Who creates uniform trial court &amp; supplementary rules? States and counties in the U.S.A. can have court rules, such as: New York State's Administrative Rules of the Unified Court System &amp; Uniform Rules of the Trial Courts Oregon's Uniform Trial Court Rules and Supplementary Local Rules Georgia's Court Rules (including uniform rules) Louisiana's Court Rules Who sets these rules? If it's not the legislature, by what authority?
In most US states such rules are set by the state's highest court, often but not always known as the State Supreme Court. The legislature could set such rules, but normally does not. It may authorize the court to do so. Mote that the Oregon rules (on a page easy to reach for the one linked above) say: Proposed changes to the Uniform Trial Court Rules (UTCR) and Supplementary Local Rules (SLR) are reviewed annually by the UTCR Committee. The committee makes recommendations to approve, disapprove or modify these proposals. After considering these recommendations, the Chief Justice or the entire Supreme Court, reaches a final decision on whether to approve or disapprove a proposed change. The Georgia rules state: **Rule 1. PREAMBLE **- Pursuant to the inherent powers of the Court and Article VI, Section IX, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution of 1983, and in order to provide for the speedy, efficient and inexpensive resolution of disputes and prosecutions, these rules are promulgated. Rule 1.6 The Council of Superior Court Judges shall have a permanent committee to recommend to the Supreme Court such changes and additions to these rules as may from time to time appear necessary or desirable. [Emphasis added] Many other states have somewhat similar procedures. Others including NY and California, set more of the rules by statute. On the Federal level, the various Federal Rules of Procedure (Civil, Criminal, and Supreme Court, perhaps others) are set by the Supreme Court, although they are usually drafted by an ABA committee Court appointed advisory committee and submitted to the Court for approval, I understand. Many (but not all) state rules closely imitate the Federal rules, down to the numbering and wording in many cases.
If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.
Someone has pulled a sample motion of this type off of PACER (the public access Internet portal to civil filings in federal court). The example is more formal and structured than a lot of state court motion practice would be, however (e.g. few state court's require or encourage motions with a table of contents and a table of authorities). This example is 36 pages long, and many states don't even allow motions to run for more than 10-15 pages without leave of the court to do so in advance. There is a New Jersey federal court example here which is also on the formal and fussy side (although, in part, because the motion isn't just an arbitration motion and is also raising several additional unrelated issues which if omitted would cut it in half). See also one here. Another example, from a California state court, is closer to the mark for a typical state court filing. A court that handles residential landlord-tenant matters is probably even more &quot;casual&quot; and probably expects motions to get to the point more quickly. The core content is probably solid, although it would have to be customized to reference the state law statutory and procedural rules rather than the federal rules of civil procedure, and to analyze and set forth the facts of your case rather than those of some random person whose pleading is linked. This would also have to be adopted to state court practice standard, which typically uses different formatting for captions, signature blocks, whether or not line numbering is required, etc., and is often subject to other requirements. Some require that a certificate of service be filed as a separate document, while others routinely incorporate it in the main document. Many state courts require that a proposed order be submitted with a motion as a matter of state or local court rules, a few states require a cover sheet to be filed with motions, many states require you to confer with the other side in the case and to recite their position opposing or supporting the motion, or something in between, before filing it, and some courts require you to notify them once the deadline for a response has passed, regarding whether an opposition has been filed to the motion's request for relief or not. Similarly, some states courts require that motions be &quot;verified&quot; (i.e. have their allegations confirmed under oath) or supported by an affidavit setting forth the factual matters alleged in them. New York State structures a lot of motions as &quot;orders to show cause&quot; in which the court preliminarily reviews the relief requested and issues an order telling the other side that it will do something if they don't file an objection showing good cause for the court not to rule in that way by a given day, which must be formally delivered (i.e. &quot;served&quot;) upon the other side by a deadline. I don't know if New Jersey local motion practice is similar. Many court systems also charge a &quot;new case&quot; filing fee for motions to compel arbitration that does not apply to other kinds of motions. Ideally, you'd want to review some motions (about pretty much anything) to get a feel for how this is usually done in New Jersey.
There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.
While the answer by Jen does a good job explaining why some possible alternative structures for US courts of appeal (circuit courts) would be unworkable, the real reason why we have such courts is their historical origin. In the United states, Justices of the Supreme Court regularly traveled through the country. They would stop at particular locations, and hold court together with the local judge of a district court as a two-judge court. Appeals from district court decisions were heard. Some were passed along to the full Supreme Court, particularly ones in which the Justice did not agree with the judge. Each Justice had a route, or &quot;circuit&quot; which that Justice covered once or twice a year on horseback (or by carriage) spending half or more of his time &quot;riding circuit&quot;. The process was quite onerous, and was by far the larger part of the work of a Justice. It allowed decisions to be reviewed by a Supreme Court member at places physically closer to the original trials, and served as a filter on cases to be decided by the full court. This practice was derived from the older English practice of having Justices in Iter (later known as circuit judges) who traveled through the country, judging cases that had been held awaiting their arrival. (The word &quot;Iter&quot; is related to &quot;Itinerary&quot;, the list of places one is scheduled to visit.) The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 1815-1835 by G. Edward White (ISBN 978-0195070590) includes a detailed description of the process of circuit riding during the period of 1815-1835, and the way in which proceeding in the circuit courts influenced constitutional jurisprudence and how cases came to the Supreme Court. I recommend this extensive book for better understanding of the origins of many features of the US Judicial system. Some years after the US Civil war the Circuit Courts officially became the Courts of Appeals and Supreme Court justices stopped &quot;riding circuit&quot;, but the geographical divisions continued to be called &quot;circuits&quot;, and each circuit is still supervised by a single Justice, who rules on &quot;emergency&quot; applications, often for stays of judgement, or for injunctions. The division of the US court system into circuits thus is due as much to historical inertia as to careful design, although an alternate design that was an improvement would not be easy to create.
