In UK, can religious institutions discriminate against the sexual orientation of their own clergy? There is this other question about the same subject but it is applicable to the United States. In this question I want to ask about UK employment laws. This is in consideration of the United Kingdom employment equality law, about which the Wikipedia page says: As an integral part of UK labour law it is unlawful to discriminate against a person because they have one of the "protected characteristics", which are, age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, race, religion or belief, sex, and sexual orientation. In this case I was looking at articles such as this one about a 2012 court case against the Catholic Church in UK, in which the solicitor Tracey Emmott (of Emmott Snell) is quoted as saying: "The relationship between a bishop and a priest of a Roman Catholic diocese has many of the hallmarks of an employment relationship, and therefore it is right and proper that the church should be held legally accountable for abuse by its priests." According to above statement it seems that at least in some cases the position of a priest with the parent church is viewed as an "employment relationship". What I am curious about is what the UK employment law would say about the relationship in cases where a gay priest decides to "come out". In this kind of situation, is the employment of the priest protected by UK law, or not?
Religious institutions who are employers are allowed to discriminate in a way that would be unlawful for other employers to the extent that the discrimination is in line with their official religious dogma. Discrimination at work - exceptions relating to religion and belief
Yes, this is legal in many US states, perhaps most. Search for "adult adoption". For instance, here is the procedure in Colorado. Also, another article on the topic. Before the advent of same-sex marriage, this used to be a technique for a same-sex couple to legally formalize their relationship; one partner would adopt the other. Here is a New York Times Magazine article about the practice. Here is another article, from The Atlantic. They even refer to a case in which the parent was younger than the child.
The UDHR does not create enforceable rights. It is aspirational and not self-executing. This said, calling a legally recognized relationship a "civil union" rather than a "marriage" does not inherently violate the UDHR any more than using the Mandarin or Swahili word for marriage instead of the English one would. A marriage is just a bundle of rights and responsibilities, the UDHR does not tightly constrain what must be included in that bundle, and it is surely the substance rather than the mere terminology that matters for determining if rights have been violated. Something fairly described as marriage must be available to all, but a rose by any other name would be just as sweet. Civil law countries already distinguish between legal marriage, which basically is a "civil union" and religious marriage, which is deinstitutionalized.
Here I assume from your cases that you are interested in the regulation of private activities (with human rights code etc.) instead of constitutional restraints on the government (under the Charter). The constitution only prohibits discrimination in law (or government policies) based on enumerated or analogous grounds. Which acts apply? To my understanding the Human Rights Act always apply, then more specialized acts (such as the Residential Tenancy Act, Labour law) apply depending on the context. Canada is a federal country with 10 provinces and three territories each having the powers to legislate under the constitution (for the provinces) or under federal devolution acts (for the territories). They all have different laws. And in constrast to the United States which is often thought to be less &quot;centralized&quot;, in the domain of properties and civil rights (including human rights, employment and housing etc.), the federal government in Canada cannot legislate over these areas generally but it can regulate these things in domains where otherwise belong to the federal jurisdiction (e.g. airlines, interprovincial railways, banks but not credit unions, telecoms, the postal service, the armed forces). Federal laws regulating human rights and employment like the Canadian Human Rights Code and Canada Labour Code apply only to those under federal jurisdiction. In most situations, provincial laws apply and are different for each province, including the list of protected characteristics (e.g. citizenship or suspended criminal records are not protected, at least not directly, in all provinces). So you will have to look at the law in your province of interest. Generally the human rights Code or Act should be comprehensive, but exceptions may arise in other special laws (e.g. union memberships are often protected in the Labour Code; disability accommodations may have separate laws). In general does something .... count as illegal discrimination? Another point is that discrimination is not generally illegal; you are free to buy Pepsi instead of Coca Cola. Discrimination based on protected characteristics is not necessarily illegal; a gay man can choose to have a man instead of a woman for his partner. In Canada, both federally and in each province, what is generally illegal is when individuals are adversely differentiated due to a protected characteristic in the course of providing a good, service, facility or accommodation available to the general public, or in relation to housing and employment. Even then, discrimination based on protected characteristics can be legal if certain requirements are met. These usually include employment or service requirements in good faith, programs designed to improve the circumstances of socially disadvantaged individuals and groups (&quot;affirmative action&quot;), and &quot;traditional&quot; exceptions (e.g. age-based discounts). Religious organizations can also discriminate based on their sincerely held religious beliefs, at least when they are not carrying out commercial provision of goods and services available to the general public. For example, it is not against the law for an employer to provide gender-separated bathrooms (it may even be a requirement). In many if not all provinces, it is not illegal for businesses to give child or seniors discounts. In some provinces, a landlord who will be living on the same premises with shared bathrooms and kitchens is not subject to human rights laws or have reduced burden to accommodate. Insurance companies also often have greater leeway in their business decisions, since their business