Is it legal for officers of one sex to strip-search detainees of a different sex? I believe there is a law that states strip searches are performed by officers of the same sex as the detainee, and not by officers of a different sex. However this did not occur in the following cases. Woman Says Strip Search After DUI Arrest Went Too Far Fully Nude Strip Search by Cops: Male Police Stripping Woman Completely Naked Is there any law broken in these cases? Under what circumstances would male or female officers strip female or male detainees, respectively, forcibly?
There is no hard rule that a strip search cannot be performed by a different-gendered officer. The hard rule is that the search must be reasonable (as required by the 4th Amendment) , which means that there have to be sufficient reasons for the search. Depending on the circumstances, a search of a male by a female, or in view of a female, could be reasonable – and in other circumstances it could be unreasonable. As the court in Cookish v. Powell, 945 F. 2d 441 said, In each case it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted There are trends in the law which speak in favor of inmates right to privacy from cross-gender strip searches. Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors is a recent decision where given the circumstances, a cross-gender search was found to be unreasonable. Cookish v. Powell is one where it wasn't unreasonable. This resource file assembles numerous court rulings, classifying them for judicial circuit, gender of staff vs. gender of inmate, sorting according to who prevails. The "rule" would be that the more intrusive the staff conduct is, the less reasonable the search is: but the more of an emergency there is, the more reasonable the search is.
If you consent, the evidence can almost certainly be used against you. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (&quot;Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and request consent to search.&quot;) If you refuse consent, it is not clear whether the evidence can be used against you, as we don't know why the officer is asking to frisk you. A stop-and-frisk must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that you have just committed or are about to commit a crime, and that you are at that moment armed and dangerous. If they reasonably suspect you have just committed a crime but do not reasonably suspect you are armed and dangerous, the police may stop you, but they may not search you. That point is worth emphasizing because several other answers are incorrectly assuming otherwise. For one example, in Thomas v. Dillard, 818 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2016), the police responded to a report of domestic violence. Based on their reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect had committed that crime, the police stopped and frisked him. Because they had could reasonably explain why they thought he had committed a crime, but could not reasonably explain why they thought he was armed and dangerous, the court said the stop was legal, but the frisk was not: Whereas the purpose of a Terry stop is to further the interests of crime prevention and detection, a Terry frisk is justified by the concern for the safety of the officer and others in proximity. Accordingly, whereas a Terry stop is justified by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, a frisk of a person for weapons requires reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others. A lawful frisk does not always flow from a justified stop. Rather, each element, the stop and the frisk, must be analyzed separately; the reasonableness of each must be independently determined. Even then, the search is basically limited to a minimally intrusive patdown to ensure you don't have any weapons on you, and the officer is generally not permitted to actually search inside pockets or the like, though the search may escalate based on what the officer is able to feel during the patdown. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375–76 (1993) (&quot;If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, ... its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context.&quot;) The refusal to respond generally operates as a refusal to consent. The police are therefore free to conduct whatever search they could have conducted without your consent. If they have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that you're carrying a gun, they can probably frisk you to see if that's the case. If they have a warrant to search your pockets, they can search your pockets. If they don't have any of that, they need to keep their hands to themselves.
This is a broad question about the powers of the police in England and Wales. I have been unable to find any UK legislation which directly addresses 'do not cross' tape (also known as police tape, crime scene tape or barricade tape). However, the police have broad statutory and common law powers, and ignoring 'do not cross' tape could be an offence in the same way as ignoring other police orders. In Director of Public Prosecutions v Morrison [2003] EWHC 683 (Admin), the High Court decided that at common law, the police have the power to cordon off a crime scene. Police had cordoned off an area to preserve evidence using tape labelled "Police: Do not Cross" [9]. The prosecution's case against the respondent was that, having been told not to enter the cordoned area, he challenged the police right to prohibit him from entering the area [10]. There was a dispute as to whether the respondent did cross the tape and other issues, but police ultimately arrested him for disorderly conduct [29]. The respondent was convicted in the Magistrates' Court of disorderly conduct under s 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 and wilful obstruction of a police constable under s 89(2) of the Police Act 1996 [1]. His conviction was set aside on appeal to the Crown Court, which found that the only statutory authority for setting up a cordon is in the Terrorism Act 2000, and the cordon had been established without the consent of the land owner or a warrant [17]. The relevant question for the High Court was: Was the Wood Green Crown Court wrong in law to hold that the Metropolitan Police on the evidence in this case had no lawful power or authority to close the public right of way over private premises by a cordon and forcibly prohibit the Defendant from using that right of way on foot against his will [4]? The answer is yes. The police have the power to cordon off a crime scene, but they must act reasonably: [W]hen seeking to investigate crime police officers do not have an unfettered right to restrict movements on private land ... but ... [a]s Lord Denning said [in Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693] "the police should be able to do whatever is necessary and reasonable to preserve the evidence of the crime" ... provided [the police] do not go beyond what is reasonable in the circumstances, routine scenes of crime searches may assume the owner's consent ... In the present case the police were entitled to assume consent ... we believe that consent could not lawfully be withheld [22]–[23]. So the police have the power to restrict movements on private land and can use this power to cordon off a crime scene. The police can arrest someone who unlawfully enters a crime scene, which may amount to the offence of wilful obstruction. It is harder to answer the hypothetical question where there is nobody around to enforce the cordon. This is a broader question about land rights; the answer would depend on who was trying to enforce the cordon and why.
