Can behaviour of a witness in a witness box affect the outcome of the proceedings? I'm getting myself ready for the court hearing and I need to verify factual accuracy of the following statements. The Judge takes account not just of what is said, but also of how it is said, of what is not said, and of the body language and demeanour of the witness in the witness box. (...) This type of evidence is opinion evidence, rather than factual evidence, although sometimes an expert will need to give evidence about what they have seen or observed as well as what their view is; I admit that in my behaviour I was hyper-rational and put too much emphasis towards factual accuracy rather than feelings and emotions of another person. Before I start investing time and energy into acting classes I would like to either confirm or debunk the body language part, as well as the other parts.
Witness demeanor is absolutely relevant, both to evaluate the credibility of a witness and in a matter such as a child custody case, to evaluate the merits of what constitutes the "best interests of the child" which hinges, in part, on the interpersonal social skills of a parent in dealing with the parent's children. Before I start investing time and energy into acting classes . . . Generally speaking, I would not encourage you to take acting classes. There is nothing that you can learn in a few weeks or months that will fool a judge. Instead, your inept acting effort will only make you look dishonest because, you are being dishonest. If you are "hyper-rational and put too much emphasis towards factual accuracy rather than feelings and emotions of another person", you are better advised to focus on how your personality can have positive aspects, rather than trying to hide who you are in reality. For example, you can emphasize how you have a detailed child care plan, are on top of the children's medical and educational needs, are stable in your work life, and may be able to interact productively with any of the children who share your tendencies in a way that a more neurotypical person might not. In a family law case, the marriage itself, if the couple was married, is assumed to be a lost cause. And, pretty much nobody in a family law court has exemplary interpersonal skills. If they did, their relationships wouldn't have fallen apart, or at least, they would have worked out mutually agreeable parenting arrangements without court assistance. You are better off acknowledging that you are not perfect and showing the court that you have good coping mechanisms than to fake being the person that you believe that the court wants you to be. Someone who has personality and temperament issues who doesn't admit that those are issues is a much bigger concern than someone who has issues but is aware of those issues and demonstrates a conscious attempt to work around or cope with those issues.
On an issue of pure law, an appellate court decides if the trial judge got it right or wrong from scratch, and if there is a case that is a better match than the one that the judge used that leads to a different outcome in the case, then an appellate court is likely to find that the trial court's ruling is a reversible error. On an issue of mixed fact and law, or on a legal issue where a judge has more discretion in how the law is applied (like many evidentiary issues), a judge is given more deference, and the judge will generally only be reversed if no reasonable judge could have applied the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them, and then, only if an application of the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them would have changed the outcome of the case. There are a couple of ways that this standard of review is described, one of which is called "abuse of discretion" review.
What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission &amp; editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial).
The appellate court reviews based upon the trial court record. To the extent that it turns on questions of law, including interpretations of written documents whose authenticity is not in question, this review is de novo. Likewise, decisions on this issue made on a paper record and argument of counsel, without an evidentiary hearing that resolved material disputes of fact between the parties, are reviewed de novo. So are procedural question, like whether an evidentiary hearing should have been held. But, in cases where there is a mixed issue of fact and law, the appellate court defers to all findings of fact made in the trial court from an evidentiary hearing held in the trial court that are supported by admissible evidence in the trial court record. Since the material facts relating to the enforceability of arbitration are frequently not in dispute in a case like this and arbitration rulings are often made without evidentiary hearings, as for example, in this case and in this case, an appellate court often does engage in de novo review. But, the appellate court is not permitted to re-weigh the credibility of witnesses, for example, in a manner contrary to the trial court's findings of fact supported by admissible evidence in the record, if an evidentiary hearing was held and this was necessary to resolve disputed issues of fact that were material to the question of whether arbitration could be compelled. While what I have said above is somewhat different than the standards, for example, in New Jersey as stated in this document quoted below, this is to some extent a function of the facts of the referenced cases. None of which involve a refusal to compel arbitration following an evidentiary hearing involving disputed findings of fact. Appellate courts &quot;review de novo the trial court's judgment dismissing the complaint and compelling arbitration.&quot; Flanzman v. Jenny Craig, Inc., 244 N.J. 119, 131 (2020). See Skuse v. Pfizer, Inc., 244 N.J. 30, 46 (2020). &quot;Under N.J.S.A. 2A:24-7, either party may move to confirm an award within three months of the date of its delivery. Once confirmed, the award is as conclusive as a court judgment. N.J.S.A. 2A:24-10.&quot; Policeman's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 292 v. Borough of N. Haledon, 158 N.J. 392, 398 (1999). N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 provides a court may vacate an arbitration award for: 1) corruption, fraud or undue means; 2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; 3) misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party; or 4) the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. &quot;Judicial review of an arbitration award is very limited.&quot; Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 276 (2010)). &quot;To foster finality and 'secure arbitration's speedy and inexpensive nature,' reviewing courts must give arbitration awards 'considerable deference.'&quot; Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201-02 (2013)). &quot;[A]n arbitrator's award resolving a public sector dispute will be accepted so long as the award is 'reasonably debatable.'