Have there been any efforts to standardize the definitions of &quot;Attempted Aggravated Assault&quot; and &quot;Attempted Murder&quot;? As far as I know, the key difference between &quot;Attempt Aggravated Assault&quot; and &quot;Attempted Murder&quot; is whether or not the prosecution can prove that the perpetrator intended to kill someone. However, the requirement for proving intent has led to a lot of inconsistency in how these types of violent crimes are classified in practice. Has there been any effort in any legal system to standardize the difference between attempted assault and attempted murder? For example, by creating a specific category for attempted violent crimes, perhaps calling it a &quot;violent attempt at harm&quot;?
united-states The Model Penal Code (by the American Law Institute) is a standardized code that individual states can draw from. Many states' criminal law is based at least in part on this code. The MPC provides definitions for aggravated assault, murder, and attempts. In general, crimes do not fit into a neat taxonomy structure with more severe ones being strict subsets of less severe or less specific ones. Sometimes, the definitions, or the manner in which offences are charged in a particular circumstance, will create such a relationship, but this is not inherent in the structure of the code. Other statutes do define umbrella terms that might be relevant to what you're thinking of. For example the Armed Career Criminal Act provides for sentencing enhancements after numerous convictions for &quot;violent felonies.&quot; That term has been interpreted several times by the United States Supreme Court to determine whether it captured specific state crimes.
The concept is known as lesser included offense. The prosecution believed that they have a chance to prove murder, so they charged murder, but they understood that the judge and jury might not convict on murder. So they said in effect, &quot;and if you won't find him guilty of murder, at least convict for manslaughter.&quot;
Are there any legal terms which can make it clear that such questions are about the &quot;outside of reach&quot; rather than &quot;outside of claim of reach&quot; situations? Enforceability Laws that claim but cannot reach lack enforceability. Note that enforceability is case-specific and subjective. The US may or may not be able to reach out to those it deems to be criminals on the other side of the world; those may or may not care.
The mere presence of a conditional isn't a determining factor, but the context of the conditional can be a contributing factor in determining whether the threat is true or not. See a more recent publication from 2003 for a better understanding of those factors. I definitely wouldn't rely on anything from the 1600s as a reliable source. Back in the old days a threat was essentially the same as an assault, but nowadays we often view threats and assaults more distinctly and have crafted more specific laws to address them. Just as an &quot;arrest&quot; was once used to describe a seizure of any kind regardless of the duration, more modern case laws have established distinctions between arrests (full-custody seizures) and detentions (temporary, short-duration seizures). Since most jurisdictions in the US now have a separate statute for addressing threats in order to distinguish them from assaults, we have to read the exact verbiage of each state to determine whether it covers the particulars of the threat. Here are a few examples. Note the similarities and differences in each: Arizona: Threatening or Intimidating Texas: Terroristic Threat New York: Menacing As you yourself pointed out, simply making a threat isn't necessarily mala en se, and there are times where the law explicitly allows for people to issue threats, particularly when it comes to defending themselves, another person, or their property. For example, in Arizona, ARS 13-407 allows a person to issue a threat of deadly force to defend their property against trespassers, but does not allow them to actually use deadly force to do so. This means that Arizonans who find themselves in a situation where they feel it necessary to issue a conditional threat to an intruder (&quot;leave my property right now or I'll shoot you&quot;), must understand that the threat is empty unless the intruder shifts his focus from mere trespassing to harming a person. (The bad guy doesn't need to know this though, and all the better if he doesn't.) Even though the threat is empty according to the issuer's knowledge, it is still a threat, albeit one that the issuer is legally entitled to make. In this situation, the threat to use deadly force is decriminalized, not because it contained a conditional, but rather because it was explicitly authorized by law. In practice, many jurisdictions, especially ones with high crime rates, have arbitrarily decided to triage threats cases based on whether they include a conditional statement or not. After all, if you have 1,000 cases a month and a team of only 30 prosecutors, you have to prioritize the cases that are easiest to prove. With that in mind, many prosecutors offices have provided direction to their law enforcement partners to only submit cases that include unconditional threats. Those agencies in turn train their officers to ignore any threats cases involving conditional threats, perpetuating the misunderstanding that a conditional automatically negates a threat as being a true threat. There are literally thousands of cases where offenders have had their convictions upheld for crimes involving conditional threats. Just think of robbery/carjacking: A man walks up to a victim in a parking lot and says &quot;give me your car or I'll kill you. Despite containing a conditional threat, there isn't a prosecutor or jury in the country that wouldn't instantly recognize this as a true threat and an element of robbery/carjacking. Conditional Intent to Kill is Enough for Federal Carjacking Conviction.
