Are priests held to the same standards as attorneys? The Seal of the Confessional for priests (at least in the Catholic faith) prohibits a priest from disclosing anything and everything that was said to them in a confession. Given that, if someone confessed a crime (major or minor) the priest could not report that individual to the police (i.e. act on his own will). I understand that a defendant's attorney could not be forced by a judge to sit in front of a grand jury and disclose what was exchanged between the defendant and even if the attorney accidentally revealed that the defendant did commit the crime, it would have to be removed from record because that is privileged information. My question is: Are priests held to the same standard? Can a judge (federal, state, etc.) order a priest to sit in front of a grand jury and disclose what was said in confession? And if the judge did and the priest refused, would the priest be held in contempt? Does this apply to all states in the US?
Confidential statements made in confession to a religious advisor are privileged in every U.S. state and in federal court. There is a body of law that surrounds each kind of privilege (attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, doctor-patient, priest-parishioner, accountant-client, husband-wife) that covers exceptions to the general rule. At least a couple of privileges (attorney-client and husband-wife) actually involve more than one distinct privilege: attorney-client privilege has a confidential communications component and a work product component that have different rules; a husband-wife privilege has a confidential communications component and a 5th Amendment like component that allows one spouse to refuse to permit the other current spouse to testify against him or her. The privilege for confessions made to priests is generally speaking, broader than the attorney-client privilege. Both attorney-client privileges have crime-fraud and prevention of imminent harm exceptions that do not apply to priests. The work product component of the attorney-client privilege also has an exception when work product is the sole available source of critical information available by no other means (e.g. due to the fact that destructive testing was conducted on evidence). A judge cannot order a priest to disclose to a grand jury or any other tribunal or official, what was said in confession, and the priest could not be held in contempt for not testifying in this manner. Indeed, even if, for example, a secret microphone had been placed on a suspect and captured his confession to a priest, the recording of that conversation would not be admissible as evidence in any legal forum due to the privilege. Often, as in the case of a seal of confessional for a Roman Catholic priest, a privilege is also accompanied by a duty on the part of the person receiving the confidential information to keep the information disclosed confidential. But, the duty to keep privileged communications confidential does not always exactly match the scope of the privilege. For example, a Mormon minister's religious obligation to keep confessions confidential might not be precisely the same as those of a Roman Catholic priest, even though confessions to either one would be privileged from compulsory disclosure in a court or other tribunal. Similarly, confidential communications to an attorney can be disclosed by an attorney in furtherance of the representation in a way that a confidential communication to a priest usually could not be disclosed. In at least some jurisdictions, the priest could probably be compelled to testify regarding whether an individual came to a place at a given time to confess (which would establish alibi or lack thereof, and proximity to the time scene at a particular time) since that itself wouldn't be a confidential matter shared with the priest and could have been witnesses by anyone else in the church building who was not a part of the confession whether it not it actually was witnessed by anyone else. In such a jurisdiction, if the priest refused to testify regarding that matter, the priest could be held in contempt of court just like any other witness under a subpoena who refused to testify. The law is not entirely clear over the extent that the priest-parishioner privilege is mandated solely by a statute, common law rule, or court rule (as the case may be from state to state, this varies considerably), and to which extent the statute, common law rule, or court rule providing for the privilege is constitutionally mandated by the free exercise clause of the 1st Amendment to the United States Constitution (incorporated to apply to the states through the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution), and by parallel state constitutional provisions. The question of whether the priest-parishioner privilege is constitutionally mandated matters because some states, in the wake of scandals involving sexual abuse of children by clergy, have sought to extend the requirement that a designated person knowing of instances of child abuse must report their suspicions to authorities, that applies to many kinds of licensed professionals who deal with children in most states, to religious officials who deal with children and their supervisors and colleagues in their churches or denominations. If the question is constitutional, it might be the case that these laws would be unconstitutional. Middle ground might find that there might be a duty of someone taking a confession from a priest to report child abuse (because this is an abuse by the priest of the privilege of receiving privileged confessions), but not a duty to report child abuse disclosed in confession by anyone else. Of course, if there is no constitutional dimension to the privilege, the legislature is free to modify it with legislation as they see fit. There is also an issue in every particular privilege regarding whom the privilege belongs to, and hence, who has a right to legally waive a privilege and allow testimony concerning the confidential communications to be provided. It might belong to the person making the confession, it might belong to the priest, or it might belong to both (hence requiring mutual consent for a waiver of privilege and not just consent by one individual who holds the privilege). I am not familiar with the state of the law in every jurisdiction regarding who holds the privilege for confidential communications with clergy.
