If Statutory Instruments are used to enact Acts of Parliament, are their powers bounded? If Statutory Instruments are (sometimes?/always?) used to enact Acts of Parliament, are their powers bounded to maintain democratic legitimacy? Are there any controls in place to avoid Statutory Instruments - that can effectively bypass Parliament - from “overreaching”?
A statutory instrument that exceeds the limits of the enabling Act is void. For example, an Act that enables the executive to make regulations about companies would not support a regulation that purported to affect companies and partnerships. There are two controls in place: regulations must be tabled in Parliament and any MP can call for the regulation to be debated and voted down. anyone affected by the regulation can go to court to oppose it - there are lots of things they can argue including that the regulation overreaches its enabling Act.
From Wikipedia: An enacting clause, or enacting formula, is a short phrase that introduces the main provisions of a law enacted by a legislature. It usually declares the source from which the law claims to derive its authority. In many countries, an enacting formula is not considered necessary and is simply omitted. The simplest enacting clauses merely cite the legislature by which the law has been adopted; for example the enacting clause used in Australia since 1990 is &quot;The Parliament of Australia enacts&quot;. Alternatively an enacting clause may invoke the ultimate sovereign. For example, California, based on the principle of popular sovereignty, has the following enacting clause: &quot;The People of the State of California do enact as follows.&quot; For example, Acts of the US Congress begin with words not unlike those of Acts of Parliament: Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled UK statutory instruments go further, stating not only who made the order, but also which legislation provided the power to make this order. To take a recent example at random: The Secretary of State for Education makes the following Order in exercise of the powers conferred by section 129(1) of the Education Reform Act 1988 From these, one might surmise that the purpose of these sentences is to convince the reader that the person or body issuing the legislation has the power to do so. For most statutory instruments, the power to make them comes from Acts of Parliament, and so the specific section(s) of the those Acts are stated. For Acts of Parliament themselves, it is taken as read that the Queen, Lords and Commons acting together (or more formally, the Queen-in-Parliament) have the power to legislate, so it is sufficient to merely state that is they who have done so - and similarly for the US Congress and other legislatures. In response to edits in the question: Can't the hackneyed sentence ... be shortened? Yes it could, as evidenced by the fact that not all countries use an enacting clause at all, and some of those that do have shorter, simpler ones. Why not something less pompous? Why should they? One shouldn't underestimate the role of tradition in the UK constitution - indeed it's held together in part by unwritten conventions whose long use has solidified them into something like law. As mentioned in the question, bills don't become acts until they've been assented to by a hereditary monarch, which is indicated by a clerk uttering a statement in Norman French. Compared to that, what's wrong with acts starting with a grandiose statement? Incidentally, if you thank that's pompous, then you'll enjoy the enacting clause which appears at the top of UK Finance Acts: Most Gracious Sovereign WE, Your Majesty’s most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom in Parliament assembled, towards raising the necessary supplies to defray Your Majesty’s public expenses, and making an addition to the public revenue, have freely and voluntarily resolved to give and to grant unto Your Majesty the several duties hereinafter mentioned; and do therefore most humbly beseech Your Majesty that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:— Finally, context is everything. I would strongly recommend watching a recording of the State Opening of Parliament. In addition to all the pomp and circumstance, the main event where is the Queen - wearing a priceless bejewelled crown, sitting on a golden throne under a golden canopy, watched by Peers of the Realm dressed in ermine robes - reads a speech prepared by the government, in the chamber of the House of Lords, with its golden ceiling, intricate carvings, statues and stained-glass windows. Compared to that, a few extra words at the start of an Act seems kind of modest, don't you think?
