Is it more difficult to convict politicians because of juries? Let's say a politician is charged with a crime that is normally punishable by prison. But one or more people on the jury is/are of the same party as that politician and thinks they did nothing wrong or they don't want them to go to prison. That person votes not guilty or asks for jury nullification regardless of if the more nonpartisan jurors agree the person is guilty. In the United States, is such a scenario plausible?
Yes, such a scenario is plausible, and there are some cases where it has probably happened. But since juries do not normally give reasons for their votes, it is hard to establish when it has and when it has not happened, and I have seen no statistics on such occurrences. By the way, &quot;Jury Nullification&quot; is simply when one or more jury members vote in a particular way because of something other than the law and evidence as presented in the trial. Most often the term is used when a jury votes to acquit because they dislike or disapprove of the law involved. For example, in the 1850s a number of people accused of violating the US Fugitive Slave Law by harboring runaway slaves were acquitted, reputedly because juries who disliked the law (quite unpopular in many northern states) no matter what the evidence. Later, during Prohibition, some people charged with possessing or selling alcohol were acquitted, reputedly by juries who disapproved of Prohibition. In both cases, it is hard to get authoritative sources that specific cases were actual instances of jury nullification. Anyway, a juror need not &quot;ask&quot; for jury nullification, that juror just votes to acquit. A jury that votes to acquit (or convict) because of political or personal views about the accused might be said to be &quot;biased&quot; but I am not sure if that would be described as &quot;jury nullification&quot;.
Legally and safely? Have a good and true reason for being excused, and hope the judge accepts it. If being on a jury would somehow cause you legitimate hardship, you may be excused. If you're a felon, and haven't had your rights restored, many courts won't even let you sit on a jury. Don't "pretend" anything, though. If you intentionally deceive the court in order to avoid jury duty -- or, where it's possible, even to get onto a particular jury -- that is illegal in probably every court that has a concept of jury duty.
The US legal system deals with this by punishing you for the crimes of which you are convicted. That is, those where the evidence (whatever it is) convinces a jury that you are guilty beyond reasonable doubt. If there is insufficient evidence, for whatever reason then you would not be convicted. The prosecution can, subject to admissibility, put forward whatever evidence they like in order to convince the jury. This can include a pile of ash that they allege contained convincing and unambiguous evidence of guilt. Of course, if that's all they've got the prosecution would probably be censured by the judge for wasting everybody's time and money, more likely, a prosecutor wouldn't lay charges in the first place. As to punishment for an evidence tampering conviction: you have been convicted of evidence tampering, not drug production so you will be punished for evidence tampering, not drug production. The legislature sets different punishments for these for a reason, possibly a reason known only to them but a reason nevertheless. The judge has discretion to apply anything between the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed. A conviction for evidence tampering in a drug case rather than, say, a jaywalking case, is likely to get a more severe sentence all else being equal.
There is no legal requirement that a jury be composed of people demographically like the defendant (or the plaintiff), there is simply a requirement that the selection process give all kinds of people an equal chance at being empaneled. So being a different race or gender from one of the parties is not prima facie evidence of a biased jury. The statement that "The jury asked a question because some invoices were not attached to a statement and wanted to impeach the victim's testimony" is somewhat puzzling, since Georgia is widely cited as a state where jurors are forbidden to ask questions. Let us suppose though that jurors manage to communicate an interest in knowing a fact, such as "Do you have an invoice for X?", then the judge could decide whether that is a proper question. At that point, it moves from being a jury matter to a legal judge matter, and if the question was itself highly prejudicial, the case could be overturned on appeal. Alternatively, the way in which the question was framed by the jury could be proof of bias, e.g. "Please ask that lying %@!^* defendant to prove her ridiculous story". The defense attorney has entered an objection (if you don't object, you can't appeal), and perhaps if the question was legally improper then the verdict could be set aside. If the attorney failed to move for mistrial (if the question proves blatant bias) then that's the end of the matter, except for a possible action against the attorney. The implied questions about attorney conduct are hard to understand. An attorney may refuse to engage in a futile legal act, but this does not preclude an individual from seeking another attorney to file a motion or even attempting to file a motion on one's own (which is probably a futile act). However, I also assume that the victim did not have her own attorney and that this was a case between two insurance companies about individuals – a third party claim. In this case, the attorney represents the insurance company, not the victim, and has to be responsible to the interests of the insurance company. The attorney thus is obligated to not cost the insurance company a packet of money if there is no realistic chance of getting anything in return. The alternative would have been be to engage (and pay) your (her) own attorney.
Since electors are in fact free to vote for whoever they want (though don't usually deviate from their assignment), the branch of federal government that would be most involved is Congress. A constitutional amendment would be required, to repeal Article II Section 1 Clauses 2 and 4 and the 12th Amendment (i.e. eliminate electors entirely), and substitute a different method. Most of the work would be done by the states, in ratifying the amendment. [Addendum] It is true that it is constitutional to require a pledge of faithfulness (Ray v. Blair 343 U.S. 214). A bit over half of the states have laws requiring 'faithful voting', though the laws have not been enforced. Washington RCW 29A.56.320 may be typical, in that the law simply says "thou shall" with no mechanism for enforcement. Even with strict enforcement such as class X felony penalties, this cannot implement IRV. The number of electors is not proportional to population (there is the "plus 2 for senators" factor), and various other reasons why state-based electors cannot be morphed into an IRV-like system.
The constitutional provision quoted in the question has been interpreted to require that a jury trial be available to a person accused of crime by the US Federal Government. Then accused is free to waive this right, and be tried by a judge only if s/he so chooses. The accuse is also free to waive the right to a trial altogether, and plead guilty (or &quot;no contest&quot; which waives a trail without an admission of guilt). The provision could reasonably be interpreted to require that if there is a trial, it be by jury. But I don't see how it could reasonably be read to require trials in all cases, and forbid guilty pleas.
Yes, this is plausible. To be doctrinally precise, "jeopardy" attaches when the jury is sworn in. Once jeopardy attaches, there can only be a second trial if: The defendant is convicted of a charge that is reversed on appeal or in a collateral attack on the conviction. There is a mistrial that is attributable to the defendant or the defendant's counsel's conduct (e.g. the defendant is observed by the bailiff trying to bribe a juror with cash in exchange for voting to acquit), or is requested by the defendant or his counsel (who has not been "goaded" into doing so by the government). There is a mistrial that is not attributable to the conduct of either the prosecution or the defendant. As explained here: Mistrials are generally not covered by the double jeopardy clause. If a judge dismisses the case or concludes the trial without deciding the facts in the defendant's favor (for example, by dismissing the case on procedural grounds), the case is a mistrial and may normally be retried. Furthermore, if a jury cannot reach a verdict, the judge may declare a mistrial and order a retrial as was addressed in United States v. Josef Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824). When the defendant moves for a mistrial, there is no bar to retrial, even if the prosecutor or judge caused the error that forms the basis of the motion. An exception exists, however, where the prosecutor or judge has acted in bad faith. In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), the Supreme Court held that "only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion."
The closest case to this is Brady v. United States 397 U.S. 742 (1970): We here make no reference to the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty. In Brady' case, there is no claim that the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a charge not justified by the evidence or that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty. In Brady, had he not entered a guilty plea, he would have been risking the death penalty. The court recognized: It may be that Brady, faced with a strong case against him and recognizing that his chances for acquittal were slight, preferred to plead guilty, and thus limit the penalty to life imprisonment, rather than to elect a jury trial which could result in a death penalty. They upheld the plea: Although Brady's plea of guilty may well have been motivated in part by a desire to avoid a possible death penalty, we are convinced that his plea was voluntarily and intelligently made, and we have no reason to doubt that his solemn admission of guilt was truthful. So, even in the case where the risk of a death penalty may have motivated a guilty plea, the plea has been upheld. All of the above is with respect to actions of the prosecution. In any case, the main test is whether the defendant entered a plea voluntarily and intelligently.