Would it be legal for bookmakers to take bets on someone being assassinated? Background: My colleague just told me that he reckons Donald Trump's presidency is most likely to end in assassination. My first thought was: "Why not put money on it then?"; my second thought was "Would that be legal?". From the bookmaker's point of view, taking such a bet would be stupid: if a person stands to win £100,000 from Trump being assassinated, it would give them motivation to pay someone up to that figure to carry out the killing. Further than that, I wonder whether giving someone motivation to kill someone could legally count as inciting someone to murder, which is illegal. Hence why I wonder whether it would be legal for a bookmaker to take such a bet. As I'm from the UK, I'm mainly interested from the UK legal perspective, but any other international perspective is welcome.
In general it is illegal to gamble on life. However, you might not even need to go to a bookmaker: A contract that pays money upon the death of a specific person is known commercially as "life insurance." In order to avoid the moral hazard (or reality) of creating a contract killing market, it has long been illegal to trade life insurance with any person or entity who does not have an "insurable interest" in the insured. (See also: The Insurable Interest Requirement for Life Insurance, by Peter Swisher, who also has a good review of laws and regulations surrounding exceptions to the rule like viaticals and STOLI. Further reading on the subject here.) I don't know if it has been tested, but I think anyone could argue that they would face a significant financial loss if the U.S. President were killed or died in office: the stock markets plunged on JFK's assassination. Therefore, it could be both legal and possible for anyone to buy life insurance on the U.S. President. (Note that, in the U.S., the disputes about third-party life insurance have revolved for generations around the tax benefits associated with insurance premiums and benefits. See corporate-owned life insurance (COLI), a.k.a. "janitor's insurance.")
Specifically, the threatened action is about stalking and implicit threats to his family. I'm not suggesting that there is a lot of merit to the claim, but that is how he is presenting the argument. The question would be where there is an intentional, repeated following of a person for the purpose of harassing the person with express or implied threats of violence or death. The jury would have to decide whether the implicit threat is credible (somebody plans to blow him or his family out of the sky), a decision would probably turn on the number of death threats he receives.
It is legal, though not if the grounds are illegal discrimination (race, religion, etc), which by their (empirically supported – they raised the price) representation is not the case. As a marketing strategy (pick a low number, hope for a bidding frenzy that drives the price up) it is legal, though carries a non-trivial risk. It does not constitute &quot;bait and switch&quot; under any definition of the term, and it is not illegal to engage in a business practice that causes someone to frown, or otherwise disapprove.
In the US, "insider trading" includes both legal and illegal versions. When a corporate employee buys or sells shares of their company, they are insiders and they are trading (there is a requirement to report to the government). The illegal version involves breach of fiduciary duty or confidence. The relevant section of the federal regulations is 17 CFR 240.10b on "Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Contrivances", and you will note that the section does not rely on the term "insider" in the law part, instead it directly characterizes what acts are illegal. Thus it would not matter, from a legal perspective, if someone considers you an insider. It is illegal to trade in securities using a “manipulative, deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance”. This relates to what is commonly known as insider trading via rule 240.10b5-1, by defining as manipulative and deceptive trading on the basis of material nonpublic information about that security or issuer, in breach of a duty of trust or confidence that is owed directly, indirectly, or derivatively, to the issuer of that security or the shareholders of that issuer, or to any other person who is the source of the material nonpublic information (emphasis added to focus on the core requirements). Whether or not you have a "duty of trust or confidence" is determined by common law standards, that is, it depends on how courts have ruled on similar matters. For instance if the CEO of Apple tells you "Our computers explode and it's gonna be on the news tonight, the stock is gonna tank, but it would be illegal for you to act on that information", then it would be illegal, because you are aware that the CEO has a duty to not use that information (thus you "inherit" the duty). This also holds if he doesn't tell you that acting on the information, since it is expected that you know that the CEO of Apple could not legally act on that information (even if in fact you are unaware of the law -- ignorance of the law doesn't get you anywhere good). However, if you are unaware and could not know that the person making the factual disclosure is divulging information that he has a duty to shut up about, then you might not get prosecuted.
The most important rule for an extradition from Germany is this: If the role of the countries were reversed, would the person be convicted in Germany according to German law? You say the link claims that he couldn't be convicted now, because he would have been convicted twice for the same crime. So he wouldn't be convicted in Germany if the roles of the countries were reversed, therefore no extradition. (The next important rule is this: There must be enough evidence that the person would be prosecuted in Germany, not necessarily convicted. You also need to convince the court that the accused will get a fair trial when extradited, that there will be no cruel or unusual punishment, including death sentence, and lastly there is no extradition for small crimes when the extradition plus having to appear in a foreign court can be considered worse punishment than the actual punishment for the crime. All these irrelevant in this case, I think). "Auslieferung unstatthaft" just means "extradition inadmissible" or "extradition illegal". PS. Ludl asked "shouldn't there be some law that if someone cannot be extradited from Germany because of extradition law, they can still be prosecuted in Germany". That would be completely unnecessary. Let's say one US citizen murders another one in Germany, the USA asks for extradition (they wouldn't, because it is a German matter, but they could ask of course), and Germany rightfully refuses. Then since it is a murder on German ground, it will be prosecuted in Germany. It would be absurd to think that a failed extradition request could protect a murderer.
Legally, yes, if you get a license from Blizzard (unlikely, and if so, they'll probably want either money or a portion of your profits). Otherwise, not legally. This is exactly the situation that IP law (e.g. copyright and trademark) was created to address. Blizzard created the game and so they have rights to control and benefit from derivatives there of. There are some exceptions, but prints, buttons, and keychains are not likely to meet the requirements for those.
In the US, in general anyone can claim anything. Others are free to believe or disbelieve the claim. In theory, a person might base their decision to do business with Hilton partly on this particular claim (this is why some software companies start presentations about their new features with a Safe Harbor statement letting the audience know not to base purchasing decisions on unreleased features), and in that case they could argue that Hilton's claim damaged them by causing them to enter into a contract under false pretenses. I doubt such a case would be meritorious, but there could be some contrived situation where the point of whether Hilton owned the hotel when it invented the brownie was actually important.
Yes, for those who 'liked' the business after reading the post, but less likely for those who had already liked the business. Under contract law, the business's post is an offer to share the winnings with anyone who is a friend of the business on Facebook. A promise is enforceable if consideration is provided under a bargain; the consideration can be of nominal value (e.g. the act of 'liking' a page). In the context of a business page, in a time when 'followers' and the like are regarded as valuable from a marketing perspective, it is entirely reasonable to interpret the post as offering an exchange of likes for a chance to win money. The commercial context and involvement of money would cause a court to presume that there was an intention to create a legally-binding contract (Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc (2002) 209 CLR 95; Banque Brussels Lambert SA v Australian National Industries Ltd (1989) 21 NSWLR 502). I am not entirely familiar with how the designation 'Friend' applies to businesses on Facebook. My understanding is that businesses have pages that are different to user pages. Businesses don't have 'friends'. They have people who 'like' the business. However, the word 'Friend' in the post has to be given content and therefore would be read as 'people who are listed as having liked this page'. People who had already liked the page are less likely to be able to enforce the promise to share the winnings, because they didn't do anything. They might be able to argue that they forwent the opportunity to un-like the business and that this forbearance is consideration. However, they would have to show that this was in consideration of the offer to share the winnings. Contract law is based on objective manifestations of agreement, not subjective thoughts (Taylor v Johnson (1983) 151 CLR 422), so it isn't necessary to show that the individual did in fact have the offer in mind when they liked (or didn't un-like) the page. However, it is necessary that the promisee have knowledge of the offer and not be acting out of some completely separate purpose (R v Clarke (1927) 40 CLR 227); therefore if a user had liked the page some time ago and never knew about the offer until after the lottery was won, then they might have a hard time claiming a binding contract. Aside from contract law, the other possible head of liability is equitable estoppel (I mention this particularly for the people who had already 'liked' the business page before the offer was posted). However, equitable estoppel usually requires some element of detrimental reliance. Leaving a pre-existing 'like' on a page in reliance on a promise to share lottery winnings is unlikely to stir a court to find an equitable estoppel, since the detriment is trivial. Contrast Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1988) 164 CLR 387, where the detrimental reliance was knocking down a building and starting to construct a replacement. Equitable remedies are discretionary, so the judge has plenty of leeway to not order compensation. This answer is based on the common law. There is nothing in Texas law which would make the outcome any different to the outcome in any other common law jurisdiction.