In the US, at what age can a child refuse to attend a religious service mandated by their parent? If a child has determined that they don't want to attend religious services with their parent, at what age can they no longer be compelled to do so? Given: A parent is stating to their child that they must go with them. A child (of unstated but still minor age) doesn't want to go. Occurring within United States (Michigan if it matters to that level) (area of the world where the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is not ratified) Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? My comment regarding abuse is purposefully vague. When is it abuse? Is it only physical? If a child claims one religious affiliation (or alternately none at all), is it abuse to force indoctrination? If so, at what age can a child be considered "old enough" to decide that this is some method of verbal abuse? Are there other abuses that can be (or have been successfully) claimed? Please don't assume I only limit the "de facto situations" to abuse. Consider if there are other items that would affect this activity.
Are there actual laws written, or de facto situations (e.g. let's say another law specifies that a child can't be physically forced to go anywhere without causing abuse) where the child can refuse to attend? Are there "tiers" to the age; Is it true that a temper tantrum of a 5 year old would be seen as such, but the refusal of a 17 year would be legally accepted? This is a hard question to answer that doesn't have a neat resolution. Very little pertaining to the authority of a parent over a child is codified in statutory law and there is not a clear cut age at which a child has "freedom of conscience" vis-a-vis a parent. Most of the law related to children concerns allocation of parenting time and parental decision making between divorced, separated or unmarried parents; abuse and neglect; and juvenile delinquency. There is also usually a snippet of criminal law stating that certain kinds of uses of force to discipline children do not constitute crimes. But, part of why it doesn't come up very much is that older children are usually socialized in a manner that causes them to show a certain amount of respect for the wishes of their parents. It also doesn't come up much for children who aren't in their late teens, because the complete economic dependence of children on their parents or guardians gives the parents considerable power of their children that doesn't require the exercise of physical force. Also, it is quite dependent upon how the issue presents itself. No law enforcement agency is going to aid a parent in forcibly dragging a kid to church against their will. But, no social services agency is going to remove a kid from a home because his birthday party will be cancelled if he doesn't go to the church of his parents' choice the Sunday before his birthday. There are also some subtle but important distinctions between states on the issue of emancipation. In Colorado, emancipation is a statement about the empirical reality. If a child is self-supporting and lives apart from parents or guardians then the child is an emancipated minor. It is not a status granted by a court, it is a status acknowledged by courts when evaluating other issues. In California, a child is not emancipated unless a court grants a child that status and a child who is de facto emancipated without the leave of a court is guilty of a "status offense" (the New York State term for someone in this state is PINS for "person in need of supervision"). Basically, if a parent can force a child to go to church by means that don't constitute abuse or neglect and don't exceed the level of force authorize for child discipline in the criminal code, then they can do it, and if they can't manage that, then they can't do it. Many states have a "status offense" that allows government intervention with the cooperation of a parent or guardian in cases where an "uncontrollable" child is defiant and simply will not give any heed to the parent or guardian's instructions. In practice, the older a child is, the less likely someone viewing a parent's conduct forcing a child to do something is to be viewed as acceptable or legally justified. The legal rights of children in a school setting are also age dependent under the case law, although not always in a really well defined way. Controls on student expression that would be uncontroversial for elementary school students may be looked upon by the law with disfavor for high school students and clearly prohibited for adults. Perhaps one useful way to conceptualize it is that trying to make a child attend a particular kind of religious service is not considered an improper purposes for a parent of any minor to utilize the resources available to the parent to do so, but the range of resources available to a parent with regard to an adult child is much narrower.
The only religious matter I'm aware of that are inadmissible are for special circumstances where one's religious beliefs may be compromised if asked in court. The classic example tends to be clergymen/women being subpeonaed for information against a defendant in court. Conversation with clergy is protected in the United States and is one of a few times cops are not allowed to listen to your one phone call or visit. The typical invocation of this would be a criminal, who confesses his sins to a Catholic priest, and may confess to a crime while receiving the Sacrament of Penance. Since Catholic Priests are bound by the &quot;Seal of Confession&quot; to not speak about the identity of the sinner or nature of the sin. The Priest can be excommunicated if he does this. However, if the religion of the witness is relevant to the case (say a discrimination case) it might be prudent to inquire into the witness's religious beliefs. Suppose a major employer has a special menu in their cafeterias for Hala and Kosher observers but does not offer a fish or non-meat option for meals on Fridays in Lent, then a Catholic's belief in this practice might be called into question.
