Procedural Rules v Federal Law? This question is inspired by @ohwilleke response to my previous question. In his response, ohwilleke highlighted the following point: Isn't the the Appellate Division in NJ required to uphold the ruling of the Third Circuit in such matters? It is not. There can be no conflict on procedural issues between the Third Circuit, which is interpreting federal rules of civil and appellate procedure, and a ruling of a New Jersey court which is interpreting state rules of civil and appellate procedure. What's the difference between state laws that are subject to federal law &amp; &quot;procedural&quot; issues (&quot;state rules of civil procedure&quot;) that apparently are not? At the heart of Coinbase v. Bielski is whether the FAA intended that an appeal divests the district court's jurisdiction of the case. It is not a question of federal &quot;procedure&quot;. If the FAA so intended, what legal right does a state court have to devise a &quot;procedural&quot; rule that is in direct conflict with federal law? A rule that is in violation of federal law is no better than a state law that violates federal law. Assuming the intent of the FAA was to divest jurisdiction when an appeal is filed, on what basis can a state create a &quot;rule&quot; that gives it jurisdiction? If the state were to create a law that is inconsistent with federal law it would be struck down as illegal. Why does that change because it is a state rule? I might be missing something basic but something doesn't sound right. Can someone explain the difference in approach between a rule and a law that is in direct conflict with federal law?
The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.
The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 9th Circuit. The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 7th Circuit. These decisions are not binding precedents, even as to federal law, on state courts, or in any other circuits, although they are persuasive authority in all jurisdictions that don't have a contrary binding precedent. When two circuits reach contrary legal conclusions in binding precedents, this is called a circuit split. Sometimes, circuit splits are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court (a large share of its docket is devoted to such cases). Sometimes Congress wakes up and enacts a law that resolves the dispute if it involves a non-constitutional issue. Sometimes (arguably, most of the time), circuit splits go unresolved for years or even decades, and the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in one part of the United States is different from the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in another part of the United States. In some other circuit where the legal issue that is the subject of the circuit split is question of first impression with no binding case law decided in that circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, the parties will offer up persuasive authority from the 7th and 9th Circuits that have previously issued binding precedents on the issue and will try to argue that the one that favors them is correct, or that there is a third way to consider the issue that also favors them. Indeed, often the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately refrains from resolving circuit splits until a clear majority has emerged favoring one view or the other. Even simply counting how many circuit splits exist is a surprisingly tricky matter. For example, one database estimates that 29%-41% of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in recent years resolved circuit splits (at the same link) but that was realistically an underestimate. the question is whether geographic or the temporal instancy in opposing decisions makes one over the other binding authority. There is not. There is no procedural rule that resolves a circuit split.
That is a bit of queer provision. I'm not going to answer your first question because I think that it is a gray area with no definitive answer. In answer to your second question, my strong suspicion is that it is drafted in the shadow of a particular state consumer protection act. An arbitration clause is allowed to change your procedural rights, but cannot change substantive rights that cannot be waived by a pre-dispute contractual agreement. If it does that, it is void and you can go to court instead of an arbitration forum. Many consumer protection laws provide that a prevailing party is entitled to minimum statutory damages in lieu of actual damages if they are smaller, in addition to your reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation costs if you prevail. This is done to make it economically viable for private citizens to sue over violations of the consumer protection law that would otherwise involve actual damages too small to be worth suing over, without having to bring a class action. If the relevant consumer protection law has a minimum $5,000 statutory damages amount for some claims covered by the clause, this clause would prevent it from being invalidated, while allowing the merchant to still have access to the consumer unfriendly arbitration forum in which class action lawsuits are probably also barred while class action lawsuits would not be in court. For a big merchant, it is far better to have to pay $5,000 and attorneys' fees to the handful of people who bring arbitrations and win them, than to lose a single class action lawsuit for millions of dollars.
