The condition of amendment in US constitution article V: Does it have any practical effect? Article V rules how the constitution can be amended, provided that ... no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. Given these texts, it seems that the content of an amendment has some restrictions. However, if the legislators and the states want to amend one of these provided conditions, say equal Suffrage in the Senate, can't they just do two amendments, in which one amends article V itself followed by the Senate related amendment? In this sense, the threshold to amend the Senate rules is not really increased, despite a possibly longer amendment procedure.
The last part, about equal suffrage in the Senate, does not expire. The question is whether it can be itself amended out of existence. There has been no test of that possibility. This article argues that this may not be subject to amendment. There is only one way to find out for sure. The idea is that the original intent was that this is supposed to be an absolute clause, but of course that only speaks to original intention (and the original intention is not clear, as the article discusses).
Article IV, Section 4 says this: The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government That would mean no state can be a kingdom. PS in response to comments: This section does not mean the federal government is guaranteeing to the states that the federal government will be republican in form; rather the federal government is required to guarantee that the state governments will be republican in form. That is done when Congress looks over a proposed state constitution before admitting a proposed new state to the Union. That has not always been done, since in particular it was not done in Kentucky. (On February 4, 1791, Congress passed an act saying the district of Kentucky in the state of Virginia would be admitted as a new state, of course with the consent of the Virginia legislature that had been expressed in 1789, but would not be admitted until almost 16 more months passed. The politicians of Kentucky had requested the long delay so they could use the time to negotiate compromises on details of their state constitution, which hadn't been written yet. That was the first time Congress passed a law admitting a new state, but because of the delay, Kentucky became the 15th state rather than the 14th (Vermont is the 14th).)
Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively &quot;amend&quot; through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment.
This is a very straightforward point of constitutional law. Chapter and verse from the Constitution, art 224: (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
From what I read, it appears that the final quoted statement is not saying another authority does this so much as the Archivist does not do it. Which would mean that the when the state notifies the Archivist and says "We ratified the amendment" the Archivist accepts that the state did all required steps to ratify the amendment and doesn't need to tick a check box list of steps. Or to put anotherway, the lawful Ratification of a Constitutional Amendment in a State is determined by the state's own institutions and not the Federal Government's. Once the state says it's ratified, the Feds assume it was done so following the states own processes and was not done in an underhanded fashion.
Yes. The leading case relevant to the question is Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a self-executing bird migration treaty could override state law. It is also well established that a treaty may override a previously enacted federal statute. While there might be a requirement that the treaty not be a sham that really doesn't involve another county, or otherwise have an international component, as a practical matter, meeting this requirement is something that would almost always be possible. So, the President and a two-thirds majority of the Senate, in cooperation with a foreign country, by treaty, can accomplish legislative ends with which the House would not agree. As a practical matter, however, the two-thirds majority requirement for passage of a treaty in the Senate, the partisan organization of politics in the U.S., and the correlation of the partisan makeup of the Senate and the House, means that this observation is basically an irrelevant footnote. No treaty that could secure bipartisan support by two-thirds of U.S. Senators, and also be signed by the President, would not be able to be passed in the House. There has never been a time in U.S. history where one political faction has a two-thirds majority in the Senate and another political faction had a majority in the House. As a practical matter, it is almost always easier to pass ordinary legislation approved by majorities in the House and Senate, than it is to pass a self-executing treaty. The only scenario I could image where this might happen would be one in which an &quot;old guard&quot; President and Senate are in place, and then one election, some new political movement suddenly nearly sweeps the House and the U.S. Senate seats that are open due to some pivotal historic event, but there hasn't been more than a single Senate election or a Presidential election since that sea change in public opinion, something that very rarely has happened in other countries.
The requirement that the House deliver the Articles of Impeachment is written explicitly in the Senate Rules. It is also implicit in the way the Constitution structures the impeachment process. The Constitution gives the House the &quot;sole Power of Impeachment,&quot; and the Senate the &quot;sole Power to try all Impeachments.&quot; To &quot;try an impeachment&quot;, the Senate needs an impeachment to &quot;try&quot;: No impeachment, no trial. Under the Constitution, an impeachment can only come from the House. In other words, given how the Constitution has divided the power of impeachment and trial, if the Senate doesn't get the articles from the House, they have no case to try. (The standard analogy may be helpful. Impeachment by the House is usually compared to indictment by a prosecutor. Like an indictment, an impeachment says, &quot;Having looked at the evidence, we charge this person with a crime.&quot; Just as in regular trials, the prosecutor does not determine guilt. That is the court's job. In the case of impeachment, the court is the Senate. Its job is to determine whether President is guilty as indicted. Again: No indictment, no trial.) The need to get the articles of impeachment from the House can be seen in the rules for impeachment trials in the Senate Manual. The Manual devotes 30 pages to &quot;Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials.&quot; The first three rules, detailing the steps that lead to the opening of the trial, all involve the House: I. Whensoever the Senate shall receive notice from the House of Representatives that managers are appointed on their part to conduct an impeachment against any person and are directed to carry articles of impeachment to the Senate, the Secretary of the Senate shall immediately inform the House of Representatives that the Senate is ready to receive the managers for the purpose of exhibiting such articles of impeachment, agreeably to such notice. II. When the managers of an impeachment shall be introduced at the bar of the Senate and shall signify that they are ready to exhibit articles of impeachment against any person, the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct the Sergeant at Arms to make proclamation, who shall, after making proclamation, repeat the following words, viz: ‘‘All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain of imprisonment, while the House of Representatives is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States articles of impeachment against ——— ———’’; after which the articles shall be exhibited, and then the Presiding Officer of the Senate shall inform the managers that the Senate will take proper order on the subject of the impeachment, of which due notice shall be given to the House of Representatives. III. Upon such articles being presented to the Senate, the Senate shall, at 1 o’clock afternoon of the day (Sunday excepted) following such presentation, or sooner if ordered by the Senate, proceed to the consideration of such articles and shall continue in session from day to day (Sundays excepted) after the trial shall commence (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) until final judgment shall be rendered, and so much longer as may, in its judgment, be needful... Moreover, the House appoints managers who present the House's case to the Senate. Without them, no trial.
There are two ways to change a constitution: Through amendments to the current constitution. By starting a new constitution. When you start a new constitutional process from scratch, its legitimacy will not depend on the provisions of the old constitution. This process will develop outside the framework established by existing laws. You could say that the constitution is self-affirming: its legitimacy cannot come from any law because there are no laws higher than the constitution. From that point on everything could be (theoretically) possible as a way to legitimate the new constitution: a referendum (in the multiple varieties that it could be present), approval by an assembly, military intervention... The success or not of a new constitution would depend on the forces that support and oppose it.