Are many judges stronger or weaker at some types of cases than others, and do court systems take judicial notice of this? Admittedly, this exercise was &quot;time&quot; and &quot;space&quot; limited, but I came up with an interesting finding regarding the ratings of New York City judges in the past decade. Most judges received &quot;average&quot; ratings (between 4.0 and 6.0 on a ten point scale) by attorneys. But as my father, a retired Civil Engineering professor would say, &quot;There are two kinds of &quot;B&quot; students. One makes &quot;straight B's.&quot; The other kind makes &quot;half A's and half C's.&quot; These judges appeared to be mostly in the latter category because (with few exceptions) they would be rated &quot;8&quot; or &quot;9&quot; in some areas of the law, and &quot;1&quot; or &quot;2&quot; in other areas, and that's how they got their &quot;average&quot; ratings. Do court systems track the above in any way and tend to assign judges cases in areas of law where they are strong, and not where they are weak or is it &quot;potluck&quot; whether a client gets a &quot;1&quot; level judge or a &quot;9&quot; level judge in the law relating to their particular case? There may be many other examples but the one I know best was the Quattrone insider trading case. The judge was a celebrated anti-Mob (read: blue collar) jurist. But he did not know that &quot;intent&quot; was an essential element of certain white collar crimes, including Quattrone's. He (wrongly) instructed the jury to ignore Quattrone's intent, and that's why the resulting conviction was overturned on appeal.
Almost all judges are weaker or stronger at some kinds of cases. Most judges have backgrounds either in criminal law, or in personal injury law, or as government litigators, although there are exceptions to the rule. Lawyers with a background primarily in non-criminal legal specialties, in contrast, are usually weaker in the area of criminal law. And, lawyers with a practice general enough to have equal aptitude in all commonly litigated areas of law are usually not prestigious and well connected enough to be appointed to, or elected to, judgeships as the case may be. Even within specialized judgeships, like designated probate judges, some are stronger in protective proceedings, like guardianships, and others are stronger in areas like technical tax oriented trust interpretation and technical probate rules governing the interpretation of wills. Do court systems track the above in any way and tend to assign judges cases in areas of law where they are strong, and not where they are weak or is it &quot;potluck&quot; whether a client gets a &quot;1&quot; level judge or a &quot;9&quot; level judge in the law relating to their particular case? Courts do not track this and for the most part it is &quot;potluck&quot;, but some courts have unofficial internal administrative divisions such that, for example, certain judges handle domestic relations cases for a while, while other judges handle criminal cases for a while, and other judges handle ordinary civil cases for a while. Usually, these assignments are rotated from time to time, but these informal internal divisions sometimes reflect the preferences or expertise of the judges. Similarly, on the U.S. Supreme Court, while each justice has an equal vote, Justice Gorsuch, with a background in Indian Law, is more likely to be the author of a majority opinion on Indian law, that Justice Alito, who has no background prior to his U.S. Supreme Court appointment, in that area of law. The law does not take judicial notice of this fact. Indeed, it does the opposite. It conclusively presumes that judges are experts on everything that comes before them, whether this presumption is well founded or not. On questions of law, it doesn't matter, because those questions are reviewed de novo on appeal without any deference to how the issue was resolved in the trial court. But on issues of discretionary determinations, findings of fact, and evidentiary issues, judges are afforded broad discretion and deference, whether or not this deference is well earned in light of their personal experience. Indeed, one of the more common sources of bad judicial determinations which are upheld on appeal is a standard of appellate review for a decision that affords a judge who has no clue in a particular kind of transaction or area of law great deference. For example, I once had a case before a judge with a background as a violent crimes prosecutor who was stunned to learn that stockholders of publicly held companies are owners of the company, and thought that one could determine the fair market value of a company several years in the past, by calling up its accountant without warning and having a five or ten minute conversation with the accountant. A factual determination based upon that approach, as disconnected from reality as it is, would receive great deference on appeal, despite the judge's obvious unfamiliarity with the basics of corporate law and business valuation.
