What was the basis/reasoning for Pennsylvania&#39;s Supreme Court decision to declare the state old-age assistance program unconstitutional in the 1920s? I read that From 1918 to 1927 [Abe] Epstein served as research director of the Pennyslvania Commission on Old Age Pensions. In that capacity, he was instrumental in having the State adopt an old-age assistance law in 1923. The law, however, was declared unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court. What was the basis/reasoning invoked by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in finding that law unconstitutional?
The case is Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 440, 128 A. 80 (Pa. 1925). The law is cited as the &quot;Old Age Assistance Act of May 10, 1923, P. L. 189&quot;, but I could not find the text of the act. The court case explains that it established a pension of up to one dollar per day for residents over the age of seventy having annual income below $365 and assets below $3000. The provision of the [Pennsylvania] Constitution under which the act was declared void [by the lower court] reads as follows: &quot;No appropriations, except for pensions or gratuities for military services, shall be made for charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, to any person or community, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution, corporation or association.&quot; And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed. They also distinguished it from other laws that remained constitutional: Laws to assist the poor and indigent were still constitutional. The state argued that the Old Age Assistance Act fell in that category, but the court held that the income and property limits were not a reasonable definition of &quot;poor&quot;, especially since the law would pay pensions to people even if they were able to work. The state apparently had a retirement pension system for public employees. This was also held to be different in that it was delayed compensation for employees, in exchange for the service they performed, and thus not charitable or benevolent.
OK, I talked to a lawyer (in Massachusetts) and these are the answers I got. One can draft a confidential exclusion letter to state wishes regarding excluding certain people from being guardians. In the letter you can explain in detail why you think somebody is unfit to be a guardian. Execute this document as you do for your will and tell your family that it exists so that they can access it if you die (or give them a copy). The advantage of a stand-alone document is that it is not public, differently from the will which is public. The lawyer also suggested to also have a separate stand-alone guardianship document (and so to not include the guardian section in the will). The reason is that a will can be executed only if somebody is dead. But if somebody is e.g. in a coma (or missing), he won't be able to take care of his children and yet his will would not be able to executed. A separate guardianship document would instead apply also in these situations thereby minimizing the chances that somebody, whom you do not consider fit, becomes a guardian of your children.
You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on &quot;spirit&quot; (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of &quot;other factors&quot;, such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach.
This is a matter of state law, and so could in theory vary from state to state. But I think that in most, if not all, US states, a public utility like a water or electric company must take any customer unless they have a history of unpaid bills or the like. They don't have to lay new pipes or run new wires to bring service to you if it is at a location not previously served, however. In the Maryland code, § 7-307 ( Termination of service to low income customers) provides: (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the Commission shall adopt regulations concerning the prohibition against or limitation of authority of a public service company to terminate service for gas or electricity to a low income residential customer during the heating season for nonpayment. (2) In adopting the regulations required under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the Commission shall consider and may include provisions relating to: (i) the circumstances under which service may and may not be limited or terminated; (ii) the minimum heating levels required to maintain life, health, and safety; (iii) the medical, age, disabling, or other individual characteristics that are relevant to a prohibition against or limitation on the termination of service; (and other provisions) That the Public Service Commission is empowered, and indeed obliged, to issue binding regulations on when service may be terminated might imply a duty to provide service in the first place, but that is not as clear as I would like. I know that in practice a utility runs a credit check and may demand a deposit if the results are not satisfactory, but I do not see a law compelling that behavior. It may be in regulations adopted by the commission.
Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions.
I do not know what actually happened to anyone in the aftermath of this incident, but it is unlikely that there is a basis for civil or criminal liability in this case. Criminal liability does not generally attach to negligent conduct except in cases of homicide or criminally negligent motor vehicle operation. But, this case appears to have involved mere negligence. It appears that somebody made an honest mistake rather than acting recklessly or intentionally to cause harm. Governmental entities and officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacity have immunity from liability for negligence except in some vary narrowly defined areas (e.g. failure to maintain government buildings, medical mistakes in government hospitals, and car accidents) which seem unlikely to be implicated here. But, it seems likely that the responsible parties were all governmental entities or officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacities. So, it is unlikely that there would be civil liability either. Needless to say, however, this does not look good on the job performance record of any civil servant below the Governor (who doesn't get evaluated in that way) when being considered for promotion, demotion, unfavorable transfers or even termination of employment. Obviously, if new facts were uncovered and this was actually more nefarious than it seems, and this hidden truth was discovered, there could be a basis for civil or criminal liability. But, if this was the case, it would have made headlines.
You are referring to 32 CFR 47.4. The only reasonable interpretation of that list is that one must meet all of the 5 requirements. The alternative interpretation would make any group that "[has not] already received benefits from the Federal Government for the service in question" eligible to apply. Since this is a regulation, the interpretation of the agency that wrote the regulations is given great deference. An agency's interpretation of the regulations it writes itself is controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation". (Auer v. Robbins 1997) Regarding whether there is ambiguity at all, read King v. Burwell for several restatements of the principle that one must read words in context before deciding they are ambiguous: A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law. They refer to the "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme".
I guess the meat of your question is: If a city enacts an unconstitutional ordinance, can it evade judicial review by repealing the ordinance and arguing for mootness once the judicial proceeding reaches to a point of potential disadvantage, and reenacting the same or a very similar ordinance once the judicial proceeding is dismissed? I don't know where the bright line is (maybe SCOTUS hasn't drawn a clear line yet), but at least there has been a case in which the SCOTUS rejected the mootness argument by a city that repealed the ordinance at issue during appeal: City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982). Two parts of the city's ordinance were at issue: (1) the language of "connections with criminal elements" and (2) "the age restriction." On appeal, the Fifth Circuit declared (1) unconstitutional but upheld (2). The city then repealed (1) and, on appeal to the SCOTUS, argued that the issue of (1) was moot. The mootness argument was rejected. The rejection argument was very short as presented in section I of the majority opinion: It is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice. Such abandonment is an important factor bearing on the question whether a court should exercise its power to enjoin the defendant from renewing the practice, but that is a matter relating to the exercise, rather than the existence, of judicial power. [Footnote 10] In this case, the city's repeal of the objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision if the District Court's judgment were vacated. [Footnote 11] The city followed that course with respect to the age restriction, which was first reduced for Aladdin from 17 to 7 and then, in obvious response to the state court's judgment, the exemption was eliminated. There is no certainty that a similar course would not be pursued if its most recent amendment were effective to defeat federal jurisdiction. We therefore must confront the merits of the vagueness holding. Footnote 11 might be a critical fact in rejecting the mootness argument: Indeed, the city has announced just such an intention. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-20. Therefore, I think, if a city repeatedly employs your proposed strategy, the SCOTUS is unlikely to declare the case moot. EDIT: As pointed out by "Just a guy", the mootness part of City of Mesquite is about voluntary cessation, which is a kind of strategy concomitant with mootness arguments. Voluntary cessation does not moot the case unless "subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur." United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199 (1968). But the point of this answer is not on voluntary cessation in general. It is in the context of intervening legislation. A voluntary intervening legislation is usually sufficient to moot a case (e.g., Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576 (1989)), but it was not so in City of Mesquite -- that's why it is different from most similar voluntary cessation cases, and resembles more closely to the NYC gun control case. Perhaps because it is a city (and was thus less burdened to reenact the same or a similar ordinance than a state legislature), perhaps because it had declared its intention to reenact, perhaps both. None of these might be controlling precedents. But, City of Mesquite and the state legislature cases like Oakes (because the NY state legislature also acted), are probably at least close ones in the jurisprudence of the SCOTUS at this point of time.