What does equitable mean, especially in special education law? I understand equitable as it's used in ordinary speech, but not in the legal sense, apparently. Here is some legal text I'm having trouble understanding: "In order to have a chance at reimbursement, a court must find: (1) that the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement; (2) the private school was an appropriate placement; and (3) there are no equitable considerations that would require the court to reduce or deny reimbursement for the parents. [...] The third prong, which assesses equitable considerations, often acts as a catchall for evaluating the reasonableness of the parents and the school district." - Navigating Tuition Reimbursement. I have tried law dictionaries. Here's an example of something that didn't help: refers to positive remedies (orders to do something, not money damages) employed by the courts to solve disputes or give relief. - The Free Dictionary. Here's another example of some text that uses the word equitable in ways that I don't understand: - THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
In this context, the phrase "there are no equitable considerations that would require the court to reduce or deny reimbursement for the parents" largely refers to defenses to claims arising under the law of equity as applied historically in the chancery courts of England, and more recently, to claims of a type that would have been brought in equity courts if there were still a separate equity court system. Two of the more common equitable defenses are "unclean hands" and "laches". The equitable defense of "unclean hands" applies when the person seeking relief has engaged in misconduct of some kind in the same transaction. For example, if "the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement" because the student had previously been expelled for beating up another kid (especially if this had nothing to do with the reason that a FAPE is needed) or because the parents ignored a deadline for filing the application for a FAPE at their public school of which they had reasonable advanced notice, that student's parents might be denied reimbursement under the doctrine of unclean hands. The equitable defense of "laches" applies when unreasonable delay on the part of the person seeking relief causes prejudice to the person from whom relief is sought even in the absence of a date certain deadline or before a date certain deadline expires. For example, suppose that "the private school was an appropriate placement" but it had tuition three times as high as two other private schools in town. If the other two less expensive private schools had vacancies for months after the student was denied a FAPE at their public school placement, but had no room for new students a week before school started leaving only the much more expensive private school with any vacancies, the request might be denied, or limited to the amount that would have been paid if the parents had applied to other private schools more promptly, under the doctrine of laches. Other equitable defenses include the duty to mitigate damages (e.g. there might be reimbursement for private school tuition, but not for late fees and interest that could have been avoided), impossibility and impracticability (e.g. no public or private placement is capable of addressing the fundamental problem that the child is in a catatonic state), acts of god/force majeure (e.g. the student was denied a FAPE because the school was destroyed in a hurricane and the school district had to shut down the schools for everyone for a semester), implied waiver or estoppel (e.g. after the student was denied a FAPE the student was enrolled for regular classes at that public school without complaint and without trying to find a private school placement), spoliation (e.g. the records needed to determine eligibility were intentionally destroyed by the applicant before the hearing), fraud as a defense and not a claim (e.g. the parents lied in their reimbursement application), payment (e.g. the student was denied a FAPE by two schools and already received reimbursement from another one and is not entitled to a double recovery), release or accord and satisfaction (e.g. a settlement agreement was already reached with the school denying reimbursement or agreeing to a particular reimbursement).
