Who would declare a law unconstitutional if the Supreme Court couldn&#39;t? Let's say the US Congress is passing a law. They are afraid that it would be declared unconstitutional in court, so they add an addendum saying "It is illegal for the Supreme Court to try this particular law in court." Now, the law is obviously unconstitutional, since the Supreme Court has a constitutional power to try any law in court. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. But if the Supreme Court can't try the law, it can by definition never get declared unconstitutional by them. My question is, who could then? Is there a check/balance in place that would allow that would allow the law to get declared unconstitutional?
Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The key language being the language in bold, who scope and limitations are the subject of hot debate in legal scholarship. For example, both military tribunal law for non-soldiers and the collateral review of death sentences implicate this provision. An issue related to U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over military court-martial court composition will be heard this year in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. There is also debate over whether the jurisdiction of every single federal court can be removed from a matter within the judicial power of the United States. In that regard, keep in mind that the United States federal court system did not have direct appeals of criminal convictions at all until the 1890s, although you could challenge, for example, the jurisdiction of a criminal court over your case with a writ of habeas corpus which is a collateral attack on a conviction in a separate civil lawsuit formally directed at your prison warden. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. You are wrong. A law that is unconstitutional on its face is, in terms of legal theory, unconstitutional immediately upon enactment and a court simply acknowledges that fact. It is not illegal to break an unconstitutional law even if no court has yet declared it to be unconstitutional (in U.S. jurisprudence). A law that is unconstitutional as applied is unconstitutional in application at the moment it is applied unconstitutionally, and again, a court merely acknowledges that fact.
There has never been a right to appeal directly, or discretionarily form a state trial court to SCOTUS. But, one can apply for a common law writ in SCOTUS with respect to a state trial court actions under the All Writs Act which is functionally an appeal, even though it is technically an original SCOTUS proceeding. But, original SCOTUS writs are extremely rare and I don't know if it has ever been used in the manner you describe. If so, it probably happened before the intermediate federal courts of appeal were created in the late 1800s. It isn't easy to do a search of cases to determine the answer. UPDATE WITH CORRECTION: After further consideration, I think that I have a better idea of what the question was getting at and want to elaborate on that. Most state courts (Utah, Texas and Oklahoma are exceptions to the general rule[1]), have either an intermediate court of appeal and then a state supreme court (sometimes given a different name such as "Court of Appeals" in New York State, in which the Supreme Court is the name of the trial court of general jurisdiction and the intermediate appeals court), or only a state supreme court from which appeals lie directly to the state supreme court. [1] In Utah there is an appeal of right in every civil case to the state supreme court and the intermediate court of appeals considers cases that it "kicks down" to the court of appeals rather than dealing with itself. In Texas and Oklahoma, there is a Court of Criminal Appeals in addition to the State Supreme Court, which operates much like a Supreme Court in criminal cases with the state supreme court that is nominally superior only rarely intervening in criminal cases (I don't know when precisely it can intervene in those states). In every state with an intermediate appeals court, there is an appeal of right to an intermediate appeals court which must be considered on the merits, and then a discretionary appeal to the state supreme court. Sometimes in these states there are a handful of exceptions. For example, in Colorado, there is a direct appeal of right to the state supreme court in death penalty and water law cases, and in municipal court and limited jurisdiction court cases (i.e. cases in courts limited to $25,000 in controversy or less), there is an appeal of right to what would usually be the general jurisdiction trial court and then a discretionary appeal from there to the state supreme court). But, there is still almost always one court to which there is a direct appeal of right. There are a small but non-negligible number of cases where what is usually a general jurisdiction trial court serves as an intermediate court of appeals of right for a lower trial court (e.g. a small claims court or municipal court), with appeal from there only in the discretion of the state supreme court. Those cases can and very rarely (but sometimes) do go on to be considered by the U.S. Supreme Court when a state supreme court denies discretionary review (in addition to being rare, few such cases are significant enough to justify the effort on the part of the parties to do so and are considered significant by the U.S. Supreme Court too), just as they would when an intermediate court of appeals rules and a state supreme court denies certiorari at the state level. But, in that case, the direct appeal still isn't a direct appeal of a "court of first instance" (i.e. a court where the original trial on the merits is held). But, there is no constitutional right to a direct appeal of right (there is only a constitutional right to a collateral attack via habeas corpus in criminal cases resulting in incarceration). The right to a direct appeal in state courts is a product of state law and state constitutions (in the federal courts it is a consequence of federal statutes). In some states without an intermediate court of appeals, there is also an appeal of right to the state supreme court. But, in other states without an intermediate court of appeals, appeals to the state supreme court are discretionary (much like appeals to the state supreme court from an intermediate appellate court and appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court). Thus, if you are in a state in which there is only a discretionary appeal to the state supreme court, and the state supreme court declines to consider your appeal on the merits, you can appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court