Can constitution amendment interpretation be negated by the Supreme Court in the US by citing unconstitutional during judicial review? I am curious that, when the constitution is amended, can the Supreme Court reject the amendment via the judicial review process by citing the amendment is unconstitutional and says the negation (by the correct semantic representation) of the amendment is now in the Constitution? If can't, does it mean the process of amending constitution is a power that is not governed by the constitution and so out of the reach of the Supreme Court decision. As a direct result, the Supreme Court justice can only interpret the amendment via the precedent constructed by how the people who amend the constitution interpret, and so the judicial review process cannot interpret law in the sense of &quot;creating precedent&quot;. If can, does it mean the current, existing US citizen does not have the ultimate interpretation about Constitution since theoretically the justice can reject and negate it by creating a precedent vacuously? (In a philosophical sense, I assume a Constitutional Amendment is not decided (logical consequence) by the existing Constitution, and so there must be someone to create the precedent to decide how to use the law, which can be done by the judicial review by saying the amendment is unconstitutional is vacuously True by the pure definition of &quot;not a logical consequence&quot;) I know it's a game of words and extremely like some form of Godel's Incompleteness proof but the self-reference property of judicial review and strong arithmetic property of principle of precedent at least in a logical sense may have unexpected behavior.
While the Supreme Courts of Germany, Honduras, India and Italy have asserted such authority, the U.S. Supreme Court's justiciable decisions about a U.S. Constitutional Amendment are generally limited to a determination of whether the amendment was lawfully adopted pursuant to Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which states: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. Usually, U.S. Supreme Court litigation over a constitutional amendment would be over whether the process of Article V has been conformed to in a particular case (which has been litigated in several prior cases). The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), that even some procedural issues are political questions for Congress to resolve that are non-justiciable, in part because the mode of ratification is expressly delegated to Congress in Article V. As the summary of Coleman at the link above explains: In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that the Kansas legislators had standing to sue, but found that two of the plaintiffs’ claims raised political questions that could only be resolved by Congress. With respect to the whether the Kansas legislature’s previous rejection of the Child Labor Amendment precluded its subsequent ratification, the Court stated that this “should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the amendment.” But, with respect to the language in bold in the quoted language of Article V above, the U.S. Supreme Court could determine that a constitutional amendment is unconstitutional. This narrow ground, however, is the sole basis upon which it may do so.
No The case was dismissed on procedural reasons. Like this. Well, perhaps not so pedantic but there are things that have to happen before the Supreme Court can get involved and they haven’t. For example, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in a limited classes of case; if this isn’t one of those (and it isn’t) it has to be heard in a court that does and then get appealed up the chain. When they have, the court will make a decision on the merits.
Contra proferentem However, it's a principle that is rarely applied in practice since it's at the end of a long line of judicial reasoning that gets applied first. Ambiguity in contract provisions are usually resolved by the golden rule: Determine the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used Consider the context of the contract including its purpose, any &quot;recitals&quot; or &quot;background&quot; clauses and other relevant provisions If the ordinary and natural meaning is inconsistent with the context or gives rise to absurdities, modify the meaning as appropriate. In the vast majority of case, this approach will give a meaning the court adopts without needing to invoke the contra proferentem rule. However, in the minority of cases where the rule is applied it works like this. The ambiguity should be interpreted against: the party who prepared the contract (particularly for standard form contracts offered on a &quot;take it or leave it&quot; basis) the party seeking to rely on the ambiguous position (e.g. the beneficiary of a guarantee, indemnity, limitation or exclusion provision). Finally, contra proferentem may not apply because: it can be specifically excluded in the contract (which most drafters do) where the provision has been the subject of back-and-forth amendments by the parties it can be impossible to say that only one of the parties drafted it.
