Blumenthal v. Trump Do Senators have standing to bring suit? In the Complaint filed today Blumenthal v. Trump (for text see [https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/11/19/senate-democrats-sue-trump-challenging-whitakers-appointment-at-main-justice/?slreturn=20181019194158 ] ), three US Senators , members of the judiciary committee allege that the Presidential appointment of Whittaker violates the Appointments Clause of the US Constitution. Some 'TV Lawyers' have opined that the compliant will not be argued on it's merits because the Court will rule that the Senators have no standing to bring the action. Rather than getting into the discussion about Mr. Whittaker's past statements and involvements, let me pose a hypothetical: If the President were to fire the Secretary of the Treasury and appoint Oprah to exercise that role without the benefit of Senate confirmation, Who would have standing to present a complaint?
Maybe, probably not. The leading case would appear to be Raines v. Byrd, 521 US 811, where 6 congressmen sued over a line-item veto law (later held to be unconstitutional). The court notes the established legal fact that To meet the standing requirements of Article III, "[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief". where that court added the italics; and the alleged injury must be legally and judicially cognizable. This requires, among other things, that the plaintiff have suffered "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized" In this case, the court find that "appellees have not been singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective bodies", and they are claiming institutional injury, arising "solely because they are Members of Congress...If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead". The court did, however, uphold standing in one legislative case, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, where there was an issue over whether the legislature had ratified a constitutional amendment when the Lt. Governor of Kansas cast a tie-breaking vote on the question (the allegation was that this was improper). The court held that the legislators "have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes", finding that their votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient to de- feat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. The Raines court finds that legislators "have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified" – but that was not the case in Raines (the line-item veto act had clearly passed). Applied to the Oprah hypothetical, senatorial vote would arguably have been completely nullified by the proposed process: that is the argument made in the present complaint, para 33-34. The end of sect. III of the Raines opinion gives extensive historical analysis of the fact that branches of government do not generally have standing to sue each other, closing with the note that Our regime contemplates a more restricted role for Article III courts, well expressed by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166 (1974): "The irreplaceable value of the power articulated by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall [in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803),] lies in the protection it has afforded the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action. It is this role, not some amorphous general supervision of the operations of government, that has maintained public esteem for the federal courts and has permitted the peaceful coexistence of the countermajoritarian implications of judicial review and the democratic principles upon which our Federal Government in the final analysis rests. There is a very narrow window through which the Senate might have standing to sue POTUS and otherwise, the answer is "no". The Oprah case is distinguished from Raines in that there is no political recourse to simply ignoring the appointments clause, except impeachment, and the courts might see such an action as equivalent to vote-nullification.
We can only guess at what argument he has in mind, but one possible argument is that the standard is unconstitutionally vague, similar to the argument by McDonnell in the recent McDonnell v US (admittedly about a different statute). The vagueness argument was developed in several of the briefs: http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/mcdonnell-v-united-states/ The unconstitutional vagueness argument has also been made specifically about 18 USC 793 (e). US v Hitselberger 1:12-cr-00231-RC D.D.C. (2014). The defendant made a motion to dismiss based on constitutional vagueness, but this motion was denied. Private Manning raised the same defence, also unsuccessfully: http://fas.org/sgp/jud/manning/051012-vague.pdf
Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, &quot;the unitary executive theory&quot;. The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may &quot;act against the rule of law&quot;, but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take.
The alternative is the same whether just one lower court or many lower courts ignore SCOTUS precedent. An aggrieved parts will appeal the lower court ruling, and the matter will work its way up the ladder until SCOTUS directly rules on this application of the law. This sort of happens all the time, when lower courts don't apply the ostensive "final ruling" because they find that there is some other overriding consideration ("that rule only applies to businesses employing more than 50 people"). Where the case to be remanded to lower courts for further proceedings consistent with SCOTUS opinion and still the lower courts refuse to comply, i.e open rebellion, SCOTUS could rule that non-compliance by lower courts constitutes contempt, and an order could be issued for the removal (in some form) of offending parties (we may presume, the justices of the lower court). The statute outlining court power allows on order of imprisonment for "disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command". Federal marshals would then arrest non-compliant judges, unless the marshals too are in open rebellion. If the judges in question were federal judges, the marshals would have to decide whether to obey the order of SCOTUS vs. the order of the district or circuit court. Since under the US Constitution states that "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", it is objectively established that SCOTUS rulings are superior, so provided that the marshals elect to uphold their oath of office, they will enforce the SCOTUS ruling. However, citizen action becomes irrelevant once SCOTUS has made its ruling, and the matter has moved from legal determination of fact to enforcement of established fact.
There is no law governing the 'number' of the president. Common sense suggests that a person can't be 45th and 46th; there must be someone in between having the presidency and they will become the 46th president. In the extremely unlikely scenario that a foreign power occupies the United States this year, eliminates the office of President, and a few years later the US is liberated and Donald Trump is re-elected, I guess people could name him the 45th and 46th President, but it makes no sense to speculate about this.
