What is the priority of potential extraditions in Assange case? Julian Assange has been arrested by the Metropolitan police for jumping bail and also pertaining to an extradition request from the US. Also the lawyer for one of the alleged victims of sexual assault in Sweden has asked the Swedish prosecutor to re-open the investigation. This could result in the prosecutor asking the UK for Assange to be extradited to Sweden to face charges. I would expect that Assange would serve any sentence for the bail violation in the UK prior to being extradited. However, what would the priority be between the US and Swedish extradition requests were Sweden to request such? And as a follow on, if the UK granted both requests and extradited Assange to the US, say, is the US obligated to then send Assange to Sweden following the completion of their process?
It may simply be a case of which extradition order is deemed valid first - extradition to Sweden and to the US involve two different parts of the Extradition Act 2003, and involve different timescales. Extradition to Sweden under the European Arrest Warrant solely involves the judiciary - once all appeals have been heard and ruled on, if the extradition warrant is still deemed valid by the judiciary then the extradition must be carried out within 10 days of the final ruling. Extradition to the US involves a decision by both the judiciary and the Secretary of State - once all appeals have been heard and ruled on, if the extradition warrant is still deemed valid by the judiciary, the Secretary of State must make a determination on whether or not to allow the extradition. If the Secretary of State does determine the extradition must go ahead, then the extradition must ordinarily be carried out within 28 days of that determination. Government guidance on extraditions Thus, if both the US and Sweden put forth extradition requests, it may simply come down to which one clears all hurdles first.
If the FBI has reason to believe they have committed a crime under US law Being an official of a foreign (or domestic) government in a military or civilian capacity does not make a person immune from US law except in the specific case of diplomatic immunity. There are some US laws that apply even if the perpetrator is not and has never been in the US, for example, computer hacking and fraud. So, if the FBI has probable cause they can ask for and get an arrest warrant. If the US were at war with this person’s country then, barring war crimes or crimes against humanity, military action against the US is not a crime. Naturally, exactly the same circumstances apply to US citizens vis-a-vis foreign laws.
If I did punch him , would that be okay? No, that would be Assault and Battery. If you did him serious injury you could face a charge of Grievous Bodily Harm. If you killed him, that would be murder. If you are in the UK, Canada or Australia and you were charged with murder you could claim provocation in an attempt to have the charge reduced to Voluntary Manslaughter. If you were in the US you could attempt to argue "extreme emotional or mental distress" if you are in a state that has adopted the Model Penal Code for any of the charges; if successful your sentence would be reduced. I saw people punch one another over this in movies. And I saw aliens invading the Earth in the movies - what happens in the movies if not necessarily true. Kissing my wife is adultery right? No, extramarital sex is adultery. Notwithstanding, adultery is not illegal in common-law countries. I'm pissed and don't know what to do? I sympathise with you but this is not a legal question. Whatever is going on between you, your wife and your neighbour is a social situation; not a legal one.
There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.
Extradition is done for specific charges. A principle found in virtually all extradition treaties called the &quot;rule of specialty&quot; says that the country requesting extradition may not prosecute the defendant for any crimes except the ones for which extradition was granted without the permission of the extraditing country, except for crimes committed after the defendant is extradited. This protection expires once the defendant has been released from jail and had a fair chance to leave the country. The rule of specialty doesn't necessarily mean the other charge needs to be dropped, but the defendant can't be tried for it as long as the rule applies. If they're later in the country for another reason (or don't leave when they have the chance), they can potentially be rearrested for the other crime. But as long as they're only in the country because they were extradited, they can't be tried for any other past crimes without the extraditing country's permission.
This issue was addressed in United States v. Meng, 2020 BCSC 785. The authority to extradite is via the extraditing state's treaty with the U.S. and its domestic implementing legislation. In Canada, this is the Extradition Act. Extradition requires consent of the extraditing state and for the requesting state to follow the extraditing state's domestic procedure. The question you raise is how sanctions of requesting state affect the interpretation of the domestic offence for the purpose of establishing the double criminality requirement. Critical in this case was that the charged offence was fraud against HSBC (albeit based on alleged concealment of sanctions violations). See para. 23: The double criminality question in the committal hearing is therefore whether Ms. Meng’s alleged conduct, had it occurred in Canada, would have amounted to fraud contrary to s. 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Ms. Meng argued: that the conduct cannot amount to fraud because in essence the proposed prosecution is to enforce US sanctions laws against Iran, measures that are not part of Canadian law and which, indeed, Canada has expressly rejected. The Attorney General argued: that the double criminality analysis may properly take the US sanctions into account as part of the foreign legal backdrop against which the essential conduct is to be understood. The court agreed with the Attorney General: The effects of the US sanctions may properly play a role in the double criminality analysis as part of the background or context against which the alleged conduct is examined.
The US does not &quot;have to&quot; take in any refugees. There is a provision under US law pertaining to asylum. First, the person has to be in the US, including &quot;having arrived at&quot;. The principle underlying a grant of asylum is that a special exception is made if not allowing the person into the US and repatriating them to their country of citizenship would make then &quot;unsafe&quot; in specific ways. If that can instead be repatriated to a safe third country (e.g. were granted asylum in Norway then decided to move to the US), then they are not eligible for asylum in the US unless the Attorney General determines that it is in the interest of the US. There are various provisions whereby a person from Eritrea (for example) would not be admissible, such as having participated in the repression or being a criminal. This article gives a detailed analysis of the criteria for asylum, which reduce to unwillingness to return to one's home country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion You would have to decide what a &quot;climate refugee&quot; is to see how the law applies. For example, if you mean &quot;a climate-change denier who is subject to persecution for expressing their skepticism&quot;, that would be covered by the protected category of political opinion. The actual climate in a country is not grounds for granting asylum.
Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).