How does Equity get lost long before a bankruptcy case is filed? How's Judge David Jones correct? On May 26 2020, Hertz announced bankruptcy and its price dropped even more, from $2.83 to 0.59. Retail Traders Flout Legal Logic by Buying Up Bankrupt Stocks “No one ever loses equity in a bankruptcy case,” U.S. Bankruptcy Judge David Jones said during a status conference in the J.C. Penney case last month. “Equity gets lost long before the case is filed.” Under U.S. bankruptcy law, shareholders are last in line for any kind of payout -- behind the lawyers, lenders, and vendors -- making a recovery for shares unusual. The size and scope of payouts is usually determined by a so-called Chapter 11 plan, which creditors vote on and send to a federal judge for approval. Those plans often leave even high-ranking creditors getting less than they’re owed.
Because a company with positive equity isn't bankrupt Usually. The simple version Equity in accounting terms is a part of the Statement of Financial Position (previously called the Balance Sheet) and represents the value owned by the shareholders. It was called a Balance Sheet because it balances: Assets - Liabilities = Equity A bankrupt company is one that is unable to settle its debts meaning that its Liabilities (what it owes) are greater than its Assets (what it owns). Therefore equity is negative - the equity has been lost before the company files for bankruptcy. Since shareholders have limited liability, they do not have to contribute to pay the company's debts so their shareholding is worthless. Their shareholding can't be worth less than worthless so in that sense David Jones is right “No one ever loses equity in a bankruptcy case, Equity gets lost long before the case is filed.” It is the loss of the equity that caused the bankruptcy. The more complex version The Statement of Financial Position is a point in time measure of the liquidated value of the entity - that is, the value of the company if all assets were sold for their book value and all debts were settled for their book value. This isn't something that can actually happen for all sorts of reasons. A company that gets liquidated will often not realise the full value of its booked assets because these are accounting measures of value rather than sale under the hammer values at a liquidation auction. Further, businesses as going concerns have a different value than their book equity. An ongoing business will make profits (or losses) in the future and the expectation of these needs to be added (or subtracted) from the book equity. This is why a company with negative equity may still be worth operating and, conversely, why one with positive equity maybe should be closed. Also, businesses may have significant off-balance-sheet assets such as valuable IP and branding that was developed in house and therefore don't create bookable transactions. For example, there is no item in the Coca-cola balance sheet that represents the value of the brand. This is clearly an item of value that a) isn't on the balance sheet and b) only has value while someone is making cola and using that branding. Kodak, Blockbuster, Panamerican and Concorde were all once valuable brands that now only have nostalgia value. One final point is that it is quite possible for a business with positive equity to go bankrupt because bankruptcy can be triggered by insolvency. Insolvency is being unable to pay your debts as and when they fall due. An asset rich but cash poor organisation can be insolvent while still having positive equity. For example, a property developer may have a large portfolio of valuable property and owe a relatively small amount to contractors, however, if they can't come up with the cash to pay these debts they are insolvent and this can trigger bankruptcy. Many businesses and individuals may be insolvent and recover from it - they borrow money from a bank (or by delaying payments to creditors) or inject more funds into the business. It is usually only when a business is of borderline profitability that insolvency will push them into bankruptcy.
They recently took me to court (I am now 20) to have me start paying for the bill, under distress I signed paperwork stating that I'd start paying them, however I find this entire situation very aggravating. Short Answer You are almost surely screwed at this point and can't do anything but abide by the settlement that you agreed to when you signed the paperwork. Preface Regarding The Applicable Jurisdiction I am answering based upon the majority rules of law in U.S. states, because there is almost no other country in the world where you could end up in this financial situation due to universal healthcare systems that exist in most countries other than the United States. Also, this isn't an area of law with a great deal of state to state variation, although the law isn't exactly the same in every single U.S. state. The Minority Defense You quite possibly had a minority defense before you signed the paperwork. The minority defense is based upon an inability to give adequate consent to a contract. Whether the minority defense would have worked in this case, however, is a close call, because there are exceptions to the rule that would probably apply in this case. Settlement, Ratification and Duress The legal standard for "duress" in contract law usually means situations where there is literally a gun to your head or they're going to kill your dog or something like that, not the kind of economic pressure or persistent harassing collection efforts that I suspect you are referring to in this case. Of course, if they did steal your dog and threaten to kill it if you didn't sign the paperwork, then you really would have signed it under duress and you should probably both take legal action to repudiate that paperwork (because agreements entered into under duress are generally voidable, rather than void), and you should probably report the incident to the police as a crime. So, anyway, the paperwork you signed is probably enforceable, despite the pressure that they put on you to sign it. Once you sign a settlement agreement as an adult (which is almost surely what you did) you have ratified the agreement made when you were a minor and forfeit any way to fight it. You are stuck with what you agreed to at this point and there is nothing you can do about it short of going bankrupt. I would not recommend going bankrupt over a debts owed to a single medical provider unless that debt is so huge that ruining your credit for seven years and paying a bankruptcy lawyer is worth it to get out of this debt. For most twenty-year-olds facing debts for a few chiropractor treatments this would not make sense. Lesson learned: Talk to a lawyer before you sign paperwork, not afterwards, because once you've signed on the dotted line, there is usually little or nothing that a lawyer can do to help you at that point. Guarantors As a guarantor of the obligation to pay for your care, your mother would no doubt be on the hook in any case, whether or not you settled, and whether or not you went bankrupt. Unless the settlement agreement that you signed says otherwise, they can still attempt to collect the bill from her as well as from you. Of course, as you make payments towards the total balance due, the total balance due goes down. Your mother, as a guarantor, is only obligated to pay the portion of the bills that remain unpaid when they try to collect the debt from her. The Necessaries Exception To The Minority Defense Even though the minority defense might apply in this situation, most states recognize an exception to the minority defense when a purchase of "necessaries" is made by a minor. Bills for medical care would usually count as "necessaries", because you would have had no choice but to buy if you had been an adult anyway, so your lack of consent to pay isn't something that caused you material harm. Honestly, in the medical industry, an agreement in advance to pay a negotiated price is the exception rather than the norm. Often the providers themselves have no real clear idea what their patients are billed for their services, although chiropractors tend to be more informed about the financial arrangements than medical doctors in most cases. Void Contracts v. Voidable Contracts In any case, minority is a defense to a contractual obligation that would ordinarily only make the contract voidable, rather than void. In other words, a minor can repudiate a contract that is voidable on account of minority and successfully get out of it within a reasonable time of becoming an adult (or sooner while you are still a minor through a parent or guardian or next friend), but it is not automatically invalid. There is a good chance that a court would consider a two year delay in trying to repudiate the contractual obligation too long, even if it concluded that the necessaries doctrine did not apply because, for example, the court considered this to be elective, luxury care rather than medically necessary services. Unjust Enrichment Claims Also, in addition to suing for breach of contract, the chiropractor might be able to sue for quantum meruit. This legal theory is not based upon mutual consent the way a contract claim is, although this is sometimes called a "quasi-contract" or "implied contract" claim (it is also sometimes called a "restitution" or "unjust enrichment" claim). As a result, minority is not usually a defense to a quantum meruit claim. Instead, a quantum meruit claim is based upon preventing you from being unjustly enriched, (1) from benefits that you received, (2) that were not unwelcome, (3) from the efforts of someone else who did that work, (4) with a reasonable expectation of being compensated for the work, (5) in situations where there is no binding contract between the parties. (Different lawyers and different courts might break up these elements into more or fewer components, but the gist of the claim would be the same in pretty much any state.) In a quantum meruit case, damages are based upon the fair market value of the services rendered, rather than an agreement of the parties, since there was no mutually agreed price under a contract that they are seeking to enforce. Quantum meruit claims are frequently brought as a backup claim to a claim for breach of contract by failing to pay for services, in cases where the contract claim may be infirm for reasons such as minority.
