In INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i), what does &quot;other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence&quot; mean? INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i) states that Any alien (other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence) who— (I) was unlawfully present in the United States for a period of more than 180 days but less than 1 year, voluntarily departed the United States (whether or not pursuant to section 1254a(e) of this title) prior to the commencement of proceedings under section 1225(b)(1) of this title or section 1229a of this title, and again seeks admission within 3 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal, or (II) has been unlawfully present in the United States for one year or more, and who again seeks admission within 10 years of the date of such alien’s departure or removal from the United States, is inadmissible. There are two ways to interpret &quot;other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence&quot;. It could mean (1) that a lawful permanent resident who is returning to the US cannot be found inadmissible under INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i), or (2) any departure or removal from the United States while a lawful permanent resident does not trigger an INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i) bar. (1) seems to be the most straightforward interpretation based on the plain wording of the statute. Plus, in some rare cases, it is possible for a person to obtain LPR status through a route to which 212(a)(9)(B)(i) bars, by statute, do not apply; and presumably such a person, after having obtained LPR status, has no restrictions on their ability to travel in and out of the US compared with any other LPR. It would seem bizarre and absurd to reject (1). We can easily think of a hypothetical scenario that tests (2). A tourist entered the United States on January 1, 2016. Their period of authorized stay expired on July 1, 2016. They remained in the US unlawfully. Then, on August 1, 2017 (i.e., after more than a year of unlawful presence), they married a US citizen and applied for adjustment of status. This was granted on September 3, 2018. On December 21, 2018, they travelled outside the US for the first time since their arrival for a brief vacation, and returned to the US without incident (see (1)). Eventually, at some point in 2021, they stayed outside the US for too long, and, having abandoned their US residence, decided to submit Form I-407 to avoid any complications with returning to the US. Now, in 2022, they decide to try to move back to the US with their spouse. The US citizen spouse submits a new I-130, and the noncitizen spouse applies for an immigrant visa. What will happen? Will the consular officer notify them that due to their previous period of unlawful presence, they are inadmissible until December 21, 2028? My hunch is that in the above scenario, the person is not considered inadmissible until December 21, 2028 because their departure from the United States after accruing more than 1 year of unlawful presence occurred while they were an LPR. In other words I think interpretation (2) is correct, but (1) is also correct: INA 212(a)(9)(B)(i) does not make LPRs inadmissible, nor is it triggered by any departure of a noncitizen while they hold LPR status. However I have not been able to find any relevant case law.
I think that the plain meaning points to (1). The &quot;other than an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence&quot; modifies who &quot;is admissible&quot;, in the present tense, i.e. at the time of seeking admission. It doesn't modify the departure. Also, if it were (2), there would be weird issues like, if the departure doesn't count as a departure for the purposes of this section, then what about the unlawful presence? Does it stay accrued until a future departure, or does it just get wiped clean with no consequences? If it stays accrued, then in some cases it may be worse than interpretation (1), because interpretation (1) starts the 10-year period earlier while it doesn't affect you while you are a permanent resident, so that if you lose your permanent residency in the future the ban will be over earlier. The only case I know where a departure doesn't count as a departure for the purposes of this ban is when you leave on a grant of Advance Parole, as ruled by the BIA decision in Matter of Arrabally. But the reasoning in that case was that Advance Parole was specifically granted to allow the person to travel abroad an preserve their eligibility for Adjustment of Status, which a ban would defeat. But this reasoning wouldn't really apply to the case in this question, because permanent residency isn't specifically granted for travel abroad, and a returning permanent resident isn't subject to this ban anyway, so interpreting it as a departure doesn't defeat the maintenance of permanent residency. The issue you are asking about is rare. In most cases, when people become permanent residents, they stay permanent residents or naturalize to become US citizens, in which case they do not have to worry about this ban after becoming permanent residents. Only if they lose permanent residency would this question come up. I am not aware of any guidance or case law regarding this case.
