Is the individual right to bear arms disproven by the deleted conscientious objector clause of the 2nd amendment? As an individual, is the notion that an American has the right to a firearm per the 2nd amendment disproven based on the deleted clause of conscientious objectors? Proposed by James Madison upon the first draft of the amendment, it read: “A well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but no one religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.” If the second amendment was solely referring to the individual rights of a private American citizen, why would there be a mention of “render[ing] military service” in the original draft of the amendment? Doesn’t this imply that the amendment only pertains to the military or collective militias?
No. The intent of the draft was to protect those who objected to bearing arms for religious/moral reasons from being forced by the government to bear arms against their will (essentially making any draft that didn't have consciencious objector allowance from being Constitutional). The line was removed at drafting because it was redundant: The First Amendment protects the free exercise of religion and barrs the government from declaring religious tennents illegal without a very compelling government interest... the government making war was not compelling enough of an interest to force religious pacifists to take up arms for the government... better that the U.S. should suffer military defeat than violate the beliefs in individual liberty. It does not imply that the 2nd amendment was intended for military purposes, but rather for self-defense purposes (at the time, militia meant the able bodied men of a community who could muster to defend from attackers. While we think of the &quot;Wild West&quot; in terms of the Modern West of the U.S., in 1789 when the Bill of Rights was being drafted, the &quot;Wild West&quot; were the western most parts of the states that we today think of as the &quot;East Coast&quot; the French and Spain/Mexico and the British controlled much of what is West of the Appalachian Mountains today. The &quot;wild west&quot; was closer to home than we tend to think of it and people did live far enough into the wilderness that the &quot;community&quot; that could form the militia might just be the patriarch of the homestead. It was so important that not only did the founders think to make sure that the right to weapons was essential, not only did they draft this having just exited a sucessful war where their troops were just that and an armed rebellion that was even fresher in their mind, the match that ignited the powder keg of the Revolutionary war was the British attempting to sieze weapons from Lexington and Concord that the people in those towns needed for survival. The &quot;Shot Heard 'Round the World&quot; was shot over the right of the colonists to keep and bear arms and the founders were well aware of what they were fighting for. To further validate the individual right to the people, President Thomas Jefferson, who had a hand in writing the Bill of Rights, when asked about if this allowed a merchant to place cannons on his ship, responded with essentially &quot;That's the reason I wrote the Amendment in the First Place.&quot;
In most states, the answer would be less clear, as First Amendment protections begin falling away quickly when you enter private property. In California, though, there is some strong precedent indicating that this behavior would be protected. In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 902 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that "the soliciting at a shopping center of signatures for a petition to the government is an activity protected by the California Constitution." That case adopted the reasoning of a dissent in a previous case where the court had rejected such an argument: It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment. As a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there]. A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations ... would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights. I'd bet there is case law addressing religious leafleting, as well, but I don't know California law well enough to cite to it. Even if there isn't, though, the First Amendment's requirements of content-neutrality in government decisionmaking would probably require that the same protections be extended to religious speech. Of course, the answer to these kinds of questions always depends on the specific facts, requiring you to engage a lawyer to get a reliable answer. For a lower cost, you could also just ask the local police if they would enforce a request from the property owner to have you removed.
Probably not Now, some US constitutional rights do get interpreted very broadly, and it's possible this might be the case here too. But fundamentally, this situation is not equivalent to the security contractors example you mentioned. The crux is that Facebook already has every right to delete your posts for whatever reason they want. A security contractor does not have any intrinsic right to conduct searches (warrantless or otherwise) on your person, residence or effects. Facebook can choose, at their sole discretion, to delete all your posts, delete none of your posts, or delete some of your posts according to whatever metric they came up with. In this case, the metric is 'did the government flag this as misinformation'. The government isn't censoring you - Facebook is, and Facebook is allowed to do that (they happen in this case to be following the government's advice on what specifically needs censoring, but where they choose to get their advice is also purely their business). A security contractor, by contrast, can't do much of anything to you, except when they have been specifically deputized by the government to do so by some legal process. If this happens, then they are said to be acting 'under color of law', and suddenly First (and Eighth, etc) Amendment restrictions do begin to constrain their actions. Facebook is not getting any kind of state power delegated to them, and thus they aren't considered to be acting 'under color of law'. They aren't doing anything they were not already allowed to do.
So can Congress itself just declare someone guilty of insurrection and bar them from standing in elections, without that being considered a bill of attainder? No. Even if it isn't a bill of attainder, the Congress can't do that. Or do they have to delegate the finding of fact (in re insurrection) to another body, e.g. to the judiciary? The issue would be presented when someone ran for public office and their qualifications were challenged, and would be resolved by state and local election officials, subject to judicial review. If that was not done, Congress could nonetheless refuse to recognize a state certification of someone's election on these grounds.
Wooden made two arguments to suppress the evidence, first that he had not consented to the officer entering his house (the officer and the court disagreed) and the second that even if the officer's entry had been legitimate, the evidence wasn't legitimate because of the Fourth Amendment: Much of Wooden’s challenge turns on the fact that Mason was neither in uniform nor identified himself as a police officer. Both are true. But generally speaking, neither amounts to improper deception in the Fourth Amendment context. United States v. Baldwin , 621 F.2d 251, 252–53 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Lewis v. United States , 385 U.S. 206, 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966) ). Nor did Mason take any affirmative steps to attempt to deceive Wooden regarding his identity. Mason was silent as to his official position; he did not hold himself out to be anything he was not. He merely asked to speak to Harris and then asked if he could come inside, to get out of the cold. Probably relevant also is that the officer didn't &quot;search&quot; for the rifle that prompted the arrest. Wooden picked it up in plain sight, the search of Wooden's person that revealed the second firearm was done as the officer arrested him for the rifle and the subsequent search of the house was carried out with the consent of the other resident Janet Harris.
This story is plausible but the technical legal details are probably wrong. It is completely illegal to transport a pistol in a car in New York State if you do not fall into the list of exceptions § 265.01-b: A person is guilty of criminal possession of a firearm when he or she: (1) possesses any firearm or; (2) lawfully possesses a firearm prior to the effective date of the chapter of the laws of two thousand thirteen which added this section subject to the registration requirements of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter and knowingly fails to register such firearm pursuant to such subdivision. Since the question mentions the firearm locked in a glovebox I'm assuming it is a pistol. Comments have suggested and certain exemptions in the law suggest that there isn't a licensure or registration requirement for manual action long guns, but I have not found the specific section exempting them from the possession law. There is a long list of exemptions to the possession law in § 265.20, but the only one that could be applicable to a person just travelling through the state might be section 13: 13. Possession of pistols and revolvers by a person who is a nonresident of this state while attending or traveling to or from, an organized competitive pistol match or league competition... Notably, for a regular citizen they must have a New York State carry permit to possess a handgun, and their long guns must be registered with the state: 3. Possession of a pistol or revolver by a person to whom a license therefor has been issued as provided under section 400.00 or 400.01 of this chapter or possession of a weapon as defined in paragraph (e) or (f) of subdivision twenty-two of section 265.00 of this article which is registered pursuant to paragraph (a) of subdivision sixteen-a of section 400.00 of this chapter or is included on an amended license issued pursuant to section 400.00 of this chapter. Neither applies to someone simply travelling through the state to another state who hasn't fulfilled the appropriate license or registry requirements. What may apply, however, is the federal Firearm Owners Protection Act, which in part codifies 18 U.S. Code § 926A: Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where he may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver’s compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console. The notwithstanding in this case preempts state law and affirms that transporting a firearm between two states that allow the person to carry that firearm cannot be a crime assuming they meet the statutory requirements on carrying the firearm and ammunition. However, he failed to meet those requirements by keeping the firearm in the glove box, which the federal law specifically does not protect. Therefore, NY State law is allowed to apply and he can be charged with possession without a license under NY State law. The part about whether or not he stayed overnight being a distinction may be a retelling error or conflating this law with similar state laws that allow transporting firearms that are inaccessible in the vehicle as long as the vehicle doesn't stop in the state beyond minor pit stops (e.g. for gas).
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, SCOTUS held that A corporation is a &quot;person&quot; within the meaning of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 and numerous preceding cases find that &quot;the First Amendment applies to corporations&quot;. Corporations also enjoy the right to contract (protected by the Contract Clause), meaning that the government cannot willy-nilly invalidate a contract because one of the parties is a corporation, see Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518. (But, of course, any government can regulate any contract by process of law). In general, under 1 USC 1, In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise...the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals We know that corporations do not have the right to vote. Second Amendment corporate rights are district-specific at present: Seventh Circuit courts view firearms sellers like booksellers — as holders of constitutional rights. While gun sellers are subject to much stricter regulation than are booksellers, they are both protected by the Bill of Rights. Conversely, in the courts of the Fourth Circuit, gun sellers have no Second Amendment rights. Third Amendment rights are unknown. Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 which is binding only in a few states, is the entirety of 3rd Amendment case law and does not enter the relevant legal territory. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, the court held that The Fourth Amendment protects a corporation and its officers from compulsory production of the corporate books and papers for use in a criminal proceeding against them when the information upon which the subpoenas were framed was derived by the Government through a previous unconstitutional search and seizure, planned and executed by its officials under color of a void writ, provided the defense of the Amendment be seasonably interposed, and not first raised as a collateral issue at the trial of the indictment. The article &quot;A Corporation's Right to a Jury Trial under the Sixth Amendment&quot;, 27 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 375 explores the question of Sixth Amendment rights of corporations esp. the right to trial by jury – the summary is that this has yet to be clearly determined. US v. Troxler Hosiery Co., 681 F.2d 934 finds such a right as does United States v. R. L. Polk and Co., 438 F.2d 377 A corporation does not have the same right not to incriminate itself as does a natural person, but it does enjoy the same rights as individuals to trial by jury. However, corporate trial-by-jury rights are buried deep in questions about the &quot;seriousness&quot; of the prosecution. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 held that &quot;Petitioners are not entitled to a jury trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3692&quot;, but this is about a specific statute and a question of whether the offense is petty, and the broad constitutional question remains. The right to an attorney seems to be secure, see this opinion by Merrick Garland, and citations therein.
Yes, A First Amendment defense would apply. This is no longer a crime. Schacht In Schacht vs. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) the US Supreme Court held the final clause of 10 USC 772(f) unconstitutional on just this ground. In that case anti-war protesters rehearsed and performed a skit in which soldiers shot and killed a character dressed as a member of the Vietcong, only to discover and proclaim that the character was a pregnant woman. One of them, Daniel Jay Schacht, was indicted in a United States District Court for violating 18 U.S.C. 702, ... He was tried and convicted by a jury, and on February 29, 1968, he was sentenced to pay a fine of $250 and to serve a six-month prison term, the maximum sentence allowable ... In the opinion by Justice Black, the Court held; This clause on its face simply restricts 772 (f)'s authorization to those dramatic portrayals that do not &quot;tend to discredit&quot; the military, but, when this restriction is read together with 18 U.S.C. 702, it becomes clear that Congress has in effect made it a crime for an actor wearing a military uniform to say things during his performance critical of the conduct or policies of the Armed Forces. ... ... it follows that his conviction can be sustained only if he can be punished for speaking out against the role of our Army and our country in Vietnam. Clearly punishment for this reason would be an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech. The final clause of 772 (f), which leaves Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it, cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment. To preserve the constitutionality of 772 (f) that final clause must be stricken from the section. Hamilton In United States vs Hamilton (2012) the US Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals limited 18 U.S.C. § 702 (wearing a military uniform without authorization), and 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) and (d) (wearing military medals and other insignia without authorization). Hamilton had, among other actions, appeared at a Vietnam Veterans’ Recognition Ceremony in the dress Uniform of a Colonel of US Marines, wearing numerous medals and awards including two Navy Crosses, four Silver Stars, one Bronze Star, and seven Purple Hearts. He had in fact been medically discharged years earlier with less than 1 year of service, after an accident to his hand, with the rank of Private First Class (PFC). He had not been awarded any of the medals or decorations that he wore. (He had previously been apprehended on military bases three times wearing the uniforms of a colonel (once) and a lieutenant general (twice), but was not charged on those occasions.) The Fourth Circuit wrote: We observe that the Ninth Circuit applied such a limiting construction to Section 704(a) in United States v. Perelman, holding that the statute created a criminal offense prohibiting the unauthorized wearing of military medals only when the wearer &quot;has an intent to deceive.&quot; (658 F.3d at 1137-38) In our view, the imposition of a limiting construction requiring an &quot;intent to deceive&quot; is appropriate with respect to both Sections 702 and 704(a). ... Accordingly, we hold that persons violate the insignia statutes if they wear a military uniform without authorization, or wear military medals or imitations of such medals, respectively, only when they do so with the intent to deceive. The Fourth Circuit went on to hold these provisions constitutional when so limited, and to uphold the convictions under them, quoting Schacht is support of this holding.