What is the meaning of notwithstanding in this context? In this Trust document can you explain the meaning of " notwithstanding"? I believe the Trustees feel it means in spite of. My interpretation is that it means with exception of. Here's how it's written, On page 29 of the 5th Amendment, the definition of education is outlined for the Education Trust. It is: Definition of "Education." Notwithstanding subparagraph 5(b) of Article Twenty of this agreement, as used in this Article only, the term "education" shall mean only undergraduate and graduate study leading to a degree, in any and all fields whatsoever, whether of a professional character or otherwise, at an accredited university, college, or other institution of higher learning, whether public or private. The activities described in this paragraph may be carried on either in the United States or elsewhere. In determining payments to be made for all such education, the Trustee shall take into account and may pay for the beneficiary's reasonable costs of tuition, room, board (whether or not charged by an educational institution at which such individual shall be a student), books, laboratory or other equipment or tools (including computer hardware and software), fees, travel to and from school, transportation and charges for tutoring. Thank you so much for any input and observations.
What is the meaning of notwithstanding in this context? The clause that starts with "notwithstanding" narrows down the levels of studies that are eligible for payment by the Trustee(s). In other words, for purposes of payment of benefits, "education" can be interpreted only as "undergraduate and graduate study", and thus it overrides --only pursuant to that clause-- the wide encompassing notion of "education" as defined in paragraph 5(b). The clause implies that any other levels of studies, such as "elementary or high schools", are not eligible for payment by the Trustee(s). The inclusion of "notwithstanding" seems intended to reflect the awareness of apparent discrepancy of the definitions of "education", and to consequently clarify the intent that paragraph 5(b) be regarded as the appropriate definition of "education" for everything except the matter of payments.
Legalese The purpose of a legal document is to set out the rights and responsibilities so that: they can understand them, a third party (e.g. a judge) can rule on them in the event of a dispute. These two requirements are often in tension. We have about 1,000 years of legal precedent where certain words and phrases (sometimes in Latin rather than English) have developed very clear and precise meanings. This serves very well for the 2nd point but it can be confusing to lay people especially where: the word as used in everyday speech has a broader meaning than the way it is used in the law (e.g. shall), the word is no longer used in everyday speech (e.g. thou), or the damn thing is in Latin (e.g. certiorari). For example: "Thou shall not kill" is a legal prohibition - killing by you must not happen. However, "Killing is illegal" is merely an observation. TL;DR There is no reason why an agreement cannot be expressed in plain English. However, when put in front of a judge, that plain English must be interpreted; maybe it is better to use words that have clear and unambiguous legal definitions? An anecdote, probably untrue In the spirit of never letting the truth get in the way of a good story. The legal fraternity's love of opaque language supposedly dates from the 1600s. In those days a lawyer was paid by the folio - a large piece of paper. As a consequence lawyers used very big handwriting. Parliament, justifiably, thought that this was a rort and legislated that lawyers must be paid by the word. So now we have "in the event that" instead of "if" because 400 years ago it was worth four times as much. Parliaments do this kind of thing a lot.
There isn't a difference. The terminology in England and Wales that means the same thing is "litigant in person", with the source of these Latin phrases have abandoned them in favor of plain English terminology. The variation of usage, however, does not necessarily break down on a federal v. state court basis. Pro se is the majority usage, but the variation is more regional, within state courts, than it is a federal v. state divide. California and Michigan, for example, use both terms and use them interchangeably. If there is a historical reason for the variation in terminology, I haven't groked it. Incidentally, there was historically a subtle distinction between the two concepts related to consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court that has long since become obsolete (more than a century ago), but which movements such as the "sovereign person" movement errantly believe has great legal importance to the power of a court over them.
You have read it: legally It doesn’t matter if you haven’t read it in fact. At law, you have. Therefore you cannot avoid obligations or consequences by saying “ I didn’t read it”. It’s an extension of the common law principle that if you affix your ‘mark’ to a document you were acknowledging that you understood it and would abide by it: even if your mark was an X because you were illiterate. There are protections. At common law an unconscionable term is unenforceable and may void the contract entirely. Additionally, many jurisdictions have passed legislation to make unfair contract terms unenforceable, particularly in contracts of adhesion. Further, consumer protection laws often have non-excludable warranties that operate in spite of the contract.
As a terminological matter, I assume that by &quot;public school&quot; you mean state-operated K-12 systems. As a part of the government, public schools cannot be sued unless the state has allowed a suit on such grounds. Issues such as negligence and violation of rights are not litigated under contract-law theories. Because the public school is required to accept and teach students, parents are required to send their children to school, and parents are not obligated to pay anything, the opportunities for a contract to exist are highly limited. I set aside popular fake contracts between student and teacher which simply recites the teacher's pedagogical vows and expectations, since these are not enforceable contracts with new obligations and consideration. IEP (Individualized Education Program) &quot;contracts&quot; may be advertised as being agreements, but they are mandated (of the school) by law. The contract would be between the parent and the school because the student as a minor lacks capacity to form contracts. The parent cannot be &quot;forced&quot; into an enforceable contract since state law already mandates that the school must provide an education, and the parent never faces the &quot;sign or no schooling&quot; choice. Public schools can, of course, contract with a business, for example a pest-control service, or employment in general. The person whom they contract with can naturally be a parent of a child in the district, but the business contract is incidental to the person's being a parent.
A private school in the US is not bound by the 4th Amendment requirement for searches to be &quot;reasonable&quot;, just as parents do not need a search warrant to search your room. Instead, limitations would arise from contract law. This typically means that per the contract whereby you can go to that school, you agree to certain things (as do they). This may or may not include the power for a teacher to conduct a surprise inspection. It just depends on what is said in the contract regarding dorm room searches. Typically, adjudication of this type of matter is left to parental outrage rather than courts, unless there is a clear violation of the contract terms.
A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.
The plain meaning of "any" is "all". That does not mean that that is how the word is interpreted under current US law: that can only be determined by inspecting the case law. In US v. Alabama 443 Fed. Appx. 411 (No. 11-14532-CC), fn. 2 states "Pursuant to § 1304(e), every alien eighteen years of age and older must carry a certificate of alien registration or alien registration receipt card", thus this court has suggested that the meaning is actually "some". However, the case was not ruling on the interpretation of "any" here, so this could be a slip. The case involves an Alabama law, which as reported in the opinion's summary of the part of Alabama law being challenged by the US states: Section 10 creates a criminal misdemeanor violation under Alabama law for "willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document if the person is in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) or 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a)..." indicating that the Alabama statute refers to "some" (which could influence the interpretation of "any", since "some" and "any" are often mixed up in legal drafting). That is, it is possible that the court in the footnote read "any" as "some" because the state law in question, which is parallel to the federal law, says "an". In US v Arizona 641 F.3d 339, the court weakly suggests a "some" interpretation as well, saying: Determining Congress' purpose, and whether Section 3 poses an obstacle to it, first requires that we evaluate the text of the federal registration requirements in in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304 and 1306. These sections create a comprehensive scheme for immigrant registration, including penalties for failure to carry one's registration document at all times.. Again, the meaning of "any" is not the central issue: in using "one's registration document" in the singular, the court must have been interpreting "any" as "some". US v. Daubon 334 Fed.Appx. 167 (2009), another case that invokes the law but does not rule on the meaning of "any", rephrases the law: 8 U.S.C. § 1304(e) requires every alien over eighteen to carry his permanent resident card at all times. which is at odds with the possibility of there being two such documents: it suggests that an I-766 is not good enough. Lexis-Nexis returns 18 cases that cite this statute, and only Arizona v. US which was about the preemption issue was decided by SCOTUS. None of these opinions rules on the meaning of "any", so the matter has not yet been decided.