Is a supermajority requirement for raising taxes constitutional? In a number of US states, in order to enact new taxes or increase taxes, a two-thirds majority vote is required in the legislature or through a ballot proposition. Some supermajority requirements, like overturning vetoes or amending a constitution, are content-neutral. The tax-increase supermajority requirement is not, since there is no similar requirement for lowering taxes. Since one of the main divisions in US politics is the attitude toward tax-and-spend policies, the supermajority requirement in essence makes a Democratic vote be worth half a Republican vote. Doesn't that contradict the "one-man, one-vote" principle? Could it be challenged on constitutional grounds?
This is an open question in Colorado, where there's an ongoing challenge to the state's supermajority requirement in Kerr v. Hickenlooper. The state requires a supermajority for tax or spending increases, and several lawmakers challenged the law as violating the Guarantee Clause, which guarantees each state a republican form of government. The case has been going on for a long time. It's about seven years old now, and they're still arguing about who has standing to bring the lawsuit. The latest development is that no one had standing, but that decision is currently being appealed in the Tenth Circuit. A bigger problem than standing, though, may be justiciability. In Huddleston v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court of Oregon, rejected a challenge to supermajority requirements for reducing citizen-approved sentences for crimes, and in Lefkovits v. State Board of Elections, the Northern District of Illinois did the same with respect to judicial retention votes. Both courts concluded that supermajority requirements were a political issue, not a legal one. The justiciability concerns should be tempered by two considerations. First, there's an argument in Kerr that because taxes and spending are such core legislative functions, that it should be harder to uphold restrictions on the legislature's ability to vote on them. Second, there's U.S. Supreme Court precedent in New York v. U.S. suggesting -- but not deciding -- that the questions about justiciability are overblown: The view that the Guarantee Clause implicates only nonjusticiable political questions has its origin in Luther v. Borden, in which the Court was asked to decide, in the wake of Dorr's Rebellion, which of two rival governments was the legitimate government of Rhode Island. The Court held that “it rests with Congress,” not the judiciary, “to decide what government is the established one in a State.” ... Over the following century, this limited holding metamorphosed into the sweeping assertion that “[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the courts.” This view has not always been accepted. In a group of cases decided before the holding of Luther was elevated into a general rule of nonjusticiability, the Court addressed the merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause without any suggestion that the claims were not justiciable. More recently, the Court has suggested that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions. ... We need not resolve this difficult question today. My money says that the question is not authoritatively answered in my lifetime.
Article IV, Section 4 says this: The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government That would mean no state can be a kingdom. PS in response to comments: This section does not mean the federal government is guaranteeing to the states that the federal government will be republican in form; rather the federal government is required to guarantee that the state governments will be republican in form. That is done when Congress looks over a proposed state constitution before admitting a proposed new state to the Union. That has not always been done, since in particular it was not done in Kentucky. (On February 4, 1791, Congress passed an act saying the district of Kentucky in the state of Virginia would be admitted as a new state, of course with the consent of the Virginia legislature that had been expressed in 1789, but would not be admitted until almost 16 more months passed. The politicians of Kentucky had requested the long delay so they could use the time to negotiate compromises on details of their state constitution, which hadn't been written yet. That was the first time Congress passed a law admitting a new state, but because of the delay, Kentucky became the 15th state rather than the 14th (Vermont is the 14th).)
This was asked and answered by KPD on the Politics stackexchange. This issue came up in a decision from an appeals court, with a judge dying before the opinion was released, leading to the following SCOTUS opinion. The short of the answer: that Judge's vote is voided. If the result of negating the deceased Justice's vote is a 4-4 tie, then the usual procedure for a 4-4 tie is invoked, which is addressed in the Q&amp;A you link. Of course this assumes that SCOTUS will apply this to themselves, but the issue appears to be non-controversial, as it was a fairly recent decision with no dissents noted. So this assumption seems safe.
From the holdings of May 14, 2018 in NJ. v. NCAA, As the Tenth Amendment confirms, all legislative power not conferred on Congress by the Constitution is reserved for the States. Absent from the list of conferred powers is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States. The federal law in question forbids legislatures from passing certain laws, but PASPA’s anti-authorization provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do. The distinction between compelling a State to enact legislation and prohibiting a State from enacting new laws is an empty one. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event. The anti-authorization provision does not constitute a valid preemption provision. To preempt state law, it must satisfy two requirements. It must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution. And, since the Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,” New York, supra, at 177, it must be best read as one that regulates private actors. There is no way that the PASPA anti-authorization provision can be understood as a regulation of private actors. It does not confer any federal rights on private actors interested in conducting sports gambling operations or impose any federal restrictions on private actors. The Commerce Clause does not enter into the majority opinion, though in Thomas' concurring opinion, he indicates he is not entirely happy with purely in-state applications of the Commerce Clause. But, at present, interstate gambling does not differ.
The federal law, 18 USC 597, states that Whoever makes or offers to make an expenditure to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate; and whoever solicits, accepts, or receives any such expenditure in consideration of his vote or the withholding of his vote shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if the violation was willful, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. It is not required that the prosecution prove that the recipient voted at all. You just have to make a payment or offer of payment, and you just have to agree to vote or not vote in exchange for that payment. These laws are entirely enforceable.
