Is the German embassy in London bound by British accessibility law like the Equality Act 2010? Is the German embassy in London bound by the Equality Act 2010 and cabinet office guidance on medical mask wearing exemptions? The website explicitly state that in order to enter the Passport section of the embassy it is &quot;required to wear a protective face covering (without valve)&quot;. Further it mentions that &quot;In order to claim an exemption you will need to present a corresponding medical certificate in your name.&quot; So the general question would be whether the German embassy in London is bound by German law or by British law?
Laws of the host country do apply in foreign embassies, but the authorities of the host country may only enforce laws in a foreign embassy by invitation of the foreign diplomatic delegation. So the general question would be whether the German embassy in London is bound by German law or by British law? It is subject to both, but the embassy can decide to what extent British law applies. In the case of a mask mandate imposed by British authorities, the embassy may require its occupants and visitors to comply with the conditions imposed under British law. It could also refrain from imposing such a requirement. In fact, unless German law prohibits a mask requirement, it can impose a mask requirement on its own initiative even if there is none imposed by British law nor German law. Is the German embassy London bound by the Equality Act 2010 and cabinet office guidance on medical mask wearing exemptions? It is not bound, but it may comply voluntarily.
I can't find any specific laws or cases in the United Kingdom. In Australia, bag searches must be consensual - shopkeepers and even security staff have no power to search your person or belongings. It is for this reason that you will often be asked by security staff to open your bag, and move belongings around inside that may obstruct their view. If they attempt to force you to surrender your bags for search by physical force or by intimidation, you may be entitled to bring a claim for the tort of assault and/or battery. You need only prove that these occurred, without actual loss or damage. In any case, they do not have the power to arrest or detain you unless they believe you have committed a crime, and in those circumstances, only reasonable force may be used. You are under no obligation to remain in the store. If they detain you against your will and you are later found not to have shoplifted, you may be entitled to bring a claim for the tort of false imprisonment, which is, again, actionable per se (you need not actually show damages) and serves to vindicate a person's right to liberty.
Yes, it's legal. It would be lawful discrimination on objectively and reasonably justified grounds Here's why: On the face of it, this is a case of direct discrimination contrary to Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010: (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. however, the company may argue that they are taking positive action in line with Section 158 of the Act (emphasis mine): (1) This section applies if a person (P) reasonably thinks that— (a) persons who share a protected characteristic suffer a disadvantage connected to the characteristic, (b) persons who share a protected characteristic have needs that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it, or (c) participation in an activity by persons who share a protected characteristic is disproportionately low. (2) This Act does not prohibit P from taking any action which is a proportionate means of achieving the aim of— (a) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to overcome or minimise that disadvantage, (b) meeting those needs, or (c) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to participate in that activity. It is likely that they will be able to justify direct discrimination on the grounds of positive action. The Government's Explanatory Notes on the section express the intent of the legislation as such (emphasis mine): This clause provides that the Bill does not prohibit the use of positive action measures to alleviate disadvantage experienced by people who share a protected characteristic, reduce their under-representation in relation to particular activities, and meet their particular needs. It will, for example, allow measures to be targeted to particular groups, including training to enable them to gain employment, or health services to address their needs. Any such measures must be a proportionate way of achieving the relevant aim. A clear example is provided: Having identified that its white male pupils are underperforming at maths, a school could run supplementary maths classes exclusively for them. Furthermore, there is case law to establish that such positive action is entirely lawful: R (Adath Yisroel Burial Society and another) v Inner North London Senior Coroner [2018] EWHC 969 (Admin) (emphasis mine): Before leaving this topic we would stress that section 158 does not concern what is sometimes called “positive discrimination”; it is more limited and concerns only what the legislation calls “positive action”. In general “positive discrimination” is unlawful under the Equality Act. Therefore, as a matter of domestic law, prioritisation of some deaths for religious reasons would not be unlawful; to the contrary, it would be consistent with section 158. That position is mirrored in Convention jurisprudence. The point can be well illustrated by the decision in Jakóbski v Poland (2012) 55 EHRR 8. In that case the applicant was serving a prison sentence in Poland. He adhered strictly to the Mahayana Buddhist dietary rules and requested a vegetarian diet for that reason. This was not provided for him. The prison authorities stated that they were not obliged to prepare special meals for prisoners on the basis of religious belief as a matter of Polish law and that to do so would put excessive strain on them. The application before the court succeeded under Article 9. For that reason the Court did not consider it necessary to address separately the right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Convention rights in Article 14 (to which we return below). However, in our view, the case of Jakóbski is a good illustration of the principle of equality at work in cases of this kind. What on its face looks like a general policy which applies to everyone equally may in fact have an unequal impact on a minority. In other words, to treat everyone in the same way is not necessarily to treat them equally. Uniformity is not the same thing as equality. While this judgement concerns itself with positive action on religious grounds, it has broad application to positive action on grounds of sex too, and would be consistent with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights—namely that if the discrimination can be objectively and reasonably justified, it is lawful.
