What is the legality of &quot;known&quot; harmful actions while pregnant? There are lots of things that are generally accepted as harmful to a developing fetus, such as drinking alcohol, lots of caffeine, smoking, etc. Would a pregnant woman who did something known to cause harm to the fetus be open to being charged with assault or something similar? For example, suppose a woman gets pregnant, doesn't stop drinking, and the baby is born with fetal alcohol syndrome or some other pathology. Is that considered a crime?
Yes or no, depending. The question is investigated in &quot;The Status of Pregnant Women and Fetuses in US Criminal Law&quot; (JAMA), which collects 23 opinion in US jurisdiction. In Reinesto v. Superior Court, 182 Ariz. 190 where the court ruled that the state cannot prosecute for child abuse a woman who uses heroin during pregnancy and thereafter gives birth to a heroin-addicted child. However, in Whitner v South Carolina, 492 SE 2d 777 the court did find the mother criminally liable for child abuse, based on prenatal drug use. The South Carolina case is the sole example of that type, in the study (published 2003). Charges range from child endangerment/abuse, illegal drug delivery to a minor, or fetal murder/manslaughter. The general finding is that since a fetus is not legally deemed to be a person (in those jurisdictions, at that time), where was no &quot;child abuse&quot;. South Carolina, on the other hand, reasoned, here and in prior cases, that We have no difficulty in concluding that a fetus having reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from its mother is a person. A different study (&quot;Criminal Charges for Child Harm from Substance Use in Pregnancy&quot;, JAAPL) which included cases up to 2015, found a slightly different distribution but generally concludes that courts do not consider maternal drug use to be a legal question. That article also cites a web page which at the time is purported to say that 18 states allow civil child abuse proceedings. In Chenault v. Huie (Texas), the court found that Texas does not recognize a cause of action in tort for injuries to a child that result from the mother's negligent or grossly negligent conduct while she was pregnant with the child but according to the more current Guttmacher Institute study, about half of the states have such a civil cause of action.
The relevant (criminal) defence is Sec 11(b)(3) [the Civil defence in Sec 11(a)(iii) is an easier one]: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, it shall be a defence to prosecution under this subsection if the defendant committed the offense based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her family, or any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species. I would say that the defendant could easily demonstrate a "good faith belief that he was acting to ... any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species." Even if there were other ways to rescue the child other than lethal force to the gorilla they all would have necessitated exposing the child to a longer period of danger, exposing another person to danger or may have had less predictable outcomes (e.g. tranquilisers have an onset time) all of which would be unconscionable.
No To declare that a parent is &quot;unfit&quot; in the US requires at least a decision by a government agency (often called &quot;child protective services&quot; or &quot;child welfare&quot; depending on the state) usually confirmed by a judge. Medical testimony may be persuasive, but neither doctors nor hospitals may make such determinations.
X can be convicted of murder in all jurisdiction in the United States (and probably the other common law jurisdictions). The issue here is two-fold. Contracts that involve illegal actions are not enforceable. In fact, the contract killing example you gave is a classic illegal agreement/contract. See the Wikipedia articles on illegal agreements and contract killings. Most criminal prosecutions involving bodily injury or death proceed regardless of the victim's wishes. This is because the prosecution represents the State's interests and can prosecute a case where the victims want it dismissed. Consider and example where the "battered spouse" doesn't want to testify against his/her abuser. The prosecution can still bring changes where the victim is not cooperative. It just makes proving their case more difficult. Check out this article from the DOJ that discusses how victims do not have a right to veto a plea agreement or other prosecutorial decisions. http://www.lclark.edu/live/files/6439-input-into-plea-agreement One could make an argument that the affirmative defense of consent could apply; however, most states have consent statutes like Colorado's that would not apply to murder. See C.R.S. § 18-1-505(2), which states: When conduct is charged is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious, or the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport, or the consent establishes a justification under sections 18-1-701 to 18-1-707. This statutes basically says consent doesn't apply where someone received serious bodily injury (murder would meet this standard), unless they are in a lawful athletic sport, such as boxing.
