What is the effect of a law which relies on false statements? Under the Firearms Act of Canada, the SVD Dragunov is banned as a variant of the AK-47. The SVD is a completely different design which shares no important parts (a single screw in the buttstock), and you'd be hard pressed to find a firearm expert who would agree that it's a variant of any Kalashnikov design. Here is the text: The firearm of the design commonly known as the AK-47 rifle, and any variant or modified version of it except for the Valmet Hunter, the Valmet Hunter Auto and the Valmet M78 rifles, but including the: (a) AK-74; (b) AK Hunter; (c) AKM; (d) AKM-63; (e) AKS-56S; (f) AKS-56S-1; (g) AKS-56S-2; (h) AKS-74; (i) AKS-84S-1; (j) AMD-65; (k) AR Model .223; (l) Dragunov; ... It seems to me this would be equivalent to say, a law banning steam locomotives specifically naming the Ford Mustang as a steam locomotive. While a Ford Mustang shares some common traits with a steam locomotive, such as being motorized transport that requires fuel, it's quite obvious that a Ford Mustang is not a steam locomotive. I'm specifically looking for examples in common-law countries where this sort of thing has been challenged or ruled on instead of being ignored.
Without getting into the merits of the legislation, the short answer is that the existence of a false statement/factual error in the law has no effect on the law. The legislature has essentially used a term to explain which firearms are prohibited, and then it defined that term. Sometimes the legislature's definition will generally match the definition used by the general public; sometimes it will seem as though they just pulled something out of thin air. Most lawyers would agree that it is not best practice to have definitions that don't seem to match their antecedents, but they would also agree that such definitions continue to hold the force of law.
The concept of &quot;ignorance&quot; of laws isn't about the individual. It's about administratibility of the system. The argument is that a system with a wide-ranging ignorance defense would struggle to produce results—just or otherwise. So the American system presumes knowledge of the law and then carves out narrower exceptions, such as mistake of law. For example, the law wasn't published, or it had been overruled. Alas, the question about why there isn't a hotline belongs on another site.
So, as I understand the decision, it's a little more subtle than that. By default, states have sovereign immunity and can't be sued without their consent. Congress can remove ("abrogate") this immunity by law in some circumstances. They tried to do so for copyright infringement cases with the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990. However, in the present case of Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that this part of the CRCA is unconstitutional. The idea is that under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate state immunity when it's necessary to ensure people's right to due process, but only in a "congruent and proportional" way. Now if a state unintentionally or negligently infringes someone's copyright, that does not violate the person's right to due process, but an intentional infringement might. At the time the CRCA was passed, when Congress went looking for instances where states infringed on copyrights, they found several cases of unintentional or negligent infringement, and just a couple where they may have infringed intentionally. SCOTUS argued that to respond to this by completely abrogating state immunity in all copyright cases was disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional. But the Court suggests in the opinion that Congress could pass a different law to abrogate immunity in copyright cases, if it were narrower. For instance, a law that only stripped immunity in cases of intentional infringement would likely be constitutional, especially if there were evidence that intentional infringement was happening enough to be a significant problem. So I think the answer is that as of right now, a state could deliberately infringe someone's copyright (e.g. by pirating software) and be immune from suit. However, Congress has the power to "fix" this, and most likely will, especially if there seems to be egregious abuse. (By the way, the decision contains an impressive quantity of pirate jokes. I guess since it's not only about copyright infringement (aka "piracy"), but actually alleges infringement of a video about a sunken pirate ship, the justices just couldn't resist.) Your "eminent domain" idea is separate from this. Seizing copies of the software wouldn't give the state the right to use them, as the software itself would still be copyrighted. The state would have to seize the copyright, and I don't know whether that is possible - it's not necessarily property in that sense. But if they did so, then they wouldn't be infringing the copyright at all (since the state itself would now own the copyright) and this case would be irrelevant. On the other hand, when a state uses eminent domain to seize property, they must as you say pay fair market value for it, and that means the market value before they seized it. So the value of the copyright in such a case wouldn't be "nothing" - it would be more like the amount a competitor would have had to pay the software maker to buy all the rights to that product. Likewise, if the state seizes your lovely house and bulldozes it to build a toxic waste dump, they owe you what someone would have paid for the house, not the value of a dump that nobody wants.
Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
After some more research, I found several german retailers like Frankonia and Brownells, which do ship firearm magazines to Austria. My reasoning is as follows: If they were regulated in any way, they would either be confiscated or sent back to the store. In either way, the customers would get in contact with the store, and the store would stop shipping magazines to Austria. Since I was unable to find a german store which specifically mentioned that they would not ship to Austria, I am going to assume that they are not regulated and can be purchased freely.
Pre-1991, Wisconsin criminal law ONLY prevented handguns (as well as various other things such as nunchuks and tasers) from being possessed by minors (being people under age 18), in section 948.60. https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1987/related/acts/332 The Hunting code is a civil code, and it places restrictions on the use of firearms by people aged under 16, at 29.304 https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/29.pdf This meant that prior to 1991, the possession of an AR-15 by a 15-year-old would not face any criminal penalties, only the civil penalty provided under 29.971 ($1000 fine). In 1991 the Wisconsin Senate passed a law which updated 948.60 https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1991/related/acts/18 Because 948.60 is a criminal law cross-referencing a civil one, the wording ends up confusing, but the effect of the revised 948.60 was that: a minor who went hunting with any firearm without a hunting accomplishment certificate (29.593 of the civil hunting code) a child under 16 who possessed a firearm of any kind except in accordance with 29.304 would for the first time be guilty of a crime, after the 1991 law passed. In addition, because 948.60 does double purpose as the supply of a weapon to a minor section, an adult supplying a child with an illegal short-barreled weapon (as defined in 941.28) is also guilty of 948.60, along with the minor themself. Therefore, 948.60 gives criminal effect to breaches of 29.304. Hence, children aged under 16 ONLY (29.304 does not apply to 16 or 17 year olds), and the person supplying them must comply with 29.304, or commit a misdemeanor under 948.60 as the minor (subject to age of criminal responsibility of 10), or a felony as the supplying person. Thus: Age 0-11 - can only carry a firearm during a hunter education class under supervision by an instructor, or carrying it, unloaded, to or from said class, by their parent, or an adult designated by their parent Age 12-13 - ditto, but can also carry a firearm while accompanied by their parent or adult designated by their parent Age 14-15 - ditto, but can now possess a firearm if they have a hunter education program certificate, including from other states or countries, if evidence is provided to the department So we can see that: under Wisconsin code 29.592, no person may hunt without an accomplishment certificate, and that for a 16 or 17 year old ONLY, such hunting with a firearm becomes a criminal offence under 948.60 the person supplying a gun to an 0-11 commits a crime, as does the child if they are 10-11 it would appear to be legal for a parent to accompany their 12 or 13 year old to a riot armed with an AR-15, or for the parent to designate a person to do this a 14 or 15 year old who has a hunter competency certificate can attend a riot armed with an AR-15 unaccompanied a 16 or 17 year old can attend a riot with an AR-15. However, unlike 18+ year olds they cannot attend with a handgun, since 948.60 is only intended to ban minors from handguns, while giving teeth to other restrictions on the use of rifles and shotguns by minors.
