What does &quot;appropriated to the contract&quot; mean in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, s 18, Rule 5? Here, the verb appropriate is followed by TO. What does it mean that someone appropriates &quot;goods of that description and in a deliverable state&quot; TO THE CONTRACT? At large, what does it mean that a person appropriates goods TO THE CONTRACT? This syntax feels bizarre. Which definition of appropriate applies here? I know many legal terms are still in Latin. Is the Latinate meaning of appropriate relevant at all? Googling links to this wordreference.com thread. Sale of Goods Act 1979 Rule 5. (1) Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods by description, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods then passes to the buyer; and the assent may be express or implied, and may be given either before or after the appropriation is made.
A popular word meaning the same would be assigned. See for instance Merriam-Webster entry 2 definition 2: &quot;to set apart for or assign to a particular purpose or use&quot;. As an example, if you go into a pub and ask for a pint of beer and the barman says &quot;certainly sir&quot;, at that point there is a contract of sale but you are not the owner of any part of the beer in the barrel. But when the barman fills a glass for you at that point the beer is appropriated to the contract of sale and becomes your property. The beer has been appropriated to the contract by the seller with the assent of the buyer. On the other hand if the barman says &quot;certainly sir but I am a bit busy right now so would you mind coming round this side of the bar and filling a glass from the barrel yourself&quot; that means that the beer has been appropriated to the contract by the buyer with the assent of the seller.
Contracts contain an implicit term that obligations will be carried out in a reasonable time While the situation is unusual and we obviously don't have the specific terms of the agreement, it would appear that the vendor agreed to contribute to half the cost of the roof repair and your sister was obliged to contribute the other half and arrange for the roof to be repaired. Implicit in this is that she would do this within a reasonable time. Your sister does not have the right to keep the money in limbo indefinitely. It's open to argument whether a year is a reasonable time or not. Similarly, if your sister is in breach of the agreement, the vendor would probably only be entitled to damages for what they have lost; they would not normally be entitled to terminate the contract. Their damages might be assessed as the difference between what their share costs now compared to what it would have cost a year ago - this may be nothing or a lot depending on how prices have changed - and interest lost on the balance that should have been returned to them.
39 USC 3009(b) says that Any merchandise mailed in violation of subsection (a) of this section, or within the exceptions contained therein, may be treated as a gift by the recipient, who shall have the right to retain, use, discard, or dispose of it in any manner he sees fit without any obligation whatsoever to the sender. and (a) prohibits "the mailing of un­ordered merchandise". (d) then says For the purposes of this section, “un­ordered merchandise” means merchandise mailed without the prior expressed request or consent of the recipient. If you previously expressly request a jar of herring and they deliver a jar of herring, you have to pay for it. If instead they send you a jar of honey, then since you did not expressly order a jar of honey, they have violated the law. It doesn't matter whether they deep-down intended to send a jar of herring and accidentally sent honey, or they deep-down deceptively, deliberately and maliciously sent you honey – you still didn't order honey. So it isn't necessary for the law to say anything about error, since the effect of the law is clear enough without saying "whether deliberately or by error". TOS wording cannot override federal law.
Depends on the context Statutory timeframes Certain documents, like a Statement of Claim or an Adjudication Application, set very strict timeframes in motion by their receipt and there are real legal consequences if they are not responded to within a statutorily mandated period. For the former, failure to respond may result in a default judgement and, for the latter, it prohibits the adjudicator from considering a response. In such circumstances, the statute will set out the notice period. Contractural timeframes The document may be initiating an action where there are timeframes spelled out in a pre-existing contract. For example, what’s commonly called a “show cause notice” is a notice from one party to the other that they are invoking a contractural term that requires them to give the other party the opportunity to respond, that is, to “show cause”, why they should’t do something the contract then allows - like terminating it. In such circumstances, the contract will set out the notice period or, if the contract is silent, then a reasonable notice period is required - see below. Reasonable notice It is inherent in contracts, but also a feature of the law more generally, that when a specific notice period is not given, reasonable notice is required. What is reasonable depends on all the circumstances including the ability of the recipient to respond, the severity of the consequence of not responding, and the urgency of the issue. For example, a reasonable time to respond to an eviction notice will be longer than that required to respond to remove your vehicle that is blocking a fire escape - particularly if the building is presently on fire. Date of the notice or date of receipt? When measuring all these times, the question might arise as to whether they are from the date printed on the notice, the date the notice is delivered (or, in legal speak, served), or the date that it comes to the attention of the recipient. Again, that will depend on the circumstances and a statute or contract may measure time from any of those things. They may also have deemed receipt, that is, receipt has legally occurred even if it hasn’t factually occurred. For example, receipt may be in the ordinary course of mail for a posted letter - so for a letter posted by Express Mail, the next business day after postage even if the Post Office loses it. Any or all of these may be subject to their own measures of reasonableness. For example, even if the time is measured from the date on the notice, this would not be reasonable if the sending party waited 2 weeks before sending it. Similarly, if the recipient can demonstrate that they spent the last 6 months in a coma, it might not be reasonable to sanction them for failing to respond. The legal art of service, deemed or otherwise, is a whole subsection of law in itself.
