Why and when would an attorney be handcuffed to their client? While reading about the trial of Hans Reiser I came across this peculiar sentence: On Monday, July 7, 2008, Reiser led police to Nina's shallow grave in the Oakland Hills. Reiser's attorney, William Du Bois, who was handcuffed to Reiser and accompanied by a heavy police guard to the site, said that the remains were found buried on the side of a hill […] (Originally reported by SFGate) I find this very strange for multiple reasons: The attorney is not legally responsible for the defendant's safety or security. The attorney is free to leave at any time. The attorney is not required to be armed and can not be expected to defend himself from a violent defendant …nor can he be expected to physically restrain the defendant if necessary. If the heavy police guard has to intervene, having an innocent civilian chained to the target must make their job much more difficult in case the defendant has to be subdued by force. Why and when would this be standard practice, and who would order that? Is it something that the Judge would order, or would the attorney himself have to suggest it?† † Unfortunately we can not ask him personally since, while researching the question, I found that he recently passed away.
My impression, and the plausible explanation in the absence of the actual facts, is that this was something that the attorney agreed to, in order to allow a skittish client to reveal information pursuant to a favorable plea agreement. The police probably insisted that the client be handcuffed to someone while doing this to prevent the client from fleeing. The attorney probably offered to do the job instead of a police officer, to be able to provide advice to his client and keep his client calm enough to do it, which might not have happened (sacrificing the favorable plea deal that the attorney negotiated) if someone else were in that role.
@Dale M is basically correct, but fudges a bit on the process. The court issuing the order would issue an order to show cause to a government official who is alleged by the person who sought the order to have violated the order after having received legal notice (i.e. service) of the order. If that individual fails to appear at the appointed time and place in the order to show cause, a warrant issues for that individual's arrest. If that individual does appear, the allegedly contemptuous individual is read their rights and a hearing date is set. At the hearing, if the person appears, the person seeking the contempt finding (or some other attorney appointed by the court) prosecutes the case and if the person is found in contempt, then contempt sanctions issue. If they do not appear, a warrant issues for their arrest and a hearing is held on the merits promptly following that arrest. An individual can also be ordered to show cause in an official capacity in which case the contempt sanctions would be imposed against the organization rather than the individual. Usually, in federal court, the U.S. Marshal's office has primary responsibility for arresting people on contempt warrants. The U.S. Marshal's office primarily reports to the judicial branch, although strictly speaking, it is part of the Justice Department, and ultimately reports to the Attorney-General. There are actually two kinds of contempt - remedial and punitive. Remedial contempt sanction can include indefinite incarceration or a fine (often a per day fine) until the violation of the order of the court ceases and is allowed only when it is possible to comply with the order going forward. Punitive contempt has a sanction comparable to a misdemeanor conviction and applies in cases where the goal is to punish someone for a past violation of a court order whether or not it is possible to comply going forward. (Both of these are examples of "indirect contempt", i.e. violations of court orders that take place outside the courtroom. A different summary process called "direct contempt" applies when someone misbehaves in the presence of the court - this is summary incarceration or fine without a trial on the spot for disrespecting the dignity of the court in the courtroom.) Established practice is to direct a contempt order at the lowest level official necessary to remedy the violation of the order. There are a few examples in living memory of cabinet members being held in contempt, however (e.g. the Secretary of Interior, with regard to Indian Trust fund litigation), and keep in mind that in the case of remedial contempt an official can purge the contempt and be released from any sanction by resigning from office, after which the official no longer has the ability to comply. I am not aware of any instance in which the President of the United States has personally been held in contempt of court, but I am also not aware of any authority that specifically prohibits a court from holding the President in contempt of court. While contempt is the only "hard" remedy for a violation of a court order, the bureaucratic structure of the federal government is also set up in a manner that once a court order definitively resolves a legal issue, the higher ups in a federal agency are supposed to take all reasonable actions to insure that their subordinates follow that order (and they are themselves subject to contempt sanctions if they fail to do so). And, keep in mind that most of the people in the chain of command are civil servants with legal protections from unlawful employment actions hired on a merit basis, not political appointees, and that lots of the people in the chain of command are also members of unions that provide individual employees with the ability to fight wrongful employment action from a superior for violating a court order. In particular, the top lawyers in the executive branch would in ordinary times direct government employees to follow a clear court order and to cease and desist from explicitly disobeying one. Among other things, the courts could probably deny lawyers who refused to do so the right to practice law in federal court. But, usually things never reach this point. Then again, we are living in interesting times. There are about 670 political appointee positions in the executive branch, many of which are currently vacant and less than a dozen of which would be relevant