If you paid $2.5 for a car that&#39;s worth $3 if of the age represented, why would you get (1) an award or (2) loss of bargain damages? I don't grok the emboldened hypothetical. I simplified the math in the title; dividing prices by 1000 doesn't change factual pattern. If car = 3K if of the age repesented, then Alex got a bargain of 500 = (3 – 2.5)K. Thus why would Alex get "an award of £800 (£3,000 less the £2,200 value of the car received)"? Alex wouldn't get anything! What's his "contractual loss of bargain"? Why give him it "rather than returning each party to their starting positions"? Prof Richard Taylor, Damian Taylor. Contract Law Directions (6 edn, 2019). p 189. All sections refer to Misrepresentation Act 1967. Damages in lieu of rescission Alex buys a car from Phillippa for £2,500, but due to a misrepresentation about the car’s age, the car is only worth £2,200. If Alex rescinded, he would return to Phillippa the car worth £2,200 and get his £2,500 back from Phillippa. So he has his £2,500 back in his hands. If the court decides to award damages in lieu of rescission under s.2(2), such damages would have to achieve the same result. Since no rescission is being ordered, Alex keeps the car worth £2,200 so he needs another £300 to bring him up to the £2,500 he could have got under rescission. What these damages should not cover, however, is any other items of loss, for example suppose Alex has purchased £100 of accessories which only fit models of the year he thought he was purchasing and which are now useless to him. Such losses would have been left equally uncompensated if rescission plus indemnity had been awarded and they can only be recovered if Alex establishes some other right to damages, for example under s.2(1), which is considered later. [1.] Similarly, if the car would have been worth £3,000 if of the age represented, there should be no question of getting an award of £800 (£3,000 less the £2,200 value of the car received) since that would be to give him [2.]¸his contractual loss of bargain rather than returning each party to their starting positions. To gain such loss of bargain damages, Alex would have to prove that the age of the car was a term, not just a representation and that there was therefore a breach of contract.
Its the difference between two different causes of action Facts Phillipa says she is selling a 2003 Super-X car The market value of a 2003 Super-X is £3,000 Alex and Phillipa agree on a price of £2,500 and complete the transfer The car is actually a 1999 Super-X The market value of a 1999 Super-X is £2,200 Question: Is the error (1999 vs 2003) a misrepresentation or a term of the contract? Misrepresentation It is clearly misrepresentation and this gives Alex grounds to sue. His remedies for misrepresentation are: Recision of the contract: Alex gets his £2,500 back and Phillipa gets the car back, or Damages for his loss. He gets £300 (£2,500 - £2,200) keeps the car and Phillipa keeps the balance of the money. Misrepresentation restores you to the position you would have been in if the contract had not happened Breach of contract If Alex can prove that the misrepresentation was more than a pre-contractural statement that induced him to enter the contract, that is, he can show that the year of the car is actually a term of the contract, then he can sue for breach of contract. His remedies for breach of contract are: Recision (as above) plus damages based on his expectation of profit from the contract. Alex gets his £2,500 plus the £500 profit he expected; Phillipa gets the car back, or Damages based on his expectation of realizing £3,000. He keeps the car (worth £2,200) and Phillipa pays him the £800 difference between that and the value of the car. Breach of contract puts you into the position you would have been in if the contract had been completed without the breach TL;DR Not all legal remedies are equal. The same fact pattern may give different grounds for action - some are better than others.
The first thing to notice is that the £100 offer appears to be a legit offer. That is to say, accepting it will create a binding agreement between you and the company. There is no reason yet for the company to believe that you have suffered more damages, and you do have reasonable options to prevent them (ask bank for a new card - that's not going to cost you £100). The second observation is that the GDPR does not really affect the first observation. The GDPR itself does not give rise to additional civil claims or special damages. Yes, the GDPR states that the company is in the wrong, but parties can make agreements how a wrongful deed is made right again. And their offer appears to do so. Note that accepting the offer does not take away your continuing GDPR rights. It just affects their past error. You can still ask them whether they have your card data on file today.
It means exactly what it says: one of the parties (call them A) to the case purchased a life insurance policy that would pay £300,000 (presumably to A) if the judge were to die. Why they did this, we can only guess. But if the case was extremely long, there may have been a greater chance that the judge would die before it ended, and this would presumably delay the proceedings even further, causing more trouble and expense to the parties. It may be that A wanted to be protected financially if this happened. Another possibility is that A felt that Scarman was favoring A's side of the case; if Scarman were to die and be replaced by another judge, it might reduce A's chances of winning, and so A wanted insurance against that.
New Jersey is not a community property state, but it is an equitable distribution state. This means that in a divorce marital property is divided, not automatically 50-50, but in a way that seems financially fair to the supervising judge, or according to an agreement entered into by both spouses. This also means that the state considers a car bought during the course of the marriage "marital property". There are also special rules for property bought before May 28 1980, which do not seem to apply in the case in the question. However, "marital property" mostly applies when a marriage ends which the question says is not in view here. NJ does allow for a car to be titled to only one, or to both. A title with both names may read "John Doe OR Mary Doe" or "John Doe AND Mary Doe". In the AND case both spouses must sign to sell or borrow against the car, in the OR case either signature will do. If only one name is on the title, that person must sign to sell or borrow. If it comes down to a dispute, the person whose name is on the title can decide where it is to be garaged, and who has permission to drive it. If the "sporty" car is in the name of both parents, either could move it to some other location, and either could move it back. Going back and forth could easily get ugly. If both names are on the 'sporty' car's title with an OR, the husband could sell it without consulting the wife. if there is an AND he would need her to agree. If the older car is in the husband's name alone, he could deny the wife or the son the right to drive it. The wife could, of course, buy a different older (used) car and allow the son to use it. Obviously it would be a good idea if the husband and wife came to a voluntary agreement about all this, but no law requires them to do so.
Nope, the seller can't refuse &quot;to sell&quot;. They have sold it. They sold it right at the moment the contract was created (which, depending on where they were, would not necessarily even need to be in writing). The deposit is irrelevant. What is relevant is that now your friend must pay the full balance, and the seller must hand over the car. If the seller does not do that, that is a breach of contract which can be fixed by going to the court and obtaining an order to hand the car over.
The part of the statute (which is part of an article of the Uniform Commercial Code model language applicable to the sale of goods) that you are discussing reads as follows: 1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such power even though (a) the transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or (b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or (c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale", or (d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law. I have put the critical language of (1)(c) for the purpose of understanding what they are talking about when they are talking about "cash sales" in bold. You are asking: Please explain it to me and tell me what a "cash sale" has to do with voidable title. Doesn't cash sale just mean you are paying cash for something? That sounds perfectly innocent to me. Items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) involve circumstances which are examples of transactions in which a buyer of goods obtains voidable title from the seller. This means that the sale can be undone if the seller acts promptly enough, but the sale can't be undone if the buyer in turn sells the goods to a good faith purchaser for value (i.e. someone who pays a meaningful price for the goods without knowledge that the seller only has voidable title). If the goods have been sold to a good faith purchaser for value, however, then the seller who could otherwise undo the sale entirely can now only sue the buyer for damages (usually the agreed purchase price, or fair market value if no purchase price had been agreed upon yet). When it says in (1)(c) that "it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale"," what the statute is describing is a transaction where the original deal was that you will deliver goods to me with the understanding that I will pay you for the goods in full with currency or other "good funds" (like a wire transfer), roughly contemporaneously. But, what actually happens is that you deliver the goods to me and instead of promptly paying you the cash you are owed for the goods, I don't actually pay you anything. This could happen because I was trying to cheat you and get something for nothing, in which case I would have also committed fraud which also falls under (1)(d). More innocently, suppose that I run a small grocery store and you run a dairy that delivers milk for resale to my grocery store every morning at 5 a.m. before banks open, in time for the morning rush of innocent customers milk to put in their coffee on their way to work, before the banks open, and then I go to the bank when it opens every day at 9 a.m. and take out some cash and hand it over to your money collector, when your money collector stops buy my grocery store around lunch time. But, today, I was stunned to discover that all of the money in my bank account had been frozen due to a garnishment on a money judgment against me that I hadn't been aware of because the process server who was supposed to give me notice of the lawsuit against me instead threw the court papers in the sewer and lied on the return of service saying that he'd delivered the court papers to me, so that unbeknownst to me, a default judgment was entered against me. The sale would be voidable in both cases, the one where I was trying to cheat you while telling you that it would be a "cash sale" and the one where I innocently found out that I didn't have the money to pay you that I had no reasons to think that I wouldn't have available to me. And, in each situation, if my grocery store sold half the milk that was delivered to me in the morning rush, those sales would be valid and irreversible, even though I completely stiffed the dairy owner and there was a total failure of consideration in what was supposed to have been a cash sale transaction. But, the dairy owner would have a right, when he found out that he wasn't getting paid at noon and the sale turned out to have been a voidable one, to take back all the milk that hadn't been sold to my customers yet in the hope that he could sell it to someone else who was actually