If private citizens cannot sue when the grievance is common to all citizens, who is supposed to sue? Follow-up question to What does this sentence about Trump's lawsuits in Pennsylvania mean? The document cited by Nate Eldredge in the answer to that question says: Federal courts are not venues for plaintiffs to assert a bare right “to have the Government act in accordance with law.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126–27 (2014). When the alleged injury is undifferentiated and common to all members of the public, courts routinely dismiss such cases as “generalized grievances” that cannot support standing. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173–75 (1974). Such is the case here insofar as Plaintiffs, and specifically candidate Bognet, theorize their harm as the right to have government administered in compliance with the Elections Clause and Electors Clause. This seems to say that if the government does not act in accordance with law, private citizens cannot file suit to force it to do so. But if the government is not acting in accordance with law, presumably someone/something would be legally empowered to force the government to obey the law. What is that entity? What happens if that entity does not file suit? Offhand, the closest example that I can think of is when the UK government passed a bill that would break international law, but that is obviously different -- that case involved international law and the aggrieved country would presumably file a lawsuit with the International Court of Justice.
The general rule, in US courts, is that a person (or organization) can only sue if that person has actually been harmed in some way by the actions of the person or entity to be sued. This is called having standing. In some cases a law specifically grants standing more widely than the usual rule would. For example, some state elections laws grant standing to any voter to challenge certain kinds of procedural violations. In some countries there are special courts in which governmental actions (or inaction) alleged to be in violation of law can be challenged. In the US there is no such special court, such challenges are brought, if at all, in the form of ordinary lawsuits brought by individuals, groups, or organizations. Sometimes a person who has actually been injured by a governmental action must be found in order to mount a legal challenge to that action. There are other mechanisms than lawsuits which may be used to force compliance with law. An official who is acting improperly may be impeached, convicted, and removed from office. And non-compliance may be politically unpopular, and lead to a change of administration or to a legislator not being re-elected. But of course neither of those remedies always works. In some cases one part or agency of the government can sue another part or a specific official. The law may explicitly provide for this, or a court may declare such a suit to be permitted. In some cases there is apparently no way to force a legal settlement of a dispute. For example, the US Federal constitution has an &quot;emoluments clause&quot; which essentially says that the President shall not accept payments from foreign rulers or governments. It was apparently intended as a sort of anti-bribery provision. No US court has ever enforced it, and recent cases seem to suggest that impeachment is the only way to enforce it. (It seems that this is incorrect, and a better example is needed.) The current US system is imperfect (as is every other system I know of, although in different ways). The reason for the standing rule is that if everyone who felt that something wrong was being done, even if not to him or her personally, could sue, the courts would be totality overrun with such suits, and much of government would have no time to do anything but to defend such suits. That is because almost every governmental action offends or angers someone, even if it does not do that person measurable harm. Limiting suits to cases where the plaintiff has standing is a key method of keeping the system in check. The US doe3s not have any overriding monitor agency which can sue for any improper government action. If it did, who would keep that agency in its proper bounds?
At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.
This case was filed in federal court under diversity jurisdiction, meaning that it’s a lawsuit between citizens of different states. In most cases, diversity jurisdiction requires “complete” diversity: every plaintiff has to be a citizen of a different state than every defendant. If one of 12 plaintiffs is a Maryland resident and one of 15 defendants is also a Maryland resident, that tiny overlap means the entire lawsuit is kicked back to state court. In this case, the defendants are an Ohio fraternity, an Illinois resident, a Wyoming company, and a person whose residence is unclear. Defendant Smith might be a Wyoming resident, a Utah resident, or a Washington resident. The plaintiffs aren’t sure. However, as long as the plaintiffs aren’t residents of any of those states, there’s complete diversity of citizenship. It doesn’t matter whether Doe II is from Alaska or Florida, just that she isn’t from the same state as any defendant.