Isn't there tension between these two parts of the opinion? There is perhaps some tension, but the resolution of that tension is clear. There is certainly no self contradiction. The most obvious tension is between the chief justice's line of reasoning and Justice Ginsburg's. It may be described thus: Justice Ginsburg would uphold the statute by interpreting it as a tax, avoiding the need to consider whether it is authorized as a command under the commerce clause. Chief Justice Roberts notes that the statute reads on its face as a command and says that this requires the court to find that this &quot;more natural&quot; reading is &quot;not authorized&quot; before it can consider other interpretations under the &quot;duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible.&quot; Only by following this line of reasoning may the court consider whether the provision may be upheld under the power of taxation. The reasoning paraphrased in the first paragraph of this question explains that the court may go beyond congress's labels -- the claimed basis of its authority -- when it interprets a statute. The quotation from the opinion explains that it is however necessary to consider congress's claimed source of authority first, before moving on to other possible sources. There is a bit of a chicken-and-egg nature to this: if we don't consider (and reject) the commerce clause argument, we can't justify the statute as a tax, but if we can't justify it as a tax, we have to consider the commerce clause argument. Ginsburg's reasoning would avoid this paradox. Therefore, to the extent that a chicken-and-egg paradox is &quot;tension,&quot; yes, there's internal tension in Roberts' reasoning, but not outright contradiction. The more significant tension is between Ginsberg's desire to avoid considering the commerce clause justification and Roberts' reasoning that requires it.
There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict­ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter.
It is binding precedent for lower federal courts in the Ninth Circuit. They are required to follow it. It is persuasive precedent for the other circuits and for state courts. They may be persuaded by the reasoning and will consider the fact that the Ninth Circuit held as it did to be one factor in their decision-making, but they can make a different decision if they want to. Some courts are also more persuasive than others, although this is usually not explicitly acknowledged in written opinions. For example, state courts in the Ninth Circuit are likely to give more weight to a Ninth Circuit opinion than they are to give weight to a decision from another circuit. Cases from the Second Circuit are more likely to be persuasive than cases from other circuits, because of its reputation. Cases from the Southern District of New York are more likely to be persuasive than cases from most other non-local District Courts. There is also a personal reputation function that comes into play when looking at persuasive decisions. Some judges have a better reputation or a better reputation with a particular other judge, and their decisions may be considered more carefully. This is not explicit, but it means a good lawyer will mention the judge's name when a case in support of his position was decided by a well-regarded judge. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's holding would be persuasive precedent for the Supreme Court. You could write law review articles about this, but to dip one toe in: they may be persuaded by the reasoning and it matters to their function of providing unifying law, so especially during the process of applying for a writ of certiorari, they will care what different circuits have held on an issue and which circuits are going which way. But they are not bound by the circuit courts, and will overturn all of the circuits if they think that's the right decision. They did that a while ago with a statute about what it meant to use a firearm while committing a crime, for example.
Current Place of Magna Carta in US law Magna Carta is not now a current statute in any part of the US. I don't think it ever was (not since the US became independent of the UK), but I am not sure of that. Its words influenced the drafters of the US Federal Constitution. In some cases it may thus be helpful in understanding the original intention of the framers, but probably The Federalist and the records of the debates of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention are far more persuasive and more helpful. The major decisions of the Marshall Court are also very relevant. The US Supreme Court can and does change its interpretation of laws passed by Congress and of the Constitution. The words of Magna Carta are not more binding than Supreme Court decisions. In fact they are not binding at all, on any court or official in the US in any way. They are part of our legal history, but they are mnot current law, no more than the Code of Justinian or the Laws of Hammurabi are. The detailed procedural rules of Magna Carta are certainly not in fore in the US in 2022, nor in the UK either. The Ninth Amendment, which protects unenumerated rights of the states and the People does not protect,such procedural details, At least it has never been held to do so, to the best of my knowledge. I don't even know of a case where such a contention was seriously argued. The question states that: The meaning of “Due Process of Law” of the Fifth Amendment is, primarily, chapter 28 of Magna Carta and everything that built on it by judicial decisions. There is a sense in which this is true, but a very weak one. The concept of “Due Process of Law” was to some extent spelled out in Magna Carta, and later court decisions and legal and political philosophers (such as Locke) built on it. But most of the specifics of what constitute &quot;due process&quot; at the time of Magna Carta have since been dropped, and most of the current requirements were added much later. The idea of a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where the accused can present evidence, goes back to MC. Other requirements of due process, such as a right to a lawyer, rights against self-incrimination, rights against double jeopardy, the right of an accused to testify under oath, the right of an accused to issue subpoenas to witnesses, the right to an impartial jury, The right to be free of search, seizure or arrest unless probable cause has been shown under oath, and many others were added long after MC, some not until the 20th century. Such one-time aspects of due process as the right to be tried by members of one's own social class, a vital aspect of MC, are long gone, and never really existed in the US. Two-Witness Rule There was an early debate in a Supreme Court case, a perjury case if I recall correctly, on the need for two witnesses for conviction, but later statues have altered that rule. I don't know of any such rule ever applying to arrests in the US. It surely does not apply now. Coke and Magna Carta Early in the 1600s Lord Justice Edward Coke used the text of Magna Carta (among other things) to argue that Equity courts should not be able to use injunctions to stop cases pending in common-law courts. To do this he gave to Magna Carta a semi-sacred status it did not have when it was originally issued. (Indeed J.C. Holt, in his classic study Magna Carta, arguses that the charter was a victory for King John, and a defeat for the Barons, because the Barons allowed themselves to be bought off by promises that John never intended to keep, and that were not, in fact, kept. He further argues that it was the re-issues over the period 50-100 years later that gave MC what contemporary force it had, but that it was Coke's invocation of it that gave it the modern reputation as a foundation of freedom. I agree.) Coke claimed things for Magna Carta it could not have meant at the time it was issued, as the equity courts did not exist as an institution at that time, and would not for several generations. Charles Rembar, in his excellent non-technical history of Anglo-american law, The Law of the Land: The Evolution of Our Legal System (ISBN: 978-1-5040-1566-0; 1980) wrote (pp. 57-8): Early in the 1600s, Lord Justice Coke declared that neither king nor Parliament could transgress fundamental principles of common law. In time the proposition was true enough for king (also, academic: he himself could make no law, fundamental or trivial), but it has never held for Parliament; no one in office followed Coke along this line, not even Coke himself. Removed from the bench, he entered the House of Commons, and fought the Stuarts there. In the last stage of his long career, Coke asserted the utter supremacy of Parliament, an assertion which by the century’s end had become the constitutional law of England. The equation of &quot;Due Process of Law&quot; with &quot;Law of the land&quot; was part of this argument on Coke's part; it was, in effect, a piece of spin, which not all later scholars have noticed. &quot;Due process&quot; was, at beat, a part of the &quot;law of the land&quot;, and it was always subject to modification by Act of Parliament (earlier, by acts of King-in-Council). It is true tht the US Supreme court has taken &quot;Due process&quot; in a procedural sense, to imply in most cases the right to a hearing, before an impartial tribunal, including a right to present witnesses and evidence, and that several of these principles are mentioned in Magna Carta, and come down to us from MC through much legal history. Magna Carta in the Case of Murray's Lessee In the case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &amp; Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856) The US Supreme Court looked back throigh legal history to consider what is and is not permitted by the US Fifth Amendment, and its &quot;Due process&quot; clause. This is the kind of extensive excursion into legal history that was more common in Court opinions from the fist half of the Nineteenth Century that it is now. (Rembar remarked, on p 170 of The Law of the Land, &quot;the Supreme Court, ... is fond of legal history and often gets it wrong.) But it is important to note how that opinion from the Taney Court (not the previous Marshall Court) used Magna Carta. The court wrote: [59 U. S. 277] We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. We apprehend there has been no period since the establishment of the English monarchy when there has not been, by the law of the land, a summary method for the recovery of debts due to the crown, and especially those due from receivers of the revenues. It is difficult, at this day, to trace with precision all the proceedings had for these purposes in the earliest ages of