Under English law, what limitations apply to arbitration of civil disputes? Under U.S. law, almost all kinds of disputes between people who have contractual relationships with each other can be subject to binding arbitration with no appeal right or class action rights through a contractual term with only minimal regulation of the arbitration process. In English law, are there significant classes of civil disputes that can not be subjected to arbitration? For example, is binding pre-dispute arbitration prohibited (or required) for any significant subset of consumer disputes, landlord-tenant disputes, realtor disputes, employment disputes, banking disputes, or international disputes? Or, for example, are there contexts in which the duty to arbitrate is subject to strict scrutiny, either based upon either the arbitration process or the nature of the subject matter subject to arbitration? Also, in civil disputes, when they are subject to arbitration clauses, is the arbitration process subject to significant legal regulation in English law? For example, is the business/profession of arbitrating civil disputes one that requires licensing and is subject to government regulation that affects the arbitration process in any material respect? To be clear, when I say "arbitration", I mean a pre-dispute agreement to have a non-governmental private individual or firm resolve a civil dispute between parties bound by a common agreement of some kind, in lieu of resort to civil courts, where the agreement is binding without further action of the parties (with or without a right to a trial de novo or appeal of the decision either within the arbitration context or to a civil court). I do not mean mediation in which the parties are required to discuss settlement with the aid of a third party facilitator that only has any legal effect if both parties affirmative sign some sort of settlement agreement to particular terms after those terms are known.
It is not true to say that there is &quot;only minimal regulation&quot; of arbitration in the US: arbitrations are conducted under law, usually the Federal Arbitration Act but sometimes equivalent state laws and must be conducted in accordance with the rules agreed to by the parties. Further they can be appealed, however, the grounds for appeal are restricted to those enumerated in the Act or agreed by the parties. In general, this is the case for all jurisdictions including England, however, the specific Acts that makes arbitration legal are different in each jurisdiction. Section 69 of the UK Arbitration Act 1996 enumerates the rights of appeal and which may and may not be excluded. That said, appeals from arbitrations are rarely initiated and exen more rarely upheld. A recent decision, NYK Bulkship (Atlantic) NV v Cargill International SA [2016] UKSC 20 has clarified this section: The only two grounds to challenge an award which cannot be waived in an English-seated arbitration are those of substantive jurisdiction or serious irregularity. The right to appeal an award on a point of law is not a mandatory provision of the English Arbitration Act 1996. Where this right to appeal on a point of law has not been excluded, an appeal can be brought under section 69 only with the agreement of the parties to the dispute or with the permission of the court. Under section 69(3), the court can only grant permission if (a) the determination of the point of law will substantially affect the rights of one or more parties, (b) the question is one which the tribunal was asked to answer, (c) the arbitral award is obviously wrong or else the decision is open to serious doubt and concerns a question of general public importance, and (e) it is just and proper for the court to rule on this issue despite the parties agreeing to resolve the dispute by arbitration. It is then at the court's discretion to confirm, vary or set aside the award or else to remit it to the tribunal in whole or in part for reconsideration in the light of their ruling. However, the statute provides that the court shall not exercise its power to set aside an award unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the award to the tribunal for reconsideration. http://hsfnotes.com/ As far as I know arbitration clauses in England are not mandatory in any class of contract nor can a court order arbitration (but they can order mediation). They are restricted in employment contracts where the employee has a statutory right to appeal to an employment tribunal in that they cannot be the sole remedy and they are prohibited in insolvency proceedings and criminal matters. Other than impartiality, there are no requirements under the Arbitration Act relating to the qualifications and characteristics of arbitrators. It is not necessary for an arbitrator to be a national of, or licensed to practice in, England. While not strictly relevant to English law recent decisions in the USA and Canada on the unconscionably of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts (where one party can offer a &quot;take-it-or-leave-it&quot; contract to the other) have come to diametrically opposed conclusions. In the USA these are enforceable, in Canada they are not: probably a reflection of the different attitude of the jurisdictions on laissez-faire versus social welfare styles of capitalism although in both jurisdictions they were 5-4 decisions so more finely balanced than you might think. I would guess that English courts would probably find the Candadian rather than the US decision more persuasive if and when the question is asked. In other common law countries, Australia is almost certainly on Canada's side particularly since for small-business contracts the standard is (since 16 November 2016) whether a term is &quot;unfair&quot; rather than &quot;unconscionable&quot;.
