Why does the First Amendment apply to states? The First Amendment doesn't say &quot;No one can restrict free speech&quot; - it says &quot;Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.&quot; You could interpret it as saying, &quot;Congress cannot restrict free speech, but a private company like StackExchange can make any restrictions it wants on speech, as long as they are not discriminatory,&quot; which I believe is a correct interpretation. But by the same token, couldn't you also read it to say, &quot;Congress cannot restrict free speech, but the states (and maybe executive orders) can impose any restrictions they want on speech.&quot; I'm reasonably certain this is NOT a correct interpretation. Is there some understanding that &quot;Congress&quot; here means &quot;any government entity&quot;?
The Fourteenth Amendment generally requires the states to recognize the same individual rights that the Bill of Rights requires Congress to recognize. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Supreme Court recognized that this includes the First Amendment right to free speech: For present purposes, we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and &quot;liberties&quot; protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States. We do not regard the incidental statement in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 259 U. S. 543, that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no restrictions on the States concerning freedom of speech, as determinative of this question. There is some debate as to exactly which language in the Fourteenth Amendment makes this happen -- probably the due-process clause, maybe the privileges and immunities clause -- but there isn't any real debate as to the outcome. The executive branch is likewise unable to enforce speech restrictions because all its programs are authorized and funded by Congress. There has been some argument in line with your proposed reading to the contrary, but the courts consistently enforce the First Amendment against the executive branch and even against themselves.
This page lists the highlights of case law regarding prior restraint and the First Amendment. Two pertinent cases are New York Times Co. v. United States, where the court held that despite the potential harm of publishing the revealed information, the prior restraint doctrine was more important (the government cannot prohibit speech before it happens). Reno v. ACLU affirms that even if a publication might cause harm to a class of people, that (limited) harm does not justify universally prohibiting the speech. There is no criminal penalty arising from the government censoring speech. A civil lawsuit – &quot;section 1983&quot; – is possible against an official who illegally attempts to suppress expression contra the First Amendment. The award might be just a dollar if the person so oppressed cannot prove actual damage. Technically, the sky is the limit, and it just depends on how outrageous the jury finds the government's action. If the government were to order suppression of opposition to its policies, we could easily be in the territory of world-record awards for violation of civil rights.
The right to free speech is a right that is guaranteed against the federal and state governments only. It is not a right that is secured against private individuals and corporations. It is also neither absolute nor unconditional, as there are a number of exceptions/limits. Alex Jones could not walk into your home and start "exercising free speech" and leave you with no recourse whatsoever to remove him from your home. If you don't consent to him being there, you may legally tell him to leave and have him removed by force if he fails to comply. Facebook etc. are the "homes" of the relevant corporations. They simply told Alex Jones to get out and go somewhere else. He retains his right to free speech; he simply never had a right to speak wherever he wanted. An always relevant XKCD.
How can incitement of imminent lawless action not be constitutionally protected? The short answer to your question is &quot;because the Supreme Court of the United States said so.&quot; In Brandenburg v. Ohio SCOTUS found that the Constitution protects speech that calls for lawless action in the abstract but does not protect speech &quot;directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action&quot;. The court's per curiam opinion seems to treat the decision as self-evident - it's quite short after discussing the facts of the case. However, Justice William O. Douglas wrote a concurring opinion (his &quot;caveat&quot;) that discussed and was critical of previous decisions in such cases, including the use of the 'clear and present danger test', so his opinion is useful for a brief history of First Amendment judgments to that point (Brandenburg). The Declaration of Independence is not law. Following &quot;a history of repeated injuries and usurpations&quot; and failures to reach political settlements it asserts a moral right to overthrow the tyranny of the British crown. It alludes to rights, it does not &quot;enshrine&quot; or create a legal right that the judiciary can interpret. Judges might refer to the Declaration in their judgments, not using it as legal authority but an articulation of fundamental values.
The restrictions of the First Amendment have been made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. For the right to assemble, this was recognized in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). But note that the right only protects peaceable assembly. When it is alleged that improper violence or other properly unlawful action has occurred, the state may make that criminal, and indeed laws against rioting have existed throughout the history of the US. Whether a law is criminalizing peaceful assembly or prohibiting unlawful violence is a question that depends on th wording of the law, and the way it is applied In the De Jonge opinion the Court wrote: The broad reach of the statute as thus applied is plain. While defendant was a member of the Communist Party, that membership was not necessary to conviction on such a charge. A like fate might have attended any speaker, although not a member, who &quot;assisted in the conduct&quot; of the meeting. However innocuous the object of the meeting, however lawful the subjects and tenor of the addresses, however reasonable and timely the discussion, all those assisting in the conduct of the meeting would be subject to imprisonment as felons if the meeting were held by the Communist Party. ... While the States are entitled to protect themselves from the abuse of the privileges of our institutions through an attempted substitution of force and violence in the place of peaceful political action in order to effect revolutionary changes in government, none of our decisions goes to the length of sustaining such a curtailment of the right of free speech and assembly as the Oregon statute demands in its present application. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, under the New York statute defining criminal anarchy, the defendant was found to be responsible for a &quot;manifesto&quot; advocating the overthrow of the government by violence and unlawful means. Id. pp. 268 U. S. 656, 268 U. S. 662, 268 U. S. 663. In Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, under the California statute relating to criminal syndicalism, the defendant was found guilty of willfully and deliberately assisting in the forming of an organization for the purpose of carrying on a revolutionary class struggle by criminal methods ... Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Gitlow v. New York, supra, p. 268 U. S. 666; Stromberg v. California, supra, p. 283 U. S. 368; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 283 U. S. 707; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 297 U. S. 243, 297 U. S. 244. The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press, and is equally fundamental. As this Court said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 92 U. S. 552: implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. The First Amendment of the Federal Constitution expressly guarantees that right against abridgment by Congress. But explicit mention there does not argue exclusion elsewhere. For the right is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions -- principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 272 U. S. 316; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 287 U. S. 67; Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra.
Normally, the term &quot;benefit of the doubt&quot;, if it was used, would mean that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the person entitled to it. This could be applied to contract interpretation or to statutory interpretation. Here is an example: When dealing with restrictions on campaign spending and speech, a court's construction must “give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship. The First Amendment's command that ‘Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech’ demands at least that. Colorado Educ. Ass'n v. Rutt, 184 P.3d 65, 75–76 (Colo. 2008) (ultimately holding that union activities to organize volunteers to walk precincts with a political candidate did not constitute a &quot;campaign expenditure&quot; of a union within the meaning of a state law restriction campaign contributions by unions).
You have a couple major misconceptions about US law. First, crimes against the person are generally punished at the state level. States are not restricted to any sort of enumerated powers, and can pass any law they want to promote the general welfare unless there's a reason they can't. This is called the "general police power," and it lets them make everything from contract law to laws against murder. The federal government has to justify what gives it the authority to pass a law, and cities and counties have to justify their authority with state law or a state constitution, but a state government never has to preemptively justify why they have the authority to pass a law. States are especially not limited to powers listed in the federal constitution. The US Constitution sets up the federal government. State governments are set up by state constitutions, and derive their authority directly from the consent of the people of the state exercising their right to democratic self-determination. The only powers the US Constitution gives to states are minor technical powers involving state-federal relations (e.g. deciding how their presidential electors are appointed). But as I said, they aren't generally limited to any sort of enumerated powers by their state constitution either. Even the federal government isn't limited to "protecting rights listed in amendments." That's very little of what it does, in fact. Congress has powers listed (for the most part) in Article I and Article IV. It can pass laws banning murder in DC because Article I lets it exercise exclusive jurisdiction (meaning general police power) over DC and over federal enclaves. Article IV lets it exercise general police power over US territories, and pass laws regarding other federal property (I think it has a general police power there too, at least according to current law). The Necessary and Proper clause gives Congress the power to protect its own operations by, for instance, criminalizing the murder of a federal judge. Etc. Where there isn't a clear thing that lets the feds regulate something, they can probably get away with cramming "in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce" in the law, secure in the knowledge that practically everything affects interstate commerce. I'm not sure where you got the idea that laws are passed exclusively to enforce rights protected by the Constitution. They are not. They are not passed primarily for that purpose. Such laws do exist (e.g. deprivation of rights under color of law, which was passed pursuant to the 14th Amendment), but they're protecting you from government infringement of that right.
What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be &quot;crucial military information&quot;.