When the Director differs from the script Let's assume Alice wrote a bestseller. Then she made a script from it. This script is then given to the movie studio in Hollywood, who contracts Director Bob to make the actual film. The studio doesn't have the greatest lawyers, so it signs conflicting contracts: The contract between the studio and the author was written by the studio's lawyer, but the author demanded two provisions: It explicitly states that the studio or its employees and contractors may not alter the script (except for minimal things) without the written approval of the change by Alice, though it is not expressly said if said approval needs to be prior or could be gotten after the fact. The very next clause prescribes that if the approval provision is breached, the license to make and distribute the adaption is void without the need of further notice. The contract of the studio with the Director was drafted by the Director's lawyer as his standard contract and the studio representative just signed it off after being handed it. It allows him artistic leeway over how to alter the script but never specifies what that means. It doesn't contain any damage clause. During the negotiation with the representative, Bob did not inquire about the licensing contract the studio had with Alice or the script author and thus didn't read it, though he could have gotten a copy if he had asked. Filming starts, and Director Bob does as he does, starting to edit the script by altering the dialogue and merging characters as he sees fit, using what he calls artistic leeway. He also never sends his alterations to the studio to have them check them for approval by the author. Then, Alice decides to request a pre-premiere of the film and is given so by the studio (Director Bob would never approve!). As a result, Alice discovers the substantial alterations and points out that the license was voided, prohibiting the distribution. Which brings us to the questions of law of this situation: Was the studio representative [grossly] negligent in granting Director Bob the artistic leeway clause, not expressly informing Bob about the licensing terms and not checking up on changes when it was bound to get approval for such by its contract? Is Director Bob liable for the expenses and damages incurred by bringing the studio into the breach of its licensing contract? Did, through the voiding of the license, the film become an unlicensed derivate and thus it is wilful copyright infringement? If so, at what moment did it become so?
Was the studio [grossly] negligent in granting Director Bob the artistic leeway clause and not checking up on changes when it was bound to the contrary by its contract? The studio (or its agent/representative, per your subsequent edit) was even reckless for agreeing to artistic leeway despite knowing that the production ought to adhere to Alice's script. The term artistic leeway denotes or implies permission to make non-negligible changes to the script. The contract between studio and director should have addressed the issue carefully. Is Director Bob liable for the expenses and damages incurred by bringing the studio into the breach of its licensing contract? The director cannot be liable for violating constraints which are missing in his contract with the studio. In fact, the term artistic leeway gives the misleading impression that the studio is not under such constraints. Did, through the voiding of the license, the film become an unlicensed derivate and thus it is wilful copyright infringement? If so, at what moment did it become so? it is not expressly said if said approval needs to be prior or could be gotten after the fact The film becomes an unlicensed derivate if Alice is not timely informed about the non-negligible changes the director made. Timely in this context refers to the possibility of rolling back the changes in the event that Alice rejects them. The hypothetical scenario you outline is the converse of the movie example in section Practical Consequences of this page. Here, Alice took the precaution of requiring the second clause you mention.
Not very novel What you are talking about is a derivative work. This is arguably the most famous example: It's an interesting example because Leonardo da Vinci did not have copyright in the original but Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia do have copyright in the derivative. Even though the changes are physically small, they are enough. A crucial factor in current legal analysis of derivative works is transformativeness, largely as a result of the Supreme Court's 1994 decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. The Court's opinion emphasized the importance of transformativeness in its fair use analysis of the parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman" involved in the Campbell case. In parody, as the Court explained, the transformativeness is the new insight that readers, listeners, or viewers gain from the parodic treatment of the original work. As the Court pointed out, the words of the parody "derisively demonstrat[e] how bland and banal the Orbison [Pretty Woman] song" is. For an author to have copyright in the derivative they must: Meet the (low) threshold of originality for copyright to exist. Make their derivative lawfully - either because they have permission or because their use falls under an exception to copyright like fair use or fair dealing. However, they do not have copyright in the original elements. For example, I could take the Mona Lisa and give her different clothes, a different background or a hat I will not be infringing their copyright. If I give her a different style of moustache? However, there is an issue with "I have copyright on the contents of the post" when you don't. Even if your work is derivative, you do not have copyright in the original parts and do not have the right to licence them. So, for example, this post is a derivative work of the Wikipedia page linked to above and I have copyright in my original contributions because: They meet the threshold of originality I have permission to make the derivative either through the Wikipedia licence or because my use is fair use. I can give Stack Exchange a licence for my work but I cannot give them a licence for the original work including, for example, the image and quote above. So, someone could quote my entire answer subject to the licence or fair work, but they couldn't copy just the image or quote.
If you used some creative work of mine without my permission (I'm the copyright holder, and you have no license giving you permission) then I can sue you to make you stop using my work, to get payment for damages, and to get payment for statutory damages. If you used my work because someone else told you wrongly that you had a license, that's very unfortunate for you, but is no reason why I wouldn't or shouldn't sue you. Obviously in this situation that third party did something badly wrong. I can sue both of you together to make sure that I get payment from whoever has deeper pockets. You can also sue that third party if you think that their lying, or being mistaken, about a non-existing license caused you damages, or if there is a contract or something that makes them responsible.
If you're in the U.S., then section 117 of the Copyright Act is likely what you're looking for. The U.S. Copyright Office says: Under section 117, you or someone you authorize may make a copy of an original computer program if: the new copy is being made for archival (i.e., backup) purposes only; you are the legal owner of the copy; and any copy made for archival purposes is either destroyed, or transferred with the original copy, once the original copy is sold, given away, or otherwise transferred. Based on the information you provided, it sounds like you meet all three of these criteria. They also note that your particular software's license agreement might include special conditions that affect your right to make a backup copy. Such a warning would only make sense if it was legally possible for the software distributor to make such a limitation, so I'm afraid the direct answer to your main question is "yes". It's definitely not the norm - at least in my experiences - but it is a possibility so you'll need to consult your program's license agreement. There's also a possibility that the company misunderstood you and was thinking that you were running a backup server (in the sense of a redundant infrastructure) and not making an offline backup of your entire server. It's quite normal to require an additional license for the former case.
You did not specify a jurisdiction, so this answer looks at the Berne Convention and the United States. To summarize, you are correct about joint works; the "death of the author" is taken to be the death of the last surviving author. The general approach for works with corporate authorship is to specify a fixed term that takes into account both the date of creation and the date of publication, if there is one. Here's what the Berne Convention has to say in Article 7bis: The provisions of the preceding Article shall also apply in the case of a work of joint authorship, provided that the terms measured from the death of the author shall be calculated from the death of the last surviving author. This is pretty clear; your presumption is correct. In article 7, there is special consideration for cinematographic works: (2) However, in the case of cinematographic works, the countries of the Union may provide that the term of protection shall expire fifty years after the work has been made available to the public with the consent of the author, or, failing such an event within fifty years from the making of such a work, fifty years after the making. That is, the copyright term is fixed at fifty years from the date of creation, but if the work is published within that fifty-year term, then the copyright term extends until fifty years after the date of publication. That's the 1971 text; I suppose the specific duration may have been adjusted in the meanwhile. The United States Code, at 17 USC 302, has similar provisions about copyright term in joint works: (b) Joint Works.— In the case of a joint work prepared by two or more authors who did not work for hire, the copyright endures for a term consisting of the life of the last surviving author and 70 years after such last surviving author’s death. In a "work made for hire," the copyright is owned by the employer; this would cover movies and other cases in which the creation is attributed to a corporation rather than an individual. These cases are covered by the next paragraph: (c) Anonymous Works, Pseudonymous Works, and Works Made for Hire.— In the case of an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first. [...] The deleted text concerns anonymous and pseudonymous works.
The GPL does not explicitly specify a time within which the source code must be provided, which probably means a &quot;reasonable time&quot; is allowed. What is &quot;reasonable&quot; would eventually be evaluated by a court, if the matter ever got that far. But please note that only the copyright holder (or the holder's authorized agent) can sue for infringement. The license does not give other people a right to sue for infringement, and I doubt that any license could grant such a right. One could inform the copyright holder who could sue, but the holder need not sue, and undertaking such a suit would involve expense, time, and effort. Whether the offer to provide the source constitutes a binding agreement is not clear, and may well vary in different jurisdictions. The question does not state any particular jurisdiction.
Law (regardless of its type) supersedes contract, provided it has jurisdiction over the persons bound by that contract. Contract provisions that are counter to law are generally held to be void. State law has authority over an employer's policies or hand book. However, there may be exceptions in state law (so I would double check). A frequent exception (at least in California law, which I am most familiar with) is for very small businesses. Another exception, from C.R.S. § 8-4-101(5), is if you are considered a "contractor" rather than an employee, per the government's determination. It is possibly worth your time to let you employer know of this conflict before termination if possible, so that they can adjust their policies, rather than in an adversarial position after termination, if only to avoid the headache.
No-ish, it is not. The relevant sticking point would be in their DMCA takedown notice, where they have to follow 17 USC 512(c)(3)(A) and include in their notice (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. The key here is having a "good faith belief". There is a credible scenario where a company A could file multiple notices for the actually same material B posted by the exact same person C, where the person has the right to post that material, and do so in good faith. If A was not able to locate evidence of the permission to C, then they would shift the burden of proof to C – "good faith belief" doesn't mean that they have to be right, just that they have to actually think they are. If C also uses the name D, A would not be able to determine that the work was licensed to D based on the fact (once they know that) that it is licensed to C. DMCA abuse is not an permanently open escape hatch. 17 USC 512(4) states Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. See Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The ruling judge found that "Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright". The appeal court drew on precedent and dictionary to fill in gaps w.r.t. "good faith belief", that the person should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations In this case, the abuser was flagrantly abusing the takedown system, and there is some reason to believe that in the instant case, the abuser had actual knowledge of non-infringement. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America provides an alternative outcome. In this case, Rossi operated a website that appeared (note the word appear) to offer free downloads of movies, and the rights-holder MCAA filed a takedown notice. In fact, it did not offer any such downloads, but MCAA's investigation stopped prematurely. This court held that "good faith belief" is subjective, so Rossi did not prevail. It is no doubt crucial that Rossi actually counted on his customers thinking that you could get actual downloads of protected material. Whether or not a DMCA abuse suit would succeed would depend very much on the factual details of why the material is not infringing, and how easily the rights-holder could know that there was no infringement.