How often is bail money returned? I have been reading a little about the housing mortgage crisis of 2000s. I have found some articles on the internet, some inference and intuition that has lead me to believe that many banks in fact wanted individuals (poor credit rating or not) to default on their mortgage payments. Often using predatory tactics to induce certain behavior upon borrowers. In similar suit, the various USA governments have enough motive to keep large sums of money that initially are expected to be returned to the payer upon completion of obligation. Does anybody have stats that show how often bail money is returned vs kept by the system?
I don't know precisely what the default rate is, but I represented a bail bondsman for several years so I do have a good sense of the economics of that business. Basically, bail bond business make very little profit after their expenses (rent, payroll, licensing, cost of use of money put up as bonds, etc.) on the non-refundable fees that they charge for the bonds themselves (typically about 10% of the bond amount although prices vary on a case by case basis). Additional fees are charged for security measures taken by the bail bond company to insure the client's attendance such as ankle bracelets or fees paid to bounty hunters to recover the client if he absconds. The profits come almost entirely from seizing collateral (often motor vehicles, firearms and homes) that someone paying for a bond pledges in the event that the bail bond is forfeited, for example, because the criminal defend absconds rather than appearing at a hearing or trial, in addition to the non-refundable fee charged to provide the bond in the first place. (It is a bit like movie theaters which break even on their movie ticket revenues and make their profits by selling food and drinks.) A typical bail bond business owner will sell the motor vehicles and firearms pledged as collateral to pawn brokers and independent used car sales lots, and will keep the (typically very bottom of the market) real estate and rent it to low income tenants. In other words, most bail bond company owners eventually build wealth by becoming slum lords with real estate pledges as collateral for bonds that go bad. Another revenue stream for a bail bond business is bounty hunter work, partially for their own absconded clients which can result in a partial or full restoration of the funds provided by the bail bond company that often does not result in a refund to the client whose collateral was seized as a result of the default, and sometimes for other wanted felons upon whom law enforcement has placed a bounty because they are not set up to recover the subject of some of their outstanding warrants in an economically viable way. Usually, bounty hunting one's own absconding clients is more profitable than chasing reward money from law enforcement agencies for other people subject to arrest warrants. Default rates are ultimately a function of how selective a bail bond company is about the clients for whom it posts bonds and about how closely the company supervises the client who is out on bond to make sure that he (or she) complies with his (or her) pre-trial release order terms. But, even if the client absconds and the bail posted by the bail bond company is forfeited and can't be recovered within any applicable grace period, the bail bond company can still avoid losses by having collateral securing the risk of a forfeiture of the bond that is worth significantly more that the amount of the bond posted by the bail bond company. As a typical bail bond company website (which sounds more clear than it is when you really try to pin down what they are saying and for what it is worth is not my former client's website) explains: Most of the time bail collateral takes the form of property. If the court is collecting on a property-based bail collateral because of a failure to appear in court, it typically involves the seizure and sale of the individual’s home. Property bail takes weeks to collect on, and equity in the estate being sold must be determined to equal at least 150% of what is owed the court. Collateral will be returned when the case is completed, whether the the person is found innocent, the charges are dropped, the person is sentenced or bail is exonerated. If the individual for whom the bail collateral was offered fails to appear in court at the agreed upon time and date, the collateral will be seized or collected by the court or the bail bond company. The full amount of the collateral may not be returned to the individual if a premium has been put in place when using a bail bond agent. This premium is negotiated between the bail agent and the arrested party or person bailing the arrested person out. Bail collateral will typically be returned within five business days after the individual has paid off all financial obligations and their case has been concluded. Until this happens a bail bond agent can hold the bail collateral. A financial website explains the situation this way: When a defendant uses a bail bond agent to post bail, the defendant must pay the bondsman’s fee, and may also have to hand over collateral or sign a security agreement. Should the defendant comply with bond conditions, the bond agent will return the collateral or release the lien created by the security agreement upon the conclusion of the case. However, the bond agent’s fee (the 10% to 15% of the total bail amount) is not returned no matter the outcome. Bond Forfeiture and Bounty Hunters Should a defendant who used a bond agent’s services fail to appear in court or otherwise violate bail terms, the agent can usually try to find the defendant, take that person into custody, and physically take the defendant back to police custody. Courts typically grant bond agents a grace period after a defendant violates bail terms. If the agent can return the defendant to court within that grace period, the court usually will not require the agent to pay the full bail amount. As part of this process the bail bond agent can employ bounty hunters, also called bail enforcement agents, to track down and apprehend the defendant. Bounty hunters, like bail bond agents, are not government employees or law enforcement officers. They do not have general arrest powers, but can arrest a defendant who used the bail bond agent’s services. This is because as part of the contract defendants sign with the bail bond agent, defendants typically agree to allow the bond agent, or bounty hunters working for the agent, to enter their home, arrest them, or take other actions that would typically be illegal without the defendant’s consent. Note that state laws on both bail agents and bounty hunters can differ significantly, and not all states allow for bail bond agents or bounty hunters. For example, suppose that son is arrested for a felony and released prior to trial on a $20,000 bond for which his parents pay a non-refundable $2,000 non-refundable premium and sign off on a $20,000 second mortgage on their house with a $200,000 fair market value which is also subject to a $160,000 first mortgage. If son defaults in a way that triggers his parents' obligation to pay the $20,000 placed at risk by that default, and the parents don't have the money, the bail bondsman takes the house subject only to the $160,000 first subprime mortgage and nets $40,000 of equity (the $20,000 surplus would rarely be enough to cause another buyer to bid at the foreclosure sale). The bail bondsman then refinances the $160,000 first mortgage at the much lower interest rate he qualifies for with his higher net worth and better credit rating, and then rents it (often initially back to the parents who pledge the house as collateral in the first place) at a market rate, which, for a house like that is probably on the order of $2,000 a month, until he decides to resell it (perhaps assembling many similar houses on the same block over time and then selling the entire block to a developer who wants to scrape the houses to build an apartment building on the entire block instead, at a significant premium). Even if I a mistaken and the collateral can only be seized when the bond is actually forfeited and not merely when it is placed in peril by a failure to appear when the grace period has not yet run, or if the actual amount of the bail bond debt is repaid after the collateral has been foreclosed upon and sold to a third party, insuring that there is sufficient collateral to back the full amount of the bond if it has to be repaid to the bail bondsman, this still prevents the bail bondsman from losing any money in the worst case scenario if the bond is forfeited. Indeed, this will usually make the bail bondsman a healthy profit because the value of the collateral is generally significantly in excess of the value of the bond, at the cited bail bond company at least 150% of the amount potentially owed (also providing a cushion if the fair market value of the collateral has been overestimated), but not so high relative to the value of the bond that another bidder will bid at a foreclosure sale. So the bail bondsman will sometimes make a profit on the collateral seizure and sale to a third-party, even if the bond debt ($20,000 in this example) is ultimately repaid to the sponsors of the client because the client is returns to court custody before the grace period expires. Sometimes a bail bondsman will also take a guarantee of repayment of the bond amount if there is a default, in place of some or all of the collateral if the guarantors' incomes are sufficient to comfortably be able to pay the full bond amount, at least in installments over time, even if the guarantor has few assets of value to pledge, but this is much more common for small bonds of, for example, $500 or $1,000 or $2,000 than it is for a medium bond amount for a felony of about $10,000 or a higher amount of $25,000 or $100,000 for serious felonies when the court is worried that the client is a flight risk, where the bail bondsman will typically post bond only of the client's supporters can offer sufficient collateral to cover the full amount. This is very similar to the reason that a hard money lender doesn't worry too much about the ability of the people borrowing from the hard money lender to pay during the typically short loan term because any unpaid loan balance can be recovered by seizing collateral for the hard money loan which is worth significantly more than the value of the loan. The New Yorker interviewed a bail bondsman who claimed that less than 1% of his clients defaulted, in 2013, but in my experience this is highly implausible and unusual (as the story notes, even prime secured mortgage loans have a higher default rate than that most of the time), even though it certainly isn't impossible if one is very selective about who one takes on as a client. The more likely possibility is that the bail bondsman is actually talking about clients who abscond or violate bond conditions who are not returned to the court within the grace period, or about the percentage of transactions in which the bail bondsman actually loses money after foreclosing on collateral and collecting from guarantors, if necessary. A New York Times in a 2018 article does not provide a forfeiture rate figure, but does explain that as long as the client is returned to law enforcement authorities within a grace period that can vary from a few months to two years on a state by state basis, the forfeited bond will usually be returned to the bail bond company. One company cited in the 2018 New York Times article with $800 million of revenues had zero losses as a result, a data point that I strongly suspect reflects not a zero bond forfeiture rate but a complete recovery of forfeited bonds from bond collateral and guarantors, with profits on some bond collateral seizures exceeding, on average, losses from bonds extended with insufficient collateral or with guarantors who can't make good on their obligations or go bankrupt. According to this 2018 New York Times article, California is one of the only states that requires a premium refund when a client is re-incarcerated voluntarily during the grace period. This policy white paper from the Obama Administration notes that: Though failure-to-appear rates declined from 25 to 17 percent between 1992 and 2009, pretrial re-arrest rates actually increased from 14 to 16 percent for released felony defendants in large counties. This 15-17% failure to appear rate is a much more accurate estimate of bond defaults prior to before considering grace periods. A law review article from 1994 explores the economics that drive the bail bond industry in more detail than is possible in a Law.SE answer.
Do I have standing to sue a credit bureau or lender after being approved for a loan but being prevented from signing due to their error? Unfortunately, no. The email you got from the loan agency reflects that no contract was formed yet. The email merely is the loan agency's expression of interest to proceed toward the formation of that contract. Absent that formation of the contract, even if for reasons beyond your control, you are not entitled to the benefits or consideration(s) the contract would provide. Nor would the lender be entitled to your compliance with the terms of that contract, terms which might not even be informed --let alone known-- to you. There is no legal obligation from one party to the other. Lastly, the agency's or bureau's faulty process/questionnaire is not actionable either. Lender's reluctance to employ an alternative method is within his freedom of contract.
In the US, a house Title determines ownership, the name on the mortgage determines who owes the bank money. But a new mortgage will need the title holder to be on the document, because you cannot use someone else's real property as collateral. As to who can evict someone, it's the property owner, not the mortgage holder.
This is a good example of the life of the law being experience and not reason. While there is a logical argument that this isn't theft, in reality, this conduct would universally be considered an open and shut case of shoplifting and anyone who tried this would surely be convicted of a crime with consequences far more severe than creating a tort debt for conversion of the property. Also, you do intend to permanently deprive the store of its property. The fact that you intend to remedy that by paying for it doesn't change that. You aren't borrowing the property with an intent of returning it.
My friend should have taken his property with him, but presumably the host can't just keep it, especially after reaching out to them? Correct. However, the host does not have to do anything to facilitate its return i.e. they don’t have to post it to you. So long as they keep it for your friend to collect and don’t appropriate it for their own use, they are not breaking the law. If they do appropriate it, that is called theft or its tort equivalent, conversion. As my contract was with Airbnb and the host works from them, is there any responsibility on their part, e.g. Could I hypothetically open a small claims case against them? Or would any small claims case be directly against the host themselves? This is not true. You and the host each have a contract with Airbnb for the use of the platform. The contract for the accommodation is between you two and doesn’t involve Airbnb at all. In any event, there is no contractural issue here.
Consult a lawyer These issues are quite common and their impact depends on your jurisdiction (usually local governments handle this) and the attitude of your potential lenders/buyers. In most cases, local governments have the power, in extremis, of ordering the demolition of unpermitted work. However, this is normally done only when the work is irredeemably unsafe or adversely affects the amenity of neighbours. More common might be an order to make good any defective work, possibly to current rather than historical codes after which they will retroactively grant the permissions. Some lenders will refuse to lend if there are unpermitted works. Others will only lend against the unimproved land value less the cost of demolition. The same is true of insurers. As for buyers, well, its making you stop and think, isn't it? Common solutions are to make your offer contingent on the current owner cleaning all this up before you close or offering less to cover the risks you are assuming. This may cause you to miss the property but that's the risk you run.
user6726's answer about civil action is good, as you appear to have lots of evidence that document-based in terms of bank records, etc. And media shaming would work; but you could be sued in retaliation, even if you're right. But try calling a prosecutor - such as a county attorney - rather than an arm of law enforcement. The police are always overworked and can be reluctant to try and put a case together for the local prosecutor. Contacting a county attorney is free and doesn't require you to get a lawyer, and it can be a surprisingly effective tactic against a criminal. A phone call or a detailed letter to the county attorney for the person's county of residence that explains the criminal activity may be the key to getting some movement in the situation. You have lots of hard evidence to hand the attorney about an individual who is committing fraud, and that evidence may make simply make the case for the attorney, as it is documented evidence they can immediately verify and use, either at the county level, or be passed to the district (state) prosecutor. A loss of $4000 is significant, and may be a felony in that state. But the "$6,000 in products that were not shipped" is intent on the criminals' part and is not a loss to you. If it is a county with a large population, the attorney will have many assistants who may have time to pursue the case. An attorney for a small county may be looking for an easy case. And who knows? The attorney's office may already know the person - if it's a county with a small population, or if that person already has a criminal history (which you could research yourself in that county's records) - and that makes the case even easier for the attorney.
