Can the US government be compelled to honor the NATO treaty? The North Atlantic Treaty (which establishes NATO) commits each member to mutual defence in case any member is attacked. The treaty has been ratified by the US, so it is legally binding. My question is, can the US government be legally forced to honor this? For example, if hypothetically a NATO country is attacked and the US refused to help (for some reason, e.g. it has an isolationist President or it doesn't want to escalate the conflict into a world war), can someone go to a US court and make it force the US government to do it? For example, the court might achieve this by making people in the government go to jail if or pay a lot of money they don't do it.
First, the practical answer is no: even if they ordered the President to go to war, the President can just refuse. The military is generally in the habit of listening to orders from the President, particularly if the question is "do we or do we not go to war;" the courts do not have the power to command the armed forces. They could try issuing an injunction instructing the military to go to war, but the injunction would be ignored. They could try holding people in contempt, but the President is in charge of almost all federal law enforcement (and can pardon criminal contempt), so that's not going to work. And even if the President could be punished for contempt, if he thinks intervening will result in the annihilation of the human race in a thermonuclear war, he will not issue the orders. But that's assuming the courts would even try to intervene. They wouldn't. Courts don't generally want to issue orders that they know will be ignored. In this case, the relief being sought (i.e. an order to do something) is a kind of relief that is up to the discretion of the court. So even if a court would be legally justified in issuing that order, they have an easy out. (For damages claims, Congress can just refuse to appropriate any money to satisfy them; no federal money can be spent unless Congress appropriates it). There's an even earlier out, though. Courts are not political branches of government; one of the basic rules of jurisprudence is that courts should not get involved in deciding something that's really up to the elected branches. Baker v. Carr had a list of factors to consider: a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Foreign relations in general is very often grounds for deference, as is military strategy. Courts are utterly unqualified to determine proper diplomatic or military actions to take, or to evaluate whether the President's actions were enough to meet the requirement of "do what's necessary to restore security;" foreign policy is a case where a country needs a unified face (because other countries aren't particularly willing to deal with US internal politics), and where the courts could easily screw up what the government is doing; and whether to send Americans to war is a question that is clearly a matter for those accountable to the people. So, federal courts cannot analyze this question to decide whether or not the government has done anything wrong; it's for the other two branches to decide.
The fact that an explosive device is improvised is irrelevant to any law of war with which I am familiar. "Legal in war" is more a matter of deciding which treaty, convention, or custom you care to respect.
The way "with intent to lose citizenship" works in US law is extremely demanding; it is very hard to establish it by doing anything short of appearing before a consular officer and formally renouncing citizenship. Other ways include serving in the military of a country at war with the US, being convicted of treason for committing one of the specified potentially expatriating acts (serving in an army at war with the US is sort of a trial-less special case of that, because engaging in a war against the US is treason), or serving in a "policy-level position" in a foreign government. The State Department says as much in the link. Obtaining citizenship is listed as a case where the administrative premise applies; so is swearing allegiance to a foreign state, serving in the military of a state at peace with the US, and serving in lower-level government posts of a foreign state. In those cases, the person retains US citizenship but at some point in the future may be asked by the State Department if they wanted to renounce it. Intent to renounce citizenship is established only by explicit declaration if you've only obtained citizenship in another country. With "policy-level posts" the premise doesn't apply, but then the State Department just decides on a case-by-case basis. You may well lose US citizenship (although the King of Thailand was born in the US, and I'm not sure if he's considered to have lost citizenship), but it's not automatic. Your senior ministers may lose citizenship, but it is likewise not automatic. But the normal citizens? The link explicitly says that the administrative premise covers that.
Could the US extradite the Russian Hackers who started the cyber attack against the US private sector and US government agencies and departments? No. The United States and Russia do not have an extradition treaty. See Russian Indictment and Extradition | American Constitution Society. And within Russia, extradition is constitutionally prohibited; see Chapter 2. Rights and Freedoms of Man And Citizen | The Constitution of the Russian Federation. Is there forced extradition? Maybe. Either country could use covert action or even start a war to "force" extradition, or use a form of covert or overt rendition to bring the individuals to a country to face trial.
The Antarctic Treaty does not nullify claims or prevent land ownership, and most of Antarctica is claimed by one of a handful of countries. However, these claims are not recognized by most countries. There are many entities that are not universally recognized, including the Republic of Somaliland which is recognized by no-one (January 2022). One should include declaration-only micronations such as Liberland. In other words, you can say whatever you want, declaration does not make it so. A new nation could, in principle, can be created as it was done in the case of East Timor and South Sudan, which underwent processes of self-determination. These were lands that had permanent populations, unlike Antarctica. Such a process of peaceful nation-creation would, without doubt, involve the intervention of the UN to determine if this new nation represented &quot;the will of the (resident) people&quot;.
The use of the active duty military in a law enforcement role is not unconstitutional but it is prohibited by the posse comitatus act. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (adopted 1878). The text of the relevant legislation is as follows: 18 U.S.C. § 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Also notable is the following provision within Title 10 of the United States Code (which concerns generally the organization and regulation of the armed forces and Department of Defense): 10 U.S.C. § 375. Restriction on direct participation by military personnel The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law. The act does not apply to the National Guard mobilized at the request of a state governor. In practice, 10 U.S.C. § 375 has more bite because a federal prosecutor can and usually would refrain from prosecuting a crime ordered by his ultimate boss, the President, and there is not legal duty to prosecute every possible crime, but 10 U.S.C. § 375 creates an affirmative duty on the party of the Secretary of Defense that might be enforceable in a civil action.
Yes. A person may not be punished for action taken in good faith reliance upon assurances from an appropriate authority that he will not be punished for those actins as a matter of U.S. Constitutional law. See, e.g., U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
The settlement was a politically motivated act to provide de facto disaster relief and express a moral apology in a cash that there is no plausible way that the U.S. would lose if it litigated the case on the merits. The articulated basis for making the payment would not survive a seriously argued dispositive motion from the United States government, either on behalf of the U.S. government itself, or against the federal law enforcement officials involved under Bivens. A complaint making such a claim would barely survive a motion for a Rule 11 sanction for making a frivolous claim if the government pushed the point, and then, only on the theory that it advanced a good faith argument for change in the law, not on the theory that it was supported by existing law. The Parkland case was considerably weaker than the Charleston shooter of 2015 case even, because Parkland involved a discretionary law enforcement decision, while Charleston arguably involved a non-discretionary administrative matter (although the government probably could have won that case as well).