Are marketplace lenders subject to fair lending laws? Are 'marketplace' lenders, such as those using Lending Club or Funding Circle, etc., subject to fair lending provisions, such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or the Fair Lending provisions of the Fair Housing Act? (Though I realized there are probably few mortgages through these sites.) If so, what are the obligations of lenders under the law, and what is the enforcement mechanism for violations?
In the case of the ECOA, yes. The law applies to any person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly participates in a credit decision, including banks, retailers, bankcard companies, finance companies, and credit unions. For example, a 2017 American Bankers Association report at pages 91-92 (internal pages numbers, add 7 for pdf page number) which states: Since marketplace lenders are very much involved in many aspects of the credit transaction, they must structure and operate their lending platforms in compliance with the ECOA and applicable state law counterparts. In addition, the criteria used to determine creditworthiness must not have a disparate impact on the basis of any Prohibited Basis. Notably, the ECOA applies to commercial as well as consumer lending. The Fair Housing Act also applies in mortgage lending with regard to owner occupied residential housing (see also here). The only meaningful exemption would be for mortgage lending provided by religious organizations to its members only, which does not apply to the situations in the question. But see, Alexander v. AmeriPro Funding, Inc., No. 15-20710 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, U.S. No. 16-cv-01395 (11/6/2017) (holding that the FHA does not apply to secondary market purchases of mortgage loans which are subject at the underlying loan level to the act). This case is discussed starting at page 18 of the American Bankers Association report linked above (internal page numbering, not pdf page number). For what it is worth, I do not believe that Alexander will be followed by other federal circuits or will remain good law, because it is contrary to a plain reading of the statute and HUD and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") policy (at least prior to the current administration), and because it requires primary lenders to make prohibited distinctions to cull packages of loans for sale to secondary market purchasers.
If I understand your question correctly, you have some clients who have paid you for services that you have not yet provided and, indeed, they have not yet requested. Is this correct? The accounting term for this is a "prepayment". The correct accounting treatment is to increase an asset account (your bank account) and create a liability account (Prepayments or something similar). You need to talk to your accountant about how to treat these for consumption and income taxes. Legally, these people are now creditors of your business - just like all of your suppliers and employees. There is no legal requirement to escrow or otherwise treat this as trust money. Basically, if your business goes bust they will lose their money. This is something that you should have dealt with in your contract with your customers - if you are running an online business then you should get a lawyer to revise your terms of service to cover things like how they can ask for a refund (and how long you have to get it to them) and how long (or if) they forfeit the funds. As it stands the money effectively becomes yours after whatever time under a statute of limitation applies to transactions of this type and size (under whatever law applies to the contract) since after that time they cannot sue to get it back.
If you are given a paid job, and you do the work, then "consideration has been provided", and 1682 will not apply. As to "referral fees" those sound more like kickbacks, but it depends on what, if anything, the person gets for the fee.
There are exemptions, and "justifications", in 24 CFR 100. The exemption is 100.10: (c) Nothing in this part, other than the prohibitions against discriminatory advertising, applies to: (1) The sale or rental of any single family house by an owner, provided the following conditions are met: (i) The owner does not own or have any interest in more than three single family houses at any one time. (ii) The house is sold or rented without the use of a real estate broker, agent or salesperson or the facilities of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings. So such a restriction could be allowed if e.g. you live in the house and rent only a few rooms, or a single family home marketed and managed in the right way. There is also an exemption for religious organizations and private clubs allowing rental to members only. 100.500 lays the groundwork for disparate impact hot water. It says: (a) A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. So only renting to students in a particular seminary would most likely have a disparate impact. There is, however, the possibility of justifying the policy, following 100.500: (b) (1) A legally sufficient justification exists where the challenged practice: (i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614; and (ii) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. (2) A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section. So let's say that the offended party has made the case that the practice will have a discriminatory effect, then the accused can set forth the aforementioned justification: (c)(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant. (c3)(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. The crux of the matter is having a "substantial, legitimate nondiscriminatory interest", i.e. why would you want to rent to only seminary students.
What you're talking about is a liquidated-damages clause, where the contract explicitly spells out the damages to be awarded in the event of a breach. The law will vary some from state to state, but these clauses are generally enforceable. Some courts limit their use to cases where calculating the damages resulting from the breach would be impossible or impractical. But in the United States, along with all other common law jurisdictions, courts generally agree that if the liquidated-damages clause appears to penalize the breach instead of simply compensating for it, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift &amp; Loan Ass'n, 17 Cal.4th 970, 977 (Cal. 1998) (“A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.”) The trillion-dollar damages clause &quot;bears no reasonable relationship&quot; to the damages that would actually result from a breach of a software license, so you can safely expect a court to refuse to enforce it, and limit you to whatever damages you could actually prove in court. Even if you were to drastically reduce it to &quot;all the money you have, and then some,&quot; &quot;all the money you have,&quot; &quot;half the money you have,&quot; or even &quot; &quot;1 percent of all the money you have,&quot; the language still makes clear that the contract is not aimed at compensating for the breach, but rather penalizing the breaching party. In the end, what you're talking about isn't going to work, because contract law is generally less concerned with penalizing people than with making them whole.
The United Kingdom and common-law countries generally use the concept of fair dealing. The EU doesn't really have a doctrine analogous to fair use. Instead, it has a list of explicitly permitted uses (Article 5 of the Information Society Directive), and its courts are generally very resistant to the adoption of fair-use analyses.
Landlord or tenant responsible for the furnishing damaged after a flooding? This brief analysis of Scandinavian Contract Law explains the difficulty of addressing with certainty matters of Swedish contract law. Despite the legal and factual ambiguities, it seems to me that the contract terms and landlord's conduct preclude his entitlement to a reimbursement from you. (Disclaimers: I have never litigated in Sweden's courts; I do not purport to be knowledgeable about Swedish law; and it is unclear to me whether Swedish contract law has evolved since the date of the publication of Ramberg's criticism of Scandinavian contract law) First, it appears that the landlord was negligent by waiting several days to ask tenants to remove moldering furnishings (as these were starting to smell). If that was the landlord's earliest reaction to the flooding, then the delay might evidence [landlord's] failure to mitigate damages. In other legal systems, failure to mitigate damages is an obstacle to recovery from the sued party. Second, the landlord's unqualified instruction to throw everything away --in response to your proposal of checking for salvage-- might forfeit his entitlement to reimbursement. In this regard, page 4 of the aforementioned publication points out that [t]he Swedish Supreme court [...] generally stated that a contract containing the standard terms was deemed to have been concluded due to the parties' behaviour. Obviously, not all of the contract would be void, but only the application of the clause about tenant's financial responsibility for missing or damaged items in this particular context of landlord's delay and reckless response to your proposal. Third, in the clause regarding tenant's financial responsibility "to replace missing or damaged items", I would say that the qualifier "missing" is key. Here, the usage of "missing" connotes a deliberate act of taking items away in violation of the landlord's proprietorship, regardless of whether it was the tenant or a third party who removed/stole them. That same connotation of deliberate act should govern the very next qualifier, "damaged", absent any language that expands the latter's connotation of causality. Also a criterion of negligence would fail, because you were not notified that a flooding occurred. The contract's clarification that their "insurance doesn't cover [your] personal belongings" opens --albeit weakly-- the door to the possible interpretation that instead the policy covers the counterparty's (that is, the landlord's) belongings. On the other hand, the landlord could avail himself of arguments such as (1) tenant should have made arrangements prior to leaving for the holidays; and (2) landlord's bed &amp; mattress were not intended to be stored in the basement, and instead should have been notified toward procuring an appropriate storage for them. It is hard to make a more precise assessment without knowing more about the terms of the contract and the circumstances. Therefore, the best thing to do is to look at the subtleties in the language of the contract (as I did above regarding the deliberate nature inherent to the adjective "missing" and its interpretative effect on the adjective "damaged").
As written, your question seems to ask for legal advice in a specific case. That would be off-topic. If you are asking strictly as a hypothetical: In germany, there is supposed to be the Bestellerprinzip for services of a real state agent (whoever retains the agent pays the fees). This was clarified in the Gesetz zur Regelung der Wohnungsvermittlung as changed in 2015. Landlords and real estate agents are frequently trying to get around it, but getting the legal construction of the contracts wrong would mean a substantial fine.