Yes. The lawyer can use this information. The privilege is a privilege against involuntary disclosure to third-parties. There is a parallel duty of confidentiality not to disclose information revealed to the lawyer to third parties. But, the lawyer is not revealing the information to third-parties in a collection capacity. And, there are exceptions to both the privilege and to the duty of confidentiality that apply in the case of disputes between lawyers and clients.
In Guinn v. Church of Christ, plaintiff withdrew from the church after an internal investigation of her conduct. The church apparently held as a matter of religious doctrine that she must repent of her sins, also that withdrawing from the church is doctrinally impossible. The transgressions were widely publicized within the church; a lawsuit over outrage and invasion of privacy ensued. The upshot of the appeal is that the church can be held liable for post-withdrawal actions, but before that, the church has a privilege to communicate such transgressions (the church is not subject to secular judicature of its actions w.r.t. its members). Contract law is not relevant here, what matters is that a person can knowingly and intelligently waive their right to litigate against a party, and while one is a member of the church which has such a waiver as part of their disciplinary doctrine, one cannot sue the church for its doctrinary actions as long as the actions do not constitute a threat to public safety which would justify state interference. Although the church argued that church membership is irrevocable, the court found that &quot;Just as freedom to worship is protected by the First Amendment, so also is the liberty to recede from one's religious allegiance&quot;. Given that plaintiff had withdrawn consent yet the church subsequently announced the transgressions without her consent, the church was thus found to be liable. In Stepek v. Doe, the court similarly affirmed that a church enjoys a privilege against charges of defamation, when the plaintiff continues to operate within the church, not having left the church. So it can &quot;work&quot;, to some extent. The person can always withdraw consent; the person has no legal recourse in case consent has not been withdrawn. The article is correct as far as it goes, which is not far enough: it errs in not stating what the legal consequences of of the transgressor leaving the church are.
Documents are not protected under the 5th Amendment, so a person can be compelled to produce documents that may incriminate them. The person cannot be forced to testify against themselves, however – they can invoke their right to not testify against themselves. The attorney-client privilege canon has some exceptions, for example (4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules or (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services (bearing in mind that POTUS is required by law to turn all documents over to the national Archives, so turning the records over is &quot;compliance with the law&quot; and a think that an attorney would do for their client, though this event is quite belated). No subpoena was issued and no testimony was given, so the Fifth Amendment is irrelevant.
united-states I am answering this in the case of a criminal jury trial (given the context of the previous question). It is my understanding that the judge must accept (almost?) all evidence admitted into court. So, this leaves me with three questions: What happens if an official shows evidence that the judge hadn't agreed to feature in the trial? . . . What happens if the evidence happens to be inadmissible? A trial in a criminal case takes place in a courtroom at a predetermined date and time, with the prosecutor physically sitting at one table in front of a judge and the defendant and the defendant's lawyer physically sitting at another table in front of the judge, and a jury physically sitting in a seating area to the side of the judge, and a witness (usually) physically sitting in a chair on the other side of the judge (in rare circumstances, for minor witnesses, testimony is provided by telephone with the phone put on speaker in the courtroom for all to hear), and a court reporter or tape recorder keeping track of what happens verbatim. In a trial, essentially all evidence comes in through witnesses sitting on a special the chair in front of the judge designated for witnesses (called the witness stand) at the request of either the prosecuting attorney, or the defense attorney. This is the only way the evidence is introduced (other than by stipulations of both side's lawyers). Prosecutors and defense attorneys don't testify or provide evidence themselves. The judge is usually not told what evidence will be offered at trial in advance, although sometimes a pre-trial hearing is held to consider a particularly important piece of evidence's admissibility prior to trial, in a hearing on what is called a &quot;motion in limine&quot; or a &quot;motion to suppress&quot;. If that happens, the judge's decision made in advance will be honored by the judge when anyone tries to introduce the evidence at trial. But those are the exception and not the rule. Usually, any witnesses can be asked any questions at trial and the judge does not consider the admissibility of the answer to the question until it is asked and objected to by the other side's lawyer at trial. A defendant can choose to be, but is not required to be, a witness in his or her own case. In a trial, when it is their turn, the prosecution and defense, respectively, ask witnesses to sit at the witness stand one by one and ask them questions, which the witness answers under oath, absent an evidence objection from the other side's attorney. While a witness is on the stand, exhibits such as documents or physical objects can also be introduced into evidence in connection with the authenticating testimony of the witness (except in cases where both sides stipulate to the admission of the documents or other non-testimonial evidence). As the lawyers try to introduce evidence by asking a question to a witness on the stand, or by asking the judge