Is it legal to assign future judgment payments to supporters? Is it legal to involve supporters by promising them payments from legal judgements or sanctions resulting from a law suit?
No, One cannot lawfully do this in Ohio Historic Common Law In English common law, granting a share of a future legal judgement was prohibited as Champerty According to the Wikipedia article just linked: Champerty (from Old French champart) is the financial support, by a party not naturally concerned in the suit, of a plaintiff that allows them to prosecute a lawsuit on condition that, if it be brought to a successful issue, the plaintiff will repay them with a share of the proceed from the suit.{&quot;Oxford English Dictionary&quot;. www.oed.com. Oxford University Press. Retrieved 14 January 2021.} In Giles v Thompson{ UKHL 2, [1993] 3 All ER 321 (26 May 1993)} Lord Justice Steyn declared: &quot;In modern idiom maintenance is the support of litigation by a stranger without just cause. Champerty is an aggravated form of maintenance. The distinguishing feature of champerty is the support of litigation by a stranger in return for a share of the proceeds.&quot; At common law, maintenance and champerty were both crimes and torts, as was barratry (the bringing of vexatious litigation). This is generally no longer so1 as, during the nineteenth century, the development of legal ethics tended to obviate the risks to the public, particularly after the scandal of the Swynfen will case (1856–1864).2 However, the principles are relevant to modern contingent fee agreements between a lawyer and a client and to the assignment by a plaintiff of his rights in a lawsuit to someone with no connection to the case. Champertous contracts can still, depending on jurisdiction, be void for public policy or attract liability for costs. In any common-law jurisdiction that inherited the common law of England (which includes all US states other than Louisiana) champerty will remain unlawful unless a) a specific stature has removed or altered this part of the common law, b) a general statute has done away with the common law entirely, replacing it with statutory law generally (in which case a similar prohibition may or may not be in statute), or c) an appellate court has declared that champerty is no longer unlawful in that jurisdiction. Ohio In Ohio a case precisely on point was Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 99 Ohio St.3d 121, 2003-Ohio-2721.. In that case a Ms. Rancman, who had a valid claim against an insurance company, did not wish to wait for the resolution of her case, and contracted with Interim Settlement Funding Corp. for an advance against the settlement of $6,000, in return for a promise of an amount ranging from $16,800 to $27,600, depending on how soon the case was resolved. If she lost the case, she would owe nothing according to the terms of the contract. When her insurance case settled for $100,000, she refused to pay as specified in the contract, instead offering to return the money advanced plus interest at eight percent per year. The lower courts upheld the eight percent rate as valid, The Ohio Supreme Court, however, held (at ¶19}) that: The advances made to Rancman constituted champerty and maintenance. Consequently, the contracts requiring their repayment are void and shall not be enforced. Apparently this left Interim Funding not even getting their principal back. Given this relatively recent holding (2003), one doubts that funding companies would be willing to advance money on future Ohio claims. In the Rancman opinion Justice O’Connor wrote: {¶9} It is unnecessary for the resolution of this case to determine the threshold level of risk necessary for a contingent advance to be treated as an investment rather than a loan. The advances here are void as champerty and maintenance regardless of whether they are loans or investments. {Emphasis added} {¶10} “Maintenance” is assistance to a litigant in pursuing or defending a lawsuit provided by someone who does not have a bona fide interest in the case. “Champerty” is a form of maintenance in which a nonparty undertakes to further another’s interest in a suit in exchange for a part of the litigated matter if a favorable result ensues. 14 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1995), Champerty and Maintenance, Section 1. The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were developed at common law to prevent officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and contention by vexatious and speculative litigation which would disturb the peace of society, lead to corrupt practices, and prevent the remedial process of the law.” 14 Corpus Juris Secondum (1991), Champerty and Maintenance, Section 3. See, also, Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A. (2000), 94 N.Y.2d 726, 709 N.Y.S.2d 865, 731 N.E.2d 581. {¶11} The ancient practices of champerty and maintenance have been vilified in Ohio since the early years of our statehood. Key v. Vattier (1823), 1 Ohio 132, 136, 1823 WL 8. We stated in Key that maintenance “is an offense against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and contention, and perverts