model is usually and inherently built on discrimination (of risks which can correlate with protected characteristics). There are also social expectations and conditions that &quot;rank&quot; a hierarchy of grounds and circumstances (justifiably or not) which may lead to more or less scrutiny over different grounds of protection and areas of service (e.g. an insurance policy discriminating on race is socially absolutely not acceptable where discrimination due to age in insurances are acceptable and discrimination due to gender is controversial; addiction-based disability claims may also attract more scrutiny; employment and housing are considered much more important and in detail compared to retail discounts). Public policy overwhelmingly favours or at least more carefully consider claims from the traditionally socially disadvantaged groups. that applies to everyone but negatively affects a protected class more In Canada, the discrimination you are thinking of are often referred to as &quot;adverse effect discrimination&quot;, sometimes also called &quot;indirect&quot; discriminations, where a practice neutral on its face adversely impact individuals based on a protected characteristics. It is not necessarily separately or explicitly spelled out, but results from the purpose of human rights legislations. The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator, but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on other members of the community, it is discriminatory. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 But not all policies that cause disproportionate impacts are necessarily illegal. Insurance rates based on postal codes may discriminate against areas where a racial, ethnic, religious, age etc. group concentrates. But it can be justifiable as a reasonable good faith business requirements if the discrimination is based on an objective, reasonable criteria (e.g. flood risks or claim rates). The extent that a protected characteristic is relevant to the impacts must be considered. An arbitrary, artificial, stereotypical policy are more likely to be illegal than a considered, reasoned, well-founded one. Does intent matter? A discriminatory practice is &quot;objective&quot; and a good or neutral intent does not prevent a practice from being illegal discrimination. However, evidences of intent of discrimination are often illegal discrimination in itself and in any case, they can be used as evidences to prove discrimination cases and undermine the on-the-face neutrality of an action in question. Malicious intent or lack of can also be relevant in determining appropriate damages awarded to the complainant. Newfoundland and Labrador for example makes this explicit in their human rights law: Discrimination in contravention of this Act does not require an intention to discriminate. Human Rights Act, 2010, SNL 2010, c H-13.1 But the reasoning has been established by the Supreme Court going back at least to 1985 and apply to the interpretation of all human rights codes in Canada (unless an intent is specifically required): The intent to discriminate is not a governing factor in construing human rights legislation aimed at eliminating discrimination. Rather, it is the result or effect of the alleged discriminatory action that is significant. The aim of the Ontario Human Rights Code is to remove discrimination ‑‑ its main approach is not to punish the discriminator but to provide relief to the victim of discrimination. Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, 1985 CanLII 18 (SCC), [1985] 2 SCR 536 However, intent or reasons also matter for the proper course of remedy. If a policy that is neutral on its face causes adverse effects on individuals due to protected grounds, it must be eliminated if there is no rational reason for the policy to exist. A neutral policy that are genuinely established for proper business reasons is also not illegal if upon request reasonable accommodations to the requirements are provided or attempted to the point of undue hardship. In general, human rights laws impose a duty to accommodate upon persons subject to them like service provides, employers or landlords so that actions are taken, if possible, reasonable and not posing an undue hardship to the provider, to to eliminate or reduce the negative impact an individual suffers due to a protected characteristic. I heard some residential leases prohibit any open flames including candles. Since many religions use candles, wouldn't this be an illegal form of discrimination of a protected class? Or does that not apply because the rule is applied to everyone equally. The first step is to determine whether using candles are in fact part of a sincere religious practice, the hindering of which would violate the rights of the believer. Simply liking the scent of candles when they read the Book is likely not enough to establish that the freedom of religion would be violated. Lighting Shabbat candles on the other hand is much more likely to be recognized as a religious practice. If a discrimination practice is established at first view, the landlord would need to justify its decision, e.g. fire safety. It is not exempt just because &quot;the rule is applied to everyone equally&quot;. If the reason for the discrimination is justifiable and reasonable accommodation is not possible, it is not illegal. Conformation to e.g. legal requirements like fire or health and safety codes is often a defence for private individuals (though the complainant may raise claims against the government). However, a duty to accommodate (to a reasonable extent) still exists, e.g. the landlord may need to consider the tenant in priority for similar properties under its constrol that allow open flames (if available). IIRC they came out with a gaming console that had a video camera to monitor the user's movement. It didn't register well for people with dark skin (e.g. black). Like said above, adverse effects based on protected grounds can be illegal discrimination and can give rise to a duty of accommodation. But this case is more tricky and I didn't find any clear case law on similar situations. It would depend on if the company did all it commercially reasonably could do to eliminate or reduce the impacts. A physical limitation caused by hardware (e.g. filter lenses) may be more easily justified than a lack of darker-skinned training samples in their statistical learning algorithm. Even if a successful discrimination claim is established, the damages may also be limited in this context (but an automatic system that decides on home mortgages and are discriminatory unjustifiably can lead to significantly more damages).
A private college or university is allowed to grant preferential treatment to anyone they please, except for oen of the reasons prohibited by relevant anti-discrimination law. Such laws vary by state, but generally prohibit preferences based on race, national origin, or gender. Some also include sexual preference or other categories. But I have never heard of a law preventing discrimination based on wealth, or specific donations. None of the Federal civil rights acts have such a provision. Preferences for so-called "legacy" students -- that is students whose parent or parents (or possibly more remote ancestors) are alumni of the school are common, and I am not aware of any case in which they have been seriously challenged as unlawful discrimination. Preferences for military veterans are also common, and may be mandated for public schools. For public schools justifying discrimination might be harder, and any relevant legislative polices will need to be considered, but even they can be free to make "rational" distinctions at least. Not all discrimination is unlawful discrimination -- far from it.
From the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) website: An employer must have a certain number of employees to be covered by the laws we enforce. This number varies depending on the type of employer (for example, whether the employer is a private company, a state or local government agency, a federal agency, an employment agency, or a labor union) and the kind of discrimination alleged (for example, discrimination based on a person's race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information). All employers are covered, whether or not a particular regulation covers a particular employer is dependent on the number of employees. For example, age discrimination is covered by employers who have more than 20 employees and Equal Pay Act coverage is for virtually all employers. From the same web site: People who are not employed by the employer, such as independent contractors, are not covered by the anti-discrimination laws. Figuring out whether or not a person is an employee of an organization (as opposed to a contractor, for example) is complicated. If you aren't sure whether a person covered, you should contact one of our field offices as soon as possible so we can make that decision. The EEOC has regulations covering: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act The Equal Pay Act of 1963 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Sections 102 and 103 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 The EEOC is an agency responsible for creating rules and regulations and enforcing civil rights laws against workplace discrimination. The regulations and enforcement actions are based on a large number of laws, any one of which may or may not apply to a particular employer. Exemptions are based on a particular anti-discrimination law, not on the agency itself. Each anti-discrimination law has a different set of entities to which the law applies and different sets of exemptions.
There are two kinds of evidence for discrimination. The primary evidence is direct, that is, statements by an employer, for example "We need to make sure not to hire a ___ for this position". The act of hiring a person that has a certain demographic property is never evidence for discrimination, because discrimination law treats all races and religions (etc) the same, so hiring a European is not intrinsically discriminatory, nor is hiring an African or Asian. Discrimination is also not defined in terms of the sameness or difference of an employee and a supervisor. Another possibility w.r.t. a discrimination claim is demonstrating a discriminatory pattern. However, the law does not demand exact proportional representation of all protected demographic classes. It is possible that certain circumstances would be compelling enough that illegal discrimination could be established, but this would require showing a pattern, and would not be useful in an individual action. There is no law requiring employers to be up-front about hiring decisions. There is also no law requiring posting a job (I assume this is not a government job), and no law requiring consideration of more than on candidate. It might be contrary to company policy. This is not murky from a legal perspective, even if it is scummy from an HR perspective.
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting, says (at p. 24): The equal protection analysis might be different, in my view, if we were confronted with a more focused challenge to the denial of certain tangible benefits. That indicates to me that there is probably a majority on the court that thinks same-sex couples should have the same adoption rights and other tangible benefits as opposite-sex couples, but that would have to be tested in court. Regarding level-of-scrutiny, this opinion says nothing on the issue. But, given that Justice Kennedy follows a fundamental rights analysis, it could be argued that it is likely strict scrutiny, or at least a level of scrutiny higher than rational basis. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 631 (1996) (emphasis added, internal punctuation removed): If a legislative classification or distinction neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold it so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.