Executive order by Trump on 2020-11-12 barring investment in publicly traded companies that the US says are owned/controlled by the Chinese military I read on finance.yahoo.com (mirror): The move stems from an executive order President Donald Trump issued on Nov. 12 barring investment in publicly traded companies that the U.S. government says are owned or controlled by the Chinese military. I'm confused by the executive order: Does this only concern US citizens, or also US legal permanent residents? I understand that such Chinese companies will be delisted from NYSE. Does it allow such Chinese companies to be still traded via OTC Bulletin Board? Does it allow US citizens/residence to own shares in such Chinese companies via non-US brokerage account?
The order itself is here. It applies to &quot;any United States person&quot;, which includes citizens, LPRs, entities with a US basis, and any other person in the US including tourists. It applies to transactions, and not static possession. There is no exception to the effect that &quot;you can trade as long as it's not on the NYSE&quot;, and it says Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited The order is not just directed at brokers, or the NYSE, it applies to everybody / everything everywhere, if you are a US person. Apparently there was some unclarity on the OTC question, which was clarified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, to the effect that it includes OTC trading.
Overview An executive order cannot make new law. However, most executive orders are based on powers granted by law to the President, or to some executive agency or department. Others are based on laws that come under the general power and duty of the President to &quot;take care that the laws are executed&quot; and announce some policy for how laws will be interpreted and enforced. Announced mandates In the case of the mask and vaccine mandates announced but not yet issued by the Biden administration, they apparently claim to exercise powers granted under various laws, particularly the Occupational Health and Safety Act. It is likely that once such regulations are formally issued they will be challenged by those opposed to such mandates. If they are upheld, (or are somehow not challenged and thus assumed to be valid) they will carry the force of the laws under which they are issued, and thus the Supremacy Clause will apply to those laws, and to the orders as ways to enforce those laws. Other Precedents The question says: Currently, the only precedent to enforce fines and vaccine mandates (at a state level) that I am aware of is a 1905 decision by the Supreme Court, Jacobson v. Massachusetts (197 US 11 (1905)), where it allowed Massachusetts to fine an individual for refusing to comply with vaccine mandates set by the state. This is not quite correct. Jacobson is the leading case on this issue, but there have been some others. In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) the US Supreme Court held that a local ordinance mandating vaccinations for school attendance did not violate federal constitutional rights, citing Jacobson and calling the matter settled law. Note that the ordinance in Zucht applied to both public and private schools without exception. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) the Supreme Court opinion included (at 166) the statement that: Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state, as parens patriae, may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death. People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243. The catalogue need not be lengthened. It is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare, and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction. (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted) Prince v. Massachusetts was a child labor case, not a vaccination case, and the above comment was technically obiter dictum (not binding precedent). But because of it Prince has several times been cited in later vaccination cases alongside Jacobson and to show that Jacobson is still good law. Note that Prince, like Jacobson and Zucht, was a case supporting state law against a 14th amendment challenge. Supremacy Clause An Executive Order that is not backed by any valid law would not be the &quot;Supreme law of the land&quot; under the supremacy clause, and might well be simply held invalid for lack of Presidential authority to issue it, depending on the subject of the order. But orders claiming to make law on the President's own authority are quite rare. Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (the steel seizure case) invalidated such an order. In that case the President not only did not have the backing of a specific law, but failed to follow the procedures set out in a relevant law. In Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer the concurring opinion by Justice Jackson has proved influential in later cases and in later congressional drafting of laws. The key passage of that opinion starting at 343 U. S. 635 reads: Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government, as an undivided whole, lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least, as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables, rather than on abstract theories of law. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. Into which of these classifications does this executive seizure of the steel industry fit? It is eliminated from the first by admission, for it is conceded that no congressional authorization exists for this seizure. That takes away also the support of the many precedents and declarations which were made in relation, and must be confined, to this category. Can it then be defended under flexible tests available to the second category? It seems clearly eliminated from that class, because Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field, but has covered it by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure ... Would a vaccine mandate or mask mandate that goes beyond any law passed by Congress fall into Jackson's &quot;zone of twilight&quot;? In the absence of a court ruling, no one can say.
