Is Citizen-Based Taxation Constitutional? The U.S. is currently one of two countries in the world that imposes taxes on all her its citizens regardless of where they live or where they earn money from. The other is Eritrea. Considering that one of the primary grievances which sparked the American Revolution was "taxation without representation", Citizen-Based Taxation is quite ironic. There are no elected representatives for American citizens abroad and their interests are almost never considered. From a constitutional perspective, is it legal to force a U.S. citizen living abroad and earning a living abroad to pay taxes to the U.S. despite having no representation, and receiving no benefits in return - in addition to being deprived of the basic freedom to expatriate (the tax and filing requirements are so onerous for Americans abroad it is in most respects unfeasable to live abroad. Those that do are overwhelmingly not compliant). What are the arguments for and against?
I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce.
This is tied up in the concept of sovereignty - nation states have control over their territories and citizens and they recognise the right of other nation states to do likewise. The USA, China (Hong Kong) and Panama are all sovereign states, they each decide what the law is within their own territory and they can’t tell each other what to do; they can ask, however, that’s what diplomats do. If a HK domiciled company provides HK based servers then they have to comply with HK law irrespective of where their customers are located. The USA could pass a law requiring US companies (like ISPs) to keep logs of traffic to and from HK servers but they cannot force a HK company to do anything, unless and until it operates in a place where the US has jurisdiction which means both the right and the ability to enforce their law.
Only the currently unmarried may lawfully marry in the US US laws generally prohibit a marriage if either person is currently in a valid marriage to a third person, whether in the US or anywhere else. If a current marriage is valid it must be ended by divorce or in some other lawful way before a valid US marriage can occur. Marrying in the US while already married to another person is the crime of bigamy, and will also render the later marriage invalid and void. All this is true regardless of immigration status, it would be true for citizens, green-card holders, holders of any visa type, and undocumented people. No one may contract a marriage while currently married to someone else. I believe this is true in all US states and territories. Committing the crime of bigamy could possibly have negative impact on the immigration status of a non-citizen, in addition to potential criminal penalties. I am not sure why you would think it might be OK to proceed with such a marriage without first obtaining a divorce, annulment, or other lawful termination of any existing marriage, inside or outside the US, but it is not.
This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.
According to CENDI, yes the US government is able to claim copyright on works internationally. The law in question which makes US government works public domain in the US (17 U.S. Code § 105) only does so within the confines of US copyright. Since copyright protection is on a per-country basis, there's no reason that the US government couldn't assert IP rights under foreign copyright law (though I didn't go looking for an example). While the Berne Convention generally requires countries to provide foreign works the same protection as domestic works, I can think of two general reasons why US government works wouldn't fall under copyright protection in some countries: The country simply doesn't apply copyright protection to any government works (don't know how common this is). The country applies the rule of the shorter term. If they do, they aren't required to provide a longer term of protection than the country of origin does (which is nil in this case).
As user6726 notes in an answer, the page you link to derives from 26 USC 7701. However, it does not reproduce the text accurately. There, "United States person" is defined at section 7701(a)(30), and it notably lacks anything corresponding to "any other person that is not a foreign person." It's possible that that language is motivated by some court decision, but it's also possible that someone just added it for the sake of symmetry with the definition of "foreign person" without thinking about the logical paradox that it might create. Looking at section 7701, I don't see any explicit mention of US non-citizen nationals. It appears that such a person who does not live in one of the 50 states or the District of Columbia falls under the definition of nonresident alien at 7701(b)(1)(B) even though such a person is explicitly not an alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. I do not see any regulations correcting this oversight, but I suppose that in practice such people are indeed treated as US citizens. I don't know enough about the classification of nonhuman legal persons as foreign or domestic to have any ideas about whether there are similar ambiguities there.
The tricky bit from a GDPR standpoint is that the US has a law that says a US-based company must hand over data to US government agencies even if the data is stored outside the US. This is US specific and a case where the US government gives itself jurisdiction outside the US but the EU can't directly do anything against it (outside of international negotiations). As you noticed this means if you store data at a US data processor there is no real difference whether the data is physically stored in the US or the EU. So to avoid transferring EU consumer data to the US several steps are needed. First the servers have to be physically located in the EU and second the company needs to be non-US based, EU based seems the obvious choice. AFAIK constructions of a US-based company creating a fully owned EU-based subsidary are currently used to achieve the second part. Whether this is sufficient may have to be decided in court.
The conservative argument that the Dreamers law is unconstitutional is that it ascribes equal protection to non-US citizens under the 14th Amendment. The 14th Amendment lays out clearly and explicitly that only US born or naturalized citizens have equal protection. If anyone makes that argument, it's an extreme fringe. The 14th Amendment does not prevent states from giving equal protection to non-citizens. In fact, in general, the 14th Amendment means states are required to give equal protection to non-citizens. See Graham v. Richardson: The Fourteenth Amendment provides, &quot;[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.&quot; It has long been settled, and it is not disputed here, that the term &quot;person&quot; in this context encompasses lawfully admitted resident aliens, as well as citizens of the United States, and entitles both citizens and aliens to the equal protection of the laws of the State in which they reside. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 118 U. S. 369 (1886); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 239 U. S. 39 (1915); Takahashi v. Fish &amp; Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. at 334 U. S. 420. It's also settled that illegal immigrants are fully entitled to equal protection of the laws. See Plyler v. Doe: That a person's initial entry into a State, or into the United States, was unlawful, and that he may for that reason be expelled, cannot negate the simple fact of his presence within the State's territorial perimeter. Given such presence, he is subject to the full range of obligations imposed by the State's civil and criminal laws. And until he leaves the jurisdiction -- either voluntarily, or involuntarily in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the United States -- he is entitled to the equal protection of the laws that a State may choose to establish. The dissent to Plyler also agreed that illegal immigrants are entitled to equal protection of the laws: I have no quarrel with the conclusion that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to aliens who, after their illegal entry into this country, are indeed physically &quot;within the jurisdiction&quot; of a state. However, as the Court concedes, this &quot;only begins the inquiry.&quot; Equal protection does not mean people in different situations must be treated identically. States are limited in their ability to discriminate against lawful permanent residents (Richardson), but there are situations where discrimination is appropriate (Foley v. Connelie, which held that a state can require police officers to be citizens). It's often considered reasonable for states to discriminate against illegal immigrants, but Plyler held that it was unreasonable to deny children the right to attend school because they were illegal immigrants. At the federal level, Congress has broad authority to discriminate against non-citizens (one reason states are fairly limited here is so they don't interfere with federal authority). The question in the case mentioned in the comments, DHS v. Regents of the University of California, was whether the Trump administration's decision to end DACA was legal. One argument raised was that it violated the Equal Protection Clause because it disproportionately hurt Latinos and was motivated by prejudice against them. The Court held that the claims of a prejudicial motivation were weak and that the disproportionate effect was just because illegal immigrants are disproportionately Latino. The Court didn't explicitly say &quot;you can constitutionally make immigration policies that discriminate against illegal immigrants,&quot; but that's so obvious that no one seriously thinks otherwise. What the Supreme Court did not rule was that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to illegal immigrants. They held that it didn't ban this particular policy change, but that's not particularly surprising. They certainly didn't hold that DACA was illegal because it violated the Equal Protection Clause by protecting non-citizens. No one even bothered to address that claim.