Is shredding a document included in forgery? I'm wondering if a defendant was to take the ownership papers of a $125,000 yacht and shredded them, would it still be considered forgery since it is altering the document?
Is shredding a Document included in Forgery? You don't give a jurisdiction, so for england-and-wales: NO s.1 of Forgery and counterfeiting Act 1981 defines forgery as: A person is guilty of forgery if he makes a false instrument, with the intention that he or another shall use it to induce somebody to accept it as genuine, and by reason of so accepting it to do or not to do some act to his own or any other person’s prejudice The unlawful shredding of documents would probably be criminal damage, theft or perverting the course of justice depending on the circumstances.
Suppose Publisher printed 10,000 copies under the terms of the contract, and within those two years they sold 7,000 copies (and paid royalties). If you did not receive leftover copies at the end of the 2 years, then either (1) they broke the contract or (2) at the last minute they sold the remainder to some third party. If the latter is the case, they would be obligated to pay royalties on that last sale, and the numbers should add up (assuming you know how many were printed initially). If they failed to pay royalties, or they continued to sell the book, you would need to send your lawyer after them. Another possibility is the lost-email excuse – "We emailed you asking if you wanted the books, and you didn't reply, so we sold them" (disposing of does not necessary mean "destroy"). The burden would be on them to prove that they offered you the remainders and you elected not to purchase (if that is the wording – the contract could have required a specific refusal, not just a failure to respond). Under the contract, Publisher can't just decide to keep printing the book, nor can they continue to distribute it (but a third party could distribute existing copies forever). You would have "legal exposure" i.e. some risk of being sued if you republish, but it might be minimal – definitely get your attorney to advise you on that. Vendors might refuse to sell the republished work if they think it is an unauthorized edition.
You certainly can't legally steal anything, ever. If it is legal, it is not stealing. In particular, if it is your property, it isn't stealing. The question is really, "is it your property"? This will be jurisdiction dependant. I am familiar with England and Wales, and other common law jurisdictions may be similar. The fact you co-signed for the car definitely does not make it your property. It just means that out of the goodness of your heart, you agreed to reduce the finance company's risk by promising to pay if your ex-friend didn't. In E&amp;W, I don't think it is possible to register a car jointly, but there is a long page explaining that the registered keeper is not necessarily the owner of the car. My guess is that the car probably does not belong to you, so if you take it you will probably end up with a conviction for theft.
This is one of the things Martha Stewart was convicted of. 18 USC 1001 is the US federal law requiring truthfulness. That statute forbids you to falsify, conceal, or cover up a material fact. One limitation on how broad this law is, is that it has to be a matter "within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States". If your neighbor is an FBI agent and he asks if you're the one who broke his window, and you lie, that's not a federal matter. Another limitation is that the lying has to be material. The essential part of the law is subsection (a). Subsection (b) then states an exception: (b) Subsection (a) does not apply to a party to a judicial proceeding, or that party’s counsel, for statements, representations, writings or documents submitted by such party or counsel to a judge or magistrate in that proceeding. Then you also owe a lesser duty of truthfulness to the legislature. Taking note of US. v. Yermian, it is not required that the person you lie to be a federal officer. Yermian lied to his employer, who was a defense contractor, and the fact that the relevant form was submitted to the government for scrutiny is what made it a matter in federal jurisdiction. Comparing the wording of 1001 to the perjury statute, the operative expression for perjury involves statements "which he does not believe to be true", we can see that the perjury statute requires telling the literal truth (see Bronston v. US), which allows so-called lies of omission (of a particular subtype: much more could be said about that). In contrast the lying statute forbids both literally false statements and concealing of the truth. I don't have cases at my fingertips that indicate how broad your truthful answers have to be, for example if you think the FBI is trying to put away a friend and ask you about what he did on June 14, and you know that he did a bad thing on June 13, would it be lying in the relevant sense to conceal that fact which they didn't ask about. [ADDENDUM] A session of perusing cases has led to a tiny bit of further information. A literal reading of the statute says that you are in violation of the law if you falsify a fact (sloppy epistemology, unless it refers just to altering records and evidence), or conceal a fact, and the courts recognise this as a fundamental division. As for falsifying, the way that has been applied is to refer to cases where the accused makes a statement which asserts something that he knows to be untrue. Thus, saying "No" to a question when the truth is "Yes" is a violation. A propos concealment, in US v. Diogo 320 F.2d 898 the court states that False representations, like common law perjury, require proof of actual falsity; concealment requires proof of wilful nondisclosure by means of a 'trick, scheme or device.' This case is pre-Bronston so there is mixing of concepts from perjury law and lying law, which would not happen now, but we can steering clear of their perjury citations. The crucial fact is that accused(s) were technically married in New York, for immigration purposes, and they were accused of a 1001 violation for having indicated that they were married. Part of the government's case was that such a marriage is not valid, and the court rejected that conclusion. The government's second prong was to maintain that the court "should affirm appellant's convictions on a theory of concealment", and this too the court rejected, saying "proof of their ulterior motives in marriage would not be tantamount to proof of willful and knowing concealment of these material facts". What they said on the forms was literally true, and they did not have a duty to volunteer information that they probably knew the government was interested in. Contrarily in a later case, US v. Zalman 870 F.2d 1047 we are told that the underlying purpose of a marriage is a material fact which bears upon the validity of the marriage, and that any false or fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the actual purpose of a marriage in order to gain status as a resident of the United States can be punished under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 so you have to be more truthful than the literal truth standard. There are also circumstances where there is an independent duty to give information, such as reporting income to the IRS. In US v. Hernando Ospina 798 F.2d 1570 the court maintained It is clear that in order to support a section 1001 concealment conviction there must be a legal duty to disclose the facts the defendant was convicted of concealing citing US v. Tobon-Builes 706 F.2d 1092, where again there was a legal duty to report "existence, origin, and transfer of approximately $185,200 in cash". In other words, it is not clear what information you are allowed to not volunteer when asked a question in a federal matter.
This is a good question, which I am going to answer from a practical perspective, rather than a theoretical one, which would probably justify a law review article (applications of the takings clause to criminal justice fact patterns is actually one of my pet areas of legal scholarship, but a lot of it calls for dramatic changes in established practice and precedents reached from other perspectives, making it impractical to pursue in real life). I recently had a case along these lines in my office where my client's property was seized as evidence in a criminal case against a third-party. The crime involved a gun shop where all of the guns that were in the possession of the shop owner for repairs at the time of the bust (i.e. as bailments), including ours worth several thousand dollars in addition to having some sentimental value, were seized as evidence of charges against a shop owner who was fencing stolen goods, making sales to felons off the books, falsifying excise tax returns, etc. He seemed legitimate and had been in business for many years in what was not a fly by night operation. He had all of the proper licenses. Who knew we were dealing with a crook? In that case, we intervened on behalf of our client in the primary case to seek the physical return of the property (basically a replevin claim), as have others affected by the bust. It took a few months and some legal fees, but we prevailed without too much effort, as have the other intervenors. Generally speaking, to make a 5th Amendment claim, you would have to show a total taking and move into some legal gray areas in this context, while it is usually hard for authorities to show a continuing need for possession of third-party property in the face of a demand for its return, especially when photography and other scientific tools can document the evidence in great detail these days. In that case, showing that our client's particular gun was not involved in any illegitimate transaction also simultaneously made it less important as evidence, although that would not necessarily be true in general in these kinds of situations. There is a pending case in Colorado posing similar issues, where a suburban police department essentially destroyed a guy's home in order to catch a felon with no relation to the homeowner whatsoever, who had fled into it and taken refuge there. But, that case, as far as I know, has not yet been resolved on the merits.
No-ish, it is not. The relevant sticking point would be in their DMCA takedown notice, where they have to follow 17 USC 512(c)(3)(A) and include in their notice (v) A statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law. (vi) A statement that the information in the notification is accurate, and under penalty of perjury, that the complaining party is authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed. The key here is having a "good faith belief". There is a credible scenario where a company A could file multiple notices for the actually same material B posted by the exact same person C, where the person has the right to post that material, and do so in good faith. If A was not able to locate evidence of the permission to C, then they would shift the burden of proof to C – "good faith belief" doesn't mean that they have to be right, just that they have to actually think they are. If C also uses the name D, A would not be able to determine that the work was licensed to D based on the fact (once they know that) that it is licensed to C. DMCA abuse is not an permanently open escape hatch. 17 USC 512(4) states Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the alleged infringer, by any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized licensee, or by a service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it. See Automattic Inc. v. Steiner, 82 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The ruling judge found that "Defendant could not have reasonably believed that the Press Release he sent to Hotham was protected under copyright". The appeal court drew on precedent and dictionary to fill in gaps w.r.t. "good faith belief", that the person should have known if it acted with reasonable care or diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it was making misrepresentations In this case, the abuser was flagrantly abusing the takedown system, and there is some reason to believe that in the instant case, the abuser had actual knowledge of non-infringement. Rossi v. Motion Picture Association of America provides an alternative outcome. In this case, Rossi operated a website that appeared (note the word appear) to offer free downloads of movies, and the rights-holder MCAA filed a takedown notice. In fact, it did not offer any such downloads, but MCAA's investigation stopped prematurely. This court held that "good faith belief" is subjective, so Rossi did not prevail. It is no doubt crucial that Rossi actually counted on his customers thinking that you could get actual downloads of protected material. Whether or not a DMCA abuse suit would succeed would depend very much on the factual details of why the material is not infringing, and how easily the rights-holder could know that there was no infringement.
Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
The contract remains valid. Most contracts don't need to be written at all. Even if yours did need to be written under the Statute of Frauds or some other law, you're saying that it was made in writing, even though you later tore it up. The fact that the contract is missing or destroyed doesn't change the fact that it exists and obligates the parties; it just makes it harder to prove what it said.