Can a Pediatric Dentist Require Conscious Sedation or Refuse Treatement? Pediatric Dentists regularly administer oral sedatives (&quot;conscious sedation&quot;) to perform dental work on young children or toddlers because it makes them &quot;cooperate&quot; better. If a parent is reluctant for his/her child to undergo conscious sedation due to the inherent risks and side effects associated with this procedure and wants the physician to perform the dental work using nitrous oxide or just a local anesthetic, can a dentist refuse to treat the child? I think it's noteworthy that insurance does not cover the cost of conscious sedation (even in young children or in children who need a lot of dental work done) which suggests that conscious sedation is not actually necessary for the physical and mental well being of the child. It is mostly done for the convenience of the dentist or to accelerate the procedure. Can a dentist withhold treatment in such cases? Or can a parent force the dentist to perform treatment with a lesser invasive approach?
A medical practitioner may use whatever methods s/he thinks proper and appropriate, subject to the limits of malpractice law, and to the right of the patient (or patient's parent or guardian for a child) to give informed consent to any procedure or treatment. A patient can not insist on a treatment or method that the doctor or dentist does not wish to perform, having only the right to seek another practitioner. Nor is a practitioner required to use only procedures covered by insurance, unless bound by contract to do so (as may be the case with some &quot;in-network&quot; or HMO agreements). Again, the patient is free to seek treatment elsewhere. So the parent could insist that the dentist not use &quot;conscious sedation&quot; by withholding consent, the dentist may then refuse to treat at all, unless perhaps this was an emergency situation not allowing the parent to seek another treatment venue.
There is no specific statute in Missouri that prohibits a teacher from saying &quot;ADHD&quot;. There is a specific federal statute that obligates the school district to make accommodations if a student is diagnosed with ADHD (also a state law). A teacher is not technically qualified to diagnose ADHD. Finally, the teacher is an employee of the school district and is required to follow the policies of the district. Those are the 4 legal cornerstones on which the teachers response must rest. The unquestionably weakest cornerstone is understanding the realities of district policy. There may be district-policy type reasons that motivate reticence to recommend testing, but such &quot;abundance of caution&quot; is not motivated by a legal mandate imposed on the teacher, it is more likely to be the result of a fear of reprisals (for triggering extra expenditures by the district). Such a fear is not legally warranted, except insofar as if you don't know what the law says (many people don't), fear is a kind of reasonable response. But ignorance of the law is no excuse. It might be useful to know that it is not required to get a doctors diagnosis of ADHD, so the teacher's evaluation might carry more weight that you would expect, were that a requirement.
Most states have a low barring the distribution of counterfeit drugs, which this would appear to violate. For example, the Colorado Imitation and Counterfeit Controlled Substances Act, codified at Sections 18-18-419 to 18-18-424, Colorado Revised Statutes, makes it a minor drug felony (class 4) to distribute an imitation controlled substance which is &quot;a substance that is not the controlled substance that it is purported to be but which, by appearance, including color, shape, size, and markings, by representations made, and by consideration of all relevant factors as set forth in section 18-18-421, would lead a reasonable person to believe that the substance is the controlled substance that it is purported to be.&quot; It already contains a placebo exception for medical professionals stating that it &quot;shall not apply to practitioners licensed, registered, or otherwise authorized under the laws of this state to possess, administer, dispense, or distribute a controlled substance, if the distribution, possession, dispensing, or administering of the imitation controlled substance is done in the lawful course of his professional practice.&quot; But there is an argument that the intended purposes of the use of the counterfeit rather than the real thing was to prevent a suicide, and that doing so had that effect, which might excuse the crime. The fact that B initiated the conversation by asking A and might have successfully obtained the drug if he asked someone else makes this defense particularly plausible. People who fail to commit suicide do not statistically just try again by another method, suicide is an impulsive action that if prevented is not nearly as likely to recur if someone fails to do so by one particular method. Colorado expressly allows the use of physical force to prevent a suicide. &quot;A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious bodily injury upon himself may use reasonable and appropriate physical force upon that person to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to thwart the result.&quot; Section 18-1-703(1)(d), Colorado Revised Statutes. This isn't actually a use for physical force, but it informs the application of the &quot;choice of evils&quot; defense, codified at Section 18-1-702, Colorado Revised Statutes in Colorado, which provides (with nuances not reproduced here) that: conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no conduct of the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue. It isn't obviously immoral either (for the same reasons), although one could make a case that the &quot;victim&quot; could bring the tort of outrageous conduct a.k.a. intentional infliction of emotional distress, against the person causing it, although again, the question would be what were the damages and was it justified. The tort remedy is a better fit as it is often used in cases of &quot;pranks&quot; calculated to cause extreme emotional distress as this one apparently was. The intent of the &quot;victim&quot; to commit suicide might also constitute &quot;unclean hands&quot; barring a tort recovery in this situation in tort law if asserted by person A.
