US laws requiring US citizens to enter the country at designated border crossings I've been able to find only one law that requires people entering the US to use designated border crossing points, which is 8 USC 1325. This law applies only to aliens, however; both relevant subsections of the code begin with "Any alien who...." Is there a US law that requires US citizens to use designated ports of entry when entering the US? Is there a law requiring US citizens to present themselves for immigration inspection (or customs inspection) if they cross the border somewhere other than a designated port of entry?
Yes for individuals, and yes for vehicles. They're customs laws rather than immigration laws.
This varies depending on the specific law of the state or locality involved. In New York, the word &quot;POSTED&quot;, along with the name and address of the owner is sufficient to notify people not to intrude, and anyone ignoring such a sign is technically trespassing (although, in practice, if such a person leaves the property when asked, did no damage, and appeared honestly ignorant, it is likely that no legal action would be taken). In California, as specified by penal code section 553 (quoted in the linked answer) a sign for this purpose must include: the words “trespassing-loitering forbidden by law,” or words describing the use of the property followed by the words “no trespassing.” in letters at least two inches tall, and follow other specifications in the law. The word &quot;Posted&quot; is neither required nor sufficient, although the law calls land with such signs &quot;posted property&quot;.
There are some statutes that have a section that says "any violation of this action is punishable by . . . ." but the INA is not one of them. Generally speaking, the way it would be imposed would be: (1) to deny entry on a departing commercial airplane flight or ship (which is enforced by the private enterprises involved pursuant to Transportation Department regulations that the private enterprises may be sanctioned for not obeying) and (2) to set up presumptions about the reasonableness of, for example, laws requiring someone to have brought a passport to secure embassy access. One of the reasons that no penalty is stated is because the constitutionality of this statute is doubtful. Geographical restrictions on travel in some cases have been upheld as constitutional with regard to specific countries and in war time, but are even then strictly construed. But, no case has upheld the restriction as applied to travel to a country to which geographical restrictions do not apply. Likewise, I doubt that the provision denying entry to U.S. citizens without a passport, even during times of war, would be upheld today. For example, 215(b) was given a narrow construction (disallowing criminal prosecutions when someone went to Cuba and returned via a third-country while holding a valid U.S. passport) in part out of concern for the constitutional right to travel. U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967). See also See L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-15, at 957 n.22 (1978) (arguing that ‘the power approved in Zemel must be limited to the most extraordinary situations'). For background see, e.g. Right to Travel Abroad, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 184, 195 (1984) (student note published anonymously) and Thomas E. Laursen, Constitutional Protection of Foreign Travel, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 902 (1981). The fundamental right of a citizen is to enter his own country so that he is not stateless with no place he can lawfully be, and that analysis has been developed more in the law now than it had been in 1967. Alternatively, could a judge impose a penalty without a statutory basis (beyond the designation of the act as unlawful)? Historically, some U.S. states provided this authority which was called the power to impose punishment for "common law crimes", and there are some that still do and there are others, such as Michigan that don't define key crimes that were crimes at common law, such as murder, other than in case law and simply set punishments by statute for these otherwise undefined crimes. As recently as 1947, a majority of U.S. states had at least some common law crimes. Many states codified their criminal laws in the wake of the Model Penal Code in the 1960s even though all states adapted it to their local needs and only a minority of states adopted a penal code close based upon it. The Model Penal Code made it easier to think of what had previous been an ill defined and massive legislative task into a more manageable and finite project for ambitious reformist legislators (an attitude and approach that was common in the U.S. in state legislatures in the late 1960s and early 1970s). But, the federal judiciary has never had this authority (as formally determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1812, just 23 years after the current constitution was adopted), in part, because the federal government does not have plenary legislative authority on all matters and federal courts are likewise courts of limited jurisdiction (while all or almost all states have at least one court of general jurisdiction that can handle any matter that no other court has jurisdiction to handle). From Wikipedia: The notion that common law offenses could be enforced in federal courts was found to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). Some have argued that they are inconsistent with the prohibition of ex post facto laws. At the state level, the situation varies. Some states, such as New Jersey, have abolished common law crimes (see State v. Palendrano), while others have chosen to continue to recognize them. In some states, the elements of many crimes are defined mostly or entirely by common law, i.e., by prior judicial decisions. For instance, Michigan's penal code does not define the crime of murder: while the penalties for murder are laid out in statute, the actual elements of murder, and their meaning, is entirely set out in case law.
