Do countries (with rule of law) exist where a court can require the legislature to vote on a law in order to clear ambiguities? I thought of this due to Roe V. Wade being recently overturned. From my understanding, (and if I am mistaken, then just take this as a hypothetical) it is not clear to everyone whether the constitution allows states to limit the right to abortions. So when Roe V. Wade was originally ruled on, the judges had to use their best logic and assumptions to determine what the ruling should be. If there was a way for supreme court judges to resolve ambiguities, by forcing congress to vote on whether states can limit the right to abortions, then after however the law was voted, the judges could just rule in accordance to that new law. This obviously does not make the ruling set in stone. Just like any law, the law could later be repealed, or a new law in the future can modify that previous law. Similarly, the state supreme court could send a bill to the state legislature to resolve an ambiguous law. I realise that this is not the case in America. However, are there any political entities (countries, states, counties, ...) where the court can require their respective legislative to vote on a law in order to clear ambiguities?
germanycivil-law there was a way for supreme court judges to resolve ambiguities The Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), through a Verfassungsbeschwerde (constitutional complaint), can determine that an existing law is not clear enough or is not complete and require the legislature to make changes. In the quoted case below, the law contains measures up to 2030. Since the complainant is young, the court cannot determine if the complaint is justified due to the lack of detail of what will happen after 2030. The legislature (Gesetzgeber, Bundestag) is required add these details to the law by the 2022-12-31. The complaint is considered partially successful since not all aspects have been taken into account when the law was written. 2021-04-29: Bundesverfassungsgericht - Presse - Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen das Klimaschutzgesetz teilweise erfolgreich Mit heute veröffentlichtem Beschluss hat der Erste Senat des Bundesverfassungsgerichts entschieden, dass die Regelungen des Klimaschutzgesetzes vom 12. Dezember 2019 (Klimaschutzgesetz ) über die nationalen Klimaschutzziele und die bis zum Jahr 2030 zulässigen Jahresemissionsmengen insofern mit Grundrechten unvereinbar sind, als hinreichende Maßgaben für die weitere Emissionsreduktion ab dem Jahr 2031 fehlen. Im Übrigen wurden die Verfassungsbeschwerden zurückgewiesen. With a decision published today, the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the provisions of the Climate Protection Act of December 12, 2019 (Climate Protection Act ) on national climate protection targets and the annual emission levels permitted up to 2030 are incompatible with fundamental rights insofar as they are sufficient standards for the further emission reduction from the year 2031 is missing. Otherwise, the constitutional complaints were dismissed. ... Der Gesetzgeber ist verpflichtet, die Fortschreibung der Minderungsziele der Treibhausgasemissionen für Zeiträume nach 2030 bis zum 31. Dezember 2022 näher zu regeln. The legislature is obliged to regulate the updating of the reduction targets for greenhouse gas emissions for periods after 2030 in more detail by the December 31, 2022. Sources: Bundesverfassungsgericht - Verfassungsbeschwerde Bundesverfassungsgericht - Constitutional complaints 2021-04-29: Bundesverfassungsgericht - Presse - Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen das Klimaschutzgesetz teilweise erfolgreich
Courts have inherent jurisdiction to reconsider/recall their own decisions. This rarely happens (especially if the decision has already been &quot;sealed&quot; i.e. issued in writing) but still possible. The principle of finality only applies to parties asking courts to reconsider; it does not constrain courts themselves. So, in this example, &quot;the judge agrees to vacate them&quot; but that decision hasn't been sealed yet. The judge can easily just change their mind (although, again, it rarely happens). No double jeopardy applies because it is still the same trial.
