Does 7 USC 136j(a)(2)(G) ban the use of a pesticide labeled for use against a pest not mentioned on the label? In one of the answers to the recent question, Is it illegal to kill honeybees in Oregon or in the USA?, 7 USC 136j (a)(2)(G) was cited, which says: It shall be unlawful for any person... to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling The argument was then made that, if the label does not specifically allow use against honeybees, then the use of pesticide against them is a violation of the this law, as it would be using the registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling. Is this a correct interpretation of this law? Is it really illegal under 7 USC 136j(a)(2)(G) to intentionally use a pesticide against a pest that the label does not mention? (Note that this question is not concerned with the ultimate answer to the cited question, so whether any other law may exist that limits or bans pesticide use against honeybees is not of concern for this question, though it might make an interesting answer to the cited question.)
No, it is not illegal under 7 USC 136j (a)(2)(G) to use a pesticide labeled for use against one pest against another pest... at least not anymore. It turns out that there apparently were cases of the EPA interpreting the language of that portion of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) in an overly broad manner. This included the interpretation in question here, as well as even interpreting it to ban using doses or concentrations less than those specified by the label. In response, Congress amended FIFRA in 1978 to add a definition of the term "To use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling" as 7 USC 136 (ee): The term “to use any registered pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling” means to use any registered pesticide in a manner not permitted by the labeling, except that the term shall not include (1) applying a pesticide at any dosage, concentration, or frequency less than that specified on the labeling unless the labeling specifically prohibits deviation from the specified dosage, concentration, or frequency, (2) applying a pesticide against any target pest not specified on the labeling if the application is to the crop, animal, or site specified on the labeling, unless the Administrator has required that the labeling specifically state that the pesticide may be used only for the pests specified on the labeling after the Administrator has determined that the use of the pesticide against other pests would cause an unreasonable adverse effect on the environment... [other exceptions not relevant to this question] The act that included the amendment became Public Law 95-396 (PDF), also known as the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, upon being signed into law by President Carter on Sept 30, 1978. A question was raised on the linked question that this exception might have been referring to accidental use against one pest when another was being targeted, however, the following description of the meaning was given in a summary of the bill on the Senate floor when the final version of the bill was being considered for passage: Third, the new definition will permit farmers to use pesticides that are already registered for a crop or site for pests not listed on the labeling. It is rather foolish to tell farmers that they can put a pesticide on a crop for one bug, but that they cannot apply it to the same crop for another bug. Senator Herman Talmadge (D-GA), Senate Floor, Sept 18, 1978 (Source: Congressional Record vol. 124 (1978), part 22, page 29760 (Warning: 584 MB PDF)) Senator Talmadge was Chair of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry at the time and so had been heavily involved in crafting the bill. So, allowing the use of a registered pesticide against a pest not mentioned on its label was indeed the expressed intent of Congress in adding this exception to the definition of using a pesticide in a manner inconsistent with its labeling. As long as the pesticide in question is being applied to a plant, animal, or site specified on the label and the Administrator of the EPA hasn't required the specific pesticide in question to expressly prohibit use against other pests on its label, then intentionally using it against a pest not specified on its label is not a violation of 7 USC 136j (a)(2)(G).
Laws against such actions are not stated in terms of popular and fluid concepts like "computer virus", they are stated in terms of clear concepts like "unauthorized access". There are federal and state laws against this. This web site lists and links to all of the state laws on the matter. There is also a federal law: a detailed legal analysis by DOJ is given here. There are some limits to federal jurisdiction, for example "protected computers" include "computers used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication". The term "affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication" is widely used in federal law, and can be used to prohibit growing feed for your own animals. Anything that you "send" clearly affects interstate commerce (the internet is internationally connected). 18 USC 1030(a) says Whoever ... (2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains...(C) information from any protected computer Essentially, a computer connected to the outside world is protected. The key here is "without authorization". If you authorize MS to report back stuff about your computer, that is not unauthorized. It may not be possible to use their product without giving such authorization, in which case you can use a different product that doesn't require that you grant authorization. There is also the possibility that some software producer has technically violates the law because they think that it's okay for them to access the computer as long as they do no harm. Typically, people are not aware that they have granted software publishers access to their computer. The concept of "harm" is pretty much irrelevant to computer-crime criminal law. It would be relevant, though, if a plaintiff were to sue someone for sniffing around their computer: then you'd have to show that you were damaged.
Against Bob: yes; Against Cindy: no I'm going to borrow @Trish's example because it's a good one although the conclusions they reach are wrong. Alice made a green box. Bob signs an NDA never to tell anyone that Alice made a green box, and there is a clause in it that if the NDA is breached, the box is red. Bob tells Cindy that Alice made a green box. Cindy has a patent on making green boxes. Cindy sues Alice and in the lawsuit puts Bob on the stand. Situation 1 So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. Bob is on the stand and is required to answer questions honestly and no contract can prevent him from doing so. He testifies that the box is green. This would be a breach of contract except that a clause that requires a breach of the law (perjury in this case) is void for public policy reasons so Bob cannot be sued for this. However, he can be sued for the initial breach - he may have a public policy defense here because Alice was breaking the law, however, it’s easy enough to construct a scenario where Alice was innocent but suffered loss from Bob’s disclosure. Cindy can say what she likes because she is not bound by the NDA. Cindy wins, Alice loses. Situation 2 Cindy dies - after a long and happy life so we won't grieve too much. To Bob's surprise, he inherits Cindy's green box patent of which he was previously in complete ignorance of. Bob sues Alice for breaching Cindy's now his, patent. So, the box is objectively green and objectively a breach of Cindy's patent on green boxes. However, Bob agreed with Alice in the contract that the box is red and so, legally for matters between Alice and Bob the box is legally red (notwithstanding that everyone knows it's green) and is not in breach of Bob's patent. This sort of stuff has a name - a legal fiction. Adoption is a legal fiction - adoptive parents are (legally) parents; biological parents of adopted children are (legally) strangers. Alice wins, Bob loses.