There are a number of areas in which the US states can pass laws only to the extend that they do not conflict with Federal laws passed by Congress. When a federal law clearly says that states may not pass laws on a given subject, the issue is clear. When it specifically invites state laws, the issue is also clear. But when a Federal law imposes certain regulations in a given area, it may not be clear if a state may go beyond the Federal requirements. Sometimes it can. For example, there is a Federal Minimum Wage. But states are free to impose higher minimum wage levels, and some have done so. So when a court decision or legal article says &quot;Congress having occupied the field&quot; it means that a set of Federal laws is intended to be a compelte regulation of a given area, and states may not add additional regulations of their own in that area. I am not sure what rules apply to disclosure of information by the Capitol police.
How I understand your question You have asked about mechanisms to &quot;ensure the return&quot; or something that will &quot;trigger a law-enforcement or legal action if the child does not leave the US on the end of the submitted trip schedule.&quot; So I take it as premises of your question that there is a parenting agreement regarding schedule and return, and this trip will happen. Dale M's answer provides advice about what he recommends to a person in such a situation. However, I recognize that many parenting orders include a term that allows international travel that can't be unreasonably refused by the other parent,1 or that allow international travel with no consent necessary.2 There is no mechanism There is no mechanism to pre-register a potential violation of a parenting agreement with a foreign state. I cannot cite to a source to prove a negative, but I am familiar with the operation of the Hague Convention and non-Hague Convention regimes and none that I have encountered have such a mechanism. I have also spent some time looking to see if I have missed something, and am still convinced there is no such mechanism. 1. 2020 BCPC 16: &quot;He shall not unreasonably withhold his written consent to such a trip. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, Y.N. has liberty to apply for a court order. If the court, on such application, finds that W.G. has unreasonably withheld his consent to such a trip, he is hereby put on notice that he may be ordered to pay Y.N.’s expenses incurred in bringing the application.&quot; 2. 2018 ABQB 1031 (&quot;Each party shall be entitled to travel internationally with the children without the consent of the other party upon providing 30 days notice of such travel along with a full itinerary including flight information, destination, where the parties are staying and contact information.&quot;); 2010 ABPC 410 (&quot;I will allow T.C. to travel outside the country without the written consent of the father.&quot;); 2021 ONCJ 440 (&quot;Either party may travel with the Child outside of Canada during his or her parenting time. The Father requires the consent of the Mother, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The Mother may travel internationally with the Child without the consent of the Father, but she must advise him accordingly.&quot;); 2020 ABQB 434 (&quot;either party may travel during their respective vacation or ordinary parenting time in Canada or internationally to any Hague Convention Country, without the consent of the other party&quot;); 2017 BCSC 1463 (&quot;The claimant is at liberty to travel with the Children both in Canada and internationally without the consent of the respondent.&quot;)
The 4th Amendment applies to administrative inspections. Per Camara v. Municipal Court 387 U.S. 523 (1967), there are some exceptions for tightly regulated industries, but you don't seem to be describing such a situation. If you object to a warrantless inspection, the inspectors would need to get a warrant to do those parts of the inspection that require getting on the curtilage of your property. Curtilage is the part of your property that is so intimately connected with the home that it treated the same for 4th Amendment purposes. Per United States v. Dunn 480 U.S. 294 (1987), a fence doesn't mean everything inside the fence is curtilage (but for a small, city dwelling, the fence is probably going to be considered the curtilage boundary). Not having a fence doesn't mean nothing is curtilage. As you say, even if you object to the warrantless inspection, they can probably do a lot of the inspection from outside your curtilage and avoid infringing your 4th Amendment rights. The inspectors may choose to return with an inspection warrant. An example statute describing an inspection warrant is California Code 1822.50: An inspection warrant is an order, in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a judge of a court of record, directed to a state or local official, commanding him to conduct any inspection required or authorized by state or local law or regulation relating to building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor, or zoning.
