Tax law and holding accounts (like Kickstarter) Kickstarter is a simple example to highlight the question. Let's say I'm Kickstarter's malformed cousin Rickstarter and someone is raising 100k for a project between November and April on my site. Rickstarter charges and holds funds in an account to distribute if the backer hits the 100k threshold, they fully refund in the case of the not hitting the milestone. Let's say by New Years the fund has 50k in it's account. Questions: How would taxes be resolved if the funds are distributed for a successful campaign (say 5% cut for Rickstarter if we need specific metrics) before they file in April? How would taxes be resolved if the funds are refunded for a failed campaign before they file in April? How would taxes be resolved if they filed in February before it became clear either way what was happening with the funds? By my understanding taxes are based on the prior year so I'm quite confused who exactly owns (and owes) what here.
Note: I do not know the internal mechanics of Kickstarter (some comment states that it does not work as explained), so I will work on Rickstarter description by the OP. The funds are managed and held by Rickstarter but they are not owned by Rickstarter; it works as a scrow service. For each $1 of cash directed to funding a project Rickstarter accrues an obligation (either towards the donor or the project to be funded)1 of exactly $1; in the books there is neither profit nor loss. At some point of time RS will get its cut from that $1. It is similar to getting a $100.000 loan from a bank: you are not any richer because with the money comes the obligation to pay it back. A point of interest is when Rickstarter gets its profits. The basic rule is that Rickstarter can only put into the books its income when it has earned it and can be reasonably sure to get the money. For example, Rickstarter could stablish in its service terms that it gets a 5% rate from any donation, and in this case it could be reasonable to consider a 5% of any received money to count towards the profits immediately. If there were a time for the investor to retreat his money without penalties, then the profits should only be accounted after that period. Or Rickstarter could apply a 5% rate to the money directed at projects that get enough funds, and in that case it could only write his profits in the book the moment the project gets that limit. In case that Rickstarter allowed people just to pledge the money, it would be unwise to count the profits before people had actually paid the money....3 Now, direct taxes4 on business are almost always directly linked to profits, not to the size of assets, so Rickstarter's taxes would be linked to its cut of the money (minus all expenses, of course) and not related to the size of assets that it keeps in scrow. A different (and a lot more complicated) issue would come from regulatory obligations: there could be laws mandating that if Rickstarter manages more than $X assets then it has to start making audits and comply with other rules. But, while following those rules can have a cost, that would not make them "taxes". 1The specific details of which kind of account would be convenient to reflect this obligation is beyond my knowledge of accounting. 2Here the prudence concept comes into play, you cannot consider that you got your cut until you are reasonably sure that you have earned it. 3This can become very complex. For example, in the case of a pledge RS would probably write as an asset "the $1000 SJuan76 owes us", but at the same time if there are doubts about SJuan76 ability or willingness to pay it should also anotate a liability of "the $1000 (or $500) SJuan76 might default" so it would not be count (at least totally) towards profits. 4There may be taxes based on activity (e.g. sales tax) or related to some assets (for example property taxes on the buildings owned by the company), but I think you are not asking about those.