Can you be trespassing on public property for no reason at all? Yes. When the government owns property, it can direct you to leave for any reason (even a legally invalid reason), and you are trespassing if you don't leave. When you are present on land you don't own with permission, but without a lease, you have a &quot;license&quot; to be there which is a contract-like right and is not a property right. A license doesn't give you the right to stay on the property over the objections of the owner or an agent of the owner. You might be able to receive money damages for an improper termination of your license to be present at the property (e.g. if you are told for no reason to leave a movie after paying for a ticket), but you don't have the right to simply stay there. If you stay there over the objections of the owner or the owner's agent, you are trespassing. The law applicable to government property owners and private property owners is basically the same in this regard. Realistically, on government property, furthermore, the standard by which the government employee may legally terminate your license to be there and exclude you from the property is low. Basically, it must merely not violate any constitutional right you may have, and you do not have a constitutional right to be present on government owned property, except in a quite narrow subset of cases (e.g. the &quot;town square&quot;). More exactly, you do not have a right to be on government property per se, but you can't be excluded from it for a constitutionally impermissible reason. The government gets to decide what parts of property it owns are available to the general public and for what content-neutral purposes. Thus, the right to be present on government owned &quot;public&quot; property (which doesn't include private areas of government owned property) can be subjected to reasonable and content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions. For example, a town could legally decide that the town square is closed from midnight to eight a.m. every day. The quoted material from the case Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1999) cited in the answer by bdb484 is narrower than a plain reading out of context would suggest. In that quotation, the term &quot;public place&quot; is being used in a sense much more restrictive than in the broader sense of property that is merely government owned. It is referring to places where the government has expressly or implicitly allowed members of the general public to be present on land that it owns (as opposed, for example, to a government office area of a building, or a maintenance facility in a government owned park, or a conservation area in a government owned park). This narrow sense of the word resolves what would otherwise seem to be a contradiction in the law. But, the government has the authority to make something that once was a public place into a non-public place going forward. For example, historically, the Civic Center park in front of the capitol in Denver, Colorado has been a public place. But, the government can and did close it off to the public for many months for maintenance and out of public health concerns when heavy use of it by homeless people and drug dealers caused the premises to be seriously damaged and created a public health risk from it being used to dispose of dirty, used, injection-drug syringes, and for people to defecate. A Hypothetical Suppose that Chris is the sole librarian in one of the towns of College Corner, which is on the Ohio-Indiana border, which are in different time zones. In that capacity, Chris has the authority to set library policies including the hours of the library and the rules for its use without the approval of anyone else. Chris has a hot date at 5:30 p.m. But, at lunch time, Chris learned that the hot date was at 5:30 p.m. in Ohio and not an hour later at 5:30 p.m. in Indiana, but the library's official closing time is 5 p.m. in Indiana, because Ohio was observing daylight savings time, but Indian was not, at the time when this happened. Chris, as the sole government official in charge of the library, decides to close the library before its posted closing time at 4:00 p.m. Indiana time (5 p.m. Ohio time) in order to be able to make it to the hot date. Chris quietly asks everyone left in the library to leave at 4 p.m. Indiana time, and everyone but you does. But you, who are homeless, really want to stay the extra hour before getting out in the cold and finding a bridge to sleep under, so you refuse to leave saying that the library is still open until 5 p.m. Indiana time, as stated in its posted hours. Chris orders you to leave and warns you that he is calling the police to remove you if you don't do so voluntarily. The police arrive and restate the complaint of Chris. The police arrest you for trespassing and you are charged with this crime in the appropriate court by the appropriate prosecuting attorney. You had done nothing wrong whatsoever prior to being asked to leave and refusing to do so. But, Chris has not violated your constitutional rights by ordering you removed for some unconstitutional reason. Chris then goes on the hot date; it is love at first sight, and Chris gets married the next week. As an apology for putting you out for the sole convenience of Chris, Chris invites you to the wedding. Do you have a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge on the grounds that the librarian's actions were unconstitutional? No. You might have a &quot;good faith claim of right&quot; defense, however, to the criminal charges. Do you have a valid claim for money damages for a violation of your constitutional rights? No. Indeed, ordering you removed for &quot;no reason&quot; that has anything to do with your conduct, as in this case, is probably more likely to be legal and constitutional, than having you removed for &quot;some reason&quot; other than just &quot;because I the librarian say so&quot; that doesn't involve wrongdoing on your part. A Variation In The Hypothetical If instead, your were being ordered to leave the library because you were wearing an National Rifle Association cap (and the library didn't prohibit wearing caps), this affirmative reason, which is contrary to the First Amendment freedom of expression, would be a violation of your constitutional rights, which would definitely be a basis for a civil lawsuit against the librarian and police involved in you being arrested. I don't know the details of constitutional defenses in criminal law well enough to know if the violation of your constitutional rights would be a valid defense to the criminal trespassing charge (or a failure to obey a police officer's order to leave charge) resulting from you failing to leave in that circumstance, and I can see legitimate arguments both ways. This is also a situation where the non-constitutional claim of right defense to a trespassing charge would be a strong one.
