Does ratifying USMCA imply a (stealth) ratification of UNCLOS? I tried asking this on Skeptics first, but apparently there's too much law (interpretation/opinion) and not enough fact in this issue. Several conservative/right-wing sources says that if the US Senate were to ratify USMCA (Trump's renegotiated NAFTA), they would basically ratify UNCLOS by implication as well. (For more context, the US has signed but not ratified UNCLOS/LOST.) E.g. the John Birch Society says: Trade can be done without these many-paged deals. But the USMCA isn’t about trade. It is all about the establishment of regional and world government. This dangerous deal would in effect ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty -without any Senate vote on it. A more detailed article in Canada Free Press concludes with the same: In article 24.18, Sustainable Fisheries Management, regulating “marine wild capture fishing,” USMCA agreement subordinates the United States to U.N.’s international authority and its many organizations. [...] Sustainable fisheries must abide by the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and many others. (USMCA, art. 24.18) A.J. Cameron stated that the “same people in the Obama Administration who crafted the TPP also crafted USMCA. USMCA back-doors many of the tenets of the reprehensible trade agreements to which we were told by politicians that we would not become a member.” [...] The European Union and 162 countries have joined the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which was adopted in 1982 and now called simply The Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST). [...] Under LOST, any kind of maritime dispute, fisheries, environmental protection, navigation, and research must be resolved under this treaty through mandatory dispute resolution by the U.N. court or tribunal which limits autonomy. But disputes should be resolved by U.S. courts. When Congress approves the USMCA agreement, the Law of the Sea Treaty (LOST) will also be ratified through the back-door, by including it in the USMCA. Which senator is going the read this massive bill? Is this interpretation (UNCLOS-wise) of the implication of USMCA ratification correct?
While I haven't read the full agreement (trade deals aren't exactly riveting), there seems to be a few gaps in the arguments given. Here's Article 24.18(3) (PDF link): Each Party shall base its fisheries management system on the best scientific evidence available and on internationally recognized best practices for fisheries management and conservation as reflected in the relevant provisions of international instruments aimed at ensuring the sustainable use and conservation of marine species. In my opinion (since I can't find too much independent commentary on this point), the US would only be required to abide by UNCLOS insofar as it relates to fisheries management. UNCLOS covers a much wider range of topics than just fisheries. There appears to be no commitment beyond that. On the other hand, there's no dispute that UNCLOS is one of those "international instruments," as it's referenced in the footnotes to this section. Also, since the US is not party to UNCLOS, dispute resolution would be through the panels established by Article 31 (PDF link), not through UNCLOS tribunals which might otherwise be possible between Canada and Mexico, as per 31.3, for example.
Note, Washington State Senate Bill 5061 seeks to block certain "untracable" firearms without a serial number. This relates in part to "3D printable" guns, but the act of milling of a 80% lower (in Washington) could be a violation, if and when it passes. But it appears the bill hasn't been made a law yet... Is Washington specific news this issue what drives the question? Federally, the ATF web site says: Receiver blanks that do not meet the definition of a "firearm" are not subject to regulation under the GCA. The ATF has long held that items such as receiver blanks, "castings" or "machined bodies" in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid and un-machined have not reached the "stage of manufacture" which would result in the classification of a firearm per the GCA. But this gets a bit technical. For further risk mitigation, the Texan could mitigate any risk related to both Federal and Washington state law by shipping it to a federal firearms licensee (FFL) in Washington as if it were a firearm, per ATM instructions which say (in part): Generally, for a person to lawfully transfer a firearm to an unlicensed person who resides out of State, the firearm must be shipped to a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) within the recipient’s State of residence. He or she may then receive the firearm from the FFL upon completion of an ATF Form 4473 and a NICS background check. That FFL is then responsible for ensuring the transaction properly conducted in the state of Washington, including federal and state requirements. The FFL I contacted only charged $25.00 (plus collecting the state sales tax). Form 4473 was easy enough; only about one page for me to fill out. Of course, I've got a clean record, so going through channels isn't a problem for me, it took less than an hour. The FFL confirmed for me that it wasn't necessary for something like an antique musket, which legally isn't a firearm by the federal defeinitions. In my case the sender was a nervous "trust" lawyer who wasn't sure, hired yet another lawyer to advise him. The FFL didn't charge me anything for receiving that musket.
The note you have quoted does not accurately summarise the decision, which is available on BAILII. What happened was: IOC agreed to sell 5,000 tons of salt to Mumtazzudin. Atlas paid IOC for the salt on behalf of Mumtazzudin. Because Atlas paid, Atlas received the bills of lading. Thus, the salt was pledged to Atlas to secure the money owed by Mumtazzudin. Atlas endorsed the bills of lading over to Chabbra for value. In other words, Atlas sold Chabbra the right to be repaid by Mumtazzudin, and to take delivery of the salt as security for the debt. Mumtazzudin persuaded the shipowner to hand over the salt without presenting the bill of lading. Chabbra sued the shipowner for conversion (destroying the value of its security). What does “refused to redeem the pledge when the bills of lading were tendered to them by Chabbra” mean? Chabbra, as the pledgee of the bills of lading, was entitled to possession of the salt, until Mumtazzudin “redeemed the pledge” by paying Chabbra the amount originally advanced by Atlas. But Mumtazzudin managed to get the salt without the bills of lading, so it refused to pay Chabbra. Why would a savvy seller even transact with buyers who couldn’t pay for the transaction upfront? The alternative may be that the sale is not made at all. However, that is not what happened in this case – the seller got paid.
I think the Washington law and order is fairly clear: you must stay home unless you are engaged in certain allowed activities. The underlying law, RCW 43.06.220(h) empowers issuing an order prohibiting "Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace". Therefore I can walk my dog. When I do, there are a lot of people also out walking their dogs, so that provides a letter-of-the-law permitted exception to the stay-at-home order. Nothing in the order specifically addresses the situation where you pause your dog-walk to talk to a neighbor (the "appropriate social distancing" sub-rule only applies to recreational departures from your home). It is well-established that the central legal issue is what the "compelling government interest" is, and whether these restrictions fail on grounds of narrow-tailoring or least-restrictiveness. The failure to include "go to your brother's place for lunch, provided you follow appropriate social distancing guidelines" as a permitted activity is a candidate for not being least-restrictive. The problem is that the courts will not engage in an infinite regress of second-guessings about whether certain measures are "truly necessary". There is a SCOTUS challenge where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld that's state's order, but a SCOTUS order requires the state to reply to a petition by Monday. The "status quo" is that these orders are legal, until someone constructs a compelling argument that they are not, and that matter is then resolved in favor of petitioner by SCOTUS (which has not happened). So far, governors have prevailed at the state level.
Why has this never been interpreted by SCOTUS? It has never been interpreted by any court, because the interpretation you're advocating is nonsensical, and nobody has ever tried to advance it in any court. Therefore, no court has had an opportunity to rule on it. Congress, however, has (at least implicitly) interpreted this clause to mean that all natural-born citizens are eligible to be president if they also fulfill the other requirements, regardless of when they were born, so that is the prevailing interpretation unless someone manages to challenge the interpretation either before congress or in a court. If such a challenge is made then there will be an explicit ruling.
The short answer is generally yes, but also.... it depends. The long answer is also... it depends. The first question is what (or who) is actually being sanctioned, second who is impacted by the sanction, third what is the specific sanction? There are a variety of different types of sanctions, sanctions against the state, businesses, people, etc. Most sanctions for example are against specific people, or conduct like investment or movement of capital, not necessarily the purchase of goods. I go into further discussion below, but for the quicker answer to your specific question, unless the person you are buying from is directly sanctioned or the subject of sanctions, or the entities specifically involved in the sale of goods (export company, vessel, etc) are directly sanctioned (or Russian companies operated in Crimea), yes it would be legal to purchase. So yes, unless the specific item you are buying/ entity you are buying it from is specifically sanctioned it would be legal, it is not particularly common for sanctions to prohibit the purchase of goods by consumers, unless there is a unique circumstance. Here is the 2-3 page overview of U.S. sanctions on Russia: https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10779.pdf As to the further discussion. For example see below, many current sanctions are against government officials; Or in the case of EO 13685 from 2014 concerning the occupation of Crimea many of the sanctions imposed aren't strictly against Russia, but instead prohibits U.S. business, trade, or investment in occupied Crimea. EO 13685 excerpt: Section 1. (a) The following are prohibited:(i) new investment in the Crimea region of Ukraine by a United States person, wherever located; (ii) the importation into the United States, directly or indirectly, of any goods, services, or technology from the Crimea region of Ukraine; (iii) the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, from the United States, or by a United States person, wherever located, of any goods, services, or technology to the Crimea region of Ukraine; and (iv) any approval, financing, facilitation, or guarantee by a United States person, wherever located, of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction by that foreign person would be prohibited by this section if performed by a United States person or within the United States. (b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to the effective date of this order. (And even then sanctions may apply, unless they don't...) CRS Report: The United States has imposed sanctions related to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on at least 735 individuals, entities, vessels, and aircraft that OFAC has placed on its Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN) or Sectoral Sanctions Identification List (SSI) (see Table 1 and Table B-1). The basis for most of these sanctions is a series of four executive orders (E.O.s 13660, 13661, 13662, and 13685) that President Obama issued in 2014.15 In addition, the Department of Commerce’s BIS denies export licenses for military, dual-use, or energy-related goods to designated end users, most of which also are subject to Treasury-administered sanctions. Two of President Obama’s Ukraine-related E.O.s target specific objectionable behavior. E.O. 13660 provides for sanctions against those the President determines have undermined democratic processes or institutions in Ukraine; undermined Ukraine’s peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity; misappropriated Ukrainian state assets; or illegally asserted governmental authority over any part of Ukraine. E.O. 13685 prohibits U.S. business, trade, or investment in occupied Crimea and provides for sanctions against those the President determines have operated in, or been the leader of an entity operating in, occupied Crimea. The other two E.O.s provide for sanctions against a broader range of targets. E.O. 13661 provides for sanctions against Russian government officials, those who offer them support, and those operating in the Russian arms sector. E.O. 13662 provides for sanctions against individuals and entities that operate in key sectors of the Russian economy, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R45415.pdf https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/russia-sanctions See further references below: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2014/12/24/2014-30323/blocking-property-of-certain-persons-and-prohibiting-certain-transactions-with-respect-to-the-crimea https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/topic/1576 https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/ukraine-russia-related-sanctions https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/126/ukraine_overview_of_sanctions.pdf
In the case New York Times Co. v. United States, the court issued a brief per curiam opinion basically saying that the NYT won, and then each justice wrote a separate concurrence or dissent. A few justices did join each others' opinions, and in particular, Justice Harlan's dissent was joined by both of the other two dissenters (who also wrote separately). On the concurrence side of things, Justices Black and Douglas joined each other, and Justices Stewart and White joined each other. The subject matter in this case was whether the New York Times was allowed to publish the Pentagon Papers; the United States government opposed this on the grounds that the documents were classified and (allegedly) a risk to national security. This gives us a total of nine signed opinions plus one unsigned per curiam opinion, which is rather short and so I don't think it should count. The sole function of the per curiam was to prevent any one of the concurrences from being characterized as &quot;the majority opinion.&quot;
The contract is almost certainly not valid. The answer you linked references the 2001 Federal Circuit case Fomby-Denson v. Dept of the Army. The court, in its opinion, quoted from the 1948 Supreme Court case Hurd v. Hodge: [t]he power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the United States . . . . Where the enforcement of private agreements would be violative of that policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions of judicial power. It is clear that, in the case you propose, the enforcement of such a contract would go against the public interest. Quoting from the 1972 Supreme Court case Branzburg v. Hayes, the Fomby-Denson decision said: it is obvious that agreements to conceal information relevant to commission of crime have very little to recommend them from the standpoint of public policy. It further notes this clause from the First Restatement of Contracts: [a] bargain in which either a promised performance or the consideration for a promise is concealing or compounding a crime or alleged crime is illegal.