Can a single person hold multiple judicial commissions? Suppose that the President of the United States nominated a candidate to two different judicial positions (say a district court judge as well as a circuit court judge) and also the Senate confirmed that person for both positions. Could the President then award a commission for both positions at the same time? Or is there a principle that prevents holding multiple offices in the Judicial branch (it is clear that a person can hold an office in the Executive and Judicial branch, see John Marshall who served as Secretary of State and Chief Justice.
Statutes provide that federal judgeships are a full time job. It isn't expressly constitutionally prohibited, however. Indeed, there have been times in U.S. history when higher court judges served in lower federal courts &quot;riding circuit&quot; to meet personnel needs. This is still done by senior judges and sometimes in other circumstances, on a temporary, often case by case basis. Similarly, for example, all judges on the FISA Court are also federal court judges with other primary posts. This doesn't require a separate Presidential appointment. In lower courts, for example, municipal courts, where the judgeship is a part-time position, it isn't uncommon for one person to be a judge in multiple courts.
united-states Sort of. Most particular courts have a chief judge, a position that is paid slightly more than that of a usual judge for a huge additional burden of administrative work managing the court house (e.g. courtroom assignments, policies on implementing case assignments, overseeing the jury system, security measures, hiring court clerk's office and court building staff, reviewing court budgets, deciding whether to close the courthouse for weather or pandemics and the like, etc.). In Colorado, there is a state appointed panel for each court that in connection with an outside private contractor evaluates judges periodically and prepares a report recommending or not recommending their retention in periodic retention elections, and there is a separate appointed panel that investigates allegations of judicial misconduct. In many other states, some or all judges have to run for re-election when their terms end and the voters decide if they should stay in office. Sometimes judges in these states are nominated by the appropriate level of one of the major political parties. In the federal courts, since judges serve for life and there is far less discretion to discipline them, Congress is the main supervisor in the sense of having the power to &quot;fire&quot; a judge. Trial court judge's substantive legal decisions are subject to review by courts with appellate authority over their court on a case by case basis. For courts of general jurisdiction, direct review of their cases on appeal is vested in an intermediate court of appeal in all but a few small states. For courts of limited jurisdiction that handle smaller civil disputes and/or misdemeanor criminal cases, direct appellate review is usually vested in the courts of general jurisdiction above it. In each state, the state judiciary as a whole has at its pinnacle a highest court, usually called the state supreme court, although a few states call it something else. It is the final court of review in the appellate process. It also has the authority to intervene in particular judicial decisions that would not ordinarily be ripe to raise in an ordinary direct appeal (e.g. questions about whether allegedly attorney-client privileged or other privileged evidence must be disclosed), including the authority, in rare cases to order that a judge in a case that was appealed be removed from a case. The federal court system and some larger states vest this authority in intermediate appellate courts as well. State supreme courts also have general administrative authority over the judiciary as a whole. The state supreme court (primarily through the chief justice of the state supreme court) in its administrative capacity handles budget issues, formulates court rules, prepares annual reports on the judicial branch, lobbies for state funding, is responsible for auditing lower court finances, makes IT decisions for the state judiciary as a whole, and makes myriad other policy decisions, although it does not directly supervise judges in the way that a line manager in a government agency would supervise that manager's subordinates.
