What laws regulate the use and ownership of firearms by British-flagged ships? Firearms are heavily regulated in the UK, especially handguns and automatic weapons, after several horrific shootings in the late 20th century. Long-guns, such as shotguns and rifles are also tightly controled, one or more licenses being required. One exception that there seems to be for this regulation is for British-flagged vessels. There are also a document which publicly available on armed guards for ships, but it is not clear to me if this includes otherwise illegal weapons. In order to better explain question, here's a scenario - ACME shipping has a cargo ship that frequently travels round the Horn of Africa, a known high-risk area for piracy. ACME decide that in order to safeguard their ships, crew and cargo, they must have a contingent of armed guards on board each ship. What firearms would these guards be allowed, under British law, to carry? (Only Rifles and Shotguns, or could these guards also be authorised by the Secretary of State to carry Assault rifles and handguns as well?)
Authorisation under section 51, Firearms Act 1968 is required but only if the criteria in the Home Office Guide on Firearms Licensing Law at Chapter 28: Authorisation of armed guards on UK registered ships is met: The policy to allow the use of armed guards applies only in exceptional circumstances: to ships transiting the area at risk of attack by pirates within the High Risk Area (HRA) which is bounded: in the Red Sea: northern limit: Latitude 15°N; in the Gulf of Oman: Northern limit: Latitude 22°N; Eastern limit: Longitude 065°E; Southern limit: Latitude 5°S; when ‘Best Management Practices’ to deter piracy is being followed fully but, on its own, is not deemed by the shipping company and the ship’s master as sufficient to protect against acts of piracy; AND the use of armed guards is assessed to reduce the risk to the lives and wellbeing of those on board the ship. The policy applies to internationally trading passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and above. The policy only applies in relation to the protection of UK registered ships. The assurance process for the authorisation of private maritime security companies is to ensure that as far as possible public safety is not endangered by the use of armed guards. Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) wishing to employ armed guards on board UK registered ships in these exceptional circumstances must be authorised to possess a range of firearms (which may include section 1 and section 2 weapons), including those requiring an authority from the Secretary of State for the Home Department under section 5 of the 1968 Act, and be able to deploy them as necessary. All PMSCs wishing to employ armed guards on UK registered ships must receive clearance via the Home Office section 5 authorisation process. It is an offence for a person to have in his possession, purchase, acquire, manufacture, sell or transfer, or possess, purchase or acquire for sale or transfer, a weapon prohibited under section 5 of the 1968 Act without the authority of the Secretary of State. It is also an offence not to comply with any condition of the authority. [...] 28.14 The PMSC must provide details of the number and type of section 5 prohibited firearms they wish to possess on board the UK registered ship, and why this number and type of weapon is necessary. All PMSCs must be authorised to possess section 5 firearms. The High Risk Area covered by this policy is shown by the red/orange hatching on this map, sourced from UK War Risks (no affiliation): 1Section 5(3) of the 1968 Act states: In this section “authority” means an authority given in writing by— (a) the Secretary of State (in or as regards England and Wales), or (b) the Scottish Ministers (in or as regards Scotland). In this instance, the authorisation would presumably be given by the Home Secretary
The image is almost surely protected by copyright. The model used in the game would probably be a derivative work of the original image. As such, permission from the copyright holder on the original image would be required. In the absence of such permission, the copyright holder could sue for infringement, and have a reasonable chance of winning. Whether such a holder would choose to sue cannot be predicted. It would depend on whether the holder ever learned of the infringement in the first place, whether it could be proven, and the degree of damages that might plausibly be claimed. It would also depend on the holder's attitude toward such circumstances. In addition, the gun makers might claim trademark infringement. This would depend on how recognizable the guns are, and what trademarks the makers have secured protection on. If a logo is visible and recognizable, that would strengthen a claim by the maker. On the conditions described in the question, trademark infringement seems a bit unlikely, but exact details will matter in such a case, so one cannot be confident in any generic answer on that point.
