Can the US Congress subpoena witnesses for any arbitrary reason? This question was prompted by the headline on October 15, 2020 that the Senate Judiciary Committee will vote on whether to subpoena the CEO of Twitter for suppressing certain political content. This led me to wonder whether or not social media companies in the US can legally curate user content however they want. This has been asked on the site, and the answer seems to be that they can (with the possible exception of state law in California). So if Twitter has not violated any federal laws, it led me to wonder if it is constitutional for the CEO to be subpoenaed by congress? Can congress compel any person or company to appear before them for any reason? Or do they need to state some probable cause that laws have been broken in order to do so? If he wanted to challenge the subpoena, would this CEO have a valid argument (ignoring political considerations)?
Congress can compel any person or company to appear before them for any reason: this article and this more extensive review give overviews of Congressional subpoena power. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 affirms the power of Congress to investigate matters that could bear on the actions of Congress, but also draws lines on what kinds of questions can be asked. It is unquestionably the duty of all citizens to cooperate with the Congress in its efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. It is their unremitting obligation to respond to subpoenas, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the province of proper investigation. This, of course, assumes that the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by the Congress as they are in a court of justice. The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action. Witnesses cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves. They cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and seizure. Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political belief and association be abridged. Congress has the power to enact laws (and it not charged with the duty to investigate federal crimes, which is in the domain of the executive branch). So if Congress wants to find out whether they should pass a law, they can subpoena people and ask them questions. In the case of Watkins, an individual was interrogated regarding his personal life. He refused to answer, stating that &quot;I do not believe that such questions are relevant to the work of this committee nor do I believe that this committee has the right to undertake the public exposure of persons because of their past activities&quot;. The Supreme Court concluded that while it is an offense to refuse to answer questions &quot;pertinent to the question under inquiry&quot;, the Court could not figure out with reasonable certainty what the inquiry was about. BTW the holdings section of this opinion (in 1957) ranges a-y, which is a remarkably nuanced and non-committal collection of holdings, which can be summarized by saying that the court found the question to likely be &quot;off-topic&quot;. If Congress wants to contemplate passing a law to restrict Twitter, it can subpoena anyone it wants to. There is an unresolved question regarding subpoenaing the executive branch (specifically, the role of executive privilege, where POTUS can shift the burden of proof to Congress to establish their right to interrogate the executive branch).
There is no constitutional requirement that Congress provide copyright protection in the US. Congress could, if it so chooses, repeal Title 17 of the US Code, and afford no copyright protection whatsoever. Given that the US has protected copyright from its earliest days, that copyright protection in English law dates to the 1600s, that almost every nation currently has a Law protecting copyright, and that such protection is a requirement of membership in the World Trade organization (WTO) I find it highly unlikely that such a change in the law will be made in the foreseeable future. But Congress does have the power to abolish copyright in the US.
Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
This is an important question that affects consumer advocacy, blog-based-journalism, political speech and spending, and probably other things. People disagree about what the answer is. This podcast episode features both sides of the argument. Professor Volokh holds the view that the freedom of the press is "freedom to print", "freedom to use the printing press". Freedom of the press is the freedom of everybody to use the printing press. Assessing the grammar of the clause, he argues that this points in the same direction. The text says "freedom of speech or of the press". He points out that speech is not a group of people. It would be odd to treat "speech" as an activity, but to treat "press" as a group of people given the parallel construction. This side of the argument is described more in this article by Prof. Volokh. Professor West argues that there is a defined group of people called "the press" that deserves protection under this clause. This article explains Prof. West's position in detail. The main point is that "An expansive definition of the press means virtually complete overlap between press and speech and thus no meaningful way to interpret the Press Clause." If "press" means simply the right to publish speech, then it becomes redundant because courts have held the right to publish speech is given under that "speech" portion of the clause. Justice Stevens's concurrence in Citizens United also argued for "some kinds of identity-based distinctions" regarding whether a person is a member of the press. Each side can give examples of the term "the press" being used at the time of the First Amendment that is consistent with their favored interpretation. I think to get the best idea of the two sides to this question, you should read Citizens United (including all dissents and concurrences), read the two articles linked above, and listen to the podcast episode.
