How long have prisons (in the USA?) had this &quot;open&quot; concept? I remember this American TV show called &quot;Oz&quot;. It was (or so I thought) about this fictional, experimental new kind of prison where basically the inmates live together and have large open spaces where they can walk around freely most of the time and interact with each other, and their cells are wide open for anyone to walk into except during certain &quot;lockdowns&quot;/sleep time. After watching some reality prison TV series in recent years, it seems like this is now a thing in reality. Now I wonder: Is this unique to the USA, or now common elsewhere? How long has this been done, as opposed to keeping all the inmates constantly locked in their own cells and only seeing each other when eating in a dedicated eating place or when brought outdoors once a day for an hour or so? If you get sent to such a prison, can you choose to get a normal cell if you don't want anything to do with these violent, crazy people? Or are you forced to endure that living nightmare and constantly be on guard? Even though it would be terrible to blocked in a little cell all my life, with possibly one other guy at worst, I'd definitely pick it over having to interact with all those scumbags all day, every day. What a true Hell...
Is this unique to the USA, or now common elsewhere? No. It is common throughout the developed world. How long has this been done, as opposed to keeping all the inmates constantly locked in their own cells and only seeing each other when eating in a dedicated eating place or when brought outdoors once a day for an hour or so? Before the late 18th century, imprisonment was not a punishment - it was a place where you were held while awaiting trial or punishment: execution, corporal punishment, humiliation or transportation. However, it was not uncommon for prisoners who had been acquitted to still be held because they couldn't pay the cost of their pre-trial imprisonment. The 1779 Penitentiary Act introduced solitary confinement, religious instruction, and a labour regime. These types of prisons were not actually built until the 19th century and saw increasing use as the death penalty became applicable to fewer and fewer crimes. These types of prisons spread across the western world and it is this 100+-year-old image that you are thinking of. However, for some reason, solitary confinement and individual prayer seemed to cause no improvement in the moral state of prisoners. Therefore, since the early 20th (yes, 20th) century most prisons had communal mess halls and recreation yards for use on the weekend. In most, prisoners worked during the week, around the prison or outside in things like quarries and road construction. Starting in the late 20th century &quot;hard labour&quot; was largely done away with and prisoners were offered work or education opportunities. They were confined to their cells at night in medium-security and higher-level prisons but low-security prisons often work on an honour system and cells are not locked. Developments such as day-release and weekend detention have influenced prisons. Many northern European countries have literally open prisons where you are free to come and go so long as you spend the nights there. Only the worst of the worst are kept in super-max prisons and only the worst of them are kept to their cells and isolated from the rest of the prison population. Those are the people who get 1 hours recreation only. That said, prisoners have rights and their physical and psychological well-being are the responsibility of the State. Doctors and psychologists examine prisoners and balance risks to society against the rights of the prisoner. I've worked inside super-max prisons as a contractor and they are bleak and scary places but most inmates are free to roam around the grounds and other common spaces. I've also worked in low-security prisons and they are very different - still not nice places but spartanly comfortable. If you get sent to such a prison, can you choose to get a normal cell if you don't want anything to do with these violent, crazy people? Or are you forced to endure that living nightmare and constantly be on guard? You're a prisoner. One of your punishments is having your freedom of choice taken away from you. The system will tell you where you sleep, where you eat, where you can go and when you can go there. If you are a &quot;violent, crazy&quot; person then you will be in a super-max prison with other &quot;violent, crazy people&quot;. If you are a white-collar criminal, you won't be.
Even if unlimited resources were available, in order to have a fair trial, the prosecution and defense both need time to prepare their cases, research the law, conduct investigations, gather evidence, interview witnesses, seek out experts, order forensic tests, etc, etc. And there will be pretrial motions that have to be prepared, argued, and judged. You have to figure out what's going to happen to the defendant during that time, be it detention, release, bail, or some other alternative. Shortages of personnel obviously exacerbate the delays, but even without that issue, it's not like the courts could try every defendant on the spot. That would be something like the Wild West, or the Dark Ages; certainly not what the modern world considers justice.
