Is refusing service to unvaccinated equal to a vaccination mandate? Yesterday, Texas Governor Greg Abbott issued Executive Order GA-40 that says: No entity in Texas can compel receipt of a COVID-19 vaccine by any individual, including an employee or a consumer, who objects to such vaccination for any reason of personal conscience, based on a religious belief, or for medical reasons, including prior recovery from COVID-19. The American Contract Bridge League is planning on hosting its national tournament in Austin next month. Their safety protocols for the tournament state: In accordance with the city of Austin’s current safety requirements to minimize COVID-19 exposure and spread, face masks must be worn at all times in the tournament area. Additionally, participants of any NABC event must be fully vaccinated and will be required to show proof of their COVID-19 vaccine status. We will notify attendees at a later date with details on how to verify their vaccination status to ensure the verification process is as seamless as possible. Many of the prospective attendees are wondering whether the EO prohibits ACBL from implementing this requirement. IANAL, but my opinion is that it doesn't. Denying service to an unvaccinated individual is not the same as compelling them to get vaccinated. As a precedent, I refer to the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision, which allowed a cake shop to refuse to sell a wedding cake to for a same-sex wedding; they weren't forcing the couple to stop being gay. And it's not a civil rights violation, as being unvaccinated is not a protected class. Is my interpretation reasonable?
I think that is not a &quot;reasonable&quot; interpretation of the order, but that's separate from the question of what will be enforced. Focusing on the word of the order, No entity in Texas can compel receipt of a COVID-19 vaccine by any individual, including an employee or a consumer What does it mean to &quot;compel&quot; a person to do something? A court can compel a person to stay in jail for some period of time, and can order the police to use force to enforce that requirement – that's the classical example of compulsion. Nobody except the police can compel a consumer to do anything. All of the words of the order have to be given meaning, and it is not reasonable to say that &quot;compel&quot; is limited to &quot;actions backed up by police action&quot;. The government does not separately compel &quot;consumers&quot; and &quot;employees&quot; to do things. In order to sensibly interpret &quot;compel&quot; and &quot;consumer&quot;, this has to interpreted as including things other than &quot;pointing a gun at a person&quot;. The only sensible interpretation is one that includes denying service to those who do not comply. In addition, the series of &quot;Whereas's&quot; clearly indicate a ban on &quot;no shots, no service&quot; conditions. It remains to be seen in court whether this is found to be enforceable (via the &quot;failure to comply&quot; clause, exactly analogous to other emergency powers allowing restrictions on gatherings etc. previously).
If correctly structured, probably First, there is no issue with escorts in Canada. If you are in Toronto and need a plus one for the big gala dinner, you can hire a date provided sexual gratification is not part of the deal. An NDA as part of that sort of contract would be fine. Similarly, in jurisdictions where sex work is legal, there’s also no problem. So, we will just focus on contracts where one of the fundamental obligations involves an illegality. This doesn’t have to be prostitution, it could be a contract for murder, or the supply of illicit drugs, or the supply of unpasteurised milk. One of the requirements for a valid contract is legality of objects. A contract for an illegal purpose is void. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Therefore, an NDA that was a term of such a contract is also void. However, an NDA that was a separate contract, even a collateral contract, would be enforceable because NDAs do not have illegal objects. This can probably best be illustrated by an example. Let's imagine there is an establishment where people can go for food, drink, entertainment, and socialise - we'll call it the club. As part of the contract for using the club or being an employee or supplier to the club or its patrons, there is an NDA not to reveal anything that happens in or is associated with the club. There is no reason to believe that this NDA would not be a valid and enforceable contract - subject to the normal laws that limit such agreements. Now, if visitors entered other agreements that were void, with each other or with the club - such as for the supply of sex or illegal drugs - this would not, on its own invalidate the NDA contained in the other contract. If a court decided that the whole operation was a sham and that the club was merely a front for a brothel, they may find the original contract is void as being against public policy or, it quite likely may be an irrelevancy, because people engaged in a joint criminal enterprise have very few rights against one another anyway. However, if the club is primarily a legitimate business, then there would be no reason to impugn the original contract.
For a contract (including ToS) to be valid, one of the things it must have is "legality of objects". That is, if the contract purports to require anything that is unlawful in the jurisdiction then (barring a severance clause) it is not a contract. In common law countries, the starting point is that people are free to contract for and about anything they like - a contract is simply a mechanism for exchanging value between the parties on whatever terms they wish. However, judges and legislatures have decided that there are some things you cannot trade and some terms that are unconscionable or against the public interest and these vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction*. For example, a contract is not legal in any jurisdiction if its terms seek to exclude the intervention of the courts - this is against public policy. So for example, a binding arbitration clause requiring the parties to accept a private arbitrator's decision as final excludes the courts, yes? Well, in Australia, yes, such clauses if used in a contract between parties with different bargaining power (like a Telco and its customers) are invalid because they prevent the weaker party pursuing a class action. However, they are perfectly legal in the United States because the SCOTUS has determined that the customer can persue litigation after arbitration is finished so this doesn't impede the courts. These are essentially the same laws interpreted by the courts so that they have totally opposite effects. So this might lead you to think that you'll put one in - it'll be OK in the US and Australians will represent such a tiny share of your market that you don't care if I can't enforce my ToS there. Except, if your website is visible by Australians, you have just exposed yourself to a government fine of up to AUD 5,000,000 (say USD 3,000,000) per day for breach of Australian Consumer Law. As a general guide (which is very stereotypical), US jurisdictions are the most permissive in the rights they will allow their citizens to give up: the US attitude is that everyone is free to make the best deal they can. European jurisdictions are the least permissive in this regard: most European countries follow a more social welfare state model and the citizen needs protecting from themselves. Commonwealth countries tend to be more in the middle.
Welcome to LSE. Here are some answers to your question: No! It's not even close, but something like it is. The OSHA standard you cite is for mercury in the air in the workplace. You ask about &quot;injections,&quot; which do not involve mercury in the air, so: this standard does not apply to injections. You ask about &quot;injecting your employees with thiomersal.&quot; With only a few exceptions (for those helping diabetics, etc, and emergencies), all states require that licensed health care professionals administer injections, and then, only under a prescription. (For example, thiomersal is mostly used in vaccines. All states require licensed health professionals to administer vaccines.) So: Unless you are a licensed health professional with a prescription, you cannot inject your employees with thiomersal. However, OSHA has interpreted its rules and regulations to allow employees to require vaccines in some circumstances, such as a pandemic. To the extent these vaccines contain thiomersal, employers can require employees to get injected with thiomersal by a licensed health professional.
According to the EEOC, in general: An employee cannot be forced to participate (or not participate) in a religious activity as a condition of employment. But how religious is this party? Simply calling it a "Christmas party" (or "holiday party") doesn't really make it a "religious activity". Many nonreligious people celebrate Christmas as a general holiday. If the party is nonreligious, then your religion is mostly irrelevant, whether or not it celebrates a winter holiday. The law requires an employer or other covered entity to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would cause more than a minimal burden on the operations of the employer's business. This means an employer may be required to make reasonable adjustments to the work environment that will allow an employee to practice his or her religion. So, they'd likely have to serve something you could eat if they're serving food, as that would be a reasonable accommodation. (But you'd have to inform them of your needs beforehand; asking them to go out and buy something during the party would probably not be "reasonable".)
You say: the school expects him to create a public Twitter account, with his real information, in order to promote the program &amp; the results of the program. This is a cut-and-dried case of compelled speech. Your son is being required to say certain things in public in order to pass this course. The Supreme Court has decided that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate". This is subject to the legitimate interests of the school, but it is hard to see how compelled speech on Twitter can be defended as a legitimate interest. You also say this is to "promote the program and the results of the program". It sounds like the students are being required to say certain things about the course. If your son were to create the account and then post only material critical of the school, such as complaints about compelled speech, would that result in a passing grade? It sounds like it might be an issue. Compelled speech at school was considered by the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which is the case about students being required to salute the flag. They found that requiring students to salute the flag was unconstitutional. Public education, according to the Court, should “not strangle the free mind at its source [or] teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.” Instead, education should enable students to make informed choices about what to believe. From the judgement itself: the refusal of these persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The sole conflict is between authority and rights of the individual. That is very much the case here. Your son's refusal to make the required public speech is not causing any difficulty for the school authorities. In conclusion, your son has made a decision not to create a Twitter account under his own name and say certain things within that account. This is entirely his constitutional right. You might consider contacting the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), who have a history of engaging in cases like this. The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) might also be interested. Edit: Zack Lipton in comments below makes the point that much student work can be considered a kind of compelled speech (e.g. "Write an essay on Hamlet" or "Submit an entry to this poetry competition") and asks how this is different. Its a good question, and I have to say it does suggest that there is a difference of degree rather than kind. However I would argue that posting to an international forum widely used by adults is a different matter to a school assembly, or even a national essay competition. It would also depend a great deal on what has to be posted to get a passing grade.
There is, in most countries at least, no law requiring a business to treat a customer fairly. In general, a business may refuse to serve a would-be customer for any reason or none, provided that the reason is not membership in a protected class (racial, religious, ethnic, or sexual bias, mostly). Exactly which classes are protected depends on the local law (in the US, there can be such laws at all of federal, state, and municipal levels). If a customer is asked to leave and does not do so, s/he could be charged with defiant trespass (or local equivalent). More likely, security, or the police, could simply escort the customer out of the business, using as much force as is reasonably needed for that purpose. Unless there are grounds for action not mentioned, I see no basis for a successful suit by the customer.
This article is a useful introduction to restrictions on political advertising in the EU, where §3.4 (p 33) covers Italy. Silenzio elettorale is covered by art 9. of Norme per la disciplina della propaganda elettorale. The statutory situation is not entirely clear to me, but the main controlling fact relevant to the internet question is that AGCOM issues rules. An English legal analysis (from an Italian law firm) is here. Their undernourished analysis of the silence period is Finally, Italian legislation prohibits political propaganda on election day and on the day before. Although AGCOM is not competent for ascertaining infringements of said prohibition, it considers important to call everyone to turn the attention on these provisions. Indeed, they are important to guarantee effective protections of the constituents. As such, in the Authority’s opinion, the prohibition applies to all media. Clearly, the law applies to internet platforms. What is not clear is whether the prohibition as applied to web pages is against &quot;adding content&quot;, or does it require the elimination of previously-distributed content and scrubbing of links to such content. Perhaps the matter will be clarified in court one day.