Is the premise of Robert Mueller about how a sitting President cannot be indicted imply that a sitting President is above the law? Background In page 213 of the Mueller Report, the Special Counsel team describes thier considerations that guided their obstruction-of-justice investigation. First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to initiate or decline a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions in violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations, see 28 U.S.C. 515; 28 C.F.R. this Office accepted legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from constitutional view, we recognized that a federal criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President's capacity to govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct. Regardless of the reasoning, it is the belief of the Special Counsel's team that a sitting president cannot be indicted regardless of the crimes he committed (at least in obstruction of justice in this particular case). This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th ammendment of the constitution. Question Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted?
Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
The Main Answer: The Judge Can't Appeal; But Other People Can Since the Judge now has an attorney, can this Judge appeal to the Supreme Court (or appeal again starting from a different court jurisdiction) to potentially allow him to continue his decision to review if the Michael Flynn case should be dismissed? Not exactly. It is potentially subject to appeal, but not by the judge. But the question contains an understandable and natural false premise that confuses the issue. The attorney appointed by the Court to present the position abandoned by the Justice Department is not a lawyer for the judge (who has absolute immunity from liability). Instead, the attorney is someone appointed to provide additional representation to &quot;the People&quot; on the theory that the Justice Department in unable to fully represent the interests of &quot;the People&quot; due to an alleged conflict of interest. The attorney appointed by the judge to present a position that the Justice Department abandoned, might have standing to do so, but the judge himself or herself, while listed as the Respondent in the case, is only a nominal party and not a true real party in interest. Also en banc review of a panel decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals can be raised sua sponte by any judge in the Circuit, without prompting from any part for further review (which is what happened in this case). The Archaic Federal Writ of Mandamus Practice Explained There is a general rule that says that only final decisions of trial courts can be appealed to an appellate court.&lt;1&gt; Thus, usually, a criminal defendant can only appeal from a criminal case after the criminal defendant has been convicted of a crime and sentenced for that crime. But, this general rule has exceptions. A request for a writ of mandamus is one way to get around this general rule. A writ is a court order directed at a government official by a court having jurisdiction over the official, usually, but not always, in a matter in which the government official is not alleged to have done anything making the government official eligible for punishment personally. For example, a writ of execution, is a court order directing the sheriff or some other government official, to take action to enforce a court order awarding someone a money judgment that the prevailing part seeks to have the sheriff involuntarily seize. A request for writ of mandamus (i.e. for an order directing a government official subordinate to the court to take a non-discretionary action in a court case) is structured in the old fashioned approach used in federal court as a lawsuit against a judge brought in a court with supervising authority over the judge. But, in substance, this is a legal fiction and formality used (in this context, writs of mandamus are used in more than one way) to provide review of trial court decisions prior to the entry of a final decision on the merits in a case (something also called an &quot;interlocutory appeal&quot;). This process was established in the All Writs Act of 1789 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651) that applied to the federal courts the process in place immediately prior to the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1789 in the courts of the American Colonies. The procedure used in the pre-constitution courts of the American colonies was borrowed from English common law procedural practices then in place. The English practice was in turn originally established during or not long before the reign of King Edward II (reigned 1307 to 1327 CE). Those procedures have then evolved over time. This procedure was formally established in the U.S. in the federal courts by case law interpreting the All Writs Act (the All Writs Act itself is only a sentence or two long). Put another way, the All Writs Act gave the federal courts the authority to order other government officials (including but not limited to judges) to do things to carry out federal court orders, in the same broad circumstances where English common law courts has the power to do so, and using the same procedures. Originally, a writ of mandamus really was a lawsuit against a judge, and there are contexts where a writ of mandamus is sought against a government official other than a judge that continue to be a lawsuit against a government official. But, now that is just a formality and not a real lawsuit in this context, and that has been the case in cases involving writs of mandamus filed against judges for hundreds of years. &lt;1&gt; A direct appeal of right from a final criminal conviction is a relatively new innovation in the federal courts in the U.S.. The right to bring a direct appeal of right of a criminal conviction secured in federal court did not exist until 1890. And, the right to bring a direct appeal of right of a criminal conviction is not constitutionally guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution or the Bill of Rights, it exists solely by virtue of a federal statute. Prior to 1890, most judicial review of federal criminal convictions was conducted via writs of habeas corpus (which has much narrower grounds upon which relief can be granted) or via Presidential pardons. The Modern Approach Used In Many Jurisdictions Contrasted The modern approach designed to avoid the confusion associated with nominally suing the judge, is