The first passage quoted appears to be from the North Carolina General Statutes section 14-269.2 (Weapons on campus or other educational property) The roughly corresponding section of South Carolina law is SECTION 23-31-215 (Issuance of permits.) subsection (M) (5). It is quite different in both wording and content. I do not find the second quoted passage in an online search, and I presume it is of the school's own writing. If you were in elementary school &quot;about 10 years ago&quot; it would seem that you are probably in high school or college now. Rules for those institutions are often quite different from elementary school and from each other. I have no way to evaluate what the school regulations on such subjects might be, but it is probably safer to leave your empty casing at home, although no rule you have quoted or that I can find online would prohibit it. An expended cartridge or casing is not a &quot;gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind&quot; and so this provision of NC 14-269.2 would not apply, even in North Carolina. An expended cartridge is not likely to be defined as a &quot;weapon&quot; either, and so the second quotes passage should not apply, although it is possible that the school regulations define &quot;weapon&quot; differently so that an expended cartridge is included. I have no way to know what other provisions the school regulations might include that would be relevant.
There are several federal excise taxes on firearms. The main ones are (dispensing with the fine definitional details and Internal Revenue Code citations): A tax on transfers of firearms of $5 per concealable firearm and $200 per firearm on certain other firearms; a $500 per year firearm's dealers tax which is increased to $1000 if you import more than a certain number of firearms per year; a 10% of sales price excise tax on pistols and revolvers; and an 11% of sales price excise tax on other firearms and on ammunition. Of course, like any other business, firearm's dealers also have to file annual income tax returns on their revenues less their expenses on tax forms that depend upon the form of organization of the business (e.g. C-corporation, S-corporation, partnership/LLC, trust, etc.). The IRS has the right to examine the books and records of people who owe or are believed to owe taxes without going to a court to obtain permission to do so. Treas. Reg. § 1.601.105. Subject to certain exceptions, information obtained by the IRS in a review of a taxpayers records and their return information are confidential. 26 U.S.C. § 6103. There are criminal penalties for (slightly over simplifying) tax offenses including willfully failing to keep records necessary to file tax returns, willfully attempting to evade or defeat taxes, willfully failing to collect and pay taxes where required by law to do so, and willfully making false statements to IRS employees or on returns. 26 U.S.C. § 7201-7212. If the government provides probable cause to a federal judge or magistrate in connection with a possible criminal tax prosecution that there is probable cause to believe that a taxpayer has committed a criminal tax offense, then the government may obtain a search warrant to seize records without the advanced notice available in the usual civil record examination process. For example (not based on any facts I have been told about or read about in this particular case), suppose that a former employee of a firearm's dealer or an ex-spouse of one of the owners of the business, told the IRS that the dealer intentionally lied on their excise tax return by underreporting the number of firearms the dealer sold and that the dealer then kept the sales taxes collected from unreported buyers who completed Form 4473, and told the IRS criminal division investigators where the Form 4473s were kept at the dealer's offices. In that case, it would be routine for the IRS to obtain a federal search warrant to obtain those forms to seize and review in connection with an excise tax fraud investigation. If there was just an income tax audit, bank records and accounting records obtained by subpoena from banks and accountants would usually be sufficient. But this would cease to be the case if the inventory records obtained by subpoena from the dealer's suppliers, for example, and the accounting records, didn't match. If there was evidence of unreported firearm sales income, or of unreported excise taxable sales, the IRS would usually need to compare the the Form 4473s of the business to its income and excise tax returns filed with the IRS. It would be routine to obtain these records with a search warrant rather than a civil office record review with advanced notice if tax fraud was suspected. The Form 4473s due to IRS confidentiality requirements, wouldn't be publicly available to anyone by the IRS and criminal investigators (not even members of Congress or local law enforcement), and would probably only be presented in redacted or summary forms in a criminal tax fraud prosecution at trial. In all likelihood, the IRS doesn't care about the customers who filled out the Form 4473s at all, and isn't even bothering to investigate them (except possibly to spot check for fake social security numbers or names, which appear on the forms, to see if fake information was used to Form 4473s used to substantiate tax records). Instead, the IRS is probably simply tallying them up and noting dates of sale, putting them in a spreadsheet, and seeing if they are different from what was reported to the IRS on the dealer's tax returns. If the dealer, for example, paid the proper excise taxes on 800 guns in 2022, but had 1200 Form 4473s in banker's boxes at its offices, then the people involved in the tax fraud at the dealership are probably going to go to federal prison for a few years. Indeed, they would probably just plead guilty rather than going through a futile trial where documents with their own signatures on them from boxes seized in their shop clearly establish their guilt in that case. Federal firearm excise tax fraud prosecutions aren't terribly common, but they are about as plain vanilla as they come in the world of federal criminal prosecutions. This certainly doesn't portend any threat the Second Amendment rights or any crack down on the firearms industry. In terms of this message this sends, this is really no different that seizing the electronic records of a gas station that filed false gasoline excise tax returns to show how much gasoline was actually sold, and prosecuting the people who engaged in the tax fraud for that. The argument that a Form 4473 isn't a &quot;financial record&quot;, when it provides documentation of all of the information except the price on all of the dealer's firearm sales (Manufacturer, Model, Serial Number, Type of Firearm, Caliber or Gauge, number of firearms sold, and check boxes for tax exemptions), and the fact the some of the federal firearm excise taxes due don't even depend upon the price of the firearm, isn't a very strong one. Even if the search warrant didn't single out Forms 4473s from other kinds of business records, this would probably just be harmless error, because the IRS absolutely has the right to ask for and seize Form 4473s in connection with the tax fraud investigation, just like any other business record of a firm suspected of not paying its taxes. These records aren't protected by any evidentiary privilege in a federal tax fraud prosecution. Also, combined with past sales fliers and catalogues and business records about sales pricing for different products from the dealer in its accounting records, it would be fairly trivial to use this information to recreate a very accurate forensic reconstruction of the gross firearm sales revenues of the dealer and the amount of excise taxes that should have been paid. It would be tedious work, but it would be extremely damning evidence of tax fraud if the estimated sales significantly exceeds the sales reported on the dealer's tax returns. Even if the some of the documents in a particular banker's box aren't within the scope of the search warrant (for example, perhaps someone put Christmas Cards and as well as accounting ledgers and cancelled checks in the same box), the IRS would not be beyond its rights to grab all of the banker's boxes of documents, review them at their leisure in a government office, and then return the contents of the boxes that turned out to be something other than what the IRS requested a search warrant to seize. A good faith belief that the boxes seized has some financial records in them would justify taking them away, reviewing their contents, and returning materials that were beyond the scope of what was sought. The IRS criminal division agents don't have to look through the many, many banker's boxes page by page at the dealer's place of business to screen them at that time at that level of detail. Similarly, the IRS agents are not required to assume that boxes actually contain what the label on the outside of the box says that the box contains. Of course, if the Form 4473s corroborate the tax returns filed by the dealer apart from minor clerical errors or uncertainties about the exact sales prices of sales reported on them due to irregular discounts provided by a dealer who sometimes haggled over the prices of used firearms, the dealer would be vindicated and the informant who triggered the investigation and prosecution (if there is evidence that this informant willfully lied to IRS investigators) might even be prosecuted for making an intentionally false report to a law enforcement officer. The dealer wouldn't be entitled to reimbursement for criminal defense expenses or harm to the dealer's reputation, but it would still be a huge PR coup and the criminal charges would go away, probably long before a trial was even held. Montana Attorney General Austin Knudsen absolutely knows all of the facts in the post above. His claimed fear of a crackdown on gun users is something he is doing to willfully mislead the people of Montana for political gain. He may also be throwing stones at federal prosecutions because he was irritated that the IRS and Justice Department didn't keep him in the loop on this tax investigation in his state which he sees as his turf, even though it was purely a matter of federal tax law violations which his office didn't have jurisdiction over. Indeed, the IRS may have kept him in the dark and out of the loop from this investigation, in part, in order to protect taxpayer and gun owner privacy by not sharing confidential IRS investigation information with state law enforcement officers, something that it is not allowed to do.