Can a child be a contract killer? Various jurisdictions including Canada, England and Wales and Washington have laws which state, apparently categorically, that children under a certain age cannot commit crimes or be convicted of crimes. E.g. Canada's criminal code section 13 says: No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or omission on his part while that person was under the age of twelve years. Does this mean that a minor under the specified age could &quot;openly have, say, a contract killer career, retire at [the specified age] and walk free&quot;? What legal mechanism would stop a child that is younger than their jurisdiction's minimum age for criminal liability from doing this? There may very well be legal consequences for the minor's parents or legal guardians, but this question is specifically about the legal consequences for the minor. (This question is a follow-up to a discussion on this other Q&amp;A, where @Greendrake proposed this hypothetical example.)
In germany, a child below the age of 14 cannot be guilty of a crime. However, a family court may order measures regarding the welfare of the child. In a case like the one you describe, or even somewhat less extreme ones, this might be taking the child out of the family and into a care home where the child would be locked up for his or her own good.
british-columbia I am not aware of any judicial consideration of this issue. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 78(1) says: A minor must not, except as provided under this Act or unless the minor does so with other lawful excuse, ... consume liquor. (One of those exceptions are when the alcohol is supplied by the minor's parents, spouse or guardian in a residence for consumption in the residence. There are other exceptions, too. But I'll assume you're asking about a circumstance where no exception applies.) The Liquor Control and Licensing Act defines a &quot;minor&quot; to be a person under the age of majority established by the Age of Majority Act, which is age 19 today. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 57 makes it an offence to contravene s. 78(1). The Interpretation Act, s. 25.1 states that &quot;A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date.&quot; The Interpretation Act also clarifies that the reference to time &quot;is a reference to Pacific Standard Time&quot; (or Pacific Daylight Saving Time, when it is in effect). Thus, a person is a minor until &quot;the beginning [in Pacific time] of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date.&quot; It is most clear in relation to the identification requirements when selling to a minor, but the Regulations (s. 158) refer to the date of birth as displayed on the person's identification card. This all suggests that when consuming alcohol in the greater Vancouver area, a person just about to reach the age of majority must wait until the date in the Pacific time zone is that which is displayed on their identification. Or barring any identification, until the date in the Pacific time zone is the date that is the person's birth date.
There is a specific exemption in 29 USC 213(c)(3) that The provisions of section 212 of this title relating to child labor shall not apply to any child employed as an actor or performer in motion pictures or theatrical productions, or in radio or television productions. See this article for further analysis, a propos state laws. Incidentally, the act defines "oppressive child labor" as: a condition of employment under which (1) any employee under the age of sixteen years is employed by an employer (other than a parent or a person standing in place of a parent employing his own child or a child in his custody under the age of sixteen years in an occupation other than manufacturing or mining or an occupation found by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years or detrimental to their health or well-being) in any occupation, or (2) any employee between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years is employed by an employer in any occupation which the Secretary of Labor shall find and by order declare to be particularly hazardous for the employment of children between such ages or detrimental to their health or well-being; but oppressive child labor shall not be deemed to exist by virtue of the employment in any occupation of any person with respect to whom the employer shall have on file an unexpired certificate issued and held pursuant to regulations of the Secretary of Labor certifying that such person is above the oppressive child-labor age. The Secretary of Labor shall provide by regulation or by order that the employment of employees between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years in occupations other than manufacturing and mining shall not be deemed to constitute oppressive child labor if and to the extent that the Secretary of Labor determines that such employment is confined to periods which will not interfere with their schooling and to conditions which will not interfere with their health and well-being. Without the statutory exemption, if you are under 16 and employed by a non-parent, in any occupation, that is oppressive child labor. But because of the specific exemption, what would otherwise be statutorily oppressive child labor is allowed. The political "why" question (why did the bill contain such language) is extremely difficult to answer. The only substantive clues that I have seen are in a 1959 dissertation by G.E. Paulsen and this article on the passage of the act. It seems to be a legislative compromise relating stricter original standards, and was particularly driven by the need to allow children to work on family farms. The relevant clause was added from the floor of the House on May 24, 1938 by Rep Charles Kramer (CA). This is recorded on p. 7441 of the Congressional Record, which, unfortunately, is not freely available online. The two toughest questions were asked by Schneider (WI), Kramer's reply in parentheses: The gentleman's amendment would exempt children engaged only in the making of moving pictures? (The gentleman is correct) There are very few young people employed in that occupation? (Very few. There are hardly more than 10 employed at one time.) Shirley Temple was in fact invoked by Kramer.
