Can an Employer Enforce Arbitration After the Expiration of a Contract in NJ? Suppose an employer hires an employee for exactly one year and terminates the employee after the year is over. During the year the contract was in effect, their relationship was governed by an arbitration agreement. After the employee is terminated (and after the contract governing their relationship expired) the employee wishes to bring suit against the employer regarding a work injury (or some other suit) that occurred during his employment. Is the suit subject to the arbitration agreement? Or can it be argued that since the contract was terminated already, the arbitration agreement &quot;expired&quot; and can no longer bind them to arbitrate even though the suit is based on something that occurred while the arbitration agreement was still in effect? While my gut feeling is that something like this is subject to arbitration, I'm wondering if there are any case precedents to support this assumption, especially in NJ? In short, the question is whether a suit brought after the expiration of a contract, where the merits of the claim is based on pr-expiration time frame, is subject to arbitration or not? CLARIFICATION: While this question is similar to this one it is not the same. In that question the employee disputes the validity of termination so there are reasons to argue that the contract is still in effect. In this question, there is no disagreement between the employer and employee that the employee was properly terminated and the contract is no longer active. However, since the dispute relates to an incident that occurred while the arbitration agreement was active, the question is whether one of the parties can compel arbitration. Moreover, the top answer in that question primarily focuses on the fact that it is unlikely that the contract truly expired in that case. It merely transitioned from one phase to another. In this case, I am painting a scenario where there is no doubt at all that the contract expired. While there is some similarities between the two cases, my point in this question is to focus only on one specific component: Does it depend on what gave rise to dispute or when the dispute is being brought to court?
Yes I would reach the same conclusion as DaleM, i.e. that the arbitration clause still applies to the dispute in the question, but for a different reason.&lt;1&gt; While the severability principle is indeed a concept in arbitration law, I don't believe that is the relevant doctrine here.&lt;2&gt; Termination Of Employment v. Termination Of An Employment Contract What terminates when a period of employment ends is the employment itself, not the contract of employment. The contract remains effective as to rights and obligations arising during the course of the employment covered by the contract. (This concept would also sometimes be described in terms along the lines of &quot;the right to a remedy for the workplace injury and the right to have disputes related to that resolved in arbitration are vested rights&quot; that are not modified when the contract term of employment ends.) This concept isn't particular to the arbitration obligation. For example, if contract of employment that did not contain an arbitration clause provided that the employee was paid $200 an hour for the first six months and $220 an hour for the second six months of a one year fixed term employment agreement, but the employer failed to adjust paychecks according after the first six months and continued paying the employee at $200 an hour instead (assume to avoid the issue of waiver that this wasn't readily apparent on the face of the paystubs provided to the employee), the employee could bring suit thirteen months after the employee's employment terminated for the $20 an hour not paid as agreed during the last six months of the contract even though the employment period had ended. The contract still remains in force to govern the rights and obligations of the parties arising during the period of employment. Examples Of Termination Of The Contract Itself In contrast, sometimes one contract is replaced, even retroactively, with another contract, in what is called a &quot;novation&quot; of the original contract. This truly does terminate the old contract, so that only the replacement contract remains. So, if, for example, the original employment contract contained an arbitration clause, but this was replaced by a new employment contract without an arbitration clause three months later (in the sample case, before the worker was injured&lt;3&gt;), then the arbitration clause would not apply because the contract, and not just the employment was terminated. Similarly, support that the workplace injury was the second dispute between the employer and employee that had come up. The first was a dispute over the rate of pay received which was resolved by a settlement agreement negotiated by lawyers for the parties before either arbitration or litigation in court was commenced, which expressly terminated all rights, known and unknown, of the parties arising under the contract, and the second was the workplace injury for which the relationship of the injury to work was only discovered later on. In this case, the contract and not just the employment had been expressly terminated, and so the arbitration clause would not apply to the workplace injury dispute (which would be barred by the settlement agreement and which may or may not have had an arbitration clause of its own). End Notes &lt;1&gt; At least assuming that the dispute would have been subject to arbitration if a dispute were litigated while the employee was still employed. There can be circumstances when a workplace injury is not subject to arbitration even if the employer and employee undoubtedly agreed to an arbitration clause that applies to the dispute in question. For example, workplace injuries arising from sexual assault are not subject to arbitration in the United States. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 401-402. &lt;2&gt; The severability principle usually concerns a determination of the enforceability of an arbitration clause in the face of certain kinds of arguments that the entire contract as a whole is voidable. It also does not apply in cases where there is a dispute over whether any contract of any kind was formed in the first place. For example, if someone presented the court with a contract containing an arbitration clause and sought to compel arbitration, and the defense to a motion to compel arbitration was that the defendant had never met or had any connection with or communication with the defendant or anyone related to the alleged contract. &lt;3&gt; The hard case, where the novation takes place after the injury, is complicated by legal doctrines regarding the conditions under which a vested legal right can be waived, which may or may not be met depending upon the circumstances under which the novation was entered into by the parties and presents conceptually distinct legal questions in addition to the legal questions already present in the simple case where the injury takes place after the novation.
Statutes of limitations (hereinafter "SOL") vary from jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction. If it is only one-year in New York (I've not confirmed this) that would not be surprising. SOLs exist for all civil matters and nearly all criminal matters. I'd just like to point out that your question is not really limited to defamation or to the time frame for which the specific SOL runs for libel/slander ... at least as I've read it. It seems you are asking the broader question pertaining to what the philosophical or practical purpose(s) for SOLs in general are, as well as what effect these limits can have on the ability of a would-be claimant/plaintiff to get relief through the courts. So, to answer whether a person who believes they've been defamed can still bring a cause of action after the SOL has passed: the short answer is no. But, that is only the short answer. SOL is an affirmative defense, meaning that it can only be asserted if it is pled in the answer to a complaint. So, if John Doe feels he's been defamed by a libelous statement in the Times, and he files suit 4 years after the statement was made (and the SOL is 1 year), the court will still accept the filing of the complaint and Times must still be served. You do not lose the right to file your claim, when the SOL has passed, which is a very common misconception of the law. And, Times must still file an Answer to avoid defaulting. However, in that answer Times (no doubt by and through qualified counsel) will most likely assert a variety of affirmative defenses pro forma, which will include the passage of SOL (the claim is stale). If, in fact, the SOL has passed and the affirmative defense is pled, the next thing the Times will do is file a motion to dismiss. The judge will view the complaint in a light most favorable to Doe, the plaintiff, which will lay out all the facts (including when the libelous statement was published). If the cause of action accrued (this just means when the injury was sustained) and the claim was not filed prior to the expiration of the SOL, Doe's case will be dismissed. If the Times does not assert SOL though, it is deemed to have been waived for that and any subsequent related proceedings. There are ways to toll (extend) the statute of limitations. There is a discovery rule (this does not mean Doe didn't read it until after the SOL, even though he was able to). It means that the SOL can be tolled in cases where one could not have discovered the tort occurred. In these instances, the SOL doesn't begin to run until the discovery was either made or should have been made. This is most typically seen in medical malpractice cases (e.g., a surgeon leaves a sponge or instrument in your abdomen, and after years of failed treatments for IBS your doc sends you for an x-ray and an MRI and it's discovered) or in asbestos cases (you don't know you breathed it until you have asbestosis) &ndash; those types of scenarios. In cases like that, the SOL begins to run when you find out the tort occurred. This has also been successful in recovered memory cases where childhood sexual abuse occurred but was suppressed. Incapacitation is another way the SOL can be tolled. So, in Doe's libel case, the SOL can be tolled if he is incapacitated (in a coma and didn't wake for 4 years, in a mental hospital in a break from reality for 5 years) &ndash; in such circumstances you can still file a claim and have it survive a motion to dismiss based on SOL once you are rehabilitated. Also, Absence due to military service is reason to toll in some jurisdictions. Lastly, (at least the last one I can recall) is that minors can often toll the SOL however long the statute is (say 1 year) after they turn 18. As for why there are SOLs: That is more public policy than anything else. It is one of the oldest rules of law known to modern man, dating back all the way to early Greek and Roman law. Statutes of limitations are a fundamental part of EU and US law, as well as most other modern legal systems. They function to prevent fraudulent and stale claims from arising after all evidence has been lost or after the facts have become dubious and unclear due to the progression of time, which can lead to lost or uncertain memories, death of witnesses (for each side), or disappearance/inability to locate witnesses. The policies behind SOLs are also for judicial economy and to protect defendants from having a never-ending potential suit looming over them. Often, the seriousness of the crime or the tort, or some element of it, dictates the time frame of the SOL. It is a means to ensure that plaintiffs pursue their claims with reasonable diligence: I.e., if it matters to you, file it. Also, as I touched on above, time disadvantages defendants. Plaintiffs are the "injured" party, so they tend to retain evidence much longer than a defendant, who might not even realize he has done wrong &ndash; especially in civil matters. So, in a libel case, the whole basis of the claim is the irreparable damage to your reputation. If more than a year has passed and you didn't know about it, one could assume the damage never rose to the level of having sufficed to make a valid claim in the first place. That is why they run fast in those cases. They run fast in medical malpractice claims too, but this is a result of tort reform &ndash; the public policy that litigation against doctors/hospitals causes increased health care costs for everyone. So, policy suggests it's best for society to dispose of these claims quickly (not so much if you're the plaintiff). Whereas most regular negligence claims can have SOLs as long as six years in some jurisdictions where I have practiced. So there are clearly policy determinations going into these legislative acts. The Golden Rule of Law that I tell all of my clients is this: If you think you have a claim, talk to a lawyer right away, because if you don't you can lose the right to pursue relief, much, much quicker than one may ever imagine! I know this is a long answer, but I get asked this (type) of question all the time. Plaintiffs feel the SOLs run too fast, while Defendants cannot believe they can still be on the hook!
Provincial jurisdiction may need to be specified. But in general, assuming you are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, you can be terminated for any reason or even no reason, as long as the contract is followed, the actual or apparent reason is not discriminatory or otherwise illegal and the termination procedure meets the provincial employment standards. The labour law usually provide requirements for notice periods or severance pay (or both), unless there exists a just cause (e.g. extreme disregard of duty, theft, repeated insubordination, etc.; lack of funds on the part of the employer is not a just cause). shouldn't the employer be fully responsible for the salary coverage of his employee in the course of his contract? Yes, but the contract is saying it can be terminated under certain conditions, after which time you are no longer &quot;in the course&quot; of your contract. Termination due to lack of funds is usually not considered discriminatory or otherwise illegal. You remain entitled to wages for any period you have worked. Additionally, the employer needs to respect the required notice period or severance pay under the provincial employment standards related to termination with or without cause, regardless of the funding situation.
In general, "a signed piece of paper" is not "a contract". It may be a record of a contract, but the contract itself is the meeting of minds where an agreement is reached and doesn't depend on the existence of the piece of paper. (Depending on the jurisdiction, some sorts of contract are required to be in writing, but this doesn't usually apply to employment contracts; it's usually contracts involving land.) What is far more worrying to me is that you don't know how much they are going to pay you. That suggests there hasn't been a meeting of minds, and there is no contract. (It might be that "the going rate" is good enough to form a contract - to determine that would require advice from a local lawyer.) I suggest you don't write up a formal agreement, but nag your boss to decide how much they are actually going to pay you.
Is there any legal doctrine whereby E's agreement with A continued to apply to E in his work for company N? No, because the parties to the non-compete agreement were Employee E and company A, not the human who owned and sold A. What about B? Do they have any standing to block E's going to work for a B's customer? No. My rationale is that the decisions you describe result in a waiver of the non-compete clause. An employment relation between B and E never existed. Thus, the only vestige of B's non-compete rights binding E that could have been preserved stem from E's former employment at A. However, that vestige disappeared at the instant B --apropos of the hospital project-- waived its non-compete clause with N. Given B's waiver with regard to N, N's failure to establish a non-compete clause with E enables the latter to conduct business with (or accept employment at) the hospital. If anything, B would have standing to sue N for negligence or related torts. But neither B nor N has any viable non-compete claims against E.
If this is a client - contractor relationship, it depends on the contract. Attorneys may bill on a quarter-hour basis, or a 10th-hour basis. A 1 minute phone call under a quarter hour billing basis is more expensive than under a 10th-hour basis, all other things being equal (i.e. the hourly rare). So if I hire an attorney to do something and he bills me for 1 hr 6 minutes because he spent 1 hr 4 minutes to do it, he can do that, and I can't object that he didn't spend a full second hour on the task. It just comes down to what the client and contractor agreed to, and if a contractor wants to bill by the second, he can. For employers and their employees, the Fair Labor Standards Act applies in the US (there are state analogs which mostly say the same thing). The employer is responsible for paying employees based on work done, so they have to keep records. Department of Labor rules allow an employer to simplify record keeping, for example they can round employee hours (1 hr 2 minutes is the same as 55 minutes) – you have to be consistent. They explicitly allow 5 minute granularity, and don't disallow granularity to the second.
The law often provides a default which a contract can modify. For example, the law might provide that a lease can be terminated on 30 days notice, but the parties could agree on a different notice period, which would control. But a contract cannot be for an illegal result (or if it is, it will not be enforced by a court). Nor can a contract modify positive legal provisions which are specified as absolute. For example in some US states a consumer sale includes an implied warranted of merchantability, and this cannot be waived or modified by contract. Or the law in some cases gives a period, perhaps three days, within which a party has a right to cancel without penalty. This generally cannot be shortened by contract. There are various reasons why laws provide terms which a contract may not overrule. In many cases it is because one party is perceived as being in a stronger position and might be inclined to take unfair advantage. This is the case with much consumer protection legislation. In other cases it is to society's advantage if there are uniform terms and standards known to all, which cannot be varied by contract, so third parties do not need to check for contract terms. For example, US copyrights always expire on the last day of a year, and no contract can modify this. For another example banking law specifies the position and format of account numbers and routing numbers on a check, and a customer may not contract with a bank for a different format. I do not know if the EU refund law provides a default which can be modified, or an absolute rule which cannot.
In general, the express terms of the lease signed supersede all prior negotiations of the parties, except to the extent that the particular language in question in the lease is ambiguous. This is called the parol evidence rule (which is the law in all U.S. jurisdictions although it has been expressly rejected in Israel). The parol evidence rule expressly makes a written agreement supersede a verbal agreement, rather than making them equally valid. Also, even if both agreements had been written, generally speaking, the last and final version of the agreement will supersede earlier versions of the agreement. The best defense would be along the lines of fraud-in-factum or fraudulent inducement, i.e. that this term was slipped into the final draft in a manner expressly intended to mislead the signing party about what was being signed. I've won one case where this happened (where there was extensive email correspondence between business lawyers regarding the changes that would be made in each draft and there the version signed did not correspond to the last version signed electronically in a very long document on paper and there were other indicia of fraud), but by far the more common outcome is to bind the party signing the document (especially in a commercial context) and to consider failing to carefully read all terms of the final draft to be negligent on the part of the party signing the contract. Arguably, there might also be a malpractice claim against the lawyer for the tenant for missing this change in a material term before the contract was signed.