On what basis could the Federal Government legalize abortions? Now that Roe vs. Wade is expected to be overturned, many politicians are calling for legislation to protect the right to an abortion to be passed on the federal level. But on what grounds could the federal government legalize abortions in all 50 states? Would they be forced to open federal &quot;abortion clinics&quot; to prevent state jurisdiction? Are there similar precedents of the Federal government legalizing something against the wishes of the states?
The federal government has the power to regulate interstate commerce, and the current definition is incredibly broad -- certainly broad enough to include the provision of abortions. If it were challenged, the government would likely rely on Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). In Gonzales, two patients who used medical marijuana as authorized by state law challenged the federal government's laws prohibiting the use of medical marijuana. They argued that because they were growing their own marijuana, because it never left the state, and because it was for personal, noncommercial use, it was outside Congress' authority to regulate interstate commerce. But the Supreme Court rejected their arguments, holding that Congress could use its Commerce Clause authority to enact health-care laws regulating access to marijuana and pre-empt contradictory state health-care laws. The federal government's case for regulating abortions would be event stronger than its case in Gonzales: First, because obtaining an abortion is typically a commercial enterprise; it is likely covered by insurance, and even if it patient isn't charged, someone is likely paying the doctor money to perform it. Also, abortions more obviously implicate interstate commerce because patients frequently travel from state to another to obtain one, because clinics order supplies and services from outside the state, and because they rely on instrumentalities of interstate commerce (highways, telephone lines, the Internet) to do their job. Indeed, as far as I know, every court to consider the issue has concluded that regulating access to abortion is a straightforward application of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Violent and obstructive activity outside abortion clinics adversely affects interstate commerce in reproductive health services. In enacting the Access Act, Congress did not exceed its Commerce Clause power.”); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520-21 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Congress found that doctors and patients often travel across state lines to provide and receive services, id.; in other words, there is an interstate market both with respect to patients and doctors. In addition, the clinics receive supplies through interstate commerce. ... Congress' findings are plausible and provide a rational basis for concluding that the Access Act regulates activity which &quot;substantially affects&quot; interstate commerce. Thus, the Access Act is a constitutional exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.”); U.S. v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 688 (7th Cir. 1995) (“the Access Act may be viewed as a direct regulation of interstate commerce and confirms once again that the Act is well within Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause.”). Reacting to Dobbs, then, Congress could write a law finding that existing state laws pose a threat to the interstate markets for providing and receiving reproductive services, and then rely on those findings to say that the only limits on abortion are X, Y, and Z, and that states may not impose any additional restrictions.
In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the US Supreme Court ruled unanimously that a similar provision in Maryland's constitution violated the First Amendment and could not be enforced. So presumably the North Carolina provision is similarly unconstitutional and unenforceable. It's not clear why it wasn't removed in 1971. I found references to a 2009 incident in which an avowed atheist named Cecil Bothwell was elected to the Asheville, NC city council. Opponents apparently threatened to mount a legal challenge to his eligibility under the Article VI provision. It's not clear if they actually tried to do so, but in any event, Bothwell served his full four-year term and was then re-elected for another.
Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow.
There are no feasible legal actions that you can take. The implausible action is to sue the state on some constitutional grounds and have the order overturned in part. The order contains no appeals process, so you would have to attack the order itself. There are, here and there, lawsuits on Free Expression Clause grounds regarding the shuttering of churches, which stand the greatest chance of prevailing at the level of SCOTUS. Even if the court were to rule that under these circumstances the right to attend mass church meetings cannot be restricted, it is significantly less likely that application of the emergency powers acts to weddings would be found to violate a fundamental right.
I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.
The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), majority opinion, written by Justice Antonin Scalia: Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited ... Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. (emphasis mine)
It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched.