Can one disclaim or renounce a British peerage after holding it for a year? According to the Peerage Act 1963, anyone may disclaim a hereditary title of nobility within one year of inheriting it, or within one year of the passage of the Act. Since the latter deadline has long since lapsed, is there currently any way to disclaim or renounce a peerage after having held it for more than a year? For instance, say the Earl of Exampleshire, who has held the title since 1990, becomes a fervent republican and wishes to completely dissociate himself from any noble rank. Short of lobbying for and obtaining new legislation (possibly in the form of a private act), or being attainted for a heinous crime, is there any legal mechanism by which said Earl could rid himself of his title and all its attendant privileges and obligations? If the only realistic options involve the consent of the government or the legislative action of Parliament, and the government/Parliament refuses to cooperate, would the Earl have any recourse to the European Court of Human Rights? That is, is there anything in the European Convention on Human Rights that could plausibly be construed as applying to such a case?
There is currently no means for the Earl to disclaim his title, if it has been longer than the permitted period since he inherited it. He also could not do so if he was the first holder, since the 1963 Act only applies to inheritance, and he cannot disclaim a life peerage. The reasoning from 1963 is that the Act was made for people who wanted to sit in the House of Commons, but could not do so due to an accident of birth - something they had no say in. For a life peerage, or peerage of the first creation, they should have refused the honour at the time it was offered. The situation is now a bit different thanks to the removal of all but 92 hereditary peers from the House of Lords in 1999, and the resignation provisions in the House of Lords Reform Act 2014. If the Earl were one of the 92, then he could not disclaim the peerage until he resigned, or was disqualified under other provisions of the 2014 Act. On resignation, he would become able to vote in general elections, stand as a candidate, and sit in the Commons if elected. (By the way, Church of England bishops who are members of the Lords can also resign, but do so in a different way.) So any hereditary or life peer who feels that they are disenfranchised by virtue of sitting in the Lords also has the means to leave that chamber. That makes it difficult to make a human rights claim on the basis of Article 3 of the First Protocol. The European Court of Human Rights has upheld other kinds of voting restrictions in parallel circumstances, such as Ahmed and others v United Kingdom [1998]. In that case, several local government officials were barred from certain political activities, including standing for election, and brought a claim against the UK concerning violation of Articles 10 (free expression), 11 (free association) and 3 of Protocol 1 (free elections). The Court found that the restrictions were justified, and in particular that the applicants could avoid them by resigning. An opposite case was X v United Kingdom [1978] in which the applicant claimed a violation of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) because he claimed to have the right to sit in the Lords but his petition to the Queen was denied. The Commission found that participating in the legislature is part of public law as opposed to a &quot;civil right&quot; within the scope of Article 6. Also, granting or withholding an honour has traditionally been held to be immune from judicial review - cited for example in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 - although this conclusion may no longer be completely solid since the well-known 2019 Miller case. That would apply for aspects of a peerage which are purely ceremonial in nature. The Earl might want to argue that his free expression is impaired by having a hereditary title at all. But there is nothing stopping him from calling himself by an ordinary name. British law doesn't require him to be called the Earl in any context, and there are plenty of peers who use their normal names while working at normal jobs. He has a defined place in the order of precedence, but I am not convinced that the situation would arise where he insisted on going to a fancy dinner and had a contretemps with the host over the seating arrangement that amounted to a human rights violation. Equally, he has the right to wear an Earl's coronet at a royal coronation, but our newly republican Earl would probably just not go. In the case of the Earl Marshal - a hereditary office which goes along with being the Duke of Norfolk - there are non-trivial duties involved, and an Earl Marshal might justifiably want to stop doing them. The past procedure has been for the Crown to appoint a Deputy Earl Marshal instead, as was done in 2000 when the Duke at the time was unwell. It would seem that a similar manoeuvre would work for any other hereditary offices that were more than nominal. If the Crown refused to do this, then perhaps a claim could arise under Article 14 (discrimination on the grounds of birth), but it would require a particularly intransigent Crown. Hereditary peers may hold property in a variety of entertaining feudally-derived ways, in addition to more familiar modes. The most relevant scenario to imagine is that our Earl owns Exampleshire Castle in &quot;fee tail&quot;, meaning that he can't dispose of it even though it is horribly expensive for him to keep paying for repairs to its leaky roof - it must pass to his eldest son, and so forth. Even if the Earl is able to disclaim his peerage, he may still be on the hook for the property, depending on how everything is structured. However, there are generally legal workarounds these days, beyond the scope of this question, unlike when entails were so important to the plots of historical stories featuring the aristocracy. There is a current campaign by daughters of some peers to change the inheritance laws away from male-preference primogeniture, including on human rights grounds. It remains to be seen how that will work out, but a key difference here is that they are losing out by not being able to inherit, while the Earl is able to divest himself of all the disadvantages of the title, by simply not using it.
