Does the Geneva Convention apply to the party denying that the war is going on? Suppose a country R invades another country U without declaring war and insists that the invasion is not a war, but a &quot;special operation&quot;, aimed at liberating U's citizens from U's government, or some BS like that. U's position, on the other hand, is that R's invasion of U is an act of war. The first question: can captured soldiers from R's army claim protection under Geneva Convention? The second question: is R required to respect Geneva Convention rights of the captured U soldiers? Furthermore, R hired mercenaries from yet another country, S. Those mercenaries, even though acting at R's behest and under R's instructions, are not a part of R's or S's armies. The third question: does the Geneva Convention apply to them too? Finally, volunteers from other countries are volunteering to help U's resistance, despite not being citizens of U and despite the volunteers' nations refusing to take any part in the conflict. Are those volunteers protected too?
International Humanitarian Law applies to all armed conflicts The Geneva Conventions are a part of the overarching body of this law. It applies to all armed conflicts, not just declared wars. An armed invasion by R of U is a conflict to which IHL applies irrespective of if it is a declared war or not. BTW, declared wars outside Africa and South America are virtually unknown since WWII
Yes, for most of them. Article 42.7 TEU If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. The &quot;specific character&quot; for &quot;certain Member States&quot; refers to states with a traditional military neutrality, notably Austria, Ireland, and Sweden. Those EU states which are also NATO members would not have that excuse since they agreed, in principle, to use military force to protect others, so they cannot say they are constitutionally incapable of doing so in the EU case. This is why the EU does not, generally, admit members with open territorial conflicts. Probably no, for the rest of NATO Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. This is in a way weaker than the EU clause, &quot;such action as it deems necessary&quot; might allow individual countries to do less than going to war if that is unnecessary. Also, NATO-but-not-EU countries might claim that a Russian attack on EU forces in an EU-but-not-NATO country does not constitute an attack in the treaty area: Article 6 For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, [...] How to interpret a Russian counter-counter-attack on NATO countries after those counter-attack Russia in accordance with collective defense after a Russian attack on a non-NATO country would become a political issue. As pointed out in the comments, the practical application of either TEU 42.7 or NATO Article 5 would be intensely political, not just in the &quot;indirect&quot; case but also where it seems to be clear-cut. Nations might rally to the flag or drag their feet, depending on the details. Or even depending on totally unrelated issues where they want to get concessions. Or they might alert their forces and deploy them on different flanks than the one under attack, because that flank feels exposed.
NO (mostly). Servitude means that the employer, or owner of the indenture, or whatever, can use physical force to make the indentee carry out the work given. If the indentee runs away they can be arrested and forcibly returned. This is distinct from the law of contracts. If Alice agrees to provide labour for Bob and subsequently fails to fulfil the contract then Alice may have to pay damages, but that is all. Even in cases of crminial fraud where Alice never meant to provide the labour in the first place, the penalty is defined by law, and would not be the provision of the contracted labour. As the OP notes, military service is generally an indenture-style contract; desertion is a crime. However the other party in that case is the government acting under law rather than a third party acting in their own self-interest. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits all forms of servitude.
There are circumstances in which countries that are generally recognized to follow the rule of law will extradite in the absence of a treaty. For example, the U.S. generally will not extradite absent a treaty, and there are many countries with which the U.S. does not have an extradition treaty. Regardless, 18 U.S. Code §§ 3181 and 3184 leave the executive with the authority to extradite without regard to the existence of a treaty, persons (other than citizens, nationals or permanent residents of the United States), who have committed crimes of violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries. U.S. Department of Justice Manual, 9-15.100 - General Principles Related to Obtaining Fugitives from Abroad
What a country claims to be the case certainly doesn't guarantee what is the case. The constitution (at least as of 2012) of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (aka North Korea) says: Article 67. Citizens are guaranteed freedom of speech, the press, assembly, demonstration and association. The State shall guarantee the conditions for the free activities of democratic political parties and social organizations. Needless to say, North Korea is not generally considered a bastion of free speech. The People's Republic of China has a similar provision in its constitution. When we get to countries where those outside the country consider there to be some level of freedom of speech, there are still restrictions. In the UK, the Official Secrets Act makes it a crime for any person to republish leaked classified information. Germany makes it illegal to deny that the Holocaust happened. Until 2013, Canada made it illegal for a person to use telecommunications to say something that would expose people to hatred for some reason covered by antidiscrimination law. Many, many countries criminalize child pornography. Many, many countries have copyright laws. "Free speech" does not mean "you can say whatever you want and the government can't stop you." It means "as a general rule, the government can't restrict what you're saying because they don't like it." I am unaware of any country with a functional government with unfettered freedom of speech.
