Can you be convicted based on the testimony of the victim alone? I am reading a book called "Gender Stereotyping - Transnational Legal Perspectives", which says that: The second case, R. v. Ewanchuk36 (“the Ewanchuk case”), concerned the role of sexual stereotypes in the adjudication of a case related to the sexual assault of a seventeen-year-old female complainant. The complainant alleged that Mr. Steve Brian Ewanchuk, the respondent, had sexually assaulted her. Specifically, she claimed that following a job interview in Ewanchuk’s van, she accepted an invitation to see some of his work in the attached trailer. Upon entering the trailer, the complainant deliberately left the door open, but Ewanchuk reportedly closed and appeared to lock it when he followed her inside. Ewanchuk then allegedly initiated several incidents involving touching, each more intimate than the last. [...] In the trial decision, the complainant was found to be a credible and intelligent witness who had given reliable testimony regarding her nonconsensual encounter with Ewanchuk. Notwithstanding, Ewanchuk was acquitted based on the defense of “implied consent,” a decision later upheld by the Alberta Court of Appeal My question is: can a conviction be based only and solely on the testimony of the victim alone, without any further corroborating evidence? In which jurisdiction is that permissible?
Yes. The jurisdiction I am familiar with is England and Wales. Conviction requires evidence (witness testimony is evidence) which proves the case "beyond reasonable doubt". It is open to the jury to find the witness so convincing that they find that they are sure the defendant committed the crime. In general of course, prosecutors prefer to have some supporting evidence (either additional witnesses, or circumstantial evidence - like DNA.)
Almost certainly not. See, e.g., Lopez-Mendez v. Lexmark Intern., Inc., 680 F.Supp.2d 357, 375 (D.P.R. 2010) &quot;This incident, however, is not sufficient to constitute direct evidence of discriminatory animus...[Defendant's agent]'s anecdote could be interpreted as emphasizing the importance of a positive attitude, rather than plaintiff's interpretation that it expressed a preference for younger male employees...This benign interpretation seems more plausible...In light of these facts, there does not appear to be any evidence on the record that gives a 'high degree of assurance' that discriminatory animus was behind the decision to terminate plaintiff&quot; (emphasis added). NOTE: OP's original question was simply whether listing 'positive attitude' on a job description was illegal. OP has now changed the question to whether making employment decisions based on a depressed individual's lack of a positive attitude is illegal. Although I have great sympathy for those with mental illness and personally wish the law were different, my answer is still that this is almost certainly legal. Another example of a court finding attitude to be a legitimate reason upon which to base employment decisions is: Martin v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 126 F.Supp.2d 809 (M.D. Pa 2000). In this case, the court accepted as a legitimate reason for promoting one individual over another that the promoted individual &quot;demonstrated good interpersonal skills.&quot; Id. at 817. A third example is Lloyd v. Swifty Transp., Inc., 552 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2009). In this case, the Seventh Circuit explicitly noted that &quot;[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and we will not second-guess that decision.&quot; Id. at 601. It then went on to affirm dismissal of the plaintiff's ADA claim because the employer &quot;said that lead drivers must have knowledge of the mechanics of the trucks and be able to manage the other drivers on the truck through a positive attitude and ability to get along well with others. But the supervisors in charge of hiring lead drivers testified without contradiction that [the plaintiff] had a negative attitude that drew complaints from other drivers.&quot; Id. at 601-602 (emphasis added). After a relatively exhaustive search, I've found no case to counter these pretty clear statements that basing employment decisions on 'attitude' is legal. FURTHER NOTE: OP has now modified the question again to add the qualification that the lack of a positive attitude &quot;doesn't prevent the employee from doing their job.&quot; IF this were actually true, then the answer likely becomes that illegal discrimination has occurred because then the employee would be 'otherwise qualified' (a key phrase in employment law litigation). BUT, there is an inherent contradiction in premises in OP's question now because if X is a requirement of a job, and Y employee cannot do X because of Z, then Z is preventing Y employee from doing that job. In other words, if a job requires a positive attitude, then one can't do that job without a positive attitude. Ultimately, what OP's question is really trying to get at is 'what if the employer makes 'positive attitude' a job requirement, but I don't think it should be a job requirement?' Unfortunately, there's almost certainly no legal recourse for this as long as it's a legal job requirement because, to reiterate the 7th Circuit, &quot;[t]he employer, not a court, determines what functions are essential, and [a court] will not second-guess that decision.&quot; Id. at 601.
