Why are Constitutional rights not absolute? Phrases like &quot;shall make no law,&quot; &quot;shall not be infringed,&quot; etc. seem to imply the rights are absolute. Why is this not how SCOTUS has interpreted the Constitution?
Because people inevitably come into conflict exercising different aspects of their rights. For example, the 1st amendment says that congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. Someone who runs a sound truck around a residential neighborhood at 3am extolling the candidate of their choice would be exercising their right of free speech but it would be a significant negative impact on all the folks in that neighborhood trying to sleep. Governments and the courts have to balance the free speech rights of the person running the sound truck versus the rights of other citizens to go about their lives. In this case the compromise is that cities and states can pass noise ordinances that restrict the hours when amplified sound systems can be used, but such restrictions have to be content neutral.
The First Amendment states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. It thus protects such videos. An analogous situation is that there is network news coverage of riots, bank robberies, terrorist attacks and assaults. Backpage was seized because it facilitated prostitution, not just reported or even encouraged it. That is basically where the line exists.
When you get married is possible to have contract renouncing both parties right to a divorce. No. That clause would be redundant, materially indistinguishable from breach of contract, and otherwise unenforceable. It is redundant because the legal definition of Marriage (Black's Law Dictionary) states that it is "A contract, according to the form prescribed by law, by which a man and woman [...] mutually engage with each other to live their whole lives together in the state of union which ought to exist between a husband and a wife". Thus, the perpetuity as expressed in the term whole lives preempts the conceiving of an eventual separation. Insofar as marriage is legally cognizable as a contract (see legal definition), it might specify or imply remedies in the event that one or both spouses decide(s) that substance of marital relationship no longer exists; that is, in the event that a breach of that contract occurs. A court may order to the breaching spouse performance of certain acts (for example, alimony) in accordance to statutory law or common law. However, a prohibition to divorce goes beyond the scope of what is legally permissible. The U.S. Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984) helps explaining why a prohibition to divorce would be unenforceable: "In one line of decisions, the Court has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect, freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty." If that is not possible how much can you limit the right to a divorce with a contract or something similar? There is no possible limit or requisite duration of a marriage, as that would inherently infringe a person's fundamental element of personal liberty mentioned in the Roberts case.
Current Place of Magna Carta in US law Magna Carta is not now a current statute in any part of the US. I don't think it ever was (not since the US became independent of the UK), but I am not sure of that. Its words influenced the drafters of the US Federal Constitution. In some cases it may thus be helpful in understanding the original intention of the framers, but probably The Federalist and the records of the debates of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention are far more persuasive and more helpful. The major decisions of the Marshall Court are also very relevant. The US Supreme Court can and does change its interpretation of laws passed by Congress and of the Constitution. The words of Magna Carta are not more binding than Supreme Court decisions. In fact they are not binding at all, on any court or official in the US in any way. They are part of our legal history, but they are mnot current law, no more than the Code of Justinian or the Laws of Hammurabi are. The detailed procedural rules of Magna Carta are certainly not in fore in the US in 2022, nor in the UK either. The Ninth Amendment, which protects unenumerated rights of the states and the People does not protect,such procedural details, At least it has never been held to do so, to the best of my knowledge. I don't even know of a case where such a contention was seriously argued. The question states that: The meaning of “Due Process of Law” of the Fifth Amendment is, primarily, chapter 28 of Magna Carta and everything that built on it by judicial decisions. There is a sense in which this is true, but a very weak one. The concept of “Due Process of Law” was to some extent spelled out in Magna Carta, and later court decisions and legal and political philosophers (such as Locke) built on it. But most of the specifics of what constitute &quot;due process&quot; at the time of Magna Carta have since been dropped, and most of the current requirements were added much later. The idea of a hearing before an impartial tribunal, where the accused can present evidence, goes back to MC. Other requirements of due process, such as a right to a lawyer, rights against self-incrimination, rights against double jeopardy, the right of an accused to testify under oath, the right of an accused to issue subpoenas to witnesses, the right to an impartial jury, The right to be free of search, seizure or arrest unless probable cause has been shown under oath, and many others were added long after MC, some not until the 20th century. Such one-time aspects of due process as the right to be tried by members of one's own social class, a vital aspect of MC, are long gone, and never really existed in the US. Two-Witness Rule There was an early debate in a Supreme Court case, a perjury case if I recall correctly, on the need for two witnesses for conviction, but later statues have altered that rule. I don't know of any such rule ever applying to arrests in the US. It surely does not apply now. Coke and Magna Carta Early in the 1600s Lord Justice Edward Coke used the text of Magna Carta (among other things) to argue that Equity courts should not be able to use injunctions to stop cases pending in common-law courts. To do this he gave to Magna Carta a semi-sacred status it did not have when it was originally issued. (Indeed J.C. Holt, in his classic study Magna Carta, arguses that the charter was a victory for King John, and a defeat for the Barons, because the Barons allowed themselves to be bought off by promises that John never intended to keep, and that were not, in fact, kept. He further argues that it was the re-issues over the period 50-100 years later that gave MC what contemporary force it had, but that it was Coke's invocation of it that gave it the modern reputation as a foundation of freedom. I agree.) Coke claimed things for Magna Carta it could not have meant at the time it was issued, as the equity courts did not exist as an institution at that time, and would not for several generations. Charles Rembar, in his excellent non-technical history of Anglo-american law, The Law of the Land: The Evolution of Our Legal System (ISBN: 978-1-5040-1566-0; 1980) wrote (pp. 57-8): Early in the 1600s, Lord Justice Coke declared that neither king nor Parliament could transgress fundamental principles of common law. In time the proposition was true enough for king (also, academic: he himself could make no law, fundamental or trivial), but it has never held for Parliament; no one in office followed Coke along this line, not even Coke himself. Removed from the bench, he entered the House of Commons, and fought the Stuarts there. In the last stage of his long career, Coke asserted the utter supremacy of Parliament, an assertion which by the century’s end had become the constitutional law of England. The equation of &quot;Due Process of Law&quot; with &quot;Law of the land&quot; was part of this argument on Coke's part; it was, in effect, a piece of spin, which not all later scholars have noticed. &quot;Due process&quot; was, at beat, a part of the &quot;law of the land&quot;, and it was always subject to modification by Act of Parliament (earlier, by acts of King-in-Council). It is true tht the US Supreme court has taken &quot;Due process&quot; in a procedural sense, to imply in most cases the right to a hearing, before an impartial tribunal, including a right to present witnesses and evidence, and that several of these principles are mentioned in Magna Carta, and come down to us from MC through much legal history. Magna Carta in the Case of Murray's Lessee In the case of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &amp; Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856) The US Supreme Court looked back throigh legal history to consider what is and is not permitted by the US Fifth Amendment, and its &quot;Due process&quot; clause. This is the kind of extensive excursion into legal history that was more common in Court opinions from the fist half of the Nineteenth Century that it is now. (Rembar remarked, on p 170 of The Law of the Land, &quot;the Supreme Court, ... is fond of legal history and often gets it wrong.) But it is important to note how that opinion from the Taney Court (not the previous Marshall Court) used Magna Carta. The court wrote: [59 U. S. 277] We must examine the Constitution itself to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this country. We apprehend there has been no period since the establishment of the English monarchy when there has not been, by the law of the land, a summary method for the recovery of debts due to the crown, and especially those due from receivers of the revenues. It is difficult, at this day, to trace with precision all the proceedings had for these purposes in the earliest ages of the common law. In short that court is interested in Magna Carta only as it has influenced US state and Federal statutes. It in no way states or implies that the exact procedure of Magna Carta must be that of the current US, or is assumed to be such in the absence of a statute changing that procedure. Rather it looks at how US States adopted procedures derived from MC as a guide to the meaning of the Due process clause. After discussing at 59 U. S. 278 what the procedure for retrieving money from tax officials who had allegedly retained it improperly under the statutes of the Tudors (already long after Magna Carta, although well before Coke) the Court wrote: [59 U. S. 278] This brief sketch of the modes of proceeding to ascertain and enforce payment of balances due from receivers of the revenue in England is sufficient to show that the methods of ascertaining the existence and amount of such debts and compelling their payment have varied widely from the usual course of the common law on other subjects, and that, as respects such debts due from such officers, &quot;the law of the land&quot; authorized the employment of auditors, and an inquisition without notice, and a species of execution bearing a very close resemblance to what is termed a warrant of distress in the act of 1820, now in question. It is certain that this diversity in &quot;the law of the land&quot; between public defaulters and ordinary debtors was understood in this country, and entered into the legislation of the colonies and provinces, and more especially of the States, after the declaration of independence and before the formation of the Constitution of the United States. ... [59 U. S. 279-280] Provisions not distinguishable from these in principle may be found in the acts of Connecticut (Revision of 1784, p. 198), of Pennsylvania, 1782 (2 Laws of Penn. 13); of South Carolina, 1788 (5 Stats. of S.C. 55); New York, 1788 (1 Jones &amp; Varick's Laws, 34); see also 1 Henning's Stats. of Virginia, 319, 343; 12 ibid. 562; Laws of Vermont (1797, 1800), 340. Since the formation of the Constitution of the United States, other States have passed similar laws. This legislative construction of the Constitution, commencing so early in the government when the first occasion for this manner of proceeding arose, continued throughout its existence, and repeatedly acted on by the judiciary and the executive, is entitled to no inconsiderable weight upon the question whether the proceeding adopted by it was &quot;due process of law.&quot; *Prigg v. Pennsylvania-, 16 Pet. 621; United States v. Nourse, 9 Pet. 8; Randolph's Case, 2 Brock. 447; Nourse's Case, 4 Cranch C.C.R. 151. Tested by the common and statute law of England prior to the emigration of our ancestors, and by the laws of many of the States at the time of the adoption of this amendment, the proceedings authorized by the act of 1820 cannot be denied to be due process of law when applied to the ascertainment and recovery of balances due to the government from a collector of customs It is to support this last conclusion on what is and is not Due Process under the Fifth Amendment that the Court examined history, including Magna Carta. All the rest of this discussion of history was Obiter Dictum not binding precedent. And of course, not Supreme Court precedent is binding on future Supreme Court rulings. The court can and does overturn its own decisions, and change its interpretations of the Constitution. Wooden v. United States and its citation of Murray's Lessee In Wooden v. United States (Mar. 7, 2022, No. 20-5279), Justice GORSUCH in his opinion concurring in the result, but dissenting from the majority opinion's reasoning, wrote, starting on page 6 of his separate opinion: Consider lenity’s relationship to due process. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, neither the federal government nor the States may deprive individuals of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law&quot; Amdts. 5, 14. Generally, that guarantee requires governments seeking to take a person’s freedom or possessions to adhere to “those settled usages and modes of proceeding” found in the common law. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &amp; Improvement Co., 18 How. 272, 277 (1856); N. Chapman &amp; M. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1774–1775 (2012). And among those “settled usages” is the ancient rule that the law must afford ordinary people fair notice of its demands. See, e.g., Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U. S. ___, – (2018) (GORSUCH, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 3– 5). Lenity works to enforce the fair notice requirement by ensuring that an individual’s liberty always prevails over ambiguous law. Early cases confirm the message. In United States v. Wiltberger, a sailor had killed an individual on a river in China. 5 Wheat. 76, 77 (1820). But the federal statute under which he was charged criminalized manslaughter only on the “‘high seas.’” Id., at 93 (quoting Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 12, 1 Stat. 115). Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that other parts of the law might have suggested Congress intended to capture the sailor’s conduct. 5 Wheat., at 105. But he insisted that “penal laws are to be construed strictly” because of “the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals”—and, more specifically, the right of every person to suffer only those punishments dictated by “the plain meaning of words.” ... United States v. Mann tells a similar story. 26 F. Cas. 1153 (No. 15,718) (CC NH 1812). ... As the framers understood, “subjecting . . . men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were breaches of no law . . . ha[s] been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instrumen[t] of tyranny.” The Federalist No. 84, pp. 511–512 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); see also McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. S. 25, 27 (1931) Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law . . . fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand The first thing to note is that this is not a majority opinion, and so not binding law. Indeed another opinion in this case specifically responds to Justice Gorsuch's views, taking issue with them. The next thing to note is that while the opinion does cite Murray’s Lessee, it never so much as mentions Magna Carta, nor does it quote any of the mentions of Magna Carta in Murray’s Lessee. Justice Gorsuch cites Murray’s Lessee to support two principles. One is the &quot;rule of lenity&quot; whch says theist when there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, it shall be read so as to favor the accused. The other is the &quot;rule of fair notice&quot; which says that a person shall not be convicted of crime unless some law clearly makes the actions charged criminal. Justice Gorsuch derives both of these from the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. To establish this, he cites, not Magna Carta, nor cases from Tudor times, nor US cases from before the Constitution, but US Supreme Court cases written by Justices Marshall and Story (both members of the Marshall Court), and one of the numbers of The Federalist (often considered a good guide to the intentions of the framers). Nothing in this citation implies that the detailed procedures of Magna Carta are now in force, nor that they ever were in the US. It applies only a general rule of law, not a detailed procedure, and that on the basis of US Supreme Court precedent, not because Magna Carta says so. The Great Charter may have been one of the earliest statements of these rules, but it is the reconfirmation of them, in case after US case, that makes them part of US law today.
The Supreme Court considered and rejected some related interpretations in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). The entire opinion, and the dissents, are well worth reading, if you wish to get a clearer understanding of how the Court has most recently interpreted the Second Amendment. A few specific comments: "The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia" (p. 1). The Court does not agree that "militia" should be understood as synonymous with "National Guard": The “militia” comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved. (p. 2) The Court, citing U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, holds that the weapons protected are "those in common use for lawful purposes". There is some discussion on pages 55-56, in which the majority seems to explicitly deny that the Second Amendment grants a specific right to possess military weapons. Instead, they reason that historically "the militia" would have reported for duty with the sort of firearms they normally had at home, whether or not those were the preferred weapons for fighting a war, and so therefore the Second Amendment protects the right to bear "household" weapons, not military weapons. They seem to agree that laws banning "dangerous and unusual weapons" are constitutional, even if those weapons are in military use. They specifically mention M-16 rifles as a type of weapon that can be banned.
I can think of three ways that your hypothetical bill could fail to become enforceable law. The Canadian Constitution contains unwritten constitutional principles. Among other things, in Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, the Supreme Court recognized that protection of minorities is an independent and fundamental part of the Constitution: Canadians have long recognized the existence and importance of unwritten constitutional principles in our system of government. [...] the preamble invites the courts to turn those principles into the premises of a constitutional argument that culminates in the filling of gaps in the express terms of the constitutional text. [...] the protection of minority rights is itself an independent principle underlying our constitutional order [...] The Supreme Court of Canada could rule such a law unconstitutional in order to protect minority rights. The Queen of Canada via her Governor General could decline to give such a bill royal assent, preventing it from becoming law. The Queen/Governor General can dissolve Parliament at any time to trigger an election.
This would require a constitutional amendment (overriding the First Amendment), which can be done in two ways. Congress can write an amendment and submit it to the states; or the states can call for a convention. None of these methods can be implemented by any number of courts.
Isn't there tension between these two parts of the opinion? There is perhaps some tension, but the resolution of that tension is clear. There is certainly no self contradiction. The most obvious tension is between the chief justice's line of reasoning and Justice Ginsburg's. It may be described thus: Justice Ginsburg would uphold the statute by interpreting it as a tax, avoiding the need to consider whether it is authorized as a command under the commerce clause. Chief Justice Roberts notes that the statute reads on its face as a command and says that this requires the court to find that this &quot;more natural&quot; reading is &quot;not authorized&quot; before it can consider other interpretations under the &quot;duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible.&quot; Only by following this line of reasoning may the court consider whether the provision may be upheld under the power of taxation. The reasoning paraphrased in the first paragraph of this question explains that the court may go beyond congress's labels -- the claimed basis of its authority -- when it interprets a statute. The quotation from the opinion explains that it is however necessary to consider congress's claimed source of authority first, before moving on to other possible sources. There is a bit of a chicken-and-egg nature to this: if we don't consider (and reject) the commerce clause argument, we can't justify the statute as a tax, but if we can't justify it as a tax, we have to consider the commerce clause argument. Ginsburg's reasoning would avoid this paradox. Therefore, to the extent that a chicken-and-egg paradox is &quot;tension,&quot; yes, there's internal tension in Roberts' reasoning, but not outright contradiction. The more significant tension is between Ginsberg's desire to avoid considering the commerce clause justification and Roberts' reasoning that requires it.