Why and when did some American appellate courts add an &#39;s&#39; to the word &#39;Appeal&#39; in their title? In England &amp; Wales and most of the Commonwealth, the title of an appellate court is the Court of Appeal. The word 'appeal' is singular because it describes the purpose of the court in contrast to the Court of Justice (i.e. justice has been done by the court below, and the action now is that of appeal, similarly to the nomenclature of a Court of Cassation, a Court for the Correction of Errors, etc). In the United States, some states follow the 'traditional' nomenclature—eg, the largest, California, has a Court of Appeal. However, the federal courts, and many states, instead add an additional 's' to the title of appellate courts. Why is this, and where did it originate from?
On January 15, 1780, the Continental Congress resolved to establish &quot;for the trial of all appeals from the courts of admiralty in these United States, in cases of capture&quot;, then a few lines later resolved &quot;defraying the expence of said court of Appeals&quot;, and resolved actions &quot;to carry into full and speedy execution the final decrees of the Court of Appeals&quot;, thus clearly establishing the acceptance of the first federal court of the US, the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. Some years earlier, Nov. 25 1775, the Continental Congress passed a number of resolutions pertaining to judiciously deal with seized goods in the course of the war (when there was no codified law or court system), where &quot;prosecutions shall be commenced in the court of that colony in which the captures shall be made&quot;, but &quot;cases an appeal shall be allowed to the Congress, or such person or persons as they shall appoint for the trial of appeals&quot;. The Court of Appeal of England and Wales was created in 1875, which seems to be the first UK court specifically established for hearing appeals. There is no obvious linguistic reason for these different names assigned to the functionally same court in two countries, but once a name is officially given, it takes an act of Congress or Parliament to change the name.
It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment&mdash;specifically the ratio&mdash;that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today)
Generally speaking, a decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is binding only in the District of Columbia. Courts of other jurisdictions are not required to adhere to its decisions. If the issue came up again in Virginia or Maryland, courts there would have no obligation to follow it. Virginia tort law is different from D.C. tort law, so Virginia courts would need to determine whether their law is different on this particular point.
You have your answer already in the quotation you give. Her petition to appeal in forma pauperis was presented on February 26, 1931, and granted on March 17, 1931 At that time the Appeals (Forma Pauperis) Act 1893 (56 &amp; 57 Vict c 22) was in force. This created a limited form of legal assistance for paupers that paid for, amongst other things, counsel to appear before the House of Lords on appeal. See the costs order made by the House of Lords on remitting the case.
&quot;Regina&quot; or &quot;R&quot; or &quot;The Crown&quot; or &quot;The Queen&quot; is the respondent. These are different ways of expressing the same concept. However, it is not typical to name &quot;Crown Prosecution Service&quot; in the citation, or the formal heading of the case. This differs from Scottish practice where appeals look like &quot;Adam v HM Advocate&quot;. Other public prosecutions can be brought by bodies other than CPS, such as the Health and Safety Executive, so R does not invariably mean the CPS. For England and Wales, the philosophy is that criminal prosecutions are brought by the Crown as the fount of justice, and maintained as such on appeal, and it so happens that the interests of the public are represented by agencies such as the CPS. They are not representing their own interests and are not parties to the case. We do see &quot;Adam v Crown Prosecution Service&quot; in judicial review cases, which are civil rather than criminal. For example, SXH v Crown Prosecution Service [2017] UKSC 30 was about challenging the CPS's decision on whether to prosecute somebody. An &quot;appeal by way of case stated&quot; may also arise in this way, where there is a point of law to be decided in the Administrative Court of Queen's Bench, such as Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions [2012] EWHC 2157 (Admin). The DPP is the head of the CPS. The distinction is that a judicial review is about whether the public body's decisions were lawful - they are the ones being scrutinized - whereas in a criminal case, the prosecution is mounted on behalf of the public in general, with the CPS merely happening to be the agency usually responsible. Equally, the CPS can be a party to employment disputes and things like that. &quot;R (Crown Prosecution Service)&quot; looks a little unusual because &quot;R (Somebody) v Anotherbody&quot; usually means a judicial review on behalf of the Somebody, against Anotherbody, with the R being a vestige of the historical basis for this kind of review. It would be odd for the CPS to be in that position. If you look through recent Court of Appeal judgements you will see some variations in presentation, but a common pattern of saying something like this: In the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) On appeal from Oxford Crown Court Mr Justice Glossop Before: Lord Justice Tibbs Mrs Justice Bloggs Mr Justice Dubbs Between: Regina (Respondent) and Adam (Appellant) B Smith (instructed by Appeals-R-Us Solicitors) for the Appellant C Jones QC (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent
There is currently no difference, but there have been substantial differences in the past. Since the Courts Act 1971 (specifically s.42), the City of London has had its own county court that is on the same basis as other county courts. It is called &quot;The Mayor's and City of London Court&quot; for historical reasons, as that was the name of the court that was the previous closest equivalent. The 1971 Act establishes that the new version of the court has the same jurisdiction as any other county court, thus taking away any special privileges which the old version had. It was already almost like a county court by virtue of the City of London (Courts) Act 1964. Moreover, since the Crime and Courts Act 2013, there are no longer separate county courts, but one enormous one that sits in several places. That includes the City of London location. In criminal matters, the Crown Court (established under the same 1971 Act) is logically also one enormous court. When it sits in the City of London, it is known as the &quot;Central Criminal Court&quot; (Senior Courts Act 1981, s.8(3)), but is still the same court. It does not have any special status with respect to the City, being meant to handle cases from all of Greater London as well. Formerly, it had to operate a complex system of separate juries for City cases, but nowadays that is all uniform. For magistrates' courts, the Courts Act 2003 created a single jurisdiction for all of England and Wales. That is divided into &quot;local justice areas&quot;, one of which is the City of London - these replace the old &quot;petty sessional divisions&quot;. There are no special rules for the City. Applying the general rules for a particular criminal case would result in it being dealt with in the place where the offence is alleged to have happened, or where the accused lives, or where the witnesses mostly live, or &quot;where other cases raising similar issues are being dealt with&quot; (s.30(5)(d)). Perhaps soon, powers under the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 will be exercised to abolish local justice areas (s.45), enabling even more flexibility with the assignment of cases to courts. In particular, this is meant to make it easer to shift cases around depending on local workload, or on which court location is genuinely most convenient in all the circumstances. The Act also removes (ss. 46 and 47) the current special rules about the City of London court premises being provided by the City authorities, rather than by the Ministry of Justice which handles all the other ones. Formerly, there have been plenty of law courts for the City, or its livery companies, or St Paul's Cathedral (the consistory court had criminal jurisdiction over clergy), or the &quot;compters&quot; (debtors' prisons). Some of these still exist in a ceremonial capacity but do not function as courts. For example, the aldermen of the City can meet as the &quot;Court of Husting&quot;, which was formerly a functioning law court but nowadays has the sole purpose of enrolling certain deeds, and hasn't done that since 1978. There are still two Sherriffs, nominally associated with the Poultry Compter and Wood Street Compter, but their courts have not existed since 1867. Some of the City's officers have residual ceremonial connections with the Old Bailey or other institutions, but these have no practical impact on the work of the courts.
The direct answer is &quot;no&quot; and the indirect answer is &quot;yes&quot;, that is, your way of putting the matter diverges significantly from how the Bill of Complain puts the matter. The claim is that the defendant states violated the Electors Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause. Texas claims that there is an injury in fact, citing various SCOTUS rulings e.g. Wesberry v. Sanders which says that No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined See the argument in the brief for more legal rhetoric. There can be no question that one state can sue another; equally clearly, the plaintiff must show actual harm and not just annoyance. New Jersey v. New York is a case involving a question of equity, not the federal constitution, but there is no legal principle to the effect that one state cannot sue over a constitutional harm rather than an equitable harm. See the brief p. 65 ff. The court does not require that there be exact precedential analogs (otherwise, Roe v. Wade would have turned out differently), what's required is simply that there be reasonable logical steps: SCOTUS gets to decide what is reasonable (or it can decline to decide).
Under U.S. law, a U.S. court can assert jurisdiction sufficient to enter a binding judgment (called "long arm personal jurisdiction") if the events giving rise to the lawsuit took place in the state where the state or federal court in which the suit is brought is located. Generally speaking, modern U.S. law allows the service of the summons and complaint that gives the court jurisdiction over the defendant if the events giving rise to the suit took place in the state, to be served anywhere in the world (or even in outer space, for that matter). But, the practical reality is that serving someone with process from a U.S. court in another country would be difficult and expensive, and enforcing the judgment if you win could likewise be difficult. There are also a couple of other problems specific to small claims court: Many small claims courts do not have the full jurisdiction that the U.S. Constitution allows them to have by virtue of the statutes that authorize them and their contemplation that proceedings take place predominantly or entirely in person. It isn't uncommon for the statute authorizing a small claims court to limit its jurisdiction to defendants that live in the same county. Most small claims courts are only allowed to enter money judgments subject to some very narrow and idiosyncratic exceptions. Most small claims courts do not have jurisdiction to order specific performance of a contract to sell a car, even though they could award money damages for breaching the contract to sell the car if those money damage could be demonstrated convincingly. These barriers particular to small claims court could be solved by filing suit in another state court that has broader jurisdiction. (The federal courts would probably not have jurisdiction over this case even if there was "diversity of citizenship" between the parties because the amount in controversy would probably be less than $75,000 unless it was a very fancy car indeed to be worth that much used.) Different consideration would apply if these facts and circumstances arose outside the United States, depending upon the jurisdiction in question.