A person who is nominally in the class and does nothing remains in the class. Such a person can file formal objections to the terms of the settlement, including the amounts to be paid to the lawyers who ran the class action and negotiated the settlement on behalf of the class. Any such objections will be considered when the judge decides whether to approve the terms of settlement. As a practical matter, there needs to be a good reason stated for any objection if it is to have any effect on the terms. A member of the class does not pay any fees, directly. However, the total fees paid come out of the money provided by the settlement, and may reduce the benefits available to class members, which is why members may file objections to th fee structure. A member of the class can get some of the settlement money only if that person files a claim on the proper form, and the claim is approved. A person who is nominally in the class may send in a written request to be excluded from the class. Such a person ceases to be a member of the class, cannot object to the terms of settlement, and cannot file a claim. However, such a person is not bound by the settlement, and can file a separate, individual lawsuit over the same issue, if such a person chooses to do so. This would mean paying a different set of lawyers.
Pretty much any time a contractual, statutory or case law precedent uses the word &quot;reasonable&quot; what it means is that the decision regarding what is and is not reasonable is vested in the trier of fact (i.e. the judge in a U.K. landlord-tenant case) to decide on a case by case basis in light of all of the facts and circumstances presented at trial, rather something to be decided as a matter of law by an appellate court absent of extreme abuse of discretion by the judge in determining what is reasonable. Put yourself in the judge's shoes and consider the range of opinion that people who are judges in a case like this might have, and you have your answer. A reasonable amount of time balances out factors like the availability of repair contractors at a reasonable price, the magnitude of the repair, and the extent to which the repair impairs the habitability of the premises, and assumes a time frame that would apply if the landlord is diligent and trying to solve the problem in good faith. A reasonable time to fix a broken heating element is different in July than in January. If three different inspectors failed to determine the cause of the problem, that is going to work in favor of the landlord for a longer period of time. So will the significant extent of the damage (apparently). On the other hand, the fact that the repair rendered the premises completely uninhabitable argues for a shorter time period. Starting late to address an urgent problem could be breach, although it doesn't sound like this has happened here if some action has been taken that would seem to be reasonable under the circumstances and the results have been inconclusive about what to do. Unnecessary foot dragging could also be a fact in reasonableness, because ultimately the duty is to get the job done. There may also be a parallel duty of the landlord to provide a habitable premises and to compensate you for time when this is not provided, in addition to the duty to repair within a reasonable time. Asking to be paid for alternative accommodations while diagnosis and repairs are underway would be a logical demand to make before suing for a fairly small dollar amount in an ongoing lease. You would probably focus on failure to repair in a reasonable time more if you seek to terminate the lease entirely and rent elsewhere instead in the face of repair delays, hoping to avoid the duty to pay rent for the remainder of the lease term due to the landlord's breach of the duty to repair under the lease.
The pre-action protocols are part of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) which governs proceedings in the County Court, High Court, and Court of Appeal (see Rule 2.1). They set out what the parties should do before initiating proceedings in court. Being practice directions, they are not rules, but you ignore them at your peril; failing to do so will not affect the outcome of your case but can have cost implications or, in the most severe cases, result in sanctions (see paragraphs 13 - 15 here). There is a general pre-action protocol and a set of specific pre-action protocols for particular types of cases. If there is a specific protocol for your case, you follow that, otherwise you follow the general one (see paragraph 2). The full list of specific pre-action protocols can be found here. Note that there is another list contained within the general pre-action protocol at paragraph 18 but this list is not complete. This is rather unfortunate because paragraph 18 contains the phrase &quot;the table sets out the protocols currently in force&quot; and, below the table, &quot;Updated: Wednesday, 6 April 2022&quot; (which implies, incorrectly, that any older protocols not appearing in the table are not currently in force). I suggest using the first list. &quot;How long does it typically take?&quot; This varies depending on the protocol being followed. See for example paragraph 6 of the general protocol which, without being prescriptive, suggests that a reasonable time for a defendant to respond to a pre-action letter is 14 days in a simple case and 3 months in a complex one. &quot;pre-action protocol (PAP) must be completed before a case is brought to court in England-and-Wales&quot; This is incorrect. Per paragraph 17 of the general pre-action protocol, if you are close to the limitation period, you can start proceedings and then apply for a stay to give you time to comply with the protocol.
Note that in the Duval case the landlord was prevented form approving the alterations only because there was also a provision in the leases of other tenants providing that any of them could require the landlord to enforce the agreements. In paragraph 41 of the judgement it is said that: Dr Duval accepts that, absent clause 3.19, the landlord and lessee would be free to agree a waiver of an absolute covenant or a licence to carry out a piece of work that would otherwise amount to a breach of its terms, but contends that in this case and as a result of the inclusion of clause 3.19 in each of the leases, any such waiver is precluded unless all of the other lessees agree to waive their rights. Put another way, by undertaking to enforce the covenants of the lease, the landlord has undertaken not to do the opposite, namely to license breaches of covenant. She argues that, were it otherwise, clause 3.19 would be ineffective. And this contention was eventually upheld. In paragraph 59 (the final paragraph) the court wrote: ... By contrast, clause 2.7 is directed to more fundamental works which go beyond routine alterations and improvements and are intrinsically such that they may be damaging to or destructive of the building. These are the kinds of work which it is entirely reasonable to suppose should not be carried out without the consent of all of the other lessees. In short, the landlord could have approved the work, even in the face of an absolute covenant, butr for the presence of the further covenant with other tenants to enforce the absolute covenant . Even then, the work can be done provided that all of the tenants approve. It would seem from this judgement that substituting the lawyer's statement &quot;without consent of the landlord&quot; for the older absolute form would permit such changes to be made if the landlord consents, and such consent apparently may not be unreasonably withheld. However, under the older absolute form, the consent of the other tenants might also be required, if there is a provision similar to clause 3.19 in the Duval case by which the landlord promises enforcement to other tenants. In the absence of a conflicting contract with others, a landlord and tenant can agree to modify a lease or tenancy agreement in any lawful way. In the Duval case there was such a conflicting contract.
When you tendered three pennies, that should have satisfied the debt as the landlord does not have the right in this situation to insist on payment in a money order in lieu of currency. A money order requirement is only effective as a means by which to refrain from accepting personal checks, not cash. This is the ignorance of the property manager at work. At a minimum, refusing to accept the pennies would constitute a violation of the landlord's duty of good faith: § 383.550. "Good faith" obligation Every duty under KRS 383.505 to 383.715 and every act which must be performed as a condition precedent to the exercise of a right or remedy under KRS 383.505 to 383.715 imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement. Imposing a late fee in this situation may also be unconscionable: § 383.555. Unconscionability (1) If the court, as a matter of law, finds: (a) A rental agreement or any provision thereof was unconscionable when made, the court may refuse to enforce the agreement, enforce the remainder of the agreement without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result; or (b) A settlement in which a party waives or agrees to forego a claim or right under KRS 383.505 to 383.715 or under a rental agreement was unconscionable when made, the court may refuse to enforce the settlement, enforce the remainder of the settlement without the unconscionable provision, or limit the application of any unconscionable provision to avoid an unconscionable result. (2) If unconscionability is put into issue by a party or by the court upon its own motion, the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the rental agreement or settlement to aid the court in making the determination. This term is defined as follows in § 383.545(16): "Unconscionable" means an act or conduct which is willful and is so harsh and unjust as would be condemned or considered to be wrongful and would be shocking to the conscience of honest and fair-minded persons. The notice should not be effective to bring an eviction action because it states a demand that the landlord is not authorized to make. The notice is probably attempting to comply with this statutory requirement: § 383.660. Tenant's noncompliance with rental agreement - Failure to pay rent (1) Except as provided in KRS 383.505 to 383.715, if there is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or a material noncompliance with KRS 383.605 or 383.610, the landlord may deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts and omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement will terminate upon a date not less than fourteen (14) days after receipt of the notice. If the breach is not remedied in fifteen (15) days, the rental agreement shall terminate as provided in the notice subject to the following. If the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages or otherwise and the tenant adequately remedies the breach before the date specified in the notice, the rental agreement shall not terminate. If substantially the same act or omission which constituted a prior noncompliance of which notice was given recurs within six (6) months, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement upon at least fourteen (14) days' written notice specifying the breach and the date of termination of the rental agreement. (2) If rent is unpaid when due and the tenant fails to pay rent within seven (7) days after written notice by the landlord of nonpayment and his intention to terminate the rental agreement if the rent is not paid within that period, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement. (3) Except as provided in KRS 383.505 to 383.715, the landlord may recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or KRS 383.605 or 383.610. If the tenant's noncompliance is willful the landlord may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees. By not accurately stating the non-payment, the notice may be ineffective legally. The circumstances of your case would not entitle the landlord to attorneys' fees. O'Rourke v. Lexington Real Estate Co. L.L.C., 365 S.W.3d 584 (Ky. App. 2011). My guess is that the late fee is $71.20 because there are really two components of your rent, one of which is $712 per month with a 10% late fee, and the other of which is $83.33 which is probably some passed through charge for utilities or a water and sewer bill or some sort of tax. If indeed the late fee is a percentage of the unpaid rent, then first of all, the late fee shouldn't be more than 0.3 cents (which rounds down to zero), and second of all, the unpaid portion may very well be not rent, but a passed through charge that is not subject to the late fee, depending upon what the lease says about how amounts received are to be applied. If the late fee is indeed a percentage of the amount owing, so that you owed at most 3.3 cents on the day after the rent was due, which rounds to 3 cents. Then, by tendering 3 pennies on that day, you satisfied your obligation in full and they are not living up to their obligation. If the late fee is stated as a sum certain in the lease, however, and not as a percentage, you might be obligated to pay $71.23 by the terms of the lease, even though charge a late fee of $71.20 for paying 3 cents one day late probably violated usury and consumer protection laws in Kentucky, as well as the common law related to liquidated damages which requires penalties in contractual agreements to be proportionate to the breach of the contract. The maximum legal interest rate in Kentucky is set forth at § 360.010 of its statutes is is the greater of the commercial discount rate on 90 day paper plus 4%, or 19%, which is smaller. There is a civil penalty of double the amount of the usurious interest paid. § 310.020. Still, as a practical matter, it may be easier to tender a money order for $71.23 than to deal with a bureaucratic nightmare. Honestly, this is the sort of scrooge-like behavior that TV stations love to splash on the evening news, and contacting one of them might be one of your better options. Another option may be to contact a legal aid society, or to contact the local bar association to see if they have a pro bono lawyer available to take this case. Another plausible option would be to communicate directly to the owner of the property in lieu of the property manager, setting forth the facts in writing. If I were a lawyer for the landlord, I would be embarrassed to bring a case like this one, and the judge would probably chew me out for bringing it.
Yes. Arbitration is a private, voluntary process, so two parties can agree to arbitrate virtually any dispute. However, because it is voluntary, Country B generally has no obligation to participate in the process once you've inititated it.
Non-residential tenancies are subject to Fla. Stat Ch. 83 Part I. This is statutorily a tenancy at-will unless a contrary agreement is in writing signed by the lessor: the duration of the lease is yearly, quarterly, monthly, weekly as determined by the periodicity of rent payments. There are various legal conditions related to rent default and causes for removing tenants, also conditions about premises that are wholly untenantable. Unlike residential leases, there are not any special statutory conditions surrounding the landlords presentation of leases. Florida law contemplates and allows the possibility that there are no written documents, and for non-residential tenancies has very little to say about it (only pertaining to the distinction between at-will vs not at-will leases). Therefore, the matter follows the general rules for contractual disputes: whoever makes the best case for their claims wins. If Bob has a scanned copy, that is excellent proof. If Alice alleges and proves that the scanned copy was modified, that disposes of Bob's evidence. If Alice presents a copy of the contract that says otherwise (I do mean copy), then this anomaly has to be explained. Bob can claim that they tore up Alice's original and renegotiated the deal, but he needs to prove that claim. If Alice presents the original contract, Bob's story becomes much less plausible. There are millions of variants of what might happen: the point is, there is no requirement to present the original signed document to support a claim in a contractual dispute.