Can prosecutors and/or judges be sued for dereliction of duty when they change charges to avoid a jury trial? Scenario (Utah, USA): A defendant is arraigned at a pre-trial hearing. Charges include driving without insurance and driving with an expired license. State law declares that those who do these things are guilty of misdemeanors in each case, and prescribes a minimum penalty for each if found guilty. The defendant expresses a desire for a trial, and seeing that these are criminal charges, he exercises his State and Federal Constitutional right to a jury trial to respond to those charges. The judge immediately prevaricates and solicits input from the prosecutor, who promptly adjusts the charges to &quot;infractions&quot;. The judge then repeatedly affirms that a jury trial is not an option because no criminal charges are being made, despite criminal charges having been the cause of the arraignment. The judge attempts to coerce either a bench trial or a plea deal, repeatedly saying that since no criminal charges are being made, no jury trial can be arranged. The State Constitution also says that &quot;All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation&quot;. In the same jurisdiction, people arraigned with identical initial charges and with comparable evidences against them have been charged as misdemeanors, pled guilty or issued a plea in abeyance, and were convicted by a bench trial with no further findings beyond police reports or pulling their traffic records, and were left with a criminal record on account of the conviction, and required to pay a commensurate fine and being required to conform to additional sentencing. Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges?
Can the prosecutor and/or the judge be sued for dereliction of duty, and for non-uniform application of the law? No. Judges and prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for their actions in the course of their duties in connection with the court process. Prosecutors have effectively absolute discretion in their charging decisions and in their decisions to reduce the charges sought against a defendant (prior to jeopardy attaching when a jury is sworn in). Can the outcome of a bench trial be appealed on grounds that the judge did not inform the defendant of his rights Yes. or that his rights were taken away by unwarranted modification of the charges? No. Incidentally, there is no federal constitutional right to a jury trial in a case where six months or less of incarceration is sought as a penalty, and there is no federal constitutional right to counsel unless incarceration is a possible penalty. The Utah State Constitution distinguishes between criminal matters and non-criminal matters in several respects mostly found in the state's bill of Rights (Article I of the State Constitution) in Sections 8, 10, 12, 13, and 19. But, it is fundamentally the right of the state through its prosecutors to decide what charges to press against someone, and they are well within their rights to change their minds. Often, this will be in your favor because reducing an offense to a civil infraction rather than a misdemeanor will have far fewer collateral consequences related to having a criminal record.
The judge would reject the defendant's guilty plea and proceed to trial. This is a common part of a plea colloquy, which is a standard (often scripted) conversation that occurs between the judge and a defendant who is pleading guilty to ensure that the plea is voluntary and made with knowledge of its possible consequences. It seeks to ensure that the defendant is aware of what they're charged with and the consequences of their plea, and that they were not improperly pressured into pleading guilty—for example, because they felt that their lawyer wasn't doing a good enough job. This is required by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11, which requires that: Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement) Many (possibly most/all) US states have similar rules. For example, Pennsylvania law states that &quot;The judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and shall not accept it unless the judge determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly tendered.&quot; Examples of scripted questions to establish this include: Are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation, and advice given to you in this case by your attorney, Mr./Ms. __________? Are you satisfied with the services of your lawyer? [ Mr./Ms. defendant ], are you satisfied with the representation you have received from [ Mr./Ms. defense counsel]? If the defendant answered that they were not satisfied (and continued to give that answer when informed of the consequences of doing so, as occurred in the below example), the judge would reject the guilty plea and proceed to trial. It's remarkably difficult to find a case in which anyone has actually done this. The only one I could find was this New Jersey case in which the &quot;defendant would not agree on the form that he was satisfied with defense counsel's work.&quot; The judge informed the defendant in various ways that this would lead to the plea being rejected and proceeding to trial: Now, if you are not satisfied with your lawyer, I cannot take your plea bargain, sir. ... The only other thing I can do is schedule you for trial, Mr. Cuevas, which you are entitled to. Now, if you are not satisfied with your lawyer, I cannot take your plea bargain, sir. I can't take your plea after you're telling me that you're dissatisfied with your lawyer. If I can't take your plea because it's not appropriate and it's not legal, the only other thing I can do is schedule the case for trial.