I find that Petri Mäntysaari: The Law of Corporate Finance: General Principles and EU Law: Volume II, p. 115-140 can pretty much explain the reasoning for this. It is in chapter 5.3 on Terms non-binding as intended. The contract might not contain all legal requirements for some reason, or a clause might become invalid due to law changes. Sometimes the contract becomes unenforceable for some reason or another in part or full. The salvatorian clause is there to fix the defective clause to become the closest estimate to the written form that is legal and not deficient instead of being just dropped from the contract. This can save a contract from becoming unenforceable or making it void in whole. Especially look at Page 140: If a contract term is invalid because of a mandatory provision of law, it will be replaced by legal background rules(§306(2) BGB). One of the standard ways to address the situation is to use a so-called salvatorian clause. [...] This [reinterpretation/fixing of deficiencies] would not happen without a specific contract term. (See §139 BGB. On the other hand see also §140 BGB. Compare DCFR II.-7:302 and II.-7:303) A caveat though: if the alteration to the clause needed is too big and substantial, the contract as a whole can become void and null, no matter what the salvatorian clause said. It cannot overcome some burdens and there are regularly courts (I know this for Germany) voiding contracts due to such serious deficiencies. Notes BGB is the German "Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch", an english translation exists §139 says "If a part of a legal transaction is void, then the entire legal transaction is void, unless it is to be assumed that it would have been undertaken even without the void part." Example: a sale lacking any payment is not a sale (which starts a legally required warranty) $140 says "If a void legal transaction fulfils the requirements of another legal transaction, then the latter is deemed to have been entered into, if it may be assumed that its validity would be intended if there were knowledge of the invalidity." Example: a sale lacking any payment can be interpreted as a gift if the intent was to do so (and does not grant warranty) DCFR is the EU Draft Common Frame of Reference, so the above rules are to be found in the document as follows II.–7:302: Contracts infringing mandatory rules - p. 565. Paraphrased: "if a clause in a contract violates a law, substitute the law for it, courts shall decide if that alters or voids the contract. They may fix contracts to cure them." II.–7:303: Effects of nullity or avoidance - p. 574. Paraphrased: "void contract (parts) can constitute unjustified enrichment, transfer of items might not have happened, courts may fix contracts to cure." From the DCFR document one can read what happens in absence of a Salvatorian clause, especially for UK law. II.–7:302: I. Contracts contrary to law 1 All European systems deal with contracts which contravene some rule of law, as opposed to contracts which are contrary to fundamental principles of morality or public policy. 5 In ENGLISH, IRISH and SCOTTISH law the standard texts all include chapter headings such as “Illegality”, or “Statutory Invalidity”. See further Enonchong, McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 19.28-19.36, and, for the confused development of Scottish law, Macgregor in Reid &amp; Zimmermann vol. II, chap. 5. II. Effects of infringement 8 The general starting point in most European legal systems is that contracts violating legal rules are void. There is often, however, considerable flexibility in the law. 14 In ENGLISH and SCOTTISH law, while an illegal contract may be void, it is more often presented as “unenforceable”, in that neither specific performance nor damages are available to the parties. Thus a party may withdraw from an illegal contract with impunity. Courts will take notice of illegality of their own motion and dismiss actions accordingly (Chitty on Contracts I27, no. 16-199; MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland, § 7.15; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.17-19.27).). Again, however, there is flexibility in the law on contracts infringing statutory provisions. There are several cases in which the courts have considered whether giving effect to the statute requires the nullity of the contract as a supporting sanction (see e.g. St John Shipping Corp. v. Joseph Rank Ltd. [1957] 1 QB 267; Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd. v. S Spangletts Ltd. [1961] 2 QB 374, CA). English law is currently under review by the Law Commission: see its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions. The Commission’s provisional proposals were to the effect that courts should have the discretion to decide whether or not illegality should act as a defence to a claim for contractual enforcement. But the discretion should be structured by requiring the court to take account of specific factors: (1) the seriousness of the illegality involved; (2) the knowledge and intention of the party seeking enforcement; (3) whether denying relief will act as a deterrent; (4) whether denial of relief will further the purpose of the rule rendering the contract illegal; and (5) whether denying relief is proportionate to the illegality involved. II.–7:303: Notes 5 In ENGLISH law the general rule is against restitution but it is possible in exceptional cases where the claimant is not in pari delicto with the recipient, or the transaction has not been completely executed, or if the claim can be formulated without reference to the prohibited contract (Treitel, The Law of Contract9 , 490-504). IRISH law is similar (Clark 314-19), and so is SCOTTISH law (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol. 15, paras. 764-765), although in one Scottish case where, by statute, contracts using old Scottish measures were void, restitutionary recovery was allowed in respect of a sale of potatoes by the Scottish acre, on the ground that there was no moral turpitude in such a transaction (Cuthbertson v. Lowes (1870) 8 M 1073; see further Macgregor, (2000) 4 ELR 19-45; McBryde, Law of Contract in Scotland1 , paras. 13.31-13.34, 19.22-19.26). The English Law Commission in its Consultation Paper on Illegal Transactions suggested that a court should have discretion to decide whether or not illegality should be recognised as a defence to a claim for restitution, various factors being taken into account. In addition the court should have a discretion to allow a party to withdraw from an illegal contract and to have restitution where this will reduce the likelihood of the completion of an illegal act or purpose, although it must be satisfied that the contract could not be enforced against the claimant, that there is genuine repentance of the illegality, and that it is not too serious.