I'm just going to talk about the US. The First Amendment to the US Constitution codifies that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;... What is clearly prohibited by this Amendment would be Congress (or any inferior legislature via the 14th Amendment) restricting the ability of religions which refuse to marry same-sex couples from marrying opposite-sex couples, or in general outlawing any kind of religious law about who a particular church is willing to marry (e.g. only marrying if both parties are of the religion). However, legislatures are generally allowed to influence action via government inducements (I'll just use inducements to describe subsidies, tax breaks, etc). The current precedent for determining whether a particular legislative action violates the Establishment Clause is the "Lemon Test," from Lemon v. Kurtzman, which has the following test: Government action violates the Establishment Clause unless it: Has a significant secular (i.e., non-religious) purpose, Does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and Does not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. On the first point, I think the law fails - inducing religious establishments to perform same-sex marriage does not have a "significant secular purpose" because ultimately the government doesn't care whether or not you have a marriage ceremony, just that you sign a marriage certificate with an appropriate witness, which can be a government official. The law could survive on the second point if it could be shown to have at least the preponderance of being for social good, if it is argued that the law's purpose is to make church marriage ceremonies more accessible for same-sex couples by inducing more churches to perform them, and not to harm churches that don't perform them. However, this would probably be an uphill battle, since the law has the practical effect of promoting some religions' beliefs over others. The law probably fails on the third point as well, going back to the previous point that it effectively results in the government choosing one religious practice to promote over another. However, the Lemon Test often criticized or entirely disregarded by the current Supreme Court, for example in the case American Legion v American Humanist Association (a case decided by the current Supreme Court): This pattern is a testament to the Lemon test's shortcomings. As Establishment Clause cases involving a great array of laws and practices came to the Court, it became more and more apparent that the Lemon test could not resolve them. It could not "explain the Establishment Clause's tolerance, for example, of the prayers that open legislative meetings, . . . certain references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings; or the attention paid to the religious objectives of certain holidays, including Thanksgiving. Even without the Lemon Test, we can look at Walz v. Tax Commission of New York for an idea of when tax breaks for religious establishments is allowed (emphasis mine): The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion... New York, in common with the other States, has determined that certain entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its "moral or mental improvement," should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes. It has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such;... The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest. This paragraph seems to provide some argument both ways. First, the bolded section would seem to prohibit using government inducements to promote one religious practice over another, and that the government can only assist religious institutions when the assistance is applied equally. On the other hand, states are allowed to grant tax relief to religious organizations "that foster..."moral or mental improvement,"..." A legislature could argue that the law promotes "moral improvement" by encouraging acceptance of same-sex marriage, rather than a particular religious belief. However, I don't think that such an argument would prevail over the general prohibition on promoting any religious exercise over another. Government assistance for religious organizations is very thinly held to be permissible only when it is equal. In my opinion, the Supreme Court already has to use twisted gymnastics to argue in favor of any government assistance of religious organizations granted because of their religious status, so they are unlikely to allow something this far (especially since it is usually the conservative justices arguing in favor of these policies, and they are less likely to do same-sex marriage any favors). On the other hand, a permissible policy may be to have government grants for any organization that performs same-sex marriage ceremonies, whether or not that organization is religious. Whether or not that is allowed is likely going to depend on what proportion of the receiving organizations are religious in nature, but there may be enough hotels and other non-religious venues that would qualify that such a law might survive.
The 2018 Data Protection Act specifically implemented the GDPR EU Regulation in the UK - while the regulation itself was directly binding it required member states to create their own legislation for implementing the details - setting up the required supervisory and accreditation bodies etc. The various 'opening clauses' in the regulation also provided the means for the members states to implement specifics in local legislation (so long as that legislation exceeded the minimums set out in GDPR). At the end of the Brexit transition period the UK was no longer a member state (and it's citizens were no longer EU citizens), keeping the DPA 2018 as was would have actually meant that UK citizens weren't eligible for the very protections it was intended to provide them! Therefore the basis of the law needed updating (as well as certain minor provisions that no longer made sense) hence the &quot;UK GDPR&quot; provided a substitute. The fundamentals are the same and crucially it also codified the necessary basis for the UK's data protection laws to have what is referred to as &quot;adequacy&quot; - which means that the EU considers the UK GDPR/DPA to provide &quot;essentially equivalent&quot; levels of protection and therefore data is allowed to continue to flow between the UK and the EU.
