Is failing to report a bank error in and of itself a crime? (Related to discussion at https://money.stackexchange.com/questions/133263/how-should-i-handle-money-returned-for-a-product-that-i-did-not-return/133270 ) Suppose a customer receives a deposit into their bank account due to an error by the bank. They decline to mention this to the bank, hoping that the deposit will not be reversed, but they keep the entirety of those funds in the same account ready for return in case it is. The customer's contractual agreement with the bank surely has a clause that enjoins the customer to promptly notify the bank of any errors and they will have violated that (although perhaps in plausibly deniable fashion). However for the crime of theft to have been committed, we need &quot;intent to deprive&quot;. To me (not a legal expert) it seems that merely failing to inform the bank of its own mistake does not rise to the level of intent to deprive, and no crime is committed unless/until the customer takes further action (such as spending the money). Am I wrong? Even if it is technically illegal, as a practical matter I assume that no bank would pursue this over merely reclaiming the funds. Is there any precedent for someone being punished purely for failing to report a bank error? (Jurisdiction note: the initial discussion centered around UK law, but as this is a hypothetical question, answers from other jurisdictions are also interesting.)
Disclaimer: I was the person who originally had the debate with the OP which prompted this question. My answer is based on the UK jurisdiction. Short answer (TLDR) If the action is deliberate, then under UK law it is likely that a crime of theft has been committed. Under the statutory definition of theft, five elements need to be established: dishonesty, appropriation, property, belonging to another, and intention to permenantly deprive. The first four are easy to satisfy. To establish intention, it is not necessary that the money be spent. It is only necessary to establish that at the moment that the recipient realised the mistake, they intended not to return the money. Even if they do plan to eventually return the money, it can still amount to an intention to permenantly deprive. In A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983), the Court of Appeal held that theft could be committed in a case where an employer had mistakenly paid £74.74 to an employee for hours they had not worked. The obligation to return the money arose at the moment the employee realised the mistake. Whether or not the money was spent was not an issue (it was not even raised). Full answer I'm starting from the assumption (stated in the question) that the action is deliberate, as opposed to the recipient simply not noticing they have received the money. If it was accident or unnoticed then it is unlikely a crime has been committed as the necessary intention will be lacking. By deliberate I mean the person notices the money being received, realises it was an error, knows who the sender was (or can reasonably find out), and does nothing to rectify it. If the action is deliberate then this is likely to amount to the crime of theft under the Theft Act 1968 ('TA 1968'). Note, whether or not the prosecution could actually prove the crime is a separate matter. The question is not asking how easy it is to prove the elements, only whether or not the crime has been committed. Statute Theft is defined as &quot;dishonestly appropriat[ing] property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it&quot; (Section 1(1) TA 1986). Your motivations for appropriating the property (including whether or not you spend it) are not a relevant factor: &quot;It is immaterial whether the appropriation is made with a view to gain, or is made for the thief’s own benefit.&quot; (Section 1(2) TA 1986). The important thing is whether or not the five elements of theft are present. These elements appear in the statutory definition of theft and are further elaborated in the Act: dishonesty (section 2 TA 1986), appropriation (section 3 TA 1986), property (section 4 TA 1986), belonging to another (section 5 TA 1986) and intention to permenantly deprive (section 6 TA 1986). Dishonesty: Defences include believing there is a legal right to deprive the other of the property, believing there was consent, or believing that the person to whom the property belongs cannot be reasonably discovered (section 2(1) TA 1986). None of these exceptions apply here, given the premise of the question. However if one of these beliefs were instead present, it is worth pointing out that &quot;belief&quot; is assessed using the subjective test (what the defendant genuinely believed), not the more common objective test (what a reasonable person would have believed in the circumstances) (R v Robinson. [1977] Crim LR 173). If none of the exceptions apply, then there is two-stage test for dishonesty: an objective test and a subjective test. However, if the objective test is passed then the subjective one is likely to as well: &quot;In most cases, where the actions are obviously dishonest by ordinary standards, there will be no doubt about it. It will be obvious that the defendant himself knew that he was acting dishonestly. It is dishonest for a defendant to act in a way which he knows ordinary people to consider to be dishonest, even if he asserts or genuinely believes that he is morally justified in acting as he did.&quot; (R v Ghosh, [1982] QB 1053). Appropriation: &quot;Any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner amounts to an appropriation, and this includes, where he has come by the property (innocently or not) without stealing it, any later assumption of a right to it by keeping or dealing with it as owner.&quot; (emphasis added) (section 3(1) TA 1986). That very clearly applies here. Property: &quot;'property' includes money [and] things in action&quot; (Section 4(1) TA 1986). A bank balance is not money but a &quot;thing in action&quot; (a debt from the Bank to the customer) (A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369). Belonging to another: &quot;Where a person gets property by another’s mistake, and is under an obligation to make restoration (in whole or in part) of the property or its proceeds or of the value thereof, then to the extent of that obligation the property or proceeds shall be regarded (as against him) as belonging to the person entitled to restoration, and an intention not to make restoration shall be regarded accordingly as an intention to deprive that person of the property or proceeds.&quot; (Section 5(4) TA 1986). Note that it is not necessary that the customer be under a contractual obligation to return the money to the bank. Such an obligation can arise anyway under the law of restitution. It also arises in the law of equity - a person who gives property by mistake retains an equitable interest in that property (Chase Manhattan Bank v Israel-British Bank [1981] Ch 105). This principle has specifically been applied to bank errors (R v Shadrockh-Cigari [1988] Crim LR 465). Intention to permenantly deprive: &quot;A person appropriating property belonging to another without meaning the other permanently to lose the thing itself is nevertheless to be regarded as having the intention of permanently depriving the other of it if his intention is to treat the thing as his own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights; and a borrowing or lending of it may amount to so treating it if, but only if, the borrowing or lending is for a period and in circumstances making it equivalent to an outright taking or disposal.&quot; (Section 6(1) TA 1986). There are two important things to note here: firstly, an intention to take and then return an item can still amount to theft. Secondly, it is the intention at the time of the appropriation which matters. If the person intended to keep the money (in our case, by hoping it will never get asked for) at the time they became aware of the mistake then it doesn't what their later intention is after the event (e.g. they later decide to return the money because they have been asked for it). See also the reference to intention above in relation to &quot;belonging to another&quot;. Other relevant case law Hibbert McKiernan [1948] 1A, ER 860: Property can cease to belong to another if abandoned. However the threshold for this is very high. Property is not abandoned just because the owner has stopped looking for it. You are therefore unlikely to be helped by the fact that the bank does not attempt to recover the money. R v Scott [1987] Crim LR 235: The defendant stole a pair of curtains from a shop but planned to return them the next day (to claim a fraudulent refund). Held: intention to permenantly deprive was present at the moment they were taken from the shop since the defendant treated the item as theirs to dispose of (see statutory definition of intention above). It didn't matter that defendant intended to return the item, even within a short timespan. Now you may argue that on the face of it it appears that you don't treat the bank balance as yours to dispose of because you leave it untouched. But remember you are under an obligation to return it as soon as you notice the error, which you fail to do. A-G's Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1984] 3 All ER 369: the defendant (R), a police officer, was mistakenly paid by bank transfer £74.74 for overtime she had not worked. The police made no demand for repayment. Held by the Court of Appeal: (1) section 5(4) TA 1986 applicable, (2) the legal obligation to return the money commenced as soon as R became aware of it, (3) satisfactory proof that R had no intention of making restoration to the police would be proof of an intention permanently to deprive. Note that whether or not the money is spent is not a factor (nor was it examined in the case): it is the intention that matters. Judgment excerpts: 186: &quot;There was some evidence before the jury that she had decided to say nothing about this unsolicited windfall which had come her way, and had decided to take no action about it after she discovered the error. No demand for payment of the sum was made by the Receiver of the Metropolitan Police or anyone else.&quot; 189: &quot;there was a legal obligation upon the respondent to restore that value to the receiver when she found that the mistake had been made&quot; 189: &quot;once the prosecution succeed in proving that the respondent intended not to make restoration, that is notionally to be regarded as an intention to deprive the receiver of that property which notionally belongs to him.&quot; Other points raised in the question &quot;merely failing to inform the bank of its own mistake does not rise to the level of intent to deprive, and no crime is committed unless/until the customer takes further action (such as spending the money). Am I wrong?&quot; Yes. For most crimes (other than absolute or strict liability crimes), you need to establish two things: actus reus (an action) and mens rea (a state of mind). A failure to inform the bank is part of the actus reus (it is an action, not a state of mind). It therefore has nothing to do with intention. The intention is the reason why you carried out the action. In our case it is the part in bold here: &quot;they decline to mention this to the bank, hoping that the deposit will not be reversed&quot;. It is that hope which establishes intention. &quot;Even if it is technically illegal, as a practical matter I assume that no bank would pursue this over merely reclaiming the funds.&quot; It is not necessary for a civil entity to pursue a criminal conviction. That is handled generally by the Crown Prosecution Service or by other government agencies that are empowered to prosecute. The bank's co-operation is only needed if their evidence is required to prove the case. Even then, a witness can be compelled to assist the case against their will (section 2, Criminal Procedure (Attendance of Witnesses) Act 1965 and Part 17, Criminal Procedure Rules and Practice Directions 2020). Note that it is unlikely that a bank would refuse to cooperate. In any case, whether or not a crime will actually be prosecuted is not relevant to whether or not a crime has been committed (see my opening remarks about proving a case). &quot;Is there any precedent for someone being punished purely for failing to report a bank error?&quot; There are plenty of cases reported in the media involving convictions for failing to report and then spending money resulting from a bank error. See 1, 2, 3 for some examples. I was unable to find any precedents specifically relating to cases involving a bank error where the money was not spent. However, A-G's Reference above is essentially the same scenario, just involving an employer instead of a bank. In any case, the lack of an identical precedent does not mean that the courts would acquit a person in these circumstances. What matters is the statutory rules and whether or not the court would apply the existing precedents to the facts.
No, it doesn't seem like you did anything wrong. You can't have committed fraud because you didn't have the intent of entering the museum without paying. Fraud is defined in section 263 StGB: (1) Whoever, with the intention of obtaining an unlawful pecuniary benefit for themselves or a third party, damages the assets of another by causing or maintaining an error under false pretences or distorting or suppressing true facts […] You had no intention of obtaining an unlawful benefit. You presumably did not misrepresent your disability status. German criminal law has a related violation in Section 265a StGB, “obtaining benefits by deception”: (1) Whoever obtains the output of a machine or the services of a telecommunications network which serves public purposes or uses a means of transportation or obtains entrance to an event or facility by deception with the intention of not paying the fee […] Again, your lack of intent means that you haven't committed this crime. Interpreting what actually happened: The K20 ticket fees are reduced for severely handicapped people with 50% GdB (degree of disability indicating the person's difficulty of participating in society, in particular that person's difficulty for working a normal job, as determined by the VersMedV). You were not attested such a degree of disability via the German system, and therefore were not eligible for the discounted entrace fee of EUR 10. The museum has no obligation towards you to actually collect those fees. They can waive them whenever they want, for whatever reason they want. The museum could have given you the discounted price even without suitable evidence of your disability. Instead, they waived the fee entirely. If anyone is going to have problems here, it is the person at the ticket counter for failing to collect the appropriate fees. But that is an internal issue for the museum. You legally obtained a valid ticket to visit the museum. Translations were taken from the official page https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html
In England and Wales, theft is defined by s1 Theft Act 1968: A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it It does not matter if the victim is not the rightful owner of the property, as the law only requires that the property belongs to another: the victim and owner can be two different people. As long as the other elements are present, the offence is committed. It's important when considering theft to look for dishonesty and intention to permanently deprive: borrowing something without permission with the intention to return it isn't theft, and nor is taking something by mistake. Theft is an 'either-way' offence (i.e. it can be tried summarily or by a jury), and in the latter case carries a maximum penalty of seven years in prison (s7 TA 1968).
The question does not say what reasons the other party gives for not paying, and so one cannot judge whether such reason is covered by the terms quoted in the question. In general a contract need not be highly specific if the intent is clear. However, any ambiguity will usually be resolved against the party who wrote the contract, so it is in that party's interest to be as clear and specific as possible. It is not clear from the quoted terms that they form a contract at all. No consideration is stated. Contractual provisions which deny all recourse are not always enforceable. They may be overruled by law or regulation, or by prior court decision or by an equitable decision. If there is a serious problem with the service provided, particularly in a consumer transaction, a court might reject a provision denying all refunds even if it is quite specific and clear. The question does not list the jurisdiction (country and, for federal countries, state or province). Laws on contracts and enforceable terms vary significantly in different jurisdictions. Without this a specific answer is not possible.
