What are the main differences between Napoleonic law and Germanic law? I only recently started appreciating the differences between Civil Law and Common Law. The following map on wikipedia shows the distribution of different legal systems around the world, which makes a distinction between Napoleonic law and Germanic law: The respective articles articles on wikipedia are a bit too obtuse for my limited intelligence. In layman's terms, what are the main differences between Germanic and Napoleonic law systems, and the main implications of those differences?
Both Napoleonic and Germanic law are subdivisions of Civil Law and both are inheritors of late empire Roman Law plus ecclesiastical law and traditional law. The main differences between them are their route from the Roman Empire to the modern world. Napoleonic law was codified in 1804 under Napoleon I, unsurprisingly; and drew together the feudal laws of France. Germanic law came through the various Germanic tribes and was codified at various times and in various places. Do these historical distinctions matter? Probably not; they are both code based laws so you must know the code for the particular jurisdiction. However, knowing the origin of the code, while it may not help you draft a contract, will allow you to understand the mode of thought and jurisprudence behind the laws. In a way, it is like the difference between understanding languages and understanding linguistics.
The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to &quot;make a case&quot;. The &quot;court of public opinion&quot; may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form.
Different socities, including some that are not considered sovereign nations, create laws, that is enforceable rules of conduct, in different ways. Not all write them down. But they are all Law in that they are rulwa that societies can and will enforce mon their members. I recommend reading Legal Systems Very Different from Ours by David D. Friedman (Professor of Law at Santa Clara University). There are free versions available on the web, and the final version is available from Amazon. It includes chapters on several systems where law is not written, including: Pirate Law Prisoners’ Law Romani Law Comanche, Kiowa and Cheyenne: The Plains Indians Somali Law Other chapters deal with systems where law may have been written, but its method of formation and operation are very different from the models usually discussed on this site. This include Roman law, Imperial Chinese law, Jewish law, Early Irish Law, and the law of saga-period Iceland.
What do the contracts with your suppliers and the policy with your insurer say? Changes in government regulation do not ipso facto relieve Parties of the obligations under a contract under common (English) law. Contracts are allowed to allocate the risk of force majeure (and indeed, to define it because it has no common law meaning) but if they don’t, then each party bears their own risk and if they fail to honour their obligations they are in breach of contract. Common law does have the doctrine of frustration, however, that is much narrower and must result in the inability of the contract to be completed at all. And then there are consumer rights which may apply. When the dust settles, we are likely to see a lot of litigation around force majeure. Your venue appears to be complying with both the law and their obligations under the contract so you have no breach of contract claim against them and no trigger for the insurance policy. If you choose to cancel, then you broke the contract. Importantly, the position is reversed in civil law jurisdictions - a party unable to fulfil their obligations under a contract is not in breach.
In the US, Congress may pass an act, and this creates one kind of law (if it is promulgated: signed, ignored, or re-passed with a super-majority). Some of those acts direct the executive branch to do things, and pursuant to that act, a regulation is promulgated. Together with case law, the whole thing is "law". A bill (in the House, or the Senate) may result in an act being passed by both houses. It may go through a number of drafts between the point when it is first introduced and the time it becomes an act.
Deadly self-defense is legal in Germany. The self-defense law (in particular Sect. 32 of the Criminal Code) makes no restrictions as far as the type of aggression and the type of defense is concerned. That means that - in principle - you can defend yourself against an attack by any means that is necessary to stop it. The principle behind that is "das Recht muss dem Unrecht nicht weichen", which translates to "the law does not have to yield to the unlawful". That particularily means that: You do not have to run. You do not have to yield. You do not have to wait for help from public authorities (notably the police). You can defend yourself (against any attack on you, be it life, limb or property), no matter if that would mean commiting a crime (even if that crime is killing a person). This is called "Trutzwehr" or "schneidiges Notwehrrecht", which can be translated to "active defense" or "aggressive defense" as opposed to passive defense. However... This regulation is not without pitfalls and limitations. There are quite a few, which means that in practice deadly force could be considered unlawful in self-defense. Books have been written about this subject alone, so it can not be exhaustively handled here. Some examples for corner cases are: Attackers that clearly can not understand the severity of their actions have to be spared from extreme effects of your self-defense. The classical book case is that you can't shoot little children stealing apples from your tree. If there is a massive discrepancy between what you want protect and the damage the attacker has to endure (called "qualitativer Notwehrexzess" - translating to "qualitatively eccessive self-defense"). If someone insults you, shooting him might go to far, since while your honour is attacked (which is protected by Sect. 185 Criminal Code), the attacker's life (protected by Sect. 212 Criminal Code) by far outweighs it. Note that, to ensure the effectiveness of the self-defense laws, the discrepancy must be extreme. And it does not mean you can't defend yourself. You just have to choose a less severe measure. So you might get away with knocking the insulter out. After the attack is over you hit the attacker once too often, which causes his death (called "quantitativer Notwehrexzess" - "quantitatively eccessive self-defense"). The attack was over at the time of the deadly blow, so your right for self-defense had ended. You might get away without punishment, if it was impossible for you to realize that the attack was over. If you only think an attack is happening, but it is not (for example someone attacking you with a rubber knife on Halloween). In this case there is no attack and so technically there is no right for self defense (called "Putativnotwehr"). Similar to the cases of excessive self-defense, it depends on your individual case (notable if you had a chance to realize the attack was false) if you are punished or not. To sum it up: You have the right to defend yourself by any means necessary, but you are held responsible if you go to far (not just a little, but really really to far).
