Should I be taxed on electricity in Florida as a private resident? I live in Tallahassee, Florida where everyone gets their electricity from Talgov. I recently looked at my utility bills and realized my electricity charges were about 10-11% larger each month than I expected from the rate posted on the website. I went to my account and saw this discrepancy came from a section on the monthly bill called "Taxes &amp; Credits" so it appears I am being taxed on my electricity. However, when I Google "florida sales tax exemption electricity", the first result has a paragraph that says: Condos &amp; Homeowners Associations This exemption is based upon Section 212.08(7) (j), Florida Statutes and Department of Revenue Rule 12A-1.053(1)(a). The sale of electric power or energy by an electric utility is taxable. The sale of electric power or energy for use in residential households, to owners of residential models, or to licensed family day care homes by utilities who are required to pay the gross receipts tax imposed by Chapter 203, F.S., is exempt. Section 212.08(7) (j) reads: (j) Household fuels.—Also exempt from payment of the tax imposed by this chapter are sales of utilities to residential households or owners of residential models in this state by utility companies who pay the gross receipts tax imposed under s. 203.01, and sales of fuel to residential households or owners of residential models, including oil, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas, coal, wood, and other fuel products used in the household or residential model for the purposes of heating, cooking, lighting, and refrigeration, regardless of whether such sales of utilities and fuels are separately metered and billed direct to the residents or are metered and billed to the landlord. If any part of the utility or fuel is used for a nonexempt purpose, the entire sale is taxable. The landlord shall provide a separate meter for nonexempt utility or fuel consumption. For the purposes of this paragraph, licensed family day care homes shall also be exempt. The second Google result says: Florida Sales Tax on Energy/Electricity Florida has an automatic residential sales tax exemption for residences and common areas of residential complexes used exclusively for residential purposes. If any of the energy serving a meter is used for commercial purposes, the entire electricity usage is taxable. There is also a PDF link on the Talgov website to an "Application For Refund Of Florida State Sales Tax". Can I just fill out this application and get back the 10% extra I've been paying on my electricity? I certainly don't use any of my electricity for "commercial purposes". I found this news article from over four years ago that seems to be related, but it doesn't give a final answer either way.
As it turns out, Talgov has a convoluted way it bills taxes which it doesn't explain on its bills or website. Its website claims to bill electricity at a rate of $7.59/month + $0.10522/kWh but, with taxes, it actually comes to $8.5631 plus $0.11598/kWh. On top of the advertised rate, it bills a gross receipts tax of 2.56406%. It also bills a public service tax of 10% on the monthly charge + $.07792/kWh + the gross receipts tax. That gets you the higher effective billing rate I mentioned above. The $.07792/kWh is reached by replacing the ECRC rate from the website with $.0077/kWh--I don't know why and I can't find an official document saying this--but that's what is happening apparently. So, Talgov doesn't bill sales tax after all and private residences are not exempt from the taxes it bills. Thus, it has not overcharged me a tax I should be exempt from and Talgov is allowed to do what it is doing, but it would be better if they represented their billing rate more honestly on their website. I'm also still not sure how they reach their 2.56406% gross receipt tax rate. The Florida statute that addresses gross receipt tax seems to specify either 2.5% or 2.6% (I can't figure out which should apply), but not something in between: (b) 1. The rate applied to utility services shall be 2.5 percent. 2. The rate applied to communications services shall be 2.37 percent. 3. An additional rate of 0.15 percent shall be applied to communication services subject to the tax levied pursuant to s. 202.12(1)(a), (c), and (d). The exemption provided in s. 202.125(1) applies to the tax levied pursuant to this subparagraph. 4. The rate applied to electrical power or energy taxed under subparagraph (a)3. shall be 2.6 percent. I found the information about the Talgov tax rates in a document from a Jacksonville utility company that compares utility rates for various utility companies, including many in Florida. Some Florida companies use a 2.5% gross receipt tax and some use a rate between 2.5% and 2.6%. This is also strange because that Florida statute seems to suggest the rate should be uniform statewide. TL;DR: Talgov is not charging sales tax, but rather some other taxes that I am not exempt from. I was able to figure out what rates they were charging for those taxes, but not why.
