Voting while serving a sentence for felonious refusal to pay taxes Last I heard (but my information may not be up to date) in 49 48 of the 50 states in the U.S., persons serving a sentence for a felony are not allowed to vote. Suppose a person is convicted of a felonious failure to pay a tax. Under the 24th Amendment, their right to vote cannot be denied for that particular offense. (If it were tax evasion, i.e. concealing facts in order to avoid paying, that would be different matter, if I'm not mistaken.) My question is whether that has ever happened, i.e. a person convicted of a felonious failure to pay a tax has been allowed to vote while serving a sentence because of the 24th Amendment?
The 24th Amendment states: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. But, no one in incarcerated in prison (and hence loses the right to vote) merely for failing to pay taxes. Usually, one is incarcerated in prison on tax charges for fraud in connection with one's tax obligation which is different from failure to pay. (A misdemeanor conviction does not result in the loss of an ability to vote, even while in jail.) Refusal to pay, on grounds other than lacking the money (inability to pay isn't a criminal offense), when done without full compliance with other tax return filing obligations, is tantamount to tax litigation abuse and abuse of process, not mere failure to pay a debt.
The previous constitutional provision, which copies the wording of the 13th Amendment to the US Federal Constitution, would in theory have allowed a converted criminal to be sentenced to lifetime slavery, or to a long period of indentured servitude, although this has not commonly been done. This language has allowed convicted criminals to be sentenced to many years of hard labor in a prion setting, including under circumstances where the convicts are rented out to private employers. I take it that such practices would be forbidden by the new language, and that only a limited period of &quot;community service&quot; would be allowed, not under prison conditions, and not designed to benefit private employers. It is not clear to me just what the limits of &quot;community service&quot; are, in intensity or duration. But the suggestioinb seems to be that they would be much less intense, in both aspects, than traditional &quot;chain gang&quot; sentences.
In Wisconsin, right after the perjury law, they have a law prohibiting "false swearing". It applies if a person: Makes or subscribes 2 inconsistent statements under oath or affirmation or upon signing a statement pursuant to s. 887.015 in regard to any matter respecting which an oath, affirmation, or statement is, in each case, authorized or required by law or required by any public officer or governmental agency as a prerequisite to such officer or agency taking some official action, under circumstances which demonstrate that the witness or subscriber knew at least one of the statements to be false when made. The period of limitations within which prosecution may be commenced runs from the time of the first statement. So even if they couldn't actually get you for perjury, they could get you for violating this law. Perjury and false swearing are both class H felonies, so you can expect the same punishment. I am going to guess that the existence of this law suggests that it was needed to cover what would otherwise be a loophole in the perjury law, but I can't say for sure.
No. The relevant provision of the United States Constitution is Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 which states in the pertinent part: The President . . . shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. The correct conclusion flows pretty directly from the definition of a "reprieve" and a "pardon", both of which, in the ordinary senses of these words refer to granting forgiveness for acts that have already occurred. One of the leading cases on point which supports this view is Ex parte Garland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 380 (1855), which states: The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions. Despite its antiquity, this case remains good law and has been applied repeatedly in subsequent cases (although few on the right of a President to pardon future crimes which just hasn't come up). Other Observations The President's pardon power is limited to federal crimes, so no President may pardon or commute a state or foreign conviction. The nature of the pardon power, if any, with respect to state and local crimes is governed by each respective state constitution and varies rather considerably. The power in the U.S. Constitution is broader than that is some state constitutions. For example, the corresponding provision of the Colorado Constitution, applicable to convictions entered by the state of Colorado, does not allow crimes to be pardoned prior to a conviction. Article IV, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution provides: "The governor shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons after conviction, for all offenses except treason * * *." The History Of The Pardon Power One of the most thorough and up to date reviews of the scope and nature of the federal pardon power can be found in the law review article, Todd David Peterson, "Congressional Power Over Pardon and Amnesty: Legislative Authority In The Shadow of Presidential Prerogative" 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1225 (2003). In particular, it has an interesting historical overview of the power at pages 1228-1235 (pagination and footnotes omitted): The President's pardon power derives from the authority that had been invested in English kings since the end of the first millennium. Although the King possessed plenary power to grant pardons, over the years Parliament imposed specific limitations on the pardon power in order to avoid perceived abuses. For example, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 made it an offense for any person to imprison an English subject outside of the country and, in order to avoid an evasion of the writ, Parliament prohibited