Which Supreme Court justices have been the most anti-intellectual property? Which Supreme Court justices, present or historical, have ruled the most against intellectual property rights?
Which Supreme Court justices, present or historical, have ruled the most against intellectual property rights? In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of intellectual property rights, overturned more expansive rulings of the Federal Circuit, and overridden Patent and Trademark Office policies consistently. All but two the 26 U.S. Supreme Court rulings on the subject (pro or anti-IP holder) in the last 13 years (both in 2018) have either been unanimous or had only one dissenter (with no one consistent dissenting justices). The two 2018 cases with more than one dissenting justice, each involving the inter partes review of previously grated patents by the PTO under a new patent statute, implicate separation of powers and civil procedure issues that have historically been more controversial than pure intellectual property issues. Oil States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy Group (2018) (7-2 with Gorsuch and Roberts dissenting) (upholding PTO invalidation of previously granted patents); SAS Institute v. INACU (2018) (5-4 with Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan dissenting)(expanding scope of PTO reconsideration of previously granted patents). Matal v. Tam (2017) (unanimous) (overturning PTO policy on offensive trademarks); Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc. (2017) (unanimous) (weakening patent protections vis-a-vis biologically similar drugs to patented ones); Impressions Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. (2017) (7-1 Ginsberg joining the ruling in part and dissenting in part) (weakening rights of patent holders); TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC (2017) (8-0) (overruling Federal Circuit by limiting venue in patent infringement cases); SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC (2017) (7-1 with Breyer dissenting) (disallowing laches defense to patent law claims); Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple, Inc. (2016) (unanimous) (limiting damages awards in multi-component products where only some components are infringing); Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health &amp; Fitness, Inc. (2014) (unanimous) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems (2014) (unanimous) (the Federal Circuit had set too high a standard for the recovery of attorneys' fees for frivolous patent prosecutions); Alice v. CLS Bank, Int'l. (2014) (unanimous) (limiting software patents); Medtronic v. Mirowski (2014) (unanimous) (burden of proof wrongly placed on someone other than the patent holder); Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) (unanimous) (invalidated patents on naturally occurring DNA sequences); Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012) (unanimous) (district court's factual findings made clear that drug monitoring device patent merely restated a law of nature and was invalid); Caraco v. Novo (2012) (unanimous) (alleged infringers right to bring counterclaims expanded); Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (2012) (unanimous) (first sale doctrine does not invalidate ban on reproducing crops grown with patented GMO seeds); Kappos v. Hyatt (2012) (unanimous)(expanding ability of applicant denied a patent to challenge the denial with additional evidence); Global-Tech v. SEB (2011) (8-1, Kennedy dissenting) (added knowledge of infringement element in claim for induced patent infringement); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership (2011) (unanimous) (presumption of validity of patent continues to apply during patent re-examination process conducted by PTO); Bilski v. Kappos (2009) (unanimous to reverse, complicated holding as to extent of new law)(limiting software patents); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. (2008) (unanimous) (disavows Federal Circuit doctrines allowing patent holders to limit use of patented device after a first sale); KSR International v. Teleflex (2007) (unanimous) (expanding obviousness defense); MedImmune v. Genentech (2007) (8-1, Thomas dissenting) (allows for contests of patent validity without risking liability by infringing patent prior to legal ruling on question); Microsoft v. AT&amp;T (2007) (7-1, Roberts dissenting) (U.S. patents laws don't have extraterritorial application); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (2006) (unanimous) (sets higher standard for obtaining injunctions once infringement is established); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (2005) (unanimous) (exemption from patent infringement applies to use of patented drugs for narrow purposes of research associated with FDA drug approval process).* Intellectual property issues have not been a partisan or ideological issue on the U.S. at any time in recent memory, and have not been a signature issue of any one justice relative to the other justices. Dissents in IP cases, where they have occurred have tended to be related to non-IP aspects of the cases.
The issue is discussed in quite a few cases, including an in depth discussion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Official Syllabus of that decision summarizes its analysis: The Copyright and Patent Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: &quot;Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings.&quot; In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years: Under the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), copyright protection generally lasted from a work's creation until 50 years after the author's death; under the CTEA, most copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death, 17 U. S. C. § 302(a). As in the case of prior copyright extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future copyrights alike. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain, brought this suit seeking a determination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause's &quot;limited Times&quot; prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Petitioners do not challenge the CTEA's &quot;life-plus-70-years&quot; timespan itself. They maintain that Congress went awry not with respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with existing copyrights. The &quot;limited Tim[e]&quot; in effect when a copyright is secured, petitioners urge, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to extend. As to the First Amendment, petitioners contend that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations. The District Court entered judgment on the pleadings for the Attorney General (respondent here), holding that the CTEA does not violate the Copyright Clause's &quot;limited Times&quot; restriction because the CTEA's terms, though longer than the 1976 Act's terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore fit within Congress' discretion. The court also held that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. In that court's unanimous view, Harper &amp; Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, foreclosed petitioners' First Amendment challenge to the CTEA. The appeals court reasoned that copyright does not impermissibly restrict free speech, for it grants the author an exclusive right only to the specific form of expression; it does not shield any idea or fact contained in the copyrighted work, and it allows for &quot;fair use&quot; even of the expression itself. A majority of the court also rejected petitioners' Copyright Clause claim. The court ruled that Circuit precedent precluded petitioners' plea for interpretation of the &quot;limited Times&quot; prescription with a view to the Clause's preambular statement of purpose: &quot;To promote the Progress of Science.&quot; The court found nothing in the constitutional text or history to suggest that a term of years for a copyright is not a &quot;limited Tim[e]&quot; if it may later be extended for another &quot;limited Tim[e].&quot; Recounting that the First Congress made the 1790 Copyright Act applicable to existing copyrights arising under state copyright laws, the court held that that construction by contemporaries of the Constitution's formation merited almost conclusive weight under Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 57. As early as McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, the Court of Appeals recognized, this Court made it plain that the Copyright Clause permits Congress to amplify an existing patent's terms. The court added that this Court has been similarly deferential to Congress' judgment regarding copyright. E. g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together an unlimited number of &quot;limited Times,&quot; the court stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. Rather, the court emphasized, the CTEA matched the baseline term for United States copyrights with the European Union term in order to meet contemporary circumstances. Held: In placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA, Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutionallimitations. Pp. 199-222. The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights does not exceed Congress' power under the Copyright Clause. Pp. 199-218. (a) Guided by text, history, and precedent, this Court cannot agree with petitioners that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Congress' Copyright Clause authority. The case most squarely on point to your question held that a telephone book is not sufficiently original as a constitutional matter to be subject to copyright. It held that originality, for copyright purposes, is constitutionally mandated for all works. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See also: Under the Copyright and Patent Clause, Congress' copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012). Under this clause, Congress, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation, may guarantee to authors and investors a reward in form of control over sale or commercial use of copies of their books. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). This clause is both grant of power and limitation; this clause is limited to promotion of advances in useful arts. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The economic philosophy behind this clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is best way to advance public welfare through talents of authors and inventors in Science and useful Arts. Mazer v. Stein , 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The Copyright Act of Congress, R.S. § 4952, as amended by the Act Mar. 3, 1891, c. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works, is valid as applied to pantomine dramatization by means of moving picture films. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). This section does not limit the useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily needs, and painting and engraving not intended for a mechanical end are among the useful arts, the progress of which Congress is empowered by this section to promote. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). No authority exists for obtaining a copyright beyond the extent to which Congress has authorized it; a copyright cannot be sustained as a right existing at common law, but depends wholly on the legislation of Congress. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). Legislation concerning trademark protection is not authorized by this clause. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). A list of U.S. Supreme Court cases on the issue of copyright at Wikipedia includes many additional copyright cases that don't implicate the U.S. Constitutional language. It is also worth noting that while the U.S. Supreme Court is the final and most authoritative interpreter of the U.S. Constitution, that any court presented with an issue of constitutional interpretation can, and indeed, is duty bound, to interpret the constitutional in a legally authoritative way, which in the case of appellate courts (state and federal) serves as a legal precedent for other cases that &quot;makes law&quot; on the issue.
No The case was dismissed on procedural reasons. Like this. Well, perhaps not so pedantic but there are things that have to happen before the Supreme Court can get involved and they haven’t. For example, the Supreme Court only has original jurisdiction in a limited classes of case; if this isn’t one of those (and it isn’t) it has to be heard in a court that does and then get appealed up the chain. When they have, the court will make a decision on the merits.
Yes Time shifting for personal use was ruled fair use by SCOTUS in 1984.
This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.
How should one reconcile these conflicting understandings? A holding of the U.S. Supreme Court that it has not later abandoned is, by definition, the correct interpretation of the U.S. Constitution for all purposes of U.S. law, even if a plain reading of the constitutional language might suggest otherwise.
The Constitution does not state your opinion of SCOTUS's job, instead it just says that there shall be one supreme court with judicial power, and it says what kind of cases are within the jurisdiction of that court. Thus The Constitution does not mandate whether rulings will adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis, will be based only on a narrowly literal interpretation of The Constitution, or will be based on a general sense of justice. The Constitution also does not say anything about the rules of that Supreme Court, therefore the court is free to set its own rules, and to allow or to not allow amicus briefs. Many points raised in amicus briefs fall on deaf ears, sometimes because they are based on non-shared legal assumptions. You can read a very brief summary of the over 140 amicus briefs in this case here. If you read various SCOTUS opinions over the past 225+ years, you will see that the court does make reference to fact, not just statements of the law and constitution. This brings it well within the scope of &quot;potentially relevant&quot; to determine some fact. The lawyers get to argue how facts relate to legal conclusions, but the basic fodder for any legal decision is some set of facts. The specific briefs you mentioned are: Pro-Life Obstetricians and College of Obstetricians. The latter's argument is self-summarized as Amici’s position is that laws regulating abortion should be evidence-based, supported by a valid medical or scientific justification, and designed to improve—not harm—women’s health Pro-Life Obsetricians' position is self-summarized as support for a law that rationally furthers Mississippi’s interest in protecting women’s health from risks posed by later- term abortions, which are now well established in the literature These statements refer to interpretive doctrines previously established by SCOTUS, but not literally expressed in The Constitution. In US v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 introduced concepts of constitutionality (not literally stated in The Constitution) whereby cases could be reviewed either with &quot;strict scrutiny&quot; for protection of Constitutional rights or else discernment of a &quot;rational interest&quot; in government taking a certain action. Either of these kinds of judicial review require a comparison of law to &quot;the facts&quot;. Hence &quot;the facts&quot; can be legally relevant.
The patent is invalid From 35 U.S.C. 102 A person shall be entitled to a patent unless — (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent There is no doubt that the Persion &quot;printed publication&quot; in c.1100 BCE predates the invention of the technique by Sharp Co. in 2012 CE. If follows that Sharp Co. is not entitled to patent protection. This is merely a refinement of 35 U.S.C. 101 which says (my emphasis): Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. The process Sharp Co. invented was not &quot;new&quot; - patent rights only accrue to the first inventor, in this case, some unnamed ancient Persian. The prior art exclusion is merely one means of ensuring that the patent holder is the first inventor.