Did the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and freedoms cause any existing laws to be immediately struck down? In the Charter, certain laws became more difficult to pass without the use of the notwithstanding clause. Some laws theoretically violated the Charter as soon as it was enacted (certain sections of the Indian act, for instance). Did any laws immediately become void simply by the Charter being enacted?
The invalidity of laws that are inconsistent with the Charter is by virtue of section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which came into force with the bulk of the Charter. It states that: The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect. This might be read as immediately applying by its own force to render laws inconsistent with the Charter to be void. And language to this effect has been even used by the Court, saying that a provision inconsistent with the Constitution is &quot;invalid from the moment it is enacted&quot; (e.g. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Laseur, 2003 SCC 54). But for Section 52 to have effect &quot;requires the exercise of judicial power to declare the law to be unconstitutional&quot; (R. v. Sullivan, 2022 SCC 19 at para. 54). That a law is inconsistent with the Constitution is &quot;revealed through litigation, specifically the judgment that declares the inoperability of the impugned law&quot; (Sullivan at para. 55). Section 52 has no practical effect aside from Courts or other decision-makers declining to apply law that is inconsistent with the Constitution. Whether a law was void as soon as the Charter was enacted is not really a meaningful question nor even detectable until a Court declares the law to be invalid. The Court has also clarified that declarations of invalidity are not necessarily retroactive to the moment of enactment (internal citations removed): [60] ... Mr. Sullivan points to the idea that an unconstitutional law is invalid from the moment it is enacted. But the strict enforcement of such a principle “cannot easily be reconciled with modern constitutional law”. Instead, it is subject to a number of exceptions and s. 52(1) must be read “in light of all constitutional principles”. In Albashir, my colleague Karakatsanis J. explained that declarations of unconstitutionality are generally retrospective, consistent with the notion that a law is unconstitutional from its enactment. However, other constitutional principles may require a purely prospective declaration of unconstitutionality or a suspended declaration. Similarly, the legal effect of a s. 52(1) declaration by a superior court must be defined with reference to constitutional supremacy, the rule of law, and federalism. I'll say this one more way: while it's true that some laws were immediately inconsistent with the Charter, s. 52(1) did not have any observable effect until a court declared such laws to be invalid.
No. The law would be void for vagueness. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926): [T]he terms of a penal statute [...] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. The example of the "well known but hidden stop sign" appears to allow for arbitrary prosecution and should also be void.
None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals.
Is the government exempt from anti discrimination legislation Broadly speaking, the government (in Canada, the executive power vested in Her Majesty the Queen) is not subject to any law unless the legislature binds the Crown explicitly. In this case, Ontario Human Rights Code does bind the government and any agency of the Crown. However, Canada is a federal country, and for certain areas exclusively regulated by the federal government, provincial laws may not apply fully. This is the case for human rights and employment laws; the federal government along with federally regulated industries (banking, telecommunications, airlines etc.) enjoy immunity from provincial human rights codes. But they are still subject to the federal Canada Human Rights Act (which only apply to businesses under the federal jurisdiction), which also prohibit age discrimination. Additionally, government actions are also subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 15 of which prohibits discrimination based on age. what is with the huge number of jobs that list &quot;Must be eligible to participate in the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program&quot; as a requirement (with &lt;30 being the top listed requirement). For example, the Canada Summer Jobs (CSJ) program you referred to in the question is a federal program within the spending power of the Parliament of Canada and are immune from provincial laws that interfere with its application. Ontario laws simply to no apply in this case (but federal law and the Charter does) even if an action physically happens in Ontario. What Exemptions are there to the Age Discrimination laws in Ontario? Anti-discrimination law in general only prohibits &quot;unreasonable&quot; discriminations. If someone can show that they have &quot;good reason&quot; to discriminate, it can be legal. For example, it is legal for a casting director to choose a black man to portray Martin Luther King Jr. instead of a white woman. It is also legal to discriminate against people with certain disabilities if they are in fact unable to carry out tasks required in a job even with reasonable accommodation. It is also legal for an employer (or for the law to require an employer) to give special leaves to women for pregnancy and childbirth, even though otherwise discrimination is not permitted based on sex. Age-based discounts for example are usually not illegal (and even explicitly legal in Ontario's legislation for senior's discounts) if the purpose is genuine (e.g. less spending power for teens and seniors). While age requirements are on its face a discrimination, youth programs usually qualify as affirmative action programs that are designed to ameliorate the conditions of a disadvantaged group. It is the same basis why certain gender-, race- or age-based scholarships and grants are legal. In the employment context, the government considers youths as a disadvantaged group and improving youth employment is a reasonable government objective. The Charter allows affirmative programs by the government: (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. and both federal and Ontario human rights legislations allow special programs: 14 (1) A right under Part I is not infringed by the implementation of a special program designed to relieve hardship or economic disadvantage or to assist disadvantaged persons or groups to achieve or attempt to achieve equal opportunity or that is likely to contribute to the elimination of the infringement of rights under Part I. R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, s. 14 (1). 16 (1) It is not a discriminatory practice for a person to adopt or carry out a special program, plan or arrangement designed to prevent disadvantages that are likely to be suffered by, or to eliminate or reduce disadvantages that are suffered by, any group of individuals when those disadvantages would be based on or related to the prohibited grounds of discrimination, by improving opportunities respecting goods, services, facilities, accommodation or employment in relation to that group. Canadian Human Rights Act
In the United States, the answer depends on who is unlawfully in power. In the hypothetical you presented, the answer is probably that the law would remain valid, as Congress generally has the sole authority to pass judgment on whether to admit the elected person. A third party would not have the ability to challenge the law based on the qualifications of a lawmaker. But if we were dealing with an administrative official promulgating regulations, those rules would generally be void if that official were unlawfully appointed. That was the case in Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014), where a cola distributor challenged a labor regulation, saying that the members of the NLRB who enacted it were improperly appointed. The Court agreed that the appointments were improper, so the regulations were nullified. A judicial decision coming out under these circumstances would also be nullified if one of the judges weren't really a judge. That happened just last year, in Yovino v. Rizo. In that case, ten judges from the Ninth Circuit heard a case, and the vote split 6-4. But the author of the majority opinion died before the decision was published, which is when it become effective. The Supreme Court held that because there were therefore only five votes for that decision, it was not a majority opinion, and therefore not binding on future Ninth Circuit panels.
