Right to travel(transportation code definitions) I believe we can all agree that there is no reasonable argument that anyone has the right to drive without a drivers license. The states have been granted in several court cases even up to the supreme court. The state has the power to regulate interstate, and intrastate transportation, and commerce. So when it comes to people saying that they have the right to travel, we can all agree that they have this right guaranteed in the constitution. However, the problem comes along when they try and say that they have the right to operate, or drive a motor vehicle. Initially, I thought that this was a ridiculous and frivolous argument, until someone asked me to define the following terms. transportation motor vehicle vehicle drive owner operate In standard English, we all know exactly what the law states, and what the courts have decided. However, when using the LEGAL definition of these words. I do see an argument. That argument being that all of these words' legal definition refer to commerce, and that none of these words actually apply to the individual not engaged in commerce. The question I'm trying to understand is if the common-law right to travel can be applied to a person driving a car, or rather I guess the statement would be made that the transportation code does not apply to individual citizens who are not actively engaging in commerce. , but with the definitions coming from U.S. statutes, case law and blacks TRANSPORTATION CODE TITLE 7. VEHICLES AND TRAFFIC SUBTITLE A. CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AND REGISTRATION OF VEHICLES CHAPTER 502. REGISTRATION OF VEHICLES SUBCHAPTER A. GENERAL PROVISIONS (2) “Commercial Motor Vehicle” means a motor vehicle other than a motorcycle, designed or used primarily to transport property. (13) “Motor Vehicle” means a vehicle that is self propelled (16) “Owner” means a person who: (A) holds the legal title of a vehicle (B) has the legal right of possession of a vehicle: or (C) has the legal right of control of a vehicle. (24) “Vehicle” means a device in or by which a person or property is or may be transported or drawn on a public highway, other than a device used exclusively on stationary rails or tracks. Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 165, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1995. Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 625, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1997. Amended by: Acts 2005, 79th Leg., Ch. 586, Sec. 2, eff. September 1, 2005. Common Carrier – Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990 at 275). A common carrier is “[a]ny carrier required by law to convey…freight without refusal if the approved fare or charge is paid…”(Commerce) Common Carrier – Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004 at 275). A carrier that is “generally required by law to transport…passengers or freight, without refusal, if the approved fare or charge is paid(commerce).” Contract Carrier – Black’s Law Dictionary, at 325 A contract carrier is a “transportation company that carries, for pay(commerce), the goods of certain customers only as contrasted to a common carrier that carries the goods of the public in general.” Driver – Black’s 3rd One employed(commerce) in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. Driver – Black’s 4th One employed(commerce) in conducting or operating a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals, or a bicycle, tricycle, or motor car, though not a street railroad car. A person actually doing driving(commerce), whether employed by owner to drive(commerce) or driving(commerce) his own vehicle. Driver – Black’s 6th A person actually doing driving, whether employed by owner to drive or driving his own vehicle. Traffic(commerce) – Bouvier’s (1856) Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise , bills, money and the like. Traffic – Black’s 3rd Commerce; trade; sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, and the like. The passing of goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money. Senior v. Ratterman, People v. Horan, People v. Dunford, Fine v. Morgan, Bruno v. U.S. (C.C.A.) Transportation – Black’s 4th The removal of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier(commerce). Transportation –Black’s 6th The movement of goods or persons from one place to another, by a carrier. Transportation – 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5102(12) “transports” or “transportation” means the movement of property and loading, unloading, or storage incidental to the movement.(We now see ANY of these words refer to TRANSPORTATION which has been defined as commerce) The United States Supreme Court has ruled that: Undoubtedly the RIGHT of locomotion, the RIGHT to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the RIGHT, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any state is a RIGHT secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution. See:Williams v. Fears, 343 U.S. 270, 274 “Generally “public road” is road used by public as matter of right.” See; Atchison Transportation &amp; Shipping F. RY. Co. v. Acosta, (Civ. App. 1968) 435 S.W.2d 539 ref. n.r.e. Transportation is Commerce, which IS a REGULABLE activity.
