Why can some states choose to reject the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine? In the United States, the US Supreme Court established the Turntable Doctrine, in R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657. As I understand it, In general, if a person is injured while trespassing on someone’s property then, unless the injury is due to some specific fault of the landowner, the landowner isn’t liable. After all, if someone trespasses on your property, you shouldn’t be liable for poor judgment exercised by the trespasser, especially since he shouldn’t have been trespassing in the first place. But Stout created an exception to this, initially termed the “turntable doctrine” (named after the piece of railroad machinery that that the child Stout was playing on when injured). The idea was that young children are a special case requiring a higher duty of care. Stout was cited soon after in a similar turntable case, Keffe v. Milwaukee &amp; St. Paul Railroad Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875). The term “attractive nuisance doctrine” originated in Keffe, which explained the attractiveness concept thus: To treat the plaintiff as a voluntary trespasser is to ignore the averments of the complaint, that the turn-table, which was situate[d] in a public (by which we understand an open, frequented) place, was, when left unfastened, very attractive, and, when put in motion by them, was dangerous to young children, by whom it could be easily put in motion, and many of whom were in the habit of going upon it to play. The turn-table, being thus attractive, presented to the natural instincts of young children a strong temptation; and such children, following, as they must be expected to follow, those natural instincts, were thus allured into a danger whose nature and extent they, being without judgment or discretion, could neither apprehend nor appreciate, and against which they could not protect themselves. The difference between the plaintiff's position and that of a voluntary trespasser, capable of using care, consists in this, that the plaintiff was induced to come upon the defendant's turn-table by the defendant's own conduct, and that, as to him, the turntable was a hidden danger, a trap. Twenty years later, the New York Court of Appeals discussed the turntable doctrine in Walsh v. F.R.R. Co., 39 N.E. 1068 (NY 1895) and said Stout didn't apply in that case. Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. But then Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 19 N.E.2d 981, 280 N.Y. comes along in 1939 and says The general rule which has prevailed since the well-known turntable case (Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 145 N.Y. 301) is that the so-called doctrine of attractive nuisance does not apply in New York, and that the only duty which an owner of land owes to a trespasser or bare licensee is to abstain from affirmative acts of negligence or not to injure intentionally such person. And from there to the present, supposedly New York doesn't follow the Attractive Nuisance Doctrine. How can some states follow it and some others not? I've heard of circuit splits, but they can be resolved by a Supreme Court decision. In this situation, a Supreme Court decision already exists, so I don't see how there can be a circuit split on this. (Reason for question: I am taking a paralegal class and one of the exercises asks the student to determine whether the attractive nuisance doctrine holds in the state where the student lives.)
The US Supreme Court only has jurisdiction in federal matters. So if someone is suing under federal law, or there is a constitutional question, the Supreme Court is the place to go for a definitive answer. However, states have their own laws. The Supreme Court cannot tell New York that it must apply the attractive nuisance doctrine, as it is neither a matter of federal law nor a constitutional matter. New York is free to make its own laws on the subject, and the New York courts are free to interpret those laws as they see fit. In fact, federal courts are required to defer to New York's interpretation if New York's laws apply to the case, even if the case is in federal court for some reason (like diversity of parties.) See the Erie doctrine (which, coincidentally, involves yet another case about railroad injuries.)
Overview This is a somewhat complex issue. The presence of &quot;No Trespassing&quot; signs would make anyone who enters the property without a specific invitation a trespasser. So would the presence of a fence, even if there was a closed but unlocked gate. An &quot;Enter at your own risk&quot; sign probably would not make such people legally trespassers. In West Virginia, a landowner or lessee or other lawful occupant owes a duty of &quot;reasonable care&quot; to invitees and other non-trespassers. No such duty is owed to trespassers. However, the owner or lawful occupant is expected to avoid dangerous conditions and reckless hazards, as well as intentional causes of harm (such as booby-traps). If through recklessness or serious negligance a dangerous condition exists and a person, even a trespasser, is injured or killed because of such a condition, the owner or lawful occupant is likely to be liable. However, if the danger is &quot;open and obvious&quot; or is as well known to the injured person as to the owner or occupant, there is no liability. A warning sign might make a danger &quot;open and obvious&quot;. I do not see that video cameras will be relevant to the matter at all. Cameras do not warn a pedestrian not to enter, nor do they warn of any danger, nor do they prevent a pedestrian from being injured. They may help in detecting or even preventing crime, but will not affect liability for injury to a pedestrian. Sources West Virginia Code Code Sections §61-3B-3. (Trespass on property other than structure or conveyance.) of the West Virginia Code provides that: (a) It is an unlawful trespass for any person to knowingly, and without being authorized, licensed or invited, to enter or remain on any property, other than a structure or conveyance, as to which notice against entering or remaining is either given by actual communication to such person or by posting, fencing or cultivation. §55-7-27. (Liability of possessor of real property for harm to a trespasser.) (a) A possessor of real property, including an owner, lessee or other lawful occupant, owes no duty of care to a trespasser except in those circumstances where a common-law right-of-action existed as of the effective date of this section, including the duty to refrain from willfully or wantonly causing the trespasser injury. (b) A possessor of real property may use justifiable force to repel a criminal trespasser as provided by section twenty-two of this article. (c) This section does not increase the liability of any possessor of real property and does not affect any immunities from or defenses to liability established by another section of this code or available at common law to which a possessor of real property may be entitled. (d) The Legislature intends to codify and preserve the common law in West Virginia on the duties owed to trespassers by possessors of real property as of the effective date of this section. Articles from Law Firms The article &quot;West Virginia Legislature reinstitutes “open and obvious” doctrine&quot; from the law firm Farmer, Cline, &amp; Campbell discusses how the case of Hersch v. E-T Enterprises, Ltd. P’ship. in which a WVa court abolished the &quot;open and obvious&quot; except to liability, imposing dameages for an &quot;open and obvious&quot; hazard, specifically an open stair without guardrails. The legislature then amended §55-7-27. (a) to restore the exception. The article also reads: West Virginia state law requires property owners remove hazards from their property to reduce the risk of these injuries. The expectation is dependent on the type of person that is on the property. Previously, visitors were broken into one of four categories: invitee, licensee, social guest or trespasser. The duty of care owed to the visitor depended on the category under which the visitor qualified. Today, there are only two categories: trespasser and non-trespasser. The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Mallet v. Pickens, abolished the four categories mentioned above, and held that “landowners or possessors now owe any non-trespassing entrant a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.” The article &quot;Property owners may be liable for injuries to trespassers&quot; from the law firm Farmer, Cline, &amp; Campbell reads: West Virginia homeowners are not obligated to protect those who trespass upon their property. However, they should be aware that they cannot willfully cause injury to any who do trespass. This law can become an issue for homeowners with frequent trespassers as they may find themselves liable for injuries any people, even the uninvited ones, sustain if their properties are left in an unsafe condition. For example, homeowners and landowners could potentially face lawsuits if they purposefully made their properties unsafe. They may also be held liable if the condition of their properties could cause serious bodily harm or death. Further, landowners can also potentially face legal consequences if they fail to warn potential trespassers that there are hazards on their properties. The article &quot;Determining Duty in West Virginia Premises Liability Cases&quot; from Colombo Law reads: Most states use three categories to determine whether a duty is owed to individuals who enter the property of another. These three categories are business invitee, licensee, and trespasser. In the past, West Virginia was one of the many states that followed this standard. However, in 1999 West Virginia abolished and replaced the three specific classifications with a new, more general standard of determining whether the individual is a trespasser or a nnon-trespasser Trespasser. A trespasser is an individual who enters the property of another without the permission of a landowner. An individual will be deemed a trespasser if they do not have either express or implied permission from the owner. In West Virginia, the courts offer little protection to those who are trespassers. As a trespasser, a landowner must only refrain from intentional or reckless conduct. Non-Trespassers. Contrary to trespassers, landowners owe a duty to anyone that is permitted to be on the property. If an individual enters private property with the express or implied permission of a landowner, the landowner must ensure that the premises are reasonably safe for those on the premises. To ensure you are meeting the standard of care, the landowner must inspect the premises to determine whether there are any dangerous conditions present on the property and repair and/or warn individuals of the danger. Premises liability is the legal premise for which landowners are responsible for harm caused by unsafe conditions existing on the landowner’s premises. Premises liability is a broad concept that may be raised for a variety of harms present. One main reason for personal injury actions stemming from premises liability include slip and fall accidents as a result of: Slippery floors Uneven sidewalks or pavement Objects protruding from carpeting , floorboards, or store shelves
There is a general defence to any crime called self defense. If you commit a crime, but the reason you commit it is because you are acting in self defense, or the defense of another, then you will not be found guilty of that crime. For example, if you kill someone, but the court believes you are acting in self defense, then you will not be found guilty of murder (or manslaughter). This defense extends to other crimes too, and trespassing would be included in this. Acting in the defense of another person has the same effect as acting in self defense. Just note that you would have to prove that it was reasonable for you to be acting in the way you did. Usually this means that the crime you committed was proportional or necessary to prevent the crime that would have occurred, and if self defense is involved, that it was necessary to do what you had to do to prevent harm to you or another.
This varies depending on the specific law of the state or locality involved. In New York, the word &quot;POSTED&quot;, along with the name and address of the owner is sufficient to notify people not to intrude, and anyone ignoring such a sign is technically trespassing (although, in practice, if such a person leaves the property when asked, did no damage, and appeared honestly ignorant, it is likely that no legal action would be taken). In California, as specified by penal code section 553 (quoted in the linked answer) a sign for this purpose must include: the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” in letters at least two inches tall, and follow other specifications in the law. The word &quot;Posted&quot; is neither required nor sufficient, although the law calls land with such signs &quot;posted property&quot;.
Can someone be compelled to prove they are complying with a contract? In this context, yes, since its apparent breach is evident. The other answer rightly explains the notion of preponderance of evidence, which pertains to the procedural aspect. Here, I will mainly address the substantive standpoint as per the situation you describe. The HOA rule most likely is intended to serve one or more purposes, such as preserving the prestige of the neighborhood, and to avoid safety hazards. The prolonged presence of an abandoned vehicle --just like any piece of junk--- tends to contravene those purposes. Regardless of the vehicle's true state, the effect of its apparent abandonment is visibly detrimental to the neighborhood, and it frustrates the ultimate purposes of the HOA rule: to preserve safety conditions in the neighborhood as well as the value of the properties. Also, the presumption that an abandoned vehicle is inoperable seems reasonable. The most straight-forward way to disprove the board's allegations of inoperability is to actually move the vehicle at least once in a while. Accordingly, the owner's inexplicable reluctance to take that simple step reinforces the supported suspicion that the vehicle is indeed inoperable, and thus in breach of the HOA rule.
The Missouri trespass law is here. The police will not detain a person for expressing himself, even repeatedly, though a court order to stay away would change things. The law says A person does not commit the offense of trespass in the first degree by entering or remaining upon real property unless the real property is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders or as to which notice against trespass is given by: (1) Actual communication to the actor; or (2) Posting in a manner reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders. You can also use purple paint markers. There is also a law against stalking which prohibits unwanted communication that may be threatening, intimidating, frightening or causes emotional distress to another person. However, you need to petition the courts for an order of protection. If granted, violating the order would be a felony, and more likely to get the attention of the police. Getting an attorney is the simplest immediate solution, since I expect that purple paint won't mean much to him.
Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).
Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.