Does jumping a fence between two public spaces constitutes trespassing or other law violation? I noticed that many places, specially in the United States, have fences separating two streets, even for pedestrians. My guess that the streets are not connected for cars to calm the traffic on residential streets and to relieve congestion on main roads, but the segregation for pedestrians also seems more to intend to lengthen the trips for people walking, thus forcing them to use cars instead. Since both sides are public spaces, thus crossing those forbidden passages does not seems to constitute trespassing at first, but would that constitute another violation? Here is an example of such kind of fence
"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.
Trespassing requires that you be on someone else's property without their permission. The supervisor has explicitly given you permission, so it's not possible for you to trespass. You are correct that someone with the proper authority could revoke this permission at any time, at which point you would have to leave or be guilty of trespassing. The only way this situation could constitute trespassing is if they revoke your permission and you ignore them. You can't trespass somewhere that the property owner has allowed you to be and you observe the rules they have set (which may be implied) for you being there.
Since the incident was on private property (inside a building), a person does not have the same right to be there that you would have on the street outside the building. Yale police therefore can legally make a determination whether a person is trespassing (for example, by asking for identification), especially when there is an allegation that a person is trespassing. A law holding a person criminally or civilly liable for reporting their &quot;suspicions&quot; to the government without e.g. &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot; could easily run afoul of the First Amendment.
The critical consideration is that the permitted left turn must be onto a one-way roadway in that direction. One is not permitted to perform a left turn which involves crossing traffic from the left, which would also imply that it is not a one-way roadway.
This an instance of the general rule ignorantia legis neminem excusat: ignorance of the law is no excuse. If the municipal ordinances state that a particular place does not allow parking at certain times, then if you park there you have violated the law and will get ticketed. There is no requirement that there be signs prominently posted saying that you must obey the law in this particular location. A law might itself require there to be postings, for example speed limit law pertaining to school zones typically are stated in terms of "posted" boundaries. Assuming that the ordinance doesn't have such a "as posted" requirement, you have no legal leg to stand on, and the burden must be shifted to your political leg. If, for example, you were in Pennsylvania, 75 PaCSA 3353(d) permits local parking ordinances: The department on State-designated highways and local authorities on any highway within their boundaries may by erection of official traffic-control devices prohibit, limit or restrict stopping, standing or parking of vehicles on any highway where engineering and traffic studies indicate that stopping, standing or parking would constitute a safety hazard or where the stopping, standing or parking of vehicles would unduly interfere with the free movement of traffic. Signs are kinds of traffic control devices. Since PA does not statutorily prohibit overnight parking, any local restrictions on overnight parking would require signage. Thus restriction such as this one that "The following vehicles shall not be parked between 9:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. on the streets...", applying to commercial vehicles among others, would require a sign. That borough has an interesting ordinance stating that In the event of a conflict between the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale and the provisions set forth in the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3351 through 3354, as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Codified Ordinances of the Borough of Lansdale shall control. Generally speaking, local ordinances are subordinate to state law, so this provision is legally questionable (although: the borough does not actually deny the signage requirement, so technically this is not a conflict, it is just ignoring state law – if there is no signage). The borough could of course argue that they were unaware of the state requirement to post no-parking signs, but ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
No one can tell you how the facts are going to line up if you get sued. The attractive nuisance doctrine is alive and you can be found liable if you have, on your property, a dangerous condition which is attractive to children, especially if the danger is not appreciable to the child. Now, I'm a bit skeptical that a child would climb a fence to kick snow, especially if there is other snow outside the fence for them to kick, but stranger things have happened. What can you do? These are ideas, I don't think they are legal advice. Start with the premise that dangerous stuff happens everyday, and kids aren't getting hurt by most of it. Use a fence with barbed wire. In other words, injured the the child with a lesser injury to reduce your liability. Use an opaque fence. Granted, curiosity might be too great and a child will trespass to discover what you are hiding. Use a shed, just one of those thin aluminum structures. Include proximity sensors to set off alarms and lights and whatever. Get your project away from kids; find space in a commercial area.
From Rule 170 of the Highway Code: watch out for pedestrians crossing a road into which you are turning. If they have started to cross they have priority, so give way If this was indeed the case, then it suggests that the OP had right of way, and the driver was at fault. In any case, the driver should have indicated before turning.