It depends In the united-states &quot;Pedophilia&quot; is not a legal term for the prohibited content. The relevant legal term is &quot;child pornography&quot; The US DOJ offers a useful &quot;Citizen's Guide To U.S. Federal Law On Child Pornography&quot; which mentions key federal laws on the topic, including: 18 USC §2251 18 USC §2251 (Sexual exploitation of children) prohibits having a minor (person under 18) engage in sexual activity &quot;for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct&quot; So if a drawing is modeled from an actual child who engaged in sexual activity, it is illegal under 18 USC §2251. That section also makes it illegal for a parent, guardian, or custodian to permit such sexual activity and the making of a depiction of it. It also prohibits the advertising and distribution of any such depiction. All offenses under 18 USC §2251 involve an actual child at some point. 18 USC §2252 18 USC §2252 (Certain activities relating to material involving the sexual exploitation of minors) makes it a crime when someone knowingly transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any visual depiction, if— (A) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of such conduct; under certain circumstances, mostly involving intestate or foreign transmission or distribution. The same section also makes it a crime when a person: knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction... if the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of such conduct; So again to be covered under 2252 an actual child must have engaged in sexual conduct at some point, but a drawing modeled on such a child would be covered under this section. 18 USC §2252A 18 USC §2252a (Certain activities relating to material constituting or containing child pornography) makes it a crime if anyone: knowingly mails, or transports or ships in interstate or foreign commerce ... any child pornography knowingly receives or distributes any child pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce ... [or] any material that contains child pornography [that has been similarly mailed shipped or transported] or who possesses such child porn. This section does not define &quot;child pornography&quot; but 18 USC §2256 (8) defines it as: any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— (A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; [or] (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; It would appear that under this section an image that &quot;appears to&quot; be a depiction of an actual minor engaged in sexual acts or is advertised as such may count as &quot;child pornography&quot; and thus be criminal. Whether this can apply to a wholly fictional character not based on any real child is not clearly stated in the law. I don't find any reported conviction involving an invented child character under this section. However in United States v. Hotaling, 599 F. Supp. 2d 306, 310 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) aff ’d, 09-3935 WL 677398 (2011), the US 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that an image created by combining the image of the face of an actual child with the body of an adult in a sexual situation was child porn under this section. That case involved computer morphing to in effect paste photos of the heads or faces of children onto the bodies of adults engaged in sex, but a combination done by an artist's skill would presumably face the same ruling, if the child was recognizable. 18 USC §2260 18 USC §2260 makes it a crime if anyone outside the US has a minor engage in sexually explicit activities in order to make a visual depiction of such activities, and imports that depiction into the US, or who participates in the import or attempted import of such a depiction into the US. 18 USC § 1466A 18 USC § 1466A (Obscene visual representations of the sexual abuse of children) makes it a crime when anyone knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with intent to distribute, a visual depiction of any kind, including a drawing, cartoon, sculpture, or painting, that depicts a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and is obscene; or depicts an image that is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse ... lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Simple possession of such a visual depiction is also a crime under this section. In United States v. Whorley No. 06-4288. (2008) the 4th circuit Court of Appeals wrote: Counts 1-20 [of the indictment] charged Whorley with using a computer on March 30, 2004, to knowingly receive obscene cartoons in interstate and foreign commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462. The 20 cartoons forming the basis of those counts showed prepubescent children engaging in graphic sexual acts with adults. ... We also reject his arguments that ... cartoons depicting minors in sexually explicit conduct must depict real-life minors to violate § 1466A(a)(1). ... The clear language of § 1466A(a)(1) and § 1466A(c) is sufficiently broad to prohibit receipt of obscene cartoons ... The Supreme Court declined to review Whorley Leaving this holding in place. First Amendment issues In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) the US Supreme Court held that obscene content, which it defined by a 3-part test somewhat looser than the previous test in Roth, was not protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under 18 USC § 1466A have no first amendment issues, because only obscene visual depictions are prohibited under that section. in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) the Court held that child pornography was not protected by the first amendment. However, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) the Court limited this to visual depictions of actual children that are produced by the abuse of such children, and found that depictions of fictional children that are not obscene under Miller are protected by the first amendment. This means that prosecutions under §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, §2260 and related sections of 18 USC have no first amendment issues, because all of these are limited to the depictions of actual minors. Some of these sections, however, also criminalize possession or distribution of images that &quot;appear to be&quot; minors, or are advertised as being of minors. Prosecutions under those provisions for images that do not in fact depict any actual child and are not obscene might be barred by the US first amendment. I have not found any reported case in which such a claim has been raised and decided, one way or the other. Conclusion &quot;Cub art&quot; as described in the question will not be protected under the US first amendment simply because it is a drawing rather than a photograph. A drawing which recognizably represents an actual child engaged in explicit sexual activity will probably trigger prosecution under one or more of §2251, §2251a, §2252, §2252a, or §2260. Even if the child was not actually abused, using the recognizable image of an actual child can be treated, under Hotaling (cited above) as child pornography and therefore criminal. If the art does not depict any actual child, but the image is found to be obscene under Miller, then a prosecution could be brought under § 1466A. Note that whether a given image is or is not obscene is a matter of fact, ultimately for a jury to decide, based on the Miller standard. As Whorley shows, completely fictional cartoons may be the basis of a successful prosecution under § 1466A. Anyone reading this answer should be aware that anything that might be considered &quot;child porn&quot; is taken quite seriously by US law enforcement. Penalties for conviction are severe. Even if the materiel is found to be protected by the first amendment, an arrest may lead to significant expense, loss of employment, and other negative consequences. It should also be noted that a &quot;minor&quot; or &quot;child&quot; under the sections of US law mentioned here means anyone under the age of 18. The age of consent under state law is not relevant. Thus it might be lawful for a person of 16 to engage in sex in some US states, but it will still be criminal to distribute or poses a photo or other image of such an act. People should also be aware that the law on such matters differs significantly between different countries. Content that US courts have held to be protected by the US first amendment may be criminal to posses, receive, or transmit under the laws of other countries. Penalties are potentially severe. The question of whether any given image is protected or criminal is not always easy to resolve, and finding out via an arrest and a criminal trial could be a very unpleasant and expensive way to determine this. Consulting a lawyer skilled in such matters might be wise if any content in one's possession is even arguably questionable on such points.
E can leave at any time E is not detained and there is no basis to detain her. As a child, that decision can be made by a parent. E can be subpoenaed to testify but she does not have to talk to law enforcement (and would be wise not to).
