Can a jury&#39;s vote be nullified , if majority of the jury is found to have leaning towards a certain political and racial group hence causing a bias? In U.S. multiple ways have been politically implemented through which minorities don't have a huge representation , even in the jury. So , can the person who is trying to be convincted of a crime , ask to nullify jury's vote , unless the political and racial views of each jury member is clearly stated . In the vice news documentary - https://youtu.be/3oIKv_TIk0I , It has been mentioned that the group of people who burned down a mosque , are asking the judge to change the location from which jury has to be selected because the area from which their jury is to be selected is less conservative and if such a condition has been provided then will it not be unconstitutional , because doing so will bring down justice wrt political alignment.
Historically (long, long ago to the point that there is no leading case establishing this rule), you could challenge a verdict based upon a failure of a judge to dismiss a juror for cause (or for improperly dismissing a juror for cause) when this was an abuse of discretion. Race is an improper reason to dismiss a juror for cause. Political views often mandate dismissal of a juror for cause if they prevent a juror from being impartial or create an appearance of bias in the jury. More recently, race or sex (but not political opinion) based exercise of peremptory challenges (which are otherwise not for cause) was a ground upon which a verdict could be challenged. The leading case is Batson v. Kentucky (1986). Just last year (2017), in a case out of Colorado, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed a verdict to be overturned because of racially discriminatory (and again, not political) motives a juror expressed for convicting a defendant in the course of jury deliberations. Jury deliberations themselves had previously been sacrosanct and not subject to investigation in the absence of an outsider interference (e.g. a third party bribe presented to a juror).
Generally, a local county judge’s decision is not binding on the judgement of another judge unless it is that of an appellate division. The law of the case principle could be referred to as an argument if it would have been decided by another judge in the same case (some courtships work on a rotary basis with different judges sitting over a single case). This would mean that the court would give greater deference to that decision; however, applying the principle is a matter of administrative preference to save resources of the court. Whether or not the other judge would reconsider the matter would be within their discretion absent binding authority to the contrary as a “law of the case” is not binding. In fact, even if it would have been the same judge with the exact same facts deciding the matter in a final judgement, there wouldn’t be much to do. One could argue that deciding differently is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment which, if the judge fails to explain the different decision on the exact same facts may have a reasonable probability to get overturned provided the unconstitutionality finding was correct in the first place. If the matter was, in fact, unconstitutional, appeals may overturn a contrary judgement if the issue is brought up in the lower court and enters the court record. It may have some weight still to cite the decision of the other judge as the argument may be given more weight than if merely delivered as the argument of counsel.
The last part, about equal suffrage in the Senate, does not expire. The question is whether it can be itself amended out of existence. There has been no test of that possibility. This article argues that this may not be subject to amendment. There is only one way to find out for sure. The idea is that the original intent was that this is supposed to be an absolute clause, but of course that only speaks to original intention (and the original intention is not clear, as the article discusses).
Jurors cannot directly disqualify each other. However, they can inform the trial judge if they have reason to believe that one of their peers should be discharged. The judge will then allow the lawyers for both sides to ask the juror questions before deciding to dismiss them. In some jurisdictions, the judge may be required to hold a hearing to examine the evidence. Jurors may also be charged with contempt of court for interfering with a defendant's right to a fair trial, and could be disqualified from jury service in the future. Your examples of juror misconduct point at bias or refusal to deliberate, e.g. when the juror has made up their mind ahead of time (but not because they are using faulty logic). Depending on the jurisdiction, the trial may continue with a smaller jury. In some jurisdictions, the judge will have to declare a mistrial if no replacement juror can be found. See: Juror misconduct
Sometimes rights conflict with each other, and the courts decide which right takes priority. The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant is entitled to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor". The Fifth Amendment says "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". And the First Amendment gives the right to free speech, which includes the right to not be compelled to speak. If you're on trial and try to get someone else to confess on the stand, his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination trumps your Sixth Amendment right to have him testify. But if he couldn't take the fifth (for example, if he had already been acquitted), your Sixth Amendment right would override his First Amendment right to free speech.
