What&#39;s the difference between a single solid white line and a double solid white line? What's the difference between a solid white line and a double solid white line on the United States? I read on https://www.wwinjurylaw.com/blog/2016/november/can-i-cross-over-the-solid-double-white-lines-ne/ California Vehicle Code Section 21460 (b): Double white lines. (b) If double parallel solid white lines are in place, a person driving a vehicle shall not cross any part of those double solid white lines, except as permitted in this section or Section 21655.8. That sounds the same as a single solid white line to me. I'm mostly interested in California.
The article to which you link, which describes the solid lines, mentions the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). This document describes the standards used nationwide. States were required to adopt these standards by 2012. Your linked article also mentions that California is changing their double yellow lines separating HOV lanes to double white lines in order to conform to this standard. From the MUTCD Chapter 3B - Pavement and Curb Markings: When used, lane line pavement markings delineating the separation of traffic lanes that have the same direction of travel shall be white. Later in that section, describing the use of single and double lines (emphasis mine): Where crossing the lane line markings is discouraged, the lane line markings shall consist of a normal or wide solid white line. Where crossing the lane line markings is prohibited, the lane line markings shall consist of a double white line. The California driver's handbook describes where those lines are used: Solid white lines mark traffic lanes going in the same direction, such as one-way streets. Double white lines are two solid lines that indicate a lane barrier between a regular use and a preferential use lane, such as a carpool/HOV. Never change lanes while in these lanes; wait until a single broken white line appears. You may also see these parallel lines in or near freeway on and off ramps.
There are a lot more differences than this, but if your teacher sums up what he/she means by that sentence. Here, specifically, in Civil Law, the decision of the courts must comply with the laws as enacted, which means there are specific statutes required to make something illegal. Common Law features Stare Decisis which basically means that if Case A is decided in one way, and Case B is a similar Case to Case B, Case B must yield the same decision for all cases in that jurisdiction and lower courts below that court. This means that while statutes (laws) can be made by a legislature, the courts can "make law" by deciding cases. For example, some States in the United States and England and Wales only recently (within the past 30 years) adopted an actual law that made murder illegal? Prior to that murder was illegal under Common Law Murder that had been based on precedence from bazillion cases before that said it's illegal. Nobody bothered to write it down in an actual law. There are several other big differences such as Inquisitorial vs. Adversarial nature of courts, how and when punishments are decided (The famous "Just following Orders" Defense was given in part because of this difference and a lack of understanding over it.), who is the trier of fact vs. who is the trier of law, but as far as what is "Law" this is a good single summation of the difference in a single sentence. But it really shouldn't be condensed to a single sentence.
There isn't a difference. The terminology in England and Wales that means the same thing is "litigant in person", with the source of these Latin phrases have abandoned them in favor of plain English terminology. The variation of usage, however, does not necessarily break down on a federal v. state court basis. Pro se is the majority usage, but the variation is more regional, within state courts, than it is a federal v. state divide. California and Michigan, for example, use both terms and use them interchangeably. If there is a historical reason for the variation in terminology, I haven't groked it. Incidentally, there was historically a subtle distinction between the two concepts related to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court that has long since become obsolete (more than a century ago), but which movements such as the "sovereign person" movement errantly believe has great legal importance to the power of a court over them.
It's legal The Ohio Court of Appeals has addressed a nearly identical situation in State v. Paseka. The relevant law is, as you noted in the question, R.C. 4511.39, which states, in relevant part: No person shall turn a vehicle or trackless trolley or move right or left upon a highway ... without giving an appropriate signal The facts in this case are directly on point—an intersection where continuing straight puts one on a different road, while the original road requires a turn to stay on it: Appellant was traveling west on State Route 6. At a certain point, Route 6 veers to the left. As appellant approached that area of State Route 6, he chose to maintain a straight-ahead course which automatically placed him on Wahl Road. He was stopped for failing to activate his turn signal in violation of R.C. 4511.39. The court ruled that this did not violate the law requiring the use of a turn signal: It is undisputed that appellant’s straight-ahead entrance onto Wahl Road did not require him to turn his vehicle, nor did it require him to switch into a different lane. As such, we fail to see how appellant violated R.C. 4511.39. Here's the intersection in question, via Google Maps: Imagery ©2021 Google, Imagery ©2021 Maxar Technologies, State of Ohio / OSIP, USDA Farm Service Agency, Map data ©2021
The national standard, found in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD), indicates, in Section 2B.13 Speed Limit Sign: 03 Speed Limit signs, indicating speed limits for which posting is required by law, shall be located at the points of change from one speed limit to another. It would not be legal to accelerate to the new speed before reaching the sign. All states were required to adopt the MUTCD no later than 2012. This standard is followed by all states.
