Will those in UK who have had court fees charged to them, now get it back? The UK government is going to stop the payment of Criminal Court Charges for those tried in court. Will those who have already paid these charges now get their money back, and will those charged before the new rule applies have to pay?
The Howard League for Penal Reform, who I presume are well informed about the subject, issued a press release including the following: “There remains the problem of people who have had the criminal courts charge imposed on them, many of whom will simply not be able to pay. We call on magistrates to exercise compassion and common sense when these unfortunate people are returned to court.” So the answer is yes, unless they can convince a magistrate that the charge is unaffordable when they get hauled back to court for non-payment. As the abolition of the charge was done by secondary legislation, I doubt there would be powers to act retroactively, even if this was thought desirable.
Yes, the correct forum is the Local Court in the relevant state (in some states these are called Magistrate's Courts). The amount is too large ($10,000) to qualify as a small claim . If you want to do it yourself the court websites are very informative and in NSW, at least, the process can be initiated online including your paying for the Sheriff to serve the summons (they will not find the person, you have to give them an address). After being served they have 28 days to file a defence or you can get a default judgement and begin recovery. If they do file a defence then things will get more expensive. Of course, you may want to hire a local lawyer.
You're missing some pretty important details in describing the facts of this case. The most important of which is: What were the agreed terms upon which Alice obtained possession of the car prior to paying? Your description says: Alice takes the car and doesn't pay. If that's literally true, then this case is both criminal theft and the tort of conversion — not breach of contract. Since the remainder of your question references a breach of contract, then I have to conclude that the fact as you stated it is not literally correct and there is some important missing detail about the terms upon which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it. So, I will have to invent some scenarios that would fit two other facts you describe: The jury awarded Bob $5,000. The jury found Alice to be in breach of contract. The following are the scenarios I can think of that would match the facts (as I understand them and speculated where important details are missing from the question). Maybe this is a small claims court and the damages are capped at $5,000? I never heard of a jury trial in small claims court but I guess it could be possible. Or maybe it was actually a judge and use of the term jury was careless or otherwise inaccurate? Maybe the terms under which Alice was in possession of the car when she crashed it put the parties in position where they effectively shared liability or risk of damage to the car? Like maybe Bob (or both parties) was/were required to carry insurance on the car while Alice was "test driving" it. I only use the term "test driving" as a placeholder for whatever she was doing with the car prior to paying for it which is left unclear by the question. Maybe Bob was found to have contributed to the breach of contract by something he did or didn't do. Similar to the above speculation about insurance. All this would be much easier to analyze if we knew how and under what terms Alice came to possess the car. Maybe there was only $5k of damage done to the car? Or, alternatively, the car was only found to be worth $5k and, for whatever reason (again, which we can not fully analyze given only the partial set of facts presented) the liquidated value of the car was the basis for the damage award and not the contracted price. (Consistent with @jimsug's comment.) I can easily imagine a scenario where Bob and Alice are close friends or family so the entire transaction is handled very loosely and informally and Bob let's Alice drive the vehicle while she is gathering the money to pay him. In this case, the jury might decide Bob shares the liability with Alice since the terms of the sales contract did not transfer the risk of liability to Alice during the time she was driving prior to payment.
If you are in the habit of paying people just because they ask you to, then I say you owe me $500 - if you want to pay I'll send you my wire transfer details. This is a facetious way of making a very simple point: You don't owe people money just because they say you do. If someone claims to be owed money by you, the legal onus is for them to prove both their legal entitlement and the amount. Normally, people agree that they owe money and that's enough, however, if the debtor disputes the debt then the creditor has to prove that it is owed: the debtor does not have to prove that it isn't. Their legal basis must come from either a contract or the tort of trespass. For the former they must prove that a contract exists and that you breached a term of it. For the latter they must prove that you committed the tort. In both cases, they are only entitled to recover their costs (including loss of profit) that your actions caused. As they are not a government they have no right to punish you with a fine: if they are asking for more than damages then this is a penalty and void. I am unaware of the consumer protection laws in Canada but presuming they are similar to Australia - a disputed debt is not a debt. It only becomes a debt when the dispute is resolved, usually by agreement or a court. Only actual debts can have enforcement action taken including such things as being pursued by a collection agency or being recorded by a credit reporting agency. In short: this is a scam. In 2012 I went through a similar process. This is the letter I sent: We are the registered operator of motor vehicle XXXXX and have received your letter dated 6/6/2012 for payment of car parking penalty number XXXXX that you allege we incurred on 6/4/2011. To the extent that we entered into a contract with you, which is denied, please take this letter to constitute a written appeal in accordance with the appeal process described on your website and/or in your documentation. We dispute incurring the alleged debt and we dispute entering into any contract with you. We will defend any action brought against us. You must cease all efforts to collect this alleged debt whilst it remains in dispute, in compliance with National, ACCC and NSW laws and guidelines. Except as specifically outlined herein, we are requesting that you cease all contact with us about the alleged debt. Any further contact should be strictly in conformity with the ACCC Debt Collection Guidelines (refer http://tinyurl.com/parking-01). Your contact with us should be limited to: acknowledging our letter and providing us with any documentation that we have requested informing us that you have ceased collection efforts on the alleged debt stating that you are taking a specific action in relation to the debt such as commencing court proceedings (note that you can only threaten court proceedings if you intend to start them otherwise you are in breach of the guidelines - refer page 33 "you must not threaten legal action if the start of proceedings is not possible, or not under consideration, or you do not have instructions to start proceedings"). You must also advise any debt collectors or lawyers you have collecting this debt to stop. If you or your agents continue to attempt to collect this alleged debt, we will complain in writing to the ACCC, to NSW Fair Trading, and to the car park owner (and if we receive a further letter from your lawyers, we will complain to the Legal Services Commissioner in the lawyer's home state). Please send us within 7 days: Confirmation of whether or not you still hold us responsible for this alleged debt. If you still hold us responsible, we require you to properly articulate the facts and matters on which your claim is based. Please forward us the following particulars: A copy of the contract we are alleged to have entered into. Photographs of any signs that need to be read in conjunction with the alleged contract. Details of the actual offence you are claiming. e.g. failure to buy ticket, expired ticket, parking in no-standing etc. As well as the usual particulars of date, time, precise location with the car park and other facts and matters giving rise to the alleged breach of agreement. An itemised breakdown of the debt you are claiming and details on how it was calculated. Show separately legal costs, court costs, administration costs, costs associated with identifying us as the car owner, patrolling costs and a breakdown of any other costs not already mentioned. Pursuant to the Privacy Act, a copy of all photos you have of our car and/or us. Indicate the date each photo was taken and the name of the person who took the photo. And forward us any other data that you hold on us that the Privacy Act requires you to disclose. The basis on which you allege that we ware a party to the agreement alleged to exist; Proof that the alleged debt was incurred by us. The name(s) of any lawyers or solicitors who received payments pursuant to any clause in your terms and conditions. Please show the amounts and dates on which these costs were incurred, and the dates when these payments were made. Please itemise the work that such lawyers or solicitors performed for you, and indicate which clause in your terms and conditions allows you to hold us liable for such payments. A copy of any agreement that the car parking company has with the owner of the car park which covers the handling of disputes and appeals. Indicate the amount of money the car park company would have been paid had we entered into the alleged agreement with it, and if the alleged terms and conditions had been followed to the company's satisfaction. (In other words, how much money do you normally receive for a car to park in your car park for the period of time we are alleged to have parked there for). The contact name, postal address, and phone number of each of the following: the car park owner, the car park manager, and the car park operator. A copy of your Appeal handing procedure. As well as setting out what factors are taken into account, state who is the judge or arbitrator and whether they are independent and any other relevant factors to the Appeal. In addition, please give us disclosure of any arguments being put by yourselves on this matter in the Appeal so that we might reply to any new issues which are raised. If you decide to dismiss our appeal, please send us the full reasoning in relation to each of the specific points raised in our letter. The name and address of the person you allege was driving our car at the time you allege our car was parked in your car park. If you are alleging an agent authorised by us was driving our car, please confirm this in your response and forward us a copy of the agency agreement, along with the name and address of the agent. We put you on notice that should you continue this claim, we will issue an application, seeking orders that: Any request for a statutory declaration or request from you to prove in anyway that we do not owe this debt is misleading or deceptive conduct, because you are not a government agency and that the burden of proof rests with you as the person who claims the alleged debt. The amount claimed pursuant to the alleged contract amounts to a penalty and therefore void at common law. Alternatively, the amount claimed is claimed pursuant to a consumer contract within the meaning of the Australian Consumer Law and that the amount claimed is an unfair term within the meaning of section 23 of the ACL and, accordingly, is void. Finally, this debt remains in dispute until we advise you in writing that we owe this debt. I received one further piece of correspondence which didn't address any of the things I asked for and which I ignored and that was the end of the matter.
It is likely that the law applying will be both that of the USA and your country. If you went to court this would be one of the things you argued over. For example, Australian Consumer Law applies to any goods or services sold to a customer in Australia irrespective of where the vendor is located. Your jurisdiction may have similar laws. At first blush you must comply with the term of the contract preventing reverse engineering. They would be within their rights to terminate the licence if you don't. However, they probably have an obligation under your equivalent to the ACL to supply a product that: is merchantable is fit for purpose does what it says it will do If it doesn't then you have a right to terminate and get your money back, sue for damages and your country's government may prosecute.
Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette &amp; Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm.
You can’t “mislead or deceive” in “trade or commerce” in Australia It is flat out against the law to mislead or deceive - you can’t lie, you can’t conceal salient facts, you can’t tell half truths, you can’t even tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth if that could be misleading. The fines are huge (for example), plus the contracts are unenforceable, plus the reputational damage is extreme. The types of practice that you describe would result in orders to return the premiums, plus fines plus probably revocation of the licence to be an insurer in Australia if they were systemic. This is particularly true of insurance companies - the legislation that applies to them is enumerated here.
There is, as far as I can see, no Crown exemption from the sale of goods acts (including the International Sale of Goods Conventions), but unfortunately for this patient the NHS has no liability either in logic or in law. The doctor provided a written prescription, for which there is no charge, and which allows patients to buy certain drugs. The patient took the prescription to a chemist's, which (for money) provided the drug specified in it. Even if the patient had noticed that the prescription was for the wrong form of medicine, the pharmacist has no discretion to alter it; if the prescription specifies tablets, the patient can either buy the tablets or not buy them and take the prescription back to the doctor. In neither case has either the doctor or the chemist committed any conceivable offence regarding sale of goods. (There might theoretically be a case for negligence, but it would never be worth either suing a doctor for an £8 prescription fee or reporting him to the authorities for writing a prescription for the right drug in the wrong form).