Legal or Political nature of Impeachment of a US President In the United Kingdom the Prime Minister (broadly equivalent to the US President although the PM is not head of state) has to stand down if the government loses a vote of &quot;no confidence&quot; in the House of Commons (lower house of the legislature). There could be many reasons for a &quot;no confidence&quot; vote. The PM might have done something disreputable or it might just be that the majority no longer support the PM's political policies and programme. Because it is relatively easy to get rid of a PM there is no need to consider impeachment (the last impeachment was over 200 years ago I believe). In the US, lack of support by the legislature does not affect the tenure of the president - only impeachment has that effect. My question is about the nature of impeachment in the US and how it looks to US lawyers. To a lawyer in the UK there is nothing unusual per se about a president/PM losing office because of a political vote by the legislature, but what looks very odd to many lawyers in the UK is that the impeachment process looks like a legal process but the normal standards of logic, of defining what has to be proved and then proving it, don't seem to apply. I'm not talking here about the vote on whether to impeach being split on largely party lines but the actual process before the vote. The lawyers in the proceedings look as if they are not behaving and arguing like lawyers. How does this look to US lawyers? Does it look odd to you?
While I am not a lawyer, this is fairly well settled in US constitutional theory. The framers thought of impeachment is something very much like a legal process, which is shown, among other things by the procedure in the Senate being referred to in the Constitution as a &quot;trial&quot; and a vote to remove being described as a &quot;conviction&quot;. The use of the term &quot;High Crimes and Misdemeanors&quot; also suggests a legal process. In The Federalist, Hamilton took the view that the trial was to determine &quot;guilt or innocence&quot;, but would be inherently political.[A] But there is no supervising authority, and the Congress (and each house of it) is a very political body. Procedures for drafting and passing Articles of impeachment in the House are whatever the House chooses them to be on each particular occasion. Procedures and rules of evidence in a Senate trail are whatever the Senate chooses them to be on each occasion. There is no standard format which is binding, or even customary. Thus in practice an impeachment will be a political issue whenever the Congress treats it as one. Early in the history of the US there was an opinion among some legislators and politicians that an impeachment was simply a statement that &quot;we want your offices to give them to better men&quot;[B], suggesting that it be treated much like a vote of no-confidence in the UK parliament. In the impeachment of Justice Chase the Senate did not vote to convict, and this was held to establish the principle that actual wrong-doing, not mere political dispute, must be the basis of any impeachment. In the impeachments of Federal Judges, the procedure has been essentially legal, with accusations of actual crime, such as bribery or malfeasance in office, being the basis of impeachments, and Senate trials being quite similar to criminal trials. This was perhaps particularly apparent in the impeachment and trial of Justice Chase. The articles of impeachment drafted in the case of president Nixon also looked very much like an indictment for ordinary crime. The trial never took place, but discussions of its format at the tiem suggested that it would have also been somewhat like a criminal trial. But the impeachments and trials of Presidents Clinton and Trump had a much more political aspect to them. While accusations were made of actions alleged to be not just politically unacceptable but unlawful, the Senate essentially inquired not into the truth of the accusations, but into whether they were improprieties deserving of removal at all. This was essentially a political, not a legal decision, and was made in a quite partisan way in each case. The US Supreme Court has held that it has no authority to approve or disapprove the outcome of any impeachment proceeding (not does any other federal court). An &quot;impeachable offense&quot; is whatever the House choose to list in an Article of Impeachment, and a &quot;removable offense&quot; is whatever the Senate chooses to vote for removal on the basis of. Thus those preparing proposed articles or advocating them in a Senate trial will be as legalistic or political as they think the occasion demands. Notes and sources The Federalist on Impeachment [A] Essay number 65 of The Federalist (by Alexander Hamilton) begins: THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial character of the Senate. A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt. ... What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of the nation themselves? It seems that Hamilton's ideal was that of a legal proceeding, a court, which was to determine &quot;guilt or innocence&quot;. But he was well aware of th importance that political factors (and factions) might assume in any impeachment trial, and regarded this as inherent in the nature of such a proceeding. Most constitutional scholars seem to have followed this line of thought. Giles [B] Senator William Branch Giles, leader of the Senate forces favorable to the Administration of President Jefferson, is reported by John Quincy Adams to have said: Impeachment was not a criminal prosecution ... and a removal by impeachment was nothing more than a declaration by Congress to this effect: &quot;You hold dangerous opinions, and if you are suffered to carry them into effect, you will work the destruction of the Union. We want your offices for the purposes of giving them to men who will fill them better.&quot; quoted from Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (J.P.Ipperncot &amp; Co; 1874) Volume 1, page 322; quoted in Grand Inquests By Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist (William Morrow &amp; Co; 1993) page 27 (Chapter 1) The Wikipedia article on Giles (linked above) says: Giles strongly advocated the removal of Justice Samuel Chase after his impeachment, urging the Senate to consider it as a political decision (as to whether the people of the United States should have confidence in Chase) rather than as a trial.
Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
This is more a political question than a legal one, so the answer is more political than legal. Countries are sovereign, and thus can decide which treaties affect them. The UK does not need to agree to any treaty with the EU. It can just refuse to sign the agreement, and just go on its own. Of course, this works both ways. In the same way the EU cannot impose a treaty on the UK about movement of people or the North Ireland borders, the UK cannot impose a treaty on the EU allowing it trade without tariffs. If the UK does not want the deal, the path is straightforward: the Parliament1 rejects the treaty proposal. Of course, then probably the EU will be way less amenable to a free trade pact. Someone being free to do something does not exempt that someone from the consequences of doing that something. If the treaty is put into effect, then at any moment the UK (either from action by the Executive1 or the Parliament1, that is to be internally decided by the UK) can just decide that EU trade is not worth following EU regulations and just withdraw from the treaty. Happens all the time. That the UK cannot unilaterally withdraw from the treaty means is that, should the UK unilaterally decide to leave the "backstop", the UK will be in breach of the treaty and so the EU can ask in international courts for compensation3. In contrast, in many treaties there are explicit clauses explaining the conditions (e.g. notification in advance to the other parties) that allow for a signatory to "lawfully" withdraw from the treaty. But certainly the EU cannot impose its laws on the UK against the decision of the Parliament (again, this is pretty much what "the UK is a sovereign country" means). 1 Elected by British citizens2. So much for "political discrimination". 2Actually it is something more complicated but not because of the EU but of the Empire, as there are some rules allowing citizens of British Overseas Territories or Commonwealth to vote. But that is a question completely internal to the UK. 3And of course, cancel the tariff-free part of the treaty and the agreements for after the backstop ends.
Historically, this was true in the Icelandic Commonwealth in the Middle Ages, and in some democratic Greek city-states in the classical era. Similarly, in non-democratic feudal regimes, the lord or monarch was both the law giver and sitting in court was also the arbiter of all disputes arising under the lord's own laws. In places like Saudi Arabia where the monarchy's power is more than symbolic, the system still works this way to a significant extent. The practical reality in most one party Communist states is similar. In the United Kingdom, historically, the Appellate committee of the House of Lords (staffed by a subset of aristocrats usually appointed for life by the Prime Minister to the post) was the highest court of appeal of other courts in the British Commonwealth (with the Judicial committee of the Privy Council handling final appeals from outside Britain), and it was also a court of original jurisdiction for certain criminal cases against other aristocrats to satisfy the Magna Carta's notion that one is entitled to a jury of one's peers. Top level general purpose legislatures rarely serve as courts at the highest level, except in very isolated political matters. A good example of narrow quasi-judicial legislative power is the power of the Congress in the U.S., to be the ultimate judge for Congressional election disputes and of some Presidential election disputes. Congress also has quasi-judicial jurisdiction over impeachments of government employees whether or not they are elected, and over expulsions for cause of its own members and over other ethical sanctions of its own members. Many other legislatures have some sort of quansi-judicial impeachment and/or explusion power exercised as a whole by by some committee within it. It is common in the United States for administrative agencies, within their narrow area of competence to exercise both quasi-legislative power to enact regulations with a broad mandate in a subject area, and also to have quasi-judicial power in that same subject area. The Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Internal Revenue Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Merit System Protection Board, for example, all operate in this fashion to some extent. Likewise, it is very common at the local government level for a city council and its planning board to carry out both legislative roles and quasi-judicial role when disputes come up regarding its land use regulations. Similarly, school boards routinely both establish employment regulations and other school rules, and serve in a quasi-judicial role with respect employee discipline or termination, and with respect to student discipline. This dual role is also common for the boards of other public institutions like hospitals and state colleges, and for private non-profit organizations. A recent example in that kind of situation is Colorado's State School Board which both exercises legislative power over when charter schools (i.e. public schools not under the direct supervision of any elected local school board) may be formed, and has the ultimate and final judicial review role over decisions by local school boards to grant or deny school charters.
The most relevant federal Obstruction of Justice type is from 18 USC 1505: Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress— I'm not sure if passed Articles of Impeachment count as an "inquiry", and I'm not sure whether failing to "send" them to the other house is "corruptly impeding". Even if those two conditions are met, members of Congress are immune to judicial process for acts taken while they are in session, as part of the Speech or Debate clause of the Constitution (Article 1, Section 6, Clause 1): ...shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their attendance at the Session of their Respective Houses, and in going to and from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So, if the person in question is not a member of Congress acting in their official capacity and intentionally endeavors to prevent passed Articles of Impeachment from being sent from the House to the Senate (e.g. a courier intentionally failing to deliver them, or an IT person preventing the electronic form from being copied into the Senate's database), I do not know whether that could be considered Obstruction of Justice, as I doubt such a situation has ever been adjudicated. Given the publicity of the proceedings, such an impediment would probably be found out or overcome so quickly that no one would be inclined to do more than fire the perpetrator.
This was asked and answered by KPD on the Politics stackexchange. This issue came up in a decision from an appeals court, with a judge dying before the opinion was released, leading to the following SCOTUS opinion. The short of the answer: that Judge's vote is voided. If the result of negating the deceased Justice's vote is a 4-4 tie, then the usual procedure for a 4-4 tie is invoked, which is addressed in the Q&amp;A you link. Of course this assumes that SCOTUS will apply this to themselves, but the issue appears to be non-controversial, as it was a fairly recent decision with no dissents noted. So this assumption seems safe.
To become law, a bill must be passed, in identical form, by both chambers of Congress, during the same Congress that is during the two-year period between congressional elections. At the end of a congress (also called a term), any bill that did not become law (passed by both chambers and signed by the President or any veto overridden) is dead. It may be taken up in a later congress, but it starts again from the beginning of the process. See Article I, Section 7, Clauses 2 and 3 of the United States Constitution The comments correctly point out that the constitutional provision cited and linked to above does not specify the rule that a bill must pass both chambers during the same Congress (sometimes called the same term of Congress). I am confident that the rule stated above is correct. I have read news stories about bills that did not pass both chambers &quot;dying&quot; at the end of a Congress, although I have no citations to hand at the moment. I have spent several hours over the last two days searching the House and Senate websites, reading the House rules, the Senate rules, and Jefferson's Manual. Jefferson's Manual began as notes on parliamentary procedure, made for his own use by Thomas Jefferson during his tenure as Vice-President (1797-1801), based on the then-current procedure of the English Parliament. It is the original basis for the Senate rules. I understand that it is still considered an authority on the procedures of Parliament as they existed in the period 1750-1801. Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice section li (a session) (sec 588, page 316), reads: Parliament have three modes of separation, to wit: by adjournment, by prorogation or dissolution by the King, or by the efflux of the term for which they were elected. Prorogation or dissolution constitutes there what is called a session; provided some act was passed. In this case all matters depending before them are discontinued, and at their next meeting are to be taken up de novo, if taken up at all. 1 Blackst., 186. ... [Sec 590, page 317] Congress separate in two ways only, to wit, by adjournment, or dissolution by the efflux of their time. What, then, constitutes a session with them? A dissolution certainly closes one session, and the meeting of the new Congress begins another. The Constitution authorizes the President, &quot;on extraordinary occasions to convene both Houses, or either of them.&quot; I. 3. If convened by the President's proclamation, this must begin a new session, and of course determine the preceding one to have been a session. So if it meets under the clause of the Constitution which says, &quot;the Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.&quot; I. 4. This must begin a new session; for even if the last adjournment was to this day the act of adjournment is merged in the higher authority of the Constitution, and the meeting will be under that, and not under their adjournment. So far we have fixed landmarks for determining sessions. ... [Sec 592, page 318] When it was said above that all matters depending before Parliament were discontinued by the determination of the session, it was not meant for judiciary cases depending before the House of Lords, such as impeachments, appeals, and writs of error. These stand continued, of course, to the next session. Raym., 120, 381; Ruffh. Fac., L. D., Parliament. The practice of the English Parliament as set down by Mr. Jefferson seems to be the basis of the current US practice, but I can find no law, nor any provision of the current house or senate rules, explicitly adopting or codifying it, or setting it as a rule for the US. The official page How Our Laws Are Made has an extensive discussion of the progress of a bill from proposal to law, but nowhere mentions what happens to a bill not agreed to by both chambers.
The Rules of Professional Conduct apply only to lawyers and are the foundation for a lawyer to be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred or receive other license related professional discipline. They are neither criminal offenses, nor on their own, a grounds for a civil lawsuit (although they may be relevant to an element of a civil cause of action giving rise to a lawsuit). The Rules of Professional Conduct also prohibit using a non-lawyer as a sock puppet to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. But, the Rules of Professional Conduct themselves are not applicable to pro se parties or even to non-lawyer parties who are acting fully independently of the lawyers they have retained. In some circumstances, a violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(g) could also constitute the crime of extortion, or could constitute duress such that an action taken in the course of litigation or a business deal is not actually legally considered to be voluntary and making it potentially voidable. But this would not always, or necessarily even usually, be the case. Incidentally, Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 is one of the Rules of Professional Conduct with the most state to state substantive variations and it also has multiple differing interpretations even in cases where the language is verbatim identical between states. The appropriate scope of this rule as a matter of policy is one of considerable controversy. And, it isn't unusual for the converse to happen (i.e. for a criminal prosecutor or an attorney regulation system official to force the hand of a civil litigant in the course of negotiations about those charges).