Valid definition of &quot;vagrant&quot; per Washington state law RCW 9.66.010 suggests that in &quot;every place... [w]here vagrants resort... [e]very act unlawfully done and every omission to perform a duty, which act or omission [s]hall offend public decency&quot; is an offense. However, my understanding is that the Washington state statute defining vagrancy was repealed in 1975. In this case, one would suggest the definition of vagrancy would default to that definition held at common law - the question is, what is that definition? Or is this clause simply invalid?
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, SCOTUS found that a particular statute criminalizing being a vagrant was unconstitutionally vague. The court does not offer an alternative acceptable definition of &quot;vagrant&quot;. Washington (and other states) dealt with this by repealing the law against being a vagrant, but left intact the law criminalizing &quot;maintaining a public nuisance&quot;, which includes houses of prostitution and being a place &quot;where vagrants resort&quot;. I have not located any subsequent ruling within Washington that indicates that this clause applied to &quot;places&quot; is enforced, and there is no jury instruction defining &quot;vagrant&quot;. Instead, laws are written to prohibit specific acts (such as panhandling, sleeping on the sidewalk, prostitution). Cornell characterizes a vagrant as &quot;a person who roams from place to place without a permanent job, home, or material resources&quot;, with no supporting citations. This article offers a competing common law definition as &quot;a person who was idle, refused to work although capable of doing so, and lived on the charity of others&quot;. In Johnson v. Florida, 202 So. 2d 852, the court cites F.S.A 856.02 (since repealed) defined vagrants as Rogues and vagabonds, idle or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling, or unlawful games or plays, common pipers and fiddlers, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons who neglect their calling or employment, or are without reasonably continuous employment or regular income and who have not sufficient property to sustain them, and misspend what they earn without providing for themselves or the support of their families, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, idle and disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses or tippling shops, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children, and all able bodied male persons over the age of eighteen years who are without means of support and remain in idleness, shall be deemed vagrants Common law definitions arise from appellate cases that approvingly restate and unify prior court and statutory definitions (for example &quot;negligent&quot;). The dearth of approving rulings since Papachristou indicates that the concept itself is in jeopardy. A test could arise if a municipality decided to outlaw homeless encampments, however, such a law would be partially preempted by a state law allowing a religious organization to arrange a homeless encampment (plainly a violation of the First Amendment, but it would mean that a generic non-religious organization might be found guilty of violating a local analog of the &quot;place where vagrants resort&quot; law). Hence I conclude that the courts would also find that clause to be at least void for vagueness.
Elected officials are not "employees subject to the civil service laws" unless a state has made extremely odd decisions, and maybe not even then. The "civil service," as that term is used when talking about government employment, consists of at most those people who work for the government as a career. It generally actually means something even more restricted: civil servants are people protected from arbitrary action or political cronyism. For instance, the Labor Department's Wage and Hour division (interpreting the same type of language) defines it as follows (29 CFR 553.11): The term “civil service laws” refers to a personnel system established by law which is designed to protect employees from arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and political coercion, and which uses a competitive or merit examination process for selection and placement. Continued tenure of employment of employees under civil service, except for cause, is provided. Elected officials, in contrast, do not have an expectation of continued employment other than for cause -- they can be voted out for any reason whatsoever.
The law of Washington is probably typical. Under RCW 9A.56.110, "Extortion" means knowingly to obtain or attempt to obtain by threat property or services of the owner, and specifically includes sexual favors. By RCW 9A.56.130(1), A person is guilty of extortion in the second degree if he or she commits extortion by means of a wrongful threat as defined in *RCW 9A.04.110(25) (d) through (j). Then looking at the relevant definition of threat (please note that there is a numbering error in the statute, that should be (28), I don't know if they will fix it), it says (28) "Threat" means to communicate, directly or indirectly the intent:... (e) To expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or (f) To reveal any information sought to be concealed by the person threatened; Second degree extortion is a class C felony. It is not first degree extortion, since that requires the threat to be (a) To cause bodily injury in the future to the person threatened or to any other person; or (b) To cause physical damage to the property of a person other than the actor; or (c) To subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement or restraint; Washington does not include a category of rape by extortion, though I've heard rumors that there is such a crime in some states. (It is not rape by forcible compulsion, second degree rape, because forcible compulsion is defined as "physical force which overcomes resistance, or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of death or physical injury to herself or himself or another person, or in fear that she or he or another person will be kidnapped": that is, there has to be actual or threatened physical force)
This is known as the "ministerial exception". Because the Free Exercise and Estalishment clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the government from interfering with religion, the government cannot override a doctrine that contradicts the teachings of a religion (so women and gays cannot sue the Catholic church for not being hirable as priests). In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, an individual taught classes and led prayer at a religous school, but was fired ultimately due to a disability (narcolepsy). The Lutheran church does not have any known doctrine condemning narcolepsy: but it was unanimously ruled that "the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own". Thus the church was legally permitted to fire the individual due to her disability.
There are literally hundreds of such laws. Most of them (perhaps all, if we exclude firearms-related crimes in Title 26) are contained in Title 18 of the US Code, part I. The problem is that your definition of "public insurrection" is too broad, since it would include lying to federal agents (a crime), insofar as the reason for 18 USC 1001 is to prevent impeding federal investigations by giving them false information. Assaulting a federal agent impedes government and is a crime. There is pretty much a federal version of any state-level crime of violence. There is the riot act, and a specific law against insurrection and rebellion. Chapter 115 is probably the most relevant: this is where the various "overthrowing the government" laws are.
The relevant statute, 28 USC 455 simply states what shall be, and does not suggest that the law could be enforced by any particular means. There have been cases where there was a suggestion of a hint of impropriety at SCOTUS and yet things proceeded. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 Rehnquist did not recuse himself despite being a White House lawyer and having expressed an opinion on the legality of certain arrests, and that was the end of that matter.
The religious freedom argument has no legs following Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Although a State would be "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]" in violation of the Clause if it sought to ban the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts solely because of their religious motivation, the Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons. With respect to the "involuntary servitude", this was dealt with in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The engagement of Federal power relied on the interstate commerce clause but the current case, as a state law matter, does not need to do this. Basically, by voluntarily providing the goods/service to the public, they agree that they will provide it in accordance with the law governing that kind of commerce. They are free to not provide it to anyone but if they choose to supply it they must supply it to everyone (subject ti normal rules of commerce like the customer actually paying etc.).
This may constitutes harassment, which is against the law in most jurisdictions. But what counts as legal harassment is not obvious. Taking Washington state as an exemplar, RCW 9a.46, the stated intent of the law is to criminalize "repeated invasions of a person's privacy by acts and threats which show a pattern of harassment designed to coerce, intimidate, or humiliate the victim", and mailing glitter in order to annoy a person would not match that desideratum. In Washington, the law is limited to threats of physical harm or restraint or the intent to "substantially harm the person threatened or another with respect to his or her physical or mental health or safety". There is no legal standard for judging what constitutes substantial harm to mental health. California defines "harassment" in its civil code as unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner. More words, but still it is left to the jury to decide whether an act causes severe emotional distress. Emphasis was added in the text to highlight important elements missing from sending glitter to someone for the purpose of annoying. In general, annoying someone is not against the law, but repeatedly and severely annoying someone could be.