Why was the Supreme Court of the United States set up to only hear cases en banc? From the very beginning of the US Supreme Court, we've required a quorum of Justices to be present to hear a case. Unfortunately, seeing as we set up a co-equal judiciary rather than the parliamentary dominance over English common law, we did not have England to use as an example. We have had multiple opportunities to change this, like the Judiciary Acts of 1891 and 1925 where Congress decided that rather than expand the Supreme Court or allow assignment of cases to a panel of Justices like it does the circuit courts, we would simply give the judiciary greater power to pick which cases it heard. To me, this implies that the quorum model was not only intentional, but that it was important enough to preserve for the length of our democracy. So why is the US Supreme Court set up to only hear cases 'en banc'?
The practice of having all SCOTUS cases heard by the whole court (en banc) rather than by individual justices or panels is nowhere specified in the US Constitution. Nor is it mentioned by The Federalist which is often a good source on the intentions of the Framers. It seems to have been adopted by the first session of the court with little discussion -- at least none that has come down to us. I strongly suspect that English models were in the minds of those early court members, but I do not know exactly which models. The practice of the various state Supreme courts may also have been influential. This practice seems to have been confirmed and definitely settled by Chief Justice John Marshall, who did so much to define the Court's procedure. He also strongly encouraged the court to issue a single option in each case, discouraging both concurring and dissenting opinions. He felt that the Court should always speak with a single voice. During the first fifteen years of his tenure, he himself wrote close tom 90% of the court opinions, according to an academic study of the Marshal Court I read about a year ago. It is worth recalling that in the early years there were not many SC cases, and there was no need to split up the work of the court. It is also worth remembering that at that tine there were no separate appeals courts. Rather, each Justice &quot;rode circuit&quot; holding court in several different cities, in each sitting with one or two District Court judges as a panel court. Thus when a case reached the SC on appeal, it had already been passed on by a single Justice. The justices, through the end of the Marshall Court in the 1830s spent more than half of each year on circuit. Addition: One should also remember thst from the start through the 1830s the Justices lived in boarding houses during the Court term, and in most terms most or all of the Justices lived in the same house, where the work of the Court was discussed over dinner and in the evenings. None of which Really answers &quot;why do we do it this way?&quot; I do not know of any document that first laid out this practice, much less gave reasons for it.
On January 15, 1780, the Continental Congress resolved to establish &quot;for the trial of all appeals from the courts of admiralty in these United States, in cases of capture&quot;, then a few lines later resolved &quot;defraying the expence of said court of Appeals&quot;, and resolved actions &quot;to carry into full and speedy execution the final decrees of the Court of Appeals&quot;, thus clearly establishing the acceptance of the first federal court of the US, the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. Some years earlier, Nov. 25 1775, the Continental Congress passed a number of resolutions pertaining to judiciously deal with seized goods in the course of the war (when there was no codified law or court system), where &quot;prosecutions shall be commenced in the court of that colony in which the captures shall be made&quot;, but &quot;cases an appeal shall be allowed to the Congress, or such person or persons as they shall appoint for the trial of appeals&quot;. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales was created in 1875, which seems to be the first UK court specifically established for hearing appeals. There is no obvious linguistic reason for these different names assigned to the functionally same court in two countries, but once a name is officially given, it takes an act of Congress or Parliament to change the name.
India does not have a constitutional court, which is a term usually reserved for a court which has exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional questions and is usually limited to deciding constitutional questions. India has a (mostly) unitary court system capped by the Supreme Court of India, but its jurisdiction is not limited to constitutional questions, and it is not the only court in India that can interpret and apply the Constitution of India. When a component of a decision decided by the Supreme Court of India is not necessary for resolution of the case before it, that portion of the decision is called dicta and is not binding precedent although it is still persuasive authority before lower courts as it is a good indication of how the Supreme Court of India would resolve a case in future litigation. The same distinction between portions of a ruling that are binding precedents and those that are mere dicta also applies in all other appellate courts in a common law legal system such as India's. Also, a portion of a court decision is not dicta merely because it is far reaching. A binding precedent can be broad or narrow in the deciding court's discretion. What makes &quot;dicta&quot; distinct is that it is literally &quot;off topic&quot; and not literally controlled by the potentially broad principles used to decide the case before the Court. What determines whether a part of the ruling is &quot;off topic&quot; is the exact scope of the issue that the court states that it is resolving. For example, if the Court states that it is resolving the question of &quot;due process in an admiralty case&quot; and remarks on due process in an ordinary non-admiralty case, the later remarks are dicta. But if the court states that it is resolving the question of &quot;due process in a legal proceeding&quot; then the same statement is not dicta.
The Supremacy Clause. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. [emphasis mine] This is also known as the "Supremacy Clause" of the U.S. Constitution. It prevents any law of any state from acting contrary to the federal constitution. A comment correctly cites multiple cases that use this clause, in part, as the basis for SCOTUS' authority to review State Supreme Court decisions. So in your hypothetical, the federal issue in play is the clarity of the federal constitution which supersedes state law.