It would seem that the law involved is probably Section 58-17-4096 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 58. This is part of the General Railroad Law of SC (GRL), and apparently was last revised in 1996. Section 58-17-4096 reads, in full: (A) It is unlawful, without proper authority, for a person to trespass upon railroad tracks. (B) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days. Note that the section does not specifically define &quot;proper authority&quot; nor &quot;trespass&quot; (nor do the definition sections at the start of the GRL), so those terms should have their ordinary meanings. It might be argued that the landowner has &quot;proper authority&quot;. It is interstice to contrast this with the previous section, SC Code § 58-17-4095 (2012) which gives a rather detailed list of who is authorized to &quot;park or operate a vehicle on a railroad right-of-way&quot;. Persons authorized are: an employee of the railroad ... in the performance of his duties [one who] has authority from the railroad [one who] is using a public or private roadway which crosses over the railroad ... [one who] is acting in an official capacity with the military, police force, a fire fighting organization, or some similar public authority ... which crosses over the railroad ... [one who] is an employee of a public utility or telecommunications carrier, or of the forestry industry ... The question asks: Can a law that effectively bars a property owner from access to their property be enforced or does the constitution protect the property owner’s rights and thus make them exempt from such a state law? There is no such absolute right of access by the owner specified in the US Federal Constitution. As the comments by Nate Eldredge suggest, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment might be relevant, but that would have (or should have) been applied when the railroad lines were put in, and if proper compensation was paid at that tiem to the then landowner, future ownership would include the restrictions then imposed. Any easement should be recorded on the actual deed to the property, but a tract map would not normally show it. Moreover, it is possible that the railroad was put in before the fourteenth amendment made the takings clause applicable to the states, or before this incorporation was recognized in Chicago, Burlington &amp; Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Even so, an easement might have been obtained by private agreement between the railroad and the owner of the land at that time. In the &quot;Interactive Constitution&quot; article &quot;The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause&quot; by Richard A. Epstein and Eduardo M. Peñalver (both noted professors of law) it is said that: ... The Clause also applies, not only to the confiscation of all existing interests in any individual piece of property, but to the confiscation of certain lesser interests in property. Under Anglo-American law, these would include recognized interests like easements (such as rights of way), leases, mortgages, life estates, and remainders. ... ... Any time some private party could seek a court order stopping another private party from engaging in harmful activities, the government can impose the same limitations through fines and court orders without a duty to compensate. A law or regulation authorized by law may bar access by a landowner to a part of a property in proper cases. For example if the land is environmentally sensitive, or if there is a dangerous condition, such as old ordnance on a former proving ground or battlefield. Such a law would probably be a partial taking, and require appropriate compensation, depending on the exact circumstances The answer by Greendrake which says: the only theoretically possible case of trespassing here is that of trespass to chattels, but that is a tort, not a crime. There can be no charges, only claims. is incorrect because of Section 58-17-4096, which specifically makes such trespass a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. However, in Faulkenberry v. Norfolk Southern(Opinion No. 25454, Opinion Filed April 29, 2002) the South Carolina Supreme Court found that a railroad claiming under an 1845 charter which authorized it to purchase land, and force such purchases, had acquired only an easement, not a title in fee simple. The opinion by Justice Waller refers to and quotes the SC 1845 Act No. 2953 which granted powers of acquisition to the railroad, and mentions other similar acts of the same era granting such powers to other railroads. The opinion also cites the SC 1868 Act No. 43, 7, which explicitly limits such railroad tenures. The Justice wrote: The circuit court, pursuant to numerous cases of this Court, held Railroad acquired only an easement to use the tracks, rather than a fee simple determinable, and that, in any event, Faulkenberry was entitled to an easement by necessity. ... In Ragsdale v. Southern Ry. Co., 60 S.C. 381, 38 S.E. 609 (1901), the Court construed a Charter to the Spartanburg and Union Railroad which had provisions identical to those of sections 9, 10 and 11 above. The Court noted that, under sections 9 and 10, the Legislature had specifically provided that land taken by and paid for by the railroad would vest in fee simple. However, the Court noted that no such words were used in section 11, which provided only that the company shall have &quot;good right and title. . . so long as the same may be used only for the purpose of said road.&quot; The Ragsdale Court, after citing Justice Wardlaw's dissent in Lewis, concluded: [t]he legislature wisely made a distinction in the tenure by which the railroad company held the land when it was under one or the other of said sections. Having reached the conclusion that the rights of the parties are different under the foregoing sections, . . . [o]ur interpretation of the foregoing sections is that the railroad company acquired only a right of way over the land described in the complaint. ... We adhere to the wealth of authority in this state and hold the 1845 Charter created only an easement in Railroad, such that Faulkenberry is entitled to use the disputed crossing. We note, however, that although Faulkenberry may cross the railroad tracks, he may not do anything which would unreasonably interfere with Railroad's use of its easement. Marion County Lumber Co. v. Tilghman Lumber Co., 75 S.C. 220, 55 S.E. 337 (1906) (owner of the dominant estate cannot materially interfere with use and enjoyment of servient estate's easement; owners must be held during continuance of easement to have abandoned every use of the land except such as might be made consistent with the reasonable enjoyment of the easement). See also Brown v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 30, 33, 324 S.E.2d 639, 640 (Ct.App.1984). ( A footnote to the opinion mentions that: The circuit court ruled that, in any event, Faulkenberry was entitled to an easement by necessity to cross the railroad tracks. In light of our holding, we need not address this alternate ruling. Note that in the Faulkenberry case there was apparently a road crossing the tracks, although not an authorized crossing. The doctrine of an easement by necessity might apply in the case described in the question. Detailed legal advice would be needed to determine this, and quite probably a court case.