How would the amount of &quot;latitude&quot; that is allowed a defense attorney be determined under the following? This situation is seen most often on TV legal shows like Perry Mason and Matlock, but is seen from time to time in real life. The prosecution is trying to show that Y killed X. The usual means are to demonstrate motive, means, and opportunity. All those weight against the defendant. The &quot;standard&quot; defense is to dispute one or more elements of the foregoing. But in this instance, the defense attorney uses an &quot;indirect&quot; defense; that Z had similar means, motive and opportunity to do the deed, thereby casting &quot;reasonable doubt&quot; on Y's guilt. The prosecution objects: &quot;Z is not on trial here, only Y.&quot; What are the canons of trial law that govern how far the defense can go to &quot;put Z on trial&quot; in order to defend Y? (Let's say that Z is the prosecution's star witness, but someone who might have been given immunity in exchange for testimony against Y.) Or is it a matter that is largely left to the discretion of the judge?
Offering up evidence that another person committed a crime is a standard and accepted, although rare, criminal defense strategy. It is mostly not used very much because most crimes for which defendants are charged were not committed by somebody else, and because most innocent defendants lack the investigative and economic resources to identify enough information about another potential suspect to present such a case credibly. The defense would have to articulate to the judge that the reason for offering up evidence about Z is to support Y's theory of the case that Z and not Y committed the crime, in order to overcome a relevance objection. But, the defendant had wide latitude to do so in order to create a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. In most circumstances, it would be a reversible abuse of discretion to prevent the defendant from introducing evidence to support a theory of this kind. A similar strategy, for example, was recently used in a preliminary hearing in a case involving a high profile murder in Colorado where a man stands accused to murdering his wife (the man is Barry Morphew) has developed a theory that his wife was murdered by someone else based in part, for example, on the evidence of unidentified DNA near the murder scene allegedly associated with previous crimes in DNA databases.
Your question convolutes a number of different circumstances and legal questions. When is a person justified in using deadly force against a driver? When the person can convince a prosecutor, judge, or jury that a reasonable person would consider it necessary to prevent grievous bodily harm (and other situation-dependent defenses &ndash; for more nuance see self-defense). When can a law enforcement officer assault people with his vehicle? When he his performing official duties, and is performing them in a manner reasonably consistent with his training and official obligations. When can a driver assault people with his vehicle? When the driver can convince an inquiry that a reasonable person would consider it either not an act of assault, or else a justified act of self-defense. When are pedestrians liable for collisions with vehicles? When they are obstructing or infringing a traffic right-of-way; or when a judicial inquiry determines that they are at fault. Pedestrians in such situations could also be cited for many other offenses (Disorderly Conduct, Jaywalking, etc.).
The standard of proof for civil cases in Texas is generally &quot;preponderance of evidence&quot;. See in re Steven Lipsky for some discussion. The applicable evidentiary standard is generally determined by the nature of the case or particular claim. Criminal cases require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a near certainty, whereas civil cases typically apply the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, that is, a fact-finder’s determination that the plaintiff’s version of the events is more likely than not true. Some civil claims, including some defamation claims, elevate the evidentiary standard to require proof by clear- and-convincing evidence. See Sec. 171.208 of SB8. There is no specific statutory specification of the evidentiary standard, therefore the standard is &quot;preponderance of evidence&quot; (compare Lipsky: the issue is that the statute refers to &quot;clear and specific evidence&quot; which is not defines in the statute or elsewhere, hence that lawsuit).
In the United States, prohibition against double jeopardy is a constitutional protection. As long as one was actually at jeopardy for an offence by a particular sovereign, that sovereign may not subsequently prosecute the accused for the same wrong. In other jurisdictions, such as the U.K., it has a less strict form, even though generally, special pleas of autrefois acquit would be available. It is also not the case that after an apparent &quot;confession&quot; in public that there is &quot;no doubt&quot; about a person's guilt. No evidence is &quot;certain&quot; in law without being tested in court. Also, you propose: you were tried for murder and acquitted - then you go out and publicly admit that they were wrong, you did actually murder that person This does not put the acquittal into question. The prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. This means at law that one is deemed to be not guilty. Your scenario does not show that the trier of fact was &quot;wrong&quot; about the prosecution failing to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not an avenue by which the prosecution can challenge an acquittal. If a properly instructed trier of fact finds that that the prosecution did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, this conclusion is unassailable. You ask &quot;where is the justice?&quot; The justice of a system is assessed by its application across the totality of cases. Given that a system of prosecuting and judging that is run through humans will inevitably produce errors, the law has developed to promote a measure of &quot;justice&quot; across the entirety of the cases that are disposed of by the court rather than to futilely attempt to ensure the &quot;correct&quot; result in every particular case. The rule against double jeopardy has arisen out of this systemic concern for justice. It does not purport to secure the &quot;correct&quot; result in every case.