Caveat Keep in mind that words do not have uniform definitions for all times and places and contexts. Words can have different meanings in particular contexts and can be defined in a contract or statute to have a meaning different from the common meaning. "Person" Usually Includes Entities Of Any Kind This said, usually the term "person" in the law refers to any human being and any trust, estate or entity that is capable of suing and being sued and entering into contracts. An "entity" in this sense would often include partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, non-profit associations (whether or not incorporated), business trusts, joint ventures, local governments, states, the federal government and foreign governments. (I break out trusts and estates separately because there is divided authority in different jurisdictions over whether trusts and estates are entities, or are simply a special hat that the trustee or executor wears that are not entities, which can be relevant in some highly technical situations.) Agency Situations The term "person" is also often used in the sense that it refers to the principal and not the agent, when an agent is taking action on behalf of the principal. Thus, if there is a law that says "a person who enters into a real estate contract must disclose that person's taxpayer identification number", and someone with a power of attorney from you signs a real estate contract on your behalf, the power of attorney agent should disclosure your taxpayer identification number and not theirs. Why Is The Term "Person" Defined So Broadly? One important reason for using the term "person" to apply to entities as well as human beings, is that it allows for statutes and contract terms or case law legal rules to be stated in very general terms without being wordy in a way that accurately reflects how those legal rules or contract terms should apply to entities. For example, a statute using the word "person" might say: A person who is engaged in business in this state must register with the department of business licenses. By using the word "person" in this way, the statute wouldn't have to say instead (probably less accurately and less comprehensibly): Any individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, business trust, non-business trust, estate, governmental entity, or other entity, including the principal of any agent acting on behalf of the principal, engaged in business in this state, must register with the department of business licenses. The phrasing without the word "person" would be more likely to create loopholes because some kind of entity is omitted, and would be prone to ambiguity because one would have to decide which words that define the kind of persons and entities that are covered modify which other words in the sentence. Thus, using the word "person" is often makes entities more rather than less accountable to the law, by making legal language more clear and more general (and hence containing fewer loopholes). "Individual" or "Natural Person" Usually the term "individual" or "natural person" would mean a human being, although, of course, there are other senses of the word "individual" such as "an individual Widget" referring to exactly one Widget in particular, as opposed to Widgets in general. Alternative Definitions Of "Person" There are isolated times when the word "person" would not include minors and incapacitated people who are incapable of suing or entering into contracts in their own name due to lack of legal capacity. It isn't uncommon to have a definition of "person" in a statute or contract that omits governmental entities, that omits all kinds of entities, or that omits particular kinds of entities (e.g. foreign entities or corporations). For example, a tax statute might define "person" in a way that includes natural persons and entities, but excludes governments. Some of the definitions of terms like these in the bankruptcy code are particularly non-intuitive.
I wouldn't say that it "trumps state law". Indeed, the State of Georgia, either expressly by statute or through the common law, establishes that teachers and school administrators have the authority to create rules and regulations governing the conduct of students that are not themselves unconstitutional as applied to students, although, in general these consequences can't resort to criminal punishments. Instead, typical punishments include detention, suspension (in school or out of school), expulsion, and adjustment of grades for an assignment or a course. Marks in one's disciplinary record and public shaming, forfeiture of eligibility to participate in school sponsored extra-curricular activities or honors (including marching at graduation), refusing to release transcripts, and historically (but much less so in recent years) corporal punishments such as spanking, have been options for schools to enforce their punishments. A prohibition on recording in a syllabus certainly wouldn't result in criminal punishments, and probably wouldn't even give rise to civil liability. Depending upon the purpose for which the recording was being used, it is even conceivable that the school's right to punish someone for violating a school rule could be estopped by First Amendment and whistle blower protection law considerations (e.g. if it was used to document harassment and discriminatory conduct for use in sharing with the school board or law enforcement or publishing on radio or TV or an Internet news source). But, the mere fact that conduct is legal outside a school setting does not mean that a school cannot prohibit and punish that conduct in its own rules. The closer case, upon which there is more division of legal authority, is under what circumstances a school can legitimately punish conduct away from school, for example, uploading rap lyrics about a teacher to YouTube from home without using any school resources to do so.
