Calling a judge as a witness in a case that the judge is presiding over? I want to pose a question on the limits of a defendant's right to call people to testify at trial. Let's assume that a judge is conducting a trial (the sort of trial is irrelevant - it could be criminal, civil, family or traffic court even), and the defendant calls the judge to the stand to testify - as a &quot;hostile&quot; witness if need be. Does this action result in an automatic mistrial regardless of whether the judge accepted or refused to take the stand? Further, does a defendant have the right to subpoena and call anyone he wants to the stand, as a witness - even the president or the pope or a member of the jury? If the ridiculous witnesses he calls don't take the stand, is this also grounds for a mistrial since the witnesses he wanted were not heard in court?
Parties may only call witnesses for the purpose of adducing* admissible evidence. Evidence is only admissible if it is relevant. If a witness cannot give any relevant evidence, then a party has no right to call them or invoke the court's power to compel them to give evidence. In practice, if there were any doubt about the witness's ability to give relevant evidence, it is likely that the court would allow the defendant to call the witness, if only for the purpose of a preliminary hearing where the parties can argue about whether the proposed evidence is actually admissible. If a judge or juror is able to give relevant evidence about a case, they should recuse themselves. If a judge does not recuse, or does not permit the defendant to call some other witness having decided that the witness could not give relevant evidence, these decisions can be reviewed on appeal. The standard required to overturn the judge's decision varies depending on the jurisdiction, but generally the defendant would have to show that the evidence they were not permitted to adduce was also material. This might prevent a mistrial from occurring in cases where, for example, the defendant was not permitted to call the President to give evidence about something that occurred at a public event the President attended. The President's knowledge of the event might be technically admissible, but plainly not likely to advance either side of the case, given the other evidence available. Of course, if the President can give relevant, admissible and material evidence about a fact in issue then the defendant would be entitled to call them. *Adduce: cite as evidence.
Not at all Well, except that a contempt of court charge would also apply. The bailiff would make an arrest and transfer custody to the police who would follow their normal process. Witnesses would be interviewed and ultimately testify. The judge , as a witness would not be able to hear the case so it would be brought before another judge.
Your question slightly misrepresents what the article says: Yes, the judge denied the motion which led to the collapse of the case, he did not make a ruling on the substance of the case. The distinction is significant to my mind as the judge was using non-evidentiary knowledge (i.e. what he read in the paper) to make a decision on process; in this case a process that would have put a lot of people to a lot of inconvenience. It would not be proper for the judge to have used such knowledge to inform a judgement. It is also not clear from the article if the academic paper in question was actually introduced by the defendant as evidence. If that was the case then it is only right and proper for the judge to consider it. As to why a judge is allowed to read the news and a jury is not, I can offer several ideas: A judge must document their reasoning process in a judgement which is subject to review - if they were to make a decision based on matters not supported by the evidence then an appeals court could correct it. Alternatively, juries are specifically prohibited from revealing their reasoning process to anyone. Judges do their jobs for years, perhaps a whole career - to prohibit them from consuming media is a) unworkable and b) a serious impediment on their lifestyle. Juries are empaneled for weeks or months - such sacrifices are more reasonable. Judges are (supposedly) trained and impartial professionals who are more readily able to make the distinction between evidence and news. Newsworthy cases are relatively rare
Yes Impeachment proceedings (as are all activities of Congress) are legal proceedings in that they are enabled by the Constitution. While it is true that they are not judicial proceedings, the activities of the legislature as with the executive (like a police interview) and judiciary (like a trial) are legal processes and the Fifth Amendment rights apply. During the McCarthy “red scare” era, pleading the fifth was commonplace by witnesses to Congressional hearings. However, pleading the fifth does not mean you can avoid testifying. If subpoenaed you would need to turn up and answer the questions, pleading the fifth when the answer could incriminate you in a criminal matter.
If no one objects to a leading question, then the judge does nothing. A judge does not generally pro-actively police the rules of evidence at trial. Also, there are circumstances when a judge has discretion to allow a leading question even when it wouldn't ordinarily be allowed to move the trial along on largely undisputed points or to allow in inarticulate witness to testify. The exception to judicial passivity in the absence of an objection at trial is "plain error" that is not "harmless error", which a judge has a duty to prevent or address even if no objection is raised by a party. But, offering a leading question when one is not allowed by the rules of evidence almost never constitutes plain error, and would almost always be considered "harmless error" even if it was objected to and the judge ruled incorrectly, unless the use of improper leading questions was pervasive and there was a contemporaneous objection by counsel. For example, allowing a prospective juror to serve as a juror, despite that juror saying in the jury selection process that he can't be impartial because the defendant committed adultery with his spouse, because neither the prosecution or the defense attorney moves to strike the juror for cause, rather than striking that juror for cause of the court's own accord, is the kind of conduct that would often be considered "plain error" that is not "harmless error."
Yes, Defendant may compel Plaintiff to appear and may cross-examine Plaintiff personally. The right to counsel does not include the right to have an attorney testify for you at trial. At trial or deposition, Plaintiff's lawyer generally has no business testifyng at all, and his statements would not be evidence. If the attorney's testimony is necessary for trial, he would likely be disqualified from representing Plaintiff. Defendant is unlikely to persuade the judge to question Plaintiff for him. The judge might ask questions to clarify answers that Defendant elicits himself, but he might also just rule based on whatever information he receives, regardless of how clear it is.
Every state requires at least two witnesses to a will unless it is entirely written in your own handwriting. A lawyer as a witness is fine. A spouse as a witness is not ideal as she would be an interested party if there was a dispute over whether it was executed. It may not be prohibited, but I would never do that in my practice ever. I discontinued a will signing just last week because we only had a lawyer and a spouse and not other witnesses. I would be somewhat concerned.
as a witness. You secretly disapprove of the thing taking place Does this actually invalidate the document (as not properly witnessed)? No. In regard to the substance of a contract, witnessing does not imply, entail, or require approval thereof by the witness. The meaning or relevance of a witness's signature is nothing more than him or her certifying that the act of "2+ other parties entering a contract" took place indeed. And are you committing a crime by doing it? I highly doubt it, regardless the country or jurisdiction. The witness's [bizarre] act of acquiescence falls short of criminal conduct such as (1) forging someone else's signature, or (2) fraudulently "acknowledging" the presence of the contracting parties when in fact at least one of them was totally absent. Only if the witness subsequently acts in a way that hinders the purposes of the contract, thereby causing harm, the harmed party(-ies) might sue the witness for tortious interference with business or relation (or its equivalent in other non-U.S. jurisdictions). For instance, suppose a contract-based transaction requires involvement by a third party, who is hesitant to perform the transaction because suspects that the witness's signature was forged. That suspicion may prompt the third party to inquire of the witness whether he actually signed as witness to the contract. If the third party rejects the contract-related transaction due to the witness's [false] denial, the harmed party(-ies) in the contract may sue the witness for any losses (examples: bounced checks, costly delays, missing of deadlines, provable loss of business opportunities) that his false denial caused.