willing and able to pay for it instead. In general, under circumstances when a sale is voidable, if I haven't resold the goods to a good faith purchaser for value, then you can legally force me to return the goods and have the sale invalidated. But, if I have sold the goods to somebody else for a more than nominal price, and the person who bought the goods from me doesn't know that I cheated you by not paying for the goods, then you can't undo my sale of the goods that I didn't pay for to the good faith purchaser for value. Situation (1)(c) is very similar to situation (1)(b), in which you give me the goods and I give you are personal check for the purchase price, but the check is then dishonored by the bank (something that could been my intentional plan to cheat you, but which could also have been my failure to keep track of the balance in my bank account as I wrote checks). Both of these situations involve broken promises which may or may not have been made with no intent to honor those promises in the first place. Situations (1)(a) and (1)(d), in contrast, involve out and out fraud and deceit, but not "fraud in the factum". In other words, what (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c) and (1)(d) all have in common is that the goods were voluntarily delivered by you to me, even though your voluntary delivery was obtained by improper means such a deceit regarding who is buying the goods. ("Fraud in the factum", which is also void, involves situations when, for example, I ask you for you to sign what I tell you is a birthday card, when what I have actually done is have you sign a letter authorizing your delivery man to deliver lots of goods to me, and then I use that letter to have goods delivered to me.) In case (1)(a) this would often be a sale on credit or open account to someone you believe to have good credit but who is in fact someone else with bad credit. For example, you make a sale to George Shrub, thinking you will be delivering goods to George Shrub, Sr. who has good credit, but instead you are tricked into delivering the goods to George Shrub, Jr. who has multiple bankruptcies and never pays his bills on time. In case (1)(d) there are myriad possible examples. For example, I may have given you counterfeit money to get you to deliver the goods to me. Or, I may have purchased your cow in a barter exchange for beans that I told you were magic beans, but that were really just ordinary beans. But, in both (1)(a) and (1)d), as well as in (1)(b) and (1)(c), you are voluntarily delivering the good to me and then not getting what you thought you had bargained for in the deal, sometimes with evil motives and sometimes for innocent reasons, so voidable title arises. In contrast, suppose that I snuck into my stockyard one night and stole the goods from you. In that situation, you would have a right to get your goods back not only from me, but even from a good faith purchaser for value to whom I sold the stolen goods, because out and out theft that does not even involve consent procured through fraud or a broken promise, doesn't give me any title to the property, not even voidable title. Similarly, suppose that I pointed a gun at you in your shop and insisted that you deliver the goods to me or else I will kill you. Again, in that situation, you aren't giving me even voidable title to the goods, and you can sue a good faith purchaser for value from me to get the goods that I never had any colorable claim to have ever owned back. The language in the first sentence of (1) goes along with the language about voidable sales of goods in the rest of (1), because the first sentence of (1) covers situations when I may not have 100% ownership of goods that I sell to some else. For example, suppose that I have a pedigreed male dog that I have purchased the pet rights in from a breeder, while the breeder has retained the stud rights in the dog. (Yes, these transactions really happen. I've litigated them.) Under the first sentence of (1), I can sell the pet rights I have in the dog to you, but I can't sell the stud rights that I don't own to you because I don't own them. And, unless I am a pet store owner to whom the dog has been "entrusted" (and I'm not a pet shop owner), I probably can't destroy the stud rights through a sale of the dog to you when I am purporting to be selling you both the pet rights and the stud rights, even if you are a good faith purchaser for value, because I am not a merchant to whom the "entrusting" doctrine applies. So, if I sold the dog, the owner of the stud rights could still enforce those rights against the person to whom I sold the dog. Parts (2) and (3) deal with an exception to the general rule in the first sentence of (1) called "entrusting" which is quite similar to voidable title. Entrusting involves you leaving your goods with a merchant who is in the business of selling those kinds of goods. So, if I leave my nice clothes with a consignment shop or a pawn shop and the consignment shop or pawn shop sells my clothes to someone and give the buyer good title, and I can't undo that sale even if you didn't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I had entrusted to the consignment store or pawn shop (e.g. perhaps they were only allowed to sell my wedding dress for a minimum price of $100, but instead sold it to someone for $30 which they didn't have permission to do, then the buyer of my wedding dress for $30 would still have good title to the wedding dress and the sale couldn't be undone). But, on the other hand, if I leave my nice clothes with an automobile parts shop or a grocery store or a stationary store, and they don't actually have my permission to sell the nice clothes that I left in their care, and then they sold my nice clothes to one of their customers, that sale made without my permission would be void and could be undone, even if their customer paid more than a nominal price for my nice clothes and had no knowledge that the merchant didn't have my permission to sell my nice clothes. This is because we don't believe that someone who buys, for example, my wedding dress from an automobile parts shop or grocery store or stationary store, can legitimately say that they really believed in good faith that the seller really had your permission to sell my wedding dress, because that is not an ordinary merchant-customer transaction for them.
Do the police have to pay to fix your front door? If they took a year to analyse a mobile phone, can you claim due to the excessive amount of time it took? What if the device is returned broken, or wiped? What court costs can you recover? Can you recover loss of income? You've asked a few questions; I'll attempt to deal with them all, and I'll refer to each item as I do so. Damage to property This could apply to damage to property (items 1 and 3, which are more or less the same thing). The answer? The police may pay damages. Here's a recent example from 2008: Police in Britain paid out more than half a million pounds last year to repair doors, ceilings and even mantelpiece ornaments smashed in raids that were based on wrong information. ... The Home Office said that compensation policy was decided at force level but most police authorities draw tight legal lines round repayments. A spokesman for the Gwent force said: "The critical factor is simply whether forced entry is legal, proportionate and reasonable given the circumstances." Items seized as evidence In general, you are not entitled to compensation for an item that is seized for an extended duration of time (2). The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (1984) ("PACE") states: (1) Subject to subsection (4) below, anything which has been seized by a constable or taken away by a constable following a requirement made by virtue of section 19 or 20 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances. (4) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose. If it's just the data on your phone they want, then they would be required by PACE to copy it and then return the device. Legal costs A successful defendant (4) is entitled to compensation in some cases, including costs incurred for expert witnesses. Schedule 7, para. 3 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 inserts additional provisions to the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985: (3)Condition A is that the accused is an individual and the order is made under— (a)section 16(1), (b)section 16(3), or (c)section 16(4)(a)(ii) or (iii) or (d). (4)Condition B is that the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in a court below which were— (a)proceedings in a magistrates’ court, or (b)proceedings on an appeal to the Crown Court under section 108 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (right of appeal against conviction or sentence). (5)Condition C is that the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in the Supreme Court. (10)In this section— “legal costs” means fees, charges, disbursements and other amounts payable in respect of advocacy services or litigation services including, in particular, expert witness costs; “advocacy services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right of audience in relation to any proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide; “expert witness costs” means amounts payable in respect of the services of an expert witness, including amounts payable in connection with attendance by the witness at court or elsewhere; “litigation services” means any services which it would be reasonable to expect a person who is exercising, or contemplating exercising, a right to conduct litigation in relation to proceedings, or contemplated proceedings, to provide.” Basically, you can include the legal costs noted above: where the accused is an individual and the order is made under section 16(1), 16(3), or section 16(4)(a)(ii) or (iii) or (d) of the POA; where the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in a court below, which were either proceedings in a Magistrates Court, or proceedings on appeal to the Crown Court under Section 108 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 (right of appeal against conviction or sentence); or where the legal costs were incurred in proceedings in the Supreme Court; where the accused is an individual and the legal costs were incurred in relevant Crown court proceedings, as defined in POA s6A(11), and the Director of Legal Aid Casework has made a determination of financial ineligibility in relation to the accused and those proceedings (POA s16A(5A)). Compensation for loss of employment Loss of a job in and of itself is not generally grounds for compensation. What if you were arrested for some highly sought-after skill - say, computer vulnerability testing - and were acquitted by means of an affirmative defense? You might end up with a job that pays more. You are not entitled to any statutory relief. But, let's say it's something unflattering, and the police continued to broadcast your arrest and charges even though they were aware it was false. There's precedent for aggravated damages, as per Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 645. In this case, the Claimant was stopped and searched upon entry to the UK. After being denied entry, the Claimant appealed the decision... the primary judge found that the immigration officers had falsified information pertaining to the Claimant's suitability to enter. Although this was appealed, I haven't been able to find the subsequent ruling; it's possible it was settled outside of court. However, this shows that judgement can - and has - been made against a defendant who causes pecuniary loss through malicious and contumelious conduct. I think I've covered everything, but it's hard to be sure. Consider your question into several separate questions in future :)
The criminal charges against the driver and his mother are police business, not yours. You have a civil case for damages against the driver, and possibly his mother on the theory that she enabled her son's behaviour. Depending on the amount you should either sue them in the small claims court or else hire a lawyer. If you win the case and the driver was uninsured at the time of the accident then there are two outcomes: either they pay the damages or they go bankrupt. If the latter then sorry, you are out of luck. Also talk to your insurance company; if you are insured for this kind of event then they will take the case off your hands, pay you, and then litigate to recover the money themselves.