What is the legal theory which allows members of active military service to be legislators? Rep. Tulsi Gabbard is a Hawaii Army National Guard major. She is also a serving member of the House of Representatives. On the face of it, it seems to be a violation of the separation of powers for any person to retain an officer commission while also being a legislator. She may, after all, (at least in theory) have to take orders from the commander-in-chief, who is in a different branch of the government. I do not think that her situation is unique. I am sure there have been many other legislators who were either in reserve or on active duty. Was there a SCOTUS case which provided guidance on why this is allowed? Or does this arrangement rely on a good faith belief that (a) a President would not interfere with the legislature by issuing orders which may interfere with an enlisted legislator's Congressional duties or that (b) such a legislator would not use her position to influence the armed services?
First, this issue doesn't come up for people on active duty. 10 U.S. Code &sect; 973 forbids active-duty military officers from holding or exercising the functions of an elective federal office; DoDD 1344.10 extends that to all active-duty personnel. Both the law and the directive also apply to reservists or retirees on long-term active duty (more than 270 days). Second, for status reasons, this is much less likely to come up with enlisted personnel. The sort of people who serve in Congress are generally also the sort of people who'd be officers. Many of the relevant restrictions apply to people holding office in the executive branch, and enlisted personnel do not hold office (only commissioned and warrant officers do). Third, an interesting quirk that makes this even more significant: Retired military personnel do not technically leave the military. They're no longer in active service, but they are still military personnel, bound by the UCMJ, and subject to both voluntary and involuntary recall. In fact, people retired from active-duty components are bound by the UCMJ at all times, whereas non-retired reservists are only bound by it when called up. If this is an issue for reservists because they might be called up, it's also an issue for retirees. Now that we've handled preliminaries, the central issue comes from the Incompatibility Clause in Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution: [N]o person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of either House [of Congress] during his continuance in office. The question is whether reservists count as holding an "office under the United States." If it does, you have to resign from the reserves before entering Congress. However, Congress decides whether or not someone is qualified to be a member, and Congress has generally refused to explicitly decide if reservists are allowed (implicitly meaning that yes, they are). 6 Cannon's Precedents &sect;&sect; 60--62 covers the situation as of World War I: the House Judiciary Committee recommended that members of Congress who had accepted National Guard commissions be considered to have forfeit their seats in Congress, but the full House didn't act on the recommendation. After the war, the House decided to pay members who had been on military service the difference between their congressional pay and military pay. In the second debate, the House considered the difference between temporary and permanent office. It was pointed out that in past wars, members had served as officers in short-term volunteer units and then returned to their seats at the end of their service. It was also pointed out that an "office" is an inherently permanent thing: a temporary commission for the duration of a war might not necessarily be an office. 2 Deschler's Precedents &sect; 14 discusses how things played out in World War II and beyond. Here, the US involvement was much longer, and there was more consideration given to the problems with holding both offices. The executive branch was the one that complained; they decided that serving in Congress was more important than serving overseas, and that military personnel who were also in Congress would be told to pick one (either go back to Congress and serve there, or resign from Congress and be in the military). In 1965, the Defense Department issued an order (currently found in DoDD 1200.7) which provides for the involuntary transfer of people in key positions (including all members of Congress) from the Ready Reserve to the Standby Reserve. Congress did not like that, and they (finally) struck back in the 2016 NDAA: they amended 10 U.S. Code &sect; 10149 to ban transfers to the Standby Reserve based on service in Congress. This certainly seems to promote the idea that Congress thinks reserve service is allowable, but when Barry Goldwater tried to get a resolution to that effect in 1963, Congress didn't act on it. So in summary: Congress (which enforces the Incompatibility Clause) hasn't explicitly said simultaneous reserve service is allowable, but has essentially let it happen. The executive branch has tried to discourage it, but Congress has opposed that (personally, my guess is that members of Congress want the political benefit of saying "I'm currently in the military," while the military would prefer not to have them). I've discussed how Congress handles it, and Congress does have the final authority to judge the qualifications of its members. There was one Supreme Court case (cited in Deschler's Precedents) where a group tried to get the two positions ruled incompatible, but it was dismissed on standing grounds (the group could not establish that they were particularly harmed by the alleged violation). A lower court had held that the offices were incompatible, but that ruling was vacated by the Supreme Court. However, there was another opinion issued in 2006 where the courts couldn't duck the question. Sen. Lindsey Graham was also an Air Force lawyer (he's since retired), and while a Senator he was tapped to be a military judge on the Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals. An airman was convicted at court martial and appealed to a panel that included Graham, then appealed again to the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. There's no question that a criminal defendant has standing to challenge whether his judge can legally be a judge, and Congress does not have the final say over whether someone's qualified to be a military judge. In US v. Lane, the CAAF held that Graham's office in the Senate was incompatible with service as a military judge. However, the CAAF cannot tell Congress "you can't be an active reservist and a sitting member of Congress." Even the Supreme Court is limited in its ability to interfere with Congress's decisions on the qualifications of its members: the Court did hold that Congress can't add qualifications, but this is a question of "does this provision apply to this person," which Congress has final authority over.
While this does not really directly answer your question of overturn, but this might somewhat directly address your original concern. This provides a path for it to become a carte blanche unrestrained power of Congress. This statement seems a bit misleading. It seems to indicate that Congress now is unfettered to abuse its impeachment power, but this is not true, because Congress is divided into two halves that place check on each other: The House of Representatives ... shall have the sole Power of Impeachment. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
There may be a purpose to have laws which are impossible to follow. (I'm neither a lawyer nor a politician, following points are what I like to call qualified hearsay - they come from qualified people I know personally but were given as a remark or during a chat over a cup of coffee and therefore are not easily substantiable with rigorous sources. You can treat them as a hypothetical ideas for your thought experiments.) Everybody is implicitly guilty Confident citizens and transparent law is the worst enemy of totalitarian regime. You learn to live with ingrained feeling that there surely is something you are guilty of. Merely being addressed by police makes you nervous and malleable; should you stand up against oppression, it is easy for the state apparat to detain or convict you of one or more default offenses. A good example would be the law present in many, if not all, socialist bloc countries saying that knowing of a comrade having commited an offense or merely planing to and not reporting it to authorities is an offense in itself. Whether you did or did not know would be determined by the authorities. Make your laws very strict with a hope thay they will be followed at least to a degree Not laws in themselves, but standards (technical norms) regarding nuclear power stations in the former Soviet Union were strict to the point where they were technically impossible to follow given the state of the art. For example the standards for manufacture of high pressure pipes would state very low level of material impurities that when the actual manufactured material contained twice the level of impurities the pipe will still be very safe to operate. In a centrally planned economy with ever more ambitious production projections and declared zero need for contingency this was one of several ways how to create a bit of a wiggle room. (Source: I once worked for a nuclear power research institute supporting Soviet technology and was told this by an expert on stainless steel.) So there you have a bit of an illustration what may happen if a law is intentionally impossible to follow. Since you labelled your question 'United States', I believe the follow-up question is why would anyone want to propose such a law.
The short answer is &quot;yes&quot;. There is U.S. Supreme Court authority that supports this position, In particular, United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 599 (1965), and Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), stand for the proposition that a defendant may not be punished for actions taken in good faith reliance upon authoritative assurances that he will not be punished for those actions. If the U.S. Department of Justice (or a U.S. Attorney with jurisdiction over the place the offense was committed) (hereinafter DOJ) says this, people who reasonably rely on that pronouncement can't be prosecuted until a different policy is announced and people who acted in reliance on the previous DOJ position are given a reasonable opportunity to change their conduct in response to the newly announced policy. The statement does have to be a publicly announced policy (or a policy personally communicated to the defendant or his counsel), and not just a de facto reality in terms of prosecutions not being brought in the past, or a secret, unannounced policy (or, for example, an unofficial and offhand statement of the U.S. Attorney General at a party that does not amount to a policy statement). Of course, the defense doesn't protect you if the DOJ says it won't prosecute if you do X, but you do X times Y which goes beyond the safe harbor created by the DOJ pronouncement. For example, the DOJ might say that they will not prosecute conduct involving marijuana offenses that is legal under state law, if it does not violate any other laws, and also meets certain conditions found in federal law (e.g. no offenses within 1000 feet of a school) that the DOJ chooses not to refrain from enforcing. But, if the DOJ then publicly says that it will start enforcing federal law without exceptions on July 1, 2021 and has rescinded its prior policy, a reasonable time in advance, then this defense ceases for conduct after that date. What constitutes reasonable notice would depend upon the facts and circumstances. The DOJ can also reach a binding agreement not to prosecute a particular instance of conduct by a particular person irrevocably in connection with plea bargaining type agreements, with respect to offenses of which the DOJ has jurisdiction (but not necessarily prosecutions by a different government such as a state government or the government of another country, for which the DOJ is not an authorized representative). For example, suppose that a mail carrier is killed by a resident of a home claiming to have acted in self-defense in Denver, Colorado. The DOJ could reach an irrevocable agreement with the resident to accept a plea bargain to a misdemeanor charge of not paying the tax due on the sale of the firearm from a non-compliant gun shop, dismissing forever the charge of murder of a federal post office employee. But that agreement would not bar the District Attorney in Denver from bringing murder charges twenty years later under state law prohibiting murder of human beings in the State of Colorado. For the defendant resident to prevent that from happening definitively, an agreement from the State of Colorado's District Attorney in Denver, or the Colorado Attorney General, would also be required.
Analysis. This question has never been squarely resolved by case law. An analysis would look to the U.S. Constitution (the pertinent parts of which are restated below) and case law under it, to determine if Congress has the authority to enact such a law or not including whether laws currently on the books affect it. Caucuses and primaries are used by political parties as part of their process for determining their Presidential nominees, and the only constitutional acknowledgement that they exist, or are subject to federal regulation is in the 24th Amendment. Political parties also have a 1st Amendment freedom of association interest in choosing their nominees as they see fit, subject to reasonable regulation in an area of law that is not well spelled out in case law. On the the other hand, caucuses and primaries are government regulated, mostly at the state level, because their results have an officially recognized role in Presidential elections under state laws regulating elections for Presidential electors, and primaries are generally conducted at state expense by state and local government officials, rather than by political parties acting autonomously. And, states have wide expressly granted discretion regarding how they conduct Presidential elector elections subject to the authority of Congress to prohibit various kinds of discrimination in the conduct of elections and to set the date of Presidential elections (a right that Congress has chosen not to strictly enforce allowing early voting, for example). New Hampshire does have the authority to say what a political party must do to have its nominee recognized on its general election Presidential ballot, and when it will conduct its state primaries. But, it does not necessarily have the power to determine whether or to what extent a national political party will consider the results of that primary in the process of selecting its nominee for President. The Democratic party, for example, would probably be within its rights to award no delegates to its national convention based upon New Hampshire's primary election participants based upon the New Hampshire primary election, and to instead award New Hampshire delegates solely as &quot;superdelegates&quot; who serve ex-officio, or based solely upon an entirely privately funded and operated Presidential caucus it held in New Hampshire at a date of its choosing. The flip side is that New Hampshire might be within its rights, probably, to decline to put a Democratic party national convention chosen nominee on its Presidential elector ballots, a retaliation, although arguably that would deny the rights of its citizens to vote in the Presidential election over which the federal government has more regulatory authority. The exact details of any situation leading to litigation would matter a lot, and it isn't possible to predict with any great certainty how a challenge would come out, although it is possible to articulate what provisions of the U.S. Constitution (and with more research, what court cases (maybe a dozen or two are arguably pertinent), federal statutes and state statutes) would be pertinent to the decision. It is possible to advocate for an outcome within the range of legally relevant authority, but, in practice, a negotiated compromise that would not push up against the hard constitutional limits of the constitution, relevant statutes and cases would almost surely be reached before it came to that point. For example, while New Hampshire might arguably have the right to refuse to put the Democratic nominee on the ballot because it didn't consider the results of its first in the nation primary in choosing its nominee, I very much doubt that New Hampshire officials would actually go that far, if push came to shove. On the other hand, if Congress passed a law stating that the District of Columbia shall hold the first in the nation primary, as it is probably expressly authorized to do under the 23rd Amendment, that federal law would probably pre-empt New Hampshire's law on the point. Relevant Provisions Of The U.S. Constitution As Amended Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution might be relevant. It states: The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution might be pertinent, it states in the pertinent part that: The Congress shall have power . . . To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. Even more directly, Article II, Section 1 which states, in part, that: The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected, as follows: Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. . . The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States. Article VI states in the pertinent part that: This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. The 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. The 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. Sections 1, 2, and 5 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. These sections state: Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . . Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state. . . . Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. The 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 19th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 23rd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a state, but in no event more than the least populous state; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the states, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a state; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 24th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which is the only one expressly recognizing the existence of primary elections, might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. The 26th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution might apply. It states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are 18 years of age or older, to vote, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any state on account of age. Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. Collectively, these sections of the U.S. Constitution give the federal government considerable legislative authority to regulate state elections for federal offices.
Your question: "How blatant the circumvention of the Constitution has to be for SCOTUS to act?" indicates some confusion about the big picture of how contesting the constitutionality of a law works. SCOTUS doesn't proactively do anything. The Supreme Court cannot simply review a law that has been enacted and say it is unconstitutional of its own accord, or at the request of someone involved in the political process (some countries allow this, the U.S. does not). The U.S. Supreme Court is not equivalent to the institution of a "Constitutional Court" found in many countries. It is just the last court of appeal for all U.S. Courts. It often ends up resolving constitutional questions, but only after other courts have already done so in cases where there are real tangible immediate consequences to the decision. A lawsuit must be brought by someone who is actually injured for the courts to act In your example, nothing would happen unless a home owner could show that soldiers had actually commandeered his home without consent or compensation, or places him in imminent fear of having this done. If someone can't show that, then no lawsuit to determine the constitutionality of the law is allowed even if it is blatantly unconstitutional and the question of the law's validity will remain unresolved by the courts. This limitation is called "standing" and requires that there be an actual case and controversy with a suit brought by someone who has suffered a legal injury before anyone can bring any lawsuit. In point of fact, there are all sorts of laws in the United States that are clearly unconstitutional, but which are never brought before the courts to declare unconstitutional, because the government agrees that those laws are unconstitutional and makes a point of not enforcing those laws. All cases (with exceptions not applicable here) start in trial courts Suppose soldiers do commandeer Bob's house at the express direction of the President without Bob's consent or following any procedure that amounts to due process. What does Bob do? Bob brings a lawsuit against the soldiers and their commanders up through the President and the United States in the U.S. District Court for the state where the house is located or where the defendants live. Suits against the U.S. and its employees must be brought in federal courts rather than state courts. SCOTUS can hear cases as a trial court, but only in cases involving a state or foreign country or a diplomat as a party (and in practice, even those cases are referred to a temporary judge called a special master for evaluation and SCOTUS only considers the case after receiving a recommendation from the special master). None of those circumstances apply in this case. A federal trial judge hears the case and decides if the law is constitutional or not, and if it is held to be unconstitutional may decide that Bob is entitled to a remedy. There will also be other separate issues to decide in the case. For example: Was the lawsuit brought within the statute of limitations? Are the soldiers immune to suit for damages against them personally, which depends upon how clear it was to the soldier that he was acting unconstitutionally? Were the soldiers violating orders or following orders? Did Bob meet other procedural requirements during the course of a lawsuit (like making the proper disclosures of information and showing up to hearing he is required to attend, and presenting evidence in accordance with the rules of evidence)? If the trial judge finds that the law is unconstitutional, the trial judge can issue an order saying so and that is the law of land that binds the parties (including the U.S. in any other case presenting the same issue under a principle called collateral estoppel) unless someone appeals the case. Every state and federal judge in the United States from small claims court judge to a U.S. Supreme Court justice has the power to declare laws unconstitutional if it comes up in a case properly heard in that judge's court, not just SCOTUS. SCOTUS (with exceptions that don't apply) doesn't hear direct appeals A handful of cases are directly appealed from a trial court to SCOTUS (mostly election law cases). But the vast majority of cases, including this one, would go to an intermediate court of appeals first. If someone does appeal the case, it goes to the U.S. Court of Appeals for whatever circuit the state of the District Court is located in. It reviews the judge's ruling in light of the evidence presented and can either reverse the trial judge's decision or affirm it. Only after the U.S. Court of Appeals has ruled (sometimes with one more layer of decision making within the U.S. Court of Appeals), any party can appeal the case by a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. SCOTUS often declines to reconsider Court of Appeals Rulings The U.S. Supreme Court doesn't have to take the case and 98% of the time that cases are appealed to it, it doesn't take the case. If it doesn't take the case, then the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling is the law and that ruling is binding on any other federal court in its jurisdiction in future case. The U.S. Supreme Court will usually only take the case if it feels the decision was wrong, or there are conflicting precedents that have to be resolved from different courts. Whichever judge decides constitutionality (a power not reserved to SCOTUS) that judge will try to follow the law to make the right decision whether the violation of the constitution is blatant or subtle. If the U.S. Supreme Court does decide to take the case, it can affirm that U.S. Court of Appeals ruling (which is then binding on all U.S. Courts as precedent), or it can reverse the U.S. Court of Appeals. In each case, at the trial court level, at the U.S. Court of Appeals level, and at the U.S. Supreme Court level, the only question is whether the law conflicts with the constitution as interpreted by the case law already decided over time. Only a handful of cases in the history of the United States have ever squarely addressed whether a law violates the 3rd Amendment so there isn't a lot of directly applicable precedent, but the judges would also consider how similar provisions of the constitution, like the 5th Amendment, have been treated and would consider law review articles and historical records about the intent of the Third Amendment