What is the difference between mandamus and injunction? What if the party is a government official? Wikipedia defines mandamus as: Mandamus is a judicial remedy in the form of an order from a court[1] to any government, subordinate court, corporation, or public authority, to do (or forbear from doing) some specific act which that body is obliged under law to do (or refrain from doing), and which is in the nature of public duty, and in certain cases one of a statutory duty and defines injunction as: An injunction is a legal and equitable remedy in the form of a special court order that compels a party to do or refrain from specific acts. So it looks like the only difference is that mandamus is directed against a government official (which may be not a party to a proceeding?), while injunction is directed to a party of a proceeding. Is this the only difference? What if the party of a proceeding is a government official? Would he receive a mandamus or an injunction?
First, mandamus is always a form of writ whereas injunctions are typically a part of the proceedings in a lawsuit. Writs and lawsuits are each distinct, individual legal actions whereas multiple motions for various remedies like injunctive relief can occur within one continuous lawsuit. The lawsuit and the various motions within it including injunctions have largely replaced the common law writ (including writs of mandamus except those from a higher court to a lower) as legislated in rules of civil procedure federally and in most states
Is official misconduct simply the act of "abusing public office" (or close to that)? There is no clear definition of malfeasance in office, or rather, there are many different definitions because there are so few appeals court judgments about it. Common elements of what definitions there are, are: First, malfeasance in office requires an affirmative act or omission. Second, the act must have been done in an official capacity—under the color of office. Finally, that that act somehow interferes with the performance of official duties—though some debate remains about "whose official" duties. It does not, necessarily, require that the malfeasance be criminal or unlawful in and of itself (i.e. things that would be unlawful if the person wasn't a public official), however, it really helps in obtaining a conviction. Did the judge act outside of the scope of his duties by even considering standing in a probable cause determination? Absolutely not. Standing is one of the matters a judge is required to consider. He may have got the decision wrong but that is why we have appeals courts. What in the citizen's complaint rule provides for the citizen's "closeness" to the crime? If nothing, then what else could the judge have based that decision on? It is a fundamental part of the common law that a person must have standing to bring a case. A statute can specifically grant or deny a class of people standing but if it doesn't the common law rule flows through. For a person to have standing absent a grant in the specific statute they must be sufficiently close to the act or omission that they have suffered damage or may yet do so. In general, just because the act or omission affects "all citizens" or "all taxpayers" is not generally enough - it must affect you personally and substantially enough to warrant the state dedicating scant resources to it. Time a court spends dealing with any particular case is time it cannot spend on every other case - probable cause is the judicial equivalent of medical triage.
No a senator does not have that power under their elected position. However politics does not work like that. A senator could know the governor of their state very well. Governors could issue pardons which will release people from jail. Governors can also command a certain person to do something, like release a prisoner.
Rakusen was the appellant at the Court of Appeal. Many, but not all, appellate courts adopt the norm of listing the appellant as the first party in the style of cause, even if they were the respondent or defendant in the underlying matter. This style decision can vary between courts within the same country and can even differ between courts within the same appeal hierarchy. E.g. in Canada different provinces do it different ways, and not all of them match the Supreme Court's style.
The answer depends on the jurisdiction, as always. But under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are the model for most American courts, there are all kinds of potential sanctions for discovery violations. Rule 37(b): If a party or a party's officer, director, or managing agent—or a witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)—fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the following: (i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims; (ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence; (iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; (iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed; (v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part; (vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or (vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination. But the court will not move directly to imposing sanctions against the offending party. Instead, the rules require the aggrieved party to raise the issue privately and attempt to resolve it without court intervention. If that is unsuccessful, the court may issue an order compelling discovery. Rule 37 sanctions are generally only available if the offending party then fails to comply with that order. Separate from Rule 37, though, the court also has inherent authority to impose sanctions for litigation misconduct, but you can usually expect it to limit itself to Rule 37 protocols. Most judges don't want to hear about discovery, so they are happy to force people through the informal resolution process first.
In the United States, you can always choose to (try to) flee police. If the police subsequently assert that they tried to detain you, then they can choose to charge you with a number of crimes (which vary by jurisdiction). The assertion that you did not (or could not) in fact hear or perceive a lawful order to stop is a defense that you could raise in response to such charges. It is up to the triers of fact to determine whether, given the specifics of the case, they accept that defense.
&quot;Cancellation&quot; is generally a result of some statement or action a person made becoming public or having been made in public. Tortious interference requires that the defendant's actions are independently wrongful, such as defamation or criminal acts against the plaintiff. Truthful speech and opinions which do not allege facts are protected by the First Amendment (as well as state constitutions) and thus cannot be wrongful conduct. To apply that here, anyone can react to public knowledge about a person and call for that person to be fired, that is protected speech. As far as I know in this particular petition's case, RMS does not dispute that he made the statements they are attributing to him and using as evidence for their call to remove him from the board.
There are many Procedure Rules are they just that - the rules that need to be followed i.e. the &quot;what&quot;. Whereas a Practice Direction is &quot;how&quot; a Rule should be implemented, or as Wikipedia puts it, a supplemental protocol to rules of civil and criminal procedure in the courts – &quot;a device to regulate minor procedural matters&quot;.