Why does &quot;note up&quot; mean &quot;check whether subsequent decisions have followed its precedent or not&quot;? Why was the &quot;process of examining how a case has been treated in subsequent cases to determine if it is still authoritative or “good law”&quot; termed &quot;note up&quot;? Step 4: Find Cases That Have Considered the Statute (Note It Up) To note up the statute (i.e., to see if it has been considered in the courts, once you have located the statute click the &quot;Noteup&quot; tab and then the search button. Links to cases that have considered that statute will be displayed. Maureen F. Fitzgerald, BComm (Univ. Alberta), JD (Univ. Western Ontario), LLM with Merit (London School of Economics), PhD (University of British Columbia). Legal Problem Solving – Reasoning, Research and Writing (2019 8e), p 134.
The term &quot;note up&quot; is probably an effort to find a generic term for what is called &quot;Shepardizing&quot; in the United States after the legally protected trade name of Shepard's citations, the only commercial publisher in the U.S. who provided resources with which it was possible to do this kind of search for most of its legal history (basically until computerized databased from multiple publishers came into existence). It was probably coined by a competing firm entering the market and providing the same service. &quot;Validate&quot; probably would have been a more descriptive word, but the firm with this software probably wants to create its own legally protected terminology for this activity that is specific to this process and doesn't have a more general meaning.
Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581.
There are several forms of notarized documents, the most common of which are affidavits (which are written statements of a person made and signed under oath) and acknowledgements (which is a notarized statement that a document was signed before a notary, usually used for documents related to real property). There would be no legitimate reason I can think of to notarize an offer letter, and the fact that you want to do that probably means that you are confused about some other aspect of the law that would make you think that you would want to or need to do something like that. A more common thing to do, for example, in anticipation of a lawsuit, would be to prepare and execute an affidavit which states that the letter, attached as an exhibit, was signed by you, and anyone else that you have personal knowledge signed it, for your signature before a notary. A notary is not allowed to execute an affidavit (or a very similar document called a verification which is a very short document saying that the facts stated in a single document asserting a claim in a court case are true and correct in a form substantially similar to an affidavit) if it is signed outside the notary's physical presence (in theory because the notary administers an oath before you sign it). An acknowledgement can be executed by a notary if the person who signed the document comes before the notary in person and acknowledges that it was signed by him or her, even if the notary was not there when it was actually signed. The notary would state the date that you acknowledged it in person to the notary in the acknowledgement and would not make any statement regarding when it was actually signed. There is special formalized legal language that must accompany each kind of notarization, which is called the "jurat". Then the notary signs and dates the jurat in the appropriate place and applies a notary seal near the jurat in the indicated location (if any) mark "L.S." for "location of seal" in latin.
Because they are only apparent with hindsight The judge writing the judgement does not decide what is dicta and what is obiter - that is for some future judge considering a different case and deciding if they are looking at a binding (dicta) or persuasive (obiter) precedent. First of all, the vast majority of cases follow precedent; they do not set it. If you are trying to disentangle dicta and obiter then you are usually looking at the case of an appeal, not a trial judgement. Most trials turn on the facts, not precedent-setting points of law - usually, there is no dispute about the law at all. Even then, most appeal decisions don't set a precedent either and sink into obscurity until at some point in the far future when a lawyer doing research on a particularly tricky case has an &quot;ah-ha&quot; moment and says &quot;Look at what Justice Bozo said in paragraph 365 of this 56 page judgement about a tangentially related issue between different people at a different time in a different place - I need to spin this as dicta.&quot; Meanwhile, the lawyer on the opposite side has a different precedent from a different case that contradicts this one - one of them must be wrong. So a trial judge faced with this paradox has to resolve it; they don't get to say &quot;this is too hard&quot;. Basically they have 2 methods of doing so: The decide that one (or both) are obiter and make the decision based on the precedent that remains. They decide that both are ratio and write a judgement that they know has to be appealed because they have to follow both precedents and they can't. At least in Australia, this is becoming more and more common. The judge basically says &quot;I have two conflicting binding precedents, I pick this one for [reasons]. Now go off to the Court of Appeals to see if I got it right. I look forward to finding out.&quot; Of course, the winner isn't going to appeal and it may not be in the loser's commercial interest to do so. So maybe the question just gets kicked down the road for some other poor bloody judge to have to deal with.
