Why do courts dismiss cases as moot? Trump recently received a subpoena that would have forced him to testify at a trial. He appealed it saying he couldn't be compelled to testify as the sitting president. The appeal is now dismissed as moot since he is no longer president: While president, Trump had tried to quash a subpoena that would force him to testify at the civil trial in the Bronx and sit for a videotaped deposition beforehand. In 2019, his lawyers appealed a judge’s order denying his request. On Tuesday, the state’s Appellate Division dismissed Trump’s appeal as moot. “This appeal concerning the proper standard for determining whether a sitting President may be compelled to give videotaped trial testimony about unofficial acts in a civil action against him or her is moot given that the rights of parties will not be directly affected by our determination,” the court said in its ruling, “and that there will not be an immediate consequence of the judgment.” Source Why would the court do this instead of rule on it anyway? This sounds like it just postpones the ruling until some time in the future when it happens again. True, it might not happen again, but it also might. It feels like running away from a problem on the grounds that it doesn't need to be solved today, and therefore shirking responsibility.
The court is not running away from the problem; Trump isn't president, so the problem has actually gone away. Because there's no point in resolving a purely academic question, the courts generally accept the idea that it shouldn't spend taxpayer money on work that doesn't need to be done. When there are thousands of other cases working their way through the system, it doesn't make much sense for the court to answer questions that don't require answers. The other reason for the mootness doctrine is that the courts believe they can get the best available information, argument, and advocacy from parties that actually have something to gain from winning the case. Here, the court can't trust Trump to argue the case because it doesn't know whether Trump has any real interest in defending the prerogatives of the presidency. Maybe he's planning to run again, but maybe he's more interested right now in making life miserable for President Biden. And if that's the case, maybe he'd like to tank the case so the Texas attorney general can start issuing subpoenas to the president and his son. This tendency is the rooted in centuries of common-law precedent acknowledging that the courts shouldn't just sit around and offer answers to questions that aren't part of a real dispute. That principle resulted in the &quot;cases or controversies&quot; clause that limits the jurisdiction of Article III courts. There is no such constitutional limitation on the New York courts handling the case you're asking about, but they honor the mootness doctrine anyway. Society of Plastics v. Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 772 (N.Y. 1991) (“Under the common law, there is little doubt that a &quot;court has no inherent power to right a wrong unless thereby the civil, property or personal rights of the plaintiff in the action or the petitioner in the proceeding are affected.&quot; ”) There are some exceptions to the mootness doctrine, including one for controversies that are &quot;capable of repetition, yet evading review&quot; -- essentially, for disputes that occur frequently but are too short-lived to be fully litigated. Abortion cases are a great example of this: If a woman is unable to obtain an abortion, she generally has less than nine months to take a case from filing through all its appeals before the baby is born, mooting the case. But that exception isn't a good fit for Trump's case, because subpoenas like this to sitting presidents aren't all that common, and the four or eight years of a presidential term are typically going to be enough time to fully litigate the question. This is especially true given the speed with which courts typically resolve cases that pose a credible threat to presidential prerogatives. For instance, Trump challenged another subpoena in Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, (2020). In that case, the prosecutor issued the subpoena on August 1, 2019, and it was less than a year before the U.S. Supreme Court had weighed in. So even though it's possible that the issue could come up again without being resolved before the president is out of office, it is not particularly likely, and therefore not a good candidate for resolution despite its mootness.
When a judge decides a case there will be An order - e.g. &quot;Smith shall pay Jones £100,000&quot; Reasons for the decision - i.e. a description of the evidence, and the judge's findings of fact and legal reasoning. Sometimes a party, even though they have completely won, is nevertheless aggrieved by some things the judge has said in the Reasons (or in the way the judge has handled the trial - e.g. the judge's interventions). For example the judge may have said that the winning party was not a credible witness but they nevertheless won because of the evidence of other witnesses who were found to be credible. The rule in England and Wales is that you can only appeal orders. So if the order is completely in your favour you cannot appeal just because you don't like the reasons.
