Which security is the social security number about? Everywhere online this seems to be a given, no source even attempts to explain it: If the social security number is about identifying an individual/citizen/taxpayer, why is it not called social identification number? What security is the SSN about?
Social Security numbers are called Social Security numbers because were invented to implement the Social Security Act of 1935, which was one of the important programs adopted by Congress as part of the New Deal during the Great Depression. These individual identifying numbers made it easier for the government to compile and collate information about the payroll taxes on the wages and salaries of workers potentially entitled to Social Security benefits which was (and is) collected by employers to pay for Social Security benefits. Compiling this data was necessary because under the Act one's lifetime history of Social Security payroll taxation history is used to determine if you, or your dependents, are eligible for Social Security benefits at all, and if so, to determine how big the benefit check should be according to formulas adopted by the government agency administering the program. This agency is now called the Social Security Administration. But, this agency has been relocated in the federal government bureaucracy now and then since the Act was passed in 1935 as part of general reorganizations of the federal government bureaucracy. Keep in mind that all of this data collection and collation was done by hand. Computers adequate to assist government agencies in administering government programs wouldn't come into being for another thirty years. The &quot;security&quot; referenced is the economic security that the Social Security Act of 1935 provided to elderly people, widows, and orphans. Before the Social Security Act was adopted, the elderly, widows, and orphans, who often lacked the ability to earn a living wage in the economic marketplace, routinely faced extremely high poverty rates, and employer survivor's and disability benefits were uncommon. In time, Social Security numbers began to be used as a tool for the government to identify people for purposes other than administering the Social Security Act, such as for purposes of administering state and federal income taxes. But, by then, the name &quot;Social Security number&quot; for these identifying numbers originally used to administer the Social Security program was already firmly established.
From Lumen Introduction to Sociology: Many governments provide legal definitions of race for purposes of census-taking and calculating budgets for governmental programs such as those that promote equal opportunity employment. For instance, in the U.S. Federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Census Bureau currently uses race and ethnicity as self-identification data items. In this system, the residents choose the race or races with which they most closely identify and indicate what their ethnic origin is (e.g., Latino). The racial categories represent a social-political construct for the race or races that respondents consider themselves to be. OMB defines the concept of race as outlined for the U.S. census as not “scientific or anthropological” and takes into account “social and cultural characteristics as well as ancestry”, using “appropriate scientific methodologies” that are not “primarily biological or genetic in reference. ” The race categories include both racial and national-origin groups. Governmental Use of Racial Categories This image illustrates U.S. real median household income per year by race and ethnicity from 1967 to 2008, as compiled by the U.S. Census Bureau. Race and Law Enforcement In an attempt to provide general descriptions that may facilitate the job of law enforcement officers seeking to apprehend suspects, the FBI employs the term “race” to summarize the general appearance (skin color, hair texture, eye shape, and other such easily noticed characteristics) of individuals whom they are attempting to apprehend. From the perspective of law enforcement officers, it is generally more important to arrive at a description that will readily suggest the general appearance of an individual than to make a scientifically valid categorization by DNA or other such means. Thus, in addition to assigning a wanted individual to a racial category, such a description will include: height, weight, eye color, scars, and other distinguishing characteristics. British Police use a classification based on the ethnic background of British society, for example W1 (White-British), M1 (White and black Caribbean), and A1 (Asian-Indian). Some of the characteristics that constitute these groupings are biological and some are learned (cultural or linguistic) traits that are easy to notice. In many countries, such as France, the state is legally banned from maintaining data based on race, so the police issue wanted notices to the public that include labels like “dark skin complexion. ”
No, it is not debt and you are not owed any money beyond what Congress decides to give you. Section 1104 of the act says the benefits are what Congress decides to give out. This was challenged in 1960 and upheld. To quote Wikipedia: Ephram Nestor challenged Section 1104 after he was denied Social Security payments as a deported member of the Communist Party. He argued that a contract existed between himself and the United States government, since he had paid into the system for 19 years. ... The Court ruled that no such contract exists, and that there is no contractual right to receive Social Security payments. Payments due under Social Security are not “property” rights and are not protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The interest of a beneficiary of Social Security is protected only by the Due Process Clause.
This is less of a compliance question, and more of an infosec question. On one hand, you want to be able to restore access to an account to users who have lost their access. On the other hand, you must prevent unauthorized access e.g. from hackers. These factors must be balanced. Whether you'll fulfil a data subject access request will generally follow the same criteria as deciding whether you'll reset someone's access credentials, so I'll mostly discuss identity verification in general. Trying to validate names is generally pointless from a security perspective, since the name on the account might not be real, or because validation documents like scans from a passport can be easily forged. When a service has identity validation measures like requesting a copy of photo ID, or requesting a photo of you holding up a validation code written on paper, that doesn't actually help validating that the person requesting access is the account owner, but that the person requesting access appears to be a natural person, and now documents about their identity are on file. A lot of information like names, birthdates, or addresses is also not at all secret and could be easily guessed by a malicious actor. Most websites work by equating access with control over an email account. If you can receive a password reset code over email, you have access. In effect, this delegates the responsibility of account recovery to the email or OAuth provider. So the issue is what happens when someone loses their email account, which is not entirely uncommon for accounts that are multiple years old. One reasonable (and likely GDPR-compliant solution) is to deny access when someone loses their account. Quite a lot of services operate this way. A milder form of this is to email the old address that someone is trying to take over the account, and turn over the account only if you have other evidence of ownership and there has been no reply over multiple weeks. Since this is part of an identity verification measure, I don't think the GDPR's normal 1 month deadline would apply. However, this approach is very risky: an attack can succeed through the mere inaction of the true account holder, and it would arguably be a data breach if you give access to the wrong person – safer for erasure requests only. Also, emails like “click here or we'll delete your account” look a lot like spam (I get a lot of those about alleged problems with my Paypal account). A potentially more reasonable approach is to use questions about the account to verify ownership. When did they create the account? When did they last use it? Can they answer questions about non-public content of the account? (But don't let an attacker choose the questions!) You see some older sites that ask the user to select a “security question” for recovery purposes. But this isn't a best practice – they are frequently the weakest link in an authentication system. If the user answers truthfully, the answer may be easy to guess or discover for an attacker. E.g. the infamous “what is your mother's maiden name” question is horrendously insecure in the age of Facebook. If the user provides a more secure answer, that is essentially just another password that's even easier to lose than an email account. High-value accounts typically offer a secondary authentication method as a fallback. E.g. my bank can send me new access codes via physical mail. GitHub can optionally link a Facebook account for recovery purposes. But these measures would be overkill for most cases. Especially collecting a physical address for the sole purpose of offering account recovery would likely violate the GDPR's data minimization principle, though it may be fine when the user opts in with freely given consent. To summarize: what you're trying to do is extremely difficult, because you've need to balance different security aspects: keeping malicious actors out, and letting legitimate account owners in. Whereas I'd resolve that by denying any account recovery or subject access requests, other approaches exists with other risk profiles. The GDPR requires you to perform reasonable identity verification measures, but what is reasonable depends on the business context and is ultimately an infosec question.
There is no state that requires you to show ID to obtain medical care. To the extent that this is done it is done at the behest of whoever is paying for the care to determine that you are someone who is authorized to benefit from this payment, and not an imposter, or as a matter of policy of the doctor. (An exception to this general rule applies when one wants to pick up a prescription for a controlled substance or a Sudafed product, where you must indeed show ID to show that your name matches a prescription or to insure that the right name is entered into the Sudafed database.) It might be more convenient for the doctor in terms of collection of bad debt, insurance policy claims (where an insurance card would normally be required, at least), protection against fraud claims from an insurer, and medical record keeping to have a name, so a doctor might make it a policy to require ID, but it is not required by law (except where a government benefit provider like Medicaid or Medicare is involved and has a regulation requiring it). For example, in the Las Vegas shooting, where there wasn't time to process paperwork, hospital triage officials simply assigned an alias to every incoming patient and wrote it in marker on their body to keep the medical records straight, and to allow that alias to track medical costs to be billed when the time came to get the proper intake paperwork filled out and the file sent to the accounting department. There are also other circumstances that do not involve emergency treatment (e.g. STD testing, methadone treatment at free clinics, and clinical trials) where an alias rather than a true name is sometimes used to keep track of patients.
Nicknames, usernames, or gamer tags are definitely personal data under the GDPR. You are operating under a very narrow definition of “identifying”, which is understandable since the definition of personal data in the GDPR isn't overly enlightening at first glance: […] an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person; — GDPR Art 4(1) However, this definition does show that “identifiable” should be interpreted rather broadly. For example, indirectly identifying data is still identifying data – there doesn't even have to be a strong identifier like a name, passport number, or street address. It is also not necessary that identification enables you to determine the real world identity – identification is anything that allows you to single out a person, or to combine data into a profile of that person (compare Recitals 26 and 30). In any case, an online username or user ID is clearly an identifier and will fall under one of “a name, an identification number, […] an online identifier”. If in doubt, ask your data protection authority for guidance. You've correctly understood that you will need a legal basis to process this data, and that legitimate interest could be that legal basis. This doesn't have to be your own interest, so a community interest would be OK. You need to balance the user's rights against this interest. You have performed this balancing and have found that the interest outweighs these rights. You've noted that such leaderboards are a cultural norm and are generally expected, which strongly weighs in your favour. However, legitimate interest is not a free pass but just means an opt-out solution (right to object per Art 21). You should also inform users that the leaderboard is accessible publicly when they join your server (transparency principle per Art 5(1)(a) as detailed by the information obligations in Art 13). In particular, you should use a “message of the day” or welcome message functionality to link to your privacy policy. You should also be aware that other rights such as the right to access, erasure, and data portability apply. As an alternative to legitimate interest (opt-out) you could also consider consent (opt-in), though this results in slightly different data subject rights and is more difficult to do correctly. But I'd agree that legitimate interest is more appropriate here.
Basically how reducible is personal information until it's no longer personal information? When it can no longer be used, alone or combined with other data, to identify a person (or small number of people). Context matters, if you have data on the people in say New York City, (pop. 8 million+) there are only 676 2 letter initials which averages out to about 12,000 each BUT initials are not uniformly distributed: there are a lot more JS out there than XX. In fact XX could be so rare that you can identify an individual in NYC just from this. Of course, if you are using all initials then in, English speaking countries most people have 3 names and so, 3 initials; this not only reduces the number of people in each “bucket” it makes it way easier to identify unique individuals with 2, 4, 5 or more names. If your data set is smaller than this and people have a way of working out who was in your data, then the prospect of being able to identify an individual just from their initials is much greater. For example, my family has 4 individuals and there are 4 unique first initials so in that group, the initial clearly identifies each of us.
Natural persons are not and cannot become juridical persons. Juridical persons are entities that are not natural persons, but which it's necessary or convenient to treat in many respects as though they were natural persons. The categories are mutually exclusive. There is no "contract" involved in citizenship from a legal standpoint (there's a concept of a "social contract," but that's a philosophical justification for government and not an actual legally binding agreement with specific terms); citizenship is not subject to commercial law in any way. Incorporation has nothing whatsoever to do with citizenship; a natural person is not incorporated, and is a citizen as a natural person. That citizenship is the ordinary notion of citizenship.