Federal bright-line forbidding shooting a non-threatening fleeing suspect? Context: Re: Woman shot by school safety officer to be disconnected from life support The school safety officer had responded to an &quot;off-campus&quot; incident, Chris Eftychiou, public information director for the Long Beach Unified School District, told CNN in an email. &quot;The preliminary investigation revealed the school safety officer was driving when he observed a physical altercation between an 18-year-old female suspect and a 15-year-old female juvenile victim occurring in the street,&quot; the LBPD statement said. Police said Rodriguez and two others involved in the altercation then attempted to flee in a four-door sedan, when the school safety officer approached the vehicle and shot at it as it accelerated quickly, striking Rodriguez, who was in the front passenger seat. The incident was &quot;off campus&quot;: outside of a school. Questions: Is there a Federal bright-line in which officers are forbidden from shooting / killing a non-threatening fleeing suspect? or is this left to the states to decide? Did a fleeing Manuela Rodriguez have the right not to be shot and killed by a Millikan High School safety? Bonus round: any clarification as to whether California Highschool safety officers have the authority to enforce law outside of the confines of a school is also of interest. Commentary: IANAL: any edits to the question is appreciated: including tags. In a day and age where law enforcement is a political football, this question is intended to be posed agnostically: I would like to understand the contours of the law. That being, I would think it prudent for the young, to review this CNN article for understanding the risk associated with fleeing law enforcement over a fist-fight. As a frequent metropolitan pedestrian, my biases lead me to believe that shooting at fleeing suspects (that have not posed a threat) is unnecessarily dangerous to the community and prompts me to pose the question.
The federal precedential case on using deadly force against a fleeing suspect is Tennessee v. Garner: The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so. Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. This case does not generally prohibit using deadly force to arrest someone who is fleeing in a vehicle, as vehicles are deadly weapons. A person fleeing police in a car poses a threat to pursuing officers and the general public so it is up to local policy and the officers on scene to weigh the risk of public harm against the interest of taking suspects alive and the risk of attempting to use deadly force against them. However, most if not all police departments do not allow the use of deadly force merely because someone is fleeing in a vehicle and also prohibit using firearms against a vehicle in this way, and at least according to the LA Times this is true of the Long Beach Police Department as well: According to a use-of-force policy from Long Beach Unified’s school safety office, officers are not permitted to fire at a moving vehicle. Firearms may be discharged only when reasonably necessary and justified under the circumstances, such as self-defense and the protection of others, the policy states. The policy also bars shooting at fleeing suspects.
Assuming these are common law crimes (Kenya is a common law country - sort of) or statutory crimes that have codified common law crimes without substantially changing them. It is not attempted murder - this requires an intent to kill. Pulling the trigger would have that intent, pointing it doesn't. It is assault if it puts the victim in fear of immediate harm (pretty sure it would). There are probably some statutory firearms offences too.
You acted illegally in assaulting your fellow student. When you are in public, a person can legally take your picture, and you are not allowed to assault a person because you do not like their legal actions. Any degree of force is excessive except in certain responses to illegal fource, and even the threat of force is excessive. You also have no right to demand that a person prove that they didn't take your picture, and certainly no right to enforce that demand with physical violence.
Answering the question title, a Texas law enforcement officer can certainly make arrests in Louisiana these days under the right circumstances (I'm not about to look up the laws as of 1934). For starters, Louisiana law grants any person the authority to make an arrest when the person being arrested has committed a felony, whether or not that felony was committed in the presence of the person making the arrest. This is normally a legally risky thing to do (the arrest is illegal unless the person actually committed a felony, while a cop's felony arrest is legal as long as the cop had probable cause), but in this case the pair had been involved in a kidnapping and a robbery in Louisiana. Any person could have made a lawful arrest, and could have used necessary force to effect that arrest. But suppose the gang turned out to be innocent of the Louisiana crimes. In that case, a citizen's arrest would be illegal. But the Texas lawmen weren't at the ambush alone. They were there with the parish sheriff and a deputy, who were Louisiana peace officers with the authority to make an arrest on probable cause. And under Article 219 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, A peace officer making a lawful arrest may call upon as many persons as he considers necessary to aid him in making the arrest. A person thus called upon shall be considered a peace officer for such purposes. Neither of these things depends on the Texas officers' status as Texas officers. There are some arrests which are legal based on that (e.g. hot pursuit), and a Texas officer has some extra powers in Louisiana based on federal law that make an arrest easier (e.g. cops in the US can carry concealed firearms nationwide without needing a CCW permit), but under normal circumstances a Texas police officer has no special authority to make an arrest in Louisiana. However, it's not at all uncommon for police agencies in different states (or at the state and federal level) to cooperate on something, and there are ways to make it work out. With more planning, there are normally formal ways to do it instead of needing to rely on "we'll ask you for assistance" (for instance, officers could formally be appointed as deputies in the appropriate agency; this happens a lot on federal task forces, where a deputized state or local cop gets nationwide jurisdiction). If Bonnie and Clyde existed these days but the feds wanted to involve state cops, they'd just set up a federal task force, make Hamer a special deputy US marshal, and go from there.
Hope you have a good prosecutor and a sympathetic judge "They asked repeatedly how much she had to drink ..." Objection: Asked and answered "how she could claim not to remember certain details" Objection: Calls for a conclusion/speculation. The witness is not a brain scientist, she cannot speculate as to why people remember some details and not others. She is testifying as to what she does remember, not as to why she doesn't remember things. "asking if she had not been flirting with him in the days before the incident" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense seriously suggesting that flirtation, if it happened, in the preceding days amounts to consent at the time of the incident? "asked her why she had not chosen a more modest one" Objection: Relevance. Is the defense now suggesting that what the witness wore amounts to consent?
If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.
In your example, there is nothing that indicates to me that there is a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of . . . criminal activity". If you have described the totalilty of the circumstances, the officer does not have the right to arrest or detain the individual. To your broader question about how specific descriptions must be in order to provide a basis for a stop, the assessment is based on the "totality of the circumstances". For example, an anonymous tip that "a woman would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right tail light [carrying cocaine]" was enough to warrant a stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)1 In contrast, the court "determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from a bare-bones tip that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a gun." Florida v. J. L., 529 U. S. 266 (2000) The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify such a stop “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Navarette v. California 572 U.S. ___ (2014) In any case, a crime must be part of the particularized suspicion. 1. This case focused on the indicia of reliability necessary for an anonymous tip to support a reasonable suspicion, but it is also an example of a degree of non-specificity in identification of a suspect.
tl;dr: no, they're not law yet. Background The two bills are different. A5217 proposes to create a juvenile alternative to the current community service program, and A1969 proposes changes to the state's anti-bullying law. It looks like they've reassigned the number "5217." The correct version of A5217 is at this link. A bill becomes law when signed into law by the governor. To be delivered to the governor, the bill has to pass both houses of the legislature. In order to pass in one house, the bill has to survive a full vote there. To be voted upon, a bill typically has to clear its committee. Sometimes that entails getting adequate support (like sponsors). Bills include the language "Be it enacted" because each house has to vote on the precise language the governor will eventually sign. A5217 is still in progress, meaning that it has yet to pass the Assembly. It has been introduced, referred to the Assembly Law and Public Safety Committee, and got a third prime sponsor (on May 24 DiMaso joined Lopez and McKnight as a sponsor). The companion bill, S3447, has been introduced and referred to the Senate Law and Public Safety Committee. A1969 has been introduced and referred to the Women and Children Committee. It does not yet appear to have a Senate companion.