Meaning of the word &quot;person&quot; and &quot;individual&quot; under U.S. law How does the U.S. define the word "person" in the statutory sense? I know the Dictionary Act defines it as an "individual" or a corporation, corporate body, but that leaves open the question, what is an "individual" under U.S. law? There is the Black's Law Dictionary, which defines "person" as a "human being." I am also aware that the word "individual" is distinguished from corporations by the distinct jurisprudential definitions for "natural person" and "legal person," or "artificial person." "Natural person" is defined as a human being who is born alive by Black's Law Dictionary. So is "individual" in the Dictionary Act equivalent to a "natural person," and thus, a "human being"?
Caveat Keep in mind that words do not have uniform definitions for all times and places and contexts. Words can have different meanings in particular contexts and can be defined in a contract or statute to have a meaning different from the common meaning. "Person" Usually Includes Entities Of Any Kind This said, usually the term "person" in the law refers to any human being and any trust, estate or entity that is capable of suing and being sued and entering into contracts. An "entity" in this sense would often include partnerships, limited liability companies, corporations, non-profit associations (whether or not incorporated), business trusts, joint ventures, local governments, states, the federal government and foreign governments. (I break out trusts and estates separately because there is divided authority in different jurisdictions over whether trusts and estates are entities, or are simply a special hat that the trustee or executor wears that are not entities, which can be relevant in some highly technical situations.) Agency Situations The term "person" is also often used in the sense that it refers to the principal and not the agent, when an agent is taking action on behalf of the principal. Thus, if there is a law that says "a person who enters into a real estate contract must disclose that person's taxpayer identification number", and someone with a power of attorney from you signs a real estate contract on your behalf, the power of attorney agent should disclosure your taxpayer identification number and not theirs. Why Is The Term "Person" Defined So Broadly? One important reason for using the term "person" to apply to entities as well as human beings, is that it allows for statutes and contract terms or case law legal rules to be stated in very general terms without being wordy in a way that accurately reflects how those legal rules or contract terms should apply to entities. For example, a statute using the word "person" might say: A person who is engaged in business in this state must register with the department of business licenses. By using the word "person" in this way, the statute wouldn't have to say instead (probably less accurately and less comprehensibly): Any individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, business trust, non-business trust, estate, governmental entity, or other entity, including the principal of any agent acting on behalf of the principal, engaged in business in this state, must register with the department of business licenses. The phrasing without the word "person" would be more likely to create loopholes because some kind of entity is omitted, and would be prone to ambiguity because one would have to decide which words that define the kind of persons and entities that are covered modify which other words in the sentence. Thus, using the word "person" is often makes entities more rather than less accountable to the law, by making legal language more clear and more general (and hence containing fewer loopholes). "Individual" or "Natural Person" Usually the term "individual" or "natural person" would mean a human being, although, of course, there are other senses of the word "individual" such as "an individual Widget" referring to exactly one Widget in particular, as opposed to Widgets in general. Alternative Definitions Of "Person" There are isolated times when the word "person" would not include minors and incapacitated people who are incapable of suing or entering into contracts in their own name due to lack of legal capacity. It isn't uncommon to have a definition of "person" in a statute or contract that omits governmental entities, that omits all kinds of entities, or that omits particular kinds of entities (e.g. foreign entities or corporations). For example, a tax statute might define "person" in a way that includes natural persons and entities, but excludes governments. Some of the definitions of terms like these in the bankruptcy code are particularly non-intuitive.
