Absolute immunity, judicial corruption and public interest I'm reading DENNIS v. SPARKS, (1980). It is part of larger reading from Operation Greylord. Part of the decision says: Judicial immunity arose because it was in the public interest to have judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent judgment about the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages should an unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal that the judge acted not only mistakenly but with malice and corruption. Pierson v. Ray, supra, at 554; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 349, 350, n. The decision also makes reference to 42 U.S.C. 1983, but I have not read it yet. So I may be missing something obvious. (If so, then please accept my apologies). I'm not clear how it is the public's interest not to hold a corrupt judge accountable. In Operation Greylord the 17 judges willfully accepted bribes; it was not a matter of a "honest" mistake or false accusation. Naively, it seems to me a holding a judge accountable for willful criminal acts provides a deterrent. (A similar argument is usually made when the state provides a death sentence and executes its citizens). Or maybe the contra-positive is more import - a judge who knows he or she is not held accountable is free be be as corrupt as they like knowing they will probably not get caught. How is it in the public's interest not to hold a corrupt judge accountable?
Judicial immunity means only that the judge can't be sued by the people negatively affected by his decisions, even if they were made corruptly. The idea is that if this were possible, then anyone who lost a case before the judge could sue him, perhaps falsely claiming that he was corrupt. Defending such suits would be a major nuisance and expense for the judge, and some fraction of such cases might be wrongly decided against him (courts do err sometimes). So, a party who said (or insinuated) to the judge that "you'd better decide my case in my favor or else I'll sue you" would have a credible threat, and the judge might be intimidated into giving in. This would certainly not be in the public interest, and so judicial immunity removes this possibility. It's a trade-off: the harm done by false accusations would outweigh the good done by legitimate lawsuits against truly corrupt judges, and you can't allow the latter without creating the possibility of the former. However, judges can still be held accountable for corruption - just not through the mechanism of lawsuits by the affected parties. This is addressed within the Dennis decision, in the paragraph right above the one you quoted: But judicial immunity was not designed to insulate the judiciary from all aspects of public accountability. Judges are immune from 1983 damages actions, but they are subject to criminal prosecutions as are other citizens. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974). So a corrupt judge can still be prosecuted by the state: removed from his job, fined, sent to prison, etc. But the decision to prosecute him would be made by a state prosecutor, who has no personal stake in matters before the court, rather than by a potentially disgruntled litigant.
The probable answer is right there in the article: the Kim Dotcom case has been a PR coup but a legal disaster. Mr Dotcom has not, at this time, been jailed and it may have become apparent to US and NZ law enforcement agencies that he probably never will be! It is really, really easy to accuse someone of committing a crime; it can be really, really hard to prove it beyond reasonable doubt in a court of law. So after initiating a case that has turned out to be a total disaster, why would you expect them to do the same thing a second time?
If the owner of the intellectual property leaves property subject to the jurisdiction of the state of Washington, and it is determined that the owner is dead and has no heirs, then per RCW 11.08.140 it is designated escheat property. Then the following sections specify that title to the property vests in the state. The Department of Revenue has jurisdiction over that property, which has the duty to protect and conserve the property for the benefit of the permanent common school fund. There is no general answer to the question of what would best benefit the school fund. Any form of giving it away would not benefit the school fund, at least if there was an viable option for sale / licensing. There are provisions that relate to the possibility that an heir is eventually uncovered, but I will assume that no heir ever appears. Ohio law is similar. The decendant's property escheats to the state in case there is no heir. Then under ORC 2105.07, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which letters of administration are granted upon such estate shall collect and pay it over to the county treasurer. Such estate shall be applied exclusively to the support of the common schools of the county in which collected.
Civil litigation involves general causes of action that are available to anyone, including both private parties and the government. Civil courts are designed primarily to provide restitution to the injured party. Criminal courts exist for governments to exercise their police powers: specific, limited authority held only by the government. The principal purposes of criminal law are...well, they're debated, but broadly speaking, it's to punish and/or rehabilitate the criminal and deter future criminals. Because criminal conviction can result in jail time and even the death penalty, there are more stringent procedural protections accorded to criminal defendants than there are to civil defendants. So when the government's goal is to recover damages, it's easier for them to use the less burdensoome civil procedures, just the same as anyone else would. Let me give you an example. Someone steals your identity and runs up $100,000 on your credit card. You call the police, and they find someone they think is the guy. To convict him, the police must convince an entire jury panel that he did it, beyond a reasonable doubt--a high standard. He pleads the fifth, and without his testimony, the police may not succeed. If they do, he will be sent to jail, and he may also be ordered to give part or all of your money back. If the case is weak, however, the police may not want to spend their limited time on it--and that's their call, not yours. (This also applies to government agencies; only law enforcement can bring a criminal case, not any government agency.) However, you can also file a civil lawsuit. In that lawsuit, depending on the jurisdiction, you may only need to convince some of the jury--civil verdicts don't always have to be unanimous. You may even just face a judge, with no jury. And the legal standard is a "preponderance of the evidence," which in layman's terms just means "more likely than not"--a much easier thing to prove. Because the Fifth Amendment doesn't apply to civil litigation, you may even be able to argue before the jury that the defendant's refusal to testify suggests he's guilty. In summary: civil lawsuits use different rules and procedures, which may make it easier to recover money (or get other civil relief, such as an injunction) in cases where that's the goal. These courts are open to anyone, including the government. But if the government wants to use its special police powers to put someone in jail or get other criminal relief, they have to use the stricter criminal rules and procedures.
