Is there precedent of secret subpoena that compels government access? Under what guise of law, would state actors (UK, US, etc.) be able to issue secret (unpublished) subpoenas that require industry / utilities to provide government access to their systems? Examples of access include phone companies, which were forced during the Clinton administration to build digital networks that government agents could tap. The modern day version of "tapping" is dismantling end to end encryption of messaging systems such as Facebook or WhatsApp
In the UK and USA (and I imagine other jurisdictions) there have been laws that explicitly provide for orders obliging entities to (A) provide access or information and (B) keep the order secret. For example, in the USA the Stored Communications Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Right to Financial Privacy Act authorise the FBI to issue National Security Letters (Wikipedia, EFF, EPIC, Lawfare). These are an administrative subpoena, without prior approval from a judge, for meta-information (e.g. phone numbers dialed or email recipients addressed but not the content) of communications relevant to national security investigations. They typically contain a non-disclosure requirement prohibiting the recipient of the NSL from disclosing its existence or the FBI's demands. There have been challenges on First Amendment grounds to the non-disclosure aspect but, so far as I'm aware, they have all ultimately failed. Some of their non-disclosure requirements may eventually expire under other laws. In response, so-called 'warrant canaries' (Wikipedia) have been developed (and gone a bit further than the original idea) - these are intended to allow entities to relatively passively warn of such an order having been received if not the detail of the order. However, they can be legally risky in that they might be seen by a court as trying to circumvent the non-disclosure requirement and therefore breaking it.
1-3: This would be prohibited under Article VI, paragraph 2 of the US Constitution, which provides that federal law, and the ability to enforce that law, has supremacy over state law. As summarized by Cornell Law, the Supremacy Clause: establishes that the federal constitution, and federal law generally, take precedence over state laws, and even state constitutions. It prohibits states from interfering with the federal government's exercise of its constitutional powers... 4: Not legally; see above. 5: Yes, probably a lot of laws. Those charges could range anywhere from interfering with a federal investigation, wrongful imprisonment, assault, or kidnapping. I think it's important to point out that it is highly unlikely the situation would ever escalate to 4, let alone 5. The federal government is incredibly well resourced with regards to being able to move its law enforcement officers throughout the country. And that's not withstanding that the FBI and other agencies (CBP, TSA) are already stationed in any particular state. A non-zero number of those agents are also residents of the state they're stationed in, which would complicate things further.
Note that what is being bought or sold here is actually information about the exploit. Attempting to criminally penalize the transmission of information in the US often runs into First Amendment issues. If a person has good reason to know that information is going to be used to commit a crime, or is likely to be so used, and there is no plausible legitimate use for the information, that person might be charged with complicity or conspiracy for distributing the information. But where there are legitimate uses, that is much less likely. Here the information could be used to defend against the exploit, or to identify and remove software subject to the exploit, or for research into such exploits generally. There may be other legit uses as well. Some years ago the Federal government attempted to prosecute a person for exporting a book describing how to create an encryption program. The courts eventually ruled that this was protected speech. I suspect a similar ruling would be made in the sort of case described in the question, but the details would matter.
The clause you highlighted has an &quot;or&quot; in front of it: &quot;..., or in such pretended character...&quot;. It's only one alternative. Demanding or obtaining money, etc, is sufficient to violate the statute but not necessary. Looking at the previous clause, it is still a violation if the pretender merely &quot;acts as such&quot;, which I suppose is what people allege this person is doing. She can be guilty without having demanded or obtained anything, so the question about whether it's a &quot;thing of value&quot; is moot. As to the &quot;nonexistent agency&quot; issue: a useful source for information about how federal criminal laws are interpreted and enforced is the Justice Department's Criminal Resource Manual. (The link may be a past version; they seem to have reorganized their documents and I can't find a version not marked as &quot;archived&quot;, but I think the information is still valuable.) 18 USC 912 is discussed in sections 1469-1477 of that version. Section 1474 examines the meaning of the &quot;acts as such&quot; element, and includes this note: It is not necessary that the act be one which the pretended officer would have authority to perform if he were in fact the officer he represents himself to be. Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); United States v. Hamilton, 276 F.2d at 98. Nor is it necessary that there be in fact such an officer as the defendant pretends to be. Caruso v. United States, 414 F.2d 225, 227 (5th Cir. 1969). Caruso in particular was a case in which the defendant, as part of a scam, claimed to be the Administrator of a Veterans Hospital. He was convicted, and appealed on the basis that the government had not proved that the office of administrator existed. (Just as in this case, the government certainly could not prove that the Freedom to Breathe Agency existed, since it does not.) The Fifth Circuit found that his point had &quot;no merit&quot; and, citing Brafford v. United States (6 Cir. 1919, 259 F. 511, 513), that it was &quot;immaterial whether or not there was any government officer or employee with the precise title [the defendant] assumed&quot;. I realize that claiming to be a nonexistent officer is not exactly the same thing as claiming to represent a nonexistent agency, but I would expect that courts would treat it the same.
In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge.
The president is not permitted to blackmail the Supreme Court, but what you've described isn't blackmail. Blackmail is a threat to expose someone's crimes. You're probably thinking of something more like extortion, which is outlawed under 18 U.S. Code § 875: Whoever, with intent to extort from any person, firm, association, or corporation, any money or other thing of value, transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to injure the property or reputation of the addressee or of another or the reputation of a deceased person or any threat to accuse the addressee or any other person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. There are three problems with your theory I see right away: With the facts: As you noted, the President's statements were &quot;seemingly unrelated,&quot; which is essentially an admission that there's no indication one has anything to do with the other. Under those circumstances, you can't establish that he's making any kind of threat. With the statute: &quot;Extortion&quot; is generally understood to refer not merely to a threat to do something unpleasant. Instead, extortion is inducing another person to turn over property by the wrongful use of force, violence, or fear. There's no property at play here, and it's not unlawful to study changes to the court (nor would it be unlawful to actually make changes to the Court, which the president doesn't even have power to do anyway). With the First Amendment: The President has a First Amendment right to advocate for changes to gun laws, and for changes to the composition of the Supreme Court. That right does not evaporate when it is informed by the court's conduct. So the Biden situation is not really a good fit with the hypothetical you've described, which presents a much stronger factual basis from which to find a threat. Because it also appears you're using wrongfully inducing fear of economic injury to obtain another person's property, and because you have no right to do so, you would be liable for extortion, while the President would not. EDIT: Although the top-line questions has been reframed, I'll just note that the answer remains basically the same. Bearing in mind that the president has no power to force any Supreme Court justice into retirement, one might rephrase the question this way: &quot;If the Court rules that a constitutional amendment has Meaning X, can the president threaten to support a constitutional amendment?&quot; The answer should be obvious: The president is free to support policies to change the constitution, at any time, for any reason.
The situation in Texas is unclear. It is worth mentioning Texas as a state where the law may require statutory authorization in order to copyright state documents. Although the statute does not explicitly state such as a requirement, it can be inferred from an attorney general opinion. At a bare minimum, the Department of Health, the State Preservation Board, the Water Development Board, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and county governments all have statutory authority to hold copyrights. In your specific case, there's an additional complication. Something is only a work of the State of Texas if one of the following is true: 1) it was created by a government employee as part of their job duties, or 2) it was a work for hire. It's quite likely that neither of the above is true for a student newspaper, rendering the question of Texas-owned copyrights irrelevant.
You are likely thinking of United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979) and the related injunction against a letter by Charles R. Hansen. However, these were not prosecutions; they were applications by the United States for injunctions to prevent the publication of the material. The allegation relating to The Progressive was that an article due to be published would be in violation of the &quot;born secret&quot; clause of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2011 and following). The author was journalist Howard Morland. That act declares as restricted (see 42 U.S.C. 2014): all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 2162 of this title. The U.S. argued: that its national security interest also permits it to impress classification and censorship upon information originating in the public domain, if when drawn together, synthesized and collated, such information acquires the character of presenting immediate, direct and irreparable harm to the interests of the United States. It is not universally accepted that the information was actually gleaned wholly from public knowledge, but that would not have made a difference to the government's position on the injunction. There was a related letter by Charles R. Hansen, containing instructions for a hydrogen bomb, that was also enjoined by the United States against being published in the Daily Californian. This was eventually the one actually first published, and is known colloquially as &quot;the Hansen Letter.&quot; Ultimately, after the Hansen letter was published in The Press Connection and the Chicago Tribune (two publications not enjoined by court order), the government withdrew its request to prevent the publication, and the other publications went forward.