for permission to introduce non-testimonial evidence, the other side's attorney can say, &quot;I object&quot;. If that happens, the witness on the stand is not allowed to answer the question and the non-testimonial evidence (e.g. documents, or a knife allegedly used in a crime) is not made available to the jury until the judge rules on whether it is admissible or not in accordance with the rules of evidence. Usually, the judge rules on the evidence objection immediately in the moment, although in rare cases, the judge will let the jury have a break for a few minutes while hearing arguments from the lawyers for both sides on about the relevant evidence rules and/or researching the legal issue, before ruling on the evidence issue. Once the judge rules on the evidence issue, the trial continues immediately. If the judge &quot;sustains&quot; the objection to the evidence, then the question doesn't get asked and/or the jury doesn't get to see the non-testimonial evidence. The lawyer whose question or offer to introduce evidence was successfully objected to moves on to their next question (if any) for the witness instead. If the judge &quot;overrules&quot; the objection to the evidence, then the witness answer the question and/or the jury gets to see the non-testimonial evidence which is &quot;received&quot; into evidence by the judge. This process continues continuously, for as many business days as it takes, until all witness testimony and all non-testimonial evidence has been presented to the court and both sides have told the court that they have presented all of their evidence. Then each side makes closing arguments to the jury, the judge reads the jury instructions of law on how to resolve the case, and the jury is sent to closed room to discuss the case and decide whether to say &quot;guilty&quot; or &quot;not guilty&quot; with respect to each charge brought by the prosecution in the trial. This decision is called a &quot;verdict&quot; and when the jury has made up its mind on all charges present to it, the jury lets the judge know that it has made up its mind, and the judge calls everyone back to the courtroom, and the jury tells the judge what they decided in open court. If the verdict is &quot;not guilty&quot; on all criminal charges in the case, then the case is over, with no post-trial motions and no appeals. If the verdict is &quot;guilty&quot; the defendant is convicted, subject to post-trial motions to declare a mistrial and appeals by the convicted defendant. If the convicted defendant appeals the case, and the judge abused his discretion in overruling an objection to the evidence that is made by the lawyer for the defendant (or the defendant personally if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer), because no reasonable judge could have found that the evidence was admissible under the circumstances, then the appellate court rules that the judge has made an &quot;error&quot;. The appellate court will not find that the judge's ruling is an &quot;error&quot; if the judge made the correct decision for the wrong reason. If it is reasonably possible that &quot;error&quot; possibly in combination with other errors made by the trial court judge could have caused a convicted criminal defendant to have been acquitted by the jury if the errors weren't made by the judge, then the defendant gets a new trial. The new trial usually before the same judge with a new jury. But the new trial is before a different judge and a new jury if the judge is no longer a judge on the court for any reason, or if the judge has been so defiant of the appellate court (typically ignoring its instructions in a retrial after a first appeal) that the appellate court decides it must remove the judge from the case. A criminal defendant is only acquitted by an appellate court if the appellate court finds that it would be impossible under any circumstances for the defendant to be convicted in a new trial, possibly with different evidence presented by the prosecution. What happens if a private citizen does the above? This doesn't make sense. Private citizens don't rule on the admissibility of evidence in a criminal trial, and can't introduce evidence in a criminal trial except at the request of a prosecuting attorney or defendant's attorney by being called as a witness and asking the questions that the lawyers (and sometimes the judge as well) asks the witness. Witnesses are not allowed to volunteer testimony or provide documents to a jury unless asked to do so by a lawyer in the case. What happens if someone provides evidence in court without the knowledge of the judge? As the process described above should make clear, this is basically impossible absent some extremely irregular event on the same level of irregularity as someone bribing a jury or threatening a jury with harm if he votes the wrong way.
The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.
What are the factors in weighting whether to disclose substantive evidence vs. using it for impeachment at trial? In an adversarial system (such as that in the jurisdictions in the U.S.) the surprise factor is disallowed on trial. I am not knowledgeable on the procedural exceptions, but generally speaking the documentary evidence (including deposition transcripts) has to be filed during the discovery stage of proceedings. A discovery deadline is set up during case scheduling, and extensions of that deadline have to be requested via motion. There is the slightly related concept of sequestration of witnesses whereby inconsistencies may serve to impeach a witness's testimony, but that is different than withholding from the jury any pre-existing evidence that a plaintiff would like to be considered on trial (whether for impeachment or otherwise). Also, it is in the injured party's best interest that the jury get to see the evidence rather than have it merely rely on a witness's reaction of surprise. The wrongdoer's lawyer will try to confuse the jury and thus outweigh the jury's perception of a "surprised witness", but that attempt is likelier to fail if the jury has the evidence with which to compare the witness's testimony at trial.