While this does not really directly answer your question of overturn, but this might somewhat directly address your original concern. This provides a path for it to become a carte blanche unrestrained power of Congress. This statement seems a bit misleading. It seems to indicate that Congress now is unfettered to abuse its impeachment power, but this is not true, because Congress is divided into two halves that place check on each other: The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
In an extreme hypothetical situation: at a meeting where there is a quorum present, there are 50 members qualified to vote in attendance. An issue comes up for a vote, and 45 people abstain, 3 vote yes, 2 vote no. Would this pass 3 to 2, or is there some overriding part of &quot;majority present and voting&quot; that I am just not understanding? The measure would pass 3-2. The words mean what they say. Quorum requirements prevent the small number of people voting from being unfair.
No, it is not. Section 1 allows legislatures to infringe all Charter rights under certain reasonable circumstances. Section 33 is an alternative method by which legislatures can completely ignore the Charter rights that it can be applied to (ss. 2 &amp; 7 to 15). Section 33 is a legislative procedural provision, it is not in itself an inherent right which would be subject to Section 1. Furthermore, reading Section 1 to apply in this way to Section 33 would completely eviscerate the meaning of Section 33 since it is a stronger mechanism for violating Charter rights. Case law on this is few due to the relative rarity of legislatures invoking the Section 33 notwithstanding clause and the fact that invoking it is generally a shield to judicial review. However, while not explicitly confirming what I said, Ford v. Quebec (AG) [1988] 2 SCR 712 basically takes for granted the above and applies it (note it can be a confusing read due to three different Charters being involved). In it, ss. 58 &amp; 69 of Quebec's Charter of the French Language were disputed. Due to legislative hijinks*, it was unclear whether either section was covered by an invocation of the notwithstanding clause. The Court first undertook a procedural analysis to determine whether the notwithstanding clause applied and found that s. 58 was covered, but s. 69 was not (para. 34). Only after that did it address the substantive rights issues. While still analysing both ss. 58 &amp; 69 to fall within the guarantees of Charter s. 2(b), the court only concluded s. 69 to infringe the Charter since (implicitly) s. 58 was not eligible for such a determination by virtue of the notwithstanding clause (para. 60). As Charter rights were found to be infringed, the Court then examined whether s. 69 could saved under Section 1. It could not, thus rendering it an unjustifiable infringement of the Charter (para. 73). *To keep this answer both short and focussed on law, we really do not have time to get into the Quebec government's initial responses to the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982.
Yes, legislative bodies can pass legislation that constrains the interpretation of the rest of their legislation. In the U.S., see 1 U.S.C §1-8. In Canada, see The Interpretation Act. In British Columbia, see The Interpretation Act. As an example of a back-and-forth between the courts and congress regarding a setting a standard of review, consider the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Summarizing from Holt v. Hobbs 574 U. S. ____ (2015): In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court held that "neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden the exercise of religion usually do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment". Congress desired a stricter test that prohibited the burdening of religion regardless of whether the laws are neutral or generally applicable. Congress passed RFRA in 1993, which required that "[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that application of the burden to the person — (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest". RFRA was passed with the goal of setting the standard of review for all other legislation that burdens a person's exercise of religion. Without RFRA, the standard of review would have been that used in Smith, based solely on First Amendment protections. With RFRA, the standard of review became stronger, basically strict scrutiny. An example of Congress setting the factors to be used in a balancing test is the addition of fair use via the Copyright Act of 1976. Prior to 1976, courts had been applying a fair use exception based on common law rather than statute. The act encoded in statute the four factors that Congress wanted to be considered and listed several purposes for which fair use was explicitly applicable. In this case, Congress basically codified the fair use doctrine as it was being used at the time by the courts. It could be considered an expression of approval for the existing interpretation of the time and a desire to prevent drift in that analysis.