Could Congress &quot;bribe&quot; the President to sign a bill by including a presidential pay raise? If Congress wanted to pass a law that they expected the President to be reluctant to sign, could they legally &quot;bribe&quot; the President to sign the bill by including a Presidential pay raise in it?
No. Article 2, Section 1 of the Constitution states The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them. Congress could include an increase to presidential compensation in the bill but it couldn't take effect until the next election.
No A state may not do that. The US Constitution Art. I section 8 says: The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes; Art I section 10: No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress. The power to regulate interstate commerce and foreign commerce is exclusive to Congress, no state may exercise it. The power to tax imports and exports is only given in vary limited degree to states, and only by specific permission of Congress. The Interstate Commerce Clause has been interpreted to mean that a state may not favor its own citizens over citizens of other states in taxation or in commercial privileges, although it may restrict state services to state residents, or charge non-residents higher fees, as for tuition at public colleges. Even with the consent of Congress, or if passed by Congress, such a law might well be precluded by the Equal Protection clause. Congress may prohibit specific items from being moved in interstate commerce, or it may limit, license, or tax them. But all such regulations must be uniform across the United states, and may not apply only to a specific state. Regulation of interstate commerce can include regulation of purely intra-state transactions, if they are held to "affect" interstate commerce. This power is very wide-ranging.
Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
Article II of the Constitution does say that "The President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors". So it is true that a president or a federal judge could be impeached and removed from office, and it has happened to some extent 19 times – in 8 cases it went all the way to removal (as opposed to acquittal or resignation). However, this would not be a very effective way to avert a "crisis". Any judicial ruling is subject to appeal by a higher court, until you get to the Supreme Court. Moreover, impeaching a lower judge does not erase his or her rulings. So ultimately, a matter will be decided by SCOTUS. In anticipation of such a ruling, Congress might decide to get rid of some Supreme Court justice who they think might stand in the way. That was attempted with Samuel Chase, who was acquitted. Such a decision is not subject to judicial review (Nixon v. United States 506 U.S. 224). However, SCOTUS can also overturn that decision though that would be very unusual. It would also be very unusual for Congress to impeach a Supreme Court justice for having a position that they disagree with. At any rate, there is no such thing as a "deadlock" between branches of government. When the court rules, that is the end of the matter from a legal perspective. It is, in fact, entirely possible that a general will rule that the court or the president (or both) are wrong and will declare what the law now is, but that takes us out of the realm of legal discussions.
The law you cite says that the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request That includes specific individual returns. That it was intended to include such returns is made clear by the provisions restricting identifiable individual data to executive session. Whether this ought to be the law might well be debated. Whether the House ought to use this law as a way to get at Trump's returns could also be debated. Those are matters of politics, or perhaps ethics, not law. Whether some other provision of law overrides this provision in this case is pretty clearly going to be argued in court, and we will see what the decision is. I won't try to predict it here.
It is common place for major official actions, not just checks but also, for example, governmental buildings, to note the politicians who implemented law or enacted them at the time. This practice is not forbidden by any law or election-related regulation. There is a strong political norm as a matter of political etiquette that checks from the government be signed by a senior official in the Treasury department or a state and local equivalent, such as the Secretary of Treasury, the Comptroller of the Currency, or the Director of the Internal Revenue Service, rather than the President, Governor, or Mayor. But no one would have legal standing to challenge a violation of this political norm in court, because a person receiving a check naming the President as the signer has not suffered an actual injury.
Maybe, probably not. The leading case would appear to be Raines v. Byrd, 521 US 811, where 6 congressmen sued over a line-item veto law (later held to be unconstitutional). The court notes the established legal fact that To meet the standing requirements of Article III, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief". where that court added the italics; and the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable. This requires, among other things, that the plaintiff have suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized" In this case, the court find that "appellees have not been singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective bodies", and they are claiming institutional injury, arising "solely because they are Members of Congress...If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead". The court did, however, uphold standing in one legislative case, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, where there was an issue over whether the legislature had ratified a constitutional amendment when the Lt. Governor of Kansas cast a tie-breaking vote on the question (the allegation was that this was improper). The court held that the legislators "have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes", finding that their votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient to de- feat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. The Raines court finds that legislators "have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified" – but that was not the case in Raines (the line-item veto act had clearly passed). Applied to the Oprah hypothetical, senatorial vote would arguably have been completely nullified by the proposed process: that is the argument made in the present complaint, para 33-34. The end of sect. III of the Raines opinion gives extensive historical analysis of the fact that branches of government do not generally have standing to sue each other, closing with the note that Our regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts, well expressed by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974): "The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),] lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests. There is a very narrow window through which the Senate might have standing to sue POTUS and otherwise, the answer is "no". The Oprah case is distinguished from Raines in that there is no political recourse to simply ignoring the appointments clause, except impeachment, and the courts might see such an action as equivalent to vote-nullification.
It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional &quot;qualification&quot; on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow &quot;register&quot; as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean &quot;anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born&quot;. The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree.