When did the American and British naming conventions for legislation diverge? American laws seem to be named as, for example, the Trade Act of 2002, while British Acts of Parliament seem to use the same naming convention, except without the word &quot;of&quot; preceding the year? Did American legislation ever follow the British naming convention of today? Or did British legislation ever use &quot;of&quot; like the US still does? If so, when and what can the changes be traced to?
The naming conventions for legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom have evolved over time and have undergone various changes and adaptations. It is difficult to pinpoint a specific time when the naming conventions for legislation in the two countries diverged, as the process has likely been a gradual one. In general, the United States and the United Kingdom both have a long history of using names or titles to identify and refer to legislation. In the United States, legislation is typically given a short and descriptive title, such as the &quot;Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act&quot; or the &quot;Sarbanes-Oxley Act.&quot; In the United Kingdom, legislation is often referred to by its short title, which may include the year in which it was enacted, such as the &quot;Companies Act 2006&quot; or the &quot;Bribery Act 2010.&quot; These naming conventions have evolved over time and have been influenced by a variety of factors, including changes in the political and legal systems of the two countries. It is likely that the naming conventions for legislation in the United States and the United Kingdom will continue to evolve and change in the future.
I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.
The starting point of any analysis has to begin with asking what the scope of the Act's application is i.e. what acts fall under its remit and what does not. The question is whether Parliament intended the Act to apply to ANY alteration to the structure, or only a certain class of acts. Clearly it is not the former. With the latter then in mind, statements like that you pointed out merely acknowledge that the Party Wall Act does not cover every single conceivable alteration to a shared structure, as that statement has to be viewed in its entire context. You have left out the second half of the statement that stipulates the core principle of the Act, which is that the Act only imposes the req to serve notice only if, generally, the alteration would cause much structural change or damage. The de minimis threshold can be inferred from the list of activities covered under section 2. Notice that the general character of the listed activities envisage acts which are atypical (in the sense of just drilling holes etc.). This can also be inferred from Parliament's intent in its drafting of the Act as a whole. Also, it might just be common sense.
You have asked about "United Kingdom", but I can only answer about England and Wales; the law in Scotland is very different (rather more different in some respects than the difference between E&amp;W and the State of New York). There is no time limit per se on manslaughter charges; if the police find evidence for a manslaughter charge after 80 years, there is no difficulty (in principle) in bringing a charge against the now-centenarian (provided they are competent to stand trial, and they can get a fair trial, and so on). However, in the case you mentioned I would have thought the major problem would be a defence of autrefois convict - in other words, the defendant can (usually) only be charged once with charges arising from a particular set of facts. It is just possible that the subsequent death constitutes a new fact which allows a new prosecution. On the other hand, the rule for murder used to be that if the victim survived a year and a day then it wasn't murder (even if they then died of their injuries). Finally, the case certainly would not be reopened with a charge of manslaughter. It would be "causing death by dangerous driving", which is a very different offence. Edit My thanks to ohwilleke whose comment about the "year and a day" rule prompted me to do a little research, and discover the Law Reform (Year and a Day Rule) Act 1996. Section 2(2) clearly covers the present case (in both legs), and says that the perpetrator can be re-prosecuted, but only with the permission of the Attorney General. The act is very brief, and I encourage you to read it all. (And incidentally, does not apply to Scotland.)
The law was changed several times, and different versions apply to different age groups because certain rules were not changed retroactively. The page you link describes the situation for children born after the year 2000. My advice: citizenship is such a serious matter that you should consult a specialized lawyer, not a random crowd on the web.
The details depend on the state, of course. The common law thing you are looking for is a writ of mandamus -- a court order to a public official to do something (or not do something) that they are required to do under the law. Writs of mandamus were traditionally only applicable to ministerial tasks (i.e. things that are basically paper-shuffling where there is little to no discretion); marriage licenses are typically considered ministerial. With discretionary actions, things are much more complicated because the government official is supposed to have significant ability to decide what should and shouldn't be allowed; mandamus doesn't apply unless there's a right to the action requested. In some cases, mandamus has been replaced with other forms of judicial review, but in Alabama it is definitely still mandamus that's involved (source: mandamus is what's previously been used to stop issuance of licenses). For federal review, which is more likely to get somewhere, the approach to use is the exact same thing that led to DeBoer (the case bundled into Obergefell that was about granting licenses), and Perry, and many of the other gay marriage cases: a lawsuit seeking an injunction or declaratory relief under 42 USC 1983, which allows actions in law and equity whenever anyone denies civil rights to a US citizen (or someone in the jurisdiction of the US) under color of law. The ultimate result of this kind of suit is a federal court order to issue a marriage license, or a declaration that it's illegal to not issue the license (and so anyone who doesn't will be subject to a court order). Violating this order, like any court order, is contempt of court.