As in most cases it depends on the details. The length of a blade (> 44mm and width > 10) is important and the circumstances. Assume a fine to something up to € 10000, but a sentence up to 3 years is also possible. In Germany it is not crime (anything that can be fined or minimal sentence is less than 1 year is not a crime). I assume that they took your home address and let you leave the country, which alone is a sign that it not a crime. Since you were so smart to place this in your luggage, where it garantied to be found by airport security, you will probably get something in the range of the minimal fine. You also cooperated by giving a statement, which will assist to lessen the fine (you were after all caught red handed). Having it on your person in a public space, the fine would have be higher. Swinging it around among peaple in a threatening manner, will lead you into the range of a sentence. When the fine arrives, there will be bank transaction form. Go to the next post office or bank and pay it, retaining the receipt. Border control will not be interested in you (they only get alerts for proper criminals). Customs (Zoll) could be interested to enforce the fine, show them the receipt. Pay the fine and get on with your life. As to the U.S. Consulate (forget Embassy, State Department: they deal only in diplomatic affairs) all they will tell you is you must obey the laws of the country you are in assisted in getting an English speaking lawyer when requested send you bill for their efforts A Consulate deals with citizen affairs (administration, assistance). Most Embassies have a Cousulate department inside, but not all. In Berlin it does not. The Cousulate is about 20 Kilometres away from the Embassy. The right to call them is based on the Vienna Conventions 1815 and 1961. All countries that reconised these conventions are required to allow a foreigner to contact their Cousulate. A dual citizen, when inside the country where they are a citizen, do not have this right.
In Germany, had the store not called the police (or paramedics), they would have been charged for not doing so under Section 323c. Other jurisdictions will no doubt have similar laws. On arrival, being informed that you ran away - but thankfully paid with a credit card - the police will try to find you. They are not allowed to make a determination that you are just being foolish, but must assume you are a danger to yourself. At some point in the extensive bureaucratic matter, they will probably come to the conclusion that you have acted in a negligent manner. Once that has been done, you will be made liable for all entailed costs to the taxpayer. So your fear of being charged for threatening to commit suicide is the least of your problems. Your claim against the store is probably justified (the listed price is in most jurisdictions binding). Your reaction to that is not. Section 323c Failure to render assistance; obstruction of persons rendering assistance (1) Whoever does not render assistance in the case of an accident or a common danger or emergency although it is necessary and can reasonably be expected under the circumstances, in particular if it is possible without substantial danger to that person and without breaching other important duties, incurs a penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine. (2) Whoever obstructs a person who is rendering or wishes to render assistance to another person in such a situation incurs the same penalty. Sources: Section 323c - German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB)
I'd rather not, but this might be compliant if you make sure that the personal data under your responsibility remains secure and protected even if it is processed abroad. Since the UK has left the EU, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between implications of the EU GDPR and the UK GDPR. These are functionally equivalent, but in the matter of international data transfers the practical details have diverged. In my answer that you cited, I argued that any website processes personal data, and is thus potentially in-scope for the GDPR. If you cause another organization to process this personal data outside of the UK, you are performing an international data transfer (called “restricted transfer” in UK guidance). For example, such non-UK processing occurs if you use cloud services that run outside of the UK. The UK ICO has guidance on international data transfers. As in an EU GDPR context, you can only perform the transfer if the data remains suitably protected, or one of the exceptions applies. The data remains suitably protected if the target country was attested and “adequate” level of data protection, or if you have implemented appropriate safeguards. As of 2022, the list of countries considered adequate is