University prohibits professors from testifying Context: ABC news has published: University of Florida Prohibits Professors from Testifying The University of Florida is a State College (not a private college) and has indicated the University is a &quot;state actor&quot;: “UF will deny its employees’ requests to engage in outside activities when it determines the activities are adverse to its interests. As UF is a state actor, litigation against the state is adverse to UF’s interests,&quot; according to an email from an assistant vice president at the university to McDonald that was filed with the court documents. The University contends: In its statement, the University of Florida said the decision not to let the professors perform outside paid work wasn’t denying them their First Amendment rights or academic freedom. If indeed the University is an extension of the state of Florida, let us assume that criminal prosecution is off the table and that professors face some form of University administrative penalty (in all likeliness being fired, demotion, or similar pressure). In the absence of all the details: Assume that there is no contractual employment constraint that professors have signed that would support the University's reasoning. Questions In responses, please keep in mind IANAL. From the professor's viewpoint: What law is violated or what right is abridged? From the university's standpoint: What law are they invoking to selectively prevent professors from testifying? Do the states (not just Florida) have the authority to silence citizens in court settings? Is there a standard, which the University must meet in order to establish the claim that: Testimony challenging voting restriction rights is “adverse to the university’s interests as a state of Florida institution.&quot;? Although the said 3 professors are paid as subject matter experts, assume that they are willing to testify without compensation. OBSERVATIONS: Kaya3 noted and I sensed: &quot;As UF is a state actor, litigation against the state is adverse to UF’s interests&quot; - this seems to take the position that suing the state cannot advance the state's interests, i.e. that the state always accurately encodes its own interests in its own legislation. I wonder if the author of this statement consulted any political science experts. I would think that a clever attorney could make a similar argument that it is in the interest of the state that any and all arguments regarding voting rights are heard in a court of law.
It’s important to bear in mind that there is a difference between expert witnesses and witnesses of fact: expert witnesses must consent to testify (with or without payment), witnesses of fact can be compelled to testify. It would be 100% illegal for an employer or anyone else to attempt to prevent a witness of fact from testifying under a subpoena. For an expert witness, the person must agree to be an expert and an employer might lawfully and reasonably prohibit them doing so. They might prohibit expert witness work in general as distracting from their core business or they might prohibit it in certain cases where they feel association might damage their brand. Such a prohibition might reasonably extend to the employee moonlighting as an expert witness on their own time. However, such a restriction can’t be applied post-hoc. Once a person has agreed to be an expert they are now an officer of the court and can be compelled to testify. What is a reasonable restriction on an employee’s activities depends on the employment contract, the nature of the employer’s business and the employee’s role. University professors are usually guaranteed academic freedom - the ability to write and say whatever they like within their field irrespective of if it is controversial or offensive. This is often a part of a collective bargaining agreement and/or written into individual contracts. Expert testimony within their field (and they couldn’t be experts outside their field) would fall within this. Further, when the employer is a State actor, such a prohibition might infringe the employee’s first amendment rights. Now, these rights are not unfettered - the FBI can prohibit their agents from discussing cases and the Department of State can prohibit its employees from disclosing diplomatic negotiations. However, such restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny, the government must prove that the law or policy is necessary to achieve a &quot;compelling state interest&quot; and is “narrowly tailored”. Restricting opinion on the Constitutionality or otherwise of a particular law doesn’t seem to have either a &quot;compelling state interest&quot; or be “narrowly tailored.” Personally, I think the University is on a hiding to nothing.
According to Florida law 454.23: Any person not licensed or otherwise authorized to practice law in this state who practices law in this state or holds himself or herself out to the public as qualified to practice law in this state, or who willfully pretends to be, or willfully takes or uses any name, title, addition, or description implying that he or she is qualified, or recognized by law as qualified, to practice law in this state, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. What you propose therefore seems to be a felony. And according to a 2015 survey from the American Bar Association, Florida had the highest budget in the nation for prosecuting unauthorized practice of law - $1.8 million. So this seems like a very bad idea.
