Why did Judge Hugo Black consider Humanism and athiesm to be a religion? As this site declares: https://donotlink.it/9NEO While sometimes labeled “Secular” Humanism (to falsely frame it as non-religious), Humanism most certainly is a religion, and was acknowledged as such by the US Supreme Court in Footnote 11 of Justice Hugo Black’s majority opinion in Torcaso v Watkins (1961). Importantly, Hugo Black was FDR’s Marxist agent on the court who shifted the US Constitution from a Biblical to a Humanist foundation in Everson v Board of Education(1947) and then leveraged the Everson ruling to, in effect, declare Atheism a religion vested under the 14th Amendment with “equal protection of the law” in Torcaso. This doesn’t sound right at all. Athiesm is a belief yes but not a religious one.
The relevant passage from the opinion in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) is: We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, [Footnote 10] and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs. [Footnote 11] The text of the footnote is: Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others. See Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 249 F.2d 127; Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal.App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394; II Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 293; 4 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957 ed.) 325-327; 21 id. at 797; Archer, Faiths Men Live By (2d ed. revised by Purinton), 120-138, 254-313; 1961 World Almanac 695, 712; Year Book of American Churches for 1961, at 29, 47. This was a case where a man was appointed to the office of Notery Public, but Maryland law required him to declare a belief in God to assume the office. The US Supreme court held that this violated the man's rights under the First Amendment's establishment clause, which had been incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth. The man was not, as far as I can tell, himself a Secular Humanist, and Secular Humanism was mentioned in the footnote merely as an example of a belief system that did not include a belief in God. Why Justice Black used the term "religion" to refer to it, I cannot say, some of the other groups listed in the footnote are clearly religions, and others are belief systems that for First Amendment purposes are often treated similarly to religions. What might better describe the Court's rulings here than the linked site does is that believers in Secular Humanism, Ethical Culture, and other similar belief systems will have their beliefs protected in just the same way that believers in any religion will. Freedom of Religion includes the right not to have a religion. By the way, the passage from Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1 which is quoted in Torcaso v. Watkins and to which the linked web site probably refers is: The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.' By the way, any site which proclaims that Hugo Black was a "Marxist agent" has lost much credibility in my opinion. Read the linked article and other easily available sources and judge for yourself.
As far as I can tell, one can hold any beliefs or lack thereof, and there is no need to register your beliefs with the government per se. However, there are laws where religion is relevant, such as the Hindu personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Hindu Succession Act, such as stating who gets your stuff if you die intestate. These laws apply to Hindus, and since Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists are treated as legal Hindus (!), it applies to them; and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. and don't ask me to interpret that "unless clause". That is, the Hindu laws do not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews. On the face of it, that would mean that Yazidis would be treated as Hindus, w.r.t. the subject matter of those laws. Registering a religion isn't relevant to the question: what matters is that the Indian Government decided to create these particular laws, and they have not created any Yazidi-specific laws. There are currently no national laws prohibiting religious conversion, and I can't find the state laws. This article discusses such laws, noting that some states require a person to register their conversion. I seems that the restriction is on A converting B, and not on B converting sua sponte.
I don't see the contradiction. The ACLU article you link to explains that the Supreme Court found against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in principle in the 2018 ruling. Instead they found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had taken a dismissive attitude to the religion of the bakery's owners, and that in itself was religious discrimation and a violation of their First Amendment rights. I would say the 2018 ruling paved the way for the more recent one, which is why the article you link is titled: &quot;In Masterpiece, the Bakery Wins the Battle but Loses the War&quot;
LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.
The priest-penitent privilege exists in all 50 states in some form, as discussed in this article and this. In the US, in People v. Phillips (1813) this is a consequence of the Free Exercise clause (this is where the clause &quot;sprang to life&quot; in constitutional law. The statements excluded vary between states as discussed in this article, so Montana and Wyoming only recognize the privilege for &quot;confessions&quot;, whereas New Jersey have a broader interpretation of the privilege. The privilege only exists w.r.t. communications between a clergy member and the accused, and does not apply to things that a clergy member may know about a person (but it's a separate question whether heresay is admissible, anyhow).
From NYC website (creed): Creed refers to a set of moral or ethical beliefs and the practices and observances associated with those beliefs. Although creed includes traditional religious beliefs, it also incorporates belief systems that may not be expressed by an organized religious group. Based on the examples shown on the website, it doesn't seem like it was intended to extend to political views, but rather religion and religion-like beliefs.
The granting of citizenship is expressly recognized in multiple places in the US Constitution. It would be incoherent if the prohibition on titles of nobility meant that the US could not confer citizenship on people. It would also be totally out of sync with any public understanding of &quot;titles of nobility&quot; at the time of the framing or today. The US has conferred citizenship by parentage to children born abroad since 1790, which is further indication that the nobility clause was not understood to preclude citizenship by parentage. The concern behind the nobility clauses was the creation of &quot;super-citizens.&quot; As Joseph Story wrote in his Commentaries on the Constitution at Vol. 3, p. 215: [the nobility clause] seems scarcely to require even a passing notice. As a perfect equality is the basis of all our institutions, state and national, the prohibition against the creation of any titles of nobility seems proper, if not indespensible, to keep perpetually alive a just sense of this important truth. Distinctions between citizens, in regard to rank, would soon lay the foundation of odious claims and privileges, and silently subvert the spirit of independence and personal dignity, which are so often proclaimed to be the best security of a republican government. He cited Federalist No. 84, in which Alexander Hamilton wrote: Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people. The worry was that titles of nobility would undermine the republican system of government. I also question your premise that citizenship is &quot;clearly hereditary in the U.S.&quot; As you say, the 14th Amendment guarantees citizenship to those merely born in the US and subject to its jurisdiction. For the vast majority of U.S. citizens, citizenship is based on their place of birth being in the U.S. Knowing that somebody is a citizen tells you nothing about their heritage.
In Guinn v. Church of Christ, plaintiff withdrew from the church after an internal investigation of her conduct. The church apparently held as a matter of religious doctrine that she must repent of her sins, also that withdrawing from the church is doctrinally impossible. The transgressions were widely publicized within the church; a lawsuit over outrage and invasion of privacy ensued. The upshot of the appeal is that the church can be held liable for post-withdrawal actions, but before that, the church has a privilege to communicate such transgressions (the church is not subject to secular judicature of its actions w.r.t. its members). Contract law is not relevant here, what matters is that a person can knowingly and intelligently waive their right to litigate against a party, and while one is a member of the church which has such a waiver as part of their disciplinary doctrine, one cannot sue the church for its doctrinary actions as long as the actions do not constitute a threat to public safety which would justify state interference. Although the church argued that church membership is irrevocable, the court found that &quot;Just as freedom to worship is protected by the First Amendment, so also is the liberty to recede from one's religious allegiance&quot;. Given that plaintiff had withdrawn consent yet the church subsequently announced the transgressions without her consent, the church was thus found to be liable. In Stepek v. Doe, the court similarly affirmed that a church enjoys a privilege against charges of defamation, when the plaintiff continues to operate within the church, not having left the church. So it can &quot;work&quot;, to some extent. The person can always withdraw consent; the person has no legal recourse in case consent has not been withdrawn. The article is correct as far as it goes, which is not far enough: it errs in not stating what the legal consequences of of the transgressor leaving the church are.