The Department of Justice has a nice guide on each section of the Charter, including section 28. As @MichaelSeifert's comment says, section 15 did not come into effect until later to give government time to resolve possible conflicting laws. During this time, section 28 can still be used to ensure other Charter rights are enforced on a gender equal basis. During the period from 1982 until April 1985, section 28 was the only Charter guarantee of sexual equality. It has been said that this may be the main effect of that section. There is to date limited jurisprudence on section 28. It is also important to note that section 28 is for interpretation of the Charter, not other laws. It cannot be directly applied to other parts of the constitution, ordinary laws nor other actions of the government. 28 Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons. Equally, section 15 cannot be used to challenge other parts of the constitution, it can only be used against laws and actions at a lower level (Adler v Ontario (AG), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609). The DOJ guide also describes this section as &quot;interpretive, confirmatory, and adjunctive&quot;, in other word, symbolic. Nothing wrong with this, laws, especially constitutional acts that are profoundly political, are often symbolic. It also helps to contextualize section 1 analysis that determines the extent of acceptable limitations on Charter rights. Additionally, in my opinion, a very important historic reason is the Persons case. Section 28 is reminiscent and affirmative of the results in the that case, which declared that &quot;persons&quot; in the Constitution included female persons. This is was not as obvious as we would think today, gender-neutral language on its face did not mean that the law was interpreted in a gender-neutral way. Not to mention, in French, masculine forms (the Charter uses chacun and &quot;tout citoyen canadien&quot; for example) are often used as the generic (nothing wrong with this since gender in French is grammatical). But the section affirms the generic value of the expressions for both sexes, similar to subsection 33(1) of the Interpretation Act or other places where you see things like &quot;masculine forms/pronouns has been used only for convenience and the rules apply equally to women.&quot;. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected women as &quot;qualified persons&quot; within the meaning of the Constitution for the purpose of appointing Senators; it was only because SCC was not Canada's final court at the time that the case succeeded in the British Privy Council. Notwithstanding clause As a compromise with the principle of parliamentary supremacy, section 33 of the Charter provides that (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15. [...] The legislatures cannot use the notwithstanding clause on other sections, e.g. democratic rights (sections 3-5), mobility rights (section 6) or language rights (sections 16-23). Section 28 is also not subject to a notwithstanding declaration, as such, it may mean that a government action notwithstanding other sections of the Charter nonetheless cannot violate sexual equality (but this question remain unsettled). This is one argument used to challenge the Quebec law on state secularism. The litigation is still ongoing, but the decision of the Superior Court of Quebec so far has disagreed with the preceding interpretation. The Superior Court deemed that once the legislature suspended the application of a Charter section, the rights in that section essentially are no longer guaranteed by the Charter and section 28 cannot be applied.
Yes. In some common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and even some U.S. states, the government may under some circumstances refer a legal question to the appropriate Supreme Court (Privy Council in the U.K.) for an advisory opinion. These opinions are non-binding, but have large influence because they are often made by the same judges that would otherwise end up dealing with the question should it occur in a case. One common law country in particular stands out in this field: Ireland. Under Article 26 of the Irish Constitution the President may, with some exceptions, refer a bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality. The referral is optional, but once made, the Supreme Court's decision is binding. The relevant portion: 3 1° In every case in which the Supreme Court decides that any provision of a Bill the subject of a reference to the Supreme Court under this Article is repugnant to this Constitution or to any provision thereof, the President shall decline to sign such Bill. [...] 3° In every other case the President shall sign the Bill as soon as may be after the date on which the decision of the Supreme Court shall have been pronounced. This power was last used successfully in 2004.
The future prospects are negligible, and the present status of such influence is non-existent. In a few cases, you may find an appellate decision citing some statement from a reputable law review. Here is an article that addresses such influences on SCOTUS (which, the authors note, have decreased over time). However, you are describing a wingnut legal theory, and courts do not rely on wingnut legal theories, they rely on what the actual law is.