Did the President have to commute or pardon the Russians in US prisons, or is there an existing statutory basis for releasing some prisoners? As far as American law is concerned, in this particular case, it was a &quot;simple&quot; deportation. The defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced to time served, based on submissions from the prosecutors and the defendants, which are usually followed by the judge. Alternatively, if the judge had sentenced someone to real prison terms, a commutation may be required. If they want, the prosecutors can also withdraw the charges before sentencing. Obama commuted Iranian citizens in a spy swap deal. In another Iran-USA prisoners exchange, charges were dropped for Masoud Soleimani. Then as &quot;free&quot; men and women who are foreign nationals, they can still be inadmissible to the United States and be deportable aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S. Code § 1182 - Inadmissible aliens, § 1227 - Deportable aliens). In this case, there are so many potential grounds to choose from: conviction of a crime of moral turpitude, misrepresentation, national security, foreign policy, etc. The Secretary of State can also revoke their visas at the Secretary's discretion and make their presence unlawful. They have the right to contest deportation if they are considered &quot;free&quot; as far as the criminal law is considered. But, they usually want to go home. The US may choose to prosecute them for other potential crimes if they contest. Then if they are deportable and there is no stay on the proceedings due to judicial or administrative intervention, they can be removed from the United States. Is there a formal agreement in international law between the US and UK? I do not believe the United Kingdom was involved directly to the exchange itself. The prisoner swap was done in Vienna. Agreement needs to be obtained from the Austrian government regarding entry conditions etc. UK revoked Anna Chapman's British citizenship. Igor Sutyagin and Sergei Skripal moved to UK. But those are not really international matters legally. The UK alone determines how its citizenship works and who can enter and stay in the UK.
According to Wikipedia's article Diplomatic Mission: Contrary to popular belief, most diplomatic missions do not enjoy full extraterritorial status and – in those cases – are not sovereign territory of the represented state. Rather, the premises of diplomatic missions usually remain under the jurisdiction of the host state while being afforded special privileges (such as immunity from most local laws) by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Diplomats themselves still retain full diplomatic immunity, and (as an adherent to the Vienna Convention) the host country may not enter the premises of the mission without permission of the represented country, even to put out a fire. (Supporting citations omitted) According to its article on Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations key provisions include: Article 22. The premises of a diplomatic mission, such as an embassy, are inviolable and must not be entered by the host country except by permission of the head of the mission. Furthermore, the host country must protect the mission from intrusion or damage. The host country must never search the premises, nor seize its documents or property. Article 29. Diplomats must not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. They are immune from civil or criminal prosecution, though the sending country may waive this right under Article 32. However, people who are not diplomats do not have automatic protection from arrest, and the idea that an embasy is the &quot;soil&quot; of the country it represents is largely obsolete. See This stack exchange politics question. So if Turkey were to obtain custody of people it accused of doing the killing, and if those people were not accredited diplomats, it could try them under Turkish law. Whether any of that is likely to happen is another question.
Volokh commented on this. There is no 2nd Amendment issue, nor does federal law. It may be illegal in some states, depending on whether age is included in public accommodation anti-discrimination laws. For instance, Conn. Gen. Stat. §§46a-64 says (a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, age, lawful source of income, intellectual disability, mental disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the applicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all persons; §46a-63 defines "public accommodation" (1) “Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement” means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public, including, but not limited to, any commercial property or building lot, on which it is intended that a commercial building will be constructed or offered for sale or rent Public accomodation laws are how states deal with discrimination in sales, such as selling wedding cakes Illinois 775 ILCS 5/1-103 likewise prohibits age discrimination in public accomodations, but defines "age" as "the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old". Connecticut used to define "age" as "any age between forty and sixty-five, inclusive", but that clause was deleted. Lousiana also prohibits age discrimination (La. Rev. Stat. §51:2247). Their statement about age likewise limits anti-discrimination protection to "individuals who are at least forty years of age". Maryland in MD State Govt Code § 20-304 also bans age discrimination, and does not redefine "age" or limit the scope of those ages that are protected. So while it is generally legal to refuse to sell goods to the young (and sometimes mandatory, e.g. alcohol, firearms, tobacco), there are a few states where such a policy would violate state anti-discrimination laws. There can also be city laws (Seattle has very broad anti-discrimination laws), but they exclude age from the Public Accommodation subset of discrimination.
Short answer: You find a country who is willing to recognize you as stateless, and issue you travel papers. At that point you can enter the U.S. by applying for a visa. The USA really does not want to create stateless people. They are laboring diplomatically to eradicate statelessness. As such, the State Department will want to see that you are secure in another country's citizenship before they will repudiate your US citizenship. Otherwise, they are very reluctant. The State Department will insist you do the repudiation in a foreign country at a US embassy. If you want to become stateless with your feet in the United States, you'll likely have a legal fight on your hands. Regardless, it will cost you $2300 in filing fees (plus, all your back taxes) :) At that point, you become the problem of the foreign country. You aren't anyone to the USA, and you have to apply for a visa just like anyone else. When a stated person enters the US, immigration's pivotal concern is whether you'll leave the US consistent with the terms of your visa, i.e. return to your country of citizenship. Being stateless increases this risk, and being a USA expat increases that risk further, since you are so familiar and comfortable in the US. If you found yourself in the kind of piccadillo that would qualify a foreigner for refugee or asylum status, the US would consider it just the same as others, since those statuses include right of residency. Some countries manufacture stateless people, e.g. Syria will not grant citizenship to a non-Muslim born there.
