Do drivers have a right to remain in their vehicle? If stopped by a police officer, do drivers have a right to remain in their vehicle? I’m unable to find any specific RCW regulation for Washington state. I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case?
I feel that a person, not the subject of arrest, should be protected by the 4th amendment if they choose to remain in their vehicle, even if “ordered” to exit the vehicle by an officer. The intuition is fine, but is basically incorrect. I’m most interested to know: How would a driver (1) Politely (2) determine if a given instruction to exit the vehicle must be complied with, and (3) decline the instruction without giving the officer “cause” or otherwise damaging a potential case? From a practical perspective the only workable response is to comply. There are times when this is done without a reasonable suspicion (or in some cases probable cause) or other legal basis, but it is pretty much impossible for you to dispute this one the spot. Most of the time, the officer will have the legal authority to order you to leave the vehicle. If they order you to exit the vehicle despite not having the legal authority to do so, the right course of action is to comply and then to file a complaint with the agency employing the officer or to bring a civil lawsuit against the officer. There are good answers to a basically duplicate question at How can you tell if you have to follow a police officer&#39;s instructions?
I am aware of a view of the California law that if a pedestrian looks like they might want to cross the street, any car must stop, but this is not supported by the law, which is about &quot;yielding&quot;. The law incorporates both &quot;yield&quot; and &quot;stop&quot;, the former being &quot;and allow the other person to proceed&quot;. Ignoring the photo for a moment, the requirement to yield (not stop) allows a car to continue driving when the driver is e.g. 10 ft from the crosswalk and the pedestrian is three lanes over when they enter the crosswalk, remaining in compliance with the law. The pedestrian and the driven can continue with their journey because there is no conflict. The requirement to yield states whose right to proceed is subordinated to the other person's, in case of conflict. Turning to the video which shows what is in front but not behind, it is evident that the vehicle did not actually conflict with the pedestrian, who did not slow down in order to let the vehicle pass. The violation of social conventions is clear, in that the pedestrian enters the crosswalk while the car is 5 or so car lengths back, and can safely slow down so that there would be zero chance of hitting the pedestrian (it starts to slow but only trivially one the pedestrian is visibly 'crossing the street'). As far as I can determine, California case law has not established any numbers that constitute &quot;not yielding&quot;. While I would stop in this circumstance, I don't see that there is a conflict between the pedestrian and the vehicle.
I'm not a lawyer; I'm not your lawyer. Victoria The Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 73A makes the obstruction of the operation of a safety camera or speed detector an offence. It is likely that the obstruction of a mobile speed camera would fall within this offence. The law does not restrict the operation of the device to police, and so it may not be relevant whether the car was marked or not. New South Wales Certainly, the obstruction of an authorised officer is an offense as per the Roads Act 1993 (NSW) s 240 and the Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 173 Obviously these apply to NSW and Victoria only; I haven't researched the other states yet. It's possible, though not definite, that other states will have similar laws. It is also likely, though not definite, that people who attempt to obstruct it may be charged with obstruction of traffic in some way, as most states require you to not obstruct the normal passage of traffic unreasonably. (eg Road Obstruction (Special Provisions) Act 1979 (NSW) s 4)
Yes Under Texas law (and pretty much everywhere else) the driver of the vehicle is responsible for ensuring that it is roadworthy. This does not mean that someone else cannot also be liable - the mechanic who fixed the wheel and their employer would also be liable. The claim for damages from a motor vehicle accident lies in the tort of negligence and the standards that the driver has to attain to avoid liability is that of a reasonable person. A reasonable person is not an average person who (probably) just gets in a car and drives but a prudent person who considers the risks to themselves and others and takes reasonable steps to mitigate them. Like looking at the wheels of an unfamiliar car. If the defect were obvious to a layperson from a visual inspection, they would be liable if they had not conducted such an inspection. Similarly, continuing to drive when a car is making a &quot;Knocking&quot; noise even if you didn't know what it was is not something a reasonable person would do. If you knew what the noise was and kept driving we are now moving from negligence into recklessness and the realms of criminal liability like manslaughter.
In principle, police are liable for the safety of anyone they detain. If an officer creates a hazardous condition, as was described in this scenario, he or his agency (which effectively means the taxpayers who fund his agency) can be held liable for damages resulting from that action. (Whether it is the officer or instead the taxpayers who get stuck with the bill is a separate question of "qualified immunity.") This idea has been formalized under two theories: The "special relationship doctrine" would apply in this case because the officer was detaining the driver. Otherwise, the liability could be argued under the more broad "state-created danger doctrine."
I assume this took place in Washington state. There are a number of self-defense provisions in Washington law. The first, RCW 9A.16.110, is primarily about reimbursements for prosecutions of acts of self-defense, but includes an applicable limit on prosecution: No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself, his or her family, or his or her real or personal property, or for coming to the aid of another who is in imminent danger of or the victim of assault, robbery, kidnapping, arson, burglary, rape, murder, or any other violent crime as defined in RCW 9.94A.030. This provision is relevant, since executing a prisoner on death row is not a crime (the state Supreme Court recently struck down the death penalty, so I assume this took place before that ruling). RCW 9A.16.020 states the more classic law on justified use of force, saying The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:...(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully aiding him or her, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his or her person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or personal property lawfully in his or her possession, in case the force is not more than is necessary; Statutory law does not define offense against his or her person. Grabbing a person and strapping them down for some harmful purpose would normally constitute battery under the common law, but in this instance it is privileged, so it is not an offense against the person). RCW 9A.16.030 says that Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent. The person is under court order to be executed, and it is not lawful to resist that order. The guard, however, RCW 9A.16.040, may use deadly force pursuant to the legal mandate to carry out the court orde ((1)(b)"to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a legal duty").
They don't treat right-of-way persistence at all You are required to follow the car ahead at a distance that is reasonable and prudent, having regard for both speeds, traffic generally, and road condition (i.e. curves, rain). CVC 21703. This would apply to the other driver. You must only shift lanes left or right when possible with reasonable safety and only after signaling. CVC 22107. That applies to you. If you &quot;cut them off&quot; such that they must make adjustments to re-acquire a distance that is reasonable and prudent, then you are guilty of 22107. If you changed lanes properly, then it is immediately and continuously THEIR duty under 21703 to maintain safe distance despite whichever lawful maneuvering you may need to do. Note that 22109 forbids you to stop or suddenly decrease speed without first giving an appropriate signal, unless there is no opportunity to give that signal. 22109 is a civil infraction that assumes accidental or negligent braking. (i.e. me going for the clutch and not remembering the car is an automatic). Intentionally brake-checking someone is a crime with risk of jail and other more serious consequences than &quot;fine and points&quot;.
Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally &quot;yes.&quot; States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic &quot;driving while black&quot; situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.