Is there a line that excludes preaching religious murders from first amendment protection? In general, religious beliefs can be as free under the first amendment as they come. You can believe in any god or pantheon, or nothing at all in pretty much any fashion. Very free indeed. But is it truly unlimited? So to illustrate, let's take a look at a fictitious religion that is defined by how repulsive it is: Welcome to the world of Marvel Comics, where people like Reverend William Stryker create fringe cults with bloomy names like Purifiers that propagate hatred, demand genocide and hunt humanoid people for their cause since 1982. The ideology of the purifiers is simple in its core tenet: People carrying a specific gene shall be found and killed. For that they develop technology to combat those individuals. While most of the shadow-hidden acts that the purifiers do in the comics are crimes in themselves (abduction, mutilation, murder, genocide...), the Purifiers also are alluded to have a more public-facing side: They preach a rather fundamental offshoot of Christianity, heavily infested with their core tenet to kill mutants. Now, does that make the religious belief to kill the mutants protected by the Freedom of Religion? At what point does preaching the need for some kind of religious killing from a protected activity to unprotected speech and a crime?
As edited, this asks two different questions: Is it legal to have a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? Is it legal to preach a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? The answer to the first question is pretty clearly yes. Your right to think whatever you want is essentially ironclad under the First Amendment, under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The answer to the second question is more nuanced. Although it can be tricky to actually apply, there's little question that merely advocating for murder is generally protected under the First Amendment: The teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) Over time, the courts have developed a two-part test for evaluating whether the advocacy of crime can itself be criminalized. We now assume that speech advocating for the commission of a crime as protected under the First Amendment, unless and until that speech is: (1) intended to cause imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to actually result in imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). So if Rev. Stryker meets Charles Xavier for a televised debate on the merits of killing all mutants, that speech would likely be protected by the First Amendment. Although he may sincerely hope his words will inspire others to kill mutants, the time between speaking them and any resulting murder is too great to say they are either intended or likely to cause imminent lawless action. But if the X-Men confront Rev. Stryker on television, and Rev. Stryker urges his studio audience to storm the stage and kill them all, that's more likely to result in immediate violence, and therefore more likely to be considered unprotected incitement. There's of course a lot of middle ground between those two options, so the tough part for judges and juries is figuring out the speaker's actual intent and how imminent is too imminent.
In the US, a person is "within their rights" to invoke the Fifth Amendment, i.e. refuse to self-incriminate. However, the government can give a person immunity from prosecution for offenses having to do with the testimony, in which case he can be compelled to testify. A person is not required to guess about whether they could actually be convicted based on their testimony. It is the privilege of the court (judge) to determine whether a witness has "a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer" (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17).
What you describe is essentially a Warrant Canary, which is legally murky. From a functional point of view, it is breaking the non-disclosure requirements of the NSL by omission. Proponents of warrant canaries would point to case law such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette and Wooley v. Maynard to suggest that the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment restricts the government from compelling speech. New York Times Co. v. United States could also be read to prevent the prior restraint unless the existence of the NSL was successfully argued to be &quot;crucial military information&quot;.
