In UK legislation, what does &quot;reasonable grounds to suspect&quot; mean? In the Customs and Excise Management Act of 1979, section 161 the language "if there are reasonable grounds to suspect" appears. Practically, where is the line drawn for "reasonable," and how stringent is "suspect"? I'm essentially trying to figure out how this compares to "Probable Cause" under the US 4th Amendment.
The concept of reasonable suspicion is used throughout the common law world. While the Wikipedia article (at present) focuses on the term as used in the ‘stop and search’ context of Terry v. Ohio, a different line of authority has emerged in the interpretation of police powers (both with and without warrant) in Commonwealth countries. Commonwealth case law One significant authority is Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942, a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Federal Court of Malaysia. This case concerned the interpretation of a power of arrest, under the Malaysian Criminal Code, which arose if “reasonable suspicion existed of [the plaintiffs’] having been concerned in an offence …” Lord Devlin, delivering the judgment of the court, said: Suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: “I suspect but I cannot prove.” Suspicion arises at or near the starting-point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end. When such proof has been obtained, the police case is complete; it is ready for trial and passes on to its next stage. It is indeed desirable as a general rule that an arrest should not be made until the case is complete. But if arrest before that were forbidden, it could seriously hamper the police. To give power to arrest on reasonable suspicion does not mean that it is always or even ordinarily to be exercised. It means that there is an executive discretion. In the exercise of it many factors have to be considered besides the strength of the case ... There is no serious danger in a large measure of executive discretion in the first instance because in countries where common law principles prevail the discretion is subject indirectly to judicial control. Lord Devlin noted that “the test of reasonable suspicion prescribed by the Code is one that has existed in the common law for many years,” and continued, citing Dumbell v Roberts [1944] 1&nbsp;All&nbsp;ER&nbsp;326: The police are not called upon before acting to have anything like a prima facie case for conviction ... Prima facie proof consists of admissible evidence. Suspicion can take into account matters that could not be put in evidence at all. The Privy Council’s judgment was quoted with approval by the High Court of Australia in George v Rockett (1990) 170 CLR 104. Terry v. Ohio Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) involved testing police conduct “by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures,” and deciding whether, if the petitioner’s constitutional right had been violated, the exclusionary rule should prevent the use of evidence obtained in the search. The Supreme Court held: [T]he quite narrow question posed by the facts before us [is] whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest. It is important to remember the constitutional context of Terry v. Ohio. The analysis of a statutory grant of search powers upon reasonable suspicion, particularly in a jurisdiction with no constitutional bill of rights, is a different exercise. It is also significant that one purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to curtail the abuse of the royal writ of assistance, which a customs officer must hold to exercise the power conferred by s&nbsp;161 of the Customs and Excise Management Act! The Customs and Excise Management Act There is a good chance that a statute of the United Kingdom, conferring police-like powers on a public officer upon reasonable suspicion, would be interpreted in accordance with the long history of the use of that term at common law. The scope of any litigation would probably depend on the procedure that brought the question before the court – for example, judicial review of a warrant, an action to recover goods, or an action for damages. I am not aware of any case law on s&nbsp;161. Perhaps there are not that many customs officers holding a royal writ of assistance. But any court reviewing the scope of that power would consider the purpose of the legislation, as well as the traditional common law meaning of ‘reasonable suspicion.’
Yes. The jurisdiction I am familiar with is England and Wales. Conviction requires evidence (witness testimony is evidence) which proves the case "beyond reasonable doubt". It is open to the jury to find the witness so convincing that they find that they are sure the defendant committed the crime. In general of course, prosecutors prefer to have some supporting evidence (either additional witnesses, or circumstantial evidence - like DNA.)
