Is self-defense allowed when there are objectively reasonable grounds but it is actually done subjectively for improper reasons? Suppose that someone uses deadly self-defense in circumstances when it would have been objectively reasonable to do so (e.g., someone has a gun pointed at you and has threatened to shoot). But, the actual subjective reason that the person used it was invalid (e.g. the partially deaf person firing at the assailant misheard the threat to shoot and thought the assailant was insulting his dog). Is this a good defense to murder?
canada The person claiming self-defence must have the subjective belief that &quot;a threat of force is being made against them or another person.&quot; Such belief must also be based on reasonable grounds. They must also act with the subjective purpose of protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force. This comes from the text of the defence, codified at s. 34 of the Criminal Code. It reads: 34 (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if (a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person; (b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. &quot;Unless the accused subjectively believed that force or a threat thereof was being used against their person or that of another, the defence is unavailable&quot; (R. v. Khill, 2021 SCC 37, para. 52). The National Judicial Institute's model jury instructions slightly rephrases: [the accused] believed that force [or the threat of force] was being used against him/her [or against another person] and [accused]’s belief was based on reasonable grounds Regarding evidence in general: the court needs some evidence on which to give an &quot;air of reality&quot; to every element of this defence in order to place the burden on the Crown to rebut the defence beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not require the accused to testify about their subjective belief. The evidence about the subjective belief can come from elsewhere in the evidence. For example, even if an accused had no memory of the encounter, there may nonetheless be evidence about their subjective belief: video evidence of the encounter, hearsay evidence about what the accused said during the events, physical evidence revealing a defensive posture, etc. The evidence must support an inference of a subjective belief in a threat. It is not enough that the evidence shows that a subjective belief would have been reasonable. But none of that is relevant to the question of what the elements of self-defence are or whether an act taken without the subjective belief that the accused or another person is being threatened is self-defence. The question has helpfully taken the standard approach to legal hypotheticals of just asserting what the facts are in order to take questions of evidence off the table.
Battery &ndash; offensive, nonconsensual contact with another person &ndash; is a crime unless it is justifiable. There are numerous justifications, and the standards for them can vary. For example, self-defense is a justification for battery, and the standard is usually the "reasonable person." I.e., would a reasonable person in the position feel that force was necessary to defend against imminent injury, and was the force used reasonable and proportional to the perceived threat? Force can be used to effect a lawful arrest. The standards for arrest are different for police officers. For example, police typically need only have "probable cause" (i.e., a justifiable belief that a person likely committed a crime) to effect an arrest, and at the point police are typically allowed to use any force necessary to effect the arrest. On the other hand, "citizens' arrests" are typically limited to more serious suspected crimes and, in practice if not in theory, subject to higher levels of scrutiny. So, for example, a cop grabbing the person being chased from a store would almost certainly be immune to charges of battery. A bystander doing the same thing would have to be prepared to justify his interference in civil, if not criminal, court. Some jurisdictions accord a higher right to use force to owners of property. For example, "shopkeeper's privilege" allows merchants to use reasonable force to detain individuals they reasonably believe to have stolen from them. "Castle doctrine" allows people to use lethal force against any intruder in their residence. In the bus fare scenario you describe the bus driver is guilty of battery. Even if a prosecutor declined to charge him for the crime, the victim of that battery could sue the driver civilly. Likewise, the passenger who chose to subsequently attack the bus driver is guilty of battery, because (presumably) there was no ongoing physical threat once he was off the bus.
One of the conditions for a contract to be enforceable is that its undertakings must be legal. This would mean that you cannot, contractually, be indemnified for murder - at least, not in any jurisdiction where homicide is illegal.
washington Under the laws of Washington State, USA, a dog can be considered a deadly weapon. See State v. Hoeldt, 139 Wash. App. 225 (2007). Hoeldt allegedly released a dog which attacked a police officer, and was convicted of second degree assault with a deadly weapon. He appealed, claiming that a dog was not a weapon for purposes of the assault statute. The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction: Because a dog is an instrument that can be used to cause death or substantial bodily harm, we hold that a dog can be a &quot;deadly weapon&quot; under RCW 9A.04.110(6).
