How to refer to Supreme Court cases by just one name I'm writing a paper for my high school U.S. History class, and I want to refer to certain Supreme Court cases by just one name after my first naming of the case (for example, I want to refer to Rucho v. Common Cause as Rucho or as Common Cause), but I'm not certain about whether the proper name to use is that of the appellant or that of the appellee, or even whether such a standard exists. I've seen it done before in news sources covering Supreme Court cases, so I know it can be done, but I have seen both used at times. I've tried to search for a solution to my problem online, but have found only references on how to cite decisions in full, at the end of a paper. Any help would be appreciated. Thank you.
How to refer to Supreme Court cases by just one name In general, subsequent references to a decision can be the first name in the caption of that case. As an example, you will notice that in the decision Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. 2484 (2019) the court makes an initial reference to Gill v. Whitford (at 2492), and thereafter most of the references to that decision are simply Gill (see, for instance, at 2498, 2501, 2507). Nate Elredge makes a good point in that there are exceptions. Where the general rule may result ambiguous, another main party in the caption would be mentioned. Using Nate's example of United States v. Nixon, the court's subsequent references to that case in Calley v. Callaway, 382 F.Supp. 650 (1974) is Nixon. There might be other, harder to find, instances where ambiguity persists. For instance, several unrelated decisions issued by the same court might involve the exact same parties. In those scenarios only the suffix (that is, the numbers following the caption) would distinguish among decisions.
The author of a text or essay may cite in whatever order s/he thinks best. It m,ay be that a basic text gives a better and clearer overview than any actual case, and so is worth citing first. It is true that actual case law is often more authoritative than a statute, and cases and statutes are normally more authoritative than any text or essay, but there is no rule binding on an author to cite in any particular order, although citing the actual law first may be the common practice. When writing a brief or a court decision there may be standards of citation that are enforced.
There isn't any kind of legal reason for the distinction; it's just a matter of custom and convenience. The normal rule is that you would shorthand a case name by referring to the first-named party, but there are lots of times where that is not the case. With Casey, the issue is that Planned Parenthood is a serial litigant, so if you were to just refer to &quot;Planned Parenthood,&quot; there would be some ambiguity as to whether you were referring to Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), or Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), or any of the many other cases Planned Parenthood has litigated in the circuit and district courts. For the same reason, criminal cases are typically named after the defendant, as we would otherwise have tens of thousands of cases named &quot;California&quot; or &quot;New York&quot; or &quot;United States.&quot;
The judicial rank of English judges is abbreviated to letters after their names, but not their personal titles. High Court judges always receive a knighthood or damehood on appointment, so, to take Tim's example, John Donaldson became Sir John Donaldson on his appointment to the High Court, but in court he was Mr Justice Donaldson, abbreviated in reports or written argument to Donaldson J, and on promotion to the Court of Appeal he was Lord Justice Donaldson or Donaldson LJ. (In person in court he would have been addressed as "My Lord", and in other settings as "Sir John".) Beyond that it becomes more complicated. For the time he was Master of the Rolls, the reports refer to him as "Sir John Donaldson, MR". The UK Supreme Court replace the House of Lords and the highest court for the UK (leaving aside the role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council) in 2009. The judges in the House of Lords were full members of the House, so they were peers, in fact, since 1887 as a special type of life baron (not hereditary) known as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary. So they were always referred to by their titles, as in the case of Lord Donaldson (barons always being referred to as "Lord" unless it is necessary to make the rank explicit); however, letters after the the were used for the Lord Chancellor, as in Lord Hailsham, LC. (There was at one time a convention that the Lord Chancellor would get a promotion to viscount, the next higher rank in the peerage, as in the case of Viscount Cave, LC.) When the Supreme Court came into being in 2009, the existing Lords of Appeal in Ordinary became the first judges of the Supreme Court. Since they were already Lords, they were, of course, referred to by their titles. Subsequent appointments are given the courtesy title of Lord or Lady, though they are not made barons/baronesses, so they cannot sit in the House of Lords. (While the courtesy titles are comparable to the Scottish judges' titles, the immediate need was for parity between new appointments and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary: Courtesy titles for Justices of the Supreme Court.) The head of the Supreme Court is the President. This is abbreviated by letters after the name in the reports, so the current president (Baroness Hale of Richmond, having become a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary in 2004) is referred to as Lady Hale, P.
Distinguishing a case which was decided by a higher court does not violate the doctrine of stare decisis. If the case can be distinguished, then it is not a controlling precedent. The term &quot;controlling&quot; indicates not only that the decision is binding on lower courts, but also that it applies to (or cannot be distinguished from) the facts of the specific case in question. Whether a precedent is &quot;controlling&quot; or not, in a particular case, could itself be a question for an appellate court. So if a lower court distinguishes a previous decision and therefore declines to follow it, the appellate court could say that was an error, and set aside the lower court's decision for not following a controlling precedent.
Statutes of limitations (hereinafter "SOL") vary from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction. If it is only one-year in New York (I've not confirmed this) that would not be surprising. SOLs exist for all civil matters and nearly all criminal matters. I'd just like to point out that your question is not really limited to defamation or to the time frame for which the specific SOL runs for libel/slander ... at least as I've read it. It seems you are asking the broader question pertaining to what the philosophical or practical purpose(s) for SOLs in general are, as well as what effect these limits can have on the ability of a would-be claimant/plaintiff to get relief through the courts. So, to answer whether a person who believes they've been defamed can still bring a cause of action after the SOL has passed: the short answer is no. But, that is only the short answer. SOL is an affirmative defense, meaning that it can only be asserted if it is pled in the answer to a complaint. So, if John Doe feels he's been defamed by a libelous statement in the Times, and he files suit 4 years after the statement was made (and the SOL is 1 year), the court will still accept the filing of the complaint and Times must still be served. You do not lose the right to file your claim, when the SOL has passed, which is a very common misconception of the law. And, Times must still file an Answer to avoid defaulting. However, in that answer Times (no doubt by and through qualified counsel) will most likely assert a variety of affirmative defenses pro forma, which will include the passage of SOL (the claim is stale). If, in fact, the SOL has passed and the affirmative defense is pled, the next thing the Times will do is file a motion to dismiss. The judge will view the complaint in a light most favorable to Doe, the plaintiff, which will lay out all the facts (including when the libelous statement was published). If the cause of action accrued (this just means when the injury was sustained) and the claim was not filed prior to the expiration of the SOL, Doe's case will be dismissed. If the Times does not assert SOL though, it is deemed to have been waived for that and any subsequent related proceedings. There are ways to toll (extend) the statute of limitations. There is a discovery rule (this does not mean Doe didn't read it until after the SOL, even though he was able to). It means that the SOL can be tolled in cases where one could not have discovered the tort occurred. In these instances, the SOL doesn't begin to run until the discovery was either made or should have been made. This is most typically seen in medical malpractice cases (e.g., a surgeon leaves a sponge or instrument in your abdomen, and after years of failed treatments for IBS your doc sends you for an x-ray and an MRI and it's discovered) or in asbestos cases (you don't know you breathed it until you have asbestosis) &ndash; those types of scenarios. In cases like that, the SOL begins to run when you find out the tort occurred. This has also been successful in recovered memory cases where childhood sexual abuse occurred but was suppressed. Incapacitation is another way the SOL can be tolled. So, in Doe's libel case, the SOL can be tolled if he is incapacitated (in a coma and didn't wake for 4 years, in a mental hospital in a break from reality for 5 years) &ndash; in such circumstances you can still file a claim and have it survive a motion to dismiss based on SOL once you are rehabilitated. Also, Absence due to military service is reason to toll in some jurisdictions. Lastly, (at least the last one I can recall) is that minors can often toll the SOL however long the statute is (say 1 year) after they turn 18. As for why there are SOLs: That is more public policy than anything else. It is one of the oldest rules of law known to modern man, dating back all the way to early Greek and Roman law. Statutes of limitations are a fundamental part of EU and US law, as well as most other modern legal systems. They function to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after the facts have become dubious and unclear due to the progression of time, which can lead to lost or uncertain memories, death of witnesses (for each side), or disappearance/inability to locate witnesses. The policies behind SOLs are also for judicial economy and to protect defendants from having a never-ending potential suit looming over them. Often, the seriousness of the crime or the tort, or some element of it, dictates the time frame of the SOL. It is a means to ensure that plaintiffs pursue their claims with reasonable diligence: I.e., if it matters to you, file it. Also, as I touched on above, time disadvantages defendants. Plaintiffs are the "injured" party, so they tend to retain evidence much longer than a defendant, who might not even realize he has done wrong &ndash; especially in civil matters. So, in a libel case, the whole basis of the claim is the irreparable damage to your reputation. If more than a year has passed and you didn't know about it, one could assume the damage never rose to the level of having sufficed to make a valid claim in the first place. That is why they run fast in those cases. They run fast in medical malpractice claims too, but this is a result of tort reform &ndash; the public policy that litigation against doctors/hospitals causes increased health care costs for everyone. So, policy suggests it's best for society to dispose of these claims quickly (not so much if you're the plaintiff). Whereas most regular negligence claims can have SOLs as long as six years in some jurisdictions where I have practiced. So there are clearly policy determinations going into these legislative acts. The Golden Rule of Law that I tell all of my clients is this: If you think you have a claim, talk to a lawyer right away, because if you don't you can lose the right to pursue relief, much, much quicker than one may ever imagine! I know this is a long answer, but I get asked this (type) of question all the time. Plaintiffs feel the SOLs run too fast, while Defendants cannot believe they can still be on the hook!
Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as &quot;their neighbor&quot; instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings &amp; proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.
Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.