Why does someone need to know? Supreme Court decisions are effective to all cases at trial or on direct appeal when decided, so long as the issue it resolves are raised in the trial court. Judges generally don't suspend cases because a case that could change the law is pending. If the decision comes out shortly after the trial, the judge can overturn the result in a post-trial motion. If the decision comes out later, the issue can be raised on appeal. A smart plaintiff raises favorable issues that could be decided in his or her favor in pending appellate cases to leave the door open for that possibility. If the law is unsettled, the judge makes a best guess about how the higher courts will resolve it and is effectively free to choose either outcome knowing that the result is uncertain. If there is binding precedent on an issue at the time, the judge must follow it, even if there is a likelihood that it could be reversed on appeal. People are presumed to know the law, but it's not possible to know what future decisions the Supreme Court of the USA will make. Therefore, the existing written precedents should be relied upon in their present form, and the case at trial should continue without delay. This kind of consideration is mostly relevant only in cases of &quot;qualified immunity&quot; and in certain kinds of federal habeas corpus petitions (which collaterally attack criminal convictions affirmed on direct appeal). In those cases, law enforcement conduct is not punished, and judicial decisions are not overturned, unless there was clearly established law at the time the decision was made that made the law enforcement conduct unconstitutional, or make the judicial decision a wrongly decided one. In all other contexts, what was believed to be the law at the time an action was taken, or a judicial decision was made, doesn't matter.
The Supremacy Clause. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2: This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. [emphasis mine] This is also known as the "Supremacy Clause" of the U.S. Constitution. It prevents any law of any state from acting contrary to the federal constitution. A comment correctly cites multiple cases that use this clause, in part, as the basis for SCOTUS' authority to review State Supreme Court decisions. So in your hypothetical, the federal issue in play is the clarity of the federal constitution which supersedes state law.
The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.
It is probably illegal in all of the jurisdictions in the US where a fetus is legally declared to be a person and where the murder statutes are written to not explicitly exclude abortion: that is, in no jurisdictions. No law existing or proposed for Georgia specifically addresses "travel for the purpose of getting an abortion". The underlying theory behind the claim (advocated by some Georgia attorneys) is that a person may be open to a conspiracy charge for taking a woman to another state to get an abortion, which would be a crime if committed in Georgia. If a conspiracy exists in Georgia to do something illegal (in Georgia), that is a violation of OCGA 16-4-8 ("when he together with one or more persons conspires to commit any crime and any one or more of such persons does any overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy"). The substantially same law exists in Washington, and most if not all other states. The theory is apparently that "conspire to commit a crime" means something like "conspire to perform an act which would be a crime if performed in in this jurisdiction", e.g. "purchase marijuana, or take a job at certain payday loan companies". No state has successfully claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction, where a Georgia resident can be prosecuted in Georgia for a legal act carried out in another state, so this theory is a bit of a stretch.
Can a state make a law that deputizes individuals to sue individuals in other states? This question (apart from the question below that implicates federalism concerns about a sister state court process in the secondary question below) would be resolved by the constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction and choice of law. A state can have a law that authorizes a lawsuit for non-judicial system conduct against a non-resident of the state if it meets the requirements of &quot;long arm jurisdiction.&quot; The most succinct description of this requirement is that the person being sued &quot;personally availed themselves&quot; of the laws of the state whose law authorizes the lawsuit, in a manner that would reasonably be understood to subject that person to the state's legal authority. This could involve a lawsuit against someone outside the state arising from an incident that took place in the state. It could also involve a lawsuit against someone who took tortious action directed at a state or people in a state that caused harm, or a lawsuit arising from a business transaction that could reasonably be considered doing business in the state imposing that law. Constitutional law requirements on &quot;choice of law&quot; require that the state or foreign jurisdiction whose law is applied to a question in a dispute must have some meaningful connection to the disputed issue (subject to the backdrop rule that the law of a jurisdiction other than the forum where a case is litigated is presumed to be identical to that of the law of the state where the case is being litigated if no party provides any evidence or legal authorities to the contrary). Case law on state level qui tam litigation (which involve statutes that empower private individuals to sue someone who has wronged the government on its behalf for a share of the amount recovered for the government), the case law regarding private criminal prosecutions that are available in a handful of U.S. states, and some California consumer protection laws (which authorize suits without personal showing of actual damages in some cases when there are fraudulent advertisements) might also be relevant. So would the authority granted to bail bondsmen that is similar to law enforcement authority but limited to people authorized a person posting a bail bond for a criminal defendant who is subject to that authority. Concretely, if the constitutionality of the Texas law was upheld&lt;1&gt;, Texas probably can authorize a lawsuit against a California resident who would be involved in an abortion that took place in Texas that was illegal under Texas law. And, a judgment from a Texas court in a case like that would probably be entitled to full faith and credit in California. But, Texas probably couldn't constitutionally authorize a lawsuit against a California resident in connection with an abortion that took place in California. There would be, of course, many edge cases with no close past precedents, where the application of constitutional jurisdiction and choice of law limitations would be far less clear. &lt;1&gt; The majority opinion by five conservative justices other than the Chief Justice deciding not to stay enforcement of the law specifically limits itself to whether the proper parties were joined to the request to enjoin the statute and states &quot;this order is not based on any conclusion about the constitutionality of Texas’s law, and in no way limits other procedurally proper challenges to the Texas law, including in Texas state courts.&quot; A decision that has not been resolved on the merits. The Courts have merely declined to stay enforcement of the law pending the current litigation over the law's validity. Upholding the law on the merits would require courts to overturn existing precedents related to abortion restrictions and other legal issues. Is there any extra legal barrier that would prevent states with pro-choice legislatures from passing laws designed to counter the anti-abortion deputies? For example, California could pass a law that deputizes private California individuals to sue people who sue abortion providers, and could reimburse their court costs up to $10,000. This seems to be a separate question from the question in the title. A law of this character would probably not be upheld. Basically, it would make a state authorized legal process in one state's courts, actionable as illegal in another state. Generally speaking, interference in another state's legal process would either violate the &quot;dormant commerce clause&quot;, or the &quot;full faith and credit clause&quot;, or constitutional limits on jurisdiction and choice of law, or constitutional standing limitations (even though they don't apply in the same way in state courts as in federal courts, or the &quot;due process clause&quot; of the 5th or 14th Amendments, or the &quot;privileges and immunities clause.&quot; The exact legal theory isn't clear because there is really not history of litigation over this kind of legislation and you'd need to resort to vaguely analogous cases. The effort of Texas to litigate Pennsylvania election law administration following the 2020 election was recently dismissed by the U.S. Supreme Court for lack of standing and that is suggestive of how this case might be resolved, even though it isn't strictly analogous. It is also informed by the long standing common law rule, that could conceivably have constitutional dimensions, that litigants participating in a court process in good faith are immune from collateral litigation in another lawsuit over their conduct in the original lawsuit. There isn't a lot of precedent one way or the other with laws having this kind of purpose, and none on a law exactly in this form. Indeed, a dissenting opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court yesterday by the Chief Justice and two of the liberal justices (with which the third liberal justice states he agrees without formally joining that opinion) stated that: The statutory scheme before the Court is not only unusual, but unprecedented. The legislature has imposed a prohibition on abortions after roughly six weeks, and then essentially delegated enforcement of that prohibition to the populace at large. The last time there was significant litigation of laws with a similar purpose that were adjudicated was in the pre-U.S. Civil War period in abolition of slavery oriented legislation. But, the post-Civil War amendments to the U.S. Constitution and subsequent development of constitutional case law would render most precedents from that time period infirm.
Art. 1 Sect 5 of the Constitution empowers both houses to make their own rules. That means that they can articulate rules regarding what or how you can talk on the floor. It is held that the president of the senate can issue a ruling, and the ruling can be overridden by majority vote. If the Constitution were amended to be more specific about rules of conduct, then some such Senate rules might be unconstitutional and SCOTUS could invalidate the rule. The only specific constitutional requirement on conducting business is that a majority constitutes a quorum.