once the state supreme court has declined your state level petition for certiorari. The actual pre-requisite at the state level in a direct appeal is that your state direct appellate options be exhausted. So, if you are in a state without intermediate courts of appeal in which the state supreme court reviews trial court decisions on only a discretionary basis, then you can make a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court if you have sought review on direct appeal in the state supreme court and it declined to grant certiorari to review your case on the merits. In practice, this is still very rare. States without intermediate appellate courts are universally small in population and hence have small case loads. Most states with only a single supreme court still have at least one direct appeal of right and have had that right for most of their history. And, state supreme courts usually do exercise their certiorari power in cases that are worthy of discretionary consideration in the U.S. Supreme Court. But, in this narrow situation, the U.S. Supreme Court may consider a trial court decision on a direct appeal, without it ever having been considered on the merits at the state level. This happens rarely (although the U.S. Supreme Court not infrequently, i.e. perhaps a couple of times a year, considers a case upon which there has been an intermediate direct appeal and a state supreme court has refused discretionary review), but it has almost certainly happened sometime. It is hard to devise a legal research search that would locate such a case, however, and strictly speaking, the denial of certiorari can be seen as a state supreme court ruling that is required in almost every case.
Public Law ##-### is a reference to a slip law -- an actual bill, as passed by Congress and signed (or vetoed, if the veto was overridden) by the President. The first number is the number of the Congress that passed it, the second the number of the law in that Congress. (the "Public" is in contrast with private bills, which are things like "XYZ person, who is otherwise ineligible for citizenship, is a citizen" -- things that affect basically one person). The US Statutes at Large are a compilation of slip laws (both public and private). Each volume has all the slip laws from a session of Congress, at least these days (I'm not sure how it interacts with the first few Congresses before the Statutes at Large existed). Laws there are still often called PL such-and-such, because that just means "law as enacted." If that doesn't line up exactly with the enrolled bill as passed and signed, something has gone wrong that really shouldn't go wrong. If this happens, someone is getting fired. The slip law and Statutes at Large are both official, pretty much irrefutable evidence of any laws of the United States. Laws are passed by Congress, and they contain exactly what was passed. Logical. However, while they're logical, they're also a terrible research tool. If you want to find the law from them, you need to scan through every federal law ever passed. They aren't organized in any way having to do with topic. But there is another way: instead of just saying "everything the legislature has done is the law," you can rearrange those laws by topic and update them as the legislature does things. This is not easy: the legislature is passing things organized by what they're trying to do, and you need to put it all in an order that's based on what the laws actually regulate. There's a lot of editorial judgment involved. But it makes a better research tool to see what the law is. The US Code is the second attempt at that (the first attempt failed). It's made by the House of Representatives Office of Law Revision Counsel, and does not inherently form part of US law. By default, it's merely strong evidence for what US law is; it is not conclusive, and the Statutes at Large takes precedence. This is because codification is hard. However, some titles of the US Code have gone further: the House OLRC cleaned them up and Congress enacted them into law. With the titles where this happened, Congress then passes all laws about them with direct reference to sections of the US Code, the OLRC can't move things around by themselves. The title itself becomes US law. With these titles, the US Code is just like the Statutes at Large: it's identical to the law as passed, and if not then heads will roll. Also, in such cases, the US Code becomes just as official evidence as the Statutes at Large.
Ultimately the answer (in the US) is the US Constitution. The courts pretty much have the unlimited power to interpret the law, and the limits on power mainly pertain to what the state can do. The length of the leash on the government depends on what kind of rights are at stake. The weakest and default limit is known as "rational basis", and comes down to asking whether a government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (such as stopping terrorist attacks) plus whether there was due process and equal protection. There are more rigorous standards (intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) in case a law involves a "suspect classification", or in case a fundamental constitutional right is infringed. In the case of strict scrutiny, the government would have to show that it had a compelling interest in the action, the law would have to be "narrowly tailored" (i.e. does that thing and only that thing), and should be the least restrictive way to achieve that result. Roe v. Wade is probably the best-know example of that kind of review, which held that abortion laws "violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy". A court would not order a party to do an impossible act. A court could order a party to do something which the party had argued was impossible, but you can interpret a court's decision to indicate that it rejected the argument. The defendant would not shoulder the burden of proving that the action was impossible, though they would have to counter the government's argument that the act could be performed if they believe it is not possible. (In the Apple case, the argument would probably be some Apple-internal document that says "Yeah, we can do it, but do we want to?"). There is probably an expense-related limit in that the courts would not order Apple to liquidate all of their assets to comply. But: if a case were to end up at the Supreme Court, the court is stricken with mass insanity and arbitrarily orders a defendant to do the impossible, there is only the option of impeachment and Senate trial to remove the offending justices, and that is just not going to happen. There is no higher authority that overturns SCOTUS.