I suspect that the statute in question may be Section 11-104(1)(F) of municipal ordinances of the Town of Bloomsburg, PA, a university town (home to Bloomberg University of Pennsylvania, a public college) that purports to have special need for regulation based upon the large number of student rentals in the town and apparently applies primarily to house rentals to students. (If not, the ordinance in question may be modeled on this one, or this one may be modeled on the ordinance in question.) This ordinance imposes the following duties on people who have been granted landlord licenses, which the town requires of most landlords renting to students (a landlord is called the "owner" in the ordinance): The owner shall maintain a current and accurate list of the occupants in each regulated rental unit or dormitory unit which shall include their name, permanent address and permanent telephone number which shall be available to the Town for inspection upon reasonable notice. The owner shall notify the Town of changes in the occupancy within 10 days of the change and shall provide the name of the person who is not longer residing in the premises in the event a person departs and the name, permanent address and permanent telephone number of new occupants in the event a new person is added. On its face, this is probably valid. There is not a constitutional right to keep your own contact information or address, or your tenant's identity. Indeed, very similar requirements are routinely imposed upon operators of hotels and motels. And, I strongly suspect that in Pennsylvania, that towns of any reasonable population have more or less plenary authority to adopt ordinances that aren't specifically prohibited by other state or federal laws or constitutions or the town charter. I do not believe that there are any federal statutes that prohibit a town from imposing such a requirement, barring extraordinary circumstances like a duty to cooperate with national security measures, witness protection programs, or a federal organized crime investigation that don't benefit the average tenant. The kind of privacy policy and privacy disclosure laws in place at the national level apply mostly to health and financial information (and far more in Europe), but not generally to legally mandated disclosures of landlords to local governments. The requirements of a privacy policy don't apply here. The main federal privacy laws and some of the most notable state privacy laws are: The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) which affects websites that knowingly collect information about or targeted at children under the age of 13. Any such websites must post a privacy policy and adhere to enumerated information-sharing restrictions COPPA includes a "safe harbor" provision to promote Industry self-regulation. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires institutions "significantly engaged" in financial activities give "clear, conspicuous, and accurate statements" of their information-sharing practices. The Act also restricts use and sharing of financial information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rules requires notice in writing of the privacy practices of health care services, and this requirement also applies if the health service is electronic. The California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003 – Business and Professions Code sections 22575-22579 requires "any commercial websites or online services that collect personal information on California residents through a web site to conspicuously post a privacy policy on the site". Both Nebraska and Pennsylvania have laws treating misleading statements in privacy policies published on websites as deceptive or fraudulent business practices. But, most of these laws apply only to Internet sharing of information by private firms, and the Nebraska and Pennsylvania laws don't require anyone to actually have a privacy policy. Those laws certainly don't pre-empt local ordinances. There is at least one state law that should supply an exemption to this statute in Pennsylvania pertaining to confidentiality for domestic violence victims that should override contrary town ordinances. Address Confidentiality Program (ACP): Victims can get a legal substitute address (usually a post office box) to use in place of their physical address; this address can be used whenever an address is required by public agencies. First class mail sent to the substitute address is forwarded to the victim's actual address. Probably the most fruitful means by which an ordinance like this one could be challenged would be to argue that the true intent of the ordinances when adopted or as it has been subsequently applied, is to use it for a purpose that the town is not allowed to engage in, such as enforcing immigration laws, suppressing voting rights, imposing a de facto poll tax, or engaging in discrimination against a protected class in violation of state and federal fair housing laws. College students, however, the expressly stated and plausible target of the ordinance, are not generally a protected class under fair housing legislation. There are precedents upholding zoning regulations discriminating against households of "Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals" aimed at students and other kind of populations whom municipal busybodies often find to be undesirable against federal constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) and Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). California's courts have been more hostile to this kind of legislation. See, e.g. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 125 (Cal. 1980) (an op-ed arguing that this was wrongly decided in the L.A. Times in 1990 is here), but that isn't very helpful in Pennsylvania, and California rather than Pennsylvania is the outlier nationally on this kind of issue. The general issue over free association and privacy rights in connection with housing and unrelated individuals is discussed in an up to date manner in a 2016 Florida Law Review article. Proving an improper purpose in an as applied or legislative intent based challenge to a facially neutral statute is very, very difficult in all but the most blatant cases (e.g. when town council members openly proclaim their improper purpose is that true purpose of the law). No doubt recognizing the possibility of such a challenge to the ordinance, this particular ordinance has a particularly lengthy and detailed legislative declaration regarding its purpose that no doubt is an effort to take a position that it has a proper purpose in the event of future litigation. This states: It is the purpose of this Part and the policy of the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg, in order to protect and promote the public health, safety and welfare of its citizens, to establish rights and obligations of owners and occupants relating to the rental of certain dwelling units and dormitory units in the Town of Bloomsburg and to encourage owners and occupants to maintain and improve the quality of rental housing within the community. It is also the policy of the Town that owners, managers and occupants