Where is the line between defending a city and using human shields? The Geneva Convention prohibits the use of human sheilds. From the Red Cross: The prohibition of using human shields in the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I and the Statute of the International Criminal Court are couched in terms of using the presence (or movements) of civilians or other protected persons to render certain points or areas (or military forces) immune from military operations. Most examples given in military manuals, or which have been the object of condemnations, have been cases where persons were actually taken to military objectives in order to shield those objectives from attacks. There have recently been claims that the opposite can constitute a war crime, where the placing of weapons within cities has been interpreted as breech of this law. Examples include this page blaming Ukrainian forces for putting military equipment within residential areas of Kharkiv and this page blaming Hamas for operating in built-up residential areas. Ukraine: Ukrainian Armed Forces place 122mm D-30 howitzers in residential areas Soldiers from the 92nd brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces hiding behind the backs of Kharkiv civilians Gaza: Palestinian fighters are clearly operating in built-up residential areas and have positioned tunnels, rocket launchers and command and control infrastructure in close proximity to schools, mosques and homes. Obviously these conflicts are vastly different, but they share features. In both cases we have a relatively weak force largely restricted to urban areas facing an opponent using a vastly superior air and artillery force. While in both cases the military equipment could be placed in the open outside of the cities, if they were the equipment would be expected to be destroyed quickly. I cannot think of a conflict where this was done, whereas the converse seems universal. Is there anything that clarifies international law in this area? Have there been cases where a party was found to have breached this by moving weapons to residential areas, or found not guilty when facing such a charge? Is there anything else that could guide interpretation?
I think you'll find the definition of &quot;human shields&quot; used in practice in Western courts narrower than what Russia claims (it is), e.g. In the Review of the Indictments in the Karadžić and Mladić case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia qualified physically securing or otherwise holding peacekeeping forces against their will at potential NATO air targets, including ammunition bunkers, a radar site and a communications centre, as using “human shields”. Having said this, turning your own civilians into &quot;incidental targets&quot; for enemy fire (or &quot;collateral damage&quot; as it's more popularly known) when said fire is (legitimately) targeting armed forces, is usually not particularly smart. But there's a line between that and war crime.
I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").
The international laws of war are generally much easier to apply in the context of a group of people claiming to be a state, than in the context of a group of people who do not claim to be a state. For example, one of the critical questions for classifying an individual under the laws of war is whether the enemy combatant is publicly identified as a soldier of the entity against which a country has declared war. In the context of an entity that claims to be a state, like Daesh, the distinction between identified soldiers, civilians, and covert combatants is relatively workable to apply. There are actually tens of thousands of people who personally identify themselves as regular soldiers loyal to a particular Islamic State with a defined territory, chain of command and political leaders, and there are millions of people who personally identify themselves as civilian subjects of Daesh who are not soldiers, and there are probably even people who personally identify themselves as covert combatants for Daesh - like some of the European terror incident perpetrators we've seen over the last couple of years. People applying the laws of war still need to do their best to accurately determine who fits in which category, but the categories in question are bona fide meaningful categories that are mutually socially agreed to by everyone involved that are reasonably well defined. Recognition of something as a "state" for law of war purposes is also something quite different from recognition of something as a state for diplomatic purposes. Inherent in the laws of war is the understanding that one side may believe that the other side is an usurper or illegitimate government. In contrast, in conflicts with many organized groups that are clearly non-state actors in the eyes of all involved, the distinction between publicly identified soldiers of a state and covert combatants is often ill defined. Calling people citizens or subjects of that non-state group is likewise hard to analogize to the kinds of situations contemplated when the laws of war were devised. Does one have to be a "member" of the organization to qualify as a subject? Does one have to provide "material support" or conspire to carry out some specific acts? Or, does subjective support or a bare public statement of allegiance on a facebook page or bumper sticker suffice that did nothing material to aid the cause suffice? This matters because, under the laws of war, subjects of an enemy can be interned humanely even if they are not combatants, and the lawful treatment of public and covert combatants is very different under the laws of war.
TL;DR: It's controversial, but it looks like it also protects the rights for the individual. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. While the exact explanation is a matter of opinion, it reads like it's a subject, a reason and a right to the subject. Your question is essentially whether or not the subject is a group, an individual or both. The definition of "Militia" can be multiple things though, due to the age of the 2nd Amendment it changed over time and wasn't very exact to begin with. "the Militia ... civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion." "the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense." "And further, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time." In a militia, the character of the laborer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that of a soldier." "the militia system ... implied the general obligation of all adult male inhabitants to possess arms." . This site explains it quite well in my opinion. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." The first two phrases are related to each other. The fact that the third phrase is separated from the verbal phrase by a comma indicates that the verbal phrase has more than the third phrase as its subject. The abbreviated grammatical construction actually renders the meaning of the Second Amendment as: "Neither a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, nor the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall be infringed." So what does the Supreme Court think about the explanation? Current Supreme Court case law defines the Second Amendment (second part) as protecting from infringement by the federal and state governments, the right of the individual to keep and to bear a weapon which is part of the ordinary military equipment or which use could contribute to the common defense. Three cases are cited: U.S. v. Planned Parenthood v Casey (120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992)) U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez (108 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1990)) U.S. v. Miller (83 L. Ed. 1207 (1939)) According to the SAF the Justice Department includes individuals to be protected by the 2nd Amendment. The Justice Department’s enlightened interpretation of the Second Amendment as an individual right was hailed today by the firearms civil rights organization that has supported a key Texas case that led to a federal appeals court ruling upholding the individual rights concept. And: “Today’s constitutional scholars, including Prof. Laurence Tribe, confirm that the Second Amendment is an individual right,” LaCourse continued. “For years, our own Justice Department has been deaf and blind to such scholarship, and the Fifth Circuit ruling forced the government to face the facts. Solicitor General Olson and Attorney General John Ashcroft deserve credit for their courageous reversal of four decades of constitutional denial.” While the above is biased, it does state the opinion of non-trivial parties.
Enemy combatants do not have a right to a speedy trial and do not have the same rights as criminal defendants, but Senator Graham is incorrect in asserting that they may be held without trial &quot;for as long as the government deems necessary.&quot; Instead, they may only be held so long as the &quot;enemy&quot; with whom the detainee is affiliated is still an &quot;enemy&quot; in the context of a Congressionally authorized use of military force. Detention of an enemy combatant is a close cousin of detention of a prisoner of war. It is a basis for detention based upon the detainee's status, for which the military only has to justify the military detention by showing that the detainee is a combatant member of a group which is an &quot;enemy&quot;, such as a soldier, covert operative, or terrorist for that group. The term &quot;enemy&quot; is a term of art which means a country or non-military armed group with which Congress has declared war, or has authorized the use of military force against. For example, since the U.S. does not have Congressionally declared wars or authorizations for use of military force in place at this time against Russia and China, members of the militaries of Russia and China are not &quot;enemy combatants&quot; even though a large share of the U.S. military budget is devoted to preparing for war with these countries. Detention of enemy combatants is authorized to continue until the U.S. is no longer at war with, or no longer authorizes the use of military force against, the combatant force that the detainee is a part of (i.e. &quot;for the duration&quot;). This has happened in a recent case where the U.S. made a peace treaty with a particular group connected with the Afghan War discussed below. If the Authorization For Use of Military Force (2001) were repealed and not replaced by Congress today, all enemy combatant detainees in the U.S. would have a legal right to be released except the five that are currently facing separate quasi-criminal charges for specific wrongful conduct before a military commission, discussed below, rather than merely being combatants affiliated with a U.S. military enemy. The main due process protection is the right to bring a habeas corpus petition challenging your classification as an enemy combatant. In addition, the military evaluates whether the detention of an enemy combatant is lawful because the person is an enemy combatant, and whether this detention continues to be lawful in a Combatant Status Review Tribunal, rather than in a quasi-criminal court-like military commission. Since it is not a criminal offense/charge (instead, it is a military tactic), it is not subject to the speedy trial act requirement. As the Lawfare blog explains: On Oct. 19, Judge Amit Mehta of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia did something we have not seen in many a year: He granted a Guantanamo detainee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, ordering the man’s release. The man in question is Asadullah Haroon Gul (aka Haroon al-Afghani), an Afghan citizen who was captured alongside six other men in an operation by Afghan government forces in early 2007. All the men, it appears, were members of the armed group known as Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commanded by former Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Though not formally part of the Taliban, Hekmatyar’s political movement and its armed expression, HIG, were aligned theologically and politically with the Taliban. And after the fall of the Taliban, HIG became one of the armed groups fighting against the new Afghan government, U.S. forces and other allied forces. In short, HIG for many years was a paradigm example of an “associated force” engaged in hostilities against the United States in connection with the larger conflict with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Indeed, in 2011, a U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit opinion authored by now-Attorney General Merrick Garland expressly affirmed as much in Khan v. Obama. But here’s the thing about military detention authority: The scope of that authority will grow or shrink in accordance with the scope of the underlying armed conflict on which the claim of military detention authority is based. And thus it mattered a great deal when, in fall 2016, the then-government of Afghanistan reached a peace agreement with HIG. Thus, even without the eventual U.S. decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and end the fight against the Taliban too, the legal foundation for military detention in cases predicated solely on membership in HIG appeared to be going or already gone by late 2016. . . . In 2018, the Justice Department responded by abandoning its claim of authority to detain based on HIG membership alone. It argued that Gul still could be held, however, based on the distinct claim that Gul separately had been involved with al-Qaeda itself. Gul denies that argument on factual grounds, and for a time that was the central issue in the case. Then, with the recent full withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan, Gul appears to have expanded his argument to include a much broader claim about the expiration of the legal grounds for detention. That claim, if accepted by the court, could have sweeping implications for other Guantanamo detainees. Courts have generally declined to enforce speedy trial protections for people detained as enemy combatants who are then transferred to civilian criminal courts such as Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani (who initially faced military commission charges discussed below) and Jose Padilla, the only U.S. citizen detained in the United States for conduct in the United States as an enemy combatant. Padilla was subsequently transferred from military custody to civilian federal criminal justice system pre-trial detention and tried and convicted there of a federal crime, while he was appealing his detention as an enemy combatant to the U.S. Supreme Court. This made the case moot, but left the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals precedents made earlier in his case, which had upheld his detention as an enemy combatant in these circumstances, on the books as a binding precedent that the U.S. government could invoke in a future case. The leading modern case on the topic is Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) which addresses the authority to detain an enemy combatant, and the scope of the habeas corpus remedy in the case of a U.S. citizen who is alleged to be an enemy combatant. The official syllabus summarizes the case as follows: After Congress passed a resolution–the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)–empowering the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” that he determines “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” in the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorist attacks, the President ordered the Armed Forces to Afghanistan to subdue al Qaeda and quell the supporting Taliban regime. Petitioner Hamdi, an American citizen whom the Government has classified as an “enemy combatant” for allegedly taking up arms with the Taliban during the conflict, was captured in Afghanistan and presently is detained at a naval brig in Charleston, S. C. Hamdi’s father filed this habeas petition on his behalf under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 alleging, among other things, that the Government holds his son in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although the petition did not elaborate on the factual circumstances of Hamdi’s capture and detention, his father has asserted in other documents in the record that Hamdi went to Afghanistan to do “relief work” less than two months before September 11 and could not have received military training. The Government attached to its response to the petition a declaration from Michael Mobbs (Mobbs Declaration), a Defense Department official. The Mobbs Declaration alleges various details regarding Hamdi’s trip to Afghanistan, his affiliation there with a Taliban unit during a time when the Taliban was battling U. S allies, and his subsequent surrender of an assault rifle. The District Court found that the Mobbs Declaration, standing alone, did not support Hamdi’s detention and ordered the Government to turn over numerous materials for in camera review. The Fourth Circuit reversed, stressing that, because it was undisputed that Hamdi was captured in an active combat zone, no factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing allowing Hamdi to be heard or to rebut the Government’s assertions was necessary or proper. Concluding that the factual averments in the Mobbs Declaration, if accurate, provided a sufficient basis upon which to conclude that the President had constitutionally detained Hamdi, the court ordered the habeas petition dismissed. The appeals court held that, assuming that express congressional authorization of the detention was required by 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)–which provides that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress”– the AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate force” language provided the authorization for Hamdi’s detention. It also concluded that Hamdi is entitled only to a limited judicial inquiry into his detention’s legality under the war powers of the political branches, and not to a searching review of the factual determinations underlying his seizure. Held: The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded. Justice O’Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, concluded that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged in this case, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-maker. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concluded that Hamdi’s detention is unauthorized, but joined with the plurality to conclude that on remand Hamdi should have a meaningful opportunity to offer evidence that he is not an enemy combatant. Military Commissions Compared A Military Commission trial is different from detention as an enemy combatant. On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued a Military Order governing the “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism.” The Military Order effectively established the novel military commissions at Guantanamo Bay, which began in 2004 with charges against four Guantanamo detainees. In 2006, the Supreme Court struck down the military commissions (in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld), determining that the commissions violated both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In response, and in order to permit the commissions to go forward, Congress passed the 2006 Military Commissions Act (MCA). Congress significantly amended the MCA in 2009. In 2019, exercising authority granted to him under the MCA, the Secretary of Defense published an updated Manual for Military Commissions, which sets forth the current procedures that govern the commissions. The enemy combatant detainees who face military commission trials are a small subset of the total number of detainees: Of the 779 men detained at Guantanamo at some point since the prison opened on January 11, 2002, thirty two total have been charged in the military commissions. Charges were dismissed in 12 of those cases, and stayed in another. The U.S. government has procured eight convictions total, six of which were achieved through plea agreements with the defendants. U.S. federal courts have overturned several of the eight convictions in whole or in part. There are five cases are currently ongoing in the commissions—and another two pending appeal—including United States v. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, et al.—the prosecution of the detainees alleged to be most responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. None of those five cases has yet gone to trial. Only one military commission case to date produced a conviction following a military commission trial, and that conviction was vacated on appeal in Hamdan v. United States (D.C. Cir. 2012). Another military commission defendant had his case transferred to a civilian criminal court where he was convicted following a civilian criminal trial (Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani) where he was convicted and is currently serving a life sentence in a federal prison. He is the only person originally charged by a military commission who is still incarcerated by the U.S., and again, in that case, outside the military commission process. Two of the six military commission guilty pleas were subsequently vacated in the cases of David Hicks, who was then deported to Australia, and Noor Muhammed, who was deported to Sudan. Five military commission cases remain outstanding. Footnote: Enemy Non-Combatants The parallel case law for civilians who are not combatant is Korematsu v. United States, 323 US 214 (1944), which while deeply criticized, has never been overruled as applied to non-citizens. This case held that the U.S. may detain a non-combatant civilian, even as U.S. citizen, who has ancestry from an &quot;enemy&quot; (with &quot;enemy&quot; defined in the same ways as in connection with &quot;enemy combatant&quot;) in an interment camp for the duration of a military conflict with that &quot;enemy.&quot; In that particular case, the &quot;enemy&quot; was the Japanese Empire upon which Congress declared war after the December 7, 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor, and the non-combatant civilians who were interred were ancestrally Japanese or families of people who were ancestrally Japanese. While this precedent has never been formally overruled as as applied to non-citizens, it has received heavy criticism in legal scholarship and is no longer good law as applied to U.S. citizen who were merely born citizens of an &quot;enemy&quot; or shared the ethnicity of an &quot;enemy&quot;. The portion of the Korematsu holding that upheld this detention in the case of U.S. citizens was abrogated by a majority opinion of conservative justices in U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018), which stated (in a case upholding the legality of Trump's Muslim ban as modified from its original version): Finally, the dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944). Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. The entry suspension is an act that is well within executive authority and could have been taken by any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions of this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid Proclamation. The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—“has no place in law under the Constitution.” 323 U.S., at 248, 65 S.Ct. 193 (Jackson, J., dissenting). But, it might very well continue to be good law as applied to non-citizens in the U.S. who were nationals of an &quot;enemy&quot;.
united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority.
Criminal charges are filed and prosecuted by the government, on behalf of the public, and there is no requirement for approval or cooperation by the victim. As a policy matter, a DA may decide to not charge a person in case the victim is unwilling (though less so in cases of domestic violence), perhaps because of the widespread impression that the victim has to "press charges" (which indeed they would have to do in the case of private prosecution, which is no longer allowed in the US). The alleged victim's reddit exchanges on the topic are here. An uncooperative victim does not make a good witness, even if they are compelled to testify. The police statement that they cannot pursue an investigation should not be interpreted as a statement of law, it's probably a statement of policy and practicality.
Edits added below to outline Florida's laws based on OP's comment Jurisdiction does matter but here is a general answer regarding "stand your ground" laws. States that have so-called "stand your ground laws" each have their own language concerning the law. "Stand your ground laws" are often misunderstood but, generally, just mean that a person has no duty to retreat when using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or the defense of others. Your examples are more akin to "castle doctrine" laws which I touch on below. Note that all of these laws vary by jurisdiction. I've provided partial examples from Arizona, New York and California. Using deadly physical force for purposes of self-defense or defense of others is complex law and even a complete example from any particular jurisdiction will not be able to cover all circumstances. Each case will be determined by a judge or jury based on the facts of that particular case. Arizona's "stand your ground" statute, as an example, states: B. A person has no duty to retreat before threatening or using deadly physical force pursuant to this section if the person is in a place where the person may legally be and is not engaged in an unlawful act. "Stand your ground" simply means that a person doesn't have to first attempt to retreat before resorting to the use of deadly force. Arizona's statute regarding justification for self-defense states (emphasis mine): A. Except as provided in subsection B of this section, a person is justified in threatening or using physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that physical force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force. B. The threat or use of physical force against another is not justified: In response to verbal provocation alone; or To resist an arrest that the person knows or should know is being made by a peace officer or by a person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, whether the arrest is lawful or unlawful, unless the physical force used by the peace officer exceeds that allowed by law; or If the person provoked the other's use or attempted use of unlawful physical force, unless: (a) The person withdraws from the encounter or clearly communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot safely withdraw from the encounter; and (b) The other nevertheless continues or attempts to use unlawful physical force against the person. Note the phrase, "extent a reasonable person." This means that the actions of a person using deadly force will be measured against what a "reasonable person" would do in similar circumstances. Some states have a duty to retreat, particularly when in a public place, before using deadly force. New York, as an example, has a "duty to retreat" before using deadly force except in specific circumstances (emphasis mine): A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless: (a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is: (i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or (ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter`s direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or (b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or (c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20. Castle Doctrine Laws typically refer to what one may do in their own home when it comes to the use of deadly force. Some states have extended the "castle doctrine" to include personal automobiles as well. California's "castle doctrine" statute, as an example, states that if one is in their own home and someone "unlawfully and forcibly" enters the home one can presume that the person in his or her residence "held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury": Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury. In California's statute both the resident and the person using force to gain entry have to know or have reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. If a person simply entered an unlocked home then the resident would have to have some other reasonable reason to believe that they were in imminent peril of death or great bodily injury. Wikipedia has a reasonable entry on the adoption of "stand your ground" and "castle doctrine" statutes and gives a state-by-state breakdown of both. Note that these laws have seen a lot of change recently and any particular entry for a state may not be accurate. Florida's self-defense laws Florida's "Use or threatened use of force in defense of person" states: 776.012 Use or threatened use of force in defense of person.— (1) A person is justified in using or threatening to use force, except deadly force, against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. A person who uses or threatens to use force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat before using or threatening to use such force. (2) A person is justified in using or threatening to use deadly force if he or she reasonably believes that using or threatening to use such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible felony. A person who uses or threatens to use deadly force in accordance with this subsection does not have a duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground if the person using or threatening to use the deadly force is not engaged in a criminal activity and is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Florida outlines the cases where use, or threatened use, of force is justified. Notice that in the law Florida specifically states that the person threatened does not have a duty to retreat. Florida also specifically states that a person has a "right to stand his or her ground" if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be and is not engaged in criminal activity. Florida statute also specifically outlines the right to use self-defense within one's home and vehicle. Florida has a "castle doctrine" similar to what was outlined above and similar in nature to New York's and California's laws: The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle; Florida has a longer list of exemptions related to who may have used force to enter a home including ownership interest in the property or vehicle, children and grandchildren, the person who engaged defensive force was involved in criminal activity and law enforcement officers. Florida's Justifiable Use Of Force is chapter 776 discusses when force can be used. There was an attempt by the Florida legislature in 2019 to change the standard by which use of force could be justified from "reasonably believes" force is necessary to "a reasonably cautious and prudent person in the same circumstances would objectively believe" force was necessary. The bill was withdrawn in May, 2019.