Under what circumstances (other than defamation) is &quot;truth an absolute defense&quot; against prosecution? My understanding is that &quot;truth is an absolute defense&quot; against a &quot;defamation&quot; charge, in the U.S. (Although you could be charged with something else such as &quot;publication of private facts.&quot;) If you shouted &quot;fire&quot; in a crowded theater, and there really was a fire, would &quot;truth be an absolute defense&quot;? If so, under what heading would this doctrine fall, since we are not dealing with &quot;defamation&quot;? On the other hand, &quot;truth is NOT an absolute defense&quot; against &quot;defamation&quot; in the United Kingdom. (At least as I learned UK law in the 1990s.) Are there any other instances in the UK where &quot;truth is not an absolute defense&quot;?
The original phrase &quot;falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic&quot; came from the opnion by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) where it was a metaphor for speech that might validly be prohibited under he First Amendment. It served to introduce the famous &quot;Clear and present danger&quot; test. The issue in that case was whether distributing fliers urging people not to submit to the draft could be the reason for a conviction under the Espionage Act, or whether such action was protected by the First Amendment. Holmes held it was not protected. The case was not about any actual shout of &quot;fire&quot;. The Court has generally held that true speech may not be prohibited, and for this reason some legal scholars argue that the &quot;private facts&quot; tort is unconstitutional in the US. But in many cases the Court has held that false speech is also protected, so truth is not the primary criterion. In Brandenberg vs Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969) the &quot;Clear and present danger&quot; test was replaced by a rule that only speech &quot;directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action&quot; may be prohibited under the first amendment, and this is now the test for any crime of &quot;incitement&quot;. Under this test Schenck would hav gone the other way. This test says nothing about the truth of the speech, and a perfectly true statement may nevertheless be incitement if it seeks to arouse lawless action, and is likely to succeed. Near vs Minnesota held that bare truth must be a defense in any prior restraint case (unlike truth published &quot;with good motives and for justifiable ends&quot; which the saturate at issue in Near allowed as a defense), but went on to greatly restrict any prior restraint, even if the content was false. Defamation is really the primary situation in which falsity is a vital element of the offense, and so truth is a defense. Falsity is an element of perjury also, and so truth would be an absolute defense there as well. Falsity is also an element of the common-law tort of fraud, and of most statutory versions of fraud, but in some of those a true but misleading statement can still be held fraudulent, so truth is not an absolute defense. I cannot think of another such legal situation. Updatew: A comment asked: What if I inform all of Joe's neighbours that Joe had been arrested for murder - when I fully know that he was completely exonerated and the real murderer is in jail right now. It's literally the truth, but completely misleading. In that case the law takes you to have made by implication a statement that Joe is currently under suspicion for murder, or perhaps a statement that Joe is actually guilty of murder. As those statements are false, and apparently knowingly false, they can be the basis of a defamation action. There is a lot of caselaw on defamation by implication, but in general one is taken to have made statements that are clearly implied by the statements one did in fact make. I don't think this is very different in UK and US law, but I am not sure about the UK. Anyway truth is not a defense here because the implied statement is not true.
It's hard to say, given how little we know about the case and the information, also what you mean by &quot;corrupted&quot; and what your evidence is. Here are two hypothetical cases that illustrate different possibilities. 1: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge &quot;My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was murdering his brother&quot;. Lawyer deems this to be a bad argument because murder is punished more severely than robbery. The lawyer is doing his job, protecting the interest of the client. No crime or civil wrong. 2: The accused instructs the lawyer to tell the judge &quot;My client has an alibi against the robbery charge: at the time, he was in church&quot;. The lawyer doesn't understand that this is exculpatory evidence, thinking &quot;they never asked about church, there's no point in me raising this issue&quot;. The client can probably sue for incompetence. There are possible criminal charges possible, for example if the lawyer is working for The Mob he might be involved in an actual criminal conspiracy.
england-and-wales Alice's defence will be that she had an honest belief, given the circumstances, that force was necessary and the force she used was reasonable in defence of John (and possibly Alice). John's consent is irrelevant unless it had some bearing on that. Why did John oppose the use of force? Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he would rather die than cause a death? Irrelevant. Did John tell Alice not to shoot because he believed Bob was not a real threat due to circumstances X, Y and/or Z that he wanted Alice to heed? Relevant.
When it can be “reasonably read both to impart a defamatory inference and to affirmatively suggest that the author intended or endorsed that inference.” Which is the standard the New York appeals court endorsed in 2014 for “defamation by implication”. So, on the face of the statements, they have to imply fraud and they have to show that the speaker intended to imply fraud. Whether they did that is up to the jury.
Defamation is a suit that can be brought by anyone, however, there are extra hurdles if the plaintiff is an official. Following New York Times Co v Sullivan, the plaintiff must prove actual malice: that the defendant knew the information was untrue or acted with reckless disregard for its truth.
It seems generally uncontroversial that in examining a witness at trial, a lawyer may not ask questions implying that the witness has engaged in some wrongdoing, unless the lawyer has some basis for asking those questions. This is not true. A lawyer is allowed to guess and ask such a question, although if it assumes a fact not in evidence it could be objected to for lack of foundation. For example, the opposing counsel could object if the lawyer asked, "After you drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar, isn't it true that you got into a car and drove away?", because there would be no evidence in the record at that point that he drank twelve beers at BigTown Sports Bar. For instance, in the absence of any evidence indicating that alcohol was involved, I would imagine that a plaintiff's lawyer in an accident case could not cross-examine a defendant with leading questions suggesting that he had been drunk at the time of the crash. Sure he could. He could ask, "Isn't it true that you were drunk at the time of the crash?" There is nothing objectionable about that question. If the answer was "no", however, and the lawyer had nothing else to back up that suggestion, the question might not help the case, but the question is proper. Sometimes a lawyer just has a hunch and goes with it, and sometimes the hunch is right. Is this rule codified in a rule of evidence or is it just rooted in the courts' ideas of decorum and propriety? I can see how it might implicate the Rules of Professional Conduct, but that wouldn't seem to provide a remedy to a party who was prejudiced by such behavior. I'm more interested here with civil cases than criminal, where a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights might be complicate the question. It isn't codified because such a rule does not exist. There are some special rules that apply to prosecutors, who are ethically required to bring criminal cases only when they believe that the cases are supported by probable cause. But, that rule applies at the case level and not at the question by question level. Lawyers are also prohibited, especially in criminal cases, from making statements asserting personal knowledge of the credibility of a defendant or witness. This is because this transforms the lawyer from an advocate to a credibility witness. But, the lawyer can ask a judge or jury to find that someone is not credible in closing argument based upon X, Y and Z evidence presented at trial.
There is no magic about the word &quot;allegedly&quot;. &quot;Rob allegedly killed Alice&quot; simply means &quot;Someone said that Rob killed Alice&quot;. It implies that the person reporting this is not claiming that it is true or false, but just reporting what someone else has said. If in fact some person did say that, such a statement is true, and quite probably not defamatory. However, if the original claim is unreliable, and it is being repeated in a way that serves to lend it credibility, it could still be considered defamation by implication. If Rob has been charged, or accused by a credible source, or multiple such sources, reporting on that accusation will normally not itself be defamation. Saying &quot;I allege that Rob killed Alice&quot; is just saying that &quot;I claim that Rob killed Alice&quot; and might well be defamatory if Rob did not in fact do so. Again there is nothing magic about any particular word here. It is the overall meaning of the statement that makes it defamatory or not, as that meaning would be reasonably understood by readers or listeners. Any statement that will be understood as carrying a defamatory meaning may be an act of defamation. There is also nothing magic about Rob having been formally charged. Such a charge is a fact that can be freely reported on. Widespread or credible claims that Rob is the killer are also facts, and can also be reported. But if the only source is an anonymous vid on YouTube, with no supporting evidence, that is not a credible claim. Reporting it in a way that makes it sound far more credible than it is may cause people to believe the false accusation, and thus be defamatory. Again the overall meaning of the statement is important.
That really depends what they lie about In the United States, there's no general law against lying. The fact that a statement is false doesn't inherently strip it of protection under the first amendment. Public figures lie to the public all the time. That's why news companies have fact checkers. Was it defamatory? It is, however, illegal to defame someone. If someone makes a false statement of fact (that is, not an opinion) about a person or company, they may be liable for that. Whether they are liable for that depends on a number of factors, including whether the target is a public figure (see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan), the speaker's knowledge of its falsity, and whether the target was damaged by it. Was it part of some other criminal scheme? False statements to the public could be part of some sort of fraud, for instance. Pump and dump schemes, for instance, are illegal. Was it under oath? Lying under oath (such as when testifying in court) would constitute perjury, which is a crime. There are many other situations in which lying could be a crime (such as lying on your taxes), but these are the main ones I can think of that would be about lying to the public. In this case (I'm unfamiliar with the details of what he said, so I'm just going off your description), I can't immediately think of any reason that could lead to liability. Mocking and calling something a &quot;nothing burger&quot; is pretty clearly an opinion, not a false statement of fact. I'm not aware of any securities law against saying you don't like something you're actually invested in (though I'm not especially familiar with securities law).