Does judicial estoppel apply to adhesive contract interpretation? Large corporations are unique, in that they (1) enter into adhesive contracts with millions of people, (2) get sued a lot, and (3) often use outside counsel. What happens if a corporation—probably through outside counsel—argues an interpretation of the contract that helps them win one case but is otherwise a bad position for them? Is the corporation estopped from arguing the good position in the future?
The doctrine of judicial estoppel could potentially be applied in the manner that you suggest. The doctrine is applied in a manner that involves considerable discretion (unlike the similar doctrine of collateral estoppel, which makes judicial determinations against a party on the merits in a litigated case binding against the party against whom it was decided in future cases, in which there is much less judicial discretion). So, it isn't a lock solid winning argument that can be convincingly relied upon. But, it is a legitimate argument that a party can make in a lawsuit that would sometimes win. Footnote Large corporations are unique, in that they (1) enter into adhesive contracts with millions of people, (2) get sued a lot, and (3) often use outside counsel. For what it is worth, most businesses and government agencies, large and small, enter into adhesive contracts, often with at least hundred or thousands of people, if not with millions of people, and many get into frequently lawsuits and sometimes use outside counsel. So, the uniqueness of large corporations is somewhat overstated in the question.
As a preliminary note, the mandate that “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” can be interpreted two ways, (a) prohibiting punishments which are cruel as well as those which are unusual, or (b) prohibiting just those which are both cruel and unusual. The courts have not interpreted this to have meaning (b), even though "cruel and unusual" is a fixed phrase repeated in court rulings. In various cases where the "cruel and unusual" clause is invoked, e.g. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 the courts consistently analyze the punishment in terms of being jointly "cruel and unusual", and never consider the possibility that a punishment might be cruel but usual, or unusual but not cruel. The prohibition derives from the pre-American "cruell and unusuall Punishments" provision of the English Declaration of Rights, analyzed in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, which provides "[t]hat excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Punishments inflicted". The court observes that cruel punishments can indeed be quite common, for example But the vicious punishments for treason decreed in the Bloody Assizes (drawing and quartering, burning of women felons, beheading, disembowling, etc.) were common in that period -- indeed, they were specifically authorized by law, and remained so for many years afterwards. The court concludes from its historical analysis that "unusual(l)" in the context of English common law really means "illegal", i.e. "contrary to Law and ancient practice," without "Precedents" or "express Law to warrant," "unusual," "illegal," or imposed by "Pretence to a discretionary Power."
does the individual have a legal case against the company? Unfortunately, no. Some details and terms you use are unclear (e.g., "phantom" equity, "manifest" core technology, and so forth), but your overall description reflects that the individual sabotaged himself by signing a contract that does not mention the promise of equity through which he was persuaded to engage. A written contract usually supersedes any prior agreement --regarding the subject matter of that contract-- between the parties. That superseding effect means that the contract formalizes or overrides, accordingly, said agreements or promises. Since the initial promises of equity are not reflected in the "interim" contract, the investor's subsequent silence upon individual's reproach/reminders is from a legal standpoint irrelevant. At that point only the terms of the contract matter. The individual might consider alleging mistake in the sense of Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 151-154 such that would make the contract voidable and perhaps "make room" for other theories of law. However, that seems futile unless the interim contract contains language that (1) provides specific conditions for its expiration, or (2) reflects the company's [mis-]representations that induced the individual to sign it. Neither seems to have occurred in the situation you describe. There is always a possibility that the contract might favor the individual's position and he just has not noticed it. But the only way to ascertain that is by reading the contract itself.
No contract can limit a court's jurisdiction An NDA is a contract: it cannot prevent the application of the judicial process. Should your dispute reach a courtroom, the NDA and the documents it seeks to protect are all admissible and you should subpoena them from the defendant and submit those copies to the court (that way you are not breaking the terms of the NDA). What is not admissible is bona fide "without prejudice" documents: that is documents that contain admissions and offers made in a genuine attempt to settle a dispute. This privilege is established by the context of the document, not by if it does or does not have the words "without prejudice" on it (except, of course, that their presence/absence is part of the context).
Dale is right; here are the details from CA statutes: Since 1872, CA law has told CA courts to assume the parties to contracts in CA are reasonable, not crazy. If the literal reading of the contract is crazy, the California Civil Code's rules for the Interpretation of Contracts tells its courts: ignore the crazy reading. Here is what the statute says: § 1636 A contract must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as the same is ascertainable and lawful. To win under this section, you would need to claim that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. No judge would believe this. § 1637 For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties to a contract, if otherwise doubtful, the rules given in this Chapter are to be applied. To win under this section, you would need to claim that there is no doubt that both you and the landlord intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1638 The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity. To win under this section, you would need to claim that it was reasonable that the landlord would pay the late fee. Again, no judge would believe this. § 1640 When, through fraud, mistake, or accident, a written contract fails to express the real intention of the parties, such intention is to be regarded, and the erroneous parts of the writing disregarded. To win under this section, you would also need to claim that both you and the landlord really intended that the landlord would pay the late fee. Since no judge would believe this, any judge would rule that the wording was a mistake, and should be disregarded. § 1643 A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative, definite, reasonable, and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without violating the intention of the parties. Ditto.
Yes Quite a large chunk of the legal system deals with those general concepts. 27 - pretty much all contract law deals with when and how you must discharge your obligations 28 - ditto, although if it’s not owed until tomorrow … 29 - there are laws against criminal conspiracy 30 - making false accusations can be a crime and can give rise to defamation
They are merely telling you what the law is There is a tort called interference with contractual relations: The question strikes at the heart of our economic and legal system both of which are based upon principles of freedom of contract and freedom of choice. However, parties that freely enter contracts cannot freely breach such contracts and Courts have shown that they are prepared in some cases to provide relief against unlawful interferences with contractual relations. If A (the vendor) has contracted with B (the realtor) it is unlawful for a third-party (you) to induce A to breach their contract. If you were to approach A and they then broke their contract with B, B could sue A for breach of contract and you for interference in contractual relations. Anti-competition law is directed at ensuring there is a free and fair market for goods and services but once two parties have willingly entered a contract, they are no longer participating in the market. Now, if A approaches you, that's on A and hence why the answer o both questions is c.
We can assume there was a meeting of the minds when the contract was drafted, and both parties expected payments to me made based on product usage. Plaintiff alleges that this did not happen. Thus plaintiff is indeed alleging that the contract was breached. Now plaintiff alleges that defendant broke the contract, while defendant counters that plaintiff broke the contract. "[T]o be determined by tracking software" is woefully ambiguous. The court will want to know which party drafted the contract, as disputes arising from ambiguity are often resolved in favor of the non-drafting party.