If a judge makes a factual error, can that be appealed? If a judge makes a factual error, and that error was an important part of his judgement, can the judgement be appealed? Normally, an appellate court will only consider matters of law and assume the matters of fact as being settled at the full discretion of the trial judge. What if the judgement makes a clear error of fact? For example, imagine that in the judgement it reads as follows: Since luminol will only fluoresce in the presence of blood, we can assume that the blood of the victim was present. This statement is simply factually incorrect. Luminol will fluoresce when in contact with a wide range of catalyst materials, not just blood. So, in this case the judge has made a factual error. Can such a provable error be the basis for an appellate court to overturn or remand a lower court decision?
When judges are finder of fact, the standard is one of deference to the trial court, but may be overcome if the trial court made a "clearly erroneous finding". See Concrete v. Const. Laborers, 508 U.S. 602 (1993).
The form calculat is late Latin, and so we may not find this exact phrasing in our earliest Roman sources. The general principle regarding correction of numerical errors is in the Digest of Justinian (530-533), which deals in 49.8 with decisions which can be rescinded without an appeal. The authority cited is Aemilius Macer, a jurist of the third century, whose work De Appellationibus (&quot;On Appeals&quot;) is quoted as saying: si calculi error in sententia esse dicatur, appellare necesse non est: veluti si iudex ita pronuntiaverit: &quot;cum constet titium seio ex illa specie quinquaginta, item ex illa specie viginti quinque debere, idcirco lucium titium seio centum condemno&quot;: nam quoniam error computationis est, nec appellare necesse est et citra provocationem corrigitur. sed et si huius quaestionis iudex sententiam centum confirmaverit, si quidem ideo, quod quinquaginta et viginti quinque fieri centum putaverit, adhuc idem error computationis est nec appellare necesse est: si vero ideo, quoniam et alias species viginti quinque fuisse dixerit, appellationi locus est. Translation from Samuel P. Scott, 1932: If an error in the calculation is alleged to exist in the decision, it is not necessary to appeal, for instance, if the judge decides as follows: &quot;As it is proved that Titius owes Seius fifty sesterces for such-and-such an article, and also twenty-five for another; therefore I hold that Lucius Titius shall pay Seius a hundred sesterces;&quot; because, as the mistake is one of computation, it is not necessary to appeal, and it can be corrected without doing so. If, however, the judge of this question should render a decision for a hundred sesterces, for the reason that he thought that fifty and twenty-five made a hundred, still, the same mistake is one of computation, and it is not necessary to appeal. But when the judge decides that there is another sum of twenty-five sesterces due, there will be ground for appeal. Another maxim for this situation is error calculi non nocet, an error in calculation does no harm. In the Corpus Iuris Civilis, 2.5, a similar formulation is attributed to a ruling from the co-Emperors Diocletian and Maximian, so the same rough time as Macer: errorem calculi ... veritati non adferre praeiudicum, an error in calculation does not prejudice the truth. The &quot;non nocet&quot; phrase can be found in much later sources, such as the 14th century commentary by Baldus de Ubaldis on Justinian. I think that this is a more precise and common term than iudex non calculat for that idea. The cited law is that a judge can correct their own calculational error, to make the outcome accord with the just outcome they had intended. The form iudex non calculat matches this idea for saying that the arithmetical working is not primary, but rather something that is deduced from the decision. This is also a feature of modern law systems, wherein obvious mistakes in court orders can be corrected by the court itself, on application. For the secondary meaning, assessing the strength of arguments rather than their quantity, this is so commonplace that it's hard to identify any particular source. It's certainly an idea we find in Cicero's rhetoric. His Orator, for example, has: The stress of an argument does not always, and in every cause, depend upon similar topics. He will, therefore, exercise his judgment; and not only discover what may be said, but thoroughly examine the force of it. ... An Orator, therefore, should carefully examine each, that he may be able to select with propriety. Otherwise, how can he enlarge upon those which are most pertinent, and dwell upon such as more particularly affect his cause? Cicero is suggesting that we should choose and hone our strongest arguments, not just reel off everything we can think of. Inclusion of weak or irrelevant material may make the overall case weaker, as well as trying the patience of the listener. I've heard similar sentiments from contemporary judges, so it's clearly something we've been struggling with for a couple of thousand years and counting. The phrase &quot;iudex non calculat&quot; does not appear to have much current live use: perhaps mainly jurists disclaiming any interest in figures, using the phrase slightly ironically.
Conditions stated in a will should be objectively verifiable, to avoid later ligation of the "yes he is / no he isn't" type. In this case, it would appear that your concern is over the beneficiary not actually being competent to take care of themselves. The courts often have to make that judgment, when a party seeks conservatorship over an adult. So it seems that the situation you are addressing can be summarized by saying "has not been found legally incompetent". You should discuss with your attorney what the exact wording ought to be, and also whether that describes your actual intents. For example, the description of disqualification probably should not include execution of a temporary power of attorney for a specific purpose, nor would it include a DNR order. Hiring an attorney who knows the terminology would steer clear of vague or mistaken terms.
