“color of authority” Matt Whitaker vs inventor with complaint When now Acting US Attorney General Matt Whitaker was on the board of directors of a company that acted as an agent for inventors, he sent a letter to a complainant inventor client, warning of possible legal consequences if the inventor persisted. Since Whitaker stated(correctly) in the letter that he was a former US prosecutor, could he have been guilty of a crime involving “color of authority?
'Color of authority', specifically 'color of law', refers to a person who holds government power and acts in a way that is unlawful using that governmental authority to assert (implicitly or explicitly) that the action is lawful. There is no way that someone who identifies themselves as a former government officer can be doing that.
Short version: No, no one has even been prosecuted. Does the perjury clause apply to all the information in the notification, or only the statement that the complaining party is authorised to act etc. ? This seems to be answerable by the plain text of the statute that you quoted: A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. There doesn't seem to be any remotely grammatical way to read &quot;under penalty of perjury&quot; as modifying anything in the first part of the sentence (i.e, the statement or the information in the notification). The closest we could come would be reading &quot;A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury&quot; as saying that the information is both accurate and under penalty of perjury. Even if we ignore the fact that that would add a stray comma (as comma errors are not uncommon), that still leaves us with &quot;that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly in-fringed&quot; after an additional comma. This would need a conjunction (such as &quot;and&quot;) that is not there in order for it to read at all correctly. On the other hand, it is perfectly grammatical to read it as: A statement: that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. This would mean that only the statement that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright holder is made under penalty of perjury. Thus, the &quot;statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized&quot; described in § 512(c)(3)(a)(v) and referenced in your second question is not made under penalty of perjury. I couldn't find any case law regarding this, though, which brings us to the second question: Has anyone ever actually been convicted of perjury as a result of sending a DMCA notice that lied about the &quot;good faith belief&quot; in the infringing nature of the target material? As far as I can tell, no one has ever even been criminally prosecuted for sending false DMCA notices, let alone convicted. In fact, as far as I can tell, no one has ever been prosecuted for false copyright claims under any other laws, either. It's a bit difficult to find an authoritative reference stating something has never happened, and the best I found was the Wikipedia article on Copyfraud, which cites Fishman, Stephen. The Public Domain, Nolo (2006), pp. 24–29 for the proposition that (presumably as of 2006), &quot;[n]o company has ever been prosecuted for violating&quot; a related law on false claims of copyright. Obviously, that's not a great source, due to the date, not having access to the original text, and the fact that it's not quite the same law. I also tried quite a number of search terms on Google and found no criminal prosecutions there, either. There have, however, been civil suits regarding such bad-faith misrepresentations: Automattic, owners of Wordpress.com, have filed at least two. In at least one of those, a lack of such a good-faith claim by the defendant was in fact found by the court: Similarly, here, the Court finds that Defendant knowingly misrepresented that Hotham violated his copyright because Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright. Moreover, there can be no dispute that Defendant knew, and indeed, specifically intended, that the takedown notice would result in the disabling of Hotham's article. This resulted in the court finding the defendant liable for damages under § 512(f) for the time and money that the plaintiffs spent dealing with the results of the fraudulent DMCA takedown notice. Neither the court nor the plaintiffs mention perjury at any point other than quoting the takedown notice (unsurprising, though, given that it's a civil suit).
As mentioned in a comment by @Dancrumb, the exact policies of each local police department will be different, and there are thousands of them. There is a relevant requirement at the Federal level according the Department of Justice, but it is not clear to me to what extent this applies to peers and not just supervisors: An officer who purposefully allows a fellow officer to violate a victim's Constitutional rights may be prosecuted for failure to intervene to stop the Constitutional violation. To prosecute such an officer, the government must show that the defendant officer was aware of the Constitutional violation, had an opportunity to intervene, and chose not to do so. This charge is often appropriate for supervisory officers who observe uses of excessive force without stopping them, or who actively encourage uses of excessive force but do not directly participate in them.
Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' &amp; judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.
The accusation would be the crime of securities fraud ("insider trading" is legally meaningless), under 15 USC 78j(b). There is a bit more elaboration in 17 CFR 240.10b5-1. That law prohibits using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in" in connection with a securities transaction. Under 15 USC 78ff, violation of the law can result in a fine of up to $5 million and 20 years, thus it is a crime. As a crime, the standard of proof required is must higher than it in for a civil forfeiture (which can be as low as "reasonable suspicion"). In the US, and pursuant to the Due Process clause, that requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that is (from in re Winship), "proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged". The statute itself does not state the elements that must be proven to secure a conviction, but they can be discerned based on jury instructions (which are circuit-specific). The 9th Circuit instruction is here. You can see that there are 4 specific allegations that have to be chosen between, and the prosecutor has to have at least alleged one of those prohibited acts (so that the jury can decide if the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did that thing). The evidence you have presented could constitute "reasonable suspicion", but not "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". If we had a different standard of proof in criminal trials, where it was sufficient to just suspect based on a small bit of evidence that a person may have done something prohibited, then the conclusion could be different. Or, if you had stronger evidence surrounding the sale, your argument might carry a bit more weight. In other words, criminal prosecution is based on quite a lot of specific and objective evidence about what happened. An example of the kind of evidence and allegations required to get the ball rolling can be seen here; for "insider trading" specifically, look here (this case is based on an FBI investigation, where an agent will presumably testify to hearing the defendant state a plan to violate the law).
I am not aware of any cases with a fact pattern at all like this in which there has been an injunction against an individual publicizing accusations against a company. In each of the cases Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer; Lucas Nursery &amp; Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse; TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2004); Cleary Bldg. Corp. v. David A. Dame, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1265 (D. Colo. 2009)' Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir.2000) an individual put up a &quot;gripe sit usign teh trademark of the company or something close to it, as a URL. Courts held this was not trademark infringement adn ther was no reason to enjoin such sites. More recently &quot;companySucks.com&quot; sites have been created to host complaints about {company}. Atempts to shut these downishe bottom.&quot; using trademark law have largely been unsucceaful. See this page for more on this. The first amendment makes it hard to shut down such sites, as they are on &quot;matters of public concern&quot; the &quot;actual malice&quot; rule makes defamation cases tough.
Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally &quot;yes.&quot; States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic &quot;driving while black&quot; situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.
In the USA, you must be found guilty "beyond reasonable doubt". As you describe it, I'd say there is an unreasonable suspicion of guilt, not guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If the magician killed three people that way, then three unexplainable deaths following three spells might get him convicted. A jury might say that even though there is no way to explain how the killing worked, the correlation might be enough to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.