What is the legality of two (or more) trade partners trading (i.e. billing) each other in a mutually agreed units of exchange Assuming that company A (based in say, the US), wants to trade with another company (B say), based in say, Germany (or anywhere else in the world). Assuming that these two companies have agreed to trade in buffalo wings (as a ridiculous example), can company A and B invoice each other in Buffalo wings? Although the question might sound frivolous, there is a real world motivation behind it. Assuming a bunch of economic actors across the world decide to conduct business in a basket of commodities (say Gold and silver) - and call each Unit of this basket &quot;FooBar&quot;, what are the legalities of these economic actors trading with one another in &quot;FooBar&quot; instead of a recognised currency?
Assuming a bunch of economic actors across the world decide to conduct business in a basket of commodities (say Gold and silver) - and call each Unit of this basket &quot;FooBar&quot;, what are the legalities of these economic actors trading with one another in &quot;FooBar&quot; instead of a recognised currency? This is legal, and indeed is done routinely in some sectors of the economy, either by denominating a transaction in a third-party currency (e.g. many Polish mortgages and international petroleum contracts are denominated in U.S. dollars even when no party to the transaction has U.S. ties), or by some indexing amounts to a commodity (e.g. gold or oil). There are consequences to doing this, however. I can't speak to the German tax law implications of doing this, but in U.S. tax law, barter transactions have to be converted to U.S. dollars on both sides of the transaction before U.S. tax laws are applied to the transaction. So, in the course of preparing a U.S. tax return for the parties to this business arrangement, a CPA filling out the tax return has to establish a conversion rate for Buffalo wings or FooBars to U.S. dollars and then has to complete the tax return on this basis. Barter transactions are taxed under U.S. federal tax law as if the seller sold whatever was sold for U.S. dollars equal to the fair market value of what was sold, and as if the buyer sold whatever was sold for U.S. dollars equal to the fair market value of what was purchased. See, e.g., this IRS publication on the subject. There are some narrow exceptions to the taxability of barter transactions, most notably for like-kind exchanges of investment real estate (governed by Internal Revenue Code Section 1031), for transactions between spouses, for transactions between entities disregarded for tax purposes (like single member LLCs) and their owners, and also, for example, for certain financial instruments like exchanges of stock certificates in the same company which are identical except that they have different certificate numbers. But none of those exceptions would apply to the situation described in the question. There are tax regulations and other authoritative U.S. Treasury Department publications that provide detailed guidance on how a CPA is supposed to do this on an operationalized basis. I'm not personally sufficiently familiar with those regulations to describe them in any detail (because in domestic commerce, which is what most of my tax work involves, nobody does business in Buffalo wings), but I would know where to find them if I needed to do so, as would most CPAs and tax lawyers. There are separate U.S. income tax rules for commodities transactions and foreign currency transactions. If you do business in Buffalo wings or FooBars or a cryptocurrency, rather than in a true foreign currency, the commodities transaction rules and barter transaction rules, rather than the foreign currency rules, apply to the transaction.
There is no law against driving a hard bargain If you were describing real estate owners rather than YouTube channel owners we’d have a term for them: a motivated seller. There is no law against using the fact that someone is desperate to sell to negotiate a lower price: that’s just good business. In general, common law legal systems do not involve themselves in whether a price agreed between two parties was fair: if you want to sell your original Picasso for $1 or pay $1m for a used tissue, that’s up to you. If you have ethical issues with that, don’t do it but it’s not illegal. Legal issues can come up where you are the cause in some way of the motivation. A lender foreclosing on a mortgage is ok. A lender offering to buy the property to avoid foreclosure is not. The first is just enforcing the terms of the contract, the second looks like undue influence and unconscionable conduct. Some countries have laws against profiteering and you would need to look at the legal definition to decide if this is or isn’t profiteering. In the US, it isn’t because their laws only deal with profiteering that damages the government. Some US states have laws against price gouging but these are usually to prevent charging too much, not too little. Which clauses of YouTube's Terms of Service would be violated? None. YouTube does not have any terms about selling your digital assets and we know it happens. Which US sanctions would be violated? It’s impossible to say without reading the sanction. If it’s illegal to transfer money to the sanctioned people then the whole plan falls over because you can’t pay for the channel in the first place.
I am not aware of any law making this illegal. You need to avoid any "bait and switch" tactics, though, like initially offering cola for $1 and then not actually letting them buy it for that price.
