Third-party doctrine when recording isn&#39;t obvious I'm not a lawyer (constitutional law or otherwise), but my understanding of the reasoning behind Smith v. Maryland (full text) and the subsequent "third-party doctrine" was that: The phone companies know what number is dialed, and people know that because the phone company's equipment has to know where to route you. The phone companies keep a record of every call dialed, and people know that because they see it on their monthly phone bills. People know that "pen registers" and similar devices exist, or at least the technology to trace a call exists, because the phone company can track down people who make harassing calls. Therefore, people shouldn't reasonably expect the numbers they dial to be private. From the opinion: Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain secret. What I'm wondering is whether there's any subsequent case law which questions whether the third-party doctrine holds when one of these tests is not true. I'm specifically interested in cases where #2 is violated, although I'd be interested in the others as well (e.g. a hypothetical secret machine that can read the contents of mail without opening the envelope). My entirely untrained (and only moderately informed) opinion would be that because ISPs don't make it obvious in any way that they keep a record of what you do online (your monthly bill isn't broken down by website, for example), then the third-party doctrine shouldn't be applicable to them. Likewise, until Snowden brought attention to it, I would have expected most people to not know that their activity could be easily intercepted. Since there haven't been any cases making this point that I've heard of, I assume that either the cases have been quiet or there's a flaw in my logic and thus no one has tried.
You've identified exactly the right question: whether the person's subjective expectation of privacy, when viewed objectively, is the "justifiable under the circumstances". (Smith v. Maryland) The Supreme Court hasn't addressed how this test applies to ISPs and website requests. However, this question has been addressed by several circuit courts of appeal. I'll build a list of example cases. Many find that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in this information, but there are some cases that go the other way, and there is some nuance regarding exactly what information is being given away. US v. Beckett (11th Cir. 2010): the information consisted of the identifying information transmitted during internet usage and phone calls that is necessary for the ISPs and phone companies to perform their services. It is unreasonable for Beckett to have been unaware that such information was being transmitted to the ISPs and phone companies and so he “assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the [information].” United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2007): Analogously, e-mail and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information. Like telephone numbers, which provide instructions to the "switching equipment that processed those numbers," e-mail to/from addresses and IP addresses are not merely passively conveyed through third party equipment, but rather are voluntarily turned over in order to direct the third party's servers. Regarding your secondary question about a "secret machine" that the government develops to get access to contents of an envelope without opening it, that is very similar to the situation in Kyllo v US 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (internal quotations removed): [...] obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the home's interior that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. [...] Reversing that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the home.
Generally... There are important caveats to the general &quot;two-party&quot; consent rule in the State of California; I will attempt to generally describe some of them. &quot;To violate the PC section 632 rule the communication must be &quot;confidential&quot; - this means that recordings taken in places where the other party should have reasonably expected the communication might be overheard or recorded are not covered.&quot; (Wilkins v. NBC, Inc. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1079.) &quot;[A] conversation is confidential if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded.&quot; (Flanagan v. Flanagan, 27 Cal.4th 766, 768 (2002)) Accordingly, if one as a complaining party tries to prove that one had a reasonable expectation of privacy it is not enough that one proves that one reasonably thought it was possible or even probable that the conversation was not overheard, monitored or recorded; one must be able to establish that a reasonable person in the same circumstances as one would objectively, that is based on the sum of factual circumstances, assumed a conversation was confidential. This shows well through the following authorities: &quot;A conversation is deemed “confidential” under § 632 of CIPA only if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded. Flanagan v. Flanagan(2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 768, 774–776; Vera v. O'Keefe (S.D.Cal.2011) 791 F.Supp.2d 959; 1396;. Whether there exists a reasonable expectation that no one is secretly recording or listening to a phone conversation is generally a question of fact. (See Kight v. CashCall, Inc. (4th Dist. 2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1396-97; Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 156, 169.) However, where the facts are undisputed, the court may decide the issue as a matter of law. (See Weiner v. ARS Services, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 2012) 2012 WL 3632025 (finding circumstances of call, including its short duration, indicated no expectation of privacy).” An important point is made here: No one assert an objectively reasonable exception if the time to evaluate the circumstances of a conversation or the intention, manner and other factors of the other party to engage in a conversation within an objectively insufficient time. Therefore, the duration, and even more so, the shortness of a conversation can very well be determinative of the reasonableness of a party to complain about their expectation to a part or the entirety (for e.g. in an extremely short exchange) of a conversation. This should come as no surprise: If we ever wondered as to how one may overcome the catch 22 of being accused to have begun recording a conversation if one notifies the other party of the recording just prior to beginning the recording since the notice would not be recorded or being accused for invasion of privacy under California Penal Code § 632 for the part of the conversation recorded just before the lawful indication of the lack of objectively reasonable expectation towards confidentiality in the conversation (for e.g. announcing the fact it is not a confidential call or that it may be recorded), is resolved in this. Again, it is, because the criminal threshold to be met, there must be an objectively reasonable expectation to privacy. If one by act or word calls that into question sufficiently that a reasonable person would not be able to objectively expect that the conversation is private or confidential, it no longer is: It implies that private conversations are the exception, and not the rule although the general perception may differ. This, will now be clear through the definition of confidential communicate in the state, too: “Penal Code § 632(c) defines “confidential communication” as including: any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made . . . in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. To me, through this excerpted quote of the statute, it does appear as to leave an in-between grey area since it does not exclude communications in any other circumstance where circumstances do not reasonably indicate that no party desires it to be confidential, but only in those circumstances in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded. Which indicates toward the general reading of the statute that confidentiality is the rule, and public communications are the exception. However, authority has consistently reenforced the more restrictive approach. Returning to the previous point, due to the above standard test of confidentiality per, among others, Frio that requires a reasonably objective expectation to privacy, it will be clear as to why it is generally sufficient also to announce a call may be recorded or a call may be monitored — this latter announced solely is fairly rare. (See, e.g., Kight, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at 1396-1397) Since such announcements in themselves call anyone's reasonably objective expectation to privacy into question, that is, an average person at least contemplates the very real possibility of overhearing or monitoring. Also another consequence which may seem obvious at this point is that since it is not really &quot;consent&quot; that is a prerequisite, but a reasonably objective expectation, and though a fairly low bar, it is effectively imposed on the complaining party, and not the party wishing to record therefore &quot;for purposes of section 632, the privacy rights affected are the same regardless of whether a conversation is secretly recorded by a machine or monitored by a human being” (See, e.g., Kight, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at 1396-1397) since the threshold is reasonably objective expectation to privacy and effectively not presence or absence of consent; however, if consent is express, than there is, clearly, no reasonably objective expectation to privacy. &quot;Two-party consent&quot; not all party consent? This also leads to the hypothetical: What if in a group one asks another if one can record the conversation, and the other answers in the affirmative, and one begins recording: Would that allow for the recording when the other parties to the conversation haven’t answered? My reading of these interpretations would be that if everyone else in the group made heard the question would no longer have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy furthermore, their consent would also be implied by not objecting and/or proceeding with the communication. So multiple defenses could be used in a case like this — non-confidential communications as well as consent. An even more extreme, and to many, hardly