Yes. Juries aren't terribly accurate. There is an irreducible chance that no matter how clear the outcome should be that the jury will get it wrong. Based upon a review of the academic literature on wrongful convictions and inaccurate acquittals, I generally tell my clients that this is about 10%. Many people think that this is a low end estimate. Also, sometimes a jury will acquit a defendant in a case where they think that the defendant was actually legally guilty because of extraordinary circumstances, and so the jury will disregard the law and acquit. This practice is called &quot;jury nullification.&quot; And, as other answers have noted, sometimes the prosecution or the judicial system screws up for reasons that are unforeseeable, after a not guilty plea, in a way that makes proving your guilt difficult or impossible. Basically, if you &quot;roll the dice&quot; there is some non-zero chance you will be acquitted, while if you plead guilty, there is none. Also, sometimes court decisions will change the law in way favorable to you after the trial, and as long as your case is still on direct appeal from the conviction, you can benefit from those changes in the law, which you cannot if you simply plead guilty without any concessions. Likewise, if you are innocent and the evidence is currently strongly against you, but you wish to preserve the ability to later attack the conviction based upon future newly discovered evidence, not pleading guilty is generally necessary to preserve that option. Another circumstance where going to trial but losing can still be worth it, is where there are extenuating circumstances that make your conduct understandable, even if it is not a legally valid defense. Getting these facts in front of the judge in a fuller fashion, as a trial can make possible, can convince the judge that while you are legally guilty, that you deserve leniency. Going to trial typically results in a longer sentence, even without a plea bargain, however, so going forward with a hopeless trial is rarely a good move.
When the jury is sworn in united-states Jeopardy is said to &quot;attach&quot; when the jury has been sworn in, or if it is a non-jury trial, when the judge first starts to hear evidence after a witness has been sworn. At that point the trial has begun, and a new trial would normally constitute double jeopardy, which is not allowed under the Fifth Amendment to the US Federal Constitution. Jeopardy also attaches when when a court accepts a defendant's guilty plea unconditionally, and thereby ends the case (on acceptance of a plea, see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975)). Exceptions There are several exceptions to the double jeopardy rule. If the defendant requests or agrees to a dismissal, and agrees that it will be &quot;without prejudice&quot;. This is unusual, as a defendant will not usually agree to a dismissal without prejudice, which specifically means that the case may be brought again if the state chooses to do so. If the first trial and the second are under different sovereignties. For instance, if one trial is by a state and the other is by the Federal Government. Or if one trial is by state A, and the other by a different state B. Or if one trial was in a court of some nation other than the US. The Double Jeopardy rule only applies if both trials are under the same government. A mistrial due to a hung jury (see United States v. Josef Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579 (1824)) or due to procedural error, misconduct (by a person other than the posecutor or judge), or a situation beyond the control of the court, such as: civil disorder; the illness or death of an attorney or a juror; Disqualification of a juror. If the two trials are for legally different offenses, even thoguh both are based on the same underlying facts. See United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378 (1992), where the US Supreme Court held that: a[n]…offense and a conspiracy to commit that offense are not the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. If a conviction was overturned on appeal and remanded for a new trial If the defendant was never truly in jeopardy at the first trial. The classic case is that of Harry Aleman in which the judge in the fist trial was bribed to manipulate the proceedings so that Aleman would be acquitted. See Could double jeopardy protect a murderer who bribed the judge and jury to be declared not guilty? and this Wikipedia article as well as this other article. The case was Aleman v. Judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998). The Aleman case may be the only instance in which this rule has been applied. See also When is a trial considered to have happened vis-a-vis double jeopardy? Sources Online Articles Findlaw's page: &quot;When Does Double Jeopardy Attach?&quot; states: Double jeopardy protections in the U.S. Constitution keep criminal defendants from being prosecuted twice for the same offense. But the protection does not “attach” itself to a case immediately when a defendant is charged, nor does it necessarily end upon conviction. Once someone is charged with a crime, jeopardy attaches at the following stages: When the jury is sworn; When the first witness is sworn (for cases tried by a judge without a jury); When the court first hears evidence in a juvenile proceeding; or When the court accepts a plea agreement between a defendant and a prosecutor. The Justia article &quot;Protections Against Double Jeopardy for Criminal Defendants&quot; states: One of the core protections for criminal defendants is the double jeopardy rule provided by the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The short version of the rule is that you cannot be prosecuted more than once for the same crime. It prevents prosecution for the same crime after an acquittal or a conviction, and it also prevents imposing multiple punishments for the same crime. However, double jeopardy becomes much more complex in some circumstances. The