The nature of diplomatic immunity I used to think diplomatic immunity meant a diplomat was subject to the laws only of his own country and not those of the host country. Now I'm not so sure. If the police and courts in the host country can't touch him, that's not the same as his not being subject to that country's laws. Let's say a German wants to sue an American diplomat in Germany. Presumably he'd have to do it in an American court. If the case involved a lease on an apartment in Germany, one finds that German laws say a lot about what the terms are unless the contract says otherwise. An American court could apply German laws. To what extent would a diplomat's home country normally apply the host country's laws in such cases? How extensive is immunity to the host country's laws in trials in the home country's courts?
Diplomatic immunity means that diplomats are immune from prosecution in their host countries. It does not necessarily mean that they can be sued or prosecuted in their home country. Whether the diplomat is subject to the home country's laws and courts is up to the home country. In most cases, it seems, diplomats can escape prosecution altogether by reason of their immunity. If the home country wishes to dissociate itself from the diplomat's actions, it can waive diplomatic immunity to enable prosecution in the host country's courts. There are some interesting examples, some of which touch on your question, in the Wikipedia article on diplomatic immunity. With respect to your example of an apartment lease, it appears that a diplomat might not actually be immune, since the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 provides for some exceptions to immunity, including A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission Interestingly, the Wikipedia article lists two prosecutions under home-country legal systems that both involve Romania, and both involve fatal accidents in which the driver had been drinking alcohol. (In one case, Romania was the sending state, and in the other, it was the receiving state.) In one case, the driver was an American Marine assigned to guard the US embassy. He was tried in a court martial, presumably under the US military code, which no doubt penalizes drunk driving, but that's just a guess. The court may well have applied Romanian law. In the other case, Romania apparently prosecuted its chargé d'affaires in Singapore after a fatal automobile accident. It's not clear whether he was charged under the Romanian or Singaporean law.
Laws are different around the world and you didn't bother to state your location, but typically no- this is not how the system works. What would be the point? There's no defendant. You, the plaintiff would argue against thin air and then what? The court rules in your favour, declares this illegal, and nothing happens because there's no defendant. Is it so you can use this ruling if you find out later? Pretty sneaky. Let's look into how this would actually work. You bring up a case- Jackson vs a mannequin or something. You make your arguments. The defense makes literally no defense. The judge rules in your favour, with a result of nothing as there is no defendent. Next, you find the culprit and bring a case against them. You point out that this is illegal because we came to that decision last week. What's that defendant? An argument against it being illegal? Too bad, the decision has been made. When I posted this answer, it was before the &quot;Nyah, I was ranting about government spying but was deliberately vague- aren't I clever?&quot; comment and I assumed it was against, say, a neighbour but it doesn't really matter. You cannot have a system that makes a judgement without a defendant so it can be applied later.
The way "with intent to lose citizenship" works in US law is extremely demanding; it is very hard to establish it by doing anything short of appearing before a consular officer and formally renouncing citizenship. Other ways include serving in the military of a country at war with the US, being convicted of treason for committing one of the specified potentially expatriating acts (serving in an army at war with the US is sort of a trial-less special case of that, because engaging in a war against the US is treason), or serving in a "policy-level position" in a foreign government. The State Department says as much in the link. Obtaining citizenship is listed as a case where the administrative premise applies; so is swearing allegiance to a foreign state, serving in the military of a state at peace with the US, and serving in lower-level government posts of a foreign state. In those cases, the person retains US citizenship but at some point in the future may be asked by the State Department if they wanted to renounce it. Intent to renounce citizenship is established only by explicit declaration if you've only obtained citizenship in another country. With "policy-level posts" the premise doesn't apply, but then the State Department just decides on a case-by-case basis. You may well lose US citizenship (although the King of Thailand was born in the US, and I'm not sure if he's considered to have lost citizenship), but it's not automatic. Your senior ministers may lose citizenship, but it is likewise not automatic. But the normal citizens? The link explicitly says that the administrative premise covers that.
Most jurisdictions don't require special licensure for bodyguards and don't regulate it as a profession or occupation. Body guards in those jurisdictions don't have any special legal authority or any special legal responsibilities other than a fiduciary duty to protect the client. They have the same rights to make citizens arrests and carry weapons that any ordinary citizen would. If a jurisdiction does regulate bodyguards, the answer depends upon the law of the jurisdiction which varies considerably. Only a minority of jurisdictions in the world even recognize the concept of cash bond, or the concept of a bail enforcement agent. Logically, it is unlikely that the regulation of bail enforcement agents in places where bail bonds exist is unlikely to be the same as that of a bodyguard. A bail enforcement agent's authority flows from the adjudication of a court that a particular person has diminished rights while on bail, and that the bail bonding company through its bail enforcement agent, has extraordinary authority (analogous to that of a parent or legal guardian) over that particular person for whom the bail bond agency has taken responsibility. A bail enforcement agent doesn't have special authority over anyone else as a general rule. In contrast, a bodyguard is generally seeking to protect one person from the entire rest of the world, when the entire rest of the world is not subject to any court orders temporarily diminishing their rights. So, it wouldn't make sense for a bail enforcement agent to have the same legal treatment as a bodyguard, even if both were regulated occupations or professions. A body guard is more analogous to a private security guard for a business, or premises, or vehicle, which a minority of jurisdictions regulate as a licensed occupation or profession. Of course, if the skills and qualifications for both bail enforcement agents and bodyguards are similar in a jurisdiction where both profession or occupations are regulated, nothing would prevent the same individual from obtaining both kinds of licenses. In your fictional world, however, you can do whatever you want.
Not going to hold up. Dutch Supreme Court confirmed 2012-09-21 in LJN BW6135 that arbitration is still covered by the the right to an independent judge, as established in Golder v UK, ECHR 1975-02-21, nr. 4451/70. Stack Exchange can't decide the rules themselves. (The Dutch case confirms that sector-wide arbitration is in fact legal, with regard to a standard arbitration clause commonly used in the Dutch building sector. The arbiter was found to be independent in that case precisely because they weren't picked by the builder involved.) The GDPR is only indirectly relevant, but the fact that it's mentioned does mean that there is an indisputable intent to provide services to EU consumers. (See section 23 of the GDPR, or its national equivalents). As such, you can't hide behind a US business address. If you intend to do business in the EU, it's under EU laws - all of them. You can't say that only the GDPR applies, and not other rules. I'm having a bit of a problem finding a source, but I'm fairly confident that consumers have the right to sue at their own, local court, overruling the default of suing in the court where the counterparty is located. Finally, I have the right under national law (Dutch: BW 6:236 start and sub-n) to strike the arbitration clause up to 30 days after the conflict arises, and demand a court decision. That's not 30 days after I accept the "Public Network Terms", that's 30 days after the arbitration is invoked. Dutch law explicitly allows arbitration abroad, and arbiters may apply foreign law, but as written the arbitration clause has no legal basis in the Netherlands, and any arbitration resolution would therefore not be considered valid. You may wonder if it matters to Stack Exchange that the arbitration decision would not hold in the EU. Well, consider a clause like Indemnification, which demands the user indemnifies Stack Exchange. That's a pretty empty demand if it's not enforceable.
Not necessarily. The right to a translator is derived from the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments, and the prohibition against discrimination based on national origin (the Civil Rights Act). However, SCOTUS noted in Perovich v. US, 205 US 86 that appointment of a translator is a discretionary matter for the court (this was simply mentioned, without details as to why a translator was asked for). There is a federal law (applicable to federal cases) that sets up an infrastructure for providing interpreters, but this does not create a right to an interpreter. In US ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F. 2d 386, defendant was not afforded a translator throughout the trial, and the court found that The least we can require is that a court, put on notice of a defendant's severe language difficulty, make unmistakably clear to him that he has a right to have a competent translator assist him, at state expense if need be, throughout his trial The question which the court has to ask and answer is whether the defendant is capable of competently assisting in his defense were the trial conducted in English. If a person is perfectly bilingual in English and Mien but decides to testify in Mien to be annoying, the court will not pander to the defendant's desire to be annoying. If the person has a weak grip on English and can more effectively testify in Mien, then (after cogent arguments to that effect) the defendant should be provided a translator. The question that the court has to address is necessity.