No, it is not illegal to use the symbol of the federal government for your own personal use as it is a public domain symbol. However, the USMC will frown upon it. Marines have a sort of warrior culture ethos to them, when compared to the other branches of the U.S. military and a strong culture among those who served. Among Marine culture "there is no such thing as a former Marine"... that is, once you enter the service, you are a marine even if you retire (a former Marine is usually someone who was dishonorably discharged OR committed an action that would have gotten him/her discharged had they not retired). They do not take kindly to Stolen Valor (pretending or seeming to pretend you served when you did not). While this is legal to do per SCOTUS rule, it's not considered advisable. Most of the US military have dim views of Stolen Valor and will react very negatively. And seeing as how the Marines like to boast in song that they Guard Heaven for God upon Death, these are not enemies you would like to make. Tread extremely cautiously while doing this.
Civil forfeiture typically pits the government against property, not the government against an individual, and in the US (also anywhere else), only people have rights: property has no rights. The first relevant instance to reach the Supreme Court was an early case, The Palmyra (25 US 1), where a ship was confiscated because it had been used in privateering against the US. Although the owner had been convicted of nothing, the court still allowed the confiscation since The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing, and this whether the offense be malum prohibitum or malum in se The defendant here is the ship itself, not the owner of the ship (known as in rem proceeding). The case law is replete with cases like "US v. $500,000", and such forfeitures have long been part of the arsenal to be used against wrong-doing, a law authorizing this having been one of the first acts of the US Congress, especially applicable to ships and cargo involved in piracy. The courts have repeatedly allowed such confiscation, at least in certain circumstances. In one more recent case, Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, the court stated that It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property intrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment followed by a huge list of citations. Because of the doctrine stare decisis (courts respect prior rulings in similar cases), once a pattern is deemed constitutionally acceptable, it is very hard change that interpretation of the law. It should be noted that J. Thomas recently hinted in a dissent that there is a Due Process problem with civil forfeiture, raising strict scrutiny type objections to civil forfeiture, specifically that forfeiture was typically more narrowly applied – limited to customs and piracy, and justified by necessity, because the party responsible for the crime was frequently located overseas and thus beyond the personal jurisdiction of United States courts also observing that founding-era precedents do not support the use of forfeiture against purely domestic offenses where the owner is plainly within the personal jurisdiction of both state and federal courts Essentially, the reason why civil forfeiture (in its current revenue-generating incarnation) hasn't been ruled unconstitutional is that a persuasive argument has not been made to that effect. The court can't just decide this on its own, and in the most recent case, the constitutional issue was only raised at the Supreme Court, not in the Texas appellate court where it should have been raised. The most significant problem is that it isn't clear what constitutes "due process of law". There is, in all jurisdictions, some kind of legal process (see this report for an overview of the kinds of process involved). The standard of proof that allows forfeiture is pretty low (being a civil case, it is not "beyond a reasonable doubt"), and there are various impediments discouraging anyone from suing to prevent forfeiture (which until 2000 included a substantial bond requirement and the threat of having to pay the government's attorney's fees if you lose). Since there is a process whereby forfeiture can be challenged, a more sophisticated argument is needed, based on Due Process.
As @DavidSupportsMonica says, you can't go back in time to fix the problem. As a rule regulators are more interested in obtaining compliance than throwing the book. There are no sentencing guidelines for health and safety offences, but most convictions lead to a fine. However HSE Policy is that enforcement should be proportionate to the degree of non-compliance and the level of risk created. 5.2 In our dealings with duty holders, we will ensure that our enforcement action is proportionate to the health and safety risks and to the seriousness of any breach of the law. This includes any actual or potential harm arising from any breach, and the economic impact of the action taken. 5.4 Applying the principle of proportionality means that our inspectors should take particular account of how far duty holders have fallen short of what the law requires and the extent of the risks created An annual inspection that was overdue by one day is a very minor failing, and the principle of proportionality means that you are most likely to get verbal advice not to let it happen again. You say &quot;if anything happens&quot;, presumably meaning if there is an actual incident or serious risk, such as a fire or CO poisoning. Its true that in such a case they will certainly want to look at your records, but the proportionality rule still applies. They would need to be able to make a causal link between your failing and the actual incident to make any more of it, which wouldn't be the case here.
For purposes of criminal law, in practice, airports in the United States are treated as part of the territory of the state (or district or territory) that they are a part of and of the United States. The scope of maritime criminal jurisdiction is defined at 18 USC 7. It states: The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”, as used in this title, includes: (1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. (2) Any vessel registered, licensed, or enrolled under the laws of the United States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any of the Great Lakes, or any of the waters connecting them, or upon the Saint Lawrence River where the same constitutes the International Boundary Line. (3) Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building. (4) Any island, rock, or key containing deposits of guano, which may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to the United States. (5) Any aircraft belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or any State, Territory, district, or possession thereof, while such aircraft is in flight over the high seas, or over any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. (6) Any vehicle used or designed for flight or navigation in space and on the registry of the United States pursuant to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, while that vehicle is in flight, which is from the moment when all external doors are closed on Earth following embarkation until the moment when one such door is opened on Earth for disembarkation or in the case of a forced landing, until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the vehicle and for persons and property aboard. (7) Any place outside the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the United States. (8) To the extent permitted by international law, any foreign vessel during a voyage having a scheduled departure from or arrival in the United States with respect to an offense committed by or against a national of the United States. (9) With respect to offenses committed by or against a national of the United States as that term is used in section 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act— (A) the premises of United States diplomatic, consular, military or other United States Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto or used for purposes of those missions or entities, irrespective of ownership; and (B) residences in foreign States and the land appurtenant or ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for purposes of those missions or entities or used by United States personnel assigned to those missions or entities. Nothing in this paragraph shall be deemed to supersede any treaty or international agreement with which this paragraph conflicts. This paragraph does not apply with respect to an offense committed by a person described in section 3261(a) of this title. Often, law enforcement at an international airport is provided by a county sheriff or municipal police department in addition to the TSA (including air marshalls) which has narrower jurisdiction, in contrast to places like Indian Reservations and federal parks, which while within a state are outside state and local law enforcement jurisdiction (although the assimilative crimes act applies state law in many such circumstances). They are definitely not subject to maritime jurisdiction in the United States. Duty free status usually arises from a definition particular to tax treaty and not a global sovereignty definition.
Federal law bars possession of guns by felons and also bars the use of straw purchasers. The primary statute involved in 18 U.S.C. § 992(g). Being in a gun show would not be per se illegal, absent an atypical parole or probation condition. But, in this case it looks like the individuals held the guns which would constitute possession, and it looks like they also arranged for a straw purchase. Merely touching a gun with a single finger would probably not constitute possession of a gun for this purpose, although the incentive not to test the boundaries is great, because the sentences are so severe. (Incidentally, there are more convictions for this offense in Missouri than anyplace else in the United States).
That a company (C) has a website that can be accessed from a given county does not mean that the company operates in that country. If C is located in country A, markets and advertises to country A, offers products designed to appeal in country A, has its site only in the primary language of country A, uses servers located in country A, and has all its assets and physical offices in country A, it is not operating in country X, even if a few people from X do business with C over its web site. Country X may have laws which claim to apply to C or its web site. It will find it hard to enforce those laws, particularly if owners and officers of X do not travel to X. It will find it hard to extradite anyone for violations of the laws of X unless those actions are also crimes under the laws of A. If X is a major, powerful country such as the US, the UK, or the EU it may be able to get A to enforce its court orders, or to use its influence over the banking system to impose penalties on C. If X is North Korea, or even Brazil, it is probably out of luck. Thus the management of C needs worry primarily about the laws of A, and to a lesser extent the laws of major countries that make some effort to enforce their laws outside their own borders, such as the GDPR, or certain US laws. It probably has little reason to worry about the laws of other countries. If A is itself a major country that can easily resist any pressue from X, C has even less reason to worry. If C does significant business in countries D and E, and particularly if it opens physical offices in D or keeps assets in E, it will have much more reason to worry about the laws of D and E. If it does advertising in the D &amp; E markets, this also gives C more reason to be concerned with their laws. There is always some risk of X finding a way to enforce its laws, but the risk is small.