If police collected evidence based off of a call they suspected, but couldn&#39;t prove, was fraudulant would the evidence be upheld? I'm asking this hypothetical situation mostly as I was considering writing a story with the premise and want the story to be legally accurate, but also because I'm frankly curious how the law would handle such a situation. Let's say someone (call him Bob) got sick of police being unable to act against individuals everyone 'knows' to be committing a crime due to lack of sufficient evidence to get a warrant. One day he decides to take matters into his own hands and he calls into 911 with a made up claim that he witnessed a crime take place and a gunman drag someone into a known crack house. As I understand it when the police arrive they will have sufficient justification to enter the crack house without a warrant to intervene with a crime believed to be in progress. They won't find evidence of the original, made up, crime, but once they have entered the house they will likely see evidence of other crimes. Since they were there in good faith the evidence of other crimes within 'plain sight' in the house would be fair game and could be used to make arrests and/or get a warrant to search the rest of the house for more evidence. Despite the fraudulent nature of the original claim arrests could be made since Bob was not an agent of the police. So far this is covering legal concepts I think I understand. Now lets say that the police were never able to trace the original fraudulent call to Bob, and Bob gets it in his head to act as a the world's least interesting vigilante. He starts regularly making fraudulent calls claiming to witness a crime in progress to the police to give them justification to enter locations that are commonly believed to have illegal activity within them in a hopes of helping the police to collect enough evidence to make arrests. While Bob changes the number he is calling from and as much of his MO as he can each time the police would noticed a pattern of fraudulent claims and have reached the point that they can usually guess when a call is a fraudulent one made by Bob, but they can never be certain it's him or that a crime isn't actually happen. Assume the police have actively stated they do not support or condone Bob's actions, have made a public plea for him to stop, and are trying (but failing) to find and arrest Bob as well. I assume the police would continue to respond to the claims in case the call is real and a crime is actively in progress. Is there a point where they would no longer possess sufficient cause to enter a premise to investigate a believed crime in progress due to their suspicion the crime may not be legitimate? If they do have justification to continue to enter the premises then at what point, if ever, would evidence witnessed as a result of responding to the potentially fraudulent calls not be admissible?
Calls to 911 are treated as genuine at all times until the complaint is dealt with. This is because most people only call 911 for legitimate reasons and even some criminals call 911 because they want them to know the situation (Bomb scares are an extreme version of this as they cause a lot of disruption; they cannot be ignored because if the cops were to call bullshit and it was proven not to be bullshit, it's gonna be a lot worse than if they treat it as real and find out it's an alarm clock.). From the point of view of the first responders, whether cops, fire, or EMS, the call is always real and to be treated as such. Entering without warrant is legit if they have a probable cause of a crime or a person in distress, such as a hostage or a person in medical need; the emergency call is almost certainly sufficient. As you correctly said, at this point any evidence of a crime in plain sight is good reason to pursue the criminal acts unrelated to the original call. 911 calls are recorded so they can prove to the courts they got a tip and were following up. However, tying up emergency services with fake crimes is still not a proper use of 911 and there are ways to find people making bogus calls. 911 also traces phone calls in case of prank callers or even generally locating people in distress (if the dispatcher has to tell someone who is hiding from robbers in her house to be quiet, they can still dispatch officers to the general area by pinging the phone's metadata) so a string of burners will be noticed. Burner numbers can be traced to point of sale and most stores that carry them will have cameras (staff that remembers, not so much). If using pay phones, in this day and age, again there is likely cameras because the frequency of the latter and the infrequency of the former. Phone Booths haven't been a thing for far longer, so much so that the Christopher Reeves Superman film had a famous gag about how Phone Booths were phased out, when Clark Kent, needing to switch to his iconic Persona, runs to a bank of payphones (all without booths) and desperately looks for a new place to shed his clothes... in the 1970s. Either way, cops would be looking for nearby cameras to identify you and without many pay phones reliably lying around it won't take long. The more dangerous aspect of this is that drugs and organized crime are pretty much hand in hand. It could be the crack house you just called in is well known to the cops, but they're trying to use it to find out who the supplier is. The vigilante could be ruining their sting by calling in a true threat. If he does this too much, the local gang members will be looking out for him and may try to find him too; and whereas the police have rules, the gangs do not.
can really anyone in Germany call the police on others without proof of anything? Anyone anywhere can call the police without proof of anything as long as they have a phone. The question is, what will the police do about it. Police in Germany are more professional and less corrupt than in many countries in the world (e.g. they are much less corrupt than police in much of the United States or police in Southern Italy or Mexico, or in much of the &quot;third-world&quot;). Most German police are unlikely to exercise their power unless they are genuinely deceived into thinking that you committed an actual crime. But, German cops are human too. Some German cops are bad cops and even good cops aren't perfect truth detectors or bias free. and if so what are my rights? There has to be some evidence to arrest you or prosecute you, but testimony from people who claim to be eye witnesses is a form of evidence and proof. People are routinely convicted of crimes (everywhere in the world) based solely upon the testimony of other people with no additional proof. This is usually a good rule. As a society we don't want the criminal justice system to let people who commit crimes that are witnessed by lots of truthful witnesses and testified to, to go free just because there is no non-testimonial evidence. But because people lie (or are simply mistaken about the truth) sometimes, it isn't a perfect way of determining who is guilty and who is innocent. You also have the right to lodge a complaint of criminal defamation with the police in Germany and in Germany hundreds of thousands of such cases are prosecuted by police every year. Making false accusations against you (or even just insulting you in an extremely offense manner) as they did is a minor crime in Germany. and the person I mentioned had 2 of his employees with him but I am sure and I know for a fact they are on his side and I had no witnesses with me so how can I prove I am innocent? if they agreed on making up a story against me? The possibility that people will be wrongfully arrested and wrongfully convicted of crimes because people lie and authorities believe the people who are lying is a constant risk. The best you can do is to tell your story consistently and honestly and hope that you are believed. But it is impossible to eliminate the risk that people will lie and be believed and that you will suffer the consequences, even if you are doing everything right. In the long run, you may want to avoid people who you think would lie and make false accusations around you, and to have the presence of either friendly witnesses and/or audio/visual recording at times when you are in their presence. You may also, as a long run strategy try to figure out if there was anything you could have done to prevent them from being out to get you so badly that they would make false accusations against you. While I don't want to blame the victim, and often enough, especially for example, if you are a foreigner or otherwise different in a homogeneous community some people are doing to hate you for no reason, sometimes their real motivation may be a failure to follow social norms that are not actually illegal, or a misunderstand that could be cleared up.
This is going to depend on what you think or know is on the phone, why you want to keep it undisclosed, and why the officer says s/he wants it. If one knows or has good reason to think that there is evidence of a crime on the phone, then destroying or hiding that evidence may be criminal. If one gets a court order, such as a warrant or subpoena, to turn over evidence, destroying the evidence or otherwise failing to comply may well be criminal contempt of court, or another criminal offense. In most circumstances an officer must have probable cause, and usually a warrant, to conduct a lawful search. But border searches are different. That searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (sustaining search of incoming mail). See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (opening by customs inspector of locked container shipped from abroad). The Congressional Research Service wrote: in the March 2021 report &quot;Searches and Seizures at the Border and the Fourth Amendment&quot; (pdf): The Supreme Court has recognized that searches at the border are “qualitatively different” from those occurring in the interior of the United States, because persons entering the country have less robust expectations of privacy, given the federal government’s broad power to safeguard the nation by examining persons seeking to enter its territory. While law enforcement searches and seizures within the interior of the United States typically require a judicial warrant supported by probable cause, federal officers may conduct routine inspections and searches of persons attempting to cross the international border without a warrant or any particularized suspicion of unlawful activity. But a border search that extends beyond a routine search and inspection may require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Recent years have seen legal challenges to border searches of electronic devices such as cell phones and computers, which often contain more personal and sensitive information than other items frequently searched at the border, such as a wallet or briefcase. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue. Lower courts have generally held that government officers may conduct relatively limited, manual searches of such devices without a warrant or any particularized suspicion. The courts, however, are split over whether more intrusive, forensic searches require at least reasonable suspicion. ... Federal statutes and implementing regulations confer designated law enforcement officers with broad authority to conduct searches and seizures at the border and surrounding areas without a warrant. These searches commonly occur at designated ports of entry along the border, such as border crossing points.[1] But searches may also occur in other places along or near the border.[2] To enforce U.S. customs laws, federal law enforcement officers may inspect and search individuals, merchandise, vehicles, and vessels arriving at the border, as well as further into the interior of the United States and within U.S. waters. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1496, a customs officer may examine “the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order to ascertain what articles are contained therein” and whether those items are subject to taxes or otherwise prohibited. Similarly, 19 U.S.C. §1467 allows customs officers to inspect and search the persons, baggage, and merchandise arriving by vessel from a foreign port (including U.S. territories). If there is nothing that could be evidence on a phone, erasing it should not be criminal destruction of evidence, but this will be hard to prove after the fact, and border officials have authority to insist on a search with no warrant or particular suspicion. Notes [1]: See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing a “border search” as one that occurs at ports of entry where there is an actual or attempted border crossing);see also U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, Border Security: At Ports of Entry (last modified Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/bordersecurity/ports-entry (describing U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s functions at ports of entry). [2]: See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 593 (1983) (recognizing the government’s interest in patrolling inland or coastal waters “where the need to deter or apprehend smugglers is great”); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973) (noting that the Border Patrol conducts inland surveillance activities “all in the asserted interest of detecting the illegal importation of aliens.”); See also U.S. Customs &amp; Border Prot., &quot;Border Security: Along U.S. Borders&quot; (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders (describing the Border Patrol’s responsibilities along the border
You have raised two broad questions. The question about reasonable suspicion asks: when is evidence illegally obtained? That's difficult to answer, because it depends on the nature of the evidence and any statute which controlled the way in which it should have been collected. However, the focus of your question seems to be the second issue: what use can the government make of illegally obtained evidence? This is the subject of the exclusionary rule. The short answer is this: The exclusionary rule is a judicial remedy created for the purpose of deterring future unlawful conduct. The rule prohibits both direct and indirect use of illegally obtained evidence (&quot;fruit of the poisonous tree&quot;) in a criminal prosecution, but will only be applied where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. To give more insight into how the courts have applied this balancing test, I will summarise its history and rationale. I will then set out the modern formulation of the rule, and try to answer some of your specific hypothetical questions. History and rationale of the exclusionary rule The exclusionary rule originated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The government searched Weeks' house without a warrant, seized letters and other property, and charged him with operating an illegal lottery. Weeks applied for the return of the property, but the district court held that &quot;the letters having come into the control of the court, it would not inquire into the manner in which they were obtained, but if competent would keep them and permit their use in evidence.&quot; Weeks was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution ... The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the doctrine was extended to prevent indirect use of information derived from illegally obtained evidence, unless the information comes from an independent source. The government illegally searched Silverthorne's offices, and copied the records seized before the district court ordered their return. The district court also impounded the copies, so the government issued a regular subpoena to produce the original documents. The district court held Silverthorne in contempt for failure to comply with the subpoena. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed. The Court acknowledged the 'complexities' of this distinction in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). This case introduced the term 'fruit of the poisonous tree,' and an exception to the doctrine where the connection between the illegality and the evidence presented is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' Nardone had been convicted of defrauding the revenue twice. The first conviction was based on evidence obtained from an illegal wiretap, and was reversed by the Supreme Court. Nardone was convicted again after a retrial, and argued that the conviction should be set aside because he was not permitted to &quot;examine the prosecution as to the uses to which it had put the [illegally obtained] information.&quot; Frankfurter J, delivering the opinion of the Court, quoted the above passage from Silverthorne and said: In practice this generalized statement may conceal concrete complexities. Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint ... The burden is, of course, on the accused in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that wire-tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is established—as was plainly done here—the trial judge must give opportunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the trial court that its proof had an independent origin. Development of modern limits to the exclusionary rule The Court clarified the purpose of the doctrine in United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338 (1974), declining to extend it to grand jury proceedings. The Court held that Calandra was required to answer questions put to him by a grand jury, even though the questions had been informed by the fruits of an illegal search. The Court said: The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim ... Instead, the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures ... In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved. Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons ... the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The Supreme Court endorsed a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Drugs were found in a search of Leon's house and car pursuant to a facially valid search warrant, but on review the district court found that there was no probable cause to issue the warrant. Therefore, the search was illegal although the officers executing it had acted in good faith. After reviewing the cases in which the Court had declined to apply the rule, the Court held that the evidence against Leon should not have been excluded: The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern ... We have now reexamined the purposes of the exclusionary rule and the propriety of its application in cases where officers have relied on a subsequently invalidated search warrant. Our conclusion is that the rule's purposes will only rarely be served by applying it in such circumstances. In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. In Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998), the Court cited Leon and explicitly endorsed the use of a balancing test in declining to extend the rule to State parole proceedings: [B]ecause the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated, we have held it to be applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its &quot;substantial social costs&quot; ... A federal requirement that parole boards apply the exclusionary rule ... would severely disrupt the traditionally informal, administrative process of parole revocation. The marginal deterrence of unreasonable searches and seizures is insufficient to justify such an intrusion. We therefore hold that parole boards are not required by federal law to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court endorsed an even more circumspect approach to the rule in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). The police executed a valid search warrant and found guns and drugs in Hudson's house, but the search was unlawful because the police did not knock and announce before entering. The Court declined to exclude the evidence obtained in the search, holding that: Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last resort, not our first impulse. The exclusionary rule generates &quot;substantial social costs&quot;, which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been &quot;cautio[us] against expanding&quot; it, and &quot;have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's 'costly toll' upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging [its] application.&quot; We have rejected &quot;[i]ndiscriminate application&quot; of the rule, and have held it to be applicable only &quot;where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,&quot;—that is, &quot;where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 'substantial social costs.'&quot; (citations omitted) Current state of the law As of June 2017, the last word on the rule is the Supreme Court's decision in Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232 (2016). Again, the Court reversed a State court's decision to suppress unlawfully obtained evidence in a criminal trial. The Court identified three exceptions to the exclusionary rule: First, the independent source doctrine allows trial courts to admit evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source. Second, the inevitable discovery doctrine allows for the admission of evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source. Third, and at issue here, is the attenuation doctrine: Evidence is admissible when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that &quot;the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.&quot; (citations omitted) Strieff was illegally stopped and asked for ID after leaving a house under surveillance by narcotics police. After discovering an outstanding arrest warrant for a traffic violation, the police lawfully arrested and searched Strieff and found him in possession of methamphetamine. The Court found that the exclusionary rule did not apply because of the attenuation doctrine: The three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), guide our analysis. First, we look to the &quot;temporal proximity&quot; between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of evidence to determine how closely the discovery of evidence followed the unconstitutional search. Second, we consider &quot;the presence of intervening circumstances.&quot; Third, and &quot;particularly&quot; significant, we examine &quot;the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.&quot; (citations omitted) [W]e hold that the evidence discovered on Strieff's person was admissible because the unlawful stop was sufficiently attenuated by the pre-existing arrest warrant. Although the illegal stop was close in time to Strieff's arrest, that consideration is outweighed by two factors supporting the State. The outstanding arrest warrant for Strieff's arrest is a critical intervening circumstance that is wholly independent of the illegal stop. The discovery of that warrant broke the causal chain between the unconstitutional stop and the discovery of evidence by compelling Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff. And, it is especially significant that there is no evidence that Officer Fackrell's illegal stop reflected flagrantly unlawful police misconduct. Specific scenarios Can the past arrests serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion to stop a person? As a basis for inclusion of the person on an informal watch list? As mentioned in the introduction, this question is not really about &quot;fruit of the poisonous tree.