Depends on where you are, and likely also on what they knew when. It is entirely normal to order some goods (like perishable food, or custom-fitted furniture) before it is produced. The contract may or may not include advance payment. Most jurisdictions require some sort of intent for fraud, so the non-fulfillment would not be fraud if circumstances beyond the control of the supplier prevent delivery. The question of civil damages and repayment is distinct from criminal fraud charges.
Essentially, if there is no written agreement or receipt of payment, the only records that exist will be in the payment itself. If it was paid by cash, there's probably no recourse without additional facts. However, if it was paid electronically, then even if there's no narration (description) that claims that the payment was for rent, it is still possible that you would be able to file a summons requiring the recipient bank to produce the information relating to the entity that holds the account the money was sent to. The information they have may be limited, but generally this would include: Name Address Date of birth (for natural persons) Phone number The above information is typically required under anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist funding legislation. Additionally, if it was paid electronically, the regularity of the payments and the regular amounts may be persuasive. Finally, it's not proof, but you can swear an affidavit or a statutory declaration attesting to the truth of your assertions, but without additional evidence (the aforementioned transaction information), it doesn't really hold weight on its own.
Given the facts as stated in the question, it appears that Spirit owes a refund. If the portal or site through which the service was sold also handles other flights that do provide wi-fi, there may not have been an intention to sell an unavailable service, and so this may not have been fraud. It is not proper to knowingly sell a service that is not available, but if it is an error, it is not strictly illegal, but the contract has not been fulfilled. One could, in such a case, attempt to place a charge-back with the credit card through which payment was made, if a card was used. Failing that, one could take the matter to small claims court. Before opening a court case, I would send a physical letter by certified mail to the airline's customer service address, with a copy to its HQ address, explaining what happened and requesting a refund by a specified date. If there is a customer service email, a copy to that as well.
Yes A creditor (or alleged creditor) in the US may report such a debt, but must include in the report the information that the debt is disputed, if the creditor has been informed in writing that there is a dispute. If the consumer disputes that debt is valid that is a &quot;factual dispute&quot;. That would include claims that goods ordered were never delivered, that the wrong goods were delivered, or that the goods were damaged or non-working at the time of delivery. One relevant law is the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Under § 611 of the act (15 U.S.C. § 1681i) a consumer may file a notice of dispute with a credit reporting agency (CRA). The CRA must re investigate the issue, and may ask for confirming information from the merchant or other person who initially reported the information (known as the &quot;Furnisher&quot; in the law). There is a set of procedures for handliung such disputes. Information found to be &quot;Inaccurate or Unverifiable&quot; must be removed. Subsections (b) and (c) of thsi section provife that: Statement of dispute. If the reinvestigation does not resolve the dispute, the consumer may file a brief statement setting forth the nature of the dispute. The consumer reporting agency may limit such statements to not more than one hundred words if it provides the consumer with assistance in writing a clear summary of the dispute. (c) Notification of consumer dispute in subsequent consumer reports. Whenever a statement of a dispute is filed, unless there is reasonable grounds to believe that it is frivolous or irrelevant, the consumer reporting agency shall, in any subsequent report containing the information in question, clearly note that it is disputed by the consumer and provide either the consumer’s statement or a clear and accurate codification or summary thereof. Section 616 of the act (15 U.S.C. § 1681n]) provides penalties for wilful noncompliance, and section 617 of the act (15 U.S.C. § 1681o]) provides penalties for negligent noncompliance. These include for wilful noncompliance actual damages, statutory damages of up to $1,000, punitive damages if the court thinks such proper, and &quot;the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney’s fees&quot; for winning cases. For negligent noncompliance actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees are allowed. See also the Wikipedia Article on the Acty, &quot;Summaries of Rights Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (Regulation V)&quot; from the Federal Register, and &quot;Understanding the Fair Credit Reporting Act&quot; from Experian (a major credit reporting agency). 15 U.S. Code § 1692g which is part of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act provides that if a consumer notifies a collector within 30 days of the initial debt collection attempt that the debt is disputed, collection attempts must cease until the collector verifies the debt, or obtains a certification from the creditor. Section 807(8) of the FDCPA (15 USC 1692f) prohibits: (8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed. See also &quot;Dealing with Debt Collectors: What You Should Know&quot;