It depends on the type of warrant. Failure to pay a fine is not necessarily an arrestable offence. The Police Scotland Warrants Standard Operating Procedure (710 kB PDF) states: 5.3 Whilst there is no legislative requirement for Officers to physically possess the warrant to force entry / effect arrest, it would be considered best practice if a forced entry is anticipated. There may be instances where this is not practically possible to obtain the warrant in time or it may be geographically challenging to do so. Possession of a scanned copy of the warrant would be good practice on such occasions, again where the circumstances permit. and 5.5.1 By virtue of Section 135 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 an apprehension warrant implies authority, where it is necessary for its execution, to break open shut and lock fast places. Entry into any house or building, therefore, may be affected by any constable in order to execute the warrant in accordance with its terms and only as a last resort. and 5.6.1 An Extract Conviction/Means Enquiry Warrant (back fine warrant) is issued by the Clerk of Court when an accused person fails to pay the fine imposed within the period allowed for payment. This extract is a sufficient warrant for the apprehension of the accused, but unlike an ordinary warrant of arrest, it does not authorise a constable to break open doors in order to affect arrest. Sheriff officers are not police - they are closer to what in England and some parts of the USA would be termed bailiffs, used for civil recovery of debts etc.
In the United States, we use the phrase "Reasonable Person" which is not to say an average person or a simple man, but an individual who understands the limitations of the situation and would act in accordance with that knowledge. For example, if a doctor improperly rendered help a patient, his actions would be evaluated based on reasonable knowledge of people with his medical knowledge, where as a person practicing medicine without a license would be subjected to a more common-man standard. The phrase person is therefor substituted for a reasonable individual and thus, a "Reasonable Landlord/Renter" could exist in housing cases, or a "Reasonable Doctor" in medical torts or "a Reasonable Woman" in sexual assault cases, so the "Reasonable Person" is often used to allow the jury to put themselves in the shoes of the witnesses and the accused and see how they would react (Historically, the term was called a "Reasonable Man" though "Reasonable Person" was used to make the term more neutral to what the definition of "Man" was (A human male or a member of the Human Species, regardless of gender).
The general rule is that a warrant is required to enter private property (absent constitutional case law exceptions to the warrant requirement such as exigent circumstances and consent), and that a warrant is available only when there is probable cause that a crime has been committed. Whether the neglect or abuse of an animal constitutes a crime within the meaning of this 4th Amendment requirement could potentially be seen as a gray area, since historically, in the absence of statutory authority in early common law, an owner of an animal had absolute authority to deal with his or her property (the animal) as the owner of the animal saw fit. The purpose of the statute is to clarify that this conduct by an animal owner constitutes a crime for 4th Amendment search and seizure purposes by making a state law determination that it is a crime, which states can do, even though they can't change the constitutional requirement under the 4th Amendment. Also, just because a state can authorize law enforcement to get a warrant for any search authorized by the U.S. Constitution, that doesn't mean it has to allow law enforcement to do so in every case where it is constitutional for the state to do so. The duty to get a warrant for law enforcement to enter onto private property at all arises not only from other state statutes, but also from the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (as incorporated to apply against state and local governments though the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). But, the constitutional requirement has case law exceptions, so it isn't required in all circumstances. In particular, exigent circumstances, and the consent to entry exceptions, which are allowed by constitutional criminal procedure case law, could apply to the requirement to get a warrant in the first place. But, law enforcement needs to have the authority to search at all with a warrant under state law, for an exception to the warrant requirement to be relevant. This statute appears to carry out that purpose by authorizing searches for this particular purpose. For what it is worth, it is not the best drafted possible statute to achieve this objective, and it could have been written to be more clear, but it still gets the job done. So, in answer to the top-line question, no, I wouldn't read this statute as requiring a warrant in every possible circumstance in order to go onto private property to check on an animal, although a warrant would be required in every case where an exception to the warrant requirement under 4th Amendment case law does not apply. Section 578. Is an animal related statute rather than people. The people involved are the property owners. The property owner's rights in their real property are potentially infringed if there is a warrantless entry. The human beings owning the animals are potentially violating a law which the State of Missouri wants law enforcement officers to be able to enforce (the relevant laws are the state animal cruelty and agricultural laws expressly referenced in the statute, so, it is irrelevant that &quot;Barry County Missouri has no animal control laws or leash laws&quot;). Among other things these statutes make it a crime if a person &quot;Has custody or ownership of an animal and fails to provide adequate care[.]&quot; As the question claims that: &quot;The definition &quot;Adequate care&quot; is vague as well.&quot; But the question also notes that: &quot;The 578 statute has been challenged for being unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary which was overruled but that was serious abuse case.