&quot; It is an anterior question about whether or not a police stop was unlawful. The court asks: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Officers are permitted to consider criminal history, as the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Sprinkle, 106 F.3d 613 (1997): A prior criminal record &quot;is not, alone, sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.&quot; Nevertheless, an officer can couple knowledge of prior criminal involvement with more concrete factors in reaching a reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. (citations omitted) As probable cause for a future search warrant or arrest warrant or wiretap? As basis for active surveillance without a stop or arrest or search warrant? What if law enforcement set up a sting operation targeted at this individual? As with reasonable suspicion, evidence of the suspect's reputation and criminal history can be taken into account in establishing probable cause for an arrest or search warrant. However, a history of past arrests would probably not suffice in itself to &quot;warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed&quot;: Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). Could the suppressed evidence be used to counter an entrapment defense (which requires a showing that the defendant didn't have a propensity to commit the crime)? Could the suppressed evidence be used to impeach testimony in a criminal case that the defendant had never used drugs before? If the evidence is suppressed then by definition it cannot be used adversely to the defendant. However, if the evidence is shown to have been obtained illegally, it will only be excluded where the deterrence benefits of exclusion outweigh its substantial social costs: Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott. The evidence is more likely to be admitted if it falls into one of the three exceptions set out in Utah v. Strieff: independent source, inevitable discovery or attenuation. In considering attenuation, the court will pay particular attention to 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.' Clearly, it is impossible to say, in general, whether unlawfully obtained evidence could be admitted to counter an entrapment defence or attack the defendant's character and credibility. Not only will the application of the exclusionary rule depend on a wide range of considerations, other rules of evidence may need to be applied (such as the rules against character evidence and extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter). Nevertheless, the cases cited above should give some insight into how the court will approach the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
“Anything you say can be used against you in court.” Is what the police say in the USA. “You are not obliged to say or do anything unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say or do may be used in evidence. Do you understand?” is what they say in New South Wales. “You do not have to say anything, but it may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evidence.” is what they say in England and Wales. And so on. Whether Mark wants to mention that he was robbing a bank on the far side of town at the time is entirely up to him. If he does, and that can be verified it’s likely the murder charges will be dropped and armed robbery charges will be brought instead. Note that in many jurisdictions, if the defence intends to use an alibi defence, the prosecution must be told about it at a very early stage or it can’t be used at all.
It is probably illegal, just not pursued. In the case of something like bank robbery, you'd have a victim that filed a police report. A murder would need to be discovered somehow - either a missing person report or a dead body. If the porn shoot happened somewhere that a member of the public saw it and subsequently filed a police report, the video could be used as evidence. Absent a report, the police simply have no reason to look into it (unless the police catches them in the act, but we probably don't see those videos posted online). Why would these public offenses go unreported? Perhaps nobody sees it. Perhaps the bystanders in the video are paid extras. Maybe they're filming in what appears to be public but is actually private property. Perhaps they have a permit to use a public space for this purpose. Perhaps they just got lucky. Again, there might be some confirmation bias here - you're not going to see as many videos of folks they catch breaking the law, since they will either be interrupted and stopped or (maybe) have their videos ordered taken down.
Assuming that the police have a warrant to seize your cell phone, the scope of what can be seized is specified in the warrant. It is not automatic that seizing a phone entails seizure of some or all online accounts (e.g. automatic backups, collections of passwords in a Google account) and it does not automatically &quot;freeze&quot; or block a person's access to their accounts including phone accounts. It's not that it is impossible to seize an account, it's that it is not automatic: it has to be in the scope of the warrant. Here is a collection of petition templates, asking the court to allow the seizure of various things for various reasons (mostly electronic), including access to bank accounts. If the police suspect that information might be available online after it has been deleted from a phone, they would need to include online accounts in the scope of the petition(s). There is even a template for &quot;give me everything&quot;, called &quot;Frankenstein&quot;.
