moving to dismiss a count in an amended complaint although &quot;answered&quot; in the original complaint Hypothetical scenario: Plaintiff files a complaint having three counts A, B, and C. Defendant files an answer to counts A &amp; B and moves to dismiss count C for &quot;failure to state a claim.&quot; On Plaintiff's motion, judge grants leave to amend and denies pending motion to dismiss as moot. Plaintiff files an amended complaint containing counts A and D (D being a new count, B and C having been removed). The language of Count A remains completely unchanged. Defendant files a new motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on all counts. Is the Defendant's decision to challenge count A permitted by FRCP? It seems at the very least a logical necessity that either the initial answer or the subsequent motion to dismiss must have been filed in violation of Rule 11 because: I don't see how defendant can initially believe that Count A states a claim and then later decide it does not. I suppose I should add the assumption that they did not come across any new case law during the time interval between pleadings and that the governing law did not change. Rule 11 requires a reasonable inquiry be made into the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint, and that no document be filed for an impure purpose. I can't think of any &quot;pure purpose&quot; one would have in filing an answer when a motion for dismissal is warranted. So it leads me to conclude that either the Defendant did not make a reasonable inquiry into Count A before filing an answer, and has wasted both the court and plaintiff's time by not raising Count A's insufficiency initially, or that either the answer or the later motion to dismiss were filed for an impure purpose.
According to rule 15a: (1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within: (A) 21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier. (2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires. If you are still within 21 days of when you served your original pleading (or their response, if one was required) then you should still be able to amend your pleading. If you are outside that window, you may be able to use rule 12(c): (c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings. According to rule 12(d), this is not the same as a motion for summary judgement under rule 56 (with all that entails) unless the court has already been presented with matters outside the pleadings. Your question was about rule 11. I don't think your scenario would violate it. Under rule 11b: By presenting to the court a pleading... an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances... (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information. It doesn't actually say in there that the defense must investigate the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims (although that's obviously something the defense would ordinarily want to do.) The part about making sure &quot;the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted...&quot; relates to the claims being made the party in question, not the ones being made by the other party. I can't think of any &quot;pure purpose&quot; one would have in filing an answer when a motion for dismissal is warranted. Depending on the circumstances, a party might have good reasons to not make every claim they think they're entitled to make. Perhaps they aren't sure about how the court will rule on their motion to dismiss but like their chances at trial. (Indeed, if it's a certainty the court will dismiss, then perhaps Rule 11 sanctions are in order for the plaintiff, for filing a case that was not at all warranted by the law.) Drafting a motion is time the attorney has to spend, which is an expense for their client, and it may or may not work. But maybe their motion to dismiss Count D uses the same theories as their motion to dismiss Count A, and it's now worth it to make the argument. And maybe now since the court ruled with them on Count C they're more optimistic that the court will also rule in their favor on counts A and D. If the defense delayed this motion solely to &quot;harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation&quot; then Rule 11 would be violated. But that seems unlikely. Look at the context. They're making a motion on the amended complaint. That's still rather early in the process. Given that a brand new count was added, an earlier motion to dismiss count A would not have resolved the litigation anyway, so there was no real delay caused. The costs for either side have not been significantly increased, either. Also note the phrases &quot;to the best of the person's knowledge&quot; and &quot;reasonable under the circumstances&quot;. The defendant only has 21 days to file a response after being served, and they might not even have an attorney yet when that clock starts. How much inquiry is reasonable in that time frame, especially when responding to a multi-count complaint?
There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.
Does the law or judge ever make exceptions for events such as this? From a legal standpoint, your friend is at high risk of being found in contempt and thus be sentenced to imprisonment. Your friend should have called 911 rather than violate the protection order under pretext of consoling her. Asking from the standpoint of whether judges ever do this or that is pointless. The answer would be &quot;yes, they make exceptions&quot; even in scenarios which are plain aberrant. However, a judge's departure of the law quite often is not a reliable standpoint for understanding the law, but the result of his/her ineptitude and unfitness for judicial office.
Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as &quot;their neighbor&quot; instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings &amp; proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.
You need, at least, to let the person receive 2 reminders which have to name a reasonable period (after the first exceeds, you can send the second) and if the last deadline exceeds, you have the possibility of escalating further. Although often repeated, this is not correct which makes most of your argument moot. By German law (specifically § 286 BGB) these are the exact conditions for a default of payments: (1)If the obligor, following a warning notice from the obligee that is made after performance is due, fails to perform, he is in default as a result of the warning notice. Bringing an action for performance and serving a demand for payment in summary debt proceedings for recovery of debt have the same effect as a warning notice. (2)There is no need for a warning notice if a period of time according to the calendar has been specified, performance must be preceded by an event and a reasonable period of time for performance has been specified in such a way that it can be calculated, starting from the event, according to the calendar, the obligor seriously and definitively refuses performance, for special reasons, weighing the interests of both parties, the immediate commencement of default is justified. (3)The obligor of a claim for payment is in default at the latest if he does not perform within thirty days after the due date and receipt of an invoice or equivalent statement of payment; this applies to an obligor who is a consumer only if these consequences are specifically referred to in the invoice or statement of payment. If the time at which the invoice or payment statement is received by the obligor is uncertain, an obligor who is not a consumer is in default at the latest thirty days after the due date and receipt of the consideration. (4)The obligor is not in default for as long as performance is not made as the result of a circumstance for which he is not responsible. Depending on what was contractually agreed on the default happened even before the first warning. For example that is the case if a specific payment due date was agreed to. Even if a warning would be required it is only one and you can see that no requirements on the specific wording or form on that warning is given. I don't know how you assume an "official reminder" should look like. According to the law a specific and explicit demand to fulfill an obligation is enough. Also, the warning does not need to contain a specific date. If it doesn't the default is effective immediately.
The amount requested has little or nothing to do with the amount, if any, eventually awarded. Once can sue "for 100 million dollars" and be awarded 100 dollars, and although it is rarer, one can be awarded more than the amount asked for when suit is field. That initial amount now serves as a peg to hang sensational news stores on, and nothing more. The plaintiff, and the plaintiff's lawyer, may consider that such publicity serves them well. Such inflated amounts are not grounds to dismiss the suit, so there is no downside to including them, except possibly negative publicity if people mock the demand.
Yes, this happens with some regularity. In the absence of timely notice, courts should generally permit the alibi testimony, assuming that prosecution will not be surprised or prejudiced by the late notice and that the lack of notice was not the result of bad faith. But when that's not the case, courts can and definitely do exclude alibi testimony: State v. Reed, 155 Ohio App.3d 435 (2003) (&quot;The record demonstrates that the prosecution was unaware of Reed’s alibi, and it had no opportunity to investigate the claim. Thus, the state would have been prejudiced by Reed’s unanticipated alibi testimony, and Reed has made no showing of excusable neglect or good cause for his delay in providing notice. In light of Manns’s failure to appear at trial and Reed’s last-minute change in trial strategy, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the alibi evidence.&quot; United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1076 (10th Cir. 1994) (&quot;The better practice is generally to hear an alibi witness. However, the district court maintains discretion in such matters, and it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the testimony in this case.&quot;) People v. Grant, C050172, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3356 (Apr. 25, 2006) Assuming the government is subject to reciprocal discovery obligations, a defendant's due-process rights do not preclude the exclusion of alibi witnesses as a sanction for failing to give timely notice. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973) (&quot;The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants.&quot;).
Service of process is jurisdictional, but specific phrasing isn't typically specified by statute. For example, here's the Illinois statute, 735 ILCS 5/2-203(a): Except as otherwise expressly provided, service of summons upon an individual defendant shall be made (1) by leaving a copy of the summons with the defendant personally, (2) by leaving a copy at the defendant's usual place of abode, with some person of the family or a person residing there, of the age of 13 years or upwards, and informing that person of the contents of the summons, provided the officer or other person making service shall also send a copy of the summons in a sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed to the defendant at his or her usual place of abode, or (3) as provided in Section 1-2-9.2 of the Illinois Municipal Code with respect to violation of an ordinance governing parking or standing of vehicles in cities with a population over 500,000. The certificate of the officer or affidavit of the person that he or she has sent the copy in pursuance of this Section is evidence that he or she has done so. The key is that the service of process be completed. Legally, this implies that the server will file an affidavit that describes the circumstances of the legal completion of service. For example, here is a sample affidavit. Like any other trade, process servers have an association that offers training, publishes a policy manual, and abides by certain best practices. All that said, the best practices don't specify any specific verbiage. Rather they elaborate a preference for the methods of service (e.g. personal vs. drop) and the like.