Why is the Rules Enabling Act necessary? What is the Rules Enabling Act? I understand it is congress allowing the courts to make rules, but why does congress have to give that power to the courts? I thought the courts were independent, one of three co-equal branches?
Prior to that act, civil procedure in federal courts was non-uniform (historical overview). The main problem seems to be that courts were supposed to conform to the procedure of the state in which the court is located (as mandated by the Conformity Act of 1872). The "has to" reason is that SCOTUS at the time did not feel that it was authorized by the Constitution to write its own rules when Congress could have done so, see Wright &amp; Miller Federal Practice and Procedure. The root problems seems to be the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, which in the latter case did not allow courts to set rules for actions at law, and in the former case required courts to apply rules in effect when the state joined the Union (regardless of how the rules changed subsequently).
There isn't to the best of my knowledge, any single document that tells courts to follow precedant or when and how to do so. Each State, and the Federal government, has a set of court rules of procedure. These will indicate, among many other things, the form that should be used in citing previous cases, but that is about form, not content -- about how to cite a case, not about when a court should or should not cite one. Some precedents are what are called persuasive. These are from other court systems: say a different state, or even another country. These also include rulings from other courts at the same level, say from a different district, or even from lower courts. Other precedents are binding. These are from a superior court to the one where the case is cited. In a state's lower court, rulings of that state's supream court are binding. In Federal district courts, rulings of the Court of Appeals for the same Circuit, and of the US Supreme Court are binding. In Federal appeals courts, rulings of the US Supreme Court are binding. They are also binding in state courts on matters where the US constitution is involved, or where Federal law supersedes state law. Prior rulings of the same court are strongly persuasive, but not strictly binding -- a court can overrule its own precedents when it thinks the law or justice requires this, although most courts are reluctant to do so. Or more often it can distinguish a previous ruling, saying, in effect: "that previous ruling is still valid, but this is a different case in such and such a specific way, so the result is different". Students in law school spend a good deal of time learning how precedents are cited, and how they should be used, learning what sorts of things are controlled by precedents, and how to find the precedents that apply to a particular case. When they become lawyers and then judges, they taken this body of learning with them, and use it in writing decisions, and opinions that explain those decisions. New law from the legislature can reverse previous court decisions, except in the case of decisions interpreting the constitution (federal or state). Amendments can change the constitution. Judges must adapt to such changes in the law. To a significant extent our system of precedent is a matter of tradition, going back largely to the common-law courts of England, although it has been modified by specific legislation in many ways, as well as by more recent court decision and practice. It is passed on in law schools, in legal apprenticeships of various kinds, and in individual court decisions.
No The case was dismissed on procedural reasons. Like this. Well, perhaps not so pedantic but there are things that have to happen before the Supreme Court can get involved and they haven’t. For example, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in a limited classes of case; if this isn’t one of those (and it isn’t) it has to be heard in a court that does and then get appealed up the chain. When they have, the court will make a decision on the merits.
This would establish a new precedent (I assume) You assume correctly. However, a precedent is only binding on lower courts and persuasive on courts at the same level so a trial judge precedent is not very far-reaching. Does this statute takes precedence over (overrules) the previous court precedent? Not exactly. The precedent was good for the old (common) law. Now the law has changed and the old precedent is irrelevant. Courts only interpret the law and legislatures are free to change the law within the limits of their constitutional power. Indeed, a fair number of laws are enacted because the legislature does not agree with how courts are ruling.
Constitution of the USA, Article IV, Section 1: Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof. and the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 3): [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; SCOTUS has found the former to mean that states that do not allow same-sex marriages in their laws must recognize same-sex marriages registered by other states - Obergefell v. Hodges. Maybe one could argue that driver licenses are not equivalent among states, but I would expect judges (SCOTUS) to require a very well reasoned explanation. For example, maybe Alaska could refuse to recognize licenses from Florida because Florida drivers do not know how to cope with snowed roads. But even in that case Alaska probably would need to produce data showing that these measures aim to serve the public interest (avoid accidents) and that there are no other ways of getting the same result. OTOH the Commerce Clause has been successfully used to avoid states mandating racial segregation of travellers, so it is quite reasonable to see it being used to prevent a state from trying to limit the mobility of citizens from other states (again, in the supposition that the state restricting it cannot show a compelling reason to do so). AFAIK, only the Federal Government could invoke the Commerce Clause; I would expect a lot more people (in your example, the PA government or maybe even any PA driver) would have standing.
Your gut feeling is reasonably close, but not precisely correct. The Constitution sets the baseline rules for the powers of and interactions among the branches of the federal government, as well as the powers of and interactions between the state and federal governments. With only one exception (the dilution of a state's representation in the Senate), the Constitution can be amended to basically anything. It can make anything legal and it can make anything illegal. It generally addresses fairly high-leval legal principles, but there's no reason that it couldn't be amended to include a 9,000-page law specifically addressing every conceivable aspect of the regulation of nuclear energy. As it stands now and as it always has, the Constitution permits the federal government to write laws only with respect to certain topics. The states, meanwhile, retain authority to write laws on virtually any other topic. There are a variety of legal and historical reasons why prohibition took the form of a constitutional amendment while drug laws are handled legislatively, but one important consideration is the scope of Congress's power to regulate &quot;interstate commerce.&quot; At the time of prohibition, it was not clear that Congress could regulate commercial activity that took place entirely within a single state. So if you grew all the ingredients for your whiskey in Kentucky, and you distilled those ingredients in Kentucky, and then you sold your whiskey in Kentucky exclusively to residents of Kentucky, it seemed that your conduct was outside the reach of Congress, and that any attempt to regulate it would be vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. The solution, therefore, was to amend the constitution and give that authority to Congress. About a decade after prohibition ended, though, the Supreme Court decided that the power to regulate interstate commerce includes not just transactions that cross state lines, but also any conduct that “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce” Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). This broadens the Commerce Clause authority to cover virtually any economic activity. So even if you buy marijuana seeds from your next door neighbor, plant them in your own back yard, grow them for strictly personal use in your own home, and never sell anything to anyone, the courts will hold that your conduct affects the interstate market for marijuana, and is therefore subject to federal regulation. This standard substantially lowers the bar for Congress to act without a constitutional amendment, which is a big part of the reason there hasn't been an amendment to address narcotic use.
The rule that all bills die when a Congress ends is an unwritten rule, based on precedent. It is part of a more general rule: All unfinished business dies when a Congress ends. The logic of this rule is simple: Because every member of the House is elected every term, every new Congress is considered a separate Congress. To require a new Congress to take up the unfinished business of the previous Congress would violate yet another, more general rule: “No Congress can bind its successors.” This rule came from England, where it was thought to be a direct implication of parliamentary supremacy. In the US, it is justified either as implied by the constitution, or by practical political realities. What the Congressional manuals say The rule “all business dies” is mentioned in several of the standard compilations of Congressional practice and precedent. These compilations, (available online from the GPO,) include House Practice: However, because past proceedings of one Congress do not bind its successor, business remaining at the end of one Congress does not carry over to the beginning of a new Congress (with the exception of impeachment). Precedents of the House, § 8. Legislative Business of a Prior Session: Each Congress is a separate parliamentary body that comes into being at assembly and terminates upon sine die adjournment. Thus, it is generally the case that business of one Congress does not continue as business of the next Congress. For example, bills and resolutions introduced in one Congress cannot be taken up in a subsequent