Will the supreme court ruling in favour of LGBTQIA+ protection from discrimination have effect on the 2018 ruling in favour of the bakery in Colorado? There have been numerous debates about whether religion justifies a reason for refusing to provide service to a group of individuals, but last week, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld in a 6-3 decision that LGBTQIA+ discrimination was the same as discrimination on the basis of sex. Here is a link to an article that explains more about the 2018 ruling. Wouldn't these two cases sort of contradict themselves, or would this one override the other?
I don't see the contradiction. The ACLU article you link to explains that the Supreme Court found against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in principle in the 2018 ruling. Instead they found that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had taken a dismissive attitude to the religion of the bakery's owners, and that in itself was religious discrimation and a violation of their First Amendment rights. I would say the 2018 ruling paved the way for the more recent one, which is why the article you link is titled: &quot;In Masterpiece, the Bakery Wins the Battle but Loses the War&quot;
The interpretation of state rules of civil procedure is a matter purely for state courts. Whether a state procedural rule (or even substantive approaches to jurisdiction) violates federal law, including the U.S. Constitution, is a question of federal law, but state courts are still competent to answer such questions that arise in the process of state litigation, subject only to precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. I may be starting to just repeat things now, but even if the legal issue you're interested in (the extent to which trial courts are divested of jurisdiction during non-frivilous interlocutory appeals in matters controlled by the FAA) is substantive or jurisdictional rather than procedural, Federal circuits do not bind state courts. However, the Supreme Court of the United States can provide binding prcedent on federal law that state courts must apply. I could see the reasons in Coinbase being written broadly enough to apply to both state and federal proceedings.
I’ve managed to answer my own question. Age discrimination legislation only applies to over 18s: It’s only discrimination if a trader or service provider treats you unfairly because of: age - if you’re 18 or over disability gender reassignment pregnancy and maternity race religion or belief sex sexual orientation Source
Do vaccine mandates amount to religious discrimination? The term &quot;vaccine mandate&quot; is not sufficiently clear to tell, in a vacuum. Is it a mandate to get a vaccine? A mandate not to serve an unvaccinated individual in a public place? A mandate to vaccinate children that attend public schools? A mandate to serve unvaccinated individuals at public accommodations? Or what? The details of the mandate, how it was enacted, and the circumstances under which it is being challenged, are all critical to determining its legal validity. As noted in the linked answer (text reordered for clarity): Under the US Constitution, a public health authority could even make vaccination mandatory, and this was done in some historical epidemics. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the US Supreme court held such mandatory vaccinations to be constitutional. . . . In Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174 (1922) the US Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a public school district's exclusion of unvaccinated students. . . . In Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) the US Supreme Court upheld as constitutional an involuntary quarantine law. Likewise, facially neutral health and safety regulations of businesses are generally valid even if they disproportionately impact members of a religion, under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (and as it is applies to state and local governments under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 tips the balance somewhat to make accommodations in some circumstances to facially neutral laws that disproportionately impact the free exercise of religion, but still does not prohibit facially neutral laws that serve a compelling public purpose from burdening the free exercise of religion. The core language of that Act which sets forth the substantive standard in those cases states that: SEC. 3. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION PROTECTED. (a) IN GENERAL.—Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). (b) EXCEPTION.—Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. (c) JUDICIAL RELIEF.— A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the Constitution. The standards referenced in the act tap into well established case law that was previously applied less broadly than under the Act, when the U.S. Constitution alone, unaided by the Act, was implicated. Could a restaurant refuse to serve unvaccinated individuals, even including those with sincere religiously-founded anti-vax beliefs? Yes. Usually, businesses can establish facially neutral rules even if they have a disparate religious impact. Generally, private businesses do not have an affirmative duty to serve anyone. Certainly, it could do so as a matter of company policy, if the law did not forbid discrimination specifically on vaccination status (which it currently does not in most or all places in the U.S., although there may be recent legislation on this of which I am not aware). For example, it is legal to operate a restaurant that only serves bacon cheeseburgers and operates 7 days a week, all year long, without holidays (in many places that lack blue laws for restaurants), even though this effectively denies service to strictly observant Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and (on Fridays during Lent) to observant Catholics, and could make it an uncomfortable place for such workers to work. The harder question is whether the restaurant could serve an unvaxxed individual when the business and the customer both want to do so, and both have sincere religious beliefs that cause them to feel that they must do so (the business owner might have sincere beliefs about serving everything, the customer might have sincere beliefs about being unvaxxed for religious reasons). Even then, when religious people aren't singled out for being religious, this requirement might be upheld if there was no alternative that meets the public health goals of the requirement, although the case that there could be some alternative that is less restrictive might be pretty good.
Yes, they're able to discriminate as long as its not illegal discrimination; and there's currently no law protecting people with these views. Both at a physical or digital store, they can be refused service and told to leave.
The fair housing act does not mention "socially marginalized groups". It says that it shall be unlawful To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. The U.S. Supreme Court just ruled on a case, Texas Department of Housing &amp; Community Affairs v. The Inclusive Communities Project Inc., that covered disparate impact as a measurement of discrimination. Disparate impact raises the question of whether policies that appear to be neutral but result in a disproportionate impact on protected groups are legal. The Supreme Court, in its ruling, indicated that disparate impact claims can be brought but it also imposed significant limitations. How does this case apply to your question? The underlying situation in the referenced case is one where, from the ruling: The ICP alleged the Department has caused continued segregated housing patterns by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits, granting too many credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas and too few in pre-dominantly white suburban neighborhoods. The basis of the claim, which can now be heard under a disparate impact claim, is that a government organization discriminated against pre-dominantly white neighborhoods. FHA protects against racial discrimination, not against racial discrimination only against certain groups.
The government is prohibited by the first amendment from creating a law which gives preference to one religion over another. Banning entry to persons of one or more religions would do this.
In most states, the answer would be less clear, as First Amendment protections begin falling away quickly when you enter private property. In California, though, there is some strong precedent indicating that this behavior would be protected. In Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 902 (1979), the California Supreme Court held that "the soliciting at a shopping center of signatures for a petition to the government is an activity protected by the California Constitution." That case adopted the reasoning of a dissent in a previous case where the court had rejected such an argument: It bears repeated emphasis that we do not have under consideration the property or privacy rights of an individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail establishment. As a result of advertising and the lure of a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to take advantage of the numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there]. A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in connection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business operations ... would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights. I'd bet there is case law addressing religious leafleting, as well, but I don't know California law well enough to cite to it. Even if there isn't, though, the First Amendment's requirements of content-neutrality in government decisionmaking would probably require that the same protections be extended to religious speech. Of course, the answer to these kinds of questions always depends on the specific facts, requiring you to engage a lawyer to get a reliable answer. For a lower cost, you could also just ask the local police if they would enforce a request from the property owner to have you removed.