How does multinational criminal copyright infringement get settled? Let's say, The plaintiff, lives in the UK and published a literary work (e.g. A Book) The defendant, a corporation headquartered in the US, wilfully infringing plaintiff's copyright worldwide. Criminal copyright infringement involves 4 elements. that a valid copyright; was infringed by the defendant; willfully; and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain According to this answer, only prosecutors can settle criminal claims. The Berne Convention, which deals with Copyright laws, has 179 contracting parties. So it raises a few questions in a multinational dispute like this. Which country prosecutors have jurisdiction to settle criminal claim like this? UK, US or Both? Since each country has jurisdiction on the infringement happen within their country, does the mean the criminal case to be settled in each 179 countries? If that is the case, then don't you think this increases the paperwork? Can matters like this only be settled from only one country (plaintiff or defendant)?
You forgot an element of criminal copyright infringement, a minimum amount of copying. I believe the US statute specifies at least $1,000 worth of copied works within a 6-month period, but by policy the DOJ does not prosecute unless the matter is much bigger than that. A matter of terminology: criminal charges are not &quot;settled&quot;. They are prosecuted, leading either to a trial or a plea-bargain. If not prosecuted, charges are dropped. Any country where infringing products are produced or distributed may choose to prosecute criminal infringement. However, the country where the products are produced and thus where the criminals, or some of them, are located, has an advantage in arresting them and bringing them to trial. Thus the country of production is often the one to do any prosecuting that gets done. However, often such criminals choose a country with a relatively weak law-enforcement system, or one that does not much care about enforcing foreign (to it) copyrights, to operate in. Thus the the country that could arrest the criminals doesn't, and the country that might want to, can't get hold of them. International criminal copyright prosecutions are, I believe, rather rare. As a practical matter, almost all copyright enforcement is by private suit, not criminal prosecution. Since each country has jurisdiction on the infringement happen within their country, does the mean the criminal case to be settled in each 179 countries? If that is the case, then don't you think this increases the paperwork? There is no need to &quot;settle&quot; the case in every, or indeed in any, jurisdiction. Any country where a criminal act occurred may prosecute if it chooses. In practice, few if any will choose to do so. Can matters like this only be settled from only one country (plaintiff or defendant)? No, several countries can bring cases if they so choose. There is no such thing as double jeopardy between separate countries, unless an agreement specifies that there is, and that is not common. Such countries may need to negotiate over possession of individual defendants - If country A has arrested Joe Thug, country B may not be able to try Joe without the cooperation of country A. Corporate defendants are, of course, always available. But unless they have an agreement not to do so, multiple countries may legally try Joe or Infringements inc for copyright infringement. Whether they will do so is another matter.
The court in France would not enforce a debt collection against you; but the person who owed you the money could - very easily. They would apply to the court in Scotland to enforce the judgement of the French court, the Scottish court would look at it, say "yup, the French court has made a decision", and then tell you to pay up. After that, the French company has the same range of options as a Scottish company would. I think (but I could be wrong), that the decision of the French court might well not go on your credit record - but the corresponding decision of the Scottish court would. Note that a CCJ doesn't go on your credit record if you pay within a short period (seven days?). In your case though, the right thing to do is Pay the amount you don't dispute you owe Wait for them to sue (they may well not). Defend the case (probably in writing, not in person). If you lose, pay up straight away (at this point the court has decided that you were wrong, and you do owe the money. As such you should pay.)
Prompted by this recent similar question, I've revisited this question and deleted my original answer as it was completely off the mark. This is its replacement. It is illegal, and it turns out to be an international standard in the Berne Convention. Article 16 in full: (1) Infringing copies of a work shall be liable to seizure in any country of the Union where the work enjoys legal protection. (2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also apply to reproductions coming from a country where the work is not protected, or has ceased to be protected. (3) The seizure shall take place in accordance with the legislation of each country. Your scenario falls squarely within point (2) and the imported George Orwell book is to be treated as an infringing copy within the UK. The implementing UK legislation for (2) can be found in Section 27(3) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette &amp; Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm.
Jan Böhmermann faces prosecution in Germany for violating their penal code section 103 as discussed here. Lèse-majesté is not a crime in the UK, though apparently it was a common law crime in Scotland until 2010 (though not prosecuted since 1715). Though there is always the possibility of a defamation lawsuit, depending on what you say.
united-states In US copyright law, criminal copyright infringement is defined by 17 USC 506(1), which reads: In general.—Any person who willfully infringes a copyright shall be punished as provided under section 2319 of title 18, if the infringement was committed— (A) for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain; (B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during any 180-day period, of 1 or more copies or phonorecords of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000; or (C) by the distribution of a work being prepared for commercial distribution, by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public, if such person knew or should have known that the work was intended for commercial distribution. Note that there is a financial floor in subsection (B), that the infringing copies must have a retail value of $1,000 or more. However, my understanding is that, as a matter of policy and not law, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) only brings charges of criminal copyright infringement where the infringement is both extensive and lasting, in effect there the accused has made infringement a business. I am fairly sure that password sharing itself would not be copyright infringement under US law, but might well be a violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). But using a shared password to access protected content without authorization might be infringement, if a copy of the content is made. Sharing a password knowing that it will be so used is probably a violation of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, which has been incorporated into Title 17, the US copyright law. But that normally leads to civil liability.
This answer assumes Europe as jurisdiction, not the United States. This will vary wildly across jurisdictions, but given that this question is unanswered for two weeks now, I will provide an answer for Europe, specifically the Czech Republic. It will be somewhat different in other states. First, the list of criminal offenses a corporation can commit is specified in the law. It is exactly that, a list. Of the 300 crimes an individual can commit here, about 100 of them can also be done by a corporation. It is hard to discover why these hundred crimes were chosen specifically. Logic used to make this list eludes me. For example, a corporation can commit Rape, but not Murder. It can commit a Terrorist attack but not Terror. It can commit Threatening a public official but not Oppression. I looked through the explanatory notes for the law and I discoved the reason: Strictly only those crimes were created for corporations that were required by higher european law, which only moves the question higher up. I did not look up what the European Parliament had to say about this. There is one crime that was added specifically, later on, to the list, and that is Usury. In principle, all crimes committed by an individual can be done by a corporation, because a crime is considered to be committed by a corporation if the action is done by an employee in the name of the corporation.
There are some complexities here. First of all, in the US, trademarks may be protected under either state or federal laws. Suits for trademark infringement under either kind of laws may be filed in state courts, although suit under federal laws are more often filed in federal courts. My understanding is that to file a trademark infringement lawsuit, I have to file it in the state where the &quot;infringing activity&quot; is occurring, in other words the location of the defendant. That is not quite correct. The infringing activity occurs wherever sales are made, and often wherever goods or services with an infringing marks are advertised. If goods are sold by mail, the infringing activity may be held to occur where the customers are located. If an infringing mark is being used to sell or advertise goods or services in a particular US state, suit may normally be filed in that state, whether in state or federal court, no matter where the infringer is located. (However it may be much easier to secure damages if a suit is won when suing in the jurisdiction where the infringer is located.) Procedures are different if the trademark is registered than if it is not. Trademark suits are often complex and costly. It would be very wise to consult an experienced trademark lawyer when considering bringing such suits. If goods carrying infringing marks are being imported into the US, the US Customs can seize or deny entry to such goods. A trademark lawyer might be able to advise how to get the customs service to act on such situations, and what the limits of such enforcement is. Trademarks are generally matters of national law. A mark that is valid and fully protected in the US, may not be protected at all in Hong Kong, for example.