Can U.S. states form or join new unions? The U.S. is presently a country with deep political divisions, which are distributed in part geographically. One possible resolution is a split into multiple nations; this idea was firmly refuted by the Civil War. However, another possible solution is to form additional new governments out of existing states. This would be a governmental layer above the state layer but below the federal layer. These super-states would represent multi-state regions of more closely aligned political views. The constituent states would cede some of their authority to these super-state governments, which would then be empowered within their borders to collect taxes, write and enforce laws, etc. However, neither the states nor the super-states would deny the authority of the Federal government. The super-states would not be nations, would not form treaties with other nations, and would leave all international policy to the Federal level. They would also defer to Federal law when applicable, e.g. the commerce clause. The benefits of super-states would be similar to the domestic benefits of the federal government, but at a smaller scale. For example, rather than each state individually setting entitlement/ education/ health/ energy/ environment policy (which has high administrative costs due to duplication), or each state trusting the federal government to do so (which is likely to displease a lot of states due to political divisions), the super-states can set the policy for their constituent like-minded states. My question is this. Does the U.S. Constitution or existing legal precedent prevent the establishment of such super-states? That is, do states have the authority to transfer their own rights?
Only with the approval of Congress. An agreement between states is called an "interstate compact" (a variety of existing compacts are listed in the link). The federal government can also unilaterally create an independent agency with authority in some states, but not others such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Appalachian Regional Commission. The relevant parts of the Constitution are Article I, Section 10, which states: 1: No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 2: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. Also relevant are Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1: New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. and Article V: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.
No; only 23 states require their congressional districts to be contiguous. See Reapportionment and Redistricting in the West by Gary F. Moncrief: Only 23 states have [contiguity] requirements for their congressional districts, although as a practical matter most congressional districts will be contiguous; the relative dearth of legal limits is a manifestation of the fact that few states have provided any express legal constraints on congressional districting at all. But that's not to say more states don't have contiguous districts. On Profesor Justin Levitt's website, he observes that: Many states require contiguity only "to the extent possible," and courts generally accept anomalies that otherwise seem reasonable in context. I am having a difficult time finding a list of states with such requirements; I will update if I find it.
For the first question - No, patents are territorial. A US patent is not &quot;working&quot; anywhere else. Of course one can apply in multiple countries if the proper time frames and procedures are followed. There is a mechanism (PCT Treaty) that allows a straightforward way to apply in over a 140 countries simultaneously. Although it is frequently used, it is expensive to continue to prosecute the application in each place and even in high-value inventions only a handful of places are eventually chosen to actually pursue patents. Each country's/region's laws and processes are different and success in patenting can vary. Normally two countries would not have the same thing patented by different inventors. The patenting or publication of the first one would make it prior art to the second filed one. This should be found by the second examiner and stop a duplicate patent by a second inventor. However there can be subtle differences between similar inventions and mistakes do happen. In the case of true simultaneous invention this can happen. To get a patent, the invention must be novel - that means no one has published or patented it anywhere in the world at any time in any language. Before the AIA law in the U.S. the law said &quot;or known in this country&quot;. It could have made a loophole where something was known publicly elsewhere but did not constitute prior art in the U.S. That is now changed to be world-wide. Even if the examiner does a world wide search they might miss something and a patent might get issued even though the invention was not novel and a patent elsewhere is granted. To invalidate it the original patent owner would need to look into available procedures in country A. It might be court or it might be administrative. In most places an annual “renewal” fee must be paid to keep a patent in-force. In the U.S. a “maintenance” fee must be paid at the 3.5 year, 7.5 year and 7.5 year points in order to stay in-force. A patent who’s renewal or maintenance fee hasn’t been paid is expired for fee reasons. That can imply that it can be revived by the patent owner by paying the fees and usually a penalty. There may be a time limit or a small set of allowable circumstances to revive. A patent labeled expired for fee reasons might now be past its normal lifespan and therefore not revivable. In general patents are given to inventors and those an inventor assigns their rights to. Someone else can’t come along and revive a patent they had nothing to do with originally. There is no “re-patenting”.
I know of no specific provision of the Constitution that would forbid it. I know of no court case in which it has been found unconstitutional. There's no "irony" clause in the Constitution. Taxation without representation may have been a grievance, but there's no inherent reason why the framers would have had to forbid it. US citizens do still have the "freedom to expatriate" (and avoid taxation) if they renounce their citizenship. There are already other examples of "taxation without representation" in US law (e.g. District of Columbia), which also have not been found unconstitutional in court, as far as I know. In many cases, expatriates can still vote for federal offices, including Congress (e.g. in a state where they used to live, or where a parent used to live). See https://www.fvap.gov/citizen-voter/registration-ballots. The Sixteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to "lay and collect taxes" with few limitations. There is certainly no explicit exception for expatriates. As far as I can tell, it would be constitutional if Congress were to impose an income tax on everybody in the world, regardless of residency or citizenship; it would just be hard to enforce.
The U. S. Supreme Court ruled in 1869 that states may not unilaterally secede. The state litigant in the case was Texas. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_v._White
No Recognition of territorial claims is the sole province of the diplomatic branches of national government, and of heads of state. In the US it is the State Department, and ultimately the President. The actions of telephone operators and people engaging in other forms of communication cannot and do not bind the decisions of the President, or of other heads of state. Besides, there may be cases in which a telephone country code or a web domain may not match the actual, undisputed legal status of a territory. Accepting a phone call does not affect a country's legal status. For decades the US did not recognize the communist regime in China. Legally, it considered that the Republic of China (aka Taiwan) was the only valid government, and the acceptance of telephone calls did not change that.
15 USC Subchapter IX gives the Secretary of Transportation powers to set rules about the 11 time zones, and those laws supersede state and local laws. Observance of Daylight Savings Time is optional for a state. This is the DST law. First, it says that at the DST changeover times, the standard time of each zone established by sections 261 to 264 of this title...shall be advanced one hour...however, (1) any State that lies entirely within one time zone may by law exempt itself from the provisions of this subsection providing for the advancement of time, but only if that law provides that the entire State (including all political subdivisions thereof) shall observe the standard time otherwise applicable during that period, and (2) any State with parts thereof in more than one time zone may by law exempt either the entire State as provided in (1) or may exempt the entire area of the State lying within any time zone. which allows a state to stay on permanent standard time (but not permanent DST). The appearance that government has to approve the change comes from the fact that states (other than Arizona, Hawaii, Guam etc) seem to want to switch to permanent DST, not standard time. The standardization of time is governed by laws passed by congress, so the government can change it, if they can pass a bill through both houses and get the president to sign.
This is an open question in Colorado, where there's an ongoing challenge to the state's supermajority requirement in Kerr v. Hickenlooper. The state requires a supermajority for tax or spending increases, and several lawmakers challenged the law as violating the Guarantee Clause, which guarantees each state a republican form of government. The case has been going on for a long time. It's about seven years old now, and they're still arguing about who has standing to bring the lawsuit. The latest development is that no one had standing, but that decision is currently being appealed in the Tenth Circuit. A bigger problem than standing, though, may be justiciability. In Huddleston v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court of Oregon, rejected a challenge to supermajority requirements for reducing citizen-approved sentences for crimes, and in Lefkovits v. State Board of Elections, the Northern District of Illinois did the same with respect to judicial retention votes. Both courts concluded that supermajority requirements were a political issue, not a legal one. The justiciability concerns should be tempered by two considerations. First, there's an argument in Kerr that because taxes and spending are such core legislative functions, that it should be harder to uphold restrictions on the legislature's ability to vote on them. Second, there's U.S. Supreme Court precedent in New York v. U.S. suggesting -- but not deciding -- that the questions about justiciability are overblown: The view that the Guarantee Clause implicates only nonjusticiable political questions has its origin in Luther v. Borden, in which the Court was asked to decide, in the wake of Dorr's Rebellion, which of two rival governments was the legitimate government of Rhode Island. The Court held that “it rests with Congress,” not the judiciary, “to decide what government is the established one in a State.” ... Over the following century, this limited holding metamorphosed into the sweeping assertion that “[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in States cannot be challenged in the courts.” This view has not always been accepted. In a group of cases decided before the holding of Luther was elevated into a general rule of nonjusticiability, the Court addressed the merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause without any suggestion that the claims were not justiciable. More recently, the Court has suggested that perhaps not all claims under the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable political questions. ... We need not resolve this difficult question today. My money says that the question is not authoritatively answered in my lifetime.