Because cases challenging actions of almost any Federal agency or department are typically filed at the head office of that agency or department, which is usually in DC. Similarly, national organizations of all kinds who are affected by some government action often file a case from their own national headquarters, which is often in DC. Thus the DC circuit has a much larger volume of cases and appeals than its population would suggest. According to the Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018 Tables the numbers of Appeals Court cases by circuit were: ` Commenced Terminated Pending ` . 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018 Circuit DC 1,184 872 1,190 1,029 1,446 1,289 1st 1,538 1,213 1,488 1,322 1,408 1,299 2nd 4,450 4,316 4,382 3,937 3,252 3,631 3rd 3,477 2,926 3,745 2,969 2,297 2,254 4th 6,136 4,166 6,185 4,506 2,497 2,157 5th 8,270 7,217 8,235 7,359 5,021 4,879 6th 5,164 4,401 5,195 4,900 3,197 2,698 7th 3,332 2,754 3,452 2,652 1,669 1,771 8th 3,571 2,850 3,154 3,040 2,102 1,912 9th 11,504 10,804 12,032 12,030 12,789 11,563 10th 2,275 1,862 2,296 1,848 1,216 1,230 11th 8,050 5,982 7,686 6,240 3,905 3,647 Total 58,951 49,363 59,040 51,832 40,799 38,330` Similar data is available for other years, and for district court cases. These seem to show that caseloads for the DC or "Federal" circuit are comparable to those of the smaller circuits. This does not take into account any question of complexity levels. Also, it looks to me as if the percentage of District Court cases which are appealed to the Circuit Court level is higher in the DC circuit than in most of the other circuits.
Here's a 2002 law review article by MP Henderson that does a rundown of ineffective assistance of counsel standards and precedents in both the UK and US (and also details shortcomings and inconsistencies in both, which is the true focus of the article, though not particularly relevant to this Q&amp;A). The short of the matter is that bdb484's summary of the basic standard for the US is essentially the same in the UK: both focus on the practical impact of the counsel, rather than the actual efficacy and skill of the counsel. Meaning that if the court concludes that the result of the trial would have been the same with an effective counsel, then the results of that trial will stand. This is usually phrased in legal parlance as a &quot;miscarriage of justice&quot; issue. This results in a few seemingly glaring absurdities being ignored when the evidence against the defendant is seen as too strong to defend against, like sleeping through trials. The specific case detailing the standard test in the UK is R (Aston) v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2004] EWHC 2368, and is essentially the same 2-part test as the Strickland test detailed in bdb484's answer: was the conduct outside the range of that of a reasonable counsel/advocate, and if so was it materially relevant enough to alter the verdict? The article I linked at the start states (with several citations, for the quotes in particular, here omitted): Courts in the United Kingdom are highly deferential to counsel's decisions. Also, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct will fall within the wide range of reasonable effective assistance. Additionally, courts in the United Kingdom will make allowances for the &quot;distorting effect of hindsight&quot;. As the result of such discretion, &quot;[c]onducting the trial without, or even contrary to, the instructions of the client, mere errors of judgment or even negligence, may not be sufficient to set up an inference of an unfair trial.&quot; And it's that last bit that's relevant to your question: simply defying the instructions of the client as concerns which evidence to present is not necessarily (and is unlikely to be) a basis for a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. What constitutes a &quot;fair&quot; trial is a fairly broad umbrella; it doesn't require perfect counsel, nor that all conceivable avenues of defense be explored. Both UK and US lawyers are expected to both abide by the instructions of their client, while also being granted the leeway to present the case in the manner they deem best. This is spelled out quite clearly in the Scottish case Anderson v HM Advocate, where the High Court spelled out four points for what constitutes (in)effective assistance of counsel. To quote Henderson's summary again (which again has many citations here omitted) First, the accused has the right to a fair trial and to have his or her defense presented to the court. If counsel's conduct deprived the accused of those rights, a miscarriage of justice could result. Second, counsel must abide by the client's instructions, and not disregard those instructions. However, counsel must conduct the case as he or she thinks best. Third, counsel determines how the defense is presented, and the accused is bound by counsel's decision. Finally, counsel, not the accused, decides whether or not to attack the character of a Crown witness. Again, it's the third point that largely crushes your hypothetical's chances of success on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. For it is the counsel that ultimately decides how to present the defense, which includes what evidence and testimony to seek to include, and this is a binding decision upon the accused. The counsel in your hypothetical may have decided that the value of the evidence was significantly weaker than the client thought, and this generally falls under the umbrella of reasonable discretion for the advocate. Only if you can show the act to not present the evidence was outside the behaviors of a reasonable (generic) advocate, and also that it materially impacted the verdict, could you expect to prevail. As a bit of aside, there is something of an issue on whether or not there is a right to effective assistance of counsel in the UK. The right to a fair trial was really only expressly codified in The Human Rights Act of 1988, but that does not specify a right to effective counsel, only the right to a fair trial. A trial can be fair with no counsel at all. By contrast, in the US the 6th ammendment has been held to grant a right to both a fair trial and effective counsel in criminal matters, and the government must foot the bill to provide the accused with an attorney if requested/needed (the accused can waive this right, and there is a certain reasonableness where courts will eventually tell a defendant &quot;oh well, figure it out yourself&quot; if they keep rejecting their court appointed attorneys and demanding a new one). In the UK access to legal counsel is largely considered only available to those who can afford to pay for it, with the government fronting the bill only in exceptional cases (e.g. the courts deems it desirable to do so in the interests of justice). This right to a fair trial rather than a right to legal counsel seems to be why the UK currently places the emphasis on the practical impacts of the alleged ineffectiveness, rather than the alleged ineffectiveness itself. My understanding of US jurisprudence suggests it's rather more practical in justification: the courts don't want to do do-overs over procedural issues when the result is a fait accompli, as it consumes lots of time and resources and risks the general ravages of time on evidence, will, and memory.
None of the three factors you identify is correct. With respect to reason (1): The belief that a judge is likely to be landlord friendly on the merits, while a factor favoring a bench trial is actually a pretty minor one. Empirically, actual outcomes on the merits are far less different between jury trials and bench trials than you might expect. There aren't a lot of "moving parts" in a typical landlord-tenant case that afford the trier of fact much discretion. Usually there is evidence quantifying the amount of damage to the property in dollar terms and the amount of rent owed is usually just math. It isn't like a personal injury case where pain and suffering damages are highly subjective and even liability which hinges on a common sense assessment of what constitutes "reasonable case" is very vague. There may be some wiggle room in a landlord-tenant case to disagree on the credibility of witnesses and to differ in opinion regarding what constitutes "reasonable wear and tear", but the differences in litigation costs between a jury and bench trial will usually be greater in magnitude than the differences in outcomes on the merits between the two. Of course, in the rare case where the tenant is suing the landlord for a personal injury on the premises, the difference in outcome on the merits does matter quite a bit and a judge is much less likely to enter an extremely tenant favorable damages award than a jury is to do so. But, usually, lawyers for landlords aren't thinking about this scenario very much when they write a lease because it doesn't come up very often. With respect to reason (2): The landlord actually probably has a procedural advantage over the tenant in a jury trial where having a lawyer is more important than a bench trial, but this is pretty irrelevant, because landlords are overwhelmingly more likely to win than the tenant anyway. It isn't hard to prove that somebody didn't pay all of the rent that was owed, or that they damaged the premises. Landlords care more about litigation costs than they do about their odds of winning on the merits. With respect to reason (3): And, the judge interprets of rental agreement for the jury - the jury only decides the factual issues that are disputed with regard to the rental agreement as the judge explains what it means to them. So, confusion isn't a major concern either. Instead, the biggest factors are timing and litigation costs. A jury trial is longer, because it takes time to select a jury, to prepare jury instructions, to instruct the jury, and for the jury to deliberate. A landlord-tenant bench trial might be half a day or one day long, while a jury trial on the same matter might take two or three days. Selecting and charging a jury alone takes about half a day, and instructing a jury and having it deliberate takes another half-day at least. The longer duration of a jury trial means that it takes longer for a case before a jury to be scheduled than a bench trial, because there in any given time frame, there will be more slots available for short trials than long ones. A half day bench trial might be possible to schedule two or three months out, while a two or three day jury trial might not fit into a judge's calendar for five or six months. And, a lawsuit involving a jury trial is more expensive to conduct. It probably takes something on the order of 32 more hours of lawyer time to litigate a case that goes to a jury trial than a case set for a bench trial, which is on the order of $8,000 at $250 per hour. Generally, a tenant who is being evicted or owes rent is either judgment-proof, or at least hard to collect from, so the landlord has an interest in keeping litigation costs low. The out of pocket costs other than attorney's fees are also higher in a jury trial - there is typically a jury demand fee and a need to prepare a juror notebook for each juror. The need for better quality exhibits (e.g. exhibits may need to be blown up and put on an easel, or made into a powerpoint that can be see by all the jurors, rather than just photocopied and put in a single binder for a judge).
