Is homeowner liable for police injury during raid Hypothetically speaking, let's say that a person is very paranoid about intruders, government, end of the world, so on. They decided to buy some land and have a fence around the property with clear markings "do not enter" and warnings that there are "traps" in the area. The person makes every reasonable attempt to warn people not to enter. Now after sometime, authorities secure a search warrant and approval to raid the house via legal means, and the warrant and raid are both justifiably issued. Let's assume that the person was willing to cooperate with the authorities as well after they had identified themselves. The person is also willing to assist in disarming / identifying any traps. Would the home owner be liable for any damages done to the authorities if they were injured by his "traps" prior to them identifying themselves or after? Note: Trap could be anything in FM 5 31 maybe even an inner electric fence.
Even if the authorities aren't injured, the homeowner may well face criminal charges. Many states make it illegal to set booby traps; for instance, California makes it a felony in section 20110 of the Penal Code. The definition of "boobytrap" in the code is "any concealed or camouflaged device designed to cause great bodily injury when triggered by an action of any unsuspecting person coming across the device;" on the face of it, it is definitely not clear that a generic "there are traps" sign makes it not a boobytrap (whereas a sign on the trap announcing its presence probably would). If a trespasser falls victim to a trap, that can be grounds for a successful lawsuit against the homeowner; see Katko v. Briney (an Iowa civil case). The duty of care to trespassers is low; there's no general duty to mitigate hazards. However, one part of the duty is generally that one may not lay a trap for trespassers (example: report from Connecticut Office of Legal Research).
Rob is responsible. No Bull! Around the world, the law of wandering cattle depends on the details. New Zealand is no different. This case is covered by s 26 of the Impounding Act of 1955, Damages for Trespass. As you said, S 26(1)(d) says Bob is entitled to damages whenever his &quot;land (whether fenced or unfenced) is situated in a city.&quot; This is different to the rest of the country, where animals must be fenced out. S 26(2) of the Impounding Act says the damage is owed by Rob, as the owner of the stock: (2) In any case where damages are payable under this section the amount of any damage shall be recoverable by action from the owner of the stock. It may be that Rob and Alice have some arrangement that Alice will indemnify Rob against any trespass damages. But that agreement does not change the underlying law; it only allows him to recoup his loses (by suing his mother, if necessary!). Added: Something fun to read Law professor Robert Ellickson studied how people actually resolve disputes over wandering cattle in Shasta county in northern California. There's a readable summary of what he found here. (The title of his book, &quot;Order without law,&quot; sums up his main finding -- there are rules that are enforced, but those rules have little to do with the formal law or law enforcement.)
The police would still be able to get a warrant even if there was no suspicion against the current owners, provided that there was reasonable evidence to suggest that the body was in the garden. In the event that the police enter the garden and see something like the marijuana plants, plain sight doctrine would allow the police to charge the owners with growing marijuana. If there was something like a green house, separate from the garden area that the body may be located in, the search warrant, if limited in scope, may not apply to the greenhouse. This depends on how specific the location of the body is believed to be: anywhere in the garden? or right behind the house against the wall? The odds are good the police would bring in a cadaver dog (included in the warrant) and patrol the garden to see if the dog finds anything.
Yes and no. Using deception to get someone to open the door so that you can execute a warrant is okay (United States v. Contreras-Ceballos, 999 F.2d 432). Leading a criminal to believe that you are a crime-customer (e.g. for purposes of a drug sale) and not a police officer is okay (Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206), but must be limited to the purposes contemplated by the suspect and cannot turn into a general search. Lying about whether you have a warrant is not okay (Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, Hadley v. Williams, 368 F.3d 747), nor is it okay to lie about the scope of a warrant (United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126). Misrepresenting the true purpose of entry, even when the person is identified as a government agent, negates consent (US v. Bosse, 898 F. 2d 113; United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131; United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297). However, there is no requirement to be fully forthright (US v. Briley, 726 F.2d 1301) so you can gain entry saying that you "have a matter to discuss with X" even when the intent is to arrest X. In a case similar to what you describe, United States v. Wei Seng Phua, 100 F.Supp.3d 1040, FBI agents disrupted internet access and then posed as repairmen to gain access to the computer. Their efforts were wasted, as fruits of the poisonous tree.