Overview Generally speaking the Titles of Nobility clauses in Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the U.S. Constitution, were aimed at barring hereditary grants of special privileges which is what it means by "Titles of Nobility". In particular, it was mostly aimed at preventing a monarchy from arising in the U.S. This said, there is extremely little case law directly interpreting the the Titles of Nobility clauses, mostly because neither the federal government in the United States, nor any state, has shown much inclination to grant titles of nobility. Most cases discuss the Titles of Nobility clauses in order to interpret other clauses of the constitution (usually in dissenting opinions as part of a parade of evils). A Titles of Nobility amendment to the U.S. Constitution was also proposed in 1810, but never adopted, although many conspiracy theories claim that it was adopted and is in force. This would have automatically revoked the citizenship of anyone awarded a title of nobility. As Wikipedia explains: It has been claimed that the Titles of Nobility Amendment became part of the Constitution. It was erroneously referred to as the Thirteenth Amendment in some early 19th century printings of the Constitution.2[9] Between 1819 and 1867 the statutory law code of Virginia included it as well.[10] The term "Thirteenthers" has sometimes been used in recent years to refer to those who mistakenly believe this amendment was ratified in the 1810s, and also for those who today wish to see this amendment adopted.2 This misconception has become significant because it is yoked with another misconception—that a lawyer's use of the word or abbreviation of "Esquire" after his name is a title of nobility acquired from a foreign power—and so some litigants and others have tried to assert that lawyers have lost their citizenship or are disqualified from public office. Consistent with the discussion below, the title "Esquire" for lawyers as used in the United States, is not a title of nobility because it cannot be passed on to the children of the people who hold it (in either English or American usage) and because it does not, in U.S. usage, at least, confer legal privileges on a hereditary basis. (In 19th century English usage, certain sons of nobles who do not have a noble title themselves were properly addressed "Esquire" and some minor privileges may go with that title, so in that context it may have historically been a Title of Nobility even though this has never been part of the American use of the term "Esquire.") Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) defines "Nobility" as follows: In English law, a division of the people, comprehending dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts, and barons. These had anciently duties annexed to their respective honors. They are created either by writ, i.e. by royal summons to attend the house of peers, or by letters patent, i.e. by royal grant of any dignity and degree of peerage; and they enjoy many privileges, exclusive of their senatorial capacity. Letters patent still exist in both English and American law and primarily refer to document in the nature of a deed that transfers real estate from the sovereign to a private individual. The connection is that most (although not all) titles of nobility were personal rights incident to being the feudal owner of a parcel of land (the right to say who inherits land from an individual was originally entirely governed by law without the discretion of the owner to give it to someone else, but this was reformed gradually in the "early modern" period of English history and was fully reformed by the Victorian era except as to the titles of nobility historically associated with the land). Titles of Nobility are hereditary. An appointment to a position for life (the moral equivalent of a "Life Lord" in England or a Senator in the Canadian Parliament, or a federal judgeship in the U.S.) is not prohibited. But, no rights, other than citizenship or a right to an inheritance (in the absence of a will providing otherwise), that is hereditary may be granted. The Framers of our Constitution lived at a time when the Old World still tolerated in the shadow of ancient feudal traditions. As products of the Age of Enlightenment, they set out to establish a society that recognized no distinctions among white men on account of their birth. See U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States"). Fullilove v. Klutznick, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 448 U.S. 448, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) dissenting opinion at Footnote 13 (overruled on other grounds). This case discusses citizenship issues. And similarly: Such pure discrimination is most certainly not a "legitimate purpose" for our Federal Government, which should be especially sensitive to discrimination on grounds of birth. Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are, by their very nature, odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100. From its inception, the Federal Government has been directed to treat all its citizens as having been "created equal" in the eyes of the law. The Declaration of Independence states: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." And the rationale behind the prohibition against the grant of any title of nobility by the United States, see U.S.Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 8, equally would prohibit the United States from attaching any badge of ignobility to a citizen at birth. Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 427 U.S. 495, 49 L.Ed.2d 651 (1976) dissenting opinion at footnote 3. This case discusses illegitimacy discrimination. Some state constitutions use the phrase "no title of nobility or hereditary emolument, shall be passed," which emphasizes the hereditary component. Titles of Nobility confer legal privileges. Titles of Nobility in U.K. law at the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted in 1789, among other things, conferred immunity to a trial by an ordinary jury and instead gave rise to a jury of one's peers (i.e. other nobles of the same rank or higher) if one was charged with a crime. This was enshrined in the Magna Carta of 1215 CE. This logic is still retained on a residual basis in U.S. courts-martial where a court martial proceeding of an officer can only be tried by other officers (who must be of equal or greater rank, if possible). 10 U.S.C. § 825. The historical link between the two concepts is that the British aristocracy derives mostly from grants of feudal rights to members of the conquering Norman army in 1066 CE proportionate to military rank and in accord with military hierarchy with modest modifications over time. The goal of the prohibition of Titles of Nobility was to prohibit titles of nobility that gave someone an unequal status in law in this fashion. So, a mere honorary recognition would be distinguished from a title that gave someone rank and privilege (on a hereditary basis). A dissent in the famous Dred Scott case, to which the birthright citizenship clause of the 14th Amendment enacted less than a decade later was a response, illustrates the concern: It is, in effect, whether the Constitution has empowered Congress to create privileged classes within the States, who alone can be entitled to the franchises and powers of citizenship of the United States. If it be admitted that the Constitution has enabled Congress to declare what free persons, born within the several States, shall be citizens of the United States, it must at the same time be admitted that it is an unlimited power. If this subject is within the control of Congress, it must depend wholly on its discretion. For, certainly, no limits of that discretion can be found in the Constitution, which is wholly silent concerning it; and the necessary consequence is, that the Federal Government may select classes of persons within the several States who alone can be entitled to the political privileges of citizenship of the United States. If this power exists, what persons born within the States may be President or Vice President 60 U.S. 578 of the United States, or members of either House of Congress, or hold any office or enjoy any privilege whereof citizenship of the United States is a necessary qualification, must depend solely on the will of Congress. By virtue of it, though Congress can grant no title of nobility, they may create an oligarchy, in whose hands would be concentrated the entire power of the Federal Government. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 15 L.Ed. 691, 60 U.S. 393, 577-578 (1857) dissenting opinion (majority opinion subsequently overruled and superseded by constitutional amendment). In this infamous case: The United States Supreme Court decided 7–2 against Scott, finding that neither he nor any other person of African ancestry could claim citizenship in the United States, and therefore Scott could not bring suit in federal court under diversity of citizenship rules. Moreover, Scott's temporary residence outside Missouri did not bring about his emancipation under the Missouri Compromise, which the court ruled unconstitutional as it would "improperly deprive Scott's owner of his legal property." The primary concern was that the United States not become a monarchy. In the debates of the Federal Convention Benjamin Franklin discusses his "apprehension" that the government of the States may "end in a Monarchy" and describes this possibility as "Catastrophe." See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 32 (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966) (1927) at 53. John Dickenson, although noting the merits of limited monarchy, stated: "A limited Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times-the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable." Id. at 56-57. Edmund Randolph noted that the "permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy," id. at 58, and argued against a single executive, regarding it "as the foetus of monarchy." Id. at 46. Conclusion Since a Kentucky Colonel, or a Prom King, or an Apple Butter Queen or what have you, are merely honorary without conferring legal rights and privileges, and are not hereditary, they do not constitute true Titles of Nobility in the constitutional sense. This is so even though a Kentucky Colonel is appointed by Letters Patent in a manner that apes the process by which Titles of Nobility were awarded in English law at the time that the Titles of Noblity Clause was enacted.
If you say something twice, eventually they’ll be in conflict Law codes are vast. They deal with many things and sometimes, as here, they deal with the same thing twice. If they duplicated themselves, rather than cross-referencing, every time the law was changed, every single instance would have to be tracked down and changed. Admittedly, that is not as big a problem with digital codes (but still not infallible and definitely time-consuming) but when these would have to be found by hand, it was damn near impossible. Written this way, change it once and it’s changed everywhere. My first boss taught me that. The fired was engineering rather than law but the principle is the same.