Can everyone name Soldier F now that an MP has named him in Parliament? Recently, the MP for Foyle, the Hon Colum Eastwood, named &quot;Soldier F&quot;, who is facing charges of murder over Bloody Sunday in 1972. A judge in Northern Ireland had made an anonymity direction in the case, but Mr Eastwood used parliamentary privilege to circumvent this and publicly name Soldier F. As the linked article shows, the media have resolutely refused to repeat Mr Eastwood's identification, but it is not clear to me if this is for legal or ethical reasons. Can anyone in the UK (especially anyone in Northern Ireland) now name Soldier F in the context of directly quoting Mr Eastwood's remark? Is the anonymity direction now a dead letter, or does anyone using the name in the context of quoting Mr Eastwood and are they thus protected as a consequence of parliamentary privilege? Or does the order still apply to everywhere outside of Parliament, and one could be arrested for contempt of court for using the name in public?
At common law, parliamentary privilege does not extend to the republication of words spoken in Parliament: Stockdale v Hansard (1839) 112 ER 1160. To overcome this, Parliament passed the Parliamentary Papers Act 1840, which provides absolute privilege for a report published “by or under the authority of either House of Parliament” (ie. Hansard). Section 3 of the Act provides qualified privilege for publishing an “extract or abstract” of Hansard. In relation to statements made under parliamentary privilege in breach of a court order, the Committee on Super-Injunctions wrote in its report on Super-Injunctions, Anonymised Injunctions and Open Justice (May 2011): In order to obtain the benefit of the immunity from civil or criminal proceedings under section 3, the individual must prove, before a jury, that the relevant material was published in good faith and without malice. It is an open question whether publication of any extract from or abstract of Hansard which had the effect of frustrating a court order and was deliberately intended to do so would be held to be in good faith and without malice … Where media reports go beyond, or fall outside, the ambit of protection provided by the 1840 Act, it is the common law which determines whether there is any protection from contempt proceedings for breach of court orders. Mr Woolf noted that while Wason v Walter (1868) 4 QB 73 established a limited common law protection in defamation proceedings for honest, fair and accurate reporting of Parliamentary proceedings, there was ‘no reported case which authoritatively decides the extent of protection against proceedings for contempt available in respect of fair and accurate reports of proceedings of Parliament’ … It therefore appears to be an open question whether, and to what extent, the common law protects media reporting of Parliamentary proceedings where such reporting appears to breach the terms of a court order and is not covered by the protection provided by the 1840 Act. What is clear is that unfettered reporting of Parliamentary proceedings (in apparent breach of court orders) has not been established as a clear right. In its report on Parliamentary Privilege (June 2013), the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege said that the Parliamentary Papers Act would generally not apply to the contemporary media, and that the defence of qualified privilege was limited to defamation actions: An “abstract” was defined by the 1999 Joint Committee as a “summary or epitome”. Thus media reports of what goes on in Parliament, even if they draw on documents published by order of the House, such as Hansard, do not generally enjoy the (qualified) protection afforded by section 3 of the 1840 Act—a point confirmed by Sarah McColl, Solicitor Advocate in the BBC Editorial Legal Department, in her oral evidence on behalf of the Media Lawyers Association … Outside the field of defamation, it does not appear that media reports of parliamentary proceedings (as opposed to extracts or abstracts) enjoy legal protection. This arises most obviously in the case of breaches of court injunctions … The Joint Committee recommended that the law should be reformed: On balance, we do not support extending absolute privilege to all reports, including media sketches and summaries, of proceedings in Parliament … we consider that the existing protection of qualified privilege—that is, that all fair and accurate reports are protected, unless they can be proved by the claimant to have been made maliciously—already provides a robust defence of press freedom … At the same time, we acknowledge that the media need clarity and certainty. The Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 provides qualified protection for all “extracts and abstracts” of parliamentary publications (including broadcasts), but as we have already said these terms do not appear to cover media reports or editorial comment … We endorse the recommendation of the 1999 Joint Committee that [the] Parliamentary Papers Act 1840 should be replaced by modern statutory provisions … We recommend that these new provisions should … establish that qualified privilege applies to all fair and accurate reports of parliamentary proceedings in the same way as to abstracts and extracts of those proceedings; provide that in all court proceedings in respect of such fair and accurate reports, extracts or abstracts, the claimant or prosecution shall be required to prove that the defendant acted maliciously … However, it appears that Parliament has not taken up the Joint Committee’s recommendation, and the extent of any common law protection remains an open question. Accordingly, the article linked in the question states that “The BBC is not naming Soldier F for legal reasons.”
This question and many related ones are analysed in detail by Eugene Volokh, in a long paper that is worth reading in its entirety if you are interested in the topic. The [Supreme] Court has offered “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” as one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” excluded from First Amendment protection. But if this exception is indeed to be well defined and narrowly limited, courts need to explain and cabin its scope. This Article — the first, to my knowledge, to consider the exception in depth — aims to help with that task. On threats, he says: Companies are generally barred from firing employees for voting for a union, and unions are generally barred from retaliating against employees for their speech. The Court therefore concluded that speech that threatens unlawful retaliation is itself unlawful. On blackmail, he says: [...] telling black citizens “stop shopping at white-owned stores or we’ll publicize your behavior to your neighbors and fellow church members” is similarly constitutionally protected. On the other hand, “vote for this civil rights bill or I’ll disclose that you cheated on your wife” is likely unprotected. In general the line where the First Amendment protections end and criminal speech begins is surprisingly vague. General advice to avoid self-incrimination by not answering questions from the police is clearly protected. Threatening a witness with violence is clearly not. In between are shades of grey.
