Panel of Judges in Supreme Court - Odd number? In Supreme Court, the panel of judges will always be a odd number? 3,5,7,9 so the decision in terms of votes count verdict will always outcome a result and not a tie?
The UK Supreme Court (as you tagged in the question) uses an odd number for this exact reason. A recent case, Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 58, further explains: it is a very common feature of appeals in the UK generally that the appellate court consists of a larger panel than the court appealed from. It not infrequently happens that a party to an appeal to the Supreme Court wishes the court to depart from an earlier decision of the Supreme Court or of the House of Lords. In such a case the practice is for the appeal to be heard by an enlarged panel of seven or more justices, precisely to clothe it with that greater authority The statute establishing this Court provides: The Supreme Court is duly constituted in any proceedings only if all of the following conditions are met— (a) the Court consists of an uneven number of judges; (b) the Court consists of at least three judges; (c) more than half of those judges are permanent judges. (with the possibility of some deviation in special circumstances). This practice was previously followed in the House of Lords, before being made statutory when the Supreme Court was formed. The UK court does not sit en banc, partly because there are twelve permanent judges and that is an even number, and partly because the legal tradition hasn't held it to be worthwhile. An exceptional case was R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5, heard by eleven judges - a record! - which happened to be the entire Supreme Court at the time, since there was one vacancy. A panel of nine was used in Attorney General's Reference (No. 2 of 2001) [2003] UKHL 68, for the first time since R v Ball [1911] AC 47. Smaller numbers are more typical, such as five. For the Supreme Court of the United States, there are nine judges but they do not use panels. It is fairly common for some judges to recuse themselves because they had been involved with proceedings at a lower stage, or if there is a vacancy, and so there are cases where there are an even number of judges actually involved. The US court also has a practice of fairly complex patterns of concurring and dissenting opinions, with justices potentially joining more than one opinion, so it can be subtle to identify where the majority position really lies. It is therefore possible for there to be a tie. If there is a tie on appeal, then the lower court's decision stands, without precedential effect. For matters within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, there is no consensus on what is meant to happen - see What happens if the US Supreme Court ties 4-4? for more.
Yes. Juries aren't terribly accurate. There is an irreducible chance that no matter how clear the outcome should be that the jury will get it wrong. Based upon a review of the academic literature on wrongful convictions and inaccurate acquittals, I generally tell my clients that this is about 10%. Many people think that this is a low end estimate. Also, sometimes a jury will acquit a defendant in a case where they think that the defendant was actually legally guilty because of extraordinary circumstances, and so the jury will disregard the law and acquit. This practice is called &quot;jury nullification.&quot; And, as other answers have noted, sometimes the prosecution or the judicial system screws up for reasons that are unforeseeable, after a not guilty plea, in a way that makes proving your guilt difficult or impossible. Basically, if you &quot;roll the dice&quot; there is some non-zero chance you will be acquitted, while if you plead guilty, there is none. Also, sometimes court decisions will change the law in way favorable to you after the trial, and as long as your case is still on direct appeal from the conviction, you can benefit from those changes in the law, which you cannot if you simply plead guilty without any concessions. Likewise, if you are innocent and the evidence is currently strongly against you, but you wish to preserve the ability to later attack the conviction based upon future newly discovered evidence, not pleading guilty is generally necessary to preserve that option. Another circumstance where going to trial but losing can still be worth it, is where there are extenuating circumstances that make your conduct understandable, even if it is not a legally valid defense. Getting these facts in front of the judge in a fuller fashion, as a trial can make possible, can convince the judge that while you are legally guilty, that you deserve leniency. Going to trial typically results in a longer sentence, even without a plea bargain, however, so going forward with a hopeless trial is rarely a good move.
