Michael Jackson trial and the constitutionality of gag orders In this page, Wikipedia says that in the Michael Jackson 2005 trial (People v. Jackson) the judge: put a gag order on both sides Erwin Chemerinsky says (link, at the time of 1:53:37) that gag orders are unconstitutional. Which way is which? Was the injunction the judge released in the Michael Jackson trial unconstitutional? If so, why nobody challenged it?
The two statements are not contradictory. A court may impose a gag order on the parties to legal proceedings, as in the Michael Jackson trial, but it may not impose a gag order on the press that is covering the proceedings, which is what Chemerinsky is discussing.
If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error."
The relevant statute, 28 USC 455 simply states what shall be, and does not suggest that the law could be enforced by any particular means. There have been cases where there was a suggestion of a hint of impropriety at SCOTUS and yet things proceeded. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 Rehnquist did not recuse himself despite being a White House lawyer and having expressed an opinion on the legality of certain arrests, and that was the end of that matter.
A party can ask a judge to recuse at the outset of a case for bias or other reasons (e.g. a family connection to a party). Generally, a judge rules on that motion personally and it is an interlocutory motion not subject to appeal except by extraordinary writ (or the equivalent) to the state supreme court. It is not generally proper to do so during a trial. Moreover, one jeopardy has attached in a criminal trial (which happens when the jury is sworn) if the trial ends prior to a jury verdict for reasons other than those attributable to the defendant, the defendant cannot be tried again on those charges and is functionally acquitted. There are probably some arguable exceptions to this rule in extraordinary circumstances that are not the fault of either party (e.g. if a meteor hits courthouse and kills the judge and some jurors mid-trial, or if it is revealed that the judge committed the crime for which the defendant is being tried). But the threshold for exceptions to the general rule is very high.
When it is a mistake of memory, and not intentional (as this question is asking), there are no clear standards, and it is largely up to prosecutorial discretion. This means that whatever factors affect prosecutorial discretion (such as the prosecutor knowing who they have to work with on other days) can become significant in the determination. A prosecutor who announced this decision also specifically noted that it's up to the prosecutor to decide each case separately, with no guidance on fact patterns that could influence the decision either way. The Washington Post Magazine covered this question somewhat in depth several years ago, arriving at that conclusion. This was a surprise to me, but the article seems like a good resource on this - the question turns out to be more interesting and less resolved than it first appeared to be.
A witness who disobeys a court order has automatically broken the law. Indeed, this is the most fundamental of laws; you can't decide "If I turn up to the hearing I may be punished for my crime; but not attending isn't against the law, so goodbye." A witness who goes out of the jurisdiction cannot, of course, be punished while there (though when he returns he may have to explain why he chose to leave having been warned that he must attend or face penalties- that is the meaning of sub poena). But your assumption that anybody who fails to attend probably had a good reason betrays a fundamental, though common, misunderstanding. A court has determined that your evidence is necessary for justice to be done. There is therefore no good reason not to attend. It may well be that a doctor would prefer that you did not go to court that day, and if you apply to the court it may be possible to find some arrangement. But you are not allowed to decide 'my convenience is more important than discovering whether the defendant should go to jail or not". Civilised countries have people who are empowered to make that decision; they are called judges, and the decision has been made.
There is a potentially infinite regress of questions regarding the constitutionality of restrictions imposed under these "emergency" circumstances. The basic legal principle is clearly established: laws restricting fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny. The specific details of a particular law and surrounding circumstances have yet to be discovered by the courts. If it is necessary to the purpose of saving lives that meetings of more than 10 people be prohibited, then the "compelling interest" test probably has been satisfied. That is basically a medical question, and the courts have a limited interest in scientific controversies, instead they are interested in whether people who make legal decisions do so rationally (is it reasonable to think that such limits would accomplish that compelling government end). Is it reasonable to think that restrictions lasting two months are necessary? The Black Death lasted at least 4 years. In the current circumstances (very limited hard knowledge this disease), it's hard to say what government actions could not be excused based on necessity. Summary execution is, at least in the current knowledge context, probably not going to pass strict scrutiny. As already explained in other thread on the topic, there is no "churches are above the law" constitutional provision. The appropriate question in the Florida case is not about the First Amendment, it is about the Due Process clauses – is the arrest lawful? We will, no doubt, see. On the face of it, he violated the law, so he can be arrested. I understand that there is a team poking holes in the order.
