Are jurors allowed to disquallify each other? Say Mike the Murderer is on trial and there's no doubt he's the murderer. 12 jurors meet. All of them think he's obviously guilty, except for one David the dissenter. Is there any way the other 11 jurors can stop David from hanging the court? In particular, in the case that David is a bad-acting juror. For example David brags to the other jurors that he wants Mike the Murderer to go free because he's sexy David says he hates the other jurors and is hanging the jury to spite them This is just one example of the broader question of if jurors are allowed to disqualify each other. One final example I want to give is: what if it so happens that two people on the jury are boss Bob and employee Emma? Emma has every reason not to stand up against boss Bob during jury deliberation. What are Emma and Bob supposed to do in this case? And what about the other 10 jurors, if this comes to light?
Jurors cannot directly disqualify each other. However, they can inform the trial judge if they have reason to believe that one of their peers should be discharged. The judge will then allow the lawyers for both sides to ask the juror questions before deciding to dismiss them. In some jurisdictions, the judge may be required to hold a hearing to examine the evidence. Jurors may also be charged with contempt of court for interfering with a defendant's right to a fair trial, and could be disqualified from jury service in the future. Your examples of juror misconduct point at bias or refusal to deliberate, e.g. when the juror has made up their mind ahead of time (but not because they are using faulty logic). Depending on the jurisdiction, the trial may continue with a smaller jury. In some jurisdictions, the judge will have to declare a mistrial if no replacement juror can be found. See: Juror misconduct
Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of &quot;acquittal&quot; was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing &quot;guilty as charged&quot; and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard &quot;not guilty as charged&quot;. After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of &quot;guilty&quot;. The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.
I think it would depend on how a jury viewed the "challenge" to her audience. The general rule for self-defense in Texas is that the person needs to reasonably believe that force is immediately necessary to protect herself from someone else's use of force. I think a jury would find it reasonable to believe that someone forcefully attempting to steal your gun was planning to use it against you. More importantly, the law generally presumes that that belief is reasonable if the person is being robbed, assuming that she isn't otherwise engaged in criminal activity. Since openly carrying an AR-15 is -- as far as I know -- legal in Texas, I think she'd probably be fine. But: The law also says that the use of force is not justified when a person consents to the other person's use of force, or if the person has provoked the other person. So now you have the question of whether the student's challenge constitutes a provocation or consent to the use of force. I think you can make a decent argument for provocation, which means that "the defendant did some act or used some words intended to and calculated to bring on the difficulty in order to have a pretext for inflicting injury." Neal v. State, No. 12-14-00158-CR, 2016 WL 1446138, at *11 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2016). You might also make out a decent argument for consent, which doesn't necessarily seem to require that the parties exactly spell out the rules of engagement, just that there is some kind of agreement between the two parties. In one case, for instance, a defendant tried to argue that a fight had gone beyond the rules because one party used a chokehold and knocked the other out. But the court said that the only actual rule agreed to was that there would be no weapons used. Padilla v. State, No. 03-07-00513-CR, 2008 WL 5423139, at *2 (Tex. App. Dec. 31, 2008). That makes me think that as long as there's consent to some kind of fight, you don't necessarily need rules, though you do need to abide by them if you agree to them. So what's the scope of consent in this case? If we say that she's agreed to the use of force by challenging people to take something from her, and she hasn't said how you can do it, can you do it by any means you choose? I don't think a court would let someone shoot her to get it, but maybe they would be allowed to pry it out of her hands. So all of that is a long way of saying that this is a tricky question, and that any decision would probably depend a lot on the specific facts of who she was talking to, what exactly she was saying, how she was carrying the gun, and so on.
