Can a gift shop no longer selling your art be actionable discrimination under English law? Inspired by the case of the artist Jess de Wahls, who is considering legal action against the Royal Academy after they discontinued stocking her art in their gift shop because of Ms de Wahls's view that trans women are not authentically women and that non-binary identities are invalid. Such a putative action would apparently under grounds related to the Equality Act 2010. Obviously, the facts of this case may not be entirely known to the public, but as a general question: can the act of no longer stocking the work of a particular artist in an art gift shop really constitute actionable discrimination in England &amp; Wales? It strikes me that all choices of what a small shop made up of numerous artists sells are arbitrary. While Ms de Wahls's views may be protected according to the EAT's recent ruling in Forstater, that doesn't seem to me that it would that a shop has an obligation to endorse those views (but I'm not an expert). For the sake of the question, let us presume as appears to be the case with Ms de Wahls, that there are no breached contractual obligations or an employment relationship between the shop and the artist...
In addition to the points raised by Dale M's answer, it is important to recall the law as clarified by the Supreme Court in Lee v Ashers Baking Co &amp; Ors [2018] UKSC 49 (aka, the 'gay cake case'). This case found that the providers of business services have a right not to be compelled to make speech with which they disagree without proper justification, under the Human Rights Act 1998. To quote from Lady Hale's judgment (emphasis added): [56] Under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, all legislation is, so far as it is possible to do so, to be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. I have already indicated my doubts about whether this was discrimination against Mr Lee on the grounds of his political opinions, but have acknowledged the possibility that it might be. But in my view, FETO should not be read or given effect in such a way as to compel providers of goods, facilities and services to express a message with which they disagree, unless justification is shown for doing so. (nb: FETO refers to the statutory equalities instrument in Northern Ireland at issue; the analagous statute here is the Equality Act 2010) Given that the RA stocking Ms de Wahls was seen by critics as a communication of endorsement of the artist, there is a strong argument that the RA have the right not to be compelled to express endorsement of Ms de Wahl's views. (Whether or not stocking an artist is expressing their views is an open question, but I think the relevant point here is that the communicated message to some in the art community was of endorsement, meaning that RA was dealing with the semiotics of seeming to endorse). I think Lees provides support that the RA cannot be compelled to agree with Ms de Wahls's beliefs.
Two people exchanging goods or services on a commercial basis and then pretending it was two gifts is tax evasion. It's not a gift. It's a commercial sale that you lie about by 'putting' a different 'label' on it. Sometimes two people will give mutual gifts, e.g. if you come to my wedding: I give you dinner, you give me some kitchenware. Yet there's nothing commercial about it. So that's not income for either party. However, if you're talking about two businesses making sales to each other, that is very much income, regardless of what you badge it.
Part 3 of the Equality Act is the Part that applies to the provision of services to the public, which includes &quot;the provision of goods.&quot; This Part prohibits service providers from discriminating as to the terms on which a provider provides the goods to the customer. Indirect discrimination is defined at Section 19 of the Equality Act 2010. It establishes that indirect discrimination is a form of discrimination: 19 Indirect Discrimination (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (3) The relevant protected characteristics are— age; disability; gender reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation. In characterizing the &quot;practice&quot; that is being applied, the Court of Appeal has said this word is not a term of art and is not to be construed narrowly or in a limited way (see Ishola v Transport for London, [2020] EWCA Civ 112). A fair way to characterize the &quot;practice&quot; being applied in this circumstance is that the store is &quot;selling Nike Jordan 4128s (women's) at £150 and Nike Jordan 4128s (men's) at £200.&quot; (If instead the &quot;pratice&quot; were characterized more narrowly—selling Nike Jordan 4128s (women's) at £150—then the analysis would not even get past 19(2)(b). Likewise, if the &quot;practice&quot; were characterized more broadly—selling both the women's and men's versions at a discount from time to time, not necessarily at the same time—then the analysis will also have difficulty getting past 19(2)(b).) The question is whether the application of this practice indirectly discriminates against &quot;male purchasers.&quot; 19(2)(a): does the Nike store apply this practice to male and non-male purchasers? Yes. (This is why we're in an indirect discrimination analysis rather than direct discrimination.) 19(2)(b): does this practice put male purchasers at a disadvantage? Depending on evidence showing that male purchasers are more likely to want to purchase the Nike Jordan 4128s (men's), then yes. (I could also see a tribunal cutting the analysis off at this stage, depending on how much weight they place on choice. I know that Canada avoids inquiring into the &quot;source&quot; of the disadvantage or blaming it on an individual's choice, but I have no idea what the approach in the U.K. is to this aspect.) 19(2)(c): would this practice put a particular male claimant at that disadvantage? Depending on evidence showing that the particular claimant wants to purchase the Nike Jordan 4128s (men's), then yes. 19(2)(d): is it the case that the Nike store cannot show the practice to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim? My prediction is that the store would be able to justify the practice as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. One example of a legitimate aim: a charging policy at swimming pools that disproportionately affected &quot;disabled swimmers&quot; was found to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, being part of &quot;an overall financial structure which covers the provision of a wide range of public services&quot; (https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2022/1588.html) Other examples of legitimate aims: &quot;running an efficient service,&quot; &quot;requirements of a business,&quot; &quot;desire to make a profit.&quot; However, Economic reasons alone are not enough to justify discrimination. Someone can’t justify discrimination by saying it’s cheaper to discriminate. But costs can be taken into account as part of the justification if the person can show there are other good enough reasons for the treatment. So, depending on the business rationale, and the proportionality of the discount compared to the business need (e.g. cost of holding extra stock, risk of failing to sell stock as a new model comes in, etc.), the price differential could be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. This will depend on the evidence. I predict most stores would be able to justify a modest and occasional price differential, even in the case that the production costs of each shoe are identical. Summary I see four ways through this analysis, each leading to the conclusion that this would not be indirect discrimination: a narrow characterization of the &quot;practice&quot; as simply selling the women's version at £150 (probably too narrow of a view) a broad characterization of the &quot;practice&quot; as selling all versions at a discount from time to time, albeit not necessarily at the exact same time a view that any disadvantage experienced by men is due to their choice not the price discrepancy (dubious) the price discrepancy is a proportionate means to achieve a legitimate aim (admittedly, a thin analysis requiring more research)
Yes, it's legal. It would be lawful discrimination on objectively and reasonably justified grounds Here's why: On the face of it, this is a case of direct discrimination contrary to Section 13 of the Equality Act 2010: (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. however, the company may argue that they are taking positive action in line with Section 158 of the Act (emphasis mine): (1) This section applies if a person (P) reasonably thinks that— (a) persons who share a protected characteristic suffer a disadvantage connected to the characteristic, (b) persons who share a protected characteristic have needs that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it, or (c) participation in an activity by persons who share a protected characteristic is disproportionately low. (2) This Act does not prohibit P from taking any action which is a proportionate means of achieving the aim of— (a) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to overcome or minimise that disadvantage, (b) meeting those needs, or (c) enabling or encouraging persons who share the protected characteristic to participate in that activity. It is likely that they will be able to justify direct discrimination on the grounds of positive action. The Government's Explanatory Notes on the section express the intent of the legislation as such (emphasis mine): This clause provides that the Bill does not prohibit the use of positive action measures to alleviate disadvantage experienced by people who share a protected characteristic, reduce their under-representation in relation to particular activities, and meet their particular needs. It will, for example, allow measures to be targeted to particular groups, including training to enable them to gain employment, or health services to address their needs. Any such measures must be a proportionate way of achieving the relevant aim. A clear example is provided: Having identified that its white male pupils are underperforming at maths, a school could run supplementary maths classes exclusively for them. Furthermore, there is case law to establish that such positive action is entirely lawful: R (Adath Yisroel Burial Society and another) v Inner North London Senior Coroner [2018] EWHC 969 (Admin) (emphasis mine): Before leaving this topic we would stress that section 158 does not concern what is sometimes