While the Supreme Courts of Germany, Honduras, India and Italy have asserted such authority, the U.S. Supreme Court's justiciable decisions about a U.S. Constitutional Amendment are generally limited to a determination of whether the amendment was lawfully adopted pursuant to Article V of the U.S. Constitution, which states: The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. Usually, U.S. Supreme Court litigation over a constitutional amendment would be over whether the process of Article V has been conformed to in a particular case (which has been litigated in several prior cases). The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), that even some procedural issues are political questions for Congress to resolve that are non-justiciable, in part because the mode of ratification is expressly delegated to Congress in Article V. As the summary of Coleman at the link above explains: In an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that the Kansas legislators had standing to sue, but found that two of the plaintiffs’ claims raised political questions that could only be resolved by Congress. With respect to the whether the Kansas legislature’s previous rejection of the Child Labor Amendment precluded its subsequent ratification, the Court stated that this “should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the amendment.” But, with respect to the language in bold in the quoted language of Article V above, the U.S. Supreme Court could determine that a constitutional amendment is unconstitutional. This narrow ground, however, is the sole basis upon which it may do so.
This is largely congruent with* the doctrine of laches. The basic idea, under common law, is that you can lose rights by failing to assert them. This is generally important for many reasons, but specifically in the case of appeals: The argument should have been brought before the trial court. Justice is not a game, but it's important to recognize that the party trying to raise the argument had an opportunity to do so already. They have given up their right to raise this argument, and extending them the privilege of doing so is (for the following reasons) not good for the system. Courts of appeals are typically not well-equipped to evaluate factual evidence. It is not their area of expertise. Witnesses or evidence may be less available. It's just not practical to try to adjudicate factual issues on appeal, most of the time. If anyone could get an appeal by bringing new factual arguments, then everyone would do that. You'd bring your strongest argument before the district court, and then if that fails, bring the second strongest before the circuit court. That way, you get an extra trial. This is inefficient. Allowing factual arguments on appeal would encourage attorneys and their clients to strategically bring different facts before different courts. This kind of forum-shopping is harmful because it has little to do with who has the stronger overall case, and more to do with who has the better lawyer. * "Congruent with" is not the same as "an instance of"; this rule is not formally an application of laches. It just happens to share the same justification.
Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.
Congress can't override substantive rules of constitutional law Marbury v. Madison is a binding interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution permits or denies, and in substance, this law seeks to change that interpretation of the scope of the judicial power, so that interpretation may not be overruled except via a Constitutional amendment. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appellate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statue passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. The language in italics is jurisdiction stripping language, which I discuss below, and which is also discussed in another answer. But, the language in bold is enunciating a substantive rule of law regarding how the judicial branch may resolve a case that is otherwise properly before it. And, Congress does not have the power to change that to make the U.S. Constitution a dead letter under its Article III jurisdiction regulation powers. The language in bold language is a direct attempt to overrule a binding interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and that is beyond the authority of Congress to do, so the statute would be unconstitutional, at least, in part. Jurisdiction stripping Yes, Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to Article III, Section 2 which states: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under the Regulations as the Congress shall make. But, there are parts of Article III that apply in addition to the power of Congress to create "Exceptions" the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the power to create and modify the "inferior courts" that exist. The first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is crucial, and interacts with the Exceptions power. The default provision is that all judicial power as defined in Article III, Section 2 is vested in the "supreme Court" unless and until that power is instead vested in an "inferior Court" established under Article III that Congress creates by law. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to deny every court (or even every federal court) both original and appellate jurisdiction over any constitutionally justiciable claim arising under Article III, even if the claim is not within the express original jurisdiction of SCOTUS. If they deny every inferior Article III federal court jurisdiction over something within the constitutionally defined scope of the judicial power, then it reverts to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court even though it is not expressly made a part of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal courts collectively is defined in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and extends to all cases arising under the U.S. Constitution which would include a claim to have a provision of federal or state law declared unconstitutional as in violation of the constitution. It says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; . . . (This analysis is attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.) Now, this is not to say that Congress couldn't do something to make it harder procedurally to have statutes declared unconstitutional. For example, there would be a much harder claim of unconstitutionality if Congress vested original jurisdiction in all such cases in the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, and then only assigned one judge to that district, and