as well. Judges have quite a bit of freedom in interpreting the law, but will try to rule in the way that most fairly represents what the total body of the law and interpretative information about the law says in the context of the facts before it. In this case the government would probably lose but you can never be sure In a case as clear as your example, the Government would very likely lose although no case is entirely certain, because it allows action at any time even though it is not a time of war, does not consider the home owner's consent, and does not create any meaningful procedure for exercising the right. But, it really doesn't matter if the violation is blatant or if it is subtle. The court even routinely rules that laws are unconstitutional not because they actually violate a provision of the constitution directly, but because they merely "burden" the exercise of a constitutional right. A law that effectively nullifies a constitutional provision would usually be invalidated. Sometimes lawyers informally and in private call an argument that is technically valid (for example, by creating a procedure albeit a meaningless one) "too cute." Arguments like that usually lose. The U.S. Supreme Court routinely invalidates laws that violate the constitution only in very subtle ways (e.g., requirements that have been interpreted to pose minor barriers to voting could be held unconstitutional), and the U.S. Supreme Court now and then refuses to invalidate laws that seemingly blatantly violate the constitution (e.g., "In God We Trust" on U.S. coins). Often a non-constitutional or settled constitutional law question is resolved purposely in a way that avoids the need to rule on an unresolved constitutional question Often, constitutional cases are resolved on the question of standing, or whether the right person has been sued, or by interpreting a law in a manner that is unnatural, in order to avoid having to address the question of the constitutionality of the law itself. For example, in your case, a judge might say that "at any time" in the statute, really means "at any time during a war", and that "regardless of the objections of the owner" really means "over the unreasonable objections of the owner", and that there is a duty to pay fair market value for the use of the house under the statute because the law is silent on that point, even if none of those things, in a cold plain reading of the statute would seem to be reasonable interpretations of its plain language. And then the judge might say that interpreted in this way, the law is constitutional, but the government violated the law and the court might then award a remedy to Bob, because the government violated the law so interpreted rather than because the government enforced an unconstitutional law. But, if it decides to take up a constitutional question because it isn't satisfied with how the U.S. Court of Appeals resolved the issue, it won't hesitate to do so.
Might it be everyone except commissioned officers? Not necessarily Non-commissioned ranks require either a Green Card as per Title 10 U.S. Code § 504: (1)A person may be enlisted in any armed force only if the person is one of the following: ... (B)An alien who is lawfully admitted for permanent residence, as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(20)). Or (2) ... the Secretary concerned may authorize the enlistment of a person not described in paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines that such person possesses a critical skill or expertise— (A)that is vital to the national interest; and (B)that the person will use in the primary daily duties of that person as a member of the armed forces. And Title 10 U.S. Code § 532 states that non-citizens cannot hold a commission: (a) ... a commissioned officer (other than as a commissioned warrant officer) in the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, Regular Marine Corps, or Regular Space Force may be given only to a person who— (1)is a citizen of the United States... UNLESS they have a Green Card and a waiver: (f)The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) with respect to a person who has been lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, or for a United States national otherwise eligible for appointment as a cadet or midshipman under section 2107(a) of this title or as a cadet under section 2107a of this title, when the Secretary determines that the national security so requires, but only for an original appointment in a grade below the grade of major or lieutenant commander.
Whether or not a war between political entities can result from some action is completely political and strategic, and not legal. The specific incident is probably legal, given US and international law regarding military action. Unless the order was self-evidently unlawful there is no possibility of arrest and prosecution under US law, however there might be a framework for legal action by Iran, if e.g. a drone operator were to fall into Iranian hands. The specifics of the order are not generally known, though we know that DoD states that this was due to a presidential order. This article discusses targeted killing from a legal perspective. In the context of war, killing is legal though not entirely unregulated. There was a failed attempt to sue the US in the case Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, which involved a targeted killing of a US citizen involved in planning terrorist attacks, a suit which was dismissed. One problem is that the suit "failed to state a 4th Amendment claim", and also failed to state a 5th Amendment due process claim since Al–Aulaqi's deaths was unanticipated. The court notes that a Bivens claim allows damage action against a federal officer for violation of clearly-established constitutional rights. However, No case has discussed precisely whether a plaintiff can proceed on a Bivens action that claims deprivation of life without due process based on the overseas killing by United States officials of a U.S. citizen deemed to be an active enemy. In the discussion, the question arises whether special circumstances counsel hesitation (Doe v. Rumsfeld and citations therein), which the Doe court notes would "require a court to delve into the military's policies", and they will not do that lightly. All of this is about US citizens. Soleimani was not a US citizen.