This came in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison (1803). At the last moments of his term, President Adams and Congress appointed a bunch of new judges to the courts. One of those was Marbury, but his new commission was not delivered by the outgoing Secretary of State John Marshall. The incoming President Jefferson had the undelivered commissions thrown out and ignored by his own Secretary of State (Madison). So Marbury sued to have his commission instated. There were some peculiar subtleties to the case. One is that Marbury sued directly in the Supreme Court, rather than an inferior court. A law passed by Congress had granted SCOTUS authority to be the trier of certain cases; said law was repealed before the case went before the court. Another oddity is that the Chief Justice was the very same John Marshall that had originally failed to deliver the commission; he did not recuse himself. The case was very contentious. Congress and the President were both very combative and eager to claim control of &quot;constitutionality&quot; for themselves. Congress would not much appreciate its laws being thrown out, and Jefferson was of the (combative) mind that it was in fact the President who decided the constitutionality of laws (the constitution can be said to explicitly charge him with enforcement of the laws and protection of the constitution), etc. The court risked getting neutered by both sides with just the slightest misstep. The President was sure to ignore any attempt to make him do anything, and Congress would retaliate if anyone but them threw out their laws. And simply declaring themselves impotent was the same set of problems. That the ruling effectively avoided all such problems makes it one of the great examples in SCOTUS opinions to this day, though not all hold it up in a positive way (it arguably intentionally handled the case backwards, so as to yield a ruling rather than a dismissal; some even argue the case may have been manufactured as a way to formally let SCOTUS claim this power). The ruling basically said the following: (1) Does Marbury have a right to this commission? Yes, the commission was validly created and the deliverance of it is just a non-discretionary formality, failure of which is an injury that can be fixed (give him the commission). (2) Do we have the power to force the Executive branch to do something like this? Yes, for non-discretionary duties that are non-political and owed to a particular person, the courts may order the lower ranks of the Executive branch to do things. (3) Do we even have the authority to hear this case? No. It is held that the law in question would grant us original jurisdiction over this issue, but that is unconstitutional: our original jurisdiction is completely enumerated by the Constitution, and cannot be expanded by legislation. (4) So what do we do? Nothing, we just dismiss it. Madison can be ordered to do this thing, but won't actually be so ordered since the law required to let us do so is invalid. And we can invalidate that law, but don't actually do so since Congress has already repealed it. In this way both Congress and the President were left with no real angles to hold a beef over the court, as neither one of them had effectively had their authority directly neutered or compelled. The ruling did nothing but what was already done, and simply asserted the Judiciary had certain powers it could flex later: it could rule on the constitutionality of laws, and it could order the Executive branch to do things. For what it's worth, the Marshall court never really invoked these powers again, seemingly still mindful of a contentious battle for power between the branches of government that could render the courts impotent, but one way or another the ruling successfully claimed the power to decide the constitutionality of things for the courts.
Short Answer This account would be a fairly extreme outlier relative to normal practice in jury selection, but it is certainly something that could possibly happen (except for one small detail that isn't very relevant to the core issues that it raises; this detail is discussed below in the last heading of this answer). The substantive points made in the Facebook post about what the facts recounted say about the state of women's conditions and attitudes about women in our society, and the poster's skepticism that a judge who made decisions like these really acted appropriately, are well founded, fair, and appropriate to raise. These concerns are within the heartland of what the case law on these kinds of issues discusses and struggles with, although because of the procedural posture of this issue, there isn't a lot of case law on this issue. Long Answer My Sources Of Knowledge I have participated in choosing perhaps half a dozen juries in which I was counsel, and I have observed the process in other cases one or twice and have previously been in a couple of jury pools myself (I've never been actually selected to serve). I'm also familiar with accounts of others practitioners regarding their experiences with jury selection, I know what I was taught in law school about the process, and I am familiar with the academic and practitioner oriented literature about the process. I am answering based upon U.S. law, because I don't have intimate familiarity with petite jury selection in other common law countries, although the broad outlines of the process are similar. As a caveat to this answer, however, recognize that judges have very broad discretion in the jury selection process and that not all judges adhere to &quot;best practices&quot;. Further, in many states, judges are partisan elected officials who tend to end up in there positions because of, rather than in spite of, their extreme views and positions of legal issues over which they have discretion relative to the average lawyer or judges in places where the judicial selection process is less partisan. Your Questions How often are jury members subject to separate examination by defense counsel (or prosecution counsel) during jury selection? This usually happens in any case more serious than a simple traffic offense. It would be unusual to examine every single member separately in a separate room, but normally quite a few jurors a questioned separately on one point or another. This process is called voir dire (a situation in which U.S. legal terminology borrows from French rather than Latin). How frequently are jury members dismissed in the presence of other members? Jury members are usually dismissed in the presence of other members, but the specific juror responses to the reasons for doing so may or may not be discussed in the presence of the other jurors. Less sensitive questions (e.g., do you still live in this county, are you a U.S. citizen, do you speak English, do you have scheduled health procedures during the anticipated trial or a trip with a non-refundable ticket or similar issue, and a few other &quot;categorical&quot; exclusions) are usually discussed in the presence of other members, as are responses to general questions that are unlikely to be grounds by themselves for a dismissal for cause, but could inform peremptory challeges of jurors. The better and more common practice is for sensitive questions, such as a previous incident of being assaulted, to be discussed out of earshot from the other panel members, but in the hearing of the judge, at least one lawyer for each side and the court reporter who includes the bench conference in the trial transcript. Alternatively, how often are dismissed jury members informed of the selection or elimination of fellow jury members? Normally, jury pool members leave the courtroom and get on with their day once they are dismissed. But, if they choose to stick around, they will learn who is selected to serve on the jury, and who is eliminated from the jury pool. Is the defense counsel able to eliminate (all twelve) jury members from consideration (for cause) without objections by prosecution counsel? Terminology First of all, here and in your prior questions it is important to distinguish between the jury pool (a group of randomly chosen people who might end up being jurors) and the jury (a group of people ultimately selected to decide a case after challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are complete). The Voir Dire Process There is, in principle, no limit on the number of members of the jury pool who can be dismissed for cause, and if they run out, everyone goes home for the day and comes back the next day with a supplemental batch of jury pool members. In an obscure civil case or minor low profile felony case, the jury pool would typically be 30-60 potential jurors. In a death penalty case or case that has famous parties (e.g. a civil case involving Taylor Swift held in Denver recently), the jury pool would typically be several hundred people and the first round of voir dire would happen over the course of several days or even weeks. Any time that either party requests that a juror be dismissed for cause, the other party can choose to not object, or can object and argue that the juror should not be dismissed for cause. The judge doesn't have to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike the juror for cause and not infrequently will refuse to dismiss a juror even when both parties agree to strike a juror for cause. This is because the judge has an institutional incentive to discourage jurors other than the one that a party has moved to dismiss from the jury pool from giving a lame excuse to try to get out of jury duty, even if the parties, who don't have that institutional concern, don't care about that. Why Might A Prosecutor Fail To Object? The downside of objecting to a request to dismiss a juror for cause is that it creates an almost automatic appellate issue for the party seeking to dismiss the juror if the juror is not dismissed. So, a prosecutor might not object to a questionable request to dismiss a juror for cause in order to reduce the likelihood that a conviction obtained by the prosecutor would be reversed on appeal. Giving the defense the jury it wants also makes it more likely that if the case starts going badly that the defendant will agree to a plea bargain mid-trial rather than risking a conviction by the jury, because any conviction obtained is more likely to hold up on appeal. A defendant may appeal a ruling denying a motion to dismiss a prospective juror that is denied after a conviction, if any, is entered. If the jury acquits the defendant (the unfavorable outcome the prosecutor would like to avoid by not having a juror dismissed for cause), the prosecutor can't appeal the case, and if the jury hears evidence, the case can't be dismissed without prejudice or retried unless there is a conviction that is reversed or there is a mistrial (the mistrial rules are bit complicated). So, if the prosecutor was really appalled by the dismissal for cause of so many women and felt that this would impair the prosecution's chance of obtaining a conviction materially, the prosecutor would have to dismiss the criminal charges so as to vacate the trial, before evidence was presented to the jury, and then refile the charges (assuming that this would be possible consistent with statutes of limitation and speedy trial requirements). But, this would be an extraordinary move with high stakes, because the prosecutor has a long term strategic interest in not pissing off a judge in any case because that could cause the judge to exercise the judge's discretion against the prosecutor in future cases. The judge and prosecutor may have to deal with each other in future cases for decades and will do so on a regular basis every few weeks or months. A judge is likely to be pissed off in this situation because dismissing a case ready to go to trial and scheduled for trial with a jury fully selected because the prosecutor was unhappy with the judge's rulings on motions to dismiss jurors for cause would not be appreciated by the judge who naturally believes that the rulings made on those motions were sound even if that belief is unreasonable. I strongly suspect that this was the reason that the prosecutor allowed all twelve women in the jury panel to be stricken for cause in the case that you describe (assuming, of course, that the Facebook account is factually accurate, which is sometimes the case and sometimes not the case – even if the gist of the account was accurate, it wouldn't be surprising if some technical details or nuances were incorrectly recounted). It Would Not Be Normal For A Prosecutor To Not Object In This Case Despite these procedural considerations, it would be very unusual for a prosecutor to not object to striking all twelve women on a jury panel for cause in these circumstances and it would be very unusual for a judge to agree to strike all twelve women on the jury panel for cause in these circumstances whether or not the prosecutor objected. Generally speaking, merely having had a prior experience of having been assaulted would not be sufficient to strike a prospective juror for cause. Normally, the prosecutor and/or the judge would ask the prospective juror if this experience made it impossible for that particular juror to be impartial in this particular case, and normally most of the prospective jurors asked that question would say &quot;no&quot;. Usually, in that situation, the judge would not agree to