Is it truly illegal for the US Armed Forces to hire someone whose IQ is less than 83? In this video, Jordan Peterson says that [...] anybody into the Armed Forces if they have an IQ of less than 83 Is this true? What law is this supposed restriction based on?
Short Answer Applicants are required by military regulation to have a percentile score on a standardized test called the ASVAB that is 31 or more, which is roughly comparable to an IQ score on the Stanford-Binet scale of a little bit less than 92, for high school graduates seeking to enter the Army or Navy (other services have more strict requirements and applicants with only a GED or to the national guard must have an ASVAB score in the 50th percentile which is equivalent to an IQ of 100). But, U.S. law allows the Department of Defense to allow people with a percentile score on the ASVAB that is as low as 10 if it chooses to do so. An IQ score of 83 on the Stanford-Binet scale is the 14th percentile of the general population and is fairly close to a 10th percentile score on the ASVAB, although the conversion is not very exact, because ASVAB test takers have fewer people in the top and the bottom of the IQ range than the general population. So, the assertion that the law prohibits people with an IQ score of 83 or less from serving in the U.S. military is close to the truth, although the reality is somewhat more complicated. Long Answer The U.S. military sets, as a matter of policy in a government regulation at the Department of Defense level, certain minimum requirements for people who seek to enter military services. Some of the main requirements are found here. There are also requirements not described there such as a requirement that people enlisting may not have juvenile or criminal records of a certain severity. Additional requirements apply to certain military occupational specialties within the military. For example, someone may qualify to be an Army cook, but not to be a military intelligence specialist in the Air Force. If a person does not meet those requirements, that person is not allowed to serve unless a waiver is obtained from a person with the authority to do so, and even the kind of exceptions that can be made and the factors that must be considered when making an exception on a case by case basis, are specified by a regulation or official pronouncement of the Department of Defense. Among the requirements specified by regulation are educational requirements (a high school diploma or GED subject to some exceptions). Applicants are also required to take the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) from which the applicant receives an AFQT score is equal to the applicant's percentile ranking of the applicant's raw score on the test. An applicant's AFQT score is strongly correlated with a applicant's IQ score on a traditional IQ test. Applicants with a GED rather than a high school diploma, and all national guard applicants, must score at least 50. Applicants with high school diplomas must score at least 31 to enter the Army or the Navy, 32 to enter the Marines, and 36 to enter the Air Force or the Coast Guard, as a matter of federal regulation. ASVAB scores from one year are not necessarily full comparable to ASVAB scores from another year because the test is rescaled from time to time based, among other things, on the scores earned by people who take the test. For all practical purposes, a Department of Defense regulation has the force of law with respect to an individual applicant seeking to enlist in the military, or an individual recruiter evaluating military applicants. But, Congress has vested the task of setting exact cutoffs and deciding which tests to use to evaluate applicants in the U.S. military and it changes its regulations from time to time based upon the recruiting targets that it needs to meet to satisfy Congressionally set force sizes, and the quality of the applicant pool, subject to the requirement that no one with an AFQT score of below 31 may enlist without a high school diploma, that everyone that enlists must have an AFQT score of at least 10, pursuant to 10 USC 520, AND that no more than 20% of enlisted soldiers may have an AFQT score below 31. AFQT score percentiles on the AVSAB and IQ percentiles aren't completely comparable to each other, however, because IQ percentiles are based on the general population and AFQT scores are based upon people who take the test. People with very high IQs (who tend to go to college rather than the military in the U.S.) and people with very low IQs (who tend to not even try to enlist in the military, knowing that it is futile) are underrepresented among AVSAB test takers, so very low AFQT scores correspond to somewhat higher IQ percentiles, while very high AFQT scores correspond to somewhat lower IQ percentiles. IQ scores are scaled with a Standard Deviation of either 15 (Weschler) or 16 (Stanford-Binet), and a mean of 100 for the general population. In a 16 point standard deviation IQ test, the 30th percentile is an IQ score of 92 and an IQ score of 83 is the 14th percentile. It isn't unreasonable to estimate that an AFQT score of 10 corresponds to an IQ score of 83, although I haven't seen any source making that exact conversion. My best guess is that the minimum AFQT score of 10 corresponds to an IQ score of more than 83 but less than 92 on a Stanford-Binet scale. For comparison's sake, an IQ score of 70 is normally considered developmentally disabled (a.k.a. mentally retarded). The minimum IQ score for entry into the military according to Congress would be considered a bit &quot;dull&quot;, but within the range of ordinary self-sufficient people in the general population. The minimum IQ score for entry into the military by current regulations of about 92 would be within the &quot;normal&quot; range of 90-110 that includes about half of the general population. UPDATE (September 26, 2019): While this is a law that the U.S. military is duty bound to honor, it isn't at all obvious that anyone, with the possible exception of Congress or at least a majority of one house of Congress, would have standing to bring a civil action in court to enforce this requirement. To have standing one would have to show an actual injury from the violation to you personally, and that in turn, would be extremely hard to show in a casual manner. Generally speaking, however, mere statistical evidence of some actual injury to you on average is insufficient. One could imagine a case where a low IQ person's mistake harmed a fellow soldier, but it would be almost impossible in practice to segregate the IQ contribution to the mistake happening to myriad other facts that could also have led to the mistake (e.g. insufficient training).