Summary: Constitutionally, the power of provinces to control liquor sale and to apply sales tax to those same sales are distinct. There must be sufficient presence in a province for its taxation power to apply. This is categorically not the case for sales aboard aircraft. For trains, case law is scant but a case-by-case analysis has so far been favoured. Independently, HST still applies according to the origin province, as that tax is backed by federal power. Liquor control—including sale—is far more complex and is probably an open question. Federal jurisdiction over aviation and railways does not remove provincial powers with respect to control of liquor sale. However, those provincial powers might not apply in this context on their own merits, especially with regards to aircraft. 0. Answer overview Due to the particularities of Canadian federalism, each combination of taxation &amp; liquor control with respect to aircraft &amp; trains could in theory have different answers. I've essentially reframed your specific questions into analysis of these four cases, though I provide direct answers at the end. I'm going to start with sales tax on aircraft since that has the strongest case law available. Then, I'll extend the reasoning to each of the other three cases. Note that to avoid excessive caveating and further lengthening this answer, I've mostly avoided specifying how confident I am in my interpretations of the legislation and case law available. While I'm relatively well-read with respect to the Canadian constitution, I would not consider myself very knowledgeable in the areas of tax, commerce, transportation or liquor. Please make your own judgments based on the strength of the citations and arguments I present. In writing this answer, I generally got less and less confident the further along I was, the exact opposite of what happens after each drink aboard an aircraft (so I'm told). 1. Sales tax Parliament is granted a very broad taxation power by the Constitution Act, 1867 s. 91(3), while provincial taxation power is limited to &quot;within the Province&quot; by s. 92(2). In practice, sales tax in Canada is a mess mix of systems. Parliament has established a federal sales tax, the Goods and Services Tax (GST). Concurrently, all provinces except Alberta have some form of provincial sales tax applied. None of the territories levy an additional sales tax. Further complicating matters, Parliament has developed a Harmonized Sales Tax (HST) whereby participating provinces have ceded their authority in favour of the federal government administering a single sales tax and remitting a percentage which the provinces specify. Currently participating are Ontario and the Atlantic provinces. In Quebec, the arrangement is mostly reversed with Quebec generally administering both federal and provincial sales taxes. The remaining provinces have separately administered federal and provincial sales taxes. 1.1 Sales tax aboard aircraft There are two especially on-point Supreme Court cases, both involving specifically the sale of liquor in-flight. In The Queen (Man.) v. Air Canada, [1980] 2 SCR 303, the court found that: Merely going through the air space over Manitoba does not give the aircraft a situs there to support a tax which constitutionally must be &quot;within the Province&quot;. In the case of aircraft operations, there must be a substantial, at least more than a nominal, presence in the Province to provide a basis for imposing a tax in respect of the entry of aircraft into the Province. In reaching this finding, similar American jurisprudence was cited specifically noting that &quot;No question of legislative jurisdiction over air space was involved.&quot; This reasoning was then extended to include stopovers. In Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd. v. British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1133, this was further declared to apply to flights entirely within a single province. Therefore, provinces have no constitutional authority to tax sales in-flight as being in the air does not count as &quot;within the Province&quot; for taxation purposes. However, the federal government is not so restricted. While GST is straightforward, things get interesting with HST. It is legislated for in the Excise Tax Act Part IX s. 165(2). Despite the remittance to the participating provinces, it is de jure a federal tax which can therefore still be constitutionally levied. The attached New Harmonized Value-added Tax System Regulations states in s. 23: If a supply of property or a service (other than a passenger transportation service) is made to an individual on board a conveyance in the course of a business of supplying passenger transportation services and the property or service is delivered, performed or made available on board the conveyance during any leg of the journey that begins in any province and ends in any province, the supply is made in the province in which that leg of the journey begins. Therefore, if the leg of a journey beings in an HST province, the sale of liquor in-flight is taxed according to the origin HST. Otherwise, only GST could be charged per constitutional reasons above. Note that Quebec falls in the non-HST category. While it administers both federal and provincial sales taxes, they are still separate taxes unlike the HST. 1.2 Sales tax aboard trains The question is now whether sales aboard trains, and more generally, land-based transport are sufficiently &quot;within the Province&quot; to fall within provincial taxation power. Case law is scant, but four of the five applicable cases I could find have refused to mechanically apply the result from aircrafts, preferring to undertake a factual analysis on whether sufficient presence is established. They are Ace-Atlantic Container Express Inc, Re, 1992 CanLII 7103 (NL CA), Canpotex Ltd. v. British Columbia, 1999 CanLII 5844 (BC SC), Pétromont and Company Limited Partnership v. Ontario (Finance), 2008 CanLII 5980 (ON SC), Dow Chemical Canada Inc. v. R., 1992 CanLII 1019 (BC CA) and Lynden Transport Inc. v. British Columbia (Finance), 1981 CanLII 785 (BC CA). Notably, Lynden involved only transit through the province and directly applied the result from R. (Man.) v. Air Canada to find that the province could not apply its taxation power in this instance. Canpotex also involved transit only, engaging in some analysis before considering itself bound by Lynden. The other three are all similar fact patterns and results. Most operations of the taxed companies were transit through the province, but not exclusively. The non-transit operations were found to be a sufficient enough presence to allow the province to apply a general tax. Pétromont at para. 79 notably emphasized length of time railcars spent in the province as a reason for departing from R. (Man.) v. Air Canada. Unfortunately, none of these are directly analogous to sale of liquor aboard a train. They were all about whether tax could be applied to the land transport vehicle or the goods contained therein. There are hints in some of these cases and their citations of CPA Ltd. v. BC that this may make a difference, but nothing anywhere near definitive. Constitutional questions about provincial taxation power aside, I can find no statutory difference between planes and trains with respect to the applicability of HST per the Excise Tax Act regulations cited in the previous section (all cases cited here are pre-HST in the participating provinces). 2. Liquor control There is no singular &quot;liquor&quot; power in the constitution. This has resulted in liquor control having an extraordinary amount of possible constitutional bases for both Parliament and the provincial legislatures. To maintain a degree of sobriety (I'm sorry), I will focus my analysis on the provincial power to control sale of liquor which typically applies within their borders and whether federal jurisdiction over aircraft and railways impede this power. To fully understand the scope of the constitutional complexity of liquor, I strongly recommend reading in full the lecture paper The Effect of Alcohol on the Canadian Constitution ... Seriously (2011) by the Honourable Morris J. Fish (Supreme Court justice 2003-2013) though it is not strictly necessary for this answer. Note there are a few paragraphs in French, they aren't crucial to overall understanding. 2.1 Liquor control aboard aircraft As you point out, Air Canada v. Ontario (Liquor Control Board) [1997] 2 SCR 581 at least to some extent confirms that airlines can still be subject to provincial liquor control. Specifically, the court found at paras. 72-76 that provision of onboard liquor is not a core part of the federal aviation power. Therefore, this opens the door for provincial liquor sale law to be applied in-flight. However, this provincial power must be grounded (again, I'm sorry) in a constitutionally granted power. In Air Canada v. Ontario the court acknowledged that a possible consequence of their main result was that provinces could impose importation fees on liquor that merely passed through their airspace (paras. 63-66). However, this is clearly dicta and was partially due to a very specific lending of federal power that isn't generally applicable here (or currently, as the involved federal statute has since been amended). I mainly wished to point out that the fact provincial airspace is not within provincial taxation jurisdiction does not imply provincial airspace is immune from all provincial authority. Moving on to powers specifically granted to the provinces by the constitution, there are three different bases that justify the provinces' ability to locally control liquor sale enumerated in the Constitution Act, 1867 (emphasis mine): In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, [...] Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes. [...] Property and Civil Rights in the Province. [...] Generally all Matters of a merely local or private Nature in the Province. Those familiar with the constitution will recognize the latter two powers as the &quot;default&quot; ones which allow the provinces do most things within their territory. Indeed, Air Canada v. Ontario acknowledges that 92(16) authorizes the provincial liquor monopolies (para. 54). In addition to the two usual suspects, there's 92(9) which by its wording likely doesn't amount to full control, but certainly allows imposing licences on liquor sale. The main question is whether any of them can apply extra-provincially or in provincial airspace. As you can probably guess by my added emphasis, extra-provincial legislation is generally not allowed (see eg. Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act [1984] 1 SCR 297 at pg. 332). Yes, this does mean I'm extremely suspicious of WestJet's assertion tying their policy to a single province's laws, though I can certainly understand wanting to be in compliance with the liquor licences issued by your home province. As for airspace, Air Canada v. Ontario appears to be the most recent Supreme Court decision addressing provincial airspace jurisdiction. All we can note is that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the possibility of provincial influence on their airspace. It's additionally possible that even if provinces do in fact have jurisdictional control, aircraft might not be found to be &quot;in&quot; the province much like they are not &quot;within&quot; for taxation purposes. Should the provinces not have liquor control jurisdiction on the aircraft, this jurisdiction would default to Parliament through the Constitution Act, 1867 s. 91 peace, order, and good government clause. On the other hand, if the provinces have the necessary aircraft liquor control jurisdiction, it might be possible for Parliament to encroach on that jurisdiction, though I will decline detailed analysis. I would mainly be wildly speculating, and since your question concentrated on provincial power, I am content having found the necessary conditions for provinces to exercise their local liquor control power when there is no encroachment. I'll just briefly gloss the general constitutional principles: Parliament could not encroach by passing effectively provincial liquor control legislation and saying it's allowed because of their aviation power (pith and substance doctrine), though it's possible they could find a way through paramountcy or a separate power under s. 91 (in particular if sale aboard inter-provincial transport constitutes inter-provincial trade), since liquor control is complex and constitutionally divided. Finally I'll quickly comment on Porter Airline's FAQ you cite. They partially attribute their in-flight drinking age to the Canadian Aviation Regulations. It's an incredibly lengthy regulation so it's very possible I missed something, but I can't find any basis for this attribution. Perhaps telling is that in the very next FAQ question on drinking limit, they state: Under Canadian Aviation Regulations (602.04), cabin crew is expected to stop serving alcohol to a passenger who appears to be intoxicated. A specific section of the regulations is cited, now that one definitiely exists! Also, this is a good example of a federal regulation I would guess to be constitutionally valid through pith and substance &amp; paramountcy doctrines (again, assuming provincial liquor control jurisdiction to begin with). Avoiding having unruly intoxicated passengers can reasonably be tied to the federal aviation power and so would displace any provincial legislation contrary to that. 2.2 Liquor control aboard trains While federal jurisdiction over aircraft is long established through the Aeronautics Reference, the basis for federal jurisdiction over trains is slightly more complex. The Constitution Act, 1867 s. 92(10)(a) confers federal jurisdiction over inter-provincial and international railways and s. 92(10)(c) allows Parliament to issue a declaration that a railway falls under federal jurisdiction, both in conjunction with s. 91(29). If Wikipedia is to be believed, railways are the majority reason for a 92(10)(c) declaration. The Queen v. Board of Transport Commissioners, [1968] SCR 118 confirms that the federal jurisdiction over railways extends to any train on those railways. I don't think it's controversial to state that provincial liquor sale law applies on trains outside federal jurisdiction. For those in federal jurisdiction, I don't see a reason why the legal reasoning in Air Canada v. Ontario wouldn't also apply, as well as the constitutional principles I covered in reference to it (substituting &quot;airspace&quot; for &quot;railspace,&quot; I suppose). For trains, I would just add that as land-based transport, they might be more likely found to be &quot;in the Province&quot; and therefore under provincial liquor control. Indeed, it's difficult to imagine that if they can be &quot;within the Province&quot; for taxation purposes, they wouldn't also be &quot;in the Province,&quot; as that appears to be a less stringent requirement per the line of case law established by the cited R. (Man.) v. Air Canada, CPA Ltd. v. BC and Air Canada v. Ontario (though frustratingly, never an absolute direct constitutional confirmation). 3. Answers to your main questions Do provincial laws on sales and supply of liquor apply to services of alcohol on board a plane or a train subject to federal jurisdiction? If so, which province's law apply, and to what extent? Open question, more likely yes on trains. If the province's law applies at all, it would apply within its borders and probably close to full extent. Does the law treat aircrafts (in air) and trains (on ground) differently? Does it matter if the plane or train makes any stop in the province? Aircraft and trains can be treated differently for sales tax and maybe for liquor control as well. Essentially this comes down to land-based transport being &quot;closer&quot; to usual provincial jurisdiction. For aircraft, stops matter only for determining whether HST applies. For trains, stops could additionally contribute to them being found to be more fully in the jurisdiction of the province they stop in. Which province's sales tax (HST/PST/QST), if any, apply to in-flight and on-train purchases? I would assume the destination since that's the assumed place of consumption, but it seems that it would be very complicated for trains. For travel by either mode, only origin HST (or federal GST) can be applied for each leg of the journey. PST and the provincial portion of QST are constitutionally barred from applying on flights. Provinces might be able to charge on-train sales tax within their borders given sufficient company presence.
Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules &amp; Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.
I just put in for a transfer to another location my company has there and will transfer back to my original location when we move back. I don't believe I should have to go and change my state of residency, drivers license, car registration/plates, insurance etc) since I consider where I am now my permanent home. It's just a temporary relocation. While this arguably works for the common law concept of domicile, as a practical matter, if you live someplace for the majority of a year, and often more than 30 days, you are considered to reside there. You should change your driver's license, car registration/plates, insurance, voter's registration, etc., unless there is an extremely compelling reason to do otherwise, and not just different tax rates and more bureaucratic inconvenience. A planned three year stay doesn't cut it, especially, if you don't own a home or have a residential lease on a residence in the state you want to claim as your residence. The main exceptions would be someone who is in an institutional setting, such as attending college residentially for nine months a year while supported by their parents, in a prison, or in military service, where different conventions sometimes apply. Legally, could I leave everything as is since the apartment &quot;technically?&quot; isn't mine (I'd just be staying there with her? No. Residency and who owns or leases the place where you are living are two entirely different things. The many people who don't have a lease or own a home are still residents of the places where they live. For that matter, even if you are not a citizen of the U.S., you can still be a resident of a particular state or locality. I'd be filing my taxes as someone that commutes out of state to work and residing in their current home state etc. Nope. For state income tax purposes, you reside in the state where you sleep a majority of the nights in a year. There are sometimes more complicated rules that apply to apportion income between states, but that is the strong general rule. Is there anything I'm missing/not aware of that would make this a bad idea? Or is this a normal thing people do commonly and I'm overthinking it. This is a bad idea and not a normal thing that people do commonly. At a minimum, it will leave you with bureaucratic tangles and at risk of serious state tax audits (which, reading between the lines, seems like the most plausible reason you are thinking about this approach). At worst, you could be exposed to liability for having improper tax payments and car insurance in place, and potential criminal liability for misrepresenting your residence. It might not end up coming to a head and being a problem, but the probability that it will is significant.
Shouldn't the village compensate me or him for allowing the sale with wrong measurement or for changing the rule? No. It is very common for local governments to make changes to zoning ordinances, building codes, etc, that have the effect of restricting the way that property can be used. In most cases this is not considered to be a &quot;taking&quot; for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, even if it reduces the value of the property, and the government does not have to compensate the property owner. See for instance Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Roughly speaking, the Takings Clause only applies if the regulations are so restrictive that the land cannot really be used at all. Here you are still perfectly able to use the existing house, and it sounds like you can even build an addition - you just can't build in the exact way that you want. You'll either need to design your addition to comply with the current setback rules, or see if you can get the village to approve a variance.
My understanding is that the "flow-through" treatment is specifically a tax law concept. The LLC has its own income, which it can use to pay expenses or acquire assets or for whatever other purpose, and such assets become the property of the LLC. It's just that when it comes time to pay taxes, the LLC's net income is taxed as income to the owner. But that does not mean that the LLC's income is treated the same as the owner's income in all other legal contexts.
The legal question is whether a tax (state or federal) constitutes a &quot;taking&quot; for purposes of the 5th Amendment eminent domain clause. The Courts have always held that a generally applicable tax does not constitute a taking, so the income tax is not a taking. The Court came to this conclusion because the 5th Amendment takings clause was always understood to refer to government exercise of the power of eminent domain, rather than generally applicable taxes or regulations, even though they might have a negative economic effect on someone by causing their property to be taken for public use or by making their property less valuable. The exclusion of taxes from 5th Amendment takings predates the 16th Amendment. There have always been taxes and taxes are always collected for public use. The direct/indirect tax distinction arises not under the 5th Amendment, but under Article I, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the United States Constitution and governs what kinds of taxes Congress is authorized to impose. This has nothing to do with the 5th Amendment.