dismiss that prospective juror for cause. Most prosecutors would expect their objections to a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in this situation to be taken seriously by the judge and for only a few of these requests that cast the most doubt on the impartiality of a potential juror to be granted. And, most prosecutors would not consider the appellate risk involved in opposing a request to dismiss a prospective juror for cause in the typical scenario that I outlined above very troubling, because a judge has fairly broad discretion on dismissals of jurors for cause in the face of a marginal fact pattern. The fact that the judge allowed this also suggests that the prosecutor may know that the judge is very unenlightened and has misogynist leanings and that fighting the judge's ruling in this case would be a lost cause that is hard to appeal. (Of course, if any of the women had previously been assaulted by the defendant in this particular case and personally knew that defendant well, that would normally cause the potential juror to be dismissed for cause.) After Challenges For Cause Keep in mind also that after dismissals for cause are completed, a certain number of jurors equal to the number of peremptory challenges allowed to the prosecution and defense combined plus the number of jurors who need to be left over to decide the case would be put in the second stage of narrower jury pool. In this second stage, during which the narrower jury pool is honed to the actual final panel of jurors who will hear the case, each side exercises their allocated number of peremptory challenges (normally alternating back one forth, one juror at a time). While peremptory challenges can generally be made without good cause, you can not make a peremptory challenge solely based upon a potential juror's race or sex. If a side dismisses all women, or all men from the jury pool, there is a presumption that this is what was done by the party striking the jurors that must be overcome with convincing reasons not based on race or sex. The same analysis, strictly speaking, doesn't apply to motions to dismiss jurors for cause because in those cases a non-discriminatory reason has been definition been advanced by the party seeking to dismiss the prospective juror and accepted by the judge as convincing based upon the voir dire evidence. One reason not to fight very hard to dismiss a juror for cause is that many of those jurors who seem most favorably inclined to your case, although not necessarily all of them, are likely to end up being dismissed in a peremptory challenge in any case. A Footnote on Ex Parte Proceedings Ex Parte Voir Dire Is Improper The author of the OP also clarified that: When I asked, &quot;How often are jury members subject to separate examination […]?&quot;, I meant that only one party (or counsel for one party) is examining the jury at a time. E.g., first the judge and prosecution counsel examines the jury (without defense present) then the judge and defense counsel examines the jury at some other time. Normally, the judge asks boilerplate routine questions first, then one side asks questions, then the other side asks questions. But, it would be almost unheard of (and it would be improper and unethical) for this to happen without lawyers for both sides present to see what transpires during the other side's questioning, even if the prosecution wasn't planning to make challenges for cause, so as to gather up information needed for the preemptory challenge phase of jury selection. To have a proceeding without both sides having a lawyer present is called an ex parte communication with the judge which both the judge and the lawyer doing so have an &quot;ethical&quot; duty to avoid in this part of the jury selection process. An ethical duty means that the judge could be, in theory, kicked of the bench or temporary suspended or public reprimanded or require to take a judicial ethics class for doing so; and that the lawyer could similarly be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or publicly reprimanded or required to take a legal ethics class for doing so. Conducting the proceeding ex parte could also be grounds for a mistrial ruling that would not prevent the defendant from being retried (because it would have been done at the request of and for the benefit of the defense counsel), or for an appeal in the appropriate cases. (There are ex parte proceedings which are ethical and permitted such as applications for search warrants and arrest warrants, but juror selection is not a proceeding to which an exception to the general rule applies.) The Prosecution Could, In Theory, Waive The Right To Participate In principle, the prosecutor could waive the right to be present while the judge and defense lawyer examine prospective jurors, but this would be almost bizarre conduct that would only happen if someone was calling about an incredibly urgent development that threatened to shut down the courts or put the prosecutor or co-workers or family at immediate risk of physical harm happened. For example, a prosecutor might waive a right to be present if the prosecutor wasn't planning on objecting to any jurors for cause and was learning that the 9-11 attacks were underway, or that a mass shooting at the prosecutor's offices had happened or was in progress, or a prosecutor having a spouse who the person they stepped out to talk with was in a newly discovered hostage situation, or the prosecutor suddenly feeling an intense need to vomit or being on the verge of passing out or feeling like a heart attack might be in progress. Even then, however, it would be more common for a judge to call a recess for a little while in any of those circumstances. The Case Description Is Probably Incorrect Or Misleading On This Point The ex parte examination of prospective jurors, which was apparently described, would be so far outside the norm of typical jury selection conduct, that I suspect that this part of the account is inaccurate or was confusingly worded. For example, the post's wording arguably misleadingly implied that there was an ex parte proceeding as part of the jury selection process, but it wouldn't be necessarily inconsistent with a scenario in which a prosecutor was already present with the female jurors &quot;before the remaining candidates were led into a room to meet the judge and defense attorney.&quot; For example, it could be that what really happened was that a member of the prosecutors office was introduced to the in the jury assembly room, and led the prospective jurors to the correct courtroom without making any comments to them, and then they met the judge and defense counsel, which would be entirely proper and not unusual.