I conclude (contrary to an earlier expression) that there is no such list, nor can there be, because the term "officer" is not well enough defined. The inferior officers are those officers who are not principal officers (as specified in the Constitution, e.g. ambassadors, cabinet members, judges), since there are only two kinds of officers. There is no constitutional or statutory definition of "Officer of the United States", so we have to figure it out from case law. As noted in Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654 The line between "inferior" and "principal" officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn. Officers of the US cannot be appointed by Congress (Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976), so that narrows down the possibilities – if in fact an appointment can be made by Congress, that is not an inferior office (since Congress has no such authority). That court also said that We think that the term "Officers of the United States," as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in United States v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an "Officer of the United States," and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article. To take a specific example, "special trial judges", authorized in 26 USC 7443a are an example of an officer. We know they are officers, because Freytag v. Commissioner 501 U.S. 868 says so (since they read Buckley): A special trial judge is an "inferior Office[r]" whose appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause. Such a judge acts as an inferior officer who exercises independent authority in cases governed by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). The fact that in subsection (b)(4) cases he performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform his status. The Dept. of Justice offers an analysis of "Officer of the United States". The main elements in their opinion are that the position must possess delegated sovereign authority of the Federal government, and the position must be continuing. There are other criteria possibly applicable (things that were invokes at some time) including method of appointment, having been established by law, taking an oath of office, an emolument (not a volunteer), and receiving a commission. Still, Congress authorizes (by law) the hiring of federal employees, and not all employees are "officers". An earlier memorandum on the topic is here. Footnote 54 notes that It is at least arguable, however, that the authority exercised by second lieutenants and ensigns is so limited and subordinate that their analogues in the civil sphere clearly would be employees. Warrant officers and non-commisioned officers would likewise have quite limited authority. Since the definition of "Officer of the United States" is up for grabs, there can't be a complete list of inferior officers, especially if all military officers are included. There is a long list of civilian officers under the executive branch published in United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions, after each presidential election. The so-called Plum Book is on a government web page here in the 2012 version, and here for 2016. However, you will not find special trial judges of the tax court in the Plum Book, which were held in Freytag to be officers, and are civilians in the executive branch. The special trial judges are apparently listed here, as are the sitting judges (who are also not in the Plum book).
Ignorantia juris non excusat You can say I didn't know: it won't keep you out of jail. Rather than delving into the specifics of your question, I will keep my answer general. If you break the law, you break the law. It doesn't matter if: you don't know what the law is, you didn't think the law applied to you, you thought what you were doing was in accordance with the law. "Break the law" is an objective fact - there is no subjectivity involved. The state of mind of the person is, in most jurisdictions, irrelevant; the common law doctrine of mens rea or "the guilty mind" has almost universally been done away with. Now specific offences have specific defences. Generally, in underage sex cases genuine ignorance of the age of the person is one such defence. A court may decide that ignorance that the person was underage under US law may qualify for this defence.
Firstly, this is actually a really good question - The Australian Constitution grants few explicit protections or rights to people, and it does not protect you from discrimination on the basis of age. In any case, you'll find that it is not a violation of the Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) - see s39. This makes an exemption, amongst others, to the Act when acting in compliance with specified Commonwealth laws, or with State or Territory Acts or Regulations, which typically enact minimum drinking ages. In general, governments are able to legislate within the bounds of their powers, usually as enumerated in a constitution, and sometimes limited by a bill of rights. Even where the power to legislate with respect to age is not specifically granted, governments are generally empowered to legislate with respect to other matters where age may be a factor: employment, sale of goods, gambling, etc.
I think your confusion stems from assuming there is a universal definition of "minor" across laws, jurisdictions, and rights. 18 is the age of majority for the purpose of voting (26th Amendment), the death penalty, labor law (although age 14 is the minimum age for employment), and many other laws. But, 21 is the age required to buy alcohol in all states (by their own choice in order to receive highway funding). Nothing requires the age of majority to be consistent across different sections of code or statute or between jurisdictions (except when constitutionally prescribed, like voting age, or minimum age for certain elected offices). There are many counties that prohibit purchase of alcohol at any age. The age of consent varies between 14 and 18 across US states. Age 65 is a threshold for certain tax credits. You need to be 25 in order to be a member of the US House of Representatives, 30 to be a Senator, 35 to be President. You are only protected from age discrimination if you are 40 or older. Here is a rough list of various age-based thresholds for various rights, privileges, or responsibilities in the US. (I havn't vetted this whole list, and some are clearly satire, but the ones I know about are consistent with my understanding.)
One way in which it holds legal water is that if you use the website in violation of the terms, then you may forfeit your right to take civil action against the company. Analogous language especially regarding the age of the user may protect the site against actions by third party governmental entities (COPPA-like laws), though nothing patently obvious springs to mind (insofar as this deals with firearms and there is also an age 21 restriction both on the web site and in terms of US firearms law, this is not a totally crazy idea). The citation of 18 USC 1030 non-probatively points to an issue which may be disposed of by SCOTUS in US v. van Buren, that knowingly violating the terms of service is a crime (a proposition rejected by lower courts, see US v. Valle). Facebook v. Power Ventures in particular clarifies how &quot;being put on notice&quot; may make such unauthorized access indeed &quot;unauthorized access&quot; in the statutorily-relevant sense. This does not prevent a legally-authorized law enforcement investigation, pursuant to para (f), but if the &quot;violation of TOS = unauthorized access&quot; theory is upheld, it limits how LEOs can legally access the website (and the limitations extend past LEOs). It is a separate and potentially interesting question whether there actually are any legal limits on the investigative powers of the government – if any law enforcement officer has the liberty to investigate anyone they want, with no supervision or requirement of justification, then this would be a rather gaping loophole in their legal strategy. Web pages involve massive copying of copyright-protected data, and the function of terms of use is in part to conditionally grant access to that copyright-protected content. When a person copies protected material from someone's web page having been explicitly denied permission to copy, they run the risk of an infringement lawsuit.
So it's not that SCOTUS is declining to review the matter on Constitutional Grounds but that it's declining to rule because 1.) It's a military matter 2.) It's under review by congress. SCOTUS is basically saying that, of the three branches, they are the least equipped to deal with military policy and when a better equipped branch is reviewing the matter. SCOTUS doesn't want to dictate to Congress how to change the rules when Congress is in the process of changing the rules itself... but they can say &quot;Hey, we got our eyes on this as a constitutional matter so keep that in mind when you decide on what you're gonna do about this. When Congress makes a decision on this particular law (either change it or keep it), SCOTUS may take a look, but that doesn't mean they'll rule against it, as Congress and the Military can present an argument that it might be necessary for military defense reasons.
The protection lies in the fact that these sorts of restrictions are expressed in state laws, and states are Constitutionally forbidden from denying to any citizen the equal protection of the law, or from interfering with religion. The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids states from making any law impeding free exercise of religion, or having the effect of establishing a state religion. This means that any law that forbids people of any religious denomination (including atheists) from holding any office (elected or not) under any level of government is unconstitutional. See Torcaso v. Watkins. Moreover, Title VII's protected classes are also (with the exception of sex) suspect classes under the Equal Protection Clause. A state or local government may not pass a law discriminating against a suspect class unless it is a narrowly tailored law which is the least intrusive way to achieve a compelling state interest. In practice, that means a state can't pass a law discriminating on the grounds of national origin, race, or religion. Sex is a quasi-suspect class; government discrimination on the grounds of sex must further an important state interest in a way reasonably related to that interest; again, in practice this will tend to rule out laws saying "no women can be elected to this post." The Americans with Disabilities Act actually does not exclude elected officials. It defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer." The Equal Pay Act doesn't apply to elected officials, but again, sex is a quasi-suspect class. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act also excludes elected officials, and this is the one case where a state really could discriminate -- the applicable test is whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, which is not an especially high bar.