What power does the supra-national European parliament have regarding the control of Golden Visa/Passport schemes run by many EU member states? What power does the supra-national European parliament have regarding the control of Golden Visa/Passport schemes run by many EU member states? The EU report on the Investor residency and citizenship Schemes urges member states to take safety steps like rigorous checking for money laundering etc.., or things like sharing of the data about the rejected applicants to each of the member states (so that a rejected applicant does not succeed in applying in another state). This is primarily to safeguard the whole of the EU from potential criminals/terrorists. EU is apparently urging member states (in its report) to take proper measures for a safe Golden Visa scheme and has also decided to form a committee that will itself monitor the issues and take appropriate actions to make these schemes safe. The EU apparently cannot interfere in National legislation of member states to remove these schemes that have the potential of fraud and other security risks. It just directs member states to be careful as a golden visa scheme introduced by national legislation directly affects other member states due to free movement rights. But can the EU altogether scrap each and every golden visa scheme (currently around 20 member states run such schemes) of all member states? Does the supra-national parliament legally have the sort of power to do a thing like that?
No, it can't unilaterally scrap such schemes Immigration is a shared competence between the Union and Member States under Article 4(2)(j) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. This means that the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts. However, it is predicated on a triad: the Commission (proposer of legislation), Parliament (co-decision maker), and the Council of the European Union (co-decision maker). The Parliament would not be able to propose and enact legislation scrapping the schemes by itself. The matter of proposing legislation would fall to the European Commission under the ordinary legislative procedure. Such a proposal would go before the Parliament and the Council of the European Union for a &quot;co-decision&quot;. Either side may amend, accept, or reject the proposal. While the Parliament may accept any proposed legislation from the Commission, the Council is unlikely to agree. This is because the Council is comprised of government ministers from each Member State. In the matter of immigration, it is likely that the Home Affairs minister of each Member State would meet as the Council to consider the proposed legislation. Given the obvious conflict of interest for each &quot;golden visa&quot; scheme, it seems unlikely that the Council would agree to curtail or scrap the system given the advantages it provides that Member State, and the need to be &quot;competitive&quot; with other Member States (even though such competition should not really exist, to ensure the harmony of the Union). Therefore, the Council would likely reject the proposed legislation and assuming the subsequent conciliation committee cannot get both the Parliament and the Council to agree on the matter, the proposal will be abandoned.
"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services
Yes Companies can own companies - that’s what subsidiaries are. On a practical level, you know this is true because you actually have an example. Companies House would not have allowed its registration (barring error) if it was illegal. Why can’t it open a bank account? Banks (or any other business) can choose who they will and won’t do business with. Unless it’s discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic, it’s not illegal. Since juridical persons don’t have protected characteristics (apart from nationality) it’s virtually impossible to illegally discriminate against them.
It would probably already be illegal based on national laws that comply with Directive 95/46/EC (of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995). What's new with GDPR include: the sanctions that can be imposed the accountability i.e. you must be able to provide documented evidence on your practices even before something happens the obligation to report all data breaches. So you'd definitely have more concrete responsibility to follow good security practices under the GDPR.
This is a good question, as it raises an issue which places the controller's interest in providing a smoothly functioning customer sign up process against customers' right not to have their data leaked. Note that it is not necessary to consider &quot;enumeration&quot; here. Even just being able to check whether one person has a registered account raises the issue. The relevant provisions of the EU GDPR (or in the UK, the UK GDPR as defined in sections 3(1) and 205(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018) are (emphasis added): Article 4(2): 'processing’ means any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction So, disclosure of the fact that a user has a registered account amounts to &quot;processing&quot;. Article 6(1): Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: (a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one or more specific purposes; (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract; (c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject; (d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person; (e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; (f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. Of these, only (a) and (f) are likely to be of any relevance: (a) is not too useful since it isn't feasible to design a sign-up system that depends on the user's consent (which they may not give). That leaves us with (f). As noted by the Information Commissioner's Office, &quot;Legitimate interests is the most flexible lawful basis for processing, but you cannot assume it will always be the most appropriate. It is likely to be most appropriate where you use people’s data in ways they would reasonably expect and which have a minimal privacy impact, or where there is a compelling justification for the processing.&quot;. The legitimate interest here would be that you need a sign up system which prevents duplicate registrations. Remember though that the processing has to be &quot;necessary&quot; for the purposes of the legitimate interest. One might argue that it is not since you could design the system to give the appearance of accepting the duplicate registration followed by sending an email to the account holder to inform them. On the other hand this will result in a less user friendly experience which could itself be a legitimate interest. Ultimately this is a balancing exercise and it is hard to say whether you have struck the right balance until someone complains to the ICO or the court and a decision is issued. The fact that the practice is widespread among well-resourced and large companies would tend to indicate that it is lawful albeit this is not conclusive in the absence of a court decision. I'm not aware of any cases involving this particular issue but would be interested to hear from others on this point. If the processing is unlawful then Article 18 is applicable: The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller restriction of processing where one of the following applies: [...] (b) the processing is unlawful and the data subject opposes the erasure of the personal data and requests the restriction of their use instead Where processing has been restricted under paragraph 1, such personal data shall, with the exception of storage, only be processed with the data subject’s consent or for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or for the protection of the rights of another natural or legal person or for reasons of important public interest of the Union or of a Member State. In other words, the data subject could ask you not to disclose their registration status via the sign up page, and you would be obliged to comply with the request. Separately from the above points, in order to be lawful you must provide the data subject with certain prescribed information at the time when the data is collected. Of particular relevance here are the following items: Article 13(1): Where personal data relating to a data subject are collected from the data subject, the controller shall, at the time when personal data are obtained, provide the data subject with all of the following information: [...] (c) the purposes of the processing for which the personal data are intended as well as the legal basis for the processing; (d) where the processing is based on point (f) of Article 6(1), the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party; So even if you conclude that the processing will be lawful you will have to give some consideration to the basis so that you can comply with the above provision.