There is no law governing the 'number' of the president. Common sense suggests that a person can't be 45th and 46th; there must be someone in between having the presidency and they will become the 46th president. In the extremely unlikely scenario that a foreign power occupies the United States this year, eliminates the office of President, and a few years later the US is liberated and Donald Trump is re-elected, I guess people could name him the 45th and 46th President, but it makes no sense to speculate about this.
While the answer by Jen does a good job explaining why some possible alternative structures for US courts of appeal (circuit courts) would be unworkable, the real reason why we have such courts is their historical origin. In the United states, Justices of the Supreme Court regularly traveled through the country. They would stop at particular locations, and hold court together with the local judge of a district court as a two-judge court. Appeals from district court decisions were heard. Some were passed along to the full Supreme Court, particularly ones in which the Justice did not agree with the judge. Each Justice had a route, or &quot;circuit&quot; which that Justice covered once or twice a year on horseback (or by carriage) spending half or more of his time &quot;riding circuit&quot;. The process was quite onerous, and was by far the larger part of the work of a Justice. It allowed decisions to be reviewed by a Supreme Court member at places physically closer to the original trials, and served as a filter on cases to be decided by the full court. This practice was derived from the older English practice of having Justices in Iter (later known as circuit judges) who traveled through the country, judging cases that had been held awaiting their arrival. (The word &quot;Iter&quot; is related to &quot;Itinerary&quot;, the list of places one is scheduled to visit.) The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 by G. Edward White (ISBN 978-0195070590) includes a detailed description of the process of circuit riding during the period of 1815-1835, and the way in which proceeding in the circuit courts influenced constitutional jurisprudence and how cases came to the Supreme Court. I recommend this extensive book for better understanding of the origins of many features of the US Judicial system. Some years after the US Civil war the Circuit Courts officially became the Courts of Appeals and Supreme Court justices stopped &quot;riding circuit&quot;, but the geographical divisions continued to be called &quot;circuits&quot;, and each circuit is still supervised by a single Justice, who rules on &quot;emergency&quot; applications, often for stays of judgement, or for injunctions. The division of the US court system into circuits thus is due as much to historical inertia as to careful design, although an alternate design that was an improvement would not be easy to create.
These charges aren't the same offense. They are three different offenses, all of which arise from the same conduct. Imagine throwing a grenade in a building because you saw a police officer about to discover evidence connecting you to a crime. I think most people would agree that there's no reason you could not be charged with murder, arson, and tampering with evidence under those circumstances. Likewise, Chauvin committed multiple distinct offenses when he kneeled on George Floyd's neck -- for instance, murder charges are based on the act of causing a death, while manslaughter charges are based on the act of creating a risk of death -- and the state is free to seek punishment for all of those offenses. Double jeopardy doesn't have any application to the case at this point. The Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't say you can't face multiple charges for the same conduct; it says you can't face multiple trials for the same charges.
There are two possible scenarios: The Vice-Presidential President and a mass Write In. In the first, if the elected President is removed from office after 2 years in office, than the Vice-President (and the entire eligible line of succession for that matter) would be eligible to run for two terms, giving the Former Veep the ability to serve for a total of 10 years. If the Veep ascends to President prior to the 2 year mark, it counts as his first term for 25th Amendment Purposes and he can only run for one more election. In the second scenario, if there is a mass write in campaign of a former two term President that wins, the votes will not be counted as the candidate is not eligible under the terms of the 22nd Amendment. Under Article II of the Constitution, no person who is ineligible from office may ever ascend to the office of President. In terms of the 25th Amendment, the Presidential Line of succession currently is starts with the Vice-President, then the Speaker of the House, then the President pro tempore of the Senate, followed by the Cabinet by order of Creation of office. Only the Vice-President is exclusively barred from being a non-Native Borne U.S. citizen. However, the rest of the offices in the succession line are not barred in such a manner, so there could arise a case in which the line has a member who is not a native born citizen (Currently Secretary of Transportation Elaine Chao is a naturalized citizen and not eligible to become President. Were she eligible, she would be 14th in line.). As such, she is omitted per the Presidential Succession Act and the line below her is elevated. She is also disqualified from being a Designated Survivor, as they role entails that they must be legally authorized to be President should the worst happen.