SHORT ANSWER Suppose a President can see that such a vote is coming and will pass, shortly before an election. Can that President resign just before the vote in order to effectively avoid the disqualification penalty? Probably yes. But, there is no historical precedent for this happening. Nixon resigned before the House voted to impeach him, not midway into the impeachment proceedings. Neither Andrew Jackson nor Bill Clinton resigned prior to not being convicted on the basis of a U.S. House impeachment. Several federal judges and one cabinet official, however, have resigned midway through impeachment proceedings prior to being convicted, and in those cases, the case was dismissed and no judgment was entered by the U.S. Senate, so they were not disqualified from holding future federal public offices. LONG ANSWER Relevant Constitutional Language The pertinent provisions of the U.S. Constitution include the following: Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7: 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 7: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. Article II, Section 2, Clause 3: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. Analysis The key language is in Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution which states in the pertinent part that: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States[.] This means that a President who is impeached by the House and convicted by the U.S. Senate may be prohibited from holding any federal office from President to dogcatcher in the future. But, this can only be done in a &quot;judgment&quot; of the U.S. Senate in connection with an impeachment based upon a conviction in the U.S. Senate following a House impeachment, which has never happened. The history of the impeachment language and the limitation to removals from office, suggest that only a person who is current serving in office may be impeached. Otherwise, the proceeding would be invalid as moot, and would be dismissed (as it has been in the case of many judges who have resigned after investigations are initiated or after a House impeaches but prior to a conviction of impeachment). A U.S. Senate ruling that someone is disqualified from holding future office can only be entered in a judgment of conviction for impeachment, so cannot apply to a past President. If this were done it would probably be an invalid &quot;Bill of Attainder&quot; or &quot;Ex Post Facto&quot; law. See U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 (&quot;No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed&quot;). And, the U.S. Senate can't pass a law unilaterally, or enter a judgment convicting someone on an impeachment unless the House initiates the proceeding. There is no precedent concerning whether if someone who was convicted by the U.S. Senate and removed from office based upon an impeachment initiated by the U.S. House, in which the judgment did not disqualify the person impeachment from holding future federal public offices, the U.S. Senate could amend its judgment later on to also disqualify the person so removed from office from holding further public office. I suspect that if the question were presented that the federal courts would hold that the amendment of the impeachment judgment was not valid because the word &quot;judgment&quot; implies an immediate ruling upon a case and not a perpetual right to hold the person subject to the judgment in limbo regarding the consequences of his impeachment conviction.
Separation of powers means that the judiciary can't pass laws or executive orders. It doesn't mean that the judiciary can't interfere with their passage and enforcement. Quite the opposite -- the checks and balances inherent in the system ensure that the judiciary can interfere in some cases. One of the checks is the concept of judicial review: the courts' power to review each branch's actions for compliance with the constitution -- and more importantly, to strike down actions that are unconstitutional. When a court strikes down part of a law, though, they aren't writing a new law, or even repealing a law. They are overturning parts of the existing law -- basically declaring the unconstitutional parts of it void, to be treated as if they didn't exist. In India's constitution, Article 13 provides the main basis for this power. Article 13.(2) (in Part III) states: (2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. This article, aside from making it clear that laws passed by the State can be void, also gives the Supreme Court the inroads it needs to do the overturning. The catch is, the Court can not overturn most laws passed by Parliament, just the ones that Part III can be construed to prohibit. (While the judiciary is not explicitly named, it's the only branch that can officially say whether or not a law is constitutional. It'd be a conflict of interest anyway for Parliament to do it. Parliament, in passing the law, presumably wanted it to be enforced, and thus has an interest in avoiding too much scrutiny.) So the Court can already declare an unconstitutional law void, because it already is...and that's before we even get to Article 142. Let's take a look at the article anyway: (1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe. (2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself. Note that (2) explicitly grants the power to issue subpoenas, contempt citations, etc. So we can't claim that's what (1) was intended for, and have to ask what it means. The Court decided that the article gives it the power to order the government not to violate your rights, as such an order is "necessary for doing complete justice". And as the final arbiter of the meaning of the very text that defines it into existence, it has that prerogative. And due process is one of the rights protected. Article 21 (also in Part III): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. "Procedure established by law" is a much weaker phrase than "due process", and technically meant that anything that the government scribbled into law was good enough. But case law has all but removed the distinction. (See Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India.) Basically, any procedure for depriving someone of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. (Otherwise a law declaring you a criminal, to be arrested on sight, would be constitutional.) "Someone filed a complaint" simply wasn't gonna fly.
In U.S. practice, double jeopardy protections attach once the jury is seated and this scenario contemplates the change in position arising at trial. A mistrial could be called, or a continuance obtained, if the defendant suddenly claimed an alibi defense, since that amounts of a defendant waiver of double jeopardy protections. But without proof that the witness was tampered with, obtained at the last moment, it can be difficult or impossible to get proof of tampering or to contradict the story with other evidence to undermine the credibility of the witness. The prosecution would probably request a recess in the trial to regroup and try to admit evidence that the testimony changing witness made a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the testimony of that witness, from whomever that witness told the first time (probably a law enforcement officer). But this is still far less convincing to a jury than an affirmative statement from a witnesses about a key fact. If the prosecution could find evidence of defense side tampering and present it to the judge in the hours or small number of days before the trial ends, it might be able to get a mistrial declared. But it is much harder to get a mistrial for witness tampering when the witness shows up and testifies contrary to prosecution expectations than it is when the witness is, for example, killed or kidnapped and doesn't appear to testify at trial at all. But if evidence of neither type could be obtained before the jury was sent to deliberate and evidence was closed, and the jury then acquitted the defendant, it would be very hard for the prosecution to change this result. Perhaps not completely impossible, but very nearly so. The witness could be (and in this circumstance, despite the extreme rarity of perjury prosecutions, probably would be) prosecuted for perjury, but that wouldn't change the acquittal. If a link to the defendant could be found, the defendant could also be prosecuted for witness tampering or obstruction of justice or something similar. But that is hard to prove (and the witness would probably have to be convicted or provided with use immunity for his testimony) to do so. In English criminal law practice, in contrast, the likelihood of having the verdict of acquittal set aside and getting a new trial would be much greater (and the likelihood of getting a recess mid-trial would be greater in far more common bench trials in lower level criminal cases), but it would still be a serious burden for the prosecution that it might not be able to overcome. Lawyers aren't entitled to expect that witnesses will testify exactly the way that they discussed things with the lawyers before trial, and this can be explained away with a variety of excuses that are usually true (&quot;after thinking it over after meeting with you, I realized that I was confused and getting it wrong&quot;), but are sometimes a cover for a change of story that is not sincere. I've had similar things happen a few times in civil litigation and there is only so much you can do about it.