the common law. In short that court is interested in Magna Carta only as it has influenced US state and Federal statutes. It in no way states or implies that the exact procedure of Magna Carta must be that of the current US, or is assumed to be such in the absence of a statute changing that procedure. Rather it looks at how US States adopted procedures derived from MC as a guide to the meaning of the Due process clause. After discussing at 59 U. S. 278 what the procedure for retrieving money from tax officials who had allegedly retained it improperly under the statutes of the Tudors (already long after Magna Carta, although well before Coke) the Court wrote: [59 U. S. 278] This brief sketch of the modes of proceeding to ascertain and enforce payment of balances due from receivers of the revenue in England is sufficient to show that the methods of ascertaining the existence and amount of such debts and compelling their payment have varied widely from the usual course of the common law on other subjects, and that, as respects such debts due from such officers, &quot;the law of the land&quot; authorized the employment of auditors, and an inquisition without notice, and a species of execution bearing a very close resemblance to what is termed a warrant of distress in the act of 1820, now in question. It is certain that this diversity in &quot;the law of the land&quot; between public defaulters and ordinary debtors was understood in this country, and entered into the legislation of the colonies and provinces, and more especially of the States, after the declaration of independence and before the formation of the Constitution of the United States. ... [59 U. S. 279-280] Provisions not distinguishable from these in principle may be found in the acts of Connecticut (Revision of 1784, p. 198), of Pennsylvania, 1782 (2 Laws of Penn. 13); of South Carolina, 1788 (5 Stats. of S.C. 55); New York, 1788 (1 Jones &amp; Varick's Laws, 34); see also 1 Henning's Stats. of Virginia, 319, 343; 12 ibid. 562; Laws of Vermont (1797, 1800), 340. Since the formation of the Constitution of the United States, other States have passed similar laws. This legislative construction of the Constitution, commencing so early in the government when the first occasion for this manner of proceeding arose, continued throughout its existence, and repeatedly acted on by the judiciary and the executive, is entitled to no inconsiderable weight upon the question whether the proceeding adopted by it was &quot;due process of law.&quot; *Prigg v. Pennsylvania-, 16 Pet. 621; United States v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 8; Randolph's Case, 2 Brock. 447; Nourse's Case, 4 Cranch C.C.R. 151. Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of this amendment, the proceedings authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to be due process of law when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances due to the government from a collector of customs It is to support this last conclusion on what is and is not Due Process under the Fifth Amendment that the Court examined history, including Magna Carta. All the rest of this discussion of history was Obiter Dictum not binding precedent. And of course, not Supreme Court precedent is binding on future Supreme Court rulings. The court can and does overturn its own decisions, and change its interpretations of the Constitution. Wooden v. United States and its citation of Murray's Lessee In Wooden v. United States (Mar. 7, 2022, No. 20-5279), Justice GORSUCH in his opinion concurring in the result, but dissenting from the majority opinion's reasoning, wrote, starting on page 6 of his separate opinion: Consider lenity’s relationship to due process. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the federal government nor the States may deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law&quot; Amdts. 5, 14. Generally, that guarantee requires governments seeking to take a person’s freedom or possessions to adhere to “those settled usages and modes of proceeding” found in the common law. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &amp; Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856); N. Chapman &amp; M. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1774–1775 (2012). And among those “settled usages” is the ancient rule that the law must afford ordinary people fair notice of its demands. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. ___, – (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3– 5). Lenity works to enforce the fair notice requirement by ensuring that an individual’s liberty always prevails over ambiguous law. Early cases confirm the message. In United States v. Wiltberger, a sailor had killed an individual on a river in China. 5 Wheat. 76, 77 (1820). But the federal statute under which he was charged criminalized manslaughter only on the “‘high seas.’” Id., at 93 (quoting Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 12, 1 Stat. 115). Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that other parts of the law might have suggested Congress intended to capture the sailor’s conduct. 5 Wheat., at 105. But he insisted that “penal laws are to be construed strictly” because of “the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals”—and, more specifically, the right of every person to suffer only those punishments dictated by “the plain meaning of words.” ... United States v. Mann tells a similar story. 