We can't really know until the ruling is made. The Supreme Court might issue a ruling that encompasses all software APIs, or may predicate its ruling on this more specific situation, e.g. that because Oracle's library is so extensive its structure can be copyrighted even if that does not necessarily mean that any individual function signature can be copyrighted. They could also decide based on something unrelated to the heart of the copyright question - skimming through the petition for a writ of certiorari, they could make a decision based on the original implied license from Sun, for example. Hopefully their decision will answer the copyright question of function declarations completely, but it isn't required to.
There are, as far as I know, no &quot;FDA-approved&quot; vaccines against covid in the US. The FDA has given Emergency Use Authorization to some vaccines. This does not currently include the Johnson &amp; Johnson vaccine. It is impossible for a person to get the J&amp;J vaccine in the US, because it is not authorized, and J&amp;J does not distribute it. One could imagine an unauthorized foreign vaccine being smuggled into the US, but it would be illegal to distribute it. I assume that you specifically mean, can a person refuse to get a vaccination on the grounds that it only has an emergency authorization and is not actually approved: and can one sue an employer for firing you because you refused to get vaccinated? In general, the employer can fire for anything they want, unless you have an employment contract that limits the grounds for termination. There are discrimination-based grounds that they cannot use, such as race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, gender identity, and sexual orientation), national origin, disability, age (age 40 or older), or genetic information at the federal level. Mississippi has no specific employment discrimination laws. Other that that, an employer can fire an employee for any reason, or no reason (Mississippi is what's known as an &quot;employment at will&quot; state). There are some state restrictions where it is prohibited for an employer to fire an employee for engaging in a specific required activity such as being called for jury duty or being called to military duty. An employer could not require an employee to break the law, but that is not applicable here.
There appear to be no explicit federal laws against the practice. Each state has its own laws and many would depend on the individual interpretation of the genera "Humane Treatment of Animals" statutes. It appears that individual states do have laws against killing cats and dogs for food. The California law also protects "any animal traditionally or commonly kept as a pet or companion," Is it legal to eat your cat? Few states have specific laws barring the use of pets for food. The ones that do typically ban the slaughter or sale of dog and cat meat. The state of New York expressly prohibits "any person to slaughter or butcher domesticated dog (canis familiaris) or domesticated cat (felis catus or domesticus) to create food, meat or meat products for human or animal consumption." It's not clear whether the eating itself is outlawed or only the butchery. If you managed to buy dog or cat flesh from someone else who broke the anti-slaughter law, you might be OK. The law also doesn't cover ferrets, gerbils, parakeets, or other less familiar pet species. (Although the general anti-cruelty law might protect exotics.) California's anti-pet-eating law has a broader reach. It bars possession of the carcass, so having bought your cat steaks from someone else wouldn't be a useful alibi. The California law also protects "any animal traditionally or commonly kept as a pet or companion," rather than just Fido and Fluffy. The statute is somewhat untested, though, so no one really knows which animals are included. Pigs are not, even though they are commonly kept as pets, because they are farm animals. Horses are specifically covered by a different section of the code. There's no precedent on iguanas, goldfish, or boa constrictors. In most of the country, the legality of pet-eating would come down to the specific language of the general animal cruelty statute and how a judge interpreted it. Some states, such as Virginia, bar the unnecessary killing of an animal, with a specific exemption for "farming activities." In those places, it's very likely that killing a cat for dinner would get you in trouble, because the killing wouldn't be necessary, and cats aren't commonly associated with farming. On the other end of the spectrum are states like Missouri, where very few restrictions are placed on when, why, and how an owner can kill his pet. In these areas, it would be difficult to lock up a cat-eater, unless his chosen means of slaughter were particularly inhumane. There was also a report that a Los Angeles restaurant had been granted permission to consume and sell dog meat (American Restaurant Granted Permission To Sell Dog Meat - link now dead). However, according to fact checking site Snopes.com, this is not true: Fact Check - American Restaurant Granted Permission to Sell Dog Meat: Claim: A restaurant in Los Angeles or New York has been granted legal permission to serve dog meat. FALSE
From what I can see on the USPTO registry, &quot;tweet&quot; is still not trademarked for the purposes you're talking about. Twitter has been working to secure that trademark, but I can't find any record of them having actually secured it. Just the same, I'd predict that using it will get you at least a cease-and-desist letter, and possibly a lawsuit. Whether you'd win that case seems to be a very open question, but that presumes you have the resources to litigate.
Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts.