Is it legal for a parent who is against vaccines to prevent their child from receiving the preventative vaccine against rabies? So this is a modified version of a question I asked on Biology.SE. I know that the vast majority of US states allow parents to opt out of giving their child a vaccine for religious reasons, and roughly half allow parents to opt out for philosophical reasons. Does this include rabies? The only laws that I can find on the matter require pets to be vaccinated; there is no mention of children in any law I can find. The last question I asked was closed because it was considered irrelevant and too open ended (I'm guessing because I focused too much on the ethics of forcing pets to be vaccinated, but not children), but this time I'm just asking what the legality is for parents to vaccinate their children against rabies if they were bitten by an animal. Also, would legal implications change if the animal that bit the child later tested positive for rabies or if the child insists on getting a rabies vaccine but the parent refuses? Can the parent be charged for a crime if the child develops symptomatic rabies and dies?
I'm just asking what the legality is for parents to vaccinate their children against rabies if they were bitten by an animal. Also, would legal implications change if the animal that bit the child later tested positive for rabies or if the child insists on getting a rabies vaccine but the parent refuses? Can the parent be charged for a crime if the child develops symptomatic rabies and dies? In this circumstance, while a parent has fairly broad discretion, once the necessity of preserving a child's life comes into play and rabies can be deadly, that discretion ends and the child's life takes priority. Failing to do so could constitute child abuse and result in termination of parental rights and criminal sanctions for child abuse causing death or something similar. Simply failing to treat rabies out of good faith ignorance of the option, however, would ordinarily not be a criminal offense.
A police officer (or any other random person) would not be guilty of a crime or subject to civil liability for standing by and watching a suicide occur when it could be prevented, unless the person attempting to commit suicide was in his custody and he failed to take reasonable care to prevent a suicide in which case the officer could be subject to civil liability. It would not be a violation of the law, however, for a police officer (or in most cases, even a private citizen) to intervene to attempt to stop an attempted suicide. Likewise, prisons and prison guards can have civil liability for failing to prevent the suicide of someone in their custody. Of course, a police officer might still receive a negative employment evaluation from his supervisor for such conduct, or might even be fired for it depending on the rules of a particular department, as it would reflect poorly on the police department and show bad judgment on the officers part. In general, an affirmative duty enforceable by a lawsuit to take reasonable efforts to prevent someone from committing suicide applies in circumstances where the person attempting to commit suicide is in someone else's care and custody and has their liberty constrained. So, there could be liability on the part of a hospital or treating medical personnel (I've actually brought such a case that was dismissed due to malpractice in missing a deadline by local co-counsel who was then disciplined for ethical violations by the State of Illinois for his conduct.) In the absence of such a relationship, a legal duty to take affirmative action to prevent a suicide generally does not arise. Certain medical facilities and providers are required to make anonymized incident reports for the purpose of creating national public health statistics on a periodic basis. In certain extreme circumstances, there are duties to report someone who is a threat to others which may also include a risk of suicide, to authorities, but those are quite narrowly interpreted, and actual legal consequences from failing to warn are very rare. There may be other reporting requirements in educational institutions and for mental health professionals, but I am not personally aware of them and I do not believe that they are national in scope. Usually, for criminal liability, there would have to be actual affirmative acts to aid or to attempt to cause a suicide.
england-and-wales The law on this point in England and Wales has recently changed. The main statute here is section 4 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, amended in 2019 to add an exception relevant to police dogs. Under subsection (1), you commit an offence if you cause a dog (as an example of a &quot;protected animal&quot;) to suffer unnecessarily. The necessity conditions in subsection (3) include the example of protecting yourself or someone else, in (3)(c)(ii), but this list is not exhaustive. Nonetheless, that specific defence is excluded by the new subsection (3A) in the case when the dog is a police dog being used by an officer &quot;in a way that was reasonable in all the circumstances&quot;. This exception was added precisely to cover the example of a police dog being used to apprehend a suspect, to stop people from claiming self-defence; it's known as &quot;Finn's Law&quot; after a police dog who was stabbed in those circumstances. If this came up in practice, for the scenario you suggest, then the court would have to deal with (among other things): Was the officer's conduct reasonable in all the circumstances? Could the person have avoided harming the animal? Was the level of harm to the animal proportionate? The answers would depend on the exact facts involved, so it's not possible to say in a vacuum whether the elements of the offence could be proved. Note that the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which might otherwise apply to the officer in charge of the dog for letting it be &quot;dangerously out of control&quot;, actually does not by virtue of section 10(3) so long as it is being used &quot;for a lawful purpose&quot;. Meanwhile, as a civil matter, there is a strict liability provision in the Animals Act 1971 which might catch police dogs. That Act distinguishes between animals of a dangerous species, where the liability always applies, and others where it only applies if the animal meets certain conditions. These have attracted some criticism by senior judges over unclarity in their drafting - see for example Ford v Seymour-Williams [2021] EWCA Civ 1848 and Mirvahedy v Henley [2003] UKHL 16 - but on the basis of those decisions, one could argue that the likelihood of the damage or of its being severe was due to characteristics of the animal which are not normally found in animals of the same species in the case of a police dog specifically trained to attack on command. However, on the other side, whether the claim is under the Animals Act, or for battery, etc.: The police may argue that the damage was due to the suspect's own fault. An example I found cited in Street on Torts is Dhesi v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2000] WL 491455. A claimant bitten by a police dog was held to have accepted the risk of sustaining damage when he refused to come out of his hiding place, after being warned a dog would be sent in to flush him out; this engaged section 5(1) of the Animals Act and defeated strict liability. The police can argue that their use of force was reasonable for the purpose of preventing crime and/or arresting a suspect. (The same argument by which human officers can use force.) The police can argue that the dog was no more dangerous than an ordinary dog, that the officer did not know it could cause such severe damage, etc., thus removing it from the category of animals where strict liability applies. The police have some protection from civil suit, known as &quot;Hill immunity&quot; after the case Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [1988] UKHL 12, which is not absolute but is very likely to defeat claims where officers were not unusually negligent, not acting outside the bounds of their duties, exercised reasonable care and skill, or did the best they could in a fast and confusing situation. See the recent judgements in Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, a case where officers arresting a suspect accidentally hurt an elderly lady, for a very thorough discussion of duty to bystanders and police negligence in general. So again, it all depends on the fact pattern in the specific case, but you may or may not be able to win a civil claim against the police based on the harm done to you by a police dog, even when you didn't hurt the dog.
Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.).
This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.
It excludes pain and suffering incidental to lawful capital and corporal punishment Many countries around the world still execute people. As far as is known, no form of capital punishment is totally painless - even lethal injection involves a needle. In any event, the anticipation of capital punishment is likely to cause suffering. Similarly, corporal punishment such as caning is still a lawful sanction in many jurisdictions. This clearly causes pain - that’s the point - but it isn’t torture. It would also exclude lawful corporal punishment of students by teachers where this is still legal. Or of military personnel by their superiors, again, where that is legal. Now, organisations like Amnesty International consider all of those things to be torture. I don’t think they are wrong in taking that position but, under the convention, they aren’t legally torture.
In Illinois: The General Assembly has established numerous protections for the generous and compassionate acts of its citizens who volunteer their time and talents to help others. Basically, if you are a licensed medical profession, or have had successful training in CPR provided by the the American Red Cross or the American Heart Association, and you try in good faith to save somebody's life and fail, you are not liable for their death, under the assumption you did not cause harm in the first place (i.e. you can not stab someone in the chest, attempt CPR, and be exempt from lawsuit(s)). Note that this doesn't apply to just CPR or physicians. This also covers dentists, Pharmacists, Optometrists, Physical Therapist, etc.
Questions about whether a certain action is "just" tend to be maters of opinion, politics and philosophy, but it can be addressed from the perspective of legal theory (especially following the model of common law, where legal principles are based on concepts of just and proper action). Whether or not a certain action is actually legal in a certain jurisdiction depends on the laws of that country -- I suspect that the answer is different for the US versus China. The first question would be whether those government officials have the legal authority – I assume they do. Such authority is generally governed by some specific circumstances, for example, "poses an imminent and grave threat to public health". It is basically not a legal question whether quarantining in the face of this viral threat is necessary from a public health perspective, that is a medical question. What the law would say is that if this is a serious threat, then a person's liberty can be curtailed to a limited extent, because a person does not have the right to harm others because they don't want to do some thing that protects the rights of others (be vaccinated, stay in quarantine until it is safe). However, principles of legal justice also say that the government's response should be proportionate, e.g. shoot-on-sight in response to a sneeze is not proportionate. Quarantining has long been recognized as a valid, just and legal response to such extreme medical threats. Historically speaking, quarantining used to be the only effective action that a government can take against e.g. smallpox, plague, Spanish flu, Ebola.