Why is Supreme Court seeking brief from Attorney General? It's a well-known concept that federal law preempts state law. Apparently, as per LA Times Op-Ed The case against Colorado's pot law, Nebraska and Oklahoma are suing Colorado to invalidate Colorado's recreational marijuana law, since the border cities of some border states have already collected far too many visitors from Colorado in their lock-up facilities. (Some towns/sheriffs even go as far as to claim that Colorado must share Colorado's revenues to allow the neighbouring states to prosecute such Colorado visitors!) The Op-Ed states that the situation is rather clear -- however outdated or incorrect it may be, federal Controlled Substances Act does preempt Colorado Amendment 64 (as well as the similar law of many other states where cannabis is not illegal), even if the previous attorney general, Eric H. Holder Jr., didn't feel like prosecuting anyone (but the office now has a new AG). But why is the Supreme Court asking the Attorney General for a brief? Isn't the law clear enough as it is? Can Colorado use the well-known evidence that the federal law is simply outdated and was never really correct to start with, contradicting medical advice since the start? Likewise, if some states do feel that prosecuting their own citizens who visit Colorado is a worthy pastime for their border cities, why don't they simply put their money where their mouth is, by raising the taxes on their own residents, to make sure their border cities have adequate lock-up facilities? Is the Supreme Court at all allowed to do something like the Jury Nullification here, to declare that the justice would not be served if the outdated federal law was to preempt the realities of the many states?
First off, a court in the United States does not care if the federal law was good policy or bad policy. Courts do not make those decisions. A court cannot strike down a law for being a stupid idea; it can only strike down the law for violating a more fundamental law (i.e. state and federal constitutions, including striking down state laws for going against federal laws). Courts are not in the business of evaluating whether marijuana is dangerous, because that determination was made by Congress. As long as the law itself does not violate the Constitution (and being stupid doesn't make it violate the Constitution), a court cannot strike it down. If a law is validly passed under the Constitution, a court likewise cannot decline to strike down a state law that contradicts it. Valid federal laws preempt state law. This is not seriously disputed by courts. The question before the court is whether or not the CSA forbids Colorado from involving itself in the marijuana business. This is a question about federal law. While the Supreme Court will make the ultimate decision themselves, the US government generally submits an amicus brief on just about every Supreme Court case involving federal laws, outlining its position. The purpose of the brief is to get more arguments, in order to provide more for the court to think about. It is not even a tiny bit unusual for non-parties to submit briefs, and it would be incredibly unusual for the US to not submit one here. The Supreme Court cannot do something like jury nullification*. That's not their role in the world. No Supreme Court decision can say "well, this is the law, and it's clear, but we don't like it and are doing it another way." Their duty is to apply the actual law, not what they want the law to be. What they can do, though, is stretch words and make arguments to fit what they think it should be. Often, in cases they don't want to handle, they end up finding some technical point to avoid setting broad precedent. But they don't get to simply not apply the law because they disagree. * Technically, if they do that, they can't be overturned; however, it's just something that is not done.
Assuming that all of these locations are in the same state, this is not an issue of federal law and is not governed by the U.S. Constitution. The geographical jurisdiction of state and local law enforcement officers is exclusively a matter of state law and has no single correct resolution. Different states handle the issue differently. Even if state law or the state constitution prohibited the arrest, this violation of state law or the state constitution, would not give rise to a federal claim for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which may vindicate only federal rights, and could not form a basis for a collateral attack on a state court conviction in a federal court habeas corpus petition which is likewise limited to vindications of federal law rights. Any remedy would have to be secured in the state court system invoking state law rights (assuming for sake of argument that state law provides such a remedy), or in a diversity lawsuit in federal court applying state substantive law, if the defendant was from another state and the amount in controversy was in excess of $75,000.
The best course of action for Barr would be to file an objection to the subpoena in the proper court (probably the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia) under or by analogy to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d) (which governs disputes over subpoenas in civil cases in the federal courts), if he thinks that there are matters he cannot lawfully divulge or thinks it is improper to divulge even if they are not privileged, and to let a judge decide. Generally speaking, in a civil action, you can only object to a subpoena by following this process and Congress has increasingly used the civil lawsuit discovery process as a benchmark. Failure to file an objection with the proper court, or at least in a response to Congress by the date required in the subpoena to produce the materials, will generally constitute a waiver of the objections that might otherwise have been asserted to the subpoena. Simply not responding without explanation by the due date would be a pretty clear case of Contempt of Congress which is the basis for both a civil action and criminal contempt charges. For example, in the Lynch case, cited below, the Court stated with respect to information that was withheld without any claim of privilege: Failure to provide any grounds for withholding particular records does not comply with the order or enable the Court to resolve defendant’s privilege claims as to those documents. Accordingly, defendant must produce the material withheld without any proffered justification. This said, in any dispute between Congress and the Executive Branch there is always some uncertainty, and the courts strongly favor negotiation and conferral between the parties before bringing these matters to a head. A general discussion of Congressional subpoenas can be found here, recognizing, however, that while there are a variety of grounds for redaction asserted in the Mueller report case, "Executive Privilege" is not among them and so the special considerations that apply to an assertion of executive privilege do not apply. The authority of the judicial branch to resolve these issues has been upheld, for example, in the cases of United States v. Nixon (U.S. 1974) and Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Lynch (D. D.C 2016) (both of which involved the more difficult scenario of an assertion of executive privilege in addition to the more ordinary assertions of privileges like the grand jury privilege). Not infrequently, the judge will review the unredacted material in camera (i.e. privately in chambers without showing it to the requesting party) to determine if the claim of privilege or other basis for redaction is really valid (e.g. maybe something that was redacted under the label grand jury testimony is not, in fact, grand jury testimony). But, there is case law to support the notion that Congress would have to demonstrate some specific reason why it doubts the accuracy of the assertions of the executive branch regarding redactions in this particular case to make it necessary for there to be an in camera review. In the Lynch case (which is a non-precedential opinion itself) the Court said: As for whether the redactions are what they purport to be, the Court notes that counsel for even the most disputatious parties are often called upon to trust each other, and that the judiciary relies regularly on declarations by the executive branch that matters redacted from FOIA productions are what they are described to be in the Vaughn index. See Loving v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 550 F.3d 32, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that district court had not abused its discretion by relying on agency’s Vaughn index and declaration in determining whether a disputed document contained segregable portions); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) (“The reviewing court may rely on the description of the withheld records set forth in the Vaughn index and the agency’s declaration that it released all segregable information.”). The Court has been provided with no reason to believe that its assistance is needed to verify for counsel for one branch of government assertions made in pleadings by an officer of the court representing another, equal branch of government. If in the end, a neutral is required to read each individual redaction and confirm that what the Department claims is simply a name or a telephone number is in fact a name or a telephone number, the parties can arrange for that on their own. These discretionary issues are likely to be influenced by the partisan leanings of the particular judges involved. Another question is to whom a subpoena could be directed. While attorney-general Barr is one possible person to whom it could be directed, Mueller himself is another possible person to whom a subpoena could be directed and that might lead to a more tractable counter-party in the lawsuit and might simplify some of the conflicts of interest present in a subpoena of the attorney-general himself that in criminal contempt cases is enforceable by his subordinates, i.e. U.S. attorneys, who are required by law to bring such charges.
This is currently untested but the U.S. Supreme Court did leave the door open to allow someone to plead the 5th amendment in order to hide their identity. In Hiibel v. Nevada the U.S. Supreme Court held that the petitioner did not have a 5th amendment right to withhold his name from a questioning police officer. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Hiibel could be arrested for failing to identify himself because Nevada's statute requiring identification was narrowly tailored and was not vague. The police officer who stopped Mr. Hiibel had reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and Mr. Hiibel could have satisfied Nevada's statute by simply stating his name; there was no requirement to turn over any papers or other documentation. The final paragraph of the opinion speaks of the importance of the narrow scope of the disclosure requirement and then goes on and states: ...Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant in the scheme of things as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances...Even witnesses who plan to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege answer when their names are called to take the stand. Still, a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense. In that case, the court can then consider whether the privilege applies, and, if the Fifth Amendment has been violated, what remedy must follow. We do not resolve those questions here. While the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether there are circumstances where one may refuse to identify themselves, they are making it quite clear that such a situation would be very different than the case decided in Hiibel. There is a strong hint that they would uphold Fifth Amendment privilege in the situation you posit.
While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.
This happened despite the fact that the marriage and Bible verses requirement were almost surely illegal and similar things have happened on and off, mostly in rural courts with non-attorney judges, for pretty much as long as the U.S. has been a country (and earlier). The trick is that the orders take effect unless someone appeals them, and since deals like this are usually a result of a plea bargain which waives rights to an appeal, and even if the result is simply imposed by the judge, one has to consider if taking the case up on appeal, having the sentence reversed, and then having it remanded to the same judge for resentencing would be worse from the perspective of the defendant, given the broad authority of a sentencing judge in a minor case like this one, than simply accepting the illegal sentence. Also, cases that aren't appealed never create precedents and aren't generally available among resources used by legal researchers, so they systemically evade documentation in easily available sources.
Under Article VI of the US Constitution, the federal constitution and valid federal laws are the supreme law of the land, and judges in every state are bound to apply them regardless of anything in the laws or constitution of any state.* If a state legislature passes a law banning same-sex marriage, a state court is required under the federal constitution to instead apply the federal constitution (as interpreted by the US Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges) and rule as though same-sex marriage is legal. When it comes to a federal court, things are even easier: a state cannot command a federal court to do anything. A federal court’s authority is laid out in Article III of the federal constitution and in federal statute, which (per Article VI) is supreme over anything in the laws or constitution of any state. There have been times where states attempted to challenge federal supremacy. Normally, this is handled by going to federal court. Decisions in state courts can ultimately be appealed to the US Supreme Court, which can reverse them if they incorrectly applied federal law. Most of the time, that’s the end of matters: when a federal court rules, state officials comply. Occasionally, that’s not enough. If a state disobeys the orders of a federal court, they can be enforced by federal agents. If even that isn’t enough, the President can deploy the armed forces to uphold federal authority. * There are situations which are more complicated, like when something is a federal crime but not a state crime. I can do more research on that if you want, but for now I’m going to leave it at “it’s more complicated.”
What exactly would a prosecutor charge? State? Federal? It depends on whether it is a state or federal prosecutor. It appears that the president has at least flirted with violating both federal and state law, in which case he may be charged by both the federal and state prosecutors, each one laying charges under the relevant body of law. Would Trump be vulnerable to Federal prosecution of the phone call after he leaves office? Yes, if the facts support such a prosecution. It's not clear to me that the conversation constituted an unambiguous violation of the federal statute, but I have no knowledge of any precedent that might inform such a determination.