obvious application of double jeopardy is when law enforcement finds new evidence of the defendant’s guilt after the jury has already acquitted them. The prosecution cannot charge them again, even if the evidence shows that they probably are guilty. Another situation in which double jeopardy is clear is when a judge tries to sentence a defendant for a crime for which they have already served their sentence. ... Double jeopardy does not attach until the court swears in the jury, or until the first witness starts to testify in a trial before a judge. Filing charges thus does not trigger the rule. Double jeopardy attaches in a bench trial as soon as the first trial witness is sworn in. ... The federal and state governments can prosecute a defendant separately for the same conduct without violating the double jeopardy rule. Multiple states also can pursue separate prosecutions. Protection attaches only for prosecutions by the same sovereign. The dual sovereignty rule means that a defendant can face prosecution by both the state and the federal government, although often one will defer to the other. The federal government may have a right to prosecute a crime that did not cross state boundaries, occur on federal property, or violate a specific federal law, as long as it had some connection to interstate commerce or another area controlled by the federal government. The Nolo article &quot;The Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy&quot; states: The government must place a defendant &quot;in jeopardy&quot; for the Fifth Amendment clause to apply. The simple filing of criminal charges doesn't cause jeopardy to &quot;attach&quot;—the proceedings must get to a further stage. Indeed, in many cases, the prosecution can drop charges through dismissal or nolle prosequi, then later refile them. Generally, jeopardy attaches when the court swears in the jury. In a trial before a judge, jeopardy normally attaches after the first witness takes the oath and begins to testify. Case Law [Footnotes generally omitted] Serfass (1975) in Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975) the US Supreme Court wrote [Page 420 U. S. 388] As an aid to the decision of cases in which the prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause has been invoked, the courts have found it useful to define a point in criminal proceedings at which the constitutional purposes and policies are implicated by resort to the concept of &quot;attachment of jeopardy.&quot; See United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 480. In the case of a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is empaneled and sworn. Downum v. United States, 372 U. S. 734 (1963); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458 (1973). In a nonjury trial, jeopardy attaches when the court begins to hear evidence. McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (CA10 1936). See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 336 U. S. 688 (1949). The Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach, and the constitutional prohibition can have no application, until a defendant is &quot;put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.&quot; United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 479. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100, 195 U. S. 128, 130-131 (1904); United States v. Macdonald, 207 U. S. 120, 207 U. S. 127 (1907); Bassing v. Cady, 208 U. S. 386, 208 U. S. 391-392 (1908); Collins v. Loisel, 262 U. S. 426, 262 U. S. 429 (1923). ... Petitioner's defense was raised before trial precisely because &quot;trial of the facts surrounding the commission of the alleged offense would be of no assistance in determining&quot; its validity. United States v. Covington, 395 U. S. 57, 395 U. S. 60 (1969). See Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12(b)(1). [Footnote 13] His motion to postpone the trial was premised on the belief that &quot;the expeditious administration of justice will be served best by considering the Motion [to dismiss the indictment] prior to trial.&quot; At no time during or following the hearing on petitioner's motion to dismiss the indictment did the District Court have jurisdiction to do more than grant or deny that motion, and neither before nor after the ruling did jeopardy attach. ... [Pages 420 U. S. 390-392] It is true that we have disparaged &quot;rigid, mechanical&quot; rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U. S. 458, 410 U. S. 467 (1973). However, we also observed in that case that &quot;the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.&quot; Ibid. Cf. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 303. Implicit in the latter statement is the premise that the &quot;constitutional policies underpinning the Fifth Amendment's guarantee&quot; are not implicated before that point in the proceedings at which &quot;jeopardy attaches.&quot; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 400 U. S. 480. As we have noted above, the Court has consistently adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach until a defendant is &quot;put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.&quot; Id. at 400 U. S. 479. This is by no means a mere technicality, nor is it a &quot;rigid, mechanical&quot; rule. It is, of course, like most legal rules, an attempt to impart content to an abstraction. When a criminal prosecution is terminated prior to trial, an accused is often spared much of the expense, delay, strain, and embarrassment which attend a trial. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 355 U. S. 187-188; United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 479. Although an accused may raise defenses or objections before trial which are &quot;capable of determination without the trial of the general issue,&quot; Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12(b)(1), and although he must raise certain other defenses or objections before trial, Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 12(b)(2), in neither case is he &quot;subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction.&quot; Green v. United States, supra, at 355 U. S. 187. Moreover, in neither case would an appeal by the United States &quot;allow the prosecutor to seek to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after having failed with the first.&quot; United States v. Wilson, ante, at 420 U. S. 352. See United States v. Jorn, supra, at 400 U. S. 484. Both the history of the Double Jeopardy Clause and its terms demonstrate that it does not come into play until a proceeding begins before a trier &quot;having jurisdiction to try the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused.&quot; Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. at 195 U. S. 133. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. at 398 U. S. 329. Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy. [Emphasis added] Jorn (1971) In United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) the judge found that several prosecution witnesses had not been (or might not have been) sufficiently informed of their rights against self-incrimination nor warned of the dangers they might incur by testifying. [Page 400 U. S. 473] The [trial] judge, expressing the view that any warnings that might have been given were probably inadequate, proceeded to discharge the jury; he then called all the taxpayers [potential witnesses] into court, and informed them of their constitutional rights and of the considerable dangers of unwittingly making damaging admissions in these factual circumstances. Finally, he aborted the trial so the witnesses could consult with attorneys. When the case was brought up for retrial, the defendant argued that such a retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy clause. the US Supreme Court wrote: [Page 400 U. S. 474-5] The issue is whether appellee had been &quot;put in jeopardy&quot; by virtue of the impaneling of the jury in the first proceeding before the declaration of mistrial. In Sisson, supra, the opinion of the Court ... concluded, inter alia, that the &quot;put in jeopardy&quot; language applied whenever the jury had been impaneled, even if the defendant might constitutionally have been retried under the double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment. 399 U.S. at 399 U. S. 302-307. [Emphasis added] ... [Page 400 U. S. 476-7] But it does not follow from the nonappealability of rulings which are essentially interlocutory insofar as they expressly contemplate resumption of the prosecution that Congress intended to foreclose governmental appeal from the sustaining of a later motion in bar on the trial judge's conclusion that constitutional double jeopardy policies require that the earlier mistrial ruling now be accorded the effect of barring reprosecution. ... [Page 400 U. S. 479-481] The Fifth Amendment's prohibition against placing a defendant &quot;twice in jeopardy&quot; represents a constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit in federal criminal proceedings. [Footnote 8] A power in government to subject the individual to repeated prosecutions for the same offense would cut deeply into the framework of procedural protections which the Constitution establishes for the conduct of a criminal trial. And society's awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. Both of these considerations are expressed in Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 184, 355 U. S. 187-188 (1957), where the Court noted that the policy underlying this provision is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though innocent, he may be found guilty. These considerations have led this Court to conclude that a defendant is placed in jeopardy in a criminal proceeding once the defendant is put to trial before the trier of the facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge. See Green v. United States, supra, at 355 U. S. 188; Wade v. Hunter, 336 U. S. 684, 336 U. S. 688 (1949). [Emphasis added] But it is also true that a criminal trial is, even in the best of circumstances, a complicated affair to manage. The proceedings are dependent in the first instance on the most elementary sort of considerations, e.g., the health of the various witnesses, parties, attorneys, jurors, etc., all of whom must be prepared to arrive at the courthouse at set times. And when one adds the scheduling problems arising from case overloads, and the Sixth Amendment's requirement that the single trial to which the double jeopardy provision restricts the Government be conducted speedily, it becomes readily apparent that a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial whenever circumstances compel the discharge of a jury without the defendant's consent would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal security and freedom from governmental harassment which such a mechanical rule would provide. [Emphasis added] As the Court noted in Wade v. Hunter, supra, at 336 U. S. 689, a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some circumstances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.&quot; Thus, the conclusion that &quot;jeopardy attaches&quot; when the trial commences expresses a judgment that the constitutional policies underpinning the Fifth Amendment's guarantee are implicated at that point in the proceedings. The question remains, however, in what circumstances retrial is to be precluded when the initial proceedings are aborted prior to verdict without the defendant's consent. [*Emphasis added] In dealing with that question, this Court has, for the most part, explicitly declined the invitation of litigants to formulate rules based on categories of circumstances which will permit or preclude retrial. Thus, in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 (1824), this Court held that a defendant in a capital case might be retried after the trial judge had, without the defendant's consent, discharged a jury that reported itself unable to agree.
