What would be the legal repercussions of a UK government employee coming out as homosexual in the 1970s? This question is inspired by an incident in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy (the Hollywood film version starring Gary Oldman, not the novel or the BBC miniseries with Alec Guinness). One of the British spies, Peter Guillam (played by Benedict Cumberbatch), is secretly homosexual. Partway through the film, on the advice of George Smiley, he abruptly terminates his romantic relationship and evicts his male lover. The reason he does this is because Smiley's vital counter-espionage operation cannot risk being discovered, and Guillam leading a double-life inevitably leads to discrepancies that, if anyone were to probe, could conceivably lead to the discovery of Smiley's mole hunt. My question is: would it have been legally acceptable for Guillam to resolve his dilemma by coming out of the closet? In 1973, did homosexuals in the British government face any kind of legal discrimination? Were they barred from serving in the government, or the intelligence service, or from living in London, or anything else? Was there any legal reason a gay man could not have had Peter Guillam's job in Her Majesty's Government in 1973? For a more detailed discussion of the fictional context, see this answer of mine on Movies.SE which prompted me to consult you fine folks.
Many The UK is not a unified jurisdiction. While the Sexual Offences Act 1967 decriminalised homosexuality in England and Wales, it was still a crime in Scotland until 1980 and Northern Ireland until 1982. However, even after 1967, an estimated 15,000-plus gay men were convicted of homosexual acts that still remained criminal. While homosexuality was decimalised; it was only legal if it took place in total privacy: at home, behind closed doors and curtains with no one else in the dwelling. The age of consent was 21, compared to 16 for heterosexual sex. It was a crime if there were more than 2 people involved or if they were filmed or photographed. In 1966, the year before decriminalisation, there were 420 convictions for homosexuality; in 1974, there were 1,711 convictions for still criminal activities around homosexuality. Perversely, decriminalisation led to a more zealous police force targeting gays for what had not been decriminalized about their lifestyle. It was still a crime for members of the armed services and for merchant seaman, decriminalised in 1994. It was still legal to sack civilian sailors for homosexuality until 2017. Notwithstanding, even where there was no criminality, there was no protection against discrimination until various laws were introduced between 2003-2007. Socially, there was enormous prejudice against homosexuals through the 1970s, 1980s and continuing to today in some communities. I can remember the nasty jokes, abuse and, in some cases, physical violence and murders directed against gays when I was at school and university. The categorisation of AIDS as the &quot;gay disease&quot; did nothing to alleviate this prejudice. For a spy to be openly homosexual? Not a chance it hell. It would be seen as a weakness that could be exploited by the enemy.
The statute reads (emphasis mine): A person is guilty of adultery when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person at a time when he has a living spouse, or the other person has a living spouse. Suppose Alvin has sex with Betty while Betty is married to Charlie. Does Alvin's conduct satisfy the elements of the crime? Alvin engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (namely Betty) at a time when the other person (Betty again) had a living spouse (namely Charlie). So yes, Alvin has violated this law. Betty has also violated the law (the first clause instead of the second). Betty engaged in sexual intercourse with another person (Alvin) at a time when he (Betty; the pronoun "he" is meant to be gender-neutral in the statute's style of writing) had a living spouse (Charlie). However, this law is effectively unenforced in modern times. According to https://www.dbnylaw.com/adultery-is-still-a-crime-in-new-york-state/: It is extremely rare for anyone to be arrested just for adultery. Indeed, since 1972, only 13 persons have been charged with adultery. Of those 13 persons, only five actually were convicted of the crime. In virtually every one of those cases, there was some other crime that was committed and the prosecuting attorney added adultery as just one of many crimes committed. If Charlie files a complaint regarding the affair, it is almost certain that the police and prosecutors will ignore it, and that nobody will actually be charged with anything.
&quot;Lightsaber&quot; is a trademarked term, so it's gotta be called something else. The idea behind a lightsaber is older than Star Wars, anyhow idea are not protected by copyright. The actual design of such a weapon would be protected, but it would be a matter for the jury to decide if the supposedly-infringing design was a copy of a Lucasfilms-protected object, or that of the cover of Analog, Jan. 1969. The &quot;setting&quot; of the movie is completely irrelevant, all that counts is whether the object &quot;copies&quot; the plaintiff's design. In light of the earlier Wolfling design, it's not a foregone conclusion that all lightsaber-resembling objects are infringing. Available evidence indicates that you will be sued if you do it, so consult a really good IP attorney.
Eddie Slovik was executed by firing squad for desertion during World War II (the only U.S. solider to have the death sentence carried out for desertion during the war). He requested from his commander an assignment behind the front lines, was denied, and took it upon himself to leave his post, walk to the rear and presented a note to a cook there confessing to the crime of desertion. Hundreds of U.S. soldiers (on both sides) were executed during the Civil War for desertion, or "simply walking away." Ebenezer Leffingwell was almost executed during the Revolutionary War for "running away from where the firing was, with every mark of fear and trepidation." This case is complicated by the fact that, after first being told to return, Leffingwell made a feint to do so then tried to desert again. After Col. Joseph Reed again "admonished" him with the broadside of his saber and instructing him back to the fight, Leffingwell turned and attempted to fire his weapon at his superior, though it failed to discharge. General George Washington approved the sentence, and Leffingwell received a last minute pardon after his grave had already been dug and the firing squad had lined up. To answer your title question, there is this quote from Wikipedia: The maximum U.S. penalty for desertion in wartime remains death, although this punishment was last applied to Eddie Slovik in 1945. No U.S. serviceman has received more than 24 months imprisonment for desertion or missing movement post-September 11, 2001 It also highlights § 885. Art. 85 from the 2012 edition of US Manual for Court Martial: Any person found guilty of desertion or attempt to desert shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war, by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, but if the desertion or attempt to desert occurs at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial may direct.
34 CFR 106.15 covers admissions, and (e) says Subpart C does not apply to any public institution of undergraduate higher education which traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a policy of admitting only students of one sex. Subpart C, then, kind of redundantly prohibits "discrimination on the basis of sex in admission and recruitment", so that means there is no prohibition against single-sex public institutions of undergraduate education. The remainder of Title 9 applies, though. "Public" institution does not mean "government-run", it means "open to the public", which Wellesley is, although it is not government-run. I am not positive, but I think DLI is not a public school (even though it is operated by the US Army).
Assuming that the documents were either true, or Manning reasonably believed that they were true, there would be no cause of action for defamation. Many of the documents disclosed would have been confidential in some sense, but usually a violation of a confidentiality statute has a criminal sanction associated with it, but does not carry with it a private cause of action &ndash; in part, because conceptually, the party actually harmed is considered to be the government and not the person about whom information is revealed. It is also possible that Manning could utilize the state secrets privilege as a defense and have such a suit dismissed on the grounds that a full and adequate defense of the claims would require the disclosure of official state secrets. For example, if a covert agent were murdered due to a wrongful disclosure of information, usually official disclosure of the fact of being a covert agent would be required to prove the case, and that evidence would be barred by the state secrets privilege, effectively barring the lawsuit entirely. Constitutional claims of privacy violations under the 4th Amendment generally relate to the wrongful acquisition of information and not its wrongful disclosure. The constitution bars unreasonable search and seizure, not unreasonable disclosure of information. The only privacy tort that might be applicable is "Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts." (A sister privacy tort, Intrusion upon seclusion or solitude, or into privacy affairs, is directed at the collection of data phase and not the dissemination phase). See Restatement of the Law (Second) of Torts, §§ 652B and 652D. But, this tort raises serious First Amendment concerns and has not been widely adopted. Realistically, this tort is unconstitutional in the absence of an affirmative contractual or quasi-contractual duty not to reveal facts that runs to the person making the disclosure, and in general, Manning would not have that kind of relationship. The classic public disclosure of embarrassing private facts case would involve a lawyer's or psychotherapist's revelations about a client. Also, in the case of the public disclosure tort the basis for damages is largely personal emotional distress and violation of trust, as opposed to damage to reputation, per se. The requirement is that the disclosure be embarrassing or breach of contract, not that it harm someone's reputation since you have no legal right to a reputation that differs from the truth.
None The First Amendment says: Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, ... Jack has exercised his freedom of speech and has not been fined, imprisoned or otherwise punished by law. Freedom to speak does not ensure freedom from consequences We can use your example of anti-LGBTQ comments or we can substitute any other thing you like: anti-veteran, pro-veteran, anti-Trump, pro-Trump, anti-Ice Hockey, pro-Ice Hockey or, of course, pro-LGBTQ. Jack can say what he likes on any of those subjects and anybody else can take offence to them and act accordingly. In terms of voters in an election - this the ultimately epitome of free speech, they can vote for who they like for whatever reason they like. In terms of people serving on a board, they voluntarily restrict their freedom to speak because of their duty to the organisation they represent. Whatever their views in private, by agreeing to take on the duty they agree that they will act in accordance with the ethics and ethos of the organisation in public. If they don’t, they can be disciplined; usually for the catch-all offence of bringing the organisation into disrepute. Providing the organisation follows its internally mandated procedures and affords natural justice (I.e. it follows due process), no court will overturn its right to act according to its principals.
It can (and has) been argued that some of the post-bellum trials of Germans and Japanese (but no Italians because they were Allies now) proceeded on shaky legal grounds. However, the arguments of your friend are wrong. In addition, many of the cases proceeded on solid legal foundations based on war crimes (e.g. the Commando Order) and treatment of prisoners-of-war (e.g. the Stalag-Luft III murders). Citizens and non-citizens are protected by the law and were even in Nazi Germany, albeit not equally. The Nuremberg Laws did not classify Jews as non-humans, merely as non-citizens (which is not to trivialise their awfulness). Superior orders has never been a recognised defence for criminal acts under civil or common law. The first recorded rejection of this defence was in the trial of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474. The roots of modern International Law can be traced to the 16th century and were definitely well advanced by the 19th, let alone the mid-20th. Nations accepted that international treaties and diplomacy were supported by international law and these included the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906 and 1929, since updated in 1949 (of which Germany was a signatory) among many others. In addition, since the Enabling Act (which instituted Hitler's dictatorship) was quite probably illegal, it can be reasonably argued that all actions that flowed from it (i.e. basically everything that the Nazi's were tried for) was illegal under German law.