There are essentially no such limits on the use of such evidence. The police are free to use evidence from one case in whatever other cases it may be helpful, and criminals have no right to turn over evidence to the police on the condition that it not be used against them. The Exclusionary Rule has no application here, because it only governs evidence that was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because the defendant here consented to producing the evidence, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. Nor does the Fifth Amendment prohibit the use of this evidence. The right against self-incrimination only applies to compelled self-incrimination; if a defendant wants to voluntarily confess or turn over inculpatory evidence, he is free to do so.
Others have mentioned Title IX, the federal law that generally prohibits sex discrimination at federally funded educational institutions, 20 US 1681 et seq. However, there is specific permission for single-sex housing in 20 USC 1686: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this chapter, nothing contained herein shall be construed to prohibit any educational institution receiving funds under this Act, from maintaining separate living facilities for the different sexes. As to your &quot;in this day and age&quot;, this particular section of the law has not been amended since it was first passed in 1972. If you think it should be, you can certainly write to your members of Congress and tell them so. However, you say you attend a &quot;Christian&quot; college. Religious schools get an even broader exemption from Title IX, as Michael Seifert also mentioned. 20 USC 1681 (a) (3): This section shall not apply to an educational institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of this subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization; So even if 20 USC 1686 were repealed, if your college determined that mixed-gender housing was &quot;inconsistent with its religious tenets&quot;, they would probably be allowed to continue having single-gender housing anyway.
In short, no, that cant be a pardon for those police officers who would be now influenced to take more violent actions towards those they detain. Pardons are only applicable to past actions. You may be pardoned before charges are filed, but the actions must have already occured. Though I less certain about this, simply because Ive never heard such a thing proposed, I would also note that it is highly improbable that the actual statement he made - generic and during a speech - could everbe interpreted as an affirmative act intending to grant pardons to anyone who may act in that manner in the future.
We need to assume that the stop was legal (not a high hurdle to clear), that is, there was some reason to stop you. Even so, following Utah v. Strieff, police don't actually have to have a reasonable suspicion to stop you and if in the course of an ID check they discover that you have a warrant out for your arrest, the arrest is still legal. So if the police stop you, RCW 46.61.020(1) says: It is unlawful for any person while operating or in charge of any vehicle to refuse when requested by a police officer to give his or her name and address and the name and address of the owner of such vehicle, or for such person to give a false name and address, and it is likewise unlawful for any such person to refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer or to refuse upon demand of such police officer to produce his or her certificate of license registration of such vehicle, his or her insurance identification card, or his or her vehicle driver's license or to refuse to permit such officer to take any such license, card, or certificate for the purpose of examination thereof or to refuse to permit the examination of any equipment of such vehicle or the weighing of such vehicle or to refuse or neglect to produce the certificate of license registration of such vehicle, insurance card, or his or her vehicle driver's license when requested by any court. Any police officer shall on request produce evidence of his or her authorization as such. There is no law that says "you have to provide ID only if accused of a crime", or "police can pull you over only if you are suspected of a crime". Various traffic infractions will get you pulled over but are not crimes; random sobriety checks are legal. However, note that the requirement to provide ID applies to the operator. There is no law requiring citizens to carry identification papers (but there is a law requiring a vehicle operator to carry a specific form of ID). In some states there are "stop and identify" laws which allow police to demand ID from a person suspected of a crime, but Washington does not have such a law.
Yes, they're able to discriminate as long as its not illegal discrimination; and there's currently no law protecting people with these views. Both at a physical or digital store, they can be refused service and told to leave.