How to determine a fair sentence? I am reading a book called Noise, I am still at the beginning, but already I have a question. The book in the first chapter tells the story of how the US Sentencing Commission tried to set some guidelines for the criminal sentences. By their own admission they did not have a method to determine a fair sentence and their solution was to take an average of past sentences. I thought that such solution was too simplistic and I wondered whether there could be a better way. One solution could be to study the outcome of past convictions. Someone could take some past cases where the convict has served the entire sentence at least x years ago, group these cases by type of crime, circumstances and the length of the sentence (maybe discretised) count the number of convictions in each group and calculate the percentage of repeated offenders. I guess that, barring some noise, it could be possible to fit a curve to these data that would see the number of repeated offenders inversely proportional to the length of the sentence. In many case a change in the slope of the curve could indicate point that would optimise the trade off between the length of the sentence and the number of repeated offenders. Did anybody ever make a similar study to determine what could be a fair sentence? I am not a law expert and I am sure that there could be other methods that are a lot more sophisticated, but this seems a step ahead compared to the solution adopted by the Sentencing Commission. Am I right or is there a flaw in this idea?
You are assuming that avoiding recidivism is the primary goal of a custodial sentence If that were the case, then the death penalty for every crime would be the most effective: not only do dead people not commit crime, they don’t even think about committing crime. Now, if you’re rebelling against that idea of the death penalty for shoplifting, that just demonstrates that criminal punishment has other goals than merely avoiding recidivism. Section 3A of the new-south-wales Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 codifies the common law: (a) to ensure that the offender is adequately punished for the offence, (b) to prevent crime by deterring the offender and other persons from committing similar offences, (c) to protect the community from the offender, (d) to promote the rehabilitation of the offender, (e) to make the offender accountable for his or her actions, (f) to denounce the conduct of the offender, (g) to recognise the harm done to the victim of the crime and to the community. Custodial sentences are good at (a), (e), (f), and possibly (g). In the short term they are good for (c) but not so good in the long term and they are terrible at (b) and (d). Of course, if you’re in a jurisdiction where judges are subject to political pressure, either directly by being elected, or indirectly, by not being independent, then the primary purpose of sentencing is to ensure the judge keeps their job or otherwise advances their career. This can be considered the central dilemma of democratic politics: you cant do “good” unless you have power but getting or keeping power might require you to do “bad’ things. As for whether there are studies statistically linking any of these objectives to sentence length, there are literally thousands.
If someone was charged with 15 counts of a crime but was only indicted on 2 counts, can the prosecutor introduce evidence at sentencing of charges that the person was not indicted on? In federal court, yes. This has been the case since Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) which held that evidence such as counts and conduct upon which the defendant was not charged or indicted may still be considered in a sentencing hearing. Since U.S. v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), the prosecutor can even introduce evidence at sentencing of charges upon which the person was acquitted by a jury. See generally here. This remains good law although it is controversial both in academic writing and in political discussions and among many sitting federal judges. Neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor constitutional provisions related to evidentiary matters (e.g., the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment) apply at sentencing. Therefore, the court may consider hearsay and other types of information that would not be admissible during a trial. However, the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission has stated that information considered by a court at sentencing must have “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.” Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, the court “must — for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter — rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing.” In resolving factual disputes, the court ordinarily applies the preponderance of the evidence standard. From here. The quote above cites the following authority: FED. R. EVID. 1101(d)(3). Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 480 (2011) (“This Court has long recognized that sentencing judges ‘exercise a wide discretion’ in the types of evidence they may consider when imposing sentence and that ‘[h]ighly relevant — if not essential — to [the] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.’ Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246– 247 (1949). Congress codified this principle at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which provides that ‘[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information’ a sentencing court may consider ‘concerning the [defendant's] background, character, and conduct,’ and at § 3553(a), which sets forth certain factors that sentencing courts must consider, including ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant,’ § 3553(a)(1).”). USSG §6A1.3(a). FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(3)(B). USSG §6A1.3, comment.; see also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91-92 (1986) (holding that due process does not require sentencing factors to be proved by more than a preponderance of the evidence). Federal Rule of Evidence 1101 states (emphasis added): Rule 1101. Applicability of the Rules (a) To Courts and Judges. These rules apply to proceedings before: · United States district courts; · United States bankruptcy and magistrate judges; · United States courts of appeals; · the United States Court of Federal Claims; and · the district courts of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. (b) To