Very few terms have a single "legal" definition or meaning that applies to all laws, and can be looked up as if in a dictionary. Rather, when a specific meaning is needed in connection with a particular law, that law will include a definition. But that definition will often not apply to the use of the same term in other laws or other contexts. Here I suspect that the OP has found the definition section of a US Federal law regulating commercial transport in interstate commerce. Obviously in such a law, those terms would be defined in the context of commercial transport. That does not mean that the same meanings will be applied in other laws. Driver's licenses and other traffic and motor vehicle regulations are largely matters of state law in the US. Definitions from a federal law, or indeed any law but that state's Motor Vehicle Code (or whatever a given state calls such a body of law) will simply not be relevant. The argument sketched in the question simply does not follow.
No. I'm going to assume we're talking about the US, where being convicted of a crime requires proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, our hypothetical friend has NOT committed murder. Nor has he committed manslaughter (as this too requires that somebody die) or attempted murder or manslaughter (as that requires an intent that the person should die). If it could be proven that the person our hypothetical scumbag ran over died as a result of being run over, our hypothetical scumbag would likely have committed negligent homicide or involuntary manslaughter; however, as these imply a lack of intent, they lack "attempted" versions (see People v. Hernandez, http://law.justia.com/cases/colorado/court-of-appeals/1980/76-813.html though state laws differ and some may be weird). In short, he has not committed any flavor of murder or manslaughter. So, what other enterprising charge or legal proceeding might we be able to level against him? I'm sure one exists. I'll edit it in once I find it. Civil suit for wrongful death Normally, our hypothetical scumbag would find himself on the receiving end of a wrongful death lawsuit. This would require that he (1) owed the dead man a duty of care (which he clearly did; all motorists are obliged to exhibit reasonable care in operating their motor vehicles) and that he (2) breached that duty (which he presumably did), but also that (3) this failure caused the death of the guy he ran over (which you have stipulated that we cannot "even guess," which precludes a "preponderance of the evidence" (the standard for civil matters)) and that (4) that person's death has caused actual, quantifiable damages to the plaintiff (which it can't as "nobody knows him"). Reckless driving charge In most states, our hypothetical scumbag's behavior meets the threshold for reckless driving. For example, in VA law: [In reckless driving cases, e]ither the driver is believed to have driven recklessly in a manner that threatened people or property, to have driven 20 miles per hour or more in excess of the speed limit, or to have exceeded 80 miles per hour, no matter the speed limit. http://manassascriminalattorney.com/2015/10/can-reckless-driving-in-virginia-be-a-felony-charge/ In some states, this may be felony reckless driving; in others, it may be a mere misdemeanor. Misc links https://www.virginia-criminallawyer.com/homicide-laws-virginia-code.html http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/proving-wrongful-death-civil-case.html A forum discussion that (thank heaven) cited its sources: http://www.top-law-schools.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=155412
If they have no legal grounds then it would be trespass to chattels However, they do have legal grounds. Following the procedure laid out in the relevant Act makes the car refuse under the Act notwithstanding your opinion. Move it or lose it. Or seek an injunction preventing the council removing the vehicle- this will likely fail.
This varies greatly by state, but the pedestrians "right of way" is quite a common misconception. Pedestrians do not always have the right of way, but you're also not allowed to just run them over if they're in the middle of the street. That's why states have jaywalking laws, and a lot of people don't realize that they can be ticketed for it - because it's a huge safety concern for a pedestrian to walk in the street outside the designated areas. The NCSL provides a Pedestrian Crossing 50 State Summary that outlines the laws regarding pedestrian crossing. Particularly, there are two lines that frequently repeat throughout all the states: Pedestrians may not suddenly leave the curb and enter a crosswalk into the path of a moving vehicle that is so close to constitute an immediate hazard. Pedestrians must yield the right-of-way to vehicles when crossing outside of a marked crosswalk or an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection. Bottom line: if there is a pedestrian randomly in the middle of the street somewhere, you are fully obligated to attempt to not hit them with your vehicle. Feel free to curse them out (if that's your thing) because in most states they are themselves breaking a law. If an accident can't be prevented due to a pedestrian's actions, then the pedestrian is fully at fault and you will not be held responsible in any way.