This is entirely possible in a number of different motions that could have been made. At this point, Vinny had destroyed the Prosecutor's eyewitnesses by showing they had issues that called their testimony into question (The first has a timeline that doesn't line up with events, the second has poor vision and her prescription glasses were not doing their job, and the third had many obstructions blocking his view of the scene). His first witness tears apart the &quot;expert&quot; witness, who was only there to testify that the tires were the same brand (albeit, a popular brand at the time... loads of cars had the same tires). While it might go by a different name in different jurisdictions, the Prosecutor is allowed to make a motion to dismiss at any point prior to the jury goes to deliberation (as is the Defense; Also they might be able to make motions while the jury is in deliberations). If properly titled, the Prosecutor should have made a &quot;motion for nolle prosequi&quot; (not prosecuting). This can mean any number of things including the prosecutor no longer believes the evidence can prove the charges OR even that the prosecutor is no longer convinced that those charged committed the crime. In the &quot;My Cousin Vinny&quot; case, as the jury was seated the case cannot be retried by the State of Alabama at this point. This is possible because the Prosecutor's duty is to uncover the truth behind a crime, no matter what that truth becomes. In this case, despite his previous beliefs, the prosecutor in My Cousin Vinny, upon realizing he was wrong, admitted it and dropped the charges. Given his backstory of having worked as a defense attorney and making the switch after getting a client off some serious charges (and knowing the client was guilty) shows that he was inherently an honest man and dedicated to finding the truth of the matter (as a government employee, he undoubtedly took a pay cut when he switched to prosecution. Private industry almost always pays way more than a government equivalent). With that in mind, it is expected of prosecutors to be perfectly honest with what evidence they have and make the choices in the case based on that evidence. This comes up in another scene when Mona Lisa Vito explains to Vinny that the prosecutor was required to give Vinny all the files he had on the case... because Vinny, by representing the Defendant, is allowed to examine all evidence against his clients. The only dirty trick he pulled was the stunt where his expert witness was not disclosed and while bad, really it's the judge allowing the witness to testify that would have caused a problem with the trial (his response to Vinny's objection could have created a mistrial on appeal). To give a real world example, I was charged with driving on a suspended license which I had no idea I was doing at the time. As it turned out, the license was suspended for an unpaid traffic ticket that I had paid in the last minute... essentially the DMV forgot to unsuspend. A quick call fixed that issue but I still had to go to court over the charge. The day of the trial, I show up in the court room and the prosecutor walks over and tells me that they were going to enter a motion of &quot;nolle prosequi&quot; for the charge... essentially dropping it... because the matter was a clerical error on the state's part and not anything I did wrong. Edit: Additionally had the prosecutor not motioned to dismiss, Vinny certainly could have. In fact there are two points during the trial where Defense attorneys are expected to make these motions. The first is when the Prosecution rests their case. The second is before the jury is given the case to deliberate. As for why it was called a motion to dismiss in the film, it's likely to due with the fact that the audience would not know what a &quot;motion for nolle prosecui&quot; and it is a type of motion to dismiss.
united-states Yes and no, that is, the courts have extensive powers to compel testimony, but there are rules about doing so. This article addresses the question of expert testimony. Suppose you want an expert to testify, then Rule 26(a)(2)(B) applies, requiring disclosure of the information to be disclosed, along with a written report. It could be nearly impossible to provide the required information without the cooperation of the expert. Furthermore, under Rule 45(d)(3)(B)(ii), a subpoena can be quashed, which the article summarizes in terms of the objections that Testimony about an expert’s findings may impact or limit an expert’s ability to conduct research Testimony about an expert’s work may be unethical, if the work is not completed, peer reviewed, or otherwise in a “publishable” format The subpoena and resultant testimony could put the expert at a competitive disadvantage Work required to adequately prepare for such testimony is overly burdensome The subpoena and subsequent testimony may put the unwilling expert in a controversial or otherwise uncomfortable position In a specific instance of subpoenaing an involuntary witness, the court in In Re: World Trade Center Lower Manhattan Disaster Site Litigation addressed a motion to compel expert testimony. The opinion lays out various powers of the court to compel a &quot;non-retained&quot; expert witness, including the &quot;substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship&quot;. There is a complex weighing of factors here, which is resolved at the finding that &quot;Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Non-Retained Experts' testimony is unique&quot; so the petition to compel testimony was denied, but the affiliated research center was compelled to disclose the underlying data. So it depends on the circumstances, see Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811.
