Removal of an Attorney General The President nominates the Attorney General, and is responsible for seeing that the Attorney General faithfully upholds his duty to execute the laws of the land. The Attorney General is subject to the policy direction of the President, and serves at the President's pleasure and discretion. Why then, when the Attorney General is derelict in his duties, does it take the House to charge him and the Senate to try him, for him to be removed? Can't the President simply fire him?
Yes, the President can just fire them, or more commonly, request their resignation. The provision for impeachment by Congress exists in case the President doesn’t do what the President should do.
Different people have suggested different things as to what constitutes, &quot;the unitary executive theory&quot;. The US Supreme Court is not likely to simply adopt such a theory in general terms. It will, instead, rule on a specific case that comes before it, and state the principles behind that ruling. There are a number of Supreme Court rulings saying that a President must abide by laws limiting presidential authority, perhaps the most famous is Youngstown Sheet &amp; Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) in which the Court rules that the President did not have authority to seize steel mills to put a stop to a labor dispute that was allegedly endangering national security during the Korean War. Congress had passed a law providing a different method of dealing with such situations, and President Truman did not follow the method established by that law. The President has broad power over the operations of executive branch agencies, possibly including the right to order an investigation halted for whatever reasons seem good to the president. If such a case came before the courts and they supported the President, presumably they would hold that the President's actions did not constitute obstruction of justice or any other crime. I find it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that the President may &quot;act against the rule of law&quot;, but they might rule that in particular cases the law implicitly grants the President power to take certain actions that others may not take.
The Department of Justice's Office of the Pardon attorney says yes: Under the Constitution, only federal criminal convictions, such as those adjudicated in the United States District Courts, may be pardoned by the President. In addition, the President's pardon power extends to convictions adjudicated in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and military court-martial proceedings. Like other felonies committed in the District, murder charges are adjudicated by federal prosecutors in the Superior Court, so they would fall within the scope of the presidential pardon power, as interpreted by the DOJ.
Under the Constitution, the president has to be a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for 14 years (relevant in the early years), and 35 years of age or older. Any action to preclude a candidate has to be based on these qualifications. Art. II of the constitution spells out the powers of the executive branch. His primary power is to carry out laws enacted by Congress, therefore executive orders have to be based on some statute, or specific Constitutional authority (e.g. as commander-in-chief). No law allows the president to nullify the fact that Biden is a natural born citizen of the US, a resident for many time 14 years, and 35 years old. Congress has not passed a law declaring that Biden has been previously impeached and removed from office (another way to stop a person from being elected). There being no such authority, an order to that effect would not be legal. In addition, executive orders give orders within the executive branch, and the executive branch isn't in charge of certifying the next president: POTUS cannot give orders to the House of Representatives, or to the Supreme Court.
Doesn't the last statement contradicts the first one? Are agencies controlled by the President or insulated from his control? These statements aren't contradictory. They just reflect a somewhat complex reality (although the new post-Scalia ultra-conservative supermajority on the U.S. Supreme Court has pushed the notion of a &quot;unitary executive&quot;, a long time conservative goal, that casts doubt on the constitutional validity of the structures discussed below that previously went unchallenged). Especially starting around the time of the New Deal (the 1930s), Congress started to vigorously utilize the concept of an &quot;independent agency&quot; such as the National Labor Relations Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Postal Service Board (formed in the 1970s), Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and myriad other &quot;alphabet agencies.&quot; (The Federal Reserve Board was one the first). Congress also experimented with structures like that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the FBI) whose director serves for a seven years term, even though the director is a single person rather than a collective board. Generally speaking, these agencies are run by the Presidentially appointed and U.S. Senate confirmed directors or boards with appointee who serve for fixed terms. As Presidential appointees, they are ultimately controlled by the Presidency as an institution, even if not by the current sitting President. But, since these appointees have fixed terms of office and aren't merely employees at will who may be fired on demand by the President like cabinet secretaries, these appointees have some measure of insulation from direct Presidential direction on a day to day basis in the minutia of decision making. How much control of The President is enough for a textualist to accept Chevron doctrine? What if he could hire them but not fire them? What if he could suggest them what to do but not order them what to do? The Chevron doctrine really has nothing to do with the amount of authority that the President exercises over independent agencies and the civil service. Instead, the Chevron doctrine is a separation of powers doctrine that provides that courts should defer to the executive branch (which is ultimately directed by the President, who has near absolute authority over agencies in some cases, and less authority over agencies in other cases), rather than interpreting laws from a blank slate, in cases where a federal agency has adopted an authoritative interpretation of a federal law that is not precluded by a fair reading of the statue in question, even if the court would have interpreted the statute differently in the absence of federal agency input. The Chevron doctrine tilts the balance between courts and the President in favor of the President, making the President stronger than the President would otherwise have been in the absence of this doctrine. (And, keep in mind that all regulations and litigation of the federal government goes through the Justice Department, which the President does directly control, to a great extent, even when agencies are independent and have significant autonomy.) The authority of the President to direct tenured civil servants who are not political appointees who can be hired and fired at will, or with U.S. Senate approval, is an entirely different issue with far less of a constitutional dimension until the last couple of years when a conservative supermajority captured the U.S. Supreme Court and has tried to push the non-textual and non-originalist &quot;unitary executive&quot; doctrine.
It is a vanishingly small possibility. First, someone would need to bring a case that an appropriation for the Air Force was unconstitutional. A Federal court is unlikely to find that it is because: The constitution would be interpreted broadly where the thing being considered did not exist when it was ratified. That is, the court would consider if, had the Air Force existed the drafters of the constitution would have wanted it governed by the Federal government or the State governments. Almost certainly they would decide on the Federal government. The Air Force is a direct descendent of the Army - originally being the United States Army Air Force. As such, an alternative line of reasoning for the court is that the army contemplated by the constitution consists of both the Army and the Air Force - the fact that they have been split is not relevant.
The policy of the Justice Department is that the President of the United States can not be indicted. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-indictment-explainer/can-a-sitting-us-president-face-criminal-charges-idUSKCN1QF1D3 All federal prosecutors are part of the Justice Department and that means the guidelines for them say it is prohibited. There is not an actual law saying you can or can't indict the president. The idea is that impeachment is the right way to handle presidential wrongdoing, because the president shouldn't be distracted and he could be charged after leaving office or if he was impeached. The president can be investigated though and some have. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-13/trump-nixon-five-times-the-fbi-went-up-against-the-president/9539192
Perhaps. The relevant law is assembled into notes on 3 USC 102. The original act of 1963 defines President-elect in this manner: (c) The terms 'President-elect' and 'Vice-President-elect' as used in this Act shall mean such persons as are the apparent successful candidates for the office of President and Vice President, respectively, as ascertained by the Administrator following the general elections held to determine the electors of President and Vice President in accordance with title 3, United States Code, sections 1 and 2. There is no specific statutory provision directing the Administrator of the GSA to ascertain who is that President-Elect. The administration is apparently taking a position similar to that taken by the Clinton administration, that states determine who has been elected, and the states have not officially determined who has been elected: nor has a candidate conceded. If a court orders the Administrator to make the ascertainment, I expect that the administration would appeal the ruling up to the Supreme Court. This letter, addressed to the Administrator, gives the legal rationale.