Why does the Ninth Circuit court include so many states? It appears odd that the ninth circuit contains not just so many states, which by itself would not be unique, but so many states with addition of California. Circuit courts for NY, FL, TX from what I see only contain a few states. What was the reason for this, or this is just not unusual?
Basically, it is a historical accident with a healthy mix of partisan politics thrown into the mix. The history is recounted here. Circuits were much less important until the intermediate U.S. Court of Appeals for the various circuits were created by Congress, in the Judiciary Act of 1891, commonly known as the Evarts Act, established nine courts of appeals, one for each judicial circuit at the time. Before that time, circuits were simply an administrative tool of the U.S. Supreme Court for assigning work loads of justices assigned to tasks in connection with these circuits, which was adjusted from time to time with the 9th Circuit being the last one to be created in the pre-intermediate appellate court era. The Tenth Circuit was established on February 28, 1929, under Tenth Circuit Reorganization Act of 1929, which broke the then-Eighth Circuit into the Eighth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit. The circuits have generally have had three or more states, have not split any states, and have been contiguous. As new states were admitted this ended up leaving lots of states in the 9th Circuit and there was no where else to add Hawaii and Alaska. Reassigning a state from the 9th Circuit to an existing circuit is complicated because it leaves open the question of which circuits precedents to turn to for pre-split law. If one turns to the new circuit's pre-reassignment case law, the law in the reassigned states suddenly changes on a variety of issues upon which people have acted in reliance on the old law. If one turns to the old circuit's pre-reassignment case law, then the case law is not uniform for all states in the circuit. Politically, splitting up the 9th Circuit has been discussed seriously many times, but there has not been a political consensus around a particular proposal to do it. The fact that the 9th Circuit has quite a few states in it really isn't the main issue. The issue is that it has a huge number of cases relative to the other circuits. As a result, a split is justified by the sound non-partisan reason that it is much larger in terms of caseload than any other circuit giving it more judges, twenty-nine, than any other circuit, and limiting the effectiveness of its en banc review process which doesn't include all sitting judges to resolve intra-circuit concerns about a three judge appeal panel's resolution of a case. The conservative states whose politicians want out of the left leaning 9th Circuit don't have enough population, collectively, to justify a circuit of their own, and wouldn't be fully contiguous, which makes their politically driven split proposals problematic. Arizona, Idaho, Montana and Alaska would like to be in a more conservative circuit. Hawaii, Washington State, Oregon, and California, are by and large, content to be in a liberal leaning circuit. Nevada is relatively ambivalent, but it is convenient for it to be in the same circuit as California because the two states have so many economic ties with each other that sharing the same body of federal precedent is convenient. Guam and the Marianas Islands, which are U.S. territories in the 9th Circuit, don't really have a say in the matter. California is also so dominant in terms of case load, that a California plus one or more states solution for one of the resulting circuits in a split, with the remaining states in another circuit, leaves the circuit with California in it overloaded and too large, while the remaining states in the other circuit with too small of a docket. More than 50 percent of the Ninth Circuit caseload comes from the Central District of California. This is more than the caseload of some other entire U.S. Court of Appeals circuits. California as a whole accounts for about 63% of the 9th Circuit's work (about 18 judges worth), and about 13% of the number of appeals lodged nationwide. The First Circuit, which includes Maine, New Hampshire, Massachussetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, is the smallest of the U.S. Court of Appeals Circuits which manages with just six judges, about half as many as are necessary to consider appeals from the Central District of California alone.
It's a gray area. You won't know for certain until a case is tried by a court. Regulatory bodies are notoriously assertive on the matter of jurisdiction. If there is a gray area, they often assert jurisdiction first, then let the judiciary limit their authority. Also, if you try to ask the regulatory body for an opinion or "permission" in advance (as a prudent person might think to do), they might offer you one if you are lucky. But they will most likely qualify it as "non-binding." In other words, they give themselves wiggle room to change their mind at a later time to file an action against you. The long and short of it is, the scenario you describe is likely to at least cost John Smith a fortune in legal fees to litigate the matter with the California authorities. So it would be prudent not to give the advice in the first place. Even if he were to ultimately eventually prevail on the action.
The U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to set everyday procedural rules in state court, although it can mandate processes that flow from the constitution. In criminal cases, this allows it to regulate courtroom conduct that is prejudicial to defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has prohibited keeping criminal defendants facing trial in a cage in the courtroom as is common in many jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. The Rittenhouse case took place in state court, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has limited authority in such matters. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has broad authority to establish court rules in the federal courts and could adopt rules in those courts if it deemed fit, and if its proposed rules were not legislatively vetoed by Congress.
As a linguist who reads laws for a hobby, I would say that "and" legally means what it was intended to mean. There are often interpretive statutes which say that "and" can be read as "or" or vice versa, when necessary (as in ORC 1.02 "And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it. Delaware doesn't have that as a rule, but it is a rule employed by courts "as required". One approach to interpretation is to discern intent from surrounding text, so we would look at the whole code. The general context is the rule that "A building or land shall be used only for the following purposes". Following Article XXVII of the code, other uses could be permitted because "§115-32. Special use exceptions may be permitted by the Board of Adjustment and in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVII of this chapter and may include...". That section ends with "C:Other special use exceptions as follows", and includes "Private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district". From the list of things enumerated in §115-32, there is no coherent pattern – some things are in the list of special exceptions, some things are in this list, some not. So the "surrounding text" approach doesn't help in this case. Scrutiny of legislative debate is sometimes invoked, especially at the federal level, but there is negligible chance that there is any such evidence here. The almost-final approach is to spell out the competing interpretations, and see if anything jumps out as ridiculous (because it is assumed that lawmakers do not pass ridiculous laws). The two interpretations are "both must be true", versus "one must be true". Since the general rule is that you can go ahead unless it is restricted, then with the "both" interpretation, you need a special exception permit if you simultaneously plan to have more than 4 automobiles (which means, 5+, so 4 is allowed) and floor area greater than 900 sf. Thus if you plan for only 4 cars, or can fit the 5 cars into 900 sf, then you would not require a permit (on the "both" interpretation). Which btw is the literal interpretation of "and". This is not an absurd scenario (using a generous 10'x18' space, which I derived from parking slot regulations in Danbury CT). So it is reasonable to think they meant "both". The "either of these" interpretation says that they are being even more restrictive – you need permission to have a 5+ car garage (regardless of size), and you need permission to have a garage larger than 800 sf (even if there were only 1 car in it). This seems a bit specific since there isn't generally a size restriction on structures in the code – except that playhouses are limited to 150 sf. and can't be tall enough for an adult to stand up. Since the literal meaning of "and" is "both at once", and since no facts about the code say otherwise (i.e. that interpretation does not result in an absurd nullification of some other provision), an objective court should interpret this rule to mean "both at once", thus the government imposes the fewest restrictions on your property. No way to know what they will do.
Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.
Short answer: Yes. There are some matters in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, which consists of suits between U.S. states and/or foreign states with each other and suits involving diplomats. On average, one or two such suits are filed each year. The original jurisdiction in these cases is created by Article III of the United States Constitution (Section 2, Clause 2), and is exclusive in these cases by virtue of the 1789 Judiciary Act. The 11th Amendment also plays a role in this analysis. Long answer: The original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court is set forth in Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United State Constitution, which states: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. Basically, these are cases of a state against the United States and/or another state, often regarding boundary disputes, interpretations of interstate compacts, or water rights, or cases involving diplomats adjudicating the extent of diplomatic immunity. (Incidentally, almost all, but not all of the cases in the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction are discretionary, but appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court from three judge panels ruling in certain election law cases are of right.) How rare are these suit in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court? On average, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered about one per year on the merits since it came into existence. This has been between 0.5% and 2% of the U.S. Supreme Court's overall caseload of merits cases in modern times. (These days the U.S. Supreme Court typically decides about 70 case a year on the merits and evaluates about 5,000 certiorari petitions each year.) Between 1789 and 1959, the Court issued written opinions in only 123 original cases. Since 1960, the Court has received fewer than 140 motions for leave to file original cases, nearly half of which were denied a hearing. The majority of cases filed have been in disputes between two or more states. The Court has generally accepted state party cases dealing with boundary and water disputes, but it has been much less likely to field original cases dealing with contract disputes and other subjects not deemed sufficiently substantial for the Court's resources. In practice, when a case in the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is filed, it is almost always assigned immediately to a "special master" who develops the case until it is ready for U.S. Supreme Court review. The U.S. Supreme Court briefly allowed non-residents of a state to sue state governments in its original jurisdiction, but this authority was quickly eliminated by the passage of the 11th Amendment (which has also been interpreted as codifying the principal of a state's sovereign immunity from suits by its own citizens outside its own courts without its consent). In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress made the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction exclusive in suits between two or more states, between a state and a foreign government, and in suits against ambassadors and other public ministers. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the remainder of suits to which a state was a party was to be concurrent, presumably with state courts since the statute did not expressly confer these cases upon the inferior federal courts. Notably, this exclusivity rule does not apply to suits between a state and the United States, or to suits brought by states against non-residents (whether or not they are U.S. persons), although such suits have been interpreted to be within the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court: In the 1892 case of United States v. Texas , Justice John Marshall Harlan ruled that since the federal judicial power extended to "cases in which the United States was a party," and the Court was granted jurisdiction over cases to which a state was a party, the Court would take jurisdiction in a United States suit against a state. Such suits by the United States increased after the 1890s and usually involved disputes with states over land, though in the late twentieth century they also included a few suits to enforce provisions of the Federal Voting Rights Act. As a result of the 11th Amendment and the 1789 Judiciary Act, the U.S. District Courts only have jurisdiction over states when they consent to suit in the forum (usually for federal law cases involving bankruptcies), or when the United States is a party and no private individuals are parties (as in the federal district court case Arizona v. United States mentioned in the comments) since U.S. District Courts have jurisdiction over all suits to which the United States is a party. U.S. District Court jurisdiction is limited, however, by doctrines of state sovereign immunity, to cases seeking only injunctive relief that seek to enforce the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution (although this is circumvented, in part, by bringing suits against state officials as opposed to state governments themselves). So basically, states themselves can only be sued in U.S. District Courts by the United States for injunctive relief under the 14th Amendment. (For this purpose, unlike many other purposes under the U.S. Constitution, the term "state" does not include local governments which can be sued in federal court, and often are sued there for civil rights violations.) Also, despite the seemingly mandatory nature of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, it declines to hear about half of the cases presented to it in that capacity. The Supreme Court further limited its original docket by declaring that it would exercise discretion over whether to hear cases even if they were legitimately within the Court's jurisdiction. In a series of cases in 1971, including Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp ., the Court declined to hear environmental pollution claims brought by states against corporations that dealt with complex and technical factual questions. The justices ruled that the states had other available forums to bring their claims and that the cases were not "appropriate" for the Court in light of its primary function as the nation's highest appellate tribunal. The Court resolved to examine the "seriousness and dignity" of claims so as to preserve its resources for consideration of appeals involving federal questions. The Supreme Court soon expanded its appropriateness doctrine to decline to hear some cases between two states, even where the Court's jurisdiction was exclusive. The U.S. Supreme Court also has the statutory authority (almost never used) under the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651) to issue writs of habeas corpus filed directly in the U.S. Supreme Court rather than a lower court, although strictly speaking it doesn't add to the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction. About 60 habeas corpus cases are filed directly in the U.S. Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction each year, although very few are granted. The text of the All Writs Act is as follows: (a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. (b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction. According to Wikipedia (with appropriate citation to authority): Application of the All Writs Act requires the fulfillment of four conditions: The absence of alternative remedies—the act is only applicable when other judicial tools are not available. An independent basis for jurisdiction—the act authorizes writs in aid of jurisdiction, but does not in itself create any federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Necessary or appropriate in aid of jurisdiction—the writ must be necessary or appropriate to the particular case. Usages and principles of law—the statute requires courts to issue writs "agreeable to the usages and principles of law".
There have been instances where the US Supreme Court has held over cases to the next term, and instances where they ordered a case re-argued in the next term. Brown vs Board of Education was a particularly well known case that was reargued. I believe that such occasions are rare, and that the court makes a significant effort to decide each case in the same term where certiorari is granted. Once exception is when the Court has a vacancy and is waiting fora new Justice to be confirmed, and the Justices in office are tied. Then cases with 4-4 splits are often held and re-argued. More often, the Justices decide, after granting certiorari, that this was a mistake, and dismiss the case altogether. The phrase used is that the writ is &quot;dismissed as improvidently granted&quot; or &quot;DIGed&quot;. This has the same ultimate effect as if certiorari had never been granted -- the lower court decision is left standing, and no Supreme Court precedent is created. This is still fairly rare. To the best of my knowledge there is no rule requiring decision within any specific time, but I have never heard of a case held over for more than one term.
Your options are generally limited by where you have (or can establish) residency, along with where your communal property is held. There are (decreasing numbers of) jurisdictions known as "divorce mills" that have notoriously lenient rules for establishing residency and completing divorces.