Is it true that a suit of defamation could require “very little effort”? No. Definitely not. The Wikipedia article (and understandably the comment on which it is premised) leaves out many details about substantive and procedural law which are essential in US jurisdictions. For instance, the [Wikipedia] item of "1. accusing someone of a crime" is insufficient for the falsehoods to be considered defamation per se. The crime of which one is falsely accused needs to be considered an infamous crime or involve moral turpitude. Under [US] defamation law, a crime is deemed serious or infamous when it is classified as felony or its punishment could exceed one year of prison. The case law cited in Lakin v. Rund, 896 N.W.2d 76 (2016) reflects how this criterion is uniform among US jurisdictions. Another difficult issue in defamation lawsuits is the need to prove the defendant's mental state known as actual malice. Even where there is clear proof of a defamer's actual malice, a plaintiff can be denied justice because of judge's arbitrary choice to side with the defendant (just like with non-defamation lawsuits). For case law from various jurisdictions regarding defamation law and actual malice, you might want to see the citations in my briefs in the SCOTUS here and here. Most of the records in regard to the latter case are available here. Defamation lawsuits are not exempt of having to comply with the procedural laws involved in judicial proceedings either, nor is the discovery, drafting, or legal research any simpler for being a lawsuit about defamation. In the context of the comments that prompted your question here, the "repeated violations" that SE imputed to former moderator Monica would hardly be grounds for a viable lawsuit against SE for defamation per se or otherwise. Here are some reasons: Rejecting a policy of gender pronouns such as the one SE seeks to impose is not considered an infamous crime. There is no legislation to that effect, at least yet. An actual refusal to adhere to that policy hardly involves moral turpitude. Far from involving corruption (i.e., moral turpitude), the controversy about gender pronouns touches on some of a person's deepest beliefs. Thus, the "offense" of opposing such a policy cannot be said to constitute an act of moral turpitude. The previous two items rule out a viable claim of defamation per se. Thus, Monica would have to prove that SE's falsehoods about her (whatever they are) caused her concrete losses (a typical example is lost income) by prompting others to dissociate from her. I am unaware of whether Monica's situation would fit in this scenario. You are right in that a claim of mental distress is not viable either. Note from here or here that in a claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) (1) the conduct must be intentional and reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe Any claims of harassment that might be available to Monica would not be against SE, but against the specific individuals who engaged in harassing her directly. Depending on the methods and severity of the harassment, Monica might be able to obtain injunctive relief --typically in the form of restraining orders-- against those specific individuals. It is noteworthy that not all criticism or heckling at or about Monica would be cognizable as harassment.
Basically, it is up to the court. The relevant law is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE). You don't give much in the way of specifics, but it sounds like you confessed something to the police at the side of the road immediately after the accident, and now wish to dispute that confession. If you are taken to court and the police want to introduce your confession as evidence then you (through your lawyer) can ask the court to rule it out. You may be able to do so on a number of grounds. Was the confession properly recorded at the time? Were you treated in an oppressive manner, such that you felt you had to say what the police wanted to hear. Did you think you might get more favourable treatment if you said what the police wanted? For instance, did you think you might be allowed to go home once they were satisfied? Were you given a proper rest, or were you in a mental state that might cause you to say things without understanding the consequences (it sounds like this would be your main argument, but consider the others too). [Edit] If you needed medical treatment that would also be relevant. Were you properly cautioned (that speech beginning "You do not have to say anything...") before the police asked you questions. If you think you may be facing criminal charges then you should get yourself a lawyer sooner rather than later. A lawyer will know all about this and be able to navigate the relevant legal processes on your behalf. A bit of background: back in the 1970s the police frequently attributed incriminating statements to suspects when arrested, such as "Its a fair cop, guv", or "Who ratted on us?". The rules in PACE were made to stop such "verballing".
A lawyer for either party can claim, during argument, that an adverse witness is not credible, for any reason or none. Often the lawyer will point to matters disclosed during cross-examination, claiming that they are contradictions, show bias, or otherwise indicate lack of credibility. Or the lawyer could point to elements of the primary testimony which the lawyer claims are implausible. If there has be evidence of a prior conviction, the lawyer could refer to this. A lawyer may in general ask a witness about prior convictions. Criminal convictions are generally matters of public record, and can be researched. It is not usual to present reputation or credibility witnesses for any person except the defendant, and failure to do so, even for the defendant, does not lead to any automatic assumption of lack of credibility. Not does the appearance of such a witness grant an automatic assumption of credibility. But a lawyer may point out reasons for thinking a witness not credible. Ultimately it is up to the finder of fact, often a jury, to decide what weight to give the testimony of each and every witness, based on the impression that testimony made, as well as any argument from the lawyer. This is one reason why courts are reluctant to overturn factual assessments by a jury: the reviewing court does not see and hear the manner of a witness and what it may indicate about credibility.
