Legally working , Two remote jobs at same time I’m currently working with a software company remotely and the work load is very light. So I received a new offer from another Software company and was planned to accept it and keep my current job as well, keep in mind both companies aren’t competitors they work in two different categories. But my new contract has this section: And not sure if legally I have to leave my current job or I can keep it as long as I work for my first job outside the working hours of the second. DUTY OF LOYALTY You agree that while you are employed by the Company, (a) you have an undivided duty of loyalty and fair dealing to the Company and will work for the best interests of the Company and not take over any of the Company's business opportunities or prospective business opportunities for your personal gain and/or to the detriment of the Company; (b) you will not engage in any other employment or business activity without written permission from executive management; and (c) you will not engage in any other activities that conflict with your obligations to the Company. Also worth mentioning my current job doesn’t have in the contract Duty of loyalty or any other similar rules.
You need written permission from the second employer That’s a condition that the second employer (but not the first) has imposed on you. It’s not a complicated interpretation.
I infer from the use of the past tense &quot;worked&quot; that you no longer work for the company in question. Also, from the fact that you are wondering whether there might be negative consequences, I infer that you do not have permission to use the systems in question. The specific consequences will depend on where the company and its computers are located, as well as on the nature of the systems you log in to and on what you do with those systems, but it's certainly possible to receive a penalty of several years' imprisonment. The fact that you created the system in question makes no difference.
The first question would be whether you are an employee, or an independent contractor. There is more to that determination than how the company labels you, but that is a starting point. Based on the minimal autonomy that you imply that you have, you would probably be found to be an employee. Then there are limits on the number of hours that you can work in a week or day, which they are complying with. The employer is required to record the hours that you worked, and it is a crime to keep false records. It is also required that an employer pay for the time you work. Therefore the employer cannot legally refuse to pay you for your labor, and they cannot legally falsify records. The employer can limit your pay to 15 hours per week, if you work just 15 hours per week. They can also set ridiculous performance standards, whereby at the end of the week you will not have done what they wanted you to do. Their only recourse is to dismiss you. In response, you can file a complaint, but note that the concept of "wrongful dismissal" under the act is about entitlement to termination or severance pay. The arbitrator may find that the employer contravened the act, and can order them to rescind the termination. Or, before you get fired, you can complain and the arbitrator could order the employer to either modify their work requirements or else to pay you for the time worked. The difficult point (for you) in this case is that the act does not address employer performance expectations, and employers are generally allowed to set their own performance standards. If you have a written employment contract, there might be provisions regarding termination which could help you. Without a written contact, there is no statutory provision that prevents an employer for terminating you, but they may have to give you notice and pay for doing so, as long as you are not terminated for "just cause". Hoang v. Mann, 2014 ONSC 3762 is an Ontario case where an employee was terminated for just case based on insubordination, job performance, inability to get along with co-workers and so on. On the front of job performance, the courts have found that an employer must clearly communicate standards to employees, and give employees an opportunity to meet those standards. But they do not generally decide e.g. how many units per hour an assembly-line worker can reasonably be expected to complete.
It would basically be illegal, regardless of what a contract says: contracts are subordinate to the law. So the question comes down to whether the law unequivocally requires OT for shifts longer that 8 hours. These sorts of governmental fact sheets are not absolute statements of the law, they are guidelines about what is most commonly applicable, and to determine if there are any exceptions, one must consult the actual law. The fact sheet says "After working eight hours in a day an employee must be paid time-and-a-half for the next four hours worked", which is somewhat different from "in a shift". The (summarized restatement of the) law says that an "averaging agreement" is legal (if in writing), so if that allows working more than 8 hours in a shift, that could be consistent with (does not override) the law. To really know, you have to read the actual law. The section on maximum hours and overtime says 35 (1) An employer must pay an employee overtime wages in accordance with section 40 if the employer requires, or directly or indirectly allows, the employee to work more than 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply for the purposes of an employee who is working under an averaging agreement under section 37. So 3 shifts of 12 1/3 hours would be legal, and perhaps typical in a hospital. The "average hours" part of the law says an employer and employee may agree to average the employee's hours of work over a period of 1, 2, 3 or 4 weeks for the purpose of determining the employee's entitlement, if any, to overtime wages under subsections (4) and (6) of this section and wages payable under subsection (8) or (9) (b). as long as there is a clear advance agreement (as in a contract). This still limits hours worked without overtime to 40 hours/week (on average), and then there is still an upper limit of 12 hours: An employer under this section who requires, or directly or indirectly allows, an employee to work more than 12 hours a day, at any time during the period specified in the agreement, must pay the employee double the employee's regular wage for the time over 12 hours. Since the law is stated in terms of "day", we better see what a "day" is: "day" means (a) a 24 hour period ending at midnight, or (b) in relation to an employee's shift that continues over midnight, the 24 hour period beginning at the start of the employee's shift; so you can't force an employee to work 12 hours without overtime (without an averaging agreement), simply by splitting a 12 hour shift across midnight. It is thus possible for a contract to do things that superficially appear to be contrary to the "most common situation" factsheet representation, but the law itself is not overridden by such a contract.
