What requirements, if any, do judges have to render timely decisions? Are there any statutes or rules that compel judges to render timely decisions on matters that they hear? I.e., if a motion or case is brought before a court is there anything preventing a judge from taking months or years to issue an order or verdict? (I am primarily curious about U.S. trial-level courts, both state and federal; but also interested in answers for higher courts or other countries.)
united-states In Colorado (which is an outlier among U.S state court systems), trial court judge in the state court system has a duty to rule on pending motions within three months, and if they do not, a litigant can, after providing certain notices to the judge and appropriate authorities in the court administration office move to have the judge's paycheck suspended until the judge rules. In practice, even most lawyers don't know that this rule exists. Those lawyers who are aware of this rule virtually never utilize it, out of the well founded belief that it only makes sense to do so if you are a client in a very time dependent situation whom you are certain the judge will rule against when the judge actually gets around to ruling and you want to get on to the appellate process quickly for the client. Even then, the prevailing assumption is that the judge will be prejudiced against litigant in all discretionary matters for the rest of the case, and that the lawyer for that litigant will be at a disadvantage before that judge for the rest of his or her legal career. Colorado has no similar duty for municipal court judges or administrative law judges (who are not administrative part of the state judicial branch), or for appellate court judges. Likewise, there is no such duty in federal court. In an extreme circumstance, a state court litigant could file a Colorado Appellate Rule 21 motion (formerly called a writ of mandamus) with the Colorado Supreme Court seeking interlocutory relief from the excessive delay, and a federal court litigant in an Article III federal trial court could seek parallel interlocutory relief from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the trial court is located. But, either way, the likelihood of the relevant appellate court actually granting interlocutory relief for excessive delay by a trial court in addressing a pending matter is virtually nil, unless the case is one statutorily entitled to priority scheduling such as election law cases, protective order cases, and in Colorado state court, in certain civil cases involving very elderly parties. By way of example, I have had civil cases in which dispositive motions have been fully briefed and awaiting a ruling from a judge in both a general jurisdiction state trial court, and also in a different federal court, in which no ruling was forthcoming for more than a year after the matter was fully briefed. It isn't terribly unusual when appellate court rulings are released, to see that the oldest case ruled upon (often an appeal of a serious criminal conviction) that day was filed five or more years before the opinion is issued, even though once a trial court record is transmitted to the court (which typically takes three to six months), and there are typically only three or four appellate briefs to be filed plus half an hour of oral argument to conduct once the case is fully briefed for the appellate judges to consider before ruling. There are rare cases where proceedings can be even slower due to exigent circumstances. For example, I once had a limited jurisdiction civil case that went to trial over automobile repairs in which the presiding judge who had heard all of the testimony and taken careful notes from it had a serious health incident the evening after the last day of the trial, leaving him hospitalized for seven months, and in which it was discovered that the tape recorder that was supposed to have recorded the trial court proceedings that could have been used to create a transcript for use by another judge to rule on the case was broken and had recorded nothing. A year after the trial was completely and the judge had recovered and returned to work, we got the judge's ruling that he otherwise would have provided within a week (because that would have been his normal practice, not because he was required to do so) had he not been hospitalized. Needless to say, no one can tell the U.S. Supreme Court to speed up ruling on a matter in any binding way. There are some exceptions to this in U.S. criminal law trial practice at both the state and local and at the federal level, where there is a constitutional right to a speedy trial that if abridged results in the dismissal of charges against the defendant, and there are a few other deadlines of a similar character related to the post-conviction process. There is also a very short deadline in criminal cases, once a defendant is arrested, for the defendant to have a first appearance before a judge.
Appellate judges make holdings on matters of law, and generally defer to the fact-finder in a given case (the jury, or sometimes the judge) on factual matters relevant to a case. So in a case that involved certain mathematical arguments, they would generally leave it to the jury to decide whether those arguments were reliable. Put simply, Appeals courts don't make binding decisions on issues of fact, only issues of law.
The jury isn't told what the law allows. They are told to come up with a number and if it exceeds what the law allows, the judge modifies it in response to post-judgment motions.
Not generally. While double jeopardy considerations does not apply in Canada until the final verdict (i.e. all appeal processes have been exhausted by decision or failure to appeal within the time limit), the right to a jury trial for serious offences, both under the Constitution Act, 1982 (or the Charter, its bill of rights Part) and the Criminal Code (section 471, which not only makes the jury trial a right, but also the compulsory mode of trial unless both prosecutor and the accused consent), exist. Under common law principles, the jury's verdict, in the fact-finding role exclusive to the jury, is almost sacrosanct. Even if in Canada an appeal court can set aside a jury's verdict of acquittal or conviction, they may only do so if there is a reviewable legal error (for appeals from the Crown and the accused), or if the verdict of conviction is plainly unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence (or otherwise may constitute a miscarriage of justice). In the first case, the reasoning is that the jury's verdict was defective due to e.g. insufficient or wrongful instructions, seeing evidences that should not have been admitted or failure to see evidences that should have been admitted. In the second case, the appeal court acts as a safeguard, much like in the U.S., for the accused to prevent wrongful convictions however it may occur. Even then, the appeal court cannot in essence conduct a new trial from the appeal records and substitute its own factual findings for those made by a jury, unless it finds that no properly instructed jury can reasonably convict the accused based on the evidences presented (R. v. W.H.). Now going back to what the trial judge can do after a jury's verdict. The proper course of action in case where the Crown's case cannot support a conviction is for the accused to seek a directed verdict before presenting any evidence. If the judge grants the motion, the judge (not the jury) enters a verdict of acquittal, which can be appealed for errors of law. Otherwise, the trial judge has no capacity to usurp the fact finding role of the jury. The judge can, however, in exceptional circumstances, declare a mistrial or stay of the proceedings (i.e. the proceeding is concluded without a verdict, due to e.g. abuse of process by the state or other considerations to preserve the integrity of the justice system) following the jury's verdict. All most all cases on this issue followed a verdict of conviction. In one unusual case (R. v. Burke), a verdict of &quot;acquittal&quot; was involved. The verdict is in quotes because in this case, the court recorded a verdict of acquittal apparently contrary to the jury's intention, as the jury foreman had coughed before pronouncing &quot;guilty as charged&quot; and the judge (along with the court reporter, the prosecutor and the defence lawyer) misheard &quot;not guilty as charged&quot;. After seeing the accused in the parking lot, some jury members were confused and returned to the court and reported the error. However, not all jury members could be immediately contacted and the jury had only reconvened in the court with the accused a couple days after the original verdict, and after some newspapers had reported on the situation. The trial judge decided to enter the intended verdict of &quot;guilty&quot;. The accused appealed and the Supreme Court decided in this particular case that: the trial judge can nonetheless exercise a limited jurisdiction after the jury's discharge; the judge could enter the intended verdict if it did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias; in this case, due to the media reports and relatively long delay between the original verdict and the reconvening of the jury, which may have improperly influenced the jury, a mistrial should have been the appropriate remedy instead of entering the intended verdict. On the appropriateness of a mistrial, the Supreme Court said In declaring a mistrial, the trial judge therefore turns his or her mind to the question of whether a mistrial is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This determination will necessarily involve an examination of the surrounding circumstances. Injustice to the accused is of particular concern, given that the state with all its resources acts as the singular antagonist of the individual accused in a criminal case. This factor should be balanced against other relevant factors, such as the seriousness of the offence, protection of the public and bringing the guilty to justice. It may be fitting to allow the announced verdict to stand where the period the accused has been at liberty and under the mistaken impression that he or she had been acquitted has been lengthy, and where the charge is not so egregious as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As has already been stated, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the circumstances of each individual case and select the most appropriate remedy. This case does not directly apply to a case where the jury intended an acquittal, but the considerations may still be applied in extremely limited circumstances. While no one but the jury is privy to their deliberation process and no judge can overturn a jury's acquittal because they think the jury's verdict is unreasonable, it could be imagined that, for example, if a jury reports an acquittal and a member of jury before being discharged makes a claim of jury intimidation or the Crown presents clear evidence of jury manipulation, the trial judge might still have the authority to declare a mistrial. But this has not been clarified in jurisprudence.
The question should not include France and Germany, and should be limited to common law jurisdictions that are similar to India, because the function of judges differs starkly between adversarial vs. inquisitorial systems. The adversarial model pits two parties against each other, with the judge serving as the decider (of law, and perhaps of fact). The parties can offer witnesses, who can be compelled to respond to questions, and the attorney asking the question gets to control the question asked (subject to a possible objection by the other party, to be ruled on by the judge). The judge can rule on requests (which are not questions) i.e. petitions by either party. Otherwise, the judge sits there more or less mute, soaking up the argumentation being presented. Appellate proceedings are somewhat special in that the justices may address questions to the attorney, in order to better understand the logic of the proffered argument. The burden is on the attorney to make the case. There is no direct burden on the justice to &quot;make a case&quot;. The &quot;court of public opinion&quot; may be relevant in a jurisdiction where the justice is an elected office or is appointed for limited time. Or, the contrary opinion of a higher court may have some influence on a justice's rulings – this is not the case with a Supreme Court. In other words, it would be highly dysfunctional within the adversarial system for a party to be allowed to interrogate a judge. Formal petitions are allowed, as long as you follow proper form.
You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all
The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 9th Circuit. The decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit are binding precedents on the lower federal courts of the 7th Circuit. These decisions are not binding precedents, even as to federal law, on state courts, or in any other circuits, although they are persuasive authority in all jurisdictions that don't have a contrary binding precedent. When two circuits reach contrary legal conclusions in binding precedents, this is called a circuit split. Sometimes, circuit splits are resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court (a large share of its docket is devoted to such cases). Sometimes Congress wakes up and enacts a law that resolves the dispute if it involves a non-constitutional issue. Sometimes (arguably, most of the time), circuit splits go unresolved for years or even decades, and the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in one part of the United States is different from the meaning of a federal law or a treaty in another part of the United States. In some other circuit where the legal issue that is the subject of the circuit split is question of first impression with no binding case law decided in that circuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, the parties will offer up persuasive authority from the 7th and 9th Circuits that have previously issued binding precedents on the issue and will try to argue that the one that favors them is correct, or that there is a third way to consider the issue that also favors them. Indeed, often the U.S. Supreme Court deliberately refrains from resolving circuit splits until a clear majority has emerged favoring one view or the other. Even simply counting how many circuit splits exist is a surprisingly tricky matter. For example, one database estimates that 29%-41% of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in recent years resolved circuit splits (at the same link) but that was realistically an underestimate. the question is whether geographic or the temporal instancy in opposing decisions makes one over the other binding authority. There is not. There is no procedural rule that resolves a circuit split.
If you want to have some fun and increase the likelihood that you will go to trial soon, you can file a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the Speedy Trial Act. If you have co-defendants they may be the reason for delay. You could then move for a severance. On a slightly different note, since 95% of federal criminal cases result in the imposition of a penalty on the accused, you should start calculating your guidelines.