Ambiguous speed limit after passing a T-junction Consider the intersection between Fitzgerald St and Angove St in North Perth, Western Australia (left-hand traffic). This is a T-junction, with Fitzgerald St being the continuing road and Angove St being the terminating road. The speed limit along Fitzgerald St northbound approaching the intersection is 40 km/h (pink), due to an earlier sign. The speed limit along Fitzgerald St northbound 20 metres after the intersection is 60 km/h (green), as signed explicitly. The speed limit along the Angove St approach is 50 km/h (blue), the default speed limit in a built-up area. What is the speed limit along the &quot;ambiguous portion&quot; (yellow) of Fitzgerald St northbound, that is, the 30-metre portion of Fitzgerald St from the left-turning lane of Angove St up to the 60-sign? Suppose Alice travels on Fitzgerald St northbound, and drives straight through the intersection. Alice would conclude that the speed limit along the ambiguous portion (yellow) is 40 km/h, since the earlier 40-sign on Fitzgerald St applies all the way up to the 60-sign. Suppose Bob approaches on Angove St and turns left into Fitzgerald St northbound. Bob knows nothing about the earlier 40-sign, and only ever sees the 60-sign on Fitzgerald St after the intersection, and could conclude either: The speed limit along the ambiguous portion (yellow) is 60 km/h, since the 60-sign is consistent with all of Fitzgerald St being a 60-zone (which was indeed the case before 2016); or The speed limit along the ambiguous portion (yellow) is 50 km/h, since it is an unsigned portion of a built-up area. Either way, Bob concludes that the speed limit along the ambiguous portion is greater than 40 km/h. In practice it is unlikely that Bob, after completing the left turn, could actually manage to accelerate to a speed greater than 40 km/h within the 20-metre ambiguous portion up to the 60-sign. But it seems that the speed limit in the ambiguous portion is ill-defined, meaning that Alice (going straight ahead) might be able to get away with doing 50 km/h or 60 km/h. Relevant parts of Road Traffic Code 2000: Part 1 — Preliminary 3. Terms and abbreviations used (1) speed zone means a length of carriageway defined at its beginning by means of a speed limit sign, and at its end by means of — (a) a de‑restriction sign or an “end speed limit” sign; or (b) another speed limit sign; or (c) an “area speed limit” sign, a “school zone” sign or a “heavy vehicle speed zone” sign; or (d) a T‑intersection where that carriageway ends; Part 3 — Speed restrictions 11. Speed limits generally (2) A person must not drive a vehicle in a built‑up area, at a speed exceeding 50 km/h, except within a speed zone in which a higher speed is permitted. Points and modified penalty: see regulation 17.
40km/h There is no ambiguity. The speed limit on the through road is clear and the speed limit on the side road is irrelevant. The fact that Bob may be legitimately unaware that this is the speed limit doesn’t matter either. If you want to ask if Bob has a defence if issued with an infringement notice, please feel free to post a new question.
In all honesty, this completely depends on the judge you happen to get that will hear your case. There's no straight-forward "yes this will work" or "no this won't work" answer in a case like this. But a couple things to keep in mind: The fact that he was from out of town doesn't matter. If signs were displayed, then he has to obey the signs. Your argument about the placement of the signs may or may not work, again depending on the judge. But make sure you take more evidence than just some numbers derived from guess work (you'll need pictures of where the car was parked, where the signs are at, and exact measurement between the two signs and the vehicle, pictures of obstructions, etc). It's up to you to decide whether collecting all of that is worth the $45. Someone has to pay the ticket. You cannot just go to court and get it dismissed because you weren't driving. By default, the parking ticket obligation falls onto the owner of the vehicle. If you know you weren't driving, you can then request the person who was to reimburse you, or even sue them for reimbursement if they refuse. Continuing from #2, in some jurisdictions and especially if the parking ticket was issued by a private company (like at a strip mall) that doesn't use police enforcement for parking, you can provide them with the name and address of the person who was driving and have them re-send the ticket to the correct person, but not always. However, relying on this is a bad idea. The ticket, while issued to another person, is still attached to your vehicle and if the other person refuses to pay, it's your vehicle that will be impounded, booted, etc if the ticket is left delinquent. Then you just have even more hassles to deal with. Having outstanding tickets for your vehicle could also affect your insurance premiums. Don't let this linger for too long. Get on top of it and decide what the two of you are going to do as soon as possible.
