Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will? I've been studying the relation between free will and the U.S. criminal justice system, and it appears that there is the argument that whether or not a defendant had free will to commit a crime is a significant factor in determining whether or not the defendant is factually guilty of having committed a crime. A &quot;universal and persistent&quot; foundation stone in our system of law, and particularly in our approach to punishment, sentencing, and incarceration, is the &quot;belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.&quot; United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) From a website of Attorney John Guidry, Free will creates the moral structure that provides the foundation for our criminal justice system. Without it, most punishments in place today must be eliminated completely. &quot;Free Will, Determinism, and the Criminal Justice System&quot; However, it does not appear to be published much in legal literature of legal cases. From what I have studied, the legal system adheres to the philosophy that criminals commit crimes via compatibilist free will. This, however, is from what I have pieced together from legal literature that I have read over the past 10 years. It seems to be a tenet that comes from the neo-classical school of criminology. I have yet to read some kind of Federal or State source that argues that compatibilist free will is presumed to be had by anyone who commits a crime. For instance, I might construe the appeal of Grayson v. United States to not touch upon findings of guilt but instead punishment, sentencing, and incarceration (as if whether or not a defendant had free will influences those aspects of a criminal case rather than influences a finding of criminal guilt). Where in U.S. law is it officially argued that the U.S. criminal justice system presumes defendants commit crimes with free will?
It is an unquestioned pre-American axiom, expressed in Latin as actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (&quot;the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty&quot;) which has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since at least the 17th century. It is thus presupposed in all criminal proceedings. It's not that a person only commits a crime with free will, it's that it is not deemed to be a crime if there is no free will. A person can be held at gunpoint and required to commit a criminal act: the person does indeed have free will to choose to be killed rather than commit the act, but the act is legally excused since dying is never held to be the only acceptable alternative to committing an otherwise-criminal act.
What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles.
That depends what the issue is. On constitutional issues, and on issues of federal law (which do come up in state cases) , they are binding precedent, at least in that circuit for an appeals court opinion, and in the whole US for a Supreme court opinion. District court opinions are not generally binding unless upheld on appeal. On matters of state law, the state's own highest court is the final word, but a federal opinion could be at least as persuasive as one from a different state. to the best of my understanding one does not use the term &quot;estoppel&quot; to describe the effect of a previous judgement by a different court. If it is in the same case and not on appeal, the term is Res judicata (&quot;A thing (already) judged&quot;). If it is a general matter of adhering to clear precedent, the term Stare decisis (“to stand by things decided.” ) would be used.
It refers to whoever the judge reasonably says it refers to. The referent of that specific clause N.J.S.A. 2C:45-1(b)(6) is not analyzed in any court ruling that I have been able to locate, but case law such as State v. Krueger, 241 N.J. Super. 244 has addressed other discretionary provisions of the statute, and has upheld the propriety of such discretionary acts as ordering restitution &quot;as long as (1) there is a reasonable relationship between the restitution and the defendant’s rehabilitation, and (2) there is a factual underpinning supportive of the restitution&quot;. The court concludes that we are entirely satisfied that the debarment was reasonably designed to “assist” defendant in “leading] a law-abiding life” and was thus permitted under N.J.S.A. 2C:45-la....The condition of probation was substantially related to an appropriate penological and rehabilitative objective followed by numerous citations.
The Seventh Amendment's jury trial provision does not apply to the states. The Bill of Rights does not inherently restrain the states at all, merely the federal government. The Fourteenth Amendment does restrain the states; notably, it forbids a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Courts have read into "of law" the added requirement that the law be compatible with the fundamental rights that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty; this means that most stuff that would violate the Bill of Rights if done by the feds violates due process if done by the states. However, not all provisions of the Bill of Rights have been incorporated (i.e. applied to the states); the requirement for a jury in a civil trial is one of the few that hasn't been incorporated, because courts do not consider it a fundamental right (merely one protected in the federal courts). Now, many traffic tickets are actually misdemeanor offenses, and a jury-trial requirement for crimes is incorporated. However, even for federal offenses, the courts have generally found that the Constitution doesn't require jury trial for petty crimes (those with a maximum sentence under 6 months).
Sexual intent is proven (or disproven) like any other form of intent. A confession is not necessary, although that is one available method. It may be inferred with proof from circumstantial evidence. Any combination of direct and circumstantial evidence is allowed. There isn't a formula for it. The prosecution or defendant, as the case may be, simply has to convince the trier of fact that there was or was not sexual intent. Any otherwise admissible evidence that could rationally show that sexual intent is more or less likely can be presented. If it happens in a gynecological appointment, or because the defendant slipped on a banana peel after the defendant's glasses were splattered with mud so he couldn't see what he was doing, this is going to be exceedingly hard to prove in the absence of a pattern and practice in multiple cases that couldn't be a coincidence, or with something like bragging to a friend in private. If this happens at a festival celebration, or after a dinner date, or intent is corroborated by perverted photographs on the defendant's phone, or is accompanied by sexual language, any other intent is going to be highly implausible and circumstantial evidence will strongly point to a sexual intent. One way to disprove sexual intent is for the defendant to testify that there was some other intent. There is risk in that approach. You can't simultaneously testify that sexual contact never happened and that sexual contact did happen but without sexual intent, for example. Testifying that there was sexual contact without intent basically admits some other element of the crime. But it also forces the prosecution to prove that the defendant is lying, which depending upon the evidence, may be easy, or may be hard. In real life, most of the cases that get prosecuted are easy cases. But, there will always be cases that are closer and circumstances that one wouldn't easily foresee in advance, and that is why we have courts and trials. Ultimately, the prosecution presents evidence and the finder of fact has to decide if it proved that element of its case.
We look first to the Hutaree prosecution of 2012, US v. Stone where defendants were charged with seditious conspiracy: Specifically, the Government charges Defendants with conspiring to “oppose by force the authority” of the United States Government. Essential to that charge, Defendants must have agreed to oppose some positive assertion of authority by the United States Government; mere violations of the law do not suffice. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 693 (1887). In Baldwin, SCOTUS found (emphasis added) that All, therefore, depends on that part of the section which provides a punishment for ‘opposing’ by force the authority of the United States . . . . This evidently implies force against the government as a government. To constitute an offense under the first clause, the authority of the government must be opposed; that is to say, force must be brought to resist some positive assertion of authority by the government. A mere violation of law is not enough; there must be an attempt to prevent the actual exercise of authority.
Jury trials in common law jurisdictions are simply a fact, and don't need or get justification. Jury trials are ancient. In England the Scandinavians had an assembly, the þing (&quot;thing&quot;) for deciding matters, such as guilt. Under Norman rule this became systematized, to the point that the Magna Carta Art. 39 states the law that No free man shall be captured, and or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, and or of his liberties, or of his free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we proceed against him by force or proceed against him by arms, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, and or by the law of the land There was a period subsequently where the King gained more power and trials were more arbitrary and oppressive through the Star Chamber, leading to various reforms such as the birth of the US. The right to a jury trial is for reasons of historical precedent part of the US constitution. Because of the legal right to a jury (especially in criminal cases), the only question that can reasonably come up is for a defendant to ask if they will have better chances with a bench trial versus a jury trial. All it takes is one person on a jury to not be convinced to avoid a conviction, so superficially you'd think an accused person would prefer a jury trial to increase their odds of not being convicted. This is encouraged by a mind-set &quot;the state versus the citizen&quot;, where the prosecution and the judge are both agents of the government. On the other hand, the average citizen is more likely to misunderstand the import of evidence, and be less able to disregard statements made during the trial that were held inadmissible.