to any given dispute in any case. There are about a million, civilian, non-defense department, non-postal service employees in the United States government, of which perhaps 100,000 or so are in the Department of Homeland Security and fewer are in the CBP. As far as I know, the CBP political appointees from the Obama administration have resigned and a replacement has not been confirmed by the U.S. Senate yet (there has been a Department of Homeland Security appointee confirmed if I recall correctly), and there are only a few people in the agency that political appointees can hire without either receiving Senate confirmation or using the merit based hiring process for civil servants (which takes a while, especially given an executive order imposing a hiring freeze). So, realistically, we have a case where the acting head of the CBP is probably a GS-15 or Senior Executive Service grade civil servant, rather than a political appointee, at the moment, who was hired as a civil servant many years ago, who is doing his (or her) best to follow the less than clear guidance he is receiving from his superiors and government lawyers (perhaps errantly). There could also be remedies in the form of declaratory judgment. The Court could declare as a matter of law on a case by case basis that, for example, Fatima Jones is not deportable and is lawfully within the United States and is entitled to be released from custody. This specific finding as to an individual would be very hard for the administration to escape sanction for. And, the Court could also declare that the entire executive order, at least as applied, is invalid (e.g. for failure to comply with the administrative procedures act, or for failing to include an exception for contrary court orders) or is unconstitutional.
Whether any person, provided that they are in full legal capacity (not a minor, not incapacitated etc.), needs a lawyer, is to be decided by that person. Even criminal defendants can be self-represented if they've got the balls for it — the law does not impose a requirement to have a lawyer when the person does not want it. Considerations as to whether to have a lawyer are very fact-specific and person-specific. Assuming that Steve is not literate in law, it would probably be good idea for him to get a lawyer before answering any questions. The facts are such that it is not totally impossible that he may be charged, especially if he inadvertently says something not in his favor, or otherwise says something favorable to McRobberface.
So I'm fascinated with the OJ trial and I've read a ton about it. I'll try to answer your question both accepting your premise as true, and then also going into what actually happened. First of all, jury nullification cannot be overturned in the US. The double jeopardy clause forbids it. This is such a powerful tool, in fact, that there are strict rules that prevent defense lawyers from mentioning or even hinting at jury nullification, in front of the jury, in almost all circumstances. It doesn't mean D is safe from all legal liability. OJ, obviously, was found liable in the civil trial. Sometimes other jurisdictions can prosecute. For example, after the officers in the Rodney King beating were acquitted in state court, the federal government got them for violating federal hate crime statutes. Second, looking at your premise. If jurors think D is guilty, but also being framed, that's not necessarily jury nullification. Remember, a criminal defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means that 'probably guilty' means 'not guilty.' That said, there may be times when a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt, but is so disgusted by the police tactics used in the case that they acquit. This would be jury nullification. What actually happened in the OJ case: Mark Fuhrman perjured himself on the stand. He lied and said he'd never said the N word, and the defense produced tapes of him saying it a ton. The defense recalled him to the stand. Because perjury is a serious crime, this time he came in with his own defense lawyer, and did nothing but take the fifth on the stand. In a genius move, OJ's defense team asked him whether he planted any evidence in the OJ case. He didn't deny it, instead he took the fifth (again, as he was doing to every question). This was enough to sow reasonable doubt about OJ's guilt based on the evidence in that trial (there's obviously no actual doubt, in real life, that he's guilty). So, what actually happened wasn't jury nullification.
Engaging in unlawful conduct does not completely preclude a claim of self-defense under Wisconsin law ...but it does raise the bar in some circumstances: Criminal conduct by the defendant removes the presumption that &quot;force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm&quot; when defending against unlawful forced entry to one's own property. A much higher burden on use of force is imposed if engaging in unlawful conduct that is &quot;of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack.&quot; Anyone intentionally provoking an attack by any means, lawful or unlawful, &quot;with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant,&quot; is not entitled to self-defense at all. Section 939.48 of Wisconsin law governs the standards for self-defense. 939.48(1) sets out the general standard: A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally use force against another for the purpose of preventing or terminating what the person reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference with his or her person by such other person. The actor may intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent or terminate the interference. The actor may not intentionally use force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself. 939.48(1m)(ar) provides presumptions in favor of the defendant and no duty to retreat when defending against unlawful entry to one's own property (an implementation of the castle doctrine), but those presumptions are removed by 939.48(1m)(b)1. if (among other things), &quot;[t]he actor was engaged in a criminal activity.&quot; More relevant to a case that occurred outside is 939.48(2), which lays out how provocation affects a claim of self-defense: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense.
Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.
Your question convolutes a number of different circumstances and legal questions. When is a person justified in using deadly force against a driver? When the person can convince a prosecutor, judge, or jury that a reasonable person would consider it necessary to prevent grievous bodily harm (and other situation-dependent defenses &ndash; for more nuance see self-defense). When can a law enforcement officer assault people with his vehicle? When he his performing official duties, and is performing them in a manner reasonably consistent with his training and official obligations. When can a driver assault people with his vehicle? When the driver can convince an inquiry that a reasonable person would consider it either not an act of assault, or else a justified act of self-defense. When are pedestrians liable for collisions with vehicles? When they are obstructing or infringing a traffic right-of-way; or when a judicial inquiry determines that they are at fault. Pedestrians in such situations could also be cited for many other offenses (Disorderly Conduct, Jaywalking, etc.).
Some of this will vary by Jurisdiction, that is by country, and by state in the US, or by province in some other countries. This answer will be focused on the US. Other answers may address other countries. Why did they only arrest the attacker and not the victim? There is not enough information here to say, but stories from participants or witnesses could have made it clear who the attacker was. If the police believed that one party was only defending himself, they might well arrest only the attacker. Can the victim be subpoenaed to court? Yes, the victim can be subpoenaed just as any witness can be. In some areas a victim is routinely subpoenaed even if s/he si expected to attend voluntarily. Could they have actually done anything without the victim present? Yes, if there is enough evidence. The victim rarely takes the stand in murder cases, after all. However, in some cases there is simply not enough evidence aside from the testimony of the victim, so that becomes vital to the case. But if there were many other credible witnesses, the prosecutor might choose not to call the victim. The prosecutor has wide latitude on what witnesses to call and what evidence to presnent, and what charges to bring. Would the attacker have been put in a holding cell? S/he might have, that would depend on the policy of the local police, and the facilities the police had available. Could he have requested to see the victim? This seems like the "one phone call" thing to me, but is that possible here? S/he could ask, but the police would not be required to grant any such request. Indeed permitting this would be a bit unusual, but not unheard of. Usually a visitor would not see a person in a cell, but in some sort of room for the purpose. Details vary. (Edit Comment suggest this is even less plausible than I had thought, unless this is set several decades or more ago. It probably dosen't change the plot much if the attacker was brought to some sort of conference room or visitor's room instead.) Is the victim's testimony enough to actually reduce the sentence down to aggravated assault? Is six months too short of a time? If the judge or jury believed the testimony that there was no intent to kill, then a conviction of aggravated assault would be possible, as a lesser included offense. But this would depend on the totality of the evidence, and the way in which the finder of fact (judge or jury) interpreted it, and whether all the elements of aggravated assault had been proved, and whether any elements of attempted murder had not been proved. In those jurisdictions that I know about, intent to kill is an element of attempted murder. As for the sentence, 6 months is not, I think, outside the range of plausibility for aggravated assault, depending on the facts and the view taken by the judge. The Judge has wide discretion to choose a sentence up to the maximum allowed by law, or much lower. The "usual sentence" varies by jurisdiction, and does not bind the judge anyway. Would the attacker just go back to normal after his release? Would there be any further punishments or restrictions? The court could impose an additional term of probation, with various restrictions, depending on the local law, and the choice of the Judge. These might include staying employed, not getting into other fights, not owning a firearm, taking anger management courses, or other possibilities. Failure to comply with such conditions might lead to a person being sent back to jail/prison. The Judge does not have to impose any such restrictions however. Could the victim change his testimony afterward and reopen the case? Or would that be unreliable? It can happen, but reopening the case is far from automatic. Generally a court has to order the case reopened, and courts generally are reluctant to do so. How many years would the attacker have been facing for the original attempted murder? Probably quite a few, but this varies a good deal by jurisdiction. And the Judge would have considerable discretion up to the maximum sentence permitted by the law in that jurisdiction. Why did it take so long for the case to start? The question does not say how long it took, but it is not uncommon for major cases to take several years before the start of the trial, partly because of the time taken to investigate, and partly because of backlogs in the court system. There are cases on record where the trial took place decades after the crime. That is unusual.