Is there any cognizable ground for criminal prosecution for the surreptitious or unconsensual use of male reproductive cells or “spermjacking”? Bob, the founder of a Silicon Valley business on a high-growth trajectory, meets Alice, and they enter into a romantic relationship. Sure enough, Alice informs Bob that she wants to be the wifey. Bob, without hesitation, replies Alice that, if at all, only on as strict of non-exchange prenup conditions as allowed under the law; Alice agrees, and that Bob, under no circumstances, agree to be a father. Alice agrees, and conveys no intention until any premeditated agreement is reached otherwise on parenthood. Bob and Alice continues in a romantic relationship where sex is, with reasonable caution, prevents impregnation. Soon after and with the above-described prenup, Bob proposes to Alice. Alice, after seeking legal advice, presumably found no loophole on the document, she tries negotiating, but Bob stands his grounds, and informs Alice there is no room for haggle. GRAPHIC, OBSCENE OR LEWD CONTENT WARNING One night, Alice and Bob engages in a consensual sexual intercourse on the previously agreed non-baby, non-fatherhood, non-motherhood and non-impregnation conditions. At the moment when Bob ejaculates on the abdomen of Alice — something done on several occasions between the couple —, Alice, without the express consent or any implied indication of Bob, starts to shovel the reproductive matter of Bob into her genital tract, and continues and substantially finishes against the firm and express objection of Bob. Alice also refuses to use water, soap or any female hygienic products to remove any reproductive matter of Bob; and refuses to use any postcoital contraception and so she remains with Bob’s continued objection to the potential fertilization and request that Alice prevents or ceases impregnation. END OF GRAPHIC OR OTHERWISE DISTURBING CONTENT [Alice have obtained the reproductive matter of Bob without Bob’s consent and against his objection] Alice becomes pregnant, and Bob a father. What crime or crimes did Alice commit; presume Alice premeditatedly obtained the reproductive matter of Bob on the premise she would not use it for a consensually prohibited purpose?
There is no cognizable grounds for a criminal prosecution in those circumstances. There are also no cognizable grounds for Bob to deny paternity, or to bring a civil action against Alice. Bob will be obligated to pay child support and to have all of the responsibilities of an unmarried co-parent with Alice.
In US law, there was, as far as the question indicates, no probable cause to search her phone at all, Therefore (unless there is some cause not mentioned in the question), any such search is illegal, and any evidence found in such a search, or that is found as an indirect result of such a search (pointers toward it are found in the search, and followed) would not be admissible in any criminal case against Alice. In the case of Bob, if his friends and family approach the police or other authority with a vague suspicion that Bob might be involved in the creation of illegal content That will probably not constitute probable cause for an arrest of Bob or a search warrant for his phone. Unless the accusation does prove to constitute probable cause, any evidence found during such a search would not be admissible against Bob in a criminal case. In practice, most US police would not undertake either search without better evidence than is described in the question. But some police will overstep the lines, which is what the US exclusionary rule is for. Legal procedure does not as far as I know make a distinction between "exploratory" and "confirmatory" evidence. Instead, evidence is either admissible or not. The rules for when evidence is admissible are quite complex, and vary by jurisdiction. Some of them are more traditional than logical, and some of them are addressed to particular problems that have arisen in particular circumstances. But the US Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches, and the requirement of probable cause before search or arrest warrants are issued, serves some of the same purpose. Other countries have different rules, but many of them restrict the authorities to some extent from making arbitrary searches with no initial evidence. Response to the Revised Question As the question has been edited, there seems to be fairly clear probable cause to search Alice's phone, and if clear evidence of "illegal pornographic content" presumably actually child pornography, as no other kind is illegal simply to posses) is found, she can be brought to trial and perhaps convicted. The mere "suspicion" of Alice's "friends and relatives" would add little and mi8ght well not even be admissible. The facts, if any, on which those suspicions are based might be admissible, one cannot tell from the summary in the question. The case against Bob, however, remains weak. Indeed there still seems to be no probable cause either to arrest Bob nor to se3arch his phone, and the results of any search that was done would not be admissible. Probably none would be done without more evidence. The OP wrote: Thus, although the situation looks grim for both, since the evidence against Bob is confirmatory, it might be considered stronger. Not so, the case against Bob is weaker, indeed so weak that an arrest would be unlikely, and if one were made, the case would likely be dismissed before going to trial, assuming no more evidence than was included inn the question. The evidence prior to the search seems to consist only of vague suspicion not supported by any actual evidence, and so there is nothing to confirm, and no valid search would occur. That suspicion of Bob came before the search, and the search is thus "confirmatory" is not relevant. The question is, what evidence against each defendant is admissible, and does the totality of the admissible evidence amount to "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" no matter what order it was discovered in, or what idea was in the minds of the investigators, provided that they were acting lawfully so that their findings are admissible.
