Court Decisions where Ethereum Blockchain was used to determine a verdict I asked on https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/, and was directed here. Where can I find actual cases where Blockchain (particularly Ethereum Blockchain) was used in a case, or better yet, decided the verdict of a case. Blockchain technology can be used to create "smart contracts". So far, I searched findlaw.com, and I get articles on the promise of Blockchain.
Where can I find actual cases where Blockchain (particularly Ethereum Blockchain) was used in a case, or better yet, decided the verdict of a case The results of this query reflect that that has not happened in U.S. courts yet. Mentions of Ethereum in those rulings are marginal and essentially unrelated to the blockchain technology on which major cryptocurrencies are implemented. That being said, the notion of smart contracts in Ethereum is quite distant from the disputes decided under contract law. In Ethereum, "smart contracts" is the term for programs that will execute a transaction in accordance to a predetermined schedule and/or conditions. Its involvement in contract law seemingly might only be in terms of (1) parties not furnishing the requisite keys, thereby frustrating the execution of that transaction, or (2) the implementation of those programs departing from what was agreed upon between the parties. Neither of these aspects has anything to do with the novelties spoken of Blockchain. Moreover, the expertise that programming and Blockchain entail implies that verdicts (or more precisely, the fact-finding therefor) would be premised on testimony provided by an expert witness. The average juror is unlikely to have the knowledge and skills set to assess the evidence (e.g. Blockchain, smart contracts, etc.) more directly.
The primary field of research where the kind of studies you are thinking about are done is often called &quot;empirical legal research.&quot; There is a fairly rich literature, that a substantial minority of practitioners in the relevant areas are guided by, in the area of issues related to jury trials: how jury composition influences outcomes, how juries make decisions, the difference in outcomes between jury trials and bench trials, the fact patterns that are prone to wrongful convictions or mistakes about the facts in civil cases, techniques that influence jury decision making outcomes, and the kinds of awards juries tend to make of non-economic damages in particular kinds of cases. Another area where there is a fairly rich literature that a smaller minority of practitioners reference concerns the facts that influence likelihood of success on appeal, which in turn influences the decision to appeal or not appeal a case, or to bring collateral attacks on a trial court decision (e.g. in habeas corpus review of a criminal conviction). A third area where empirical studies guide a minority of practitioners is the more general literature on negotiation which is used to influence how both transaction negotiations and settlement discussion negotiations, are conducted. In most other areas, empirical literature is used mostly to evaluate risk, either to determine its materiality in connection with worrying about it in planning a transaction, or in the early stages of a lawsuit. In these areas this is incorporated holistically into the general career experience and life experience of the attorneys involved. For example, there is an empirical literature that demonstrates that small business bankruptcies rarely successfully reorganize a business and usually result in tax creditors receiving most of the available assets, while big business bankruptcies usually do successfully reorganize (with some industries more successful than others) and tend to pay different kinds of creditors different proportions of their claims. This literature influences the decisions of individual creditors regarding what kind of cases to pursue more or less aggressively, and also influences how lawyers familiar with this literature advise clients about the risks involved in particular investments. Likewise, there is a literature on the likelihood of small business success over particular time frames with additional other factors considered (e.g. franchise v. non-franchise).
This is a developing area within the law. In the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) governs. However, the law is broadly written. This means creative prosecutors can and do win federal criminal cases by arguing the law should apply. Whether violating a website's terms of service should be considered a federal crime subject to the Act has been a subject of hot debate. In United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), the 9th Circuit decided violations of use should be considered breaches rather than crimes. However, the district court refused to dismiss some charges against Nosal when the case was returned, and a jury conviction resulted in a prison sentence. At least three different circuits have arrived at other interpretations of the CFAA. Draft legislation (H.R. 2454 and S. 1196) would limit the scope of the CFAA by excluding TOS violations, however, it hasn't been adopted as of this writing. That CAPTCHA breaking violates website terms of service isn't really in question. For example, see U.S. v. Lowson, 10-cr-114, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey (Newark) in which the judge brought a criminal case to which two defendants plead guilty to wire fraud, one plead guilty to misdemeanor computer crimes, and a fourth went on the lam. But does for-profit CAPTCHA solving violate U.S. law? Given the state of the law, one could make a case either way. Given the industry's reputation, serious questions about intended use, and questionable labor practices, that's a significant risk.