The sovereign has the power to prorogue parliament at will, but actually exercises the power only on the advice of the PM (actually, according to paragraph three of the decision, it is exercised on the advice of the privy council). Other of the sovereign's powers are delegated to the courts. The court is not unfamiliar with exercising the sovereign's power to void her own acts, as acts of parliament and acts of government ministers are also nominally acts of the sovereign. While the courts cannot void acts of parliament, they can indeed void executive acts. Two relevant quotes follow. From paragraph 30, relating to the sovereign's lack of discretion in exercising the prerogative to prorogue parliament: It is not suggested in these appeals that Her Majesty was other than obliged by constitutional convention to accept that advice. In the circumstances, we express no view on that matter. That situation does, however, place on the Prime Minister a constitutional responsibility, as the only person with power to do so, to have regard to all relevant interests, including the interests of Parliament. From paragraph 32, on the justiciability of questions concerning prerogative powers: ... political controversy did not deter the courts from holding, in the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, that an attempt to alter the law of the land by the use of the Crown’s prerogative powers was unlawful. The court concluded at p 76 that “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him”, indicating that the limits of prerogative powers were set by law and were determined by the courts.
Why do other countries, like America, not allow this? It is the way that U.S. courts have interpreted the constitutional amendment requirement and reflects a policy judgment that letting someone go free now and then is better than frequently forcing someone to be tried more than once. That value judgment flowed from concerns about and fear and skepticism of the British colonial criminal justice system and the Star Chamber in England with which they were familiar. The U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand didn't have an independence revolution in their history to create the same kind of deep distrust of authority, especially in the criminal justice area. The U.S. was founded by terrorists. Few other former British colonies were. Quoting Dale: &quot;As a constitutional protection, legislative change like this is not available in the United States.&quot; Is that really true and can someone expand on this? When the courts determine that the constitution requires something it can't be changed with ordinary legislation. Either the constitution needs to be amended to change it (which is very hard), or the courts can change their interpretation (which is unlikely in an area so settled in the law and which is relatively uncontroversial between liberals and conservatives in the U.S.). If it is, this is a big problem in my opinion. The powers that be in the U.S. don't agree. This kind of case is exceedingly rare. And, there are much bigger problems with the system that obscure that one. Also, the dual sovereignty doctrine allows federal prosecutions in some wrongful acquittals that really matter (e.g. for civil rights violations by law enforcement).
The European Convention on Human Rights has an article about privacy (article 8). Note that this is from the Council of Europe, which is not the same as the European Union: non-EU member states such as Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are also part of the Council of Europe and therefore the ECHR. I'm not sure if you first have to go to a lower court, but the European Court of Human Rights is the authority on this (commonly mistaken for the European Court of Justice, but they are distinct entities). According to this ruling of the ECtHR, it is not illegal to monitor your employees' communications per se. However, the monitoring has to be: for legitimate purposes ("the employer had only accessed the account in the sincere belief that it contained only messages of a professional, not personal, nature"), proportionate ("it was the only possible way available"), and communicated to the employee (or, if the monitoring is not announced, at least the restriction on personal use should be communicated, for example through company policy). In the European Union, there is also the GDPR, but this does not change much. It applies to your employer the same as any other organisation and basically says that they have to be reasonable about it: collect only what they need, for a legitimate purpose, and tell you about it. I think you should be able to request a copy of any data they collected about you, ask a human to review an automated decision, and your other usual rights. They don't need your consent to start collecting data, as Esa Jokinen already commented: "GDPR doesn't even require consent to handle PII data, but the consent is just the last option when there's no other legitimate reason to process the data." In fact, your employer probably cannot ask you for consent: because of the employer–employee imbalance of power, the consent would probably not be considered to be freely given (where this article mentions "The GDPR states", I think they are referring to recital 43).