&quot; Borough of Carteret v. Firefighters Mut. Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. 67, 247 N.J. 202, 211 (2021) (quoting Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013)). &quot;An arbitrator's award is not to be cast aside lightly. It is subject to being vacated only when it has been shown that a statutory basis justifies that action.&quot; Bound Brook Bd. of Educ. v. Ciripompa, 228 N.J. 4, 11 (2017) (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. # 21 v. Town of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 221 (1979)). Certain statutes, including the Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:23A-1 to -30, set &quot;strict limits on the appeal of an arbitration award.&quot; Riverside Chiropractic Grp. v. Mercury Ins. Co., 404 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 2008). In support of a contrary view that even the findings of fact of the trial court are subject to de novo review are statements like this one (from this case): The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., L.L.C., 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). But, the cited cases don't mean precisely what they are purported to say in the rare case where the decision rests, for example, on resolved a disputed credibility decision between two witnesses over whether the purported arbitration document is authentic in an evidentiary hearing. Those cases are merely dicta as applied to that fact pattern. The case containing this quote was decided at the trial court level on the pleadings alone without receiving any testimony or documents in an evidentiary hearing (see footnote 1 at page 2). Hirsch was decided in motion practice without an evidentiary hearing (see page 184) and the case itself says (at page 186): Orders compelling arbitration are deemed final for purposes of appeal. R. 2:2–3(a); GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572, 587, 17 A.3d 177 (2011). We review those legal determinations de novo. See Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995) (“A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.”). The decision in Frummer was similarly qualified and also relied upon interpretation of written instruments whose execution was undisputed that was resolved in motion practice without any mention of an evidentiary hearing. The Court in Frummer said at page 13: We review the denial of a request for arbitration de novo. See Alfano v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 393 N.J.Super. 560, 572-73, 925 A.2d 22 (App.Div. 2007). &quot;A `trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference.'&quot; Id. at 573, 925 A.2d 22 (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)). See also this case stating that: The existence of a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement poses a question of law, and as such, our standard of review of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration is de novo. Hirsch v. Amper Fin. Servs., LLC, 215 N.J. 174, 186 (2013); Frumer v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 420 N.J. Super. 7, 13 (App. Div. 2011). Again, however, I would question whether this holding is dicta because it involves the interpretation of written instruments whose authenticity is in doubt, and not, for example, a dispute over whether the person who signed the documents is the same person who is a party to this litigation and not someone else with a very similar name that was resolved in an evidentiary hearing.
Depositions must always be attended by a court reporter in every jurisdiction I have ever encountered (including Colorado, New York, California, Wyoming and Florida). Alaska may be an exception. Its state constitution creates a right to participate in many kinds of legal and legislative proceedings remotely because the distances involved are often so great. The court reporter administers an oath to the witness, keeps track of exhibits, impartially records what happens (usually stenographically and with an audiotape) and then reduces it to a transcript later, a process assisted by having been there when the testimony was given (and allowing for the court reporter, for example, to request spellings of words during breaks). A videotape can be used in addition to the court reporter and sometimes this is done when it would be helpful for understanding a highly visual topic (e.g. in a patent case where someone is explaining a 3D object) or when a witness is expected to behave badly or is known for problematic voice character or body language. Court proceedings in a courtroom are often audiotaped with a judge present but without a live court reporter present. Appellate court arguments are frequently live streamed over the Internet. There may be some jurisdictions where it is possible to have an oath administered by a notary and simply audiotape or videotape the deposition, but that would be very rare in every jurisdiction of which I am aware.
The old saying: Being your own lawyer means you have a fool as the lawyer and a fool as the client. If one fool calls the other fool as a witness, that's even more foolish. And the worst crime is annoying the judge with your antics. Opposing council will just take note of every question you ask and your replies, and then call you as witness themself. And assuming they are a proper lawyer, everything they ask will be hurting you. No need to accuse you as &quot;leading&quot; or &quot;badgering&quot; the witness.
Generally not With very few exceptions, documents do not need to be witnessed to be valid even where there is a space for a witness to sign. When you knowingly signed it you were making a legal declaration that you had read it, that you understood it and that you agreed to be bound by it. If you didn’t “pay attention to the content” then more fool you. As to being “tricked”, you would need to elaborate on this (in another question) it for this to have any effect it would need to ride to the level of misrepresentation or fraud - like substituting a different document for the one you had agreed to sign. You would also need evidence of the “trick”.
The parties can be required under oath to explain what they understand the plain meaning of the words to be. Where they disagree about the plain meaning of the words, they can use expert witnesses to give weight to their interpretation. Once the judge determines the plain meaning of the words (either by agreement between the parties or by reference to expert witnesses or other evidence), it is a matter of standard contract interpretation. Even in the case of an idioticon, where no expert witnesses are available, if the disagreement between the parties surrounds only a few words, the judge could find that there is no actual ambiguity because the context. Also, the judge could refer to parole evidence if needed. The purpose of the written contract is to provide evidence of your agreement. It is a bad idea to create evidence that you both may want to rely upon at some point if nobody else can understand it.