Who owns a copyright of a work that is found to be infringing? For example Warhol case that SCOTUS heard Warhol made screen prints from Lynn Goldsmith's photograph. Those prints have earned millions of dollars. If SCOTUS finds that Warhol infringed, who owns copyright to the Warhol prints? If they are not transformative enough to qualify as fair use, does Goldsmith own the copyright to the prints? Or does Warhol own them and he has to pay a licensing fee?
Arguably, no one owns the copyright in the general case. This is a similar case to a previous question I've answered. In short, the US has a statutory provision which bars infringing derivatives from gaining copyright. In this particular case, it's helpful to take a look at what the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had to say. While evaluating transformativeness, they did not declare Warhol's works to be derivatives, but left that possibility open and stated it was closer to being a derivative than transformative fair use: Nonetheless, although we do not conclude that the Prince Series works are necessarily derivative works as a matter of law, they are much closer to presenting the same work in a different form, that form being a high-contrast screenprint, than they are to being works that make a transformative use of the original. That Warhol's prints might have no copyright attached to them does not mean that anyone can use them though – they are still very much based on Goldsmith's photo and the underlying copyright to the original still belongs to Goldsmith. This could well mean that Goldsmith would be able to use the Warhol prints as if she owned its copyrights. Update: The Supreme Court has now affirmed, albeit on a narrow appeal from the Second Circuit Court of Appeal which dropped the issue that this question is about. Only the first fair use factor of transformativeness was challenged by the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF). Additionally, and more important for this question is that only a single use was ruled on: the licensing of one of the prints by AWF for a 2016 magazine article reprint following Prince's death. This is because Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Here's where I realize I missed a key distinguishing fact in the case: There was indeed a narrow license for use of the photo for &quot;artist reference&quot; in relation to an article to be published in a 1984 Vanity Fair issue. In effect, due to the license, the (probable) derivative could be considered non-infringing1. Nevertheless, the court ruled that the use in the 2016 issue was not fair (given there was no license for use beyond the 1984 article, AWF had to rely on a fair use defense). In other words, the Warhol prints as a whole are not necessarily infringing derivatives2, rather, the specific use in the 2016 article was affirmed to be infringing. In particular, I'd like to highlight the following from court: The fair use provision, and the first factor in particular, requires an analysis of the specific “use” of a copyrighted work that is alleged to be “an infringement.” §107. The same copying may be fair when used for one purpose but not another. The full license text is not in any of the court decisions, so it's impossible for us to know for sure, but the portions that are quoted lead me to believe the license is vaguely worded. In particular, its in the realm of possibility that only the single derivative used on the 1984 article was licensed, but I would argue its reasonable to expect an artist to try multiple derivatives given a license for &quot;artist reference.&quot; This could potentially have been of some consequence as the print used in the 2016 article is not the same as the one used in the 1984 article. But since this case was initiated in district court by the AWF seeking declaratory judgment of non-infringement, my understanding of the matter is that once the case is passed back to the district court, it will enter in that declaration given Goldsmith dropped the wider infringement claims. Take this with a grain of salt, I'm not very well-versed in trial procedure.
The significant question is whether such a statement as "no copyright infringement intended" will be viewed by the courts as evidence to suggest innocent infringement or rather as evidence to support willful infringement. This consideration of willful versus innocent is relevant when a copyright holder seeks statutory damages. 17 USC §504(c)(2) says (emphasis mine): In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. Branch v. Ogilvy &amp; Mather, Inc. says of willfulness (emphasis mine): Thus, in order to prove willfulness, a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or should have known that its conduct constituted copyright infringement. Similarly, in order to establish innocent intent, the defendant must prove that it did not know and should not have known that its conduct constituted infringement. One defense to an allegation of willfulness is the defendant's reasonable and good faith belief that its actions do not constitute copyright infringement. The central question, then, seems to be whether the notice "no copyright infringement intended" aids or harms an argument that the infringer "did not know or should not have known" that they were infringing copyright, or else that they had a "reasonable and good faith belief" of non-infringement. I am not aware of any case law that concerns such a notice, but my layman intuition suggests to me that such a notice lends evidential weight that the defendant did indeed know the work in question was under copyright; since the defendant was therefore aware the work was under copyright, it is unlikely that they could successfully claim a reasonable belief that publicly distributing the entirety of (or a substantial portion of) the work without permission was not infringement. Ultimately, I don't think such a notice does anything to aid the defendant's argument that they "should not have known" their use was infringing. Nor do I think it furthers an argument of "reasonable and good faith belief" by the defendant: the reasonableness of such a belief will rest significantly on the facts of the infringement, not only on how loudly they shouted, "I swear this isn't infringement!" Conversely, such a notice may further the idea that the defendant did know that copyright applied to the work, strengthening the plaintiff's argument that the defendant should have known the use was infringing.
You need permission from the copyright holder(s) to make the prints at all unless it falls under some fair use doctrine or is a work in Public Domain. If permission is granted, it would presumably involve you paying money on some negotiated basis. An artist might flatly refuse to give permission to your plan to use their art as a component of your art.
Probably Not The creator or owner of a piece of software does not in general have any copyright over the output when others run the software, unless that output is itself a derivative work of input supplied by the copyright owner, or forming part of the software. In this case the translation is a derivative work of the 19th century original, but that is assumed to be in the public domain. SAo google has no copyright on the resulting translation. But copyright protection is only available for &quot;original works of authorship&quot;. (See 17 USC 102 in the US, and similar laws elsewhere.) A machine-produced translation is not an original work, and it is surely not then work of the author of the overall book. However, the author would still have a copyright on the book as a whole. The legal situation is no different than if the author had simply quoted a 19th century work. One may incorporate public domain works into a later work, and that later work is still protected by copyright, provided that there is enough original contentr to make the work as a whole &quot;an original work of authorship&quot;. Others may use the PD [arts, or the original from which they are taken, but not the rest of the work (beyond what fair use would allow in any case). For example, I have made a number of posts here on LAW.SE. In several,of those I quoted sections from one of the numbers of The Federalist. That 19th century work is in the public domain. Anyone else may re-quote the passages I quoted from it. But that gives them no rights to use the rest of my work, except as the CC-BY-SA license or fair use permits. So the author would retain copyright on the book as a whole. But soemoen who merely quotes or uses the translated 19th century article but none of the original parts of the book would not be infringing that copyright. I say probably in the header, because I do not have any actual case-law to cite here. It is possible that some court has rules otherwise on the subject of the copyright on the output of a software tool, but I strongly doubt it.
Company B has created a derived work from company A's copyright-protected work, so yes, B has infringed on A's copyright. It might be difficult for A to prove it, however, so B might get away with it, but it's still infringement. On the other hand, if B creates software that behaves like A's through reverse engineering, that is, by examining the program's function without examining its code, then they will not have infringed the copyright in the code.
The first question is whose law you are concerned with, since in principle you might have violated copyright law in any country, and might be sued under the laws of multiple countries. The US has a concept of "fair use" which is notoriously difficult to apply. When you are sued in the US, you can defend against the allegation by arguing certain things: telegraphically, this includes purpose and character of use, nature of the work, substantiality in relation to the whole, and effect on market. Plus there is a 5th factor to be considered, transformativeness. The court then weighs these factors to decide if the use is "fair". By reading existing case law on the topic (conveniently available from the US Copyright office) you might develop a fact-based opinion of the risk: you would be vastly better off hiring an attorney who specializes in US copyright law to do an analysis for you. Do not hire a programmer to give you legal advice (do not hire an attorney to debug code). You would "fail" on the test of substantiality in that you are copying a highly substantial portion of the original work(s). You would "win" on nature of use (research especially non-profit and commentary are the underlying purposes that drive fair use law). It's not clear how you would fare w.r.t. nature of the work, which is intended to distinguish the extremes "news report" and "literature and artistic work" where copying news is at the fair use end of the spectrum. It is not clear how you would fare on "effect on market", but probably not so badly: are you avoiding some licensing fee? Coupled with the tranformativeness consideration, you are most likely having no effect on the market, since the product that you will distribute is not the original work, but a scientific conclusion about the work. Germany has different laws, and this article would be relevant if you cared about Germany. There was a change in the law that expanded the analog of fair use pertaining to research use. That law allows 15 percent of a work to be reproduced, distributed and made available to the public for the purpose of non-commercial scientific research. That, b.t.w., does not refer to what you are planning to do (unless you also publish quotes); for personal scientific research you may reproduce up to 75 percent. Since this is a new law only a year old, you could become part of the cutting edge in testing the limits of the law. So the standard disclaimer applies: ask your attorney. But note section 60d of the law which legalized data mining, and is squarely on point: (1) In order to enable the automatic analysis of large numbers of works (source material) for scientific research, it shall be permissible to reproduce the source material, including automatically and systematically, in order to create, particularly by means of normalisation, structuring and categorisation, a corpus which can be analysed and to make the corpus available to the public for a specifically limited circle of persons for their joint scientific research, as well as to individual third persons for the purpose of monitoring the quality of scientific research. In such cases, the user may only pursue non-commercial purposes. (2) If database works are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall constitute customary use in accordance with section 55a, first sentence. If insubstantial parts of databases are used pursuant to subsection (1), this shall be deemed consistent with the normal utilisation of the database and with the legitimate interests of the producer of the database within the meaning of section 87b (1), second sentence, and section 87e. (3) Once the research work has been completed, the corpus and the reproductions of the source material shall be deleted; they may no longer be made available to the public. It shall, however, be permissible to transmit the corpus and the reproductions of the source material to the institutions referred to in sections 60e and 60f for the purpose of long-term storage.
Copyright does not contain the right to attribution (except with respect to authors of visual arts at 17 USC 106A). A copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce a work, create derivative works, distribute copies, etc. (17 USC §106). As we already answered here, when a copyright owner gives somebody else permission to do some of those things, the copyright owner can attach a condition to that permission. A common condition is that the licensee give credit to the the original creator. With respect to visual arts, the attribution right gives the author the right to "prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation." 17 USC §106A(a)(2)
Eventually. This was a state matter prior to the enactment of the Constitution. Without the Copyright Clause, it would have been up to each state to enact such a law (apparently Delaware did not bother). This would have quickly led to inter-state disputes (a New York author being infringed by a New Jersey party), therefore the matter would have been heard by the federal courts. The current understanding of the Commerce Clause easily allows Congress to enact a copyright law, because copyright is quite commercial and potentially crosses state lines. It took a while for that clause to be interpreted by the courts the way it is now. This is a brief summary of historically shifting views on the Commerce Clause.