Is it legal to deny employee reimbursements for meat? WeWork appears to have instituted a policy where they prohibit their budgets from being used for purchases of red meat, pork and poultry, citing sustainability. www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jul/13/wework-meat-events-expense-ban “New research indicates that avoiding meat is one of the biggest things an individual can do to reduce their personal environmental impact, even more than switching to a hybrid car.” The ban appears to apply for both company-sponsored events, which seems like a reasonable policy with a clear business case — noone's entitled to free lobster (incidentally, seafood isn't prohibited by the policy, possibly because studies have shown that pescetarianism is one of the healthiest diets), as well as reimbursable per-diem expenses, which sounds like overreaching into the personal lives of employees eating on their own time during business travel. … staff will not be able to expense any meals that include poultry, pork or red meat. Is it legal for a company to have a travel policy denying its U.S. employees from reimbursement for solo sessions of meat eating during business trips?
I don't know of any federal law that is violated. US labor law is generally favorable to employers, compared to many other countries, and gives employers a lot of freedom in setting policies and rules, The theory is that an employee who doesn't like it can go and work somewhere else, and an employer with unreasonable policies will eventually be unable to get people to work for them. In particular, it surprises some people that employers aren't legally obligated to reimburse travel expenses at all: The FSLA does not have any rules regarding an employer's obligation to reimburse an employee for business-related travel expenses. No federal law requires reimbursement. So it would be perfectly legal for the company to require employees to pay for all their own meals when traveling on business. Given this, I'd expect that the company would have pretty broad discretion to place conditions and restrictions on reimbursement, including what they will and won't pay for. If an employee had a disability or religious beliefs that required them to eat meat, and the company wouldn't grant them an exception, they might have a claim under the ADA or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act respectively. But if it's just that they happen to prefer meat, I don't think there's a law to guarantee them such a right. Some states could have their own laws that might be violated, though I tend to doubt it. If you have a particular state in mind, please specify.
It is not illegal to treat the employees differently. As long as nobody is being paid for less than the time worked, this is legal. Treating employees differently because of protected characteristics is unlawful discrimination. However, the duration you have worked there is not a protected characteristic. It is perfectly legal for the employer not to mandate new employees clock in and out. It would even be legal (if not a great idea) to hire new employees for twice as much.
I believe that legally they can't force her to use sick leave since she has met the 40 hours minimum required as a salaried employee. Is this correct? Unfortunately, as far as the Department of Labor (DoL) is concerned, the employer is correct here, provided that this is company policy. First, there is no &quot;40 hours minimum required&quot;, the DoL simply says that a salaried (exempt) employee must be paid the full salary for any week in which the employee performs any work, regardless of the number of days or hours worked. This is then limited by the &quot;allowable deductions: Circumstances in Which the Employer May Make Deductions from Pay Deductions from pay are permissible when an exempt employee: is absent from work for one or more full days for personal reasons other than sickness or disability; for absences of one or more full days due to sickness or disability if the deduction is made in accordance with a bona fide plan, policy or practice of providing compensation for salary lost due to illness; to offset amounts employees receive as jury or witness fees, or for military pay; for penalties imposed in good faith for infractions of safety rules of major significance; or for unpaid disciplinary suspensions of one or more full days imposed in good faith for workplace conduct rule infractions. Also, an employer is not required to pay the full salary in the initial or terminal week of employment, or for weeks in which an exempt employee takes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. (Source: dol.gov) Emphasis Mine This means that as long as the employer has a policy or practice requiring the employee to use Paid Time Off (PTO) for sickness (sick-days), then the employer is allowed to make deductions from the employee's salary for those days. So in short, yes, the employer can require that the employee use PTO to cover sick days, regardless of the actual number of hours worked in that week, month, year, etc. There is currently no federal requirement for employers to provide paid sick leave, although some states like California may have local laws.
BC employers are required to give workers three days of unpaid personal illness &amp; injury leave per calendar year. However, this protection only applies to workers who have held a job for more than 90 days. If you have not held the job for that long, it does not appear that any protections apply to you. Note that (as of March 2021) there are separate rules concerning COVID-19 exposure &amp; illness. There may also be protections that apply to you if you are a union member, or if you work in a federally regulated job (banks, national trucking companies, airlines, and some others.)
It probably depends on whether the employer is covered by a relevant non-discrimination statute. Most employers in the United States are covered, but some are small enough to be exempt. Federal law exempts employers with under 15 employees and religious organizations. There might also be a relevant state law. It also would depend upon whether the EEOC or a court found that "be blessed" was a compelled religious statement in violation of a worker's beliefs, and whether allowing the worker not to say it would be a "reasonable accommodation." This is a strong case, and I suspect that the worker would win on both counts but it isn't a completely open and shut case. There is arguably a secular meaning to the word "blessed" and a court could conceivably find that there is a legitimate and indispensible business purpose for insisting that every single person in the worker's position need to make this statement, although I doubt that a court would do so.
Can an employer be required to provide an escort from office to vehicle? No, at least, not on the theory articulated in the question. I can imagine some circumstances where it is conceivable that there might be a duty arising from some other source, like an OSHA regulation applied to a firing range business, or an express contract with the employee (some employers provide an escort as a matter of right in the evenings or at other high risk times, as an employee benefit, especially college and university employers, in part, because they have worker's compensation liability while an employee is still on a large campus, in part because it helps attract employees who may feel vulnerable, and in part because of an attitude that the employer wants its employees to be safe at dangerous times of day and this shows that the employer cares about them), or a court injunction related to a labor-management dispute where the employee is a scab. There is no such employer duty, but an employer does have strict liability in almost every case (there are some minor exceptions for very small employers and criminal conduct by an employee who is injured when the criminal conduct is clearly outside the scope of duty of the employee) for injuries and death in the course of employment from any cause whatsoever pretty much (including criminal actions of third-parties) which is generally fully insured by worker's compensation insurance. The exact details of when someone ceases to be at work for worker's compensation/employer liability is buried in case law and regulations (for overtime and minimum wage purposes, the standard is "portal to portal" but workers compensation/employer liability need not be identical, although once you are clearly no longer on the employer's premises and commuting after a day's work is done or before a day's work starts, you are clearly not covered). But, any place where there is employer liability at all, it would be worker's compensation covered. Usually, if the employer is required to have worker's compensation but doesn't, the employer likewise has strict liability for the same harms, but the damages that may be awarded are not limited to those that worker's compensation policies would cover. This leaves the employee with at risk travel between the office and the vehicle. It seems reasonable as well that as the employer prohibits the employees self defence, they would be responsible for the employees defence between office and some safe location (i.e. vehicle). This theory pretty much always loses. An employee walking in an ordinary, non-wartime environment without a firearm is not "at risk" in a meaningful sense, any more than someone who didn't choose to carry a firearm who goes about their daily life (or is prohibited from carrying one due to past conduct such as a felony or a domestic violence protection order or a domestic violence misdemeanor or a condition of parole, probation or bond pending criminal charges). Also, the employee is not being prohibited from engaging in any kind of self-defense or protective action whatsoever (or from asserting self-defense rights if a firearm is carried contrary to an employer rule) just from carrying a firearm at that particular moment (on pain of losing a job, not forfeiting a legal affirmative defense under criminal statutes), which is one of many means by which a person can protect themselves from crimes.
In the United States, specifically in Norwalk, Connecticut, where I live, may I volunteer for an individual, and may an individual use volunteers? For example, may I volunteer as a personal chef for a celebrity, ie, cook them meals for free, and may they accept my services without compensating me? I think the answer depends on whether I'm an independent contractor or an employee. The answer is not nearly as simple and straighforward as the employee v. independent contractor distinction suggested in the question. People who work for free fit in a number of categories, some lawful and some not, even though the definition of employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (regulations here) and parallel state legislation is facially very broad (people who suffer to let others work for them, more or less) and many of the exceptions are quite narrow. The nature of the categories is a nice illustration of how much social context and nuance is buried in a seemingly straightforward black and white legal rule like the minimum wage. Any time there are common practices that a statute doesn't expressly contemplated that aren't routinely the subject to litigation, you should doubt whether the statute really applies to them (although often enough it does), and courts are more likely in these circumstances than most to devise a definitional oriented, or implied, or common law exception to encompass the common practices as being lawful. The facts in the original question aren't rich enough in character to really determine which category applies, and those facts &quot;smell fishy&quot; as far as whether it would really fit in any legal category of unpaid work, in part, because the motives of the &quot;volunteer&quot; are very unclear. The legal categories include: People work for free in furtherance of their own charitable intent (e.g., working for free at a United Way fundraiser). People working for free who have bona fide donative intent (painting a mural on your boyfriend's wall as a birthday present). This is one possible category that the original question seems to be considering as possibility. Note that donative intent doesn't preclude an expectation that there will be unspecified, not legally enforceable, reciprocity in the future, in the form of reciprocal generosity, or in the form of owing someone an ill defined &quot;favor&quot; that doesn't amount to a true quid pro quo barter transaction. You might have donative intent towards a celebrity because you are a fan, because you appreciate their work or contributions, and because you desire to be part of the inner circle of a celebrity or wish to become a friend of a celebrity and want to do so out of friendship, since the celebrity is an awesome person that it would be nice to have in your life. This category could also include cases of moral but not legal obligation, or cases of seeking to do penance to the person for whom you volunteer out of non-legally binding guilty or shame (as distinct from a threat that you will be embarrassed). Family members doing chores for each other out of a duty of care and support on the part of a parent or spouse, or a duty to obey a parent arising at common law, on