Why do lawyers write contracts with language that is more difficult to understand than other works? The recent Ig Nobel Prize Winning work &quot;Poor writing, not specialized concepts, drives processing difficulty in legal language&quot; by Martínez, Mollica, and Gibson demonstrates that contracts are written in language that is harder to understand than other genres such as academic or media writing. In particular, center-embedded clauses are used at more than twice the rate in contracts than in other professional writing except newspapers, lead to long-distance syntactic dependencies and are recalled and comprehended at lower rates than excerpts without these clauses. Why is this? One would have thought that making contracts understandable to the parties would generally be in everyone best interest, but it is possible to imagine situations where this is not the case. Abstract of the paper: Despite their ever-increasing presence in everyday life, contracts remain notoriously inaccessible to laypeople. Why? Here, a corpus analysis (n ≈10 million words) revealed that contracts contain startlingly high proportions of certain difficult-to-process features–including low-frequency jargon, center-embedded clauses (leading to long-distance syntactic dependencies), passive voice structures, and non-standard capitalization–relative to nine other baseline genres of written and spoken English. Two experiments (N=184) further revealed that excerpts containing these features were recalled and comprehended at lower rates than excerpts without these features, even for experienced readers, and that center-embedded clauses inhibited recall more-so than other features. These findings (a) undermine the specialized concepts account of legal theory, according to which law is a system built upon expert knowledge of technical concepts; (b) suggest such processing difficulties result largely from working-memory limitations imposed by long-distance syntactic dependencies (i.e., poor writing) as opposed to a mere lack of specialized legal knowledge; and (c) suggest editing out problematic features of legal texts would be tractable and beneficial for society at-large.
There Is Little Pressure To Improve Contract Drafting One piece of the puzzle is tradition and habitual writing style. A customary writing style for legal documents evolved over time, some of those conventions have evolved overtime (e.g. &quot;Party of the first part, party of the second part&quot;), others have not. Archaic vocabulary is slowly being weeded out, but again, it is almost never the goal of someone drafting a contract to reduce the reading level of the document. As long as the judge, or other lawyers, know what it means, it is an aesthetic stylistic issue more than it is a substantive issue of importance. Contract drafting is highly decentralized and change happens only when there is a powerful impetus for change. Does this mean that legal writing can't be improved? No. Some lawyers are excellent writers in both contract drafting and in court documents. A well drafted contact can reduce litigation costs when there are disputes. It can also increase compliance with the intent of the parties by preventing disputes over what the contract means from arising in the first place. But most lawyers are mediocre contract drafters, and there is little selective pressure in transactional legal work to weed out their sub-optimal writing styles. Bryan A. Garner, who among other things is the editor of Black's Law Dictionary, is pretty much the leading figure in the United States pushing for a more modern, more readable, less flabby legal writing style. This is exemplified, for example, in his book &quot;Legal Writing in Plain English&quot; (2d ed. 2013). But even then, a lot of the impetus for his stylistic decisions was primarily driven by the need to get across ideas clearly, in a minimum of words, when writing appellate briefs with word limits. This is also the main context in which legal writing is taught in law school and continuing education classes. In contracts, in contrast, in our current era of the word processor, long documents are easy to deliver, and long passages of writing can be cut and pasted. So, the same outside pressures to limit word counts and persuade judges who will read legal briefs cover to cover in order, are not present when drafting contracts. So, the pressure to have a succinct plain language writing style in contracts is less strong. This said, when there has been regulatory pressure to write consumer contracts in a way that an average consumer can understand, it can be done. For example, most credit card agreements are written in very clear plain English with a very low reading level compared to other contracts. But those easy to read credit card agreements are drafted by committees of many lawyers and senior executives, each charging hundreds of dollars an hour, over many meetings over a period of weeks of debate and refinement, and a cost of many tens of thousands of dollars each to draft. The flabby and clunky character of legal writing also reflects client imposed budgetary constraints. It takes much more time and effort, with multiple rounds of rewriting and editing, to write a clean, easy to read contract than it does to write a kludgy one. Lawyers bill by the hour and clients want the job done at a price that they can afford. There is little incentive in contracts that will not be used many times as forms, to take the effort to produce a clean, easy to read final product. This kind of beautifully drafted contract costs much more to draft for the client, but provides little additional legal benefit to the client. Few contracts are ever litigated at all, and when they are, the legal drafting tends to focus on only a handful of key provisions that are carefully drafted. Boilerplate language, which is often less carefully drafted, is very rarely litigated, so the quality of that writing doesn't matter much. Capitalization As far as capitalization goes, I agree with @user6726 that all-caps writing is often required by law. These requirements were based upon the previous legislative assumption that it was more prominent and more likely to be read, which has since been proved to be false empirically. But new empirical discoveries about readability haven't changed the relevant laws requiring certain language in contracts to be &quot;prominent&quot; and in all caps. I would also add that there is a legal writing convention that defined terms have capital letters (although not necessarily all caps), which is a pointer to when one needs to look for a definition, that relaxes the need to put the definitions of capitalized words in the actual sentence where those terms are used. Weird capitalization can facilitate shorter sentences. The Relevant Audience I'd also agree that the primary audience for contract language is often not an unsophisticated non-lawyer consumer. While it's true that the average American reads at about the 5th grade level and can't do algebra, that person isn't the target audience. In the same vein, you don't write scientific journal articles for an audience of the average American. When push comes to shove, written contracts are interpreted as a matter of law by judges who are legally trained, and not a matter left to a jury of non-lawyers to decide. Most business to business contracts are negotiated by lawyers. Most business to business contracts have as additional audiences sophisticated senior managers of business with some limited formal business law training in college, who also have great familiarity with the class of contracts involved. Even in consumer contracts, when consumer protection regulations and statutes do not compel another approach, the intent is frequently a MEGO effect (My Eyes Glaze Over) in the hope that the consumer, who often isn't at liberty to negotiate the terms anyway, won't decide to read the fine print. The only language in a contract that needs to be clear to the consumer is the actionable part like the price that needs to be understood by the consumer to perform it. And, often those parts of a contract are provided in a separate short summary document with the full contract available for future reference but not intended to be routinely read in full. Furthermore, characteristic legal writing styles can convey a sense of importance and official authority. It sounds like it is and is intended to have legal effect. It's the same reason that fictional magical spells are far more often in Latin or Greek or Sumerian than they are in plain English. Language too ordinary conveys the false impression to a client that anyone could write the contract even if legal skill is implicated in drafting it, and can even cast doubt over whether a document was intended to be a legally binding contract in the eyes of a non-lawyer encountering it. Long Sentences, Definitional Clauses, And Pronouns One of the key factors that is identified as making legal writing hard to read is the use of internal definitional clauses within sentences and the use of very long sentences. It is possible to draft without those. But, often including it in the same sentence reflects the drafting lawyer's thought process. It can also reflect a negotiated contract drafting process. Even if an initial draft of a contract has simple sentences clearly laid out, it may be easiest to clarify a bargaining point in contracting negotiations by complicating the sentence in question to make it reflect the other side's preferred interpretation, even if it is stylistically ugly. And, changing that language in a final draft to make the contract look pretty is viewed with the suspicion that a subtle substantive change in the meaning of the contract from the haggled term was intended. As an aside, some contract provisions in hotly negotiated contracts are also sometimes intentionally ambiguous. This is because resolving the ambiguity could result in a fight over a side issue that could bust the deal if each side insisted on their own interpretation. Leaving the term ambiguous allows a judge evaluating a dispute that actually arises, if a dispute even arises over that term (which it often doesn't), in order to do what makes sense under the circumstances instead. Also, lawyers are wretchedly afraid of an adverse party quoting a sentence in a contract without including the related context that clarifies its meaning (e.g. by omitting definitions that are not obvious from the plain language of the contract). Unlike most prose, contracts are rarely read front to back the way you would a court opinion or a newspaper report or a short story. Normally, someone using a contract quotes only the relevant portion of the contract in isolation from the larger entire document. When ideas are broken into separate sentences, lawyers are very worried, rightly or wrongly, that different sentences in a paragraph or section modify each other, rather than being isolated islands of legal propositions. So lawyers are more comfortable when as many connected ideas as possible are all contained in the same sentence in which everything must be related somehow. Lawyers feel more comfortable and secure arguing about the meaning of a single sentence, than they do arguing that a simple short sentence should have a particular meaning based upon the larger context in which it is found. Similarly, lawyers are quite wary about using pronouns that aren't defined terms in the contract, for fear that the person that the pronoun refers to will be incorrectly assigned, even though this is an unnatural way of writing. Common Law Contracts v. Civil Law Contracts Also, as an aside, contract drafting is an area where common law legal drafting styles differ materially from civil law country legal drafting styles (e.g. in continental Europe). This is because in civil law countries there is a great effort made to provide for what would usually be boilerplate language in U.S. contracts as default statutory rules that match the default choices that are usually made in contracts negotiated between third-parties. Far less can be taken for granted in common law countries. A lot of the operative language in a common law jurisdiction contract, including much of it the most difficult to read legalese in contracts, is simply implied in law unless specifically disavowed, in many civil law countries. As a result, civil law country contracts are usually much shorter and more focused on the deal specific terms than a common law jurisdiction contract. A civil law business agreement that runs to five pages might typically take 30-40 pages to write saying exactly the same thing in a common law jurisdiction.