Q: Why don't US prosecutors press for imprisonment for crime in the banking industry? Q. Why aren't US prosecutors (and UK prosecutors for that matter) not pressing for imprisonment in such cases? Is this because there are no such laws under bankers can be so indicted (notably, in the case reported on above, there is the additional complication of extradition) . . . ? Prosecutors have the legal authority to prosecute bankers for crimes, and not infrequently do press charge bankers with crimes and press for imprisonment for crimes in the banking industry, and have obtained many very long prison sentences in cases like these. For example, "following the savings-and-loan crisis of the 1980s, more than 1,000 bankers of all stripes were jailed for their transgressions." And, in 2008, the laws involved were, if anything, easier to prosecute and had stricter penalties than they did in the 1980s. There were 35 bankers convicted and sent to prison in the financial crisis, although arguably only one of them was really a senior official. This said, the real question is not why they don't do this at all, but why prosecutors exercise their discretion to refrain from seeking imprisonment or lengthy imprisonment, in cases where they either have a conviction or could easily secure a conviction. A former justice department prosecutor (in the Enron case) argues in an Atlantic article that it is harder than it looks. But, he ignores the fact that a lot of people looking at the very Enron case he prosecuted after the fact has concluded that the criminal prosecution may have done more harm than good, leading to significant harm to innocent people (for example by destroying the careers and wealth of Arthur Anderson accountants who had no involvement with the case, due to a conviction that was ultimately overturned on appeal). This changed the pro-prosecution of corporations attitude that had prevailed before then (corporations are easier to prosecute than individuals since you don't have to figure out exactly who in the corporation committed the wrong). This time, regulators and securities law enforcers sought mostly civil fines against entities with some success: 49 financial institutions have paid various government entities and private plaintiffs nearly $190 billion in fines and settlements, according to an analysis by the investment bank Keefe, Bruyette &amp; Woods. That may seem like a big number, but the money has come from shareholders, not individual bankers. (Settlements were levied on corporations, not specific employees, and paid out as corporate expenses—in some cases, tax-deductible ones.) The same link also points out the two very early criminal prosecutions against individuals resulted in acquittals by juries at trial, for reasons that may have been very specific to those trials, undermining the willingness of prosecutors to press even strong cases for almost three years and undermining the credibility of their threat to prosecute criminally. Also, this is not a universal rule. For example, China routinely executes people who are convicted in summary trials of banking law violations and corruption charges. Q. Is this due to the principle of limited liability? No. Banking officials in a limited liability entity (and all banks are limited liability entities) can have criminal liability for acts in violation of banking and fraud laws, notwithstanding limited liability. Is this because . . . powerful vested interests prevents the actual execution of the law as it is intended? If so - how exactly are they prevented? This does happen but not often. Sometimes this happens, but not very often. The corruption angle is a popular narrative on the political very progressive left of American politics, but as I explain below (as you note "Chomsky, the formation of Western capitalism was in large part by due to "radical judicial activism".", and Chomsky is a very left wing social and economic historian almost to the point of Marxist analysis), this visceral narrative isn't really accurate most of the time. First, for what it is worth, the prosecutors play a much larger role in this than "activist" judges do. Secondly, the decision making process is more nuanced and less blatantly corrupt and self-interested than his attempt at "legal realist" analysis would suggest. There are legitimate reasons for someone in a prosecutor's shoes to focus less on these cases, even if in the end analysis you think that they have made the wrong choices in these cases. The case for prosecuting banking fraud severely is basically a utilitarian one, but criminal prosecution is guided by norms beyond utilitarian norms. There are certainly cases where an elected prosecutor or high level elected official is persuaded not to bring criminal charges or to be lenient due to pressure from powerful vested interest. When this is done, a white collar criminal defense attorney, or a "fixer" who deals with political sensitive cases (sometimes on an elected official's staff and sometimes not), or an elected official or political party official contacts the prosecutor or the prosecutor's boss or is the prosecutor's boss, and based upon the plea from the powerful interests (direct or indirect) urges the prosecutor to back off and the prosecutor complies. At the most extreme level, a Governor or President or