Cases and Proceedings. These rules apply in: · civil cases and proceedings, including bankruptcy, admiralty, and maritime cases; · criminal cases and proceedings; and · contempt proceedings, except those in which the court may act summarily. (c) Rules on Privilege. The rules on privilege apply to all stages of a case or proceeding. (d) Exceptions. These rules — except for those on privilege — do not apply to the following: (1) the court’s determination, under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary question of fact governing admissibility; (2) grand-jury proceedings; and (3) miscellaneous proceedings such as: · extradition or rendition; · issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; · a preliminary examination in a criminal case; · sentencing; · granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and · considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. (e) Other Statutes and Rules. A federal statute or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court may provide for admitting or excluding evidence independently from these rules. Given the immense personal importance of a sentencing hearing which can exercise discretion over a range of many decades of possible prison time, and which is frequently the only meaningful opportunity for a person who is easily proven guilty to distinguish himself or herself from other defendants, it is really very stunning and counterintuitive that this is the case. And if so isn't that denying the defendant his or her due process because that person was not indicted on those charges? Under current U.S. Constitutional law, the maximum sentence that can be imposed must be based upon convictions by a jury or judge based upon charges upon which indictments were brought, which were proved beyond a reasonable doubt based upon admissible evidence. The leading case in support of this proposition is Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). But, at sentencing, the judge's exercise of discretion up to the maximum sentence established at trial may be made based upon a preponderance of the evidence and that evidence is not subject to the same procedural safeguards.
It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.
The reality, and to some extent the conventional wisdom, is that jury trial as less accurate (and jury trials are without a doubt, in modern times, less efficient). But there is also a widespread belief that jury trials are less biased than bench trials. Judges are probably more accurate but are perceived as being biased against most kind of criminal defendants, so that the average result is worse of innocent defendants, even though jury trials probably cause more guilty defendants to go free than they would otherwise. The empirical evidence is mixed and is system and context specific (judges might be biased in favor of law enforcement defendants, for example). But the revealed preferences of criminal defendants show an overwhelming belief that the average results of jury trials for them are better than the average results of bench trials for them. The fear of judicial bias also illuminates the circumstances under which the British retain civil jury trials (e.g. in eminent domain valuation proceedings, where judges are seen as having something of a conflict of interest since their department's budget competes for scarce funds with those funds used to pay eminent domain claims). Sometimes being fair is more important than being right, and that is what the jury system strives to do. The belief that judges have some inherent biases overlaps with the notion that the jury may bring a broad range of insight into interpreting the factual presentation and the credibility of witnesses based upon their wider range of personal experiences. The removal of the class and occupational biases of judges generally from the system also does have a democratic aspect to it. It gives granular active control of a key form of state use of power involuntarily over someone to the democratic populace making the system more democratic. Juries also turn a decision made by a lone judge (because unlike civil law systems, common law judges with only rare exceptions conduct bench trials individually, rather than in panels of judges), guarding against the idiosyncrasies of any one individual decision maker. Also, as a practical matter, in the U.S. and pre-modern England, there was a scarcity of legally trained judges so adopting a system calling for far more judges per capita, as civil law legal systems of Continental Europe did, would have been expensive, and juries made collective decision making possible, leveraging scarce judicial resources. Another important facet of this is jury nullification which gives a jury the practical, although often not formally acknowledged, power to disregard the law when its application seems unfair. The revolutionary Americans figures that their fellow citizens would be less likely to convict them of wrongs against an unjust state than British appointed judges had been to do so, and in practice, even in modern times, juries have often been lenient with politically motivated criminal defendants charged by the state with crimes. It also reflects a political calculus on the part of the judiciary collectively. In a bench trial, the public will seek to hold the judge responsible for decisions with which it disagrees and to blame the judiciary collectively for bad decisions. A jury trial deflects blame from the judge to an effectively anonymous and ephemeral group of ordinary citizens so that decisions perceived as bad don't taint the long term reputation of the judge with the public. More generally, bad decisions in high profile court cases can undermined the legitimacy of the government as a whole if made by a judge, but not nearly so much, if made by a jury. Finally, there are decisions that mosts often come up in tort cases (such as personal injury cases, defamation cases, and money claims for violations of civil rights) where a big component of any damage award involves compensatory non-economic damages (e.g. for pain and suffering and damage to dignity) and non-compensatory punitive damages claims, where a jury serves what amounts to an opinion survey-like role by translating intangible harms into fixed sums of money in a way that reflects community opinion, where there is no easy way to define that sum of money in a flexible way to cover myriad situations that a judge can follow in a principled way.
