Can a single act by tried as different crimes (or different versions of the same crime) in different jurisdictions, to bypass double jeopardy? Sparked by this comment: @Raven That is impossible. The crimes at the state and federal level are ?different crimes, enacted by different sovereigns and punishing offenses against different sovereigns. While they may cover substantially similar conduct, they are different offenses. There is nothing whatsoever tying the two statutes together, and no reason why a decision by the US Congress about a federal crime would change sentences for similar state crimes. That's not how US federalism works -- the two sentences were never connected. – cpast Nov 4 '15 at 4:59 If as cpast contends, federal and state crimes are different, can one be tried for the same act on different charges and not violate double jeopardy? On the same charges in different courts? I've tagged this as US, due to double jeopardy being the main question, but anywhere else that has similar restrictions (and presumably a federalist judiciary) is also welcome.
Yes, this is allowed. A famous example was the Rodney King beating, where police officers were acquitted at the state level but convicted federally. US v. Lanza formalized the rule, and it has survived the application of the double jeopardy rule to the states. It's called the separate sovereigns doctrine, and also applies to prosecutions by two states (see Heath v. Alabama) and by an Indian tribe and the feds (see US v. Wheeler). It does not apply between DC and the feds or territories and the feds, because DC and territorial laws are established under the power of the federal government. These prosecutions are uncommon. As far as the feds go, they normally consider a state prosecution to have satisfied the federal interest in the case (win or lose). But prosecution by multiple sovereigns is not barred by the Fifth Amendment.
There is precedent for the idea that double jeopardy need not apply when the initial trial was a sham because the judge and/or jury had been bribed. See Aleman v. Judges of Cook County Circuit Court, 138 F.3d 302 (7th Cir. 1998). This case was very similar to your hypothetical: Aleman was initially acquitted of a murder, but years later it came to light that he had bribed the judge (in a bench trial). He was retried and convicted in state court. He appealed his conviction on the grounds of double jeopardy, but the Seventh Circuit denied his appeal, accepting Illinois' argument that because of the bribe, Aleman was never &quot;in jeopardy of life or limb&quot; in the first place.
This is a developing area within the law. In the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Computer Fraud and Abuse Act) governs. However, the law is broadly written. This means creative prosecutors can and do win federal criminal cases by arguing the law should apply. Whether violating a website's terms of service should be considered a federal crime subject to the Act has been a subject of hot debate. In United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012), the 9th Circuit decided violations of use should be considered breaches rather than crimes. However, the district court refused to dismiss some charges against Nosal when the case was returned, and a jury conviction resulted in a prison sentence. At least three different circuits have arrived at other interpretations of the CFAA. Draft legislation (H.R. 2454 and S. 1196) would limit the scope of the CFAA by excluding TOS violations, however, it hasn't been adopted as of this writing. That CAPTCHA breaking violates website terms of service isn't really in question. For example, see U.S. v. Lowson, 10-cr-114, U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey (Newark) in which the judge brought a criminal case to which two defendants plead guilty to wire fraud, one plead guilty to misdemeanor computer crimes, and a fourth went on the lam. But does for-profit CAPTCHA solving violate U.S. law? Given the state of the law, one could make a case either way. Given the industry's reputation, serious questions about intended use, and questionable labor practices, that's a significant risk.
Are there any underlying reasons behind the nonsensical structure of U.S.C. titles? Is it simply a case of "This is how it's been for awhile, don't fix what isn't broken." or is there more to it than that? First of all, the United States Code is generally not designed to be used by non-lawyers. Second, one of the main ways to research case law interpreting a statute is by doing a boolean search on the code section of that statute. Every time you change a title or section number, you impair the ability of people doing legal research (both judges and lawyers) to find previous case law interpreting the meaning of the statute. Third, you make it much harder to determine when the substance of the provision was originally enacted (e.g. if you want legislative history or to determine which of two conflicting statutory provisions was enacted first) since an annotated statute will often show when the current section was enacted but will not explain what it was derived from. Fourth, the location of a statute within the context of other statutory sections often informs its meaning. Machine gun may have one definition in two or three laws, and a different one in two or three other laws, and there may be yet other laws where machine gun is an undefined term. Moving a statutory section from one part of the code to another could influence the default definition that one uses for an undefined term changing substantive law. Fifth, usually a new codification will also involve some drafting standards, for example, to add gender neutrality or to avoid notoriously ambiguous constructions (like 250 word sentences). But, it isn't at all uncommon for very slight changes like the position of a comma or the formatting of a section with multiple indents, to result in a change of the likely meaning of a somewhat ambiguous statute and it is pretty much impossible to know a priori when a statutory section is ambiguous until you are confronted with a fact pattern that makes the ambiguity in that context clear. This isn't confined to obscure laws of little importance. For example, the question of whether Obamacare applied in states that hadn't set up their own exchanges hinged on these kinds of issues. None of this is to say that you should never recodify the statutes. But, a basically aesthetic motivation that mostly matters to people who make up a tiny portion of the main users of the product (non-lawyers) that poses multiple threats to how statutes will be located using legal research tools, and how it will be interpreted once located, means that reorganizing statutes is not something to be done lightly. In short, there are a lot of serious, substantive costs that can accompany a recodification of a law. As a result, re-codification is most often done only as part of an overall omnibus reform of an area of law on the merits where the interest in being able to track prior interpretive caselaw and determine the original meaning of a statute enacted long ago is at its lowest. Barring the even more ridiculous case of Congress repealing everything and passing the exact same laws again, just under different Titles/Chapters/etc, This is not so ridiculous. Most states have done exactly that one or two times in their history (sometimes more for older states). Also, many newly admitted to the union states also do something similar. For example, the basic template for the statutes in Colorado was the statutes of the state of Illinois. Basically, the first time around, somebody started with an Illinois statute book, eliminated Illinois specific laws and laws that they didn't like, rearranged them and adopted them as the original statutes of the State of Colorado (it may have actually been version 2.0 after a stopgap set of statutes, I don't recall which). Also, most states completely repeal and readopt all of their statutes in codified form on the recommendation of the codifier to a legislative committee, to reflect the acts passed in the previous session, every year. This doesn't involve overhauls really, but in principle is a complete repeal and reenactment. While the federal government has never overhauled the entire U.S. Code in this manner, it has been done at the level of individual titles of the U.S. Code. For example, the most recent major reorganization and overhaul of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code (Title 26) was in 1986. The copyright laws were overhauled in the late 1970s. Both of those accompanied major substantive changes in those areas of law. Another major recodification of many parts of the U.S. Code took place following 9-11 in connection with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, which reorganized both the bureaucracy and the associated U.S. Code language associated with dozens of federal agencies. would it be possible for Congress to arbitrarily merge, combine, and delete Titles, and to rearrange the location of laws, definitions, etc? Are there laws/regulations governing this? Yes. Congress can do so any time it wants by passing a bill (it would be the longest bill ever - dozens of volumes long) doing so, and getting the President to sign it. The legislative process would be exactly the same as any other bill.