The answer by @A.fm. isn't wrong, but it also is unduly optimistic. In my experience, in real life, people are more likely to lie when they are under oath than when they are not under oath, and law enforcement officers tend to be particularly good at lying on the stand because they testify frequently in court cases. In almost all places in the United States (and most foreign jurisdictions), in a pure battle of credibility in the eyes of a judge or jury between a law enforcement officer and an individual citizen charged with a crime, the law enforcement officer's account is going to be found to be more credible (beyond a reasonable doubt) about 90% of the time or more, unless you have a majority-minority jury or an outlier extremely liberal judge or the law enforcement officer has a personal involvement in the case (e.g. it involves a family member of the officer). The likelihood that it will be resolved one way or the other does depend significantly on race and social class, however. The credibility imbalance is still great and favors law enforcement, but not as extreme, when it is between an unrelated third-party witness and a law enforcement officer. In the absence of hard evidence or a law enforcement insider witness willing to testify in your favor, it is almost impossible to win a credibility contest in a case like the ones you suggest. One important step an attorney can take, however, is to seek discovery on any prior instance in which the testifying officer has been disciplined for untruthfulness or had his testimony in court found to be untruthful. This will usually be fruitless, but levels the playing field to closer to 50-50 if you get lucky and received such evidence. Such a request also provides a means of collateral attack on a conviction if the law enforcement officer has a history of untruthfulness that wasn't disclosed by the prosecution after such a request is made by a defense lawyer. So, what does protect you? Mostly the desire of the bosses of law enforcement officers (who are ultimately politicians, mostly local politicians in the United States) to see the law enforced in a non-corrupt manner and the fear of a law enforcement officer that he or she might be found to have lied using physical evidence unknown to him at the time (like a secret recording of an interaction). Law enforcement officers usually don't have much to gain from lying (although this equation changes a law when police department can receive assets seized in civil forfeitures that they are involved in) and usually they want people who are "bad guys" to be in jail to protect "good guys" although they aren't always very concerned about the means by which they achieve these ends. Of course, "usually" is a weasel word here and there are many exceptions that crop up in real life (e.g. when police have engaged in misconduct and want to protect themselves from the consequences of that misconduct). The other obvious solution (so common that in certain eras of U.S. history there were travel guides targeted at African-American motorists to help they carry out this approach) is to avoid places with police who have historically been corrupt. The United States has a uniquely bottom heavy law enforcement structure. Something on the order of 95% of law enforcement officers are employed by local governments or are otherwise tightly constricted geographically (e.g. rangers in national or state parks). And, even the small number of state law enforcement officers are heavily concentrated doing traffic enforcement on major state and federal highways. Similarly, lots of federal law enforcement agencies are broken up into geographic divisions some of which are known to be more corrupt than others (e.g. there is more corruption in the border patrol on parts of the border with Mexico than on most of the border with Canada). So, if you want to avoid the risk of encountering bad cops, stay away from places that are known to have bad cops. The solution may seem like a "cop out" (sorry, pun intended), but it is actually a pretty unique feature of the American law enforcement system. Most countries (e.g. the U.K., South Korea, Russia, Japan, Spain, Mexico, France) have a much more centralized law enforcement bureaucracy, which is fine when the people are the top are scrupulously non-corrupt, but which also makes it much easier for the rot of corruption to become geographically widespread and hence unavoidable from the point of view of an individual citizen. In contrast, in the U.S., even in the most corrupt of times (e.g. the Prohibition era), there are almost always many jurisdictions where law enforcement is not corrupt and corrupting the entirely system is much more difficult than in most countries.