How would this scenario play out in the legal system? Prosecutor brings charges against EQM or tries to use that conviction to enhance a subsequent conviction. Defendant EQM raises the pardon as a defense. Prosecutor responds that the pardon was intended to cover EQM Prime, not EQM. The Court holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the President intended to pardon EQM Prime or EQM. The Court decides who the President intended to pardon based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, and rules accordingly. The burdens of proof are tricky. Usually affirmative defenses have a preponderance of the evidence burden on the proponent of the defense, but sometimes the defense must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt. I don't know that part of the law well enough to know without lots of research and the outcome might not be uniform across the U.S. To my knowledge, there has never been a case that got this far in which the true identity of the beneficiary of the pardon was ambiguous. It is possible, but a vanishingly rare possibility. Almost always, someone gets a pardon by asking for it and determining whether EQM or EQM Prime asked resolves it, or a reference to the crime resolves it. If the Court concludes that both asked the same President to be pardoned for the same crime (e.g. if the same crime was committed jointly by father and by son who is named after father and doesn't use Jr. day to day) and the Court concludes that the President was probably confused and didn't realize that there were two requests from different people and not one, the judge would probably give them the benefit of the doubt and treat both as pardoned as that would still reflect the President's intent.
One wouldn't be able to make a claim about a driving record without it being testimony. Testimony will be challenged during cross examination. The prosecutor won't be able to bring up prior bad acts (such as previous speeding tickets) but will most certainly be allowed to rebut any claim of no prior bad acts made by a defendant. When the defendant claims a spotless driving record the defendant is introducing character or a character trait into the trial. Once introduced by the defendant the prosecutor will be allowed to challenge the credibility of that statement and, therefore, the credibility of the witness. Imagine the following interaction: Defendant: I have a spotless driving record. Prosecutor: Are you saying you've never been issued a traffic ticket? Defendant: Um, Uh, well... When a defendant goes to court they are facing a specific charge. The prosecutor will present evidence that supports that charge and it is up to the defendant and his attorneys to sow reasonable doubt within the jury, or at least one juror. By presenting character, the defendant may appear to be saying either, "Hey, it was my first time let me off," or, "I've never done it before so I couldn't have done it this time." Either way, it probably won't create reasonable doubt in the juror's mind about the specific charge they're weighing and it has the potential to open a can of worms that would be unfavorable to the defendant.
The statutory requirement for sentencing guidelines are at section 120 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which includes: (2) A sentencing guideline may be general in nature or limited to a particular offence, particular category of offence or particular category of offender. Therefore, not every offence etc requires - or has - its own specific sentencing guideline. (Presumably as there are far too many offences to easily cover, so limited resources might need to be focused on the more common ones.) Note that at the foot of the Sentencing Council's explantory materials is this link: Where there is no guideline for an offence, refer to the General guideline. Which states it is for: sentencing offences for which there is no offence specific sentencing guideline... So this General guideline is the one to be applied when dealing with a s.53 RIPA offence. (I've not reproduced it here to save space)
Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of &quot;acquittal&quot; was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing &quot;guilty as charged&quot; and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard &quot;not guilty as charged&quot;. After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of &quot;guilty&quot;. The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.