the part of a child, and similar family obligations. Closely related is unpaid work as a fiduciary (e.g. an executor, power of attorney agent, or trustee) with a donative or family relationship motivation. Parties to contracts remedying damage that they have done for which they would otherwise have contractual responsibility (e.g. cleaning your own apartment, or an apartment upon which you guaranteed someone else's lease, before the tenant moves out, so you won't have deductions from your security deposit, or so you won't be sued for damages). Similarly, work incurred to protect or add value to your own property. People who work expecting to be paid and have a legal right to be paid who don't get paid after the fact due to the insolvency of the employer, or discharge of the debt in bankruptcy, or the expiration of a statute of limitations or claims deadline in a probate proceeding. People performing court ordered community service and inmates in prison pursuant to a conviction. Self-employed business people who don't make a profit, either personally, or in a capacity as an officer or director of an entity owned by the self-employed person. But, if this involved providing services for no compensation, without a more involved business with expenses as well as receipts, as an alleged independent contractor, for a single other person, this is probably a case where the law would find that someone is actually an employee and not an independent contractor, and where the contract is void for want of consideration. The form over substance analysis that holds that is employment subject to the minimum wage for purposes of the FLSA and state law seems like the most likely scenario in the original question, but the facts aren't detailed enough to tell definitively. Unpaid interns and students learning while doing something of value (generally permitted, but the analysis of the FLSA and state law is rather involved). This is another category that plausible could apply to the original question. People within other express FLSA exceptions that are also present in state law. The illegal categories include: Slaves. These rare cases are usually prosecuted criminally intended to punish keeping slaves (often accompanied by human trafficking charges). Indentured servants (basically slaves for a term of years who aren't allowed to quit, often to someone who paid a major expense such as travel costs to a new country for you, in order to repay the debt). These rare cases are usually prosecuted criminally intended to punish this practice (often accompanied by human trafficking charges). Inmates in jails who have not yet been convicted of a crime, and who are awaiting trial, who are required to work without pay. People working for free due to duress or blackmail, not expressly authorized by law, and not merely the generalized economic duress of needing money to live (e.g. doing household chores for a bully because he threatened to beat you up if you don't). These cases, if they are litigated at all, are usually prosecuted criminally under extortion statutes. More generally, you are not a true &quot;volunteer&quot; if you work is in any meaningful sense involuntary, even if it does not support a provable case beyond a reasonable doubt of true criminal extortion. People in normal employment relationships who are paid for some work but required to do additional unpaid work as condition of employment. Most civil FLSA litigation involving completely unpaid work, involves this category of unpaid work. I'm sure that there are other possibilities that I have not considered and listed, but generally, the legality of working for free is evaluated on a category by category basis. Situations where payment is predominantly in kind (e.g. room and board and clothing) can be complex to analyze and these arrangements are frequently subject to special rules. The primary statutory minimum wage exemptions are as set forth in the exemptions provision of the FLSA: §213. Exemptions (a) Minimum wage and maximum hour requirements The provisions of sections 206 (except subsection (d) in the case of paragraph (1) of this subsection) and 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to— (1) any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity (including any employee employed in the capacity of academic administrative personnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools), or in the capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary, subject to the provisions of subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5, except that an employee of a retail or service establishment shall not be excluded from the definition of employee employed in a bona fide executive or administrative capacity because of the number of hours in his workweek which he devotes to activities not directly or closely related to the performance of executive or administrative activities, if less than 40 per centum of his hours worked in the workweek are devoted to such activities); or (2) Repealed. Pub. L. 101–157, §3(c)(1), Nov. 17, 1989, 103 Stat. 939. (3) any employee employed by an establishment which is an amusement or recreational establishment, organized camp, or religious or non-profit educational conference center, if (A) it does not operate for more than seven months in any calendar year, or (B) during the preceding calendar year, its average receipts for any six months of such year were not more than 331/3 per centum of its average receipts for the other six months of such year, except that the exemption from sections 206 and 207 of this title provided by this paragraph does not apply with respect to any employee of a private entity engaged in providing services or facilities (other than, in the case of the exemption from section 206 of this title, a private entity engaged in providing services and facilities directly related to skiing) in a national park or a national forest, or on land in the National Wildlife Refuge System, under a contract with the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture; or (4) Repealed. Pub. L. 101–157, §3(c)(1), Nov. 17, 1989, 103 Stat. 939. (5) any employee employed in the catching, taking, propagating, harvesting, cultivating, or farming of any kind of fish, shellfish, crustacea, sponges, seaweeds, or other aquatic forms of animal and vegetable life, or in the first processing, canning or packing such marine products at sea as an incident to, or in conjunction with, such fishing operations, including the going to and returning from work and loading and unloading when performed by any such employee; or (6) any employee employed in agriculture (A) if such employee is employed by an employer who did not, during any calendar quarter during the preceding calendar year, use more than five hundred man-days of agricultural labor, (B) if such employee is the parent, spouse, child, or other member of his employer's immediate family, (C) if such employee (i) is employed as a hand harvest laborer and is paid on a piece rate basis in an operation which has been, and is customarily and generally recognized as having been, paid on a piece rate basis in the region of employment, (ii) commutes daily from his permanent residence to the farm on which he is so employed, and (iii) has been employed in agriculture less than thirteen weeks during the preceding calendar year, (D) if such employee (other than an employee described in clause (C) of this subsection) (i) is sixteen years of age or under and is employed as a hand harvest laborer, is paid on a piece rate basis in an operation which has been, and is customarily and generally recognized as having been, paid on a piece rate basis in the region of employment, (ii) is employed on the same farm as his parent or person standing in the place of his parent, and (iii) is paid at the same piece rate as employees over age sixteen are paid on the same farm, or (E) if such employee is principally engaged in the range production of livestock; or (7) any employee to the extent that such employee is exempted by regulations, order, or certificate of the Secretary issued under section 214 of this title; or (8) any employee employed in connection with the publication of any weekly, semiweekly, or daily newspaper with a circulation of less than four thousand the major part of which circulation is within the county where published or counties contiguous thereto; or (9) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §23(a)(1), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 69. (10) any switchboard operator employed by an independently owned public telephone company which has not more than seven hundred and fifty stations; or (11) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §10(a), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 63. (12) any employee employed as a seaman on a vessel other than an American vessel; or (13), (14) Repealed. Pub. L. 93–259, §§9(b)(1), 23(b)(1), Apr. 8, 1974, 88 Stat. 63, 69. (15) any employee employed on a casual basis in domestic service employment to provide babysitting services or any employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the Secretary); or (16) a criminal investigator who is paid availability pay under section 5545a of title 5; (17) any employee who is a computer systems analyst, computer programmer, software engineer, or other similarly skilled worker, whose primary duty is— (A) the application of systems analysis techniques and procedures, including consulting with users, to determine hardware, software, or system functional specifications; (B) the design, development, documentation, analysis, creation, testing, or modification of computer systems or programs, including prototypes, based on and related to user or system design specifications; (C) the design, documentation, testing, creation, or modification of computer programs related to machine operating systems; or (D) a combination of duties described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) the performance of which requires the same level of skills, and who, in the case of an employee who is compensated on an hourly basis, is compensated at a rate of not less than $27.63 an hour; or (18) any employee who is a border patrol agent, as defined in section 5550(a) of title 5; or (19) any employee employed to play baseball who is compensated pursuant to a contract that provides for a weekly salary for services performed during the league's championship season (but not spring training or the off season) at a rate that is not less than a weekly salary equal to the minimum wage under section 206(a) of this title for a workweek of 40 hours, irrespective of the number of hours the employee devotes to baseball related activities.
Under federal law, an employer may impose direct deposit as a condition of employment. The Electronic Funds Transfer Act at 15 USC 1693k only says that employers may not require an employee to have a bank account at a particular bank: No person may— (1) condition the extension of credit to a consumer on such consumer’s repayment by means of preauthorized electronic fund transfers; or (2) require a consumer to establish an account for receipt of electronic fund transfers with a particular financial institution as a condition of employment or receipt of a government benefit. If the employee is allowed to choose their bank, then such a condition is legal under this law. The government's interpretation of this law is clarified in 12 CFR 1005 Supplement I at 10(e)(2): Payroll. An employer (including a financial institution) may not require its employees to receive their salary by direct deposit to any particular institution. An employer may require direct deposit of salary by electronic means if employees are allowed to choose the institution that will receive the direct deposit. Alternatively, an employer may give employees the choice of having their salary deposited at a particular institution (designated by the employer) or receiving their salary by another means, such as by check or cash. That said, individual states can create their own legislation, and many have made it illegal under state law for an employer to require direct deposit. You didn't name a particular state so I can't be more specific, but there is a chart here created by a payroll company showing the legality of such policies by state. Note that in some sense, the employee is not really being "compelled" or "mandated" to have a bank account - if the employer insists on using direct deposit, the employee is free to go look for a different job. US law does tend to recognize that there is a major power imbalance in employer-employee relationships, so there are many regulations; but at its root, it's treated as a contract between two independent parties who may each set whatever conditions they want, and enter into the contract only if they can agree. In contexts other than employment, I would expect even fewer restrictions on how a bank account could be set as a condition for something. For instance, it could be a condition for using a particular product or service. Again, if you don't want to open a bank account, you are free to not use that product or service.