic scale of the enterprise. For example, almost every landlord brings eviction and rent collection lawsuits from time to time, and sometimes is sued by tenants over security deposit issues and alleged defects in the maintenance of the rental property. Almost every significant property owner will sooner or later become involved in litigation over boundary discrepancies or easements or in eminent domain cases. Almost every developer will sooner or later be involved in construction defect and/or mechanic's lien litigation. Almost every bank brings foreclosure lawsuits and collection lawsuits when loans are allegedly not paid as agreed or loan covenants are not met. Almost every business with a great many employees with eventually be involved in some sort of lawsuit with an employee. A large business will typically litigate a significant tax dispute at least every few years. Most of the lawsuits filed in the United States are brought by banks alleging defaults on loans, landlords alleging unpaid rent, and governments collecting unpaid taxes. For example, in Colorado, in 2022, there were 62,996 tax collection cases, 29,836 evictions, 1,971 simple mortgage foreclosures, 66,875 debt collection cases, and 306 personal property repossession cases, for a total of 161,984 civil lawsuits out of 199,293 civil lawsuits in the state (about 81%), the lion's share of which are brought by financial institution lenders, landlords, and government tax collectors. Whether 4,000 lawsuits over several decades is a lot or a little for a large business enterprise, or is just par for the course, really comes down to the nature of, and scope of, the businesses involved. The character of the allegations in the lawsuit, and whether the allegations are atypical of lawsuit involving large business enterprises, is really more telling than the number of lawsuits.
Cohen plead guilty to a number of charges. If you plead guilty with any charges, then there is no need to go forward with a trial.
In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future.
If someone was charged with 15 counts of a crime but was only indicted on 2 counts, can the prosecutor introduce evidence at sentencing of charges that the person was not indicted on? In federal court, yes. This has been the case since Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) which held that evidence such as counts and conduct upon which the defendant was not charged or indicted may still be considered in a sentencing hearing. Since U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), the prosecutor can even introduce evidence at sentencing of charges upon which the person was acquitted by a jury. See generally here. This remains good law although it is controversial both in academic writing and in political discussions and among many sitting federal judges. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor constitutional provisions related to evidentiary matters (e.g., the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment) apply at sentencing. Therefore, the court may consider hearsay and other types of information that would not be admissible during a trial. However, the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission has stated that information considered by a court at sentencing must have “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, the court “must — for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter — rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” In resolving factual disputes, the court ordinarily applies the preponderance of the evidence standard. From here. The quote above cites the following authority: FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (“This Court has long recognized that sentencing judges ‘exercise a wide discretion’ in the types of evidence they may consider when imposing sentence and that ‘[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.’ Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246– 247 (1949). Congress codified this principle at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that ‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information’ a sentencing court may consider ‘concerning the [defendant's] background, character, and conduct,’ and at § 3553(a), which sets forth certain factors that sentencing courts must consider, including ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant,’ § 3553(a)(1).”). USSG §6A1.3(a). FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(B). USSG §6A1.3, comment.; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (holding that due process does not require sentencing factors to be proved by more than a preponderance of the evidence). Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 states (emphasis added): Rule 1101. Applicability of the Rules (a) To Courts and Judges. These rules apply to proceedings before: · United States district courts; · United States bankruptcy and magistrate judges; · United States courts of appeals; · the United States Court of Federal Claims; and · the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. (b) To Cases and Proceedings. These rules apply in: · civil cases and proceedings, including bankruptcy, admiralty, and maritime cases; · criminal cases and proceedings; and · contempt proceedings, except those in which the court may act summarily. (c) Rules on Privilege. The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case or proceeding. (d) Exceptions. These rules — except for those on privilege — do not apply to the following: (1) the court’s determination, under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary question of fact governing admissibility; (2) grand-jury proceedings; and (3) miscellaneous proceedings such as: · extradition or rendition; · issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; · a preliminary examination in a criminal case; · sentencing; · granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and · considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. (e) Other Statutes and Rules. A federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court may provide for admitting or excluding evidence independently from these rules. Given the immense personal importance of a sentencing hearing which can exercise discretion over a range of many decades of possible prison time, and which is frequently the only meaningful opportunity for a person who is easily proven guilty to distinguish himself or herself from other defendants, it is really very stunning and counterintuitive that this is the case. And if so isn't that denying the defendant his or her due process because that person was not indicted on those charges? Under current U.S. Constitutional law, the maximum sentence that can be imposed must be based upon convictions by a jury or judge based upon charges upon which indictments were brought, which were proved beyond a reasonable doubt based upon admissible evidence. The leading case in support of this proposition is Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). But, at sentencing, the judge's exercise of discretion up to the maximum sentence established at trial may be made based upon a preponderance of the evidence and that evidence is not subject to the same procedural safeguards.