Has friend A got any chance of disputing the cost of the seizure as the police didn't issue the notification? I don't think so (see below for why), but you should pay a lawyer if you need legal advice. The met say A FORM 3708 seizure notice will have been given to the driver where practicable, giving full instructions on the reverse. A notice letter will also be sent to the registered keeper, if they were not the driver. In the meantime, this information will assist you. (my emphasis). Section 165A of the Road Traffic Act 1988 does not, so far as I can see, mention any legal requirement for the Police to issue a paper document at the time of seizure. Here's 165A in full 165A Power to seize vehicles driven without licence or insurance Subsection (5) applies if any of the following conditions is satisfied. The first condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 164, a person to produce his licence and its counterpart for examination, b. the person fails to produce them, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that a motor vehicle is or was being driven by the person in contravention of section 87(1). The second condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 165, a person to produce evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143, b. the person fails to produce such evidence, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being so driven. The third condition is that— a. a constable in uniform requires, under section 163, a person driving a motor vehicle to stop the vehicle, b. the person fails to stop the vehicle, or to stop the vehicle long enough, for the constable to make such lawful enquiries as he considers appropriate, and c. the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143. Where this subsection applies, the constable may— a. seize the vehicle in accordance with subsections (6) and (7) and remove it; b. enter, for the purpose of exercising a power falling within paragraph (a), any premises (other than a private dwelling house) on which he has reasonable grounds for believing the vehicle to be; c. use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of any power conferred by paragraph (a) or (b). Before seizing the motor vehicle, the constable must warn the person by whom it appears that the vehicle is or was being driven in contravention of section 87(1) or 143 that he will seize it— a. in a section 87(1) case, if the person does not produce his licence and its counterpart immediately; b. in a section 143 case, if the person does not provide him immediately with evidence that the vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of that section. But the constable is not required to give such a warning if the circumstances make it impracticable for him to do so. If the constable is unable to seize the vehicle immediately because the person driving the vehicle has failed to stop as requested or has driven off, he may seize it at any time within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time at which the condition in question is first satisfied. The powers conferred on a constable by this section are exercisable only at a time when regulations under section 165B are in force. In this section— a. a reference to a motor vehicle does not include an invalid carriage; b. a reference to evidence that a motor vehicle is not or was not being driven in contravention of section 143 is a reference to a document or other evidence within section 165(2)(a); c. “counterpart” and “licence” have the same meanings as in section 164; d. “private dwelling house” does not include any garage or other structure occupied with the dwelling house, or any land appurtenant to the dwelling house. Also what consequences could Friend A face for knowingly allowing friend B to drive his (Friend A's) car whilst he was drunk and didn't hold a valid license or insurance? A few random thoughts: B is clearly committing several criminal acts and A appears to have possibly aided and abetted them. I imagine A's insurance company might consider this invalidates A's insurance. I'm just some random bloke in the intertubes, not a lawyer.
First, if the police officer had reasonable cause to believe that a crime was in progress then the search would not be illegal in the first place. However, let's assume the search was illegal. Normally the evidence would be excluded under the exclusionary rule. However, there are two exceptions known as the independent source and attenuation doctrines. The evidence of the police officer as to the imprisonment would be excluded. However, the evidence of the victims is independent of that illegal search and their testimony would be admissible. Further, that testimony would allow independent discovery and admissibility of any physical evidence in the property. However, if the victims were dead, then there would be no independent discovery and none of the evidence would be admissible.
I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.
colorado Short Answer This woman was engaged in legally permitted self-defense when she killed the man with a knife in the kitchen under Colorado law, and she has not committed any crime. Her conduct would also not provide a basis for a valid lawsuit for money damages against her. Long Answer Applicable Law In Colorado's state criminal code, the relevant statutory section, Colorado Revised Statutes, § 18-1-704, states, in the pertinent parts (emphasis mine): Use of physical force in defense of a person - definitions. (1) . . . a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself . . . and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: . . . (b) The other person is using . . . physical force against an occupant of a dwelling . . . while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit . . . sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000. The referenced definition of burglary as relevant to this fact pattern is that: A person commits . . . burglary, if the person knowingly breaks an entrance into, enters unlawfully in, or remains unlawfully after a lawful or unlawful entry in a building or occupied structure with intent to commit therein a crime against another person or property. Note also that it doesn't matter for purposes of the burglary statute, if this is her kitchen, or someone else's, so long as it is not his kitchen. Also he need only be &quot;attempting to commit burglary&quot;, so even if he was trying unsuccessfully to get into the house and assaulting her from just outside a door or window, her use of deadly force to prevent burglary would be justified. On the other hand, if he was lawfully present in the home (perhaps a husband or roommate), the burglary justification for the use of deadly force would no longer be present. The referenced sexual assault statute states in the pertinent part that it is committed if: Any actor who knowingly inflicts sexual intrusion or sexual penetration on a victim commits sexual assault if: The actor causes submission of the victim by means of sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the victim's will . . . [which includes any case in which:] The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence[.] Even if he does not &quot;reasonably appears about to commit&quot; sexual penetration or intrusion (which are necessary for the crime to be sexual assault for purposes of the use of deadly force law in Colorado), unlawful sexual contact is a crime against a person in an occupied dwelling, so it constitutes burglary that justifies the use of deadly force, even if it doesn't constitute sexual assault. Under these circumstances, the woman may use deadly physical force if she reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate to cause the rapist to cease committing sexual assault, and any other crime against person or property in the home. Application Of Law To Facts There is no reasonable doubt that the man is, at a minimum, in the process of committing burglary, and very likely sexual assault as well, although the language of the question is somewhat coy on this point as relevant to the Colorado definition of sexual assault. He has proven himself capable of physically overpowering her efforts to resist him with non-deadly force without success. This demonstrates that non-deadly force was inadequate. She used a knife to kill him for the legally authorized purpose of ending a burglary and probably also a sexual assault. Therefore, her use of a knife to kill him is almost certain be a use of deadly force for purposes of self-defense which is permitted by Colorado law. As a result, she would not be legally guilty of any crime for killing him with a knife in these circumstances. Incidentally, she would also have no civil liability in tort for money damages in this situation in Colorado. Application To Other U.S. States The exact wording of self-defense statutes differ from one U.S. state to another and I don't personally know every fine statutory detail of every one of them. But, Colorado's statute is quite typical. A state where her actions did not constitute legally justified in these circumstances would be an extreme outlier in U.S. law. I would be surprised if there was any U.S. state in which her actions would not constitute legally justified self-defense. Historical Note Suppose that the man in the question were the woman's husband in their own home where they were both lawfully present. Prior to the 1970s, marital rape was legal in every US state. It was partially outlawed in Michigan and Delaware in 1974, then wholly outlawed in South Dakota and Nebraska in 1975. The court case Oregon v. Rideout in 1978 was the first in which someone stood trial for raping his spouse while they lived together. By 1993 marital rape was a crime nationwide. (Source) Under current U.S. law in every U.S. state, the sexual assault justification analysis would be no different because there is no marital immunity for the crimes of sexual assault, although the burglary justification would no longer be present, so an intent to commit unlawful sexual contact without penetration or intrusion would not justify the use of deadly force. But, when marital immunity to sexual assault was part of the law, as it was in every U.S. state prior to 1974, and as it was in some U.S. states until 1993, she would be guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. The distinction between second degree murder and manslaughter in that case would hinge upon whether she had an intent to kill or only intended to harm (as in a case cited by Jen in her answer). Also, she would have a good argument for manslaughter due to provocation by the victim that was not sufficient to justify the use of deadly force, even if jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that she did intent to kill him. Colorado's self-defense statute (in a subsection omitted because it was not applicable to the facts in the question) also permits the grade of a criminal offense caused in the course of conduct intended as self-defense that does not meet the statutory standards for self-defense (e.g. because non-deadly force would have been sufficient) to downgrade the severity of the offense for which the person may be convicted, in a manner similar to the &quot;heat of passion&quot; defense. But, these facts present no plausible justification for a first degree murder, which is often a charge punishable by death penalty or life in prison without the possibility of parole, since it was not premeditated or committed in connection with a crime by the perpetrator. Realistically, under the circumstances of the question, if he was her husband and they were in their own home, during a time frame when there was marital immunity from sexual assault charges, she would most likely be convicted of manslaughter under these circumstances. Side Observation The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) that the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, directly and as incorporated against the states under the 14th Amendment, prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for a rape not resulting in death (even the rape of a child). The death penalty has been unconstitutional in cases involving the rape of an adult woman in the U.S. since U.S. Supreme Court case of Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). There are many serious felonies (including some omitted from the Colorado statute above because they were not applicable to this fact pattern) for which the use of deadly force in self-defense is authorized even though the U.S. Constitution prohibits the use of the death penalty upon a conviction of that offense which does not result in someone dying.