Is there a legal path for overturning Nixon vs US (not to be confused with US v Nixon)? Nixon v US established that impeachment is not justiciable. However, this provides a path for it to become a carte blanche unrestrained power of Congress. This is a far cry from its intended aim of being a power which would only be exercised with a great self-restraint by Congress. Can this decision reach the SCOTUS only via a case brought by another impeached party? Or is there another legal path for SCOTUS to consider it again? Is there a path through an injunction? I am not asking what would guarantee its overturn. I am only asking about how the legal system works to make it possible (if a plaintiff succeeds in all challenges which they bring).
While this does not really directly answer your question of overturn, but this might somewhat directly address your original concern. This provides a path for it to become a carte blanche unrestrained power of Congress. This statement seems a bit misleading. It seems to indicate that Congress now is unfettered to abuse its impeachment power, but this is not true, because Congress is divided into two halves that place check on each other: The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
If President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Probably not, but it depends on the definition of treason. Congress could decide that it is, impeach him, and remove him from office. They could also remove him from office without using the term treason. Is he required to act on such a resolution? Not really. As chief executive, he has discretion to prioritize the tasks assigned to him by congress. Furthermore, there is plenty of precedent in international affairs for countries being legally in a state of war without any actual combat or other hostilities. If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? There's always political pressure. But there's no way to relieve the president of his command of the armed forces without relieving him of his office. Aside from impeachment by the congress, this can be temporarily achieved by the cabinet, as specified in the 25th amendment. POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. The president's ability to make immigration policy and the fact that such policy is subject to judicial review are unrelated to his powers as commander in chief. Immigration is a civil and criminal matter, not a military one. The president's powers in this regard are delegated to him by congress, not specified in the constitution. On the other hand, the president's role as commander in chief of the military is explicit in the constitution. Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? The judiciary does not have the power to order military operations.
Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
SHORT ANSWER Suppose a President can see that such a vote is coming and will pass, shortly before an election. Can that President resign just before the vote in order to effectively avoid the disqualification penalty? Probably yes. But, there is no historical precedent for this happening. Nixon resigned before the House voted to impeach him, not midway into the impeachment proceedings. Neither Andrew Jackson nor Bill Clinton resigned prior to not being convicted on the basis of a U.S. House impeachment. Several federal judges and one cabinet official, however, have resigned midway through impeachment proceedings prior to being convicted, and in those cases, the case was dismissed and no judgment was entered by the U.S. Senate, so they were not disqualified from holding future federal public offices. LONG ANSWER Relevant Constitutional Language The pertinent provisions of the U.S. Constitution include the following: Article I, Section 2, Clause 5: The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. Article I, Section 3, Clauses 6 and 7: 6: The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 7: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. Article II, Section 2, Clause 3: The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed. Analysis The key language is in Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution which states in the pertinent part that: Judgment in Cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States[.] This means that a President who is impeached by the House and convicted by the U.S. Senate may be prohibited from holding any federal office from President to dogcatcher in the future. But, this can only be done in a &quot;judgment&quot; of the U.S. Senate in connection with an impeachment based upon a conviction in the U.S. Senate following a House impeachment, which has never happened. The history of the impeachment language and the limitation to removals from office, suggest that only a person who is current serving in office may be impeached. Otherwise, the proceeding would be invalid as moot, and would be dismissed (as it has been in the case of many judges who have resigned after investigations are initiated or after a House impeaches but prior to a conviction of impeachment). A U.S. Senate ruling that someone is disqualified from holding future office can only be entered in a judgment of conviction for impeachment, so cannot apply to a past President. If this were done it would probably be an invalid &quot;Bill of Attainder&quot; or &quot;Ex Post Facto&quot; law. See U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 (&quot;No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed&quot;). And, the U.S. Senate can't pass a law unilaterally, or enter a judgment convicting someone on an impeachment unless the House initiates the proceeding. There is no precedent concerning whether if someone who was convicted by the U.S. Senate and removed from office based upon an impeachment initiated by the U.S. House, in which the judgment did not disqualify the person impeachment from holding future federal public offices, the U.S. Senate could amend its judgment later on to also disqualify the person so removed from office from holding further public office. I suspect that if the question were presented that the federal courts would hold that the amendment of the impeachment judgment was not valid because the word &quot;judgment&quot; implies an immediate ruling upon a case and not a perpetual right to hold the person subject to the judgment in limbo regarding the consequences of his impeachment conviction.
Donald Trump did not waive executive privilege: it was denied to him. In Trump Loses Big on Executive Privilege (Thursday, January 20, 2022) the Lawfare Institute says The Supreme Court Wednesday evening denied a motion by former President Trump to block the National Archive from turning White House materials to the House Select Committee on the January 6 Attack. The peculiar, four-page order, is a complicated document, but in combination with the broad and underdiscussed D.C. Circuit opinion it leaves in place, it has profound implications for Trump’s ability, and that of his allies, to make executive privilege claims in response to demands for testimony and information from the committee. On its face, the Supreme Court’s order yesterday appears to mitigate the consequences for Trump of a D.C. Circuit opinion that rejects a number of his key claims in resisting the committee. The D.C. Circuit opinion has been hanging around since early last month with little notice or discussion—probably because the Supreme Court was poised to jump in any time. But in fact, the Supreme Court action does not mitigate the matter for Trump. Put simply, the former president, whether he knows it or not, is now in a dramatically weaker position than he was only recently with respect to the committee. The new legal landscape, for example, almost certainly means that two top Trump officials—former White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadow and former top adviser Steve Bannon—can no longer argue that the privilege prevents them from cooperating with the committee. The same applies to other potential witnesses, and to the former president himself, should the committee seek his testimony. All, of course, may well continue to resist anyway—but if so, they proceed at much greater risk to themselves.
Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.
Sort of The 25th Amendment is crystal clear that the VP and a majority of the cabinet can declare in writing to the president pro tem of the Senate and the speaker of the house a presidential inability, whereupon the VP becomes the acting president. The president can then immediately transmit in writing his declaration that there is no inability, and then he resumes his position as president until the VP and majority of cabinet (not necessarily the same members) again declare a disability, within 4 days. If that happens, then Congress decides the matter. There is a 28 day period for a super-majority of Congress to make that decision, plus 48 hours for assembling of Congress is not in session. The problem is that the amendment says that the president resumes his powers unless something happens within 4 days. It does not say that he must wait 4 days to see what the VP response is. If the VP does not counter-respond immediately, then it is possible, but not guaranteed, that the president regains power until the VP reaffirms the disability. This is a question that would have to be decided by SCOTUS. In the presumably short interim, there would be serious constitutional questions as to the legality of the actions of either POTUS or VPOTUS.
An individual obtains due process rights upon entering into the United States. For a recent write-up on this question, see this piece at Reason. The people Trump is talking about generally aren't being denied admission at an established, legal border crossing; they're coming across wherever they can get through, and only being discovered by federal agents thereafter. Because they're already in the United States, they have due process rights. As for cross-border interactions with ICE or CBP, the extent of due process protections is still an open question. SCOTUS took it up last year, but it kicked the case back to a lower court rather than deciding it.