Check your local law. In Washington, the chapter RCW 63.21 says what you are supposed to do. The first part of the law has apparently been satisfieds: Any person who finds property that is not unlawful to possess, the owner of which is unknown, and who wishes to claim the found property Then you need to get a signed appraisal stating current market value from a qualified person engaged in buying or selling the items, or by a district court judge (I have no idea where district court judges get their qualifications to appraise bricks), then within 7 days, report this to the cief LEO where the stuff was found (and surrender it, if requested). You also have to serve written notice upon that officer stating your to claim the property. The burden now shifts to the government, which must publish notices in a local newspaper at least weakly, for 2 weeks. The notice might be publishable in a no-cost venue, in case the publication cost is greater than the value of the stuff. If the owner appears and establishes ownership, that's the end of the finder's potential interest. If the owner does not show up, the property will be released to the finder once he has paid the government's publishing expenses plus $10, but if the goods are appraised at less than publishing cost, there is no fee. As a finder, you have 30 days after that 60 days to pay required costs, otherwise it goes to the government. There are some exceptions, things not subject to finders-keepers (crab pots, secured vessels, motor vehicles, unclaimed property in the hands of a bailee). If you do not comply with these requirements, you forfeit any right to the property and you are liable to the property owner for the value of the bricks. Under the definition of theft, you have a defense that The property or service was appropriated openly and avowedly under a claim of title made in good faith, even though the claim be untenable since you presumably intend to claim ownership of the bricks under the lost property statute.
If I read this correctly, (and more context would support this, but I don't have time to do research at the moment; I also don't have the book in question, so I'm only basing off of the provided snippet) then it appears two different (higher court) justices making rules, not only to guide their own judgements before them, but for reference for lower court justices to base their rulings against. Note that these two cases appear to have taken place about 3 decades apart, and in two different countries, albeit with related legal codes. The Purple is "identical" to the Green, because their wording is near enough identical between the two passages. I don't think "dumbness" or lack of distinguishably is implied. Rather McRae's rule is Conditions Green AND (logical "and") Condition Red, while the British rule is just Condition Green. The orange text suggests that, under the rule in Associated Japanese Bank Ltd v Credit du Nord SA, Condition Red need NOT be shown. I.e., you don't need to show that a party is responsible for convincing the other party of an unreasonable falsehood, to prevent the first party from using the doctrine of "common mistake". It also suggests that the rule from McRae does impose Condition Red. Essentially, the text is describing two different (non-exhaustive) tests for determining when the doctrine of "common mistake" can be invoked.
There needs to be some reduction to money or specific property. This has to happen either by some after the fact evaluation of the harm caused, or by an explicit or implicit liquidated damages provision in the agreement (e.g. if X doesn't happen, they entire property is forfeited, which implicitly imposes a liquidated damages amount equal to the value of the property in the event of a default). If the seizure of the entire collateral for a default wouldn't be a valid liquidated damages provision, then the deed of trust is invalid and wouldn't be enforced as written. I can't say that I have, in twenty-five years and in additional reading of case law and news reports, ever seen a deed of trust securing an obligation that isn't monetary or capable of being reduced to money. For example, if a deed of trust secured an obligation to appear in court, as is common in a bail bond situation, the amount of the deed of trust is reduced to money when the bond is forfeited by the court for failing to appear. Similarly, if a deed of trust secures an obligation to carry out a landscaping contract by mowing the lawns of everyone in a subdivision, the obligation would be reduced to money by determining the costs of having someone else do the job. The first example I found of a California performance deed of trust, while it is not completely obvious on the face of the instrument since it incorporated another contract by reference, likewise refers to obligations that can be reduced to a dollar amount at the time a default occurs, stating: This Deed of Trust is given for the purpose of securing payment and/or performance of the following (the “Secured Obligations”): (i) all present and future obligations of Trustor set forth in this Deed of Trust or in the Resale Restriction Agreement (including without limitation, Trustor’s obligation to convey the Property only to Eligible Purchasers at no more than the Adjusted Resale Price, which is capped at an Affordable Unit Cost (as such terms are defined in the Resale Restriction Agreement); (ii) all additional present and future obligations of Trustor, to Beneficiary under any other agreement or instrument acknowledged by Trustor (whether existing now or in the future) which states that it is or such obligations are, secured by this Deed of Trust; (iii) all modifications, supplements, amendments, renewals, and extensions of any of the foregoing, whether evidenced by new or additional documents; and (iv) reimbursement of all amounts advanced by or on behalf of Beneficiary to protect Beneficiary’s interests under this Deed of Trust. The statutory process for a deed of trust foreclosure in every state I have ever seen requires the amount of money secured by the deed of trust to be determined and assumes that there is a debt for a sum certain.
It is true that a shareholder who controls a majority of the votes can be quite powerful indeed. This is a somewhat murky area of the law, but in many cases, a majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty to do what is best for the corporation as a whole (not just the majority shareholder, but all shareholders), an obligation that logically parallels the obligation of the board of directors (which controls a corporation with much the same effect as a majority shareholder). In Delaware, where most large corporations are incorporated, a major shareholder or group of shareholders can have less than 50% of the vote can still be considered de facto majority shareholder if they have influence over the rest of the shareholders. Majority shareholders, either de jure or de facto, are required to act only with "entire fairness" to all the shareholders, and courts may invalidate or otherwise grant relief on transactions made by majority shareholders that are not fair to all shareholders. If a majority shareholder takes actions directly, it has the burden of proof in court to show that any actions taken accord with the "entire fairness" standard. A more in-depth discussion of these issues can be found in this article out of the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.
If 'literally 300' attorneys declined your case on the basis of a phone call, without looking into the details, I can see three options: You are unable to communicate the nature of your case clearly. In this posting, you mentioned complaints against a company, a municipality, and a landlord, plus being evicted. Focus on explaining one case. If you think you 'know for a fact' that you have several big payouts coming, there is the first problem. Nobody knows what a jury will decide. An attorney might hesitate to work for a client who does not understand this. Litigation is always a risk. All your cases actually lack merit, a lawyer sees this and you do not. Not knowing the cases, I cannot tell. (And no, you should not explain them in detail on the web. If they do have merit, posting your strategy hurts the cases.) Your state has a vexatious litigant list and you are on it. That would not prevent an attorney from taking your case, but it might make them hesitate.
united-states Are customers who withdraw their profits and lending earnings from FTX during its last days before its bankruptcy liable to clawback from creditors? It seems that some companies and investors, such as Binance, are liable to pay creditors through clawback for FTX collapse as a result of fraud. If the right conditions are met the amounts paid can be clawed back. There are a lot of special rules that apply but the most general is that if you receive money or property to pay an amount owed on a debt within 90 days of the bankruptcy petition being filed without providing substantially contemporaneous and equivalent value at the time that you receive the money, and the amount received is more than you would have received in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, then the amount received may be clawed back into the bankruptcy estate. Usually, in financial transactions, the dollar values in an account in your name are considered to be contractual debts owed by the financial institution to you, rather than &quot;your property&quot;. So paying amount the balance of an account (to the extent it has been at that level for at least 90 days before the filing of the bankruptcy petition) will usually be a preference and give rise to a clawback obligation if the bankruptcy estate choses to enforce that right (in a Chapter 7 that call is made by the bankruptcy trustee, in a Chapter 11 that call is made by the &quot;debtor-in-possession&quot;). If a clawback amount is not returned voluntarily, court action can be taken to recover it. This is what a court has ruled, for example, in one recent crypto bankruptcy case. The lookback period is 1 year rather than 90 days for &quot;insiders&quot;. If the debt is backed by new collateral in this time period, even if not paid, the agreement to provide new collateral can be invalidated (certain additional technical rules apply to this provision). Small amounts (up to $600 for consumer debtors and $5,000 for non-consumer debtors) are disregarded even if the payment would otherwise be a preference subject to being clawed back. To make sure I have fully answered the question: What about profitable customers? Suppose a customer made trading profits and earned interest from lending his cryptocurrencies on FTX. He managed to withdraw his funds just hours before FTX's collapse. Is he liable to for the clawback? Yes. If the conditions described above are met. The logic is that people who pull out money at the last minute due to luck or insider information should not be treated differently than those who do not do so. The relevant section of the bankruptcy code is 11 U.S. Code § 547 (Preferences). It states: (a)In this section— (1)“inventory” means personal property leased or furnished, held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business, including farm products such as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease; (2)“new value” means money or money’s worth in goods, services, or new credit, or release by a transferee of property previously transferred to such transferee in a transaction that is neither void nor voidable by the debtor or the trustee under any applicable law, including proceeds of such property, but does not include an obligation substituted for an existing obligation; (3)“receivable” means right to payment, whether or not such right has been earned by performance; and (4)a debt for a tax is incurred on the day when such tax is last payable without penalty, including any extension. (b)Except as provided in subsections (c), (i), and (j) of this section, the trustee may, based on reasonable due diligence in the circumstances of the case and taking into account a party’s known or reasonably knowable affirmative defenses under subsection (c), avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property— (1)to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2)for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3)made while the debtor was insolvent; (4)made— (A)on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B)between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5)that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if— (A)the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B)the transfer had not been made; and (C)such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title. (c)The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer— (1)to the extent that such transfer was— (A)intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debtor; and (B)in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange; (2)to the extent that such transfer was in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee, and such transfer was— (A)made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; or (B)made according to ordinary business terms; (3)that creates a security interest in property acquired by the debtor— (A)to the extent such security interest secures new value that was— (i)given at or after the signing of a security agreement that contains a description of such property as collateral; (ii)given by or on behalf of the secured party under such agreement; (iii)given to enable the debtor to acquire such property; and (iv)in fact used by the debtor to acquire such property; and (B)that is perfected on or before 30 days after the debtor receives possession of such property; (4)to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor— (A)not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and (B)on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor; (5)that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured by such security interest exceeded the value of all security interests for such debt on the later of— (A) (i)with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (ii)with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B)the date on which new value was first given under the security agreement creating such security interest; (6)that is the fixing of a statutory lien that is not avoidable under section 545 of this title; (7)to the extent such transfer was a bona fide payment of a debt for a domestic support obligation; (8)if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600; or (9)if, in a case filed by a debtor whose debts are not primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $5,000.2 (d)The trustee may avoid a transfer of an interest in property of the debtor transferred to or for the benefit of a surety to secure reimbursement of such a surety that furnished a bond or other obligation to dissolve a judicial lien that would have been avoidable by the trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of such surety under such bond or obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of such property recovered by the trustee or the amount paid to the trustee. (e)(1)For the purposes of this section— (A)a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property, is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and (B)a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the interest of the transferee. (2)For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, a transfer is made— (A)at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 30 days after, such time, except as provided in subsection (c)(3)(B); (B)at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected after such 30 days; or (C)immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such transfer is not perfected at the later of— (i)the commencement of the case; or (ii)30 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee. (3)For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred. (f)For the purposes of this section, the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition. (g)For the purposes of this section, the trustee has the burden of proving the avoidability of a transfer under subsection (b) of this section, and the creditor or party in interest against whom recovery or avoidance is sought has the burden of proving the nonavoidability of a transfer under subsection (c) of this section. (h)The trustee may not avoid a transfer if such transfer was made as a part of an alternative repayment schedule between the debtor and any creditor of the debtor created by an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency. (i)If the trustee avoids under subsection (b) a transfer made between 90 days and 1 year before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor to an entity that is not an insider for the benefit of a creditor that is an insider, such transfer shall be considered to be avoided under this section only with respect to the creditor that is an insider. (j) (1)In this subsection: (A)The term “covered payment of rental arrearages” means a payment of arrearages that— (i)is made in connection with an agreement or arrangement— (I)between the debtor and a lessor to defer or postpone the payment of rent and other periodic charges under a lease of nonresidential real property; and (II)made or entered into on or after March 13, 2020; (ii)does not exceed the amount of rental and other periodic charges agreed to under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I) before March 13, 2020; and (iii)does not include fees, penalties, or interest in an amount greater than the amount of fees, penalties, or interest— (I)scheduled to be paid under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I); or (II)that the debtor would owe if the debtor had made every payment due under the lease of nonresidential real property described in clause (i)(I) on time and in full before March 13, 2020. (B)The term “covered payment of supplier arrearages” means a payment of arrearages that— (i)is made in connection with an agreement or arrangement— (I)between the debtor and a supplier of goods or services to defer or postpone the payment of amounts due under an executory contract for goods or services; and (II)made or entered into on or after March 13, 2020; (ii)does not exceed the amount due under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I) before March 13, 2020; and (iii)does not include fees, penalties, or interest in an amount greater than the amount of fees, penalties, or interest— (I)scheduled to be paid under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I); or (II)that the debtor would owe if the debtor had made every payment due under the executory contract described in clause (i)(I) on time and in full before March 13, 2020. (2)The trustee may not avoid a transfer under this section for— (A)a covered payment of rental arrearages; or (B)a covered payment of supplier arrearages.