Definition of &quot;Direct Financial Benefit&quot; in the DMCA Title 17 I run a website with pages for famous people, books, brands, movies, etc. Users can rate and discuss these things. Each page has a "profile picture", which is added by a user and then approved by a site moderator, to make sure it is non-offensive and meets quality standards. I receive financial benefit by selling adspace. The Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Title 17, Chapter 5, § 512, provides a safe harbor from copyrighted works added by users, as long as the website does not directly benefit financially from the work: "A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subjection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider...does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such activity..." It could be argued that the user-added pictures make the site a more pleasant experience and therefore more profitable, but it is clear that they are not the main purpose of the site. Has the phrase "directly attributable to the infringing material" ever been concretely defined as used in this context?
Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F.Supp.2d 688 (D. Md., 2001) touched on this. The court distinguishes Playboy Ent. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F.Supp. 503 (N.D.Oh.1997) which held that "contributory liability could attach where infringing performances enhance the attractiveness of the venue to potential customers." (internal quotes omitted) This sounds like your concern. The Costar court stated explicitly that merely adding value does not constitute direct benefit. In Costar the court found that Whereas in Playboy and Fonovisa, the finding of added value to the defendant was evidence that the defendant induced the infringement, for the purposes of the DMCA, the financial benefit must be "directly attributable to the infringing activity." 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (1998). CoStar might make an argument that the indirect type of benefit cited in Hardenburgh is also present here. However, such a benefit does not fit within the plain language of the statute. Accordingly, § 512(c)(1)(B) does not present a barrier to LoopNet remaining in the safe harbor. You could also take a look at Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir., 2013) the relevant inquiry is “ ‘whether the infringing activity constitutes a draw for subscribers, not just an added benefit.’ That case cites Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir., 2004) Ellison ultimately concluded that the financial benefit standard was not met, because there was inadequate proof that “customers either subscribed because of the available infringing material or cancelled subscriptions because it was no longer available.” But back to Fung, check this out (I quote this in its entirety because it's not that long and it should lead you to your own conclusion): Against this background, we note that we have never specified what constitutes a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity,” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added), where, as here, the service provider's revenue is derived from advertising, and not from users. We do so now. Here, the record shows that Fung generated revenue by selling advertising space on his websites. The advertising revenue depended on the number of users who viewed and then clicked on the advertisements. Fung marketed advertising to one advertiser by pointing to the “TV and movies ... at the top of the most frequently searched by our viewers,” and provided another with a list of typical user search queries, including popular movies and television shows. In addition, there was a vast amount of infringing material on his websites—whether 90–96% or somewhat less—supporting an inference that Fung's revenue stream is predicated on the broad availability of infringing materials for his users, thereby attracting advertisers. And, as we have seen, Fung actively induced infringing activity on his sites. Under these circumstances, we hold the connection between the infringing activity and Fung's income stream derived from advertising is sufficiently direct to meet the direct “financial benefit” prong of § 512(c)(1)(B). Fung promoted advertising by pointing to infringing activity; obtained advertising revenue that depended on the number of visitors to his sites; attracted primarily visitors who were seeking to engage in infringing activity, as that is mostly what occurred on his sites; and encouraged that infringing activity. Given this confluence of circumstances, Fung's revenue stream was tied directly to the infringing activity involving his websites, both as to his ability to attract advertisers and as to the amount of revenue he received. Edit to add: There is also some legislative history that some courts point to at H.R.Rep. No. 105-551, Part 2. (I include the link to the closest thing I could find.) This language shows its age! I think the only thing that speaks to your issue is the last sentence (bc it's not you). In determining whether the financial benefit criterion is satisfied, courts should take a common-sense, fact-based approach, not a formalistic one. In general, a service provider conducting a legitimate business would not be considered to receive a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity' where the infringer makes the same kind of payment as non-infringing users of the provider's service. Thus, receiving a one-time set-up fee and flat, periodic payments for service from a person engaging in infringing activities would not constitute receiving a ‘financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.' Nor is subsection (c)(1)(B) intended to cover fees based on the length of the message (e.g., per number of bytes) or by connect time. It would however, include any such fees where the value of the service lies in providing access to infringing material.
