What are the legal ramifications of a legally dead person turning up alive? Context: I am writing an urban fantasy story in which a man dies, is declared dead, and comes back to life via supernatural means on the autopsy table. The existence of the supernatural is not common knowledge in the universe of the story, and his un-death is completely inexplicable as far as medical science and the law is concerned; nonetheless, a legally dead man ends up being alive. What kind of procedures would be necessary to undo the legal death? What happens to his property (note: the reanimated character is a young man with no written will)? If he's a renter, how long will it take for his landlord to push all his stuff out and welcome a new tenant? How much paperwork does he have to fill out? Note: the story is set in the USA, and tentatively set in the state of California in the late 2010s.
What kind of procedures would be necessary to undo the legal death? What happens to his property (note: the reanimated character is a young man with no written will)? If he's a renter, how long will it take for his landlord to push all his stuff out and welcome a new tenant? How much paperwork does he have to fill out? If the person is on the autopsy table, while he may have technically been legally dead, the person's death certificate has probably not even been issued yet, since normally an autopsy is done, in part, to determine a cause of death for purposes of preparing a death certificate. Normally, an autopsy is only prepared when the cause of death is uncertain or needs to be documented for legal reasons (e.g. an accidental or potentially criminal death or one that is just unexplained), and the need for one postpones the preparation of a death certificate. If the cause of death is self-evident and there is no indication of foul play, an autopsy isn't done and the preparation of a death certificate proceeds more quickly. In other words, while he may be &quot;legally&quot; dead (defined as discontinuation of the function of certain bodily processes like brain activity and heartbeat and breathing), he very likely isn't yet &quot;bureaucratically&quot; dead. You can be &quot;legally&quot; dead days before anyone even discovers that you have died, with the time of your death determined only retroactively, but that doesn't have any practical effect until someone discovers it and it makes its way through the bureaucratic and court process. It takes a few days after a death for a probate proceeding to establish death, heirship and the validity of any will (many states have a 120 hour minimum waiting period after a date of death and most autopsies are within 72 hours). Even if a probate proceeding had been commenced, a simple affidavit or notice that someone was not, in fact, dead would cause the case to be summarily dismissed and it is unlikely that much would have happened in the court process since then. With older people, one of the fastest agencies to act is the Social Security Administration discontinuing benefits. But a younger person wouldn't have gotten those to start with, so that wouldn't be a factor. Life insurance companies normally won't pay until a final post-autopsy death certificate with cause of death is in place (so they can look for fraud in the life insurance application relative to the cause of death stated). It would be very usual for a landlord to take action sooner than the month after learning of the death, and often the estate will keep in a lease in force much longer. Next of kin may have removed some valuables prior to any official declaration, and while most people would promptly return them upon learning of the &quot;mistake&quot;, a few items might not be recovered. The final death certificate would probably never be prepared. A preliminary death certificate might be quashed as erroneous and not filed with the Vital Statistics Department of the State Department of Health, by the preparing party, through a simple, oral, in office instruction to the person in the coroner's office who handles those filings. Since there isn't a formal judicial declaration of death or a final death certificate, simply informing an agency or person that received a preliminary notice that it was in error, perhaps by letter or email, would suffice. Even if a final death certificate had just issued, the person who filed it could probably fill out a simple correction form so soon (probably just a matter of hours) after it was filed. It wouldn't be that disruptive. The messy cases are when there has been a legal declaration of death and then months of actions have been taken in reliance on the determination that someone is dead.
My question is this in fact unique? Have any other cases in the US federal courts been decided at the appeals or higher level based upon a dead judge's written opinion, and if so, have they then survived appeal? This happens roughly a couple of times a year on average in the U.S. Courts of Appeal, usually when an opinion has been agreed to in principle and a final draft of the opinion has been approved, but release of the opinion is delayed, for example, to allow the dissenting opinion in the case to be completed prior to publication of the decision. The blog "How Appealing" regularly reports this practice when it happens, although its accounts of this practice are not comprehensive. To the best of my knowledge, no appellate court opinion has ever been reversed on appeal because a judge died prior to its publication. For comparison's sake, in the most recent year for which statistics are available (2017) the U.S. Courts of Appeal handled 60,877 cases, so this happens in less than one in 30,000 cases (you have to combine the regional U.S. Courts of Appeal and the Federal Circuit which is reported separately for statistical purposes to get the total).
