What is the Basis in Law that an &quot;Investigation &#39;Quid Pro Quo&#39;&quot; is Unlawful or Unconstitutional? In cases of investigating election fraud, there seems to be a potential for a conflict of interest no matter who investigates it. So, why can't the White House investigate campaign issues (involving the Ukraine, Clintons, and Bidens), regardless of any perceived conflict of interest? How is it unlawful/unconstitutional for a President to order Executive Branch employees to investigate election fraud, (or if they were to solicit foreign allies to do the same with reciprocity)? Suppose that any given sets of facts regarding President Trump's actions are true and constitute "basis in fact". But, what would be the "basis in law" to impeach over those acts? Aren't these types of negotiations expected of heads of state?
"Conflict of interest" has a specific meaning w.r.t. various federal laws, which have financial gain as their underpinning. The so-called conflict which your referring to is an abstract moral duty, eforced at the polls every few years: there is no conflict of interest. "Obstruction of justice" is defined in 18 USC 73. The law does not require a person to passively submit to an investigation, thus you can file motions with a competent court to resist a subpoena. If there is a criminal investigation of a US criminal statute, it is illegal to willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute Saying "you don't have authority to tell me to do that" is not obstruction of justice. I have not seen any (credible) claim that it is unconstitutional for the president to order an investigation of election fraud, for example Executive Order 13799. That commission was disbanded, but a new commission could be ordered via the same mechanism. Congress has the power to defund any such commission, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to use that power in the previous instance.
I do not know the exact circumstances for the alleged obstruction (and whether there was a political or diplomatic purpose to prompt the questioning would be off-topic here) so I have just focused on the relevant legislation in answer to: What is the law here? SHORT ANSWER It's not a crime to answer a police question with &quot;I would like to speak to my lawyer&quot;? But it is a(n alleged) crime to obstruct or otherwise fail to comply with an examination under the Terrorism Act 2000. This Act is one of a very small number of laws that makes it compulsory for someone to answer questions or provide information, but as they are not under arrest there is no statutory requirement for them to have independent legal advice. What they say or provide cannot be used against them (with some exemptions, below) and failure to comply is an offence. LONG ANSWER A police officer is an examining officer, and under paragraph 2 Schedule 7, Terrorism Act 2000: (1) An examining officer may question a person to whom this paragraph applies for the purpose of determining whether he appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b). section 40(1)(b) says: (b) is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. Under Paragraph 5: A person who is questioned under paragraph 2 or 3 must— (a) give the examining officer any information in his possession which the officer requests; (b) give the examining officer on request either a valid passport which includes a photograph or another document which establishes his identity; (c) declare whether he has with him documents of a kind specified by the examining officer; (d) give the examining officer on request any document which he has with him and which is of a kind specified by the officer. BUT, under paragraph 5A (1) An answer or information given orally by a person in response to a question asked under paragraph 2 or 3 may not be used in evidence against the person in criminal proceedings. (2) Sub-paragraph (1) does not apply— (a) in the case of proceedings for an offence under paragraph 18 of this Schedule, (b) on a prosecution for perjury, or (c) on a prosecution for some other offence where, in giving evidence, the person makes a statement inconsistent with the answer or information mentioned in sub-paragraph (1). Failure to comply with paragraph 5 is an offence under paragraph 18 (1) A person commits an offence if he— (a) wilfully fails to comply with a duty imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, (b) wilfully contravenes a prohibition imposed under or by virtue of this Schedule, or (c) wilfully obstructs, or seeks to frustrate, a search or examination under or by virtue of this Schedule. Once they're arrested on suspicion of this offence then they are entitled to free and independent legal advice under section 58 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
Defendants in the US would be charged with racketeering, not bribery, since government officials were not bribed. The DoJ indictment against Webb et al. is here: most of the defendants are not citizens of the US, though none are listed as being government officials. DoJ could certainly seek an indictment of ministers, senators or presidents of foreign countries. If said official were in the US on an ordinary passport, they could be arrested. They also might be arrested by e.g. Argentinian policy and extradited to the US, but whether that would be legal depends on the country (some countries don't extradite their own citizens; there would have to be an extradition treaty between that country and the US). It is inconceivable that any nation would hand over a sitting president because of an indictment by the US, and generally unlikely for any government official, but the official could be locally deposed first. But whether a government would do this is basically a political question, not a legal one.