If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error."
united-states In U.S. practice in almost all jurisdictions, court orders must be memorialized in a signed or electronically signed writing transmitted to the parties and/or counsel. But, this can be a bare recitation of the result. The extent to which it must be reasoned is discretionary, and the reasoning can be supplied by an oral statement of the judge in lieu of a writing. Oral statements of reasoning in lieu of written judgments are common in courts of limited jurisdiction comparable to English County Courts, but written opinions are issued now and then in more complex cases or where legal issues were argued in closing arguments. A ruling of a judge sitting without a jury may be vacated and remanded by an appellate court for further proceedings, if the factual and legal basis for the ruling is not articulated with sufficient clarity to allow an appellate court to determine if the trial court's decision was legally correct and supported by the trial court record. Juries, of course, are not requires to articulate their reasoning and enter a bare verdict of liability and damages, or guilty and not guilty as to each charge (and in rare instances also answer one or more &quot;special verdict&quot; questions) in the manner set forth on the jury verdict form provided to the jury. In limited jurisdiction courts where the sole appeal is a trial de novo in a higher court, called &quot;courts not of record&quot;, a written statement of reasons is unnecessary as any appeal will not be based upon the trial court record.
Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).
I will assume that your question pertains to the United States. In other jurisdictions, different rules could apply. Context matters. The usual penalty for spoliation of evidence (the technical term for what you describe) in a civil case is a judicial determination or jury instruction that the evidence destroyed would have established the relevant part of the other side's case had it not been destroyed. In all of these cases, your failure to take affirmative action to preserve the evidence once you knew that there was a bona fide likelihood that you would be sued could be held against you by making an adverse determination that the evidence would have been unfavorable to you and possibly also money sanctions. You could not be held in contempt of court for this if these events happened before a case was commenced. In a criminal case, where you are a defendant, you have an absolute right to not incriminate yourself and do not have to take affirmative action to preserve evidence, although this right is limited to criminal cases and your failure to preserve evidence can still be held against you in a civil case. Certainly, in situation 4 you are a potential criminal defendant, so the 5th Amendment protection would apply. In situations 1 and 2, where the precautions were not put in place to facilitate a crime, the 5th Amendment would protect you if you were a potential criminal defendant, but suppose that you are a bystander like a third party ISP representative. If you were a third party, at a minimum you would have to be put on notice of the police need for the evidence, would probably have had to have had the police ask you for the evidence, and of course, would have to be aware that the destruction was imminent and have the power to prevent that destruction. If all those conditions were present, you might be guilty of obstruction of justice (there are precedents for inaction knowing of the consequences in the fact of a police question amounting to obstruction of justice). In situation 3, this kind of action pretty much amounts to being an accessory to some crime before the fact (unless someone was successfully deceived by a very elaborate story) and would likely make anyone involved part of a conspiracy to commit the crime that the destruction of the papers would facilitate. While the papers themselves might have been evidence of a crime or civil wrong, the destruction of the papers might itself be considered part of the crime, regardless of what could be established regarding the actual content of the papers.