Generally, No Contempt powers are rather broad, but not that broad. A judge has power to find anyone in the courtroom in contempt, if that person acts in violation of he rules or of the judge's instructions. A judge has the power to find any party to the case in contempt if that person violates orders from the judge, unless there is some overriding circumstance, for example if the person's action was an exercise of a constitutional right, or if the judge's order is held (by a higher court) to be unreasonable. A judge will have the power to issue orders to people not otherwise parties if this is needed to preserve the judicial process, such as "gag orders" to prevent bias from contaminating a trial. These often have conflicts with first amendment rights or other rights, and there have been various cases on exactly how far a judge can go in such matters. But if the Judge is within those rules, violations of the judge's orders may be punishable as contempt. But an ordinary individual who is simply expressing disapproval of the judge, even in a highly disrespectful fashion, neither in nor near the courtroom, should not be subject to a contempt citation, and few judges would try to invoke such a power. Note that a judge can always issue a contempt decree or citation, and may be able to have the person jailed, if the person is within the court's jurisdiction. But if the citation was an abuse of discretion, it can be overturned and the judge may be subject to a damage suit, in an egregious case. Charles Rembar in The Law of the Land wrote of one case where the judge had had a bailiff purchase coffee during a recess, and found it not at all to his liking. He had the coffee-shop owner arrested, and brought into his presence, and proceeded to scream at him over the poor coffee. The owner later sued the judge, and received a 6-figure damage award. as Rembar put it "The price of coffee is going up all the time, and it seems that the jury felt that Coffee with scream was extra."
A case can be &quot;dismissed&quot; at (most) any time (however, the further along in the process a case is, the less likely a judge will allow a case to be dismissed without very good reason). A case can be dismissed with or without &quot;prejudice&quot;, which in this legal context means essentially &quot;finality&quot;. A case dismissed with prejudice cannot be brought again, while a case dismissed without prejudice can be refiled. (Compare the criminal law concept of &quot;double jeopardy&quot;, though as phoog correctly notes, &quot;double jeopardy&quot; only applies in criminal trials, while prejudice can be applied in both civil and criminal courts). Many cases are dismissed without looking at the evidence (or even having the evidence admitted to the record); this is called &quot;summary judgement&quot; or &quot;judgement as a matter of law&quot;. There are generally three cases when this happens: First, if the prosecution or plaintiff (i.e. the party bringing accusations) has &quot;failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted&quot;, i.e. asked for something the court cannot grant. Second, is if the defendant can show, that even if everything alledged by the plaintiff is true, that the necessarily elements of the crime or offense have not been proven. Third, is if there are no facts in dispute, and only a disagreement on interpreting the law.
Appellate judges make holdings on matters of law, and generally defer to the fact-finder in a given case (the jury, or sometimes the judge) on factual matters relevant to a case. So in a case that involved certain mathematical arguments, they would generally leave it to the jury to decide whether those arguments were reliable. Put simply, Appeals courts don't make binding decisions on issues of fact, only issues of law.
On an issue of pure law, an appellate court decides if the trial judge got it right or wrong from scratch, and if there is a case that is a better match than the one that the judge used that leads to a different outcome in the case, then an appellate court is likely to find that the trial court's ruling is a reversible error. On an issue of mixed fact and law, or on a legal issue where a judge has more discretion in how the law is applied (like many evidentiary issues), a judge is given more deference, and the judge will generally only be reversed if no reasonable judge could have applied the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them, and then, only if an application of the correct law to the facts viewed in the light in which the judge saw them would have changed the outcome of the case. There are a couple of ways that this standard of review is described, one of which is called "abuse of discretion" review.