denied the U.S. Courts of Appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction over those decisions. At some point, however, even this lesser restriction, rather than elimination of a judicial power would still be subject to challenge under the due process protections of the 5th Amendment. Writ jurisdiction Notably, Marbury v. Madison was a case brought in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus, under the All Writs Act, and not in connection with its appellate jurisdiction. So, Congress would also have to repeal or amend the "All Writs Act" to pull off the intent of the proposed statute, because the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends by statute to writs that are not appellate in nature even though this power is very rarely exercised. A writ is a court order directed at a government official directing that government official to do something, or to refrain from doing something. But, there are many ways to back door a seemingly private cause of action, particularly one related to constitutionality, into a writ. And, if a court has jurisdiction over a writ, it has jurisdiction to entertain requests by litigants to have such writs issued. Congress can't remove a state court forum It is worth noting that every single state court from traffic court on up has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, and that state courts frequently do declare state statutes to be unconstitutional. Congressional jurisdiction to regulate jurisdiction is largely limited to regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It can put a federal question (e.g. copyright enforcement or disputes with the IRS) in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but there are no cases in which Congress has been permitted to place a federal law in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts while also denying any federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under that law. Otherwise, state court jurisdiction isn't regulated by Congress. And, the Constitution specifically requires all federal, state and local officials to swear to uphold the U.S. Constitution which arguably provides an independent basis for state court jurisdiction over constitutionality claims arising under the U.S. Constitution. This is a really important point. For example, suppose that someone who lives in the same state as you do sues you entirely under state law in a state court, and that state's courts require you to bring any claim you have against that person in state court over which that state court has jurisdiction as a counterclaim or you forfeit that claim forever. If you have federal claims against the person who sued you in state court, and your claims are not one of the handful of issues (e.g. copyright enforcement) that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you must enforce your federal claims against that person as counterclaims in that state court case, or you will lose them forever. For example, suppose that your employer sues you in state court for conversion (i.e. stealing company property) and you have a right to sue the employer for not paying you the right amount for your overtime work under federal law. Then, you must bring your federal overtime claims in state court as counterclaims to the conversion action, rather than in federal court. Similarly, even though state criminal charges are always brought in state courts, a criminal defendant in a state court criminal case, can raised arguments arising under the U.S. Constitution including a determination that a state criminal law is unconstitutional, in state court as a defense, even though the only federal court recourse a criminal defendant has is through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought in federal district court after all state direct appellate relief is exhausted, after petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court, and after all state post-conviction relief (including petitioning the final state order to the U.S. Supreme Court) is exhausted. In practice, this means, criminal defendants have no meaningful access to the federal courts other than two petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which are discretionary, until they have been incarcerated wrongfully for five or ten years. But, federal defenses can and routinely are raised in the state court trial (and indeed, federal defenses that could be raised in a state trial court may not be raised in a habeas corpus petition in federal court unless they were first raised in or before the original state court trial). N.B.: Federal claims in the exclusive original jurisdiction of state courts The extremes to which jurisdiction stripping is allowed are explored in the handful of claims arising under federal law that are expressly not within the scope of the jurisdiction of any federal trial court or intermediate appellate court, or within the express non-appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most notable of these are affirmative private individual civil lawsuits against offenders under the federal robocall and junk fax law (a.k.a. the Telephone Consumer Protection Act a.k.a. the TCPA a.k.a. 47 U.S.C. § 227), which do not not require a writ, which may only be brought in state court, subject to an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But, the federal courts have exclusively jurisdiction over litigation many kinds of claims other than private civil actions arising under the TCPA. This law is much less constitutionally concerning than the one proposed in the question, however, because while Congress can't repeal the U.S. Constitution, it doesn't have to pass a law giving private individuals a private cause of action when they receive robocalls or junk faxes at all. It could pass a law that was enforceable by the FCC alone, for example, and in the case of the TCPA, there are persons, including the FCC and regulated persons who want to challenge a regulation issued by the FCC, who are entitled to utilize the federal courts to enforce the TCPA or to dispute it. For example, there is no private cause of action to enforce most federal criminal laws (as such, not just involving the same harm) with a civil lawsuit by the victim against the criminal, in either federal court or state court, but that is not unconstitutional. This is because federal criminal laws can be enforced by government prosecutors and defended against by private individuals, in Article III federal courts. Also, even private causes of action under the TCPA are subject to ultimate U.S. Supreme Court appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court is an Article III federal court.