Constitutional Law in the absence of service-process Can a Federal Judge make findings that substantially affects the property interests of third persons who are not and never were before the court {no action commenced against them, and no process) during the course of criminal sentencing proceedings directed at defendant parties in that case? And if there is no authority for making such a finding, what would be the remedy where the Court ordered the property of the other persons to be sold, again without issuing service to said persons?
A court can have jurisdiction over property in rem without personal service upon all persons who may claim an interest in the property. Typically, this is done by providing some form of service (such as notice by mail) upon people who are known to have an interest in the property, and an alternative to service directed at an individual (such as notice by posting at the property, by publication of a notice in a public place, or by publication of a notice in a newspaper where the property is located). Civil forfeiture often involves this kind of indirect notice to unknown parties by publication. what would be the remedy where the Court ordered the property of the other persons to be sold, again without issuing service to said persons The ruling of the criminal court is not binding on people who were not served with process in the original action (either personally, if known, or by publication or some other similar means, if not known to the court) in another legal proceeding. But if a claim becomes moot, there may be not remedy available of a violation of one's rights. They could conceivably bring an action to quiet title, or the equivalent, or an action in replevin, which would not be bound by the Court's findings since the third-parties weren't a party to it, and an injunction on the sale could be sought in that case, if it wasn't too late. But, if the third-parties had actual notice of the pending criminal action, the better option would probably be to file a motion in the criminal action to intervene with respect to disposition of the property. Takings of property in the context of the criminal justice system are not &quot;takings&quot; in the 5th Amendment constitutional sense, for which an inverse condemnation action are available, although there is still a due process requirement, which isn't met without some effort to give potential known or unknown third-party claimants notice of the sale. If there was a court ordered sale, any claim would probably be against the proceeds of the sale, and not against a bona fide purchaser for value at a court ordered sale regularly conducted. Of course, this presumes that the property is not contraband (you can't make a legal claim to cocaine even if you own it). If the defendants did not give you notice of your ownership interest, and this resulted in you not being able to intervene in the criminal action, you could also sue the defendant for breaching duties owed to you as a fellow property owner of the property disposed of in the criminal action. Ultimately, this is not an enviable position to be in, and the likelihood of a court effectively destroying your property interest in the property subject to the criminal proceeding in a manner that there is no economically efficient remedy to address is significant. Some of the relevant case law is discussed at another answer I wrote on a related topic. See also this answer on civil forfeiture. One of the leading U.S. Constitutional law cases on the topic is Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state's action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable post-deprivation remedy.”).
The Constitution does not define any crimes (except for an explicit limit on what can be considered 'treason.') It places limits on what penalties the government may apply for crimes and how crimes are tried in court, but it does not itself actually create any criminal offenses. Rather, state and federal law do that. Having said that, if a state government creates a crime of murder (which, obviously, they all do,) the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment does require that that law protect all people within the jurisdiction of that state. That is, a state cannot make a law criminalizing the murder of a white person, but not of a black person, for example. States can't just pick and choose who is protected by their laws. It would not violate the U.S. Constitution if a state completely decriminalized murder, though. It's exceptionally unlikely to happen, but it would not be a violation of the Constitution. Depending on exactly what you mean by 'murder,' it could be argued that murder by the government is unconstitutional, though. The 14th Amendment bans states from depriving anyone of life without due process of law: No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Similarly, the 5th Amendment provides an equivalent protection from the federal government: No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
So, as I understand the decision, it's a little more subtle than that. By default, states have sovereign immunity and can't be sued without their consent. Congress can remove ("abrogate") this immunity by law in some circumstances. They tried to do so for copyright infringement cases with the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990. However, in the present case of Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that this part of the CRCA is unconstitutional. The idea is that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate state immunity when it's necessary to ensure people's right to due process, but only in a "congruent and proportional" way. Now if a state unintentionally or negligently infringes someone's copyright, that does not violate the person's right to due process, but an intentional infringement might. At the time the CRCA was passed, when Congress went looking for instances where states infringed on copyrights, they found several cases of unintentional or negligent infringement, and just a couple where they may have infringed intentionally. SCOTUS argued that to respond to this by completely abrogating state immunity in all copyright cases was disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional. But the Court suggests in the opinion that Congress could pass a different law to abrogate immunity in copyright cases, if it were narrower. For instance, a law that only stripped immunity in cases of intentional infringement would likely be constitutional, especially if there were evidence that intentional infringement was happening enough to be a significant problem. So I think the answer is that as of right now, a state could deliberately infringe someone's copyright (e.g. by pirating software) and be immune from suit. However, Congress has the power to "fix" this, and most likely will, especially if there seems to be egregious abuse. (By the way, the decision contains an impressive quantity of pirate jokes. I guess since it's not only about copyright infringement (aka "piracy"), but actually alleges infringement of a video about a sunken pirate ship, the justices just couldn't resist.) Your "eminent domain" idea is separate from this. Seizing copies of the software wouldn't give the state the right to use them, as the software itself would still be copyrighted. The state would have to seize the copyright, and I don't know whether that is possible - it's not necessarily property in that sense. But if they did so, then they wouldn't be infringing the copyright at all (since the state itself would now own the copyright) and this case would be irrelevant. On the other hand, when a state uses eminent domain to seize property, they must as you say pay fair market value for it, and that means the market value before they seized it. So the value of the copyright in such a case wouldn't be "nothing" - it would be more like the amount a competitor would have had to pay the software maker to buy all the rights to that product. Likewise, if the state seizes your lovely house and bulldozes it to build a toxic waste dump, they owe you what someone would have paid for the house, not the value of a dump that nobody wants.
Disclaimer: there are whole sections of criminal law courses that deal with this issue and the various laws and precedents that have shaped american jurisprudence relating to right of privacy, expectation of privacy, and search and seizure. So, this is more of a primer than a comprehensive answer. That being said, the Fourth Amendment, which protects the people from unreasonable search and seizure by the government, dictates that there must be probable cause for a search warrant to issue. However, in addition to the restrictions that are imposed by the Fourth Amendment, several states’ constitutions, as well as a variety of state and federal statutes, rules of procedure, and law court rulings interpret these edicts further, limiting the process for obtaining a search warrant (a state can add additional safeguards, or impose more stringent requirements, but not less than the 4th amendment demands). On the federal level alone, the laws on search and seizure are also limited in scope by sections appearing in Title 18, Part II, Chapter 205 – Searches and Seizures. 18 U.S.C. § 3101-18. Federal warrants are further governed by Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Only Judges and magistrates may issue search warrants. To obtain a warrant, law enforcement officers must show that there is probable cause (i.e. grounds) that search is legally justified. Officers must support this showing with sworn statements (affidavits) under oath, and must describe in particularity the place they will search and the items they will seize. Judges must consider the totality of the circumstances when deciding whether or not to issue the warrant. When issuing a search warrant, the judge may restrict how and when the police conduct the search. Police officers (a broad term I'm using for ease of discussion to include all manner of state and federal investigators operating under color of law) seeking a warrant do not need to show that the people being searched (or those whose property is being searched) actually, or even probably, committed the crime(s) in question. Rather, officers merely need to show probable cause exists to show that the evidence sought-after is likely there and upon discovery may implicate some person or persons in criminal activity (that has been committed). A landmark case that resulted in some reforms is Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), in which the Supreme Court opined that a search conducted by the police at a student newspaper, where the newspaper was not implicated or connected to any criminal activity, was a legal search under the Fourth Amendment, because the police suspected it had photographic evidence of the identities of demonstrators who assaulted police officers. Afterward, however, some jurisdictions responded by passing laws restricting or forbidding these kinds of searches - so again, what stands as acceptable procedure is not static. While you may not often hear of requests for warrants being denied, it does happen if there is insufficient PC pled in the affidavit; General unawareness is not surprising as it is not something often made public, although there are instances. Most officers know when they have enough for a warrant and know how to adequately swear out an affidavit so that PC is present enough for the judge to sign the warrant in good faith. However, some Judges are more stringent and demanding than others with regard to how the PC was obtained,the scope of the warrant under those facts, etc. Certainly, not every application is granted. Cornell has a great primer of this issue and you can find article when application for a warrant was denied...especially in higher profile investigations. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/search_warrant
At the federal level, there is no real equivalent to what you're describing. A probable cause hearing evaluates the government's evidence in a similar way, but it doesn't ask whether a reasonable jury would convict. The closest I can think of is a Rule 29 motion, which does ask that question, but not until trial has already begun. You typically make the motion at the close of the government's case, and (if it was not successful) again at the close of your own, though I've heard tales of judges granting the motion at the end of the government's opening statement. The states all have their own rules, but they're generally pretty similar to the federal rules in this respect, as I understand it. I don't know of any state that allows the kind of motion you're talking about, in criminal cases, at least. In civil cases, I think everyone has Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which ask the court for a pretrial determination that there's no set of facts that could establish liability on the plaintiff's theory of the case.
