Does the &quot;reasonable person&quot; standard change based on social acceptance? The &quot;reasonable person&quot; standard is the standard of care that a reasonably prudent person would observe under a given set of circumstances. It serves as a comparative standard for courts to assess liability. However, Society is constantly evolving. Acceptance of things change over time. Does that mean that the &quot;reasonable person&quot; standard also changes over time?
Does that mean that the &quot;reasonable person&quot; standard also changes over time? The reasonable person standard changes every time a new finder of fact, either a judge or a jury, considers a case. To a great extent the whole point of a &quot;reasonable person&quot; standard is to inject irreducible uncertainty into the question of what conduct someone can be held liable for, thereby giving juries (or judges in bench trials) discretion to evaluate complex factual situations and consider those situations in light of the fact finders' collective moral judgment. There are seemingly objective tests by which reasonableness can be measured, such as the &quot;Learned Hand test&quot; which compares the risk of harm caused by not taking a precaution times the likelihood that the harm will manifest itself. But ultimately, this is very rarely so clear a standard that it overcomes the broad discretion of the finder of fact to determine what is and isn't reasonable under a particular set of circumstances.
Qualified immunity is a doctrine that protects government officials (including police) from civil liability in §1983 suits. Anderson v. Creighton describes the legal standard - objective legal reasonableness. There is no condition that would strip an officer of civil immunity and open him up to criminal liability because the criminal charges could attach regardless of the disposition of civil liability. I say "could" because who is going to charge and prosecute the crime? The CATO Institute tracks police misconduct. Not all misconduct is criminal, but reading through their site will give you an idea of why it is difficult to determine when and why cops are charged with crimes. Only a small fraction of the 17,000 law enforcement agencies actually track their own misconduct in a semi-public manner, and even when they do, the data they provide is generic and does not specify what misconduct occurred, who did it, and what the end result was.
No, but... Common law does not apply in countries that follow the legal school of Code Civil, aka civil law legal system, such as Germany or France. Some basic principles are common between them and common law: While there's generally no right to a jury, the innocence part actually stems in both cases from ROMAN law: in dubio pro reo - in the case of doubt, (you have to decide) for the accused. The similar Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat - Proof lies on him who asserts, not on him who denies - is the source: It was butchered into &quot;innocent until proven guilty&quot;, but the sentiment is the same. Other countries that have no relation to common law are based on Sharia and Fiqh. There is absolutely no relation to Roman law either. However, there is a presumption of innocence, or as one of the largest Scholars of Islamic law Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib said in the mid-600s: &quot;Avert the prescribed punishment by rejecting doubtful evidence.&quot; However, what is considered doubtful is quite different. On the other hand, presumption of guilt was the foundational principle in other legal systems!
The court decides and there is precedent This type of definition is very common and the legislative intent is to give the court discretion to decide whether the particular relationship in the particular case is a “dating relationship”. The precedent for these is that the rules of statutory interpretation apply, primarily, what does the law say on plain reading? Well, this law gives three facts that need to be determined from the evidence (those in part B). When those facts are known, considering them as a totality, is it “continuing serious relationship of a romantic or intimate nature” and is it ongoing or “recent”. Once a court of record decides this for a case, that will set a precedent for similar fact patterns. That is, if the facts are close in another case, the result of whether it is or isn’t a romantic relationship will follow from the precedent. Other cases with dissimilar facts will set different precedents. In that way the woolly line will get more clear as individual cases are decided.
The English version of the law says By a maximum imprisonment of five years shall be punished for whosoever in public deliberately expresses their feelings or engages in actions that: a. in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia; b. has the intention that a person should not practice any religion at all that is based on belief in Almighty God. from the Bahasa Indonesia law Dipidana dengan pidana penjara selama-lamanya lima tahun barangsiapa dengan sengaja di muka umum mengeluarkan perasaan atau melakukan perbuatan: a. yang pada pokoknya bersifat permusuhan, penyalahgunaan atau penodaan terhadap suatu agama yang dianut di Indonesia; b. dengan maksud agar supaya orang tidak menganut agama apapun juga, yang bersendikan ke-Tuhanan Yang Maha Esa The law does not define "public", so it would normally mean what it means in ordinary language (and that is not at all easy to figure out: it might be considered "public" if the expression was made to a single person). However, in this case, it was clearly in public (at a speech with about 100 people) that the statement was made. The law does not say that those people who constituted "the public" that heard the statement have to have been offended. Rather, (first) the statement has to be made in public (it was), and second, it is "in principle is hostile and considered as abuse or defamation of a religion embraced in Indonesia". That's a matter for the court to sort out. It appears, for example, that Shi'a teachings are legally blasphemous (case of Tajul Muluk). Unfortunately, there aren't any accessible resources here pertaining to the court decisions, so it's not clear if there are any concrete limits on what could be found to be blasphemous. However, it is established law that deviant teachings are legaly blasphemous, see the 39 case synopsis and the end here.
Preface: Why Is Service Necessary? A court order is not binding with respect to a person unless the court in question had jurisdiction over that person, or their predecessor-in-interest (or sometimes someone with a relationship with that person known as "privity"). To obtain jurisdiction over a person, the court must be a forum that is capable of exerting jurisdiction over that person with respect to this particular case, and there must have been service of process upon that person by an acceptable means. In order to obtain a valid court order against a person that makes that person personally responsible for money judgment, or orders them to do something or to refrain from doing something that is not simply with respect to a particular piece of property (i.e. in an in personam action), there must be either personal service (i.e. hand delivery of legal papers to the person), or substituted service (e.g. hand delivery to an adult family member in the same household, hand delivery to an employer, service by mail or email or text message when authorized by a court, etc.). Substituted service is generally not valid for service of a subpoena, only personal service will do in that case. A person can waive service of process by delivering a signed waiver to the person seeking process, or by filing certain kinds of documents with the court in which the lawsuit is pending. Service by publication is only allowed in actions that are in rem or quasi-in-rem, as opposed to in personam. Only Actions In Rem or Quasi-In-Rem Service by publication is only effective with respect to actions in rem, which is to say regarding rights with respect identified property and the relief granted with respect to that defendant is limited to relief in rem, i.e. with regard to rights in that property, or quasi-in-rem (as explained below). For example, no money judgment against the defendant can be entered on the basis of service by publication alone, although service by publication can bar a claim for money damages by the defendant to be satisfied out of the property at issue in the action, such as the assets of a probate or bankruptcy estate. Common in rem actions including evictions (limited to termination of right to possession and not a money judgment for rent owed), replevin (a suit to regain physical possession of tangible personal property), quiet title, foreclosure, civil forfeiture, probate proceedings, bankruptcy cases, and claims processes for failed banking institutions or corporations outside the bankruptcy process (e.g. FDIC resolutions of claims of failed banks). For this purpose, a suit regarding the the existence of or termination of a marriage or family relationship is in rem, although no in personam obligations or liabilities such as a child support judgment or a protection order can be imposed in such an action. For example, this is done in adoption proceedings, in certain guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, in divorces where the other spouse cannot be found, and in determinations of death due to prolonged absence or other circumstances where the death cannot be confirmed. A lawsuit supported by "quasi-in-rem" jurisdiction, if a lawsuit is one that would normally require personal service of process or substitute service of process for the court to obtain jurisdiction, is permitted when any relief is limited to recover from specific property over which the court can claim jurisdiction. As Wikipedia explains at the link: On June 24, 1977, in the case of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the requirement that the circumstances giving rise to jurisdiction comply with the notion of "fair play and substantial justice" should apply to the quasi in rem jurisdiction questions. The Supreme Court significantly diminished the utility of the quasi in rem jurisdiction because if the case meets the minimum contacts, fair play and substantial justice tests, the action can be brought under the in personam jurisdiction. Quasi in rem jurisdiction, however, can still be an effective option to bring the lawsuit to a particular court because quasi in rem jurisdiction allows litigants to overcome limitations of the long-arm statute of a particular state. Thus under Schaffer v. Heitner, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is basically only allowed when the court could have had personal jurisdiction over the case if the defendant had been personally served with process, but it is not feasible to serve the defendant with process, and publication (often together with service by mail to the defendant's last known address and the addresses of people like a former attorney or family member with a relationship to the defendant) is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the defendant. For example, suppose that someone who owns real estate in Maine gets in a car accident in Maine, and the defendant who lives in China cannot be served with process despite duly diligent attempts to do so. If a process server in China had served the defendant with process, he would have been subject to the jurisdiction of a court in Maine where the lawsuit was filed because the accident that gives rise to the liability took place in Maine. Therefore, a court might assert quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the defendant with relief limited to the real property in Maine (since a Maine court has jurisdiction over real estate in Maine). The court would then allow the injured victim plaintiff to serve the defendant with process via publication (in the county where the lawsuit is brought) and via mail to the defendant and known associates of the defendant such as a spouse and an employer and a former attorney of the defendant. If the defendant did not file an answer in the case by the deadline, a default judgment would enter against the defendant and an evidentiary damages hearing would be held ex parte (i.e. without anyone representing the defendant there). Then, based upon that hearing a judgment would be entered against the defendant by the court, with collection of the judgment limited to that parcel of real estate in Maine. The real estate could then be seized by the plaintiff in an execution sale conducted by the sheriff, to satisfy the judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the damages caused by the car accident in Maine. There are two types of quasi in rem jurisdiction: 1) quasi in rem type 1 (QIM1); and 2) quasi in rem type 2 (QIM2). In QIM1, a plaintiff sues to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property. For example, actions that seek quiet title against another's claim to the property. In QIM2, the plaintiff has no pre-existing claim in the subject property. That is, the property rights of the owner are not in dispute, but rather the plaintiff seeks the property so that they may satisfy a separate claim. For example, a person who walks across another's real property and falls into an open pit might have no pre-existing claim regarding the property, but may initiate a QIM2 action to redress his injury. The line between in rem and quasi-in-rem type one jurisdiction (e.g. in the context of a foreclosure or an eviction for unpaid rent or enforcement of a personal property security interest where the property is collateral) is obscure and often ignored in practice. Usually, "quasi-in-rem" jurisdiction refers to quasi-in-rem type 2 jurisdiction. Only Following Duly Diligent Efforts To Secure Personal Service Service by publication requires truthful statement from the person seeking it that a duly diligent effort has been made to locate and/or serve the defendant against whom it is to be effective in person. Service by publication is not effective against a known defendant who could have been served personally, unless the defendant had actual knowledge of the service by publication within a reasonable time before the service by publication is held against him or her. See, e.g. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491 (1988), In re Sheridan, 117 P.3d 39, 41 (Colo. App. 2004), and Estate of Russo v. Sunrise Healthcare Corp., 994 P.2d 491, 494 (Colo. App. 1999). In an action where there is a known defendant in an in rem action, service by U.S. mail to a last known address of the known defendant, rather than personal hand delivery of the process to the defendant, is often sufficient. Service Via An Attorney Is Only Sometimes Available If the defendant is represented by a lawyer who has answered for the defendant in other aspects of the case, can service be effected just by notifying the lawyer? This is allowed if the lawyer represents that person in that lawsuit. With only a handful of exceptions (where ex parte motions are allowed) everything filed in court in a case must be served upon every lawyer who has entered an appearance in the case (usually via E-filing these days, but historically, usually by mail). An attorney for someone is not an agent for service of process upon a defendant unless the process served is within the attorney's scope of representation, normally, as disclosed by a general entry of appearance by the attorney in that particular lawsuit (what constitutes a general entry of appearance is something of a technical issue). But, if service of process cannot be hand with due diligence upon a party represented by a lawyer in a related case, a court will often order "substituted service" upon the lawyer (and mail to the last known address of the client) rather than, or in addition to, service by publication. Service upon an attorney does not suffice to establish actual knowledge of service by publication for purposes of issue #2 above. Or is this covered by attorney client privilege? Often the attorney cannot be compelled to disclosure to location of the party represented by the attorney due to attorney-client privilege. But, attorney-client privilege is not directly relevant to whether service upon an attorney constitutes effective service upon the client. Effective Date Usually, service by publication is in a newspaper that has been determined by law to be sufficient to provide legal notice defined by statute, and it must be published every week for three to five weeks depending on the jurisdiction and circumstances, with the date of service deemed to be the date of the last publication. Default judgment can be obtained based upon service by publication only on the X days after service that would apply if there was personal service of process upon that person. Effect Of In Rem Judgment A judgment against a defendant in an in rem action, does not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a separate action against the same defendant, in personam, seeking money damages. But, the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the in rem action are not binding against the defendant in the subsequent in personam action and instead have effect only with respect to rights in the property at issue in the in rem action. For example, if you are evicted from real estate in an in rem action where there is service by publication, because you didn't pay the rent, you cannot be obligated to pay a money judgment for the rent unless you are served with personal service or substituted service in that lawsuit or a later lawsuit. And, if it is a later lawsuit, the court's finding in the eviction action that you didn't pay the rent as agreed is not binding against you except for the limited purpose that you are no longer allowed to be in possession of the real estate from which you were evicted and that you can't challenge the validity of the eviction in a counterclaim or collateral lawsuit. In other words, even if you later prove that you had actually paid the rent that was the basis of the eviction action in a later lawsuit, you are still evicted, because you lost the right to complain about being evicted when you didn't respond to the service by publication.
Your question is almost too general to answer, but the basic answer is; being wrong is not a crime. Negligence is, but applying generally accepted medical diagnoses and treatments is not negligent. Malpractice is also a crime (or at least reason to suspend a medical licence); but evolving a theory based on experimental evidence, submitting it to peer review and having it generally accepted, and then later seeing it superseded by another theory is not malpractice, it is the normal scientific method. And no definition has ever been "proven wrong" since a definition, like an axiom, is neither verifiable nor falsifiable. The definitions of disorders vary betweeen countries, and most certainly change over time, but that is not because of any discovery or proof.
Standing requirements are different in state and federal courts, and from one state to the next. A random individual would not have standing to object to a stranger's abortion in federal court, and likely not in any state court, under normal circumstances, as they are not injured in any meaningful way by the abortion. I don't know what the normal rules of standing are in Texas, but it is likely perfectly acceptable for the Legislature to wave its wand to grant standing to whomever it wants regarding any violation of the law it sees for. That seems to be what is happening here.