What makes something a take-it or leave-it contract? The lack --be it essential or literal lack-- of opportunity to negotiate the terms of a contract. That is also known as adhesion contract. And (if I am the one taking it), are unclear clauses categorically interpreted in my favor? Rather than "categorically [interpreted]", a more accurate characterization is to say "reasonably [interpreted]". Among the reasonable interpretations of a contract, the adopted one is that which favors the party who was not the draftsman of the contract. This is known as the doctrine of contra proferentem and is cognizable in jurisdictions of the U.S. and in many others world-wide. The doctrine of contra proferentem is sought to compensate for the gap of parties' bargaining power. In an adhesion contract, the fact that one party may only accept the contract "as is" (or reject, which would render this a moot issue) evidences that the draftsman of that contract has significantly more bargaining power. A contract need not be one of adhesion in order to trigger the doctrine of contra proferentem, though. In the case of negotiated contracts, the doctrine may apply selectively so as to interpret ambiguous clauses against the party who ultimately caused the ambiguity in those clauses. Some jurisdictions are more emphatic about this aspect of contract law, which at first glance may seem a departure from the principle of interpretation [literally] against the draftsman. There could be scenarios where a party (the non-draftsman) suggests a clause, and the draftsman incorporates that clause but devises some wording to render the contract unclear in that regard. The doctrine would apply not merely by virtue of the latter party being the draftsman, but because he in his capacity of draftsman tweaked the clause arguably in an attempt to frustrate the other party's interest in --or purpose for-- that clause.
on behalf means that the party of the agreement is the landlord, not the property manager. The contract both entitles and obliges the landlord, not the property manager. The property manager is not a party of the contract. So the fact that the property manager is fired completely unrelated to the existing contract. Additionally, in most jurisdictions that I know of, even if the property changed ownership (the landlord sold or gifted it, or the landlord died and it was inherited by someone) the contract would still be in force, as the change of situations would not invalidated the rights and obligations of the other parties.
There isn't enough information to give a reliable answer in the abstract. It is a hard concept for lots of people to understand, but words don't have the same meaning in every context. Law is not physics or chemistry. Words that mean one thing in a particular instrument or statute could mean another thing somewhere else, even if exactly the same words are used. More context would be helpful in determining a meaning. It could be a reference to a type of use, like AirBnB or other short term rentals (e.g. use as a hotel or hostel). It could also be a reference to a type of building that is not permanent such as tents, RVs, or other non-permanent structures intended for residential occupancy. Usually, a look at what the adjacent and framing language of the covenants say would clarify the intent as would some sense of the kind of structures built or intended to be built in the vicinity. It also isn't clear from context if the emphasis is on "residential" (e.g. in a property with a storage facility included), or on "temporary" (e.g. in a posh suburb).
As much as they like Most pieces of legislation have a “dictionary” detailing, for the purposes of that legislation (or generally) what specific words and phrases mean. This can broaden (or narrow) the definition compared to how they are used in normal English. The purpose of this is not to set a trap for the unwary, although this may happen, but to introduce precision and to allow a short defined term to be used in the drafting rather than having to explain what is meant verbosely every time it’s used. Of course, they can’t redefine terms so that they give themselves jurisdiction when they otherwise wouldn’t have it. For example, in australia, the Constitution gives the Federal Parliament the power to make laws about, among other things, “external affairs”. A law that tried to define “external affairs” more broadly than the Constitution does (which it doesn’t, so we fall back on what it means in English) would be invalid.