Legal Context This kind of argument is often called a "defense of others" defense which is available in every jurisdiction of which I am aware. Almost every state has a specific description of when this is permitted as part of their criminal code, usually in a general principles section at the beginning, or in the sections pertaining to crimes of violence. Some details vary from one state to another, but none of the facts presented in this hypothetical really push the envelope in terms of distinctions between one state's law and another. Most of the differences involve situations when the use of deadly force is allowed. For example, states differ regarding when deadly force allowed to prevent a burglary of your home or business which is in progress, particularly if it is possible to avoid a use of deadly force at all by retreating in a manner that puts you at no one at any significant risk of bodily injury. But, the scenario presented does not appear to involve the use of deadly force (although the definition of "deadly force" can be slippery and lead to some subtle variations in what is permitted from state to state). Another common nuance of variation between states involves the circumstances under which physical force or deadly physical force is authorized to make a citizens arrest, but this situation is also not implicated by your hypothetical. Once Thug is beat up, the scenario ends without any effort to detain Thug until the police arrive. Generally speaking, a defense of others defense that justifies a use of force under criminal law will also not give rise to civil liability in a lawsuit for assault and battery as opposed to a criminal prosecution for it. A Sample Defense Of Others Statute The pertinent section of the Colorado Revised Statutes (2016), strongly influenced by the language of the Model Penal Code (which never adopted in full by any state but highly influential stylistically in how U.S. criminal codes are drafted) is very typical of the majority rule regarding the defense of others and reads as follows (emphasizing the language relevant to the scenario in the question): § 18-1-704. Use of physical force in defense of a person (1) Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, a person is justified in using physical force upon another person in order to defend himself or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by that other person, and he may use a degree of force which he reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. (2) Deadly physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a lesser degree of force is inadequate and: (a) The actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving great bodily injury; or (b) The other person is using or reasonably appears about to use physical force against an occupant of a dwelling or business establishment while committing or attempting to commit burglary as defined in sections 18-4-202 to 18-4-204 ; or (c) The other person is committing or reasonably appears about to commit kidnapping as defined in section 18-3-301 or 18-3-302, robbery as defined in section 18-4-301 or 18-4-302, sexual assault as set forth in section 18-3-402, or in section 18-3-403 as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, or assault as defined in sections 18-3-202 and 18-3-203. (3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, a person is not justified in using physical force if: (a) With intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, he provokes the use of unlawful physical force by that other person; or (b) He is the initial aggressor; except that his use of physical force upon another person under the circumstances is justifiable if he withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the other person his intent to do so, but the latter nevertheless continues or threatens the use of unlawful physical force; or (c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law. (4) In a case in which the defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction regarding self-defense as an affirmative defense, the court shall allow the defendant to present evidence, when relevant, that he or she was acting in self-defense. If the defendant presents evidence of self-defense, the court shall instruct the jury with a self-defense law instruction. The court shall instruct the jury that it may consider the evidence of self-defense in determining whether the defendant acted recklessly, with extreme indifference, or in a criminally negligent manner. However, the self-defense law instruction shall not be an affirmative defense instruction and the prosecuting attorney shall not have the burden of disproving self-defense. This section shall not apply to strict liability crimes. Analysis of the Hypothetical Facts Is Paul guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug, or would self-defense or some other standard defense apply? Paul is probably not guilty of assault and battery for attacking Thug because a defense of others defense justifies his actions. Paul is using physical force to defend a third person (and presumably himself as well once once he is involved in the fray) from what he reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful physical force by Thug, and generally, under those circumstances Paul may use a degree of force which Paul reasonably believes to be necessary for that purpose. Paul is most vulnerable in this scenario on the question of whether he reasonably believed that the degree of force he used was reasonably necessary for the purpose of defending Emily and himself from Thug's unlawful use of physical force, or whether he went further than what was reasonably necessary for a few minutes that left Thug "incapacitated and thoroughly bloodied". For example, suppose that Paul had already caused Thug to try to flee the scene after the first minute at which point Thug was slightly bruised and afraid of Paul, but was not at all incapacitated. But, suppose that despite this fact that Paul, awash with adrenaline from the fight, continued to pummel Thug for a couple more minutes as Thug repeatedly tried to flee the scene only to be dragged back by Paul. Suppose that Paul continued the fight after it was no longer necessary because Paul wanted to punish Thug for his mistreatment of Emily and to discourage other people from trying to attack Emily in the future, even after Paul knew that there was already no real risk that Thug himself would continue to use unlawful physical force against Emily no or in the near future. Under these circumstances, which aren't inconsistent with the hypothetical facts, if this extra couple of minutes caused Thug to be much more badly injured than he otherwise would have been if Thug had been allowed to flee after the first minute, then Paul could still be guilty of assault and battery, even though his actions were legally justified for the first minute of the fight. There is no indication that either Paul or Emily provoked the attack on Emily, or that either Paul or Emily was the initial aggressor, or that this was actually a pre-agreed dueling situation. So each of these circumstances which would be exceptions to the general rule that the defense of others is justified do not apply to this case. There is likewise no indication that Paul used "deadly force" as opposed to mere "physical force" in handling the situation. It is likely that Paul would have committed a crime if he had shot and killed Thug instead of beating him up, if Paul knew perfectly well at the time that he was capable of beating up Thug and making Thug go away for good as a result without resorting to a firearm, unless the attack on Emily was severe enough for Paul to reasonably believe that the attack was putting Emily at a real risk of serious bodily injury.
Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he &quot;should have&quot; (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an &quot;eggshell&quot; victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was &quot;fragile&quot; - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the &quot;Deep South&quot; it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the &quot;Deep South&quot; at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.
JeffUK has quoted the relevant law. However the question then becomes "what is an 'offensive weapon'", and "what is a lawful excuse?". Almost anything can be classified as an offensive weapon if you can use it as a weapon. See https://www.askthe.police.uk/content/Q338.htm A lawful excuse is something like "I am going to play baseball, which is why I have a baseball bat". It is emphatically not "I want it for self defence". Specifically, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/offensive-weapons-knives-bladed-and-pointed-articles cites Patterson v Block [1984] 81 LSG 2458 – carrying a weapon for defence can still amount to intent to cause injury So the answer to the OP's original question: Is it legal for a private citizen to carry any kind of weapon for self defence purposes in the UK? is "No".
canada Maybe it is unsatisfying, but there is no bright line test. The statutory language The Criminal Code says: The question whether an act or omission by a person who has an intent to commit an offence is or is not mere preparation to commit the offence, and too remote to constitute an attempt to commit the offence, is a question of law. Some judicial expressions &quot;[A] precise and satisfactory definition of the actus reus is perhaps impossible.&quot; And &quot;[n]o abstract test can be given for determining whether an act is insufficiently proximate to be an attempt.&quot; See R. v. Cline (1956), 115 C.C.C. 18 (Ont. C.A.): The consummation of a crime usually comprises a series of acts which have their genesis in an idea to do a criminal act; the idea develops to a decision to do that act; a plan may be made for putting that decision into effect; the next step may be preparation only for carrying out the intention and plan; but when that preparation is in fact fully completed, the next step in the series of acts doen by the accused for the purpose and with the intention of committing the crime as planned cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as remote in its connection with that crime. The connection is in fact proximate. Here is a summary from R. v. Root, 2008 ONCA 869, citations removed: [96] The authorities have yet to develop a satisfactory general criterion to assist trial judges in making the crucial distinction between mere preparation, on the one hand, and an attempt on the other. We leave the determination of where on the continuum the conduct lies to the common sense judgment of trial judges. [97] The distinction between preparation and attempt is a qualitative one involving the relationship between the nature and quality of the act said to constitute the attempt and the nature of the substantive offence attempted in its complete form. [98] To determine on which side of the preparation/attempt divide an accused’s conduct falls, a trial judge should consider the relative proximity of that conduct to the conduct required to amount to the completed substantive offence. Relevant factors would include time, location and acts under the control of the accused yet to be accomplished. [99] Relative proximity may give an act, which might otherwise seem to be mere preparation, the quality of an attempt. Further, an act on its face an act of commission does not lose its quality as the actus reus of an attempt simply because further acts are required, or because a significant period of time may elapse before the completion of the substantive offence. [100] To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, the act of an accused need not be the last act before the completion of the substantive offence. To constitute the actus reus of an attempt, an act must be sufficiently proximate to the intended crime to amount to more than mere preparation to commit it. This requirement of proximity, expressed in the divide between preparation and attempt, has to do with the sequence of events leading to the crime that an accused has in mind to commit. To be guilty of an attempt, an accused must have progressed a sufficient distance (beyond mere preparation) down the intended path. An act is proximate if it is the first of a series of similar or related acts intended to result cumulatively in a substantive crime.