There is no such law mandating this layout, nor is there any law permitting the defendant to demand a change to it. The arrangement seems most likely to have been driven by security concerns when courts began removing "the dock" and letting the defendant past the bar to sit with his attorneys. One court has also concluded that it was meant to assist the government "because it bears the burden of proof." It's of course impossible to prove a negative like this, but I'll note that Kenneth Lay's attorneys raised the issue in the Enron case, and they were unable to cite a single case saying that the defendant has the option to sit closer to the jury. If they couldn't find it, it probably doesn't exist. Meanwhile, the government was able to find several cases saying that the defendant does not have the right to demand a change, though it did not have any cases saying that the layout is mandatory. Instead, it described itself as "traditionally" having a right to the table. In that case, the judge ended up splitting the baby. Saying that there was "no law" to inform his decision, he sat the government next to the jury during its case, and it sat the defense next to the jury during its case. That was quite a bit more generous than the Seventh Circuit, which has rejected the jury-proximity argument as frivolous. So there are some cases addressing the issue, but I don't know of any case where a court has actually looked at the issue and given any real consideration to the due-process implications of the substantial empirical evidence suggesting that the party closest to the jury enjoys an advantage.
No The importance of following precedent, and the principle of stare decisis were inherited by the early US legal system from the British Common Law system, and have been taken as part of the natural order of the legal system by US courts ever since. This extends even to a court overruling itself. US Courts are notoriously reluctant to overrule their past decisions, even when current court members agree, However they will do so from time to time. The US Supreme Court in particular will flatly overturn previous decisions, especially on Constitutional issues, when it thinks there is no other way to achieve a proper outcome, although it often prefers to distinguish the prior decision without actually overruling it. I think the fastest and most extreme case where the US Supreme Court overruled itself was that of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the second flag-salute case. (This was also a particularly significant case.) This reversed Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) a case on the exact same issue, only three years previously, and a vote of 8-1 on the first case became a vote of 6-3 the other way, with only one new Justice on the Court. Only Justice Frankfurter, the author of the fist decision, issued a dissenting opinion in the Barnette case, and no other Justice formally joined that opinion.
united-states In Colorado (which is an outlier among U.S state court systems), trial court judge in the state court system has a duty to rule on pending motions within three months, and if they do not, a litigant can, after providing certain notices to the judge and appropriate authorities in the court administration office move to have the judge's paycheck suspended until the judge rules. In practice, even most lawyers don't know that this rule exists. Those lawyers who are aware of this rule virtually never utilize it, out of the well founded belief that it only makes sense to do so if you are a client in a very time dependent situation whom you are certain the judge will rule against when the judge actually gets around to ruling and you want to get on to the appellate process quickly for the client. Even then, the prevailing assumption is that the judge will be prejudiced against litigant in all discretionary matters for the rest of the case, and that the lawyer for that litigant will be at a disadvantage before that judge for the rest of his or her legal career. Colorado has no similar duty for municipal court judges or administrative law judges (who are not administrative part of the state judicial branch), or for appellate court judges. Likewise, there is no such duty in federal court. In an extreme circumstance, a state court litigant could file a Colorado Appellate Rule 21 motion (formerly called a writ of mandamus) with the Colorado Supreme Court seeking interlocutory relief from the excessive delay, and a federal court litigant in an Article III federal trial court could seek parallel interlocutory relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the trial court is located. But, either way, the likelihood of the relevant appellate court actually granting interlocutory relief for excessive delay by a trial court in addressing a pending matter is virtually nil, unless the case is one statutorily entitled to priority scheduling such as election law cases, protective order cases, and in Colorado state court, in certain civil cases involving very elderly parties. By way of example, I have had civil cases in which dispositive motions have been fully briefed and awaiting a ruling from a judge in both a general jurisdiction state trial court, and also in a different federal court, in which no ruling was forthcoming for more than a year after the matter was fully briefed. It isn't terribly unusual when appellate court rulings are released, to see that the oldest case ruled upon (often an appeal of a serious criminal conviction) that day was filed five or more years before the opinion is issued, even though once a trial court record is transmitted to the court (which typically takes three to six months), and there are typically only three or four appellate briefs to be filed plus half an hour of oral argument to conduct once the case is fully briefed for the appellate judges to consider before ruling. There are rare cases where proceedings can be even slower due to exigent circumstances. For example, I once had a limited jurisdiction civil case that went to trial over automobile repairs in which the presiding judge who had heard all of the testimony and taken careful notes from it had a serious health incident the evening after the last day of the trial, leaving him hospitalized for seven months, and in which it was discovered that the tape recorder that was supposed to have recorded the trial court proceedings that could have been used to create a transcript for use by another judge to rule on the case was broken and had recorded nothing. A year after the trial was completely and the judge had recovered and returned to work, we got the judge's ruling that he otherwise would have provided within a week (because that would have been his normal practice, not because he was required to do so) had he not been hospitalized. Needless to say, no one can tell the U.S. Supreme Court to speed up ruling on a matter in any binding way. There are some exceptions to this in U.S. criminal law trial practice at both the state and local and at the federal level, where there is a constitutional right to a speedy trial that if abridged results in the dismissal of charges against the defendant, and there are a few other deadlines of a similar character related to the post-conviction process. There is also a very short deadline in criminal cases, once a defendant is arrested, for the defendant to have a first appearance before a judge.