Can creed be used as a protected philosophical, but not religious belief, to prevent firing? Specifically, can white supremacy be considered a creed as it is a widely held philosophical belief?
I, semi-contrarily, speculate that the answer is "yes", as long as we understand your question to be about religion, since that is what is legally relevant in terms of discrimination law. The EEOC "answers" the question in 29 CFR 1605.1, saying In most cases whether or not a practice or belief is religious is not at issue. However, in those cases in which the issue does exist, the Commission will define religious practices to include moral or ethical beliefs as to what is right and wrong which are sincerely held with the strength of traditional religious views. This standard was developed in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). The Commission has consistently applied this standard in its decisions. The fact that no religious group espouses such beliefs or the fact that the religious group to which the individual professes to belong may not accept such belief will not determine whether the belief is a religious belief of the employee or prospective employee. The phrase “religious practice” as used in these Guidelines includes both religious observances and practices, as stated in section 701(j), 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j). The question then is what the court said in those cases that could possibly be construed as a definition of "religion". The case of Seeger, which pertains to conscientious objector status and the draft, held the following relevant points: The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in §6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption. Observe that the court does not generally define religion here, rather, it strives to interpret a clause in the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j), which denies that there is a requirement to serve in the military on any person "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form". The statutes more specifically says: As used in this subsection, the term "religious training and belief" does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code. Congress, then, also did not attempt to define "religion", rather it used that term to refer to certain undefined beliefs (it them becomes the court's job to define the term, relative to the act). Seeger also holds that Local boards and courts are to decide whether the objector's beliefs are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious; they are not to require proof of the religious doctrines, nor are they to reject beliefs because they are not comprehensible. This means that, w.r.t. the draft and the religious exemption, the basis for deciding is whether the beliefs are sincere, and whether they are in the subjects "scheme of thing" religious. I also bold the clause about not requiring proof of doctrine, since that will be an issue below. In Welsh it was held that: Section 6(j) contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by exempting those whose conscientious objection claims are founded on a theistic belief, while not exempting those whose claims are based on a secular belief. To comport with that clause, an exemption must be "neutral" and include those whose belief emanates from a purely moral, ethical, or philosophical source. The significance of this is that the conscientious objector clause flouts the Establishment Clause by specifically giving preferential treatment to beliefs founded on a theistic belief, but not a non-theistic belief. Thus, to be consistent with the Establishment Clause, the term "religious" must be interpreted in a way that does not favor theistic vs. non-theistic beliefs. In both cases, defendants were raised religiously but were not members of a church with an officially pacifist doctrine. Quoting Welsh, the defendants neither could definitely affirm or deny that he believed in a "Supreme Being," both stating that they preferred to leave the question open. Both defendants affirmed on those applications that they held deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars where people were killed. Both strongly believed that killing in war was wrong, unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade them to take part in such an evil practice. Thus, "firm belief" is the interpretation of "religious belief" w.r.t. the draft, and is relied on by the EEOC in their definition of religion. The question of whether white supremacism could be deemed a religion, w.r.t. discrimination laws, came up (and was basically avoided) in Swartentruber v. Gunite. The issue there was that the complainant had Klan tatoos, and his employer told him to cover them up. He sued the company (Gunite) for religious discrimination, to no avail. As the court summarized, he would have to show that (1) he has a sincere religious belief, observance or practice that conflicts with an employment requirement; (2) he informed his employer of the conflict; and (3) the religious practice was the basis for the adverse employment decision. His case failed for a number of reasons, but the crux of his argument was that the "Firey Cross" tattooed on his arm is one of that church's seven sacred symbols (he reports that he is "a member of the Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a religious organization"). However, Mr. Swartzentruber does not present admissible evidence, or even contend without evidence, that being required to cover up his tattoo at work conflicts with his religious beliefs This appears to be at odds with Seeger above, because one is not required to prove that ones religion has a particular doctrine. Since Swartentruber represented himself, this could well mean nothing more than that he failed to make an appropriate assertion about his firmly held beliefs (since one is not required to show that their church has a specific doctrine). The basic reason why Swartzentruber's case failed was, simply, that his employer did in fact offer him a reasonable accommodation. Firing a person, on the other hand, is not a reasonable accommodation. Following the logic of Welsh and Seeger and being mindful of the Establishment Clause, one might well expect that an ideological firing would be a violation of the religious discrimination part of the Civil Rights Act. The belief in question would have to be firmly held, but need not be theistic. Since the matter has not been decided by SCOTUS, we cannot know how they would rule if the matter came before them. There is, at least, a clear precedential path where white supremacism could be held to be a religion. In addition, if the incident took place in Seattle, the firing would be illegal because city ordinances prohibit discrimination based on political ideology.
Your school can compel you to pray, if it is a private school. I assume you are asking about a government school. As a limited public forum, the school can limit content (can forbid discussion of a topic), but cannot limit viewpoint (cannot allow only pro-abortion speech while prohibiting anti-abortion speech). If they allow the Godly pledge, they must allow the Satanic pledge (as well as allowing silence). See Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98. &quot;The power to so restrict speech, however, is not without limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech based on viewpoint, and must be reasonable in light of the forum's purpose&quot;. While it is true that schools are allowed to limit disruptive behavior, declaring &quot;disruption!&quot; does not automatically suspend the First Amendment. A reasonable person would not find find replacing a few word to be a disruption. If you scream &quot;Satan!&quot;, that is disruptive, if you just say &quot;Satan&quot; instead of &quot;God&quot;, that is not a disruption.