The only relevant case heard by SCOTUS is Nixon v. US, 506 U.S. 224, where a federal judge was tried and convicted for actual crimes, but would not resign his position so continued to draw his salary. The key legal question was whether the matter is "justiciable" (meaning, not a political matter but a legal matter). Nixon's argument was that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause, and the court held that the question (more specifically what it means to "try") is nonjusticiable. White &amp; Blackmun, and Souter, wrote concurring opinions (which might be called on in a subsequent impeachment case) that reminds the reader (and future court) what was not part of the holding of the court, and what might therefore allow future impeachment review. White writes The Court is of the view that the Constitution forbids us even to consider his contention. I find no such prohibition and would therefore reach the merits of the claim. I concur in the judgment because the Senate fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" petitioner. He observes that the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying impeachment trial procedures and because it is extremely unlikely that the Senate would abuse its discretion and insist on a procedure that could not be deemed a trial by reasonable judges. But, I would prefer not to announce an unreviewable discretion in the Senate to ignore completely the constitutional direction to "try" impeachment cases. When asked at oral argument whether that direction would be satisfied if, after a House vote to impeach, the Senate, without any procedure whatsoever, unanimously found the accused guilty of being "a bad guy," counsel for the United States answered that the Government's theory "leads me to answer that question yes." Tr. of Oral Arg. 51. Especially in light of this advice from the Solicitor General, I would not issue an invitation to the Senate to find an excuse, in the name of other pressing business, to be dismissive of its critical role in the impeachment process. Souter in his opinion states that One can, nevertheless, envision different and unusual circumstances that might justify a more searching review of impeachment proceedings. If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss, or upon a summary determination that an officer of the United States was simply" 'a bad guy,'", judicial interference might well be appropriate. In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. In other words, review of an impeachment is largely but not entirely off the table, at least until SCOTUS declares that impeachments are completely unreviewable, no matter what, period (unlikely to ever happen).
Yes It's legal: but that's more of a bug than a feature. The Constitution says this about the appointment of Supreme Court judges: he [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges of the Supreme Court, ... In the Federalist Papers: No 76, Hamilton had this to say: But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal. and in No 78: It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that &quot;there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.&quot; He was wrong about the first but right about the second. Now, this is only the way he saw it and others no doubt had other views but he was focused solely on balancing the powers of the executive and the legislature. There is no consideration of what would happen if, for whatever reason, including partisanship, the executive and the legislature were tightly aligned or hopelessly opposed. Even for the time, this view seems overly idealistic and hopelessly naive. However, these are the same people who thought it would be a good idea for the runner-up in the Presidential race to be the vice-President. Indeed, Hamilton saw and was an integral part of the intense partisanship that arose in the 1790s between the Federalists and the Republicans and the first rejection of a Supreme Court nominee happened during George Washington's Presidency. This analysis shows that the confirmation rate when the White House and Senate are politically aligned is 87.2% but only 47.2% when they are different. That said, most (78%) nominees have been confirmed with the last decade being about average. The US Supreme Court has always been partisan. Indeed, it's only since the Second World War that the idea that it shouldn't be has taken root. In earlier days, the Supreme Court was not populated by jurists - it was the domain of politicians, some of whom moved back and forth between the bench and the Capitol. In Brown v Board of Education 4 of the 9 judges had been Congressmen or Governours and some had never been on the bench of any court before their appointment to SCOTUS. So, yes its totally legal but no, it probably isn't what the founders intended but yes, it has ever been thus.
Any precedent can be overturned by any court at the same or higher level in the hierarchy So, for your example of a High Court precedent, it can be overturned at Supreme Court, Court of Appeal or High Court levels. However, the longer a precedent is in place, the less likely it is to be overturned because one of the objectives of the legal system is to provide certainty - a system that routinely overturns precedent doesn’t do that. Also, a precedent that is often cited with approval is more compelling because it’s no longer just one judges reading of the law, many other judges agree. Also, the judiciary tends to be conservative in overturning precedent. Most judges see it as their role to interpret law made by the legislature. If the people/legislature think their interpretation is wrong then the judiciary tends to feel that the legislature is the body who should change the law. That said, really old common law precedent that hasn’t been cited for a long while may be readily overturned if it comes up because social expectations may have changed.
A "circuit court" is a kind of court in a judicial system. It generally covers a large-ish area; the name comes from the fact that back in the days of horseback travel, judges would literally ride around a circuit to hold court. The exact meaning depends on the court system. At the federal level, the circuit courts are the main federal appeals courts. Each one covers multiple states (except the DC Circuit which just covers DC and the Federal Circuit which has subject-based jurisdiction). A circuit court normally hears cases before a 3-judge panel; that panel's decision is normally binding precedent in federal courts throughout the circuit, including on future panels of the same circuit. Panel decisions can be overturned by SCOTUS or by the circuit court sitting en banc (i.e. all the judges hear the case, not just 3 of them). Outside the circuit, a circuit court's decision is only persuasive precedent. At the state level, what circuit courts do depends on the state. In many states that have them, they're the most important trial courts, handling large civil cases and felony criminal cases. Some states have lower-tier courts to handle minor issues, in which case they might allow an appeal from the lower courts to the circuit court. This appeal might be like a normal appeal (where the higher court looks at the record from the lower court and only considers whether the lower court got the law wrong), or might be a trial de novo (where the higher court throws out the lower court's decision entirely and tries the case itself from scratch). It really depends on the state. If a state's circuit courts are trial courts, they generally don't set much of a precedent.