How does the issue of premeditation factor in when the death penalty is considered for felony murder? How does the fact that felony murder is at least in principle murder without premeditation, factor in when the issue of the death penalty is being considered as punishment for the crime? Surely the death penalty should only be used on the most heinous of murder cases and not on those who are in some ways an accidental death.
While felony murder was an offense originally invented to single out more culpable murders from less culpable murders, with only the former punishable by death, as opposed to imposing the death penalty on everyone convicted of murder, it has evolved into a means of convicting someone of first degree murder who otherwise would not have been guilty of the crime of murder (or even conspiracy to commit murder) at all. In a typical felony murder statute, everyone who participates in a felony designated in the felony murder statute that results in a death at the hands of any participate, without regard to premeditation or involvement in the murder itself, is guilty of felony murder, rather than merely the underlying felony crime. Typically, felony murder is one way to be guilty of first degree murder and typically the punishment for first degree murder is either life in prison without possibility of parole, or the death penalty (if the state has death penalty), as determined in a second phase of the jury trial after the guilt phase is completed. At the death penalty phase, following evidentiary presentation by the prosecution and the defense of aggravating and mitigating factors, in addition to the evidence presented in the guilty or innocence phase of the trial (at which the same death qualified jury convicted the defendant), the jury (except in Nebraska where a panel of three judges makes this decision, and in Montana where a sole judge makes this decision) must determine if the aggravating factors in the case outweigh the mitigating factors, if any. The fact that the defendant (now a convicted murderer) was a knowing participant in a felony is typically an aggravating factor. The possibility, if established, that the defendant (now a convicted murderer) was not expecting that violence would occur and did not participate in the killing would be a mitigating factor. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit imposing the death penalty for felony murder. The Supreme Court has created a two-part test to determine when the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for felony murder. Under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the death penalty may not be imposed on someone who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place. However, under Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), the death penalty may be imposed on someone who was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. So, the constitutional standard for imposing the death penalty for felony murder is higher than the constitutional standard for imposing the default life without possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence for felony murder. Keep in mind also that following a jury imposition of the death penalty that this decision will be upheld if any reasonable jury could have found facts sufficient to impose the death penalty by finding some evidence to be credible and other evidence to be less credible, whether or not that was the most plausible interpretation of the facts and whether or not this was actually the reason for the jury's decision. Also keep in mind that the death qualification of the jury (i.e. striking for cause from the jury pool anyone who is categorically opposed to imposing the death penalty), means that juries in cases where the death penalty is an option are systemically biased in favor of the prosecution in the process of how the judge guilty or innocence, and also, in their evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors in a case.
(Lots of digging) https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/609.341 The above is a series of definitions for the purposes of criminal statues. Way down (noting that the page notes that this section was amended in 2021, so almost certainly in response to this case, given the amount of attention it has received), as subdivision 22, we have the definition: Subd. 22.Predatory crime. &quot;Predatory crime&quot; means a felony violation of section 609.185 (first-degree murder), 609.19 (second-degree murder), 609.195 (third-degree murder), 609.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 609.205 (second-degree manslaughter), 609.221 (first-degree assault), 609.222 (second-degree assault), 609.223 (third-degree assault), 609.24 (simple robbery), 609.245 (aggravated robbery), 609.25 (kidnapping), 609.255 (false imprisonment), 609.498 (tampering with a witness), 609.561 (first-degree arson), or 609.582, subdivision 1 (first-degree burglary). Thus, it looks like your Minnesota government website is not complete. However, the above seem like the most likely crimes to warrant inclusion on the register. The prominent reason in this instance is the registration will hamper Chauvin from regaining employment as a police officer in Minnesota or any other state. Where I live, there are reports of &quot;problematic officers&quot; being &quot;shuffled&quot; between departments; this would explicitly prevent that.
Although the assailant (or their estate if they are killed) could lodge a claim for damages it does not necessarily follow that they would win - they would have to show that the shooting was not legitimate self-defence but rather was unlawful by, for example, negligence or use of excessive force - say by shooting them when they didn't pose an immediate and unjustified threat. The Federation rules, as far as I can see, are not actual legislation. Although they should be adhered to in normal circumstances, this shooting would be, in the given circumstances, legitimate self-defence according to Article 122-5 of the Code Pénal which says: N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, devant une atteinte injustifiée envers elle-même ou autrui, accomplit, dans le même temps, un acte commandé par la nécessité de la légitime défense d'elle-même ou d'autrui, sauf s'il y a disproportion entre les moyens de défense employés et la gravité de l'atteinte. N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui, pour interrompre l'exécution d'un crime ou d'un délit contre un bien, accomplit un acte de défense, autre qu'un homicide volontaire, lorsque cet acte est strictement nécessaire au but poursuivi dès lors que les moyens employés sont proportionnés à la gravité de l'infraction. Which Google translates to English as: The person who, in the face of an unjustified attack on himself or others, performs, at the same time, an act ordered by the necessity of the self-defense of himself or of others, is not criminally liable, except 'there is a disproportion between the means of defense employed and the seriousness of the infringement. The person who, in order to interrupt the execution of a crime or an offense against property, performs an act of defense, other than intentional homicide, when this act is strictly necessary for the aim pursued, is not criminally liable. provided that the means employed are proportionate to the gravity of the offense.
If you are texting while driving and you kill someone, you can expect to be charged with vehicular homicide or manslaughter with an aggravating factor. The crime can potentially carry a penalty as high as any other manslaughter charge that arises from a gross indifference to the safety of others.It could be as high as 20 years in some circumstances. That said, it's usually much less. The penalty for such a conviction will differ based on the circumstances and the remorse/attitude of the defendant; the judge has wide discretion in sentencing. The charge may differ by state from vehicular homicide, to manslaughter, but the fact that you intentionally engaged in a distracting activity is an aggravating factor that gives rise to these type charges, where otherwise you may have been able to avoid the accident or limit the injury caused. In the state I practice in most, an 18-year-old was convicted just a couple of years ago for vehicular homicide, texting while driving, and negligent operation. He was sentenced to nearly 5 years, all but 1 suspended. He was 18 and he killed someone. In MA, texting while driving is its own offense, as it is in CA. In nearly every state in the union, texting while driving either is illegal under its own statute (or one is pending in legislature), or it is prima facie proof of reckless driving if you cause injury or death. In Santa Ana, just this past August, a 23-year-old CA woman killed someone texting while driving. After a first mistrial, due to a hung jury, she was finally convicted of manslaughter and inattentive or distracted driving causing injury or death as an aggravating factor. She got a similar sentence. The NTSB has recently released a report finding that more injury occurs in the 16-30 age group from texting while driving than drunk driving, causing nearly 3,000 deaths last year and nearly 300,000 injuries. There is no doubt with these statistics why nearly every state has either already regulated/banned this practice or has legislation pending. See these texting and driving statistics.
Double jeopardy does not apply to different offences [N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb... The Supreme Court has held that it means what it says - murder and rape are different offences and so the double jeopardy clause is not triggered. However, if an offence requires that the same elements (or a subset of them) be proved, then they are the same offence. So, for example, both murder and rape normally incorporate the elements of common assault - a person acquitted of either murder or rape cannot subsequently be charged with common assault. Further, the principle of res judicata applies to criminal cases as well as civil cases. Therefore any fact or issue of law that was decided in the first trial cannot be reagitated in the second.
They both can be found liable, but not by using the but-for test. Suppose that person A and person B each independently negligently discharge firearms and that each on its own would be sufficient to kill person C. Is it true that, "but for the actions of A, C would still be alive?" No. Is it true that, "but for the actions of B, C would still be alive?" No. Using the but-for test would not be able to assign liability to either A or B. "But for" is not an obvious phrasing for non-native English speakers. It's the same as asking, "If it were not for the actions of A, would C still be alive?". However, courts and juries are not limited to using the but-for test for causation. See Corey v Havener, 182 Mass. 250 (1902): It makes no difference that [...] it is impossible to determine what portion of the injury was caused by each. If each contributed to the injury, that is enough to bind both.
Just to expand on what others have answered: It's important that each crime is also given its own sentence as it's possible that prisoners can be cleared of crimes if new evidence is found. This could make a significant difference to the amount of time the prisoner is serving. For example if a person was convicted for kidnap, murder, and stealing a car, all adding up to a total of 120 years, but later was found to be a car thief who was in the wrong place at the wrong time, and proven innocent of the kidnap and murder charges, that person would then only face the sentence from the car theft. If one life sentence had been issued for the three crimes, a new sentence would have to be worked out.
I do not know what actually happened to anyone in the aftermath of this incident, but it is unlikely that there is a basis for civil or criminal liability in this case. Criminal liability does not generally attach to negligent conduct except in cases of homicide or criminally negligent motor vehicle operation. But, this case appears to have involved mere negligence. It appears that somebody made an honest mistake rather than acting recklessly or intentionally to cause harm. Governmental entities and officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacity have immunity from liability for negligence except in some vary narrowly defined areas (e.g. failure to maintain government buildings, medical mistakes in government hospitals, and car accidents) which seem unlikely to be implicated here. But, it seems likely that the responsible parties were all governmental entities or officers of governmental agencies acting in their official capacities. So, it is unlikely that there would be civil liability either. Needless to say, however, this does not look good on the job performance record of any civil servant below the Governor (who doesn't get evaluated in that way) when being considered for promotion, demotion, unfavorable transfers or even termination of employment. Obviously, if new facts were uncovered and this was actually more nefarious than it seems, and this hidden truth was discovered, there could be a basis for civil or criminal liability. But, if this was the case, it would have made headlines.