The spectrum of legality I've always envisioned &quot;legality&quot; as a spectrum, with the label of completely illegal at one end, and the label of strictly legal at the other end. In the middle, I see different levels of decriminalization. Below, I will write down the different points I imagine exist on the spectrum, starting at completely illegal, and making my way towards strictly legal. Completely illegal crime. Law enforcement's focus and resources directed away from that kind of crime. The above, in addition to LEOs attaining the discretion to not arrest the criminal, or press charges. LEOs advised/implored not to arrest or press charges against people committing the crime. The act isn't punishable, but the agent is obligated/prohibited to do certain things after being caught. The act isn't punishable, but the agent can be obligated/prohibited to do certain things after being caught. The act isn't punishable, and no actions can be obligated of, or prohibited from, the agent after being caught. The action is strictly legal. Points 5. and 6. can be further subdivided, where the subtypes are different in whether the violation of the obligations and prohibitions are punishable, and/or if the agent can be physically forced to comply with the obligations/prohibitions. I am not sure where those subtypes would lie in relation to each other on a spectrum of legality however. I also want to point out that in cases/jurisdiction where the choice to enforce a law or not is already up to the LEO's discretion, points 2. and 3. are equivalent. However, if a jurisdiction originally does not allow LEO's to use their discretion in relation to arresting/charging a criminal, but then changes policies to allow such, it seems to me a step towards &quot;greater legality&quot;. Also, this is a spectrum differentiated by changes in policy and law, not changes in culture. A kind of cultural decriminalization could exist at any of these points, where the police and/or people do not care about the crime at all. Since this kind of decriminalization doesn't necessarily depend on (though of course is influenced by) any of the points on the spectrum, it exists outside of the spectrum. So, my questions are the following: Is my conceptualization correct? Is this a concept established and accepted in jurisprudence, and if so, where and by whom? Are the more points to add?
Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all &quot;completely illegal&quot; regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a &quot;criminal conviction&quot;). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been &quot;decriminalised&quot; - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority.
Ignorantia juris non excusat You can say I didn't know: it won't keep you out of jail. Rather than delving into the specifics of your question, I will keep my answer general. If you break the law, you break the law. It doesn't matter if: you don't know what the law is, you didn't think the law applied to you, you thought what you were doing was in accordance with the law. "Break the law" is an objective fact - there is no subjectivity involved. The state of mind of the person is, in most jurisdictions, irrelevant; the common law doctrine of mens rea or "the guilty mind" has almost universally been done away with. Now specific offences have specific defences. Generally, in underage sex cases genuine ignorance of the age of the person is one such defence. A court may decide that ignorance that the person was underage under US law may qualify for this defence.
All laws (federal, state and local) apply to everybody, unless you have diplomatic immunity. That is, unless e.g. the federal government decides as a matter of policy to ignore certain federal laws. California does not have a law generally prohibiting the use of marijuana, though public consumption is illegal, minor consumption is illegal, and possession over 28.5 grams is illegal. So that is one less law to be concerned with violating. The federal law still exists, and has not been repealed for anyone. However, the federal government by policy is not pursuing marijuana cases in legal contexts in those states that have legalized marijuana. The complication for foreign students is that there are also immigration laws whereby you may be deported for a drug offense (that link is full of technical details on immigration and drug laws, worth reading). The immigration laws basically make it easy to penalize a foreigner (for example you might be deemed "inadmissible" so you cannot be re-admitted to the US if you leave; it just depends on what their grounds are for action). For example, "a noncitizen is inadmissible as of the moment that immigration authorities gain substantial and probative 'reason to believe' the noncitizen has ever participated in drug trafficking," which does not mean a conviction. It is reported that in California, DHS officers have treated minor infractions as "convictions," which means to be safe you have to avoid even infractions. It appears (and hire an immigration attorney if you want to test this) that trouble only arises if there is reason to believe you are trafficking, if you are a drug addict or abuser, if you are "convicted" (not necessarily "tried and found guilty," it also includes certain legal maneuverings), or if you admit to drug use (even in the case of home use under doctor's orders, i.e. a California-legal context). This incidentally includes non-use but working for the marijuana industry. It is possible that you could get stopped on the street by a random immigration search, and if you are in possession, then... it is not guaranteed that possession of a small amount of marijuana, when caught by federal authorities, cannot lead to immigration problems.
By definition this is not an intentional crime or tort (i.e. civil wrong for which one can sue). There are several standards of intent (also called mens rea) other than knowledge that one is committing a crime or intent to commit a crime, that are commonly applied to criminal offenses and torts: Strict liability Negligence Gross negligence Willful and wanton conduct Recklessness Extreme indifference Strict liability would be highly unlikely to apply to unintentional encouragement of violence. Usually, in the criminal context, it applies to traffic offenses, like speeding or drunk driving defined by blood alcohol content. Negligence is often a basis for liability in a lawsuit or for other civil remedies (e.g. cause to fire someone from their employment), but is usually only a basis for criminal liability when a death or very severe injury results (e.g. vehicular homicide) or when the circumstances are such that there is a heightened risk involved in an activity (e.g. discharging a firearm, or treatment of a small child in one's custody). Even then, for criminal law purposes, liability is usually only imposed in cases of truly &quot;gross negligence.&quot; One could imagine highly stylized fact patterns where gross negligence encouraging violence could give rise to criminal liability (e.g. gross negligence by the commander of a military unit under military justice) but this would be a rare and exceptional situation. Willful and wanton conduct, and recklessness, don't require actual knowledge or specific intent, but do presume disregard for objectively obvious risks. Under the Model Penal Code, this is the default standard of intent that applies when no specific standard is articulated in a statute. Unintentional but reckless conduct encouraging people to be violent might very well give rise to criminal liability. Extreme indifference (also sometimes called deliberate indifference) is an extreme form of recklessness in which one acts with total disregard for the consequences when one clearly knows or should know that serious consequences are almost certain, even if the precise consequences to whom or what are not known. This level of intent is often treated as equivalent to intentional conduct and would often give rise to criminal liability. There are many potentially relevant federal and state statutes that could apply, but this is the general lay of the land regarding unintentional conduct.
Prior to Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), common law allowed police to use deadly force to effect the arrest of a person suspected of a felony. Even though SCOTUS there held that such a practice violates Fourth Amendment civil rights, I was surprised to find that in some states it is still lawful for police to use deadly force to effect an arrest! Let us examine the most extreme case, which is that the police can legally shoot at you to effect your arrest. As explained here, you are always allowed to resist &quot;excessive force.&quot; If you make it to court, these qualifications (e.g., &quot;necessary&quot; and &quot;excessive&quot;) are ultimately decided based on what a &quot;reasonable person&quot; would have believed in the situation. So if a cop shoots at you, and you &quot;dodge&quot; the bullet, it is possible for you both to be found not guilty of any crime. I.e., the cop can be found to have acted &quot;reasonably&quot; because he believed you were a violent felon and shooting you was the only way to stop you. And you can be found to have acted &quot;reasonably&quot; because you believed you were being subject to excessive force. While this is an interesting hypothetical, in practice of course by the time a cop is shooting at you you are almost certainly going to be charged with resisting arrest. Or, if the cop fired in self-defense (rather than to effect an arrest) you will be charged with a number of far more serious crimes (starting with felony assault, reckless endangerment, and going on from there...).
The advantages are: police officers, like all enforcement officers, have discretion on how they treat what they perceive to be transgressions of the law they enforce. If you are cooperative and helpful they may exercise that discretion to your benefit, if you are obstructive and difficult they may exercise it to your detriment: this may be the difference between a warning, a ticket and an arrest. one of the things that judges are allowed to take into consideration when sentencing is remorse. While the linked podcast indicates that this is not an easy thing to objectively define, it includes accepting that what you did was wrong and mitigating the harm that was done which would include cooperating with law enforcement. The disadvantages are: you may reveal information that is not known to the officer. This may or may not be admissible evidence but, notwithstanding, it may serve as a basis for further investigations which can discover things you would rather the police officer did not discover. For example Officer: "Do you know why I stopped you?" You: "I assume because of the dead body I have in the boot."