There are several possible ways to get there, but the answer is "there is no such position." Acting President vs. President Under the Constitution: In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. When William Henry Harrison died, there was some question as to what "the same" that devolved on Tyler (his VP) meant. Some thought it meant that Tyler was Acting President; others thought the office itself went to Tyler. Tyler was in the latter group, and set a precedent that the VP became the President (finishing out the President's term) if the President died; the VP wasn't just acting. The 25th Amendment later clarified that presidential death, removal, or resignation made the VP the President; if the President was unable to exercise the powers and duties of the office, the VP was Acting President. Further down the line, the Constitution explicitly says Congress decides "who shall act as President." Congress only talks about succession further down the line in terms of the Acting President and the officer acting as President. So, if that interpretation is correct, the answer is "the VP is the only officer who can assume the office of President in the event of the President's death." Of course, a new precedent could potentially be set if this situation ever arises; if someone will definitely act as President until the end of the term, then it makes a certain amount of sense to say they just assume the office itself. Eligibility for office The Constitution doesn't say "you can't be elected President unless over 35, natural-born citizen, and 14 years a resident." It says you are not eligible for the office unless you meet those requirements. That would include any way of assuming the office, including succession. You can't become President if you are not eligible to hold the office, period (that's what eligibility for an office means); the only requirements you'd get around are those covering eligibility to be elected. Succession It's unclear whether the Constitution's eligibility requirements apply to a person acting as President who does not assume the office. However, Congress has decided that they should. 3 USC &sect;19, which sets out who acts as President if both President and VP are unable to, says: (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section [i.e. the ones listing people who can act as President] shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.
Note the following argument: the landmark 1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland, which ruled that state officials cannot obstruct “the measures of a government [the federal government] created by others as well as themselves.” “In other words,” Kalt and Amar summarize, “a single state cannot use its power to derail the functioning of the United States.” (Amar is a Yale constitutional law professor, Kalt, his student) On the other hand, you have the argument by a Hofstra constitutional law professor that the 25th amendment can be applied when the President is occupied with a criminal case, ergo, the functioning of the United States can be carried on unimpared. At the end-of-the-day there is no absolute answer as it is still being argued academically and has never been specifically settled by the courts.
You are correct that the existence of a lawsuit -- on First Amendment or Fifth Amendment grounds -- is not a strong basis for believing that Acosta will have his pass reinstated. People file losing lawsuits all the time. But that doesn't really tell us anything about the merits of his case, which I discuss below. Temporary restraining order: The standard for TROs is well-established: This court may issue a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction only when the movant demonstrates that: there is a substantial likelihood plaintiff will succeed on the merits; plaintiff will be irreparably injured if an injunction is not granted; an injunction will not substantially injure the other party; and the public interest will be furthered by an injunction. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Rothe, 150 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2001). I'd normally expect the court to be pretty speech-protective in a First Amendment TRO case, but because this is the White House, they'll probably give a fair amount of extra weight when figuring out how to balance everything here. I would not, however, expect either of the factors that you mentioned -- that this is a Fifth Amendment case and that few people have press passes -- to do much to change the court's analysis. I suspect it's going to come down to who is more credible about what happened and why. Fifth Amendment: The Constitution does not promise us much at all in terms of outcomes. What it does promise is that the government will go through reasonable procedures to arrive at those outcomes. As you seem to have identified, that's exactly what Sherrill was about. Sherrill does not say that everyone has the First Amendment right to a White House press pass; it says that that everyone has the Fifth Amendment right to due process when the White House decides whether to grant or deny a press pass -- especially because of the First Amendment interests implicated in those decisions. The basics ingredients of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker, and that's all that Sherrill calls for: a publicly disclosed procedure by which the journalists can apply for credentials and appeal adverse decisions. Here, it's unclear whether the White House has provided Acosta with any notice or any opportunity to appeal his decision. If that's the case, they've almost certainly run afoul of Sherrill. But again, you are correct that this does not mean he gets his press pass back. If they find that the White House violated the Fifth Amendment as explained in Sherrill, the remedy will simply be to force it to go through the prescribed procedure. First Amendment: If it turns out that they use that procedure as a pretext to punish Acosta for protected speech, we would be out of Fifth Amendment territory and into First Amendment territory. If a court found that the White House had revoked his pass because he was from CNN, because they didn't like the questions he was asking, or because he didn't provide fawning coverage of the president, it is virtually certain that the White House would be forced to restore his credentials. But if they determine in a fair way that Acosta should have his pass revoked because he was violent, because he was infringing on other people's ability to do their job, or because he was otherwise violating established rules, a court would probably say that any of those was an acceptable justification. In that case, CNN would need a new White House correspondent.