Generally speaking, jury trials in England and Wales are allowed (but can be waived by a defendant in most cases) for offenses punishable by more than six months of incarceration (i.e. serious misdemeanors and all felonies), with exceptions for domestic violence cases, serious and complex fraud cases, Diplock courts in Northern Ireland prior to 2008, cases where there is a serious risk of jury tampering, and in cases where double jeopardy defenses are at issue. It appears that jury trials are mandatory, however, and cannot be waived by defendants, in some serious criminal cases. (Historically, trial by jury was suspended in most cases during World War II.) English law enforcement officials can also detain people without trial for limited periods of time (generally up to 28 days prior to 2011 and now 14 days) without criminal charges in terrorism cases. This detention without trial procedure was instituted at the same time that the Diplock court system was shut down. (Courts-martial present another issue entirely.) Diplock courts were instituted out of concerns about jury nullification and jury tampering, and the latter concern remains an all purpose reason to deny a jury trial in a particular criminal case. Importantly, since 1967, juries in England and Wales need not be unanimous. Up to 2 dissenting votes are allowed on a jury of 12 and up to 1 dissenting vote is allowed on juries with 8 to 11 members remaining at the time of deliberations. The failure of up to three jurors on a jury of twelve (used in the Crown and High Courts) to complete the trial is allowed without a substitute and up to 1 juror who doesn't complete a trial is allowed in a jury of eight in County Court. From the first link above: A coroner must summon a jury for an inquest if the death occurred in prison or in police custody, or in the execution of a police officer's duty, or if it falls under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, or if it affects public health or safety. Coroner's juries have 7-11 members and a minority report of 2 members of that jury can be its verdict. In civil cases, juries are used in eminent domain valuation cases, where the judge might be seen as having a conflict of interest. Further, as explained in the first link above, they are also used as follows: In 1998 less than 1% of civil trials in England and Wales were jury trials and these were principally defamation cases. Section 69 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, which replaced s. 6 of the 1933 Act in respect of High Court trials, provides that trial shall be by jury on the application of a party where the court is satisfied that there is in issue: a claim of fraud against the party; or a claim in respect of libel, slander, malicious prosecution or false imprisonment unless the court is of the opinion that the trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or accounts or any scientific or local investigation which cannot conveniently be made with a jury. FYI, Scottish practice with regard to jury trials is completely distinct from the practice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and is beyond the scope of this answer. Both the size and process of the jury, and its availability are different in Scotland.
Typically at trial, the &quot;Trier(s) of Fact&quot; (usually the Jury, unless the defendant requests a bench trier, then it's the judge) will have instructions from the &quot;Trier of Law&quot; (always the Judge) that will allow them to find guilt for &quot;Lesser and Included Charges&quot;. For example, in the U.S., unjustified homicide (legal definition used for manslaughter and murder) comes in three broad types: 1st Degree Murder, 2nd Degree Murder, and Manslaughter (ordered from worst to lesser offense). All the elements to convict on Manslaughter exist in 2nd degree murder, and all elements to convict on 2nd degree murder exist in 1st degree murder. This means that a jury can be given the option that if they don't think the evidence supports a 1st degree charge, they can see if it supports a 2nd degree or Manslaughter. However, they can only convict on the charge or the the most serious &quot;Lesser and Included&quot; charges. They cannot find guilt for all three for the same offense. This is not in violation of double-jeopardy as this is all presented at the same trial. Double-Jeopardy attaches once the jury is fully selected. If the jury acquits, the prosecutor cannot try for a lesser charge. They have one shot. The only time that you can be tried for the same crime a second time is if you are acquitted and it turns out that you were acquitted because the &quot;trier of fact&quot; was corruptly influenced by you or people acting on your direction to find you not guilty (the idea being since the fix was in, you were never in jeopardy to begin with). In all of American Law, this has happened exactly once, so it is very rare. Mistrials are another way to get a second trial but mistrials typically come about because of either lawyers misbehaving such that an impartial trial is no longer possible (if it's the prosecutor, they can't retry... if they could it would incentivize them to misbehave in front of a jury that is not favorable to them in the hopes of refiling and getting a more favorable jury). Mistrials rely on a legal fiction that the trial that was declared a Mistrial never happened in the first place. If the mistrial is declared on appeal, it is only to the benefit of the convicted, so it is essentially him waiving his right against Double-Jeopardy. Depending on the reason, the prosecution may not refile the case (usually because new exculpatory evidence was found) or cannot (if they did not reveal the exculpatory evidence prior to the trial). Edit: Since this is U.S. specific, it should be pointed out that in the United States, Double Jeopardy applies only to one jurisdiction. At any given time in the U.S., you are almost always under 2 jurisdictions (the state/territory's jurisdiction and the Federal government's jurisdiction) and as much as 7 (at the &quot;Four Corners&quot; you are under the Jurisdiction of four states, 2 tribal governments (which are independent of the states those reservations exist in) and the Federal Government). This means that if the state charges you with a crime and fails to properly prosecute you, the Feds can also charge