No. Indonesia Law uses Civil Law structures which use an Inquisitorial Trial. The chief difference is that in the United States (which has a Common Law Structure) the judge usually does not decide the case, but interprets the law (Trier of Law) and with a few exceptions, will determine the sentence once guilt is found. The Jury decides the case (Trier of Fact) and pronounces guilt (It is the right of the defense to request a Bench Trial, which gives the Judge both roles. The prosecution cannot object to this request). In a Civil Court, the big difference is that their is no Jury and the Judge has both roles (Trier of Law, and Trier of Fact). As the name suggests, rather than two sides fighting each other (adversarial), the two sides are answering questions posed to them by the Judge or usually a panel of Judges are used and the Judge may initiate further investigation in the evidence. The United States does use Inquisitional Trials from time to time, but they are often seen in misdemeanors, traffic courts, and small claims courts. The latter is a popular daytime TV genre (think Judge Judy) while misdemeanors and traffic court decisions are often time funny and make great Youtube videos. There are not many great Adversarial media as many throw out rules for time sake (real U.S. trials have many long boring periods during testimony) and story/drama sake. I would recommend "My Cousin Vinny" which was written by two lawyers who were fed up with Hollywood messing up how court room drama works and is hilarious to boot. When viewing either, take them with a grain of salt.
Each state has its own election laws, so you will get 50 different answers depending on what state you are interested in (perhaps 49, since Washington doesn't have polling places - depends on what you mean by &quot;poll watcher&quot;). This page is a starter list of legal resources. This page starts you on deconstructing this notion of &quot;poll watcher&quot;. Colorado is one state that explicitly allows partisan observers, here are the rules. No person is compelled to be an observer, so I don't understand who you think might be abusing a poll watcher. Perhaps you are referring to the possibility that an election official will prevent an observer from doing their job. Or perhaps you are thinking that being a poll watcher abuses the intent of some law. Whatever you have in mind, there are laws in each state that say what is allowed and what is forbidden, so you have to address this at a local level. No state has a requirement that observers must come from or swear allegiance to the majority party of that polling jurisdiction (e.g. county, or precinct). Any attempt by election officials, or anyone else, to block observers from the minority party would be rebuffed by the courts. The courts will not attempt to divine inner motivations for sending an observer. Most states allow partisan observers. Michigan distinguishes &quot;challengers&quot; and &quot;poll watchers&quot;, and there are distinct rules and powers for the two sets. A crucial difference is that a watcher cannot legally challenge a claimed right to vote or a precinct board action, but a challenger can. There are rules of conduct imposed on both kinds of observers, one of them being that you cannot challenge a voter for the purpose of annoying or delaying the voter. This is a misdemeanor (a crime) under MCL 168.727, and as a criminal prohibition, the state would have to prove intent beyond reasonable doubt. Blog posts by the observer might provide sufficient evidence, but speculation by the majority party would not.
The Board of Estimates still gave small boroughs like Staten Island more representatives per voter than large boroughs like Manhattan. Therefore it violated the one man, one vote principal which is evaluated with respect to all representatives having votes in a body, not just those that hold a majority. The analysis is to take all at large seats that don't violate the one man, one vote rule off the table and look at the fairness of the allocation of the remaining seats. This was an easy case, not a hard one, for the U.S. Supreme Court. The leading case are: First, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that malapportionment claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not exempt from judicial review under Article IV, Section 4, as the equal protection issue in this case was separate from any political questions). As Wikipedia explains (links to selected full text opinions added): The "one person, one vote" doctrine, which requires electoral districts to be apportioned according to population, thus making each district roughly equal in population, was further cemented in the cases that followed Baker v. Carr, including Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) which concerned state county districts, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) which concerned state legislature districts, Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) which concerned U.S. Congressional districts and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968) which concerned local government districts, a decision which was upheld in Board of Estimate of City of New York v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989). Evenwel v. Abbott (2016) said states may use total population in drawing districts (as opposed to eligible voters).