In colorado, it appears that the kidnapping statutes do not apply if the act is not &quot;knowing&quot; or if the perpetrator lacks intent. § 18-3-301 Any person who does any of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim or any other person to make any concession or give up anything of value in order to secure a release of a person under the offender's actual or apparent control commits first degree kidnapping: (a) Forcibly seizes and carries any person from one place to another; or (b) Entices or persuades any person to go from one place to another; or (c) Imprisons or forcibly secretes any person. § 18-3-302 Any person who knowingly seizes and carries any person from one place to another, without his consent and without lawful justification, commits second degree kidnapping. 2. Any person who takes, entices, or decoys away any child not his own under the age of eighteen years with intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or guardian or with intent to sell, trade, or barter such child for consideration commits second degree kidnapping. § 18-3-303 Any person who knowingly confines or detains another without the other's consent and without proper legal authority commits false imprisonment. As @ohwilleke pointed out in this answer, this means that as soon as the hypothetical car thief becomes aware that the child is in the car and doesn't then act to return the child to their parents, it becomes second-degree kidnapping. (It's also possible that CO case law has interpreted the statutes differently than I'm interpreting them here, but the plain language seems to require the actual intent to take and/or confine a person illicitly.)
canada It depends on what the mens rea requirement is. Mens rea if not specified in a criminal offence In Canada, if this is a criminal offence, and a mens rea is not specified in the Criminal Code, the presumption is that the mens rea would be satisfied by recklessness, knowledge, willful blindness, or intention (Pappajohn v. The Queen, [1980] 2 SCR 120; R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13). The prosecution would have to show that Alice was at least subjectively aware of the risk that she was doing XYZ during the prohibited hours and proceeded nonetheless (this is recklessness; Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 570 ). Based on the facts as you've presented in the hypothetical, you may have ruled out the possibility that Alice was reckless. Although, depending on the time of year, it may be that the sun sets around 9pm, which may present some awareness of the risk that you have not accounted for in your hypothetical. Mens rea if specified If the text of the statute does specify a mens rea then that is what the prosecution needs to show. For example, if one is prohibited from doing XYZ while &quot;knowing&quot; that it is after 9pm, then the prosecution will have to demonstrate actual subjective knowledge of the time, or wilful blindness (which Canadian law takes to impute knowledge: Briscoe). Additional burdens to make use of some mistakes of fact Some offences put an even higher burden on the accused in order to rely on a mistake of fact. In sexual offences where the age of the complainant is relevant (e.g. that they 14 or younger, or 16 or younger, or 18 or younger), the accused cannot make out a mistake-of-age defence without showing they took reasonable steps to ascertain the age (see Criminal Code, s. 150.1).1 Presumptive mens rea for regulatory offences is much lower: strict liability, subject to a due-diligence defence However, if this were a public-welfare/regulatory offence, like a provincial traffic law, or a licensing restriction on an aviation licence, or municipal by-law, there is no mens rea presumption. Rather, public-welfare/regulatory offences prima facie fall into the category of strict liability offences, subject only to a due-diligence defence (R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 SCR 1299). Alice would have to show that she had a &quot;reasonable belief in facts which, if true, would have rendered the act innocent&quot;. What it means to have a &quot;reasonable belief in facts&quot; is very fact-specific.2 Alice has to hold the belief herself, and the trier of fact must accept that a reasonable person would also have held that belief. Just as in the case for recklessness, I can imagine that the timing of sunset might pose a problem for a due-diligence defence in your particular example. Absolute liability If the penalties for the offence do not include the risk of imprisonment, the offence can even be declared to be an absolute liability offence, in which due diligence is not even a defence (Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486). 1. For example, simply relying on a complainant's &quot;language and statements indicating that she could be 14 years of age or older did not constitute taking reasonable steps or all reasonable steps to ascertain her true age in all the circumstances, especially after being warned by her mother to stop all contact or she would call the police and stating that the complainant was way too young for him&quot; (R. v. Dragos, 2012 ONCA 538). 2. For example, for the sale of alcohol, &quot;when the individual clearly appears to be underage, ... a duly diligent permittee would require at least two more pieces of ID confirming that the person was not a minor, question the individual about the ID, then decide if it is reasonable to serve the individual alcohol versus the youthful appearance of the individual&quot; (Citynski Hotels Ltd. v. Saskatchewan, 2003 SKQB 314).
Sometimes running away is a juvenile offense, but it is not an offense for which an adult aged eighteen or over would be arrested or punished. An adult would not be returned home.