Would a tautological law have any effect? Is there any case where a law saying something like &quot;Any person who commits theft is guilty of theft&quot; would have any effect?
&quot;Any person who commits theft is guilty of theft&quot; This is not tautological. &quot;Any person who commits theft commits theft&quot; or perhaps &quot;Any person who commits theft is a thief&quot; is tautological. But the hypothetical law as written makes theft something that someone can be guilty of, that is, theft is an offence and illegal. The exact consequences depend on other provisions and the legal system itself. If a common law jurisdiction abandons common law offences in favour of a criminal code and such code does not contain &quot;any person who commits theft is guilty of theft&quot;, then theft would be legal (or at least not criminalized by such code). Theft has to have an operable definition for the law to be effective, but the definition does not have to be explicit in the statutes when there are other sources of laws. The courts are meant to interpret the words in law reasonably, relying on ordinary definitions of expressions, the discernible intention of the legislature, history and social development. There can be unconstitutionally (or otherwise unacceptably) vague laws, but in common law jurisdictions, at least the usual crimes like theft and murder have been interpreted by the courts over hundreds of years with a rich body of case law and legal literature. Crimes like piracy benefit from a multitude of internationals conventions and case laws in many jurisdictions, for example, the Canadian definition of piracy is almost a tautology: 74 (1) Every one commits piracy who does any act that, by the law of nations, is piracy. Of course, the operative provision is exactly the one with the words &quot;is guilty of&quot; (2) Every one who commits piracy while in or out of Canada is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.
SCOTUS blog regularly does posts on that kind of topic (see, e.g., their Stat Pack) and if you looked at their sources or the authors of those posts, you could probably easily find more. There are people who do that and make their findings publicly available, but I don't know them off hand.
It might or it might not be fraud. The outcome will depend on how the facts and evidence are interpreted at trial. A more general version of this question is: If two parties discuss and orally agree to X; then sign a contract that states they agree to Y, what are the parties bound to? X? Y? Or something else? In your version, X is a fraudulent statement. And Y is an obfuscated writing. One party will argue fraud. The other will argue not fraud on the basis that all the facts were disclosed in writing. The party alleging fraud will carry the burden of proof. The standard of proof will be preponderance of evidence (more than 50%). Generally speaking, written evidence outweighs oral evidence if not accompanied by substantiating facts. Substantiating facts could be: emails or other written correspondence, a prior history or pattern of making false claims to others regarding this investment, the respective behavior of the parties after the agreement was made or anything else that corroborates the oral testimony presented at trial.
Not for that reason This would not make the Act invalid. The interaction between the two laws would simply mean that criminal prosecution would only succeed for acts on or after the Act came into effect. So, even though the law purports to invoke criminal sanction for acts before it came into effect, the Constitution says it can’t so it doesn’t. That doesn’t render the law invalid, just unenforceable for that period.
No In many but not all common law jurisdictions, a person who comitts an &quot;inherently dangerous&quot; crime can be found guilt of &quot;felony murder&quot; (not manslaughter). The Wikipedia article says: In most jurisdictions, to qualify as an underlying offense for a felony murder charge, the underlying offense must present a foreseeable danger to life, and the link between the offense and the death must not be too remote. For example, if the recipient of a forged check has a fatal allergic reaction to the ink, most courts will not hold the forger guilty of murder, as the cause of death is too remote from the criminal act. Floyd was arrested on an accusation that he passed a counterfeit $20 bill. This is not an &quot;inherently dangerous&quot; felony. Nor has it ever been established that he had the criminal intent that would have been required to convict him of a crime. Indeed it has not been proved that he knew the bill was counterfeit. But a finding of criminal intent to commit the underlying felony is essential to invoking teh felony murder rule. MN code 609.632 subdivision 3 requires &quot;intent to defraud&quot; and &quot;having reason to know that the money order, currency, note, or obligation or security is forged, counterfeited, falsely made, altered, or printed&quot;. Moreover when the value is under $1,000 the possible penalties are much lighter and may not even be a felony. In any case passing a phoney $20 is not the kind of offense for which the felony murder rule is normally invoked, nor is being killed by an arresting officer a plausible, outcome, althoguh obviously it is possible. Further sources The University of Minnesota's page on &quot;felony Murder&quot; says: When the defendant commits a felony that is inherently dangerous to life, he or she does so knowing that some innocent victim may die. In essence, this awareness is similar to implied malice, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. What is difficult to justify is a conviction for felony murder when the felony is not inherently dangerous to life. Thus most jurisdictions limit the felony murder doctrine to felonies that create a foreseeable risk of violence or death. ... Joaquin, who has just lost his job, decides to burn down his apartment building because he can’t afford to pay the rent. Joaquin carefully soaks his apartment with lighter fluid, exits into the hallway, and throws a lit, lighter-fluid-soaked towel into the apartment. He then runs outside to watch the entire building burn down. Several tenants die of smoke inhalation because of the fire. In jurisdictions that recognize felony murder, Joaquin can probably be charged with and convicted of murder for every one of these deaths. In this example, Joaquin did not intend to kill the tenants. However, he did most likely have the criminal intent necessary for arson. Therefore, felony murder convictions are appropriate. Note that Joaquin exhibited extreme indifference to whether the tenants in the building lived or died, which could also constitute the criminal intent of implied malice or depraved heart. The Minnesota code Section 609.19 MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE says: Subd. 2.Unintentional murders. Whoever does either of the following is guilty of unintentional murder in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years: (1) causes the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting; [Paragraph (2) deals with death &quot;while intentionally inflicting or attempting to inflict bodily harm upon the victim&quot; which clearly does not apply in this case.]
A contract that tells one party or another to do an illegal thing is void ab initio: courts will not recognize it or give force to it. A contract which doesnt explicitly tell either party to do something illegal but if during the course of fulfilling either party's end of the bargain they commit an illegal act it is up to the courts discretion what happens, whether to find the contract void or to maintain the contract (its a matter of public policy whether they allow the contract to continue existing, or if the contract was such that illegal acts were expected to be commited then the court will likely remder it void) Either way, you cannot indemnify someone for committing an illegal act.
There is a relevant law, Title 18 section 907 which states that "A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally". So possession of lock picks is not a crime per se. In Com. v. Gendrachi 389 A.2d 604 we are reminded that "intent need not be directly proved, but may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the incident out of which the charges arise". The accused was busted in mildly suspicious circumstances at 5:20 am in the dead of winter, urinating. The court notes that "There is no evidence that appellant's hands were on the door or that he made an attempt to extract the tools from his pocket and apply them to the door. In fact, there is no act or statement by appellant that would lead one to infer that he intended to use the tools at that time", and that "appellant is a certified locksmith and it is not unreasonable to find the tools of his trade in his pocket, especially when he is wearing his work attire". Note that this is on appeal: he was convicted initially. The point is that there is a lot of slop in cashing out the legal concept of "intent". Pennsylvania does not, apparently, have any specific laws that refer to lock picks. It does have a statute that addresses having criminal tools, which are defined as (including) "Anything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have". Mr. Gendrachi had those very tools, and the appeals court did not say anything to suggest that the tools were not "criminal tools" (and in FN 5 they actually point out that the Commonwealth cannot say that the tools were weapons, a ludicrous proposition never raised by anyone – so by failing to deny that lock picks are criminal tools, they are adoptively admitting that they are criminal tools). Thus I conclude that there is a law in PA, that lock picks are burglary tools, and that the government would have to prove intent to use criminally.
Yes. Helping someone to commit a criminal offense is generally a crime identical to the offense itself. Under Texas Penal Code section 7.02: A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if ... he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense.