What happens if a law contains an error of fact? If a law is passed that contains a demonstrably false statement or assumption about the world, how is it generally interpreted? For example, laws will often list a category of things, and then give examples of specific things in the category. It is easy for some of the examples not to be true members of the category. You might have a law that says &quot;Only fish, such as pike, capybara, and perch, may be eaten on Fridays; animal meat is right out.&quot; Does that make the capybara legally a &quot;fish&quot; for the purpose of that particular law? How would that affect courts trying to make determinations about what other things not specifically enumerated are (legal) fish? Would an attorney be able to get any mileage out of the argument that the capybara is not in fact a fish, as noted by leading fish experts? Can a law or part of a law be struck down not for being wrong but just for being false?
Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893) is a famous &quot;error of fact&quot; case in the US. The situation was that there was an import tariff imposed on &quot;vegetables in their natural state&quot; brought in from outside the US, but not on &quot;Fruits, green, ripe, or dried, not specially enumerated or provided for in this act&quot; which were on a &quot;free&quot; list. Since imported tomatoes were taxed, it was said that tomatoes are fruits and not vegetables. The court ruled that for legal purposes the terms &quot;vegetable&quot; and &quot;fruit&quot; have their ordinary meaning, and are not held to a possibly variable scientific definition. Definitions were read from Webster's Dictionary, Worcester's Dictionary and the Imperial Dictionary, and witnesses with decades of experience in the produce trade were called who testified as to whether the words had &quot;any special meaning in trade or commerce, different from those read&quot;. Dictionary entries were read regarding the definition of the words pea, eggplant, cucumber, squash, pepper, potato, turnip, parsnip, cauliflower and so on. The court reasoned as follows based on the evidence. First, The passages cited from the dictionaries define the word ‘fruit’ as the seed of plaints, or that part of plaints which contains the seed, and especially the juicy, pulpy products of certain plants, covering and containing the seed. These definitions have no tendency to show that tomatoes are ‘fruit,’ as distinguished from ‘vegetables,’ in common speech, or within the meaning of the tariff act and since the terms do not have a special meaning in trade or commerce, they must receive their ordinary meaning. Observe that &quot;scientific definition&quot; is not even a contender in this discussion. The court observed that &quot;dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court&quot;. The crux of the ruling is the following observation: Botanically speaking, tomatoes are the fruit of a vine, just as are cucumbers, squashes, beans, and peas. But in the common language of the people, whether sellers or consumers of provisions, all these are vegetables which are grown in kitchen gardens, and which, whether eaten cooked or raw, are, like potatoes, carrots, parsnips, turnips, beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery, and lettuce, usually served at dinner in, with, or after the soup, fish, or meats which constitute the principal part of the repast, and not, like fruits generally, as dessert. In other words, specialized scientific definitions are not assumed to underlie the use of words selected by lawmakers. If lawmakers list &quot;fish, such as pike, capybara, and perch&quot;, then for purposes of that law and that law alone, capybara is defined to be a fish. Explicit redefinitions are fairly commonplace in writing laws, and lawmakers universally have the power to redefine words so that &quot;and means or and or means and, as necessary&quot;. An example of a deliberate statutory redefinition is the fact that a bee is a fish in California, for some purposes, see Almond v. Fish. In the Fish &amp; Game Code, FGC §45, “Fish” means a wild fish, mollusk, crustacean, invertebrate, amphibian, or part, spawn, or ovum of any of those animals which means that worms and jellyfish, and insects, are legal fish. The Endangered Species Act §2062 then says “Endangered species” means a native species or subspecies of a bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, reptile, or plant which is in serious danger of becoming extinct throughout all, or a significant portion, of its range due to one or more causes, including loss of habitat, change in habitat, overexploitation, predation, competition, or disease. Notice that under an interpretation of the law that ignores the statutory redefinition in §45, invertebrates and a number of chordates would not be protected by law. The court notes that this was a deliberate action by the legislature in 1969, in that enrolled bill reports in support of this modification included the argument that The expanded definition of fish will permit closer control and monitoring of the harvest of species such as starfish, sea urchins, sponges and worms, and the ... Commission will be authorized to make regulations deemed necessary for proper protection and management of these species
Laws update, collectively, very frequently. Laws are embodied in statutes, regulations, and court rulings, statutes being the most stable of the three. In terms of what an individual lawyer would do, the most important is to focus on the relevant and ignore the irrelevant. If you mostly write wills and trusts, that defines a subset of issues that are important to you; if you are a tax attorney, that is another subset. If you ask a contract attorney about some highly speculative matter of constitutional law, the answer will most likely be &quot;That's outside my area of specialization&quot;. The concepts of &quot;subscribe&quot; and &quot;free&quot; are mostly antithetical. If you want the really good stuff, you can subscribe to Westlaw or Lexis Nexis. If you want the really free stuff (as generally seen here), the simplest solution is to use Google which may direct you to Findlaw, Justia, Cornell, Avvo or Law SE (unabashed plug). New is not necessarily better, and frankly, new statutes are the least informative, because legislatures often say things that are less than clear on the face of it, and will need to await either administrative creation of a regulation that spells out what the law means, or a court ruling that does the same thing – maybe 10 years after the law was passed.