Political party membership may be indirectly protected, insofar as party membership is a manifestation of a philosophical belief, but it is not a protected characteristic in itself. Political beliefs (e.g. in socialism) are capable of being protected characteristics, but not always. Nazism is not protected, because it is destructive of the rights of others and unworthy of respect in a democractic society. Businesses can usually choose who they do business with Assuming there is no other bad conduct going on (harassment, violence, discrimination, etc.), there is nothing to stop a shop or other business from excluding certain customers. This is the starting point. Some businesses have positive legal duties to serve the public in general. Your water company can't cut off your water, regardless of your beliefs. Barristers must follow the &quot;cab-rank rule&quot; and take your case even if you are a horrible person. So let's assume we just have an ordinary private-sector business, such as a shop. The protected characteristic of belief Contrary to the term &quot;protected class&quot;, which is from U.S. law, the U.K. uses the words &quot;protected characteristic&quot; to mean those personal characteristics named in the Equality Act 2010. These include age and race. They also include &quot;religion or belief&quot;, a characteristic inherited from prior equality law. Any discrimination claim relating to the &quot;No Nazis allowed&quot; sign would have to hang on the &quot;belief&quot; arm. Interpretation of &quot;religion or belief&quot; follows the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 9. In relation to a philosophical belief, the applicable test is &quot;the Grainger test&quot; formulated by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 2009, The belief must be genuinely held. It must be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. Careful readers will notice that 2009 is before 2010; the statute law was different but the point was the same. Classic examples of beliefs meeting the test include vegetarianism, humanism, and pacifism. Political beliefs There is no sharp line between a &quot;philosophical&quot; belief and a &quot;political&quot; one. Support of a political party is not covered (Grainger at 35), but there is room for belief based on a political philosophy. In this way, &quot;left-wing democratic socialism&quot; met the test in GMB v Henderson. On this basis, one might be tempted to conclude that &quot;Nazism&quot; or &quot;fascism&quot; would be similar, even if &quot;membership in a Nazi party&quot; was not. However, Article 17 of ECHR does not protect totalitarian or Nazi beliefs. This is consistent in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, and in U.K. cases on equality. It is the source of the fifth part of the Grainger test, via earlier cases in the House of Lords and before the European Court. For example, in Forstater v CGD Europe, the EAT held: A philosophical belief would only be excluded for failing to satisfy Grainger V if it was the kind of belief the expression of which would be akin to Nazism or totalitarianism and thereby liable to be excluded from the protection of rights under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) by virtue of Article 17 thereof. Employment is more protected In Redfearn v UK [2012], the ECtHR said a bus driver's rights had been violated following his dismissal for being a member of the British National Party. That was in relation to Article 11 (freedom of association) and his Article 9 claim was dismissed. The court noted that the BNP had not been banned in the U.K. and it was also looking at an employment rights issue rather than (as in the question) access to business premises; there is a general set of rights relating to unfair dismissal which were in play. It had not been proved that the driver was actually unfit to do the job. So even though party membership is not protected under the Equality Act, people may still benefit from other legal protections. The case also shows the difficulties of inferring beliefs based on indicators like supporting a political party. If the BNP were banned then it would be another matter, and U.K. law does allow the banning of extremist organisations. (Principally, under the Terrorism Act 2000, part II.) Some extreme-right groups are proscribed in this way, although there is no general restriction of fascism or Nazism.
This is a partial answer as it doesn't address the religious aspect. Grainger plc v Nicholson may be of relevance. That case was about Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of religion or belief) and focussed on the belief element rather than the religion element. The court held that the following criteria must be met for something to be a belief under the ECHR: The belief is genuinely held. It is a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint. It relates to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour. It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance. It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others. These are known as the Grainger criteria and are also of relevance in relation to Section 4 of the Equality Act 2010.
As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar.
What that church is doing is legal. There is a statutory exception in the Fair Housing Act for religious and non-profit organizations. 42 U.S. Code § 3607 - Religious organization or private club exemption Nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit a religious organization, association, or society, or any nonprofit institution or organization operated, supervised or controlled by or in conjunction with a religious organization, association, or society, from limiting the sale, rental or occupancy of dwellings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose to persons of the same religion, or from giving preference to such persons, unless membership in such religion is restricted on account of race, color, or national origin. Nor shall anything in this subchapter prohibit a private club not in fact open to the public, which as an incident to its primary purpose or purposes provides lodgings which it owns or operates for other than a commercial purpose, from limiting the rental or occupancy of such lodgings to its members or from giving preference to its members.
Legally there is no problem. What you say is protected speech under the 1st Amendment as long as it is either true or a matter of opinion. However Ron Beyer's comment is a good one; while legal this sounds very inadvisable. You would be far better off hiring a lawyer. The Mr Dicks of this world make money from the widespread fear of legal action. He will probably fold as soon as he sees a letter from a lawyer threatening a lawsuit. Until then stalling doesn't cost him anything so he will carry on doing it. BTW, don't delay. I don't know about the US, but over here in the UK there are a number of ways that people like Mr Dick can make it hard to collect. Don't give him time to play shell games with his assets.