What makes laws against wearing masks constitutional? Related to this question, "Does a statute of limitation apply to Virginia's mask law?"; how does the law in question pass constitutional muster? The law states: It shall be unlawful for any person over 16 years of age to, with the intent to conceal his identity, wear any mask, hood or other device whereby a substantial portion of the face is hidden or covered so as to conceal the identity of the wearer, to be or appear in any public place, or upon any private property in this Commonwealth without first having obtained from the owner or tenant thereof consent to do so in writing. There are exceptions to the law for holiday costumes, professions, safety and bona fide theatrical productions or masquerade balls. How is this law not a violation of the first amendment? If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Does constitutionality rest on my intent? I'm not intending to conceal my identity even though that is the result. My intent is to make a political statement, which is clearly a constitutionally protected right.
If I want to protest for or against President Trump and decide to wear a Trump mask, isn't that speech protected by the first amendment? Probably. The matter of intent, in any event, is for a court to decide (if the prosecutor determines that the question should even be presented to a court). For example, someone seeking to rob a bank in a mask would probably fall afoul of this law, and it's not likely that using a mask of a political figure would enable a successful first-amendment defense. For a political protestor, it could be easy to show that the intent was to make a political statement and not to conceal identity, in which case it would not be necessary to consider the constitutional question, for a critical element of the crime would be missing. That is, if you say "I wasn't trying to hide my identity," and the court believes you, then you haven't violated the statute. That is a separate question from whether the statute is constitutional. For the law itself to be unconstitutional, it would have to be unconstitutional in every application, generally. If some applications of the law are unconstitutional, the law could stand, but prosecutions for the unconstitutional application would not succeed.
An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution.
Sometimes In general, intentionally false speech gets less protection than other speech, and in some cases it is unprotected. The classic example of speech that is unprotected is "Falsely shouting FIRE in a crowded theater". Note that this is both intentionally false and highly likely to be seriously harmful to multiple uninvolved people. On the other hand, the classic case of New York Times vs Sullivan said that, at least when the subjects were public officials (later broadened to public figures) it was not enough to prove simple falsehood in a defamation case, one must prove "actual malice" (an unfortunate term) which in this context means statements that are either knowingly false or are made with reckless disregard for the truth. The court in that case said, in effect, that if a newspaper had to be sure that its every statement could be proved true in every detail, it would be unwilling to vigorously report on matters of significant public concern (this is a paraphrase, I'll add a quote later). Opinions are considered legally not to be either false or true. "President Jone is the worst leader the US has ever had" Is a statement of opinion, and so is not defamation. Moreover, in political contexts, attempts to punish false statements of fact that are not defamatory have been held unconstitutional. One example was the "Stolen Valor" act, which punished falsely claiming to have been awarded a medal by the US armed forces. This was held to be against the First Amendment. In general, regulation of speech (which here includes writing and other forms of communication) must be fairly narrowly drawn and must have good reasons behind them to survive a court challenge. How much so depends on the nature of the law, and particularly whether it is "content-neutral" or not. Details and cites to come when i have a little more time.
There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.
There is no current authorization to bar any member of the house from the floor, so the answer depends heavily on what actually happens. Since remote voting was approved, no constituency would be disenfranchised. But we could imagine the house adopting a rule barring remote participation, and also barring entry to the House floor for any person not wearing a mask. The House is constitutionally allowed to set its own rules. The House did bar Adam Clayton Powell from being seated, and he did indeed sue. SCOTUS, most importantly, asserted that this is a justiciable question, and most importantly &quot;In judging the qualifications of its members under Art. I, § 5, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution&quot;. This could be overcome by expelling the member who refuses to wear a mask (Congress has the power to expel, but not exclude). There would be a significant conflict of rights in this case. Residents of the district has a right to representation (equal protection clause), but Congress has the right to expel members. But Congress has expelled 5 members, and most recently, Ohio's 17th district was without representation in the US House for a half a year after Traficant was expelled. That did not prevent the House from exercising its right to expel a member.
None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals.
The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home.
Most people would refer to this as &quot;defense of others.&quot; In North Carolina, though, the relevant statute, G.S. 14-51.3, formally refers to this as &quot;Use of force in defense of person.&quot; The statute allows a defense against criminal and civil liability for non-deadly force used &quot;against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other's imminent use of unlawful force.&quot; Note, however, that the statute does not allow you to invoke the defense when the victim &quot;is a law enforcement officer ... was lawfully acting in the performance of his or her official duties and ... identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law.&quot; This raises the question of whether the officer in this case was &quot;lawfully acting in the performance of his official duties&quot; when the relative intervened. If he was, the defense would likely be unavailable.