Can the Whanganui river be prosecuted for corporate manslaughter? On March 15th, 2017, a law was approved in New Zealand recognising the Whanganui River as a legal person. In accompanying media articles it wasn't clear whether this meant a living entity, a person or a human; the article author says "human", the Whanganui representative is quoted as saying "living entity" and Finlayson is quoted as saying "person". I recognise that these are three different (although overlapping) legal definitions carrying different liabilities. And while I would agree that the net ecosystem services of a river clearly outweight its costs even before you consider the social and religious significance, as far as I am aware the law on corporate personhood does not recognise this. If/when you cause harm, you can be sued. Assuming that a direct quote from the minister responsible for the law (Chris Finlayson) can be taken at face value: Te Awa Tupua will have its own legal identity with all the corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a legal person ... I assume (and it would be sensible if) we're actually talking about legal personhood here. In which case, if the river floods, it is personally (and criminally) liable for the damage? If someone drowns, the river will be prosecuted for murder? What happens if a river goes bankrupt? The Economist article mentions that some NZers have been 'joking' about whether the river can be prosecuted if someone drowns, but doesn't attempt to answer that. I assume it's implying that it's ludicrous, but that's not obvious to me from the information provided. I am interested to know whether this decision potentially creates significant legal liabilities for the river which may not be obvious to those who think this is a straightforward environmental 'win' for the Whanganui.
In context, the answer is clearly not. The precise reason that this is the case, requires a somewhat more sophisticated theory of what is going on than the Economist article cited seems to provide. The most useful analogy to apply to a situation when a river or forest or some other non-sentient being is given legal personality would be the relationship of a guardian and ward. A guardian for a ward can be appointed by a court or other person with a special relationship to the ward (e.g. a parent or deceased parent for a child, or a spouse for an older person, or an indigenous tribe for a river), to look out for the best interests of a ward (sometimes at public expense). A ward could be a minor, or a person with advanced dementia, or otherwise unable to personally take legal action on their own behalf. In this case, the ward is a river. You couldn't prosecute a river criminally or for most civil obligations (e.g., breach of contract and torts) for its own actions for the same sorts of reasons that you couldn't prosecute a six months old, or an individual in a coma, on that basis. A person such as that could neither have capacity to contract nor form the intent necessary to commit a tort and be legally responsible for that tort. In the same way, the river doesn't actually walk into court, or sign affidavits, or sign contracts, or anything like that. Instead, it acts through a fiduciary appointed to act on its behalf in its best interests (in the environmental law context (also here), such a guardian is often called a "Lorax" after the character in the Dr. Seuss book, "The Lorax" who says "I am the Lorax. I speak for the trees. I speak for the trees for the trees have no tongues."). It merely has the capacity to sue, much like a corporation or a trust or a probate estate or a guardianship estate, through a fiduciary appointed on its behalf, and is granted legal standing in cases related to it. If the river enters into contracts through its guardian, however, for example, to provide irrigation water to a company in exchange for the company ceasing to pollute it, that contract would probably be enforceable by specific performance, at least (the river is probably judgment proof, so a suit for money damages would be futile anyway), in a suit to which the guardian would be made a party and have standing to raise defenses.
You are courting seduction by the sovereign citizen doctrine. This is a crackpot legal theory that will get you nowhere. Run away as fast as you can. See, for example, Can a natural US person hold citizenship while remaining non-juridical?. See also "Mercedes-Benz Financial (DCFS Canada Corp.) v. Kovacevic, 2009", CanLII. This person fared particularly poorly because his argument relied in part on the UCC, which is a United States model code, but he was arguing in a Canadian court. Still, even in a US court, he would have lost. See What are &quot;freemen of the land&quot; or &quot;sovereign citizen&quot; theories and do they hold any water?.
It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.