Only a jury can answer your question, and then on a case-by-case basis. When a witness testifies, the question of whether and to what extent to believe/disbelieve a witness is nearly 100% the decision of the jury (or the judge in a bench trial). In a criminal trial, at least, if a thousand disinterested nuns can take the stand and give identical testimony that Defendant robbed the bank, and Defendant's mother says he was actually with her on a Bahamas cruise at the time of the robbery (nevermind the fact that he was arrested exiting the bank), the jury is 100 percent free to conclude the nuns are lying and the mother is telling the truth. Likewise, if Superman is on trial, the jury would be free to believe or disbelieve whomever they chose if the only evidence they had to rely on was (1) Lex Luthor's testimony that he hates Superman and saw him kill Doctor Light; and (2) Lois Lane's testimony that she loves Superman and saw Lex Luthor do it. The jury's right to weigh credibility is hundreds of years old. The question of how to weigh this evidence -- and the answer, which is that it is essentially left entirely to the jury -- is among the most well-settled principles of common-law evidence. See, e.g., Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:354 (1768) (&quot;All others are competent witnesses; though the jury from other circumstances will judge of their credibility.&quot;). Jury instructions therefore routinely advise jurors that they may consider a witness's prejudices for or against the defendant and conclude that his statements are not reliable, whether because he is lying or simply too biased to reliably remember the events in question. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469 (1984) (&quot;Bias is a term used in the 'common law of evidence' to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness' self-interest.&quot;). You can follow the trail of cases supporting this position quite a ways back. I stopped when I reached Honegger v. Wettstein, 94 N.Y. 252 (1883), a case where a manufacturer sued members of a firm that had bought its goods but never paid. At trial, a principal of the firm testified about the invoiced amount to be paid, and because the testimony was uncontradicted, the judge ordered a directed verdict in favor of the buyers. But the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the credibility of a biased witness's testimony must be left to the jury: Although not contradicted, he was an interested party, and had a direct interest in increasing the fund in the hands of the receiver, and in preventing its payment to the plaintiffs. His evidence was given for the purpose of showing the alleged violation of law by the plaintiffs, and in explanation of the three invoices which were made of the goods, of which duplicates were made, and it was a fair question for the jury to say whether he might not have been influenced by the circumstances stated. Ten years later, the Supreme Court addressed your question a bit more directly. In Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301 (1895), a defendant who took the stand was convicted after the trial court told the jury that &quot;Where the witness has a direct personal interest in the result of the suit the temptation is strong to color, pervert, or withhold the facts.&quot; But the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that &quot;the court may, and sometimes ought, to remind the jury that interest creates a motive for false testimony.&quot; Modern courts permit, but do not require, instructions highlighting a specific witness's bias. These cases of course deal with witnesses who have a bias in favor of a party, but the rule is no different in cases where a witness, as in your question, admits to a bias against a party. In United States v. Coleman, 887 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1989), for instance, a defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit arson. Because the only direct evidence of his agreement to the arson was testimony from a witness &quot;who admitted a bias against defendant,&quot; he sought a judgment of acquittal, but the trial court denied his motion and sent the case to a jury. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction, holding that it was up to the jury to decide whether the witness was credible: As defendant points out on appeal, Boscaglia's credibility was very much in issue at trial, but the jury resolved the issue against defendant. The jury's decision on &quot;the credibility of witnesses is not reviewable on appeal.&quot; Although such instructions are allowed, this does not mean that a court is always required to give an instruction addressing the credibility of a specific witness. Depending on who the witness is biased for/against, there are likewise cases saying that no instruction was necessarily required, Kovacich v. Spearman, No. 2:13-cv-0985 KJM DAD P, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108233 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015) (denying habeas claim by defendant who unsuccessfully sought jury instructions highlighting the bias of the investigating officer), or that such an instruction is a bad idea but not disallowed, United States v. Jones, 372 F. App'x 343, 345 (3d Cir. 2010) (&quot;While such an instruction that singles out the defendant's interest in the case is not advisable, we find that here it did not constitute reversible error.&quot;). I haven't found any saying that such an instruction was a reversible error, though I suspect that there are cases out there in which verdicts were reversed because the judge went overboard in suggesting to a jury how much credibility they should extend an admittedly biased witness.