Legal repercussions for an act of discrimination What are possible legal repercussions for someone who stands up in a restaurant and says something like &quot;this n-r must leave the place where white people eat&quot;? What laws apply here?
The only applicable law is the local trespassing law. If he wants, the proprietor can demand that the patron leave, and if the patron does not leave, he can be arrested for trespassing. It uncontroversial that the First Amendment protects racist declarations.
I think this is a lot like this question Liability for poisoning food one expects to be stolen because you are causing harm to someone/something when they are using your things without permission. That question says that if you expect someone to do something with something that you have purposely made wrong then you are legally responsible for the effects.
I do not know the particular legal environment in France, but in general the shop is private property and the owner decides who may enter and who may not. You have no right as such to enter somebody else's property against their will. Doing so would at least be classified as trespassing, possibly more serious considering you mention using force to enter the premise.
There appears to be no general federal statute addressing the legality of a male entering a female-labeled bathroom, or vice versa, within federal jurisdiction. There are various regulations that touch on bathrooms, for example the OSHA regulations pertaining to sanitation require that "toilet facilities, in toilet rooms separate for each sex, shall be provided in all places of employment in accordance with table J-1 of this section", but "Where toilet facilities will not be used by women, urinals may be provided instead of water closets". These are regulations imposed on employers, and there is no provision for enforcement by employers, for instance no clause saying that the employer must call the police, or in any way intervene or sanction an employee, if a person enters a bathroom of "the wrong sex". It is apparently not a crime, as reflected anywhere in the US Code, for a male to enter or remain in a female bathroom, or vice versa. Building managers have some discretion regarding the operation of federal facilities, for example courthouses, which could extend to requesting a male to not enter a female bathroom or vice versa, but there isn't a practical way to determine what departmental regulations exist that would allow eviction of a bathroom-cross-user. Federal law does not protect against sex/gender discrimination in public accommodations. As for Maryland law, the owner of private property has the right to control his property up to the point that state law take that control from him, and therefore in principle he could call the police to remove a person trespassing in a bathroom (this article addresses the trespass angle in North Carolina). Maryland does not appear to have any case law or statutory exception to trespass laws related to labeling of bathrooms, so enforcement actions would be at the discretion of the owner. At the lower end of the political hierarchy, Baltimore has an ordinance requiring single-use bathrooms to be gender neutral, and a proposal exists to enact a state law with this effect. In other words, there does not appear to be any direct, enforceable legal requirement regarding bathroom entry and sex. Trespass laws could be used, but are at the discretion of the property owner (who might be civilly sued for his actions, but the police don't decide the merits of a discrimination suit before evicting a trespasser).
One option would be for an attorney to spend one of their peremptory challenges, which they could do as long as the juror is not a member of a racial minority (Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79). Even then you can, you just have to give a valid reason other than race. Otherwise, the side wishing to strike for cause has to show that there is reasonable doubt that the prospective juror can be impartial (basing their decision just on the evidence presented and the law as explained by the court). Turning the accused / juror relation around, one might be able to strike for cause if the stripper was accused of some form of grave immorality and if the spinster was a leader of a radically puritanical religious sect that held that strippers must fry for said grave immorality crimes. The underlying assumption is that any prospective juror will be impartial, unless they say (or said, or have done) something that shows otherwise.
In placing an order (for anything, not just in a restaurant) and in the supplier accepting it then a legally binding verbal contract has been created. There are terms that come into being implicitly: some come from statute law and some from common law. For example, in most jurisdictions there will be either a common law or specific statute that requires the product to be of merchantable quality and fit for the purpose the customer explicitly or implicitly made known to the vendor. In a restaurant, this means that the food must be presented in a way that enables you to eat it and it must be fit for human consumption. It also means that, in the absence of a time for delivery being specified, that the meal must be delivered within a reasonable time. Reasonable has a specific legal meaning and is an objective test: what an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person would expect in the specific circumstances. It is clear that a reasonable time varies with the circumstances. Reasonable in McDonalds is different from reasonable in a 3 Michelin star restaurant and also different from the same McDonald's when it is obvious to the customer that they are currently insanely busy. If the supplier does not supply the goods and services within a reasonable time then they have breached a term of the contract. The customer has several options: repudiate the contract and sue for damages if this is a breach of a condition of the contract (a condition is a term that is fundamental to the contract; late delivery of food probably isn't a condition), repudiate the contract and sue for damages if this is a major breach of a term of the contract (late delivery probably is), sue for damages if this is an intermediate breach of a term or a breach of a warranty. Enough generalities, for your specific queries: What law in involved in restaurant orders? Contract law, consumer protection law, health and safety law, business law, food hygiene laws, tax laws etc. etc. If I go into a restaurant and order hundreds of dollars of food, then leave before it arrives, I would imagine there is some recourse that the proprietor could take. Sure, there is a contract, you breached it, the restaurant can sue for damages. In addition, they could make a complaint to the police that you have acted fraudulently by ordering food you never intended to pay for. However, if I order a single item and it doesn't show up for over an hour, despite me inquiring about it's status, would I be compelled to pay? It depends on if an hour is a reasonable time or not. By inquiring you have demonstrated that you don't believe that it is but you may not be "an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person". If the breach is actual and egregious enough then you probably have the right to repudiate the contract; that means the contract is at an end and neither of you have any further obligations under it including an obligation to pay. That said, you would be on surer ground if you attempted to renegotiate the contract to make time a condition. "Look, if the meal is not here in 15 minutes, I'm leaving"; if the restaurateur accepts this renegotiation by, for example, saying "I'm terribly sorry, we will sort it out" then your position is much clearer.
Anti-discrimination laws in the U.S. have exceptions for someone who rents a room in a landlord's own residence, but generally speaking, for other purposes, there is not a distinction in U.S. or Florida law. People who stay at a place with the permission of the owner for a very brief period of time and not pursuant to a lease, such as someone who gains use of a particular seat in a movie theater pursuant to a purchased ticket, is, however, not a tenant with the full rights of a tenant, and is instead a licensee who does not have a property right to use that space, only a contract that can be terminated by the property owner or their agent at will, potentially with breach of contract damages if this is done without justification, but not with liability for violating a tenant's rights. In some cases, someone whose housing, at least part of the time, is for the convenience of the employer, like a medical resident who uses a sleeping room at a hospital, or a member of the crew of a ship who sleeps on the ship incident to their duties, may have reduced rights relative to housing when their employment is terminated for cause, although this is only sometimes clearly enunciated in statutes or case law and the law would not be terribly consistent in this area.
LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.