Privileges of states &quot;now existing&quot; in contrast to other states, in importation of slaves Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States says: The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. My question is about the implications of the phrase &quot;now existing.&quot; Would that mean that before the year 1808, Congress could forbid importation of slaves into states other than the 13 that existed when this was written? Did they?
This clause was included in order to attract the Southern states to join the union. For general context, see Federalist 42,1 Federalist 38,2 and Paul Finkelman, &quot;How the Proslavery Constitution Led to the Civil War&quot; (2013) 43:3 Rutgers Law Journal 405.3 It originally appeared as if the &quot;now existing caveat... empowered Congress to block slave traffic to and from any newly formed states&quot; (James Pfander &amp; Elena Joffroy, &quot;Equal Footing and the States 'Now Existing' Slavery and State Equality Over Time&quot; (2021) 89:5 Fordham Law Review). In 1819, John Jay wrote a letter saying: I understand the sense and meaning of this clause to be, that the power of the Congress, although competent to prohibit such migration and importation, was not to be exercised with respect to the then existing States (and only them) until the year 1808; but that Congress were at liberty to make such prohibition as to any new State, which might, in the mean time, be established, and further, that from that period, they were authorized to make such prohibition, as to all the States, whether new or old. However, in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), Chief Justice Roger Taney interpreted the clause such that it required new states to be admitted on &quot;equal footing with the other states&quot; (p. 447) thus rejecting the interpretation I presented above. He also discreted the Northwest Ordinance as being beyond the power of Congress (pp. 435-38, 490-91). Four states joined the union between the ratification of the Constitution in 1790 and 1808: Vermont (1791), Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), and Ohio (1803). Vermont had already outlawed slavery before joining the union. Ohio was only allowed to join the union on the conditions established in the Northwest Ordinance, one of which was to prohibit slavery. Slavery and slave trade was allowed to continue in Tennessee and Kentucky after joining the union. 1. Note: the numbering on these has varied between the &quot;Dawson&quot; edition of the Federalist Papers and the now accepted numbering. In the Dawson edition, these were numbered 41 and 37. Federalist 42: &quot;It were doubtless to be wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren! Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government.&quot; 2. Federalist 38: &quot;It is a matter, both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect: it is sufficient that the latter is more imperfect. ... Is the importation of Slaves permitted by the new Constitution for twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever.&quot; 3. &quot;Given its economic importance and its vulnerabilities, it is not surprising that the Southerners at the Constitutional Convention demanded, and won, huge concessions to protect their 'peculiar institution,' as even they were beginning to call it. ... The clauses that Pinckney and other Southerners worked hard to create set the stage for a government that both protected slavery and was deeply influenced by it. ... In supporting a specific clause in the Constitution to prevent Congress from ending the African slave trade until 1800 (it was later amended to 1808), Sherman asserted that 'the public good did not require' an end to the trade.&quot;
It is well established that the federal government has complete control over immigration. See especially Arizona v. US which holds that States are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance. De Canas v. Bica (1976), 424 U.S. 351 is also relevant to the application of field preemption to INA. In this case, the courts found that Congress had not (at that point) entered the field of employment of unauthorized workers, so state laws were not preempted by federal law. Laws can change, and with them, potential state powers. In Arizona the court held that Intent can be inferred from a framework of regulation “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it” or where a “federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject” and with respect to issues of immigration, Because Congress has occupied the field, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 adds provisions to the Immigration and Nationality Act, including employment-related law, thus Congress has entered the field of regulating immigration with respect to employment. Current 8 USC §1324b arises from various amendments to the INA, where the present expression &quot;protected individual&quot; was inserted, by Public Law 101-649, to replace earlier &quot;citizen or intended citizen&quot;. Congress also introduced Temporary Protected Status in §302 of the law, which has specific (more restricted) provisions regarding employment. The evidence clearly indicates that Congress intended to include employment issues w.r.t. their supreme power regarding immigration. These discrimination provisions are in the field of immigration, and not discrimination legislation (where Congress has not preempted the field). Congressional silence must, in the light of what Congress did say, be interpreted to mean that the US immigration policy only offers certain specific protections, and states cannot add to or subtract from those protections.
Congress has the power to propose amendments, but not to enact them. Amendments are only enacted once they're ratified by 3/4ths of the state legislatures. And yes, there's no reason to think it would be unconstitutional for 2/3rds of each house of Congress plus 3/4ths of the state legislatures to make fundamental changes to the Constitution like eliminating other branches of government. The only limit on amendments that's still in effect is that states can't be deprived of equal suffrage in the Senate without their consent.
Such a law would be constitutional The US Congress could decide to require VPN providers to register the IPs that they provide to VPN customers. The use of such techniques would almost surely be considered &quot;interstate or foreign commerce&quot; and so Congress would have power under the Commerce Clause of the constitution to legislate concerning it. There would clearly be a rational basis for such a law -- the question outlines such a basis. This is not an area subject to strict scrutiny. None of the previously established limits on the commerce power (and there are few) would seem to apply. State laws on this topic would probably be preempted by the dormant commerce clause if Congress does not act, and clearly preempted if Congress does act, unless Congress explicitly permits concurrent legislation. Whether Congress should act on this matter is a policy question not on topic on Law.se. Whether Congress will act is speculation. I can only say that I am not aware of any widespread demand for such action, or any proposed bills, on the topic. However, there is US caselaw to the effect that anonymous speech (or other communication) is protected by the First Amendment , and that laws effectively banning anonymous speech are not acceptable. But there are other ways of anonymizing online speech, so that would not seem to provide sufficient grounds to overturn such a law.
The Fifth Amendment, and all the other amendments in the "Bill of Rights" (numbers 1-10) were universally understood when passed to be restrictions on the Federal Government only. The courts treated them that way through the end of the US Civil War. This was made definite in the US Supreme Court case Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment the courts have decided that most of the provisions of the bill of rights also apply to actions by the states. A few do not apply, such as the requirement that indictments be by a grand jury, and the Third Amendment ban on quartering soldiers in private dwellings. This was done through a somewhat roundabout mechanism -- the Supreme Court decided that the protections of the Bill of Rights were included in the Due process clause of the 14th. As a result not all the provisions were made applicable at the same time. (Most were held to be incorporated during the period from 1925-1985. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) thru Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)). Modern legal opinions sometimes discuss incorporation as if it was a fact from the passage of the 14th in 1868. But the actual gradual process is clear in the case law. For example, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases was first incorporated in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), but only for death penalty cases, and only if "special circumstances" existed, such as a defendant who was illiterate, far from home and support, or feeble-minded. Later cases gradually found "special circumstances" in more and more fact patterns, and in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) the Court extended the right to all felony cases. It has later been extended to misdemeanor cases if jail time is a possible result. A similar history could be spelled out for the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination, or for the Fourth's against search and seizure, particularly the "exclusionary rule". I, and a number of legal scholars who have better rights to an opinion, think that the 14th's "Privileges and Immunities" clause would have been a more sensible means to this end, but for various reasons that isn't how it was done. Justice Thomas seems to be trying to reverse this -- he has made comments in a number of opinions of late that various things should be protected under the Privileges and Immunities clause of the 14th, rather than the Due Process clause.. Even if the Court adopts this theory, it probably won't change many outcomes. That is how the Fifth, and other Bill of rights Provisions like the Fourth (search and seizure) and the First (free speech and religion) have been applied to restrict the states. None of these provisions directly restrict private individuals. In some cases, courts have said that while individuals may not be forbidden to do things that are forbidden to governments under the Bill of Rights, the courts will not help you do such things, such as by enforcing contracts to do them. No person shall be held to answer for a... crime "held to answer" here means prosecuted in court. Only governments do that. That provision forbids criminal court cases that do not start with a grand Jury indictment. it is one of the few Bill of Rights provisions which the Supreme Court has held do not apply to the states. But in any case it is purely procedural. It doesn't say that crimes may not be prosecuted, nor that they must. It says only "if you want to try someone for a crime, this is a step you must go through." The other provisions of the Fifth all do apply to the states, such as the ban on double jeopardy, and the protection against self-incrimination. does that mean that government can declare it legal for citizens to kill a particular person? No. That would violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause if don3 by the Federal Government, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause and its Equal Protection clause if done by a state. It would probably also violate the provision against Bills of Attainder, and perhaps the provision against cruel and unusual punishment. Once upon a time, several hundred years before the US was founded, the government of England did just that. It was called "outlawry". For certain crimes, the punishment was to be put "outside the law". An "outlaw" (in this older sense) was not protected by the law. Anyone could kill an outlaw, or steal from one, and the legal system would do nothing about it. The US has never used outlawry.
The US Constitution doesn't say one way or the other how a state's representatives are to be chosen, so until this law was passed in 1841, a state could have all of their representatives elected at-large, without districts. It is only recently that SCOTUS has gotten involved in redistricting questions: here is a summary of leading redistricting rulings. A recurring theme in these rulings has been the Equal Protection Clause, where certain redistricting plans (or non-plans) were found to violate that clause (especially ordering a state to redistrict when it refused to do so with the result being that population changes diluted the vote of those living in certain districts). Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 held that The constitutional requirement in Art. I, § 2,that Representatives be chosen &quot;by the People of the several States&quot; means that, as nearly as is practicable, one person's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's thus redistricting is a justiciable question, answerable with respect to the federal government's need to enforce the 14th Amendment. It is not necessary to amend the Constitution further to specify a means of enforcing that clause.
Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination.
Are there any restrictions on the taxes or duties a U.S. state can levy? Yes. For starters, states may not use taxes or other means to impede the federal government in its constitutional exercises of power. This precedent stems from a case called McCulloch v. Maryland from 1819. In 1816, Congress established the Second Bank of the United States. Many states were not fans of this action. One of them, Maryland, established a tax on all notes of banks not chartered in Maryland. When the head of the Baltimore branch of the bank refused to pay the tax, litigation commenced and it was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. SCOTUS held that the Constitution grants implied powers to Congress that allow Congress to implement a national government using its express powers and state action may not interfere with such exercise of power. Taxation, of course, is just one way a state may attempt to interfere with federal power. Can states impose duties on goods that merely transit their territory? Generally no. The Commerce Clause bars states from implementing taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce or that put burdens on it by subjecting commercial activities to numerous or unfair taxation. The Due Process Clause complements this concept by requiring there be a definitive link between a state and the person, property, or transaction which it seeks to tax. This goes back to the SCOTUS decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona where the state enacted a law barring trains from operating in the state with more than 14 or 70 passenger or freight cars, respectively. The Court held that this was a substantial burden on interstate commerce because trains would need to be broken up before they passed through AZ. Also, you couldn't just stop on the tracks and "break up" the trains, so that had to be done at a stop before getting to AZ. The court determined that with this law, AZ effectively controlled the length of trains as far from its borders as El Paso and Los Angeles. The alternative was to operate all trains at the lowest level allowable by any state, which would lead to AZ dictating train lengths around the country. In determining the validity of the law or regulation, a court uses a balancing test to compare the burden on interstate commerce with the importance of the state interest (the AZ law was purportedly for safety reasons).