The US Constitution has no bearing on the Nuremberg Tribunals The tribunals were not conducted under US law, they were conducted under an international treaty going by the snappy title of No. 251 Agreement by the Government of the United Kindom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Union of Societ Socialist Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis. This was signed for the United States on 8 August 1945 by Robert H. Jackson who later served as chief prosecutor on the tribunal. The laws of the United States allow three mechanisms for the US to join international treaties: treaties, congressional-executive agreements and executive agreements. I do not know what mechanism was used but AFAIK, no contemporary challenge was made that the US lacked the power to or hadn't properly acceded to the treaty. This is the extent to which US domestic law would be applicable. The US recognises that there are other laws and other courts than merely US ones and that their citizens may be subject to those laws and serve on those courts. Indeed, there are circumstances where US courts will apply foreign law to a case; when that happens US law applies to the procedure but the substantive law of the other jurisdiction is applied to the facts. There is no doubt that the legal basis of the Nuremberg Tribunal was suspect and controversial and this was recognised at the time as this April 1946 The Atlantic article demonstrates. However, there was never any doubt that US law (or UK, or USSR, or French law) was totally irrelevant. I suggest you ask a new question focusing on the role of &quot;Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law&quot; under international law.
As with all international law, it depends on &quot;who says so&quot;: I will draw on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War as most relevant. Article 3 distinguishes combatants from non-combatants, saying that Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. They then specifically prohibit murder: Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture but this only applies to non-combatants. There simply is no prohibition against killing combatants (unsurprisingly). Liberia acceded to that treaty, so for instance if one of their soldiers murdered a non-combatant, in principle they should try that soldier for the crime of murder under Liberian law. If some random dude (not a soldier) murders anybody in Liberia, in principle they should try him for the crime. Soldier may kill enemy soldier, even when the killed soldier is sleeping and poses no immediate threat to the soldier who kills him. That's the nature of war. In the case of Massaquoi, he might have been prosecuted by Sierra Leone, but negotiated immunity in Sierra Leone in exchange for information on his RUF colleagues. There was no such tribunal or arrangement w.r.t. his involvement in Liberia, and Finland opted to conduct an extraterritorial trial based on war crimes (not the killing of combatants). His acquittal was based on the lack of evidence that it was him that did the reported deeds (I don't know if there is a publicly available judgment, but it is 850 pages and in Finnish, so toivotan onnea projektille.
The 2nd Amendment does not grant a right not to bear arms. This is its text: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. Read D.C. v Heller for the reasons the 2nd Amendment stands for an individual's right to bear arms. Most relevant to this question is what the phrase &quot;keep and bear arms&quot; means (internal citations removed): We turn to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.” Johnson defined “keep” as, most relevantly, “[t]o retain; not to lose,” and “[t]o have in custody.” Webster defined it as “[t]o hold; to retain in one’s power or possession.” No party has apprised us of an idiomatic meaning of “keep Arms.” Thus, the most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have weapons.” ... “Keep arms” was simply a common way of referring to possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone else. ... At the time of the founding, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry.” When used with “arms,” however, the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular purpose—confrontation. In Muscarello v. United States, in the course of analyzing the meaning of “carries a firearm” in a federal criminal statute, Justice Ginsburg wrote that “[s]urely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment … indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear, or carry … upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose … of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’” If there is a constitutional argument against mandatory gun ownership laws, it does not stem from the 2nd Amendment.