Are individuals who identify as non-human animals members of a protected class? This question is inspired by the following question over on Academia.SE: Should students' nonhuman identity be taken seriously in classroom settings? The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission notes: In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, No. 17-1618 (S. Ct. June 15, 2020),[1] the Supreme Court held that firing individuals because of their sexual orientation or transgender status violates Title VII’s prohibition on discrimination because of sex. Individuals who identify as non-human animals report sexual aspects of their identity to academic researchers (Brooks et al 2022. PMID 35576143): evidence was found that most furries did, indeed, report being sexually attracted to various facets of their furry interest (e.g., furry-themed media) and were sexually motivated to engage in various furry-themed behaviors (e.g., interacting with other furries) Thus, my question is if individuals who identify as non-human animals are members of a protected class with respect to employment discrimination. Could such an individual assert this protection through the sexual orientation class? The question focuses on the United States, but I would also be interested in prospectives from around the world.
In the US, no. This is because &quot;protected class&quot; is defined statutorily for a particular purpose, for example &quot;civil rights&quot;, &quot;employment&quot;, &quot;housing&quot;. There can be variation in federal vs. state or municipal protected classes and what classes have which rights (e.g. &quot;race&quot; is included in all protected classes but pregnancy-discrimination is not federally protected w.r.t. housing), but so far nobody has defined &quot;self-identifies as non-human&quot; as a protected class. If Congress were to pass a blanket law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of species, then (1) it would be illegal to not consider my dog as a job candidate and (2) it would be illegal to take into consideration whether a job candidate is a human versus a dog or a fern. But there is no such law. &quot;Non-binary&quot; is not, per se, a protected class. The rationale of Bostock v. Clayton County is that one cannot legally discriminate based on whether a person is male or female, therefore one cannot legally discriminate based on whether one is a male who has sex with a female versus whether one is a male who has sex with a male, or whether one is a male who abjures sex, because they all reduce to discrimination based on whether one is male (or female). It's not legal to discriminate against furries based on whether they are male or are female, but being a furry is itself a protected class.
IQ level is not a protected class and so using it to discriminate between job applicants is not illegal per se. However - in the U.S., studies have shown that self-identified blacks score around 15 points lower than self-identified whites, on average. If your use of IQ to discriminate between applicants reflected this disparity - and did not represent a bona fide occupational qualification (unlikely) - then your use of IQ for this purpose could easily be construed as illegal discrimination based on race.
The grain of truth is what you've read is that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 19 says No person shall, by intimidation or force, prevent or seek to prevent a person from entering into or continuing in the employment of any person This is referenced in a compendium of state laws loosely subsumed under the notion of &quot;blacklisting&quot;. In Arkansas, this would be writing, printing, publishing, or circulating false statements in order to get someone fired or prevent someone from obtaining employment; in Indiana it is using any means to prevent a discharged employee from obtaining employment. The Massachusetts law only prevents use of intimidation or force to prevent a person from getting employed. In other words, &quot;blacklisting&quot; is not the same thing in all jurisdictions.
Almost certainly not. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendez v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 357, 375 (D.P.R. 2010) &quot;This incident, however, is not sufficient to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory animus...[Defendant's agent]'s anecdote could be interpreted as emphasizing the importance of a positive attitude, rather than plaintiff's interpretation that it expressed a preference for younger male employees...This benign interpretation seems more plausible...In light of these facts, there does not appear to be any evidence on the record that gives a 'high degree of assurance' that discriminatory animus was behind the decision to terminate plaintiff&quot; (emphasis added). NOTE: OP's original question was simply whether listing 'positive attitude' on a job description was illegal. OP has now changed the question to whether making employment decisions based on a depressed individual's lack of a positive attitude is illegal. Although I have great sympathy for those with mental illness and personally wish the law were different, my answer is still that this is almost certainly legal. Another example of a court finding attitude to be a legitimate reason upon which to base employment decisions is: Martin v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 809 (M.D. Pa 2000). In this case, the court accepted as a legitimate reason for promoting one individual over another that the promoted individual &quot;demonstrated good interpersonal skills.&quot; Id. at 817. A third example is Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that &quot;[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and we will not second-guess that decision.&quot; Id. at 601. It then went on to affirm dismissal of the plaintiff's ADA claim because the employer &quot;said that lead drivers must have knowledge of the mechanics of the trucks and be able to manage the other drivers on the truck through a positive attitude and ability to get along well with others. But the supervisors in charge of hiring lead drivers testified without contradiction that [the plaintiff] had a negative attitude that drew complaints from other drivers.&quot; Id. at 601-602 (emphasis added). After a relatively exhaustive search, I've found no case to counter these pretty clear statements that basing employment decisions on 'attitude' is legal. FURTHER NOTE: OP has now modified the question again to add the qualification that the lack of a positive attitude &quot;doesn't prevent the employee from doing their job.&quot; IF this were actually true, then the answer likely becomes that illegal discrimination has occurred because then the employee would be 'otherwise qualified' (a key phrase in employment law litigation). BUT, there is an inherent contradiction in premises in OP's question now because if X is a requirement of a job, and Y employee cannot do X because of Z, then Z is preventing Y employee from doing that job. In other words, if a job requires a positive attitude, then one can't do that job without a positive attitude. Ultimately, what OP's question is really trying to get at is 'what if the employer makes 'positive attitude' a job requirement, but I don't think it should be a job requirement?' Unfortunately, there's almost certainly no legal recourse for this as long as it's a legal job requirement because, to reiterate the 7th Circuit, &quot;[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and [a court] will not second-guess that decision.&quot; Id. at 601.
There are many analogous cases throughout the world, but like the petition you cite, they are not legal, they are political, e.g. the Kautokeino rebellion, the Basque conflict, Turkish-only laws in Turkey, Bantu minorities in Somalia, Jim Crow laws in the US. A legal case would be when parties file a lawsuit in some higher court, to force a government to cease a policy of ethnically-based discrimination. There were a number of cases arising in the US, which centered around the policy of &quot;separate but equal&quot; which was found unconstitutional in Brown v. Board of Education. On the political front, there has been a long standing debate over curricular matters, where not everybody's culture is given equal treatment in public school curricula. In order to successfully sue over the practice, there has to be an underlying legal basis, for example a law mandating that such-and-such be taught in the schools. Washington state law mandates teaching US history, and does not mandate teaching Chinese history, so a lawsuit over not teaching US history would succeed and one over not teaching Chinese history would fail. The courts would find that it is up to the legislature, or the local school board, to establish the rules regarding what is to be taught. It may be that there are cases where a school district is sued because they aren't following the rules set by higher authorities. It is an absolute fact that schools do not teach the history and culture of all of the students in their classes.
Context is important. There is no law against taking a picture of a child who is entirely naked or exposing certain body parts. The laws in question such as 18 USC 2251 refer to the fact that the minor "engage[s] in, any sexually explicit conduct". Sexually explicit conduct is defined in 18 USC 2256, and would include "lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" (which does not include nipples of anyone). Federal law does not define "lascivious", but the ordinary meaning of the word does not include the situation that you describe. The Justice Department, which goes after child pornographers, provides this guide to federal child porn laws. Georgia's child porn law is only marginally different, referring to "Lewd exhibition" rather than "Lascivious exhibition" , and including the "Condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise physically restrained on the part of a person who is nude" (so a picture of a person holding a naked baby would technically qualify, but is highly unlikely to be prosecuted as production of child porn). These laws pertain to any form of child porn, including "private use only". Dissemination would be an added charge.
This is known as the &quot;ministerial exception&quot;, which protects the rights guaranteed under the First Amendment, which include the right of religious groups to determine who is and is not a member of their clergy, and emerges from the case-law of the US Supreme Court. The most recent leading case on this is Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); as Chief Justice Roberts put it in that case: the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own
Leonard's law says that the school can restrict speech if it is against the religious tenets of the organization. Now I don't think school uniforms fall are part of the tenets of Catholicism, so why can private schools enforce dress codes? I see there's a misunderstanding of the Leonard's law. But I fault the California legislators (not you) for that confusion, since the statutory language is ambiguous and leads to the reasonable interpretation your inquiry reflects. The statute reads: (c) This section does not apply to a private postsecondary educational institution that is controlled by a religious organization, to the extent that the application of this section would not be consistent with the religious tenets of the organization. It is not that a religious school is allowed to restrict speech if it contravenes the tenets of that religion, but that the statute altogether is inapplicable to religious schools because it is considered an infringement of fundamental liberties to which religious institutions are entitled in the US. The [religious] school would prevail on the basis of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. See Dermody v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 530 S.W.3d 467, 474 (2017): The ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine prohibits courts from deciding cases "dependent on the question of doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical law, rule, or custom, or church government[.]". (Please note that I strongly disagree with the application of that doctrine in the Dermody case and I consider it impermissibly outdated for the controversy litigated therein, but that is a separate issue). A religious school could convincingly argue that the judicial review of its uniforms policy infringes matters of ecclesiastical discipline/rule/custom, aspects which ultimately "involve an internal church dispute over religious authority or dogma" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 220 (2005). Infringements of ecclesiastical abstention and akin doctrines would be outweighed only in "compelling" [cases] because "the duty to prosecute persons who commit serious crimes is part and parcel of the government's `paramount responsibility for the general safety and welfare of all its citizens'" Roman Cath. Archbishop of LA v. Super. Ct. at 225 (brackets added in this answer). A free speech controversy such as the school's uniform policy simply does not meet that threshold.