Consistency and coherence across statutes - Are the allowances of s29J completely negated by the offence of religiously aggravated harassment? Crime and disorder act 1988 s32 introduces religiously aggravated harassment which effectively extends S2 and S4 of protection from harassment act. This seems to completely nullify the protections of the behaviours allowed by s29J of racial and religious hatred act 2006. To a lesser extent, section 5, public order act seems to also have this effect of circumventing those behaviours which 29J seemed to have sought so thoughtfully to protect. Obviously (as yet) it still cannot override the free expression protections of the constitutional human rights act. But to what extent is there otherwise expected to be a level of consistence or coherence across different statutes of the statute book, and what consequences do the contradiction of effect between the different laws have upon each other and their respective interpretation and application?
Crime and disorder act 1988 s32 introduces religiously aggravated harassment which effectively extends S2 and S4 of protection from harassment act. This seems to completely nullify the protections of the behaviours allowed by s29J of racial and religious hatred act 2006. I don't understand how you arrive at that conclusion. Harassment is unwanted behaviour repeatedly targeting a particular individual or connected group of individuals (e.g. a family or members of a particular club or place of worship). &quot;Religiously aggravated&quot; means it has a religious component and adds to the sentence. For example, standing outside a place of worship every day, shouting at the coming and going individual(s) &quot;you Christian/Jewish/Muslim scum.&quot; https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/stalking-and-harassment Commenting or joking about Christianity/Judaism/Islam generally is entirely different behaviour and has the 29J defence.
Probably not. As I understand it, the case is being run in Scotland on the belief that Scottish constitutional law is more likely to allow this claim than English law is. That is why the case is not being run in the High Court of England and Wales. The case can't start in the Supreme Court because (apart from specific kinds of disputes) the Supreme Court only hears appeals (see the Constitutional Reform Act 2005). If the Court of Session rejects the case, the plaintiffs might then appeal to the Supreme Court, which would hear the appeal under Scottish law. Scottish law is different to English law, but there's only one Parliament and one Crown. The letter you linked to goes to great lengths to highlight possible differences between Scottish and English law, but they all occur prior to the Treaty of Union which took effect in 1707. The Scottish Parliament's Union with England Act 1707, section 18, says that Scottish law continues in force except insofar as it is inconsistent with the Treaty. A law which provided for Ministers' or the Crown's powers to be curtailed in Scotland but not in England (in respect to a single indivisible subject matter such as the Parliament) would be inconsistent with the core proposition of the Treaty, which is the creating of a joint Crown and a joint Parliament (sections 1 and 2 of the Act). The above difficulties are to say nothing of the low likelihood that any court can: (a) stop Ministers from giving advice, given that the Minister is not exercising any power (only the Queen can actually prorogue Parliament); or (b) stop the Queen from proroguing Parliament (since Her Majesty is the source of the court's authority, and not subject to it). (For completeness it should be noted that the Scottish Parliament that passed the Union with England Act 1707 and the current Scottish Parliament are two entirely different things. The current Scottish Parliament was created by the UK Parliament's Scotland Act 1998, and its powers are set out in that Act. The current Scottish Parliament is prohibited from legislating with respect to the union with England (schedule 5 paragraph 1).) The letter also says that proroguing Parliament would be inconsistent with the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. That Act expressly says that: the European Communities Act 1972 will be repealed on exit day (section 1); and up until two years after exit day, the Government can make regulations with the force of law to deal with deficiencies in UK law caused by Brexit, e.g. the conferral of powers under UK law on an EU body (presumably the regulations could transfer that power to a UK body) (section 8). The Act goes on to say that, if it gets Parliament's approval for a withdrawal agreement, the Government can make regulations with the force of law to implement that withdrawal agreement. If there is no withdrawal agreement, then there's no need for the Government to get Parliament's approval. Not only does the Act not say that Parliament needs to sit in order to consider Brexit, but it expressly sets out a coherent way to deal with the consequences of a no-deal Brexit, namely the regulations made under section 8. The case is pretty weak and would require a very adventurous judge to approve it. EDIT: Well fuck me: https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2019/41.html
The title asks about double jeopardy, but the the body seems to be asking about statute of limitations, which is a separate issue. If an argument regarding timeliness is made by John, it likely will not be based on a statute of limitations. If Jane is asking for a restraining order, she will have to show a high likelihood of harm. If further actions have occurred recently, then any statute of limitations would not apply. If four years have gone by without any further actions by John, then Jane is unlikely to convince a judge that harm is imminent. Restraining orders are not supposed to be punitive, but preventative, thus the concept of statutes of limitations generally does not apply; as they are supposed to be used to prevent imminent harm, only the current situation is considered. Long-past actions are relevant only as to interpretation of current facts. One does not get a restraining order "for" violent acts done against one; one gets a restraining order to prevent future acts, and uses previous violent acts as evidence of the likelihood of those acts. Asking a court to protect oneself from someone who has not been in one's life for four years is unlikely to go over well.
A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.