It depends... It could be an offence under section 5 Public Order Act 1986: (1) A person is guilty of an offence if he— (a) uses [...] disorderly behaviour ... [...] within the hearing or sight of a person1 likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. Then there's Causation to consider, which is: whether the defendant's conduct (or omission) caused ... harm or damage. And also recklessness, which can be described as: unjustified risk-taking. In R v G [2004] 1 A.C. 1034 two boys set a fire which caused significant damage. They were charged, and convicted, for reckless arson contrary to section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971: (1) A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property belonging to another intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence. ... (3) An offence committed under this section by destroying or damaging property by fire shall be charged as arson. This conviction was quashed by the House of Lords who determined that test of recklessness for criminal damage is subjective and should take account of, for example the defendant's age (in R v G they were 11 and 12). The court determination was: A person acts recklessly within the meaning of section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 with respect to - (i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances known to him, unreasonable to take the risk. But compare this with DPP v Newbury and Jones [1976] AC 500 if someone were to die as a result of being hit by a brick: The defendants, both teenage boys, had thrown a piece of paving stone from a railway bridge onto a train which had been passing beneath them. The object struck and killed the guard who had been sitting in the driver’s compartment. The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, and unsuccessfully appealed, on the ground that they had not foreseen that their actions might cause harm to any other person. Lord Salmon explained that a defendant was guilty of manslaughter if it was proved that he intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous and that act caused death, and that it was unnecessary that the defendant had known that the act in question was unlawful or dangerous. 1Note that there has to be such a person, not a hypothetical one, to be guilty of this offence.
Just below the section you quoted it says: (3) The victim’s prior sexual conduct is not a relevant issue in a prosecution under this section. There is no stated provision for the case you mention. I suspect that the law would apply. Whether the authorities would choose to prosecute in such a case is a very different question. There might be caselaw of this subject. I wouldn't know. If this is more than hypothetical, i would urge consulting a lawyer with local knowledge of criminal practice.
It can (and has) been argued that some of the post-bellum trials of Germans and Japanese (but no Italians because they were Allies now) proceeded on shaky legal grounds. However, the arguments of your friend are wrong. In addition, many of the cases proceeded on solid legal foundations based on war crimes (e.g. the Commando Order) and treatment of prisoners-of-war (e.g. the Stalag-Luft III murders). Citizens and non-citizens are protected by the law and were even in Nazi Germany, albeit not equally. The Nuremberg Laws did not classify Jews as non-humans, merely as non-citizens (which is not to trivialise their awfulness). Superior orders has never been a recognised defence for criminal acts under civil or common law. The first recorded rejection of this defence was in the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474. The roots of modern International Law can be traced to the 16th century and were definitely well advanced by the 19th, let alone the mid-20th. Nations accepted that international treaties and diplomacy were supported by international law and these included the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906 and 1929, since updated in 1949 (of which Germany was a signatory) among many others. In addition, since the Enabling Act (which instituted Hitler's dictatorship) was quite probably illegal, it can be reasonably argued that all actions that flowed from it (i.e. basically everything that the Nazi's were tried for) was illegal under German law.
It appears you would need to contact the Calgary courts directly to discover more about the case(s) as any case files will likely be held with them. It's possible that the case was dropped, or that they were found &quot;not guilty&quot; which would explain the lack of further news on them. I searched the Canadian Legal Information Institute's website for you but wasn't able to find any criminal cases involving them — only some civil cases around bankruptcy and creditor claims.
Is it true that there has never been a single case It is tough to prove a negative. I am not going to completely parse the quote but please notice that the quote states "we couldn't find" and concludes that "it doesn't happen." Given these two pieces of information I do not conclude that there has never been a single case. Rather I conclude that the speaker in your quote could not find a case therefore he concluded that there has never been a single case. It's largely impossible to determine that there has never been a single such case. We can search published opinions but that barely scratches the surface of lawsuits that are filed. It is entirely possible that someone filed a suit which was quickly dismissed. The Act provides a defense, it does not bar lawsuits. Someone might get sick from food and not know where the food came from so they sue the provider. If this happens the provider may raise the Emerson Act as a defense and escape liability to the extent applicable. But again, we will never know because it's impossible to examine every lawsuit filed in this country.