Guidelines to claim right to use physical force as self defense? I was wondering what constitutes a provocation to which it is justifiable to use force as self defense. For example, if someone came a slapped you on the face but did not proceed hitting you (at which point it could be claimed he no longer presented threatening force to you), would it be okay to punch him and not be legally liable? Or if someone started getting in your face but not really touch you, would it be legally okay to punch them to get them out of your face? What are some examples of provocation that the law would be sympathetic with the target using physical force against? In general, what are some guidelines, in the U.S., to know when it is okay to respond with physical force? Is ANY violence (e.g. a humiliating act like slapping somebody) enough to exempt the victim from ... beating the c**p out of or shooting the perpetrator? At which point does shooting the perpetrator becomes fair game because their actions constituted a legitimate threat?
The general rule is that using force in self-defense is justified if the person using the force reasonably believes it immediately is necessary to prevent the unlawful use of force against themselves or a third party. Deadly force is not generally justified except in response to a reasonable fear of deadly force, or to prevent certain violent crimes (like rape, kidnapping, robbery, etc.) Force is not justified in retaliation. In some states, if you're not at home (or maybe even then), you also have a duty to retreat before you can use deadly force in self-defense. So, for your specific questions: If they hit you once but aren't continuing to hit you, it's illegal to hit them back. You can only use force to defend yourself, not to get even. If someone gets in your face without touching you, you might be allowed to use force, but it depends on the circumstances. You don't have to wait for someone to hit you, but you can't sucker-punch someone because you want more space in a mosh pit. Your use of force needs to be something you reasonably believe to be necessary to stop/prevent their unlawful use of force. It also needs to be proportional to the force you're defending against; you can meet deadly force with deadly force, but shooting someone to stop them from slapping you is murder. Likewise, no one's going to believe that you really thought you had to beat the crap out of someone in order to stop them from slapping you, or that it's in any way proportionate to what they did. Deadly force is not allowed in defense of a person unless you reasonably think deadly force is needed to prevent the unlawful use of deadly force, or to prevent one of a few crimes being committed against them. Depending on the state, it might be presumptively justified if the person is trying to forcibly break into your occupied house, car, or place of business, but that's state-dependent.
First, as Mark Johnson said. Second, the job of police and prosecutors is not to put people into jail, their job is to put guilty people into jail. If you go to the police and tell them that you beat up a person, then before they investigate, they know that either you are guilty of assault, or you mistakenly believe that you are guilty of assault, or you are a phantasist who enjoys confessing non-existing crimes to the police. The police will either investigate which one it is, and may prosecute you either for assault or for wasting police time, or they may decide based on your behaviour that there was never any assault and not investigate further. I suspect they will at least question you about details of the claimed assault, to decide whether the crime is real or not.
england-and-wales It depends on Alice's belief about who Mallory is and what Mallory is doing and whether Alice's force was reasonable. If Alice is aware that Mallory's action is lawful, then Alice cannot use force to protect Bob. Is Mallory a doctor who is lawfully withdrawing treatment? (You say there is &quot;no law allowing Mallory to disconnect Bob's life support&quot; but I'm not aware of a jurisdiction that requires indefinite treatment regardless of the circumstances.) If Alice honestly believes Mallory is attempting to unlawfully kill Bob, Alice can use force to protect Bob. Is Bob on life support because of Mallory's previous attempt on his life; is Mallory a hitman, a vengeful spouse or some other person with no lawful reason to kill Bob? Crown Prosecution Service guidance: Self-Defence and the Prevention of Crime: Self-defence is available as a defence to crimes committed by use of force. The basic principles of self-defence are set out in Palmer v R, [1971] AC 814; approved in R v McInnes, 55 Cr App R 551: &quot;It is both good law and good sense that a man who is attacked may defend himself. It is both good law and good sense that he may do, but only do, what is reasonably necessary.&quot; The common law approach as expressed in Palmer v R is also relevant to the application of section 3 Criminal Law Act 1967: &quot;A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.&quot; ... In assessing the reasonableness of the force used, prosecutors should ask two questions: was the use of force necessary in the circumstances, i.e. Was there a need for any force at all?; and was the force used reasonable in the circumstances? The courts have indicated that both questions are to be answered on the basis of the facts as the accused honestly believed them to be (R v Williams (G) 78 Cr App R 276), (R. v Oatbridge, 94 Cr App R 367). To that extent it is a subjective test. There is, however, an objective element to the test. The jury must then go on to ask themselves whether, on the basis of the facts as the accused believed them to be, a reasonable person would regard the force used as reasonable or excessive.
IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed.
Yes. The principle caselaw is R v Hayward (1908) 21 Cox 692 A husband and wife had an argument that led to the husband chasing his wife out into the street. The wife collapsed during this altercation and died. Whist the husband did not physically touch her, he did shout threats at her. The wife was found to have been suffering from an abnormality of the thyroid gland that neither was aware of that meant that fright or shock could cause death if combined with physical exertion. The husband was charged with manslaughter. [...] The husband was found guilty of manslaughter. No actual proof of violence was necessary as long as the defendant’s unlawful act, which was the threat of violence, caused her fright leading to her death. The criminal law acknowledges that an assailant must take their victim as they find them... Source And... The defendant chased his wife out of the house shouting threats at her. She collapsed and died. He did not physically touch her. She was suffering from a rare thyroid condition which could lead to death where physical exertion was accompanied by fright and panic. Both the defendant and his wife were unaware she had this condition. Held: The defendant was liable for constructive manslaughter as his unlawful act (assault) caused death. The egg shell (thin) skull rule applied. He was therefore fully liable despite the fact an ordinary person of reasonable fortitude would not have died in such circumstances... Source
Battery &ndash; offensive, nonconsensual contact with another person &ndash; is a crime unless it is justifiable. There are numerous justifications, and the standards for them can vary. For example, self-defense is a justification for battery, and the standard is usually the "reasonable person." I.e., would a reasonable person in the position feel that force was necessary to defend against imminent injury, and was the force used reasonable and proportional to the perceived threat? Force can be used to effect a lawful arrest. The standards for arrest are different for police officers. For example, police typically need only have "probable cause" (i.e., a justifiable belief that a person likely committed a crime) to effect an arrest, and at the point police are typically allowed to use any force necessary to effect the arrest. On the other hand, "citizens' arrests" are typically limited to more serious suspected crimes and, in practice if not in theory, subject to higher levels of scrutiny. So, for example, a cop grabbing the person being chased from a store would almost certainly be immune to charges of battery. A bystander doing the same thing would have to be prepared to justify his interference in civil, if not criminal, court. Some jurisdictions accord a higher right to use force to owners of property. For example, "shopkeeper's privilege" allows merchants to use reasonable force to detain individuals they reasonably believe to have stolen from them. "Castle doctrine" allows people to use lethal force against any intruder in their residence. In the bus fare scenario you describe the bus driver is guilty of battery. Even if a prosecutor declined to charge him for the crime, the victim of that battery could sue the driver civilly. Likewise, the passenger who chose to subsequently attack the bus driver is guilty of battery, because (presumably) there was no ongoing physical threat once he was off the bus.
She has no legal right to your stuff, and every legal right to the apartment. The only way adjudicate such a conflict of rights is with a restraining order. A temporary order would expire in 3 weeks. Item 14 in the petition requests exclusive use, possession, and control of the property. However, that path of restraints is tailored to domestic violence, so item 27 has you describe the alleged abuse: Abuse means to intentionally or recklessly cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to you; or to place you or another person in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or to harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, keep you under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or otherwise), batter, telephone, or contact you; or to disturb your peace; or to destroy your personal property. Note that the description refers to destroying your personal property, not pawing through it. It's really impossible to know if the judge will exercise his discretion to include "reasonable fear of destruction (or theft) of personal property", since the ex-roommate has no further interest in the apartment. There is an alternative path of a harassment restraining order, which does not require a defined domestic relationship (such as ex-roommate), where "harassment" is violence or threats of violence against you, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed you and caused you substantial emotional distress. A course of conduct is more than one act and that seems even less likely.
This question and many related ones are analysed in detail by Eugene Volokh, in a long paper that is worth reading in its entirety if you are interested in the topic. The [Supreme] Court has offered “speech integral to [illegal] conduct” as one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” excluded from First Amendment protection. But if this exception is indeed to be well defined and narrowly limited, courts need to explain and cabin its scope. This Article — the first, to my knowledge, to consider the exception in depth — aims to help with that task. On threats, he says: Companies are generally barred from firing employees for voting for a union, and unions are generally barred from retaliating against employees for their speech. The Court therefore concluded that speech that threatens unlawful retaliation is itself unlawful. On blackmail, he says: [...] telling black citizens “stop shopping at white-owned stores or we’ll publicize your behavior to your neighbors and fellow church members” is similarly constitutionally protected. On the other hand, “vote for this civil rights bill or I’ll disclose that you cheated on your wife” is likely unprotected. In general the line where the First Amendment protections end and criminal speech begins is surprisingly vague. General advice to avoid self-incrimination by not answering questions from the police is clearly protected. Threatening a witness with violence is clearly not. In between are shades of grey.