What is arbitration and mediation? What does it mean to resolve disputes with arbitration and mediation? I understand that they're alternatives to going to court, but how can companies or individuals enforce this with contracts? What I mean is, if it's always a cheaper and faster than going to court, why would someone not want? Also it's my understanding it's unenforceable to have a person not go to court e.g. a term is invalid if it says a party can't go to court, so how can companies like IBM force it's employees to agree to arbitration? Is it to dissuade them from a full process in the sense they have to go to arbitration before going to court?
The first method of dispute resolution is called negotiation. This is a technique where the parties involved follow a process known as talking to each other to see if they can agree on a resolution. What makes this enforceable is a thing called goodwill. If they cannot agree or if there is insufficient goodwill people can (in some circumstances) ask a court to decide. This decision is enforceable by a mechanism known as the law. As an alternative the parties can agree to mediation and/or arbitration; hence the name alternative dispute resolution (ADR). They can either do this after the dispute arises or before by writing it into the contract. In either case a court will enforce the outcome because it is part of the contract. It is also possible for a court to order mediation before it will hear the case; this is particularly true in family law disputes. Mediation is a step up from negotiation where a third party facilitates the negotiation but is not an active participant in it. The mediator's job is to create the conditions where the parties, who may have an acrimonious relationship, can start to talk to one another. Arbitration is carried out according to rules that have legislative force, in Australia this is the Commonwealth Arbitration Act. The arbitrator(s) (usually 1 or 3) hear the evidence of each party and make a decision. Other types of ADR include conciliation and statutory mechanisms like tribunals or adjudicators, usually on an industry basis. The statutory mechanisms may be mandated alternatives or run in parallel to court. What I mean is, if it's always a cheaper and faster than going to court, why would someone not want? Nothing is always cheaper and faster, complex arbitration can approach the cost of complex litigation. Mediation would almost always be cheaper but it is not guaranteed to get a result. Mediation is unlikely to work if the animosity is so great that the parties cannot be in the same room without violence for example. Additionally, these are private methods of resolving a dispute and do not set (or necessarily follow) legal precedents. There may be circumstances where one or more parties when the decision public and binding on other parties; environmental and human rights groups spring to mind. Also, people in disputes do not always act rationally. Also it's my understanding it's unenforceable to have a person not go to court e.g. a term is invalid if it says a party can't go to court, so how can companies like IBM force it's employees to agree to arbitration? True, but they can require them to use ADR first; if the arbitration has been done properly a court would not overturn it. They also can't force anyone to agree to anything; people always have the option of not taking the job.
As a matter of contract law it would not be possible to enforce a requirement to pay legal fees without agreement. You could easily see how this would be problematic: one could just draft letters to hundreds or thousands of people and require them to pay the costs of composing the letter. My understanding is that this is common practice in the United States (see speculative invoicing). However, people are generally free to pay whatever they want to anyone they want. The other side is free to pay the legal costs, they just probably won't. In some common law jurisdictions, the concept of a Calderbank offer may be another reason to write a letter such as this; the settlement offer can be relied upon in later proceedings as an indication as to the costs that would be appropriate to award to the winning party, should the offeree unnecessarily prolong legal proceedings
No The general common law rule is that a lawsuit requires an actual dispute. This is a contrived dispute with no real-world relevance. With apparent (or even actual) authority to act on behalf of A, you assisted B with making copies. The moment you contrived this scheme and set it into motion, you consented on behalf of A to allow B to use the materials. It is like paying someone to slip and &quot;fall&quot; on your sidewalk so they can sue you. There is no actual dispute, and volunti fit non injuria.
It means that if one party breaks the lease and the other party chooses not to enforce their rights in relation to the breach, it doesn't mean that they won't enforce their rights the next time that provision is breached unless they agree that in writing thereby changing the agreement. Which may just be the longest coherent sentence I have ever written.
Let's say that the mediation doesn't succeed to achieve voluntary compliance satisfactory to both sides. What happens next? Under Sec 706(e) it appears that the complainant has to litigate himself in a civil court, and potentially be exempt from any fees and have an appointed attorney. Not really. The EEOC at that point (within a certain time period) either decides to litigate the case itself, or if it chooses not to litigate itself, authorizes the employee to litigate the case at his or her own expense, and if the employee prevails, the remedy awarded by the Court includes what the court determines to be the employees reasonable attorneys' fees. The details of the process and the relevant deadlines are available at the EEOC's website. Basically, if the case isn't resolved in mediation, the employer makes a position statement, the employee responds, the EEOC investigates (using its subpoena power, if necessary) on average for ten months, and the EEOC either prosecutes the case itself, or it issues a "Notice-Of-Right-To-Sue" which allows the private employee to hire a lawyer and sue the employer. How often does it actually happen? The EEOC handles about 90,000 charges per year and wins about $525 million a year in judgments and settlement awards (parallel agencies at the state level handle additional cases in a similar manner). The vast majority of the cases are settled or result in a Notice of Right To Sue letter, with only 100 to 400 lawsuits per year actually filed by the agency resulting in $22 million to $168 million a year of awards in court cases. About 25% of these cases go to trial. The rest settle before trial or are resolved in motion practice before trial (including default judgments, when the employer simply doesn't respond to the lawsuit). Once the EEOC brings a lawsuit, settlement is the most common resolution. So, there are a lot of cases, although there is only about one EEOC claim per 1,000 employees in the workforce subject to EEOC jurisdiction per year. Whether this is a lot of complaints or not many, is really a matter of opinion. Only about one in twenty-five people will ever file an EEOC claim in his or her entire life, although this will vary considerably based upon a person's race, national origin, religion and sex. A non-Hispanic white Christian male of European descent is much less likely to file an EEOC claim during his lifetime than someone who does not fit that description. Realistically, a majority of cases that aren't abandoned by the employee in the administrative process (which is a significant share of the total) or found to have no factual basis (a small but significant percentage) are settled for fairly modest dollar amounts (an average of about $10,000 to $20,000 per claim). The bigger dollar cases for a single employee usually end up being brought in a private lawsuit rather than by the EEOC itself. About 14,000 of those charges each year result in a Notice of Right to Sue letter followed by a civil lawsuit filed by a lawyer for the employee. It isn't terribly easy to determine from official statistics what proportion of cases resulting in a Notice of Right to Sue letter rather than an EEOC lawsuit ultimately do not result in a lawsuit being filed by the employee. About 250 of these cases (not quite 2%) go to trial each year. The rest settled or are resolved in motion practice before trial (including default judgments, when the employer simply doesn't respond to the lawsuit). Once an employee brings a lawsuit, settlement is the most common resolution. Folk wisdom in the employment litigation field is that the average settlement of a case of ordinary strength on the merits that is settled fairly early on in the process is about six months of wages. An estimate that the employees in private lawsuits secured more than $200 million a year in settlements and money judgments is probably a gross underestimate. It could easily be $500 million to $1 billion per year. But, there are no good statistics available since settlement amounts are overwhelmingly confidential. The EEOC sues on behalf of the employee in cases it chooses to litigate itself on a weekly basis, and likewise declines to prosecute and certifies the case to allow the individual to prosecute the case with a private attorney all the time. Is there any relevant case law? Yes. Pretty much every relevant detail of the process has been litigated in case law that has produced reported decisions because there have been many thousands of employment discrimination cases litigated under the Act. There are probably at least two dozen to four dozen new published appellate decisions in the federal circuit courts each year on these kinds of cases, if not more, and those decisions have come at a pretty steady rate for the past half century. There are hundreds of published decisions interpreting these statutes in almost every one of the federal circuits. On quite a few issues, there are splits of authority between different circuits regarding how to interpret the law that will ultimately be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, or by Congress, or that may remain unresolved forever. How will the civil court try the case? Will the judge reference the Civil Rights Directly? It is a little unclear what you are asking here, but I will do my best. Regardless of whether the EEOC or the individual employee brings the case, it is filed as a Complaint in federal court like any other federal lawsuit, litigated according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and resolved in the vast majority of cases either by a judge in a pre-trial motion, by a settlement between the parties, or by a jury trial presided over by a judge. In a jury trial, the judge tells the jury what the applicable law says and the jury decides if the employee has proved a case against the employer when applying that law after hearing the evidence presented at trial and then decides what damages award to make, on a very short jury verdict form. In a bench trial (i.e before a judge without a jury), the judge makes those determinations in a lengthy written ruling setting forth the factual and legal basis for the judge's determination on the merits. Jury trials are much more common than bench trials in these kinds of cases, partially because plaintiffs want juries to make a damages determination, and partially out of a perception (not entirely inaccurate) that judges tend to be pro-employer on average. What is a likely punishment? Punishment is mostly the wrong term. It is a lawsuit for money damages to compensate the employee for harm actually