Double jeopardy in its usual sense wouldn't attach because impeachment is not a criminal proceeding, which is the only thing double jeopardy applies to (esoteric estoppel matters not withstanding). You might recall that OJ Simpson was tried and acquitted of murder in a criminal court, and then subsequently tried and found liable in a civil court for those murders. There was no double jeopardy protections of which he could avail himself. But the constitution says that the Senate shall have the sole power to try impeachments, so for the most part we can expect that whatever they say goes. So they can dismiss for any reason they desire, in principle. The impeachment of Senator Blount is one example: the House impeached him, and on the same day the Senate expelled him under their constitutional power to do so, and then dismissed the impeachment for lack of jurisdiction (arguing that Congress members cannot be impeached; the impeachment was otherwise still relevant after his expulsion because it could result in preventing him from gaining office again). The costs here are political: in your hypothetical situation with very strong evidence, if popular opinion turns too strongly in favor of conviction then refusal to do so may cost the Senators and their party in subsequent elections. Attempts to argue arcane technicalities might not save you at the ballot box. Under existing impeachment precedent (as well as Congressional rules precedents), the courts would be loathe to get involved by default. Though if the action was sufficiently egregious (not even superficially resembling what a judge might call a trial, say) maybe they would feel judicial intervention and action was warranted and justified. But that's purely speculative.
Probably.* Congress has wide latitude to dictate the procedures of "inferior courts" -- the district courts and circuit courts of appeal. Those courts only exist because Congress created them, so Congress can generally set the terms on which they continue to exist. That power is limited in several important ways by the Constitution, including the terms and compensation of the judges, and standing to address cases, and then further limited by separation-of-powers principles. But the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Criminal Procedure are a good example of how Congress has already -- and largely unobjectionably -- imposed these types of demands on the judiciary. The rules are generally drafted by the judicial branch, but Congress approves them and gives them the force of law. In both sets of rules, you can already see some requirements on how decisions are worded: Criminal Rule 23 requires the court to "state its specific findings of fact" after a bench trial; Criminal Rule 32 requires the court to "set forth the plea, the jury verdict or the court's findings, the adjudication, and the sentence" in judgments of conviction; Civil Rule 52 requires the court to "find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately"; Civil Rule 58 requires that "every judgment and amended judgment ... be set out in a separate document"; Civil Rule 59 requires the court to "specify the reasons [for granting or denying a motion for a new trial] in its order"; and Civil Rule 72 requires magistrates to enter "a recommended disposition, including, if appropriate, proposed findings of fact." The rule you're proposing seems to go well beyond these requirements, but I don't see how it would run afoul of constitutional constraints. I could imagine an argument that this somehow encroaches on the courts' inherent authority, but I'm not really convinced that that authority protects against this. For more information, you can read the Congressional Research Service report on "Congressional Authority Over the Federal Courts." *This answer only applies to Article III courts, but even then does not apply to the Supreme Court, which is co-equal and generally has the authority to set its own rules. When it comes to Article I courts, though, Congress would probably have virtually unlimited discretion to impose the kinds of requirements that you're talking about, and even to say that the court has no jurisdiction to consider constitutionality at all. Congress might even get away with imposing these kinds of requirements on state courts through the Spending Clause
Yes. The Court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations. ... This protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech. ... Under the rationale of these precedents, political speech does not lose First Amendment protection “simply because its source is a corporation.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).
The Copyright Office has determined, in chapter 300 of the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices, on page 36, that the copyright bar extends to works created by the President; Congress; the federal judiciary; federal departments, agencies, boards, bureaus, or commissions; or any other officer or employee of the U.S. federal government while acting within the course of his or her official duties. So the Senator is a US employee for copyright purposes, at least according to the US Copyright Office. Technically, this is interpretation rather than law, and in theory a court might disagree, but if anyone is qualified to speak on this issue, it's the Copyright Office. In my opinion, it is most reasonable to assume that the Copyright Office is correct in their interpretation unless there is case law directly contradicting them. The only question is whether the letter was created by the Senator &quot;while acting within the course of his or her official duties.&quot; I'm not aware of any case law suggesting that constituent building is or is not an &quot;official duty&quot; of a US Senator, and there are reasonable arguments to be made in both directions. On the one hand, the letter is clearly beyond the scope of Congress's lawmaking and oversight Constitutional functions. On the other, the office of Senator is an inherently political office, and a case can be made that campaigning for reelection is part of the job. Perhaps surprisingly, that question was extensively litigated during E. Jean Carroll's first defamation lawsuit against Donald Trump, because Trump argued that his statements about Carroll were within the scope of his employment (and so a defamation claim would be effectively barred under the Westfall Act). To my understanding, the current disposition of that lawsuit is that this is considered a question of fact for a jury to decide (at least according to the Second Circuit). What can be said is who does not hold copyright: The US Senate and/or the US government as a whole. The only way the Senate could acquire copyright in this letter (short of the Senator directly granting it to them) would be as a work made for hire, but the work-for-hire doctrine requires that the work be prepared by an employee as part of their official duties, just like the federal copyright bar. So the Senate cannot acquire copyright in this manner. If anyone owns the copyright, it is most likely the Senator.