In American criminal law, do prosecutors who seek to prosecute a defendant need to have evidence of the defendant&#39;s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Would the judge in a criminal trial consider a prosecutor's statement that some evidence is representative of a defendant's guilt is a false statement by seeking the evidence to be inferred as conclusive without being thoroughly tested?
united-states The ethical standard for U.S. prosecutions, under Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8 (ethical rules have parallel numbering in every U.S. jurisdiction and there is little variation from jurisdiction to jurisdiction for this part of this ethical rule) is to refrain from prosecuting a charge that is not supported by probable cause. Probable cause is also the standard used by a grand jury, and in an adversarial pre-trial hearing, to screen charges before they go to trial. It is also the standard for issuing an arrest warrant. The higher threshold of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard for convicting a defendant at a trial on the merits of the defendant's guilt or innocence, it is not the standard for bringing a criminal charge in the first place. The job of the prosecutor at trial is to convince the trier of fact (usually a jury, but sometimes a judge in a bench trial) that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If the case was thin on evidence when commenced, this may require law enforcement and the prosecutor's office to develop evidence after the criminal charges are brought. As a practical matter, a prosecutor wants to prosecute cases that can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, and will usually try to do that. But a belief that a case can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial is not an ethical requirement for prosecutors and is not a ground for imposing sanctions against a prosecutor. Of course, individual prosecuting attorneys' offices are free to establish their own standards that are more rigorous as an internal policy for bringing criminal cases.
It's hard to say, given how little we know about the case and the information, also what you mean by &quot;corrupted&quot; and what your evidence is. Here are two hypothetical cases that illustrate different possibilities. 1: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge &quot;My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was murdering his brother&quot;. Lawyer deems this to be a bad argument because murder is punished more severely than robbery. The lawyer is doing his job, protecting the interest of the client. No crime or civil wrong. 2: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge &quot;My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was in church&quot;. The lawyer doesn't understand that this is exculpatory evidence, thinking &quot;they never asked about church, there's no point in me raising this issue&quot;. The client can probably sue for incompetence. There are possible criminal charges possible, for example if the lawyer is working for The Mob he might be involved in an actual criminal conspiracy.
The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.
Is there such a phrase in jurisprudential or legal thought? In those instances it is common to say that the evidence is inconclusive. Accordingly, it is unavailing because that evidence does not prove the party's allegation.
If the act and the evidence is sufficient, they will all be convicted. It would not be necessary, for example, to prove that it was Brutus's stab that killed the victim. It is not guaranteed that all of the participants committed the act knowed as 1st degree homicide (picking Washington law), some may be guilty of conspiracy to murder. Liability for a crime can extend to others besides the person who "did it": (3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if: (a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he or she: (i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or (ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it
canada A person is deemed to not be guilty unless convicted In Canada, by s. 6 of the Criminal Code, &quot;a person shall be deemed to not be guilty of the offence until he is convicted.&quot; This is also bolstered by s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which guarantees the right &quot;to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.&quot; There is always a chance that the tier of fact is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt The accused (and therefore their lawyer) cannot be sure that the evidence will leave the trier of fact (judge or jury) with no reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. Thus, the accused and their lawyer can only &quot;know&quot; the accused is guilty in the colloquial sense (in that they did the things that could be found to be a crime). However, they cannot know that they will be guilty in law. There is always a chance that the trier of fact is not convinced. Ways that the Crown's case can fall apart at trial: what appeared to be convincing to the parties just isn't convincing to the trier of fact a key witness or evidence becomes unavailable it turns out critical evidence was obtained contrary to constitutional principles a key witness's credibility or reliability crumbles on cross examination the prosecution is complacent in diligently moving the trial forward and the trial drags on to the point that a stay of proceedings is warranted (e.g. in jurisdictions with strict rights to timely trials) The interest in truth-seeking is not the only component of a fair trial Fair trials should seek the truth, but they should also be timely (Jordan), and they should also not rely on evidence obtained contrary to the Charter (Grant). Fair trials are not only about securing convictions when a person did the things that could constitute an offence if proven. At base, a fair trial is a trial that appears fair, both from the perspective of the accused and the perspective of the community. A fair trial must not be confused with the most advantageous trial possible from the accused's point of view. Nor must it be conflated with the perfect trial; in the real world, perfection is seldom attained. A fair trial is one which satisfies the public interest in getting at the truth, while preserving basic procedural fairness to the accused. R. v. Harrer, [1995] 3 SCR 562, at para 45 The lawyer's duty Tuckiar v. R [1934] HCA 49: He had a plain duty, both to his client and to the Court, to press such rational considerations as the evidence fairly gave rise to in favour of complete acquittal or conviction of manslaughter only. No doubt he was satisfied that through [an interpreter] he obtained the uncoloured product of his client's mind, although misgiving on this point would have been pardonable; but, even if the result was that the correctness of [another witness]'s version was conceded, it was by no means a hopeless contention of fact that the homicide should be found to amount only to manslaughter. Whether he be in fact guilty or not, a prisoner is, in point of law, entitled to acquittal from any charge which the evidence fails to establish that he committed, and it is not incumbent on his counsel by abandoning his defence to deprive him of the benefit of such rational arguments as fairly arise on the proofs submitted. The subsequent action of the prisoner's counsel in openly disclosing the privileged communication of his client and acknowledging the correctness of the more serious testimony against him is wholly indefensible. It was his paramount duty to respect the privilege attaching to the communication made to him as counsel, a duty the obligation of which was by no means weakened by the character of his client, or the moment at which he chose to make the disclosure. No doubt he was actuated by a desire to remove any imputation on Constable McColl. But he was not entitled to divulge what he had learnt from the prisoner as his counsel. Our system of administering justice necessarily imposes upon those who practice advocacy duties which have no analogies, and the system cannot dispense with their strict observance. A laywer's obligation is to put forward on behalf of their client their best efforts. Whether they &quot;know&quot; their client is guilty of the offence charged or not, to do otherwise amounts to a dereliction of duty and weakens the protections afforded all of us who believe in the rule of law: Arthur Maloney, Q.C., &quot;The Role of the Lawyer in Society&quot; (1979) 9 Manitoba Law Journal 351.
Criminal conviction by a judge after acquittal by a jury would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. A criminal conviction involves both a finding of fact and the application of the law, and a judge (unless this is a bench trial) doesn't find facts, he makes judgements of law. Overturning an acquittal after a jury trial would thus be in essence a whole new trial (moreover one where the defendant was not given a renewed opportunity to defend himself).
We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.