Are there any criminal jurisdictions where burden of proof rests so entirely on prosecution that defense does not need to deal with evidence? In criminal trial processes that I'm aware of, particularly adversarial, burden of proof is nominally with the prosecution in most circumstances, but in practice it seems to be somewhat shared - both sides introduce witnesses, and both sides cross-examine the other's witnesses, each generally trying to create a convincing story and undermine the basis of the other's story. So I wonder whether there are any criminal trial processes around the world which place the entire burden of collecting evidence on the prosecution, and the burden of testing it on either the prosecution or a combination of prosecution and court, making it unnecessary for the defence to introduce or test evidence, and sufficient for them to point out shortcomings in the prosecution's evidence base.
The common law adversarial system is just that: the prosecution must prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The defense is not obliged to call evidence at all. They are allowed to though: they will do it merely if they feel that the prosecution evidence needs rebuttal — in order to discredit the evidence or, at least, raise that &quot;reasonable doubt&quot;.
Yes - all evidence needs to undergo evaluation If there is ground for a Retrial or New Trial on the lower court level, that starts everything in the trial from 0. The whole matter is looked at de novo, which means as if there had never been any trial before. 1 All evidence is put on the record (again), motions to suppress or exclude evidence are evaluated (again), and then the whole trial happens once again. New Evidence just as much as evidence from the old trial will both be scrutinized the same. This means, witnesses will need to enter the stand once more, especially since the questions might be different from the first time. 1 - Note that Courts of Appeal might look at things de novo but not admit new evidence - they don't offer a retrial but evaluate the lower court was following the correct procedures in those cases.
There is no &quot;different legal procedure&quot; for challenging the constitutionality of a law. The only way to do so is through the process that this question contemplates: to argue that the law is unconstitutional in a civil or criminal trial. Whether the law bears directly on the matter at trial or only on ancillary matters such as discovery, the court has the power to find the law unconstitutional and to issue orders accordingly. The extent to which such a ruling binds other courts depends on which court issues the ruling.
Is there such a phrase in jurisprudential or legal thought? In those instances it is common to say that the evidence is inconclusive. Accordingly, it is unavailing because that evidence does not prove the party's allegation.
If the government withholds information that is pertinent to the credibility of a witness is that cause for a mistrial? Only if the error is not harmless under the standard applicable to evaluating harmless error in criminal cases (there is a voluminous case law on that point). Basically, it means that a new trial may be held and a conviction vacated on a charge against a particular defendant if there is a reasonable possibility that the withheld evidence, when considered in light of the total picture of evidence presented at trial, might have changed the outcome on guilt or innocence. Does whether the government knowingly or unknowingly withheld this information influence whether a mistrial will be granted? Not really. Knowledge is imputed. If someone in the prosecution team including the police knows, then it is known to the entire team for Brady purposes. If no one knew that it had the information (e.g. a key exculpatory document in possession of the prosecution was misfiled in one of dozens of bankers boxes of documents that it seized in a search and no one reviewed those particular boxes knowing to look for a document like that one or attuned to its potential significance, since it wasn't supposed to be in the place where it was filed), then it hasn't been withheld in the Brady sense unless someone specifically asked for the information in question with enough specificity that it could have been located if they looked at what they already had. The knowledge that must be disclosed is what the prosecutor's office or the police the prosecutor's office is working with knows. So, if a beat cop hides exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor's office, that is a Brady violation, but if the cops do a sloppy investigation that fails to reveal exculpatory evidence that is out there to be found, it isn't a Brady violation. Likewise, if a cop in another department halfway across the state knows something that impacts the credibility of a witness and the prosecutor is totally unaware of the existence of that information as are all the cops working on the case, then that isn't a Brady violation. What If It Isn't A Brady Violation? Exculpatory evidence discovered after the trial that isn't a Brady violation not to disclose may still be grounds for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence in a motion for post-trial relief. But, the standard to get the court to grant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence that was not withheld in a Brady violation is much more stringent than the mere harmless error standard. Instead: With a single exception, criminal defendants in the United States seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are required to establish only that the new evidence makes it more likely than not that, in a new trial, they would be acquitted. Ohio requires clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. There's a lot of case law on what constitutes newly discovered evidence which is &quot;new, material evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original trial[.]&quot; If evidence was available, but not used at trial, it can't be presented in a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Often this means that it can't be considered even if the salience of the evidence previously available is only clear later in the light of other evidence that is genuinely newly discovered, or the defense attorney's failure to use that evidence in the first trial was negligent to a level constituting legal malpractice.
united-states For a particular sovereign in the United States, the criminal law test for this is from Blockburger v. United States (emphasis mine) 12 Each of the offenses created requires proof of a different element. The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, 342, 31 S. Ct. 421, 55 L. Ed. 489, and authorities cited. In that case this court quoted from and adopted the language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433: 'A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.' Compare Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 11, 12, 47 S. Ct. 250, 71 L. Ed. 505, and cases there cited. Applying the test, we must conclude that here, although both sections were violated by the one sale, two offenses were committed. What this says in more plain language is that a person can be prosecuted under two different statutes for the same logical act as long as there is at least one fact that has to be proven for each count which doesn't have to be proven for the other count. This does mean, for example, that a person could not be prosecuted for aggravated assault, acquitted and then later prosecuted for simple assault on the same facts if there aren't any facts required for simple assault that aren't required for aggravated assault. For the example in the question, this does seem to mean that if, for example, a robber was first prosecuted for murder, and then later separately prosecuted for carjacking after the murder, this would not be double jeopardy. I would guess in practice that courts wouldn't appreciate this kind of game-playing since it wastes the court's time as well to adjudicate two trials when there could just be one, but I don't know if there's a hard rule against it. Blockburger was actually arguing that multiple convictions from one trial should be overturned because some of them relied on the same facts as another. In this case SCOTUS ruled against Blockburger, but on the basis that the facts did not overlap, not that the legal basis of the argument was unsound. I noted in the beginning that this applies to particular sovereigns, which in terms of US law means either a state or the US Federal Government. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine (e.g. Gamble v United States), if the same set of facts of a case constitute both a state crime and a federal crime, or the also likely case that a federal crime requires all the facts of a state crime plus a few more, both the relevant state government and the Federal government can prosecute the person under their own statutes. This would technically also apply if two states wanted to prosecute someone, although it's unlikely that there is any way to have the exact same set of facts break two different state's laws since state laws generally can only cover actions taken inside the state or affecting that state in particular.
united-states In the United States, only a very few rules of evidence (most notably the &quot;confrontation clause which is similar to the hearsay rule but not identical) have constitutional status. Other rules of evidence are not constitutionally required so long as the proceedings as a whole do not deny the defendant due process of law. Often, local government court systems are not required to follow the rules of evidence that are adopted in the state court system.
I will address only the legal issues. Prosecutors for very good public policy reasons are not required to prosecute every crime they have suspicions about. When exercising this discretion they consider: Is the act, in fact, criminal - many of the things you list, while reprehensible, unethical, and possibly immoral are not actually criminal. Do they have the resources (time, staff, money) to collect the evidence and run this case as opposed to the thousands of other crimes out there. There are always more crimes than can be prosecuted and these have to be prioritised in some way. Do they have enough evidence to gain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. People can be fired or resign on suspicion, they can't be convicted on it.