What are the differences between the respective legal standings of anti Semitic and anti Jewish expressions? I have heard people be accused in the past of &quot;promoting/spreading religious hatred&quot; before, as though these are legal terms. Are these phrases legally defined? Onto the titular part of the question, is any distinction made between critiquing Judaism as a sin on an ideological basis, rather than the Jewish race of sinners on an ethnic one if you will? Is there anything legally wrong with shouting in front of some Jews that &quot;Judaism is bad for your health&quot; in a hope to benefit them by turning them away from what one views as the toxic harm of Judaism? If one believes that Judaism as a system of thought and belief is evil, surely it must be legally protected to express that viewpoint as one is talking about a set of ideas rather than a set of people? The fuzzier aspect of the question then comes in from why it isn't okay to criticise a set of people that is defined by the adherents of a particular set of objectionable ideas, but really I would hope that it isn't legally questionable either but completely protected. Because if one can't oppose sets of ideas along with their real world adherents like fascists as agents of fascism, that is a very dangerous road for society.
It is not an offence in itself to critique or criticise a religion - one can search the Crown Prosecution Service's website and UK media outlets to find out what kind of behaviour has been prosecuted and convicted. Refer to &quot;Annex A - Legislation used to prosecute Racist and Religious Crime&quot; in Racist and Religious Hate Crime - Prosecution Guidance for a summary table of offences with legislation and sentencing. In the context of your question(s) the most relevant legislation seems to be the Public Order Act 1986 (as amended). This defines racial hatred and religious hatred and related offences: the use of threatening, abusive or insulting behaviour with intent to stir up racial hatred or likely to stir up racial hatred the use of threatening words or behaviour with intent to stir up religious hatred The Act provides for a statutory defence of freedom of expression in relation to religious hatred but not racial hatred. The relevant position of the prosecuting authority of England and Wales, the Crown Prosection Service, is (with my hyperlinks to the legislation): Stirring up hatred on the grounds of race and religion Parts 3 and 3A Public Order Act 1986 cover stirring up hatred on the grounds of race and religion. As with all hate crime, any initial report to the police will be assessed by applying the police/CPS definition of what constitutes a hate incident/crime before more detailed consideration of the evidence and charging options. We acknowledge that people have a right to freedom of speech. It is essential in a free, democratic and tolerant society that people are able to exchange views, even when these may cause offence. However, we will balance the rights of an individual to freedom of speech and expression against the duty of the state to act proportionately in the interests of public safety, to prevent disorder and crime, and to protect the rights of others. Stirring up racial hatred, defined by reference to colour, race, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins is committed when someone says or does something which is threatening, abusive or insulting, and the person either intends to stir up racial hatred, or make it likely that racial hatred will be stirred up. It covers behaviour such as making a speech, posting material online, displaying a poster, performing a play or broadcasting on the media. Stirring up religious hatred is committed if a person uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays any threatening written material, and intends to stir up religious hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief. It covers the same behaviour applicable to stirring up racial hatred. Stirring up religious hatred is limited to threatening words or behaviour and we have to prove intent. Additionally, there is a freedom of expression defence contained in Section 29J, but no corresponding statutory defence for the racial offence. Any prosecution for the offence of stirring up hatred on the grounds of race or religion requires the consent of the Attorney General. For more information see the section on stirring up hatred in the prosecution guidance: Racist and Religious Hate Crime.
Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so.
Under French law, there are two relevant factors thus four possible charges: public vs. private, and insult vs. defamation. Bare use of the N-word is an insult and is not defamatory, but in case of defamation (article 32), the factor of racism increases the fine and introduces imprisonment for 1 year. Article R625-8-1 covers non-public insult, which will result in a fine.
Clause (c) says that while schools cannot generally restrict otherwise legal expressions by students, a school run by a religious organization can restrict such speech in terms of its tenets. It then becomes a matter of fact to be proven in court that the church has a particular tenet. So if you are asking whether it is correct that the religion exception is narrowly limited to contradictions of the religion's tenets, that is correct.
how (academically) acceptable are such discussions and proposals? Some academic somewhere has probably discussed it, and did not breach strong academic norms by doing so. Is it the academically acceptable practice to argue about such questions or is it a marginal view? It isn't taboo to argue such a position, but it is highly marginal and extreme. It is even more extreme in Eastern Europe (nominally in the civil law tradition) than it is in common law countries (which have more of a natural law tradition), and would be least marginal in the U.S. which has a strong natural law tradition, although it would marginal even in the U.S. Legal positivism (i.e. the law is what legislators and the governmental process including courts and citizen ballot issues says it is), is very strong now compared to prior eras and stronger in civil law countries than in common law countries. The battle between natural law and legal positivism was mostly won by legal positivism by the late 19th century although the debate continued indifferent to the reality on the ground. Philosophically, human rights are often viewed as an enlightened codification of natural law (which sometimes justifies its extraterritorial application), but it would be rare for someone who was a strong supporter of natural law to argue that human rights codifying natural law should be disfavored (really, that kind of reasoning is mostly seen in pre-modern Confucian legal arguments in China as part of the Eastern rule of law v. rule of man argument that tends to favor rule of man on the theory that any codification can be twisted by sneaky lawyers).
This is a pretty good guide to the student's right to express their views on religion (for or against). For example you may pray in school, but you cannot compel others to listen to your prayers. You may discuss Jesus Christ and you may advocate a religious perspective, if it is on topic (e.g. in a class discussion abortion, but not in an algebra class). There are familiar ways of saying "Jesus Christ" which would be disruptive, but a general prohibition against uttering a name (on the grounds that the name is of a religious figure) is not a proper application of the separation of church and state -- as the ACLU statement says, SCOTUS did not make public schools religion-free zones. Whether or not the teacher was given the authority to forbid mentioning religious figures by some supervisor, that would not have been proper authorization. Official advocacy of religion in general, or a particular religion, is contrary to the First Amendment, as is official prohibition of religion in general, or a particular religion.
This is not a true defense. It would only go to the credibility of the defendant's account claiming that he was not the perpetrator. Nothing prevents someone who is homosexual or asexual from sexually assaulting someone of the opposite sex within the meaning of the law. Sexual assault is often motivated by reasons other than sexual attraction in any case. Also, some people who publicly hold themselves out as being homosexual are actually bisexual. It is probably relevant evidence, but ultimately, it is up to the jury to decide who to believe and what happened based upon all of the facts and circumstances.
There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.