Can an appellate court overturn part of a decision not appealed against? Bob litigates against Rob. The case boils down to resolving two questions of law: X (rather critical to Bob) and Y (not so critical). The two questions are separate/isolated, although both are highly relevant to the facts. Bob wins on question X (and hence, substantial/material relief against Rob follows) but fails to convince the judge to take his view on question Y (not a big deal but somewhat disappointing to Bob). Bob takes the judge's decision to appellate court to appeal on question Y only. Can the appellate court review question X on its own volition and overturn the decision on X reached by the lower court, effectively making Bob shoot himself in the leg? If not, can the appellate court do that if Rob argues for it in his response to Bob's appeal on Y? (Any jurisdiction with adversarial system. Case law examples would be very good.)
You have asked two quite different questions there. I’ll address the second part first (where Rob argues for the decision in Bob’s favour to be overturned in his response to Bob's appeal), because it’s easier. For both parties to partially succeed at trial, and both parties to contend on appeal that they should have been wholly successful, is not that unusual. It is usually called a cross-appeal in Commonwealth jurisdictions, or in the Supreme Court of the United States, a cross-petition. An example from the United Kingdom: in R (on the application of Carmichael and Rourke) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] UKSC 58, the court dealt with four appeals arising out of challenges to the so-called bedroom tax. In one case, the claimant succeeded on one of two grounds, the government appealed, and the claimant cross-appealed on her failed ground: The Rutherfords succeeded in their claim on the ground of disability discrimination. [Ms A’s] claim succeeded on the grounds of sex discrimination. Both A’ and the Rutherfords’ Equality Act claims were rejected. The Secretary of State appeals the Court of Appeal’s decision to allow the Rutherfords’ and A’s discrimination claims. A cross-appeals the rejection of her Equality Act claim … The Secretary of State’s appeal in respect of A is allowed, and A’s cross appeal is dismissed, by a majority of 5 to 2. The first part of your question is more difficult, which is why you have received two conflicting answers. Usually appellate courts have the formal power to go beyond the issues raised by the parties, as pointed out by @Dale M. In any event, if an apex court exceeds its powers, there is no further court of appeal to say so. However, as @ohwilleke points out, to decide the case on a ground not argued violates due process. When an appellate court does this, it is said to act “on its own motion” or sua sponte. As @ohwilleke says, in the United States, appellate courts may be able to affirm the trial court’s decision for any reason supported by the record, even if not raised by any party. This is the “right for any reason” or tipsy coachman doctrine. However, your question asks whether a court can overturn part of decision not appealed against. That is, by appealing his partial win, does Bob run the risk of the court ruling sua sponte that he ought to have suffered a complete loss? This is discussed in Miller, ‘Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard,’ 39 San Diego Law Review 1253 (2002). In the introduction, Miller observes: In fact, some of the Supreme Court's most famous opinions decided issues not presented by the briefs or addressed below. In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the Court overturned sua sponte an ancient precedent on applying the common law in diversity cases. Mapp v. Ohio overrules a prior case and applied the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states, without briefing or argument on the issue. In Washington v. Davis, the Court decided that Title VII standards did not apply to constitutional discrimination, even though the parties had agreed that they did. Younger v. Harris prohibits injunctions against pending state court criminal cases, even though the issue was not argued on appeal. Indeed, in Stanley v. Illinois, the Court held that due process requires hearings and an opportunity to make submissions before a state can terminate the parental rights of unwed fathers. But the Court decided this without briefing or argument – without a hearing on the issue or an opportunity for the parties to make submissions. Most of those cases involve a petition for certiorari in which the petitioner got more than they asked for. However, Younger v. Harris is closer to the Bob/Rob scenario. Younger, the District Attorney of Los Angeles County, prosecuted Harris under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. Before the criminal trial, Harris sued Younger in the Federal District Court, which held the Act void for vagueness and overbreadth, and enjoined the prosecution. Younger appealed to the Supreme Court, but rather than determining whether the Act was constitutional, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision on the ground that federal courts should only enjoin state criminal prosecutions in extraordinary circumstances. So, Younger “won,” but Harris’s constitutional argument remained open and supported by the district court’s opinion, which Younger could not challenge again without first securing a conviction at trial. To summarise, appellate courts sometimes do overturn decisions based on arguments not raised by the parties. However, this is exceptional and is generally considered procedurally unfair. If an appellate court thinks the parties have missed an important legal argument, it is more common and appropriate for the court to raise it at the hearing, and invite the parties to consider and make submissions about it.
A motion to dismiss sets no precedent Whether it succeeds or not, it does not result in a judgement on the merits, it is simply an analysis on whether the case as pleaded shows the defendant has a case to answer. The case would have to go to trial, have a judgement issued (i.e. not settle), and await the result of final appeals (if any) before it would be considered precedent. As to your final question Is it considered intellectual property theft to capitalize on synthetic datasets produced by OpenAI's LLMs? No one knows. Hence the lawsuit.
An appeal may be made by a plaintiff, prosecutor, defendant or other interested party, so the term 'defendant' is not very useful; the party opposed to the Appellant (and served with the appeal) is usually called the Respondent. A contested appeal just means that the Respondent wishes to be represented at the appeal, presumably to fight it; most appeals are contested, but not all. Unlike a first-order case which may go by default, an uncontested appeal will still have to have some sort of a hearing; you are, after all, saying that a court decision should be set aside, and the Respondent's views are not necessarily relevant. It is, though, fair to say that an uncontested appeal will have a greater chance of success.
It isn't worth litigating a $60 fine for a non-moving violation that isn't likely to recur. You have a less than 50-50 chance of prevailing (something that is almost always true when you are appealing the decision of a judicial officer in a context like this one), you have no real long term harms as you would in the case of "points" for a moving violation, and you are even less likely to get costs of litigation or attorneys' fees if you prevail, so not having to pay a $60 fine would be a pyrrhic victory from an economic perspective. Even if it is free (and it probably isn't) it would easily take many hours to litigate that isn't worth you time. Any lawyer who would take the case would be cheating you because they would only leave you worse off than you are to start with due to their fees.
The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.
This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.
Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly.
Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.