The appellate court reviews based upon the trial court record. To the extent that it turns on questions of law, including interpretations of written documents whose authenticity is not in question, this review is de novo. Likewise, decisions on this issue made on a paper record and argument of counsel, without an evidentiary hearing that resolved material disputes of fact between the parties, are reviewed de novo. So are procedural question, like whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held. But, in cases where there is a mixed issue of fact and law, the appellate court defers to all findings of fact made in the trial court from an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court that are supported by admissible evidence in the trial court record. Since the material facts relating to the enforceability of arbitration are frequently not in dispute in a case like this and arbitration rulings are often made without evidentiary hearings, as for example, in this case and in this case, an appellate court often does engage in de novo review. But, the appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses, for example, in a manner contrary to the trial court's findings of fact supported by admissible evidence in the record, if an evidentiary hearing was held and this was necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact that were material to the question of whether arbitration could be compelled. While what I have said above is somewhat different than the standards, for example, in New Jersey as stated in this document quoted below, this is to some extent a function of the facts of the referenced cases. None of which involve a refusal to compel arbitration following an evidentiary hearing involving disputed findings of fact. Appellate courts &quot;review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration.&quot; Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020). See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). &quot;Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, either party may move to confirm an award within three months of the date of its delivery. Once confirmed, the award is as conclusive as a court judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-10.&quot; Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 292 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 398 (1999). N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 provides a court may vacate an arbitration award for: 1) corruption, fraud or undue means; 2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; or 4) the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. &quot;Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited.&quot; Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). &quot;To foster finality and 'secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature,' reviewing courts must give arbitration awards 'considerable deference.'&quot; Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013)). &quot;[A]n arbitrator's award resolving a public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the award is 'reasonably debatable.'&quot; Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013)). &quot;An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action.&quot; Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)). Certain statutes, including the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, set &quot;strict limits on the appeal of an arbitration award.&quot; Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 2008). In support of a contrary view that even the findings of fact of the trial court are subject to de novo review are statements like this one (from this case): The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). But, the cited cases don't mean precisely what they are purported to say in the rare case where the decision rests, for example, on resolved a disputed credibility decision between two witnesses over whether the purported arbitration document is authentic in an evidentiary hearing. Those cases are merely dicta as applied to that fact pattern. The case containing this quote was decided at the trial court level on the pleadings alone without receiving any testimony or documents in an evidentiary hearing (see footnote 1 at page 2). Hirsch was decided in motion practice without an evidentiary hearing (see page 184) and the case itself says (at page 186): Orders compelling arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2–3(a); GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587, 17 A.3d 177 (2011). We review those legal determinations de novo. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.”). The decision in Frummer was similarly qualified and also relied upon interpretation of written instruments whose execution was undisputed that was resolved in motion practice without any mention of an evidentiary hearing. The Court in Frummer said at page 13: We review the denial of a request for arbitration de novo. See Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560, 572-73, 925 A.2d 22 (App.Div. 2007). &quot;A `trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'&quot; Id. at 573, 925 A.2d 22 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)). See also this case stating that: The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). Again, however, I would question whether this holding is dicta because it involves the interpretation of written instruments whose authenticity is in doubt, and not, for example, a dispute over whether the person who signed the documents is the same person who is a party to this litigation and not someone else with a very similar name that was resolved in an evidentiary hearing.
What exactly would a prosecutor charge? State? Federal? It depends on whether it is a state or federal prosecutor. It appears that the president has at least flirted with violating both federal and state law, in which case he may be charged by both the federal and state prosecutors, each one laying charges under the relevant body of law. Would Trump be vulnerable to Federal prosecution of the phone call after he leaves office? Yes, if the facts support such a prosecution. It's not clear to me that the conversation constituted an unambiguous violation of the federal statute, but I have no knowledge of any precedent that might inform such a determination.
Websites are not ships that can choose a flag of convenience to govern which country's laws govern them. Generally speaking an analysis of which jurisdiction's law applies (which is strictly speaking a "choice of law" question as much as it is a jurisdiction question) isn't undertaken on a website by website, or business by business basis. Instead, jurisdiction and choice of law are evaluated on a claim by claim basis. The owners of a website may be subject to some claims in India, to some in Bhutan, and to others in the United States, depending upon the claim. Without knowing who is trying to sue for what, you can't know. Generally speaking, a business that operates in multiple jurisdictions, like a website, will be subject to the laws of all of the jurisdictions in which it does business in regard to claims with a connection to those jurisdictions. Of course, as a practical matter, only claims that can be enforced against the owners of the website are relevant, which usually means that only claims brought where the owners reside or own assets are relevant. If the website owners own property or have amounts payable to them in India, there is a very good chance that India can, as a practical matter, assert jurisdiction over them. And, it is likely, as a practical matter, that Saudi Arabia or China would not be able to assert jurisdiction over them in a meaningful way. The fact that businesses can be conducted through legal entities further complicates the analysis. But, at any rate, the place to begin is to realize that the question "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall?" is basically a category error. You need to ask "Under which country's jurisdiction does a website fall when it is sued or prosecuted for X kind of matter by someone who lives in Y?" So, really, this one question is actually dozens or hundreds of questions that each have to be analyzed individually.
Most prosecuting attorney positions in a District Attorney, or State Attorney General's office are full time salaries positions that prohibit individuals holding those positions from having any other legal employment. They are also, often, conceptually a division of state government, even if the DA is locally elected. So, any criminal defense engagement in the same state court system would also be a conflict of interest, and the reality of joint task forces discussed below would also make almost any federal case criminal defense engagement in the same state a conflict of interest in most cases because state prosecutors would gain confidential information about pending federal criminal prosecutions (and vice versa). In theory, a criminal defense engagement in the next state over, for example, say, in Gary, Indiana for a prosecutor employed in Chicago, Illinois, would not be a conflict of interest, but it would still be prohibited in most cases because the prosecutor is a full time salaried employee whose full efforts are required to be devote to that position. (In practice, de minimis civil transactional work for the assistance of friends and family members, even for a small fee, or representation of such persons in small civil lawsuits would probably be tolerated, however, and maybe even a defense of a civil ordinance violation like a traffic ticket brought by a separate local government as discussed below, for a friend or family member for free, might be tolerated.) Local governments such as cities, towns, and counties, however, sometime have an office separate from the DA's office or State Attorney General's office often called a city attorney, town attorney, or county attorney, who works part-time on a contract basis for that government and has limited authority to prosecution violations of that local government's own ordinances in the name of that governmental entity, rather than on behalf of the People as part of the state government. In those cases, it is generally ethically permissible for the city attorney (for example) to serve as a criminal defense attorney in cases outside that city that do not otherwise pose a conflict of interest from having been adverse to various criminal defendants in the city attorney role. But there might be a conflict of interest, if, for example, there was a joint task force of the city attorney, the local DA, and the federal assistant U.S. attorney to prosecute people in a coordinated fashion on federal, state and local charges of various kinds, in connection with a rash of gun violence. And, if one of the city attorney's clients were arrested for an ordinance violation in the city, a non-conflicted counsel would have to be retained by the city for that case. Often, in those cases, however, even though it is not a prohibited conflict of interest, the lawyers involved would view a criminal defense representation as a &quot;business development conflict&quot; that would risk non-renewal of the city/town/county attorney position if undertaken. Incidentally, government attorneys, unlike almost all other government employees, are usually employees at will, as a matter of legal professional ethics, unlike almost all other fixed term contract or civil service employees, even if they have other contractual or civil service employee rights.
Jurisdiction is a complex topic, and any detailed answer is going to depend on the national law of the states in question. However, there are two general principles to bear in mind: Jurisdiction is rarely exclusive; it is possible to be subject to civil or criminal jurisdiction in any state where you do business; and Jurisdiction can (usually) be accepted or waived by contract. This is the practical answer to your question: almost every contract contains a clause saying something like: "The Parties agree that the law of Norway applies to all matters arising under this agreement and agree that all lawsuits concerning the subject matter of this agreement shall be brought exclusively in the Norwegian Super Deluxe Court for the district of Oslo. The parties waive, to the extent possible under the relevant law, all rights to litigate matters related to this Agreement in any other court." These choice-of-forum provisions are not 100% enforceable--and, again, a lot is going to depend on the law of the forum you're disclaiming--but they often are, in both common law and civil law jurisdictions.