suffered. The jury (or the judge if the case can be decided before trial in a motion for summary judgment or if a jury trial has been waived) determines the amount of compensation, if any, which should be awarded for lost wages, non-economic compensatory damages, etc. and the judge then awards attorneys' fees and court costs based upon the submissions of the parties after the trial is over based upon a determination of what is allowed by law and what is reasonable. To some extent, an employer's obligation to pay attorneys' fees and costs acts as a proportionate punishment for not immediately settling a case where the employer is found to be in the wrong. To some extent, non-economic damages can constitute a punishment. But, when an employer is found to have discriminated intentionally, which is most of the time, punitive damages can also be awarded, although they must be proportionate to the amount of actual compensatory damages awarded, typical one or two times the compensatory damage award unless that award is very small. Statutory liquidated damages are sometimes awarded in lieu of certain kinds of punitive and compensatory damages awards in age and sex discrimination cases under the Equal Pay Act. There are also dollar limits on awards based upon the size of the employer. Why is the process convoluted by adding an extra step in form of the commission? Mediation is allowed as a compromise to encourage negotiated resolutions that avoid litigation costs before everyone has spent a lot of money on lawyers. In practice, a surprisingly large number of cases result in pre-trial mediation resolutions, often in cases where an outcome if the case had gone forward to a trial would have been uncertain. The involvement of the Commission is a compromise between having a system where all cases are prosecuted at state expenses and one in which all cases are brought privately with an opportunity to win attorneys' fees if one prevails. The EEOC has usually used its authority to bring cases that are clearly cases of improper employer conduct where due to the small dollar amounts involved or the number of employees affected, an individual lawsuit would not provide an adequate remedy since private lawsuits would not be brought otherwise. It is very hard for a private attorney to justify bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit over a case where the damages are likely to be in the $5,000 to $25,000 range because the employee doesn't make much money unless liability is 100% clear (e.g. there is an admission on videotape from the employer), despite the fact that a prevailing party can get non-economic damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs. So, it is particularly hard to bring employment discrimination cases on behalf of employees who don't earn much even when they aren't discriminated against. The availability of EEOC enforcement prevents employers of low wage workers and workers in temporary employment whose damages are small from ignoring the Civil Rights laws with impunity. A private lawyer does something on the order of $30,000 to $150,000 of billable work to bring an employment discrimination case involving a single employee-client to trial, and a lawyer defending such a case for an employer will typically incur more legal fees for their employer client than the employee's lawyers do, while the employer's lawyer defends the case all of the way through a trial, even before considering any amounts actually awarded to a prevailing employee in a case where the employee wins. Each side's legal fees, individually, will usually exceed the amount of compensatory and punitive damages awarded combined in a fairly small dollar case for an employee who wasn't paid very much, or at least didn't lose a huge amount of money economically due to illegal discrimination (for example, because the employee wasn't promoted while a less qualified candidate was promoted). This is an important reason why lots of cases settle and why the EEOC is necessary. The EEOC process also provides a means by which arbitration agreements with individual employees can be circumvented because the EEOC is not a party to those agreements and is not bound by them. Why isn't discrimination simply prosecuted by the state's attorney? After all racial discrimination very much fits the definition of a public wrong. Government agency resources aren't unlimited, so the government can't prosecute every credible complaint, so the EEOC has to pick and choose how to get the most bang for its available resources. In practice, the EEOC can only afford to pursue about one in ten of the employment discrimination cases subject to its jurisdiction that go to trial with its own lawyers. The cases it can't afford to bring, it delegates to the private sector rather than simply leaving those cases unprosecuted as would happen in the criminal justice system. This also provides a way for an employee who has a lazy or unenthusiastic government lawyer assigned to their case at the EEOC who doesn't take what the employee sees as a strong case seriously a way to get relief for employment discrimination despite the fact that the EEOC isn't willing to back them up. Private lawsuits are a check and balance against bad EEOC decisions about how strong cases are as well as a way for the EEOC to avoid financing the legal fees of people who can afford to sue on their own. Is the enforcement any good? Lots of employees over the years have gotten lots of money, although probably not 100% of the amount of the economic harm they suffered (and, of course, employee and employer attorneys have gotten paid a lot of money in the process as well, which is good if you are a lawyer, but is dead weight loss from an economist's point of view). But, more importantly, the behavior of employers has changed greatly as a result. In practice, most lawsuits, and almost all lawsuits not brought by the EEOC itself, involve either wrongful termination or failure to promote someone, rather than discriminatory hiring, since it is hard to show an individual right to be hired for which an individual is entitled to compensation. Even in EEOC cases, most are brought for discriminatory advertising or openly admitted discrimination in hiring, rather than covert discrimination by an employer in hiring on a non-permitted basis. The EEOC brings a handful of cases alleging covert discrimination in hiring against medium or large employers each year, in part, just to provide a credible threat to anyone considering doing so, often with a combination of tips from insiders (particularly those from hiring