Two lawyers in a (administrative) hearing suggested that I would have to "lay a foundation" in order to introduce an email as evidence. Is this a general rule of evidence? “Laying the foundation” is a term of art used to explain the process of meeting the requirements for having particular types of evidence admitted. Most courts, administrative bodies, and other tribunals require that all evidence they admit be relevant and authentic. This applies to all types of evidence including oral testimony and to physical pieces of evidence that a party is trying to admit (such as printed e-mails). The rules of evidence that most states have adopted are modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules are a codification of evidence law principles designed to only have relevant and authentic evidence admitted in hearings. So, as general rule, you must ask a witness questions to show how his testimony is relevant and authentic. For example, to meet the relevance requirements, a prosecutor in a DUI case would ask a police officer questions that showed he was the one who pulled over the person accused of drunk driving. His testimony about why he pulled over the suspected drunk driver is relevant because “it has [a] tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and the fact [he is testifying about] is of consequence in determining the [case].” Fed. R. Evid. 401 (the test for relevant evidence). This evidence would meet the authenticity requirements in evidence law by having the witness: 1. Be competent to testify. Fed. R. Evid. 601. 2. Take an oath to testify truthfully. Fed. R. Evid. 603. AND 3. Testify about what they personally observed and not speculate. Fed. R. Evid. 602. There are more specific foundational rules for: hearsay evidence (see Fed. R. Evid. 801 through 807) and physical pieces of evidence such as voice recordings, documents, and e-mails (see Fed. R. Evid. 901 through 1008). If so, could someone explain when it applies, and what in particular is necessary to satisfy the rule? As you explained in the comments to your question, this hearing is a special education impartial hearing in New York State. According to New York State Regulations of the Commissioner of Education § 200.5(j)(3)(xii)(c), the rules of evidence do not apply. This regulation explains that a more relaxed standard applies: The impartial hearing officer may receive any oral, documentary or tangible evidence except that the impartial hearing officer shall exclude evidence that he or she determines to be irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable or unduly repetitious. The impartial hearing officer may receive testimony by telephone, provided that such testimony shall be made under oath and shall be subject to cross examination. (Emphasis added.) Therefore, to admit your e-mails under this standard, you only need to show the administrative law judge that the evidence is relevant, material, reliable, and not unduly repetitious. A much easier standard task than having those e-mails admitted under the Rules of Evdience. The best thing to do would be have the person who received or sent the e-mails present at your hearing and able to testify as a witness. Then, do the following: Before the hearing, have your witness print a paper copy of the e-mails. Provide a copy of the e-mails to the opposing side at least 5 business days before the hearing. See § 200.5(3)(xii) (“Each party shall have the right to prohibit the introduction of any evidence the substance of which has not been disclosed to such party at least five business days before the hearing.”). Mark the e-mails with an exhibit number or letter (usually the plaintiff uses numbers and the defense uses letters). At the hearing, call your witness and have him/her sworn in. Ask to the judge/hearing officer to approach the witness, and give a copy to the e-mails to him. Also give a copy to the judge/hearing officer and opposing counsel. Show the e-mails to the witness. Ask the witness if he recognizes the exhibit you handed him. Have the witness explain how he recognizes it. His testimony should explained the following: That these are e-mails he printed. When and how he printed them. Who they were sent to and sent from. Who the e-mail addresses belong to (many times this is indicated in a person's e-mail signature). What the e-mails are about and why they are important at the hearing--to show that they are relevant.
A promise that a court would not enforce by injunction can still be valid consideration and be part of a valid contract. Failure to carry out such obligations would lead to some measure of money damages, most likely. On the other hand, provisions specifically barred by law, or against public policy, such as a promise to commit a crime, are void from the start, and form no part of a valid contract. Such provisions may be treated by a court as if they had just been left out, or if they were essential to the contract, or formed the sole consideration, the whole contract might be considered void. If a term is too vague for a court to determine if it has been violated or not, the court may try to clarify it, or may just ignore it. Just what it would mean for a tenant to "undermine the leadership" of a landlord is not clear to me, at least. That might well be held to be "too vague". As to "not complain" it may be that a tenant has a legal right to make official complaints, which cannot be waived by contract. Or it may not, depending on the local laws.
Stogner v. California, a criminal case, held that &quot;A law enacted after expiration of a previously applicable limitations period violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it is applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecution&quot;. In 1798, in Calder v. Bull, SCOTUS long ago decided that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to civil cases. In that case, Calder had been entitled to property under a will, and the Connecticut legislature changed the law. The Supreme Court held that the legislative act was not an Ex Post Facto law. Chase's reasoning, which relies on the distinction between ex post facto law and retrospective law, is this: In my opinion, the true distinction is between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law. The former only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be oppressive, and it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commencement, as statutes of oblivion or of pardon. They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning and after the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto within the prohibition that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law, but only those that create or aggravate the crime or increase the punishment or change the rules of evidence for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time or to save time from the statute of limitations or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like, is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an unlawful act lawful and the making an innocent action criminal and punishing it as a crime. The expressions &quot;ex post facto laws&quot; are technical; they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. So, yes it can.
The power definitely exists, and it is also said by some (respectable persons) that they have a duty to do so. There are many schools of legal interpretation. One trend is to attempt to discern legislative intent, based on whatever facts there might be such as newspaper articles or legislative committee reports. A contrary trend is to look exclusively at the text enacted by the legislature – this school is known as the Textualist school, and is currently dominant in the US Supreme Court. There are also non-textualist &quot;progressive&quot; trends that seek justice according to some social principle, rather than the text of the law or the definitive intent of the original legislators, which may address the situation that you have in mind. In civil cases, statutory law tends to be rather unclear, allowing a judge to decide on the basis of their beliefs of what is fair, equitable or just. That is because in the common law, close to a millenium old, judgments were supposed to be &quot;just&quot;. In the US, much of the common law has been re-coded as statutory law, and in that case, the intent of the legislature is really to &quot;encode the sense of justice implicit in the common law&quot;. This does not mean that trial judges have unlimited power to set aside the words of existing laws. Their primary obligation is to apply the law literally, as interpreted by their superiors (appellate courts). When the higher courts are silent and when the legislature is not clear, the trial judge has some leeway to follow whichever jurisprudential philosophy they adhere to.