&quot; The state has a right to decide what is and is not illegal. It is not prohibited from banning treatment of animals that is not serious abuse. The state has every right to make it a crime to fail to provide adequate care for an animal, even if that failure to provide adequate car does not constitute severe abuse. Also, keep in mind that a lawful search requires only probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and a good faith belief that an exception to the warrant requirement is present. If the law enforcement officer has a good faith belief that the animal will die or seriously suffer or be hidden by the owner in the time that the law enforcement officer reasonably thinks that it will take to get a warrant, the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement applies. The fact that the lawful search later reveals that a crime was no committed does not mean that the search was improper. A mere belief that an animal was abused or neglected and that exigent circumstance were present with a reasonable factual basis (e.g. a tip from a neighbor who seems credible and claims to have personal knowledge of the facts) will usually suffice to establish probable cause. So warrant needed or not? and if so, what legal action can be taken for trespass, rights violations under color of law etc. if any? If there is a search without a warrant or probable cause was not present, and an exception to the warrant requirement does not apply, and the property owner believes that their 4th Amendment rights were intentionally violated by law enforcement in the warrantless search in violation of clearly established law to the contrary, a civil lawsuit against the law enforcement officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be brought in state or federal court. The employer of the law enforcement officer can be sued as well, under the same statute, if the warrantless search in violation of the clearly established constitutional right was made pursuant to an express policy of the law enforcement officer's employer. But the fact that the law enforcement officer violated someone's rights does not automatically make the law enforcement officer's employer civilly liable for the wrong. In most U.S. states, law enforcement officers are protected by state law governmental immunity from common law trespass lawsuits for their conduct while carrying out their official duties, but I haven't checked specifically to see if that is the case in Missouri. A claim of a 4th Amendment violation can also be a ground for suppressing evidence obtained with an unlawful search when defending a prosecution under some ordinance or statute that relies upon that evidence.
There are a variety of situations like border crossings, entry into official buildings, etc. in which there is a general right for law enforcement to demand identification on a suspicionless basis, none of which seem to apply in this case. But, the most common justification for demanding ID is to make what is called a Terry stop (after the name of the U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld the legality of these stops in the face of 4th Amendment limitations on searches and seizures). Wikipedia accurately summarizes the law in this area as follows. A Terry stop is: a brief detention of a person by police on reasonable suspicion of involvement in criminal activity but short of probable cause to arrest. The name derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that police may briefly detain a person whom they reasonably suspect is involved in criminal activity; the Court also held that police may do a limited search of the suspect's outer garments for weapons if they have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person detained may be "armed and dangerous". To have reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop, police must be able to point to "specific and articulable facts" that would indicate to a reasonable police officer that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity (as opposed to past conduct). Reasonable suspicion depends on the "totality of the circumstances", and can result from a combination of facts, each of which is by itself innocuous. The search of the suspect's outer garments, also known as a patdown, must be limited to what is necessary to discover weapons; however, pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, police may seize contraband discovered in the course of a frisk, but only if the contraband's identity is immediately apparent. In some jurisdictions, persons detained under the doctrine of Terry must identify themselves to police upon request. In Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), the Court held that a Nevada statute requiring such identification did not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, nor, in the circumstances of that case, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self incrimination. New York is one of the many states that has a stop and identify statute, that allows an officer to insist on presentation of an identification any time there is a legal basis for making a Terry stop. The New York stop and identify statute is N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §140.50. This says: 1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 2. Any person who is a peace officer and who provides security services for any court of the unified court system may stop a person in or about the courthouse to which he is assigned when he reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct. 3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in subdivisions one and two a police officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person. 