fathomable scenario would be if one party explicitly objects to recording — however, only after an announcement objectively defying any reasonably objective expectations of confidentiality — what would then happen? Recording, absent any reasonable expectation to confidentiality, let alone one such that is objective, without a problem, should be able to be made. An example of this is typical to situations of domestic violence and/or divorce attorneys where they teach a longer disclaimer something along the line: “I will begin recording hence if you continue you will be deemed to have consented to bring recorded” etc., where they typically proceed even against objections. Although this may be much more than what’s minimally required to lawfully record, these disclaimers will probably have a better deterring effect to stop an assault or other aggression than a beep-tone warning that another party may simply disregard. Beep-tone warnings An important, and fairly obscure and unknown consequence of the above espoused interpretations is the so-called beep-tone warnings for recordings or monitoring of calls. In Air Transportation Association of America v. Public Utilities Common of State of California the California Appeal Court for the 9th Circuit found that if &quot;[a] person wishing to listen in on a conversation without violating the regulation can provide notice by using a beep-tone warning device audible to all parties to the conversation[...]&quot;. The rationale follows the previously analyses and is based on the following facts: A reasonable person would have an objective expectation that an ordinarily operating telephone or other customary audio-transmitting devices would cause no beep-tone in order to operate hence being made heard a beep-tone should call a reasonable persons expectation to the ordinary and/or customary operation of any such remote communication device to the extent that it could not maintain a reasonably objective expectation to his or her communication. In a fresh, though unpublished opinion in Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021), an Appeal Court did not vitiate this specific interpretation as it would likely have called the rationale behind it into question as well. &quot;Admissibility&quot; of unlawfully obtained audio recordings Generally, due to the &quot;Right to Truth-in-Evidence&quot; provisions of the California Constitution, a previous statute, Pen. Code § 632(d) was repealed and such evidence became admissible for the purposes of combatting perjury though the person creating such record would still face criminal prosecution for the unlawful recording under § 632; however, I'm less versed in this corner of the statute hence it is highly ill-advised. “[E]vidence of confidential conversations obtained by eavesdropping or recording in violation of Penal Code Section 632 is generally inadmissible in any proceeding…but can be used to impeach inconsistent testimony by those seeking to exclude the evidence.” (People vs. Crow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 440; Frio vs. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1480.) To answer your questions more specifically... If you have a good faith duty as a result of a contractual relationship between yourself and those you wish to record, you could potentially be sued for damages for a breach of the covenant of good faith duty and fair dealing if you somehow manage to lawfully notify the other party, but he could prove that you had a bad faith intention and intentionally chose a manner to mislead them. It does not seem plausible to me how they could prove this, but it certainly is within the realm of possibilities. As you can see: California's ban, as it is similar with probably other states, is not a ban for recording, per se, it is a ban of recording or monitoring of confidential conversations. Therefore, simply allowing someone else to eavesdrop on the conversation would implicate the same criminal consequences absent objective indications that would call the to-be-recorded party's reasonable expectation to privacy as you could probably thought so by now. Conclusion As you can see, many of the caveats to the statute are such that the general public would not know, and if you were to record someone, knowing that simply announcing that a call may be overheard or that someone may hear it who will not be part of the conversation or using a beep-tone warning device audible to all parties may each call the reasonably objective expectation of a to-be-recorded party into question which may be useful.
Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful.
Florida bar membership is something that can be determined from public records to see if he is an attorney or not. I would be stunned if he was not. It could be that he was an enrolled patent agent prior to being admitted to the practice of law and has never updated the record. Alternatively, it could simply be that there was a data entry error. No large database is 100% accurate. For most purposes, the rights of an enrolled patent agent and an attorney admitted to patent law practice are the same in PTO practice, so correcting this error (assuming that it is one), even if it was discovered, wouldn't be an urgent priority.
There is no general law making it illegal to lie about debts, or anything else. It is illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer in the course of an investigation. (And of course it is illegal to lie in court testimony or when otherwise under oath.) But it is in no way unlawful to decline to answer, unless a proper court order has been obtained, or other lawful means of compelling an answer. I would expect any law office to respond to such a question with something like "Am I/we being investigated? If so, send the appropriate notice and our lawyer will consider what we should tell you. If not, tell us what information you want, and we will consider and provide a written response in due course." If a taxpayer has been found to be delinquent in paying taxes, in some cases a court order may be obtained seizing assets, including unpaid debts. But no IRS agent can make such a claim on the spot, and indeed for a client to make such a payment without such a court order, or the order of an IRS tribunal (or the creditor's written consent) would itself be unlawful and would subject the lawyer to a suit by the PI (Private Investigator). When the lawyer pays a service provider, a 1099 must be filed with the IRS. If the PI is a corporation, a different form is used, but a record of payment is still required. As failure to timely file such a form is a violation of the tax code, an accusation of paying without filing would permit the lawyer to decline to answer under the Fifth amendment. If the lawyer did pay and did file a 1099 or other documentation, the IRS would know what had been payed, and would not need to confront the PI. Also, as the comment by Hilmar points out, a PI would be likely to use the cash accounting method, and so would own no tax on work performed but unpaid (as yet). So unless the IRS agent thinks the PI was paid "off-the books" and is intentionally failing to report the payment, there would be no point to such a question. And if that were he case, the lawyer would be very likely to decline to answer. I find the story quite implausible.
Since your consent is not required in Texas, revocation is irrelevant. Restrictions of use of recordings flow from the legal nature of the recording itself, so there is no provision saying, for example, that only one party needs to consent for just recording, but all parties must consent to make any use of the recording. Since these laws were devised to regulate the practice of wearing a wire and collecting evidence of crimes, requiring consent from all parties would be counterproductive to the purposes of the law. You could try drafting a contract where you pay people to not record you (anybody who doesn't sign, you shouldn't talk to them), but enforcement could be tricky, so I would not try a DIY contract: get a lawyer. You would have to show that you were harmed by them making an unconsented recording. It should be in the form of a contract where you give something of value in exchange for something of value, which is a thing typically enforced by the courts. Also bear in mind that even in an all-party state, if you know that you are being recorded, you cannot just say &quot;I do not consent&quot;, you have to stop talking. Continuing to talk when notified that there is or may be a recording constitutes implied consent, which is why on the phone companies often announce via recording that the conversation may be monitored, and they do not ask &quot;Do you consent&quot;. By not hanging up, you consented.
They don't have to inform you that they are a debt collector. Because that can be a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(2) by exposing that the person they are attempting to collect from has a debt. They are required to: identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer -- 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(1) They also may not use any language indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(5) What they do not have the right to do is harass you. They can not attempt to contact you again 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(3) unless they have reason to believe you lied. I would contact the company back and inform them that you wish to have your number removed from their calling list, and that future calls may be a violation of 15 U.S.C. Section 1692b(3). Also, send them a notice in the mail. If they continue to attempt to contact you, report them to the FTC. You may also be entitled to monetary damages as well. See FTC The judge can require the debt collector to pay you up to $1,000, even if you can’t prove that you suffered actual damages. You also can be reimbursed for your attorney’s fees and court costs. To file a claim with the FTC, go to there online claim for debt collectors Its worth it to show that you won't joke with them. I had a "debt" with T-Mobile (really, I had a billing error in their favor, and they admitted to it, but would not stop the debt collectors) and they violated the rules. I tried to work with them, 6 months later, they damaged my credit. I contacted FTC about it and T-Mobile with in 3 days had the debt cleared and reversed on my credit. They also paid for my damages. All I wanted was the debt cleared. Note: for calls being recorded, always make sure you follow local laws and inform the other party that the call is recorded. If they have a right to record you, you have a right to record them. You must always infrom them as well.
I presume you are addressing the various wiretapping laws. In all of those channels, one would have a reasonable expectation of privacy, in contrast to using CB radio or a megaphone. However the context of using the instrument affects that expectation, for example if your phone is on speaker you do not have a reasonable expectation that those around you cannot hear your conversation, when there are others around you. Also, there is no expectation of privacy surrounding employers monitoring employee emails for valid business purposes – but the federal government can't intercept your emails (without a warrant) just because you are using business email. The expectation of privacy is really about the surrounding circumstance, not the instrument you use.