the King from granting a pardon for violation of the statute. Nevertheless, English courts frequently took an absolutist view of the King's pardon power. Thus, in Godden v. Hales, the Lord Chief Justice upheld a royal pardon on the ground that the Kings of England were absolute sovereigns; . . . the laws were the King's laws; . . . the King had a power to dispense with any of the laws of Government as he saw necessity for it; . . . he was sole judge of that necessity; that no act of Parliament could take away that power. The Parliament, however, persisted in its efforts to rein in the pardon power and, in 1700, adopted the Act of Settlement, which stated that "no pardon under the great seal of England [shall] be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons in Parliament." This limitation was enforced against the King, although it did not apply to pardons granted to relieve punishments imposed after the impeachment of an official. The royal pardon prerogative was imported into the American colonies whose charters gave the leaders substantial authority to pardon offenses. At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, neither the Virginia plan nor the New Jersey plan contained a pardon power. Nevertheless, at the insistence of Charles Pinckney, Alexander Hamilton, and John Rutledge, a pardon clause similar to the English Act of Settlement of 1700 was added to the draft constitution. Thus, the first report of the Committee on Detail proposed that the clause read: "He [the President] shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment." The issue of legislative control over the pardon process was addressed directly by an amendment proposed by Roger Sherman of Connecticut. James Madison's journal notes that "Mr. Sherman moved to amend the power to grant reprieves and pardon' so as to readto grant reprieves until the ensuing session of the Senate, and pardons with consent of the Senate.'" George Mason argued that the Senate already possessed too much authority, and the proposed amendment was rejected by a vote of eight to one. The convention did approve a motion to insert "except in cases of impeachment" after pardon and remove the words "but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar." Luther Martin then sought to limit the President's power to grant pre-conviction pardons by inserting the words "after conviction," following the words "reprieves and pardons." Martin, however, withdrew his motion after James Wilson argued that "pardon before conviction might be necessary, in order to obtain the testimony of accomplices." Edmund Randolph then offered an amendment to exclude "cases of treason" from the pardoning power. This proposed amendment was defeated, although its exclusion was later to prove controversial. Thus, although the framers realized that the pardon power was subject to potential abuse by the President, they declined to place any limitations on the President's pardon power or grant the legislature any authority to check potential presidential abuses. The debates following the convention's passage of the Constitution reveal more about the framers' views on the pardon power. In the Federalist 74, Alexander Hamilton attempted to respond to the criticism that the President could pardon his accomplices in a case of treason. Hamilton acknowledged that "there are strong reasons to be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of [the legislative] body or of a part of it." Hamilton argued, however, that the reasons against such legislative authority outweighed any in its favor: "[i]t is not to be doubted that a single man of prudence and good sense, is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the motives, which may plead for and against the remission of the punishment, than any numerous body whatever." In particular, Hamilton argued, in the case of large scale seditions that attracted significant popular support, we might expect to see the representation of the people tainted with the same spirit, which had given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the condemned person, availing itself of the good nature and weakness of others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an example was necessary. Thus, Hamilton argued not only that the power was properly reposed in the President, but that it would be dangerous to grant such power to Congress. Finally, Hamilton argued that it was appropriate to grant the President pardon power in order to ensure that the authority could be exercised with appropriate dispatch: "In seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of convening the Legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be observed that a discretionary power with a view to such contingencies might be occasionally conferred upon the President; it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable whether, in a limited constitution, that power could be delegated by law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic before-hand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of impunity." There was little debate about the pardoning power during the state ratifying conventions. George Mason continued to argue that the power should not be given to the President. An opponent in New York suggested that pardons for treason should not be allowed without congressional consent. Ultimately, the Constitution was adopted without any express limitation on the President's pardoning power. The Supreme Court has on a number of occasions discussed the general scope of the pardoning power. For the most part, with exceptions to be discussed later, these decisions contain broad dicta concerning the unfettered nature of the President's power and the inability of Congress to impose any legislative restrictions on it. For example, in United States v. Wilson, the Court held that a pardon must be pleaded in order to be effective. Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the [C]onstitution gives to the [P]resident, in general terms, "the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States." As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it. Marshall further defined the pardon as an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. In Ex parte Wells, the Supreme Court considered whether the President could grant a conditional pardon in the form of commutation of a death sentence to a sentence of life imprisonment. The Court noted that pursuant to the Pardon Clause, the President has granted reprieves and pardons since the commencement of the present government. Sundry provisions have been enacted, regulating its exercise for the army and navy, in virtue of the constitutional power of [C]ongress to make rules and regulations for the government of the army and navy. No statute has ever been passed regulating it in cases of conviction by the civil authorities. In such cases, the President has acted exclusively under the power as it is expressed in the [C]onstitution. The Court noted, however, that "[t]here are also pardons grantable as of common right, without any exercise of the king's discretion; as where a statute creating an offence, or enacting penalties for its future punishment, holds out a promise of immunity to accomplices to aid in the conviction of their associates. When accomplices do so voluntarily, they have a right absolutely to a pardon . . . ." Thus, at least in dicta, the Court recognized Congress's authority to regulate clemency in the military and to adopt statutes granting immunity for cooperation in a criminal investigation. In Ex parte Garland, the Court spoke in sweeping dicta about the exclusive power of the President over pardon and amnesty. In Garland, the Court considered the issue whether a former Confederate senator would be permitted to be a member of the Supreme Court Bar without taking the statutorily required oath that he had never voluntarily given aid or comfort to the confederacy. The petitioner had received a presidential pardon and argued that the pardon exempted him from the requirements of the oath to which he could not truthfully subscribe. The Court held that it was "not within the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment beyond the reach of executive clemency," and therefore, the petitioner was entitled to membership in the Bar. In the course of the opinion, the Court broadly defined the President's pardon power: "The power thus conferred is unlimited, with the exception stated. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. This power of the President is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of offenders. The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot be fettered by any legislative restrictions." In Ex parte Grossman, the Court considered whether the President's pardon power extended to criminal contempts of court. The Court upheld the President's power to issue such pardons based on the history of royal pardons for contempt in England. The Court also looked to the long history of presidential pardons of criminal contempts of court. In responding to the argument that a presidential pardon of contempt of court would interfere with the ability of the federal courts to protect their own decrees, Chief Justice Taft noted that the Constitution provides a number of powers to the branches which give them the ability to check the other branches of government. With respect to the pardon power, the Court stated: "[t]he executive can reprieve or pardon all offenses after their commission, either before trial, during trial or after trial, by individuals, or by classes, conditionally or absolutely, and this without modification or regulation by Congress." The Court also noted that the President exercised the pardon power without any significant judicial check on his pardoning authority: "It is a check entrusted to the executive for special cases. To exercise it to the extent of destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment would be to pervert it; but whoever is to make it useful must have full discretion to exercise it. Our Constitution confers this discretion on the highest officer in the nation in confidence that he will not abuse it. An abuse in pardoning contempts would certainly embarrass courts, but it is questionable how much more it would lessen their effectiveness than a wholesale pardon of other offenses. If we could conjure up in our minds a President willing to paralyze courts by pardoning all criminal contempts, why not a President ordering a general jail delivery?" In Biddle v. Perovich, Justice Holmes wrote an opinion for the Court in which he upheld the President's conditional pardon of a convict sentenced to death on the condition that his sentence be commuted to life imprisonment. Justice Holmes suggested a different rationale for the pardon power than Chief Justice Marshall had enunciated early in the 19th century. Rather than being a private act of grace that must be accepted and proffered to the court by the one pardoned, Justice Holmes saw the President's pardon as serving public policy ends: "A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed. . . . Just as the original punishment would be imposed without regard to the prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not, the public welfare, not his consent, determines what shall be done."
Expunction may be possible for instance if you are acquitted, later proven innocent, pardoned, and various other things that fall short of being convicted and doing the time. The entire law is here (Texas code of criminal procedure 55.01). There is also the option of an order of non-disclosure, overviewed here. A requirement for such an order is that you were placed on and completed deferred adjudication community supervision, which from what I can tell is not what happened. "Background check removal" may range between simply taking your money and doing nothing, to doing what you could do yourself to get free of traces via radaris, intelius, spokeo, and so on to "request removal" from that web site. This will not make your record unavailable, because these websites don't have any special powers to reach into and manipulate state records.
The president alone has power, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, to grant pardons for federal offenses. Many states have an analogous power for governors, to pardon state offenses. In some states, though (for example Minnesota), there is a board in charge of the process (made up, in Minnesota, of the Governor, Chief Justice and Attorney General). Likewise, in Canada, pardons are granted by a board. Although POTUS has the power, in terms of implementation it is a bit more complicated, since he doesn't sit around wondering "Who should I pardon": he has an Office of the Pardon Attorney who makes recommendations. However, there are other ways to get out of jail (besides doing the time), namely having the conviction overturned, being paroled, and credit for good behavior. Federal parole is no longer an option, but the other avenues are open, at least in principle.
It depends on the jurisdiction. Some states don't require a signature. In California refusing to sign is grounds for arrest: CA Codes (veh:40300-40313) 40302) Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this code, not declared to be a felony, the arrested person shall be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of the offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where the arrest is made in any of the following cases: (a) When the person arrested fails to present his driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of his identity for examination. (b) When the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to appear in court. (c) When the person arrested demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate. (d) When the person arrested is charged with violating Section 23152.
In general they are not told. In fact, I am not aware of any jurisdiction where they are told by the judge officially. In fact judges will normally charge a jury that they must accept the law as stated by the judge, and ignore any other source of the law, whether they like it or not. But the Judge has no way to enforce such a charge. According to the Wikipedia article The 1895 decision in Sparf v. United States, written by Justice John Marshall Harlan held that a trial judge has no responsibility to inform the jury of the right to nullify laws. It was a 5–4 decision. This decision, often cited, has led to a common practice by United States judges to penalize anyone who attempts to present legal argument to jurors and to declare a mistrial if such argument has been presented to them. In some states, jurors are likely to be struck from the panel during voir dire if they will not agree to accept as correct the rulings and instructions of the law as provided by the judge. A 1969 Fourth Circuit decision, U.S. v. Moylan, affirmed the power of jury nullification, but also upheld the power of the court to refuse to permit an instruction to the jury to this effect. We recognize, as appellants urge, the undisputed power of the jury to acquit, even if its verdict is contrary to the law as given by the judge, and contrary to the evidence. This is a power that must exist as long as we adhere to the general verdict in criminal cases, for the courts cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge. If the jury feels that the law under which the defendant is accused, is unjust, or that exigent circumstances justified the actions of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to their logic or passion, the jury has the power to acquit, and the courts must abide by that decision. Nevertheless, in upholding the refusal to permit the jury to be so instructed, the Court held that: …by clearly stating to the jury that they may disregard the law, telling them that they may decide according to their prejudices or consciences (for there is no check to ensure that the judgment is based upon conscience rather than prejudice), we would indeed be negating the rule of law in favor of the rule of lawlessness. This should not be allowed. It is not so much that jury nullification is a right of the jury, as that there is very little right for the prosecutor or judge to inquire into why the jury acted however it did. If there is a suspicion that the jury was bribed, or influenced by prohibited communications, that can be looked into. But otherwise a jury is like an oracle, its actions have no specified reason or justification, they are whatever they are. The judge (or an appeals court) can set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that no rational jury could find in a particular way -- this is mostly used to overturn convictions based on insufficient evidence. But a jury has almost total freedom to believe of disbelieve any witnesses, so if it disbelieves, it could acquit, regardless of whether it rejects the law under which charges are brought. So there is no way to tell if a particular verdict was based on nullification, or on disbelief of the witnesses, or some other possible ground. In any case, there is no provision -- that I k now of -- to set aside a jury verdict on the grounds that it was an instance of nullification, so inquiring into whether it was would be of little point. This attitude toward jury verdicts goes back to the very early origins of trial by jury, when it was a replacement for Trial by Ordeal. The Ordeal had been considered a way of asking God to decide the issue, and there was no way to ask God to clarify the decision. When it was replaced by jury trial, no way to ask for clarification was considered possible there either -- the jury was said to voice the decision of the community at large: the formal term for jury trial was &quot;to be tried by the country&quot;. See C. Rembar's The Law of the Land and H.C. Lea's The Duel and the oath for more on this history. This article reports on recent cases where juries have refused to convict in Marijuana cases.