generally equivalent to the EU list of adequacy decisions. Notably, the US is no longer on that list after the Schrems II decision that invalidated the Privacy Shield Agreement. Since this decision was made before Exit Day, it also applies in the UK. This leaves “appropriate safeguards” for UK→US restricted transfers. In the linked ICO page, read the section Is the restricted transfer covered by appropriate safeguards?. In brief, you will need to perform a Transfer Impact Assessment, and sign Standard Contractual Clauses with the US data importer. In a Transfer Impact Assessment (TIA), you check that the data remains protected despite the transfer into a country without an adequate level of data protection. There is no official guidance on conducting a TIA, but the IAPP has a template and the EU EDPB has recommendations on supplemental measures to protect data transfers, which might reduce the risk and affect a TIA in your favor. It's worth noting that the EDPB recommendations were written in the wake of the Schrems II ruling, and can be summarized as “compliance is impossible when using US-based cloud services”. But this is your assessment, and TBH it seems the UK is a bit more relaxed than the EU in this regard. The Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs) are a pre-formulated contract that binds the foreign data importer to handle the data properly. In essence, this translates relevant aspects of the UK GDPR into contract law. Many service providers already provide a Data Processing Agreement that includes SCCs by reference, but you'll have to make sure that these contracts have been entered in a legally binding manner. Sometimes these apply automatically as part of the terms of service, sometimes you need to explicitly sign these documents. But SCCs are one detail where UK GDPR compliance and EU GDPR compliance diverges a bit. The old EU SCC templates from 2004/2010 can no longer be used and have been replaced. For compliance with the EU GDPR, the new 2021 SCCs must be used. For compliance with the UK GDPR, you have two options. You can either use the 2022 International Data Transfer Agreement (IDTA), or you can use the 2021 EU SCCs along with the 2022 UK International Data Transfer Addendum which modifies the EU SCCs in some details. Don't want to deal with TIAs and SCCs? Switch to a hosting provider that only processes the personal data under your control in the UK, or in a country with an adequacy decision (e.g. EU, Canada, Israel).
No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant.
Regarding the situation in Germany, it is not a crime by itself to travel to Syria (or in fact any other country), nor to take residence there. When people are arrested after such a trip, it is because they are suspected of having committed a crime during their stay. In this context, the crime could be, e.g., murder, abduction, or rape, but there are more specialized crimes, too, such as: Forming terrorist organisations (§&nbsp;129a StGB; translation) Preparation of a serious violent offence endangering the state (§&nbsp;89a StGB; translation) Preparation of a serious violent offence includes participating in a terrorist training camp where people are taught how to use weapons, construct explosive devices, etc. The definition of the crime was recently extended such that it is already punishable to make an attempt at leaving Germany with the intention of travelling to and participating in such a training camp. It is important to note that this intention would need to be demonstrated in court in order to get someone convicted; and someone travelling with different intentions, such as a journalist, would obviously not render oneself liable to prosecution. Outside of criminal law, there are other measures that the authorities may take to try and prevent people from travelling abroad if they are suspected future terrorists. As these are administrative measures and not criminal prosecution, the requirements for evidence are less strict. It has long been possible under German law to deny someone a passport (§&nbsp;7 PaßG; translation), or to revoke a passport that was already issued. The idea is that, without passport, the destination country or any transit countries are going to reject the traveller. This didn’t work too well in the case of Syria because a national ID card is sufficient for German citizens travelling to Turkey, which shares a land border with Syria. Therefore, also very recently, it was made possible to deny or revoke an ID card in much the same way as a passport (§&nbsp;6a PAuswG; no translation currently available). (Note that the translations I linked to are official but non-authoritative. In particular, be warned that the translation for §&nbsp;89a StGB at least does not yet reflect the latest amendments.)