What SE can do is controlled primarily by the Terms of Service. What most matters is the section on Subscriber Content, which says: You agree that any and all content, including without limitation any and all text, graphics, logos, tools, photographs, images, illustrations, software or source code, audio and video, animations, and product feedback (collectively, “Content”) that you provide to the public Network (collectively, “Subscriber Content”), is perpetually and irrevocably licensed to Stack Overflow on a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive basis pursuant to Creative Commons licensing terms (CC-BY-SA), and you grant Stack Overflow the perpetual and irrevocable right and license to access, use, process, copy, distribute, export, display and to commercially exploit such Subscriber Content, even if such Subscriber Content has been contributed and subsequently removed by you... This means that you cannot revoke permission for Stack Overflow to publish, distribute, store and use such content and to allow others to have derivative rights to publish, distribute, store and use such content. The CC-BY-SA Creative Commons license terms are explained in further detail by Creative Commons, but you should be aware that all Public Content you contribute is available for public copy and redistribution, and all such Public Content must have appropriate attribution. This part has not changed: the purported license is still "CC-BY-SA", and the TOS does not explicitly specify a version. What apparently has changed in the relevant section is one "helpful information" link, which now points to https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/. So the interesting question arises whether that would constitute an unpermitted post-hoc change in the terms by which SE has license to my older stuff. This matter came up in a reviled Meta question; as I pointed out, the TOS also included a merger clause that This Agreement (including the Privacy Policy), as modified from time to time, constitutes the entire agreement between You, the Network and Stack Exchange with respect to the subject matter hereof. This Agreement replaces all prior or contemporaneous understandings or agreements, written or oral, regarding the subject matter hereof. Because of that, the TOS is self-contained and stuff found on other web pages are not part of the agreement. This in itself is a bit of a problem because you can't both say "we're not bound by stuff outside of this page" and say "the specific terms of the license are outside this page". That particular clause is gone, but there is an analog in the current TOS: These Public Network Terms represent the entire agreement between you and Stack Overflow and supersede all prior or contemporaneous oral or written communications, proposals, and representations with respect to the public Network or Services or Products contemplated hereunder. Furthermore, the TOS contains the following "we can change it" clause: Stack Overflow reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to modify or replace these Public Network Terms, as our business evolves over time and to better provide Services and Products to the Stack Overflow community, or to change, suspend, or discontinue the public Network and/or any Services or Products at any time by posting a notice on the public Network or by sending you notice via e-mail or by another appropriate means of electronic communication. I assume but do not know for a fact that a similar clause existed in prior versions of the TOS. So I conclude that the change is legal.
It depends. Wikipedia is quite strict on its policies, and it only allows uploading images (and other media) that either are in the public domain or with a licence that allows to be reproduced (often, Creative Commons, CC). If you go to the details of the image it claims that the picture is licenced under CC, with attribution to Saffron Blaze. So most probably Saffron Blaze got permision to take the picture, and he distributed it with the CC-Attribution licence. When scrapping a web site for data, Google and other engines usually search for metadata (the robots.txt file) that tells them what to index and what to not. If a user gives them permission to index a picture by not stating restrictions in the robots.txt, they can do index it. Of course, in both cases it might be that someone uploads a picture that he does not have permission to share. In this case the situation will, of course, depend on jurisdiction, but many laws have provisions that ensure that, if the content provider is dilligent in addressing copyright issues caused by the users, they are protected. For example in the USA the Digital Millenium Copyright Act establishes &quot;safe harbor&quot; provisions that protects content providers if they give a way to denounce copyright infringiments and address those in a given timeframe.
Yes. Money damages can be awarded in this circumstance and would likely be awarded if the infringement was found to have occurred and not to have been fair use. Even in the absence of proof that any profits are made, there are statutory damages that can be awarded on a per offense basis for copyright violations, and trademark cases in addition to having statutory violations can measure damages by harm to the trademark owner and not just unjust enrichment to the infringer.
First, copyright means that permission from the author is generally required. The courts find three sorts of such permission: direct author-to-recipient explicit licensing (typical in the case of a book author to publisher relation), indirect licensing arising from platform usage (in using Stackexchange, you probably unknowingly click-agreed to allow me and everybody else to copy and redistribute your creations), and implicit licensing – where permission to use is reasonably inferrable, though not explicitly stated. Since the latter doesn't involve written-out statements of the conditions under which you are licensed to copy text, the courts don't rely heavily on implicit licensing. But implicit licensing is what makes it possible to legally read a web page without first signing an agreement. If we assume in your scenario that the author is fully aware that their responses are automatically distributed to various servers, then even in lieu of a platform license, an implicit license can be found. Second, irrespective of the desideratum of having permission, one is in the US allowed to copy without permission, for certain purposes known as &quot;fair use&quot;. This is a complicated area of legal analysis, where one has to weigh factors such as whether the content is artistic vs. factual, whether your use simply re-propagates vs. makes a comment, whether the use is for profit vs. free and educational, and whether the use has a negative effect on the market for the original work.
You might be able to use a site like the Internet Archive to preserve the TOC even after the site is shut down. The real liability trap here is if the site does not have the authority to give you this license. If a user uploads a photo that they do not own, and you use it, you are infringing the copyright of the original owner. Innocent infringement is not a defense to liability (although it may reduce damages in some cases.)
united-states I am going to answer based on US law. But many of the principles would be similar in many other countries. In particular the law in the EU is similar. There are two separate issues here, trademark rights and copyright. Trademark Rights Trademark law provides protection against the use of the mark &quot;in commerce&quot;. This means using the mark to identify or advertise goods or services. It does not provide any protection against use not in commerce. Specifically 15 USC 1114 (part of the Lanham Act, the main US Federal trademark law) provides, in relevant part: (1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— (1) (a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or (1) (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. If the plane was being used commercially, using someone else's trademark would be infringement and could lead to a successful infringement suit. But if it is not being used to provide or advertise a service or goodsm there is no trademark issue. Copyright 17 USC 106 specifies the exclusive rights that a copyright owner has. One is to make copies, another is to make derivative works. Unless fair use (or fair dealing in the UK) applies, one needs permission from the copyright owner. Without such permission, copying is infringement, and can lead to an award of damages. However, according to the question, the image has been released under a CC-BY-NC license. That grants permission, under certain conditions. One condition is that the image (or text) not be used for commercial purposes. If the plane is purely private, not rente out, these conditions seem to be complied with, so there is no copyright issue either. Conclusion Based on the statements in the question, there seems to br no IP issue here. Be sure that there is no commercial purpose, and that the CC license was issued by the actual copyright owner. A brief consultatuion with a lawyer might be wise.
What a lovely question! US Copyright law is clear: the author of a creative work owns the copyright unless it is work for hire. In this instance, the photographer is not doing work for hire so they own the copyright. However, the photographer does not own a copy of the photograph – that is owned by the owner of the camera. The photographer cannot demand that they give him a copy but the parties can agree on such a transfer on whatever terms they like. As the owner of a “physical” copy they can do what they like with that copy but they cannot duplicate it except as fair use or as licensed. They could sell the memory card to whomever they like but the new owner couldn’t copy it either so it would seriously limit publication. Similarly they could move the file provided there was only one copy. Arguably, they could make a print of it providing they deleted the electronic version without copyright violation. Which brings us to who owns the copyright now. The camera owner can argue that the photographer has gifted the copyright to them. This is quite a strong argument as the parties' intentions at the time of arranging the taking of the photograph is that the photographer would have no further interest in it – after all he probably doesn’t want to hang a photo of some strangers on his wall. However, in many jurisdictions, including the united-states, copyright transfers must be in writing. As a fallback position the camera owner can argue there is an implicit license given even if copyright was not transferred. The scope of the license then becomes an issue. It is probably indisputable that the license is perpetual and royalty free. What is arguable is if the license allows commercial exploitation or only personal use. This is where the battle lines would be drawn and I don’t know how it would play out. Other jurisdictions are different For example, in Australia, copyright in a photo commissioned “for valuable consideration” for a “private or domestic purpose” vests in the commissioning party, not the photographer; even though this is not work for hire by an employee. For the circumstances you describe, the purpose is “private or domestic” but there is no “valuable consideration” so the photographer owns the copyright in this case. However, if there was an agreement to “pay” the photographer (even one as simple as “I’ll take your family photo if you’ll take mine”) then the person who asked for the photo to be taken owns the copyright.