How to avoid being sued for a novel in USA and Canada Suppose that an author is writing an autobiographical novel set in the USA and Canada. The author would like to avoid being sued for libel. The novel will be fictionalized, but it isn't flattering. Would changing the setting, the physical characteristics of the characters, and creating composite characters be sufficient to avoid a suit? (And of course, not identifying it as autobiographical.) Would the standard disclaimer be enough? That is: This is a work of fiction. Names, characters, places, and incidents either are products of the author's imagination or are used fictitiously. Any resemblance to actual events or locales or persons, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. Just what does a libel plaintiff need to show?
The &quot;standard disclaimer&quot; This is a work of fiction. Names, characters, places, and incidents either are products of the author's imagination or are used fictitiously. Any resemblance to actual events or locales or persons, living or dead, is entirely coincidental. has very little legal effect. If a plaintiff can demonstrate that the characters of a novel are intended to depict real people, or that some readers are likely to take the characters as representing real people, and that negative aspects of a character in a novel have been taken as reflecting on the plaintiff, and have harmed his or her reputation, then success in a libel action is quite possible, and the disclaimer will be of no help. After all, it is a self-serving statement by the author. &quot;I am not a thief&quot; is not a defense to an accusation of theft. And if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate all that, the absence of the disclaimer will not help the plaintiff's case. The use of composite characters will make it harder for a plaintiff to demonstrate that the statements are &quot;of and concerning&quot; him or her. This is particularly true if the characters draw on more than two real people. Altered settings may help, but if the character is clearly identifiable as a specific real person, the changed setting will not prevent a defamation suit. At most, the disclaimer establishes a lack of intent to describe real people. But intent is not a key element of a libel action. If a statement is false and harms a person's reputation, it is potentially defamatory, even if made in the belief that it was accurate, or with no desire to harm. The disclaimer does not hurt, and it helps establish good intent, but that is the most it can do. To avoid risks of defamation suits, one might be careful that all statements about a character based on a real person are provably true. Or one might carefully make all characters based on a mix of multiple real people, plus fictional additions so that no character is clearly identifiable with any real person. Defamation actions are generally expensive. They are also risky, in that the original statements may be repeated many times in the course of reporting on the case, more clearly associated with a real person than the original novel ever was. (Consider the QB7 case in which Leon Uris was sued.) The chance of even a clearly defamed person bringing suit is not large, but it is not zero either. The risk will also depend on the jurisdiction likely to be involved. The US is notoriously less friendly to defamation plaintiffs than most European countries, for example. An author in such a case might be wise to consult a lawyer experienced in defamation cases in the relevant jurisdiction. If the book is to be published by a major traditional publisher, the publisher would almost surely have a lawyer on staff or on retainer to assess such issues. Otherwise, the author would have to make any arrangements. Initial consultations are often at low or even no cost, to assess if the lawyer is really needed and wants the case.
If a libelous statement is posted online, and the victim and offender are from different states, which state would be more pertinent to the defamation case? I.e. which state's defamation laws, statue of limitations, etc. are relevant? First of all, a basic point. Defamation claims arise under state law, even though state law is required to conform to the limits imposed by the U.S. Constitution. Also, there are two distinct issue to consider. One is which state's courts have jurisdiction to hear such a case, and the other is which state's law should be applied to each particular issue in the case which is called &quot;choice of law&quot;. In practice, the two issues often overlap. But this isn't always true. For example, you can always sue a defendant where they reside (or in the case of a business entity, where its headquarters are located) on a claim arising anywhere in the world. The courts of this state have &quot;general jurisdiction&quot; over this defendant. But, suppose for example, that the defendant resides in Maine, but the defamatory statement was made in New York State by the defendant when the defendant was located there to people who were predominantly in New York State, and the statement was about someone who lived in New York State and things that that person supposedly did in New York State. In that case, if a lawsuit were filed in Maine against the defendant (since Maine would have &quot;general jurisdiction&quot; over the defendant), the courts of Maine might very well apply the law of New York State to most or all of the non-court procedure related legal issues in the case. The law of the place where the statement is made can apply, and the law of a place where the statement was intended to be directed (e.g. a state where a known subject to defamation resides) can be applied to a defamation case. But, the law of a place were people merely incidentally receives knowledge of a defamatory statement is not a proper law to chose or forum in which a lawsuit can be brought, if (1) the person making the statement was not directing the statement at someone in that state and (2) the person making the statement did not intend that the person to whom the statement is directed suffer reputational harm in that state. The default choice of law rules (in the absence of a contrary statute) apply the law of the place with the &quot;most significant connection&quot; to the legal issue being applied and the same state's law is not necessarily applied to all issues in the case. In the absence of a showing that another state's law differs from that of the state where the lawsuit is filed and that it has a more significant connection to the relevant legal issue in the case, the law of the state where the case is being tried will be applied. Many states have specific statutes regarding the application of a statute of limitations from another state than the one where the lawsuit is filed in order to discourage efforts to apply the law of whichever state has the longest statute of limitations, and to discourage filing case in a state just because it has a long statute of limitations. In practice, a lot of the substantive law of defamation is limited by federal constitutional First Amendment limitations and by a common English common law source for defamation law. So, the substantive law of defamation other than the statute of limitations isn't that different from state to state. But, in recent years, the biggest difference has been that some states have enacted Anti-SLAPP statutes (SLAPP is an acronym for &quot;strategic lawsuits against public participation&quot;) that disfavor many kinds of defamation actions procedurally. The existence or lack of an anti-SLAPP statute in a state may make choice of law important in a defamation case. A recent case illustrates that it is hard to decide which states's law applies (via this blog around April of 2022). Former California Congressman Devin Nunes sues Georgia-headquartered, Delaware-incorporated CNN in Virginia for allegedly defamatory claims made in New York about Nunes' conduct in Austria. The case is transferred to New York, but still governed by Virginia choice of law, and the New York court determines that, under Virginia law, California law governs the claims. The California Congressman objects that Virginia law would have applied New York law. Second Circuit: Virginia law would have applied California law. Dissent: Virginia law would have applied New York law. Or maybe D.C. law. A comparative international analysis of the choice of law rules that would apply in the same fact pattern can be found here. See also a Florida federal court case applying these tests in 2019. Can a lawyer licensed from any state handle such cases? Usually a lawyer must be licensed to practice law in the state where a lawsuit is filed (but not in a state whose law is applied by an out of state court). A lawyer from outside a state where a lawsuit is commenced can seek admission to the bar of the state where the lawsuit is pending pro hac vice which is an admission for a single lawsuit. But, usually a lawyer admitted pro hac vice in a state court must be affiliated with a lawyer admitted to practice in the state where the case is filed as co-counsel for that case in order to do so.
Using the setting and characters of an existing and current book would probably, indeed almost surely, make it a derivative work. Creating a derivative work from a work protected by copyright requires permission from the copyright holder, unless an exception to copyright applies. In US law 17 USC 101 defines a derivative work as: A “derivative work” is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications, which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”. and 17 USC 106 provides in pertinent part that: Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: ... to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; This means that creating such a fanfic without permission would be copyright infringement, and Rowling could sue for damages. Fair use In the US the primary exception to copyright available is fair use. Whether a work is a fair use of another is always a case-by-case decision, and often a complex one. There have not been many published US cases on whether fanfiction is or may be fair use. This depends on the details, but from the description I do not think such a fanfic as the question describes would be likely to be held to be a case of fair use. See Is this copyright infringement? Is it fair use? What if I don&#39;t make any money off it? In general fanfiction has not fared very well under US copyright law. See this Wikipedia article. A recent Law Review article on this topic, one of the few available, is The Better Angels of Our Fanfiction: The Need for True and Logical Precedent, 33 Hastings Comm. &amp; Ent. L.J. 159](https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol33/iss2/1) by Stacey M. Lantagne. [Footnotes in the original shown here in {braces}.] On pages 168-9 Lantagne wrote: Although fanfiction is a flourishing medium, there has been no true case evaluating it under a fair use analysis. For instance, Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. RDR Books 575 F.Supp.2d 513 (SDNY 2008) involved a work created by a fan, but the work in question was an encyclopedic reference book about the original copyrighted material, not a piece of fiction spun off from the original copyrighted work in some way. The fan work's inconsistently transformative character swayed the court's fair use analysis{The court noted that at times the fan work lapsed into mere verbatim copying of the original copyrighted material, which detracted from its transformative nature}, and the fact that it used more of the original copyrighted work than was necessary.{The court found it telling that the fan work contained a great deal of verbatim copying of &quot;highly aesthetic expression,&quot; which tipped this factor away from a finding of fair use} These two factors would necessarily dictate a different analysis when a work of fiction is involved as opposed to a reference work.{Warner Bros., 575 F. Supp. 2d at 544. The court found troubling the excessive copying of &quot;distinctive original language from the Harry Potter works,&quot; using &quot;Rowling's original expression,&quot; in the work's entries. Id. Presumably, much less direct copying of original language would happen in a work of fiction. A similar implication occurs when considering the &quot;verbatim copying&quot; of whole sentences from the Harry Potter books. Id. at 547. Works of fanfiction seldom copy verbatim language, focusing on characters, settings, and plots.} Lantagne next discussed mthe case of Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70. That case dealt with a novel called 60 Years Later: Coming Through the Rye, whose protagonist, &quot;Mr. C&quot;, is a 76-year-old Holden Caulfield, (the protagonist of the J.D. Salinger novel The Catcher in the Rye. Lantagne wrote: The defendant's novel embodies typical fanfiction activity: taking a recognizable character and re-imagining them at a different stage of life.&quot; The court determined that the work was not permissible fair use and enjoined its publication.{This case [on appeal] recently settled, with Colting agreeing not to publish the book in the United States or Canada until the copyright on The Catcher in the Rye expires, but being able to publish it in other international territories, as long as it was not marketed using reference to Salinger, The Catcher in the Rye, or the litigation between the parties.} First, the court concluded that 60 Years Later was not a parody because it &quot;contain[ed] no reasonably discernible rejoinder or specific criticism of any character or theme of Catcher. Rather than commenting on Holden Caulfield as a character, the purpose of 60 Years Later was to &quot;satisfy Holden's fans' passion&quot; for his character. The insertion of J.D. Salinger as a character in 60 Years Later was possibly, the court conceded, a criticism and commentary of Salinger, but not of The Catcher in the Rye. While the court admitted that there was some transformative element in the Salinger character in 60 Years Later, it was limited by the character's minor role in a work that was largely not transformative. The court concluded that merely aging the main character of a novel and altering the novel's setting was not sufficient to make the use transformative. Finally, because 60 Years Later was to be sold for profit, the court found that the first factor weighed against a finding of fair use. After finding The Catcher in the Rye to be an expressive work, which weighed the second factor against a finding of fair use, the court then concluded that 60 Years Later took much more from The Catcher in the Rye than was necessary for whatever transformative commentary it was trying to make. The court disapproved mainly of the use of the main character of The Catcher in the Rye. 60 Years Later also was similar to The Catcher in the Rye in structure, in a way that was not necessary to offer a commentary on Salinger (the only transformative purpose the court had found the work to have). Finally, the court found that 60 Years Later harmed the potential market for any permissible The Catcher in the Rye sequels. The court found that fair use should not protect the ability to publish unauthorized sequels: [B]ecause some artists may be further incentivized to create original works due to the availability of the right not to produce any sequels. This might be the case if, for instance, an author's artistic vision includes leaving certain portions or aspects of his character's story to the varied imaginations of his readers, or if he hopes that his readers will engage in discussion and speculation as to what happened subsequently.&quot; Although 60 Years Later may be classified as fanfiction, the overtly commercial purpose of the work makes it an imperfect representation of the genre because most fanfiction is not-for-profit.{See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 664. A recent development in fanfiction that has led to clashes is the rise of the use of fanfiction for charitable purposes. &quot;Fanfic auctions&quot; in which readers bid for the services of fanfiction authors to write a story based on their specifications, with the proceeds to benefit charity, are becoming more common. See Gabaldon, supra note 7 (&quot;Recently, a couple of people have drawn my attention to a person who's been posting on various boards about fund-raising for an uninsured friend named Stacie who has breast cancer. Her (the poster's) idea for fund-raising is to auction off a customer-written piece of fan-fic. . . .&quot;). Fanfiction written for such a commercial purpose may change the analysis. But see Tushnet, supra note 16, at 672-73 (quoting Gene Rodenberry).} Because the court weighed the novel's commercial nature against a finding of fair use, Salinger is not an ideal fanfiction precedent Lantagne goes on to discuss the case of Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001). In that case a novel The Wind Done Gone, retelling Gone With the Wind from the PoV of the black characters, was held to be a parody as well as a sequel, to be &quot;highly transformative&quot;, and allowable as fair use. Sequels as Derivative Works A sequel uses the characters and/or setting of an existing work of fiction. It often constitutes a derivative work. The more distinctive and original the setting and characters are, and the more of those distinctive characteristics that are used in the sequel, the more likely the sequel is to be treated as a derivative work. On the matter of sequels, see the case of Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1989). In that case, a Mr. Timothy Anderson prepared a sequel to the film Rocky III which he hoped would become Rocky IV. He presented it to MGM and Stallone. They eventually declined to buy it, and Anderson sued, claiming that the film Rocky IV that was made infringed his script. The district court held that Anderson's script was an infringing work not entitled to copyright protection. The court, citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), ruled that the characters in a copyrighted work are protected when they are &quot;developed with enough specificity to constitute protect able expression.&quot; Holding that the Rocky III characters met this standard, the court ruled that the Anderson script was a derivative work created without permission, and thus was not entailed to any copyright protection at all. Anderson appealed, and the case was settled out of court while this appeal was in progress. Details of the settlement were not disclosed. An unauthorized sequel to Harry Potter would probably face the same rule and reach the same result as in the Anderson case.It would depend on how much of the &quot;distinctive&quot; nature of JKR's characters and settings were used in the fanfic sequel. The Ethical and Emotional Arguments against Fan Fiction In This comment on the question user &quot;RedSonja&quot; writes: I know this is Law and you are looking for legal answers. But what you are proposing is plagiarism by the back door. JKR went to a lot of trouble inventing her universe. Why should you be able to just plug in and milk someone else's cow? If you are that highly original, write your own universe. Leaving aside the point that if the source is acknowledged it cannot be plagiarism, although it may be copyright infringement, this is essentially an ethical argument that the law should be different than it currently is. Some authors make an essentially emotional argument, saying that their works or their characters are in effect &quot;children of the mind&quot; and that others should not touch them without permission, whatever the law may say. Some find such arguments persuasive or powerful.. I disagree with these arguments. Lantagne on pages 172-179 of the law review article linked above, responds to such arguments, writing [Some footnotes omitted, others in {braces}]: Fanfiction is frequently devalued as not being &quot;real&quot; writing. This is closely related to the aesthetic argument. Copyright only protects creative expression.{See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2002)} If the fanfiction is not creative expression, then it is not copyrightable. That, however, is a different question from whether it is infringing.{See Tushnet, supra note 16, at 681 (&quot;Fan fiction may not be copyrightable, but that does not make it an infringing use....&quot;).} It could be that the &quot;not real writing&quot; argument, translated into legalese, really expresses the idea that the work of fanfiction is not transformative enough.{See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994) (&quot;If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition, which the alleged infringer merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work diminishes accordingly (if it does not vanish), and other factors, like the extent of its commerciality, loom larger.&quot;). Importantly, however, a work does not have to be transformative to be protected under fair use. See id. at 579. The fair use test is not forgiving of shortcuts.} However, this alone does not automatically make the work a copyright infringement because other fair use factors remain. Many authors frequently describe fanfiction as being the equivalent of an affront against their relatives.{See Gabaldon, supra note 7 (&quot;[L]et us just say that there's a difference between someone dating red-haired men, and the same someone trying to seduce my husband.... I wouldn't like people writing sex fantasies for public consumption about me or members of my family-why would I be all right with them doing it to the intimate creations of my imagination and personality?&quot;); Someone Is Angry on the Internet, supra note 11 (&quot;My characters are my children, I have been heard to say. I don't want people making off with them, thank you.&quot;); Hobb, supra note 7 (comparing fanfiction to PhotoShopping a family photo).} While the artistic protectiveness for one's creation is understandable, it is not a valid argument in U.S. copyright law. Artists have the right to control derivative works of their creations. If the fair use factors come out the wrong way [for the reuser], artists can prevent that use of their work. However, the purpose of copyright is not to prevent all use by others of an artistic work.{See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574-77 (&quot;From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose ...)} It never has been. The very character of the fair use test illustrates this, as it protects most strongly those uses of an artist's creation that the artist would never permit.{See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1282-83 (11th Cir.2001) (Marcus, J., concurring) (&quot;To the extent the Suntrust [sought to impose editorial restrictions] to preserve Gone With the Wind's reputation, or protect its story from 'taint,' however, it may not now invoke copyright to further that goal. Of course, Suntrust can choose to license its derivative however it wishes and insist that those derivatives remain free of content it deems disreputable. Suntrust may be vigilant of Gone With the Wind's public image-but it may not use copyright to shield Gone With the Wind from unwelcome comment, a policy that would extend intellectual property protection 'into the precincts of censorship,' in Pat Conroy's words.&quot;)} Arguably, the more that a fanfiction work criticizes or parodies the original work, the more that fanfiction is a fair use. Thus, the argument that fanfiction should not be permitted because it transforms the original authors' characters mirrors the argument for exactly why fanfiction should be permitted under copyright law. ... The arguments that authors advance when they argue against copyright belong in a regime without fair use-a regime that would ignore the central purpose of U.S. copyright.&quot;' Such a conclusion is not only potentially untenable under the Constitution, but is also undesirable.&quot;' &quot;The public's interest in free expression . . . is significant.&quot;&quot; There is no question that courts have, throughout the history of copyright law, sought to protect that public interest. However, there is also no question that courts are inevitably swayed by value arguments. This should not be the case, but such influence is inevitable. ' Furthermore, value is a chicken-and-egg argument: Campbell did not base its decision on the popularity of music sampling, but surely the popularity informed Campbell's understanding of the critical commentary value of &quot;Pretty Woman.&quot; ... [T]he use of the word &quot;fair&quot; in &quot;fair use&quot; does not mean that it is fair to the author's wishes. Rather, it means that it is fair to the purposes of copyright. None of the emotional arguments frequently raised against fanfiction support a blanket proclamation that none of it is fair use. Truthfully, much of fanfiction may very well not be fair use. However, a true test case of fanfiction, logically evaluating each factor, would be invaluable in moving the fanfiction debate past the emotions of the participants. The argument should focus not on the emotions of the author or the quality of the writing, but on the fair use factors: on the purpose, character, and possible transformative nature of the work, on the amount of the original copyrighted work used, on the nature of the original copyrighted work, and on the effect on the market of the original copyrighted work. These are the factors that best protect the advancement of the twin goals of U.S. copyright. I agree with Lantagne here, it is often exactly those uses that a copyright owner will not want to approve that should be permitted as an exception to copyright. The limited statutory monopoly is granted in return for a contribution to the clutural fabric, and such work should therefore be available for use in further developing that fabric where it does not deprive the copyright holder of financial rewards, and where such uses in general are of public benefit. I take it thatr current US copyright law follows that goal, more or less. Non-US Law The rule on derivative works is also contained in the Berne Copyright Convention and the WTO's TRIPPS Agreement, and so applies in almost every country. Exceptions to copyright, however, vary widely. The concept of Fair Use is originally a purely US concept, although it has been adopted by Israel, and in part by a few other countries. Other countries generally have more specific and narrower exceptions, but often have several different exceptions. India has some 28 different exceptions in its copyright law. Few of these seem likely to be any more favorable to a fanfiction sequel than the US concept of fair use.
Expression is tied up with fixation. Copyright subsists in a work that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which they can be reproduced, perceived, or communicated. 17 USC 102 This expression is protected, not the idea. However, copyright infringement can occur even when there is not an exact copy. First, courts use a substantial similarity standard to determine if infringement has occurred. Second, when a character or plot is sufficiently developed, taking that character or that plot can be infringement, even if not expressed in the exact same manner. "We do not doubt that two plays may correspond in plot closely enough for infringement [...] the less developed the characters, the less they can be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking them too indistinctly." Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corporation, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) Some characters or plot elements are so common to a genre that they are either not considered "original" enough to get copyright protection, or can be taken by others without being considered infringement. This is the scènes à faire doctrine. "Stock scenes and hackneyed character types that "naturally flow from a common theme"—are considered "ideas," and therefore are not copyrightable. But as plots become more intricately detailed and characters become more idiosyncratic, they at some point cross the line into "expression" and are protected by copyright." Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 2001 See Amanda Schreyer's An Overview of Legal Protection for Fictional Characters: Balancing Public and Private Interests for many more cases and examples of the idea-expression dichotomy in action with respect to fictional characters.
Under US law, the particular work is not protected by copyright, being a government work. Therefore, an infringement suit in the US would go nowhere. Under the Berne Convention Article 7(8), the term shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed; however, unless the legislation of that country otherwise provides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin of the work This is acknowledged via EU Directive 2006/116/EC, Article 7: Where the country of origin of a work, within the meaning of the Berne Convention, is a third country, and the author of the work is not a Community national, the term of protection granted by the Member States shall expire on the date of expiry of the protection granted in the country of origin of the work, but may not exceed the term laid down in Article 1. So unless there is a special provision in the country in question, the shorter of the protection-time of the country of origin and that of the country of lawsuit prevails, i.e. zero in this instance. No jurisdiction in Europe appears to have created a special exception to the effect that government works are subject to copyright protection.
Canada In Canada, "the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein" (Copyright Act § 13(1)). Also, "[w]here the author of a work was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship and the work was made in the course of his employment by that person, the person by whom the author was employed shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright" (Copyright Act § 13(3)). Nothing in your description of the situation describes to me an employer/employee relationship, so in my opinion, § 13(3) is not implicated. Even if there were an agreement or contract to transfer copyright to an LLC or assign it to the other individuals, absent an actual writen assignment, the original owner still owns the copyright. "[N]o assignment or grant is valid unless it is in writing signed by the owner of the right..." (Copyright Act § 13(4)). In University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Ltd, there was a contract that required assignment of copyright. "The examiner was the first owner, and he has not assigned the copyright in writing signed by him or his agent. The copyright therefore remains in the examiners, subject to the obligation under the contract of employment to assign it to the University or as it may direct." Even though copyright was owed to the University, it didn't become theirs until the written assignment took place. United States Similarly, in the US, "Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work.", and "in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author" (17 U.S.C § 201). "A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent." (17 U.S.C § 204) Conclusion In both Canada and the US, transfer of copyright requires an affirmative act (a written, signed document, or a note or memorandum, etc.) Since nothing in your description indicates that the author has prepared a signed, written, instrument of conveyance or note or memorandum of the transfer of copyright, the copyright still belongs to the original author.
If I lock you in a room without access to anything and tell you &quot;Write a novel&quot; and you write a novel with characters, you have copyright in the work. But it's not absolute: If you use your own characters, you own all the copyright in the work, but not in the idea, as ideas are not copyrightable, see Feist v Rural. If you use someone else's characters extensively (as in more than a short hommage/cameo), you very likely make a derivate. You own a copyright in your part, as in the expression of the story or pictures you created, but you do not gain property interest in the existing characters' expression. Since the copyright to the characters lies with the owner of their IP, you need their OK to release (and also to even make) your work - as with the owner of a copyright is the sole right to decide on distribution and creation of derivates under 17 USC § 106 (2). Also remember that making an unlicensed derivate work risks having nothing you can sue for in case the original copyright owner lifts your ideas and scenes-a-faire parts and adapts them for their own derivate, see Anderson v Stallone The strange case of fanfiction chains... Now, there is a strange situation when a work is based on a work which is based on a work... Then, publishers and editors start with red ink and the result is, that what people know as Twilight now has nothing to do with the fanfiction it started as (It wasn't Vampires in the original draft), and 50 Shades of Grey ended up striking any and all supernatural from it, despite it having been a Twilight fanfiction originally. By making own characters and own expression of the world, there could be no copyright infringement. US law vs Egypt law? Both Egypt and the US have signed the Berne convention, meaning that copyright is very very similar in the broad strokes that the right to allow or disallow derivates is with the copyright holder. Also, since Ben10's copyright owners are to the best of my knowledge in the US (Cartoon Network Studios &amp; Men of Action Studios), they will sue in a US federal court.
No, John may not lawfully publish such a book in such a way What John wants to do is not lawful. It would infringe on the copyright on both the 1940 original, and on the 1955 translation. Both of those are still in copyright under the laws of France, the UK, and the US. Someone owns those copyrights: some person or business or other entity. If the owner has no legal heirs, in most jurisdictions the property escheats to the government (in the US to the state government). In the case of a company, its assets will be sold or handed over to some entity. But they will not become ownerless, any more than real estate will become ownerless when the owner dies or the owning company is dissolved. It is possible that the owner does not realize that s/he owns these rights. But if John publishes his book, then owner might then realize the rights that s/he holds. The owner could demand payment, or sue for damages. Under US law the damages could include any economic loss that the owner has incurred plus any profits that John or his publisher have made. John and his publisher would both be liable for these damages. As a result, no publisher is likely to be willing to publish John's book. If John self-publishers, he incurs the risk of such demands and suit. In some countries (such as the UK) there are legal procedures fore dealing with such &quot;orphan works&quot;. In those countries one can register with a government agency, and obtain permission to use the work after a search has revealed no owner, paying a rate set by law. But there is no such provision in the US. There, John must either not publish, or gamble that no owner will appear and make demands he cannot afford to meet.