Could the acceptance of the pardon then have any bearing on the case in the other jurisdiction? Possibly, but not much. There is very, very little case law on this point since: (1) pardons are rare (especially federal ones), (2) people who are pardoned generally do so because everyone in the criminal justice process in the prior case agrees that the person is reformed and they are usually correct, (3) the statute of limitations has often run on a new prosecution, and (4) many cases where these issues arise, are probably not appealed (either because the neither parties attempts to, or because a defendant is acquitted and there is no appeal), but an appeal is necessary to give rise to binding precedents. Can the admission of guilt be used in the new case? The criminal collateral estoppel effects of a pardon flow from the adjudication on the merits which is vacated. Also, comity between sovereigns and public policy mitigate such a rule. The pardon power would not be very interesting if it routinely resulted in a new prosecution that was conducted on a summary basis via a preclusion doctrine such as collateral estoppel. In many cases, the statute of limitations will have run on the original crime or there will be no parallel state law crime, but this is not always the case. Also, I would disagree with the statement that a pardon always implies an admission of guilt to the crime for which a pardon was granted, even though that statement is often used rhetorically. For example, one important use of the pardon power is to commute the sentence of someone who asserts that they are factually innocent but have been convicted of a crime, potentially in a manner that is not subject to further judicial review, and treating that as an admission of guilt doesn't make sense. As the Wikipedia entry on Burdick notes in the pertinent part: Legal scholars have questioned whether that portion of Burdick [ed. about admission of guilt] is meaningful or merely dicta. President Ford made reference to the Burdick decision in his post-pardon written statement furnished to the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives on October 17, 1974. However, said reference related only to the portion of Burdick that supported the proposition that the Constitution does not limit the pardon power to cases of convicted offenders or even indicted offenders. I would read this as dicta, as this portion of the holding was not necessary for the court to reach its conclusion and the fact pattern in Burdick was a typical fact pattern where guilt was not disputed. It didn't raise the concerns present when a pardon is requested based upon a claim of innocence, and granted following a conviction. Instead, the holding of Burdick was that there was no pardon because the pardon was rejected (in a manner very similar to a common law disclaimer of a gift), so its holding didn't need to reach the effect of a pardon that is accepted to resolve the case. Can it be used as &quot;reasonable cause&quot; for various actions? This is a bit too vague to know what you are getting at. I suppose that a pardon could constitute reasonable cause for some things favorable to a defendant who is pardoned (e.g., potentially in a motion seeking to reopen a termination of parental rights entered on the basis of the conviction). I suppose it could also be used in a manner potentially unfavorable to a defendant (e.g. showing a pattern of past conduct that demonstrates modus operandi in connection with a prosecution for a new crime). I don't think it could be used as grounds to deny an occupational or business license for bad character. Still, without more clear context it is harder to know what you are really looking for in this regard and I'm not confident that my examples address that. Does the defendant lose their right to refuse to testify in the new case? I haven't reviewed the case law, but my intuition is that if it has never been waived before, it wouldn't be waived by the pardon, but that if it was waived in a previous proceeding resulting in a conviction that was then pardoned, that the prior sworn testimony might be admissible evidence in the new action since it is not hearsay and isn't itself evidence of a prior conviction. The context of the prior testimony might have to be concealed from the jury. As noted by @Putvi, the defendant could not claim risk of conviction for the federal crime as a ground for invoking the 5th Amendment if a pardon is accepted (something that is implied in Burdick), but if there was an overlapping state law crime, risk of conviction for the state crime could constitute a grounds upon which to invoke the 5th Amendment. Burdick does stand for the proposition that a pardon not solicited by the defendant, that is rejected, cannot provide a basis for removing the 5th Amendment protection with respect to a risk of conviction for federal crime. I would also be inclined to think that matters disclosed in an application for a pardon might be admissible evidence as a non-hearsay statement of a party-opponent, if the statement was stripped of the pardon application context (which would be unduly prejudicial since it would imply a prior conviction which otherwise wouldn't be admissible).