In the US, obscenities, insults, racial slurs and so on are legal, owing to the First Amendment. An actual, believable threat to maim you would not be legal, under Cal. Penal 422, but "I oughta punch you" would not be a criminal threat. Some forms of aggressive driving constitute reckless driving, if they are driving "in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property". It is also against the law to follow too close (you must follow reasonably and prudently). Exceeding the speed limit is a violation of Veh. Code 22352, even if it's to pass a guy on a bike. Of course, we can't tell if you are obeying the law, but even if you were doing something illegal in your biking such as blowing away a stop sign, "the other guy was bad" is not a defense against a citation for illegal driving.
Hard to prove a negative, but the answer is no. Here's some support: https://martialarts.stackexchange.com/q/72 http://www.fightingarts.com/reading/article.php?id=460 explains possible origins of this myth: By Jonathan Maberry This is one of the oldest American martial arts legends, and there is absolutely no basis or reality in it. First off, there is no department or process within the U.S. government to regulate martial arts, which means there is no instrument in place to identify persons practicing fighting arts, and no governmental method by which practitioners can be evaluated. ... Actually there is not a country on earth where martial artists are required to register themselves as weapons, deadly or otherwise. This myth has its roots in two different aspects of mid-20th century history. In post-World War II Japan traditional martial arts were made illegal, and records were kept of those persons who were experienced practitioners of the arts. This was a bit of anti-Japanese backlash following the war and lasted only a few years. It has not been repeated, and it never spread beyond the borders of Japan. The other root is planted in the soil of the rich and often outrageous history of professional boxing. In the Joe Lewis era (the boxer, not the karate master), it was a common publicity stunt to have police on hand during a press conference to “register” the boxer as a deadly weapon. Understand, this was just a publicity stunt and carried no more legal weight than receiving the Key to the City actually means you can open any door with it and just walk in. In court cases involving violent confrontations, lawyers and judges may advise the jury to bear in mind a person’s martial arts, boxing, or military combat training when evaluating the facts of the case. For example, in the Matter of the Welfare of D.S.F., 416 N.W.2d 772 (Minn. App. 1988), the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that the defendant, who had "substantial experience in karate," was aware enough of the potential of his blows to deliberately break the plaintiff’s jaw. But that is a lot different from legally stating that the person in question is a registered or licensed “deadly weapon”.
The only meaningful discussion from the Supreme Court of what constitutes a "true threat" comes from Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003): “True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. ... The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” Ibid. Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. A few other courts have elaborated further: A true threat is a communication that, when taken in context, “would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its tenor.” United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981, 986 (11th Cir. 2013). A “true threat” is defined as a “statement that a reasonable recipient would have interpreted as a serious expression of an intent to harm or cause injury to another.” United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 330 (8th Cir. 2011). As far as I know, the Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to conclude that a speaker must intend his communication to be threatening. Most courts find it sufficient to show only that the speaker intended to make the communication, and that a reasonable person would feel threatened by it. If your hypothetical were in court, the debate would be about the two questions above. Since it doesn't sound like there's any question that you meant to make the statement, most of the debate would focus on whether a reasonable person would feel threatened by your statement. The prosecution would ask the victim about the background of your relationship, what you said, what your demeanor was, and what the victim understood the statement to mean, and then the prosecutor would argue that in the context in which the statement was made, any reasonable person would fear being harmed. Your defense attorney would try to minimize the seriousness of the statement, demonstrate that you never followed through (though this may not be relevant), suggest that the statement wasn't serious and wasn't intended to be serious, and that no one could believe you honestly intended to hurt the victim. From there, would be up to the jury to decide who it believes.
Murder is one of the few cases where the intention and not just the act is relevant. The act – killing a person – is the same for Mord and Totschlag, whereas fahrlässige Tötung covers acts that have caused the death of a person. The language of the Stgb labels the perpetrator who killed someone as a murderer or manslaughterer depending on their intention. That a person and not an act is punished is often criticized, but it has no practical consequence. Clearly, the intention isn't that the second one is free. Courts are able to interpret the law reasonably. However, the distinction between two kinds of killings seems to have no basis in reality and robs courts from flexibility to find a just sentence. There are occasional attempts at reform, but none will be successful while CDU/CSU is part of the government.