There are only a few areas of law of which I am aware that U.S. law treats people who are engaged to be married differently (although perhaps with more thought I could expand the list). Fiance(e)s come under a special immigration status when applying for a visa. There is a body of law related to whether an engagement ring is an absolute gift or is conditional upon being married (this is not uniform from state to state and I don't recall what the majority rule in those cases is under the common law). In South Carolina, ownership disputes over engagement rings are litigated as breach of promise to marry actions. Pre-marital agreements governing a future marriage can be made by people who are engaged (although a post-nuptial agreement is also equal in effect in most cases). People who are engaged, like spouses, are generally considered to be in a "confidential relationship" with each other which imposes higher duties with respect to fairness in their dealings with each other than strangers, but generally less high duties than fiduciaries. While not strictly arising from the status of being engaged, adult cohabitants are generally agents for service of process of each other at their shared home, and are often considered to have a legally significant relationship for purposes of domestic violence statutes (usually related to either domestic violence crimes or temporary restraining orders). I am not familiar enough with the law of France to fully answer the balance of the question, which someone more familiar with that law can expand upon. But, there is similarly a special immigration status in French law for a fiance(e). And, French law, in a flourish so romantic it could scarcely be any other country's law, also allows people who are engaged a right to marry after one of them has died in certain circumstances: "The legislation that allows posthumous marriages stems back to when a dam burst in 1959 and killed 420 people in southern France." It was most recently invoked in 2014 when a grieving French woman was granted permission by the French President to marry her former fiancé, who tragically died in 2012, just a month before they were due to wed. To be eligible the bride to be had "to convince the President of France that her’s was a special case and that her love for Michael went beyond the grave. It took four letters to the president and 20 months of waiting, desperately hoping for a positive response." The President's discretion in this matter is somewhat similar to the pardon power in U.S. law. This French law was also invoked in 2009. The law in question is set forth at Articles 171 of the French Civil Code. In English translation this states: Article 171 The President of the Republic may, for serious reasons, authorize the celebration of the marriage if one of the future spouses is dead providing a sufficient gathering of facts establishes unequivocally his consent. In this case, the effects of the marriage date back to the day preceding that of the death of the spouse. However, this marriage does not carry with it any right of intestate succession to the benefit of the surviving spouse and no matrimonial regime is considered to have existed between the spouses. I am aware of one documented case where a court entered a post-humous marriage in the United States between people who were engaged, but I am not familiar with any legal authority actually authorizing that action.
It can (and has) been argued that some of the post-bellum trials of Germans and Japanese (but no Italians because they were Allies now) proceeded on shaky legal grounds. However, the arguments of your friend are wrong. In addition, many of the cases proceeded on solid legal foundations based on war crimes (e.g. the Commando Order) and treatment of prisoners-of-war (e.g. the Stalag-Luft III murders). Citizens and non-citizens are protected by the law and were even in Nazi Germany, albeit not equally. The Nuremberg Laws did not classify Jews as non-humans, merely as non-citizens (which is not to trivialise their awfulness). Superior orders has never been a recognised defence for criminal acts under civil or common law. The first recorded rejection of this defence was in the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474. The roots of modern International Law can be traced to the 16th century and were definitely well advanced by the 19th, let alone the mid-20th. Nations accepted that international treaties and diplomacy were supported by international law and these included the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906 and 1929, since updated in 1949 (of which Germany was a signatory) among many others. In addition, since the Enabling Act (which instituted Hitler's dictatorship) was quite probably illegal, it can be reasonably argued that all actions that flowed from it (i.e. basically everything that the Nazi's were tried for) was illegal under German law.