Why is the Queen of Canada known as Elizabeth II? The regnal numbers of the monarchy of the United Kingdom are combined from the regnal numbers of the separate kingdoms of England and Scotland. Hence, as there was a previous Queen Elizabeth in England, the current queen is known as Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It is a common mistake to call her the Queen of England: she is not, as England is no longer a kingdom in its own right, but instead forms part of the singular United Kingdom. However, Canada, Australia, and Jamaica, among others, are kingdoms in their own right, with their own monarchies (which merely happen to be vested in the same person). Elizabeth is not Queen of England, but she is Queen of Canada, Queen of Australia, and queen of many other countries. In these countries, why is she known as Elizabeth II? Elizabeth I of England never ruled any of these countries.
Actually, Queen Elizabeth I and Queen Elizabeth II are not sovereigns of any common state. QEI was sovereign of England and Wales and QEII is sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (among others). The numbering has nothing to do with the states they are sovereign over: it is familial number dating from William I (the Conquerer). It is no different from the numbering that would occur if I were named for my father and my son were named for me. Some monarchies use ordinals that include mythological kings or kings that ruled a completely different state that shared a common geography or culture, or were claimed to do so in the founding myths of a state. The only legal issue here is that the number that a monarch accepts is the legally relevant one - if the next Elizabeth decides she will be Elizabeth XVII then so she will be. There is actually a case about this relating to QEII in Scotland: A court case, MacCormick v Lord Advocate, contesting the style “Elizabeth II” within Scotland, was decided in 1953 that the numbering of monarchs was part of the royal prerogative, and that the plaintiffs had no title to sue the Crown. So, legally, she is Queen Elizabeth II in Scotland even though Scotland never had a Queen Elizabeth I. Practically, state owned assets in Scotland are not embossed with EIIR (Elizabeth II Regina) but with the crown of Scotland out of consideration of Scottish sensibilities on the matter. In any event, certainly in Australia (not sure about Canada), the head of state is the Governor General, not the Queen. You can read about they whys and wherefores here.
There are two approaches to determining citizenship: where you are born (jus soli – this holds in the US), and who you were born to (jus sanguinis – the case in India). There are mixes of these systems, such as where a person born to an American but not in the US is still an American citizen (e.g. Ted Cruz). Canada allows Canadian citizenship to be inherited outside Canada by 1 generation, so a child born outside Canada to Canadian parent born in Canada is a Canadian citizen. A child born outside Canada to Canadians born outside Canada is not a Canadian citizen. If that child is born in India and the parents do not have dual citizenship, the child is stateless because at least one parent has to be Indian to acquire Indian citizenship at birth. There are various exceptions to the generalization about only revoking citizenship with dual nationals. In 1962, about 20% of the Kurdish population in Syria had its citizenship revoked. Albert Einstein was stateless for 5 years, after he renounced his (German) Baaden-Württemberg citizenship. There is no law in the US that prevents you from renouncing your citizenship, there is simply a particular formality that has to be followed. Wikipedia names a half-dozen US citizens who relinquished their US citizenship and had no other citizenship (thus were stateless). The Japanese Nationality Law limits dual citizenship and requires children to make a decision at age 22. Iran, however, prohibits renunciation of citizenship to the offspring of an Iranian male (it is automatically assigned to the child). A Japanese-Iranian child born (in Japan) to an Iranian father would might seem to have to become Iranian; but apparently Japan requires you to perform the act of renouncing, and does not require that the other country recognize the renunciation. The point is that renouncing citizenship involves the laws of two countries: the country that you renounce may or may not accept the renunciation, and the country that you renounce in favor of may or may not accept the renunciation. Section 10 of the Norwegian Nationality Law exemplifies a further variation in concepts of renunciation as part of gaining Norwegian citizenship, and statutorily acknowledges the problem or countries not allowing citizens to renounce citizenship. There is a requirement of naturalization that "the applicant must be released from any other nationality before the application may be granted", which also allows that it's okay if you can be so released after being granted Norwegian citizenship: or, ultimately, "An exemption may be granted from the requirement regarding release if release is deemed to be legally or practically impossible or for other reasons seems to be unreasonable". (The law in Norwegian is here: a Norwegian lawyer would be better able to comment on the interpretation of the text, but my reading of the law, especially the requirement to be "løst fra annet statsborgerskap", specifies the realized result of being released, and not the act of renunciation, hence "release" in the translation). If a person has dual US-Ukrainian citizenship, they might symbolically renounce their Ukrainian citizenship to avoid an expected revocation of US citizenship and deportation to Ukraine. But the US has no law that says that it must recognize the renunciation of a foreign citizenship. Canada and Australia do not allow you to renounce your citizenship if it would result in statelessness, but not all countries have such a requirement. See for instance sect. 9 of the Citizenship Act of Canada: Subject to subsection (2.1), a citizen may, on application, renounce his citizenship if he (a) is a citizen of a country other than Canada or, if his application is accepted, will become a citizen of a country other than Canada... There is, however, no specific law that compels Canada to recognize a person's renunciation of some other country. So whether the described strategy would have any effect depends on the extent to which the "retained" state is compelled to recognize a renunciation of a foreign citizenship.
