What happens if Congress declares war, but POTUS refuses to fight it? By Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the US Constitution, the power to declare war is with the Congress. Today (03/20/17), during a committee hearing, Ms. Speier, accused Russia (I assume she meant the Russian Federation) of having committed an act of war against The United States. If she introduces a resolution to declare war on the Russian Federation and convinces enough of her Republican colleagues to join her in voting for this resolution, and (because he has too many "Russian ties") President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Is he required to act on such a resolution? If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. These decisions are, clearly, subject to review by federal judges, as was demonstrated with both of his "travel bans" (which would be more appropriately called "travel restrictions"). Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? Are there any other implications of Congress declaring war which a POTUS does not choose to execute? I know none of this happened before, but we are in unprecedented territory here, so I am curious to know what kind of warning signs should I watch for when a member of Congress declares that RF has attacked us directly and makes this declaration in her official capacity (not politicking it, but while sitting in her committee chair on Capitol Hill in an open hearing). EDIT: Point 1: As an example of why stating that RF committed acts of war against the United States is significant, here's how the declaration of war against the Empire of Japan was phrased: "Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United states of America: "Therefore be it "Resolved, etc., That the state of war between the United states and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United states." While no such resolution was introduced (so far on 3/23/2017), the justification for war declaration has been cited. It has been cited almost word-for-word as it was previously cited, in at least one, previous resolution making a declaration of war. Point 2: This is NOT a question about immigration. I have no interest in any opinions or competing legal theories on whether crossing borders, which are protected and enforced, is considered "unauthorized immigration" or a limited-in-form "invasion". I am going with the opinion that it is universally considered to be a form of invasion if a border is enforced and actively protected. If you wish to challenge such an opinion, please, do so in response to other questions, questions you raise yourself, or in any other forum. I am interested solely in legal views as to what is the answer to my question based on the assumption that all the premises of my question are correct. If you wish to challenge the premises of my question, you will not be answering it to my satisfaction. EDIT 2: Since people are clearly not able to separate the issue of border defense from some cases of "immigration", let's open it up to the scope in which so many seem to want to view it. As a hypothetical, what happens if Congress declares war, POTUS refuses to fight it, but private parties begin to engage agents and armies of the adversary state in private hostile actions? Would POTUS have limited authority to stop them? Would his authority to stop them be more limited than it would be had the war not been declared? Would his attempts to thwart private parties, attempting to execute war actions against a nation with whom we would then be at war, be against policy and would be subject to the same type of criminal prosecution as when no state of war exists? The reason I think this example pertinent is because judicial constraint on war powers is tantamount to judges' ability to order inaction when the executive deems an action necessary. But any ability to order inaction can be easily turned into an ability to allow an action through administrative rebranding of paramilitary groups as "private" or even "law-enforcement" rather than military. So the actual legal theory which brands certain federal defensive forces as "civilian" may serve the purpose of putting those forces within their own silo of decision-making, making any Presidential attempts to constrain them subject to judicial review. And, in a time of POTUS flatly refusing to prosecute a war declared by Congress, a judiciary would be able to provide (through constraint of executive powers) the power to prosecute such war to the "civilian" defensive forces. This isn't purely hypothetical, either. This is essentially how it came to be that Lincoln put some of the Supreme Court justices under house arrest. They were interfering with the prosecution of the Civil War. Any law is only as good as its enforcement mechanism. What enforcement mechanisms exist to prevent judges from enabling separate decision-making silos within the "civilian" defensive forces of the federal government which do not answer to the President because of judicial restraint and which can legally prosecute a war based on Congress' expressed declaration of war?
If President Trump refuses to execute the war, does that become an act of treason on his part? Probably not, but it depends on the definition of treason. Congress could decide that it is, impeach him, and remove him from office. They could also remove him from office without using the term treason. Is he required to act on such a resolution? Not really. As chief executive, he has discretion to prioritize the tasks assigned to him by congress. Furthermore, there is plenty of precedent in international affairs for countries being legally in a state of war without any actual combat or other hostilities. If he doesn't, is there any recourse other than impeachment to force US armed forces to attack RF interests at home and abroad? There's always political pressure. But there's no way to relieve the president of his command of the armed forces without relieving him of his office. Aside from impeachment by the congress, this can be temporarily achieved by the cabinet, as specified in the 25th amendment. POTUS is the commander-in-chief, but, at the same time, he is not allowed to unilaterally decide who may or may not cross the border into the United States. The president's ability to make immigration policy and the fact that such policy is subject to judicial review are unrelated to his powers as commander in chief. Immigration is a civil and criminal matter, not a military one. The president's powers in this regard are delegated to him by congress, not specified in the constitution. On the other hand, the president's role as commander in chief of the military is explicit in the constitution. Do the judges also have a power to compel armed forces to take actions which a sitting President is refusing to take? The judiciary does not have the power to order military operations.
"Law" is actually a very broad term, which encompasses statutes, rules, regulations, precedent and I'm sure some other things that I'm forgetting. The popular understanding of "law" is the statute, which involves Congress (at the federal level) or the legislature (and the state level). That is the kind of law that we say is "passed". At the federal level, some number of representatives or senators will introduce a bill into the House or Senate, and it is discussed in a relevant committee; if it is approved, it moves to debate by the whole House / Senate and if it passes it moves to the other house. Once it has passed both the House and Senate, it goes to the President where it may be signed, rejected, or ignored. If signed, it becomes "a law", if rejected (vetoed) it can become law anyhow if it gains a 2/3 majority vote in both houses. If the President ignores it ("pocket veto"), it becomes law in 10 days (Sunday is not a day), unless Congress is not in session. Oh, and, that's just the tip of the iceberg. At the state level, there is a similar process, with the further option of referenda and initiatives. In the former case, a particular law will have been passed by the legislature and then it is put to a popular vote for affirmation / overturning, and in the latter case a new law is proposed by the people (generally through a petitioning process) and then voted on by the populace. There is a fair amount of variation on how this works and what can be done, by state. A law can be repealed (withdrawn) by passing a law that repeals a given part of the existing law, and it can be re-written. The Supreme Court of the jurisdiction can also withdraw a (part of a) law if it is found to be unconstitutional. No foreign body can override US law, although if the US is bound by treaty (which necessarily involves another country) then we might have to do whatever that treaty says, because we approved the treaty. One limit on what we can be forced into by treaties is that a treaty cannot violate the constitution. The largest source of law in the US is actually not statutory, it is regulatory law, where a regulatory agency writes rules with the force of law (so really, it is law). In that case, there has to be a statutory basis, where at the federal level a law is passed empowering an agency to write rules, where the scope of the regulation is supposed to be related to the empowering statute in some manner. In that case, there is a vetting process, but basically no voting, just an announcement, some discussion, and eventually the rules are set. Analogous processes exist at the state level. We also have various county and city governmental bodies, where e.g. the city council can vote to create a law; or, they can empower an agency to write regulations. Yet another source of law is the Executive Order, where the president can decree that such and such will be the case (as long as it has something to do with what the executive branch does). These are somewhat limited in scope, but every president seems to like to test what that limit is. Governors get to do it too! And lastly, courts have an indirect power to make law, by ruling on how an existing law is to be interpreted (as well as ruling that a law or part of a law is unconstitutional).
I haven't found any cases where this defence has worked. I strongly suspect that that's because it never has. Every piece of advice I've read on this unsurprisingly suggests you'd be a fool to attempt to rely on this defence in court, including some cases in which defendants have attempted to rely on it and have failed. There are a couple of Freedom of Information requests to the government which state very clearly that it won't work: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/statute_law_4 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/consent_of_the_governed The last link is particularly clear on the matter: every citizen of the UK tacitly consents to be governed, according to Blackstone. And this one makes it even clearer: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/18097/response/56511/attach/html/3/TO%20255452%20TO09%205866.doc.html Under the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Acts of Parliament override common law. So it simply wouldn't be possible to argue that you choose to live under the common law alone; no court in the land would allow it, as it's a cornerstone of our legal system that Parliament is sovereign, and therefore that statutes enacted by Parliament will 'trump' the common law. Parliament derives its sovereignty from the fact that the current government is elected and therefore represents the citizens of the UK, and for this reason, Acts of Parliament take priority over case law. On that basis, it wouldn't be possible for a citizen to argue that they choose not to abide by statute: their consent is tacitly assumed. Based on all the above, then, I would say no: the 'common law' defence will never hold water if relied on in court.
"Does threatening to attack cultural heritage constitute conspiracy to commit a war crime..." Almost certainly not. It's a threat to commit a war crime, but is probably not illegal in and of itself. On the other hand, if the Commander In Chief were to ask his generals what would be involved in mounting a cruise missile attack on the Meidan Emam in Esfahan, that would be conspiracy to commit a war crime (as would supplying the requested information).
Can any one uses this law to sue US for killing people in Iraq for example? No. This proposed law is limited to suing people or organizations involved in supporting terrorism in the US. The problem with it is if it becomes law and is used, the precedent will be set to allow lawsuits against foreign actors for such decisions. So a middle eastern government, e.g. Iraq or Iran, could pass a law allowing lawsuits against those who could be in some way responsible for war crimes during the Iraq war. So someone could sue the individuals directly responsible, their commanders for not stopping them or preventing them, the organization to which the individuals belonged, the government of the individuals, the members of the coalition, and the United Nations. And this would be done in that country's courts, not international courts with some claim to impartiality. The proposed law is a bad idea, but quite popular. There were some low level members of the Saudi Arabian government who supported actions taken by the group involved in the 9/11 attacks. The families of the victims are understandably annoyed by this. And yes, they are actually seeking justice, just not in the best way. This wouldn't make a good basis for blackmail, as there is no way to stop it. Blackmail is based on offering two alternatives and allowing the victim to pick one. This wouldn't be controllable like that. Once launched, it would be difficult to pull back.
The comments have already pointed out that the President of the United States is still a citizen, and all of the rights of a citizen are still protected for them. Additionally, the Administration is allowed to take policy positions which are antagonistic to a person or group's cause, even if that group is practicing their rights to express their views legally. To give a different example, the President and his administration may denounce the position of a group of Neo-Nazis marching legally. So, any argument that the President is acting in an official capacity while making antagonistic comments also probably fails, as the Administration is allowed to take a position on any issue they deem worth taking a stand on. As noted in another answer and in comments, the applicable laws appear to be 18 U.S. Code § 227, which provides for punishment of government officials who attempt to influence employment decisions through official acts for political purposes, and 42 U.S. Code § 1983, which provides for civil action when a person deprives, or causes the deprivation of, another person's rights under color of law. 18 U.S. Code § 227 likely does not apply for two reasons The President may show that his conduct was not purely for political purpose The official statements made do not qualify as official acts per McDonnell v. United States, as they are not a decision or action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy"; that question or matter must involve a formal exercise of governmental power, and must also be something specific and focused that is "pending" or "may by law be brought" before a public official 42 U.S. Code § 1983 might apply if the official statements were found to be acting under color of law, but I think the statements made so far will fail to meet the qualifications for this statute. Blair v. Bethel School District gives three qualifications for conduct that would allow recovery under this statute: (1) he engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action. The President's and Administration's official speech appears to fail the second criteria. First, it is questionable whether it qualifies as an "Adverse Action" - in Blair, as well as Hartman v. Moore and Gibson v. United States, the adverse action against the Plaintiff caused actual damage or indignity. However, even if we assume the official speech qualifies as an adverse action for the purposes of the statute, it still appears to be permissible for effectively the same reasons as the first and third arguments presented in the decision: First, the adverse action Blair complains of was a rather minor indignity, and de minimis deprivations of benefits and privileges on account of one's speech do not give rise to a First Amendment claim. The actual effect of the Administration's speech has a minimal direct effect on the players it speaks against. The decision further states: The most familiar adverse actions are “exercise[s] of governmental power” that are “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature” and have the effect of punishing someone for his or her speech Official speech by the Administration is not "regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature." While this is not a complete definition for "adverse action," it gives a sense of severity, which official speech does not appear to meet. Additionally, the President's right to speech, and the Administration's authority and need to make official speech as directed by the President is a competing interest in this case, as was the interest of the Board in Blair: Third, it is significant that Blair isn't the only party in this case whose interests implicate First Amendment concerns. To the contrary, we assume all of the Board members have a protected interest in speaking out and voting their conscience... The decision does note that: The point isn't that the vote against Blair was protected speech simply because it was expressive. Almost all retaliatory actions can be said to be expressive, including those that are manifestly unconstitutional. But, while Blair certainly had a First Amendment right to criticize Seigel and vote against his retention as superintendent, his fellow Board members had the corresponding right to replace Blair with someone who, in their view, represented the majority view of the Board. Similarly, it's probable that a court would find that the President's right to speech and their Administration's corresponding authority to speech against the players' right to protest is equally weighted or even weightier, such that stifling the official speech is as bad or worse than the alleged chilling effect of the speech. Some examples of things that clearly would fall afoul of 42 U.S. Code § 1983 would be the President or the Administration misappropriating funds to use to pay NFL teams not to hire players who kneel during the national anthem, or signing an Executive Order preventing players who kneel during the national anthem from playing - in both cases, they are taking actions which fall outside the powers of their office, which would qualify as acts made under color of law and clearly chill the players' First Amendment rights.
There is no constitutional provision which grants the President such power. I am not aware of any provision of federal law which grants such power, nor of any case where a real president has exercised such a power. Of course, the President is a citizen, and any citizen may make a Citizen's arrest Particularly for a felony. (See also this FindLaw page on the subject.) And of course, as the head of the executive department, the President could order someone who clearly has powers of arrest to make an arrest, although such an order would not be valid in the absence of legal cause to make an arrest. A comment called atention to 10 USC §252 which provides: Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion. The history for this section dates from 1861. A note indicates that a prior version was the basis of Executive order 10730, sending federal forces into Little Rock, AK in 1957 to enforce school integration there. However, this section does not explicitly increase the arrest powers of anyone, and does not grant the President personally any power of arrest.
Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter.