Why do judges wear costumes? Many judges often wear robes in the courtroom, but sometimes, they also wear it outside of the courtroom. Where did the robes originate, and why do judges (and lawyers) wear them? For example, the first image shows justices of the Canadian Supreme Court, the second shows justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the third shows a british judge.
The black judicial robes date back in time hundreds, if not thousands of years. In medieval times, all educated people in the British isles, not just judges wore robes and these were customs descended from the Gaelic people who originally ruled Britain and Ireland. This custom differed from that of the Romans who wore togas. The Gaelic elite wore robes with color signifying rank, black being the lowest rank, that of a docent, the lowest level of a professor. Later, when the Saxons invaded they eventually adopted some of the customs of the Gaels. The culmination of this was the founding of what is now known as Oxford University by King Alfred, the greatest of the Saxon kings. This tradition was preserved and developed at Oxford which affected the dress of all academics, including lawyers and justices. Thomas More in his regalia typical of an Oxford Don, c. 1500 These patterns of dress also were influenced somewhat by Italian clerical styles. The main difference between the Italian styles and the Gaelic styles is that Italian robes are usually coats, opening in the front. The Gaelic robe either has no opening at all, just a hole the head is put through, or is divided at the back. Wigs The custom of wearing wigs or perukes was a late development which originated in France in the 1700s and has no great antiquity at all.
Law is more like sport than mathematics You don’t know how it will turn out until you play the game. If a case goes to trial it’s because at both sides believe they can win. Both sides probably have good reasons for their belief. At least one of them is wrong.
If there is a divorce case and through the process of declaring a parties financial position it comes out that one of the parties has dodged a bit of tax can that evidence be held against them? Generally speaking yes, unless the relevant prosecutor's office provides a grant of immunity from prosecution for the matters disclosed, which basically never happens in a divorce case or ordinary civil case. This is why it is sometimes necessary to invoke the 5th Amendment in the context of a civil case. Does a judge have the duty to report any law-breaking that arises in civil cases No. It isn't improper for a judge to report law-breaking that is observed in the course of litigation before that judge, but the judge has no duty to do so (absent some very specialized exceptions like treason), and, in practice, rarely does report law-breaking not directly before the judge to evaluate. In contrast, in criminal cases, during the pre-trial phase of a case (and especially in the pre-arrest phase of a case), a judge often has a duty to keep knowledge of crimes obtained in that way secret until it is disclosed by the prosecution (unless the prosecution improperly fails to disclose something that it is required to disclose). This is so that criminals aren't &quot;tipped off&quot; by a judge of an impending arrest. A judge in Colorado was recently prosecuted and removed from the bench for a disclosure of that kind. or is a civil case confidential between the two parties? A judge can seal a civil case, or limit public access to certain documents, but that is the exception and not the norm and has to overcome constitutional protections of the public's right to public trials that media organizations frequently enforce successfully. Confidentiality between the parties can only be imposed for &quot;good cause.&quot; Hiding the fact that you cheated on your taxes from tax collection agencies does not constitute good cause. Footnote Most U.S. jurisdictions have an ethical rule for lawyers that prohibits them from threatening to take administrative or criminal actions to gain advantage in a civil case, although the exact details vary quite a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This does not apply to clients of lawyers acting unilaterally and without guidance from their lawyers.
We have all see on TV the judge instruct jurors that during trial they are not to speak about the case with anyone, even other jurors, unless all jurors are present and they are deliberating. However, contrary to the example given about England, in the U.S., those restrictions evaporate at the end of the trial. After a trial concludes, the court has no continuing control over the jurors and could not impose lasting restrictions without it. The Constitution provides the guarantee of trial by a jury of ones peers. In the U.S. for all general civil cases and all criminal cases, we have public trials. (special courts and tribunals are created to deal with cases involving classified information and issues of national security, and the courts have mechanisms for handling trade secrets, etc. to insure that information is not presented to jurors) So in that sense, there is nothing a juror could be exposed to in during their service as jurors that would require any type of continuing restriction.
The Queen (or King) is not the government; she represents the State. The difference is often ignored by ministers, but is important particularly in constitutional cases. Miller began as Miller v Home Office, a judicial review case. When it became clear that the question was what powers the government actually had in a certain situation, the Supreme Court decided that constitutional points should be argued by, effectively, an amicus curiae on behalf of the state, with government lawyers defending their own viewpoint (and other interested parties intervening). This made it, in their view, a case of the state versus the government, with 'Miller' being either an acknowledgement that the applicant remained a party or a means of distinguishing this case from all the other "R. -v- Government" cases over the years, depending on your point of view.
In the United States, individual members (States) of the union are allowed to make their own constitutions and state laws &amp; regulations. This includes laws that may contradict Federal law, although this is a grey area. It usually comes down to enforcement: Federal laws are usually enforced by Federal law enforcement as they can not force states to do so. Further more, State prosecutors will usually not attempt to prosecute you for a Federal law infraction. Only Federal prosecutors OR the department of justice will do this. To see a more detailed explanation on this, look at this &quot;How Stuff Works&quot; article.
In simple terms does someone request a judicial review when they believe their rights have been violated and want a court to make an order that would help them? No. A judicial review in Canada is when the court reviews an administrative decision, that is, a decision (including by omission) made by the executive branch of the government or another entity exercising public functions under legislative or administrative delegation, as a last resort to preserve the rule of law, as an exercise of the inherent judicial authority. If your rights were not violated by a decision of the executive branch of the government, a judicial recourse may still be available, but usually not called judicial review. For example, if your contratual rights were violated by a private party (e.g. you are owed money), you can still sue the person in court as an ordinary civil lawsuit. In certain cases however, an administrative tribunal can make a decision regarding private disputes; the decision of the administrative tribunal, a public body, is subject to judicial review. If your constitutional rights are violated by a primary legislation passed by the Parliament (or provincial legislature), you may apply to a competent court for declarative relief, but usually this is also not referred to as judicial review, despite some similarities and some intersections in practice. The scope of judicial review is limited. The courts show considerable deferrence to the elected legislature and government and only exercise the power when all other legal resorts are exhausted. The legislature often provides administrative recourses with quasi-judicial characteristics (e.g. administrative tribunals, see later), which must be exhausted before the court steps in. The legislature sometimes deliberately limits or even attempts to bar judicial review through privative clauses. Although completely barring judicial review is not possible, it can influence the court's deferrence. Usually, one must obtain a leave (permission) from the court before commencing a judicial review proceedings. Then, if the leave is granted, the judicial review proceeding is not a proceeding for the judge to substitute their own decision in place of what the original decision maker made. New evidences are generally not admissible in judicial review; the judge only considers what is involved in the attacked decision. In most cases, the judge assesses whether the decision-maker was reasonable in their interpretation of law and their exercise of legal authority; it does not matter whether the judge would have made a different decision. In most cases, if judicial review is granted, the original decision is quashed (cancelled) but it is remitted to the original administrative body for re-determination (usually with another officer or panel). Seeking judicial review does not automatically prevent the administrative decision from coming into force, unless the applicant specifically demands the stay of decision and the judge agrees. There are exceptional cases where the judicial review is conducted on a standard of correctness, notably when procedural fairness is involved or when another important constitutional or general legal question should be determined conclusively. The applicable standard of review is based on the Supreme Court judgement in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov. In such cases, the judge would make what they think should be the correct decision with respect to the part of decision that should be follow such standard. Even then, the judge usually would direct the original decision maker to make a new one consistent with their judgement, instead of making a new one. What exactly is an administrative review An administrative review, or reconsideration, is when the administrative body itself provides a way for an interested party to request a review of the original decision by the administrative body itself (although often by another officer within the same service). It is generally not a legal right, and only granted when there is a clear error (e.g. the decision maker had the wrong file) to ensure administrative certainty. The term is usually not applied if there is a formal statutory structure of reexamination by another decision maker for an administrative decision, even if the new reexamination occurs within the same body. or administrative tribunal? Administrative tribunals are quasi-judicial bodies established by law (passed by legislatures) that makes independent decisions on behalf of the executive government. They are established to avoid costly and slow-moving lawsuits in courts and to specialize in specific areas of law to better serve the interests of justice. There are several types of administrative tribunals: dedicated conflict resolution tribunals between private persons, for example: Landlord and Tenants Boards that resolve disputes arising from real estate leases human rights tribunals where many discrimination claims in services and employment are resolved labour relations boards that deal with the recognition of labour unions and conflicts (grievance) between unionized workers and employers tribunals that review particular types of government decisions, e.g. the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, who has jurisdiction to hear appeals on certain types immigration decisions (e.g. deportation of a permanent resident) tribunals that make independent decisions for the government, despite the tribunal itself being part of the executive branch, e.g. the Competition Tribunal the Copyright Board other bodies exercising public statutory functions, e.g. the professional regulatory bodies (e.g. law societies, colleges of physicians and surgeons) are administrative tribunals for the purpose of exercising functions delegated to them by law, even if often they are private societies, for example, the decision to or not to admit a lawyer by a law society is subject to judicial review as the law society is exercising its delegated public authority (to regulate who can practice law). Some tribunals may have multiple functions described above; for example, the IRB is the first decision maker on the grant of refugee status, while also having statutory jurisdictions over appeals of certain immigration decisions (including the decision itself made over refugee status). As all powers of an administrative tribunal must be based in law, only those decisions that the legislature said could be dealt by these tribunals can be to an administrative tribunals; for example, temporary visa decisions (e.g. for visit or studies) are not appealable before IRB, but judicial review of the officer's visa decision can be directly requested. I get the impression it can happen in the work place, school or some sort of organization with a certain level of formality and structure. If it concerns the government, it may involve an administrative action that may be subject to judicial review. For example, a federal government employee may have recourses with the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board, whose decisions are subject to judicial review. A public university's decision (including a student's grade) may also be an administrative decision subject to review. The internal university appeal procedures could be seen as similar to the functions of administrative tribunals, but these internal boards are usually not established by law and are appointed by internal university procedures. Otherwise, it is a private dispute where a formal structure may be desirable for legal and moral reasons. I also understand that it need not be fair, or at least what counts as fair is not defined. A public body exercising a quasi-judicial function, particular an administrative tribunal, must be fair. It is a matter of natural justice where the court is not reluctant to correct an administrative decision maker. The duty of fairness generally does not apply to political or legislative decisions. While there is no simple definition of what is fair and the application of the principles of natural justice necessarily depends on the case in question, there is a significant body of case law on what consists fairness (or rather, unfairness). For example, arbitrary or dishonest decisions are almost always unfair. Decisions made without possibility of being heard are often unfair. Undisclosed conflicts of interest can also bring fairness into question. A private body in its private capacity (i.e. not exercising a public function) has no general constitutional or natural justice requirement to be fair, but the law may impose upon private persons a positive duty (e.g. provision of goods and services without racial or sex discrimination; dismissal without notice only possible for cause). if it's a non-government organization, but when can a judicial review override an administrative review's decision? If it concerns a non-government organization that is not exercising a public function, a judicial review is not possible; other recourses may be possible, e.g. an ordinary lawsuit, or recourses to a public body (e.g. if you have problems with a landlord, you can go to the LTB). If it concerns an actual administrative decision, judicial review is granted, among other possible reasons: when the decision maker lacks the jurisdiction to make the decision, e.g., when they make a decision outside their statutory powers when the attacked decision is unreasonable; for example, when the decision is not supported by logic or evidences (that were submitted during the administrative decision making) when it is incorrect on an important constitutional question or other question of law, or the principles of natural justice had been breached during the decision making process.
Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions.