Is trial courtroom layout prescribed by rule or law? In the United States, in general criminal trial courtrooms, I have always seen the defense positioned furthest from the jury and the witness stand. However, I gather that not only is there no law or rule prescribing this arrangement, but also there are some courts where it is not the case. I imagine that a counselor for a defendant may have a number of reasons why he would prefer to seat himself and his client closest to the jury, or closest to the witness stand. For example, the counselor may want to get a more acute read on the reactions of jurors or emotions of witnesses. Or he may consider his client to have an attractive or sympathetic demeanor. (Conversely, he may want to keep an unsympathetic client as far from the jury's eyes as possible.) In criminal trials, does the defense ever (or always) have the option of choosing its position in the courtroom? If not, is there jurisprudence that explains why this isn't considered an unnecessary handicap to the defense?
There is no such law mandating this layout, nor is there any law permitting the defendant to demand a change to it. The arrangement seems most likely to have been driven by security concerns when courts began removing "the dock" and letting the defendant past the bar to sit with his attorneys. One court has also concluded that it was meant to assist the government "because it bears the burden of proof." It's of course impossible to prove a negative like this, but I'll note that Kenneth Lay's attorneys raised the issue in the Enron case, and they were unable to cite a single case saying that the defendant has the option to sit closer to the jury. If they couldn't find it, it probably doesn't exist. Meanwhile, the government was able to find several cases saying that the defendant does not have the right to demand a change, though it did not have any cases saying that the layout is mandatory. Instead, it described itself as "traditionally" having a right to the table. In that case, the judge ended up splitting the baby. Saying that there was "no law" to inform his decision, he sat the government next to the jury during its case, and it sat the defense next to the jury during its case. That was quite a bit more generous than the Seventh Circuit, which has rejected the jury-proximity argument as frivolous. So there are some cases addressing the issue, but I don't know of any case where a court has actually looked at the issue and given any real consideration to the due-process implications of the substantial empirical evidence suggesting that the party closest to the jury enjoys an advantage.
I'd imagine that testimony from the defendant is rare enough that in the majority of cases, prosecutors do not meaningfully prepare for a cross examination. To the extent they do, I'd expect the preparation is similar to that for basically any other witness. So I wouldn't expect complicated flowcharts, because the general rule at trial is that you only ask questions whose answers are both known and helpful. So if I need to place the defendant at the OK Corral at 3 p.m., I'm only going to ask him where he was at 3 p.m. if I have evidence showing that fact is true -- maybe he gave a written statement to the sheriff, maybe he posed for a daguerrotype, whatever. I expect him to deny it, so I don't ask the question unless I have evidence more convincing than his denial. In this way, a defendant -- like any hostile witness -- is used less to provide any facts of their own, but rather as an involuntary narrator of my own story, authenticating evidence and validating the facts consistent with my theory of the case.
It depends on what the jury said, and if it's criminal or civil. In criminal cases, the judge may almost never set aside a verdict of acquittal. There is a single case in the US in which this happened, and it was a bench trial (no jury). That case featured the defendant bribing his trial judge; the Seventh Circuit held that he was never in jeopardy due to the bribe. As far as I can tell, that's the only one. There have been no cases that I can find of a jury's verdict of acquittal being overturnable. Judges can poll the jury to make sure they're unanimous (at least in federal court), and if they aren't then it's a mistrial, but that's because the jury was never in agreement in the first place. On the other hand, a judge has several ways to enforce an acquittal. In federal court, for instance, the defense can move for a motion of acquittal either before or after the case goes to the jury. If the motion is granted before the verdict, double jeopardy applies to retrial. If it's granted after a conviction, then the judicial acquittal can be reversed on appeal, possibly requiring a new trial. Before the verdict is returned, the judge can declare a mistrial. After the verdict is returned, it's too late for that. In civil cases, things are more complicated: double jeopardy does not exist there. There, there is a notion of a judgment as a matter of law: the judge determines that, based on evidence presented, no reasonable jury could possibly find the other way. This can happen before or after the verdict, and is appealable.
Judges do not decide, jurors do (however, if a judge is the fact-finder, then the judge makes such a determination). The main input that the decision-maker gets is a jury instruction. In order to unify "reasonable doubt", "reasonable price", "reasonable delay" and so on, appeal is often made a mythical being, "the reasonable man", so reasonable force would be the degree of force the reasonable man would use in a given situation. I will draw from California criminal instructions ('cuz I have them) but similar instructions can be found across jurisdictions. For example, one instructions says "A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes". Or from a negligence instruction "A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk". More detailed appeal to The Reasonable Person is found in the justified homicide instruction: Defendant’s belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted only because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the [attempted] killing was not justified. When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed. The defendant’s belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true. There is no explanation of what it means to be "a reasonable person". Since nobody believes that they themselves are unreasonable, a simple and also wrong way of judging the matter is to subjectively judge whether you yourself would do the same thing, if you were in that situation. Very often, instructions do not even bother to say what "reasonable" means, so (re interpreting expert testimony) "You may disregard any opinion that you find unbelievable, unreasonable, or unsupported by the evidence"; (re corpus delicti) "That other evidence may be slight and need only be enough to support a reasonable inference that a crime was committed"; "Also, before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty", "when considering circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and reject any that are unreasonable" The closest the law has come to articulating an objective characterization of "reasonableness" is in "reasonable doubt" instructions. One characterization is in People v. Feldman, 71 N.E. 2d 433. It is not a doubt based upon sympathy or a whim or prejudice or bias or a caprice, or a sentimentality, or upon a reluctance of a weak-kneed, timid, jellyfish of a juror who is seeking to avoid the performance of a disagreeable duty, namely, to convict another human being of the commission of a serious crime A somewhat improved characterization is the Calcrim instruction Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt There is room for improvement, but it points in the right direction. On rare occasions, a law is written that actually includes a definition. The Gas Price Spike Act HR 3784 said The term ‘reasonable profit’ means the amount determined by the Reasonable Profits Board to be a reasonable profit on the sale. It is then up to the board to subjectively determine what that profit is. (BTW this did not become law). [Addendum] It's actually very difficult to determine what reasoning judges use in those cases where they are the determiners of fact. They will likely call on their knowledge of law, asking "are these circumstances sufficiently like past circumstance A where the defendant was convicted, or more like B where the defendant was acquitted".
united-states Minimum sentencing laws do not prescribe any punishment for a judge that simply refuses to obey them. See 18 U.S. Code § 3553 as an example that explains how sentencing must be enforced, yet no mention of punishments for violating these laws. It also makes mention of how minimum sentencing can be avoided by a judge lawfully as well. Judges do not risk jail time or fines for breaking these laws, as they have judicial discretion, which is literally a power defined by what it means to be a judge, to hand out whatever sentence they think is appropriate. (Note: there may be exceptions, but I couldn't find any. If any such examples exist, they are likely rare) If a judge refuses to hand out an appropriate sentence by these laws, there are options available. The two main choices are by review, and by appeal. The review board has a few options. They can accept the lower sentence, they can reject the sentence to have the judge resentence, or they can assign the sentencing to a different judge. By way of appeal, the prosecutors can choose to appeal to a higher court. Eventually, either the sentence will become fixed at the reduced level, or it will be corrected by someone else in the system, if not the judge, then either an associate or superior. Either way, the odds are stacked against a rebel judge. However, at least one documented example of this exists, the story of Judge John Coughenour (linked below). He sentenced the same person three times for the same crime, and while he eventually did get a &quot;victory,&quot; the story goes to demonstrate that (a) judges can rebel and get some effect, and (b) even as hard as he fought, he wasn't punished, but he also didn't get nearly the effect he was hoping for, despite a promise from the government to reduce the criminal's sentence in exchange for cooperation. While judges can be censured, reprimanded, removed from office, voted out (at least, at lower levels), and impeached, most of these punishments are reserved for situations of corruption, bribery, etc, rather than simply executing their judiciary discretion, which is one of the core powers granted to them by the judicial branch. Further Reading: One judge makes the case for judgment 18 U.S. Code § 3553 - Imposition of a sentence
If you have something to say, you should have said it before now When a judge is about to hand down a decision the case is all but over. Just like figure skating at the Olympics, the points are scored even if nobody but the judges know what they are yet. The onus is on the parties to bring forward all the evidence and make all the submissions on the law that they want the judge to consider before and during the hearing. If they didn't then that's their fault and they can't introduce new stuff now. Now, it's not uncommon for a judge to share their thoughts during the hearing or in writing when considering written submissions. This is because their thinking on the law is at variance with what the parties are contending. The plaintiff says the law is X, the defendant says the law is Y, the judge thinks they're both idiots and the law is clearly Z. They will usually call for submissions on this because the judge's role is to decide the dispute between the parties on the evidence the contend -not to impose the judge's interpretation on them; by doing this the parties may relies the judge is right and a lot of the dispute disappears or they may convince the judge that they are wrong (it's not unknown) and move on from a clear agreed position.
First, the proper immediate action is to - while not leaving the judicial branch - appeal up to the next higher court. In federal courts, the lowest levels are district courts, which issues decisions appealable to the circuit courts, whose decisions are sometimes able to make their way to the Supreme Court by submitting a Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Then the Supreme Court meets and decides which appeals it will hear for the year ahead. This works similarly on a state level, except the levels of the courts may have different names (for example, Washington, DC’s trial level court is not the District Court, but the Superior Court. In Virginia, one trial court is the General District Court, which hears claims up to $25,000 and another trial court is the Virginia Circuit Court which hears other claims, and some felonies while also serving as an appellate court for the General District Court). Assuming those options have been exhausted, the reality is yeah, sometimes there are judges who will act that way. Sometimes they will get away with it because they are maintaining enough discretion, they are powerful enough, or because someone else is corrupt, too. A number of options and variables may come into play at this point. What, if any, laws exist to prevent the behavior in question? What ethics standard does the jurisdiction have (this would likely be developed by the local bar association)? Are there any other organizations he or she is affiliated with professionally? Who else knows about it, how serious is it, will anyone else speak up, etc...? Each of those variables - and likely a number of others not mentioned here - may play into the outcome. They each can serve to make one’s actions more or less easy or desirable to perform, whether by exposing and embarrassing an actor, reminding him or her of the potential legal liability associated with such actions, etc. All that said, there are limits on what a judge may or may not do. For example, in federal criminal cases, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, rules assembled by the US Sentencing Commission that are, of course, non-binding, set a floor and ceiling on the years in prison one should be sentenced to in various circumstances with a formula used to make the calculation. It is rare (and sometimes controversial and subject to scrutiny) if a judge grossly or unreasonable deviates from the Guidelines. The intent of the Guidelines is to remove judicial bias from the doling out of prison sentences. Results have arguably been mixed. Finally, I’d be remiss not to mention that in general judicial discretion in many aspects of litigation is a desirable and useful occurrence, whether it manifests itself in the dismissal of a frivolous case or appointing counsel to an indigent defendant.
I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).