What is Admiralty law? What is Admiralty Law and where are the origins of it? What jurisdictions is this type of law applicable? What relevance does this have in the United States legal system?
Admiralty law is the law of the sea and maritime activities. (Admiralty law also applies to boats on the "navigable waters" of the United States such as the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers.) It has its roots in a mix of customary international law, treaties related to the law of the sea, and domestic statutes. It is closer in some respects to the law of civil law countries than of common law countries, although it is distinct from both. In the U.S., admiralty law is part of federal court jurisdiction and the U.S. district courts are our admiralty courts. But, each country with maritime commerce has some version of admiralty law based around a core of customary international law and treaties, with domestic statutes similar to those of other countries statutes dealing with the topic. Admiralty law is distinctive and different from domestic law in a variety of circumstances, most notably: The law governing when a ship can be detained in port to make a judgment in an admiralty proceeding against it enforceable. This is similar to a writ of attachment in domestic law (a pre-judgment seizure of assets to make a potential judgment collectable) but more broadly available. The rights of seamen vis-a-vis their employers. The relevance of the flag under which a ship sails. The "traffic laws" of the sea. The duties of a ship that encounters another ship or individuals in distress at sea. The duties of a ship that encounters hostile others parties, such as pirates, at sea. The tort law applicable to torts particular to a maritime context that take place at sea. For example, in a collision of ships, or from a failure to honor duties related to distressed ships, or from interference with a ship's commercial activity (e.g. in connection with a fishing expedition). The law governing property interests and sharing of proceeds from "prizes" such as the salvage of sinking, sunk or abandoned ships. In general, admiralty law has declined in importance as lots of high value commerce has shifted to air travel, and as ocean going ships have become bigger and better behaved corporate interests, and because modern conditions make ships at sea less isolated from the rest of the world.
There is a relevant Q&amp;A here about how ex post facto is defined in the United States. Not all law is about crime, and that includes NY rent control laws; violating them does not lead directly to a criminal prosecution, hence a sufficiently strict definition of ex post facto cannot apply to them. And such a sufficiently strict definition has been the explicit one since 1798, when the Supreme Court ruled in Calder vs. Bull ("law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal [...] law that aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was [...] law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime", etc.). Notice that Article 1 Section 9 prohibits Congress (i.e., the Federal Government) from doing exactly the same thing, so if ex post facto refers to any kind of law, then there could not be any retroactive laws passed in the United States, period. However, the Supreme Court has apparently already set further, more recent, precedents, making it clear that this rule does not apply to tax law. I would assume in this case the intention is to retroactively extend the old law, i.e., if the old law expired on the 15th and the extension passes on the 20th, that extension will be retroactive to the 15th. If the extension then continues until a new law is in place, there will be no time period under which one or the other did not apply. Despite the wording in the news article, I do not think the intention is to make the new law retroactive, only the extension of the old one, for the simple reason that the legislature would never agree to pass such a brand new law later and no matter what it contains say it will be retroactive back to the original expiration date of a law it replaces even after they already extended that until there was a new law. That is borderline non-sensical. The Daily News blurb certainly makes it sound like it might be that way, but I think this is a bit of intentional obfuscation -- the way in which a partial quote is used in the first paragraph is indicative, and the Daily News is, well, the Daily News.
No. Under U.S. Jurisprudence, any vagueness in a criminal law must be given an interpretation favorable to the people, rather than the government, since the government had the opportunity to make their intentions clear when drafting the law. Additionally, the U.S. Constitution has what is called the &quot;Vagueness Doctrine&quot; which renders vague laws at any level of government to be unenforceable (Found in the 5th and 14th Amendment as an interpretation of the Due Process clauses). The quickest way to overturn the court's ruling is for a legislature to pass an amended law that defines the vague terms in terms that are better understood and can give the courts a proper interpretation of what should happen, however, no one who was charged under the law can be recharged under the new definition.
I'm not going to comment on the specifics of this law; rather, I think this question shows a misconception of the way the legal system works in general. Here's the question: do you actually have "legally privileged" material on your phone? If not, what's keeping you from claiming that is that it's not true, and lying to a police officer is a bad idea. And just putting a letter from your lawyer on the phone doesn't mean you've established a legal privilege--attorney-client privilege is not a magic spell, it's a reasonable system of protection that only covers certain communications. The bottom line is: the statute in general, and that clause in particular, were included in the law to protect real, important, and substantial legal right. The courts interpret the law in light of that purpose. If the police officer finds a solution that protects your rights while still carrying out the purpose of the statute, the court will be unlikely to fault him or her. In this case, if you tell the officer that there is a letter from your attorney in a particular folder, the obvious solution is for the officer not to open that folder. Problem solved. In practice, in the United States at least, these cases are dealt with routinely; computers are seized, and attorneys and judges work together to ensure that privilege is protected while still allowing reasonable access to seized materials. I would imagine the same is true in the U.K. The bottom line is: the law is not a game, and technical "gotchas" are rarely effective. Common law systems allow judges enough leeway to avoid this sort of pointless technicality.
The plain meaning of "any" is "all". That does not mean that that is how the word is interpreted under current US law: that can only be determined by inspecting the case law. In US v. Alabama 443 Fed. Appx. 411 (No. 11-14532-CC), fn. 2 states "Pursuant to § 1304(e), every alien eighteen years of age and older must carry a certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card", thus this court has suggested that the meaning is actually "some". However, the case was not ruling on the interpretation of "any" here, so this could be a slip. The case involves an Alabama law, which as reported in the opinion's summary of the part of Alabama law being challenged by the US states: Section 10 creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)..." indicating that the Alabama statute refers to "some" (which could influence the interpretation of "any", since "some" and "any" are often mixed up in legal drafting). That is, it is possible that the court in the footnote read "any" as "some" because the state law in question, which is parallel to the federal law, says "an". In US v Arizona 641 F.3d 339, the court weakly suggests a "some" interpretation as well, saying: Determining Congress' purpose, and whether Section 3 poses an obstacle to it, first requires that we evaluate the text of the federal registration requirements in in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306. These sections create a comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration, including penalties for failure to carry one's registration document at all times.. Again, the meaning of "any" is not the central issue: in using "one's registration document" in the singular, the court must have been interpreting "any" as "some". US v. Daubon 334 Fed.Appx. 167 (2009), another case that invokes the law but does not rule on the meaning of "any", rephrases the law: 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) requires every alien over eighteen to carry his permanent resident card at all times. which is at odds with the possibility of there being two such documents: it suggests that an I-766 is not good enough. Lexis-Nexis returns 18 cases that cite this statute, and only Arizona v. US which was about the preemption issue was decided by SCOTUS. None of these opinions rules on the meaning of "any", so the matter has not yet been decided.
Choice of law A contract can include a choice of law clause that states the laws that apply to the contract. For the USA this would usually be the laws of a particular state. Most courts in most jurisdictions respect the choice of law clause - that is, if say a suit is brought in a new-south-wales court on a contract with a choice of law of californina, the court will (probably) apply Californian law to the contract. However, a choice of law clause does not affect non-contract law like torts, equity, criminal law, consumer protection law, and &quot;no contracting out&quot; laws. So, for the above example, while the contract will be interpreted using California/USA law, other claims will be assessed under New South Wales/Australian law. For an example of how this works in practice, see ACCC v Valve Software. It was never in doubt that the contract was under Washington, USA law, however, the &quot;no refund&quot; term, while valid in Washington violated Australian Law and was unenforcable and, more critically for valve, was misleading and deceptive, costing them AUD 3 million in fines (plus legal costs). Choice of Forum In addition to specifying the relevant law, a contract can also suggest the appropriate forum: &quot;disputes shall be subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of Californian courts&quot;. A clause that oversteps the suggestion and states the forum categorically is likely to be void on public policy grounds: a contract cannot exclude courts that have jurisdiction. A choice of forum clause is one of the factors a court will consider if one of the parties petitions that it is the wrong forum and the case should be transferred to the right forum. They are influential but not determinative and go into the mix with all the other relevant factors. Arbitration A well-drafted binding arbitration agreement will almost always be effective if it complies with local law. Courts have a very strong bias in favour of enforcing arbitration clauses.
Probably.* Congress has wide latitude to dictate the procedures of "inferior courts" -- the district courts and circuit courts of appeal. Those courts only exist because Congress created them, so Congress can generally set the terms on which they continue to exist. That power is limited in several important ways by the Constitution, including the terms and compensation of the judges, and standing to address cases, and then further limited by separation-of-powers principles. But the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Criminal Procedure are a good example of how Congress has already -- and largely unobjectionably -- imposed these types of demands on the judiciary. The rules are generally drafted by the judicial branch, but Congress approves them and gives them the force of law. In both sets of rules, you can already see some requirements on how decisions are worded: Criminal Rule 23 requires the court to "state its specific findings of fact" after a bench trial; Criminal Rule 32 requires the court to "set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence" in judgments of conviction; Civil Rule 52 requires the court to "find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately"; Civil Rule 58 requires that "every judgment and amended judgment ... be set out in a separate document"; Civil Rule 59 requires the court to "specify the reasons [for granting or denying a motion for a new trial] in its order"; and Civil Rule 72 requires magistrates to enter "a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact." The rule you're proposing seems to go well beyond these requirements, but I don't see how it would run afoul of constitutional constraints. I could imagine an argument that this somehow encroaches on the courts' inherent authority, but I'm not really convinced that that authority protects against this. For more information, you can read the Congressional Research Service report on "Congressional Authority Over the Federal Courts." *This answer only applies to Article III courts, but even then does not apply to the Supreme Court, which is co-equal and generally has the authority to set its own rules. When it comes to Article I courts, though, Congress would probably have virtually unlimited discretion to impose the kinds of requirements that you're talking about, and even to say that the court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutionality at all. Congress might even get away with imposing these kinds of requirements on state courts through the Spending Clause
You are subject to the laws of the jurisdiction that you are in. However, some of the laws of the jurisdiction you reside in or are a citizen of have extra-territorial applicability, so you have to comply with those laws too.