Yes, You May According to this page from Invest-faq It is perfectly legal for non-resident aliens to trade equities on exchanges in the United States using US brokerage houses directly. (A “non-resident alien” (NRA) is the US government’s name for a citizen of a country other than the US who also lives outside the US.) ... Of course there are certain formalities concerning tax treatment of such accounts, and these formalities must be clarified with the brokerage house when the account is opened. Individuals who are not US citizens must complete a W-8 form, which is a certificate of foreign status, and return it to the brokerage house. The specific rules of how these accounts are taxed are described in IRS Publication 515 (Withholding of tax on non-resident aliens) and IRS Publication 901 (Tax treaties). The tax treaty is especially important. If the individual’s country of residence has an agreement (tax treaty) with the US government, those rules apply. The relevant Investopedia page says: There is no citizenship requirement for owning stocks of American companies. While U.S. investment securities are regulated by U.S. law, there are no specific provisions that forbid individuals who are not citizens of the U.S. from participating in the U.S. stock market. However, even if a non-U.S. citizen can legally trade U.S. stocks and bonds, it may still be required (in addition to being advisable) for them to consult with an investment firm and use the services of a professional. ... One of the goals of the Patriot Act of 2001, passed following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was to prevent individuals with any links to terrorist activities from funding their illegal activities through the American capital markets. The act led to brokerage firms implementing more stringent requirements for verifying customer identities, particularly for non-U.S. citizens. Part of this legislation also requires stockbrokers to report any suspicious account activity to the U.S. government. However, these regulations obviously do not impact the majority of international investors because the vast majority of investors do not have any criminal associations. Some brokerage firms may require non-U.S. citizens to produce additional types of identification documents in order to comply with their individual policies. This can include visa information, a valid Social Security number, or a Certificate of Status of Beneficial Owner for United States Tax Withholding and Reporting form (also called a W-8BEN). Some brokerages may also require non-U.S. citizens to submit paper applications versus submitting online applications to open accounts. The Forbes article: &quot;If You Trade Around The World, You Need To Know IRS Rules&quot; says: Non-resident aliens are subject to tax withholding on dividends, certain interest income and sales of master limited partnerships like energy companies. They have U.S. source income — effectively connected income (ECI) — on real property and regular business operations located in the U.S. A non-resident alien living abroad can open a U.S.-based forex or futures trading account and not owe any capital gains taxes in the U.S. U.S. tax law has long encouraged foreign taxpayers to invest and trade in U.S. financial markets ... A non-resident alien living abroad can also open a U.S.-based securities account, but there could be some dividend tax withholding. If the non-resident spends more than 183 days in the U.S., he owes taxes on net U.S. source capital gains, even though he may not trigger U.S. residency under the substantial presence test. Thus having a visa of any kind is not required. Anyone anywhere in the world who is not associated with terrorism may trade on US exchanges provided they comply with the appropriate tax, identification, and other laws of the US in doing so.
Yes. The Russian owned party to the contract can be sued. The remedies would be those available under the contract, which may or may not be futile to pursue, which almost certainly specify the court to which disputes should be brought. I have no access to the contracts and can't read the relevant languages anyway, however, so I can't tell you what they say about this point. In all likelihood, a Russian court would not rule in favor of Poland or Bulgaria on this score, and would not order Russia to restart supplying natural gas to them (perhaps on the theory that national security and foreign affairs decisions are involved), and no other court would have the practicable ability to cause Russia to reopen its natural gas pipelines. So, if they prevailed, the Court would have to fashion some other remedy (e.g. seizing Russian assets sufficiently associated with the contractually bound party over which they can acquire jurisdiction). If there is a third-party guarantor of the contract, collection could be feasible. If not, it would be much more challenging.
Title 52, section 30121 of the US Code is the section regulating election spending by foreign nationals. Specifically, it forbids both making and accepting said contributions, as well as banning independent expenditures: (a) Prohibition It shall be unlawful for- (1) a foreign national, directly or indirectly, to make- (A) a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election; (B) a contribution or donation to a committee of a political party; or (C) an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an electioneering communication (within the meaning of section 30104(f)(3) of this title); or (2) a person to solicit, accept, or receive a contribution or donation described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) from a foreign national. (1) would get you. (2) would get Trump. Extradition may be difficult, but you have committed a US crime if Trump takes that contribution, and if you do turn up in the US then the US might prosecute you for it (they almost certainly won't, but they could).
Many laws control the conduct of the executive branch &quot;Attempting to control the conduct of the executive branch&quot; doesn't imply a violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Congress has many laws that control the executive. 35 USC 101 tells the Patent and Trademark Office what subject matter is patentable. 15 USC 1052 tells the Patent and Trademark Office that it must provide registration unless a trademark falls into one of several categories. There are many many more. This power comes from Article 1, Section 8 The power to enact laws that tell the executive branch what to do stems from Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives congress the power &quot;to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.&quot; Example of intrusion on Executive authority But, when a statute intrudes on the authority conferred on the Executive by the Constitution, it is not constitutional. An example where Congress intruded on Executive authority is Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). The court held that &quot;the power to recognize foreign states resides in the President alone&quot;, and that &quot;if Congress could alter the President’s statements on matters of recognition or force him to contradict them, Congress in effect would exercise the recognition power. An exclusive Presidential power disables the Congress from acting upon the subject.&quot; (Citing Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), an important separation of powers case that went the other way: the Executive issued an order that infringed on the law-making powers vested in Congress.) Executive acknowledges that Congress can control how vacancies are filled There is a case before the Supreme Court in October term 2016, where the Executive is defending its interpretation of a statute that concerns how particular executive employees are hired, fired, or directed: National Labor Relations Board v. SW General, Inc.. The Executive is not challenging the constitutionality of the statute, though. The Executive even argues, basically, &quot;If Congress wanted to control us, it has the ability to and knows how to control us.. it just didn't in this case.&quot; No bills of attainder United States v. Lovett 328 U.S. 303 (1946) is another case where Congress went too far. The background here was that Congress passed a law that said &quot;no salary or other compensation shall be paid to certain employees of the Government (specified by name)&quot;. The court held that: &quot;Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial, are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution.&quot; This principle was refined in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977). The court upheld an act that directed &quot;the Administrator of GSA to take custody of appellant's Presidential materials&quot;. Even given this specific direction to take a particular action, the court found that &quot;the Act does not, on its face, violate the principle of separation of powers.&quot;
Although it doesn’t seem to be on the Federal Register (yet), the Presidential Proclamation on Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States issued on March 8, 2018 has been published on whitehouse.gov. The relevant law cited in the proclamation is section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1862 and provides: [A]fter receiving a report ... in which the Secretary finds that an article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security, the President shall ... if the President concurs, determine the nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of the President, must be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security. The Department of Commerce published its 262-page report, ‘The Effects of Imports of Steel on the National Security,’ on January 11, 2018.
The FDA approved the device as requiring a prescription (not OTC). FDA regulations govern the manufacture or distribution of devices and drugs, not the consumption. An overview of FDA regulation is here. They say they they are "responsible for regulating firms who manufacture, repackage, relabel, and/or import medical devices sold in the United States". The entire pile of regulations (21 CFR) is here. There has to be an underlying statute that authorizes the FDA to impose restrictions: that would be in Title 21 of the US Code. The specific law regulating medical devices is 21 USC 360. Congress can easily pass laws that restrict what businesses do (a consequence of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution), but they (theoretically) have a more limited ability to restrict what an individual does. Since there is no federal law prohibiting the use of a prescription device, it is not a crime to possess or use such a device.