Questions about whether a certain action is "just" tend to be maters of opinion, politics and philosophy, but it can be addressed from the perspective of legal theory (especially following the model of common law, where legal principles are based on concepts of just and proper action). Whether or not a certain action is actually legal in a certain jurisdiction depends on the laws of that country -- I suspect that the answer is different for the US versus China. The first question would be whether those government officials have the legal authority – I assume they do. Such authority is generally governed by some specific circumstances, for example, "poses an imminent and grave threat to public health". It is basically not a legal question whether quarantining in the face of this viral threat is necessary from a public health perspective, that is a medical question. What the law would say is that if this is a serious threat, then a person's liberty can be curtailed to a limited extent, because a person does not have the right to harm others because they don't want to do some thing that protects the rights of others (be vaccinated, stay in quarantine until it is safe). However, principles of legal justice also say that the government's response should be proportionate, e.g. shoot-on-sight in response to a sneeze is not proportionate. Quarantining has long been recognized as a valid, just and legal response to such extreme medical threats. Historically speaking, quarantining used to be the only effective action that a government can take against e.g. smallpox, plague, Spanish flu, Ebola.
canada criminal-law These acts could be sexual assault. Pregnancy is irrelevant to the analysis. Deviating from the sexual activity consented to A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Kirkpatrick, 2022 SCC 33, in the context of a sexual assault charge, held that where birth control measures &quot;change the physical act itself, like condom use&quot; they are part of the &quot;sexual activity in question&quot; that is being consented to. Deviation from that activity is stepping outside of the consent. For the majority, birth control measures can very well change the physical act and can be a condition of a complainant's consent. In Kirkpatrick the issue was condom use, but the language the majority used was &quot;birth control measures.&quot; Whether birth control measures are in fact alter the physical act to which consent is granted in particular circumstances depends on the facts of the scenario. See para. 100. What matters is whether the method of birth control changes the physical nature of the act (not whether the purpose was to prevent pregnancy) and whether consent was conditioned on that. So methods like diaphragms, condoms (penile and vaginal variants), and other barrier methods are all probably relevant. Consent vitiated by fraud There is an alternate path to sexual assault: if the consent was vitiated by &quot;deceptions about the conditions or qualities of the physical act.&quot; See R. v. Hutchinson, 2014 SCC 19. Deceptions that deprive a person from the choice not to become pregnant, or exposing a person to an increased risk of becoming pregnant, or exposing a person to a significant risk of bodily harm such as a risk of contracting sexually transmitted diseases can all vitiate consent. This path to sexual assault is not as straightforward as the path described above from Kirkpatrick, as it requires a showing of dishonesty, which can include non‑disclosure of important facts, and a risk of serious bodily harm (R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371). At least one court has said this reasoning does not apply when a person falsely represents that they are taking a birth control pill and then gets pregnant (PP v. DD, 2017 ONCA 180). This was in the context of a civil claim for sexual battery, but the court considered the reasoning from Cuerrier and found it was not analogous because the deceit had &quot;no physically injurious consequences&quot; for the plaintiff. The court recognized the consequences of a person having to support a child, but in the context of a wrong based on physical contact, what matters is physical damage. the appellant's alleged damage is principally emotional harm or, in other words, hurt feelings and lost aspirations and/or career opportunities flowing from the birth of his child. His situation, as a man, is quite different from that of the woman. Clearly, there are profound physical and psychological effects on a mother undergoing a pregnancy that do not apply to the father of the child. The appellant was not exposed to any serious transmissible disease or other significant risk of serious bodily harm flowing from the intercourse. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the appellant was willing to assume some risk, albeit small, that pregnancy would result from the several instances of sexual intercourse, a risk present even where the woman is taking contraceptive pills.
In Texas, sex offenses are defined in Texas Penal Code § 21.01, et seq., and rape and kindred offenses are defined as sexual assault § 22.011 and aggravated sexual assault § 22.021. None of those laws prohibit the conduct described (assuming adults who are not in a teacher-student relationship with full mental capacity), nor do they prohibit the video as long as there is no intent or threat to disclose it. Of course, not recognizing that it is the same person both times in an in person meeting when they have sex is highly implausible.
This isn't about bullying at all, this is about Virginia being a "one-party" state. Virginia Law 19.2-62 outlines that: B.2 It shall not be a criminal offense under this chapter for a person to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However what is not said in the article is that the daughter didn't know that the recording device was in the backpack. This means that the mother did not get consent from either party being recorded (it isn't clear that a minor could give consent anyway), and is therefore in violation of 19.2-62. The (US) law has been quite clear on "two wrongs don't make a right", the mother was not getting satisfaction through other channels, but that does not mean she is right in violating the law in pursuit of justice. This is still very much in the early stages of this particular case, but I'm willing to bet that the mother will see very little if any punishment in this matter. As for why the DA doesn't prosecute the children (or their parents) for the bullying, this really depends on what kind of bullying is subject here. If the children are verbally bullying, this may not be a crime (yes, it is morally wrong, but may not be a crime). It isn't to say though that the children in this case haven't been reprimanded according to State law, at least the subject of the bullying has been moved to a different class as a result. Unless the bullying reaches a physical level, most State laws require the schools to deal with the bullying directly (through moving children to different classes, suspensions, expelling, etc), so the DA doesn't typically get involved until physical injury occurs.