I have heard that this interest rate is illegally high for a loan. Is this correct? Yes. This is an annualized interest rate of 715,586,124,880,210%, which is far, far in excess of the maximum interest rate allowed by law. The maximum legally allowed interest rate in British Columbia is 60% per annum. So, an interest rate of 65 cents or more in a five day period on a loan of $100.00 is illegal. I don't know his current address. Lending money without collateral to people without knowing their current address is just plain stupid when it comes to lending practices. Nobody does that without a primarily donative intent. Would have holding collateral been a legal solution? Potentially. This is essentially the business model of a pawn shop. In the case of a pawn shop, the borrower delivers tangible personal property to the pawn shop owner who takes custody of it, which serves as collateral for a small loan with a set, legal interest rate, for a fixed period of time much greater than five days (typically several weeks or to several months). If the loan is not repaid, the collateral becomes the property of the lender in full payment of the loan, and the parties haggle in advance over the fair market value of the collateral against which the customer may borrow the full amount. A pawn is essentially equivalent to an outright sale of tangible personal property (almost always used) in exchange for cash, with a right to rescind the deal for a modest interest charge within X number of days after the sale. Since the pawn shop owner has some asset of the borrower to collect from in the event of non-payment, and the loan is &quot;non-recourse&quot; (i.e. collection rights are limited to taking ownership of the collateral), it isn't important to even know the address of the borrower, and no lawsuits are necessary for the lending pawn shop owner to be made whole if the loan is not repaid. The down side of running a pawn shop is that the owner needs to have considerable skill to value the collateral at a price sufficient to repay the loan together with a fair share of the administrative expenses of the operation on a case by case basis, for the very modest profit margin associated with a typical pawn shop. Most people who are skilled enough to value tangible personal property accurately enough to make money running a pawn ship are also skilled enough to do other things that pay better. Late Charge: Any payment not remunerated within 10 days of its due date shall be subject to a belatedly charge of 5 percent (%) of the payment, not to exceed $500 for any such late installment. Late charges are considered in the maximum interest rate calculation, so you need a much longer term loan and a much lower interest rate for this to be legally permissible. Collection fees: If this note is placed with a legal representative for collection, then Borrower agrees to pay an attorney's fee of ten percent (10%) of the voluntary balance. This fee will be added to the unpaid balance of the loan. Not sure what is meant by the &quot;voluntary balance.&quot; It isn't inherently improper to include the costs of collection in a loan agreement, and indeed, I think that this may be the default rule of law in British Columbia without any contractual term under loser pays rules of civil procedure. But, a court can decline to award more than the &quot;reasonable&quot; legal fees incurred to collect a debt, and it is not at all clear that even the minimal amount of legal fees one could incur to collect a debt would be reasonable to collect a loan of $100 and interest. Likewise, while there are &quot;hard money loans&quot; (i.e. loans secured only by collateral and no personal obligation to pay that can be enforced against an individual's assets in court), where it is customary for the legal costs of drafting the loan documents to be paid by the borrower rather than the lender, for the most part, this simply makes no sense, because even 12 minutes of legal time (0.2 hours in the typical legal billing format) is an excessive amount to charge for a $100 loan for a five day period of time. This would typically be $50-$60 or more. It would probably be treated as an interest charge and hence would be illegal in British Columbia. Would a term like &quot;if the lender needs to resort to legal action to enforce a term of this agreement, the borrow will reimburse him for all related expenses and his time&quot; be enforceable? Reimbursement for out of pocket court filing fees and any photocopying costs and process server costs is likely to be enforceable. Reimbursement for the lenders own time to enforce the loan in the event of a default is probably not enforceable in the case of a $100 loan, even at minimum wage. Making small loans has historically been a marginal economic sector for precisely this reason. Even if the default rate is low, the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing (in the event of defaults) a small loan and the administrative costs associated with making and enforcing these promise for a much larger loan are similar. But the dollar amount of interest generated by a small loan is much smaller relative to the administrative costs involved than the interest on a large loan. Credit card companies and similar lenders make small loans affordable by automating the lending process, screening borrowers based upon credit ratings, making many loans each month to the same borrower, and making loans to many, many borrowers to spread the risk out. But making small loans on a one-off basis is not a profitable venture. Business models that charge enough to be profitable with small loans, like payday lenders and car title lenders in the United States, usually have some sort of collateral or de facto collateral (like a post-dated check), and tend to be shut down by regulators because their interest rates typically need to be on the order of 150%-400% per annum to make a profit, due to high administrative costs involved in making small loans relative to the amount of the loan. But interest rates this high are considered exploitive and are illegal. Another business model, which essentially describes the business model in the question except for the enforcement method, is called &quot;loan sharking&quot;. The main difference between legitimate or almost legitimate small loan lending and loan sharking, is that loan sharks enforce their loans by having organized crime enforcers beat up people who don't pay, rather than using lawsuits to deal with loan defaults. This is, of course, completely illegal and a serious crime.