you with a crime and prosecute you properly. Typically, the Federal government will prosecute you only if there are federal laws that you violated that the state has no equivalent of OR the state has done an optionally poor job of prosecuting you or properly punishing you (we're talking 30 days jail time for 1st degree murder). It is rare for the feds to go after common criminals and they only will go for them if the crime involves crossing state lines as an element of the crime OR the crime involves federal property. YOu are more likely to see federal kidnapping charges against non-custodial parents who take the kid to another state than you are Federal Murders. Typically, the Feds will be satisfied if the crime is tried in state court, no matter the result (it also helps them getting away with the Dual Jurisdiction rule. You can't challenge it if you aren't made a victim of it). To give an example of when they might come in, if a non-U.S. citizen enters the United States by way of illegal crossing of the Canada-U.S./Montana Border, and then proceeds to kill a U.S. border agent in the process and is caught by Montana State Police, who can prosecute him and for what? Montana can prosecute him for one count of 1st Degree Murder for the murder of a person under the jurisdiction of Montana (the border guard). The Federal Government can prosecute him for one count of 1st Degree Murder for the killing of a person under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Federal Government, an additional count of Murder under the Felony Murder rule (If someone dies as a result of your illegal criminal action, that death is a 1st degree Murder) or under the law against killing a federal employee while carrying out their duties (this second option might be rolled in with the killing someone under Federal Jurisdiction). Montana cannot prosecute the accused for the Felony murder because U.S. states cannot enforce immigration law. Therefore, in the eyes of Montana, the accused was not committing a crime that lead to someone's death. He just killed a man. The feds will likely have Montana take first crack at the case because Montana has more immediate access to labs and evidence than the Feds and because states tend to be quicker about this stuff. Once the case resolves, the Feds will then figure out if they want to charge him for both Murder charges and the Immigration violation, only the Felony Murder Charge and Immigration violation (and accept Montana's outcome of the similar murder charge), or just the Immigration violation (and accept the outcome of Montana's trial for both possible Federal murder charges). For academic purposes, the trial for the Immigration Charge will likely be held after the sentence for the Montana charges (if there are any) are carried out because deporting the suspect back to Canada (or his home country) will result in zero jail time because no element of the crime took place there.
Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
was there a good way to publicly shame Bob, and prevent him from getting his next job, without breaking Carol’s confidence? Apparently not. The conclusion that Bob's violations of company policy are short of breaking any laws leaves little to no reason for publicly shaming him. Details on the company policy, the facts, and the statements might make a difference, but your description is generic in that regard and would require us to speculate on what they could be. Could there have been grounds for a lawsuit? It largely depends on the terms of the publications, their veracity &amp; import, and --if false or unfounded-- their effect on Bob's prospects and/or whether the statements are defamatory per se. Would a truth defense for a statement such as, “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct,” require disclosing the investigation? Yes. A defendant has the burden to prove the [affirmative] defense(s) on which he intends to premise his position. Note that the statement “We completed an investigation of Bob for professional misconduct” in and of itself is not really a truth defense because it is inconclusive as to whether Bob was found to have incurred misconduct. The sole fact that Bob was investigated does not justify imputing to him disreputable conduct. Would a defense that the investigation gave them legitimate reasons to believe that the insinuation they made is true require them to disclose it? Yes. Bob is entitled to gather from the defendant the bases for the latter's allegations. Otherwise defamers would systematically elude their liability by sticking to generic allegations only. Are there other good defenses that could have gotten the lawsuit dismissed as frivolous? That requires us to speculate because we are given no details about the underlying events, Bob's pleadings, the evidence obtained during discovery, and so forth. That being said, a prevailing defense does not imply that the lawsuit is frivolous. Would the identities of the witnesses have been redacted? No. The fact that Bob did not break any laws suggests that the matter does not warrant measures akin to witness protection. Nor does your description reflect that the communications are protected by some privilege. Is it credible that Ethan had a good legal reason to keep this “in the family” for Carol’s sake? That is unanswerable because, inter alia, it is not about the law, it is unclear what exactly &quot;Carol's sake&quot; entails, and the substance of the company's other scandals as well as Ethan's reason(s) are unspecified. Ethan's &quot;good legal reason&quot; does not necessarily have to protect or advance &quot;Carol's sake&quot;.
The defence sees the prosecution evidence; witnesses don’t From context, it appears that Ms. DeCoutere was a prosecution witness, not the defendant. As such, she would not be privy to the evidence that either the prosecution or defence had or intended to present. No doubt both the prosecution and the defence would have known about the photograph and, I would imagine, it was introduced by the defence precisely because it contradicted the witness’ testimony. Further, revealing such evidence to her by either side would be misconduct - witnesses are supposed to recount the facts as they recall them without prompting or aide memoirs (police are an exception - they are allowed to refer to their own notebooks).