You are correct that the existence of a lawsuit -- on First Amendment or Fifth Amendment grounds -- is not a strong basis for believing that Acosta will have his pass reinstated. People file losing lawsuits all the time. But that doesn't really tell us anything about the merits of his case, which I discuss below. Temporary restraining order: The standard for TROs is well-established: This court may issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction only when the movant demonstrates that: there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits; plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; an injunction will not substantially injure the other party; and the public interest will be furthered by an injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001). I'd normally expect the court to be pretty speech-protective in a First Amendment TRO case, but because this is the White House, they'll probably give a fair amount of extra weight when figuring out how to balance everything here. I would not, however, expect either of the factors that you mentioned -- that this is a Fifth Amendment case and that few people have press passes -- to do much to change the court's analysis. I suspect it's going to come down to who is more credible about what happened and why. Fifth Amendment: The Constitution does not promise us much at all in terms of outcomes. What it does promise is that the government will go through reasonable procedures to arrive at those outcomes. As you seem to have identified, that's exactly what Sherrill was about. Sherrill does not say that everyone has the First Amendment right to a White House press pass; it says that that everyone has the Fifth Amendment right to due process when the White House decides whether to grant or deny a press pass -- especially because of the First Amendment interests implicated in those decisions. The basics ingredients of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker, and that's all that Sherrill calls for: a publicly disclosed procedure by which the journalists can apply for credentials and appeal adverse decisions. Here, it's unclear whether the White House has provided Acosta with any notice or any opportunity to appeal his decision. If that's the case, they've almost certainly run afoul of Sherrill. But again, you are correct that this does not mean he gets his press pass back. If they find that the White House violated the Fifth Amendment as explained in Sherrill, the remedy will simply be to force it to go through the prescribed procedure. First Amendment: If it turns out that they use that procedure as a pretext to punish Acosta for protected speech, we would be out of Fifth Amendment territory and into First Amendment territory. If a court found that the White House had revoked his pass because he was from CNN, because they didn't like the questions he was asking, or because he didn't provide fawning coverage of the president, it is virtually certain that the White House would be forced to restore his credentials. But if they determine in a fair way that Acosta should have his pass revoked because he was violent, because he was infringing on other people's ability to do their job, or because he was otherwise violating established rules, a court would probably say that any of those was an acceptable justification. In that case, CNN would need a new White House correspondent.
Bob should certainly expect to be impeached by whichever side his testimony injures. Their attorney will confront him with the transcript of his previous testimony, and likely read it out loud for the jury to hear, and force him to acknowledge that he said something different before. This is pretty standard trial tactics. Bob would not be treated as formally admitting that he committed perjury, though I think it's fair to say that he has effectively made that admission. One side will treat him as having lied the first time; the other will treat him as lying now. It's possible that he will have some explanation for the discrepancy -- he was high, he has memory problems, he misunderstood the question -- but in your hypothetical, the explanation would have to be pretty amazing to justify such a complete reversal.
I have not found a case directly on point, but there is a case in the right neighborhood. In Flordia v. Carter 364 So. 2d 1249, Carter was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath. He recanted his testimony in a letter to the defense attorney the next day. Subsequently he was charged with perjury: the trial judge dismissed the case based on his having recanted (which is a defense to perjury). The judge said (quoted in the appeal below and citing a relevant precedent Brannen v. Florida 114 So. 429) It matters not whether Carter knew his original testimony was false or whether he was merely mistaken. "The law encourages the correction of erroneous and even intentionally false statements on the part of a witness, and perjury will not be predicated upon such statements when the witness, before the submission of the case, fully corrects his testimony." The lower appeals court rejected the trial court's dismissal, saying Recantation is a defense to an allegation of perjury only where there is an acknowledgement of the falsity of the original sworn statement, a voluntary retraction of that statement, and a new statement which discloses the true facts. It is not a viable defense where the perjured testimony has substantially affected the proceeding or it has become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed. Otherwise, one could rest on his lie, allowing it to substantially affect a proceeding, and never retract unless the falsity had been exposed. This would provide no inducement or encouragement to tell the truth. That court basically felt it was based on the threat of being discovered, and felt that a particular state statute had taken away the recantation defense, so they reinstated the charge. The appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Carter v. Florida 384 So. 2d 1255 basically declared that the appeals court was wrong about the statute (they officially held that recantation is a defense to perjury). They concluded that Carter gained nothing by recanting (that was a distinguishing feature in a precedent that the lower court favored). The dissent in this decision opined that It may be that the false deposition testimony by Dr. Carter was inadvertent and without criminal intent.... These, however, are factual issues and should be resolved by a jury rather than by the trial court on a motion to dismiss. What unifies all opinions on the matter is that a false statement made under oath must be recanted. The reason why Carter was not convicted was that he (possibly) was unaware that his testimony was false and he did recant when he became aware of the facts.
This is technically an open question, but there is a general consensus that Consovoy's argument is unprecedented and unsupportable. If the president can be dragged into civil litigation over private matters in the middle of his presidency, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), it seems unlikely that the courts would give him a pass on prosecution for a midterm murderous rampage. If Consovoy is right, though, the answer would have to be that yes, Trump could avoid prosecution. Posing the question that way sort of helps to highlight the problem with Consovoy's theory. As I understand it, Consovoy's argument is that impeachment is the only remedy for crimes committed by a president. But if the president can just kill of Congress, there's no one left to impeach him, leaving the country with no way to remove him. So again, the answer is almost certainly no.