As far as I know, the leading case on the matter is Hale v. Henkel, 201 US 43. There, the court explains While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, a corporation is a creature of the State, and there is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. There is a clear distinction between an individual and a corporation, and the latter, being a creature of the State, has not the constitutional right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the State; and an officer of a corporation which is charged with criminal violation of a statute cannot plead the criminality of the corporation as a refusal to produce its books. The court specifically denies that corporations have 5th Amendment rights: The benefits of the Fifth Amendment are exclusively for a witness compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, and he cannot set them up on behalf of any other person or individual, or of a corporation of which he is an officer or employe. This contrast with protection against unreasonable searched of corporations, per the 4th Amendment: A corporation is but an association of individuals with a distinct name and legal entity, and, in organizing itself as a collective body, it waives no appropriate constitutional immunities, and, although it cannot refuse to produce its books and papers, it is entitled to immunity under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, and, where an examination of its books is not authorized by an act of Congress, a subpoena duces tecum requiring the production of practically all of its books and papers is as indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in similar terms. Similarly, in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, the constitutional privilege against testifying against himself cannot be raised for his personal benefit by an officer of the corporation having the documents in his possession. ... An officer of a corporation cannot refuse to produce documents of a corporation on the ground that they would incriminate him simply because he himself wrote or signed them, and this even if indictments are pending against him. Likewise, United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 ("The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals") and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85: Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination held not available to member of dissolved law partnership who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to produce the partnership's financial books and records, since the partnership, though small, had an institutional identity and petitioner held the records in a representative, not a personal, capacity. The privilege is "limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individual from compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." So only natural persons can plead the fifth.
John Edwards was charged and acquitted on similar facts. Note, though, that Cohen isn't being charged with unduly influencing the election. As far as campaign-finance laws are concerned, there's nothing wrong with influencing an election by paying hush money to a candidate's side piece. Instead, the law simply asks that you disclose the money you spend when you file your campaign finance reports, and it prohibits direct corporate contributions to a campaign, as well as individual contributions in excess of $2,700. Cohen went wrong by coordinating his work with "Individual-1" to help his campaign by providing valuable legal services and paying hush money to "Woman-1" and "Woman-2" without the campaign paying for it and without the campaign disclosing it. Had Cohen been on the campaign's payroll, and had the hush money come out of the campaign treasury, and had the campaign disclosed it all on their campaign-finance reports, I think he would not be in any legal trouble (although there is the tax evasion, too). I think it's probably safe to say that campaigns make these types of payments to people with damaging information somewhat frequently, and they don't get in trouble because the money comes from campaign funds (why would you want to go out of pocket, anyway?) and they report the expenditures as required. Because the campaign-finance laws are so loose, "disclosing" the expenditure isn't going to give anything away, because you can basically just say "$100,000 to Stephanie Clifford for personal services."
The policy of the Justice Department is that the President of the United States can not be indicted. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-indictment-explainer/can-a-sitting-us-president-face-criminal-charges-idUSKCN1QF1D3 All federal prosecutors are part of the Justice Department and that means the guidelines for them say it is prohibited. There is not an actual law saying you can or can't indict the president. The idea is that impeachment is the right way to handle presidential wrongdoing, because the president shouldn't be distracted and he could be charged after leaving office or if he was impeached. The president can be investigated though and some have. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-13/trump-nixon-five-times-the-fbi-went-up-against-the-president/9539192
Mrs. X is under investigation for an alleged crime (say, embezzling from her employer). Prosecutors have obtained a search warrant and seized her computer. X's attorney files a motion arguing against the validity of the computer search, and a court date is selected for a hearing before a judge. At that hearing, the prosecutor requests that the courtroom be closed to the public Search warrants Search warrants are generally issued ex parte (i.e. without an adversarial hearing) and are routinely kept secret until they have been carried out. Targets of search warrants are often, but hardly always, the subject of criminal investigations. Search warrants can only be issued upon a showing a probable cause to believe that the search will reveal evidence pertinent to a crime that has been committed. If a search warrant is issued wrongfully, the remedies are a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence, and/or a civil lawsuit for money damages, after the search has been completed. Conceivably, a search warrant target could argue that the affidavit providing a basis for the search should continue to be kept under seal, but, unless this was necessary for a grand jury investigation to continue in secrecy, this request would usually be denied. Subpoenas A subpoena does not require a showing of probable cause to issue and can be contested before documents are turned over pursuant to it by the person to whom it is directed (and sometimes other people as well), but a subpoena is rarely issued to an actual target of a criminal investigation. A prosecutor can usually maintain secrecy by conducting an investigation through a grand jury which has subpoena power. Protecting the privacy of a subpoena target would not be a valid reason for closing the courtroom. But a prosecutor's desire to not tip off other subjects of the grand jury investigation, which a public hearing on quashing a grand jury subpoena might do, would be a basis for a valid request from the prosecutor to close the hearing to the public. Have any of X's rights been violated? No. There is a constitutional right of the public and the press to attend court hearings in most circumstances. There is no constitutional right to not have your reputation tarnished by criminal prosecutors in the course of a criminal investigation. Also, generally speaking, prosecutors have absolute immunity from liability for any conduct they commit in the course of a courtroom process. Did she have any right to not have her name tarnished before enough evidence was gathered to even charge her with a crime? No. Similar arguments were soundly rejected by an appellate court panel, for example, in the classified documents criminal investigation of former President Trump.
It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional &quot;qualification&quot; on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow &quot;register&quot; as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean &quot;anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born&quot;. The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree.