Are county clerks exempt from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII, employees are offered certain protections under the law. However, section f states that (f) The term “employee” means an individual employed by an employer, except that the term “employee” shall not include any person elected to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer’s personal staff, or an appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. Yet it also states the following: The exemption set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political subdivision. So are county clerks protected under Title VII or are they exempt because the position is an elected position?
Elected officials are not "employees subject to the civil service laws" unless a state has made extremely odd decisions, and maybe not even then. The "civil service," as that term is used when talking about government employment, consists of at most those people who work for the government as a career. It generally actually means something even more restricted: civil servants are people protected from arbitrary action or political cronyism. For instance, the Labor Department's Wage and Hour division (interpreting the same type of language) defines it as follows (29 CFR 553.11): The term “civil service laws” refers to a personnel system established by law which is designed to protect employees from arbitrary action, personal favoritism, and political coercion, and which uses a competitive or merit examination process for selection and placement. Continued tenure of employment of employees under civil service, except for cause, is provided. Elected officials, in contrast, do not have an expectation of continued employment other than for cause -- they can be voted out for any reason whatsoever.
Your premise that &quot;the law did not exist previously&quot; is, from the perspective of how courts work, mistaken. The law always existed, it's just that some people (maybe even judges) mistakenly thought the law didn't exist (actually, &quot;meant something else&quot;). Many people have wrong ideas about what the law says, but ignorance of misunderstanding of the law is no excuse. Even having an understandable wrong belief is no excuse. There is an area in which ignorance of the law is excused. Violation of a person's civil rights under color of law is a civil wrong for which the officer can be sued. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 and citations therein: Respondents may nevertheless be shielded from liability for their constitutionally impermissible conduct if their actions did not violate &quot;clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.&quot; Thus an officer may not use a qualified immunity defense if the court finds that an action is a civil rights violation and this &quot;clarification&quot; of the law is new.
I think we're talking about In re Hennen, which dealt with the removal of the clerk of the district court in Louisiana: It all these departments power is given to the secretary, to appoint all necessary clerks; 1 Story, 48; and although no power to remove is expressly given, yet there can be no doubt, that these clerks hold their office at the will and discretion of the head of the department. It would be a most extraordinary construction of the law, that all these offices were to be held during life, which must inevitably follow, unless the incumbent was removable at the discretion of the head of the department: the President has certainly no power to remove. These clerks fall under that class of inferior officers, the appointment of which the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest in the head of the department. The same rule, as to the power of removal, must be applied to offices where the appointment is vested in the President alone. The nature of the power, and the control over the officer appointed, does not at all depend on the source from which it emanates. The execution of the power depends upon the authority of law, and not upon the agent who is to administer it. And the Constitution has authorized Congress, in certain cases, to vest this power in the President alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of departments; and all inferior officers appointed under each, by authority of law, must hold their office at the discretion of the appointing power. Such is the settled usage and practical construction of the Constitution and laws, under which these offices are held. In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 259–60, 10 L. Ed. 138 (1839) (emphasis added).
The general rule is that "public records" must be disclosed unless they are by definition not public records. This study summarizes US public records law on a state by state basis, if the issue is about the US. Taking Massachusetts as an example, the law defines public record here, so if the item is not a public record, it is not required to disclose the item. Clause 26 has a long list of exceptions such as (j) the names and addresses of any persons contained in, or referred to in, any applications for any licenses to carry or possess firearms issued pursuant to chapter one hundred and forty or any firearms identification cards issued pursuant to said chapter one hundred and forty and the names and addresses on sales or transfers of any firearms, rifles, shotguns, or machine guns or ammunition therefor, as defined in said chapter one hundred and forty and the names and addresses on said licenses or cards ... (o) the home address and home telephone number of an employee of the judicial branch, an unelected employee of the general court, an agency, executive office, department, board, commission, bureau, division or authority of the commonwealth, or of a political subdivision thereof or of an authority established by the general court to serve a public purpose, in the custody of a government agency which maintains records identifying persons as falling within those categories; provided that the information may be disclosed to an employee organization under chapter 150E, a nonprofit organization for retired public employees under chapter 180, or a criminal justice agency as defined in section 167 of chapter 6. (p) the name, home address and home telephone number of a family member of a commonwealth employee, contained in a record in the custody of a government agency which maintains records identifying persons as falling within the categories listed in subclause (o). If the information is not legally a public record, there is no obligation to disclose. There is a general requirement via statute, regulation and court rulings requiring the government to protect personal information, such as this. You can get a list of sources on that topic here. This does not mean that the government body in question can be forced to redact that information, but it is at least possible that there is a (slim) legal basis for requiring them to protect your privacy.