Congress but must be formally reintroduced. Unfinished business pending at the close of one Congress does not remain unfinished business of a subsequent Congress. Decschler’s Precdents, Ch. 1 § 11, The vast majority of business remaining at the end of one Congress does not, however, carry over to the beginning of a new Congress, since Congress does not allow the past proceedings of one Congress to bind its successor. Few categories have carried over from one Congress to the next; impeachment proceedings pending on the last day of one Congress have been continued at the beginning of the succeeding one, and a Presidential veto message to the House was on one occasion read and received at the beginning of the next Congress. Legislative Entrenchment: Why Congress Can't Bind The idea that one legislature cannot bind a later legislature is known as the rule against ”legislative entrenchment.” This rule traces back to England, where it was first stated by Edward Coke, in his Institutes of the Laws of England, published in 1644. Acts against the power of the Parliament subsequent bind not. In England, the rule was seen as a direct implication of parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone argued that to allow one parliament to bind another would be logically inconsistent with the idea of parliamentary supremacy: Because the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal…absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if its ordinances could bind a subsequent parliament. Interestingly, during the Revolution, an American colonist, writing as Cassandra, used the rule against entrenchment to argue for independence. He quoted Coke to claim that because no Parliament could bind future Parliaments, any British promise to respect the rights of colonists was not, as the game theorists would say, credible. It is out of the power of the British Legislature to give us security for the future enjoyment of our rights and liberties…Is there safety in entering upon terms of accommodation with a power which cannot stipulate for the performance of its engagements? In reaction to such criticisms of the British system of Parliamentary supremacy, Americans decided to adopt a written constitution. The Americans argued that while a legislature might not be able to bind itself, the people, acting through the Constitution, could bind the legislature. Instead of invoking Parliamentary supremacy, Americans justified the “no Congress can bind” rule by appealing to the Constitution (ie, the electoral cycle + the vesting clause = every Congress is a new Congress, which alone is vested with the legislative power under Art. I, § 1), or to practical considerations (it is impossible for today’s Congress to enforce a binding clause on a later Congress, which could simply pass a new statute). (For fuller discussion of these arguments, see here.) Unwritten Rules in the House Here is what House Practice, Ch. 50. Rules and Precedents of the House, says about Rules Based on Precedent or Custom: Much of what is known as parliamentary law is not part of the formal written rules of the House but springs from precedent or long-standing custom. Such precedent may be invoked to resolve a procedural question in the absence of an express written rule on the subject. More frequently, the precedents of the House are used to show the scope and application of one of its formal rules… On the theory that a government of laws is preferable to a government of men, the House has repeatedly recognized the importance of following its precedents and obeying its well-established procedural rules. The House adheres to settled rulings, and will not lightly disturb procedures that have been established by prior decision of the Chair. However, the Speaker or Chairman may refuse to follow a precedent even though it is relevant to a pending question, where it is the only precedent on the point and was not carefully reasoned.
The alternative is the same whether just one lower court or many lower courts ignore SCOTUS precedent. An aggrieved parts will appeal the lower court ruling, and the matter will work its way up the ladder until SCOTUS directly rules on this application of the law. This sort of happens all the time, when lower courts don't apply the ostensive "final ruling" because they find that there is some other overriding consideration ("that rule only applies to businesses employing more than 50 people"). Where the case to be remanded to lower courts for further proceedings consistent with SCOTUS opinion and still the lower courts refuse to comply, i.e open rebellion, SCOTUS could rule that non-compliance by lower courts constitutes contempt, and an order could be issued for the removal (in some form) of offending parties (we may presume, the justices of the lower court). The statute outlining court power allows on order of imprisonment for "disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command". Federal marshals would then arrest non-compliant judges, unless the marshals too are in open rebellion. If the judges in question were federal judges, the marshals would have to decide whether to obey the order of SCOTUS vs. the order of the district or circuit court. Since under the US Constitution states that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", it is objectively established that SCOTUS rulings are superior, so provided that the marshals elect to uphold their oath of office, they will enforce the SCOTUS ruling. However, citizen action becomes irrelevant once SCOTUS has made its ruling, and the matter has moved from legal determination of fact to enforcement of established fact.