Term for an action leading to something else I am looking (searches so far not successful) for a term that describes this type of scenario: A teen puts a nail against the tire of a parked car as a prank. It leads to an accident that results in a death, and is prosecuted for this. A person pulls a knife on a victim and a passerby fires a gun to help out. The bullet misses, but kills a bystander, and the knife thief is the one charged with murder. In other words, the term for prosecution based on being the one that set in motion a series of events, even if not the one finally responsible, here, neither the driver, nor the shooter.
I would describe those scenarios as hard cases on causation. I don't think there is any single word for an act which gives rise to such a case. Each case relates to an act which was a necessary condition of the injury which occurred. &quot;But for&quot; causation is established. However, the factual scenario is an unusual one where the legal or proximate cause is not obvious. Cases in which the chain of causation is too complex for the defendant to be held liable may be described as failing on the grounds of remoteness or foreseeability. An intervening act which breaks the chain of causation is called a novus actus interveniens.
Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!
No, a later trial is not allowed A prosecutor can, and often will charge multiple related crimes, and all will be addressed at the same trial. But once a person has been acquitted on a given set of events, the same jurisdiction cannot re-try the same person on what is often called a lesser included offense. Nor on a greater offense implied by the same events. Not even if additional evidence comes to light. However, if an act (or set of acts) is a crime under both state law and Federal law, for example theft by deception (state crime) and wire fraud (federal crime) one jurisdiction may try the person even after ther has been an acquittal in the other. I think the same rule applies if an act is a crime within the jurisdiction of two different states, that both can trey the accused. In many cases prosecutors will choose not to bring the second trial, but they can if they see fit.
This is going to vary by state to some degree. The Wisconsin battery law says in part: (1) Whoever causes bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another without the consent of the person so harmed is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. (2) Whoever causes substantial bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another is guilty of a Class I felony. And the terms are defined like this: “Bodily harm&quot; means physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. “Substantial bodily harm&quot; means bodily injury that causes a laceration that requires stitches, staples, or a tissue adhesive; any fracture of a bone; a broken nose; a burn; a petechia; a temporary loss of consciousness, sight or hearing; a concussion; or a loss or fracture of a tooth. So it would seem that one could present a defense of &quot;they consented&quot; if bodily harm was inflicted, but not if great bodily harm was inflicted. If they were being obviously sarcastic, then that's not really consent.
(assuming United States law here, though I'd be surprised if it were significantly different in other jurisdictions with such restrictions) Your friend is incorrect: that would be a new offense, for which Person A could be prosecuted anew. If your friend's logic were correct, once a person is convicted of robbing a store, they'd be free to rob that store without repercussions for life. It's worth noting that the conviction isn't relevant: the prohibition of double jeopardy in the United States prevents even multiple prosecutions (except, in some cases, for separate state and federal prosecutions or foreign prosecutions).
That sounds a lot like the German Antragsdelikt (literally "crime by request"). That is a crime (defined in the criminal code), that can only be prosecuted if the victim requests it. Antragsdelikt mostly applies to less serious crimes, such as slander or petty theft, while "serious" crimes, such as robbery or assault must always be prosecuted (Offizialdelikt). Also, there are many minor crimes (relatives Antragsdelikt) which are usually only prosecuted by request, but where the prosecution can also decide to press charges if it is in the "public interest" (usually because the act is deemed a serious infraction). Similar concepts exist in Austria and Switzerland.
Through the legal doctrine of &quot;transferred intent&quot;, wherein if one intends to murder A, and undertake actions to kill A, but one's actions kill B, one has murdered B. Whatever crimes one would have committed, had one performed them on one's intended target, are considered committed against the individual one actually performed them on. Many crimes require one to have mens rea to be guilty; they do not require one to have mens rea towards a given individual. So, so long as one had the proper intent to murder someone, the actual victim of their actions is irrelevant.
Yes. This sounds equivalent to the famous case of Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971). A shotgun trap was set up in an abandoned house owned by Edward and Bertha Briney. A thief broke in and was seriously injured. After the thief had served his sentance for the attempted theft he sued the homeowners and won $20,000 in actual damages and $10,000 in punitive damages.