If I did not sign promotion bonus document, my career would be over. Is this duress? No. The premise is hardly true or even logical, and what you describe falls short of duress. Not every imbalance of bargain power implies duress. First, it seems that you could have declined the bonus, thereby preempting the sanction/remedy for leaving within 12 months. Second, it seems hard to prove (and unrealistic) that your career would have been over if you refused to sign the document. The employer can easily refute that allegation by pointing out that there are many others who did not sign that employer's document and yet work elsewhere as investment bankers. You would need certain, additional context to reasonably allow for a conclusion that your career altogether depends on what happens with this single entity. Third, your mention that "the bonus mitigates the horrendous weekly hours" reinforces the idea that signing the document was your preference (namely, for the purpose of obtaining some additional, non-compulsory stimulus) rather than employer-inflicted duress. The rationale and decision for acceptance of those conditions reflects that you knowingly exercised your freedom of contract. A party is not entitled to void a contract only because he belatedly changed his mind about conditions of which he was aware beforehand.
People are laid off all the time when sales are down, the market is bad, etc: there is no legal "right to a job" except whatever is in your employment contract. There is a legal concept of promissory estoppel which boils down to promises being binding. However, there has to be a clear and definite promise, not for example a statement like "we hope to bring you back after this is over". Normally, the employer can argue that they have the right to fire you regardless of performance, and that would be the end of it. Let's say you have it in writing, and it is clear that they unconditionally promise to hire you back: you would want to (e)stop them from arguing that they have the right to fire you. The underlying idea of promissory estoppel is that such a promise keeps them from making that argument. But: it is not enough that they made the promise, you also had to rely on the promise and act / forbear from acting in some way because of that promise. It could be, for example, taking another job, or moving to another country, or simply looking for another job. The hard part, then, would be getting a clear and definite promise.
Generally, what you say you will do in a contract is what you must do - there is no "the dog ate my homework" excuse. For your examples: Employment contracts have so much government regulation that the common law contract is lost in the mists of time. It is unlikely that a court would interpret an employment contract as requiring exact timekeeping; it is also unlikely that the person would have worked exactly 38 hours on every week except the one where they worked 37.5. However, if it were proved that the employee owed 0.5 hours to the employer they could be required to provide it or refund the pay they had received, barring a law that changed this. The dog must be walked. Alice must find a substitute walker if she is unable to provide it. Falling sick is something foreseeable that Alice should have provided for either in the contract ("if I am sick I won't walk the dog") or by arranging for someone else to do it. For purely personal services, falling sick may frustrate the contract, however, dog-walking is probably not personal enough. There is a doctrine which allows termination by frustration where neither party is at fault, however, it is not clear that this would apply. The building burning down is foreseeable and could (should?) have been addressed in the contract. If the destruction of the building was without fault on the owner then the contract is frustrated. If there was some fault on the owner (smoking in bed, inoperative fire alarm etc.) and the cleaner stands willing, ready and able (that is able except for the absence of a building) to perform their obligations, the owner would probably be obliged to pay, at the least for unrecoverable costs (e.g. wages) and loss of profits - if they pay for the cleaning products the cleaner would be obliged to deliver them up. One of the main reasons for the length of contracts for non-trivial transactions is they deal with these contingencies.
Such a clause must be presented before or at the same time the offer is made. The (somewhat new) law NH RSA 275:70 says Any employer who requires an employee who has not previously been employed by the employer to execute a noncompete agreement as a condition of employment shall provide a copy of such agreement to the potential employee prior to the employee's acceptance of an offer of employment. A noncompete agreement that has not been disclosed to an employee as required by this section shall not be enforceable against the employee, but all other provisions of any employment, confidentiality, nondisclosure, trade secret, intellectual property assignment, or any other type of employment agreement or provision shall remain in full force and effect The question is whether such an agreement would mean you can't set up shop on your own and take a bunch of customers with you (it seems that such clauses are enforceable), or does it mean you can't work in that trade (competing for new customers, or as an employee of a competitor) – such an interpretation would not be enforced, in the analysis of this article. The clause must be "drafted narrowly to protect only a company's legitimate business interests, like customer goodwill and confidential information". A specific case of this interpretation is Merrimack Valley Wood Products v. Near, 152 N.H. 192, which finds that the law does not look with favor upon contracts in restraint of trade or competition...Such contracts are to be narrowly construed. Nonetheless, restrictive covenants are valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable, given the particular circumstances of the case In assessing reasonableness, three tests must be passed (must be answered "no"): first, whether the restriction is greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interests of the employer; second, whether the restriction imposes an undue hardship upon the employee; and third, whether the restriction is injurious to the public interest. As an example of a reasonable restriction: When an employee is put in a position involving client contact, it is natural that some of the goodwill emanating from the client is directed to the employee rather than to the employer. The employer has a legitimate interest in preventing its employees from appropriating this goodwill to its detriment. But restricting a person from working with any customers of the company (not just the employees work-related contacts) is unenforceable, because the company had no legitimate interest in protecting its entire client base from its former employee, because he had no advantage over any other complete stranger, possessing no special hold on the goodwill of the majority of Technical Aid's customers. See also Brian's Fitness v. Woodward for reaffirmation ("valid only to the extent that it prevents an employee from appropriating assets that legitimately belong to the employer"), and additional citations. The question arises whether there is a distinction between the former employee approaching former customers, versus those same customers approaching the former employee. I have not located any case that directly addresses that, but Technical Aid v. Allen, 134 N.H. 1 says A restrictive covenant must unreasonably limit the public's right to choose before it will be found to be injurious to the public interest. I think it is likely that the courts would find it to be an unreasonable limit on the public's right to choose, if a customer were prevented from choosing a different company to provide the desired service simply because the customer happened to have previously had a business relationship with the former employee. This "right to choose" is asymmetrical – the public has a right to choose any service provider, an employee does not have an equivalent right to pursue (seek out, woo) a customer, in light of a restrictiveness covenant.