The answer is going to depend on what jurisdiction you're talking about. But I can give you some general principles that apply, in most cases, in the U.S. at least. "Homicide" is a general term for the killing of one person by another. If someone died, and another person caused it, it's homicide. "Murder" and "manslaughter" are specific crimes, usually now defined by state criminal statutes. The specifics are going to differ from state to state, but in general, murder is the more serious crime and carries a more serious punishment. So if a person dies at another person's hand, it is a homicide, and it may also be murder or manslaughter. The way the law distinguishes between murder and manslaughter usually has to do with the killer's mental state. For example, a state with three homicide offenses might break them down like this: Murder: "I killed him because I wanted to steal his wallet." Voluntary manslaughter: "I killed him because I just found out he was sleeping with my wife." Involuntary manslaughter/negligent homicide: "I didn't mean to kill him, but I was drunk and didn't see the stop sign." These homicide offenses will then be further subdivided into degrees based on aggravating or mitigating factors. For instance, in some states there is a very limited definition for first degree murder, which may be the only offense that allows the death penalty (example: murder of a police officer, murder while serving a life sentence).
I don't believe there is a single "standard" dictionary that judges use. Presumably any well regarded and common one will do as long as it can be cited. You can see from Justice Alito's opinion in Intel Investment Policy Comm vs Sulyma that he references several dictionaries. Although ERISA does not define the phrase “actual knowledge,” its meaning is plain. Dictionaries are hardly necessary to confirm the point, but they do. When Congress passed ERISA, the word “actual” meant what it means to-day: “existing in fact or reality.” Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 10 (1967); accord, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 13 (11th ed. 2005) (same); see also American Heritage Dictionary 14 (1973) (“In existence;real; factual”); id., at 18 (5th ed. 2011) (“Existing in reality and not potential, possible, simulated, or false”). So did the word “knowledge,” which meant and still means “the fact or condition of being aware of something.” Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 469 (1967); accord, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 691 (2005) (same); see also American Heritage Dictionary 725 (1973) (“Familiarity, awareness, or understanding gained through experience or study”); id., at 973 (2011) (same). Thus, to have “actual knowledge” of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware of it. Legal dictionaries give “actual knowledge” the same meaning: “[r]eal knowledge as distinguished from presumed knowledge or knowledge imputed to one.” Ballentine’s Law Dictionary 24 (3d ed. 1969); accord, Black’s Law Dictionary 1043 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “actual knowledge” as “[d]irect and clear knowledge, as distinguished from constructive knowledge”).
Identifying someone as a criminal without charging them and thereby giving them an opportunity to clear their names has due process implications, largely because of the associated reputational damage. DOJ policy therefore advises against naming unindicted co-conspirators: Ordinarily, there is no need to name a person as an unindicted co-conspirator in an indictment in order to fulfill any legitimate prosecutorial interest or duty. For purposes of indictment itself, it is sufficient, for example, to allege that the defendant conspired with "another person or persons known." In any indictment where an allegation that the defendant conspired with "another person or persons known" is insufficient, some other generic reference should be used, such as "Employee 1" or "Company 2". The use of non-generic descriptors, like a person's actual initials, is usually an unnecessarily-specific description and should not be used. The policy comes from a case where they did identify two unindicted (alleged) co-conspirators, and the Fifth Circuit ordered the expungement of the portions of the indictment that named them, agreeing with their claim that they had a right a due process right "to protect their reputations ... against the opprobrium resulting from being publicly and officially charged by an investigatory body of high dignity with having committed serious crimes." U.S. v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975). At first blush, the description does seem to fall into the "unnecessarily specific" category, but note that the language doesn't actually say "Individual 1 became President in 2017," it says that Cohen's conduct occurred "in or about January 2017," and that Individual-1 had become President "at that point." So if the conduct occurred before noon on January 20, 2017, we'd be talking about President Obama. That's obviously hyper-technical, but we are talking about the Department of Justice here. Another possibility is that the success of the campaign/conspiracy may be necessary information for sentencing purposes. I'm not all that familiar with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but my understanding is that a sentence may be reduced if a defendant had withdrawn from a conspiracy in time to prevent its fulfillment. Because that did not happen here, Cohen would not be entitled to that reduction.
In the US, Congress may pass an act, and this creates one kind of law (if it is promulgated: signed, ignored, or re-passed with a super-majority). Some of those acts direct the executive branch to do things, and pursuant to that act, a regulation is promulgated. Together with case law, the whole thing is "law". A bill (in the House, or the Senate) may result in an act being passed by both houses. It may go through a number of drafts between the point when it is first introduced and the time it becomes an act.
The term "illegal" is also often used for actions that the law prohibits, but that give rise to civil liability, rather than criminal prosecution. We see such use a lot in questions on Law.SE. One also says that a person "is liable" when there are grounds for a civil suit against that person. One might also say that such a person "has commited a tort" or "has civil liability" or "could be held liable". In the specific cases of copyright, trademark, and patent law, one says that a violator "his infringed" or has committed infringement" and that an act contrary to those laws "is an infringement".
This distinguishes you as a business user as opposed to a consumer. The specific wording comes from EU consumer rights law. Consumers - ordinary members of the public who buy products and services - have certain legal rights that businesses don't. The theory is that what's going on when you buy a TV for your house is different from what's going on when you buy 1000 TVs for your hotel chain. The appropriate remedies and processes if you're dissatisfied are different. By asking you to identify yourself as not a consumer, the idea is that you wouldn't be able to use consumer rights law in the event you find Google's services to be defective, too expensive, not matching the advertising, etc. In the UK's transposition of EU law, the onus is on the trader (Google) to prove that you are not a consumer, in any legal proceedings. If they can point to you ticking a box saying that you are not a consumer, the argument is much easier for them to make. EU legislation using this phrase, or nearly, includes - Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, Article 2 ‘consumer’ means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business or profession; ‘seller or supplier’ means any natural or legal person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes relating to his trade, business or profession, whether publicly owned or privately owned. Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises, Article 2 ‘consumer’ means a natural person who, in transactions covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which can be regarded as outside his trade or profession; ‘trader’ means a natural or legal person who, for the transaction in question, acts in his commercial or professional capacity, and anyone acting in the name or on behalf of a trader. Directive 2011/83/EU on consumer rights, the main current directive on this topic, Article 2 ‘consumer’ means any natural person who, in contracts covered by this Directive, is acting for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession; ‘trader’ means any natural person or any legal person, irrespective of whether privately or publicly owned, who is acting, including through any other person acting in his name or on his behalf, for purposes relating to his trade, business, craft or profession in relation to contracts covered by this Directive Directive 2019/770 of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services, specially relevant to the Google service, makes the same definitions as in the Directive of 2011. National legislation implementing these directives uses the same phrases in English. For example: the UK's Consumer Rights Act 2015, s.2 has &quot;trade, business, craft, or profession&quot; in Ireland, the Consumer Rights Act 2007, s.2 uses &quot;trade, business or profession&quot;; and the draft Consumer Rights Bill currently before the Oireachtas uses &quot;trade, business, craft, or profession&quot;, reflecting the most recent EU wording. in Malta, Chapter 378 of the consolidated laws also reflects the EU terminology.
The law on the web page is not current: as of the beginning of the year, RCW 23.86.030(1) reads (you'll find this under Sec. 9103) "The name of any association subject to this chapter must comply with part I, Article 3 of this act" and is otherwise unchanged. In Article 3, sec. 1301 governs names, giving the sec'y some discretion to deem a name to not be distinguishable from another, saying in (3) "A name may not be considered distinguishable on the records of the secretary of state from the name of another entity by virtue of...variation in the words, phrases, or abbreviations indicating the type of entity, such as "corporation," "corp.," "incorporated," "Inc.,". It does not list "co-op", but there is no legal requirement that the list be exhaustive. This discretion is, however, related to distinguishability. However, (4) then says An entity name may not contain language stating or implying that the entity is organized for a purpose other than those permitted by the entity's public organic record. and I think that means "no". Note that LLCs, LPs, LLPs, business corporations, nonprofit corporations and cooperative associations all have name requirements of the type "must contain" and "may not contain" (a cooperative association, oddly, has no "must contain" requirements). I would say that we have to conclude that "legislative intent" was to more closely align names and legal status, and the new "purpose-implication" language isn't brilliantly clear, but that is what the intent of the law is. This is one of those issues that could easily work its way to the Supreme Court, if someone wanted to make a state case of it.