What does “belief” mean in the context of The Equalities Act 2010? The Equalities Act of 2010 (applicable in England, Scotland and Wales) says at Section 10 (in part): Belief means any religious or philosophical belief; and a reference to belief includes a reference to a lack of belief. It goes on to describe, in Section 26, harassment which includes the following: A person (A) harasses another (B) - if A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant characteristic, and the conduct has the purpose or effect of violating B’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. This seems quite broad. Would a belief that all female short lists are ethical be considered a belief in terms of this act? Or indeed a belief such as “the sky is not blue”? Or indeed any idea subscribed to. If I was to argue with a coworker that the sky is not red but blue, and he takes offense, am I breaking the law?
The key limiting factors are the language: and the conduct has the purpose or effect of violating B’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. And, also, the context of the term "belief" in the statute in conjunction with religion which is defined in the same section, which suggests that in this context it is intended to be understood as the kind of belief that constitutes a core worldview for a person, even if it is secular (e.g. Confucianism or a Stoic philosophy of life), rather than isolated particular ideas about factual things. There is also considerable room for judicial interpretation over whether, for example "effect of" is limited to an "effect" reasonably derived from the "conduct" in question. Still, in general, the U.K., has higher standards mandating civility in dealings with others than the U.S., and there is lots of conduct barred by the Equality Act of 2010 which would not be barred under U.S. law, for example. The closest analog in U.S. law is really the tort of "outrageous conduct" also sometimes known as "intentional infliction of emotional distress."
Law The origin of the phrase is from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). It specifically rules on the limitation of freedom of speech (first amendment): The original ruling is this: The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. As pointed out by @phoog, this does not saying anything about the lawfullness of shouting "fire", it says that if your speech creates a clear and present danger, the first amendment will not protect you, even if the danger does not result in actual harm. Commentary If these instances are correct then it would seem clear that Freedom of Speech is being honored as it's the result of speech, not the speech itself, that could be an offense. You seem to think that it should be illegal, but only if it results in a panic that endangers people. If people ignore you, you think it should be protected by your first amendment rights. That's not how the law works. The law tries, among other things. To establish norms for human behaviour. For example, you will be punished for driving an automobile while intoxicated, even of this does not result in you running over somebody. In the words of the supreme court: If your actions "are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger", the congress has the right to prevent you from doing so, despite the first amendment.
Are there cases or situations where both parties are burdened with justifying their positions? england-and-wales Yes, but different standards are applied. One example is the &quot;reverse burden of proof&quot; placed on the defendant in section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953: Any person who without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, the proof whereof shall lie on him, has with him in any public place any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offence... The prosecution have to prove &quot;beyond a reasonable doubt&quot; that the article is actually an offensive weapon and that the named defendant possessed it on a particular date and that s/he was in a public place at the time. Whereas the standard of proof for the defendant to show they had lawful authority or a reasonable excuse for having is the, lower, &quot;balance of probabilities&quot;. Similar legislation, for a similar offence, at section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 states that: (4)It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority for having the article with him in a public place. (5)Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him— (a)for use at work; (b)for religious reasons; or (c)as part of any national costume. Which, again, is on the balance of probabilities. See, for example, R v Lambert [2001] UKHL 37: If [a legal burden of proof on an accused] is created the matter in question must be taken as proved against the accused unless he satisfies the jury on a balance of probabilities to the contrary...