the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppression.” Id. at 143. We have held the assignment of rights to a lawsuit to be void as champerty. Brown v. Ginn (1902), 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N.E. 123, paragraph two of the syllabus. We have also said that the law of Ohio will tolerate no lien in or out of the [legal] profession, as a general rule, which will prevent litigants from compromising, or settling their controversies, or which, in its tendencies, encourages, promotes, or extends litigation. (Davy v. Fid. &amp; Cas. Ins. Co. (1908), 78 Ohio St. 256, 268-269, 85 N.E. 504.) {¶12} In recent years, champerty and maintenance have lain dormant in Ohio courts. Historically, champertors and maintainors were attorneys, and these practices by attorneys have been regulated by DR 5-103 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Williams (1990), 51 Ohio St.3d 36, 553 N.E.2d 1082. Nonetheless, the codification of these doctrines for attorney discipline did not remove them from the common law. “[T]he doctrines of champerty and maintenance appear in numerous Ohio cases as contract defenses * * *.” Tosi v. Jones (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 396, 400, 685 N.E.2d 580, appeal dismissed upon the application of appellant in (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 1430, 676 N.E.2d 535. ... {¶18} ...[A] lawsuit is not an investment vehicle. Speculating in lawsuits is prohibited by Ohio law. An intermeddler is not permitted to gorge upon the fruits of litigation Ohio Conclusion To be clear, noting that I found in Ohio law makes such an agreement a crime, even though it was on under ancient common law. In the Rancman case, it seems that no one was criminally prosecuted. Such an agreement is not legal in Ohio only in the sense that the court will not enforce it. Thus no funding company who checks the law would, I expect, enter into such an agreement and risk the same fate as Interim Settlement, not even getting the money advanced back when the suit had been won by the plaintiff. Nor is this case obscure -- a simple google search found it via the Wikipedia article, and other simple searches probably would also. Notes Abolished by Part II of the [UK] Criminal Law Act 1967, except as regards embracery, abolished by section 17 of the Bribery Act 2010. Pue, W. W. (1990). &quot;Moral panic at the English Bar: Paternal vs. commercial ideologies of legal practice in the 1860s&quot;. Law and Social Inquiry. 15 (1): 49–118. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.1990.tb00275.x
While I am a U.S. attorney, the U.K. and U.S. are essentially the same on these issue in practice: "reasonable wear and tear" is a classic issue of fact to be decided by the judge (unlike the U.S. there are never juries in U.K. landlord-tenant disputes) based upon the evidence presented to him and his or her good judgment if the case goes to court. There won't be a lot of case law that is specific enough to provide guidance in your particular case (if any) because cases like these aren't worth appealing and creating case law on and because the law intentionally vests judges with great discretion on these issues and only intervenes in appellate decisions when a judge is deeply out of line. The legal definition of "reasonable wear and tear" is basically vacuous and don't provide much meaningful guidance. I know you are joking, but no, do not set it on fire. You will find yourself incarcerated for arson, with a felony criminal record and a restitution judgment in the amount of the damages and a fine and court costs as well, and your credit record will be screwed and no one will rent to you ever again if they find out by doing a cursory background check. Your mum probably won't even invite you to Christmas dinner this year. If they charge your security deposit and you don't think you owe it, you would have to sue them for a return of the part of your security deposit you don't owe, knowing that you face a risk of paying their legal fees if you lose, but will get your fees if you hire a lawyer and win (caveat: there are more nuances to fee shifting in the U.K. courts than I spell out here which are rather technical). If they say you owe more than your security deposit and you don't pay, they can sue you for the balance, knowing that they face a risk of paying your legal fees if they lose, but will get their fees if they win. In practice, it doesn't really make economic sense for either party to hire an attorney because the amount of the fees is so high relative to the amount of money at stake. The security deposit is 2-4 hours of legal time, and the amount claimed is maybe 7-14 hours of legal time, neither of which is sufficient to address the respective issues economically in a fully litigated hearing. Short of going to court, you can provide them documentation and your video to show that you are right and to discourage them from docking your security deposit (in full, anyway) or suing you, ideally A.S.A.P. before they are too committed to taking legal action. You could also propose a compromise and see if you can get them to agree to it with neither party facing the risk of going to court.
