How did private individual litigants at the SCC and UKSC find lawyer(s) to represent them, when their quantum was ≤ $900? My Aunt is trying to instruct a lawyer (NOT a paralegal) to know her prospects of success, particularly to avoid adverse costs, before suing a large corporation for damages of $6000 CAD. Aunt shall not file a claim, if her prospects fall way under the balance of probabilities. Aunt emailed and phoned at least 30 law firms in Vancouver, in vain! Here are responses from 5 different firms. The others just never replied! Even as a junior associate, my hourly rate shall eat into your claim. I cannot provide value for a $6000 claim. Unfortunately, we do not accept new retainers just for Small Claims. We would act in Small Claims Court merely for existing clients. Our firm has a retainer policy of $5000. Retaining us does not appear cost efficient to you. Technically, I can help you out. But my retainer is $3000, and I am not comfortable with you spending this money on me. Even though you are in Vancouver, we understand why you reached out. You are right that our hourly rates are lower, as our firm is located in the countryside. We do advise clients merely by telephone and Zoom. But we do not act for matters that happened in Vancouver. We are not interested in taking this matter on. But then how did the private individuals in these apex court cases find lawyer(s) to represent them, when their quantum was ≤ $900 CAD adjusted for inflation? What is my Aunt doing wrong? In The Queen v. Savage [1983] 2 SCR 428, 1983 CanLII 32 (SCC), the quantum was $300 CAD. But Savage was represented by Alan Schwartz, for the respondent. In Attorney General (Ontario) v. Fatehi, 1984 CanLII 85 (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 536, the quantum was $300 CAD. But Fatehi (Defendant) (Respondent) was represented by Brian H. Wheatley, Q.C., and Peter A. Daley, for the respondent. In ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, the quantum was £50. But Beavis was represented by 3 English barristers and a solicitor firm — John de Waal QC, David Lewis, Ryan Hocking, instructed by Harcus Sinclair.
Most cases of these type involve a strategic interest of a party, e.g., in a situation that is likely to recur in many future cases for that party making the precedent valuable to a litigant, or in future cases in which a lawyer is likely to find the precedent useful because the lawyer frequently represents clients who would benefit from the precedent that a clean case could make, even if it doesn't make economic sense in the particular case. For example, ParkingEye v Beavis [2015] UKSC 67, addressed the pervasive issue of when penalty clauses in consumer contacts were void as contrary to public policy. The precedent is important for certainty in drafting almost every consumer consumer contract, which matters a lot for any decedent sized business. In the case of ParkingEye, for example, their whole business model is built around the ability to charge penalties is someone parks beyond the time that they are authorized to do so, or without authorization at all. A bad result for ParkingEye, even at the trial court level, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, would mean that the contract term in question would be invalid without a need to litigate the merits of the legal issue of the validity of that contract term in all future cases brought against ParkingEye. This effect on future cases against the same litigant often encourages a party to appeal a case and litigate it at a level far in excess of the amount in controversy in that particular case. Similarly, both The Queen v. Savage [1983] 2 SCR 428, 1983 CanLII 32 (SCC), and Attorney General (Ontario) v. Fatehi, 1984 CanLII 85 (SCC), [1984] 2 SCR 536, addressed the important and routinely recurring question of whether a driver involved in a traffic accident is obligated to pay clean up costs incurred by a governmental body as a result of that accident. Also, government litigants aren't as cost conscious and are repeat litigants in a great many area, and when a private litigant is sued in a case dealing with that issue, the litigation costs are generally paid by car insurance companies that are involved in litigating almost every car accident, even though the nominal party to the case is an ordinary person driving a car. One of the main things that you buy when you buy car insurance is a free lawyer in every single case where you are sued to defend you if you are sued for negligence arising from your use of a car. Both sides have a strong long term strategic interest in how the legal issue is resolved in future cases.
can you hire a witness as your lawyer to exclude their testimony? That is pure fiction and misleading. Unfortunately scenes like that contribute to keep people ignorant about the law, which then makes it easier for courts to dissimulate their recurrent miscarriage of justice. But Purdue University v. Wartell, 5 N.E.3d 797 (2014) is an example where the Indiana courts did the right thing, and is pertinent to your question. There, Purdue University first assigned an investigator in regard to plaintiff's grievance, and thereafter the University tried to withhold information under pretext that the investigator was also its lawyer and thus that the information was protected by the privilege. Because that person hitherto had been portrayed only as an independent investigator, the Indiana courts concluded that Purdue University was estopped from invoking the attorney-client privilege (as well as the work-product doctrine). Thus, the guy in the film or series who said to be "screwed on Kardashian" reflects pure cluelessness about how the law supposedly operates. I have not seen the plot of that film or series, but the information that the friend-lawyer obtained prior to becoming O.J.'s attorney would not be protected by the privilege because it was not obtained in preparation for O.J.'s defense. If there were one star witness on the opposing side and they happened to be a lawyer, could you simply pay them off by hiring them as your lawyer? This question is somewhat unclear to me, but I will mention that lawyers have a duty to disclose to their potential or actual client any conflict of interests. The rules of so-called "professional conduct" discourage lawyers to ignore conflict of interests in that this conflict may impair their "services". And, as I explained previously, any information that a lawyer obtains as witness rather than as attorney in the matter is not protected by the privilege. Thus, as for If you committed a crime at a law-firm and everyone who witnessed it was a lawyer, is there any rule preventing you from just hiring all of them? the answer is: Nothing prevents the criminal from hiring all of them, but that information is not protected.
I will assume B.C. as your specific jurisdiction: there could be provincial differences. As phoog says, you certainly may mention this problem to management, who have an interest in keeping you happy. No law against that. As for the "legality" of sexual harassment, the CBA BC branch says that "Sexual harassment, which is discrimination based on sex, is illegal under the BC Human Rights Code". It is interesting to see what the code actually says. Section 8 Discrimination in accommodation, service and facility says (1) A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable justification, (a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public, or (b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or class of persons. The question is whether using the term "babe" constitutes discrimination against a person regarding service because of sex. This article on the Law Society of BC web site specifically identifies "verbal harassment" as an instance: Verbal harassment – This comes from anyone within the firm and or other workplace or a person who does business with the firm or company. Some examples are: referring to an adult as a babe, honey, girl or stud; whistling at someone; turning work discussion to sexual topics; asking personal questions of a sexual nature; making sexual comments about a person’s clothing, anatomy or looks; or asking someone repeatedly for dates and refusing to take no for an answer. (emphasis added). In case you're thinking that maybe there's a difference in what the code says regarding services and what it says regarding employment, section 13 Discrimination in Employment says: (1) A person must not (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person, or (b) discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or condition of employment because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or because that person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to the employment or to the intended employment of that person. In other words, it is defined simply in terms of "discrimination", which means "making a distinction". It is known that unwanted sexual advances constitute illegal discrimination, see Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] 1 SCR 1252. The court found that Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Sexual harassment in the workplace is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job‑related consequences for the victims of the harassment. They did not, however, find that this is the only form of sexual discrimination (obviously, since it isn't). I can't point to case law indicating whether gender-biased expression are actionable, but that would be consistent with the letter of the law and "babe" is indeed an example cited in the Law Society article.
Can my accountant bill me for previous work he agreed to perform for free? No. The difficult part will be for you to prove that he agreed to do the job for free. Hence the importance of having this kind of "gentlemen's" agreements in writing. You have the burden of outweighing --even by means of circumstantial evidence-- the common presumption that professional work is done for compensation, not for free. However, just like it might be hard for you to prove the aforementioned "gentlemen's agreement", it would also be hard for him to prove that you agreed to (or knew, or should have known, you would have to) pay the amount he is billing now. In the event that you are unable to prove he agreed to work for free, you might want to dispute the reasonableness of the amounts he is pursuing so belatedly. It is noteworthy that the work at issue being "really simple" would not be the only factor for assessing how much he may recover. Other factors such as the accountant's qualifications or the market rate for similar services would be weighed in awarding recovery (if any). Can I legally ignore these invoices? It does not make any sense that he sends me invoices for work done 4 years ago. You may ignore the invoices regarding older work, that is, those for which the period of limitations has elapsed. For most cases, section 4 of the Ontario Limitations Act provides a two-year period to bring a claim. Since the accountant himself did the job, and most likely he was --or should have been-- aware of the payments due for his services, he would be unable to prove that his "discovery" of claims (see section 5 of Limitations Act) regarding older tax filings meets the period of limitations. Equivalently, see here the paragraph starting with "For example, if the courts determine that [...]".