Is she allowed to short the stocks of some company trading in this other metal, before she publishes her result ? Generally speaking, yes. The main exceptions consist of her being under certain form of fiduciary duty toward the company of which she is shorting stock, or (2) her transactions being motivated by superior knowledge resembling insider trading or fraud. Absent an element of fiduciary duty or insider trading, what you describe is an entirely valid arms-length transaction. Indeed, this happens all the time in financial markets, except that a lawful asymmetry of information may come in forms other than the scientific discovery of new metallic alloys (example: statistical models developed by the entity). Searching for case law containing the terms in italics will show you how these concepts supposedly are applied. For instance, see Procter &amp; Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust, 925 F.Supp. 1270 (1996): No fiduciary relationship exists ... [where] the two parties were acting and contracting at arm's length. Moreover, courts have rejected the proposition that a fiduciary relationship can arise between parties to a business relationship. (citations omitted) You will notice that the court in Procter &amp; Gamble points to case law in the sense that a party's superior knowledge imposes on him a contractual duty to disclose that information. But the notion of superior knowlege as applied in case law seems typically narrowed down to situations where the seller conceals defects for which he is responsible (Haberman v. Greenspan, 82 Misc.2d 263 (1975)) or when the concealment resembles fraud. Haberman points to a case of fraud where (1) the seller of a boat before the sale took it from where it lay and placed it afloat in a dock to prevent the examination of the bottom which the seller knew to be unsound [...]; and (2) where the seller of a log of mahogany turned it in order to conceal a hole (citations omitted). That is different from the superior knowledge that a party obtains through the design of superseding techniques. It would be extremely inept for a court to rule against a party for trading without first bringing everyone up to speed as to her superseding developments. Not only that would contradict the tenets of trade secrets, perhaps patents, and so forth, but in the context you outline it would create inconsistencies with respect to other financial instruments associated to the same perception of downside risk that is inherent to taking a short position on stocks.
Yes. The Russian owned party to the contract can be sued. The remedies would be those available under the contract, which may or may not be futile to pursue, which almost certainly specify the court to which disputes should be brought. I have no access to the contracts and can't read the relevant languages anyway, however, so I can't tell you what they say about this point. In all likelihood, a Russian court would not rule in favor of Poland or Bulgaria on this score, and would not order Russia to restart supplying natural gas to them (perhaps on the theory that national security and foreign affairs decisions are involved), and no other court would have the practicable ability to cause Russia to reopen its natural gas pipelines. So, if they prevailed, the Court would have to fashion some other remedy (e.g. seizing Russian assets sufficiently associated with the contractually bound party over which they can acquire jurisdiction). If there is a third-party guarantor of the contract, collection could be feasible. If not, it would be much more challenging.
In theory, what Dale says. However, in practice: Nope, and that's why the trader is in Timbuktu. And I apologize profusely to the Malian people, I have every reason to think it is a fine country in which citizens obey international laws and honor claims, unlike certain other countries. In anglo/Five Eyes nations, Timbuktu tends to simply be used as a metaphor for &quot;a country far, far away and different in its ways than us&quot;. If Bob is regularly buying things in the USA or Timbuktu, then either Bob works for Aperture Science and is using portals, or more likely Bob is using mail order. And now, we get to the nut of it. Most mail order sales are done by mail-order sellers who deal in volume. Those people choose their jurisdictions and venues carefully. And they have help. Do European or British consumer rights legislations bind the American/Malian trader to protect Bob, as the GDPR would? No! That's WHY they're in Timbuktu! (or, wherever they actually are; generally behind what I'll call the Red Curtain.) The point of being there is to be untouchable by civil action or government penalty due to that government's non-enrollment in international agreements, and outright obstruction of such actions. Yes, they and their legal team have crunched the question of &quot;what happens when a European or Briton sues us? What happens when an Anglo or EU government tries to action us?&quot; Their companies are structured so they slough those off at minimal real loss. Ever notice how many sellers have a company name that looks like they rolled their face across a keyboard? That's a sockpuppet shell company, and they have thousands of them. If their other layers of defense fail, they simply fold that company and create another. Their government lets them do this, because they chose jurisdictions wisely. A huge fraction of mail order sales are done on this basis, typically through web sites which purport to be &quot;only a marketplace connecting buyers to sellers&quot;... even though some of those marketplaces also provide warehousing and shipping services to the third party (&quot;only a warehouse&quot; and &quot;only a drop-ship firm&quot;)... and even though they are known for selling their own products, and use the smallest text on the page to mention that this particular item is from a third party. Not mentioning any names. This type of &quot;be fully complicit in selling junk, while the seller of record hides behind the Red Curtain and uses arrays of shell companies to limit exposure&quot; has become systemized in much of the mail order world. Another scheme I've seen is to trick American consumers into being the seller of record; these people end up &quot;holding the liability bag&quot;, and are typically not insured and not collectible in any practical way. Of course you have lovely companies like Eaton, Midnight Solar, Harsco Rail, Roshel, ILSCO, etc. who will meet GDPR simply because it's the right thing to do, even if they don't have feet on the ground inside the EU or UK against which those governments might action. But nobody asks if they're subject to GDPR, do they?
I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid &amp; Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious.
Yes This statute means that all United States money as identified above is a valid and legal offer of payment for debts when tendered to a creditor. There is, however, no Federal statute mandating that a private business, a person, or an organization must accept currency or coins as payment for goods or services. Private businesses are free to develop their own policies on whether to accept cash unless there is a state law which says otherwise.