My own answer to the question is yes, but not directly. As with many other laws it would take a court ruling to definitively spell out how international agreements are applicable to a given situation. Unfortunately it doesn't seem that such a court ruling was ever produced so far: Google Scholar fails to list any US court cases relevant to the Convention on Road Traffic. The only somewhat relevant case is Busby v. State in which the court rules that one cannot drive in Alaska with an IDP after having been previously restricted from driving in Alaska. The court does stress out that: The Convention does forbid a signatory country (or subsidiary state) from imposing or enforcing license revocations in a manner that discriminates against residents of other signatory countries. But Busby does not claim that he was the victim of such discrimination. Busby's license was revoked for conduct that would have led to license revocation if committed by an Alaska resident. (Indeed, Busby's license was revoked while he was an Alaska resident.) And Busby does not claim that he was singled out for prosecution because he was a resident of a foreign country—i.e., that the State would not have charged him with the offense of driving with a revoked license if he had still been an Alaska resident. This could possibly mean that the court believes that the Convention only applies to foreign residents, but its not spelled out specifically. Searching for Canadian court cases likewise doesn't turn up anything useful. The only relevant case is R. v. Lawend where the person in question was trying to drive in Ontario on a foreign license after previously having had their Ontario license suspended. Here the court rules similar to the decision in Alaska in that having a foreign license does not allow one to circumvent locally imposed license restrictions. Searching for UK case law doesn't turn up any relevant court cases. Australian case law is likewise mute on the subject. There is also a relevant legal opinion by the Department of State quoted in the Digest of United States practice in International Law, 2002: Reading these provisions as a whole, we believe that the State of Georgia, consistent with the CRT, (1) must permit an alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license issued by a country party to the CRT only if the alien has been lawfully admitted to the United States; (2) must permit a lawfully admitted alien to drive in Georgia using a foreign driver’s license of a CRT party only during the first year after the alien’s admission; and (3) may, in accordance with Georgia’s residency laws, require an alien resident in Georgia to obtain a Georgia driver’s license as a condition for continued authorization to drive. By the same token, nothing in the CRT would prevent the State of Georgia from applying more liberal rules with respect to the driving privileges of aliens. In Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 2014 the author further analyses how the 1949 Geneva Convention is applicable within the United States. First, to settle the definition of "international traffic": Nonetheless, the United States ultimately accepted that “the purpose of chapter II was to establish, in effect, an international code of minimum safety requirements. By indirection, the rules of the road set forth in the convention would apply to the pattern of domestic as well as to international traffic. The author the meaning behind Article I of the Convention: Article 1 states in part that no party “shall be required to extend the benefit of the provisions of this Convention to any motor vehicle or trailer, or to any driver having remained within its territory for a continuous period exceeding one year.” This provision, on its face, indicates that the parties recognized that the treaty would benefit individuals. In no way does this recognition compel a conclusion that the Convention is self-executing, but it does suggest that the treaty is of a type that the Senate might have understood to be directly enforceable. And finally on the issue of whether or not the treaty is "self-executing": For these reasons, it is likely that courts will continue to treat the Geneva Convention as self-executing. Nonetheless, a court might conclude that, with respect to section II’s rules of the road, the governmental obligation is merely to “take appropriate measures” and that such an obligation is too vague to be enforced judicially. So it seems absolutely clear that the Convention intended for participating countries to allow foreign drivers to drive abroad for up to one year. However international treaties are not self-executing by default in Canada, unlike the US: Canada is bound by the terms of treaties that it enters into and breach thereof may give rise to international claims. However, in Canada treaties are not self-executing; they do not constitute part of the law of the land merely by virtue of their conclusion. So even though British Columbia is violating the 1949 Geneva Convention one cannot directly rely on said international agreement to enforce their rights. But another state party could theorethically sue Canada on behalf of its citizen to request that Canada rectifies its laws with accordance to the agreement.