One of the conditions for a contract to be enforceable is that its undertakings must be legal. This would mean that you cannot, contractually, be indemnified for murder - at least, not in any jurisdiction where homicide is illegal.
I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms &amp; conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about &amp; accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful &amp; informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful &amp; informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit &amp; loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.
Normally, a recorded deed is taken at face value. If Bob acquires a house and conveys the house to Bob and Clark, his cousin, a joint tenants with right of survivorship, or pays for 99% of the price of a house and directs that it will be deeded to Bob and Clark as joint tenants with right of survivorship, the normal interpretation of that transaction is that Bob made a gift of an undivided one half interest in the property with right of survivorship to Clark. It sounds like the fact pattern is that Bob dies before Clark, giving Clark 100% title of record to the house subject to the mortgage, and Bob's heirs are not cool about that fact and would like to escape that consequence. This is a tall order for Bob's heirs. Normally, at least two important rules of evidence will preclude admission of testimony to the contrary. One is the parole evidence rule. This excludes as a matter of law evidence of discussions entered into prior to execution of an unambiguous written instrument that is not on its face incomplete, even if other evidence, called &quot;extrinsic evidence&quot; is available. The other is the dead man's statute, which is quite tricky in its technical application, but is basically designed to prevent an interested party from offering self-serving testimony that economically benefits them about what a deceased person said. The classic examples would be &quot;I'll sell you these gold bars for $10&quot;, or &quot;I'm giving you this painting&quot;, or &quot;I agree to let you live in my house after I die rent free for 11 months.&quot; A statement regarding an intended ownership interest in joint tenancy with right of survivorship real estate asserting that it is not 50-50 when nothing on the face of the deed suggests that this is case might be barred by the dead man's statute since these are statements of a dead man that favor the person offering the evidence. But, as I say, the application of the rule is quite technical. Also, to the extent that any third-party like a lender or a judgment creditor of the surviving joint tenant gets a lien or other property right in the property that is recorded, and that person had no knowledge of the claims of ownership outside real property records of the relative rights of the joint tenants, that evidence couldn't be used to impair or reduce the third-party's rights in the property by virtue of the recording statutes. If a dispute arose while the co-owners were alive at a time when there were no disputed claims of third-parties to the property, the joint tenancy would be easy to severed into a tenancy-in-common, and the actual relative contributions and right of the parties could be litigated in court with the testimony of those parties. But, usually, the four unities are in practice, a consequence of a joint tenancy with right of survivorship deed being prepared and recorded, rather than primarily being a condition precedent to it. If a single deed is executed that says that grantee are two or more people who are described as joint tenants with right of survivorship, then the legal consequence of that deed is that the co-owners become equal owners with a right of survivorship and unlimited right to possession of the whole. Also, even though it isn't standard, it isn't impossible for property to be in a tenancy-in-common which a side agreement to make a transfer upon death to the remaining tenant-in-common, even if it isn't a true joint tenancy with right of survivorship. So, if one proved by some competent and admissible evidence that a 50-50 ownership was not intended and that it wasn't a true canonical joint tenancy, this wouldn't necessarily invalidate the survivorship provisions on the face of the deed. A judge would be more likely to treat the deed as a non-standard non-probate transfer at death than to treat it as a tenancy-in-common without a right of survivorship, despite language of survivorship on the face of the recorded deed. Now, something other than equal co-ownership might be admissible for some purposes, like tax consequences, but that wouldn't go to who gets the property when a co-owner of the property dies. From an evidentiary standpoint, the case would [be based upon] . . . non-will ledgers, third party banking transactions, and letters of evidence that show the decedent undertook full responsibility for expenses related to the acquisition and maintenance of the property. The joint tenant was involved in the deed and mortgage issuance by the decedent for the sole purpose of mortgage qualification (i.e. credit requirements) This doesn't sound very convincing. First, there is nothing inconsistent with a joint tenancy with right of survivorship with one co-owner being the person who provides the funds for purchasing the home and handling all of the maintenance and expenses. This is more common than not in the case of a married couple or pair of unmarried domestic partners that own the real property as joint tenants with right of survivorship and it used to be even more common. Second, a lender would almost always require that all people obligated on the mortgage be owners of the property, and that all owners of the property be obligated on the mortgage. (Strictly speaking, in California, it would probably be a deed of trust rather than a mortgage, but that is functionally equivalent.) But, it wouldn't be very common as a commercial requirement to insist on joint tenancy with right of survivorship as opposed to tenancy-in-common ownership. Also since providing credit to a transaction is something of value, getting an ownership interest in the property in exchange isn't beyond the realm on possibility and plausibility in a deal that isn't entirely arms length but isn't entire a gift either. Providing credit is probably sufficient consideration to support the deal as a binding contractual agreement. Now, the best strategy might be a letter or exchange of letters that amount to an agreement. This wouldn't bind the mortgage company, but might have some relevant. Still, if the letters predate the execution of the joint tenancy deed, the parole evidence rule might keep the letters out of evidence. Some sort of express trust theory, treating the letters as a trust agreement, might if the language was right, be a stronger legal argument. I'm trying to wrap my head around how a court would interpret documentation vs. intent with regard to the joint tenancy ownership of real property. The key point being that the decedent didn't 'generally' pay for the property, but always paid for it. This is almost completely irrelevant. It is consistent with the alternative characterization of the transaction, but it is also consistent with the deed terms. In particular, if the decedent described the remaining joint tenant as a 'renter' during an interval of co-habitation, and no financial transactions between the two took place subsequent to that. I could imagine bringing a legal action to reform the deed, but the threshold of proof to win that action is pretty high. Absent some sort on undue influence or abuse of a confidential relationship, I have a hard time seeing a deed like this being reformed by a court to reflect a different kind of transaction, even if that was the original intent of the parties, but it isn't impossible if the right facts and evidence were available (which the dead man's statute, again, heavily constrains). If Bob was defrauded by Clark, I could also imagine some sort of legal remedy being available. But it is hard to think that Bob who was the primary mover in the deal would have been defrauded by Clark in this fact pattern. In California, the relevant case law seems to be Kershman v Kershman, Milian v DeLeon, and Cosler v Norwood Kershman v. Kershman is not on point. It is a divorce case dealing with the issues of marital v. separate property under California's community property regime which is an entirely different body of law that doesn't apply to unmarried co-owners of property. Milian v. De Leon is more on point, involving unmarried people with unequal contributions to the property who take title by a deed that says joint tenancy. it found that, “once the court in a partition action has determined that a true joint tenancy exists, it may not order reimbursement or contribution on account of differences in the amounts the parties have paid toward the initial acquisition of the property.” Milian v. De Leon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1195. (Source) This holding is the standard common law rule. It isn't isn't really relevant here, however, because that case applies in the context of a partition action while the co-owners are alive, and not after death when the survivorship feature causes the surviving co-owner to be sole owner by operation of law. Cosler v. Norwood is a much older case, from 1950, and seems to stand for the proposition that the language of the deed regarding equal ownership that flows from calling the co-owners joint tenants can be overcome by extrinsic evidence in the context of a partition action, although it is arguably implicitly repealed by Milian v. De Leon. But it isn't on point for the same reason that Milian v. DeLeon in not on point - it considers the rights of two living parties in a partition action dispute (i.e. a lawsuit to untangle co-ownership of property), not concerning the validity of a survivorship provision in the deed in the presence of unequal contributions to the acquisition price. Changes to the survivorship rights do not obviously at all flow from the existence of unequal contributions.
Code sections cited in this answer are to the New Mexico Criminal code, Chapter 30 as they were in my answer to the linked question, and to chapter 59A. Neither the landlord (whom I will cal LL) , nor any ordinary citizen, is legally required to report information that s/he may have about a crime to the police or other authorities. LL cannot actively conceal or destroy or tamper with evidence (section 30-22-5. of the NM code), nor assist the criminal by more than silence which would be a crime iunder section 30-22-4, Harboring or aiding a felon. If the police question LL about the crime, s/he should not lie. Apparently lying to officers during an investigation is not a crime in New Mexico, although filing a false crime report is, under section 30-39-1. If LL were to make an insurance claim while omitting or misstating a materiel fact (such as that LL knows who broke in) that would be a violation of Section 59A-16-23 paragraph (2) which prohibits: for the purpose of obtaining money or benefit, present or cause to be presented a false or fraudulent claim or proof in support of such a claim for payment of loss under a policy I am not sure if LL owes an affirmative duty to the tenant. If LL does owe such a duty, the tenant may have grounds to sue LL if LL fails to help the tenant recover the stolen property, but it is probably not a criminal matter.
With testamentary succession, the matter is simple: do what the will says. Religion aside, the Indian Succession Act, 1925 says As to what property deceased considered to have died intestate.—A person is deemed to die intestate in respect of all property of which he has not made a testamentary disposition which is capable of taking effect. Illustrations (i) A has left no will. He has died intestate in respect of the whole of his property. (ii) A has left a will, whereby he has appointed B his executor; but the will contains no other provision. A has died intestate in respect of the distribution of his property. (iii) A has bequeathed his whole property for an illegal purpose. A has died intestate in respect of the distribution of his property. (iv) A has bequeathed 1,000 rupees to B and 1,000 rupees to the eldest son of C, and has made no other bequest; and has died leving the sum of 2,000 rupees and no other property. C died before A without having ever had a son. A has died intestate in respect of the distribution of 1,000 rupees. Then other acts address intestate succession, such as the Hindu Succession Act. If we suppose the will only identifies an executor, then w.r.t. distribution the Hindi Succession Act (etc.) govern the distribution. Those acts are ostensibly specific enough that there is no discretion: except, the law only addresses portions of the estate, and not very specific matters such as who gets the watch and who gets the computer. Indeed, there is a reasonable chance that property is not wholely transferred to a beneficiary, instead the beneficiary gain an interest in the property. There are also related provisions regarding an heir's transfer of his interest in property where other heirs have a &quot;right of first refusal&quot;. So in general, the laws of intestate succession remove discretion from the equation. A will could, however, empower an executor to make a decision. The provisions of the will must be in writing. &quot;Challenging&quot; a will is a specific legal process, not the same as &quot;asking about a will&quot;. If a legal petition has been filed, the will is challenged. If a person asks a lawyer &quot;is that really legal; what does that mean&quot;, that is not a challenge.
In part, we don't know because there are currently no rules that address certain outcomes, so it will depend on who is on the Supreme Court when the issue is raised. A warrantless search will not be legal beyond current doctrines regarding crime in progress and imminent danger, even if it involves time travel. So you will need a warrant, and you will need probable cause to get it. Currently, if you break into a person's house to discover that there is a body there, you can't get a warrant to legitimize that illegal search. Adding time travel does not change anything. In situation 1, I assume they have probable cause and a warrant but the evidence was destroyed by the time of the search at time T+n. As long as prior time T is still after the crime, a warrant to search at time T would not be a problem. In scenario 2, there is nothing preventing them from stopping the crime or arresting the perpetrators in the act. However, if they travel back in time and break in to a suspect's house in order to witness the crime, that is an illegal search. You could likewise arrest a person before he escapes to the phantom zone, if you have probable cause that he had committed a crime – by the time of the arrest. Forward time travel poses a more serious challenge, as articulated in Minority Report. It would, or should, be very difficult to issue an arrest warrant at time T based on knowledge of a crime committed at T+n. Because of the arrest, the crime was not committed and there was no probable cause, so there should have been no warrant (oh no, paradox).