Not in this case First, we are having an appeals court case that is filed against the dismissal of the real case - there had been no trial. It's a research into if there was a clear error of the court, not who would have won. The Appeals court decided to send it back to the district court with pretty much a direct order to have a trial and solve the issiue, as the very last paragraph of the file shows: We conclude that Schwake stated a Title IX claim against the University because he plausibly alleged gender bias. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the district court’s order and judgment dismissing the claim with prejudice, and remand for further proceedings. Now, back to your quote. As this is an appeal case, the standard is different than in the district court. In this case, it tries to see if there might have been a case, which was dismissed erroneously. Page 15 and 16, where you cite, states (emphasis mine): Schwake’s allegations of a pattern of gender-based decisionmaking against male respondents in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings make that inference plausible. He alleged that “[m]ale respondents in student disciplinary proceedings involving alleged sexual harassment and misconduct cases at [the University]” “are invariably found guilty, regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” Schwake further alleged that he was “aware of recent [University] disciplinary cases against male respondents in alleged sexual misconduct cases who were all found guilty regardless of the evidence or lack thereof.” The district court was not free to ignore this non-conclusory and relevant factual allegation. [your quote] The absence of this level of detail from Schwake’s complaint does not render Schwake’s allegation conclusory or insufficient. There is no heightened pleading standard for Title IX claims. See Austin, 925 F.3d at 1137 n.4. That point is particularly apt here. It may be difficult for a plaintiff to know the full extent of alleged discrimination in decisionmaking before discovery allows a plaintiff to unearth information controlled by the defendant. This sheds much more light upon the situation of the case: Schwacke sued and alleged something. The University alleges the contrary in their reply brief and asks the court to dismiss the claim. The court dismissed in March 2018. This was before any discovery has taken place: nobody was subpoenaed, nobody had to testify in court, nobody had to turn over any documents. We have only statements from either side. As the next step, Schwacke appealed the dismissal, and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, as it found clear error in the handling in dismissal, as one can see in the last paragraphs from each claim's section: Here, we are satisfied that Schwake’s allegations of contemporaneous pressure and gender-based decisionmaking establish background indicia of sex discrimination relevant to his Title IX claim. Considering the combination of Schwake’s allegations of background indicia of sex discrimination along with the allegations concerning his particular disciplinary case, we conclude that sex discrimination is a plausible explanation for the University’s handling of the sexual misconduct disciplinary case against Schwake. This is sufficient for Schwake’s Title IX claim to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss stage. Now it is up to Schwacke to get into discovery, subpoena the information from the university and go into the courtroom trial... Unless the parties settles. Sidenote By the way, the quote of the university refers to a different case from the 6th Circuit (where Ohio is), which they try to pull up as a model standard. This case is not binding for the 9th Circuit (where Arizona is) but could have been used as a model. Doe v. Miami University, 882 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2018) is somewhat similar to Schwacke, as it had been previously dismissed. However, the Title IX was restored by the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit and it was sent back to the lower court to have a trial. Here too, the standard was reasonable expectation or plausibility: Plaintiff “allege[d] facts showing a potential pattern of gender-based decision-making that ‘raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal’ circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination.”
You don't really "solve" a problem with IRAC. It is a rubric for summarizing cases and writing about how a legal issue was or should be resolved. As noted by @Putvi it stands for issue, rule, analysis and conclusion. It is common when writing a court opinion, or summarizing a case. For example, you first state the issue: Does the statute of frauds bar claims for promissory estoppel to establish who owns real property? Then to state the rule: Promissory estoppel can overcome the statute of frauds for many purposes, but not for purposes of lender liability or conveyances of real property. Then to provide analysis: Promissory estoppel has been used to substitute reliance for consideration and other formal requirements such as the requirement of a writing in many contexts, but the lender liability statute of frauds was enacted with a broader application than the traditional statute of frauds and the statute of frauds for conveyances of real property is definitional in nature since a conveyance of real property doesn't have a meaning in the absence of a deed or other instrument of conveyance. Since determining who owns real estate and not just who is obligated to transfer it in the future necessarily involves a conveyance, the exception to the promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds applies. Finally, you state the conclusion: Therefore, the statute of frauds bars claims for promissory estoppel to establish who owns real property. IRAC is a tool used for communicating legal concepts and conclusions, not for reaching those conclusions. Usually, the first stage of research is that you are presented with a fact pattern from which you have to "spot issues" and you may need to do legal research to use terminology that will be helpful and accurate to determine what the exact issue you want to resolve is and what the legal rule that applies to the case is. This often involves significant analysis prior to stating the rule or defining the issue. Also, it isn't uncommon in adversary practice to start with a conclusion, and see if you can find a way to describe the issue, rule and analysis that will lead to that conclusion. It would also be common to ask a junior attorney or law clerk to IRAC a large pile of cases to allow the senior attorney to focus in on which ones matter more quickly.