Only if counsel challenged the point during the trial Difficult as it might be, you can’t allow the judge to be wrong during the trial without calling them on it: very, very politely. For example, there is case law that says you can’t successfully appeal because the judge was asleep through significant parts of the trial; appeals courts are clear that you have to wake them up. If you don’t then you accepted that you didn’t want the judge to hear the parts of the case they slept through, it’s your choice how you present your case. Frankly some cases are better if the judge misses half the evidence. Of course, if the error of law makes it through to the oral or written judgement then you can appeal even if you didn’t take issue with it.
UK and EU There is is no legally binding definition of the terms "vegan" and "vegetarian" at EU or member state level. In 2019, the EU began work on legislation for those definitions. However, under the UK's Food Information to Consumers (FIC) regulations (that implemented certain provisions of the EU directive of the same name), food information must be accurate, clear and easy to understand. This is intended to protect consumers from false or misleading labelling. The UK's Trade Descriptions Act also prohibits false or misleading labelling. The UK's Consumer Rights Act 2015 says "Every contract to supply goods by description is to be treated as including a term that the goods will match the description". And in the UK deliberate mislabelling is criminal fraud. I imagine other jurisdictions have similar laws. In 2006 the UK's Food Standards Agency published vegetarian and vegan guidance for food labelling. Unfortunately I can no longer find it on the FSA's website (food.gov.uk). However, it had the following definitions: Vegetarian The term ‘vegetarian' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of products derived from animals that have died, have been slaughtered, or animals that die as a result of being eaten. 'Animals' means farmed, wild or domestic animals, including for example, livestock poultry, game, fish, shellfish, crustacea, amphibians, tunicates, echinoderms, molluscs and insects. Vegan The term 'vegan' should not be applied to foods that are, or are made from, or with, the aid of animals or animal products (including products from living animals). Now, those definitions weren't/aren't legally enforceable in themselves but an enforcement agency might use them as criteria when investigating a complaint. Related: fish and molluscs are key allergens Also under the FIC: Food businesses include restaurants, cafés and takeaways, and businesses that produce, manufacture or pre-pack food. Food businesses must tell you if they use any of the 14 key allergens as ingredients in the food and drink they provide. They must supply allergen information for every item that contains any of the 14 allergens. The 14 allergens include fish and molluscs (e.g. mussels and oysters). The consequences You are free to ask the food business to list the ingredients (indeed this is the advice to people with allergies) You are free to report your concerns to the food business (they really must list their uses of those key allergens) You are free to not give your custom to the business In the UK you can report businesses that you don't believe meet the legal requirements to the National Food Crime Unit. But if there is no direct intention to deceive or deliberate dishonesty it is not a 'food crime' and should not be reported to the NFCU. These non-crime concerns should be reported to the relevant local authority if you get no satisfaction from the business.
Some simplified points of basic defamation law as background: A critical element of defamation law is that the defendant said something false. You therefore can't win a defamation case if it's based on a statement that can't be proven false: &quot;You are annoying.&quot; &quot;You are ugly.&quot; &quot;You are a bad lawyer.&quot; If a statement can't be proven false, it is considered opinion. Statments of opinion are virtually always protected by the First Amendment. Powell's brief relies on this framework to argue that because her statements were statements of opinion, no defamation could have occurred. It's like defending against a murder charge by saying that no one died. Although it isn't generally referred to as the &quot;reasonable person standard,&quot; reasonableness comes into this question because part of the calculus in assessing whether a statement is fact or opinion is to ask whether a reasonable person would understand the statement to be making an assertion of fact. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). By leaning into that language, Powell is not saying that reasonable people would not have any reaction or would not have any specific reaction to her statements; instead, she is saying that reasonable people would not have understood her statements to be assertions of fact. Her argument seems to turn on the fact that she was speaking as an attorney representing a political candidate in a lawsuit, and that reasonable people understand statements made in that context to be &quot;inherently prone to exaggeration and hyperbole” and &quot;view them only as claims that await testing by the courts through the adversary process.&quot; For what it's worth, that seems to me like a pretty weak argument. While people expect a certain amount of puffery from their candidates, they also expect that lawyers representing the President of the United States aren't going into court with frivolous allegations. More importantly, though, I think she's running the analysis incorrectly. Rather than asking whether a reasonable person would understand her statements to assertions of fact, she's asking whether a reasonable person would think that she was prone to exaggerate in the setting in which she made those statements. As I understand it, a speaker cannot cloak statements of fact from liability by merely refraining from uttering them until she finds herself in a context where people expect some amount of loose speech. Even if you're a partisan hack with no credibility appearing on a TV show hosted by another partisan hack with no credibility, you generally can't accuse your opponent of being a murderer or child molester or something like that. Those are still assertions of fact, even if they're bookended with statements that &quot;Donald Trump is the greatest president this country will ever have.&quot; The brief does not rely at all on Hustler or the First Amendment protections for parody that were discussed in the previous answer. These tests are closely related, however, as both defenses claim that the speech was not &quot;false&quot; in the relevant sense.
The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.
Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it.
Relying on this version, proof of truth is only allowed in order to establish a "public interest" defense or for a "necessary defense"; but also "if an official is charged with the commission of an act in the exercise of his office". Good luck with "necessary defense". It is not a defense to say "But what I said is true". However, if the defamed person has been convicted in court of said act (the defamatory statement) then there can be no punishment.