Eugene Volokh categorizes this as "crime-facilitating speech" in his articles, "The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes", and "Crime-Facilitating Speech". He characterizes the situation like this: Some chemistry textbooks discuss how explosives are made, some posts to computer security discussion groups discuss security bugs in a leading operating system, and some works on criminology or forensics discuss how hard-to-solve murders are committed. May the explicitly politically connected speech be treated as more valuable than the scientific speech? The Supreme Court has never decided a case squarely involving the suppression of scientific speech, but it has repeatedly described scientific speech as constitutionally equal in value to political speech. He presents a split amongst the circuits and statutes regarding mens rea for crimes stemming from such speech. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. In one example case, the 9th Circuit ruled that merely distributing computer code "with the knowledge that it would likely be used for bookmaking" could be punished. Other cases have held that speech must "purposely" rather than incidentally inform people how to commit a crime in order for that speech to be punished.
For instance, clients often ask them for an assessment of &quot;the chance of X going through&quot;. While clients can make it clear (in writing) that lawyers will not be held legally liable for giving &quot;pure advice&quot;, lawyers often still refuse to give any guidance (even when they clearly do have one in mind). I do this on a regular basis. This said, lawyers are ill equipped to evaluate cases in these terms, because they don't see a full and unbiased sample of cases that they study academically, because there are too many distinctions between cases to make apples to apples comparisons of them, and because most lawyers went into law because they don't like thinking about things in mathematical terms. Lawyers will not infrequently say that a case or argument is strong or weak, or very strong or virtually frivolous, but evaluating the strength of a case is difficult and there are good academic studies that show that lawyers systemically overestimate the strength of their own cases. So, humility about the likelihood of a particular outcome is a good professional norm to have in place. Basically, law contains lots of uncertainty and the known unknowns and unknown unknowns predominate over what is known, most of the time.
If you want to study the basics of law, where should you start? Don't try memorizing individual laws. That would be a waste of energy, in part because --as you rightly point out-- laws change. There are many introductory books. Law 101, by Jay M. Feinman, is an excellent starting point. The next step --broadly speaking-- consists of reading court decisions (aka court opinions). Opinions released by upper (aka reviewing) courts are available online for free. If you are interested in jurisdictions in the US, Leagle.com is one of many very good resources; EU cases are available here; and so forth. Acquainting yourself with court opinions is quite beneficial. First, court opinions [collaterally] teach how to formulate one's legal positions. Rather than merely being formulaic and a copycat, a litigant is to convey that his legal position is more consistent (compared to the adversary) with the laws and underlying doctrines. His points are easier to get across by adapting his presentation thereof to how courts are used to handle the legal principles involved. Second, court opinions identify the statutes that are relevant to the type of disputes that arise between parties. This is indicative of importance that a statute or procedural rule entails in relation to other laws. Third, court opinions reflect how statutes, rules, and doctrines are interpreted. Oftentimes the way how legislation is worded leads &quot;laypeople&quot; to have misconceptions on the interpretation of laws and rules, when in reality these are construed usually in a much narrower way. Law journals are a good source once you have gained some background in law and are interested in a sort of monograph about a topic that is new to you. But, as explained above, court opinions also serve that purpose (perhaps less scholarly). Having a legal dictionary is always a good idea. Courts in the US oftentimes quote definitions from Black's Law Dictionary for crucial terms which statutory law does not define. What is most applicable to real life? Without knowing whether you are interested in a particular field, it is safe to say that contract law is the most applicable. Entering contracts is part of our everyday life even if laypeople don't notice it when they purchase goods &amp; services, reach an agreement, or engage in a course of conduct which reasonably fosters expectations. And good news is that the principles of contract law are largely similar among modern jurisdictions, including the America (the continent, not just the USA), many member states of the EU, and Asian countries. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts is a very useful formulation of contract law. Courts in the US very often cite the Restatement for premising their decisions on contract disputes. In countries with a civil law system, the principles of contract law are usually formulated in one or multiple sections of the [countries'] Civil Code. Procedural law (aka rules of criminal or civil procedure) is also highly applicable: Large portions thereof apply to all disputes which are brought to court. To a great extent these rules are very similar across the jurisdictions of one same country, but the litigant ought too ensure his compliance with the rules lest he loses the case for a technicality. Lastly, procedural law can be remarkably boring unless the person anticipates he will be involved in litigation.