share responsibilities to obey the various codes adopted to protect and promote public health, safety and welfare. As means to those ends, this Part provides for a system of inspections, issuance and renewal of occupancy licenses and sets penalties for violations. This Part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its purposes and policies. In considering the adoption of this Part, the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings: A. While the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg acknowledges the significant contribution that Bloomsburg University, its students, faculty and staff makes to the culture and economy of the Town of Bloomsburg, in recent years, adverse effects of student housing on residential neighborhoods have increased and there has been an increase in destructive student behavior that threatens the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg. B. Accordingly, the Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg makes the following findings relating to student housing and its effect on the residential neighborhoods of the Town of Bloomsburg and the effect of student lifestyles on the health, safety and welfare of the student citizens and non-student citizens of the Town of Bloomsburg: (1) When compared to other unrelated cohabitating individuals and traditional families, groups of students have different hours, work and social habits and frequently cause noise, disturbances and problems in residential neighborhoods. (2) There is a greater incidence of violations of various codes of the Town at residential properties where owners rent such property to students. (3) There is a greater incidence of problems with the maintenance and upkeep of residential properties where owners rent such property to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (4) There is a greater incidence of disturbances which adversely affect the peace and quiet of the neighborhood at residential properties where owners rent to students than at owner-occupied residential properties, family-occupied residential rental properties or residential properties that are occupied by unrelated persons who are not students. (5) A concentration of student homes changes the character of a neighborhood from one with traditional family values to one that cannot maintain those and approximately 90% of the Town's student homes are concentrated in two areas of the Town which displaces middle and lower income housing by absorbing housing units and rendering the remaining units less desirable for more traditional residential use. (6) Since 1994, nine students have died as a result of fires in houses occupied by students; two students have died of alcohol overdose; one student has died as a result of exposure when he fell from a porch at a student party. (7) Since 1997, 155 reports of disruptive conduct under the Town's Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance involving student behavior have been filed. (8) Since 1996, 73 prosecutions for unlawfully occupying premises while smoke or fire detectors were not operational have been filed against students. (9) Since 1998, 295 prosecutions for underage drinking have been filed against students and 11 prosecutions were filed against non-student residents of the Town of Bloomsburg. (10) Since 1998, 43 student parties have been raided where arrests were made for underage drinking and furnishing alcohol to minors. (11) There are sufficient differences between student housing and nonstudent housing and the behavior of students and non-student residents to justify different regulations for each class of resident. (12) Dwelling units presently being used by three or more unrelated individuals are being modified for occupancy by two students requiring the relocating of bearing walls and the modification of utilities, sanitation facilities, means of ingress and egress and smoke and fire detection systems. (13) Inspections of dwelling units occupied by two students have revealed little or no life protecting equipment in the dwelling units such as smoke and fire alarms and detectors and fire extinguishers, over-loaded electrical services, heating systems needing servicing and the use of supplemental heaters, all of which create a dangerous living environment. (14) There is a significant occurrence of disruptive behavior in dwelling units occupied by less than three unrelated students as compared to dwelling units that are occupied by owners, traditional families or unrelated persons who are not students. (15) Students who remain in the occupancy of the premises for periods of time after they are no longer students contribute to the above-described problems. (16) Because of the demand for student housing in the Town of Bloomsburg, developers have expressed interest in developing properties for use as dormitories where students live in rooms without fixed kitchen facilities. (17) Dormitory type uses are not covered by the Regulated Rental Unit Occupancy Ordinance which applies only to dwelling units. (18) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of providing the same protection and standards for students who reside in dormitories or dwelling units. (19) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg is desirous of imposing the same responsibilities upon owners of dormitory units and dwelling units where students reside. (20) The Town Council of the Town of Bloomsburg finds that Bloomsburg University has sufficient resources and interest to properly manage dormitories owned by it and there is no need to regulate such dormitories. Even though it probably isn't inherently invalid, it is unusual, so it is likely to be challenged if someone can find an angle to do so. And, I suspect that its purposes are not as pure as those formally identified in the text of the ordinance. In conclusion, while I would totally hate to have an ordinance like that one in my town, it isn't obviously invalid and would probably survive a facial challenge in the absence of evidence that is was being applied in an illegally discriminatory manner.
The state has wide discretion on what to require that a school teach to children, particularly in the K-12 grade range. There is little case law where a parent or private school has challenged such requirements. However, for a state to forbid that certain things be taught would probably run into a first amendment problem, because the school has free speech rights. In addition, if the school is a religious one, forbidding teaching its dogmas and views might also impact the free exercise clause. Note that a state need not permit homeschooling at all, and some states do not. When a state requires that a school teach something that it disagrees with, it can often follow a line such as &quot;Many people think X {Standard state supported concept} but we believe Y instead. Then it has taught X, but not endorsed it. Some religious schools have handles the teaching of evolution in this sort of way. If a state mandated teaching matters of opinion as fact, such as &quot;CARTER WAS THE MOST HANDSOME president EVER&quot; there might well be a challenge, and I am not at all sure how it would be resolved.