parole board can pardon someone facing prison for banking crimes, which has happened, but is extremely rare. But, this sort of direct intervention in an individual case is not terribly common. My guess would be that 1% to 10% of banking prosecutions are affected by this kind of influence particular to a given case. This is far too small a number of cases to reflect the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal bank fraud cases that we observe. More Often Policy Decisions Are Involved Budgets And Institutional Case Prioritization Much more common would be for the elected prosecutor or the administration that employs an appointed prosecutor to decide to deprioritize a particular kind of case and/or to reduce funding (both at the law enforcement/regulatory agency level and at the subdepartment of the prosecuting attorney's organization level) for prosecution of these kinds of cases as a matter of broad policy. Every prosecutor's office and law enforcement office on the planet has more crimes that it could prosecute and pursue than it has resources to do so, so it is always necessary to have some kind of priorities to decide which of those cases will be pursued. For example, perhaps the Justice Department funds a white collar crime enforcement office with the resources to prosecute only 750 cases a year, and there are 7,500 strong cases that the offices could prosecute. The white collar crime prosecution office has to then prioritize which of the 7,500 strong cases is chooses to pursue. It might, for example, in good faith, decide the focus on white collar crime cases that harm "widows and orphans" and other large groups of people who can't afford to hire their own lawyers to bring civil cases to sue the wrongdoers themselves to mitigate the harm that they suffer. More specifically, a policy set in place by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in the Justice Department in 1999 was followed: The so-called Holder Doctrine, a June 1999 memorandum written by the then–deputy attorney general warning of the dangers of prosecuting big banks—a variant of the “too big to fail” argument that has since become so familiar. Holder’s memo asserted that “collateral consequences” from prosecutions—including corporate instability or collapse—should be taken into account when deciding whether to prosecute a big financial institution. That sentiment was echoed as late as 2012 by Lanny Breuer, then the head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, who said in a speech at the New York City Bar Association that he felt it was his duty to consider the health of the company, the industry, and the markets in deciding whether or not to file charges. This was a top level policy choice made a decade before the Financial Crisis arose, not an individualized act of corrupt interference. Advocacy From Representatives Of Victims Another common voice for leniency are lawyers on behalf of victims of white collar crimes (I've been in this spot myself on behalf of clients). Why? Mostly for two reasons: People in prison don't make future income to compensate the victims out of. People prosecuted criminally pay fines and court costs that don't go to the victims and reduce the pool of available funds for the victims. The private lawyers representing victims recognize that not prosecuting a white collar criminal leaves that person at large to commit future economic crimes (white collar criminals are rarely a physical threat to the people in the community around them or to anyone who doesn't do business with them) and that it fails to strongly discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Institutional victims of banking crimes and other white collar crimes may also urge prosecutors not to prosecute the crimes that victimized them, because they fear that the publicity would harm them more than the criminal penalties for the offender (whom they have ample means to sue in a civil action) would benefit them. The fact that victims seek leniency more often in white collar crime cases than in almost any kind of case (other than domestic violence cases, where victims also often urge leniency out of love and as a result of their economic dependency on the perpetrator), often causes prosecutors to determine that criminal prosecutions seeking long prison sentences are not a priority for the victims of these crimes and to prioritize their case loads accordingly. To get the $190 billion of settlement money that was paid from individuals would have required convictions of 1900 people capable of paying $100,000,000 each in 1900 very hard fought individual criminal cases, instead of 49 civil cases. This may or may not have been possible, as the most culpable figures were often in upper management, while the most affluent potential defendants were in top management and would have been harder to pin with personal criminal liability. Many top managers are relatively hands off in their management style and didn't get into the culpable criminal details. There are plenty of very influential and powerful bankers who were highly culpable who would have had less than $10,000,000 of net worth, much of which wasn't tainted with improper conduct, which isn't to say that prosecutors couldn't have seized it from them for fines and restitution, but it does make the moral case