england-and-wales - present day... Would the contents of the envelope be considered privileged? No Although it is possible to argue that the letter is a communication to the lawyer (albeit by mistake) its purpose is not in relation to seeking or receiving legal advice, so it fails to meet the definition of legal privilege: There are two forms of legal professional privilege: Legal advice privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers and their clients for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal advice. Litigation privilege protects confidential communications between lawyers, clients and third parties made for the purposes of litigation, either actual or contemplated. Would the lawyer be required to divulge it if asked by the police or in a court? Yes, No, Maybe If the lawyer is a suspect/defendant then there is no requirement to answer any questions whatsoever. Similarly, there is no obligation on a witness to answer questions unless a statutory provision has been triggered, such as the lawyer being given a Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 Disclosure Notice. Would he be required to report the matter to the police on his own? Yes Although there is no general requirement to report a crime (of this nature) to the police, the lawyer's profession is in the &quot;regulated sector&quot; which requires Suspicious Activity Reports to be submitted to the authorities: ... in respect of information that comes to them in the course of their business if they know, or suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that a person is engaged in, or attempting, money laundering... What difference, if any does it make that the client apparently did not intend to send these contents to the lawyer? None that I can see ETA The status of legal privilege in 1925 seems to have been the same as now, and this Wikipedia article, under the heading History offers this in support: The common law principle of legal professional privilege is of extremely long standing. The earliest recorded instance of the principle in English case-law dates from 1577 in the case of Berd v Lovelace ([1576] EngR 10 (&amp; Ors))
Questions about being barred from entry into the UK 10 years down the road need to be asked some number of years in the future. Current practice is that the Home Secretary does not bar entry because of an unpaid debt, instead you have to do something egregiously bad or antisocial. Given Brexit, future matters of immigration are not set in stone. One consequence of walking away from a lease is that you are likely to be sued (in UK courts) for breach of contract, and the court may find that you owe the rest of the lease money. If that happens, you need to be concerned with whether the judgment can be enforced against you, even when you are in the US. The general answer is, yes, the landlord can petition the US courts to enforce a UK judgment against you. The specific details depend on the law of your state, but most states have a version of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act. In addition, the landlord could sue you in US courts (maybe not as convenient for him). There is no requirement that you have to be a US citizen to sue a US person, and a landlord can (would almost certainly) sue you via a US attorney who would represent him. An alternative to fleeing your obligation and saying "Go ahead and sue me!" is to negotiate a termination of the lease. The landlord would have a duty to mitigate his losses, so if the remainder of the lease has a value of $2,000 a month for 8 months, the landlord can't just do nothing -- he has to try to rent the unit out, so perhaps his actual losses would be only $4,000. Suing a person is expensive especially when you you are dealing in trans-national disputes, so he may be willing to accept some figure in exchange for terminating the lease. Your (UK) lawyer will give you good advice on how to proceed, if you opt to not get sued.
Transfer of title must eventually occur, otherwise the property was never willed to another because the willing of the property is perpetually incomplete. One can place conditions on the transfer of title, but those conditions cannot last forever. They can last quite long, but there is a rule against perpetuities, especially created due to clauses constraining the transfer of of title in wills. This rule applies to a person who is transferring title, with a conditional clause that bars the full use of the property. If such a clause is limited, then it does not exist in perpetuity. The rule specifically addressed the will's call to reassign title if the transfer's clauses were violated. The maximum limitation historically was the lifetime of some person alive when the will was executed, plus 21 years, to permit an unborn grandchild to inherit. The reason this rule came about was due to the will of Henry Frederick Howard, the Earl of Arundel and Surrey. It effectively left the dead Earl managing his estates after his death, shifting properties that were bequeathed, based on the possibility of a &quot;more suitable&quot; heir being born after the Earl's death. This will eventually created the most complicated bit of common law that exists to date. In my totally amatuer attempt to summarize it; it is a combination of at least two ideas: a &quot;dead hand&quot; (deceased person) cannot guide the activities of the living forever transfer of property (title) must eventually be fully transferred Exceptions to the rule exist for conditional transfer of title back to the person who originally owned the property, but these exceptions cannot apply when the transfer is to a third party. This clause in Evan's will, &quot;If the state violates this clause, the property is to return to the heirs of the estate of Evan Carroll.&quot; would only be enforceable for a limited amount of time. First, the Estate of a dead Evan Carroll is not a lasting entity, eventually his estate would be closed. Finally, the transfer to the &quot;heirs&quot; of Evan Carroll would be a transfer to a third party, subject to the rule. Some states interpret their protections against the rule in different ways; but, nearly all states that have revoked the rule have done so by making a new rule (often with easier to manage time limits). A handful claim to have revoked the rule; but, they use other legal approaches to prevent this problem from occurring. Texas has extended the rule to 300 years while New South Wales, puts the limit at 80 years. Texas's extension seemed to be primarily to permit trust funds to operate legally long after the person establishing it had died. Consider what happens if such a rule doesn't exist. The title of the property could never be fully transferred, because the clause could never be proven to not have been violated. This would dramatically devalue the property, and clog the courts with suits claiming property held by one family for 100 years isn't theirs because of some evidence just uncovered about what happened 60 years ago. It also would massively complicate the selling of the property, because a clean title could never be proven. Note that this rule would have no bearing on a covenants not tied to the property's transfer of title. This rule even made it into a recent Disney case, which is explained far better than I can by the Legal Eagle, Devin James Stone