Sure Obama can sue Trump for defamation. Libel is a civil offense and committing libel is not a part of Trump's role as president. Regarding official acts, the President is immune. But not for personal acts. See Is the US President immune from civil lawsuits? But a libel action would be difficult to win; they're both public figures, which makes the defamation threshold higher: Public officials and figures have a harder time proving defamation. The public has a right to criticize the people who govern them, so the least protection from defamation is given to public officials. When officials are accused of something that involves their behavior in office, they have to prove all of the above elements of defamation and they must also prove that the defendant acted with "actual malice." Defamation Law Made Simple | Nolo.com The "actual malice" part is interesting: In the landmark 1964 case of New York Times v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court .... acknowledged that in public discussions -- especially about public figures like politicians -- mistakes can be made. If those mistakes are "honestly made," the Court said, they should be protected from defamation actions. The court made a rule that public officials could sue for statements made about their public conduct only if the statements were made with "actual malice." "Actual malice" means that the person who made the statement knew it wasn't true, or didn't care whether it was true or not and was reckless with the truth -- for example, when someone has doubts about the truth of a statement but does not bother to check further before publishing it. (same link above) Could malice be proved? Was Trump reckless with the truth? Could be. But would Obama sue? What's the cost/benefit analysis to him and his legacy, politically and personally? Trump was taking a political or personal risk - or he's being stupid - with such accusations, since he may feel invulnerable. He has sued and been sued and settled many times: see Legal affairs of Donald Trump I think both would not want to be in court; because once in court, they (and their lawyers) both have subpoena power and both would have to answer nearly any question put to them about their public (and possibly private; but not official) lives. Trump has interestingly enough talked about "opening up the libel laws" so he can more easily sue people. But if he did that, it cuts both ways: he would be easier to take to court. See Can Libel Laws Be Changed Under Trump? In my opinion, Obama is much better off ignoring Trump and letting the FBI, DOJ, Congress and the Intel Community do their jobs - have the facts fall where they may - and and not become a right-wing talk radio subject for the rest of his life, as well as risk being deposed himself in court. Edit 3/21/17: From a timely piece in The New Yorker: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-the-first-amendment-applies-to-trumps-presidency While it is unlikely that former President Barack Obama would sue Trump for libel, he very likely has a strong case. The First Amendment scholar Geoffrey Stone wrote in the Chicago Sun-Times http://chicago.suntimes.com/opinion/opinion-trump-could-lose-lawsuit-for-libeling-obama/ that “there seems no doubt that Trump’s statement was false, defamatory, and at the very least made with reckless disregard for the truth.” That is the test for damaging the reputation of a public figure or official: Trump either made his assertions with knowledge of their falsity or with disregard of a high degree of probability that they were false. Obama, Stone is confident, could prove that Trump made his false charge, as the Supreme Court defined the standard, with “actual malice.”
