Can Trump use executive order to lower the Medicare age? I was reading this opinion piece about the new Trump presidency and healthcare legislation. They mention an interesting thought at the end: it if Trump decided to ... lowering the age-limit for Medicare to zero by executive order. The question is simple: would this be legal? Once Trump is inaugurated, can he create "Medicare for all" with the stroke of a pen?
No. The scope of Medicare is established by statute which must be amended with a statute approved by Congress and signed by the President, or approved after being vetoed by the President with a veto override, to be changed. The age limitation is set forth at 42 U.S.C. 1395c: The insurance program for which entitlement is established by sections 226 and 226A provides basic protection against the costs of hospital, related post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care in accordance with this part for (1) individuals who are age 65 or over and are eligible for retirement benefits under title II of this Act (or would be eligible for such benefits if certain government employment were covered employment under such title) or under the railroad retirement system, (2) individuals under age 65 who have been entitled for not less than 24 months to benefits under title II of this Act (or would have been so entitled to such benefits if certain government employment were covered employment under such title) or under the railroad retirement system on the basis of a disability, and (3) certain individuals who do not meet the conditions specified in either clause (1) or (2) but who are medically determined to have end stage renal disease. Also, money doesn't grow on trees. The only way to provide that greatly expanded single payer health care benefit would be to raise hundreds of millions of dollars or more of new taxes to pay for it. Any new tax would have to be proposed with a bill initiated in the House of Representatives, approved by the Senate, and then passed by the President (or approved over his veto with a veto override). Likewise, the increased appropriation of funds for the benefits would have to be approved by Congress, even though it is an entitlement, because current legislation doesn't authorize spending for that purpose.
TL;DR: Most likely, for certain drugs. Self-prescribing was never illegal under Federal Law; it is regulated to varying degrees by the states, and discouraged by professional organizations like the American Medical Association. Pharmacists can refuse to fill prescriptions they are uncomfortable filling, and many will not fill self-prescriptions. It's not clear if, as originally written, this question is referring to the FDA's Expanded Access Program, which was created under FDA's regulatory authority (ergo it is not a law) and is colloquially called compassionate use; or the Right to Try Act, which was signed into law by President Trump in 2018. I am going to take a few moments to give an overview of both and then get to the question of self-prescribing. Expanded Access has been around for about 30 years, when it began as a way to make experimental HIV drugs available to patients during the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It has been used since them to make drugs available for a variety of diseases (like cancer), and most recently for COVID-19. The Right to Try Act is similar in that it makes experimental drugs available to patients before they have received full regulatory approval. The mechanism for that availability is a different, and it has since it is a law it has the explicit approval of Congress. Here are a journal article and a very good table breaking down the differences between Right to Try and Expanded Access. Neither of these modify the patient/doctor relationship, so they do not effect whether a prescriber can write their own prescriptions either way. A doctor could probably prescribe COVID-19-related treatments for themselves approved for widespread use under Expanded Access; they would likely be unable to self-prescribe other more medically-complex, higher-risk treatments like chemotherapy. See below. Self-prescribing is legal under federal law. As noted by the Emergency Care Research Institute: Under federal law, physicians in the United States are not prohibited from self-prescribing medications. State laws governing physicians, however, vary greatly, and some may prohibit physicians from prescribing, dispensing, or administering certain medications to themselves or family members. Restrictions vary by state. Most (perhaps all) states prohibit a prescriber from self-prescribing Schedule II controlled substances, with some providing an exception for an emergency. Many prohibit prescribing of Schedule II drugs to family members. I have found several sources that claim some states outright prohibit self-prescribing, but whenever I follow those back to the actual statute they only apply to Schedule II drugs. Professional organizations like the American Medical Association strongly discourage their members self-prescribing, stating in their Code of Ethics that &quot;treating oneself or a member of one's own family poses several challenges for physicians, including concerns about professional objectivity, patient autonomy, and informed consent.&quot; The greatest barrier to self-prescribing lies at the pharmacy, where pharmacists are able to refuse prescriptions when they question the medical necessity or standard of care that lead to the prescription.
There is no legal process whereby a demand can be made that POTUS nominate or consider a specific individual for some appointment such as a court position. There can be no law prescribing how such nominations come about, other than The Constitution which says that POTUS shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law Congress does not have the power to pass laws limiting how POTUS makes nominations, therefore whatever POTUS wants to do in this respect is a non-justiciable matter.
The bill was never passed. According to the list of all actions on Congress.gov, the bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Commerce in April 2019. Evidently, that subcommittee never did anything further with it. The bill was never voted on by either the House or the Senate.