"Allowed" is not an applicable concept, since the few laws regulating juror conduct pertain to corrupt behavior (such as bribery). Instead, there are standards for juror conduct that the legal profession wishes to be adhered to, and the only way that impression is conveyed to jurors is through the judge's instructions (or lack therein). It is held in Sparf and Hansen v. United States 156 U.S. 51 that In the courts of the United States, it is the duty of the jury, in criminal cases, to receive the law from the court, and to apply it as given by the court, subject to the condition that, by a general verdict, a jury of necessity determines both law and fact as compounded in the issue submitted to them in the particular case. In criminal cases, it is competent for the court to instruct the jury as to the legal presumptions arising from a given state of facts, but it may not, by a peremptory instruction, require the jury to find the accused guilty of the offense charged, nor of any offense less than that charged. One of the "technical" rights of a jury is the right to judge the law itself (jury nullification). This arises in part from the Zenger trial and similar colonial events, and (in terms of legal precedent) from a famous instruction by Jay in Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 1: It may not be amiss, here, Gentlemen, to remind you of the good old rule, that on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury, on questions of law, it is the province of the court to decide. But it must be observed that by the same law, which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in controversy. On this, and on every other occasion, however, we have no doubt, you will pay that respect, which is due to the opinion of the court: For, as on the one hand, it is presumed, that juries are the best judges of facts; it is, on the other hand, presumable, that the court are the best judges of the law. But still both objects are lawfully, within your power of decision. Sparf v. US however finds that a judge is under no obligation to inform jurors of that right, and jury instructions say things like "you must apply the law as I give it to you, even if you disagree with the law". For examples, instruction 101 in the California criminal instructions manual says that trials are conducted in open court with the parties presenting evidence and the judge deciding the law that applies to the case. It is unfair to the parties if you receive additional information from any other source because that information may be unreliable or irrelevant and the parties will not have had the opportunity to examine and respond to it. Your verdict must be based only on the evidence presented during trial in this court and the law as I provide it to you. This is not an enforceable law, for instance if a juror (esp. an attorney) argues one way based on his version of the law, that is not a punishable offense, nor is it a punishable offense if a juror (who is an engineer) argues that some expert testimony on an engineering matter is factually wrong. Jurors are not supposed to do either thing, but there are no legal consequences if they do. Since the legal ideal is that a jury will evaluate the (allowed) testimony in court and applies the law as given by the judge, and attorneys have an ethical obligation to uphold the law, they thus have an ethical obligation to not restate the law and especially to not do so under the guise of being an attorney (who has expert knowledge of the law). This is basically an unenforceable principle. There was an instruction in California saying that: should . . . any juror refuse[] to deliberate or express[] an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment, or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the Court of the situation but People v. Engelman 28 cal 4th 436 nixed that instruction. That case says that jurors have no right to refuse to deliberate or to disregard the law in reaching their decision but Directing the jury immediately before deliberations begin that jurors are expected to police the reasoning and arguments of their fellow jurors during deliberations, and immediately advise the court if it appears that a fellow juror is deciding the case upon an "improper basis," may curtail or distort deliberations. This does not mean that in the rare instance that a lawyer is on a jury, he must suppress his conclusions, even when they are professionally informed. This article recounts a lawyer's experience on a jury and identifies a point of law (and how the issue was handled). In that case, the question is what to make of a statement that something is "not at issue". The non-;awyers interpreted that to mean "we aren’t supposed to award her anything for back and neck injuries". The lawyer said: I was pretty sure this was wrong. While it was true that the lawyers had said the back and neck injuries were “not at issue,” that was a phrase that I could recall uttering in court, too. When I said it, I meant that both sides agreed on a certain fact or point of law. I did not mean that the fact or point of law was not material to the case. No other juror interpreted the lawyers’ statements my way, and when we checked, we found that the jury instructions were silent on the issue. So, we wrote the judge a question. Turns out, “the lawyer” was right. The judge instructed us to consider any injury from the collision, whether it was an injury to the plaintiff’s back, to her neck, to her shoulder, or elsewhere. The lesson for attorneys: explain to the jury exactly what you mean. Don’t assume they understand your shorthand terms, like “not at issue.” In other words, the judge still determines what the law is, though in this case it looks like it took the expert knowledge of an attorney to figure out that the jury needed to ask the judge what "not at issue" means.