What is the legal basis under US law for prisoner swaps with Russia? In 2010, the USA and Russia agreed to exchange prisoners. The political basis for such agreements is clear, but how does it work legally? Is there a formal agreement in international law between the US and Russia? Did the President have to commute or pardon the Russians in US prisons, or is there an existing statutory basis for releasing some prisoners?
Did the President have to commute or pardon the Russians in US prisons, or is there an existing statutory basis for releasing some prisoners? As far as American law is concerned, in this particular case, it was a &quot;simple&quot; deportation. The defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced to time served, based on submissions from the prosecutors and the defendants, which are usually followed by the judge. Alternatively, if the judge had sentenced someone to real prison terms, a commutation may be required. If they want, the prosecutors can also withdraw the charges before sentencing. Obama commuted Iranian citizens in a spy swap deal. In another Iran-USA prisoners exchange, charges were dropped for Masoud Soleimani. Then as &quot;free&quot; men and women who are foreign nationals, they can still be inadmissible to the United States and be deportable aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S. Code § 1182 - Inadmissible aliens, § 1227 - Deportable aliens). In this case, there are so many potential grounds to choose from: conviction of a crime of moral turpitude, misrepresentation, national security, foreign policy, etc. The Secretary of State can also revoke their visas at the Secretary's discretion and make their presence unlawful. They have the right to contest deportation if they are considered &quot;free&quot; as far as the criminal law is considered. But, they usually want to go home. The US may choose to prosecute them for other potential crimes if they contest. Then if they are deportable and there is no stay on the proceedings due to judicial or administrative intervention, they can be removed from the United States. Is there a formal agreement in international law between the US and UK? I do not believe the United Kingdom was involved directly to the exchange itself. The prisoner swap was done in Vienna. Agreement needs to be obtained from the Austrian government regarding entry conditions etc. UK revoked Anna Chapman's British citizenship. Igor Sutyagin and Sergei Skripal moved to UK. But those are not really international matters legally. The UK alone determines how its citizenship works and who can enter and stay in the UK.
Not for that reason This would not make the Act invalid. The interaction between the two laws would simply mean that criminal prosecution would only succeed for acts on or after the Act came into effect. So, even though the law purports to invoke criminal sanction for acts before it came into effect, the Constitution says it can’t so it doesn’t. That doesn’t render the law invalid, just unenforceable for that period.
You might be misreading the extradition criterion The UK–USA extradition treaty has an example of the clause you're asking about: An offense shall be an extraditable offense if the conduct on which the offense is based is punishable under the laws in both States by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more or by a more severe penalty. Similar wording is used in all other treaties that I have reviewed: UK–Algeria (&quot;offences which are punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty for at least a period of one year&quot;) UK–Argentina (no extradition when &quot;the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for less than one year&quot;) UK–Bolivia (same as Argentina) UK–Chile (same as Argentina) ... UK–U.A.E. (&quot;offence is based is punishable under the laws of both Parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of at least one year&quot;) If there is a treaty that requires there to be a mandatory minimum punishment of at least one year, I have not found it. While you say that &quot;[u]sually, the minimum sentence for a crime has to be 12 months for an extradition to be allowed&quot; and &quot;[e]xtraditions are based on minimum sentence in the UK,&quot; my review of the treaties makes me doubt that. The rest of this answer explains how to interpret the clauses quoted above. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the &quot;possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year.&quot; The inquiry is focused on the offence that the conduct is alleged to give rise to and the range of punishment available for that offence generally. E.g. an offence with a minimum punishment of a fine and a maximum punishment of 16 years in prison is an offence that is &quot;punishable... by deprivation of liberty for a period of one year or more.&quot; Said another way: it is not necessary that the offence have a mandatory minimum of one year imprisonment. It is enough that the offence gives rise to the &quot;possibility of a term of imprisonment or other form of detention of more than one year.&quot; See Canada v. Barrientos, 1995 ABCA 468 (CanLII) at para 103, Hetherington J., dissenting; but appeal allowed, for the reasons of Hetherington J. by the SCC in Canada v. Barrientos, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 531. In Barrientos, the courts were interpretating Article 2 of the Canada–U.S. extradition treaty, with wording substantially similar to the UK extradition treaties I reviewed above: &quot;provided these offenses are punishable by the laws of both Contracting Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year.&quot; One remaining question is whether the decision-maker needs to consider the specific facts of defendant's conduct and make a preliminary estimation as to whether in fact a term of imprisonment more than one year is likely. This position has not been adopted in Canada. At the stage where a judge or Minister of Justice is determining the authority to proceed, this is not to become a &quot;sort of sentencing hearing.&quot; See USA v. English, 2002 BCSC 1902 at para 23.
The primary source of minimum wage and hours laws for the United States as a whole is the Fair Labor Standard Act. Generally courts have held that prisoners are not employees within the meaning of the act. The amount paid for prison labor is a matter of state correctional system policy, and some states, such as Texas, pay nothing to prisoners for their labor, while others pay a tiny fraction of the federal minimum wage. The main rights of prisoners who are detained pursuant to a conviction is to be free of physical harm arising from deliberate indifference to their well being, or to be free of punishment beyond what they were sentenced to for their crimes. Prisoners who are detained awaiting a trial have greater rights. I know that slavery is legal in the United States if it involves prisoners The 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit this but some state constitutions (e.g. Colorado's), and some state laws, do prohibit it. So the law in the United States is not uniform on this subject.
The question says: Callahan used torture to get the location of the hostage out of the suspect, and information acquired by torture is not admissible as evidence. In general, evidence obtained by torture is indeed not admissible in US courts. This is particularly true when the person doing the torture is a police officer. If it is done by a private citizen, with no prompting or encouragement by the police or any part of the government, different rules may apply. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) for the inadmissibility of confessions obtained through torture or physical coercion. The Mapp decision, cited below, would have extended this to information or evidence obtained via torture. The question asks: It was not merely information what Callahan acquired, but the physical body of the victim. Doesn't that change anything? No. If the evidence was obtained unlawfully, then the evidence so obtained and all other evidence or information indirectly obtained through the unlawful act is inadmissible. This is the &quot;Fruit of the poisonous tree&quot; doctrine. It applies just as much to physical evidence as to a confession. &quot;Fruit of the poisonous tree&quot; doctrine is an extension of the &quot;exclusionary rule&quot; and like the basic rule, is intended to deter unlawful actions on the part of law enforcement and government generally, and to ensure that the courts are not complicit in such unlawful actions. The rule was first fully established in US Federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) although versions of the rule go back before the founding of the United States. The rule was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) although some states applied a version of the rule even before the Weeks decision. There are exceptions, however, notably &quot;inevitable discovery&quot;. That means if other, lawful, investigations already underway would certainly have uncovered the same evidence, then it may be admissible. Another similar exception is the &quot;Independent source doctrine&quot;. This says that when the same evidence is later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality, it may be admissible. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for both of these exceptions. There is also a good-faith exception where a warrant was obtained on invalid grounds but used in good-faith by offers who thought it valid. I do not see that any of these exceptions would apply in the situation described in the question. It does not matter how &quot;clear&quot; the evidence may be. If it is obtained unlawfully, and no exception applies, it will not be admissible. The question asks: In case of the hideout and the rifle, is such a clear evidence still inadmissible? Can't the &quot;hot pursuit&quot; rules be applied? He didn't have time for a warrant, he was running against the clock. The doctrine of&quot;hot pursuit&quot; alone does not justify entering a private dwelling without a warrant, but there are a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, one of which &quot;Exigent Circumstances&quot; is one, or rather a group of relates exceptions. In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), the Supreme Court wrote in its opinion, &quot;A variety of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search, including law enforcement's need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home . . . engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect . . . or enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause.&quot; Thus “hot pursuit” can be an exigent Circumstance and justify a warrentless entry, but this will depend on the precise facts of the case. It is not clear that the circumstances described in the question would qualify. The question asks: even if they decide not to press charges because they are afraid they can't win the trial, can't they at least put the suspect under surveillance? Legally, they probably can. Not even probable cause is required to continue an investigation, or to place a suspected criminal under surveillance There might be reasons other than the law of evidence not to use surveillance, for example if the police fear that the suspect will observe the surveillance and thus be alerted. But this seems like a place where the movie plot may have been unrealistic.
First off, the people of Finland say that Santa lives in Korvatunturi, which would mean he is subject to Finnish jurisdiction. But if he were born, resided and worked at the North Pole, as the original question states, this spot is in international waters, and under the Convention on the High Seas that would be terra nullius. Therefore no nation can claim sovereignty over his home (we must also assume he is not on a plane or ship flying the flag of some nation: article 11 allows the detention of a ship on the high seas only under order of authorities of the flag state). That might immunize him from civil forfeiture of his home, but there is more to jurisdiction than where your home is. Under Article 14, all states "shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State". Article 15 says what "piracy" is, which could be interpreted as referring to crimes against persons and property (but not possession of marijuana). Eritrea is not a signatory to this treaty, so they might claim legal jurisdiction, though enforcement of the claim could be challenging. The US has technically not ratified this treaty either, but we mostly observe it. Klaus could also be subject to US law (for example) in specific cases. The high seas are in the "special maritime jurisdiction" and the US can claim jurisdiction for offenses against a national of the US. Other states may have similar laws. A person whose IP had been copied can sue in their home country, so the lack of a North Pole jurisdiction would not protect Claus. B&amp;E is prosecuted where the offense happens; he would be free of business license laws; when he enters US airspace, he is subject to FAA regulations, and would be required to have a visa and passport to enter the US. In fact, most of the alleged crimes take place within the jurisdiction of a state.
An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it.
There is no general legal obligations be truthful Such an obligation only arises where specifically called out by law or where there is a relationship of trust between the parties, e.g. they are negotiating a contract, they have a doctor-patient relationship etc. In any event, the President has legal immunity for actions performed as President. Presidents answer for their misdeeds at the ballot box, not the courthouse.