You may be mistaken about the purpose of the Miller test. If some content is obscene according to the Miller test, then it does not receive First Amendment protection, and could be prohibited from distribution by the government. However, it says nothing about the contractual obligations that two parties can agree to. To the extent that the obligations themselves are objectionable this analysis would fall under the doctrines of unconscionability and public policy.
Does this practice contravene any state statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? Generally not. States could adopt a statute that says otherwise, but I'm not aware of states that do. States often have regulations limiting police use of biometric data for general, non-probable cause based searches for criminal suspects. For example, many states don't make fingerprints obtained for professional licensing background checks available for searched by law enforcement without a warrant and probable cause. I suspect that states may start to do so with rape kit DNA, but it hasn't previously been identified as an issue, so there aren't statutes that prohibit this in most cases (e.g. victim's rights bills have not thought to address the issue). The reason for concern that could lead to future statutes is two fold. First, including rape kit DNA in searches discourages people from reporting crimes because it might put them at a disadvantage in an unrelated criminal proceeding. Second, the risk of false positives is vastly higher in a random search of biometric data from people with no articulated connection to the crime than it is when isolated individual suspects who there is probable cause to believe committed a crime are investigated. The chance of a false positive for someone in a database with millions of people is non-negligible even if the risk of a false positive in any one isolated comparison is tiny. Even a 1 in 10,000,000 chance of a false positive in a database of 40 million people will routinely produce false positives in random searches. And, while DNA evidence is very accurate, partial forensic DNA samples aren't absolutely incapable of producing false matches to nearly the same extent as a comparison of two complete whole genome samples. So, states may adopt such statutes in the future now that the issue is in the spotlight. contravene any federal statute(s) or rule(s) of evidence? No. violate any state constitutions or the US constitution? No. At least under current jurisprudence. The relevant provisions are vague legal standards that are applied with great discretion by courts. Evolving understandings of the situation could change that view in the future. Footnote: Does doctor-patient privilege or HIPPA control? There is a doctor-patient privilege recognized in every U.S. state and in the federal courts. Forensic DNA obtained from a rape kit from a potential suspect isn't protected by the privilege since the suspect isn't a patient of the medical provider in that medical procedure. There is an arguable case that the rape victim is a patient of the medical provider who gathers the DNA, including the rape victim's DNA for the rape kit, and that the patient has not waived the doctor-patient privilege merely by permitting the medical professional to use the rape victim's DNA profile to distinguish between sample material in the rape kit that is her own from material from a suspect. Moreover, such a waiver of doctor-patient privilege would probably not be legally valid unless the rape victim provided informed consent to that release. The rape victim might also have federal HIPPA protections for the privacy of her DNA profile collected as part of her medical records under a similar theory. Mostly, this hinges on how the relationship of the rape victim to the person administering the rape kit is characterized, and in particular, if gathering evidence in a rape kit is &quot;medical treatment&quot; that is privileged. To the best of my knowledge, there is no case law interpreting either the doctor-patient privilege or HIPPA in a rape kit DNA fact pattern. If it is considered to be a doctor-patient relationship for medical treatment within the meaning of the evidentiary privilege and HIPPA, and the DNA was shared on a database which law enforcement has access to without a warrant without the victim's informed consent, this evidence and all &quot;fruit of the poisonous tree&quot; derived from it, could probably be suppressed in a criminal proceeding against the rape victim, even if the evidence conclusively linked the rape victim to the crime. Under the circumstances, and given the policy considerations and the lack of other controlling law, this would be an attractive interpretation of the existing law for a court to adopt. If evidence completely independent of the blind database match provided probable cause that the rape victim committed a crime, and the crime was one in which there was forensic DNA evidence, law enforcement could probably get a search warrant to take a legally untainted DNA sample from the rape victim to compare to the forensically collected DNA evidence, however, just as it could with any other suspect.
No Those things do not constitute &quot;aiding or abetting&quot;, nor does the Texas law define them as such. The Actual law Sec. 171.208 of the law known as Texas SB 8 reads in relevant part: (a) Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who: (a) (1) performs or induces an abortion in violation of this chapter; (a) (2) knowingly engages in conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion, including paying for or reimbursing the costs of an abortion through insurance or otherwise, if the abortion is performed or induced in violation of this chapter, regardless of whether the person knew or should have known that the abortion would be performed or induced in violation of this chapter; or (a) (3) intends to engage in the conduct described by Subdivision (1) or (2). Interpretation If the actions described in the question are covered by this law, it could only be if the fall under the category of: conduct that aids or abets the performance or inducement of an abortion which means that the definition of &quot;aids or abets&quot; is crucial. There is no definition given of this phrase in SB 8 except what is provided in 171.208(a)(2). Therefore &quot;aids or abets&quot; must be taken to have its ordinary legal or general meaning, modified only by the provision that &quot;whether the person knew or should have known&quot; is not relevant to this law. The LII page on &quot;Aid and Abet&quot;&quot; reads: To assist someone in committing or encourage someone to commit a crime. Generally, an aider and abettor is criminally liable to the same extent as the principal. Also called &quot;aid or abet&quot; and &quot;counsel and procure.&quot; The entry on &quot;Aid and Abet&quot; in the Legal Dictionary section of The Free Dictionary reads: To assist another in the commission of a crime by words or conduct. The person who aids and abets participates in the commission of a crime by performing some Overt Act or by giving advice or encouragement. He or she must share the criminal intent of the person who actually commits the crime, but it is not necessary for the aider and abettor to be physically present at the scene of the crime. An aider and abettor is a party to a crime and may be criminally liable as a principal, an Accessory before the fact, or an accessory after the fact. The definition from the Macmillan Dictionary reads: to help someone to commit a crime The definition given by USLegal reads: To aid and abet means to assist another person in the commission of a crime by words or conduct actively, knowingly, and intentionally. In a criminal offense, a person who aids and abets in a crime, participates in the commission of the crime by performing some overt act or by giving advice or encouragement. The person should be sharing the criminal intent of the person who actually commits the crime. However, it is not necessary for the aider and abettor to be physically present at the scene of the crime, or take part in the actual criminal offense ... The definition given by The Phrase Finder reads: To help and encourage, usually in the commission of a crime or anti-social act. All of these definitions include the idea of one who helps, encourages, or assists in the commission of a criminal or wrongful act. Most of them include that this help must be given knowing that the act is criminal. I do not think that one could rationally or legally say that the provision of utility services, general infrastructure, or medical equipment constitutes &quot;aiding or abetting&quot; the conduct prohibited by Sec. 171.208. Such services or support are not provided specifically to help with the acts prohibited. If providing utility services constitute &quot;aiding or abetting&quot; then utility companies could be charged as accessories to any and every crime that does not take place in a dark, unheated, unplumbed building, or in the outdoors. Insider trading, for example often takes place in the criminal's own office, but no one charges the utility company that provides power to such an office as accomplice to the crime. I think this question shows a misunderstanding of what &quot;aid or abet&quot; means. it does not refer to any service or equipment that a criminal may find helpful, but only to acts specifically designed to help in the criminal act, and usually to acts committed knowing that they are aiding a crime. Nothing in SB 8 changes this. There may be problems with SB 8, but the possibility of charging utility companies, or providers of medical equipment as accessories is not one of them.
You seem to have put a lot of thought into this - which is good. However, the short answer is: There is no legal solution. To address your points: And legally, my future wife has the right to divorce me even if I did nothing wrong (no-fault). Yes (at least in most jurisdictions). And then, according to the US Census Bureau [1], mothers usually get primary custody (unless she is on drugs or abusive, which she isn't). And according to the Indiana Parenting Guidelines [2], babies only get one night per week with the non-custodial parent. And even as a teenager, only alternating weekends. Here, it depends. What you describe is indeed what happens often, but not always. Rules vary a lot, and change, but there is an increasing trend to have joint custody in case of a divorce. The details vary, but joint custody can extend to joint physical custody or shared parenting, where both parents take turns looking after the child. This is possible in the United States. In practice, in case of separation the parents will have to work out a parenting plan - ideally together, or in court if needs be. What the result is will depend on circumstances, and on the opinion of the court what is in the children's best interest. This may or may not mean joint physical custody. Child support payments are based on custody, so I would need to pay her child support. And since she always planned on her husband financially supporting her, then I would need to pay her alimony too. And because of imputed income, I couldn't afford to take a lower-paying job with more flexibility. Again, this depends. For example, with joint physical custody, there may be only small or no child support payments if both parents care for the children about equal time. And even if child support is due, there may be no alimony payments if the mother can work (even if she chooses not to). Again, a lot depends on the specific case and jurisdiction. Also, while it is not possible to reduce child support in a pre-nup (because theses payments belong to the child), you can (to some extent) limit alimony payments in a pre-nup. Is there any way out of this situation? How can I ensure, starting now before my children are born, that their primary caregiver is me? Here we are leaving legal territory. The short answer is: There is no way to ensure this, certainly not using legal means. The only good approach is to get to know your partner first, and make sure you have similar views on how to approach parenting. If she wants to be a stay-at-home mom, and you want to share both work and parenting (such as in a shared earning/shared parenting marriage) then you need to think (and speak) about how to reconcile these views. You may find that you are just not compatible on that point. Then take appropriate consequences. To put it plainly: In my opinion, if you do not trust your partner to respect your wishes on parenting together, she is probably not the right person for you to have children with.
Does any American state have a statute under which Joanne would be liable for her son's death? Probably not. None of the mother's conduct seems like a basis for a homicide prosecution. Suicide is only prosecuted, in states that allow it to be prosecuted at all, for conduct with a calculated purpose to cause a suicide, or encouragement of someone to commit suicide. These facts don't show that. There is no intent to cause suicide and there is no encouragement of the son to commit suicide by on the mother. A survey of selected laws on point by the Connecticut Legislative Research Service can be found here. The case law and related legal theory is reviewed and analyzed in this law review article with the following abstract: In 2017, a Massachusetts court convicted Michelle Carter of manslaughter for encouraging the suicide of Conrad Roy by text message, but imposed a sentence of only fifteen months. The conviction was unprecedented in imposing homicide liability for verbal encouragement of apparently voluntary suicide. Yet if Carter killed, her purpose that Roy die arguably merited liability for murder and a much longer sentence. This Article argues that our ambivalence about whether and how much to punish Carter reflects suicide’s dual character as both a harm to be prevented and a choice to be respected. As such, the Carter case requires us to choose between competing conceptions of criminal law, one utilitarian and one libertarian. A utilitarian criminal law seeks to punish inciting suicide to reduce harm. A libertarian criminal law, on the other hand, justifies voluntary suicide as an exercise of liberty, and incitement of suicide as valuable speech. Utilitarian values are implicit in the foreseeability standards prevailing in the law of causation, but libertarian values are implicit in the reluctance of prosecutors to seek, and legislatures to define, homicide liability for assisting suicide. The prevalence of statutes punishing assisting—but not encouraging—suicide as a nonhomicide offense reflects a compromise between these values. These statutes are best interpreted as imposing accomplice liability for conduct left unpunished for two antithetical reasons: it is justified in so far as the suicide is autonomous and excused in so far as the suicide is involuntary. This explains why aiding suicide is punished, but less severely than homicide. Yet even these statutes would not punish Carter’s conduct of encouragement alone. Her conviction although seemingly required by prevailing causation doctrine, is unprecedented. Guyora Binder and Luis Chiesa, &quot;The Puzzle of Inciting Suicide&quot; 56 American Criminal Law Review 65 (2019). In any jurisdiction, could anyone but Joanne, in light of the aforementioned circumstances, face liability for Jordan's death? Maybe the bullies could be prosecuted for homicide or some lesser charge like harassment intended to provoke a suicide or something like that. More facts would have to be developed on that point. Maybe teachers have civil liability for negligence, but not criminal liability for not intervening since they didn't intend to cause or encourage the suicide.
canada In Canada, there are the separate offences of: sexual assault (premised on lack of consent, no matter by what means consent is lacking; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20) and administering a stupefying substance. If someone were to use a &quot;substance such as everyday alcohol&quot; (I would reject the premise that this is &quot;benign&quot;) for the purpose of facilitating sexual assault, this would be an offence under s. 246 of the Criminal Code. Section 246 makes it an offence for a person, &quot;with intent to enable or assist himself or another person to commit an indictable offence&quot; to administer or cause any person to take a &quot;stupefying or overpowering drug, matter, or thing.&quot; The Court of Appeal for Ontario has accepted that the element of administering a stupefying thing could be established by oversupply of alcohol. They have said that alcohol is a &quot;stupefying substance&quot; (R. v. Vant, 2015 ONCA 481) and can support a conviction under s. 246. &quot;Date rape&quot; has no legal significance and even criminologically, misframes the circumstances in which people experience sexual assualt. Further, your premise that intimate partner sexual assault &quot;usually happens when someone uses narcotics to drug another into an unconscious state&quot; is not supported by the evidence. While this is a criminological point, rather than a legal point, it is important context for understanding such crimes. This 2005 study estimated that 4.6% of intimate partner sexual assaults were facilitated by surreptitious drug use. These two fact sheets describe the variety of circumstances, completely unrelated to incapacitation by drugs, in which people experience intimate partner sexual assault/violence: Fredericton Sexual Assault Crisis Centre Info Sheet; Centre for Research &amp; Education on Violence Against Women &amp; Children Backgrounder on Intimate Partner Sexual Violence.