Default judgement when the court can&#39;t provide the requested relief Bravo v. Pelosi is the latest attempt to overturn the 2020 US Presidential and Congressional elections. The plaintiffs are suing everyone they think is even remotely related to the election, and a number of those defendants haven't responded to the summons. Normally, if a defendant fails to respond to a summons, the plaintiff can get a default judgement and the requested relief is granted. However, in this case, the core of that relief is: Permanent injunctive relief in the form of a new federal election for Congress, President, and Vice President; Permanent injunctive relief forever restraining Defendants from ever holding public office or participating in any way in an election campaign to public office other than exercising their own right to vote; Permanent injunctive relief forever restraining Defendants from violating Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights described herein, Most of it looks like it's either outside the power of the court to grant, outside the power of the defendants to provide, or both. How would the court proceed in this case? (If it matters, ignore the fact that a few of the 643 defendants have responded, some haven't yet been served, and others don't yet need to respond. The case itself is a royal mess.)
A federal court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte (i.e. without a request to do so from a party) if it is beyond its subject matter jurisdiction (a category of defenses including lack of standing) or fails to state a claim for relief on its face. A Motion to Dismiss filed in the case provides a roadmap for the judge to dismiss the entire case. It argues in essence: A Texas federal court can't assert jurisdiction over Georgia defendants. A federal court can't entertain claims against state officials in their official capacities for the kind of relief requested. The plaintiffs lack standing to sue. Subject matter jurisdiction defenses (and lack of personal jurisdiction defenses) are also not barred from being raised later in a motion to vacate the judgment, by a default judgment. The Texas federal court can also sanction parties for filing frivolous claims by, for example, awarding all of the costs and attorney fees incurred by the defendants against the party bringing the suit in a motion requesting that relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 against the parties and/or their attorney. I would not be surprised if the Plaintiffs' attorney in this case, Paul M. Davis, was disbarred and bankrupted by it. Class action lawsuits can't proceed as such until certified by the court. Furthermore, a summons has to be personally hand delivered with a complaint to be served in a way that is sufficient to result in an entry of a default judgment, even if the complaint is otherwise valid. This is unlikely to have occurred in all 600+ cases. There are several instances in which a &quot;clerk's default&quot; has been entered, but that simply indicates that a return of service (even if facially defective) was filed by the Plaintiff and that the number of days set forth in the summons for a response has lapsed. In contrast, prior to entering a default judgment, which must be done by a judge, the judge must review the complaint to determine if the court has jurisdiction over the case and if a valid legal claim is stated in the complaint.
Actually this is the only SCOTUS ruling on Impeachment because of what it legally means with respect to SCOTUS and impeachment. Namely, Impeachment is a congressional power and not a judicial one that has no punishment beyond the removal from office upon conviction and that therefor it is not a matter that is Judicial. That is a fancy way to say that SCOTUS or any lower court may not hear appeals rising from the outcome of Impeachment. Because of this, it's unlikely to hear any SCOTUS case as to the matter of impeachment and the only outstanding question they could likely hear is "Who can hear an Impeachment Trial for the Vice President?" but thus far none of the 19 impeachment trials have heard involved a vice president. Nixon v. United States basically held that in matters of impeachment it is the court's position that it is likely to respond to this hypothetical with the legal ruling of "not my monkeys, not my circus" (note: not legal jargon). With that said, this makes the U.S. senate the highest court in the land when it comes to precedents set by impeachment cases. The very first person ever impeached was a U.S. Senator, who was expelled by the Senate the same day the House voted on Articles of Impeachment. The decision not to have the trial did establish some notable precedents: first, Impeachment and conviction are all about removing an officer from office and if at anytime before conviction the officer is removed by other means, the process is stopped as it is moot. Second, and more important, is that members of Congress are not "impeachable" officers as both houses have methods that allow them to expel members by vote. This means that the only people who can be impeached are executive officers (the person who is currently president, vice president, and cabinet secretaries, any other office that is appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate, and federal judges) and that a conviction of impeachment does not bar one from holding another federal office unless the senate enacts an additional punishment after the conviction barring that person from federal office. They cannot bar one from state office. Finally, House and Senate Rules have instructions for procedures in their part in impeachment. The commonality between both is that impeachment takes precidents over all regular buisness so once articles are put to the floor, there speaker must hold the vote with in a certain window of time (three days, I think) and the Senate must hold the trial as soon as possible, though will honor reasonable delays as per the impeached officer's right to delay. As a final note, and because it wasn't clear in the question Nixon v. United States is often confused with another case (United States v. Nixon). The latter one did indirectly relate to impeachment in that it was related to President Nixon handing over evidence to the comittee investigating possible impeachment articles against Nixon, and because of that ruling, Nixon handed over the evidence and later resigned to avoid the Impeachment. The former one not only didn't involve anything related Watergate, it also wasn't related to President Nixon at all, but a (former) Federal Judge Walter Nixon, and specifically was heard because Judge Nixon happened to be the first Judge impeached by a Senate commitee as the jury rather than the full Senate, following a rule change that only held full senate as jury for the President and Vice President and a committee for anyone else. The final rule is that only the President is constitutionally mandated to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court act as the judge in an Impeachment trial, while the presiding officer for all other cases is either the Vice President (acting in his role as President of the Senate) or the President pro Tempore of the Senate (acting in his role of "Guy Keeping the Vice President's Seat in the Senate Rotunda Warm" (not technical Jargon)). Which is why the question of "who is the judge in impeachment of the Vice President?" a noodle baking question, and the answer differs from the Chief Justice to the Senate pr Tempore to the rarely serious argument of the Vice President himself. The best answer is that "It has never come up."
In order to challenge a search at trial via an evidence suppression motion, the particular defendant has to have Fourth Amendment &quot;standing&quot;1 with respect to that search: Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). From the syllabus: Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted ... a person aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. Subject to the various exemptions to the exclusionary rule discussed at this question, the evidence in your scenario would not be admissible against Bob, but would be admissible against Rob. This does not necessarily mean that Bob would go free. As noted in that other question, if police/prosecution have other evidence, independently gathered, or sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, they may still have a case against Bob. This also doesn't mean that an unconstitutional search of a person who will not even be prosecuted is without a remedy. See this answer for a discussion of civil remedies available for a person who has suffered an unconstitutional search. 1. The Court has distanced itself from the term &quot;standing&quot; in this context, so I am using it somewhat colloquially as it is still in common usage in this sense. The Court instead just conceives of whether the defendent even experienced a Fourth Amendment search; the notion of standing is either redundant with or subsumed by such analysis.
I haven't found any cases where this defence has worked. I strongly suspect that that's because it never has. Every piece of advice I've read on this unsurprisingly suggests you'd be a fool to attempt to rely on this defence in court, including some cases in which defendants have attempted to rely on it and have failed. There are a couple of Freedom of Information requests to the government which state very clearly that it won't work: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/statute_law_4 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/consent_of_the_governed The last link is particularly clear on the matter: every citizen of the UK tacitly consents to be governed, according to Blackstone. And this one makes it even clearer: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/18097/response/56511/attach/html/3/TO%20255452%20TO09%205866.doc.html Under the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Acts of Parliament override common law. So it simply wouldn't be possible to argue that you choose to live under the common law alone; no court in the land would allow it, as it's a cornerstone of our legal system that Parliament is sovereign, and therefore that statutes enacted by Parliament will 'trump' the common law. Parliament derives its sovereignty from the fact that the current government is elected and therefore represents the citizens of the UK, and for this reason, Acts of Parliament take priority over case law. On that basis, it wouldn't be possible for a citizen to argue that they choose not to abide by statute: their consent is tacitly assumed. Based on all the above, then, I would say no: the 'common law' defence will never hold water if relied on in court.
"Conflict of interest" has a specific meaning w.r.t. various federal laws, which have financial gain as their underpinning. The so-called conflict which your referring to is an abstract moral duty, eforced at the polls every few years: there is no conflict of interest. "Obstruction of justice" is defined in 18 USC 73. The law does not require a person to passively submit to an investigation, thus you can file motions with a competent court to resist a subpoena. If there is a criminal investigation of a US criminal statute, it is illegal to willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute Saying "you don't have authority to tell me to do that" is not obstruction of justice. I have not seen any (credible) claim that it is unconstitutional for the president to order an investigation of election fraud, for example Executive Order 13799. That commission was disbanded, but a new commission could be ordered via the same mechanism. Congress has the power to defund any such commission, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to use that power in the previous instance.
These situations do come up (and incidentally, this is nothing new, it has been a difficult and recurring legal issue since at least the 18th century), and they really suck to be in, and often there aren't easy answers. There are a lot of legal doctrines out there that are designed to avoid a hard clash of conflicting court orders and to prevent someone from suffering contempt of court sanctions when they are in this bind. Generally, litigants caught in this bind look for these outs. For example, when particular property or records are at issue, often the person in question will "interplead" the property placing it in the jurisdiction of a court to resolve and out of their hands. There is a doctrine called in custodia legis which provides that once something is in the custody of a court that another court may not exercise jurisdiction over it. The entire sub-field of civil procedure pertaining to jurisdiction and venue is designed to avoid these conflicts. U.S. law has a whole sub-field a statutes and legal doctrines like the Rooker-Feldman doctrine designed to prevent these conflicts from coming up when they arise between federal and state courts. One of the most important legal doctrines is that a person cannot be punished for contempt of court for failing to do something that the person being held in contempt of court does not have the ability to do. One argument, which doesn't always work, is that once you are subject to a legally binding court order that has been served upon you that you may not legally defy that court order in order to follow the order of a court which cannot override the decisions of the court issuing the first order. Usually, contempt citations are directed at individual employees or agents rather than at entities. For example, in a dispute over Indian Trust Funds against the United States government, contempt citations were brought against the Secretary of Interior personally and could have sent that individual to jail for not complying. One way the an individual can get out of the order relating to an employment or professional duty is to resign from office and thus deprive oneself of the ability to perform the order. But, the short answer is that there is no one simple legal rule for resolving these situations, and the litigants stuck in these situations look for every available legal argument to resolve it until it is resolved.
If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed.
Generally speaking if it is substantively unconstitutional for the government to punish a certain kind of criminal conduct, then this provides a basis for a &quot;collateral attack&quot; on the conviction to set it aside (in a post-conviction motion in state or federal court), even if the criminal defendant serving a sentence has already appealed the conviction directly (i.e. to the court of appeals and all higher appellate court that review that court of appeals) to the fullest extent possible and lost. But this is not self-executing. Someone has to file a court case on behalf of the person incarcerated to make it happen. It does not generally entitle the criminal defendant to compensation for wrongful incarceration or to a return of fines paid, although it would end the authority of the state to incarcerate the individual going forward or the compel that individual to pay the balance of unpaid fines. There might be a right to have the case sealed, but the ruling does not automatically remove the conviction from the criminal record of the defendant. And, getting the case sealed is likely to be harder in the circumstance where all of the sentence for the unconstitutional offense has been fully served. When a past conviction does not meet the standards of current law from a procedural context, in contrast, this may be raised in pending direct appeals, but is rarely something that can be brought up in a post-decision collateral attack on the conviction unless certain other exceptions apply (e.g. sometimes if a collateral attack pending before the decision is still pending at the time of the decision or in certain extraordinary cases involving due process concerns that cast deep doubt on the validity of all convictions obtained by that means), and even in cases where it is set aside, does not pose a double jeopardy bar against a new prosecution for the crime that meets the appropriate procedural standards. The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering the proper treatment under these rules of its holding that non-unanimous juries were an unconstitutional manner by which to convict someone of a felony, which is a procedural rule, but may fall within the exception that makes the new rule retroactive anyway. For cases on direct review, a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past Justice Harlan's habeas approach was first adopted by a plurality in Teague v. Lane and then by the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh. Thus, for collateral review in federal courts of state court criminal convictions, the general rule is that new rules of constitutional interpretation—those not 'dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final'—will not be applied. However, [a] new rule applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a 'watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Put another way, a new rule will be applied in a collateral proceeding only if it places certain kinds of conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to prescribe or constitutes a new procedure[ ] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court extended the holding of Teague beyond the context of federal habeas review, such that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, state collateral review courts must give retroactive effect to that rule in the same manner as federal courts engaging in habeas review. As a result, at least with regard to the first exception, the Court has held that the Teague rule is constitutionally based, as substantive rules set forth categorical guarantees that place certain laws and punishments beyond a state’s power, making the resulting conviction or sentence . . . by definition . . . unlawful. In contrast, procedural rules are those that are aimed at enhancing the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating the manner of determining the defendant’s guilt. As a consequence, with respect to a defendant who did not receive the benefit of a new procedural rule, the possibility exists that the underlying conviction or sentence may still be accurate and the defendant’s continued confinement may still be lawful under the Constitution. In this vein, the Court has described a substantive rule as one that alters the range of conduct that the law punishes, or that prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. Under the second exception it is not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of a trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. From here.