It is illegal in Philadelphia to discriminate on the basis of the source of income, under the Fair Practices Ordinance, e.g. section 8. The Fair Housing ordinance is here, and as you can see there is no prohibition against requiring a certain level of income as a qualification to rent (nor is there any at the state level: here are the prohibited bases for discrimination at the state level).
The only applicable law is the local trespassing law. If he wants, the proprietor can demand that the patron leave, and if the patron does not leave, he can be arrested for trespassing. It uncontroversial that the First Amendment protects racist declarations.
Do working days exclude Saturday and Sunday? Yes. Do working days exclude Federal Holidays (i.e. Columbus Day) Probably. It would be less clear in Colorado in the particular case of Columbus Day which is a federal holiday but not a state or local holiday, but this would probably be unambiguous in Florida which does not make that distinction. Any other exclusions? Probably any state holidays that are not federal holidays, and any days where natural disasters like hurricanes prevent businesses and courts from opening in the place where the events are taking place. Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.514, would probably be controlling if there is no other definition in the statute, since the question appears to be calculating a statutory time period. It states: Rule 2.514 - COMPUTING AND EXTENDING TIME (a) Computing Time. The following rules apply in computing time periods specified in any rule of procedure, local rule, court order, or statute that does not specify a method of computing time. (1) Period Stated in Days or a Longer Unit. When the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time: (A) begin counting from the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday; (B) count every day, including intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and (C) include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, or falls within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and does not fall within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice. (2) Period Stated in Hours. When the period is stated in hours (A) begin counting immediately on the occurrence of the event that triggers the period; (B) count every hour, including hours during intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays; and (C) if the period would end on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, or during any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice under Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), the period continues to run until the same time on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday and does not fall within any period of time extended through an order of the chief justice. (3) Period Stated in Days Less Than Seven Days. When the period stated in days is less than 7 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. (4) &quot;Last Day&quot; Defined. Unless a different time is set by a statute, local rule, or court order, the last day ends (A) for electronic filing or for service by any means, at midnight; and (B) for filing by other means, when the clerk's office is scheduled to close. (5) &quot;Next Day&quot; Defined. The &quot;next day&quot; is determined by continuing to count forward when the period is measured after an event and backward when measured before an event. (6) &quot;Legal Holiday&quot; Defined. &quot;Legal holiday&quot; means (A) the day set aside by section 110.117, Florida Statutes, for observing New Year's Day, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Veterans' Day, Thanksgiving Day, the Friday after Thanksgiving Day, or Christmas Day, and (B) any day observed as a holiday by the clerk's office or as designated by the chief judge. (b) Additional Time after Service by Mail. When a party may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made by mail, 5 days are added after the period that would otherwise expire under subdivision (a).
Statutes provide that federal judgeships are a full time job. It isn't expressly constitutionally prohibited, however. Indeed, there have been times in U.S. history when higher court judges served in lower federal courts &quot;riding circuit&quot; to meet personnel needs. This is still done by senior judges and sometimes in other circumstances, on a temporary, often case by case basis. Similarly, for example, all judges on the FISA Court are also federal court judges with other primary posts. This doesn't require a separate Presidential appointment. In lower courts, for example, municipal courts, where the judgeship is a part-time position, it isn't uncommon for one person to be a judge in multiple courts.