This is largely a contract law issue, with little to do with intellectual property. Let's take a closer look at Offer and Acceptance of a Contract. An Offer or Acceptance can be made: Orally In writing By conduct First, you offer your client a written contract, with terms and conditions. Your client refused to accept. There is no contract. Then, your client offers you another contract, orally: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. It is irrelevant whether $X and $Y are the same as in the written contract or not. This is a separate contract, and the original terms you proposed does not apply. Did you accept this contract? From Felhouse v. Bindley (1862): Acceptance must be communicated clearly and cannot be imposed due to silence of one of the parties. Since you accepted the deposit and began work, you have accepted the contract by conduct. This is a contract where there is no terms and conditions besides that one sentence mentioned by your client. Furthermore, you intent to carry on this contract (you wish to complete the project and get the money). This contract has benefits to you for Consideration. Would it have made a difference? Suppose that your client's response is: We are sorry, our company has a weird policy about accepting contracts in writing, 30 people have to approve it and it takes 3 months. Would you take a verbal acceptance? We will give you $X as deposit and you will begin work, after work is finished we will give you $Y, as stated in the contract. Then this would be an oral acceptance of the original (written) contract with terms and conditions. But that cannot happen, since the client explicitly refused your offer. An acceptance must be unconditional. Qualification of terms of offer means to destroy the original offer. Counter-offer means to reject the original offer. Can the client use the deposit as evidence that there is a verbal contract? Yes, certainly. But this contract is not the un-signed contract. Read this conversation, again, carefully: We still want you to move forward with the project. We will give you $X as deposit, and then you will begin work. After the project is completed, we will deposit another $Y to you. There is no mention that your proposed terms and conditions apply, is there? Even if the client, after 2 weeks, come back to you and says: Sorry for refusing your offer earlier. After due consideration, we think your company's proposal is best. We would like to move forward with you. It will be $X for the deposit, and $Y after completion. All your proposed terms and conditions apply. Deal? This time your client is making an Offer. If you accept, it will be a new contract, not the same one you offered to the client earlier. About the money. This is really a case by case situation. Depending on how much the entire project is completed and the nature of the project, results can be different. A deposit is necessary to begin work. The deposit secures the client's intention to carry on the project. The final payment is make after work is finished satisfactorily. Isn't the current situation exactly what a deposit is for?
Numbering is for the sake of clarity, and is not intrinsically required. If you refer to a section, you need a way to say which section you mean, and a vague description like "up there where I talked about copying" is insufficient. You can refer to a section by a title, if you need to refer to sections within the contract, as long as your titles match what you refer to them as (and you don't have two sections called "Your Rights").
I am not sure what the claim in the textbook means, and have been unable to find any other reference to support or explain it. Headnotes are always “presumptively correct” in the sense that they are professionally authored, so you can generally presume them to be correct, unless they conflict with the full text of the decision. But I’m not aware of any statute or case law that creates a formal presumption in relation to headnotes. Perhaps you could write to the author and ask if that’s what she means. What is unique about England and Wales, as the origin of the common law and the associated tradition of law reporting, is the preeminence of the Incorporated Council of Law Reporting. The ICLR was established in 1865 and publishes all official law reports in England and Wales. Arguably unlike the official or authorised reports of other common law jurisdictions, the ICLR’s reports are considered to be more authoritative even than the judgment published by the court itself. The ICLR’s website explains: However important the case, the transcript of a judgment does not have the same value, as a record of the decision contained in it, as a full text law report. Where, therefore, a law report is available, particularly where the case has been reported in one of the official series, The Law Reports, published by ICLR, it must be cited and referred to in that version in preference for any other: see Practice Direction (Citation of Authorities) [2012] 1 WLR 780 … the combination of a summary report and a transcript does not enjoy the same status as a full text law report where one is available, for reasons which will become clear once one appreciates the amount of careful editorial work that goes into preparing the full report. In other jurisdictions, the official law reports are treated with less reverence, although it is still normal for courts to require them to be cited in preference to primary sources such as slip opinions. Nonetheless, further down the page the ICLR makes clear that the full text of the judgment takes primacy over the headnote, just as in other jurisdictions: Although the headnote adds value to the report of a judgment, it is the judgment itself which sets the precedent and binds subsequent decision-makers. Nevertheless, a good headnote is a work of meticulous legal draftsmanship and can withstand the closest of textual scrutiny. Accuracy is all. Make the proposition too general, and the principle appears either so watered down as to be meaningless or, more dangerously, misleadingly wide in its application. Draw it too narrowly, and it fails to express the principle on which the court based its decision. At its best, a headnote is a precious distillation – the single malt of legal learning.
In the german language, in jurisprudence, we have lots of latin terms / expressions, because latin expressions seem to be more exact. Is this also the case in the english speaking world? You are correct that there are many Latin expressions in the English speaking legal world. You are not fully correct regarding the reasons that this is the case, and in some instances this means that you can't trust a Latin legal term to mean the same thing in common law jurisprudence as it does in civil law jurisprudence. In England, Latin made its way into legal use because the clergy and literate Norman French elites spoke Latin for affairs of consequence and state and used it for that purpose in much the same manner that elites in India today use the English language. But, they were using Latin to document their own rulings and decisions in the feudal records which were largely based on tradition, common sense and local custom and practice. (This was also true in Scandinavia until the Scandinavians adopted legal codes based upon continental models in the 18th and 19th centuries or so.) In Germany (and most of continental Europe) the situation was different. In the Roman Empire, the judicial role was delegated mostly to people we would call arbitrators these days, who issued written decisions in Latin after cases were litigated before them by people we would call lawyers today, and these were collected, edited, arranged by subject and published in books that are the equivalent of the legal digests or case reporters today. When the Roman Empire collapsed, these fell into disuse, but monks continued to copy sets of them of future generations through the dark ages. Then, sometimes around the late Middle Ages/early Rennaisance it became fashionable for lords and officials making judicial determinations to reference these digests in their decision making on something of a grass roots basis until it became accepted practice after a few centuries for there to be formally trained jurists who were familiar with the digests and it was expected that these trained professionals relying on these historic Roman legal sources were the only legitimate way to make legal decisions. This process is called the "reception" of Roman law in early modern Europe and was the foundation of the law in most continental European countries that ultimately became civil law countries until it was so jumbled and arcane that Napoleon streamlined it by having an expert prepare his civil code with the idea that it could be used to get fair and accurate legal resources without lawyers or legally trained jurists. Germany and Spain then copied this efforts in their respective national styles. Germany strove to be more detailed and more exactly accurate in codifying the Roman law substrate using "legal science" intended for use by legal professionals, and has a longer more detailed civil code with more major categories and more rigorously consistent used of defined terms throughout their codes as a result. Spain was, if anything, a bit more loose in drafting than the French, but made substantive adjustments to reflect local ideas on the correct rule of law. These codes, in turn, were used as models by almost everyone else in Europe. To make a long story short then, Germany and other continental European countries use Latin legal terms not just because Latin was a common language of the clergy and literate elite, but because they were borrowing Roman legal terminology directly from Roman legal sources that had been preserved by monks in through the Middle Ages and then restored to active use in the early modern period, unlike the English, who were mostly coining Latin legal terms for non-Roman legal concepts or borrowing Roman legal terminology in an uninformed and frequently not technically accurate way compared to the way they were used by the trained legal scholars familiar with Roman legal sources on the continent.