Is official misconduct simply the act of "abusing public office" (or close to that)? There is no clear definition of malfeasance in office, or rather, there are many different definitions because there are so few appeals court judgments about it. Common elements of what definitions there are, are: First, malfeasance in office requires an affirmative act or omission. Second, the act must have been done in an official capacity—under the color of office. Finally, that that act somehow interferes with the performance of official duties—though some debate remains about "whose official" duties. It does not, necessarily, require that the malfeasance be criminal or unlawful in and of itself (i.e. things that would be unlawful if the person wasn't a public official), however, it really helps in obtaining a conviction. Did the judge act outside of the scope of his duties by even considering standing in a probable cause determination? Absolutely not. Standing is one of the matters a judge is required to consider. He may have got the decision wrong but that is why we have appeals courts. What in the citizen's complaint rule provides for the citizen's "closeness" to the crime? If nothing, then what else could the judge have based that decision on? It is a fundamental part of the common law that a person must have standing to bring a case. A statute can specifically grant or deny a class of people standing but if it doesn't the common law rule flows through. For a person to have standing absent a grant in the specific statute they must be sufficiently close to the act or omission that they have suffered damage or may yet do so. In general, just because the act or omission affects "all citizens" or "all taxpayers" is not generally enough - it must affect you personally and substantially enough to warrant the state dedicating scant resources to it. Time a court spends dealing with any particular case is time it cannot spend on every other case - probable cause is the judicial equivalent of medical triage.
While you have correctly stated the usual order of events in a trial, the judge has wide discretion to modify the order if it seems that justice will be served. Even in a serious criminal case, the judge can reopen testimony after closing arguments have started if the judge finds that there is good reason to do so. Traffic cases are generally less formal, and the judge will more freely modify procedure to bring out the facts of the case. I have often seen judges at traffic court ask significant relevant questions, and if they are in fact relevant, i don't think you will get far objecting to their begin asked. I am not a lawyewr, but I also have observed several traffic cases in Maryland and in NJ.
There are a variety of reasons a judge might be disqualified. It could be that the judge was previous an attorney who represented someone (defendant, victim, key witness) involved in the case, it could be that the judge was a family member or former employer of the defense attorney, it could be that someone close to the judge or the judge personally was a victim of another crime committed by the person, it could be that the defendant or the defendant's family was a personal or family friend. The prior involvement in the protective order case could be a factor as well. The record isn't detailed enough to know. "Held" in this context means that the hearing scheduled for 1:30 p.m. on that date noted was actually conducted, rather than being continued or vacated for some reason. Your guess is as good as mine regarding "CFW" and "DB" in this context. My best guess for DB is "daily booking" and CFW might be either the removed or replacement judge's initials (e.g. Carol Francis Wilson) but those are just wild guesses. Neither appears on a list of Oregon Department of Corrections acryomns or this criminal background check abbreviation list, or this list of Oregon law enforcement abbreviations. The only matches on this list of law enforcement abbreviations and none of the matches to DB (dog bite, dead body, detective bureau) make a lot of sense in this context.
The standard of proof required to survive a motion to dismiss is very low. The factual (not legal) assertions of the plaintiff are assumed to be true, and the case is dismissed if the defense shows that even when the plaintiff is given that benefit, the assumed facts don't establish the case. This standard is somtimes referred to as "sufficiency of the claims".
Judges often issue orders and warrants that require people or entities to transfer property from one party to another. For example, a search warrant allows law enforcement to seize personal property. A garnishment requires an employer to transfer a worker's wages to someone else. A judgment can affirm that property was stolen and thereby invalidate what was previously good title to the property. Like any judicial order, such judgments can be found to be invalid and/or illegal. But unless and until they are modified, a judicial order is presumed to be lawful. In fact, it has the force of law. (It is not inaccurate to say a judgment is "law.") There are a few remedies for unfair, improper, or illegal judgments. The most common include: Motions for reconsideration. If a court makes a mistake of fact or law, this is the most expedient way to bring that to its attention and ask for an appropriate modification to the judgment. Appeals. Any party adversely affected by a judgment can usually find grounds to appeal it to a higher court. Of course, things can get messy for affected parties in scenarios like you describe. If a court orders you to transfer money from one person to another, then you cannot be found guilty of a crime for complying with the letter of that order. But depending on the broader circumstances you could later be found personally liable to the proper owners of the money. E.g., they might assert any number of legal claims that result in a court granting another judgment against you for restitution to them.