This potentially (i.e. almost certainly) runs afoul of laws against religious discrimination. However, you can have such a requirement provided you make an accommodation for those with sincerely held religious beliefs or practices against bacon-eating. You can also have such a requirement (despite the beliefs) if not having the requirement imposes an undue hardship on the business. For example, if the job is "bacon taste-tester", then there's no reasonable accommodation. This applies to religious objections, since religion is protected class, but not "I don't like bacon" as an objection; nor does this apply to people who object to meat-eating on economic grounds.
You don’t have to swear Witnesses are given the option to swear (technically take an oath) or to affirm, which has no religious connotations. You also don’t actually swear on a Bible if you do swear. For example california. The US is a very religious state france is a secular state - it prohibits religious clothing (hijabs, crucifixes etc.) in schools. The united-kingdom (specifically England) has an official state religion (Anglican) but religion is far less prevalent in politics or society than it is in the US. For example, outside of a place of worship, who your mother is sleeping with is a far more acceptable topic of conversation than what her religious beliefs are. Which is not to say it actually is an acceptable topic of conversation, just that it’s more acceptable than religion. australia elected its first openly atheist Prime Minister in 1983. The US was not founded on the idea that there shouldn’t be established religion, just that there shouldn’t be a state religion - that is, a church backed by the power of the government. Many of the early settlers were fleeing religious prosecution from state religions. Nevertheless, it was never the intention to exclude religion from politics. Indeed, religion in the US influences politics to a much greater degree than it does in most European or Anglophone countries.
Usually these words refer to whether something (e.g. a law or government action) is or is not in accordance with the Constitution, including its amendments, as currently interpreted by US courts including the Supreme Court. So in view of Chaplinsky, the Constitution (as interpreted) does not protect "fighting words", and therefore a law that forbids "fighting words" is constitutional. As phoog points out in the comments, the word can also be used to refer to whether something is in accordance with the Constitution, as the speaker thinks it ought to be interpreted. So somebody might say that a certain law or action is (un)constitutional, even if a court has not considered it, if their own personal interpretation of the Constitution is (or isn't) consistent with it. Or, if a court has struck it down (or upheld it) but the speaker thinks they erred in doing so.
It is legal. What would be illegal is for a public school to promote or inhibit a religion. You can teach all sorts of facts that touch on religion (millennia of Western history) and you can e.g. survey the major religions of the worlds as a cultural phenomenon. You can use circumlocutions or proper names. It's not illegal to confess to having personal beliefs. This is about public schools, which is an arm of the government. A person who is in a school, for example a student, is not prohibited from promoting or demoting a religion, therefore a student who clearly and openly advocates the Pastafarian faith is not to be sanctioned, except insofar as the conduct is objectively disruptive. This is because the student is clearly not acting as an agent of a government institution. Things are a little murky when it comes to teachers and guest speakers. Teachers do not lose their First Amendment rights when they enter the classroom. Here is a summary of pertinent court rulings. The main principle that comes from such cases is that school districts can direct teachers to refrain from certain actions when there is a reasonable belief that the actions would run afoul of the Establishment Clause. Individual teachers have been ordered to not engage in silent reading of prayers in school (Roberts v. Madigan). Case law on guest lecturers is probably close to zero, since guest lecturers don't have the same kind of property right to be at the school expressing themselves as teachers do.
united-states Since &quot;lying&quot; is not a clearly-defined legal concept, we need to look at a specific kind of (non)statement. Some lies are plainly illegal, for instance saying in the context of a sale that &quot;this column is made of pressure-treated lumber&quot; when in fact it is make of sand and Elmer's glue is fraud. A receptionist being told to say &quot;Mr. Smith is at a conference in New York&quot; when he is actually drunk in Chicago is a legal lie. Now the question is, who can refuse to tell this lie (without suffering employment consequences), and on what grounds? Generally, in the US you can be ordered to tell such a legal lie as part of your employment duties. If I refuse, I can be fired. If you refuse, you can request a reasonable accommodation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, since you proffer that your religion requires you to tell the truth / forbids you from telling a falsehood. If you make a claim for a religious accommodation, then the issue becomes whether there is a reasonable alternative. Such an accommodation might be that you instead say &quot;Mr. Smith is not available&quot;; or perhaps someone else who does not have a religious objection will be forced to act as receptionist for the day. This is specifically about religion. &quot;I don't want to&quot; or any similar idea does not provide protection against being fired. However, bear in mind that there is no official list of approved religions and their beliefs which the courts will refer to in determining whether your refusal was protected. If you claim &quot;As a Pastafarian, I can't lie&quot;, the courts will not accept the premise that declaring yourself to be Pastafarian (a parody &quot;religion&quot;) is valid. The available governmental resources on the fine line between general moral code and religious beliefs are quite sparse.
It isn't clear that the example you give is illegal police action, but let's assume that it is for the sake of this question, since it doesn't affect the analysis. If possession is not compelled, then it is voluntary.