It is not uncommon for a company to issue additional shares to shareholders instead of paying a cash dividend. This is known as a &quot;stock dividend&quot;. Such payment may (less commonly) be in shares of another, often related, company. If that is the source of the stock in question there is nothing illegal about it. Your broker should have a record of your transactions and whether any stock came from a stock dividend or some other source. Accordion to the Investopedia article on &quot;Stock Dividend&quot;: Also known as a &quot;scrip dividend,&quot; a stock dividend is a distribution of shares to existing shareholders in lieu of a cash dividend. This type of dividend may be made when a company wants to reward its investors but doesn't have the spare cash or wants to preserve its cash for other investments. Stock dividends have a tax advantage for the investor. The share dividend, like any stock share, is not taxed until the investor sells it unless the company offers the option of taking the dividend as cash or in stock. A stock dividend may require that the newly received shares are not to be sold for a certain period of time. This holding period on a stock dividend typically begins the day after it is purchased. Understanding the holding period is important for determining qualified dividend tax treatment. The Wikip[edia article &quot;Dividend&quot; says: Stock or scrip dividends are those paid out in the form of additional shares of the issuing corporation, or another corporation (such as its subsidiary corporation). They are usually issued in proportion to shares owned (for example, for every 100 shares of stock owned, a 5% stock dividend will yield 5 extra shares). (emphasis added) So dividends payed in the stock of another company are perfectly possible, although less common.
There is a reasonable chance that the amount that you are borrowing and paying interest on is through a third party, so the dealer can't just waive the interest for the period when they are fixing the car. Legal responses would include canceling the sale, and suing for damages. The problem with suing for damages is that this isn't costing you an extra $15/day (the loan gets paid off at a fixed time, regardless of how much you get to actually drive the car). It would be a considerable stretch to argue that you were deprived of a week's worth of enjoyment for the car because of the wrongful acts of the dealer, and should be compensated. Your attorney would be in a good position to tell you, based on the facts and Texas law, whether that approach would be futile. The legality of the situation primarily depends on what the contract says. It is likely that the contract has clauses that maximally disclaim responsibility to the maximum extent allowed by law. There will be some clause that says something about taking delivery of the car, so you can check whether they have breached the contract on that point: it is possible that there is some escape hatch like "as soon as possible, upon receipt of payment". It seems pretty clear that they concealed a material fact, in order to induce you to buy the car. For example, the manufacturer may have installed a defective veblitzer which had to be replaced, and a reasonable person would not buy a car with a defective veblitzer, thus the veblitzer is a material fact. Or: the veblitzer may have been damaged in a flood. The fact that the car is, by their representation, not safe to drive in its current state, the mind of fact that would push most people into the "no thanks" category. To pursue the fraud angle, you need to be more specific about the defective part in your complaint. The only way to force them to reveal the nature of the missing part is to sue them and compel disclosure of the relevant facts during discovery. Again, your attorney would deal with this. You should bear in mind that if the sale is simply cancelled, you may not be able to recover the loan application or processing fee, and the trade-in will no doubt have been sold, so you can't get the old car back. There are laws against deceptive trade practices which might be applicable, depending on whether they said anything deceptive in their disseminated advertising. Section 17.46 may be applicable, if they patched the car together temporarily with a counterfeit veblitzer.
Generally not. There is a notion in copyright law called the first-sale doctrine in which after a particular copy of a copyrighted work is legitimately sold, the purchaser can sell, lend, lease, give away, or otherwise dispose of the copy as he sees fit. Copyright does not give the copyright holder exclusive rights to authorize resales. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 for the relevant US law; in other countries the same principle is sometimes called exhaustion of rights. There are limits to the doctrine. In the US, it does not allow for for-profit software rental (for most software) or musical record rentals. Moreover, software companies noticed the part where the doctrine applies to a transfer of title (i.e. an actual sale). If you read a typical software EULA, it is generally quite explicit that the software was licensed to you instead of sold; this is why. Courts in the US have often enforced these provisions (particularly if the license imposes limits like "you can't resell it"); European courts have, as far as I know, been far less willing to accept that argument. However, as a general rule resale is specifically not forbidden by copyright.
First Sale Doctrine One of the rights a copyright holder has is an exclusive right &quot;to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending&quot;. 17 U.S.C. 106(3). This is distinct from the reproduction right they have to make copies or derivative works. So, absent a licence, you can neither make the model nor distribute the model. If you are operating under a licence, that is a legally binding contract between you and the copyright holder. If it says that you cannot give away models, then doing so is a breach of that contract and a breach of copyright for which you could be sued. However, if you did sell or give away the model to a third party, that would be a lawful transfer of title in the object itself, even though it is a breach of contract. An innocent third party (i.e. one who has no knowledge of the breach) would be a lawful owner and could do what they liked with the object and, under the first-sale doctrine, is not bound by the licence. If you were to die, the executor or administrator of your estate would be bound by the terms of the licence (whether they knew about them or not), and if they breached them, they would be liable for that breach. If done in good faith, they could seek indemnity from the estate, but if the estate has insufficient funds or has been finalised, they would be personally liable. This is largely theoretical as the copyright owner would have to pursue their claim so promptly that unless they were actively monitoring the death notices for anyone who ever downloaded their model, they would miss their chance. A third party who received the physical model from the estate, either by buying it or being given it as a beneficiary, would own it and have first-sale doctrine rights. Although originally a US concept (Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus 1908), it is my understanding that the first-sale doctrine has since spread to all common-law countries. The last was Australia in Calidad v Seiko Epson [2020] HCA 41. ... the public ... The above analysis presumes that the people you are gifting the models to are &quot;the public&quot;. This may not be the case where the models are distributed to a small circle of people like family and friends. In that case, there is no general right of distribution, and the copyright owner would need to rely on their right of reproduction. That is, in making the copy in order to give the object away, you breached the licence. This becomes problematic when your decision to give away the object happens later, possibly years later, possibly after you're dead. So, it might not be a problem for the executor or administrator to distribute the object to a beneficiary, but it might be a problem to sell it at a deceased-estate auction. The former is not distribution to &quot;the public&quot;; the latter is.
The tax in question that is a concern is probably not an estate tax due in connection with an inheritance tax, it is probably the federal income tax that applies to the beneficiary in some way. Typically, if there is a specific devise (e.g. I hereby leave you my nephew $10,000) that is distributed more than one year after the date of death, part of the inheritance is taxable interest income to the recipient. Another circumstance in which an inheritance could generate reportable taxable income is if the inheritance is of &quot;income in respect of a decedent&quot; (e.g. retirement account distributions, or a final paycheck). More generally, if the estate had taxable income in excess of $100 as determined in IRS Form 1041 (e.g. due to the sale of capital assets that have appreciated after the date of death, rental income, dividends, or interest received), this estate income is allocated to the beneficiaries of the estate receiving distributions and flows through to them as a result of the &quot;distributable net income deduction&quot; of the estate, and has to be reported on Schedule K-1 from the estate with the beneficiary's Social Security numbers. So, there are multiple reasons why a W-9 might be required in connection with an inheritance.
If the situation described is accurate, then maybe First, let's deal with the implicit assumption that sales tax is not payable on gifts. Whether that is true or not depends on the law in your jurisdiction. For example, in australia there is no Goods and Services Tax (GST) payable on a gift because a gift is not a &quot;supply&quot; under the law. Technically, a value-added tax like the GST is not a sales tax but close enough. However, exchanging a &quot;gift&quot; for something of value (airline points, for example) is not a gift. Of course, Australian States and Territories levy Stamp Duty on the transfer of a vehicle's registration, and this is calculated on the sale price or the market price whichever is the greater. Also, technically, that's not a sales tax either. If it's a tax avoidance scheme, then no and it's a crime Assuming that there is no sales tax payable on a gift; if John and David entered into this arrangement (not a contract because of its illegal purpose) to avoid tax, then tax is payable and they are now criminals. If the relevant tax authority learns what happened and decides to investigate, then John and David might have some explaining to do. If David can show that he has routinely given John large cash gifts on John's birthday, then they may convince the authority not to prosecute. If they can't, then they get to try to convince a judge. It is not atypical for tax law to reverse the onus of proof: the government doesn't have to prove tax is payable, John and Dave have to prove it isn't.