This is not possible, simply as a matter of definitions and legal terminology. Someone who is "represented by one or more attorneys" is by definition not pro se which means representing yourself without an attorney. There are very rare instances in criminal trials involving serious consequences in which a pro se defendant is allowed to have an attorney advisor who does not represent them in court in an agency capacity, but, first, people who do that almost always lose and are almost always mentally ill (although not necessarily eligible for an insanity defense), and second, because courts generally don't allow this in any other circumstance (at least in court). The concept of getting advice from an attorney without having full fledged representation is called a "limited representation" and the law regarding limited representations more generally varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and even between different courts in the same place. For example, Colorado's state courts and Colorado's federal courts have different rules for limited representations.
As a lawsuit, it doesn't make sense in U.S. law unless you have suffered significant injuries. Your damages are likely to be, at most, nominal ($1) if you discovered it before you were hurt, so you'd only lose the money spent replacing the jar of peanut butter with a non-defective one and the nominal $1 damages. You would not generally have a right to any of your attorneys' fees and personal time spent on a lawsuit like that which would likely cost tens or hundreds of thousands of dollars on an hourly basis (no attorney would take a case like that on a contingency basis), and would take hundreds of hours of your own personal time.
What remedies are therein the United States? I would imagine that the witness could be prosecuted for perjury. My guess is that the plaintiff could prosecute the witness for the lost damages. Are there any other remedies like reopening the original trial or declaring a mistrial so that the plaintiff could sue the (deep-pocketed) defendant, or would this be double jeopardy? Perjury prosecutions are like unicorns. They are rumored to exist but are almost never seen. A prosecutor would be exceedingly unlikely to bring charges in such a case, but it might not hurt to ask. Even if the criminal prosecution prevailed, however, the defeated plaintiff would be no better off, or might get out of pocket court costs as restitution at most. You could request that the witness be sanctioned for contempt. But, this leaves the loser in the original case no better off unless the judge made the highly unusual decision to award compensatory damages as a contempt sanction. Similarly, if you have reason to believe that the attorney knew that the testimony offered was false, that would be grounds to grieve the lawyer which could result in the lawyer's suspension or disbarment, but that is very difficult to prove and again would not advance the unjustly defeated plaintiff's cause. Assuming that the time to move for a retrial (usually two weeks) expired when the new evidence was discovered, you could move to set aside the verdict (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 or the equivalent state rule). The deadline for such motions based upon fraud by an adverse party is usually six months. Sometimes an independent action to set aside the verdict for fraud on the court could also be brought (sometimes within two or three years), which is an uphill battle, but probably the best option if all other deadlines have expired. The witness probably has absolute immunity from civil liability outside that court case for the testimony offered, so a civil action suing the witness for lost damages would be dismissed. The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply, but a similar doctrine called "res judicata" (a.k.a. "claim preclusion") prohibits retrying a case that was tried on the merits between the same parties, if it has become a final order. So, filing a new case is ruled out assuming that no appeals were filed within the deadline for doing so. And, even if the deadline for filing an appeal has not lapsed, it probably wouldn't prevail because the key new evidence wouldn't be in the record. It would be better to file to set aside the judgment in a motion and to appeal if that motion was denied.
This practice is probably not illegal, but I think it is at best ethically dubious. The invoice specifies &quot;&quot;Advising in relation to employment agreement with X&quot;, but according to the question no advice about X was given or even asked for, and while advice about Y was discussed, no such advice was given. That suggests that the asker owes the solicitor nothing. However the asker was informed of the hourly charge and then continued to discuss the issue. it could be argued that the constitutes an implicit contract to pay that rate for those discussions. It seems that the asker never said &quot;does that rate apply to this telephone call&quot;, nor did the solicitor say &quot;that hourly clock starts now if you want to continue&quot;. This leaves the situation less clear than it could have been. The second email, as described, seems to imply that the work of giving advice had not yet commenced, and thus no fee was due for services to date. A person in this situation could reply with a letter (sent by email or postal mail or better both) saying that no advice was given, no useful service was performed, and there was no agreement to pay for any service, so no fee is due. If the solicitor takes this to a court case, the asker may well want to consider consulting a different legal professional. This is a case where the exact facts may well matter, so no more precise answer can, I think, be given here.