When has Judicial Review not been the process used to deem an act unconstitutional? Are there any examples where Judicial Review has not been the process used to deem an act unconstitutional?
Several examples come to mind. This may not be comprehensive. Attorney General's Opinions Ands The Equivalent In state and federal governments in the United States, there is typically an official in the Attorney General's office who reports directly to the Attorney General who writes Attorney General's opinions which are binding legal authority on the government officials in that state or in the federal government, as the case may be, on legal issues. One purpose for which an Attorney General's Opinion is frequently used is to declare that a law shall be considered unconstitutional for all purposes by government officials in that governmental body. Typically, this is only done when the precedents regarding a law's unconstitutionality are unequivocally clear, for example, because the U.S. Supreme Court or the state supreme court in the state in question, has declared a virtually identical law to be unconstitutional (e.g. a religious test to run for public office in a state constitution), even though a court has not ruled on this particular law and it remains on the books. County attorneys and city attorneys in their respective local governments often do the same thing. State and federal tax collection agencies often following the federal model of regulation like documents called &quot;Revenue Rulings&quot; and &quot;Revenue Procedures&quot; will sometimes make determinations that are binding on the government that are essentially identical in process and effect to an attorney-general's opinion, except that these are typically issued under the supervision of the top tax policy official in the tax collection agency, rather than by an official in the Attorney General's office. This is also sometimes done by administrative or independent agency boards in the course of carrying out their determinations. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency might determine, by regulation, that a &quot;right to farm&quot; law under a state statute or state constitution is unconstitutional to the extent that it interferences with its environmental regulation of farms. Prosecutorial Discretion Frequently prosecuting attorneys refrain from bringing charges under laws that they believe to be unconstitutional (at least in the circumstances that present themselves where the law could theoretically be used) as a matter of explicit or implicit policy. Even when a policy is explicit, however, it is often an internal policy not disclosed to the general public. And, since prosecutors routinely exercise prosecutorial discretion for all manner of reasons, it isn't easy to identify cases where a failure to bring a particular charge is a result of a determination by a prosecuting attorney that a law is unconstitutional, at least as applied in the circumstances of a particular case. Real Estate Title Standards A somewhat similar practice is found in real estate title work, most often in cases involving racially restrictive real estate covenants. Often there is a statute, regulation, or simply an industry standard privately adopted title standard that title companies trying to determine the state of title to real property use to disregard racially restrictive real estate covenants (and certain other less well known title issues) on the grounds that they are unconstitutional. This is done notwithstanding the general common law rule that duly executed and recorded real estate covenants are binding and run with the land. Mass Implementation Of Retroactive Precedents In rare circumstances, when a once widely used legal practice is determined to be unconstitutional and to have retroactive effect, such as convictions of crimes by non-unanimous juries in the State of Oregon, an ad hoc administrative process is established to identify and summarily invalidate the unconstitutional convictions or judgments, without litigating those cases in the courts on a case by case basis. Legislative Determinations and the Veto Power A legislative body will often repeal or amend a law for the reason that the law in question is believed to be unconstitutional, even if the constitutionality of this particular law has not been adjudicated in a court. In theory, this is a way in which a legislative body deems an existing law unconstitutional. In practice, however, different legislators will justify the repeal or amendment of an existing law for different purposes and there is no obvious way for someone not familiar with the legislative history of an act and the related deliberations to know if a law was repealed or amended because it was unconstitutional. Similarly, sometimes a President or Governor vetos legislation for the reason that this politician believes that a bill passed by the legislature is unconstitutional. But there is generally no definitive way to determine which vetos are for this reason and which vetos are for some other reason. Pre-Litigation Advisory Opinions The federal courts are not allowed to issue advisory opinions in the absence of a genuine case or controversy as a rules of the jurisdictional limits on their authority under Article III of the United States Constitution. But some states grant either the state supreme court, or a special committee or council, the authority to review newly enacted statutes, and/or proposed ballot initiative, to determine if they are unconstitutional on their face, before they take effect. In many civil law countries outside the United States, a constitutional court, or a &quot;council of state&quot; has similar authority. Military Law Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in the United States, disobeying a lawful order is a ground to impose military justice penalties, but court-martial or otherwise. Implicit in the provision of the UCMJ, is the right and obligation of people subject to this provision of the UCMJ (basically active duty military personnel), to exercise independent judgment to disobey an unlawful order. One form of unlawful order is a military order to do something unconstitutional. So, in the first instance, a soldier given an order must evaluate whether or not the order which has the force of law as to them, is unconstitutional, and secondarily, this is raised as a defense before the appropriate military justice body (e.g. a court martial) to a prosecution seeking to discipline the soldier for disobeying an order under the UMCJ. To the extent that raising a defense in a court martial is equivalent to raising a defense in a court proceeding, that really isn't any different than ordinary judicial review. But, when a soldier refuses to follow an order on the grounds that the order is unconstitutional, this amounts to an invalidation of the order on constitutional grounds by a means other than judicial review. Constitutional Amendments The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically held that all laws adopted by the Confederate government during the U.S. Civil War issuing public debts were void as a matter of law. Similarly, the adoption of various other constitutional amendments, such as the 13th Amendment prohibiting slavery, upon adoption, immediately caused all laws authorizing and regulating the institution of slavery in the United States to become unconstitutional. Prohibition and the abolition of poll taxes provide other examples of existing laws being determined to be unconstitutional immediately, when constitutional amendments take effect. Non-Court Precedents Specific historical acts and courses of dealing are often treated as determinations that different kinds of conduct are, or are not, constitutional. For example, the U.S. Civil War was taken as a non-court precedent establishing that a U.S. state does not have a right to unilaterally secede from the United States of America, even before a court reached that determination. This likewise implicitly resulted in the conclusion that all confederate laws were unconstitutional. Many examples of this involve separation of powers provisions of the constitution and provisions adjudicating the internal affairs of legislative bodies. The former are rarely litigated so custom, practice, and political pronouncements have to suffice instead. The latter are often expressly non-justiciable (i.e. beyond the jurisdiction of the courts) so determinations of when legislative procedures are constitutional or not are often vested in the discretion of the legislative bodies themselves. Most constitutional questions related to electoral college results, Congressional elections, and the constitutional amendment process are non-justiciable and are therefore resolved by legislators rather than judges.
This determination is largely a facts and circumstances specific test to be evaluated with little additional legal guidance by the judge or jury faced with evaluating the question (usually a judge in the way that the issue usually presents itself). Like many fairly vague legal standards, it leaves open the possibility that there will be inconsistent rulings on this question in circumstances presenting similar facts.
While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.
Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
Yes It's legal: but that's more of a bug than a feature. The Constitution says this about the appointment of Supreme Court judges: he [the President] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges of the Supreme Court, ... In the Federalist Papers: No 76, Hamilton had this to say: But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the refusal. and in No 78: It equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that &quot;there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.&quot; He was wrong about the first but right about the second. Now, this is only the way he saw it and others no doubt had other views but he was focused solely on balancing the powers of the executive and the legislature. There is no consideration of what would happen if, for whatever reason, including partisanship, the executive and the legislature were tightly aligned or hopelessly opposed. Even for the time, this view seems overly idealistic and hopelessly naive. However, these are the same people who thought it would be a good idea for the runner-up in the Presidential race to be the vice-President. Indeed, Hamilton saw and was an integral part of the intense partisanship that arose in the 1790s between the Federalists and the Republicans and the first rejection of a Supreme Court nominee happened during George Washington's Presidency. This analysis shows that the confirmation rate when the White House and Senate are politically aligned is 87.2% but only 47.2% when they are different. That said, most (78%) nominees have been confirmed with the last decade being about average. The US Supreme Court has always been partisan. Indeed, it's only since the Second World War that the idea that it shouldn't be has taken root. In earlier days, the Supreme Court was not populated by jurists - it was the domain of politicians, some of whom moved back and forth between the bench and the Capitol. In Brown v Board of Education 4 of the 9 judges had been Congressmen or Governours and some had never been on the bench of any court before their appointment to SCOTUS. So, yes its totally legal but no, it probably isn't what the founders intended but yes, it has ever been thus.
Double jeopardy in its usual sense wouldn't attach because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding, which is the only thing double jeopardy applies to (esoteric estoppel matters not withstanding). You might recall that OJ Simpson was tried and acquitted of murder in a criminal court, and then subsequently tried and found liable in a civil court for those murders. There was no double jeopardy protections of which he could avail himself. But the constitution says that the Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments, so for the most part we can expect that whatever they say goes. So they can dismiss for any reason they desire, in principle. The impeachment of Senator Blount is one example: the House impeached him, and on the same day the Senate expelled him under their constitutional power to do so, and then dismissed the impeachment for lack of jurisdiction (arguing that Congress members cannot be impeached; the impeachment was otherwise still relevant after his expulsion because it could result in preventing him from gaining office again). The costs here are political: in your hypothetical situation with very strong evidence, if popular opinion turns too strongly in favor of conviction then refusal to do so may cost the Senators and their party in subsequent elections. Attempts to argue arcane technicalities might not save you at the ballot box. Under existing impeachment precedent (as well as Congressional rules precedents), the courts would be loathe to get involved by default. Though if the action was sufficiently egregious (not even superficially resembling what a judge might call a trial, say) maybe they would feel judicial intervention and action was warranted and justified. But that's purely speculative.
It's supposed to be carte blanche, i.e. "blank check". The quotation has left out several words. You can find the full decision at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/176/case.html. The complete sentence is: It thus seems that the dissent would give the courts carte blanche to impose upon the States whatever burden their various judgments indicate should be imposed.
A quick answer: your analogy isn't quite right. The Constitution gives the House "the sole power of impeachment." So unlike you, their work is never "going to court." No judge is ever going to look at the evidence they used and say, "You only used notes, not a final report. That isn't good enough, or admissible." A longer answer: impeachment is not a legal process. It is a political process. The only binding requirements are those found in the Constitution. These cover who can be impeached and tried, for what, how punished and by whom. All other matters of procedure are decided by each house. There are several sets of rules and precedents that cover impeachment. But if the House or Senate decides to ignore these rules and make up new rules, they can. After all, Article I of the Constitution gives each house "sole power" over impeachment and trial. It also gives each house the power to "determine the Rules of its Proceedings." You might ask, why, if impeachment is a political process, do so many people talk about it as if it was a legal process? The answer is simple: Both sides are busy trying to put their spin on what is going on in the House. If either side believes they will get more support by talking about impeachment in legal terms, that is how they will talk about it. But this spin should not hide the reality: impeachment is political. That impeachment is political does not mean that it should not be guided by the same values that guide legal processes. Of course, the hearings should be fair, the President should get due process, and so on. But because they are political, no court is going to step in and assure that they are fair. The only guarantee that the President will get a fair hearing and due process is also political. If enough Americans think he did not get treated fairly, or was denied due process, or what impeached unfairly, they can vote the Democrats out of office. Politics is the key to understanding much of what has gone on so far in the impeachment process. For instance, for a long time, Speaker Pelosi refused to hold a vote on whether to formally start impeachment proceedings. She offered a variety of explanations for this, but the truth was that she did not want to force Democrats from close districts to have to openly vote against the President. Similarly, Republicans, who wanted to force Democrats from close districts to vote against the President, argued that it was unfair, illegal or unconstitutional to have any hearings on impeachment without such a vote. Since there are more Democrats than Republicans in the House, Democrats got to decide when that vote was held. Of course, if the House does impeach, and the Senate has to try the President, since Republicans control the Senate, they will control the rules, etc.