If the U.S. adds a new territory, are the people currently living there able to become president? No. Or does the territory have to become a state in order for the people to be eligible to become president? Not necessarily. What does &quot;natural-born citizen&quot; mean? The meaning of the natural born citizen clause of the constitution is unclear in many respects, but virtually all scholars agree that a person who was a US citizen at birth, and who has remained a US citizen until present, is a natural-born citizen. There is a small minority of scholars who insist that a US citizen at birth is only a natural-born citizen if they were born in the US (for example, Ted Cruz would not be considered a natural-born citizen). There is an even smaller minority who insist that a person must have at least one US citizen parent in order to be a natural-born citizen. But for all practical purposes, these minority viewpoints are irrelevant. The only thing that matters is whether someone was a US citizen when they were born. Citizenship of people living in US territories When a US territory is created, the people living there don't automatically become US citizens, and if Congress eventually gives them US citizenship, the canon of presumption against retroactivity applies: a statute should not be read to be retroactive unless there is evidence that it was intended to apply retroactively. That means the people who get US citizenship under the statute don't become natural-born citizens; they're considered to have been automatically naturalized when the statute went into effect. But if there's a statute saying that people born in the territory are US citizens at birth, then people born in the territory after the effective date of that statute are natural-born citizens, since they are citizens at birth. I will use Hawaii as an example. Hawaii became a territory in 1898. Citizenship was granted in 1900. Statehood was not granted until 1959. 8 USC §1405 governs the citizenship of people born in Hawaii: A person born in Hawaii on or after August 12, 1898, and before April 30, 1900, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900, is a citizen of the United States at birth. A person who was a citizen of the Republic of Hawaii on August 12, 1898, is declared to be a citizen of the United States as of April 30, 1900. So, Hawaiians didn't become US citizens when Hawaii was annexed. They were granted US citizenship 2 years later. A person born in Hawaii on or after April 30, 1900 is a natural born citizen. Applying the presumption against retroactivity, we see that a person who was born in Hawaii between August 12, 1898 and April 29, 1900, or who was a citizen of independent Hawaii when it was annexed by the United States, was not a natural born citizen and could not have become President. In addition to the presumption against retroactivity, there is also another canon of construction that applies here: Congress could have used the &quot;is a citizen of the United States at birth&quot; language for the other two categories of Hawaiians too, but chose to omit it. Presumably, Congress acted purposefully in doing so, with the intent of granting citizenship at birth to only one of the three categories. (I can't remember whether this canon has a name.) Can Congress grant natural-born citizen status retroactively? If the US were to acquire a new territory and saw fit to bestow citizenship retroactively to birth on some natives of that territory, would those people be eligible for the presidency? No one knows the answer to that question. As an example of when Congress has granted citizenship retroactively, the Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994 created 8 USC §1401(h), which granted citizenship retroactively to birth to individuals who had been born outside the US to a US citizen mother and alien father prior to May 24, 1934. This act was necessary because, prior to that date, only US citizen fathers could transmit citizenship, not US citizen mothers. A person granted citizenship under this statute would be over the age of 89 now, so we're unlikely to see one run for president. It's an open question whether someone who obtained US citizenship through this statute would be considered eligible for the presidency. One could argue that &quot;natural-born citizen&quot; implies a person who actually was a citizen when they were born and that retroactive grants of citizenship are a mere legal fiction that cannot override the meaning of the constitution.
Might it be everyone except commissioned officers? Not necessarily Non-commissioned ranks require either a Green Card as per Title 10 U.S. Code § 504: (1)A person may be enlisted in any armed force only if the person is one of the following: ... (B)An alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)). Or (2) ... the Secretary concerned may authorize the enlistment of a person not described in paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines that such person possesses a critical skill or expertise— (A)that is vital to the national interest; and (B)that the person will use in the primary daily duties of that person as a member of the armed forces. And Title 10 U.S. Code § 532 states that non-citizens cannot hold a commission: (a) ... a commissioned officer (other than as a commissioned warrant officer) in the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, Regular Marine Corps, or Regular Space Force may be given only to a person who— (1)is a citizen of the United States... UNLESS they have a Green Card and a waiver: (f)The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) with respect to a person who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, or for a United States national otherwise eligible for appointment as a cadet or midshipman under section 2107(a) of this title or as a cadet under section 2107a of this title, when the Secretary determines that the national security so requires, but only for an original appointment in a grade below the grade of major or lieutenant commander.