Can a judge simply say that industrial farms should treat farm animals well as it is simply right to do so? In a recent case in North Carolina, Smithfields, an industrial pork farming concern versus around five hundred local residents, and who were mostly black, and who had filed almost two dozen lawsuits complaining of the stench, flies and buzzards attracted by their farming practises was won by the residents after a six year court battle when Smithfield sued to settle. One of the judges in the case, J Harvie Wilkinson III, denouncec the outrageous conditions ... conditions that there is no reason to suppose unique to that facility. He goes on to add: What was missing from Kinlaw Farms and Murphy-Brown [the former name of Smithfields] was the recognition that treating animals better will benefit humans. What was neglected is that animal welfare and human welfare, far from advancing at cross-purposes, are actually integrally connected. The decades long transition to concentrated animal feeding operations lays bare this connection, and the consequences of its breach, with startling clarity. He described a system where they expected to live in enclosures that they had outgrown, reducing them to almost suffocating closeness ... the dangers endemic to such appalling conditions [are] always manifested first in animal suffering. In such cases, I've noted that how we are to treat animals is linked, as in this case, to the benefit of hums beings. This is, as far as I understand, a utilitarian argument. Q. Can legal arguments be advanced in situations of this kind to treat animals well simply because it is right? Obviously, a court can only take into account what has been legislated into law. So more broadly speaking: Q. Have such arguments been advanced to the legislating body, the body that actually writes the law? It's probably worth adding that punitive damages of around 500 million dollars were originally granted. (But was reduced to 90 million on dollars on appeal by Smithfields). edit @Ryan M: I haven't invalidated my earlier question, as you can observe, I've said it's a more broadly based question. And a good answer can address both. Legislatures consider moral questions and this has an impact on legal discourse, so it's a judicial question as well as being a political question; though in my opinion, more moral than political. I've tagged it jurisprudence to point this out.
There are laws against animal cruelty What counts as cruel is a social convention that changes over time. It is a fundamental principle of common law jurisdictions (like most of the united-states) that courts have the power to interpret (and re-interpret) the law so that as society’s standards change, so does the law.
I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.
Generally not. A judge in sentencing has a number of options subject to the statute or common law. A fine may be one option, imprisonment another. Others include community service, a suspended sentence or death. What they choose is (subject to appeal or commutation) what you do. You can't substitute one for the other.
There is no opinion from the Ninth Circuit. I just checked PACER, and there is a docketed order dated May 18, 2016: Filed order (STEPHEN REINHARDT, MARY H. MURGUIA and JOHN B. OWENS) We have reviewed appellant’s opening brief, appellees’ motion for summary affirmance and appellant’s opposition thereto. We conclude that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (summary affirmance appropriate where the result is clear from the face of record); see Mullis v. United States Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987) (judges are immune from civil liability for damages and for declaratory relief for their judicial acts). AFFIRMED. [9981929] (WL) [Entered: 05/18/2016 02:48 PM] I downloaded Jaffe's Ninth Circuit brief and it's a pretty dull work of a crank. I use the RECAP Mozilla add-on, so the Ninth Circuit docket and brief should show up on RECAP soon. Go to https://www.courtlistener.com/ and in "Advanced Search", search on docket no. 15-56328. Based on past experience it should show up in a day or two. But that's the Ninth Circuit brief, not the SCOTUS one you're looking for; unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court is the one US court that is not searchable via PACER. You're limited to the docket, opinions and orders that the Court publishes on its site. For more legitimate cases, briefs can often be found on either SCOTUSBlog or the ABA's briefs page, but not in this case.
No, it is not illegal under 7 USC 136j (a)(2)(G) to use a pesticide labeled for use against one pest against another pest... at least not anymore. It turns out that there apparently were cases of the EPA interpreting the language of that portion of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in an overly broad manner. This included the interpretation in question here, as well as even interpreting it to ban using doses or concentrations less than those specified by the label. In response, Congress amended FIFRA in 1978 to add a definition of the term "To use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling" as 7 USC 136 (ee): The term “to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling” means to use any registered pesticide in a manner not permitted by the labeling, except that the term shall not include (1) applying a pesticide at any dosage, concentration, or frequency less than that specified on the labeling unless the labeling specifically prohibits deviation from the specified dosage, concentration, or frequency, (2) applying a pesticide against any target pest not specified on the labeling if the application is to the crop, animal, or site specified on the labeling, unless the Administrator has required that the labeling specifically state that the pesticide may be used only for the pests specified on the labeling after the Administrator has determined that the use of the pesticide against other pests would cause an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment... [other exceptions not relevant to this question] The act that included the amendment became Public Law 95-396 (PDF), also known as the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, upon being signed into law by President Carter on Sept 30, 1978. A question was raised on the linked question that this exception might have been referring to accidental use against one pest when another was being targeted, however, the following description of the meaning was given in a summary of the bill on the Senate floor when the final version of the bill was being considered for passage: Third, the new definition will permit farmers to use pesticides that are already registered for a crop or site for pests not listed on the labeling. It is rather foolish to tell farmers that they can put a pesticide on a crop for one bug, but that they cannot apply it to the same crop for another bug. Senator Herman Talmadge (D-GA), Senate Floor, Sept 18, 1978 (Source: Congressional Record vol. 124 (1978), part 22, page 29760 (Warning: 584 MB PDF)) Senator Talmadge was Chair of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry at the time and so had been heavily involved in crafting the bill. So, allowing the use of a registered pesticide against a pest not mentioned on its label was indeed the expressed intent of Congress in adding this exception to the definition of using a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling. As long as the pesticide in question is being applied to a plant, animal, or site specified on the label and the Administrator of the EPA hasn't required the specific pesticide in question to expressly prohibit use against other pests on its label, then intentionally using it against a pest not specified on its label is not a violation of 7 USC 136j (a)(2)(G).
There is no parallelism between the Texas decision and the proposed lawsuit. In the anti-mifepristone lawsuit, there exists a statute granting the FDA authority to regulate and review new drugs, and a petition procedure whereby citizens can state ground for the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to consider a regulatory action. There is no statutory basis on which a ban of meat-eating could be created by executive action. Congress cannot be sued for not passing a law (failure or refusal of Congress to pass a particular law is not justiciable). If, for example someone were to submit a petition to the FDA urging such a regulation, the petition would have to be denied because the FDA does not have statutory authority to issue such a regulation. As argued here, the anti-mifepristone plaintiffs lack standing in that case, so one can expect that to be a substantial issue in the subsequent appeal.
Astronauts are employees of the government and are thus barred from suing in lieu of receiving the government equivalent of worker's compensation. This wouldn't bar a suit against a third-party contractor who made a defective product, but I suspect that their contracts contain a waiver of liability for negligence or defective products given that this is highly experimental technology. Certainly, it would not be homicide as it was an accidental death of someone who consented to the high risk of accidental death involved. The dog would have been the property of the government, and the government wouldn't sue itself for damages to the dog. The harm that comes to animals in legitimate scientific research is not considered cruelty to animals as it is justified by a higher legitimate purpose and not for the intent of gratification of someone who enjoys torturing animals and would have been cleared by a scientific ethics committee in advance.
how (academically) acceptable are such discussions and proposals? Some academic somewhere has probably discussed it, and did not breach strong academic norms by doing so. Is it the academically acceptable practice to argue about such questions or is it a marginal view? It isn't taboo to argue such a position, but it is highly marginal and extreme. It is even more extreme in Eastern Europe (nominally in the civil law tradition) than it is in common law countries (which have more of a natural law tradition), and would be least marginal in the U.S. which has a strong natural law tradition, although it would marginal even in the U.S. Legal positivism (i.e. the law is what legislators and the governmental process including courts and citizen ballot issues says it is), is very strong now compared to prior eras and stronger in civil law countries than in common law countries. The battle between natural law and legal positivism was mostly won by legal positivism by the late 19th century although the debate continued indifferent to the reality on the ground. Philosophically, human rights are often viewed as an enlightened codification of natural law (which sometimes justifies its extraterritorial application), but it would be rare for someone who was a strong supporter of natural law to argue that human rights codifying natural law should be disfavored (really, that kind of reasoning is mostly seen in pre-modern Confucian legal arguments in China as part of the Eastern rule of law v. rule of man argument that tends to favor rule of man on the theory that any codification can be twisted by sneaky lawyers).