A bit of background: In California, current law already provides tax incentives to producers who agree to shoot their films in California, under certain conditions. One of those conditions is that their application describe any programs they have voluntarily adopted to increase the number of &quot;women and minorities&quot; in specific job classifications. SB 611 would broaden that requirement, requiring producers to describe any programs they have voluntarily adopted to increase the number of &quot;individuals from underserved communities&quot; in any job. No, the bill would not require anyone to hire diverse talent. It would only require producers who want to avoid paying taxes to describe how they try to increase hiring of people from underserved communities. If that plan is &quot;do nothing,&quot; the producer can say so and remain eligible for the credit. SB 611 is not law. It was passed by the Senate, but it needs to return to the Assembly and then be sent to the governor for a signature. It has been nearly a month since there has been any major movement on it, so it seems unlikely that the bill will become law this session.
No, such a restriction is not effective. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, and other sections as well, provides otherwise. This was settled early on in the history of US Jurisprudence In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) Justice Johnson wrote for the majority at 10 U. S. 136 (et seq) and 10 U. S. 139: The validity of this rescinding act, then, might well be doubted, were Georgia a single sovereign power. But Georgia cannot be viewed as a single, unconnected, sovereign power, on whose legislature no other restrictions are imposed than may be found in its own Constitution. She is a part of a large empire; she is a member of the American Union; and that Union has a Constitution the supremacy of which all acknowledge, and which imposes limits to the legislatures of the several States which none claim a right to pass ... ... It is, then, the unanimous opinion of the Court that, in this case, the estate having passed into the hands of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, the State of Georgia was restrained, either by general principles which are common to our free institutions or by the particular provisions of the Constitution of the United States, from passing a law whereby the estate of the plaintiff in the premises so purchased could be constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void. (See also the Wikipedia article on the case The court this case (for the first time in US history) held a state law unconstitutional, and nothing in the ruling suggested that this was a unique power of the Supreme Court: rather it was and is a power, in proper cases, of every general Federal court, whether a District Court, a Circuit Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. Indeed in Fletcher v. Peck, the Supreme court in the passage just quoted was upholding a district court decision to the same effect, thus clearly indicating that the power to strike down state laws as contrary to the Federal Constitution is found at the district court level. In the case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) Justice Story wrote for the Court (at 14 U. S. 328 et seq): The third article of the Constitution is that which must principally attract our attention. The 1st. section declares, The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such other inferior Courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The 2d section declares, that The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law or equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State, claiming lands under the grants of different States; and between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. It then proceeds to declare, that in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make. Such is the language of the article creating and defining the judicial power of the United States. It is the voice of the whole American people solemnly declared, in establishing one great department of that Government which was, in many respects, national, and in all, supreme. It is a part of the very same instrument which was to act not merely upon individuals, but upon States, and to deprive them altogether of the exercise of some powers of sovereignty and to restrain and regulate them in the exercise of others. ... ... it is manifest that the judicial power of the United States is unavoidably, in some cases, exclusive of all State authority, and in all others, may be made so at the election of Congress. ... ... ... The exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited by the terms of the Constitution to the Supreme Court. There can be no doubt that Congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of which it may vest appellate as well as original jurisdiction. The judicial power is delegated by the Constitution in the most general terms, and may therefore be exercised by Congress under every variety of form of appellate or original jurisdiction. And as there is nothing in the Constitution which restrains or limits this power, it must therefore, in all other cases, subsist in the utmost latitude of which, in its own nature, it is susceptible. As, then, by the terms of the Constitution, the appellate jurisdiction is not limited as to the Supreme Court, and as to this Court it may be exercised in all other cases than those of which it has original cognizance, what is there to restrain its exercise over State tribunals in the enumerated cases? The appellate power is not limited by the terms of the third article to any particular Courts. The words are, &quot;the judicial power (which includes appellate power) shall extend to all cases,&quot; &amp;c., and &quot;in all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.&quot; It is the case, then, and not the court, that gives the jurisdiction. If the judicial power extends to the case, it will be in vain to search in the letter of the Constitution for any qualification as to the tribunal where it depends. ... (See also the Wikipedia article on the case This case makes it particularly clear that the &quot;judicial power of the United States&quot; extends to all general federal courts (as opposed to limited courts such as the Tax Court or the Court of Claims). If the Supreme Court can make a given ruling, so can any district or circuit court (aside from the limited class of cases where the Supreme court has original jurisdiction). Rulings by lower courts may be taken to the Supreme Court, but are binding until and unless overruled or modified by a higher court. A state may not validly hold in one of its laws that it will obey a judgement by the Supreme Court, but not by a lower Federal court that has proper jurisdiction of the case. I have quoted these two early cases from the Marshall Court because this is a matter that was settled early, and rarely if ever disputed afterwards.
The two-term limit is embeded in the Constitution at the Twenty-Second Amendment. A third term would therefore require a constitutional amendment to allow more than two terms. Under Article V, constitutional amendments can happen in one of two ways: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.