As you said, "serious" is a subjective description of a crime, but most lawyers would probably have the same first reaction when asked to make the distinction: Is it a felony or a misdemeanor? Felonies are objectively more serious because they come with longer sentences, as well as a variety of awful collateral consequences -- lost voting rights, disqualification from gun ownership, etc. By that standard, unlawful entry into the United States (8 U.S. Code § 1325) is not, in most cases, a serious crime. For a first offense, it's a misdemeanor punishable by at most six months in jail. For subsequent offenses, though, it's a felony punishable by up to two years. I'd agree that the sentences meted out suggest that the judges don't view this offense as a particularly serious one. But that doesn't necessarily mean that it was pointless to prosecute. For instance, the first prosecution enables a harsher sentence if the immigrant lands in front of the judge again, and I'd bet that a fair share of the harsher sentences involved repeat offenders. Also, if you think that being a nation of laws means that we should always enforce every law (or if you at least believe this when it comes to immigrants), then the prosecutions are their own reward.
He can, to the extent that there is a federal charge involved. There is no limit to the power to "grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States", but there is no power to grant reprieve or pardon against a US state or foreign country. In other words, a presidential pardon would prevent the person from being tried or punished by the US federal government. It would not prevent them from being tried or punished by a state or foreign government.
We need a jurisdiction, because burglary is a statutory crime. Since this is a residence, in Washington, under RCW 9A.52.025(1), the trespasser might have committed residential burglary: A person is guilty of residential burglary if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling other than a vehicle. While other states may have a provision requiring intent to commit a felony, or intent to commit a crime other than trespassing, the Washington statute does not say "felony" or "other than trespassing". A person can enter unlawfully by accident, or with no intention to be there unlawfully, in which case the person committed the act without the requisite criminal intent. If a person intends to enter but not remain, and they enter, they have committed the misdemeanor of trespassing. The question of whether unlawful entering with the intent to unlawfully remain satisfies the "intent to commit a crime" called for in the Washington statute has not been directly addressed in case law, as far as I know. While the state generally shoulders the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the crime, in Washington, under RCW 9A.52.040, the accused may bear the burden of disproving intent (this is a permissive inference on the fact-finder's part): In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent. This does not mean that the state shoulders no burden of proof regarding intent, according to State v. Newton: A jury may, however, infer the defendant's specific criminal intent from his or her conduct if it is not "'patently equivocal'" and instead 'plainly indicates such intent as a matter of logical probability' In this instance, the burglary conviction was overturned because no evidence shows his intent was anything other than to show her she could walk The relevant fact is that the accused was under the influence of PCP, and believed that God had told him that his disabled mother could walk, and he broke into the residence to tell her this. Pursuant to State v. Bergeron where the conviction for attempted burglary was upheld, the court held that The intent to commit a specific named crime inside the burglarized premises is not an "element" of the crime of burglary in the State of Washington... The intent required by our burglary statutes is simply the intent to commit any crime against a person or property inside the burglarized premises The court observed in this case that "there is absolutely no evidence in the record to prove what specific crime it was the defendant intended to commit inside". What distinguishes Bergeron from Newton (the latter, not precedential, citing the former) is that there was a good case that Bergeron had an intent to commit some crime, though not a specific identifiable crime; but for Newton, there was no evidence that defendant intended to commit any crime whatsoever, even remaining unlawfully. In the hypothetical instance, the fact that the criminal smashed a vase is evidence of an intent to commit a crime (destruction of property). It's unlikely that a mere assertion "I just did that on the spur of the moment" would carry any weight. If the circumstances make it more likely that he entered intending to do something wrong, such as vandalism, the elements of burglary are present/ If the defendant claims some innocent reason for trespassing, such as escaping a riot, he may avail himself of a defense (RCW 9a.52.090) that The actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him or her to enter or remain If there is no evidence of a riot, such a defense is not credible. Alternatively, if the house is for sale, the "I thought it would be okay" defense is more credible.
If you read the first link, every offense can lead to arrest without a warrant. Notwithstanding, you don’t have to be arrested to be charged and vice -versa.