Testimonial Privilege There is a tradition, embodied in law in many jurisdictions, that a religious confession, is not subject to compelled disclosure in court or to other legal process. This arose from the Catholic practice of confession, but has been long sine extended to the similar practices of other religious organizations. Note that in most jurisdictions this applies only to confessions that a person makes about his or her own actions. It does not apply when a person reports some other person's actions to a religious authority. It also usually applies only to a formal, religiously mandated or authorized communication, not to an informal chat or counseling session. In the US this is usually a matter of state law. Let's look at the relevant law in California, which is tagged as the relevant jurisdiction. (Laws in other US states are usually similar on this subject.) Such a privilege usually applies only to actual testimony under oath, in a court or as part of court proceedings such as a deposition. The law concerning an initial report of possible child abuse is different. According to the California Evidence Code, Sections 1030-1034: Subject to Section 912, a penitent, whether or not a party,has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a penitential communication if he or she claims the privilege. Subject to Section 912, a member of the clergy, whether or not a party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose a penitential communication if he or she claims the privilege. This means that neither the clergy-person, nor the person disclosing information to the clergy-person (the &quot;penitent&quot;) can be required to provide court testimony about the content of the confession. (Note that this is part of the evidence code which governs what evidence is admissible in court.) Also, the penitent may forbid such testimony from the clergy-person. Note that the privilege must be explicitly invoked, it is not automatic. Questions may be asked about the confession, and only if the penitent or the clergy-person objects and invokes the privilege does it apply. The previous three sections (included in the linked page) limit the privilege somewhat. Section 1030 states that: a &quot;member of the clergy&quot; means a priest, minister, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church or of a religious denomination or religious organization. Section 1031 states that: &quot;penitent&quot; means a person who has made a penitential communication to a member of the clergy. Section 1032 states that: &quot;penitential communication&quot; means a communication made in confidence, in the presence of no third person so far as the penitent is aware, to a member of the clergy who, in the course of the discipline or practice of the clergy member's church, denomination, or organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear those communications and, under the discipline or tenets of his or her church, denomination, or organization, has a duty to keep those communications secret. So the privilege only applies when the communication or confession was made one-to-one, with no other person present, is part of the regular religious practice of the church or group involved, and the clergy-person has a religious duty to keep the communication secret. All this is normally true of Catholic confessions. It may or may not be true of confessions or communications in other religious organizations, depending on their traditions and practices. Also code section 912(a) provides that: the right of any person to claim a privilege ... is waived with respect to a communication protected by the privilege if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to disclosure made by anyone. Consent to disclosure is manifested by any statement or other conduct of the holder of the privilege indicating consent to the disclosure, including failure to claim the privilege in any proceeding in which the holder has legal standing and the opportunity to claim the privilege Mandated Reporting In recent decades laws have bee passed requiring people in various positions of trust, or positions where such people are likely encounter evidence of child abuse, to report to law enforcement when they know or reasonably suspect such abuse. Such people are called &quot;mandated reporters&quot;. A failure by a mandated reporter to make such a report when the mandated reporter has knowledge or reasonable suspicion of abuse is a crime. Note that, in most jurisdictions, mandated reporting applies to all forms of child abuse, not just sexual abuse, but also physical and emotional abuse and neglect. Therefore in this answer &quot;abuse&quot; is not limited to sexual abuse. In the US, this is a matter of state law. What positions carry mandated reporter status, what circumstances trigger a mandated report, an what the penalties are for failing to make a report all vary significantly from state to state. Mandated reporter (MR) status is separate from the testimonial privilege described above in this answer. However, circumstances that would trigger the testimonial privilege may also trigger an exception from mandated reporting. Mandated Reporting in California In California Penal code section 11165.7 (a) (32) and (a) (33) list clergy members (defined as &quot; priest, minister, rabbi, religious practitioner, or similar functionary of a church, temple, or recognized denomination or organization.&quot;) and &quot;any custodian of records of a clergy member&quot; as mandated reporters (MRs). However section 11166 (d) (1) provides an exception. Knowledge or suspicion acquired &quot;during a penitential communication&quot; need not be reported. For this purpose a &quot;penitential communication&quot; is defined as: a communication, intended to be in confidence, including, but not limited to, a sacramental confession, made to a clergy member who, in the course of the discipline or practice of the clergy member’s church, denomination, or organization, is authorized or accustomed to hear those communications, and under the discipline, tenets, customs, or practices of the clergy member’s church, denomination, or organization, has a duty to keep those communications secret. Note that only if the &quot;church, denomination, or organization&quot; imposes on the clergy member a duty to keep the communication secret is the communication a &quot;penitential communication&quot;. If there is no such duty, the exception does not apply. Normally, a &quot;penitential communication&quot; concerns the actions of the person making the communication, not of some other person. However in the course of a communication about him- or herself, a person may mention the actions of another person. That mention would, as I understand this law, be part of the penitential communication and thus subject to the exception in section 11166 (d) (1). When is a Report Mandated? Section 11166 (a) provides that: (a) Except as provided in subdivision (d), and in Section 11166.05, a mandated reporter shall make a report to an agency specified in Section 11165.9 whenever the mandated reporter, in the mandated reporter’s professional capacity or within the scope of the mandated reporter’s employment, has knowledge of or observes a child whom the mandated reporter knows or reasonably suspects has been the victim of child abuse or neglect. ... [The paragraph goes on to define the time and manner of reports.] Section 11166 (a) (1) defines &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot;: For purposes of this article, “reasonable suspicion” means that it is objectively reasonable for a person to entertain a suspicion, based upon facts that could cause a reasonable person in a like position, drawing, when appropriate, on the person’s training and experience, to suspect child abuse or neglect. “Reasonable suspicion” does not require certainty that child abuse or neglect has occurred nor does it require a specific medical indication of child abuse or neglect; any “reasonable suspicion” is sufficient. For purposes of this article, the pregnancy of a minor does not, in and of itself, constitute a basis for a reasonable suspicion of sexual abuse. 11166 (a) mentions a MR's knowledge of or observation of the possibly abused child. It is not clear to me if a discussion with a third party, such as another adult, would be sufficient to raise a &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot; such that a MR would be required to file a report, if there is nothing that the MR has personally observed that would raise or tend to confirm such a suspicion. However section 11166 (g) provides that: Any other person who has knowledge of or observes a child whom the person knows or reasonably suspects has been a victim of child abuse or neglect may report the known or suspected instance of child abuse or neglect to an agency specified in Section 11165.9. For purposes of this section, “any other person” includes a mandated reporter who acts in the person’s private capacity and not in the person’s professional capacity or within the scope of the person’s employment. {Emphasis added.} Thus the person who makes a penitential communication to a clergy member may (but need not) report directly to Law Enforcement, and the clergy member may urge such a person to do so. Note that 11166 (i) (1) provides that: (i) (1) The reporting duties under this section are individual, and no supervisor or administrator may impede or inhibit the reporting duties, and no person making a report shall be subject to any sanction for making the report. However, internal procedures to facilitate reporting and apprise supervisors and administrators of reports may be established provided that they are not inconsistent with this article. An internal policy shall not direct an employee to allow the employee’s supervisor to file or process a mandated report under any circumstances. Note that 11166 (i) (3) provides that: (i) (3) Reporting the information regarding a case of possible child abuse or neglect to an employer, supervisor, school principal, school counselor, coworker, or other person shall not be a substitute for making a mandated report to an agency specified in Section 11165.9. Specified Scenario In a comment on an earlier version of this answer, the original poster of the question (OP) asks: So if there was a situation where church member X tells to a religious leader L (no other persons present) that church member Y has abused a child, then the legal responsibility for the leader to inform authorities depends primarily on state law and secondarily on what the religious traditions of that religious org state? Would this be correct? Yes, the responsibility of L in that situation depends on both the state law of the state where this occurs, and on the rules and traditions of the the church or other religious organization are. There are several questionable points in that scenario under California law: When X tells L about the abusive actions by Y, is that a &quot;penitential communication&quot; under the traditions of the relevant religious organization? For instance, in Catholic practice, a confession is about oneself, and any mention of the misdeeds of others is not confidential unless it would reveal the contents of the actual confession. Does religious law, tradition or practice impose a duty of secrecy on L? If not, the exception does not apply and a report is mandated if the other conditions for a report apply. My understanding (not confirmed) is that the Catholic church, for example, has in recent years changed its canon law so that a persistent course of action, showing no indication of repentance nor effort to stop the sinful action where there is a likelihood of future harm to others relives a priest from the duty of secrecy. When there is no religious duty of secrecy, the exception does not apply. Does the report by X give L &quot;knowledge&quot; or &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot; of abuse? If not, no report is mandated. If there is not at least corroboration through direct observation of the child in question, then the wording of 11166 seems to me to imply that no report is mandated, but I have not found case law confirming or opposing that conclusion. Also, under 11166 (a) (1) suspicion must be &quot;objectively reasonable&quot; to trigger a mandated report. If X is known for making unfounded accusations, X's report might not be grounds for &quot;reasonable suspicion&quot;. Thus the detailed facts about the situation, and about the rules or traditions of the church or religious organization will matter.