While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.
Counter notices are described in 17 USC 512(g)(3). It starts with the requirement for "A physical or electronic signature of the subscriber" (and a statement under penalty of perjury...). Supposing that you can't get anywhere with finding the contributor even via a subpoena, then you're stopped there: you can't swear on behalf of someone else. Paragraph (f) also says that if a person files a false infringement claim, they become liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it but it's not immediately obvious that you would suffer damage by taking the material down (not immediately obvious doesn't mean obviously not true). A case could be made, but it's risky. In Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Diebold was hit with substantial damages basically for having made up a theory that certain email discussion was infringing when it was clearly fair use. If a person actually lies about being the copyright owner, that would probably be viewed even more dimly by the courts. Your 4th argument gives you no traction: if an infringer posts infringing material and transfers copyright on the web page, but they don't hold copyright, then that transfer mean nothing. As for the other arguments, your attorney will have to suggest an advisable course of action. S/he might advise that your evidence is so strong that you should just ignore the takedown; or that you should take the content down and then sue for damages; or take the content down and lobby your congressman for a change in the law. [Addendum] I will reiterate my recommendation to get a lawyer. I believe that under the law, the risk to you would be the situation where the person prevails in an infringement suit against you. Outside of the "mere conduit" safe harbor, you have to participate in the notice and takedown scheme in order to "stay safe" (also you have to do so quickly). You have identified a potentially huge flaw in the system. Theoretically, criminal charges of perjury and paragraph (f) damages would be enough to deter ordinary wrong-doers, provided that you can really prove that someone else is the copyright holder. But the cost of litigation is not zero and the chances of winning are not 100%. The law does assume that all parties tell the truth, indeed the law requires a "penalty of perjury" statement. Since counter-notice is also part of the legal dance, I would conclude that you do have to write yourself a counter-notice. Then if there is a suit, you have satisfied the requirements of the law.
If you had an agreement that amounts to a contract, it is binding even if it was informal. However, if your agreement was not in writing, it might be hard to prove. You can easily prove that you transferred money to the other party. But can you prove that it was a loan an not a gift? And even if it is agreed to be a loan, if no repayment time was specified, what says that the debt is due now? Was the agreement really for a loan repayable on demand? The court would have to determine what your real contract was, or what contract can be implied from the actions of the parties. Also, if you are in a common-law jurisdiction, there could be a question of what consideration there was for the loan. Without consideration, there is no valid contract in such a jurisdiction. Perhaps a promise to repay could be treated as sufficient consideration. Small-claims courts do deal with unclear verbal contracts on a regular basis, but the outcome will depend on the facts of the case, and on the details of local law. It might be wise to consult a local lawyer with small-claims experience. A single consultation should not be too expensive. In response to comment If the &quot;written binding agreements&quot; include a statement from the other person that this is a loan, and a promise to repay it, you are in a stronger position than I had thought from the original question. The question for the court would be, since there was no due date agreed, what is a reasonable date to impose. The court might treat it as a loan repayable on demand, or specify some particular date for repayment.
Yes. This type of contract is called a license. Lawyers write them.
You didn't bother to state who this appeal is with or even where you are but I'm almost certain I know the answer. Just once. If the appeal is denied, you may be able to appeal to a higher body such as a higher court or an ombudsman. However, any group or court allowing the same appeal ad infinitum until you get what you want would be farcical.
It's not legal The terms that you agree when you enter a contract can only be changed if: the contract provides for variation of its terms and then, only in accordance with that procedure. This may allow unilateral changes - these are common in ongoing relationships like telephone and ISP contracts but it appears from the Kickstarter page that this was not the case here. the parties agree to vary the contract either by deed or by another contract. If by deed then the law of making deeds must be followed, if by contract then the laws of contract must be followed. You mention &quot;around $70AUD&quot; which leads me to guess that you are in Australia. If you were there when you entered the contract then the Australian Consumer Law will apply to the transaction and, more generally, to William Painter since they explicitly &quot;do business in&quot; Australia because they ship there. It is illegal to make misleading and deceptive claims under the ACL and the fines can be huge. Perhaps a note pointing this out to them and letting them know that if they waive their fees in you case(s), you wont feel the need to report them to the ACCC.