US law simply prohibits copying, not possession of a pixel. If you copy 90% of a work, you are still copying, infringing on the creators exclusive right. Same is true if you copy 20%, and so on. The pertinent first question is, how do the courts decide if there has been copying? This is a factual matter decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence. Defense will argue, very persuasively, that it is more likely that the presence of an identical pixel in two works is purely coincidental (likewise, the appearance of the word &quot;is&quot; in two texts is purely coincidental&quot;). We can imagine future technology with megabyte pixels, where the particular &quot;white&quot; pixel is unique to the original work, and no reasonable fact-finder could hold that the later word accidentally stumbled onto exactly that pixel. The second thing that has to be established is that the degree of copying &quot;matters&quot;, starting with Perris v. Hexamer, so that to be infringing, the degree of copying must be more than minimal. Courts have long relied on the notion of &quot;substantial similarity&quot;, where you know it when you see it, that is, ordinary observation would cause it to be recognized as having been taken from another work. There is no bright line drawn by Congress of SCOTUS regarding how much copying is &quot;material&quot;. It is extremely unlikely that a reasonable line could be drawn that would render single-pixel copying &quot;material&quot;.
No crime is committed if a person performs a service and ineptly describes the service. To change the context a bit, I might contract with a guy to build a wall and he says he will charge me for installing a "Swedish drain" when in fact what he will install is called a "French drain". If he installs the thing, it does not matter (legally) whether he calls it by the conventional name. I am not relying on the distinction between French and "Swedish" drains, and that is not material. However: he may specify that the drain will use 18 inches of 1.5" drain rock, but he uses (and intends to use) 18 mm of 3/8" crushed rock, and that is a material fact. In the latter case, he has committed fraud. The same considerations go into dealing with "unnecessary" service, which however is more about "what he said". Let's assume that you come in with a flat tire and the mechanic offers to overhaul the engine. If you agree to this service, that is not fraud, because he did not say something false that you depended on. If, however, you ask "Why would overhauling the engine be necessary" and he says, I dunno, "Because by law, I can't repair a tire without first overhauling the engine", or "Because you flat was caused by astral radiation from a poorly-tuned engine", then that would be fraud – the statements are false, and you relied to their truth, in agreeing to the service. On the third hand, reasonable statements like "it might help", "it could work" are not deceptive, even if it turns out they are not true. Fraud is not about statements that "turn out not to be supported by the facts", it is about statements that you know to be false.
Here is a link to the relevant Texas Statute: Title 7, Subtitle C, Chapter 545, Subchapter A: Sec. 545.351. MAXIMUM SPEED REQUIREMENT. (a) An operator may not drive at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the circumstances then existing. Combine that with: Sec. 545.352. PRIMA FACIE SPEED LIMITS. (a) A speed in excess of the limits established by Subsection (b) or under another provision of this subchapter is prima facie evidence that the speed is not reasonable and prudent and that the speed is unlawful. This section mentions, as an example, among other points: (2) except as provided by Subdivision (4), 70 miles per hour on a highway numbered by this state or the United States outside an urban district, including a farm-to-market or ranch-to-market road; What this means is that if you are driving over 70 miles per hour on a type of highway mentioned in (2) above then you are, by legal definition, driving at a speed that is greater than is reasonable and prudent. When you are cited for speeding you are not charged for driving at a specific speed in an area posted at another speed. You are cited for violating a broader law, such as in Texas, driving in an unreasonable or imprudent manner. The mention of the speed is merely a recordation of the facts that support the state's case against you. Let's take the proposal to demonstrate the speed is too low to its logical conclusion. You plead not guilty and it comes out during testimony that you weren't driving 80 but really 85. The judge will still find you guilty of the underlying charge as the facts in the case still support that finding. I have personally witnessed mistakes in tickets result in dismissal. Those mistakes have, however, been related to other facts about the case though: time of day, date of offense, etc. I've also witnessed people attempt to claim a lower but still illegal speed. For example, "I wasn't going 85 I was only going 80." These resulted in findings of guilt.