There was no actual child who was caused to view the material, so there was no offense under that provision. By contrast, inciting a child under 13 to engage in sexual activity is an inchoate offense, so it is not necessary for any harm to an actual victim to have occurred. Note that the relevant section of the Sexual Offenses Act 2003 concerns "causing or inciting," and that the charge was "inciting." The section concerning watching a sexual act, by contrast, only inludes "causing."
In germany, a child below the age of 14 cannot be guilty of a crime. However, a family court may order measures regarding the welfare of the child. In a case like the one you describe, or even somewhat less extreme ones, this might be taking the child out of the family and into a care home where the child would be locked up for his or her own good.
One relevant US law is Title 18 Chapter 110. Using real children in porn is against the law, as is most anything connected to it (permitting children to do it, distributing, buying...). Under the definitions (18 USC 2256(1)) “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years. The possible hook for cartoons is via the definition of “child pornography” which is any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where— ... (B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct. My guess is that hentai doesn't satisfy this definition, since I hear that the characters in a cartoon don't actually look like real people. However: there are also general laws against obscenity in some jurisdictions, and in US v. Whorley, it was held that you can still be convicted of receiving obscene material (Japanese child porn cartoons) – SCOTUS refused to hear an appeal. Most cases that are prosecuted also involve real child porn, or plea bargaining. In light of Whorley, it hasn't been definitively determined that hentai is against the law, but the first step has been taken.
U.S. law does not forbid 15 year olds from joining dating websites. Direct U.S. regulation of Internet communications mostly via the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) has a cutoff age of 13 years old. This said, nothing obligates websites to allow minors to join their dating app, and they may be reluctant to do so for fear that if you are mistreated by someone as a result of the app that they could be held responsible. In particular, amendments to the Communications Decency Act (CDA) called FOSTA-SESTA for the &quot;Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) and &quot;Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA)&quot; which took effect April 11, 2018, limited the prior near total protection from liability under Section 230 of the CDA. The amendments maked it illegal to knowingly assist, facilitate, or support sex trafficking, and amended the Communications Decency Act's section 230 safe harbors (which make online services immune from civil liability for their users' actions) to exclude enforcement of federal or state sex trafficking laws from immunity. Federal sex trafficking laws largely apply to commercial sex by people under the age of 18, which an online dating app could facilitate, if used by someone inclined to use it in that manner. The two main federal sex trafficking laws are as follows: Section 1591 now provides in part the following: “Whoever knowingly in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any means a person; knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion ... , or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act,” shall be imprisoned not less than 15 years (not less than 10 years, if the victim is 14 years of age or older and the offender is less than 18 years of age). The Mann Act outlaws prostitution and unlawful sexual activities that involve interstate or foreign travel. It consists of three principal substantive sections. Section 2421 proscribes the interstate or foreign transportation of someone for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual activity; misconduct which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years. Section 2422 condemns coercing or enticing another person to travel in interstate or foreign commerce to engage in prostitution or unlawful sexual activity, or using interstate communications to coerce or entice a child to engage in such conduct. The communications offense is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years; the travel offense by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Section 2423 outlaws four distinct offenses: (1) §2423(a) - transportation of a child in interstate or foreign commerce for purposes of prostitution or unlawful sexual purposes; (2) §2423(b)—interstate or foreign travel for purposes of unlawful sexual abuse of a child; (3) §2423(c)—foreign travel and subsequent unlawful sexual abuse of a child; and (4) §2423(d)— arranging, for profit, the travel outlawed in any of these offenses. The first is punishable by imprisonment for not less than 10 years, each of the others by imprisonment for not more than 30 years. So, the reluctance of a dating app to allow minors to use their services is understandable. They either need to aggressively police a low cost or free except for ad support service with considerable employee expense to do so, to avoid the risk of FOSTA-SESTA authorized liability, or they can not offer the service at all. In a nutshell, the app providers consider you to be jail-bait and don't want to face the associated risks.
The legal question is whether there is a religion-specific exception to mandatory vaccination laws, and if so where does it come from? These are state-specific laws, so one would have to look at a specific state to answer the question. In Washington, this is implemented in the exemptions section, RCW 28A.210.090 (1)(b) A written certification signed by any parent or legal guardian of the child or any adult in loco parentis to the child that the religious beliefs of the signator are contrary to the required immunization measures; or (c) A written certification signed by any parent or legal guardian of the child or any adult in loco parentis to the child that the signator has either a philosophical or personal objection to the immunization of the child.... (2)(c) Any parent or legal guardian of the child or any adult in loco parentis to the child who exempts the child due to religious beliefs pursuant to subsection (1)(b) of this section is not required to have the form provided for in (a) of this subsection signed by a health care practitioner if the parent or legal guardian demonstrates membership in a religious body or a church in which the religious beliefs or teachings of the church preclude a health care practitioner from providing medical treatment to the child. In other words, you have to just say you object for one of these reasons, or you have to show that you are a member of a sect that is known to object. The law does not, however, provide a central registry of churches whose teachings preclude immunization, not is there any investigation of the claim allowed under the law. In Nevada, NRS 392.437 does not expressly include the personal-or-philosophical exception contained in Washington law: A public school shall not refuse to enroll a child as a pupil because the child has not been immunized pursuant to NRS 392.435 if the parents or guardian of the child has submitted to the board of trustees of the school district or the governing body of a charter school in which the child has been accepted for enrollment a written statement indicating that their religious belief prohibits immunization of such child. However, there is, likewise, no further vetting of the claim for exemption where the state determines if the religion claim is real. Nevertheless, under a Nevada-type law, one would have to make the claim that the belief was religious in nature, in order to claim the Free-Exercise exemption. California has no such exemptions – they eliminated an existing exemption – and predictable they were sued (Brown v. Smith). The state district court rejected a free exercise argument, though one based on the California constitution (the court however cited various free exercise rulings in the US). That court points to case law saying that "the state’s wish to prevent the spread of communicable diseases clearly constitutes a compelling interest", suggesting that such a law might pass strict scrutiny (the First Amendment has limited exceptions). The ultimate legal source of such exceptions is the First Amendment, specifically the "Free Exercise Clause". In a nutshell, that says that the government cannot prohibit a person from exercising their religious beliefs. If that means you must pray at noon, you must be allowed to pray at noon; if that means that you cannot eat lettuce, you cannot be forced to eat lettuce. Because "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion", the government also may not get into the business of approving or disapproving religions. The courts have indicated that a personal or subjective belief does not enjoy Free Exercise protection. In Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 the court commented that Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal, rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses. Somewhat contradictorily, in US v. Seeger, the court held that "The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption", but "The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations, rather than religious belief", and "There is no issue here of atheistic beliefs, and, accordingly, the decision does not deal with that question" (that is, the court did not rule on atheistic religious beliefs). Under the premise that one claims a religious exemption, there is no further investigation as to how compelling the claim is. On the other hand, if one makes a claim that merely looks like slapping the religion label on a personal objection, one might well run afoul of the state law, and then the courts might be forced to judge that very delicate question. This could arise, for instance, in the context of the Islamic distinction between haram and makruh acts, where the former are absolutely forbidden and the latter are "recommended against".