&quot;Since state level crimes are prosecuted in the state they happen and potential jurors are eligible voters, would this make it impossible for anyone who voted in the election to serve on such a jury as they would obviously prefer their side to win?&quot; No. A conflict of interest is a particularized and personal interest in the case that is different from an interest of a member of the general public or of a voter or of a taxpayer in general. Someone who wouldn't have standing to bring a case will generally not have a conflict of interest for purposes of being a juror.
When the SCO emails instructors on Student's behalf, then instructors will know that something has gone awry, because students normally email their instructors directly. Well, it looks like something has gone awry between the department and the student already, which is why there is now a case which the SCO is dealing with: We have discussed your case with your department. So, apparently, the SCO thinks that the issue between the student and the department is of such magnitude that any further direct interaction between them would only complicate the case. Simply put, you don't go dancing with someone in the evening if in the morning you testified against them on a witness stand. That said, the SCO is just trying to resolve the issue, and is just asking the student not to make it harder for them. This isn't a breach of confidentiality between the department and the student because the department and the SCO are parts of a single entity — the university. For any uni-related issues, confidentiality can only exist between the student and the uni as a whole, not with individual departments.
In the US, there are a number of non-government organizations which take on such cases, such as the ACLU or the Institute for Justice; individual law firms may also take such cases pro bono. There is no automatic right to free representation in case a constitutional issue is alleged, so if IJ doesn't like your case they won't take it. These are private organizations: there is no general government agency that one can call on, other than the Public Defender's office in case you are charged with a crime and can't afford legal defense. (A constitutional issue may arise in a case that a PD might handle, but you can't e.g. call on the public defender to sue the government for infringing your 2nd Amendment rights.) A state attorney general could file suit against the US government over a constitutional issue, as Washington's AG did in the case of the Trump travel executive order, where the underlying issues were constitutional. An individual might inspire a state AG to take on an issue, but the AG would be representing the interests of the state, broadly, and not individual interests.
In the US, it is not illegal to lie in general. This includes lying about someone: it's not illegal per se to lie about them. What is illegal is slander and libel: lying about someone in a way that hurts their reputation. The defamation doctrine in the US is generally a common-law doctrine (i.e. the rules and limits are based on court decisions, rather than on laws passed by legislatures), although it may differ state-by-state. Depending on the state, some defamation may be criminal; there is no federal criminal defamation. US defamation law is largely defined through its interaction with the First Amendment. While libel is not constitutionally protected, punishment for libel is seriously limited by the need to avoid either punishing protected speech, or chilling potential protected speech (i.e. discouraging people from saying something that would in fact be protected, because they aren't sure whether or not it's protected). Libel in the US only applies to a false statement of fact, or an opinion which implies some false fact. If it can't actually be proven incorrect, it can't be libelous in the US. The question of whether it's a statement of fact doesn't just depend on the literal speech; it includes things like the context, and is a question about what a reasonable person would think. If I were to claim that someone was "literally Hitler," for instance, no reasonable person would think I was seriously claiming that the person was the former leader of Nazi Germany. Now, no reasonable person who is familiar with Twitter would ever assume that the tweet meant Obama literally stood up in front of the UN and said "Please accept this nothingburger in place of a respectable climate plan." So, it only counts as libel if a reasonable person would think it implies some fact. But a reasonable person familiar with Twitter would most likely think Miesel is saying "The president's pollution plan is a pointless piece of political puffery planned to placate principalities and potentates." This is basically a matter of opinion. Even to the extent that it's not a matter of opinion, public figures in the US cannot win a defamation suit unless they show "actual malice:" the speaker must actually know or actually strongly suspect that their statement is false in some material way. It's not enough that a reasonable person would think "this might not be true;" the speaker themselves must doubt the truth of it (they must be reckless, not just negligent). Courts are also extremely deferential to defendants in these cases. While it is technically possible for a public figure to prove defamation, it is exceptionally difficult. If the person didn't know they were falsely attributing the quote, and honesty thought it was correct, they're in the clear. If the quote isn't supposed to be a statement of fact, but it implies false facts, but the speaker honestly thinks those facts are true, they're in the clear. Private figures don't have to meet the actual malice standard to prove defamation. They still need to show that the statement is a statement of fact or something implying false facts; if it's obviously a summary of something they really said, possibly with added editorial comment, they can't prove defamation.