The UK has parliamentary sovereignty, not separation of powers Unlike, say, the United States, where the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive have co-equal power in their respective spheres, in the UK, the judiciary and the executive are subordinate to Parliament. The courts have no power to nullify an Act of Parliament for being unconstitutional like they do in jurisdictions where a written constitution gives them such a power like the USA, Canada, or Australia. The purpose of the Declaration of Incompatibility is to advise Parliament that the law they have passed contradicts the HRA and they should think about that and decide if that’s what they really wanted to do. That means that the UK Parliament could pass the Arbitrary Bollock Removal Act 2023 (ABRA) tomorrow and it would be valid law. The courts can still provide judicial review of the actions of the executive under ABRA but they cannot declare the law a nullity. That is, the Minister’s actions can be scrutinised to ensure they followed the ABRA and other established principles such as procedural fairness and, if they didn’t, declare the executive actions void. However, if they did follow the law, off come your nuts.
Since you asked about any jurisdiction, and presumably any common law jurisdiction, in which one of the elements of theft is the intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property, here's the UK* answer. Regarding borrowing specifically, the UK statute referring to theft - the Theft Act 1968 - provides for this in section 6(1): A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal. In other words, a thief may say 'I only wished to borrow it', but that won't necessarily amount to a defence under English law. It depends on how long (s)he borrows it for, and how (s)he treats it while borrowing it. In addition, the case law clarifies what is meant by 'his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other's rights'. This has been held to mean: Selling, Bargaining with. R v Cahill, R v Lloyd Rendering Useless. DPP v J Dealing with in a manner which risks its loss. R v Fernandes, R v Marshall Borrowing in certain circumstances. R v Lloyd Pawning. s6(2) Theft Act 1968 Not enough to just deal with it. R v Mitchell So how do we prove whether someone intended to deprive the owner of the property permanently, or at least permanently enough to amount to an offence under the Act? The answer seems to be that we look at how they deal with it, and what condition they leave the property in. If they do any of the things listed above, with the exception of no. 6, then they have demonstrated an intent to permanently deprive; if they merely use the property, then that isn't enough to show such intent. You asked specifically: I am looking for an answer that explains whether someone who credibly asserts – e.g., by advance sworn affidavit – that they intend to return the item can be convicted of theft, or any other crime, for taking someone else's property for an extended but not infinite period of time. In the case of R v Lloyd, the court held borrowing would become intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property if 'all goodness, virtue and practical value is gone'. So if someone swore they were planning on returning the item, the court could nonetheless convict them of theft if they held on to the item for so long, and treated it as their own to such an extent, that all its value was gone. (In R v Lloyd, the items in question were films, and as they were returned in much the same condition as they'd originally been in, this was held not to be intention to permanently deprive, and therefore not to be theft.) *By 'UK' I mean 'English and Welsh'; the answer may be different in Scotland.
Section 4A of the Limitation Act 1980 sets the limitation period for defamation cases to 1 year. However, under section 32A, the court is, in certain situations, allowed to disapply the limitation period to defamation cases. Essentially a court may lift the period if they think it is just and fair to do so. They will take into consideration factors such as the extent to which enforcing the limitation period would unfairly prejudice the claimant, whether new evidence came to light (and if it ought to have come to light sooner) etc. It all really depends on the merits and circumstances of your case. I would recommend seeing a solicitor on the matter.
"Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights" on the website you linked to is very clear that the Charter of Fundamental Rights only means the EU institutions can't discriminate based on age, and that EU law is not allowed to be age discriminatory. It doesn't mean that individual acts of age discrimination are illegal: In contrast, the provision in Article 21(1) does not create any power to enact anti-discrimination laws in these areas of Member State or private action, nor does it lay down a sweeping ban of discrimination in such wide-ranging areas. Instead, it only addresses discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when they are implementing Union law. The practice of youth and senior discounts is older than the charter of fundamental rights. The charter will be interpreted in the light of continuity, it definitely wasn't the intention to outlaw price discrimination. There are specific laws that make price discrimination based on certain principles legal, e.g. UK equality act: Age discrimination - when discrimination is allowed in the provision of goods or services