What triggers a contingent election? I have read many opinion articles which discuss the possibility that some states fail to appoint any presidential electors (as actually happened with the state of New York in our first federal election). And they often go on to say something to the effect that, &quot;if nobody gets to 270&quot;, then the House of Representatives elects the president (and the Senate elects the vice-president). Is that correct? I am not a lawyer, but I read the plain language of the 12th amendment (emphasis added): The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. If for some reason the states of GA, MI, PA, and WI (to pick four states at random) did not appoint any electors this time around, then if I did the math right, there would only be 476 electors. In that case it seems to me that a mere 239 electors, not 270, would be &quot;a majority of the whole number of electors appointed&quot;; and the election would only go to the House of Representatives in case of a 238–238 tie; or if, instead of failing to appoint any electors, those states would instruct their electors to cast blank ballots or to vote for a third candidate. Am I right, or what? (By the way, I noce that the founders didn't provide for a four-way tie in the electoral vote, but that would be another question.)
The other answer is incorrect. In fact, the question you're asking turns on the meaning of the phrase &quot;the whole number of electors appointed.&quot; This could be interpreted either way, and as far as I know this ambiguity has never been considered by a court or by congress. It would only matter under the following conditions: Some states appoint fewer electors than the number to which they are entitled. The candidate with the greatest number of votes has more votes than half the number of electors actually appointed, but less than or equal to half the number of electors that should have been appointed. One way to look at this ambiguity is that it depends on how you parse the structure of the amendment. It could be either: a majority of (the whole number of electors) (appointed) a majority of the whole number of (electors appointed) In the first case, &quot;appoint&quot; refers to the sentence in Article 2 that specifies, determines, or &quot;appoints&quot; the number of electors. This reading is supported, for example, by the first definition of appoint at Merriam-Webster online, which is to fix or set officially, as in &quot;to appoint a trial date.&quot; However, if you look at Article 2, it says Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress. Here, appoint is used in its second sense, to name officially. This suggests that a failure by any state to appoint any elector to which it is entitled reduces &quot;the whole number of electors appointed&quot; because some available places in the Electoral College have not had anyone appointed to fill them. I favor the second interpretation, but I suspect that if the conditions outlined above actually did arise, Congress would choose the politically expedient interpretation. That is, if the candidate with the most votes was of the party in control of Congress, they would take the second interpretation, and if that candidate of the other party, they would take the first. I further suspect that the courts would not get involved.
There seems to be no current applicable prohibition state law in Iowa in Iowa Code 39A, the Election Misconduct and Penalties Act. It is also not at all clear that precinct caucuses count as "elections" as applicable to the sections with criminal prohibitions (the precinct caucus does not appear to constitute a "primary election" under Iowa law).
The ability to create such an office derives (according to Roosevelt, who invoked the power), from the constitutional authority of the president and the Trading with the Enemy Act amended by the War Powers Act, 1941. A president cannot repeal a part of The Constitution or an act of Congress, but he can undo an act by a president (as long as Congress hasn't come along and taken back a power for example by changing the "authorized" part to "required"). In a sense, that office is permanently gone, but until Congress or SCOTUS change the law, another president could effectively re-create that office and even give it the same name. The appendix to Title 50 which authorized the office is still there (not repealed). It is remotely possible that some other act or court ruling effectively nullifies this part of the law, but that would have to be determined by some president attempting to re-create the office and then someone else suing to prevent it (based on such an effectively nullification).
While the point made by user6726 is not wrong with respect to this particular statute, it doesn't address a more basic point about how the supremacy clause works. Federal criminal laws govern punishments for federal crimes in the federal criminal justice system. Federal prosecutors bringing federal criminal charges against criminal defendants in the federal criminal justice system can and do secure death penalty sentences against criminal defendants in states where there is no state death penalty. One recent case where that happened was the Boston Marathon bombing case where a defendant was sentenced to death in federal court for the crime for violation of a federal criminal statute, despite the fact that Massachusetts has no death penalty of its own. This is not a supremacy clause issue. No state law had to be changed or invalidated because of the existence of the federal law. States law governs how the state criminal justice system works, not the federal criminal justice system. When we say that a state has abolished the death penalty, we mean that it has abolished it in the state criminal justice system. This doesn't absolutely foreclose the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed in that state on federal charges, although it does make it far less likely that the death penalty will be imposed. Partially, this is because "blue collar" crime is handled by the states. Partially, this is because out of comity and a concern that juries in states without a death penalty are less likely to vote for a capital sentence, federal prosecutors are less likely to seek the death penalty in a state without capital punishment than in a state with capital punishment. For example, there are 2,902 people on death row as of 2016, in the U.S. Almost 98% of death penalty convictions that have not yet been carried out were obtained in state courts. Only, 62 involve civilian death penalties imposed in federal courts (mostly in states that have the death penalty) and another 6 involve death penalties imposed in military courts (mostly in states that allow the death penalty or abroad). All of the other cases arose in state courts.
Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.
Sort of The 25th Amendment is crystal clear that the VP and a majority of the cabinet can declare in writing to the president pro tem of the Senate and the speaker of the house a presidential inability, whereupon the VP becomes the acting president. The president can then immediately transmit in writing his declaration that there is no inability, and then he resumes his position as president until the VP and majority of cabinet (not necessarily the same members) again declare a disability, within 4 days. If that happens, then Congress decides the matter. There is a 28 day period for a super-majority of Congress to make that decision, plus 48 hours for assembling of Congress is not in session. The problem is that the amendment says that the president resumes his powers unless something happens within 4 days. It does not say that he must wait 4 days to see what the VP response is. If the VP does not counter-respond immediately, then it is possible, but not guaranteed, that the president regains power until the VP reaffirms the disability. This is a question that would have to be decided by SCOTUS. In the presumably short interim, there would be serious constitutional questions as to the legality of the actions of either POTUS or VPOTUS.
This would require an amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. The process is specified in Article 5: Article. V. The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. The &quot;mode of ratification&quot; has until now always been by state legislatures rather than by conventions. That's unlikely to be different in this case.
No In accordance with Article II Clause 3, once the votes are counted (and any deadlock resolved) the President has been chosen. At that point, the election is final.