I want to file a Federal criminal (not civil) complaint You can't. Only the US government can do that. https://www.uscourts.gov/faqs-filing-case Individuals do not file criminal charges in U.S. district courts. A criminal proceeding is initiated by the government, usually through the U.S. attorney's office in coordination with a law enforcement agency. Allegations of criminal behavior should be brought to local police, the FBI, or other appropriate law enforcement agency. There is an analysis of the relevant law in the case of Smith v. Krieger, No. 09-1503 (10th Cir. 2010). In his second claim, [Smith] sought to prosecute crimes allegedly committed by the defendant judges against the United States. Mr. Smith claimed he had “inherent authority” to raise his first claim under “the Ninth and Tenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Id. at 51, ¶ 255. With respect to his second claim, he contended he was “authorized to prosecute crimes committed against the United States by virtue of his inherent authority as co-sovereign, pursuant to powers reserved under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and crimes committed against his person and/or property in particular.” [p.13-14] [...] Mr. Smith’s second claim fares no better than his first. Congress has by statute conferred the power to prosecute crimes in the name of the United States on the United States Attorney General and his delegates. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519. The long-standing view of the Supreme Court is that such power is exclusive. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”) (emphasis added); id. at 694 (“Under the authority of Art. II, [§] 2, Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C. [§] 516.”); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1868) (“Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to which they are returnable, are within the exclusive direction of the district attorney . . . .”) (emphasis added). Therefore, as the district court concluded, Mr. Smith has no right to initiate a criminal prosecution in the name of the United States under the Ninth or Tenth Amendments, or otherwise. [p.19] Smith was fined $3000 for bringing this frivolous and "abusive" case (which included several other claims besides this one.) Also of note is the 1973 US Supreme Court case Linda R. S. v. Richard D.. Here, Linda R. S. took a slightly different route: in effect, she sought a court order requiring her local district attorney to prosecute Richard D. for a state crime. (Or rather, she sought to enjoin the district attorney from declining to prosecute him.) The Supreme Court ruled: The Court's prior decisions consistently hold that a citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501 (1961). Although these cases arose in a somewhat different context, they demonstrate that, in American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.
UPDATE: There is now a definitive answer. There Is No Binding Judicial Precedent Adjudicating The Key Standing Issues Raised That Are Factually Squarely On Point This is a novel argument. To my knowledge, this is the first time that any state has ever sought judicial relief arising from another state's election administration, so it is a case of first impression not directly governed by a factually similar precedent. Thus, rather than being governed by a precedent that resolved the exact standing question presented, we must result to more general principles. Because it is a novel argument, it is impossible to be completely sure how it will be resolved. General Considerations In Standing Law The General Rule Standing requirements require that there be a particularized actual injury to a legally recognized interest of the person suing. Standing is a subcomponent of subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is one of the things that must be present for a court to have subject matter jurisdiction. Standing is evaluated with reference to the merits. It exists if there is a recognized legal theory which, if proven, there has been a particularized injury to the person bringing the claim. Most standing cases involve legal claims for relief that it is clear that someone validly has and the question is whether this particular person can assert them. But a minority of standing cases involve the question of whether there is a recognized legal claim of the type asserted at all. No one has standing to assert a non-justiciable claim (i.e. a claim beyond the jurisdiction of all courts), or a claim for relief for which the courts do not legally recognize a remedy (e.g. a claim for not being chosen by a particular person to marry). As a result, standing can overlap with the argument that someone has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Generalized Grievances Don't Impart Standing Even if the law is perfectly clear that a law has been violated, that doesn't necessarily mean that anyone has standing to seek a remedy from a court for that violation of the law. To the extent that one has merely a generalized grievance shared in common with everyone (e.g. an interest in a correct outcome of a Presidential election, or a desire to have the government follow the law) that would not ordinarily suffice to establish standing. Texas does not have an interest in the outcome of a Pennsylvania or Georgia Presidential election that is any different from the interest of a citizen of Texas or me, a citizen of Colorado. But citizens of a state other than the one in which the election was conducted who aren't candidates in that election clearly don't have standing to challenge the outcome of an election in another state. If the Texas argument for standing is accepted, any voter in any state would have standing the contest the election results of every other state in every Presidential election (although not in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court). The Argument For Standing Offered By Texas And Its Flaws The Texas Argument For Standing The Complaint argues for standing as follows in paragraph 18: In a presidential election, “the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States.” Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795. The constitutional failures of Defendant States injure Plaintiff States because “‘the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.’” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II). In other words, Plaintiff State is acting to protect the interests of its respective citizens in the fair and constitutional conduct of elections used to appoint presidential electors. The Bush v. Gore Precedent Doesn't Establish Standing Here But Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 555 (1964)) (Bush II) relied upon in the Complaint is not on point. Indeed, Reynolds v. Sims (which established a one man, one vote principle for state and local legislative redistricting) expressly recognized that the federal constitution would be illegal if a parallel system like the electoral college or U.S. Senate were enacted at the state level, but declined to hold that the 14th Amendment invalidated this portion of the U.S. Constitution (in part, because a valid constitutional amendments can't alter the equal representation of a U.S. state in the U.S. Senate without its consent). Bush v. Gore likewise was an intrastate election dispute alleging that the equal protection rights of voters in one part of a state were abridged by the voters in another part of the state having different election rules applied to them in a lawsuit between two candidates in the race who clearly did have standing (although not original jurisdiction standing in the U.S. Supreme Court, which is limited with other exceptions inapplicable here, to lawsuits between two states). The Claim That Texas Has A Legally Cognizable And Justiciable Interest In The Overall Result Of A Presidential Election Is Unprecedented And Dubious The Complaint's assertion that in a presidential election, the impact of the votes cast in each State is affected by the votes cast for the various candidates in other States, citing Anderson, is also problematic. First of all isn't technically true. The United States has 51 elections for Presidential electors, it doesn't have a &quot;Presidential election&quot; of ordinary voters. Perhaps an elector has standing to assert vote dilution, but an elector voting in that election, or a candidate, but they are not U.S. states and as a result, they can't bring lawsuits in the U.S. Supreme Court's constitutional original jurisdiction. In the same way, Texas can't sue Florida alleging that a U.S. Senate or U.S. House election in Florida was conducted incorrectly, because every U.S. Senate or U.S. House election impacts which party has a majority in that house of Congress. Instead, the Constitution, recognizing that the courts offered no national judicial election remedy to people outside a state with a disputed election, created a legislative one by vesting resolution of disputed Congressional elections in Congress, rather than the Courts. Hundreds of disputed Congressional elections have been adjudicated that way. Indeed, the only case of a genuinely disputed Presidential election outcome, the election of 1876, which is the closest precedent, is one in which Congress, rather than the Courts resolved the dispute regarding the overall Presidential election result based upon allegations of irregularities in a particular state. One of the leading U.S. Supreme Court bar members concurs with this analysis: Texas has no legal right to claim that officials elsewhere didn't follow the rules set by their own legislatures. The United States doesn't have a national election for president. It has a series of state elections, and one state has no legal standing to challenge how another state conducts its elections any more than Texas could challenge how Georgia elects its senators, legal experts said. &quot;This case is hopeless. Texas has no right to bring a lawsuit over election procedures in other states,&quot; said SCOTUSblog publisher Tom Goldstein, a Washington, D.C., lawyer who argues frequently before the court. Second of all, it is irrelevant. Anderson didn't authorize one state to sue another state over its administration of an election. Even if the outcome of elections in other states have a de facto impact on other states, this doesn't mean that Texas has a legally cognizable interest in how another state selects its electors which is reserved to the legislature of the other state under the constitution. There are no precedents for one state having a legally recognized interest in the outcome of another state's election. It did not participate in the election as a voter or an administrator of that election or as a candidate. It doesn't even cast a vote for President in any case, the electors that it elected do that. The votes of the Texas electors are not diluted by the existence of electors in other states beyond the status quo expectation with no wrongdoing. Texas gets the same number of electoral votes relative to the total number of votes cast, regardless of who the electors of four other states cast their votes supporting. There is no allegation that another state got too many electoral votes. In contrast, Texas might have standing to sue if it was allocated just 12 electoral votes, when, the census results showed that it was actually entitled to 38 electoral votes. Being denied the right to cast the full number of electoral votes that Texas gets to cast probably is an actual injury and does not hinge on how another state administers its election of its Presidential electors. Links to the briefs filed by each of the four defendant states found here further detail the standing analysis in addition to other arguments. For example, Michigan summarizes its standing argument as follows: Texas lacks standing to bring its Electors Clause claim where its asserted injury is nothing more than a generalized grievance that the Clause was violated. The standing section in the Georgia brief explains that: Texas lacks Article III standing to pursue its claims. Texas alleges two types of injuries—a direct injury to the State and a supposed injury to its Electors, whom Texas seeks to represent in a parens patriae capacity. Neither is cognizable. A. Texas argues that it has suffered a direct injury because “the States have a distinct interest in who is elected Vice President and thus who can cast the tiebreaking vote in the Senate.” Mot. for TRO 14–15 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 15 (arguing that a “Plaintiff State suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election”). Under governing precedent, that is not an injury in fact. A State—like any plaintiff—has standing only if it alleges an injury that is actual or imminent, concrete, and particularized. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560); see also id. (injury in fact is the “[f]irst and foremost” of the standing elements) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998)). But Texas has no cognizable interest specific to Texas in how the Vice President votes. Texas’s interest is in its own representation in the Senate; Georgia has not impaired that interest. Texas still has two Senators, and those Senators may represent Texas’s interests however they choose. Even by its own logic, Texas has suffered no injury. In any event, Texas’s speculation that the Vice President may one day cast a tie-breaking vote is not a cognizable injury. . . . Indeed, certain Vice Presidents—Mr. Biden, for example—never cast a tie-breaking vote during their tenure. Texas’s alleged injury is not the type of imminent, concrete, or particularized injury that Article III demands. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (a “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact” (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990))); id. (standing theory that “relies on a highly attenuated chain of possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending”). Texas’s alleged injury is also not cognizable because it is a generalized grievance—the kind of injury “that is ‘plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.’” Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 440– 41 (2007) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); id. (The only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past.”); see also Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (the alleged injury must be “distinct from a ‘generally available grievance about government’” (quoting Lance, 549 U.S. at 439)). The injuries that Texas alleges on behalf of its citizens are injuries that would be common to not only every citizen of Texas, but also every citizen of every state. Cf. Lance, 549 U.S. at 440 (“To have standing . . . a plaintiff must have more than a general interest common to all members of the public.” (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 633 (1962))). And in all events, by Texas’s logic any State would have standing to pursue the alleged claims because every State purportedly “suffers an Article III injury when another State violates federal law to affect the outcome of a presidential election” (Mot. for TRO 15). So Texas’s injury is specific neither to its citizens nor to Texas as a State. An injury unique to no one is not an injury in fact. Texas cites no case supporting its assertion that it has suffered an injury in fact. Texas cites Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency for the proposition that “states seeking to protect their sovereign interests are ‘entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis’” (Mot. for TRO 15 (citing 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007)), but Texas strips that language of its context. The Court there explained that Massachusetts was entitled to “special solicitude” in the standing analysis because a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in “preserv[ing] its sovereign territory” and because Congress had afforded “a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious.” Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519–20; see also Gov’t of Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (explaining context of the Court’s reasoning). Neither thing is true here. In any case, Massachusetts involved a State’s loss of coastal property from rising sea levels, which is nothing like Texas’s alleged injury (a speculative tie-breaking vote by the Vice President). Texas has not alleged a direct injury in fact. B. Nor does Texas have standing to raise claims for its electors in a parens patriae capacity (cf. Mot. for TRO 15). A State may sue parens patriae only if it proves that it has Article III standing (see, e.g., Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178), which Texas hasn’t done. But even if it had, Texas would lack parens patriae standing because that concept applies only when a State seeks to vindicate the interests of more than a discrete and identifiable subset of its citizens (most often in the health and welfare contexts). See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp &amp; Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[M]ore must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents . . .”); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. at 665 (a State may not sue parens patriae when it is “merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens”). Here, Texas purports to represent the interests of only thirty-eight people (its Electors). But Texas’s problems run even deeper. This Court has explained that “[o]ne helpful indication in determining whether an alleged injury to the health and welfare of its citizens suffices to give the State standing to sue as parens patriae is whether the injury is one that the State, if it could, would likely attempt to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.” Alfred L. Snapp &amp; Son, 458 U.S. at 607; see also Bernhardt, 923 F.3d at 178 (same). That is not the case here. Under our federalist system, Texas could never “address through its sovereign lawmaking powers” how another State elects its Electors. Texas lacks parens patriae standing. C. Texas also lacks standing because it asserts the rights of third parties. A plaintiff generally “cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties” unless the plaintiff establishes (1) a “close” relationship with the third party and (2) a “hindrance” preventing the third party from asserting her own rights. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129–30 (2004). Otherwise, the plaintiff fails to present a “particularized” injury. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502 (1975) (“Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent.”). . . . The Eleventh Amendment bars Texas citizens from bringing such claims against Georgia in federal court, so Texas cannot circumvent that bar when asserting such individual rights in a parens patria capacity. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 465 (1945) (“By reason of the Eleventh Amendment the derivative or attenuated injuries of that sort are not enough for standing. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 708 (2013) (“It is, however, a ‘fundamental restriction on our authority’ that ‘[i]n the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.’” (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)). The Pennsylvania opposition brief's section on standing explains that: Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts to resolving “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). That same jurisdictional limitation applies to actions sought to be commenced in the Court’s original jurisdiction. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735-36 (1981). To establish standing, the demanding party must establish a “triad of injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). More specifically, that the plaintiff has suffered injury to a legally protected interest, which injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action and redressable by a favorable ruling.” AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800; see also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 736. This Court has “always insisted on strict compliance with this jurisdictional standing requirement.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 819. For invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction, this burden is even greater: “[t]he threatened invasion of rights must be of serious magnitude and it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.” People of the State of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 309 (1921). Texas fails to carry this heavy burden. First, Texas cannot establish it suffered an injury in fact. An injury in fact requires a plaintiff to show the “invasion of a legally protected interest”; that the injury is both “concrete and particularized”; and that the injury is “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016). According to Texas, the alleged violations of Pennsylvania’s Election Code undermined the authority granted to the Pennsylvania General Assembly under the Electors Clause.8 Motion at 3, 10-11, 13-15. But as the text of the Electors Clause itself makes clear, the injury caused by the alleged usurpation of the General Assembly’s constitutional authority belongs to that institution. AIRC, 576 U.S. at 800 (legislature claimed that it was stripped of its responsibility for redistricting vested in it by the Elections Clause). The State of Texas is not the Pennsylvania General Assembly. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1945, 1953 (2019) (noting the “mismatch between the body seeking to litigate [the Virginia House of Delegates] and the body to which the relevant constitutional provision allegedly assigned exclusive redistricting authority [the General Assembly]”). Second, Texas’s claimed injury is not fairly traceable to a violation of the Electors Clause. As discussed above, each of Texas’s allegations of violations of Pennsylvania law has been rejected by state and federal courts. Third, Texas fares no better in relying on parens patriae for standing. It is settled law that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. The state, thus, must “articulate an interest apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp &amp; Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Baez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). In other words, “the State must be more than a nominal party.” Ibid. That, however, is exactly what Texas is here. Texas seeks to “assert parens patriae standing for [its] citizens who are Presidential Electors.” Motion at 15. Even if, as Texas claims, the presidential electors its citizens have selected suffered a purported injury akin to the personal injury allegedly sustained by the 20-legislator bloc in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939), which they did not, that does not somehow metastasize into a claim by the state rather than those presidential electors. The 20-person bloc of legislatures in Coleman sued in their own right without the involvement of the State of Kansas. Ibid. Texas has no sovereign or quasi-sovereign interest at stake. It is a nominal party, at best. 8 In its motion, Texas disclaims a “voting-rights injury as a State” based on either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses. Motion at 14. Rather, Texas claims that its legally protected interest arises from “the structure of the Constitution” creating a federalist system of government. Ibid. As discussed infra, to the extent Texas relies on the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, those “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. Wisconsin's standing arguments are as follows: At a minimum, to invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction, Texas must demonstrate that it has “suffered a wrong through the action of the other State.” Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (1981). But Texas is unable to allege that Wisconsin itself did anything to directly injure Texas’s sovereign interests. Instead, Texas advances a far more attenuated theory of injury—that the other States’ supposed violations of their elections laws “debased the votes of citizens” in Texas. Mot. for P/I at 3. This speculative logic is not nearly enough to carry Texas’s burden to prove, by “clear and convincing evidence,” a “threatened invasion of [its] rights” “of serious magnitude,” New York, 256 U.S. at 309. Indeed, Texas’s allegations fall far short of what would be required by Article III in any federal case—that is, a showing that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). It is well settled under the Court’s original jurisdiction cases that “a State has standing to sue only when its sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests are implicated and it is not merely litigating as a volunteer the personal claims of its citizens.” Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660, 665 (1976). Apart from attempting to rely on the “personal claims of its citizens” as electors or voters, Texas struggles to identify any traditional sovereign injury to support its claim under the Electors Clause. Instead, Texas proposes that this Court recognize a new “form of voting-rights injury”—an injury premised on the denial of “‘equal suffrage in the Senate’” somehow caused by the election of the Vice President. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 14 (quoting U.S.Const. art. V, cl. 3). Texas makes no freestanding constitutional claim to this effect. In any event, this argument makes no sense. Texas does not (and cannot) argue that it now has fewer Senators than any other state. By definition, therefore, it maintains “equal suffrage in the Senate.” Texas’s attempt to garner standing for its claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses fares no better. These “Clauses protect people, not States.” Pennsylvania, 426 U.S. at 665. If Texas’s theory of injury were accepted, it would be too easy to reframe virtually any election or voting rights dispute as implicating injuries to a States and thereby invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction. New York or California could sue Texas or Alabama in this Court over their felon-disenfranchisement policies. . . . . This case does not satisfy the direct-injury requirement. Texas speculates that Wisconsin’s facilitation of mail-in voting during the pandemic may have increased the likelihood that third parties would engage in instances of voter fraud in Wisconsin. Texas does not offer a shred of evidence that any such fraud occurred. And Texas does not allege that Wisconsin directed or authorized any individual to engage in voter fraud. Nor would any such allegation be plausible. In any event, this Court long made clear that its original jurisdiction does not extend to “political disputes between states arising out of [the alleged] maladministration of state laws by officials to the injury of citizens of another state.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al, Supreme Court Practice 10-6 (11th ed. 2019); see Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 15 (1900)) (“Jurisdiction over controversies of that sort does not embrace the determination of political questions, and, where no controversy exists between states, it is not for this Court to restrain the governor of a state in the discharge of his executive functions in a matter lawfully confided to his discretion and judgment.”). It is hard to imagine a case that more clearly runs afoul of that principle than a dispute over the outcome of the presidential election, premised on the alleged maladministration of state election law. The Existence Of A Legally Cognizable Interest Needs To Be Evaluated In The Context Of The U.S. Constitution As A Whole The question of first impression concerning whether a state has a legally cognizable interest in the administration of an election in another state needs to be evaluated in the context of the U.S. Constitution as a whole. The Constitution says a fair amount about election administration and disputed elections that in context disfavors the notion that one state has a legally cognizable interest in how another state administers an election administration. All federal elections in the United States (outside the District of Columbia) are administered by the states and by the local governments and agencies created by the states. State election laws must conform to federal requirements, and candidates participating in elections or voters in that state have standing in many cases to litigate whether those state and federal laws were conformed to by state election administrators. Each election of electors is separate and prior to 1852, Presidential elections weren't even held on the same day even though the Congress had the authority to mandate a single Presidential election date. The process of determining a total outcome of the election by aggregating state electoral college votes is vested in Congress by the constitution, not in the judicial branch, and so there can be no legally cognizable interest in this non-justiciable issue. Therefore, not only does Texas lack standing to bring this suit on the theory asserted that Texas is injured by an aggregation of electoral votes including votes allegedly made by improperly certified electors. No one has standing to do so in any court of law.
In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), the Supreme Court held that &quot;there is no Bivens action for First Amendment retaliation.&quot; The Court was unanimous on this point. This means that right now, there is no way to sue for a damages remedy for First Amendment retaliation by federal officials. The majority said that &quot;Congress, not the courts, is better suited to authorize such a damages remedy.&quot;