Does IIED (emotional distress) apply to infidelity and if no, why not? I found this interesting corner of law called IIED (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress). https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/intentional_infliction_of_emotional_distress To a layman's eye, infidelity seems to fit neatly into 4 bullet points of stated definition at this link, if intent can be shown: It's an act It is generally considered outrageous It's well known that infidelity victims are likely to suffer mental health effects (I even saw mentions it's equivalent to PTSD) Conduct clearly causes the distress. If this is the case, can IIED get applied to a spousal infidelity, and if not, why wouldn't it? I'm looking ideally for a case where it was requested by the accuser, and the court either allowed it thus setting a precedent, or gave an explanation for rejecting it. Since &quot;well in this case, I don't see enough evidence that causing emotional distress was a purpose of defendant, merely an unfortunate consequence&quot; is an obvious rebuttal, I'm hopefully looking for a more interesting case, such as where there is evidence proving that accused had anticipated emotional distress and it was a desired goal. Jurisdiction is USA. And just to clarify, this is specifically regarding &quot;intentional&quot;, not &quot;negligent&quot; ED.
Does IIED (emotional distress) apply to infidelity and if no, why not? Generally speaking, infidelity falls short of liability for IIED. Clark v. Clark, 867 S.E.2d 704 (2021) appears to be one recent exception, but that is because there the defendants' conduct allegedly entailed more than mere infidelity, such as &quot;sen[ding] at least one email to Plaintiff in which Defendant Barrett told Plaintiff she &quot;was a bad mother, that [she was] uneducated... [she] was a bad wife,&quot; and that Plaintiff came &quot;from an unsuccessful family&quot;&quot; (quotation marks in original), conduct that the court seemed to associate with elements of Watson v. Dixon (i.e., frightening the plaintiff, humiliation, etc.), cited in the preceding paragraph of the Clark decision. The difficulty for prevailing on a claim of IIED generally lies in proving that &quot;the defendant's conduct was [...] so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society&quot;, Rogers v. Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 207 (2012). The notion that infidelity &quot;is not tolerated by civilized society&quot; is hard to establish. For instance, many people do not very often distance themselves from a co-worker, friend, or acquaintance merely on grounds of that person being known to cheat on that person's spouse or partner. Also the fact that adultery is hardly ever prosecuted despite being prohibited in a jurisdiction's penal code reflects the extent of societal and governmental tolerance to infidelity.
The relevant (criminal) defence is Sec 11(b)(3) [the Civil defence in Sec 11(a)(iii) is an easier one]: (3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, it shall be a defence to prosecution under this subsection if the defendant committed the offense based on a good faith belief that he was acting to protect himself or herself, a member of his or her family, or any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species. I would say that the defendant could easily demonstrate a "good faith belief that he was acting to ... any other individual, from bodily harm from any endangered or threatened species." Even if there were other ways to rescue the child other than lethal force to the gorilla they all would have necessitated exposing the child to a longer period of danger, exposing another person to danger or may have had less predictable outcomes (e.g. tranquilisers have an onset time) all of which would be unconscionable.
There are only a few areas of law of which I am aware that U.S. law treats people who are engaged to be married differently (although perhaps with more thought I could expand the list). Fiance(e)s come under a special immigration status when applying for a visa. There is a body of law related to whether an engagement ring is an absolute gift or is conditional upon being married (this is not uniform from state to state and I don't recall what the majority rule in those cases is under the common law). In South Carolina, ownership disputes over engagement rings are litigated as breach of promise to marry actions. Pre-marital agreements governing a future marriage can be made by people who are engaged (although a post-nuptial agreement is also equal in effect in most cases). People who are engaged, like spouses, are generally considered to be in a "confidential relationship" with each other which imposes higher duties with respect to fairness in their dealings with each other than strangers, but generally less high duties than fiduciaries. While not strictly arising from the status of being engaged, adult cohabitants are generally agents for service of process of each other at their shared home, and are often considered to have a legally significant relationship for purposes of domestic violence statutes (usually related to either domestic violence crimes or temporary restraining orders). I am not familiar enough with the law of France to fully answer the balance of the question, which someone more familiar with that law can expand upon. But, there is similarly a special immigration status in French law for a fiance(e). And, French law, in a flourish so romantic it could scarcely be any other country's law, also allows people who are engaged a right to marry after one of them has died in certain circumstances: "The legislation that allows posthumous marriages stems back to when a dam burst in 1959 and killed 420 people in southern France." It was most recently invoked in 2014 when a grieving French woman was granted permission by the French President to marry her former fiancé, who tragically died in 2012, just a month before they were due to wed. To be eligible the bride to be had "to convince the President of France that her’s was a special case and that her love for Michael went beyond the grave. It took four letters to the president and 20 months of waiting, desperately hoping for a positive response." The President's discretion in this matter is somewhat similar to the pardon power in U.S. law. This French law was also invoked in 2009. The law in question is set forth at Articles 171 of the French Civil Code. In English translation this states: Article 171 The President of the Republic may, for serious reasons, authorize the celebration of the marriage if one of the future spouses is dead providing a sufficient gathering of facts establishes unequivocally his consent. In this case, the effects of the marriage date back to the day preceding that of the death of the spouse. However, this marriage does not carry with it any right of intestate succession to the benefit of the surviving spouse and no matrimonial regime is considered to have existed between the spouses. I am aware of one documented case where a court entered a post-humous marriage in the United States between people who were engaged, but I am not familiar with any legal authority actually authorizing that action.