There are a number of issues here. The question mentions: Taxes, which I presume must be authorized and regulated by the US Constitution, but I don't know the details Not exactly. The states existed before the Federal government. They are not created by the Federal Constitution, nor authorized by it. A number of restrictions on state powers and actions are specified by the Federal Constitution, and a number of others are imposed by Federal law. (the Federal courts have found implied restrictions beyond the explicitly stated ones.) But there is no Federal provision granting states the power to impose taxes, only restrictions on that pre-existing power. States cannot impose taxes so as to violate rights federally guaranteed, or to place unreasonable burdens on the exercise of those rights. For example, states cannot impose different taxes or tax rates on a racial basis. States cannot impose different taxes on residents of other states temporarily present in, or doing business in the state. States cannot impose different taxes on people newly moved there from other states, compared to long-established residents. State taxes must not violate the Equal Protection clause. However, states may choose the type and amount of taxes to impose. They can use sales tax, VAT tax, property tax, income tax, excise tax, flat tax, or any combination that their legislatures pass. Different taxes may be imposed on different professions or kinds of businesses. Does the US Constitution guarantee all citizens have the natural right to conduct their own business affairs? Not as such, no. The Due Process and Equal Protection clauses limit to some extent the ability of a state to prohibit a particular business on a whim. But when a state asserts that a particular business is harmful, and demonstrates a plausible basis for that view, so that the law passes "Rational basis" review, the state can prohibit it, or heavily regulate it, or license it. If so, does a citizen lose the right to legally own and operate a business if they cannot afford requisite state or local business license fees? A state may require a license to engage in a particular occupation, and may require a fee, one-time or recurring, high or low, for that license. In addition, a tax may be imposed on those in a particular business or profession, which is not imposed on other kinds of business. For example, in many states, lawyers must pay an annual license fee, or they are not allowed to practice. So must many other regulated professions, such as hairstylist. One who cannot afford the fee may not engage in the business or profession. The state may waive or reduce fees for those too poor to afford them, but need not do so, and many states do not so so. Similarly, the state may charge a fee for a driver's license, and one who cannot pay it may not legally drive. Likewise, does a citizen lose the right to utilize the court system to petition for a redress of grievances, if they cannot afford the requisite court fees? Many states have provisions waiving or lowering court fees for those who cannot afford them, but in most cases this is applied only in severe cases, say where a person would have to go without food to afford court fees. There have been a few federal cases requiring fee waivers for those who cannot afford court fees, mostly in connection with criminal defendants. There is not currently a general federal rule requiring court access for those who cannot afford court fees. Perhaps there should be. A case could be made that Equal Protection requires this, but Federal Courts have not so held. Federal courts have held that holding people in jail or prison because they truly cannot afford fines, bail, or court fees is an unconstitutional denial of Equal Protection. But states need not waive such fees; they can be deferred and charged should the person earn enough money to (just barely) afford them. Even this rule is not yet invariably enforced, and many state courts routinely ignore it. By the way "petition for a redress of grievances" doe snot normally refer to bringing a court case, but to asking a legislature to change a law, or asking an administrator or executive to exercise permitted discretion in a particular way. And lastly, if a citizen is convicted of a crime or infraction, and the sentence requires the convict to utilize government services (e.g. prison services, probation services, registration services, etc.); under the US Constitution, can state government agencies providing these services legally require the convict to pay fees for these services (e.g. prison service fees, probation service fees, registration service fees), if these fees were not explicitly included in the sentence as fines? Yes it can impose such fees, but usually only when neither the convict nor his or her dependents will be impoverished by such fees, as I understand it. If a state attempts to pass or enforce state legislation dictating such fees, should this legislation generally be struck down as unconstitutional? Such laws will not be held unconstitutional by US Federal courts under the Federal Constitution, unless they are found to violate Equal Protection, Due Process, or other specifically imposed restrictions on the state. For example, fees which were in practice imposed on people of one religion, but not those of another, would be struck down. But a fee imposed on everyone will not usually be overturned. "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to steal bread from shops, beg in the streets, and sleep under bridges." -Anatole France