Typically in extraditions, the treaties will only allow for extraditions if both nations have a similar crime and similar punishment for that crime. In this case, there maybe some pause for Australia to grant an extradition as Australia no longer has the death penalty for any crime, so it could be that while the new crime the defendant is being sought for is Escape from Incarceration related (that's a yes in both countries), technically the punishment for an escaped Death Row Inmate is the Death Penalty. Australia can't extradite for any crime where death penalty is on the line, but the requesting nation can say they will give a more lighter sentance that is more compliant with the requested nation's own laws. However, since it is Death for another crime that Austrilia never had jurisdiction over, it complicates matters. There is precidence for procedural reasons for refusing to extradite. For example, while the U.S. and Italy have an extradition treaty and both view murder in the same light, the U.S. refused the extradition of a citizen who was wanted for a murder in Italy that she was previously aquitted of, but new evidnce was uncovered. Because it is illegal for the state to try a person twice for the same crime in the U.S., the U.S. declined the extradition treaty. Some additional notes, extradited persons can only be tried for crimes that they were extradited for, so there is an argument that Australia would refuse unless Indonesia promises to commute the Drug Trafficking sentence to Life Imprisonment
Insofar as those treaties don't bind the US, the notion of "violating" such laws is moot. Hoda Muthana is, under Yemeni law, a Yemeni citizen (it is immaterial whether she has ever "accepted" or exploited it), and as such stripping her of US citizenship would not leave her stateless. In the case of Hoda Muthana, the action is based on the legal argument that she was not ever a citizen, based on the premise that her father was a foreign diplomat. Under US law, children born to foreign diplomats in the US are not birthright citizens, following US v. Wong Kim Ark. Birthright citizenship cannot be revoked. However, a person can renounce their citizenship, via certain acts, including taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign state or a political subdivision thereof, after having attained the age of eighteen years;or (3) entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state if (A) such armed forces are engaged in hostilities against the United States, or (B) such persons serve as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer The defense argument would presumably be that ISIS is not a foreign state (despite their own claims to the contrary) so her affiliation with ISIS does not qualify. There are grounds for denaturalization, including falsifying or concealing relevant facts pertaining to naturalization, refusing to testify before Congress, or joining a subversive organization including Al Qaeda within 5 years of naturalization.
We do not have a law requiring you to renounce citizenships that you might hold, like the Nationality Law. I am not sure what you mean saying that renouncement is processed only within the Japanese legal system -- that is how it is everywhere, and there is no international authority or clearing house that handles citizenship renunciations. The effect of renouncing Japanese citizenship would be that you are then no longer a citizen of Japan: I can't find an explicit law prohibiting an exclusively-Japanese citizen from renouncing his citizenship and becoming stateless. A dual citizen would then be exclusively a citizen if "the other country", thus you would become strictly an Iranian citizen. According to the Civil Code of Iran you would be an Iranian citizen under clause 2 of Article 976. Article 977 allows accept a different citizenship but that would not apply if you have an Iranian father (and I guess does not actually get rid of your Iranian citizenship). Article 988 sets conditions for Iranians to abandon their nationality: you must be 25 or older, have renounced all property rights in Iran by transfer to Iranian nationals, have done your military service, and, have approval of the Council of Ministers. So yeah, not possible. Article 14 of the Japanese Nationality Law requires you to "choose either of the nationalities" before reaching 22, and furthermore Choice of Japanese nationality shall be made either by depriving himself or herself of the foreign nationality or by the declaration provided for in the Family Registration Law in which he or she swears that he or she chooses to be a Japanese national and that he or she renounces the foreign nationality (hereinafter referred to as “declaration of choice ”) Article 16 says "A Japanese national who has made the declaration of choice shall endeavour to deprive himself or herself of the foreign nationality". The bold part above seems to resolve that paradox, although that is based on a US-style interpretation of law and working from a translation of the law. That is, the requirement is that you try, not that you succeed (which is impossible in the case of a person with an Iranian father). There would be an effect in the US. If you renounce Japanese citizenship, you're strictly an Iranian national, and that has one consequence. What is not clear is whether the US recognizes, in any way, a renunciation which Iran doesn't recognize. This case features a person with renounced Iranian citizenship (he is also a US citizen), who was approved for a security clearance based in part on his renounciation. This gives some indication that the US does not care that Iran makes renunciation next to impossible. This is of course just for informational purposes and calls for an immigration attorney if it really matters.