4. In cities with a population of one million or more, information that establishes the personal identity of an individual who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer, such as the name, address or social security number of such person, shall not be recorded in a computerized or electronic database if that individual is released without further legal action; provided, however, that this subdivision shall not prohibit police officers or peace officers from including in a computerized or electronic database generic characteristics of an individual, such as race and gender, who has been stopped, questioned and/or frisked by a police officer or peace officer. In this particular case, if the law enforcement officer were more clever, he would have said that he was concerned that the crew might be using the drone to case the property in order to commit a crime there in the future. And, if he had said that, this would surely pass muster for reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and would have provided a legal justification for demanding ID. The "about to commit a crime" justification for a Terry stop makes it, in practice, much broader than probable cause for an arrest, which requires that the police believe that a crime has actually already been committed or is in progress, not just that someone is about to commit a crime (a person may be subjected to a Terry stop even if his actions which tend to show he is about to commit a crime have not yet progressed to the level of an attempted offense for which someone may be convicted and are not truly imminent). (Actually, strictly speaking, the officer is only entitled to determine the information that an ID would reveal, and not to insist that someone actually have the ID on his person, under state law, although a local ordinance or court interpretation of the law could possibly give him the authority to actually demand an ID to determine this information. For example, California courts have held that a duty to provide basic information implies a duty to provide it in a verifiable manner.) The fact that the law enforcement officer failed to articulate any legal basis for the stop, yet went on to arrest the individuals, weakens the case that the stop was valid considerably, because generally, at least in theory, a law enforcement officer is supposed to be able to articulate the reasonable suspicion for the stop at the time that the stop is made and not days later after the fact. In addition to stop and identify laws, some states (including Colorado) have held that failing to provide an ID on demand, under the "totality of the circumstances" can sometimes constitute obstructing a police officer and provide a basis for an arrest. It isn't inconceivable that a law enforcement officer in this situation could make that argument and prevail at least in showing probable cause for arrest on that basis, even if it wasn't a sufficiently solid argument to give rise to an obstructing a police officer conviction.
A couple of SCOTUS decisions bearing on this are Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 and Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, where the courts took pains to deny that &quot;probable cause&quot; is related to a number. From Texas v. Brown, the Court frequently has remarked, probable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely required that the facts available to the officer would &quot;warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,&quot; Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 162 (1925), that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct, or more likely true than false. A &quot;practical, nontechnical&quot; probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 From Illinois v. Gates, The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. The question is framed in terms of probability that a certain individual is guilty, but that is not the basis for issuing a search warrant. Rather, a warrant may be issued if there is a fair probability that evidence bearing on a crime will be found. That would include evidence that exonerates a person (the system is not set up to only favor convictions). It would be highly impractical to assign a numeric value to probability of finding evidence, since there is more to the matter than just declaring &quot;It must have been one of these three people&quot;.
Yes. There is both a duty to disclose and permit inspection of certain records (e.g. those that adversely affect either party's case or support another party's case) and a right for the court to demand access to other specific records. In england-and-wales the applicable rules are found in Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules. For example: Standard disclosure 31.6 Standard disclosure requires a party to disclose only– (a) the documents on which he relies; and (b) the documents which – (i) adversely affect his own case; (ii) adversely affect another party’s case; or (iii) support another party’s case; and (c) the documents which he is required to disclose by a relevant practice direction. Specific disclosure (1) The court may make an order for specific disclosure or specific inspection. (2) An order for specific disclosure is an order that a party must do one or more of the following things – (a) disclose documents or classes of documents specified in the order; (b) carry out a search to the extent stated in the order; (c) disclose any documents located as a result of that search. Party's control 31.8 (1) A party’s duty to disclose documents is limited to documents which are or have been in his control. (2) For this purpose a party has or has had a document in his control if – (a) it is or was in his physical possession; (b) he has or has had a right to possession of it; or (c) he has or has had a right to inspect or take copies of it. Right of inspection 31.3 (1) A party to whom a document has been disclosed has a right to inspect that document except where – (a) the document is no longer in the control of the party who disclosed it; (b) the party disclosing the document has a right or a duty to withhold inspection of it, or (c) paragraph (2) applies. (2) Where a party considers that it would be disproportionate to the issues in the case to permit inspection of documents within a category or class of document disclosed under rule 31.6(b) – (a) he is not required to permit inspection of documents within that category or class; but (b) he must state in his disclosure statement that inspection of those documents will not be permitted on the grounds that to do so would be disproportionate. Inspection and copying 31.15 Where a party has a right to inspect a document– (a) that party must give the party who disclosed the document written notice of his wish to inspect it; (b) the party who disclosed the document must permit inspection not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the notice; and (c) that party may request a copy of the document and, if he also undertakes to pay reasonable copying costs, the party who disclosed the document must supply him with a copy not more than 7 days after the date on which he received the request. And, in case there's any doubt that this applies to electronic records: Meaning of document 31.4 In this Part – ‘document’ means anything in which information of any description is recorded;