Why is it necessary for a belief of imminent deadly force to be subjectively reasonable? I've recently come across this video by Attorney Tommy John Kherkher regarding the subject of using deadly force in self defense. In his video, he presented a checklist of things which are required for a case to be considered self-defense and not murder or manslaughter. The list is as follows: There is a belief of actual, imminent threat of deadly force (grievous bodily harm) Belief must be OBJECTIVELY and SUBJECTIVELY reasonable Threat is unlawful and immediate Must have clean hands Confronted with imminent peril Force must be immediately necessary Response was necessary Retreat may be required if: Duty to retreat There is an entirely safe place to retreat to Safe place is known to the person retreating Exception: Castle Doctrine and Stand Your Ground The requirement for a threat to be objectively reasonable is pretty clear: Even if I have an irrational fear of something and that perceived threat seems subjectively reasonable to me, it is generally unreasonable. The example presented was his girlfriend &quot;attacking&quot; him with a purple plush unicorn and him supposedly being deadly afraid of said plush unicorn. However, the requirement for a threat to be subjectively reasonable isn't obvious to me. If there is an objectively reasonable threat of deadly force (e.g. a stranger pointing a gun at me), why is it necessary to determine if I subjectively believed this to be an imminent danger to me? Is there an example of a situation in which a threat would be objectively reasonable, but subjectively unreasonable?
Because your buddy routinely points loaded firearms at you First, you should probably get friends who don’t do this but, even though this is objectively a threat, you know that you are in no danger (barring accidents). Self-defence is not justified. This is why there is the dual requirement that the danger is clear to both: an objective observer, and the person under threat.
In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.
Fault, in English law, is &quot;blameworthiness&quot;. While it covers both the act and the mental state of the defendant, it cannot equate to the subjective criminal intent of the defendant known as mens rea. In other words, you can be at fault for negligence without having the requisite intent to commit a criminal act. This is perhaps best pointed out by the next sentence after the one in bold: It would be perfectly possible for a criminal code to provide separate crimes of negligence, with lower maximum sentences, at appropriate points in the hierarchy of offences. There are also examples of such offences in English law already. For example, careless, and inconsiderate, driving (&quot;driving without due care and attention&quot;) contrary to Section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is an offence that requires fault without mens rea. The defendant merely has to be careless and inconsiderate — they do not have to be in the state of mind where they know or believe that what they are doing is criminal in some way. In contrast, dangerous driving contrary to Section 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 has the implied requirement of mens rea because of the word &quot;dangerously&quot;. This implies the defendant must have a subjective belief that what they are doing is dangerous (or otherwise be reckless about it), and therefore criminal.
No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412
If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (&quot;Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.&quot;) If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) (&quot;If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.&quot;) The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves.
Illinois has a &quot;Castle Doctrine&quot; which includes dwellings and other qualified buildings, but not a general &quot;Stand your Ground&quot; doctrine. Normally, to claim self-defense one has to show that they were not able to retreat and had to use force, but in Illinois you do not have a duty to retreat if you are preventing criminal interference with a dwelling or with real property that you or a family member owns, or you have a legal duty to protect (see Ill Code 720-2 and Ill Code 720-3). In order to use deadly force in any case, it must be to prevent a forcible felony, which is defined as (720 ILCS 5/2-8): &quot;Forcible felony&quot; means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. So, assuming you have no legal duty to protect the 7-11, you would not be justified in using deadly force against rioters merely on the basis that they were committing a forcible felony against the building. On the other hand, if you were in the store or could see someone in the store being attacked, you may be able to successfully defend deadly force used to protect yourself or that person.
Self-Defense is an active Defense for Homicide (note, this is the legal term for taking a life. Criminal Homicide and Justified Homicide are two subsets of Homicide and are denoted by illegal actions and legal actions. Homicide as a result of Self-Defense is a Justified Homicide, regardless of the weapon, so long as it was applied with the minimal amount of force required to stop the criminal harm to oneself). Suppose you use a taser and the current causes the attacker to go into cardiac arrest and die. Your intention in using the taser was to stop the criminal from injuring yourself, your property, or another person or their property (defense of others). Even though the Taser is non-leathal, it's more like less lethal. Death by Taser is uncommon, but not impossible or rare. It would be handled as a defensive use of a weapon (same as if the attacker was killed by a gun) and processed as such. Pennsylvania is a Stand Your Ground State, meaning that in a public place, you do not have a duty to flee if your attacker approaches you in a public place, you do not have to prove that you could not flee in order to claim self-defense. However, if you pull a weapon and your attacker decides to flee, you can not give chase and kill him upon capture. You also need to have a reasonable expectation that the attacker is about to use deadly force (this normally means having sight of the weapon or what would reasonably look like a weapon i.e. a realistic toy gun without the orange safety cap would be reasonable). You also cannot claim self-defense if you were engaged in another crime when the attacker approached you (i.e. If you rob the Krusty Krab and the Hash Slinging Slasher approaches you with a knife, sucks to be you cause you don't have a right to be in the Krusty Krab after closing.).
As I understand, the limited liability that police enjoy, requires that people bringing civil cases against police must prove that the police person should have had a reasonable knowledge of the civil rights that you accuse him of breaking, for the civil case to be successful. This isn't quite right. The test you are referencing is the one for qualified immunity from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which imposes liability on government officials only for violating a &quot;well-established&quot; constitutional right. A rule of law is &quot;well-established&quot; when there is controlling case law in that jurisdiction when a factually similar binding precedent exists in that jurisdiction to show that the alleged conduct is unconstitutional. This test is employing the legal fiction that police officers are familiar with all of the binding precedents in the jurisdiction regarding what constitutes a violation of a constitutional right, which is held against officers. Of course, in reality, almost no police officers have that exhaustive a level of understanding of the law. What the test does, however, is to prevent police officers from being held civilly liable for money damages when they take action which, in fact, violates a constitutional right, but which no case law in a factually similar case that was binding precedent established before the incident took place. Thus, police officers are relieved of liability for incidents that they would have to predict that a future court would find violated a constitutional right. This is sometimes phrased as being justified because a reasonable police officer could not have foreseen a new rule of constitutional law or a novel application of an existing rule of constitutional law to a new situation. One of the reasons that the qualified immunity rule is controversial, however, is that courts have the discretion to decide a case on qualified immunity grounds without determining if the underlying action indeed did violate a constitutional right, and this prevents constitutional law from evolving normally over time to applications in new factually novel situations. The key point, however, is that this requirement that a constitutional right be well-established to be enforceable in a civil action is an &quot;objective&quot; test in that it is decided without any reference to what the particular individual being sued actually knew about the law in the particular circumstances presented. A police officer who acts without actually knowing the law does so at his or her peril.