The Highway Code said: Vehicles. Any vehicle driven by a learner MUST display red L plates. In Wales, either red D plates, red L plates, or both, can be used. Plates MUST conform to legal specifications and MUST be clearly visible to others from in front of the vehicle and from behind. Plates should be removed or covered when not being driven by a learner (except on driving school vehicles). [Law MV(DL)R reg 16 &amp; sched 4] The good old Highway Code "Must" vs "Should". "Must" means that it is a legal issue, anything that is "Should" is only advisory
As a linguist who reads laws for a hobby, I would say that "and" legally means what it was intended to mean. There are often interpretive statutes which say that "and" can be read as "or" or vice versa, when necessary (as in ORC 1.02 "And" may be read "or," and "or" may be read "and" if the sense requires it. Delaware doesn't have that as a rule, but it is a rule employed by courts "as required". One approach to interpretation is to discern intent from surrounding text, so we would look at the whole code. The general context is the rule that "A building or land shall be used only for the following purposes". Following Article XXVII of the code, other uses could be permitted because "§115-32. Special use exceptions may be permitted by the Board of Adjustment and in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVII of this chapter and may include...". That section ends with "C:Other special use exceptions as follows", and includes "Private garages for more than four automobiles and with floor area of more than 900 square feet in a residential district". From the list of things enumerated in §115-32, there is no coherent pattern – some things are in the list of special exceptions, some things are in this list, some not. So the "surrounding text" approach doesn't help in this case. Scrutiny of legislative debate is sometimes invoked, especially at the federal level, but there is negligible chance that there is any such evidence here. The almost-final approach is to spell out the competing interpretations, and see if anything jumps out as ridiculous (because it is assumed that lawmakers do not pass ridiculous laws). The two interpretations are "both must be true", versus "one must be true". Since the general rule is that you can go ahead unless it is restricted, then with the "both" interpretation, you need a special exception permit if you simultaneously plan to have more than 4 automobiles (which means, 5+, so 4 is allowed) and floor area greater than 900 sf. Thus if you plan for only 4 cars, or can fit the 5 cars into 900 sf, then you would not require a permit (on the "both" interpretation). Which btw is the literal interpretation of "and". This is not an absurd scenario (using a generous 10'x18' space, which I derived from parking slot regulations in Danbury CT). So it is reasonable to think they meant "both". The "either of these" interpretation says that they are being even more restrictive – you need permission to have a 5+ car garage (regardless of size), and you need permission to have a garage larger than 800 sf (even if there were only 1 car in it). This seems a bit specific since there isn't generally a size restriction on structures in the code – except that playhouses are limited to 150 sf. and can't be tall enough for an adult to stand up. Since the literal meaning of "and" is "both at once", and since no facts about the code say otherwise (i.e. that interpretation does not result in an absurd nullification of some other provision), an objective court should interpret this rule to mean "both at once", thus the government imposes the fewest restrictions on your property. No way to know what they will do.
It could be the passenger's problem or the taxi's problem When these sorts of breakdowns in communications happen in specifying contract terms then either or both parties can be at fault. If the passenger specified the wrong address then it is clearly the passenger at fault. Similarly, if the driver drove to a different address from what the passenger said, it would clearly be the driver at fault. However, if the passenger was imprecise and the driver made an assumption then who bears responsibility depends on whether that assumption is reasonable or not. For example, the main street in the Sydney, Australia CBD is George Street. Even though George Street is an extremely common name with literally dozens in the Greater Sydney area, a taxi driver would reasonably assume that a passenger at the airport asking for &quot;George Street&quot; means the one in the city, not any of the others. In such a circumstance, the onus is on the passenger to specify exactly where they want to go. Whether the driver is an employee or a contractor is irrelevant - they are the representative of the organisation with whom the passenger has a contract.
No. Such a marking is equivalent to a solid double yellow line, and passing is not permitted. These raised pavement markers are known as Botts' dots and are commonly used in California together with, or instead of, painted lines. A line of evenly spaced dots is meant to signify a solid line. Since here there is a double line of dots, it is a solid double yellow line. If passing were allowed, you would see a single yellow dashed line, which would be indicated with dots by a group of 3-4 evenly spaced dots, then a longer gap, and repeating. California Vehicle Code section 21460 provides as follows: (a) If double parallel solid yellow lines are in place, a person driving a vehicle shall not drive to the left of the lines, except as permitted in this section. [...] (e) Raised pavement markers may be used to simulate painted lines described in this section if the markers are placed in accordance with standards established by the Department of Transportation. The relevant standards are found in the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). On page 655, Detail 23, you can see a diagram showing exactly this configuration of dots and stating that it is an alternative to a solid double yellow line. It appears that current policy is to phase out the use of Botts' dots, so this question may become moot in the future.
California Vehicle Code chapter 11, division 7, article 1, section 22350: No person shall drive a vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent having due regard for weather, visibility, the traffic on, and the surface and width of, the highway, and in no event at a speed which endangers the safety of persons or property. Section 22358.5: It is the intent of the Legislature that physical conditions such as width, curvature, grade and surface conditions, or any other condition readily apparent to a driver, in the absence of other factors, would not require special downward speed zoning, as the basic rule of section 22350 is sufficient regulation as to such conditions. Without knowing exactly what questions the officer was asked, it's impossible to know why you were ticketed and why you were found guilty, but "reasonable or prudent" and "endangers the safety of [others]" covers a great deal of ground.