IP address details Usually how long does it take for the police to acquire IP details from the ISP now they no longer need a warrant to serve them under the snoopers charter. Would they usually then come and search your house for devices if it was cyber related?
Usually how long does it take for the police to acquire IP details from the ISP now they no longer need a warrant to serve them under the snoopers charter. The Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice published by the UK Home Office in March 2015 encourages service providers to furnish a disclosure notice within a fortnight: 3.50. Ordinarily the CSP should disclose, in writing or electronically, the communications data to which a notice relates not later than the end of the period of ten working days from the date the notice is served upon the CSP. In practice, it is impossible to tell what &quot;usually&quot; looks like because historical data is not available. Would they usually then come and search your house for devices if it was cyber related? It depends on what grounds an offence is believed to have taken place. In any case, unless you are arrested a search warrant would be required, and a constable (authorised by an inspector) must apply to a court. Lord Widgery CJ in Williams v. Summerfield [1972] 2 QB 512 described a search warrant as: ... a very serious interference with the liberty of the subject, and a step which would only be taken after the most mature careful consideration of all the facts of the case. Warrants that are governed by legislation for specific offences (The Theft Act 1968, section 26; The Firearms Act 1968, section 46; The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, section 23(3); Obscene Publications Act 1959, section 3; and Protection of Children Act 1978, section 4) require specific information as to the suspected offence. For example: If it is made to appear by information on oath before a justice of the peace that there is reasonable cause to believe that any person has in his custody or possession or on his premises any stolen goods, the justice may grant a warrant to search for and seize the same… (Theft Act 1968) More general search warrants are issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and the would first need to persuade a justice that there are reasonable grounds for believing: that an indictable offence has been committed there is material on the specified premises which is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation of the offence it is likely to be relevant evidence and it does not consist of or include items subject to &quot;legal privilege&quot;, &quot;excluded material&quot; or &quot;special procedure The justice would normally want to ensure there are reasonable grounds to believe that you would prevent access to that evidence (e.g. by refusing entry or by destroying it first), which make a warrant necessary. If you are arrested because a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that you have committed an offence, and the offence is indictable, PACE also grants a power to search premises following arrest: 32(2)(b) if the offence for which he has been arrested is an indictable offence, to enter and search any premises in which he was when arrested or immediately before he was arrested for evidence relating to the offence
I'm pretty sure that under GDPR, you can indeed request them to send all data they have on you. If it's a complex request, they may charge you something like £10. If they have a lot of data on you, they may list the categories of data they have and ask you to pick one, rather than them having to collect and send everything. They should respond within one month, but iirc in the UK implementation, they can inform you (within that month) that they will respond within three months instead. For the rest, I only know current Dutch law. GDPR is not that different from what we already had (in general terms) and in many cases it even extends it. Under our law (WBP), you can also request a correction of the data in case it is incorrect, or deletion if they no longer need it for the purpose for which it was collected and stored. I don't really know how that works out in practice though, as Facebook can of course claim that "being able to connect you to your friends when you sign up for WhatsApp or Facebook with that number" is a legitimate purpose (in their eyes). They might also not have your full name and therefore not be able to connect your data to your request. Or, perhaps, they have only your full name (and there are probably more people with your name), so they'll have a hard time verifying that it's really your data which they would be handing over or deleting. The company is required to verify your identity before acting on your request. How they implement that is up to them. Under Dutch law, if I remember correctly, any data that can be connected to your person by any party is personally identifiable information (PII). While Facebook might not be able to find who's behind a phone number, your carrier most certainly can. Therefore, the data falls under PII protection laws and they will have to implement a way to verify you and get you your data. Finally, whether your local laws apply to Facebook, I don't know exactly. There's lots of information on this though, so you should be able to find it. Generally, countries say that if something happened within their territory (e.g. you signed up for WhatsApp while in the UK), their law applies. Companies, I've read, will instead try to claim that their main office is in SomeCountry and therefore SomeCountry's laws apply. But I'm pretty sure you'll be able to find a Facebook office somewhere where GDPR applies, so that's probably fine. While not an exact answer and while I am not sure about everything, I hope this gave you some pointers to go on!
If you mean the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (aka RIPA), it doesn't provide for mandatory retention of communications data. Broadly speaking, RIPA is about interception as opposed to mass surveillance or retention just in case. The Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 obliged &quot;public communications providers&quot; to retain what is commonly known as 'metadata', i.e. information about the communication - the originating phone number, the receiving phone number, the date, time and duration (if relevant), the type of call or message - not the content of the communication. See Schedule 1. In April 2014, in the case known as Digital Rights Ireland the Court of Justice of the European Union declared the EC Directive invalid. In response, the UK made the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 (DRIPA) - sunsetted on 31 December 2016. This provided for the Secretary of State to issue a data retention notice to a communications services provider (CSP), requiring it to retain the data types set out in the Schedule to the 2009 Regulations. DRIPA's Explanatory Notes support my claims above with a summary of the history. This was replaced by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA), Part 4 of which deals with the retention of communications data. Here too the retention is of the metadata not the content (see s11(87) and the Explanatory Notes).
Let's break it apart: The police has an union or charity. That's legal in most jurisdictions. The union or charity accepts donations from non-police. Also legal in most jurisdictions. The union communicates who the donors are. Generally legal in most jurisdictions. Keeping it secret would be just as problematic. Police officers have some discretion if and how they charge incidents. That's just common sense. Otherwise you get cases like 8-year-olds being arrested. (You get those anyway when the police don't use their discretion, or if the laws are too rigid.) Police officers let themselves be influenced by the donor card in how they apply their discretion. That's usually illegal on the part of the police officer. The Brits use the catchphrase 'without fear or favour.' But it is difficult to prove, even if it is systematic. The union issues donor cards to facilitate the effects of the previous bullet point. That sounds at the very least unethical. Some might argue that it is organized corruption. On the other hand, you can assume that the police unions have some decent lawyers on staff, and that they made sure that the words on their cards are not blatantly illegal in the jurisdiction in question. It might take something like a whistleblower, a sting operation, or an internal affairs investigation to prove corruption.
This question is framed such that it could include myriad different scenarios that could lead to a search of one's personal computer. You seem to gear the bulk of your inquiry toward when the government can search, but then move to when a corporate entity has the right to do so, which is a very different thing. These are different issues with different concepts and rules that dictate when this can occur lawfully. You might want to narrow your question a bit. By way of generalization: the citizens of the U.S. have an implied right to privacy as construed through the Bill of Rights, even though there is no explicit right written into the constitution. The most common way to conduct a search in the U.S. is with probable cause through a search warrant. There are questions and answers both on here, as well as resources all over the internet, pertaining to constitutionally accepted forms of search and seizure such that you could get that information fairly easily. However, as with the U.K., and despite any rights (explicit or implicit), there are many ways your computer could be searched by the government - both known to the owner and unknown - and even remotely, that use means less common to the standard search warrant. As you've probably heard from the revelations of Edward Snowden (Wikileaks), the governments of the world have been shown to search metadata and other electronic records without a warrant under laws aimed toward protecting national security. In the U.S. the Patriot Act gave wide reaching powers to invade the privacy of individuals that required no oversight or basis for doing so. Corporations that deal with the transmission of data work with government entities to to accomplish this end. As one individual has already noted, you subject yourself to search (which includes your computer) upon entry to the country through customs. There are many ways that the government can and does engender to search computers, computer files, emails, metadata, etc. A corporation may search your personal computer under a contractual relationship you create with it (for instance if you work from home and elect to use your home computer, and to do so you elect to agree to allow the entity to inspect your computer for their intellectual property in certain circumstances). They can also do this pursuant to a civil lawsuit, which can allow for the inspection of your computer through the process of discovery. These are just some of the ways your information can become subject to inspection (search) by government or corporate entities. Again, your question would need to be limited more to address any one situation more fully.
Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.
If the police become aware of the domestic violence through you reporting it or otherwise the matter is entirely in their hands. They will decide if they want to prosecute or not.
A warrant is required: you cannot just bust into a home because the owner died. Nothing that you describe resembles the kind of emergency situation that allows a warrantless search. In order to get a warrant, you have to have a good enough reason. Suppose that campus police found a suspicious object at the scene which was evidence of a crime and which had an identifiable connection to his home. Campus police might get a warrant to search the home, to find evidence related to the possiblity that this was a murder. That evidence could be evidence that he had uncovered a terrorist plot to bomb Needles CA, and he was killed because of that. His home computer might contain records of contact between him and the terrorists: so the judge might grant a warrant. The FBI might also go to a federal court for a warrant for a different suspected crime, for example a planned bombing of Needles. Since this involves national security, this could be a FISA court, which is a secret court for surveilling foreign spies in the US. The daughter has the (apparent) authority to consent to a search – police are not required to inquire very deeply into a person's authority to consent to a search. If she doesn't consent, the police of the FBI might have probable cause for a warrant – it has to be an articulable reason, not just a mystical intuition (TV cop shows notwithstanding) that there must have been a crime and the house has evidence of the crime.