Dormitory Firearm Posession at Louisiana Public School I'm a student at a public university in Louisiana, and I was reading up on the state's firearm law in order to be sure I could legally keep such a weapon for defense in my apartment, which is extremely close to campus (D.C. v. Heller should theoretically have me covered, but I'm hardly in a position for a legal battle at the moment...). However, reading the statute, I was surprised to read the following in RS 14:95.2 C. The provisions of this Section shall not apply to: ... (4) The possession of a firearm occurring within one thousand feet of school property and entirely on private property, or entirely within a private residence. (5) Any constitutionally protected activity which cannot be regulated by the state, such as a firearm contained entirely within a motor vehicle... (8) A student who possesses a firearm in his dormitory room or while going to or from his vehicle or any other person with permission of the administration. The 4th exception seems to vindicate my current arrangement, and the 5th to permit my automotive transport of the firearm along the roads on campus. However, the 8th appears to be explicitly contradicted by policies I was informed of when living on campus, alongside signage posted liberally at campus entry roads and residential parking lots. The (to my mind, patently absurd) standard in the &quot;Living On Campus Handbook&quot; is Weapons Possession and use of firearms (including but not limited to air pistols, BB guns, and paint guns), facsimile weapons, ammunition (including but not limited to empty/spent shell casings), explosives, fireworks, knives (other than kitchen utensils), or dangerous weapons is prohibited in or around Residential Life properties. Is there some other source of legal authority legitimating the university's actions that I ought to be aware of? If not, what might the correct legal remedy be to ensure administration's compliance with the statute? I suppose I no longer have any standing, even if I were in a position to raise the issue. A perhaps more pressing meta-law question: is there a better way to see all statutes that modify a given statute, or to see the state of all regulations as they stand, i.e. can I git clone the laws I'm currently subject to rather than sifting through all the patches in the commit history?
RS 14:95.2 applies to everyone, and defines a particular kind of crime. The housing contract overlaps that law in a small way: the legislature did not make it a crime for a student to possess a firearm in his dorm room. But the university makes it a lease condition, in the same way that having a pet is not a crime, but is grounds for terminating the lease.
With respect to disciplining its students and employees, a private school can basically do whatever it wants. There's more freedom to do so with respect to students than with employees, who have greater protections derived from anti-discrimination laws, collective-bargaining agreements, and the like. If a private school wants to impose a No Burger Tuesdays and a complete ban on political activity, that's probably going to be permissible. The First Amendment will protect the school's right to associate with only those who meet its standards, as absurd as those standards may be. Again, there are exceptions to this rule, like Title IX, which requires equal educational opportunities regardless of sex, but they don't have much bearing on your question. Even for a public school, there will be quite a bit of latitude here, because these rules don't actually regulate off-campus conduct. If a student wants to attend an off-campus public gathering, the campus police aren't going to lock him in his room or arrest him for leaving campus. The rule is simply that if you attend a public gathering off campus, you may not come back on campus afterward to threaten the lives of your classmates.
Defendant's girlfriend should produce the copies of the recording to police, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney. Possession of the recording should induce the police and prosecution to at least re-evaluate the charges against Defendant, as Defendant would be able to subpoena the gun's owner to testify about the purchase and then use the recording to impeach him if he then denies owning the gun. It is unclear, though, whether the audio actually has any value because we don't know what charges Defendant is facing. If he's charged with unlawfully owning a gun, the recording would likely be quite helpful; if he's charged with unlawfully transporting a weapon, the recording's value would probably depend on whether the law in question outlaws &quot;knowingly&quot; transporting a weapon or &quot;negligently&quot; transporting a weapon, or transporting a weapon regardless of whether he knew about it.
The legal definition you are probably looking for is machinegun rather than automatic weapon. It can be found in 26 U.S. Code § 5845, which in relevant part says: The term “machinegun” means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person. Historical notes; TLDR The core of this definition dates back to the 1934 National Firearms Act (NFA) . The legislative history of that act includes testimony of Karl. T. Fredrick in front of the house ways and means committee. Mr. Fredrick, then president of the National Rifle Association (NRA), had devoted years to the study of earlier firearms legislation. He criticized earlier legislative attempts to define machine guns, calling them wholly inadequate. The earlier legislative definition was: "Machine gun", as used in this Act, means any firearm which shoots automatically more than twelve shots without reloading. Mr. Fredrick expressed several concerns with this definition, particularly with regard to the phrase more than twelve shots without reloading. His propoed language was substantially broader: A machine gun or submachine gun, as used in this act, means any firearm by whatever name known, loaded or unloaded, which shoots automatically more than one shot without manually reloading, by a single function of the trigger. Note that neither of the later two quotes is current. Thus the core of the definition used today, was in fact provided by an officer of the National Rifle Association, but that definition has been changed in the process of clarifying and codifying the law.
Shapiro v. Thompson was overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See the Wikipedia article. In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the court notes and did not object to durational residence requirements imposed by states to qualify for the benefits of lower university tuition. In Vlandis the Court wrote: Like many other States, Connecticut requires nonresidents of the State who are enrolled in the state university system to pay tuition and other fees at higher rates than residents of the State who are so enrolled. Conn. Gen.Stat.Rev. § 1329(b) (Supp. 1969), as amended by Public Act No. 5, § 122 (June Sess.1971). The constitutional validity of that requirement is not at issue in the case before us. What is at issue here is Connecticut's statutory definition of residents and nonresidents for purposes of the above provision. ... The appellees do not challenge, nor did the District Court invalidate, the option of the State to classify students as resident and nonresident students, thereby obligating nonresident students to pay higher tuition and fees than do bona fide residents. The State's right to make such a classification is unquestioned here. Rather, the appellees attack Connecticut's irreversible and irrebuttable statutory presumption that, because a student's legal address was outside the State at the time of his application for admission or at some point during the preceding year, he remains a nonresident for as long as he is a student there. This conclusive presumption, they say, is invalid in that it allows the State to classify as "out-of-state students" those who are, in fact, bona fide residents of the State. ... It may be that most applicants to Connecticut's university system who apply from outside the State or within a year of living out of State have no real intention of becoming Connecticut residents, and will never do so. But it is clear that not all of the applicants from out of State inevitably fall in this category. Indeed, in the present case, both appellees possess many of the indicia of Connecticut residency, such as year-round Connecticut homes, Connecticut drivers' licenses, car registrations, voter registrations, etc.; and both were found by the District Court to have become bona fide residents of Connecticut before the 1972 spring semester. ... In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. ... Our holding today should in no wise be taken to mean that Connecticut must classify the students in its university system as residents for purposes of tuition and fees just because they go to school there. Nor should our decision be construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational residency requirement, which can be met while in student status. We fully recognize that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting and preserving the quality of its colleges and universities and the right of its own bona fide residents to attend such institutions on a preferential tuition basis.
Only in California. The First Amendment provides a student essentially no protection from discipline by a private university. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) (&quot;The text and original meaning of those Amendments, as well as this Court's longstanding precedents, establish that the Free Speech Clause prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech. The Free Speech Clause does not prohibit private abridgment of speech.&quot;); Vaynberg v. Seton Hall Univ., No. CIV.A. 09-4999 FSH, 2010 WL 4510904, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2010) (&quot;In order for the First Amendment to apply, the challenged conduct must be deemed 'state action.' Seton Hall is a private, Catholic university. ... Because there is no evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Seton Hall's conduct relevant to this lawsuit was “state action,” Seton Hall is entitled to summary judgment.&quot;) Some states, however, have passed laws requiring private schools to provide some of the protections of the First Amendment. The most robust of these is California's Leonard Law, which essentially requires private schools to adhere to the First Amendment. Other states also recognize some measure of free-speech rights for students at private institutions. For instance, both the Pennsylvania and New Jersey supreme courts have held that their state constitutions' free-speech clauses (which, unlike the First Amendment, say nothing about the government) protected peaceful protesters who distributed leaflets on the campuses of private colleges.
As far as I am aware there is no prohibition against bartering firearms in general. This would be an odd prohibition since it is legal to gift and lend firearms. However, some of your situations change this. could I legally manufacture and exchange a firearm If you manufactured a firearm with the intent to sell you would be required to have an FFL. If this was a one-off sale of a firearm you manufactured at some point in the past for personal use this can be legal without an FFL. There are some additional requirements for the transfer. No party is a known criminal It is illegal to sell or give a firearm to someone you know to be a prohibited possessor. Not all criminals are prohibited from owning firearms, but this helps keep you safe. No party inspects the ID of the other or performs a background check This is state dependent. Some states make you go through an FFL for all transfers, others are much less strict. New Hampshire does not require private sales to go through an FFL if you know the buyer personally. Each party is known to be or appears to be old enough to own a firearm legally This is required for your scheme to be legal. One party barters regularly in this manner using firearms and firearm components This person is now engaged in the business of selling firearms and must be a registered FFL and jump through all the corresponding hoops. No party is licensed to sell firearms Not typically required, unless you do this in a regular basis.
She has no legal right to your stuff, and every legal right to the apartment. The only way adjudicate such a conflict of rights is with a restraining order. A temporary order would expire in 3 weeks. Item 14 in the petition requests exclusive use, possession, and control of the property. However, that path of restraints is tailored to domestic violence, so item 27 has you describe the alleged abuse: Abuse means to intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to you; or to place you or another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or to harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, keep you under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or otherwise), batter, telephone, or contact you; or to disturb your peace; or to destroy your personal property. Note that the description refers to destroying your personal property, not pawing through it. It's really impossible to know if the judge will exercise his discretion to include "reasonable fear of destruction (or theft) of personal property", since the ex-roommate has no further interest in the apartment. There is an alternative path of a harassment restraining order, which does not require a defined domestic relationship (such as ex-roommate), where "harassment" is violence or threats of violence against you, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed you and caused you substantial emotional distress. A course of conduct is more than one act and that seems even less likely.