to create a court rule replacing the old fashioned legal fiction of writ of mandamus practice, in which someone files an interlocutory appeal captioned (in a criminal case) as People v. Defendant, or as Defendant v. People (depending upon who files first) which is handled essentially like an ordinary appeal but with shorter deadlines and the requirement that grounds for considering the appeal at all prior to a final order in the case be established. For example, in Colorado, where I practice, the equivalent procedure to a writ of mandamus with the judge named as Respondent in a federal court, is called a &quot;Colorado Appellate Rule 21 motion&quot;. Further Appellate Options Appeals from interlocutory writ of mandamus rulings made by a panel of a U.S. Court of Appeals are a fairly esoteric corner of federal appellate procedure, and I am not intimately familiar with the ins and outs of it, but there is a process by which someone with standing could seek further appellate review of the U.S. Court of Appeals panel's ruling. The interlocutory appeal in this case was handled by a three judge panel of one of the United States Courts of Appeal. There are two main ways that a ruling of a panel of one of the United States Courts of Appeal may be further appealed. One is to seek en banc review of the decision by all of the judges of the circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals whose panel heard the case. The other is to appeal either from an en banc decision or directly from the panel decision, to the U.S. Supreme Court. In both circumstances, further appellate review of discretionary, the en banc panel or the U.S. Supreme Court, as the case may be, first decides the preliminary question of whether to consider the further appeal at all, and then, if that is answered in the affirmative, considers the merits of the issue or the issues raised in a further appeal. In a case of national interest involving separation of powers in which the panel issued a divided ruling, it isn't unthinkable that there would be further discretionary review of the ruling if it was sought by someone with standing to do so. The most controversial aspect of the panel ruling in this case, highlighted by the dissenting opinion, is that the Justice Department and criminal defense attorney filed the writ of mandamus before the trial court judge had a chance to consider and rule upon the motions filed in the trial court. Normally, a writ of mandamus is not considered &quot;ripe&quot; to file until a judge actually rules on a motion with a court order which the person seeking the writ alleges was mistaken, rather than before the judge gets to consider whether or not to grant that motion in the first instance as was done in this case. To paraphrase the dissenting opinion, the dissenting judge felt that the appellate court panel jumped the gun in an unprecedented and irregular manner that deprived it of jurisdiction to decide the issue because it was not yet ripe for decision. Other Ways This Could Have Been Litigated As an aside, it is also worth observing that there were multiple procedural options available in this case to prevent his client from being sentenced and to force the case to be dismissed. The writ of mandamus was brought by the Justice Department seeking to enforce its own institutional privileges. But, the more conventional approach in a case with a similar fact pattern in federal court, would be for the criminal defense attorney to file a separate lawsuit against the warden of the jail where his client is being held (who is also a nominal defendant under a different legal fiction, and who also has absolute immunity, but would be defended in the lawsuit by the Justice Department absent an alleged conflict of interest like the one present in this case) seeking a writ of habeas corpus ordering the warden to release his client, possibly before a different judge, and subject to direct appeal once resolved, rather than an interlocutory appeal via a writ of mandamus. But, it isn't often that the Justice Department seeks to withdraw its prosecution against a criminal defendant who has already pleaded guilty in a proceeding in which the factual basis of the plea has already been established on the record in open court and the case is ripe for sentencing to a serious felony sentence. Update As Of August 3, 2020 This case was selected for en banc review by the entire DC Circuit based upon the petition of the dissenting judge in the three judge panel that decided the case. The Order states: ORDER Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing en banc, the responses thereto, and the vote in favor of rehearing en banc by a majority of the judges eligible to participate, it is ORDERED that this case be reheard by the court sitting en banc. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the court’s order filed June 24, 2020, be vacated. It is FURTHER ORDERED that oral argument before the en banc court be heard at 9:30 a.m. on Tuesday, August 11, 2020. The parties should be prepared to address whether there are “no other adequate means to attain the relief” desired. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004). A separate order will issue regarding the allocation of oral argument time. Per Curiam
Part of the problem you'll find is that there are so few impeachments in U.S. History (Only 21 articles of Impeachment have ever been drafted, of which only 8 resulted in convictions) and SCOTUS is so selective on cases it chooses to hear, that only one case has ever been heard and that was upheld (Nixon v. United States). In that case, SCOTUS ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the legal question before it (was the new trial format a proper trial by the senate), but did not have an opinion one way or another to suggest that SCOTUS could not review other cases that come before it. One of the reasons they also haven't is in order to have a legal case in the U.S., the plaintiff must suffer actual harm. More impeachments ended without a conviction than with either acquittal (8), resignation before trial conclusion (4), and expulsion from senate (1, and will never occur again as Congressional office holders are not impeachable following this particular case). Since no harm was caused and courts do not rule on hypotheticals, a case with actual harm (conviction) must occur in order for SCOTUS to even consider hearing the case. Nixon does not bar SCOTUS from hearing more appeals resulting from Impeachment, it only bars those relating to the manner in which the senate chooses to hold the trial.
