Meaning of the term causal nexus? I recently attended a talk related to government workplace harassment law. The presenter repeatedly used the term nexus (i.e., a causual nexus) to describe any situation where actions outside of the workplace could be seen as related to workplace harassment. After the talk I found an interesting article by Prof. Jeanette Cox on the American Bar Association website on First Amendment Rights in the workplace, but it doesn't speak to the extent an employee must modify speech in their personal life to avoid liability for workplace harassment. What are the limits of behavior on personal time that might be considered a causal nexus for a harassment case? I'm assuming that any such behavior would have to also be conjunct with behavior that occurred in the workplace involving the same individuals.
"Nexus" means "connection". A "causal nexus" in this context is a connection that causes harassment at work. There isn't any bright line dividing behavior on personal term that does or does not meet this test. The law does't work that way. Instead, there is a fairly vague test (in legal theory this is called a "standard" as opposed to a "rule") and there are examples of conduct that does or does not meet the test. A lot of the more obvious examples would be the kind of situations that come up in small town life. For example, suppose that the worker who is being harassed is the firm courier, and has only about half a dozen main stops that she visits several times a week, all of which are businesses or government agencies run by people who are part of the Pessimists Club together, whose members have beer and rubber chicken at a member's bar together every Tuesday night. In that context, saying lewd and suggestive things about the courier whom a member employs over a poker game with the people who run all of her main stops in connection with her job might have a causal nexus for harassment case purposes with her job, effectively enlisting everyone she has to do business with in her job in a campaign of harassment against her. In contrast, suppose that someone who is engaging in iffy conduct that doesn't quite cross the line of harassment at work towards this courier goes to that Pessimists Club meeting and targets his crass comments not at the courier but his ex-girlfriend towards whom he has engaged in lots of harassing conduct. His comments about his ex-girlfriend would not have a causal nexus to the courier's workplace and probably wouldn't be something that could be considered to determine if he was engaged in workplace harassment. This would be true even though small town gossip made his harassment of his ex-girlfriend common knowledge which make the courier take otherwise ambiguous conduct from him much more seriously knowing his modus operandi and capacity for escalating the situation. But, ultimately, one has to make a rather holistic evaluation of the entire situation to determine if there is a causal nexus or not between non-workplace behavior and alleged workplace harassment.
The Rules of Professional Conduct apply only to lawyers and are the foundation for a lawyer to be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred or receive other license related professional discipline. They are neither criminal offenses, nor on their own, a grounds for a civil lawsuit (although they may be relevant to an element of a civil cause of action giving rise to a lawsuit). The Rules of Professional Conduct also prohibit using a non-lawyer as a sock puppet to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. But, the Rules of Professional Conduct themselves are not applicable to pro se parties or even to non-lawyer parties who are acting fully independently of the lawyers they have retained. In some circumstances, a violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(g) could also constitute the crime of extortion, or could constitute duress such that an action taken in the course of litigation or a business deal is not actually legally considered to be voluntary and making it potentially voidable. But this would not always, or necessarily even usually, be the case. Incidentally, Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 is one of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the most state to state substantive variations and it also has multiple differing interpretations even in cases where the language is verbatim identical between states. The appropriate scope of this rule as a matter of policy is one of considerable controversy. And, it isn't unusual for the converse to happen (i.e. for a criminal prosecutor or an attorney regulation system official to force the hand of a civil litigant in the course of negotiations about those charges).
In general property owners and employers can impose any rules on their property and employees (respectively) that are not prohibited by law. Granted, there are extensive statutes and regulations to protect "employee rights." I have not heard of protections that include "possession of prescribed medications," but that does not mean they don't exist in your jurisdiction. If you really want to know whether you have a legal right as an employee, and you can't find it in written law or regulation, you would have to consult regulators or employment law attorneys in your jurisdiction. (As a practical matter, of course, it might make sense to first find out whether one's employer wants to assert a policy infringing the right in question.)
Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.
What are the ethical rules that limit interaction between civil and criminal proceedings on the same facts? A private lawyer's job is to look out for the client's interests before the public interest in these cases. In many states, a private lawyer is not permitted to threaten to seek a criminal prosecution to gain an advantage in a civil action. A private lawyer, myself included, will often deliberately not pursue criminal charges in order to not impair the ability of a client to collect a judgment. A prosecutor has wide discretion to prosecute or not when the prosecutor is aware of a crime that there is probable cause to believe was committed. A complaint by the victim is not required in the U.S., but most prosecutors consider a victim's wishes. A prosecutor may ethically make prosecution dependent upon making a victim whole. So is this conflict and result just an "unfair" fact of all common-law justice? What is "fair" is beyond the scope of Law.SE which deals in "what is", not in what is "fair". Or are there mechanisms that exist to satisfy the demands of justice despite this conflict? Not really. Just the good judgment of the individual actors in the system given their respective duties and roles.