IMO this is a perfectly reasonable question, amenable to a common law analysis: (1) indicates that A has committed the tort of false imprisonment (Restatement of Torts, 2d, §35). Because of 2-4, we can see that A intends to confine B (though vide infra). The confinement is complete (§36), this being a single aisle plane although the same would be true if this was a 5-aisle plane. A has no authority to confine B (§ 41) and is not otherwise privileged, and is accomplished with a physical barrier (§38). B knows that he has been confined (§42). B is "privileged to use any means of self-defense to protect himself against confinement which he is privileged to use to protect himself against a harmful or offensive contact or other bodily harm" (§68). B uses reasonable and minimal force not likely or intended to cause death or serious bodily harm (§63), force which is privileged and thus protects B from being subject to liability (§10). A commits the tort of battery (and a second round of false imprisonment) by taking B down (§13). A is not privileged to use force in self-defense. There is no reasonable belief that B will spontaneously turn on A and use further, unprivileged force – A is simply punishing B for his minimal use of force in self defense, so A's final act is not privileged. There is a related but distinct scenario that adds a material fact, which could change the analysis: C calls out "Excuse me, my flight flight leaves in 15 minutes, may I pass?" whereby A allows C to step ahead of him in the queue. A has no obligation to let anyone jump the queue, but may consent to inconsequential contact which might constitute battery. It is reasonable to conclude that there is apparent consent (§50) given to anyone (§52) when A makes way ("making way" is a publicly-available fact, but "for C to pass" is a private fact of A's state of mind which B cannot reasonably infer: except, B has heard the "May I pass?" request). So the analysis really hinges on how to interpret 2 and 4. Coupled with 6, we (jurors) have a preponderance of evidence showing that A intended to confine B, and battered him when his confinement failed.
Almost certainly, there is no such right. It's illegal under 18 USC 831 to possess "nuclear material" without specific authorization. 18 USC 832 forbids the possession of a "radiological weapon". If there is intent to use the device to cause death, serious bodily injury, or damage to property or the environment, that's also a violation of 18 USC 2332i. I don't think these laws have been explicitly tested against the Second Amendment, but related cases suggest they would hold up (if the challenge wasn't simply dismissed as frivolous). The Second Amendment doesn't grant a blanket right to own weapons. Federal law, 18 USC 922 (o) makes it unlawful to own a "machinegun" (as defined in the statute), and in the case of Hollis v. Lynch, the Fifth Circuit held that this law was constitutional, because, as they said, the Second Amendment only protects weapons that are in "common use [...] for lawful purposes like self-defense." This case doesn't seem to have been appealed further, but the reasoning cited by the Fifth Circuit comes from the Supreme Court's opinion in D.C. v. Heller. If machineguns aren't in "common use", and therefore not protected, surely the same would apply to nuclear weapons.