In a normal case, it is not merely the contents of the indictment that are secret, but also the very fact that an indictment exists. This level of secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings is a practice so old that it may be impossible to say with any certainty why it began, but it is currently justified on various grounds. For instance: It reduces the danger of reputational harm to suspects who the grand jury believes have not committed any crime. It reduces the danger of witness tampering. It reduces the danger of defendants taking additional steps to avoid detection. It reduces the danger of defendants fleeing upon learning that they've been indicted. Naturally, the importance of any of these considerations will vary from case to case. So, had the process gone normally, the public would not be curious about the Trump indictment because it wouldn't even know the Trump indictment existed. But media leaks put the court in an awkward position, as the court was still legally obligated to pretend it didn't even know whether an indictment existed, even though the defendant had been blabbing about it for days on social media.
Traditionally, anyone could bring a bill of indictment to a grand jury. This article from Creighton Law Review provides some historical context. Government prosecutors are the overwhelming norm now, but private prosecution used to be more common. Indeed, New Jersey still has limited authorization for private prosecution (Court rule 3:23-9(d)). The New Jersey rule governing the grand jury is 3:6, and rule 3:6-8(a) on return of indictment says: An indictment may be found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors and shall be returned in open court to the Assignment Judge or, in the Assignment Judge's absence, to any Superior Court judge assigned to the Law Division in the county. With the approval of the Assignment Judge, an indictment may be returned to such judge by only the foreperson or the deputy foreperson rather than with all other members of the grand jury. Such judge may direct that the indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released pending trial and in that event it shall be sealed by the clerk, and no person shall disclose its finding except as necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant or summons. Note that the jurors decide on an indictment and return the indictment to a judge, not the prosecutor. In the rules governing grand juries, the prosecutor is allowed to be present and to speak, but has no official controlling role, other than whatever leadership is granted by the foreman. I don't know whether it is universal that grand juries do what the prosecutor tells them to, such as indicting a ham sandwich, but at least theoretically they have the power to act independently. The rules actually do not say who can ask questions of a witness, which could lead one to conclude that of course it is the prosecutor (and that the prosecutor does everything, except vote on the indictment).
There is no &quot;different legal procedure&quot; for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling.
The short answer is no. The President has plenary and absolute power to pardon anyone other than himself, before or after conviction, of any federal crime. Therefore, his constitutional exercise of this power, whatever its motive, can not constitute a crime, although it could be a ground for impeaching the President or retaliating against the President politically. In historical practice, Presidents and Governors have been increasingly loathe to use the pardon power, and tend to use it only when they are political lame ducks, precisely because the political costs of a pardon can be so high. UPDATE: Also, to be clear, a President cannot pardon a crime before it is committed, so a true &quot;pre-emptive pardon&quot; does not exist. A President can pardon a crime that has not produced a conviction, but that is very different from pardoning a crime that has not yet occurred. Further, a pardon does not relieve an individual of civil liability, for example, monetary liability to another private individual, for the same conduct, or of state criminal law liability. It extends only to federal crimes and the civil collateral consequences of any conviction of that crime if there has been a conviction of that crime. For example, a pardon relieves the person pardoned from collateral consequences such as a prohibition on possessing a firearm, a loss of the right to vote, or a prohibition on the right to engage in a licensed occupation that felons are prohibited from being licensed to perform. But, a pardon does not relieve the person pardoned, for example, of engaging in wire fraud, of civil liability for money damages to the person defrauded. Similarly, while one can pardon a criminal contempt conviction, in which a court punishes someone with incarceration or a fine for violating a court order, a pardon can not relieve someone from a civil contempt citation which imposes incarceration or a per day fine (usually) until someone complies with a court order that it is within the power of that person to comply with (e.g. an order directing someone to testify in a civil lawsuit or to turn over the password to a Swiss bank account).
This article sums up the state of the law regarding presidential pardon power. In no case has the court ruled that there are people who are unpardonable. There is no question that a presidential pardon is only available for criminal offenses against the US (not civil contempt of court, but including criminal contempt). Presidential pardons do not require higher approval.