It may &quot;seem[] normative&quot; that &quot;a law cannot enumerate any specific persons or companies to be included or excluded from its provisions.&quot; But in fact it is not generally the case. There are various kinds of laws that traditionally have named specific people or entities to define their scope. These include: In nineteenth-century England, a divorce could only be granted by a specific law passed by Parliament, naming the persons to be divorced. I am not sure when the practice stopped. In the US during the nineteenth century (and I think the early twentieth century also) a corporation was normally formed by a specific law granting a charter of incorporation to the named company. In the US during the period 1866-1870 there were a number of laws passed permitting former Confederate officers and officials who were presented by the 14th amendment from holding office under the US or any state to hold office again, as the amendment provides for. Eventually Congress passed a more general amnesty. It was once common for the English Parliament to pass bills of attainder. These were legislative declarations that a particular person was guilty of a particular crime, generally without any trial or other process. Sometimes the specific sentence was also imposed by such a bill. This was sufficiently resented that the US Constitution specifically forbids Congress or any state from passing such a bill. It was once common for actual laws to grant payments to specific people for specific purposes. This is no longer common, but there is no legal bar to it in either the UK or the US that I know of. The UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 contains a provision enabling Great Ormond Street Hospital for Children to continue to receive royalties for performances and adaptations, publications and broadcast of &quot;Peter Pan&quot; whose author, J. M. Barrie, had given his copyright to the hospital in 1929, later confirmed in his will. This right is to persist even after the expiration of ordinary copyright for the play, but is not a full grant of copyright. Laws or ordinances invoking eminent domain to take the property of particular individuals for particular purposes are common, mostly at the local level. In the US, the Equal Protection Clause generally forbids laws which treat people, or groups of people, differently unless there is some rational basis for the distinction. But in some cases a plausible basis is asserted and such laws are passed.
Letters patent are instruments issued by the monarch to publicly grant some specific rights to some person(s) with the backing of the royal power. It is also where the word patent (in its intellectual property sense) comes from, since the monopoly of invention was only granted by the authority of the monarch via a letter patent. Another use of the letters patent is to constituting certain offices, particular those exercising the royal power, for example, the Governor General of Canada. Under the British system, the courts are thought to be the monarch exercising their power over the bench. Many High Courts of India were constituted by the British monarch during the colonial rul. The British Parliament allows the monarch to issue letters patent for such purposes in the 1861 High Courts Act. Their jurisdictions were specified by letters patent. One of such jurisdiction is the power for a High Court to hear appeals from the decisions of one of its justices. For example, in the letters patent establishing the High Court in Calcutta: Appeal from the Court a of original jurisdiction to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction.- And We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal from the judgment, in all cases of original Civil jurisdiction, of one or more Judges of the said High Court, or of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 13 of the said recited Act: Provided always that no such appeal shall lie to the High Court as aforesaid from any such decision made by a majority of the full number of Judges of the said High Court, but that the right of appeal in such case shall be to Us, Our heirs or successors, in Our or their Privy Council, in manner hereinafter provided. This clause grants appellate jurisdiction to the High Court over the High Court itself when the court makes a decision in its original jurisdiction (unless the decision was already made by the majority of the court's judges). Of course, India can establish its own courts now and the power comes from the Constitution (in particular arts. 226 and 227) instead of the monarch personally, although some letters patent remain legally in force. The Indian Parliament now regulates the High Courts according to the Constitution. But the term letters patent appeal remained, because the appellate jurisdiction came from the letters patent.
The sovereign has the power to prorogue parliament at will, but actually exercises the power only on the advice of the PM (actually, according to paragraph three of the decision, it is exercised on the advice of the privy council). Other of the sovereign's powers are delegated to the courts. The court is not unfamiliar with exercising the sovereign's power to void her own acts, as acts of parliament and acts of government ministers are also nominally acts of the sovereign. While the courts cannot void acts of parliament, they can indeed void executive acts. Two relevant quotes follow. From paragraph 30, relating to the sovereign's lack of discretion in exercising the prerogative to prorogue parliament: It is not suggested in these appeals that Her Majesty was other than obliged by constitutional convention to accept that advice. In the circumstances, we express no view on that matter. That situation does, however, place on the Prime Minister a constitutional responsibility, as the only person with power to do so, to have regard to all relevant interests, including the interests of Parliament. From paragraph 32, on the justiciability of questions concerning prerogative powers: ... political controversy did not deter the courts from holding, in the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, that an attempt to alter the law of the land by the use of the Crown’s prerogative powers was unlawful. The court concluded at p 76 that “the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him”, indicating that the limits of prerogative powers were set by law and were determined by the courts.
The short answer, is "it's complicated". I can think of situations where any of the above options you listed might be true. (Another possible option is "The baby has no nationality at birth", and would therefore be considered stateless, and would fall under the birth country's rules regarding statelessness). To find a definitive answer for your specific situation, I would start with Wikipedia: British nationality law Spanish nationality law Although Wikipedia is not authoritative, it does give you a good overview of the situation for both countries. There are then links to authoritative sources in each article. In the case of a British and Spanish couple, their baby would probably be both British and Spanish at birth. Additionally, if the baby is born in a country (such as the US) which follows the jus soli rules, then the baby would also acquire the citizenship of their birth country.
While this isn't a simple and direct answer, it should point you in the right direction. There are countries which like the United States have parallel national and subnational court system, including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland. Different rules of procedure for different courts within a larger overall court system for a federal jurisdiction are not that unusual even in nominally unitary court systems. But, the division between them is on something of a continuum with fine shades of differences between them. Only a few are as close to the extreme of power sharing and a &quot;federalist&quot; approach as the United States, however. Also even unitary court systems (in a geographic and federalism sense) often have parallel court systems on subject matter grounds. For example, France has both ordinary civil courts and labor courts whose rulings could overlap, and England historically had courts of law and courts of equity with a complex relationship to each other (and also ecclesiastical courts with jurisdiction of matters now vested in the civil courts of law like inheritance of tangible personal property). Similarly, Northern Ireland has or has had what amount to different parallel legal systems for terrorism and non-terrorism criminal offense. Most countries also have parallel criminal and quasi-criminal legal systems for civilians and soldiers respectively. I've seen this tension between the two systems as a plot point in contemporary English police procedural dramas, for example. On the other hand, systems with a more unitary legal system rarely are so fierce in their defense of protections against double jeopardy as the United States, and the dual sovereignty doctrine in U.S. double jeopardy law can be seen as a safety valve in practice and as applied in cases where the double jeopardy rule as interpreted under the U.S. Constitution is too strong a bar to legitimate second prosecutions. A comparative analysis of double jeopardy concepts can be found here. It is tricky to reduce the subtly differences between the rules in different countries to a clear yes or no kind of answer. A square answer to your question requires detailed examination of a dozen or more court systems that someone felt the need to write a book about to explain. If I can find a more specific answer I will update this one.
By volume, it's almost certainly Statutory Instruments (SIs). From the relevant page on legislation.gov.uk, we can see that the number since 2010 has ranged from 1241 to 3485 per year. Compare that to, say, Acts of Parliament (23 to 41 per year in that period). The EUR-Lex page has some numbers relating to EU law. For example, in 2018, there were a total of 430 "legislative acts", and 1496 "non-legislative acts". Note that while EU Regulations become law directly in member states, EU Directives have to be implemented by domestic legislation. In the UK, this is normally done with SIs, which contribute to the numbers in the previous paragraph.