There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.
canada Maybe it is unsatisfying, but there is no bright line test. The statutory language The Criminal Code says: The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law. Some judicial expressions &quot;[A] precise and satisfactory definition of the actus reus is perhaps impossible.&quot; And &quot;[n]o abstract test can be given for determining whether an act is insufficiently proximate to be an attempt.&quot; See R. v. Cline (1956), 115 C.C.C. 18 (Ont. C.A.): The consummation of a crime usually comprises a series of acts which have their genesis in an idea to do a criminal act; the idea develops to a decision to do that act; a plan may be made for putting that decision into effect; the next step may be preparation only for carrying out the intention and plan; but when that preparation is in fact fully completed, the next step in the series of acts doen by the accused for the purpose and with the intention of committing the crime as planned cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as remote in its connection with that crime. The connection is in fact proximate. Here is a summary from R. v. Root, 2008 ONCA 869, citations removed: [96] The authorities have yet to develop a satisfactory general criterion to assist trial judges in making the crucial distinction between mere preparation, on the one hand, and an attempt on the other. We leave the determination of where on the continuum the conduct lies to the common sense judgment of trial judges. [97] The distinction between preparation and attempt is a qualitative one involving the relationship between the nature and quality of the act said to constitute the attempt and the nature of the substantive offence attempted in its complete form. [98] To determine on which side of the preparation/attempt divide an accused’s conduct falls, a trial judge should consider the relative proximity of that conduct to the conduct required to amount to the completed substantive offence. Relevant factors would include time, location and acts under the control of the accused yet to be accomplished. [99] Relative proximity may give an act, which might otherwise seem to be mere preparation, the quality of an attempt. Further, an act on its face an act of commission does not lose its quality as the actus reus of an attempt simply because further acts are required, or because a significant period of time may elapse before the completion of the substantive offence. [100] To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, the act of an accused need not be the last act before the completion of the substantive offence. To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, an act must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to amount to more than mere preparation to commit it. This requirement of proximity, expressed in the divide between preparation and attempt, has to do with the sequence of events leading to the crime that an accused has in mind to commit. To be guilty of an attempt, an accused must have progressed a sufficient distance (beyond mere preparation) down the intended path. An act is proximate if it is the first of a series of similar or related acts intended to result cumulatively in a substantive crime.
Let's back up. It's premature to say that SB 8 &quot;avoids the constitutional restrictions on banning abortions&quot;. The constitutionality of SB 8 has not been resolved; the Supreme Court said so explicitly (page 2). In fact there is good reason to think that is unconstitutional under existing interpretation of the Constitution per Roe v. Wade and the like. (Whether the court will actually follow existing interpretation is another question, of course.) But the courts do not determine the constitutionality of laws just because someone asks them; they only do so when it needs to be decided to resolve a particular case. For instance, if a person is charged with a crime, they can challenge the constitutionality of the law under which they are charged, and courts will address that question unless the case is resolved some other way. There are also ways that a person who wants to violate the law can pre-emptively sue the government to prevent them from enforcing the law, if they can show such enforcement is likely to affect them. The issue in SB 8 is that since it wouldn't be the government enforcing the law, it's unclear who an abortion provider can pre-emptively sue. In Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, they tried to sue the State of Texas, its courts, and a private party who they thought might be likely to sue them. The SCOTUS majority found that none of those defendants were relevant. However, if and when an abortion provider actually does get sued, there'll be a clear case which has proper parties and is ripe, and courts then will have to consider whether SB 8 is constitutional or not. So if your hypothetical gun control statute were treated similarly, the law might avoid pre-emptive challenges, with a chilling effect on gun sales. But sooner or later, someone would probably violate the law (maybe deliberately as a test case), and the courts would consider whether it was constitutional or not. Under prevailing interpretations of the Second Amendment, they'd probably find that it wasn't. A key difference, of course, is that abortions are much more time-sensitive than gun purchases; being temporarily blocked from having an abortion is much more consequential in most cases than being temporarily blocked from buying a gun. The other subtext is that, although SCOTUS said their decision in Whole Woman's Health is not based on the constitutionality of SB 8, it's widely suspected that several of the justices are not all that keen on the constitutional right to abortion found in Roe v. Wade, and might look to overturn Roe when it comes up. As such, they may not be very motivated to look for procedural avenues to block SB 8 in the short term, since they might be inclined to uphold it in the long term. The dissenters in Whole Woman's Health certainly thought those avenues were available. But in the case of your hypothetical gun control bill, if a majority of justices were pretty convinced that the law was unconstitutional, they might try harder to come up with grounds to block it pre-emptively.
This is an excellent explanation. All Australian jurisdictions have (in general) common road rules. In NSW these are enacted by Road Rules 2014 regulation under the Road Transport Act 2013. The relevant provision is Clause 306: 306 Exemption for drivers of emergency vehicles A provision of these Rules does not apply to the driver of an emergency vehicle if: (a) in the circumstances: (i) the driver is taking reasonable care, and (ii) it is reasonable that the rule should not apply, and (b) if the vehicle is a motor vehicle that is moving-the vehicle is displaying a blue or red flashing light or sounding an alarm. From your statement (a)(i) and (b) would seem to apply so it becomes a question if (a)(ii) does. Well, you don't know the circumstances so you can't judge if it is reasonable that the rule not apply: if the police car were involved in a collision, caught on a red light camera or booked then the driver would have to show that it was. It is worth noting that some road offences like drink or dangerous driving are not in the Road Rules, they are in the Crimes Act and so the exemption doesn't apply to them. It is also not a shield from civil liability although the difficulty of proving negligence goes up because disobeying the road rules is no longer enough.