The law does not say. It is up to the judgment of the judge to determine what constitutes "Le fait de provoquer directement à des actes de terrorisme ou de faire publiquement l'apologie de ces actes". I would not have predicted that the act constituted "faire publiquement l'apologie", but if that expression can reasonably construed as meaning "indicating approval of", then I understand the conclusion. The law does not mention SSIDs, that simply falls under the penumbra of "publicly approving of terrorism", and there isn't a specific list of forbidden acts. Analogously, Holocaust denial is against the law in France, and there is not a specific list of things that you can't say, there is a general rule from which specifics can be inferred. Publicly saying "Free Kurdistan!" could be construed as supporting PKK and thus approving of terrorism, but that would be quite a stretch. Using the SSID Pkk21, on the other hand, could be a problem.
There is actually more than one law covering whistleblowers, so the other answer is only partially correct. According to the NYT, the case in question here is also covered by the Inspector General Act of 1978 Do whistle-blowers have a right to remain anonymous? Only in a limited way. Another part of the Inspector General Act says that agency watchdogs “shall not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the inspector general determines such disclosure is unavoidable.” In line with that law, the inspector general for the intelligence community, Michael Atkinson, did not include the whistle-blower’s name in his report to the acting director of national intelligence, Joseph Maguire. Mr. Maguire testified last week that he did not know the name of the person [...] But the legal prohibition on disclosing the official’s name applies only to Mr. Atkinson. It does not bar Mr. Trump and his allies from trying to identify him or disclosing his name if they figure it out. (It would be illegal under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act for any official to disclose his name if he is a covert agent, but no one has suggested that he is.) The same information can be found in an OIG FAQ Q: Will OIG reveal employee identities or the fact that they cooperated? A: OIG investigators will respect the confidentiality of Department employees as provided by law. Section 7 of the Inspector General Act states that “[t]he Inspector General shall not, after receipt of a complaint or information from an employee, disclose the identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the Inspector General determines such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the investigation.” During the course of some investigations, it may be unavoidable that the identities of individuals involved will become known. However, OIG strives to protect the confidentiality of Department employees who provide OIG with information. In addition, employees should be aware that reprisal against any employee for cooperating with OIG is forbidden by the Inspector General Act and DAO 207-10, Section 4. Further, OIG takes whistleblower protection very seriously and, along with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, investigates alleged reprisals against employees for making protected disclosures to OIG. So Paul's spokesperson seems to be correct.
england-and-wales Initially, one should comply with the officer's instructions as he has the power under statutory Stop &amp; Search powers to detain someone for the purpose of the search (discussed here). Failure to do so may be an offence. If, subsequently, one considers the search and detention was unlawful, the first port of call is to lodge a complaint with the relevant police force who - depending on the circumstances - may escalate the complaint to the Independent Office for Police Conduct IOPC. You can complain directly to the police/other organisation (see ‘Who can I complain about?’ below for a list of the other organisations) or via the IOPC. If you complain via the IOPC, your complaint will be sent direct to the organisation involved. They will assess your complaint and contact you about how it will be handled. The IOPC will not be involved with this initial assessment of your complaint. If the complaint is found to be valid, then any offence committed by not complying with the office would (in all probability) be overturned on appeal. As well as any compensation awarded by the court, the Chief Constable may consider making an ex gratia payment (mentioned here). Note that there is no obligation to do anything if the interaction falls within the Stop &amp; Account provisions.
Yes Deciding a case on a basis the parties have not raised is a denial of natural justice (or procedural fairness) and invalid. The reason is very simple, the parties have not had the opportunity to produce evidence or make submissions about C or D that might have changed the judge’s mind about them. Notwithstanding, to successfully appeal, the aggrieved party must show there were arguments that could have been raised which could reasonably have altered the outcome. That said, it’s the judge’s courtroom and they can say “That’s interesting but what about C and D?” and then the parties can make submissions about them. They do have to be circumspect and make sure that they do not become one party’s advocate - one party might be well aware of C and D and don’t want them brought up because they damage their case and they are hoping the other party misses that - and then the bloody judge come charging in with his bloody duty to wider interests of justice. Non-judicial decision makers like arbitrators, adjudicators and other tribunals need to be even more circumspect because they generally don’t have a duty to anyone but the parties. Unlike in civil law systems, the role of the judge is to decide the dispute between the parties as a referee, not to determine some objective”truth” as an investigator. To keep things simple: if the plaintiff contends that the light was red and the defendant contends the light was green then, assuming there is no evidence opening the possibility, it is not open to the judge to find that the light was amber. Similarly, if the parties agree that red means go and green means stop, it is not the judge's role to tell the parties they are wrong (I'm sure questions would be asked but if the parties are adamant ...): since there is no dispute over this issue the judge would be wrong to agitate one. Now, a judge is free to apply the law that was argued as a whole - if arguments centred on Section 14 of the Relevant Act 1875 but Section 15 is applicable and germane the judge is not wrong for applying Section 15. However, they are on shakier ground if the bring in Other Slightly Relevant Act 1956.
The earliest mention of the principle that I can find is in Rolston v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [1975] NI 195, where the matter of compensation for the widow of a police officer murdered in Northern Ireland arose. I am sure there are earlier cases that express the same principle in different terms, however. It is a broad principle that applies to most areas of civil law, and I cannot find an original source for it. I imagine that it is simply &quot;received wisdom&quot; that has been repeated long enough to become a cornerstone of the law of restitution in England and Wales. There is currently no statutory basis for the principle so I cannot cite any relevant Acts of Parliament either.
I've seen prohibito used in a few places, but never by any source that I'd use as a model for my writing. As I understand it, the Latin names for the other writs were adopted in medieval times, when Latin was much more heavily used in the English courts, while the writ of prohibition developed centuries later. In that case, I think it would have been natural to simply give it a standard English name.