What real human teeth look like is a fact, and not subject to copyright. But some particular designer's or artist's image of human teeth would be protected by copyright, unless it is too old -- (prior to 1923 under US law), or unless it lost copyright in some other way. To create a derivative work based on such a copyrighted work would require permission from the copyright holder. Otherwise it is copyright infringement, and the holder could sue. As to the car models, the original designs would be protected by copyright, and a maker of a model should have permission in some form, or again the copyright holder could sue. Of course, a copyright holder is not required to sue, and if the value of the work is too small a suit might not pay. But that is not a matter of legal right, but of the holder's choice and business decision. A copyright holder could always change such a decision at a later time, when perhaps the value had increased. The exact laws on how to file copyright suits, and exceptions that might apply, vary by country. The question does not indicate what county it applies to.) But the basic principals are the same in all countries that adhere to the Berne Copyright Convention, which is all but a very few countries in the world. See this Wikipedia article for more details.
In the US, detention does not add anything: we can generalize the principle to any time when a student is in the custody of the teacher (classroom, field-trip, sporting event...). One question, for the scenario that you describe, is whether the injury was foreseeable. Suppose the injury is an abdominal aortic aneurysm – this is not foreseeable. The question that the court would ask is whether a person exhibiting reasonable caution and care would know that there is a possibility that the child has some condition. The details regarding this condition &quot;not being easily noticeable&quot; are essential to the outcome of the case. A child coughing up blood should be immediately treated medically, it is not reasonable to assume that a child who sneezes (once) is in imminent danger. The teacher's response is also important, and again this is a very fact-intensive inquiry. A child who has a heart attack should not be told &quot;go talk to the nurse&quot; (let's assume that the teacher correctly notices that this is a heart attack happening), 911 is the correct (minimal) remedy. Perhaps using the auto-defibrillator also part of the reasonable standard of care for a teacher (assuming there is one, and that the teacher has been trained how to use it). Then finally, the teacher is not liable if their actions / inactions don't cause the injury. In the case where a student suddenly dies, the fact that the teacher didn't somehow prevent the death doesn't make the teacher liable. But if the child is bleeding and the teacher decides &quot;We can deal with this when detention is over&quot; and the child bleeds to death in the interim, we would conclude that the teacher's lack of care caused the child's death. The school might also be liable on various grounds, for example if the school has no nurse and has no practical way for the teacher to contact emergency medical services. Some school policy which unreasonably restricts the teachers exercise of reasonable care could make the school liable. At any rate, &quot;the child died&quot; does not cause absolute liability, what confers liability is the actions and inactions of a party.
In the US, there are no laws against surgical circumcision with informed consent (and I don't know of any such laws in any other country). Parents are generally allowed to grant surrogate informed consent. There is no requirement that circumcision be carried out by a licensed physician or other approved practitioner. A person can be held civilly liable for damage done by the procedure. There are no criminal prohibitions in the cases that you describe, but there could be civil interventions. In particular, the court could override parental consent – for instance, if a parent ordered circumcision of their 17 year old. If some person does the circumcision without parental consent, that could be a crime. The key distinction is parental consent. The law grants parents the power to act on behalf of the child, under the premise that children do not have the capacity to act in their own best interest, and cannot reasonably be forced to bear the full consequences of their actions. These are long-standing pre-common law premises, which even predate the promulgation of English common law. "Best interest" is not a technical term requiring definition, but it is a factual matter that is very difficult to judge. Judges use solomonic wisdom to determine whether a surgery is in the best interest of a child when it is medically advantageous but psychologically detrimental. Just as an adult can consent to a circumcision thereby negating any accusation of assault, so too can a parent consent on behalf of their child.
The law imposes no general duty to “care for” anyone For example, unless you are a lifeguard, there is no duty to render aid to a drowning person. There are a number of specific duties including: the duty of a parent or guardian to provide for and keep safe a child a similar duty for anyone standing in loco parentis - in the place of a parent. This can be a person or an organisation: a babysitter is an example of the former, a school is an example of the latter. a duty under negligence where you have a duty of care a duty to report child abuse (including neglect) that is imposed on some occupations a general duty to report crimes that may be imposed on all members of the public in some jurisdictions a duty to stop and render aid imposed on drivers This list is not exhaustive.
There is a world of legal difference between a doctor or counselor "pressing" you to consider meds and even suggesting several and them actually writing a prescription. The line to cross is a non-doctor writing you a prescription for prescription meds; this has not yet happened. And 99.99% of the time, it won't happen. The counselor is licensed by the state and will clearly know their legal limits, which are an important part of their education and licensing; they are not going to risk their license or a lawsuit by doing something illegal. If the counselor is a doctor and is able to write prescription, then they will ask you about medical history and other meds during a formal clinical visit in order to write the prescription. If you feel the counselor may be pressing you too hard to consider meds, he may be crossing an ethical line, but that's entirely different than breaking the law. Determining if he crossed an ethical line is for his licensing board to consider, not you. You can ask the licensing board how to proceed. Ask the counselor for their license number; they will freely give it and tell you who to contact.