Does the Special Counsel's non traditional prosecutorial decision making put the president above the law since he is unable to be prosecuted? All federal government employees, including the Special Counsel, are required to conform to the interpretations of the law provided by the Office of Legal Counsel in the absence of a directly applicable court order to the contrary. But, the fact that the federal government attorneys are effectively prohibited from prosecuting the President for crimes while the President is currently in office does not put him entirely above the law. This does not preclude state and local prosecutors from charging the President with state crimes while he holds office, and if those crimes do not arise from the President's conduct in an official capacity while serving as President (in which case Presidential immunity bars actions). This does not preclude federal prosecutors from charging the President with federal crimes committing while the President held office or before the President held office after the President ceases to serve as President. This does not preclude a federal court from declaring that the Office of Legal Counsel opinion by which the Special Counsel is bound on this issue is invalid, although it is challenging to think of a procedural context in which this issue could be squarely presented to a court. The OLC opinion could also probably be overridden by Congress in a law (that would probably have to overcome a Presidential veto), as the claim that the OLC decision is one that it is constitutionally required to arrive at is a weak one. This does not preclude individuals or Congress from bringing suit against the President in a civil action, including a contempt of court proceeding in a civil action prosecuted by someone other than a federal government attorney. This does not preclude Congress from impeaching the President and removing him from office. Nonetheless, the Office of Legal Counsel opinion referred to by the Special Counsel certainly does significantly impair the extent to which a President can be punished for violating federal law as a practical matter. This seems to directly contradict the "no man is above the law" principle outlined by the 14th amendment of the constitution. I'm not sure what makes you think that the 14th Amendment is relevant in this case. Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution sets a minimum threshold for citizenship and sets for constitutional obligations that apply to U.S. states. Sections 2-4 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution govern issues particular to the Reconstruction era. Section 5 of the 14th Amendment gives Congress the authority to pass legislation enforcing the other sections. There isn't really a "no man is above the law" concept expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution (in contrast, France has had such a provision since the French Revolution). But, to the extent that one can construed a provision of the U.S. Constitution as setting forth such a requirement, it needs to be in a provision that applies to the federal government, rather than one applicable to state governments.
Yes, the President can certainly veto such a law. Per the US Constitution (emphasis added): Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. This can have a very real effect: legislators are under no obligation to vote the same way on a veto override as on the original bill. The reason the President needs to supply written objections in the first place is that it lets legislators reconsider, see if they're swayed, or see if they think this is a matter where a Congressional majority needs to be respected even if they disagree (they can change their mind in either direction). They can also get a sense of public reaction. And because the threshold for this is "present and voting," it's possible that just more legislators show up. Even if legislators won't be swayed, it still matters for pocket vetoes. That's where the President neither signs the bill nor returns it within 10 days; normally this is equivalent to signing, but if Congress adjourns in the meantime, it means the bill does not become a law. Because "Congress adjourns" is a necessary part of a pocket veto, it's impossible to override the veto (you can't do it if you're not in session). And even when this doesn't apply either, it matters for politics. Example of a futile veto: Public Law 100-4. Passed 406-8 in the House, 93-6 in the Senate. Vetoed; veto was overridden 401-26 in the House and 86-14 in the Senate (note that at least 7 Senators who voted for the bill voted not to override the veto). Example of an effective veto: While technically there was a conference report agreed to by both houses, and it doesn't seem to have had a roll-call vote (my guess is it was agreed to by unanimous consent; side note: many, many laws don't have roll-calls to check on, because they're passed by voice vote or unanimous consent), H.R.10929 from the 95th Congress was passed in the House by a vote of 319-67 and in the Senate by 87-2. After President Carter vetoed it, the House voted on whether to override the veto. The motion to override was defeated 191-206: after the veto, they couldn't even get a simple majority to override the veto of the bill which had been passed by an overwhelming supermajority. I mentioned it above, but the two-thirds threshold is "present and voting." As a general rule, any time you see a fraction of something needed for a vote to succeed in a deliberative assembly, then unless it specifies some other denominator, it's talking about the fraction of members present and voting. Relevant CRS report on override procedure.
Generally, no. Legislatures pass laws. The fact that someone else knows more about the thing they're passing laws about is utterly irrelevant -- the power to make laws is given to the legislature, not to experts. If the legislature thinks experts should make the rules on something, they can delegate (this is why the FDA approves medicine rather than Congress), but the legislature of a state generally has the power to pass any law that is not unconstitutional. Your analogy to paper money is a poor one: that's a federalism thing, not an expertise thing. Congress has established a system of paper money, and states can't interfere with that. It's not that the Fed thinks paper money is good, it's that Congress said paper money shall be a thing. That could stop a state from banning an FDA-approved drug; however, since marijuana is illegal under federal law, it would be odd to conclude that banning it at the state level as well is preempted. Legislators aren't inherently experts on anything (except being elected). That doesn't matter. They have the authority to pass laws, even if those laws directly go against the views of people who are recognized experts in the area. You appear to think there must be a judicial remedy against bad policy. You would be wrong. The role of the courts is not to decide what policies are good or bad; they are concerned only with what is legal. Deciding what policies are good or bad is a matter for the democratically elected representatives of the people, or for the people themselves in states with ballot questions. It is not the job of the courts.
The comments have basically covered this, but: It's a slightly weird parallel structure ("who shall not be at least 25, and been a citizen for 7 years, and who shall not be a resident"). The Constitution is not written in fluid 21st-century English. But the obviously correct way to parse the sentence is that no one can be a representative who isn't a 25-year-old or older who's been a citizen for at least 7 years; furthermore, no one can be a representative who wasn't a resident of the state they represent when they were elected. With some parts of the Constitution (like the Second Amendment), the drafting results in actual disputes about the intended meaning. With other parts (like here), only one reading makes any sense. It's the same with the requirements to be President. The Constitution says "No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President," which could be read as "you're not eligible unless, when the Constitution was adopted, you were either a citizen of the US or a natural-born citizen." But that's a silly reading, so "at the time of the Adoption" is read as only applying to "a Citizen of the United States:" natural-born citizens are eligible period, and people who were born before the US was a thing but were citizens by the time the Constitution was adopted were grandfathered in.