No. I can't give a more detailed answer without reference to a specific statute. But just about every state anti-bullying statute in the U.S. restricts the definition to...well, bullying. There is a good summary of state bullying and cyberbullying statutes here. The laws are varied, but they invariable contain words like "harassment", "abuse", "threatening," "fear," and "hostile environment." Would it be possible to "cyberbully" someone on Stack Exchange under some of these statutes? Sure. You could do it in comments; in answers; even in questions. "Question: Is Bill in my algebra class a dork, or a tool?" Comment: "This is a terrible question, and I'm going to burn your house down. Downvoting." You could probably fit something like that under some of the broader statutes--although they still for the most part haven't been tested for First Amendment issues. But I don't know of any statute broad enough to include downvoting a question or answer, on a site people post on knowing that the whole purpose of posting is to allow their posts to be upvoted and downvoted. If there was such a statute--and again, I don't know of any--it would almost certainly be unconstitutional. There is no law against hurting people's feelings, at least in the United States, and a law that allows people to seek legal redress for someone saying "I disagree with you" is pretty much the poster child for a First Amendment violation.
the first two highlighted parts seem to contradict each other. No, in this case they do not. The first highlighted portion refers to works or items produced "for or under the direction of the Company", whereas the second highlight refers to your creations that satisfy conditions (a) and (b). Where contradictions actually exist, the doctrine of contra proferentem entitles you (the non-draftsman of the contract) to adopt the portion or reasonable interpretation that favors your legal position. Also wondering how valid those statements actually are They are valid and become enforceable as soon as you sign the contract or your subsequent conduct reflects your acceptance thereof. it's a matter of privacy. So the question is what I can do or what the reality is of the situation The reality is that you are asked to sign a contract that is abusive and ridiculous. One vulnerability from describing your inventions (presumably in Appendix A) is that the employer gets "irrevocable, worldwide, etc" rights on them as soon as you "use or disclose any [items listed in Appendix A] when acting within the scope of [your] employment". This means that if instead of reinventing the wheel you share or apply any portion of your prior creations so as to enhance your productivity, you knowingly and irreversibly grant to the employer perpetual rights to those items. Legal disputes regarding APIs can become extremely intricate. And, since judges usually have no decent background on IT, even those few judges with integrity are unlikely to grasp the key subtleties that would lead to a correct ruling. "not useful with or related to any Company Interest" is very vague. The company could be interested in literally anything these days. Clauses which are too vague or excessively wide-encompassing are supposedly stricken as unconscionable, unenforceable, etc. However, I personally would foreclose upfront the risk of judicial hassle and decline the abusive contract. Legal issues aside, keep in mind that you are offering your expertise (in terms of supply &amp; demand, you are on the supply side). This fact has a less derogatory connotation than "asking for a job". Accordingly, the relation between the parties should be more leveled.
Under the doctrine of &quot;respondeat superior&quot;, can an employer in Michigan be legally liable if an (intoxicated) non-salary employee hits and kills a person on their way to work? Probably not. For most purposes, under principles originally established for minimum wage laws under the Portal to Portal Act, you are not at work and acting within the scope of your employment when you leave home to go to work (i.e. when you are commuting) or when you leave work to go home at the end of the day. Would the employer's legal responsibility change if the vehicle was owned by the company? Not on a respondeat superior theory. The employee still isn't acting within the scope of employment. But, Michigan does impose statutory liability upon vehicle owners which is vicarious liability even though it isn't respondeat superior liability, under a theory similar to (but broader than in some respects since it applies to non-family too, and narrower than in other respects since it is limited to vehicle owners) the common law family car doctrine. Specifically, Michigan Vehicle Code § 401(1) states (the balance of the section pertains to leased vehicles): This section shall not be construed to limit the right of a person to bring a civil action for damages for injuries to either person or property resulting from a violation of this act by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle or his or her agent or servant. The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the motor vehicle whether the negligence consists of a violation of a statute of this state or the ordinary care standard required by common law. The owner is not liable unless the motor vehicle is being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. It is presumed that the motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and consent of the owner if it is driven at the time of the injury by his or her spouse, father, mother, brother, sister, son, daughter, or other immediate member of the family. So, unless the employee had a company car without the express or implied consent or knowledge of the employer, the company is responsible for harm caused by negligence. There might be an argument that criminal activity (driving while intoxicated) which was intentional or reckless, is beyond what the employer gave express or implied consent to do and was not done with employer knowledge (I haven't reviewed the case law to examine that theory), in the same way that the employer would probably not have liability if the employee, while sober, intentionally murdered his ex-wife by driving over her with the company car. But, at first blush, it looks like the employer would be on the hook if it was a company car, since drunk driving is a traffic statute that was violated for which the negligence per se liability referred to in the statute would apply. The fact pattern of the question is notable because it catches a case where there is statutory liability in Michigan, despite the fact that neither the family car doctrine, not respondeat superior, nor a negligent entrustment theory would impose liability on employer at common law. (There are negligent entrustment cases at common law in Colorado and elsewhere where negligent entrustment liability is imposed when an employer allows a drunk employee to leave work in a company car that the employer could have forbidden the employee to use because the employee was drunk.)