for doing so less clearly compelling. Evaluating Priorities For Limited And Expensive Prison Resources Prosecutors sometimes reason in white collar crime cases that keeping a white collar criminal in prison is very expensive to the state (up to $70,000 per person per year), and doesn't change the risk of physical harm to the general public, and that a felony conviction itself and fines and publicity and probation conditions are often sufficient to mitigate the risk that the convicted person will reoffend and to discourage others from doing the same thing in the future. Parole boards, in systems that have them, often release white collar criminals as early as possible, applying the same reasoning. Also, white collar criminals tend to be model prisoners. An incarcerated white collar defendant is also depriving the public of tax revenues on income that person would otherwise receive if out of prison. A long prison sentence can victimize the public economically in amounts comparable to a moderate magnitude economic crime. Crudely speaking, prosecutors reason: "Why spend huge amounts of scarce prison money to lock someone up when we have murders and rapists and people who steal things at gun point and violent criminals who seriously injure people without justification who really need to be our priority to get off the streets? The devious and dishonest banker doesn't present the same sort of risk to the general public and his conviction and probation conditions should suffice to prevent him from having the ability to do this in the future." Social Class Bias Yet another reason is that often prosecutors and the people who set policy for prosecutors don't see white collar crimes as culpable in the same way that they do blue collar crimes. Most prosecutors spend the vast majority of their careers prosecuting blue collar criminals, terrorists and the like. These are people from a different social class, who live lives very unlike their own, and the people who are victimized by these crimes tend to be middle class or more affluent people and businesses. Banks, for example, are routinely victims of armed robberies which prosecutors prosecute, and of embezzlement by low level employees, which prosecutors prosecute. Bankers socio-economically and culturally are a lot like the prosecutors themselves (who are lawyers), their peers, and the victims they usually defend, and are rarely like the people that they usually prosecute (lower class, often minority people, who have never worked in an office, failed in school, are quick to anger and hurt others, etc.). At an individual case level, a white collar criminal defense lawyer can often marshal very impressive character witnesses to say that the defendant is basically a good guy who messed up once, while this is frequently very difficult for blue collar criminal defendants to do in a way that really reaches prosecutors and judges. The bottom line is that prosecutors (and judges, many of whom are former prosecutors) sympathize with, understand and relate to white collar criminals far more than they do with ordinary blue collar criminals. And, this colors their judgments about what kinds of punishments (criminal or non-criminal) are appropriate for the kind of conduct that these people commit. Their instinct is that a crime that might be committed by someone like me is probably not as serious as a crime that a judge or prosecutor would never dream of committing like an armed robbery of a bank, even though economically, the banking fraud crime may have caused $500,000,000 of harm while the armed bank robbery may have caused only $5,000 of harm.
Maybe. There are two questions presented. The first is whether someone who is in prison for a felony may be admitted to the practice of law. There is not a categorical prohibition on doing so. Instead, a character and fitness committee in each state to which an applicant seeks admission (even if it is a reciprocal admission) considers an applicant on a case by case basis. Usually, people with a felony conviction that is being served or is recent are not admitted to the practice of law, but it is not a blanket prohibition, so that could happen, although it would be highly unusual. The second question is whether someone admitted to the practice of law in good standing who is incarcerated in prison would be allowed to do so by prison officials. The work the inmates are allowed to do is largely in the discretion of the prison warden at a particular institution. It isn't inconceivable that a prison warden could allow an inmate to do this subject to significant limitations on scope of practice, but again, it would be highly unusual. Some factors that might encourage a prison warden to allow it would be that: (1) the state has to pay another lawyer to represent inmates in some kinds of cases if the fellow inmate does not at greater expense per hour to the state, (2) it might promote rehabilitation and garner good press, and (3) the prison warden might reasonably guess that an inmate represented by a fellow inmate is less likely to prevail on the merits than an inmate represented by another lawyer and might prefer that outcome. The leading treatise on the subject of lawyering by inmates, with and without full or limited admission to the practice of law, is the Jailhouse Lawyer's Manual.
I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.
The Fifth Amendment only protects you against being compelled to testify by the government. So unless Wonder Woman is acting on behalf of the government, information obtained through the use of the Golden Lasso is admissible. The question about whether she has been "deputized," is not the right one. Rather, the question is whether she is a "state actor." The answer to such a question is not always clear, as courts may ask a variety of questions to reach it: Is the actor paid by the government? Directed by the government? Assisted by the government? Acting under some power established by law? Also, is it "fair" to attribute that actor's actions to the government? Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 936 (1982). Undoubtedly, there are occasions in Wonder Woman's history where she has worked closely enough with the police that a Golden Lasso confession would be inadmissible. And there are many times where she was working so independently that a Golden Lasso confession would be plainly admissible. I don't remember the exact circumstances of the confessions you're talking about, but if they were from the "small group of reactionary terrorists" I remember from the beginning of the film, I can't think of any basis for excluding their confessions. Wonder Woman came on scene independently, took control and subdued the suspects without any police direction or assistance. Unless the police later asked her to assist with the interrogations, those confessions could not be "fairly attributed" to the government. (All of this is of course ignoring the fact that the crime and confessions occurred outside of the United States and are therefore not covered by the Fifth Amendment.)
united-states He'd be looking at ~6+ more years in prison in the second scenario In the United States, this would be attempted murder in both cases, though in the case of actual physical harm, the prosecutor could charge related offenses such as battery, which is &quot;an intentional offensive or harmful touching of another person that is done without his or her consent.&quot; Note that though most attempted murders would likely be state crimes, I'm going to answer the rest of this from the perspective of a federal prosecution for attempted murder. The result would likely be similar for states, though the exact mechanism would be different. Sentencing for people convicted of serious federal crimes is guided by the United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines. An &quot;offense level&quot; is determined, then combined with the offender's criminal history and checked against the sentencing table to determine a suggested sentencing range for the judge. Specifically, for Assault with Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder, §2A2.1. states that: (a) Base Offense Level: (1) 33, if the object of the offense would have constituted first degree murder; or (2) 27, otherwise. (b) Specific Offense Characteristics (1) If (A) the victim sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury, increase by 4 levels; (B) the victim sustained serious bodily injury, increase by 2 levels; or (C) the degree of injury is between that specified in subdivisions (A) and (B), increase by 3 levels. (2) If the offense involved the offer or the receipt of anything of pecuniary value for undertaking the murder, increase by 4 levels. So in this case, it sounds like Joe suffered a life-threatening injury in the scenario where he got shot. Let's assume that this is Bob's first offense, and that it would have constituted first degree murder. If Bob missed, he'd be looking at 135-168 months (11.25-14 years) in prison. If he shot Joe successfully, he'd be instead looking at 210-262 months (17.5-21.83 years) in prison.
If I were a federal prosecutor (which I'm emphatically not), I might try to charge you under 18 USC § 32 (a) (5): a) Whoever willfully— [...] (5) interferes with or disables, with intent to endanger the safety of any person or with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, anyone engaged in the authorized operation of such aircraft or any air navigation facility aiding in the navigation of any such aircraft; [...] shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both. Since you clearly know, or believe, that this has the potential to interfere with piloting, which would obviously be a serious danger to people on board the aircraft, I'd argue you would be acting with "reckless disregard for the safety of human life." If your conduct results in anybody's death, then life imprisonment and/or the death penalty are also on the table, under 18 USC § 34.