First, mandamus is always a form of writ whereas injunctions are typically a part of the proceedings in a lawsuit. Writs and lawsuits are each distinct, individual legal actions whereas multiple motions for various remedies like injunctive relief can occur within one continuous lawsuit. The lawsuit and the various motions within it including injunctions have largely replaced the common law writ (including writs of mandamus except those from a higher court to a lower) as legislated in rules of civil procedure federally and in most states
In england-and-wales and scotland, no. At common law, with a hefty influence from Roman writers such as Gaius who tackled the topic, gradual changes in a natural boundary are distinguished from others. This is usually encountered in the case of a river, whose course may change slightly from year to year. New deposits are laid down and other parts are eroded, generally imperceptibly. These processes are called alluvion and diluvion, and distinguished from avulsion where a chunk of identifiable land is washed downriver. Deliberately-induced changes are also different. For those slow and natural changes, the position is that where ownership of the land is defined with reference to the natural boundary, the extent of ownership also changes when the boundary moves. This is a sensible rule in the absence of modern surveying methods, and generally matches what people expect - I own the land on the south bank, you own it on the north, and it doesn't make sense for me to gain a sliver of land on the other side if the river should happen to meander a bit. It is possible to override that assumption by agreement between the landowners (or else litigate it) but that is the starting point. The sea works in the same way, except that the &quot;landowner&quot; on the other side is the Crown. (Quotation marks because it is not the same kind of ownership that ordinary people exercise.) The intermediate area, the foreshore, has its own rules, so in fact there are multiple boundaries to think about - the mean high water mark, the mean low water mark - but it's the same idea. The foreshore might be owned by the Crown, as the sea is, but maybe by somebody else. Perhaps what was my land is now underwater at high tide, but exposed at low tide; and some other bit of land used to be foreshore and now is totally submerged. Everyday tidal changes do not affect ownership, nor do unusually large tides either way. But if I own land next to the sea, I may gain some land, or lose it, by natural action. Gradually rising sea levels move the tide lines and the property rights follow. Some riverbeds are also owned by the Crown, so the same principle is at work there too for the motion of Crown boundaries. The rationale for why the Crown owns these places is not clear: there are several possible explanations to do with it being for the common good, or alternatively just an old feudal rule. That might affect adjudication of rights in some cases, such as for access to the &quot;new foreshore&quot; for particular activities: see R (Newhaven Port and Properties Ltd) v East Sussex CC [2015] UKSC 7 for an investigation of the public right to swim on an English beach. Even in the case of Udal law in Orkney and Shetland, ownership does not extend to the sea beyond the low-tide mark, since the Crown has sovereign rights (Shetland Salmon Farmers Association v Crown Estate Commissioners 1991 SLT 166). In land registration, a boundary marked on a cadastral map is not taken as authoritative when the underlying geographical feature moves. That's in the Land Registration Act 2002, section 61(1) for England and Wales, and the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2002, sections 66 and 73(2)(i) in Scotland. Courts have inferred that a boundary coinciding with such a feature is &quot;meant&quot; to be this way, even if it wasn't defined like that in words - see for example Southern Centre of Theosophy Incorporated v The State of South Australia (Australia) [1981] UKPC 41 in the Privy Council. So, even if the map shows my coastal property apparently extending into the large blue area, that is not the real situation - it just means that the registries are not required to keep those maps up to date when the waters shift.