So what relevance if any does standing have in criminal trials? E.g., are there any examples of criminal cases/charges dismissed for lack of standing, by which I mean that the court decided the government lacked standing? Let's restrict the discussion to federal proceedings, for the sake of not making this too broad. Almost none. Conceptually, this is because a violation of a sovereign's criminal laws is an injury-in-fact to a legally protected interest of a sovereign in not having its own criminal laws violated. The violation of the law itself is the injury. Where standing type considerations apply they are usually described as jurisdiction. A sovereign, be it a state or the federal government can enforce its own criminal laws, but not another sovereign's criminal laws except by extradition. For example, a state prosecutor can't enforce a federal immigration crime in state court, nor can a state prosecutor file federal or state charges in a federal court. Likewise, a federal prosecutor can't bring federal or state charges in a state court, and a federal prosecutor can't bring state criminal charges (unless adopted by reference as part of federal law) in federal court. Criminal justice in Indian territory which is handled by the federal courts by federal prosecutors in felony cases, are a special case conceptualized either as a &quot;contract service&quot; relationship or as evidence that Indian tribes are not fully sovereign. The extraterritorial application of criminal laws is likewise usually considered a question of jurisdiction rather than standing. Sometimes the federal government passes a law incorporating some state criminal laws by reference as federal criminal laws in federally controlled territory, but that is an issue of substantive law, not standing. A handful of states allow private criminal prosecutions for select minor offenses, rather than being exclusively brought by the government (mostly on the East Coast). In those cases, standing is an issue, just as it is in civil cases. Only victims can bring private criminal prosecutions, where they are allowed, and only in cases where they are the victim.
When judges are finder of fact, the standard is one of deference to the trial court, but may be overcome if the trial court made a "clearly erroneous finding". See Concrete v. Const. Laborers, 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
I will assume that your question pertains to the United States. In other jurisdictions, different rules could apply. Context matters. The usual penalty for spoliation of evidence (the technical term for what you describe) in a civil case is a judicial determination or jury instruction that the evidence destroyed would have established the relevant part of the other side's case had it not been destroyed. In all of these cases, your failure to take affirmative action to preserve the evidence once you knew that there was a bona fide likelihood that you would be sued could be held against you by making an adverse determination that the evidence would have been unfavorable to you and possibly also money sanctions. You could not be held in contempt of court for this if these events happened before a case was commenced. In a criminal case, where you are a defendant, you have an absolute right to not incriminate yourself and do not have to take affirmative action to preserve evidence, although this right is limited to criminal cases and your failure to preserve evidence can still be held against you in a civil case. Certainly, in situation 4 you are a potential criminal defendant, so the 5th Amendment protection would apply. In situations 1 and 2, where the precautions were not put in place to facilitate a crime, the 5th Amendment would protect you if you were a potential criminal defendant, but suppose that you are a bystander like a third party ISP representative. If you were a third party, at a minimum you would have to be put on notice of the police need for the evidence, would probably have had to have had the police ask you for the evidence, and of course, would have to be aware that the destruction was imminent and have the power to prevent that destruction. If all those conditions were present, you might be guilty of obstruction of justice (there are precedents for inaction knowing of the consequences in the fact of a police question amounting to obstruction of justice). In situation 3, this kind of action pretty much amounts to being an accessory to some crime before the fact (unless someone was successfully deceived by a very elaborate story) and would likely make anyone involved part of a conspiracy to commit the crime that the destruction of the papers would facilitate. While the papers themselves might have been evidence of a crime or civil wrong, the destruction of the papers might itself be considered part of the crime, regardless of what could be established regarding the actual content of the papers.