england-and-wales I think the main reason is that in specific prosecutions such behaviour may not be found to constitute any of those criminal offences. While on the face of it the behaviour is illegal, the court is also obliged to take into account the rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and association, in the Human Rights Act 1998. But a court's injunction sets out in black and white the restrictions on behaviour after considering the human rights aspects of the case, and breach of the order is a contempt of court (not a criminal offence as such, but punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine). Such injunctions are an additional tool for trying to mitigate or deter the behavior to which you refer and in a sense they are more convenient than criminal prosecutions. Some considerations and more detail in no particular order: Standard of proof differences You mention relevant criminal offences. These necessarily have the criminal 'standard of proof'. The trier of fact (the jury at jury trial; the magistrate or judge at non-jury trial), having considered all the relevant evidence, must be sure the defendant is guilty. However, the entity seeking an injunction (the claimant) does not need to meet that standard of proof to obtain an injunction that includes restrictions on behaviour. They need only persuade the court there is a real and imminent risk of a civil wrong for which they merit relief, or that there is a serious issue to be tried at a later date for which they merit relief until the conclusion of that trial. Criminal prosecution delays For the past two years to the time of writing this answer, circumstances have been such that if there were a criminal trial (which is by no means guaranteed), it may be scheduled months, perhaps even a year or two, in the future. But the claimant (and the wider public) may want relief 'now' and the defendant(s) might be free to continue their behaviour in the meanwhile, the defendant might not be held in custody pending trial. Due to delays, some defendants have been in custody for several months pending trial and this isn't satisfactory either, particularly if they are innocent: &quot;everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time&quot; (article 6 Human Rights Act 1998). The behaviour may not be found to constitute a criminal offence In this context, the law providing for the criminal offence must be read 'compatibly' with the human rights legislation - the qualified rights to freedom of expression, to assembly and association. Meaning, is this criminal justice system reponse to that behaviour provided for in law, necessary and proportionate, in pursuit of a legitimate aim, protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and were there no alternative and less restrictive responses? Now, some of those elements are a definite yes (e.g. trespass to or obstruction of the highway are provided for in law), others may be arguable. But in any case, the police, prosecution and the court (if it gets that far) must consider those things, must do that weighing up - it is not explicitly provided for in the legislation that creates those criminal offences. The courts have not found every protest on a highway to constitute a trespass to (Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones and Another) or obstruction of a highway (Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) v Ziegler and others (Appellants)). On the other hand, when these claimants seek an injunction the court does that weighing up and may consider alternative, less restrictive approaches (the claimant submits a wishlist, the defendant or court may push back). The court will say &quot;Yes, this is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of the claimant and the wider public, however X is disproportionate, Y is proportionate, the defendants may go in area A but not area B, this time period is disproportionate, that time period is proportionate,&quot; and so on. So the claimant and the police are now armed with that injunction, the claimant will publish it, defendants are aware of its contents and fellow protesters ought to be made aware of it. It's there in black-and-white what is restricted and anyone breaching the injunction could be found guilty of contempt of court (punishable by up to two years in prison and/or unlimited fine or asset seizure; must be proved to the criminal standard). Example judgments about injunctions including lists of restrictions Here are some examples from the context that include different kinds of restrictions by court order and the court's weighing up of the competing interests of the claimants, the defendants and the wider public. Shell UK Oil Products Ltd v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 1215 (QB) (20 May 2022) The claimant sought (and succeeded) to maintain an injunction that was granted on an emergency basis, its restrictions set out at para 20, conclusion at para 70. National Highways Ltd v Heyatawin [2021] EWHC 3078 (QB) - see para 7 for restrictions, the court found some protesters breached the so-called M25 Order and the court ordered their immediate imprisonment (para 66). National Highways Ltd v Persons unknown (blocking traffic) [2021] EWHC 3081 (QB) (17 November 2021) - the reasons for the decision to not set aside the ex parte interim injunction made by Linden J on 25 October 2021, some restrictions at para 4. High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd &amp; Anor v Four Categories of Persons Unknown &amp; Ors [2022] EWHC 2360 (KB) (20 September 2022) - restrictions at para 188.
The phrase is added to ensure that a portion of the contract is construed as the parties intended. For example, say the terms of a contract already imply some particular term. To make it clear that this is what the parties intended, they may also state that term explicitly. The problem is, if you specify a term a particular way, a party could argue that interpreting another part of the contract to mean that very same thing would render that portion of the contract redundant and therefore it should be interpreted some other way. The phrase "for avoidance of doubt" indicates a part of an agreement that is intended to restate what another portion of the contract (often in conjunction with applicable law) already implies. The phrase is added to ensure that the restatement won't be pointed to as a way to argue that other parts of the contract should be interpreted differently than intended. It is often used where it's superfluous and there it should be avoided because it will actually do the opposite of what's intended -- implying that what it covers is covered elsewhere when it actually isn't, possibly leading to other portions of the contract becoming ambiguous or subject to misintepretation.
"Ignorance of the law" refers to a (non)-defense for committing a crime ("I didn't know it was against the law"). In this case, the government hasn't passed a law saying that "the term 'simple majority' shall always be defined as..." – there is no law saying that "simple majority means more than half of the total number of votes". Instead, terms are generally given their "common meaning". A reasonable case can be made that the common meaning of "majority" is "more that any other choice", and one can point to ample evidence showing that, such as this. However, one can also argue that extra weight should be given to to specialized definitions appearing in The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure or Robert's Rules of Order (or other such document), in support of a competing definition of "simple majority". Both sides will need to provide evidence that supports their interpretation of the phrase, based on external sources (parliamentary handbooks, dictionaries, and so on), as arguments for a particular interpretation of the term. The courts will be most impressed by evidence pertaining to the behavior of the parties, so that if everybody agrees that they understood "simple majority" to be "the choice with the most votes", then that is how the term will be interpreted.
The Equality Act (2010) lists the following protected classes (emphasis mine): age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. It is unlawful for businesses to discriminate against anyone, in the goods or services (or physical access) that they offer, based on any of those characteristics. Some disabilities may prevent people from wearing masks, and those people cannot be discriminated against. I couldn't find a source in the law that says this explicitly, but according to the Equality and Human Rights Commission there is no legal requirement for people who have disabilities to be able to prove that they are disabled in order to receive accommodations for their disabilities. While you could, theoretically, ask people to prove that they have a disability if you don't believe them, you'd basically just be setting yourself up to have to pay a bunch of money in compensation when you eventually run in to somebody who actually does have such a disability, and doesn't have proof with them, who then takes you to court for discrimination and wins.
canada The person claiming self-defence must have the subjective belief that &quot;a threat of force is being made against them or another person.&quot; Such belief must also be based on reasonable grounds. They must also act with the subjective purpose of protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force. This comes from the text of the defence, codified at s. 34 of the Criminal Code. It reads: 34 (1) A person is not guilty of an offence if (a) they believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them or another person or that a threat of force is being made against them or another person; (b) the act that constitutes the offence is committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (c) the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. &quot;Unless the accused subjectively believed that force or a threat thereof was being used against their person or that of another, the defence is unavailable&quot; (R. v. Khill, 2021 SCC 37, para. 52). The National Judicial Institute's model jury instructions slightly rephrases: [the accused] believed that force [or the threat of force] was being used against him/her [or against another person] and [accused]’s belief was based on reasonable grounds Regarding evidence in general: the court needs some evidence on which to give an &quot;air of reality&quot; to every element of this defence in order to place the burden on the Crown to rebut the defence beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not require the accused to testify about their subjective belief. The evidence about the subjective belief can come from elsewhere in the evidence. For example, even if an accused had no memory of the encounter, there may nonetheless be evidence about their subjective belief: video evidence of the encounter, hearsay evidence about what the accused said during the events, physical evidence revealing a defensive posture, etc. The evidence must support an inference of a subjective belief in a threat. It is not enough that the evidence shows that a subjective belief would have been reasonable. But none of that is relevant to the question of what the elements of self-defence are or whether an act taken without the subjective belief that the accused or another person is being threatened is self-defence. The question has helpfully taken the standard approach to legal hypotheticals of just asserting what the facts are in order to take questions of evidence off the table.