The GDPR does indeed require that the password be stored "securely". It does not specify the technology which must be used for that purpose. Hashing the PW is a common method, and should be sufficient if properly implemented (strong hash function, use of salt, etc). But other methods of securing the password might be sufficient. Encrypting the PW rather than hashing it, so that an authorized person could decrypt it temporarily might be OK. Or perhaps a security app can separately retrieve only the specified characters of the PW through some sort of encryption. Or perhaps the ISP is not using proper security. In the case of Knuddles in the linked news story, an actual breach occurred which led to the poor security being reported. You could send a report to the appropriate national Data Protection Authority.
Because your legal fees and contract damages are not "in addition to" your risk; they are your risk. If you pay the retainer and lose, you don't lose anything more than the retainer and damages. If you pay the retainer and win, you don't win anything more than the retainer and damages. The only kind of argument I can see here is that you're incurring some kind of psychic cost by enduring the uncertainty surrounding the litigation, but I can't remember ever seeing a case -- in Florida or elsewhere -- in which the court recognized taking on risk as a compensable harm, especially in a contract case, where damages are much more limited than in other kinds of cases. Risk is just a necessary feature of an adversarial legal system.
As always, it depends. However, it is by no means certain that any public facing hobby project, such as a web app, is exempt from having to comply with the GDPR. Since the GDPR is only a few days old, we have of course no case law based upon the GDPR itself yet. However, when considering this, one should take the following two facts into consideration. 1. The "personal use exeption" in the GDPR is not new. The personal use exemption is unchanged from the article 3(2) of Directive 95/46/EC. (There as a lot of lobbying for removing "purely" from the sentence – but drafters wanted to keep it.) 2. Case-law under the previous regulation restricts the scope of the exception The ECJ has ruled on the scope of the personal use exception in two cases: C-101/01 C-212/13 In both these cases, the ECJ took an extremely restrictive view, and concluded that the personal use exemption did not apply to the processing done by these individuals. In C-101/01 it can be argued that the hobby project as a blogger was connected to the controllers professional activity (she was a catechist in a local church, and blogged about her work. including her colleagues). But in C-212/13, there no such connection to professional or commercial activity. Here, the controller operated a CCTV to protect his home, but set it up to also capture public space, and that was enough for the ECJ to decide that the personal use exception did not apply. Discussion Case-law based upon Directive 95/46/EC is in no way binding for a future court that need to rule based upon the GDPR. We need to wait for case-law decided under the GDPR to be able to have some degree of certainty about the scope of the "private use exception" under GDPR. However, given what we know about how the ECJ has ruled in these cases in the past, I think it is hazardous to think that just because what you are doing on the web is just a "hobby project" not connected to professional or commercial activity, you are exempt from complying with the GDPR. Conclusion IMHO, you may be exempt, or you may not be exempt. I think it really depends on your activity in your hobby project, and to what extent this project processes the personal data of other people than yourself.
You are missing something. The fact that you have a tick box and its state is saved in the database is enough. The burden of proof is only "on a balance of probabilities", so someone arguing that they didn't consent would have to demonstrate that you falsified the database entry somehow. In terms of GDPR requirements in general you don't need a greater level of proof than this, the key thing is that you have a robust system in place to obtain proof (such as not allowing data into the database without a tick in the box).
Courts only decide disputes If the written contract says X but the parties agree they meant Y, then the court adopts Y. However, if the written contract says X but one party asserts Y and the other Z, the court takes the written contract as definitive. The parol evidence rule would prevent any evidence being introduced if X is unambiguous. Plaintiff presents contemporaneous evidence that the parties did not intend the Written Agreement to be integrated, even though the template they used contains the integration clause. The plaintiff can’t introduce that evidence in the first place unless there is some ambiguity to be resolved. If it’s plain on the face that integration (whatever that is) was intended then we’re done here counsel, move along. But what if at the same time that they signed the Written Agreement in question the parties signed another agreement covering some of the same subjects? If the documents don’t create a practical conflict then we’re in the same place as before. If they do then the court will try to resolve that within the written documents - a later document will usually prevail over an earlier one and a more detailed document over a more general one. Extrinsic evidence is almost always excluded. Or what if there is incontrovertible evidence that both parties subsequently and intentionally acted contrary to some term of the Written Agreement? That would suggest that the Written Agreement did not represent the Actual Agreement. No, that would constitute a waiver by one or both parties - you can choose not to enforce (waive) your rights under a contract. This can be one off or, if repeated often enough, a waiver for all future breaches. Alternatively, the parties are free to change the terms of their contract; maybe that’s what happened.