26 F. Cas. 1153 (No. 15,718) (CC NH 1812). ... As the framers understood, “subjecting . . . men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law . . . ha[s] been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instrumen[t] of tyranny.” The Federalist No. 84, pp. 511–512 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931) Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law . . . fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand The first thing to note is that this is not a majority opinion, and so not binding law. Indeed another opinion in this case specifically responds to Justice Gorsuch's views, taking issue with them. The next thing to note is that while the opinion does cite Murray’s Lessee, it never so much as mentions Magna Carta, nor does it quote any of the mentions of Magna Carta in Murray’s Lessee. Justice Gorsuch cites Murray’s Lessee to support two principles. One is the &quot;rule of lenity&quot; whch says theist when there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, it shall be read so as to favor the accused. The other is the &quot;rule of fair notice&quot; which says that a person shall not be convicted of crime unless some law clearly makes the actions charged criminal. Justice Gorsuch derives both of these from the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. To establish this, he cites, not Magna Carta, nor cases from Tudor times, nor US cases from before the Constitution, but US Supreme Court cases written by Justices Marshall and Story (both members of the Marshall Court), and one of the numbers of The Federalist (often considered a good guide to the intentions of the framers). Nothing in this citation implies that the detailed procedures of Magna Carta are now in force, nor that they ever were in the US. It applies only a general rule of law, not a detailed procedure, and that on the basis of US Supreme Court precedent, not because Magna Carta says so. The Great Charter may have been one of the earliest statements of these rules, but it is the reconfirmation of them, in case after US case, that makes them part of US law today.
The US Supreme Court has made some decisions that legal scholars, other judges, lawyers, and people in general have strongly criticized as mistaken, but none anywhere nearly as wild as the one suggested in the question. Many such, well let me call them &quot;disputed&quot;, rulings have been later overturned by the court itself. A well known example is Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), which was overruled a few years later by West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Many of the so-called Lochner era economic decisions were also eventually overturned by the Court itself. Some disputed holdings have been altered by changes in the law, State or Federal. Some have been overturned via a constitutional amendment, such as Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which is now held to have been overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment, although the Court did not come to that conclusion until early in the 20th century. Perhaps the most notorious case is Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) which held that a person of African descent could never become a US citizen, and that Congress was without power to prohibit slavery in any US state or territory. This is perhaps the most denounced decision of the US Supreme Court in its history (See the linked Wikipedia article for a few such comments.) This decision was undone de facto by the outcome of the US Civil War, and de jure by the adoption of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Some cases have later been treated as &quot;bad law&quot; even though not formally overturned. An example is Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), in which the Supreme Court upheld the removal of US citizens of Japanese ancestry from the US Pacific coast during WWII, and their confinement in what has been described as a series of concentration camps. This has not been formally overruled, but in Trump v. Hawaii No. 17-965, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), Chief Justice Roberts wrote: The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—'has no place in law under the Constitution.' 323 U. S., at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). [quoting Jackson's dissent in Korematsu] And some cases, although much disputed, still stand as good law. The case of Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), holding that Baseball continued to be exempt from anti-trust laws, federal and state, has been much criticized, but remains in force to this day. (See the section &quot;Subsequent jurisprudence&quot; in the linked Wikipedia article) Congress has not, so far, acted to limit the exemption, as the opinion indicates that it had the power to do. In short, a US Supreme Court decision, however &quot;erroneous&quot; or &quot;absurd&quot; commentators or the public may consider it, remains the law of the land until it is overturned or distinguished by the court, or made obsolete by changes in statute or in the Constitution itself. It the highly unlikely situation described in the question, John Doe would remain in prison until his sentence expired or he received a pardon.