There are all manner of reasons that evidence can be excluded at a trial, most of which are set forth in rules of evidence. If the evidence was not admitted on the grounds of relevance and the charge was speeding, I presume that the reason that it was found not be to relevant was that it was not possible from a video to determine how fast someone was driving and there was no dispute in the case over who was driving. If the defendant could have articulated some reason that the video was relevant to those points, perhaps it could have been admitted. But, as if often the case, pro se defendants are usually not articulate enough to set forth a legally relevant reason that evidence should be admitted. Unless the defendant could show that the video showed something allowing a jury to determine whether or not the law was violated, it probably wouldn't be relevant and I can't easily imagine how it would be relevant, but perhaps there was some special facts or circumstances that might show, for example, that the speed gun was actually picking up another vehicle.
The only thing which has a name and sounds somewhat like what you're talking about is &quot;jury nullification&quot;. This generally refers to the situation where a jury deliberately sets aside the judges instructions about the law and supplies their own interpretation. For example, Peter Zenger was technically guilty of seditious libel because as a matter of law the material was sedition libel and the only legal question was whether he had published it. The jury found him not guilty, on the grounds that the statements were true, but truth was not an element of the crime. It is the general pattern in the US that the judge is the only person empowered to say to the jury what the law is. By selecting specific instructions (phrased as &quot;If you conclude X, you must find the defendant guilt&quot;, that is, stating the &quot;finding-to-verdict&quot; equation), the jury is given a formula for figuring out what the law says. Trial judges are not the ones who decide what the &quot;framers&quot; of the law intended, that comes from higher appeals courts who may study the legislative history. It can happen that a law uses an unclear phrase like &quot;irreconcilable differences&quot; and the jury doesn't know exactly what that means: then the judge may tell them to decide on their own, or give them a dictionary (however, there probably is an instruction for divorce law, and it's unlikely that a jury would be involved in a simple marital dissolution). It is entirely possible that jurors will end up misinterpreting what the law says in some instance, but I doubt that it happens very often. It is more likely that jurors will deviate somewhat, compared to judges in a bench trial, in matters of judgment such as whether an action is &quot;reasonable&quot;.
David Siegel's answer correctly explains how appellate courts consider laws and arguments not addressed in the courts below. To clarify on the comparison to the Court of Cassation, though: A trial court is generally limited to considering the facts that are properly introduced by the parties, though a court may also take &quot;judicial notice&quot; of certain facts that are highly unlikely to be disputed. On review, courts of appeal are generally limited to facts supported by the evidence in the trial-court record, though they may also take judicial notice of other facts. A party is generally unable to introduce new evidence during an appeal. It is not correct that an appellate court will not review factual determinations, as those reviews probably happen in more cases than not. But -- just as with legal determinations -- those reviews can happen with varying levels of deference. For instance, if a case is tried to a jury, an appellate court will be exceedingly deferential to the jury's factual determinations, on the theory that the jury is best positioned to evaluate the evidence, gauge credibility, make reasonable inferences, etc. A judge who makes a factual determination based on in-court testimony will enjoy a similar measure of deference. But if a court makes a factual determination based only on documents submitted in support of a motion, or otherwise lacks an opportunity to evaluate a witness in person, the appellate court will be more open to different interpretations of the evidence. Legal determinations are likewise subject to varying levels of deference. At one end is the abuse-of-discretion standard. If a trial court determines that evidence is admissible or inadmissible, for instance, an appellate court will apply the abuse-of-discretion standard, which (to oversimplify) asks not whether the ruling was incorrect under the controlling law, but whether the ruling was reached without regard to the controlling law. On the other end is de novo review, in which the appellate court gives virtually no deference to the trial court and undertakes its own independent legal analysis. Perhaps even more deferential is plain-error review, which asks (to oversimplify) whether the trial court's error is so apparent that it barely needs to be debated. If the error is obvious enough (and satisfies several other criteria), the appellate court may reverse the trial court.
The standard of proof required to survive a motion to dismiss is very low. The factual (not legal) assertions of the plaintiff are assumed to be true, and the case is dismissed if the defense shows that even when the plaintiff is given that benefit, the assumed facts don't establish the case. This standard is somtimes referred to as "sufficiency of the claims".