‘I will beat you up next week’ — Why aren&#39;t, threats to be violent in the distant future, assault? Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (8 edn, 2018). p. 75 What does ‘imminent’ mean? The victim’s apprehension must be of imminent harm. It is well established that a threat to be violent in the distant future (e.g. ‘I will beat you up next week’) is not an assault.13 But what about a threat to cause violence in the near future? Lord Steyn in Ireland indicated that a fear of violence ‘within a minute or two’ might be sufficient to constitute an assault.14 This leaves open the question of exactly where the line is to be drawn: is fear of violence in ten minutes enough, an hour, a day? We can know only when we have further guidance from the courts. ... ... 13 But there are some specific offences that relate to threats to harm in the future, e.g. there is an offence of threatening to kill in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 16. 14 See also Smith v Superintendent of Woking Police Station (1983) 76 Cr App R 234. Why isn't &quot;a threat to be violent in the distant future (e.g. ‘I will beat you up next week’)&quot; an assault? Please don't just answer &quot;because courts have judged they're not, or UK Parliament hasn't criminalized this.&quot;
The quote doesn’t say they are lawful: just that they aren’t assault Indeed, it specifically says: But there are some specific offences that relate to threats to harm in the future, e.g. there is an offence of threatening to kill in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. Assault is defined as putting someone in fear of imminent harm. Issuing threats of a more distant kind is a different crime.
Assuming these are common law crimes (Kenya is a common law country - sort of) or statutory crimes that have codified common law crimes without substantially changing them. It is not attempted murder - this requires an intent to kill. Pulling the trigger would have that intent, pointing it doesn't. It is assault if it puts the victim in fear of immediate harm (pretty sure it would). There are probably some statutory firearms offences too.
There is a Defense of &quot;Necessity&quot; which would apply in such cases, even if the law had no intent element.. This essentially allows as a defense to an accusation of crime that the actions were essential to prevent harm. Dee, for example Justia's page on The Criminal Defense of Necessity. There it is said: The defense of necessity may apply when an individual commits a criminal act during an emergency situation in order to prevent a greater harm from happening. In such circumstances, our legal system typically excuses the individual’s criminal act because it was justified, or finds that no criminal act has occurred. Although necessity may seem like a defense that would be commonly invoked by defendants seeking to avoid criminal charges, its application is limited by several important requirements: The defendant must reasonably have believed that there was an actual and specific threat that required immediate action The defendant must have had no realistic alternative to completing the criminal act The harm caused by the criminal act must not be greater than the harm avoided The defendant did not himself contribute to or cause the threat Only if all of these requirements are met, will the defense of necessity be applicable. It is also important to note that in some jurisdictions, necessity is never a defense to the killing of another individual, no matter what threat they may present. The Justia page goes on to describe the elements of the defense in detail. See also The Wikipedia artifcel which makes many of the same points. Necessity is a broader defense than the intent or willfulness requirements of particular laws, because it applied even when the law does nor contain such an element. However, it has its own strict limits, described above. The exact scope of this defense differs in different jurisdictions.
In the US, it depends on the jurisdiction because each state has its own homicide statutes: but, the defining elements don't differ a lot. Drawing on Washington state law, the first question is whether you intended to kill a person (it doesn't have to be a specific person). If you did, you have committed first-degree murder. It is first-degree murder, because it requires a certain amount of advance planning to kill with a drone. It does not matter that the drone houses the gun that killed the person and a program determines when the gun fires (the "it was the drone, not me" defense gets you nowhere: otherwise, you could always claim "It wasn't me, it was my gun / knife / fist".) If instead this is a badly-designed pig-slaughtering drone, then it could be manslaughter in the first degree, if the act was reckless, or manslaughter in the second degree, if the act was with criminal negligence. To determine which it is, you look at the definitions: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her disregard of such substantial risk is a gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. versus A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his or her failure to be aware of such substantial risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the same situation. So it would depend on whether you decided that safeguards which would prevent shooting people were too much bother (you know there is a risk and set aside that concern), or it didn't occur to you that a flying gun might hurt a person.
Because a &quot;sting&quot; does not trigger the prerequisites for the warning The Miranda Warning has triggering events: The circumstances triggering the Miranda safeguards, i.e. Miranda warnings, are &quot;custody&quot; and &quot;interrogation&quot;. Custody means formal arrest or the deprivation of freedom to an extent associated with formal arrest. Interrogation means explicit questioning or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The Constitution does not require that a defendant be advised of the Miranda rights as part of the arrest procedure, or once an officer has probable cause to arrest, or if the defendant has become a suspect of the focus of an investigation. If you voluntarily speak to a police officer (uniformed or undercover, identified as such or not) while not being both in custody and subject to interrogation, that speech can be used in evidence.
Depending on the state, menacing may be a separate offense from assault. For example, here is New York State's law on menacing (New York Consolidated Laws, Penal Law - PEN §120.13–16): §120.13: A person is guilty of menacing in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of menacing in the second degree and has been previously convicted of the crime of menacing in the second degree or the crime of menacing a police officer or peace officer within the preceding ten years. Menacing in the first degree is a class E felony. §120.14: A person is guilty of menacing in the second degree when: 1. He or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or 2. He or she repeatedly follows a person or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts over a period of time intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death; or 3. He or she commits the crime of menacing in the third degree in violation of that part of a duly served order of protection, or such order which the defendant has actual knowledge of because he or she was present in court when such order was issued, pursuant to article eight of the family court act, section 530.12 of the criminal procedure law , or an order of protection issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, territorial or tribal jurisdiction, which directed the respondent or defendant to stay away from the person or persons on whose behalf the order was issued. Menacing in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor. §120.15: A person is guilty of menacing in the third degree when, by physical menace, he or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury. Menacing in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor. However, not all states define menacing separately from assault, and the exact definition varies by state.
If the pursuit is unlawful (which it almost always is except for police) and the pursued suffers harm in fleeing from the pursuer, then the pursuer is responsible both criminally and civilly. Being pursued would put a person in fear of harm: that’s the criteria for assault so the act of pursuing someone without lawful cause is a crime. Self-defence ceases to be a defence when the other person is running away - even if they are carrying your TV. You can use reasonable force to effect an arrest but a pursuit is not likely to be reasonable if it is of any significant distance or involves vehicles. Police pursuits are strictly limited and police have been successfully sued when they exceed those limits and harm comes to the pursued. If the pursed dies, pursuers can and have been convicted of murder or manslaughter.
None, if the intention is merely trespassing, unlike burglary which requires intent to steal, commit criminal damage, or inflict grevious bodily harm or if the building is a protected site - neither of which isn't evident from the question. Note, for both offences, the actus reus is entry - there is no requirement for any form of &quot;breaking&quot; Further to ohwilleke's comment, unless the lock is damaged or destroyed etc, then there is no offence of criminal damage