Yes... whether the judge will grant the subpoena is another matter and one that it is to premature to speculate on. With what I have seen of the indictment, Pence was not named as a witness in the investigation, which will call into question why he is being asked to testify to events that were not used to indict Trump (if he saw something, that should come out in the investigation prior to trial.). Without some show that the testimony was material to the investigations findings and the charge I doubt it would be granted... but there's nothing stopping the prosecution for requesting the subpoena.
The Fifth Amendment always protects someone from being forced to testify against themselves if it would implicate them in a crime (see, among others, Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17). Any person can assert the privilege, regardless of their role in the trial, with the possible exception of the plaintiff (who is the one person who wanted to go to court). Like always with the Fifth Amendment, they can answer some questions but not others (but if they do answer a question, they need to fully answer it). In civil cases, the Fifth Amendment itself does not keep the jury from making adverse inferences against whoever invoked the privilege; if you refuse to testify, they can assume that it's because testifying would be extremely damaging in that particular case. However, most states have rules against that, and so invoking the privilege in state courts generally works like it does in a criminal case (where the jury basically ignores that the question was even asked). In federal courts, if a case is being heard under diversity jurisdiction (plaintiff and defendant are from different states but the claim is not a federal claim) the state rule is supposed to apply; if the claim is a federal claim, the federal rule applies and adverse inferences are allowed. While the Fifth Amendment can be invoked by anyone, there may be consequences. In many states (where adverse inference isn't allowed), a witness who will just invoke the Fifth and answer no questions can't be called, because it's a complete waste of time. If the plaintiff invokes the Fifth to not answer key questions, then the court can potentially dismiss the case; they have the right to assert the privilege, but their lawsuit might suffer for it. In federal court, another possibility that's been done several times before is that the civil case is just put on hold until the criminal matter is resolved. Sources: “The Fifth Amendment Can &amp; Will Be Used Against You In a (Federal) Court of Law” Taking the 5th: How to pierce the testimonial shield Plaintiff as Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment
I don't know how that would end, but states' AGs have take action against Trump personally in other matters, and that's bubbling through the courts; latest news I found on something like that on quick search (May 15): A lawsuit accusing President Donald Trump of illegally profiting off the presidency through his luxury Washington hotel was revived Thursday by a divided federal appeals court. [...] Maryland Attorney General Brian Frosh and District Attorney General Karl Racine — both Democrats — said they hoped Thursday's ruling from the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond would jumpstart efforts by the two jurisdictions to obtain financial records showing how much state and foreign governments have paid the Trump Organization to stay at the hotel and hold events there. More than three dozen subpoenas issued to various government agencies were put on hold while Trump's appeal was pending. The lawsuit was filed almost three years ago. U.S. District Judge Peter Messitte refused to dismiss it, but his ruling was overturned in July by a three-judge panel of the 4th Circuit. The judges found that Maryland and the District of Columbia lacked standing to pursue their claims against the president. But on Thursday, the panel's ruling was overturned by the full court of 15 judges. In a 9-6 ruling, the court found that the three-judge panel overstepped its authority when it ordered Messitte to dismiss the lawsuit. &quot;We recognize that the President is no ordinary petitioner, and we accord him great deference as the head of the Executive branch. But Congress and the Supreme Court have severely limited our ability to grant the extraordinary relief the President seeks,&quot; Judge Diana Gribbon Motz wrote for the majority in rejecting Trump's request to dismiss the lawsuit. All nine of the judges in the majority were nominated by Democratic presidents. The six judges who disagreed — all nominated by Republican presidents, including three by Trump — wrote a scathing dissenting opinion, saying the lawsuit should be thrown out. &quot;The majority is using a wholly novel and nakedly political cause of action to pave the path for a litigative assault upon this and future Presidents and for an ascendant judicial supervisory role over Presidential action,&quot; Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III wrote. DOJ spokeswoman Brianna Herlihy said the department is disappointed in the ruling. Etc.