called “positive discrimination”; it is more limited and concerns only what the legislation calls “positive action”. In general “positive discrimination” is unlawful under the Equality Act. Therefore, as a matter of domestic law, prioritisation of some deaths for religious reasons would not be unlawful; to the contrary, it would be consistent with section 158. That position is mirrored in Convention jurisprudence. The point can be well illustrated by the decision in Jakóbski v Poland (2012) 55 EHRR 8. In that case the applicant was serving a prison sentence in Poland. He adhered strictly to the Mahayana Buddhist dietary rules and requested a vegetarian diet for that reason. This was not provided for him. The prison authorities stated that they were not obliged to prepare special meals for prisoners on the basis of religious belief as a matter of Polish law and that to do so would put excessive strain on them. The application before the court succeeded under Article 9. For that reason the Court did not consider it necessary to address separately the right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Convention rights in Article 14 (to which we return below). However, in our view, the case of Jakóbski is a good illustration of the principle of equality at work in cases of this kind. What on its face looks like a general policy which applies to everyone equally may in fact have an unequal impact on a minority. In other words, to treat everyone in the same way is not necessarily to treat them equally. Uniformity is not the same thing as equality. While this judgement concerns itself with positive action on religious grounds, it has broad application to positive action on grounds of sex too, and would be consistent with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights—namely that if the discrimination can be objectively and reasonably justified, it is lawful.
Discriminatory pricing is a real thing. See this BuzzFeed video on discriminatory pricing as an example on how men's and women's products cost differently, even if the men's product consumes more raw material yet still costs less. However, it's illegal for hotels to charge different rates for their rooms, or for restaurants to charge unfairly or give preferential treatment; they are "public accommodations" protected under the various Civil Rights Acts. However, colleges are exempt from current laws, and it's not just tech colleges; even traditional colleges require different SAT scores for entry based on race and/or gender, and also charge different tuition. They are private accommodations and are therefore generally allowed to do this. For example, you'll have a much harder time getting in to Harvard if you're of a particular race, even if you can afford the tuition, simply because you'll be expected to have a higher SAT score. There was a class action lawsuit in California over this (the students were above 4.0 GPA, yet denied entry based on race), and as a result of law changes afterwards, California institutions can no longer do this. This is not the situation in the rest of the country, as no Federal law yet exists that protects minorities, gender, sexual orientation, etc, in regards to higher education. Also, sometimes merely proving a gap exists might not be noticeable, as companies are also starting to display pages on their websites based on data-mined information about visitors, possibly including information that would otherwise be discriminatory if it were done in person, and hiding the information from the general public. Discrimination is a difficult beast to tame, and until the law is introduced that all products and services must be offered to all consumers at the same price regardless of gender, race, sexual orientation, etc, businesses will continue to find ways to discriminate in legal ways.
It doesn't seem as if the bank is discriminating in the way you suggest. They offer two types of account: (A) accrues or charges interest and (B) does not accrue or charge interest. The bank says you can choose A or B whatever your religion. You the customer choose A or B, possibly depending on your religion. So I do not see what cause of action you have or what damages you have suffered. Therefore I don't think you could sue them.
At the federal level, gift cards seem to be treated as a special case of electronic fund transfer. 15 U.S. Code § 1693l–1 and the corresponding regulations presently regulate disclosure of fees and expiration, and do not directly say anything about sale of such a card. There might be relevant state laws, though Washington state laws mostly mirror the federal law (also allowing issuing a card with an expiration date if given for no value to a charitable organization). You can actually get your last $5 back in cash in Washington per RCW 19.240.020. A gift card / certificate isn't a "thing" in the way that an apple, hammer or table is, it's a contractual relationship. If you own a thing, you can freely re-sell it to whoever you want (assuming there isn't an express statutory prohibition against the sale of the thing). You cannot universally sell (assign) a contract right – there is a default preference that you should be able to, but Amazon has in this case said "No, you can't".
I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.