&quot;Sentence first, verdict afterwards&quot;? In Alice in Wonderland, the Queen of Hearts said during a trial, &quot;Sentence first, verdict afterwards.&quot; Are there any common law countries where this could be legal? Could the judge say &quot;This is the sentence if the defendant is convicted&quot; before the jury reached a verdict? I don't see how it would be a due process violation, because the defendant has still been convicted by a jury and sentenced by a judge, just in the &quot;wrong&quot; order.
No, but the legislature can (and does) Many jurisdictions have mandatory sentences where there is no judicial discretion in sentencing. In effect, the sentence is known when the charges are laid - if the defendant is found guilty.
What the jury must do A jury must follow the law it is given by a judge. A jury cannot "go rogue" and bring back a verdict on something that has not been charged and/or that the jury has not been told to consider. So, whether a jury has the option of convicting a defendant of a lesser included offense - a crime contained within a more serious crime - depends on the instructions the judge gives. Is it up to the judge and the judge alone? Not necessarily. Typically, judges must issue the lesser included offense instructions to the jury if the lesser included offense is part of the charged offense if there exists significant evidence the defendant only committed that lesser crime. So, only if the evidence supports such instructions. Further, at least in some jurisdictions, a trial judge may not instruct jurors on a lesser included offense if there has been no request to do so by the defendant. There appears to be a disagreement over what, if any, power a prosecutor should have in making such a request. One side would argue that a prosecutor would want to ask for it so that a defendant who is getting off on the larger crime doesn't skate completely free on, for example, a technicality. Another side would argue that prosecutors should not have a say because they are in fact who control which charges are submitted to the grand jury for indictment.
Under U.S. law, double jeopardy prevents you from being charged with the same charge twice, and also from being charged with any offense which is a lesser included offense of the charged offense, or a charge so substantially similar that for constitutional purposes it amounts to the same crime. Basically, the test is whether a prior acquittal would be inconsistent with a new criminal charge. For example, even though there is an additional element of the crime of murdering a postal officer to the crime of murdering someone on federal property, double jeopardy would probably bar a retrial of a murder on federal property case simply because the victim happened to be a postal worker and that element wasn't charged in the original indictment. This is because the acquittal of the first murder charge would almost always imply a jury determination that a murder didn't take place which would be inconsistent with a murder of a postal worker charge. On the other hand, a trial on a murder charge would probably not bar, for example, a trial on a burglary charge (which at common law involved trespassing with an intent to commit a crime), even if the burglary charge arose from the same conduct. This is because an acquittal on a murder charge isn't necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trespass, or with the intent to commit some crime other than the murder for which the defendant was acquitted. But the exact way that the line gets draw is tricky and while what I have described is a good general summary of the cases interpreting the double jeopardy clause, it isn't a perfect one. This issue has been litigated many, many tines over the years, so there are a lot of cases that are squarely on point addressing specific fact patterns in precedents that are binding case law that are not always a perfect fit to the general principles. In these circumstances, the binding case law is going to control, at least until a court with appellate authority over the court whose case established the precedent in question decided to overrule a prior precedent from the lower court, or in the case of U.S. Supreme Court precedents, until the U.S. Supreme Court revisits one of its own prior precedents as wrong decided or wrongly interpreted, which happens now and then, although it is a rare event.
A reasonable hypothetical example of where your clause "C" would be applied: A defendant is written a citation for "spitting on the sidewalk," in violation of a hypothetical Portland city ordinance. In presenting extenuating details, the defendant indicates that the expectoration occurred because she had taken a bite of vended food that was belatedly discovered to have been infested with maggots. The notion of encountering rotted food would clearly not have been contemplated by the definition of the "spitting on the sidewalk" ordinance, where the notion of having a cheekful of chewing tobacco definitely would be.
There are two sides to this question. First, there is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states: Article 15 1 . No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx When signing this treaty, however, the United States of America made a couple of reservations, including this one: I. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following reservations: (...) (4) That because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the penalty in force at the time the offense was committed, the United States does not adhere to the third clause of paragraph 1 of Article 15. (...) http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html (emphasis mine in both cases)
From this website: If the Magistrates/District Judge consider that, due to the seriousness of the offence and any factors relating to the defendant (e.g. previous convictions for assault) that the defendant should be punished with more than 6 months’ imprisonment, they can commit the defendant to the Crown Court for sentence where the greater sentencing powers are available. Or put another way: If the court decides your sentence should be for longer than 6 months, it can pass your case to the Crown Court for sentencing.
No. The Fourteenth Amendment says: nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; The Supreme Court has determined that this clause incorporates much of the Bill of Rights. The logic is mildly tortured, but it's basically that "due process of law" means "due process of a law that is compatible with the fundamental rights of a free society." This logic is known as "substantive due process," because it reads in to "due process of law" requirements about what those laws can do (as opposed to procedural due process, which is about the actual procedures being used). It's pretty settled that the Bill of Rights, after the 14th Amendment, should apply to the states. There's another possible way to get there: the 14th Amendment says "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," which Justice Thomas recently thought meant that the Second Amendment applies to the states in a concurring opinion. But as of now, substantive due process is the standard logic for it. Virtually all of the Bill of Rights is incorporated against the states. There are a couple things which aren't (like juries in lawsuits, and grand juries), but the Establisment Clause is incorporated (see Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1).
Here are the jury instructions. These describe how to evaluate witness testimony, burdens of proof, and the four-factor fair use test, among other things. The jury had to answer yes or no to the following question: Has Google shown by a preponderance of the evidence that its use in Android of the declaring lines of code and their structure, sequence, and organization from Java 2 Standard Edition 1.4 and Java 2 Standard Edition Version 5.0 constitutes a "fair use" under the Copyright Act? They answered yes. Juries do not explain their reasoning (different jurors might even have different reasonings), but the assumption is that they followed the jury instructions to arrive at this conclusion. To be clear, the issue wasn't reimplementation of 37 Java APIs, but a more limited taking, including "the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization".