GDPR Legislation and user invites by email I want to understand what the implications are for user emails with the onset of GDPR. It's a bit of a strange question but here is the scenario. We run a Software as a Service platform when a user can invite other users to a team. They do this by email, at which point we have a user's "personal information" in the form of their email and we have issued them an email invite. We have to keep the email address on record for a period of time, say 7 days, for that invite to be accepted at which point we delete it if no action has been taken. I understand the restrictions on me in terms of not marketing to this email address etc. I want to understand if I am even allowed to send the invite email in the first place. That is to say, if someone hasn't explicitly given me their email address, am I allowed to use it. Logic would indicate that this should be fine as it really makes the user experience of inviting people very poor, however, the question has been asked by a member of my team and so I thought I'd seek some clarity.
I'm not entirely sure why you have to store the data of the invited user? You can simply hash the email address. Hashes are meaningless without the original input so that would allow you to store the data. Sending email means that you're processing personal data. In your use case it would fall under Art 6 (f): Legitimate Interest. (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. I do advice you to also follow these guidelines in the submission of the email: https://sendgrid.com/docs/Classroom/Deliver/Address_Lists/peer_initiated_email_invitation_requirements.html
StackExchange is a processor under GDPR because it processes the data you provide it when you sign up and input personal information. It's determined by an analysis of what function(s) the business is performing. If you are merely processing the data but don't have control over it (e.g. another business is using your software to do something with data that it is providing you) then you are likely to be a data processor. Conversely, if you control the data, you are likely to be a data controller. It is possible to be both a data controller and a data processor at the same time. That specific link in your post goes on to state: Our business customers may qualify as controllers when they purchase certain of our products and services. We act as processors on behalf of such Customers. This is referring to the Teams product that StackExchange offers or whatever the &quot;internal company-only question and answer site&quot; product they offer is called.
An app(lication program) is software run on the end-users machine. That does not fall under the GDPR. Any processing (including storage) you do on user data has to be compliant with the GDPR. Allows a user to authenticate via e.g. Facebook and stores some basic data (optional) Authentication via Facebook leaves GDPR compliance to Facebook (AFAIK). It would be a good idea to provide alternative authentication methods, such as Google and an "own account" user name and password so that the user doesn't have to share information with a multinational company in order to use your service. The "basic data" will need to be processed according to the GDPR. As long as the "optional" part is "opt in" (i.e. the user needs to at least click on something) then this means you have permission to process that data. Providing this "basic data" as a JSON or CSV file should meet data portability requirements. Allows a user to upload a GPX file (a route or some other activity) Stores the above file to Google's database Allows the user to analyze that file. Since the user is actively choosing to upload each file you have permission to do this. You should make it clear in your privacy policy that the data will be held by Google. Doing so should not be a problem as Google has set up the legal framework to do this under the GDPR. You don't have to store the information encrypted, but you should use encryption (e.g. HTTPS) for any data transmission. Allowing the user to analyse the file is not an issue; either the user is doing it on their own machine (GDPR irrelevant) or you are doing it under user instruction (meaning you have consent). Since the user has uploaded GPX files they already have data portability on those files. You should tell your users that while you will employ best endeavours you don't promise to keep their files accessible and they should maintain their own private copies. That way if your entire database gets corrupted they can't blame you for loss of data. Finally, make sure there is a "Close my account and delete all my data" option.
If the lawyer has legitimate concerns, his first port of call would be the ICO https://ico.org.uk/. Before the ICO will take his complaint further he'll have had write to you expressing his concerns and received a written response that presumably he is unhappy with, and wants to take the issue further. Most companies have a data compliance team who will have policies and procedures to log breaches like this and decide what course of action to take in response. Not every breach needs to be brought to the attention of the ICO, and they have a handy self assessment tool to see if you should report the breach. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/ In your situation, I don't think this constitutes a serious breach which will require investigating. It's simply an admin error. If it is unlikely to pose a risk to any of the individuals they will say something like: You should keep an internal record of the breach as detailed in Article 33 (5) of the GDPR, including what happened, the effects of the breach and remedial actions taken. The definition of risk according to the ICO is: "This risk exists when the breach may lead to physical, material or non-material damage for the individuals whose data have been breached". So in this case I'd assume a simple apology (Bcc'd :) ) and a record of what happened, how it happened, and the action taken to prevent it happening again should suffice.
This might be based on a misunderstanding of the GDPR. The GDPR applies under three circumstances: Art 3(1): you (the data controller) are established/live in the EU. Art 3(2)(a): you offer goods or services to people in the EU. Art 3(2)(b): you monitor behaviour of people who are physically in the EU. What is not a factor: what citizenship your site visitors have (see Recital 14). whether your site can be accessed from the EU (see Recital 23). The crucial part is what “offering of goods or services” means. The EDPB has issued official guidelines on the interpretation of this targeting criterion (guidelines 03/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR). Some important notes: The offer of goods or services does not have to involve any compensation. Gratis access to a website can also be a service. GDPR applies when targeting people currently in the EU. US tourists in the EU are protected, EU tourists in the US are not. The moment of offering the service matters. E.g. a US person using an US service cannot claim GDPR protection against the US service while travelling to the EU. Instead of looking at the users of the service, we should look at the target market of the service: if the service doesn't cater to people in the EU, GDPR doesn't apply. The essential question is whether the provider of the service “envisages” offering services to people in the EU. Does the service provider intend for EU data subjects to use the service? The guidelines assemble a non-exhaustive list of indications from case law, in particular the Pammer and Alpenhof case. An excerpt of indications that GDPR might apply: the EU or member states are mentioned in the offer of services the website has marketing targetted at an EU audience the activity at issue is of international nature, e.g. tourism mentioning special contact details for the EU market using a top-level domain name associated with the EU or member states travel instructions when visiting from the EU mentions of an international clientele including people/companies from the EU use of a language or currency other than yours offering delivery of goods to the EU So whether GDPR applies would depend on the subject matter of your website, and on whether you intend to participate in the EU market (even if only online, even if your service is gratis). If GDPR were to apply, then blocking people from the EU would be questionable. It might also be illegal, but not on GDPR grounds. If GDPR does not apply, then blocking people from the EU is already unnecessary. However, geoblocking would be a very strong indication that you don't intend to offer your services to people in the EU. There is no good case law on whether geoblocking is necessary or sufficient. I assume that geoblocking is sufficient (even if it can be easily circumvented e.g. with a VPN), but that it's not necessary in the first place. You could also re-emphasize that you're not targeting the EU market when considering the above indications. E.g. a web shop might clarify that they only ship to North America, but not internationally. Again: your targeting of your website is the crucial factor, not the origin of your visitors. So even if there is an occasional EU visitor, that doesn't mean you have to comply with GDPR.
IP addresses are personal data. That means you need a legal basis to process them, but not necessarily consent from the user. That IP addresses should be treated as personal data in most contexts is clear, regardless of whether you can associate the IP address with a user ID. That you make such an association affirms that both the IP address and user ID are personal data in your context though. As the answers in the questions you linked indicate, there are alternative legal bases to consent. The GDPR offers a choice of six legal bases (Art 6(1) lit a–f). In most cases, you would instead rely on a “legitimate interest” for logging. But it's not enough to claim that you have a legitimate interest. You must have a clear purpose for which such logs would be necessary, and you would then have to weigh this legitimate interest against the interests, rights, and freedoms of the affected data subjects. If such logs are necessary for security and anti-abuse purposes, your legitimate interest test is likely to prevail. However, you must limit retention of the logged data and the included information to what is actually necessary. For example, keeping user IDs in there might not be necessary. If the association of IP addresses and user IDs is not necessary for a legitimate interest, then you would indeed need consent. Discussion on why IP addresses are personal data. You see many answers and opinions that IP addresses might not be personal data. Some of these are technically correct, but most are misinformed or outdated. I know only a single well-informed person that still disagrees. For everyone else such as the EU Commission, IP addresses are clearly personal data. Under the GDPR, personal data is any information that relates to an (indirectly) identifiable natural person. In the context of log files we can assume that the entries usually “relate” to a person, namely the person making the request. The exception would be requests triggered by automated systems. The more interesting question is whether the person to which the log entry relates is identifiable. While the GDPR does provide further guidance on the concept of identification in Recital 26, it does not provide clear unambiguous criteria. Thus, there is lots of debate about what that precisely means. One approach is to sidestep that debate and and notice that the GDPR's definition of personal data explicitly notes that a person might be identified “in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier” (Art 4(1)). Another but otherwise unrelated part of the GDPR mentions “internet protocol addresses, cookie identifiers or other identifiers such as radio frequency identification tags” as examples of online identifiers (Recital 30). We can also look more deeply into Recital 26 and see that “singling out” already counts as identification. We can use the IP address to single out one person's log entries from the set of log entries, so this could be interpreted as meaning that any stable user ID renders the data personal data – and an IP address is sufficiently stable in this context. Another part of Recital 26 says that we must consider “all the means reasonably likely to be used” for identification, even if this involves additional information from third parties. This phrasing is virtually identical to the GDPR's predecessor, the EU Data Protection Directive. On the basis of that DPD, the EU's top court (ECJ/CJEU) was asked to rule on the question whether dynamic IP addresses are personal data (the Breyer case, C‑582/14, judgement from 2016-10-19). It said yes. “It did not say yes”, some people will object. And they are technically correct. When someone rents an internet connection from an ISP, the ISP will have logs that connect the user's real-world identity to the IP address they were assigned at a time. You don't have access to the ISP's logs. But, if that user violated your rights (e.g. a cyberattack or copyright infringement), then you could (depending on civil vs criminal matters) report this to the appropriate authorities or to petition the court and they would have the right to order the ISP to disclose this information. The CJEU said that if this chain (you → authorities → ISP → user identity) is grounded in law, then the IP address would be identifiable. But whether there are suitable laws to compel the ISP to disclose this data would be up to national laws, and the CJEU doesn't concern itself with that. Spoiler: such laws are pretty common. To summarize typical objections: The IP address doesn't relate to a person: Can be a valid objection, but is not typically the case for user-facing web services. The Recital 30 argument is not valid because it's about profiling, not identification, and it only says that IP addresses may be used for profiling, not that they are always identifying: Technically correct, but I think that Recital 30 merely expresses the implied understanding that of course an IP address is an online identifier and permits identification by itself. “Singling out” does not apply because SOME_REASON: Indeed, this is an ill-defined term with no case law to guide us. However, regulators such as the EDPB and their predecessor WP29 routinely use “singling out” to mean being able to distinguish one person's data from other people's data. An IP address lets us do that. The Breyer judgement is not applicable because the defendant in that case was the German state, and the state has other legal means than ordinary website operators: Nothing in that case was specific to the website operator being a state or other authority. If the website operator can contact the appropriate authority and if they have the right to order the ISP to disclose the relevant data, then the IP address is identifiable. The CJEU didn't say “yes” in Breyer, it said “if”. So I'll take that as a “no”: The CJEU concerns itself with the interpretation of EU law, not with national laws. Specifically in the Breyer case, lower courts confirmed that German law has the necessary means. In other EU member states, further checks would be necessary but it would surprise me if there wouldn't be equivalent subpoena powers. If the ISP doesn't have the data, then the IP addresses are anonymous: Indeed, the CJEU scenario collapses if there is no additional data to be linked with the IP address. However: The CJEU used this scenario as an example to show that IP addresses can be identifiable. If that particular scenario fails, there could be other scenarios that still allow identification. The question of whether IP addresses are identifiable had of course been the subject of wider debate at the time. That the GDPR explicitly mentions IP addresses can be seen as a reaction to this debate. Thus, in a sense, the Breyer case is moot. It is still useful as an explanation of how broad “reasonably likely means” must be interpreted.
The obligation to notify the supervisory authority (CNIL in your case) no longer exists. It was part of the previous regulatory framework, but it is not part of GDPR (which takes affect tomorrow). If you use CCTV that may monitor employees (i.e. they sometimes enter the HQ to consult with the owner), your obligations under the GDPR is basically to inform the employees that the CCTV cameras are there. I.e. Data subjects are entitled to understand when their personal data is being processed, covering the transparency aspect of processing. The use of CCTV must be communicated via signage which indicates the areas covered and instructions for further information.
The GDPR has a fairly broad concept of personal data: any information that relates to an identifiable person. This is far more than directly identifiable information! The concept of identifiability is further explained in Recital 26: To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. So indirectly linkable information can still be personal data. In your example, that ID can be easily re-identified with a particular person if you know who the secretary was between 2012 and 2014. It is quite likely that there are members in the club with this knowledge, or that this information can be gained from public sources like newspaper reports. Thus, you should assume that your member IDs are at most pseudonyms, but not anonymous. They are likely still personal data. However, it doesn't necessarily follow that you would have to erase everything. Art 17 comes with lots of caveats and exceptions. For example, if you are processing this personal data under a legitimate interest, and someone requests erasure, you might have overriding grounds to continue processing anyway. E.g. such a legitimate interest could involve security or auditability purposes. There might also be such a legitimate interest for keeping some history for the club, but there would have to be a decision based on the individual circumstances. Furthermore, you can of course retain data e.g. due to a legal obligation, or when this information is necessary for the establishment of or defence against legal claims. I understand your desire to keep some data around. Instead of asking “do I have to delete this?” it might be more productive to consider “under which legal basis can I keep this?”. I think you might have a legitimate interest, but you'd have to carry out a balancing test between the various interests and rights. A really problematic approach would be to hold on to de-identified data in the belief that it no longer were personal data. Such a belief is usually mistaken. True anonymization that meets the GDPR's definition is really hard, in particular because you would also have to prevent indirect identification, also by other actors than yourself. There are theoretical models that can help with anonymization, e.g. with k-anonymization methods you'd ensure that there are no unique records in the DB. But this can be tricky to apply correctly, so I'd recommend to only treat aggregate statistics as truly anonymous. In 2012, the ICO has published an anonymization code of practice (PDF). It is no longer up to date with the current legal environment (in particular since the GDPR has expanded the concept of identifiability), but it provides a good overview of both the difficulties of preventing re-identification and an overview of potential solutions.