Would a confession obtained via Wonder Woman&#39;s Magic Lasso be admissible in US court, or any court? There's a scene in Justice League (the movie from 2017) where a policewoman is taking down the stories of three criminals who are wrapped in in Wonder Woman's magic Lasso. The Lasso does a couple of things: Anything anyone who is touching the lasso says is true. It compels anyone touching the lasso to speak. And it also seems to compel this speech to be relevant. (Isn't magic useful?) So a person bound by the lasso can't stay silent, or go on a rant about how Superman is wearing his underwear on the outside. It seems to me that this sort of thing violates a person's 5th amendment right to stay silent. However, this question (ironically about masked vigilantes), asserts that a person's 4th amendment rights cannot in general be violated by a private citizen. It seems to me that this should also apply to the 5th amendment, and I would find it hard to believe that Wonder Woman would be described as anything other than a private citizen. Is the confession under the lasso admissible, or is it a violation of 5th amendment rights? I'm definitely interested in US jurisdictions, but if you live somewhere else, I'd be interested to hear how the issue would be handled there. EDIT: As suggested by user6276 in the comments, it's quite possible that Wonder Woman is a deputized in some fashion, since she has various special immunities. It seems to me that if this is the case then the confession could not possibly be admitted (as a violation of 5th amendment rights). Feel free to let me know if that's wrong.
The Fifth Amendment only protects you against being compelled to testify by the government. So unless Wonder Woman is acting on behalf of the government, information obtained through the use of the Golden Lasso is admissible. The question about whether she has been "deputized," is not the right one. Rather, the question is whether she is a "state actor." The answer to such a question is not always clear, as courts may ask a variety of questions to reach it: Is the actor paid by the government? Directed by the government? Assisted by the government? Acting under some power established by law? Also, is it "fair" to attribute that actor's actions to the government? Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 936 (1982). Undoubtedly, there are occasions in Wonder Woman's history where she has worked closely enough with the police that a Golden Lasso confession would be inadmissible. And there are many times where she was working so independently that a Golden Lasso confession would be plainly admissible. I don't remember the exact circumstances of the confessions you're talking about, but if they were from the "small group of reactionary terrorists" I remember from the beginning of the film, I can't think of any basis for excluding their confessions. Wonder Woman came on scene independently, took control and subdued the suspects without any police direction or assistance. Unless the police later asked her to assist with the interrogations, those confessions could not be "fairly attributed" to the government. (All of this is of course ignoring the fact that the crime and confessions occurred outside of the United States and are therefore not covered by the Fifth Amendment.)
An existing law actually prohibits using census data "against" a person, see this recent question. The 5th Amendment ("nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself") is not interpreted to imply an absolute privilege to not answer, it means that your answer cannot be used against you in a criminal case. You can be compelled to testify "against yourself" if you are granted immunity from prosecution.
The article &quot;The Posse Comitatus Act...&quot; analyzes the legal restrictions on use of military power arising from that act. Following US v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, where the act played a role in trials related to Wounded Knee, it was found and subsequently supported in various ruling that the use which is prohibited by the posse comitatus statute is that which is regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory in nature, and causes the citizens to be presently or prospectively subject to regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions imposed by military authority. Mere &quot;involvement&quot; of &quot;deployment&quot; of the military is not contrary to the act. It should also be noted that the act includes a provision for actions expressly authorized by Congress, as was the case of the Espionage Act of 1917 and the related Magnuson Act of 1950. Hypothetically (in extremis), Congress might pass a law requiring the seizure of persons infected with a disease. If Congress expressly authorized USAMRIID to effect such seizures, that would not be in violation of the act. Otherwise, it would be. Since USAMRIID is a research lab and not an enforcement arm of the military, it is both highly unlikely that Congress would authorize such activities or that USAMRIID would get involved in this way. W.r.t. their ordinary operations, scientific research, nothing in what they do that contradicts the Posse Comitatus Act. Since we are dealing in hypotheticals, I should point out that SCOTUS has so far not definitively endorsed the &quot;regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory&quot; test, so that test could be overturned, though it is unlikely to be.
The California jury instructions for the crime of perjury give more detail on what it means to commit perjury: it's not just that you make a statement that is false, you have to willfully state that the information is true even though you know it is false. If you have a belief that you will be convicted for perjury (or any crime) by testifying, you may invoke your 5th Amendment right (I assume you are not testifying as the defendant in a criminal matter). You might (theoretically: see below on immunity and perjury) be granted immunity from prosecution, in which case there is no 5th Amendment right to refuse to testify (you are not putting yourself in criminal jeopardy), and the court can order you to testify. Or, you might not be granted immunity and still be ordered to testify. The federal immunity statute, 18 USC 6002, also needs to be scrutinized. When ordered to testify, "the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination", but it generally cannot be used against him: no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case However, there is an exception: except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. In other words, you cannot be immunized against a perjury charge. In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 defendant refused an order to testify, on the grounds that they (allegedly) believed that the government's grant of immunity was not broad enough, i.e. that there were areas where they might be questions and forced to criminally implicate themselves. They refused, and were held in contempt. The opinion recognized that the 5th Amendment "protects against any disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used" (emphasis added). In Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, the court held that The Fifth Amendment does not relieve a witness from answering merely on his own declaration or judgment that an answer might incriminate him; whether he must answer is determinable by the trial court in the exercise of its sound discretion, and unless there is reasonable ground, as distinct from a remote or speculative possibility, to apprehend that a direct answer may prove dangerous to the witness, his answer should be compelled. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 asserts that "the constitutional protection is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law, citing Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (itself quoting Lord Chief Justice Cockburn): "the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable, with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things; not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct" Although the wording of the immunity statute does not allow immunity from prosecution for perjury, the 5th Amendment right can only be invoked against a real legal jeopardy. They can be compelled to testify, they probably cannot be immunized against a perjury conviction (certainly not at the federal level). We would need to know the entire circumstances of the case to be able to assess whether the "knowing to be false" part could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
There is no clear rule on this matter, but there is a reasonable prospect for using an entrapment defense in this case, when deliberate deception is employed. There are two tests for entrapment: the subjective test and the objective test. The former focuses on the defendant's state of mind: whether the defendant is predisposed to commit the crime without law enforcement pressure. The latter is where the officer uses tactics that would induce a reasonable, law-abiding person to commit the crime. It depends in part whether the jurisdiction recognizes one of these defenses. An example of objective entrapment: &quot;A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted into committing prostitution for a substantial sum of money like $10,000.&quot; Similarly, applicable to this question: A reasonable, law-abiding person could be tempted to undertake a pleasurable action having been assured that the action is actually legal. Where the subjective test applies: The fact of asking about the legality of an action is evidence that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime.
There are several misunderstandings here. First of all, the US exclusionary rule applies only to evidence gained by the police, or by people acting as agents of the government, and not always to them. Secondly it applies only in criminal cases. The question does not say which state this would be in, and these are largely matters of state law, so it makes a difference. But I don't know of any state where taking a video without explicit consent, in a place where the person has a right to be, is a crime. In some states it would not even be a tort. If a video is taken without the subject's consent, that may be an invasion of privacy, and the subject might be able to sue (not "file charges). In such a case the video itself would absolutely be put in evidence, and if it recorded verbal permission to take the video, the case would be promptly dismissed, quite possibly with sanctions for a frivolous lawsuit. Even if the video were taken by a police officer, and was presented as evidence in a criminal case, the office could testify to the verbal permission. That would be enough for the judge to view the video as part of a suppression hearing (which is not before a jury). If the judge saw and heard verbal permission to take the video, that would be an end to the motion to suppress, unless it was claimed that the permission was somehow coerced or faked, and evidence supported such a claim.
I'm not familiar with the case you're citing, but it sounds like this may be an application of the doctrine of &quot;inevitable disclosure&quot; or &quot;inevitable use.&quot; A classic case would go something like this. WonderWidgets has discovered that by treating its widget molds with a teaspoon of ground cinnamon, it can create a superpowerful widget that is impervious to normal wear and tear, and will last forever, with very little additional expense. To protect its competitive advantage, WonderWidget takes all sorts of measures to ensure that AAA Widgets never learns about the benefits of the cinnamon additive. WonderWidgets hires Jane, an engineer with a PhD in cinnamonology to make improvements to the additive. She signs a confidentiality agreement promising to protet the company's trade secrets. After a year with WonderWidgets, Jane is recruited by AAA Widgets. WonderWidgets sues them both to prevent them from consummating an employment relationship. Assuming that the information Jane acquired from WonderWidgets is a protected trade secret, the idea here is that everyone knows exactly why AAA is hiring Jane, and that it would basically be impossible for Jane to work for them without applying the knowledge she acquired from WonderWidgets, i.e., there her employment would lead to an inevitable disclosure of WonderWidgets' trade secrets. I think most people would agree that there's at least a reasonable argument to be made in favor of WonderWidgets, there are also efforts to apply this doctrine in much shakier circumstances. For instance, WonderWidgets might try to prevent its janitor from going to work for AAA because it taught him how to mop floors, and it has cleaner floors than AAA, and therefore its cleaning techniques must be superior, and therefore those techniques must be protected. There are some states in which WonderWidgets would win the cinnamon case, and some where Jane would win, because the state doesn't recognize inevitable-disclosure at all. I don't know of any states where WonderWidgets would win the janitor case. Of course, most cases are not as clean-cut as either of these hypotheticals, but I'd say the one you're asking about is closer to the second one than the first.
As edited, this asks two different questions: Is it legal to have a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? Is it legal to preach a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? The answer to the first question is pretty clearly yes. Your right to think whatever you want is essentially ironclad under the First Amendment, under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The answer to the second question is more nuanced. Although it can be tricky to actually apply, there's little question that merely advocating for murder is generally protected under the First Amendment: The teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) Over time, the courts have developed a two-part test for evaluating whether the advocacy of crime can itself be criminalized. We now assume that speech advocating for the commission of a crime as protected under the First Amendment, unless and until that speech is: (1) intended to cause imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to actually result in imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). So if Rev. Stryker meets Charles Xavier for a televised debate on the merits of killing all mutants, that speech would likely be protected by the First Amendment. Although he may sincerely hope his words will inspire others to kill mutants, the time between speaking them and any resulting murder is too great to say they are either intended or likely to cause imminent lawless action. But if the X-Men confront Rev. Stryker on television, and Rev. Stryker urges his studio audience to storm the stage and kill them all, that's more likely to result in immediate violence, and therefore more likely to be considered unprotected incitement. There's of course a lot of middle ground between those two options, so the tough part for judges and juries is figuring out the speaker's actual intent and how imminent is too imminent.