It's happened before in real life. Here is a 1994 article describing an Illinois criminal trial where defense counsel pulled the old switcheroo and sat a different person with him at the defense table instead of the defendant. The defendant, instead, sat somewhere else in the courtroom. After a witness misidentified the perp as the person at the defense table (not the defendant), the judge directed a not-guilty verdict to settle the case but sanctioned the defense attorney instead. The appellate and state supreme courts upheld the sanction (by a one-vote margin in both cases) but dissenting opinions noted counsel and defendant technically broke no rules. From the article: The dissent said Mr. Sotomayor's intent was only to show the unreliability of the prosecution's witness. Moreover, seating a client at counsel's table is customary but not required. Nor is a lawyer obliged [...] to help a witness make an identification. Also, here is a similar but not duplicate question.
Well, it is hard to prove a negative, but the answer seems to be: No, you do not need to be engaged. For example, the article Prenuptial Agreements in the United States from the International Academy of Family Lawyers tries to give "an overview of this rather complex area of American family law and estate planning", yet contains not mention of engagement at all. If being engaged were relevant, it would likely be mentioned. Similarly, the "Frequently Asked Questions about Premarital Agreements" on lawhelp.org do not mention engagement. Also see Does being engaged (to be married) carry any legal significance? for information on where being engaged does or does not matter legally.
is spousal immunity a defense for a forced restraining order by a biological father if he won't even speak to a suitor (i.e. may I take your daughter on a date)? There is no such thing as "spousal immunity". Your post is replete with unclear references, unclear statements, and seemingly unrelated questions. But it is noteworthy that spousal privilege (not "immunity") does not preclude obtaining and enforcing a restraining order. The only relevance of spousal privilege is the evidentiary issue of precluding a spouse's testimony from being obtained and entered as admissible evidence in the court proceedings to which the respondent is a party. In the context of restraining orders, spousal privilege might be available only if the respondent invokes it during the proceedings for civil or criminal contempt that resulted from respondent's violation of the restraining order. If the restraining order is pursuant to, or in the context of, divorce proceedings, spousal privilege is inapplicable. See, for instance, MCL 600.2162(3)(a) and other exceptions listed therein. At least in theory (since courts often do whatever they want), a party's conduct &amp; statements (in or outside of court) regarding his/her spouse may forfeit spousal privilege regardless of whether the respondent or spouse ever spoke to a suitor (whatever that means) at all.
In the US, it stems from some statute, such as RCW Ch. 71.05 in Washington state, which starts by stating the rationale for the law, and which are to protect the health and safety of persons suffering from behavioral health disorders and to protect public safety, and prevent inappropriate commitment of persons living with behavioral disorders and to eliminate legal disabilities that arise from involuntary commitment etc. The various laws in this chapter make it possible to commit a person to a mental institute or to undergo involuntary therapy. There is a separate chapter, RCW 71.34, applicable to minors. In general, this law calls for professional evaluation and treatment, without legislating science. The trigger is generally evidence of a tendency towards serious harm or grave disability, with a requirement that the action be requested by a certain kind of behavioral professional. There are not many hard-coded limits on what can be ordered: while RCW 71.05.215 &quot;has a right to refuse antipsychotic medication&quot;, that right is overridden when &quot;it is determined that the failure to medicate may result in a likelihood of serious harm or substantial deterioration or substantially prolong the length of involuntary commitment and there is no less intrusive course of treatment than medication in the best interest of that person&quot;. Along with the legislation cited, there are also regulations which don't require legislative action (they are &quot;empowered&quot; by the statutes), which could specifically forbid a treatment, but again choice of treatments are left to the professional. In some other jurisdiction, it's possible that a certain treatment would be explicitly outlawed.
Can I sue If I was served a real burger after requesting a veggie burger I agree that this inquiry significantly overlaps with the post of which this one is marked by NuclearWang as possible duplicate. Thus, the answers (such as why breach of contract is inapplicable) and comments provided there largely apply here. I will only address the slight differences. I walked up to the cashier and asked was this a veggie burger? He said no. I stated that it was I ordered. He said he would make a new burger. A claim of fraud would fail in court because you will be unable to prove that the restaurant knowingly misrepresented to you (that is, despite knowing it to be false) that it was serving you a veggie burger with the intention that you would rely on that representation. Two hints indicate that the restaurant didn't act with that fraudulent intention: (1) When asked, the cashier told you that yours was not a veggie burger; and (2) he promptly indicated his intention to mend their mistake by telling you that he would make a new burger. A claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) would also fail. You wrote: After we left, my daughter who was still in the restaurant stated that they started laughing at my husband and I. The fact that the employees waited till you and your husband left reflects that they refrained from intentionally inflicting any emotional distress. A significant factor that will favor them is the fact that they stopped laughing once your daughter asked them why they were laughing: My daughter asked why were they laughing, when her parents were in the car sick from eating meat. They stopped laughing. Even if you genuinely feel disrespected by their subsequent laughter, there are no legal remedies because their laughter insofar an expression was neither obscene nor disparaging nor threatening/harassing. Laughter can be an understandable way, and possibly a psychological need, to relieve the stress from a situation like this in a context of hours of hard work in exchange for low wages with which to pay their bills. Moreover, the same fact [that they waited till you and your husband left] contradicts the allegation that they laughed "at" you. Strictly speaking, the restaurant could viably sue your daughter for defamation if the restaurant incurs any losses (including court-ordered sanctions against the restaurant) as a result of falsely attributing to it the hostile or belittling behavior implied by the particle at. By this I intend to illustrate how certain actions under pretext of extreme "sensitivity" can backfire. People elsewhere are victims of much worse misconduct or offenses that have detrimental effects and long-lasting ramifications. The court system is --if only in theory-- intended to redress wrongs which are more serious than a mistaken order at a burger restaurant.