Paternity of non-marital children I came across this document today: Sometimes a married woman gives birth to a child whose biological father is not her husband. Although the husband is not the child’s biological parent, he is the child’s legal parent under Michigan law. The husband is the legal parent of every child born or conceived during the marriage. The reverse is not true. If a man fathers another woman’s child while he is married, his wife is not the legal mother of that child. As the legal father of the children born during his marriage, a husband may have custody and parenting time. He may also be responsible for providing child support and health insurance. The biological father of such a child has no parental rights or responsibilities for the child. I'm not sure if the information is accurate, but according to the above text, when a wife cheats, it is marriage not biology that decides the paternity of the child. I got some questions: If my wife cheats on me, I would still be the legal parent of the child. If I don't want this paternity, is there a legal process to disavow it? If I fall in love with a married woman and we give birth to a child, I am the biological but not legal parent of the child. Is there a legal process for me to claim paternity of the child from the woman's husband? The document says "The reverse is not true". Why the decision about paternity is different between a wife cheats on a husband and a husband cheats on a wife?
I'm not sure if the information is accurate, but according to the above text, when a wife cheats, it is marriage not biology that decides the paternity of the child. I got some questions: If my wife cheats on me, I would still be the legal parent of the child. If I don't want this paternity, is there a legal process to disavow it? In most states, yes (I can't think of any exceptions, but there are 50 states and more self-governing territories and this is a matter of state law). Typically there is a statute of limitations of one to five years from the date of birth for a husband or person listed as a father on a birth certificate to bring a legal action to disavow paternity. See, e.g., California Family Code §§ 7540-7541 (setting a two year statute of limitations from a child's birth for a person with standing to dispute that a cuckolded husband is the legal father with genetic evidence). Note also that the process and statute of limitations are usually not the same, if, for example, a child wishes to prove that the child's biological father is someone other than the legally presumed father of that child. If I fall in love with a married woman and we give birth to a child, I am the biological but not legal parent of the child. Is there a legal process for me to claim paternity of the child from the woman's husband? Sometimes yes, and sometimes no. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), held that a state is not constitutionally required to make such a process available, but some states do anyway. The details of how this plays out under New York State law are described in this Law.SE question and answer. An analysis of the relevant portions of Minnesota law can be found here. For example, in California, Family Code Section 7541 limits standing to dispute paternity to spouses, people &quot;presumed to be a parent&quot; under Family Code Section 7611, or representatives of children seeking to establish or disestablish the paternity of someone &quot;presumed to be a parent&quot; under Family Code Section 7611. So, the only people eligible to be found to be parents are (excluding spent provisions of only historical interest): A husband who was married to the mother at the time of the birth or within 300 days before the birth. § 7611(a). A putative husband who would have been a spouse under § 7611(a), who marriage is annulled (e.g. because a marriage license expired or a husband was too closely related to the mother or either spouse is already married). § 7611(b). A putative husband who cohabited with the mother within 300 days before the birth whose attempt to married was too obviously defective to require an annulment (e.g. two fifteen year olds who have a church wedding without a marriage license). § 7611(b). A husband of the mother who marries the mother after the birth and is also named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A putative husband who attempt to marry the mother after the birth and is named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A person &quot;who receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child.&quot; § 7611(d). A parent who dies while the &quot;child is in utero&quot; if this is established in a probate court proceeding. § 7511(f). Thus, in California, a father of the child of a woman married to someone else, who is still alive, (or someone of behalf of the child seeking to establish that he is the father) can only dispute the paternity of the husband of the child's mother (if the husband himself or the mother does not challenge the husband's paternity) if he &quot;receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child.&quot; Simply claiming paternity without &quot;receiving the child into his home&quot; isn't sufficient to overcome the presumption that the mother's husband is the father in California unless the mother of the child or her husband disputes this presumption. The document says &quot;The reverse is not true&quot;. Why the decision about paternity is different between a wife cheats on a husband and a husband cheats on a wife? Because maternity (absent a surrogacy arrangement) is almost never in doubt, while paternity is often in doubt. Furthermore, it wasn't possible when these doctrines were formulated (centuries ago) to determine paternity reliably in all cases anyway, at least at an affordable price. Cheap and reliable paternity tests, that can be used in pretty much any circumstances{1}, have only been possible for less than forty years, which is why a case like Michael H. v. Gerald D. didn't come up until then. {1} There have been particular cases, for example, when mother and father are both white and a child is at least partially black, where it has always been possible to do so (although even that scenario isn't 100% accurate, as illustrated by a famous historical case in which both parents had a modest amount of African ancestry that wasn't visible phenotypically). Similarly, there was the scenario of @MartinBonner where husband &quot;was away at sea/war at the time conception would have had to occurred&quot;. Later on, blood types could disprove paternity in some cases, but not prove it with any certainty. There is a quasi-magical process described in the Old Testament for resolving such disputes involving the wife drinking a semi-poisonous liquid. In the Roman Empire, those cases were resolved by the husband who had a right to commit infanticide if he wished. In modern times, something close to the existing legal process has usually been available, complicated in certain eras by criminalized adultery, &quot;heart balm&quot; civil actions, and fault based divorce.
I know of no laws at the federal or state level that explicitly extend their protection to poly relationships. However, any law that purports to outlaw a polyamorous relationship among consenting adults should be looked at very skeptically, as it would likely be found unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003): The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. While that case dealt with homosexual relationships, it seems unlikely that the courts would conclude that heterosexual couples, throuples, etc., are entitled to less protection. Adultery laws exist in many jurisdictions, and many of them have survived constitutional challenges. But as far as I know, all those challenges relied on legal principles and precedents -- in particular, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) -- that Lawrence explicitly overruled. In this regard, I would not expect anyone in a polyamorous relationship to encourter meaningful legal jeopardy as a result of that relationship, assuming that the relationship(s) were otherwise legal and out in the open. If A is unaware of her spouse's relationship with C, for instance, that could cause problems in a divorce proceeding. I don't know of any legal options specifically designed for this sort of arrangement, but the more interconnected and interdependent these groups are, the more likely it becomes that some sort of written agreement would become worthwhile -- not as a response to legal danger arising from the polyamorous nature of the relationship, just to address the fact that someone is eventually going to fall short, potentially causing problems for the whole group. There are many lawyers who specialize in LGBT issues, and I'd imagine that some of them would be able to provide more detailed advice about how to deal with this type of situation.
No To declare that a parent is &quot;unfit&quot; in the US requires at least a decision by a government agency (often called &quot;child protective services&quot; or &quot;child welfare&quot; depending on the state) usually confirmed by a judge. Medical testimony may be persuasive, but neither doctors nor hospitals may make such determinations.
In the US, no, courts would not enforce such a contract. It would be deemed not in the public interest, perhaps unconscionable. Of course, two willing adults could make and honor such an agreement but that would only work as long as the woman didn't change her mind. What is "fair" in a situation like this is a little tricky but, ultimately, any child's welfare is going to be a major consideration in any court decision.
if the child exchange time and locations are fixed, and the husband can no longer legally drive, does this effectively nullify his visitation rights? No. He can get a ride from someone or get an Uber or Lyft or Taxi or take a bus. The drop off location is near her house, not his, and even if public transportation were an option he would not be the type to use it. He's more the type that would ignore the suspension of his license and go pick up the kids in his car anyway. He is also the kind to try to attempt to manipulate the wife into doing what he wants regardless of what a court order says. Emotional abuse and manipulation were a big part of his game, but fortunately she has gotten much better at ignoring it. What he is inclined to do and why have nothing to do with whether or not it is legal. If he has his license revoked and attempts to pick up the children as always, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she allows him to pick up the kids? Practically speaking, no, particularly in light of a court order to transfer custody. Theoretically, it is remotely possible, even though it is very unlikely. In theory, she could be held liable for negligent child neglect by allowing this to happen, particularly if the children were then harmed in an automobile accident. If he was visibly drunk or intoxicated at the time of the transfer, however, her risk of criminal liability would be considerable. Would there be any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses to allow him to pick up the children himself with a suspended license/registration? Potentially, she could be held in contempt of court for refusing to follow a court order. Her better course would be to call the police when he arrived to report that he is driving with suspended license, to not transfer the children and wait until they arrive (seeking cover inside a home and advising the 911 operator again if the situation starts to escalate into a potentially violent situation), and to explain to the police that he is also attempting to endanger the children by trying to drive with them on a suspended license. There is a good chance that he would be arrested and that the police would leave her with the children. The police might, rather than arresting him, drive him home with the kids and tell him not to drive and cite him for driving with a suspended license. Then, she should make an emergency motion to the court, regardless of how it is resolved by the police, seeking permission to formally give her a right to refuse to transfer if he arrives unaccompanied with a suspended license. If he attempts to convince her to drop the kids off somewhere else (presumably at his house) due to the suspension of his license, are there any potential legal repercussions for her if she refuses? Probably not. This time he's not following the court order, not her. It would still be advisable for her to file an emergency motion with the court explaining the situation.
Generally, in non-emergency situations, the state with jurisdiction over parenting issues related to children including relinquishment and adoption is vested in the courts of the "home state" of the child. A child's "home state" is defined by statute by a coordinated definitions set forth in parallel laws at the state (the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction And Enforcement Act in 49 states) and federal (the Parental Kidnapping Prevent Act) level. This definition of "home state" provides a fairly precise definition of something that approximately matches your intuition regarding the state where the child resides in most cases. There is also an international treaty with a similar home state definition. The state where the child was born ceases to be relevant at the point at which that state ceases to be the child's "home state". But, once a state's courts take jurisdiction over parenting issues for a child, the barrier to divest that state of jurisdiction is higher than it would be if there was no prior litigation. So, the state establishing the child support decree would often be the "home state" in the fact pattern set forth in this question. I will refrain from discussing the substantive law of voluntary relinquishment following an acknowledgment of paternity and payment of child support at length in this post as it is beyond the scope of what was asked. Suffice it to say that this is generally disfavored and is sometimes impossible. Also, the actions that could lead to involuntary termination of parental rights (even for mere non-support) also often have parallel felony criminal sanctions associated with them.
To answer the last question, the court cannot order a DNA test, see Kumar v. Gupta, on privacy grounds: &quot;such tests impinge upon the right of privacy of an individual and could also have major societal repercussions&quot;. This is not a hard line, but it would be safe to conclude that in a case like the present, the Court’s decision should be rendered only after balancing the interests of the parties, i.e, the quest for truth, and the social and cultural implications involved therein See Puttaswamy v. India, the landmark case that established the constitutional right to privacy. DNA evidence is not absolutely barred, see Banarsi Dass V. Teeku Dutta and citations therein, finding most importantly that There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. Various rulings have clarified that Section 112 establishes a defeasible presumption, and not a mindless bar to evidence: It is rebuttable presumption of law that a child born during the lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that access occurred between the parents. In other words, yes and no. As summarized in that ruling, tests cannot be ordered routinely or as a form of discovery, &quot;There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act&quot;, the court must balance the consequences of ordering such a test (&quot;branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman&quot;), and a person cannot be compelled to give a blood sample.
I don’t understand why you think this is a “3rd party communication” - as I read it it says it’s an email from you. You are most definitely not a third party. Notwithstanding, communication between 3rd parties is not prima facie excluded. For example, correspondence between your company and your accountant (who are both third parties) is likely to be extremely relevant to a family law case. Assuming that it is relevant (which is hard to say without context) and that it doesn’t fall foul of one of the evidentiary rules (hearsay, opinion, privilege etc.) there is no reason why it wouldn’t be admissible.