No. The police have no affirmative legally enforceable duty in the U.S., to the general public, or any particular person who invokes their assistance, to take action to enforce the law. The leading case on point is Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (full text here). In this case, despite the urgent requests of the beneficiary of a Colorado domestic violence restraining order and the warning that a violent crime was imminent, the police in the Town of Castle Rock blew the woman off, and did nothing to prevent ex-husband who had illegally abducted her three daughters from murdering them even though they could easily have done so. The conclusion of the majority opinion by Justice Scalia states that (some citations and footnotes omitted): We conclude, therefore, that respondent did not, for purposes of the Due Process Clause, have a property interest in police enforcement of the restraining order against her husband. It is accordingly unnecessary to address the Court of Appeals’ determination that the town’s custom or policy prevented the police from giving her due process when they deprived her of that alleged interest. In light of today’s decision . . . the benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause, neither in its procedural nor in its “substantive” manifestations. This result reflects our continuing reluctance to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as “ ‘a font of tort law,’” . . . but it does not mean States are powerless to provide victims with personally enforceable remedies. Although the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13 (the original source of §1983), did not create a system by which police departments are generally held financially accountable for crimes that better policing might have prevented, the people of Colorado are free to craft such a system under state law. Despite this concluding statement, there was a very solid argument that the law of the State of Colorado at the time had already been intended to do just that, but was not and would not be given effect. This U.S. Supreme Court case dealt with claims under federal law. There is no affirmative constitutional right to reclaim a stolen car or try to prevent your car from being stolen by a private individual, even if you have a legal right to do so under state law. So, you can't bring a federal civil rights action to enforce a deprivation of that right. The situation is even worse under state law, where police have absolute immunity from liability for all tort claims (i.e. roughly speaking, lawsuits to enforce rights other than contractual rights), unless it comes within a specific exception (of which are there are several) for cases of ordinary negligence such as car accidents when just driving around and not having emergency lights illuminated, or failing to clear ice from a sidewalk on police department property. Their boss may not take kindly to their indifference, but that is a purely discretionary issue for their boss in the context of an employer-employee relationship (often further limited by civil service protections for public employees and/or protections as members of a law enforcement union). The primary exception, not applicable in the example in the question, is that law enforcement officers have certain obligations to protect people who are in law enforcement custody from harm. This obligation is stronger prior to a criminal conviction, and is weaker after someone has been convicted of a crime and is serving a sentence of incarceration for that crime. If you brought a lawsuit of the type described in the question, you would probably lose the case on a motion to dismiss filed swiftly after you filed your lawsuit, and there is a very good chance that you would be compelled to pay the legal fees of the people whom you sued. Comparative Law Footnote Incidentally, while this rule of law is widely shared in countries with &quot;common law&quot; legal systems derived from English law, it is not the case with nearly the same degree of clarity in &quot;civil law&quot; legal systems based upon the civil codes found in Continental Europe such as France, Germany, Spain and Italy. Almost all countries in Latin America, most countries that are not former British colonies in Africa, and most countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia, are civil law countries. In civil law countries there generally are both statutory obligations and human rights law obligations for which the government or government officials can have liability for willfully refusing to enforce criminal laws. But even there it is, as a practical matter, difficult to enforce this obligation and is possible only in the most stark circumstances (such as the one described in the question where there is open defiance of this obligation without any understandable and legitimate contravening reason for failing to act).
The question is oddly phrased: The law does not give allowances for its violation. Many laws have exceptions. E.g., the law against killing endangered animals contains an exception for defensive killings. Perhaps you are thinking of safe harbors? For example, there are general provisions in the law like "exigent circumstances" that allow police to proceed with actions that, absent those provisions, would constitute violations of law. "Permission" to violate a right can be granted explicitly in the form of a warrant, which allows law enforcement to "violate" specific property and freedom rights. Finally, one might consider an executive pardon or jury-nullification to be ex post "permission to break the law."