The decision of a court consists of several things: The orders made A summary of the evidence The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the facts of the case are The judge's reasoning from the evidence to their conclusions of what the law applying to those facts is The judge's reasoning from those findings of facts and law to the orders that were made (ratio decidendi) Reasoning on how things might have been decided otherwise (or the same way) if the facts or the law were different (obiter dicta). We hope that the judge is articulate enough that we can tell which is which. Where there is more than one judge there is more than one opinion. However, there is still ratio decidendi and obiter dicta across all the opinions. Typically, a dissenting judge disagrees with the ratio decidendi in whole or part and his reasoning about that is obiter dicta. The ratio decidendi – "the point in a case that determines the judgement" or "the principle that the case establishes" – creates binding precedent. The obiter dicta creates persuasive precedent. A binding precedent is just that – it binds the decisions of lower ranked courts in the hierarchy. If the facts of the current case match the facts of the precedent then the judge must follow the precedent even if they disagree with it – indeed there are many decisions where the judge expresses their disagreement with the precedent in no uncertain terms. In addition, there can be conflicting precedent, for example, where the High Court of Australia has made a decision on a piece of legislation that conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court of NSW on an essentially similar provision in a different Act. A wise judge in such a situation should do what McDougal J did in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190 and issue orders referring it to a court that can overturn one (or both) of the precedents. A persuasive precedent can influence the decisions of other courts – they are an authority a judge can look to in formulating their reasons but they are free to consider and reject them even if the facts match. Obiter dicta from same level or higher courts in the hierarchy is persuasive precedent as is ratio decidendi and obiter dicta from same level courts and courts in other jurisdictions.
County Courts do not have official neutral citations and are placed in the Miscellaneous category by the British and Irish Legal Information Institute, who nowadays acts as the unofficial case reporter in the UK. See https://www.bailii.org/bailii/citation.html for a list of courts whose proceedings have official neutral citations. The series number appears to be decided by BAILII, probably based on the time it publishes a case.
A majority of the justices support the first opinion, written by Johnson, so Madsen (writing a separate concurring opinion) is referring to the previous opinion. "at 12" means "on p. 12" (special law talk), so at the top of p. 12 you see the quoted text. "n. 9" means "footnote number 9" (which is on p. 12).
How deterministic is the legal system? It depends. And less than we might wish. It depends on the case. How complex is the fact pattern? How strong is the evidence? How clear is the law? How compelling are the legal precedents? Questions of that nature. The only generalization I might make would be that "lower level" cases seem more deterministic than "higher level" cases. By higher level, I mean those heard by a supreme court making constitutional decisions. Here is a web site that has created a prediction market out of supreme court cases. Many have written on this topic. Read this answer. It is an excellent treatise on the subjectivity of the legal system. Written by a real attorney. Read this answer too. My advice: If you seek a deterministic system, don't look to the legal one.
The article "Enforcement of Religious Courts' Judgments Under Israeli Law" (Asher Maoz, Journal of Church and State 1991) is useful in understanding the legal underpinnings of this question. The beginning point is the Palestine Order in Council 1922 (this is from the UK Privy Council), where religion-based courts are established, so sect. 52 is about Muslim courts, 53 (later repealed) is about Jewish courts and 54 is about Christian courts. Section 53 was replaced with Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, stating that marriage between Jews follows Jewish law, and says that rabbinical court has exclusive jurisdiction. Article 6 of that law allows a district court enforce a final judgment by a rabbinical court by imprisonment. Muslim courts similarly have exclusive jurisdiction over Muslims, though it is wider (it pertains to all matters, not just marriage). Actual enforcement apparently involves the Chief Execution Officer. Basic Law 15 gives the Supreme Court supervisory power over all courts, including religious courts. So rabbinical courts don't have unfettered power to do whatever they want (under Jewish law), but there is direct state sanction of imprisonment as a penalty for not obeying a rabbinical court decision, there is non-religious execution of court orders, and there is secular supervision. Since civil marriage is non-existent in Israel, there is no choice (if you want to have the wedding in Israel) but to go to the recognized religious authorities, which seems to make Cyprus a popular wedding venue. A Roman Catholic divorce is not possible in Israel, a Muslim one is, and I really cannot tell about the various Orthodox Christian churches.
A jury verdict does not have any effect as legal precedent. Only appellate court opinions (that are not mere de novo bench trials of a court not of record) have effect as legal precedent outside the dealings of the actual parties to the case in future litigation with each other. Even then, an appellate court ruling is binding precedent only over the courts inferior to the appellate court issuing the opinion.