I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.
We don't have enough facts to know. What Bob said about having violated the injunction, which could expose him to criminal contempt of court liability, was not true. But, the precise details of what he said, to whom he said it, and his relationship to the case, are not clear. Saying something that isn't true isn't always against the law, and even when it is against the law, the consequences depend upon the context. An intentionally false statement of fact to a police officer or to the court under oath would probably be a crime (but, unlike U.S. practice, criminal defendants who testify are not generally required to testify under oath). An unintentionally false statement of fact to the same persons (e.g. because Bob misheard the question or was drunk at the time and assumed that the statement of fact he was making was true or had dementia) would probably not have legal consequences for him. A mere confession - I am guilty of violating the civil injunction - would probably not be perjury or fraud because guilt of a civil injunction includes opinions and legal conclusions which are not actionable, as well as implied statements of fact, which might be actionable. But, if he confessed in the form of a plea, there probably wouldn't have been a trial at all. Once he made his plea, his factual guilty or innocence might be irrelevant in the face of a judicial admission. Courts can sometimes sanction parties to lawsuits for wasting everyone's time under quite specific circumstances, but we don't know precisely what relationship Bob has to the case in which the injunction was entered.
You have raised two broad questions. The question about reasonable suspicion asks: when is evidence illegally obtained? That's difficult to answer, because it depends on the nature of the evidence and any statute which controlled the way in which it should have been collected. However, the focus of your question seems to be the second issue: what use can the government make of illegally obtained evidence? This is the subject of the exclusionary rule. The short answer is this: The exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy created for the purpose of deterring future unlawful conduct. The rule prohibits both direct and indirect use of illegally obtained evidence (&quot;fruit of the poisonous tree&quot;) in a criminal prosecution, but will only be applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. To give more insight into how the courts have applied this balancing test, I will summarise its history and rationale. I will then set out the modern formulation of the rule, and try to answer some of your specific hypothetical questions. History and rationale of the exclusionary rule The exclusionary rule originated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The government searched Weeks' house without a warrant, seized letters and other property, and charged him with operating an illegal lottery. Weeks applied for the return of the property, but the district court held that &quot;the letters having come into the control of the court, it would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but if competent would keep them and permit their use in evidence.&quot; Weeks was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution ... The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the doctrine was extended to prevent indirect use of information derived from illegally obtained evidence, unless the information comes from an independent source. The government illegally searched Silverthorne's offices, and copied the records seized before the district court ordered their return. The district court also impounded the copies, so the government issued a regular subpoena to produce the original documents. The district court held Silverthorne in contempt for failure to comply with the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. The Court acknowledged the 'complexities' of this distinction in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). This case introduced the term 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' and an exception to the doctrine where the connection between the illegality and the evidence presented is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' Nardone had been convicted of defrauding the revenue twice. The first conviction was based on evidence obtained from an illegal wiretap, and was reversed by the Supreme Court. Nardone was convicted again after a retrial, and argued that the conviction should be set aside because he was not permitted to &quot;examine the prosecution as to the uses to which it had put the [illegally obtained] information.&quot; Frankfurter J, delivering the opinion of the Court, quoted the above passage from Silverthorne and said: In practice this generalized statement may conceal concrete complexities. Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint ... The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is established—as was plainly done here—the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin. Development of modern limits to the exclusionary rule The Court clarified the purpose of the doctrine in United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), declining to extend it to grand jury proceedings. The Court held that Calandra was required to answer questions put to him by a grand jury, even though the questions had been informed by the fruits of an illegal search. The Court said: The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim ... Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures ... In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons ... the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The Supreme Court endorsed a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Drugs were found in a search of Leon's house and car pursuant to a facially valid search warrant, but on review the district court found that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant. Therefore, the search was illegal although the officers executing it had acted in good faith. After reviewing the cases in which the Court had declined to apply the rule, the Court held that the evidence against Leon should not have been excluded: The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern ... We have now reexamined the purposes of the exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes will only rarely be served by applying it in such circumstances. In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. In Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998), the Court cited Leon and explicitly endorsed the use of a balancing test in declining to extend the rule to State parole proceedings: [B]ecause the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its &quot;substantial social costs&quot; ... A federal requirement that parole boards apply the exclusionary rule ... would severely disrupt the traditionally informal, administrative process of parole revocation. The marginal deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures is insufficient to justify such an intrusion. We therefore hold that parole boards are not required by federal law to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court endorsed an even more circumspect approach to the rule in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). The police executed a valid search warrant and found guns and drugs in Hudson's house, but the search was unlawful because the police did not knock and announce before entering. The Court declined to exclude the evidence obtained in the search, holding that: Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates &quot;substantial social costs&quot;, which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been &quot;cautio[us] against expanding&quot; it, and &quot;have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.&quot; We have rejected &quot;[i]ndiscriminate application&quot; of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only &quot;where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,&quot;—that is, &quot;where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.'&quot; (citations omitted) Current state of the law As of June 2017, the last word on the rule is the Supreme Court's decision in Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016). Again, the Court reversed a State court's decision to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal trial. The Court identified three exceptions to the exclusionary rule: First, the independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source. Second, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source. Third, and at issue here, is the attenuation doctrine: Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that &quot;the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.&quot; (citations omitted) Strieff was illegally stopped and asked for ID after leaving a house under surveillance by narcotics police. After discovering an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation, the police lawfully arrested and searched Strieff and found him in possession of methamphetamine. The Court found that the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the attenuation doctrine: The three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), guide our analysis. First, we look to the &quot;temporal proximity&quot; between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search. Second, we consider &quot;the presence of intervening circumstances.&quot; Third, and &quot;particularly&quot; significant, we examine &quot;the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.&quot; (citations omitted) [W]e hold that the evidence discovered on Strieff's person was admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing arrest warrant. Although the illegal stop was close in time to Strieff's arrest, that consideration is outweighed by two factors supporting the State. The outstanding arrest warrant for Strieff's arrest is a critical intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of the illegal stop. The discovery of that warrant broke the causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the discovery of evidence by compelling Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff. And, it is especially significant that there is no evidence that Officer Fackrell's illegal stop reflected flagrantly unlawful police misconduct. Specific scenarios Can the past arrests serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion to stop a person? As a basis for inclusion of the person on an informal watch list? As mentioned in the introduction, this question is not really about &quot;fruit of the poisonous tree.&quot; It is an anterior question about whether or not a police stop was unlawful. The court asks: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Officers are permitted to consider criminal history, as the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613 (1997): A prior criminal record &quot;is not, alone, sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.&quot; Nevertheless, an officer can couple knowledge of prior criminal involvement with more concrete factors in reaching a reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. (citations omitted) As probable cause for a future search warrant or arrest warrant or wiretap? As basis for active surveillance without a stop or arrest or search warrant? What if law enforcement set up a sting operation targeted at this individual? As with reasonable suspicion, evidence of the suspect's reputation and criminal history can be taken into account in establishing probable cause for an arrest or search warrant. However, a history of past arrests would probably not suffice in itself to &quot;warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed&quot;: Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Could the suppressed evidence be used to counter an entrapment defense (which requires a showing that the defendant didn't have a propensity to commit the crime)? Could the suppressed evidence be used to impeach testimony in a criminal case that the defendant had never used drugs before? If the evidence is suppressed then by definition it cannot be used adversely to the defendant. However, if the evidence is shown to have been obtained illegally, it will only be excluded where the deterrence benefits of exclusion outweigh its substantial social costs: Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott. The evidence is more likely to be admitted if it falls into one of the three exceptions set out in Utah v. Strieff: independent source, inevitable discovery or attenuation. In considering attenuation, the court will pay particular attention to 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' Clearly, it is impossible to say, in general, whether unlawfully obtained evidence could be admitted to counter an entrapment defence or attack the defendant's character and credibility. Not only will the application of the exclusionary rule depend on a wide range of considerations, other rules of evidence may need to be applied (such as the rules against character evidence and extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter). Nevertheless, the cases cited above should give some insight into how the court will approach the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
The law was first promulgated on June 8, 1940 By the 76th Congress. The original text is here. It doesn’t seem to be a particularly important piece of legislation and I can find commentary on it and I’m not going to read the debates - if you do, please get back to us. Two points to note, it was passed at a time when most of the rest of the world was at war and the US was quietly preparing to be at war and it seems to be intended to fill a gap in state law since conviction under state law is a defence under Federal.