In the US, rights are independent of "responsibilities". But, responsibilities is a very broad concept: some aspects of responsibility are encoded in law, others are not. You have an absolute legal obligation to not murder or steal, as defined by the law. Some people say you have a social responsibility to put others before your own interest: this may be legally true in certain contexts, especially fiduciary contexts where your broker is supposed to make decisions on your behalf that benefit you (regardless of personal effect on the broker). Contracts are another source of obligations – you gain a right (access to someone else's property) in exchange for something, which may include standards of behavior. You thus have a legal obligation on SE to not be hurtful in your postings (enforcement is via suspension, in the worst case). The rights spelled out in the Bill of Rights are about the government – it says what the government may not do, it isn't a source of permission for you to exercise your rights. Generally, the traditional US understanding of "rights" is that they are inherent in people and are not "granted" by the government, so the Bill of Rights is a codification of what that means. Therefore, (morally, intellectually) irresponsible speech is also protected.
Confidential is simply a less "forceful" name than "privilege". If something is "confidential", this means that the recipient won't voluntarily blab it. This covers a multitude of sins. The rubric I was taught in law school is that even the front page headline of the New York Times if it relates to your case, it is confidential, because you don't want to tip off an adversary who may not have read that paper that day for some reason to the disadvantage of your client. If something is privileged, you can't be compelled to do so involuntarily. A "privilege" is a more "forceful" word. In practice, most stuff that you have a legitimate need to keep secret in the face of compulsory evidence gathering tools are privileged, and confidential matters not covered by a privilege are kept that way because it is best practice not to be source of an opponent's discovery of information and not because it can't be found any other way from something that someone has a legitimate reason to keep secret from someone in a lawsuit or criminal case (which is the main circumstance when privileges are invoked).
canada united-kingdom equity A court exercising its equitable jurisdiction may disallow a minor from impeaching the validity of a contract on the grounds of minority if the minor acted fraudulently: Wilbur v. Jones (1881), 21 N.B.R. 4 (C.A.). See also Stocks v. Wilson (1913), 2 K.B. 235: What the Court of Equity has done in cases of this kind is to prevent the infant from retaining the benefit of what he has obtained by reason of his fraud. It has done no more than this, and this is a very different thing from making him liable to pay damages or compensation for the loss of the other party’s bargain. If the infant has obtained property by fraud he can be compelled to restore it; if he has obtained money he can be compelled to refund it. If he has not obtained either, but has only purported to bind himself by an obligation to transfer property or to pay money, neither in a Court of law nor a Court of Equity can he be compelled to make good his promise or to make satisfaction for its breach. Fraud in this context is not limited to literal misrepresentations at the time of contract formation: &quot;support may be found for the view that the mere fact that the minor wishes to retain the property which he has obtained while at the same time pleading infancy as a defence to a claim for its value, is fradulent conduct in the requisite sense... 'for an infant to attempt to obtain something for nothing is, in effect, fraud in the eye of equity'&quot;: John D. McCamus, &quot;Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under Minors' Contract&quot; (1979) 28 U.N.B. Law Journal 89. In the circumstances you describe, if all is believed by the court, the court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to require the infant to return any benefit they obtained from the transaction. I cannot find an example case, but it also seems open for the court to enjoin the minor to stop disclosing the secrets. Common law and equity user6726's answer focuses on the limited nature of remedies for this wrong at common law. user6726 is correct that fraudulent misrepresentation has a fairly narrow conception in common law, and it is a good answer for pointing this out. My answer is complementary in that it focuses on potential equitable remedies. This is yet another example where the distinction between common law and equity is significant: common law produces a somewhat harsh result for the wronged party, but equity may step in to return some fairness to the situation. The common law rule is that a minor is not liable to restore benefits conferred on him under a contract which is unenforceable against him, even if the contract results from his fraudulent misrepresentation of majority. Chitty on Contracts, §11-056.