officials who are fired in retaliation for not following a discriminatory hiring policy) and with undercover "test applicants" who submit functionally identical resumes for the same job when many job openings are available. But, this is usually a tiny share of the total volume of employment litigation brought under the Civil Rights Acts. There is a certain irony in this, because employers who are willing to hire someone who belongs to a "protected class" in the first place, who hence, are probably not the most discriminatory employers in the market, are more exposed to a realistic risk of a discrimination lawsuit, than employers who refuse to hire anyone in a "protected class" in the first place, so long as the employer keeps its mouth shut about this practice and is willing to lie and come up with false pretexts for its actions. Dishonest gross racists and clear misogynists are under punished, while less culpable employers who are more honest but still a little bit discriminatory in the cases of a few well paid employees are over punished relative to more culpable employers. Also, employment discrimination laws provide the most monetary compensation to the most competent and well paid employees who probably have the greatest capacity to mitigate their damages by seeking other employment from less discriminatory employers, while providing the least compensation to the marginal employees for whom discrimination in employment most impacts their quality of life. Indeed, often the most marginal employees aren't even willing to risk filing a complaint with the EEOC for fear of being blacklisted in the future in a manner that is impossible to prove. Still, at a minimum, by making it illegal to publicly state a discriminatory reason or to state a discriminatory reason to someone who could testify against you in court, the laws in question have changed the internal normative standards that managers of medium and large sized business apply on a day to day business such that at least lip service and public commitment is given to the requirements of the civil rights laws. This change in corporate culture has probably had more of a real world effect than actual suits for damages have in regard to discrimination in hiring. The benefits of the voluntarily discontinuation of discrimination in employment as employers internalized the norms established by the civil rights laws for the most part has provided far more benefit to employees who were previously discriminated against than litigation and settlements resulting from the EEOC process. For example, when Sandra Day O'Connor (future Supreme Court justice) was a young lawyer, fewer than 5% of attorneys were women and she was often mistaken for a secretary or receptionist by clients. Now, about half of all young associate lawyers (even at very large firms who graduated from very prestigious law schools) are women. Almost all of this change was due to a change in professional norms that were a direct result of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (women had legally been allowed to be lawyers since the 1920s almost everywhere and earlier in some places), rather than through case by case litigation. The Civil Right Act opened up a huge new lucrative profession to women and minorities, and the experience of the legal profession was the norm and not the exception. Before the act, women were pretty much limited to school teaching, being librarians, nursing, secretary work, food service, day care, piece work sewing and laundry work. After the Civil Rights Act, their employment opportunities dramatically increased. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is likewise, more or less single handedly, responsible for today's black middle class which would have been an order of magnitude smaller otherwise. There are economic arguments that discrimination laws do or do not do much good, but those arguments rarely consider the fact that the law, when it was first enacted, dramatically changed corporate culture and the moral viewpoints and norms of the middle and upper middle class who act as employers making hiring decisions across the nation. Until the Civil Rights Act was enacted, tradition and prejudice kept a huge share of the population out of most of the marketplace in a manner completely contrary to what a naive Economics 101 analysis would predict.
No contract can limit a court's jurisdiction An NDA is a contract: it cannot prevent the application of the judicial process. Should your dispute reach a courtroom, the NDA and the documents it seeks to protect are all admissible and you should subpoena them from the defendant and submit those copies to the court (that way you are not breaking the terms of the NDA). What is not admissible is bona fide "without prejudice" documents: that is documents that contain admissions and offers made in a genuine attempt to settle a dispute. This privilege is established by the context of the document, not by if it does or does not have the words "without prejudice" on it (except, of course, that their presence/absence is part of the context).
How should I proceed? I am asking law friends to recommend some employment lawyers, but other than this, can I do anything else? You definitely don't need an employment lawyer for this. From a legal standpoint, the matter is very simple: If you grant their request (whether by signing or otherwise expressing your acceptance), you would be waiving any remedies currently available to you for their breach of contract. The company's attempt to override its contract with you is quite naive, but the company can always (and evidently does) try to get away with its liability nonetheless. I would not be surprised if the company subsequently tries harder to intimidate you, but that does not change your legal position &amp; merits unless you sign the waiver the company is pursuing. Asking for your post-termination availability reinforces the notion of company's poor planning and subpar management.
There is a legal dictum, de minimis non curat lex, which might lead to an exasperated court official refusing to issue your lawsuit (with or without providing the $1 out of his own pocket to save everybody's time); I recommend you look it up. But there is no official term for what you suggest, although many lawyers might off the record provide colourful descriptions. If you wish to waste your money on such a claim, then obviously in your view it is worth pursuing. Clients often say "the principle is more important than the money", though they say so more often before they receive the bills than after.