Has the Alien Property Custodian Office been abolished? I'm doing research into Japanese internment, and I was reading about executive order 9095. This order created the Office of Alien Property Custodian (APC) as authorized by the Trading with the Enemy Act. I read that the APC was abolished by LBJ in 1966. But was this a permanent abolition of the ability to create the office, or does the Trading with the Enemy Act still allow the president to create this office?
The ability to create such an office derives (according to Roosevelt, who invoked the power), from the constitutional authority of the president and the Trading with the Enemy Act amended by the War Powers Act, 1941. A president cannot repeal a part of The Constitution or an act of Congress, but he can undo an act by a president (as long as Congress hasn't come along and taken back a power for example by changing the "authorized" part to "required"). In a sense, that office is permanently gone, but until Congress or SCOTUS change the law, another president could effectively re-create that office and even give it the same name. The appendix to Title 50 which authorized the office is still there (not repealed). It is remotely possible that some other act or court ruling effectively nullifies this part of the law, but that would have to be determined by some president attempting to re-create the office and then someone else suing to prevent it (based on such an effectively nullification).
Of course not. If the owner/tenant needed to be home I could rent a house in my name, and then never occupy it (my associates live there) the cops could never enter. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) - Cops executing a warrant need to knock. If no one answers they must wait a reasonable time for an occupant to let them in. It's the knock and announce rule. By implication it might lend authority to what is an obvious answer.
I haven't listened to the podcast, but this is probably referring to the anticipated &quot;Renters Reform Bill&quot;. A white paper was published on 16 June 2022. There is no Bill before Parliament yet, so the mooted changes are quite a long way from happening. (Additionally, the usual political churn may mean that this does not happen at all. The Secretary of State has already changed, and will likely change again once there is a new Prime Minister; political priorities may shift in all sorts of ways; there could be a general election; etc.) One proposal from the government is (section 3.1): We will abolish Section 21 evictions and simplify tenancy structures. To achieve this, we will move all tenants who would previously have had an Assured Tenancy or Assured Shorthold Tenancy onto a single system of periodic tenancies. Tenants will need to provide two months’ notice when leaving a tenancy, ensuring landlords recoup the costs of finding a tenant and avoid lengthy void periods. This will provide greater security for tenants while retaining the important flexibility that privately rented accommodation offers. This will enable tenants to leave poor quality properties without remaining liable for the rent or to move more easily when their circumstances change, for example to take up a new job opportunity. Landlords will only be able to evict a tenant in reasonable circumstances, which will be defined in law, supporting tenants to save with fewer unwanted moves. Currently, tenants on an AST cannot leave their tenancy during the fixed term, unless the tenancy agreement specifically provides for this with a &quot;break clause&quot;. A break clause might say that after six months, the tenant is allowed to terminate the arrangement with one month of notice to the landlord. Or there might be no break clause at all, so that the arrangement can end early only if the landlord and tenant agree (&quot;surrendering the tenancy&quot;). Once the fixed term ends, it can be renewed for another fixed term, or terminated, or else it rolls on to become a &quot;periodic tenancy&quot;, typically month-to-month. The tenant can give notice to quit during this time. The government's proposal seems to amount to having no initial fixed term, but a statutory periodic tenancy from the get-go. As far as timing, the white paper says: We will provide at least six months’ notice of our first implementation date, after which all new tenancies will be periodic and governed by the new rules. Specific timing will depend on when Royal Assent is secured. To avoid a two-tier rental sector, and to make sure landlords and tenants are clear on their rights, all existing tenancies will transition to the new system on a second implementation date. After this point, all tenants will be protected from Section 21 eviction. We will allow at least twelve months between the first and second dates. Again, the Bill has not been introduced to Parliament or even published in draft, so Royal Assent is a long way off.
No punishment followed because those policies are not the law, and, even it was found out earlier, no Inspector General would have the authority to dismiss Mrs. Cliton, it's POTUS's prerogative, as I understand it. That is true for maybe 10 people max in a government department. For the tens or hundreds of thousands of employees who weren't appointed by the President to serve at their pleasure, violating policies can lead to suspension, fines, or dismissal.
Neither law has precedence - manufacturers have to obey both. The FD&amp;C says that they don't need to list ingredients which are trade secrets; the CFR says they must. If they list the trade secrets they do not break either law. If they don't, they break the CFR. Conclusion: they must list the trade secret ingredients. If the FD&amp;C said it was forbidden to list trade secret ingredients, but the CFR required it, manufacturers would still have to obey both laws - which would mean they couldn't sell anything where one of the ingredients was a trade secret.
The term "enemy" in the U.S. Constitution's definition of treason is generally considered to be a term of art that means a party against whom Congress has authorized the use of military force or a declared war. The only such country in existence at this time, to the best of my knowledge, is North Korea. Terrorist organizations which had affiliated involved in the 9-11 attacks (including ISIS and Boko Haram) are also covered. Russia is not an "enemy" of the United States, within the meaning of the constitutional definition of treason. Neither are any individuals or corporations in Russia, unless they are affiliated with a 9-11 terrorist organization. An important statutory definition of "enemy" might also be considered informative to a court presented with this question, which is slightly broader (as it requires "hostilities" but does not require a full fledged war and does not require Congressional action): According to 50 USCS § 2204 [Title 50. War and National Defense; Chapter 39. Spoils of War], enemy of the United States means any country, government, group, or person that has been engaged in hostilities, whether or not lawfully authorized, with the United States; (3) the term "person" means (A) any natural person; (B) any corporation, partnership, or other legal entity; and (C) any organization, association, or group. In this context, "hostilities" would generally mean physical warfare acts like shooting Americans, or blowing up American property, in a warlike manner.
There is no such law mandating this layout, nor is there any law permitting the defendant to demand a change to it. The arrangement seems most likely to have been driven by security concerns when courts began removing "the dock" and letting the defendant past the bar to sit with his attorneys. One court has also concluded that it was meant to assist the government "because it bears the burden of proof." It's of course impossible to prove a negative like this, but I'll note that Kenneth Lay's attorneys raised the issue in the Enron case, and they were unable to cite a single case saying that the defendant has the option to sit closer to the jury. If they couldn't find it, it probably doesn't exist. Meanwhile, the government was able to find several cases saying that the defendant does not have the right to demand a change, though it did not have any cases saying that the layout is mandatory. Instead, it described itself as "traditionally" having a right to the table. In that case, the judge ended up splitting the baby. Saying that there was "no law" to inform his decision, he sat the government next to the jury during its case, and it sat the defense next to the jury during its case. That was quite a bit more generous than the Seventh Circuit, which has rejected the jury-proximity argument as frivolous. So there are some cases addressing the issue, but I don't know of any case where a court has actually looked at the issue and given any real consideration to the due-process implications of the substantial empirical evidence suggesting that the party closest to the jury enjoys an advantage.
It is not absolutely against the law to produce schedule 1 substances (such as marijuana). Per 21 USC 822(a)(1), Every person who manufactures or distributes any controlled substance or list I chemical...shall obtain annually a registration issued by the Attorney General which entails specific permissions to make, distribute etc, under (b). If you turn to the prohibitions in 21 USC 841, it starts the list of prohibitions saying "Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful...". The code is liberally littered with the expression "unauthorized". The Attorney General is given authority under 21 USC 811 to make rules, thus can permit production. It's not actually clear who the grower is in the Compassionate IND program. In the Randall case, the "doctrine of necessity" was apparently invoked successfully which led to charges against Randall being dropped. The legal details of the AGs blind eye towards states like Washington are a little hazy, as it were.