It would seem that the law involved is probably Section 58-17-4096 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 58. This is part of the General Railroad Law of SC (GRL), and apparently was last revised in 1996. Section 58-17-4096 reads, in full: (A) It is unlawful, without proper authority, for a person to trespass upon railroad tracks. (B) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than two hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days. Note that the section does not specifically define &quot;proper authority&quot; nor &quot;trespass&quot; (nor do the definition sections at the start of the GRL), so those terms should have their ordinary meanings. It might be argued that the landowner has &quot;proper authority&quot;. It is interstice to contrast this with the previous section, SC Code § 58-17-4095 (2012) which gives a rather detailed list of who is authorized to &quot;park or operate a vehicle on a railroad right-of-way&quot;. Persons authorized are: an employee of the railroad ... in the performance of his duties [one who] has authority from the railroad [one who] is using a public or private roadway which crosses over the railroad ... [one who] is acting in an official capacity with the military, police force, a fire fighting organization, or some similar public authority ... which crosses over the railroad ... [one who] is an employee of a public utility or telecommunications carrier, or of the forestry industry ... The question asks: Can a law that effectively bars a property owner from access to their property be enforced or does the constitution protect the property owner’s rights and thus make them exempt from such a state law? There is no such absolute right of access by the owner specified in the US Federal Constitution. As the comments by Nate Eldredge suggest, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment might be relevant, but that would have (or should have) been applied when the railroad lines were put in, and if proper compensation was paid at that tiem to the then landowner, future ownership would include the restrictions then imposed. Any easement should be recorded on the actual deed to the property, but a tract map would not normally show it. Moreover, it is possible that the railroad was put in before the fourteenth amendment made the takings clause applicable to the states, or before this incorporation was recognized in Chicago, Burlington &amp; Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Even so, an easement might have been obtained by private agreement between the railroad and the owner of the land at that time. In the &quot;Interactive Constitution&quot; article &quot;The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause&quot; by Richard A. Epstein and Eduardo M. Peñalver (both noted professors of law) it is said that: ... The Clause also applies, not only to the confiscation of all existing interests in any individual piece of property, but to the confiscation of certain lesser interests in property. Under Anglo-American law, these would include recognized interests like easements (such as rights of way), leases, mortgages, life estates, and remainders. ... ... Any time some private party could seek a court order stopping another private party from engaging in harmful activities, the government can impose the same limitations through fines and court orders without a duty to compensate. A law or regulation authorized by law may bar access by a landowner to a part of a property in proper cases. For example if the land is environmentally sensitive, or if there is a dangerous condition, such as old ordnance on a former proving ground or battlefield. Such a law would probably be a partial taking, and require appropriate compensation, depending on the exact circumstances The answer by Greendrake which says: the only theoretically possible case of trespassing here is that of trespass to chattels, but that is a tort, not a crime. There can be no charges, only claims. is incorrect because of Section 58-17-4096, which specifically makes such trespass a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment. However, in Faulkenberry v. Norfolk Southern(Opinion No. 25454, Opinion Filed April 29, 2002) the South Carolina Supreme Court found that a railroad claiming under an 1845 charter which authorized it to purchase land, and force such purchases, had acquired only an easement, not a title in fee simple. The opinion by Justice Waller refers to and quotes the SC 1845 Act No. 2953 which granted powers of acquisition to the railroad, and mentions other similar acts of the same era granting such powers to other railroads. The opinion also cites the SC 1868 Act No. 43, 7, which explicitly limits such railroad tenures. The Justice wrote: The circuit court, pursuant to numerous cases of this Court, held Railroad acquired only an easement to use the tracks, rather than a fee simple determinable, and that, in any event, Faulkenberry was entitled to an easement by necessity. ... In Ragsdale v. Southern Ry. Co., 60 S.C. 381, 38 S.E. 609 (1901), the Court construed a Charter to the Spartanburg and Union Railroad which had provisions identical to those of sections 9, 10 and 11 above. The Court noted that, under sections 9 and 10, the Legislature had specifically provided that land taken by and paid for by the railroad would vest in fee simple. However, the Court noted that no such words were used in section 11, which provided only that the company shall have &quot;good right and title. . . so long as the same may be used only for the purpose of said road.&quot; The Ragsdale Court, after citing Justice Wardlaw's dissent in Lewis, concluded: [t]he legislature wisely made a distinction in the tenure by which the railroad company held the land when it was under one or the other of said sections. Having reached the conclusion that the rights of the parties are different under the foregoing sections, . . . [o]ur interpretation of the foregoing sections is that the railroad company acquired only a right of way over the land described in the complaint. ... We adhere to the wealth of authority in this state and hold the 1845 Charter created only an easement in Railroad, such that Faulkenberry is entitled to use the disputed crossing. We note, however, that although Faulkenberry may cross the railroad tracks, he may not do anything which would unreasonably interfere with Railroad's use of its easement. Marion County Lumber Co. v. Tilghman Lumber Co., 75 S.C. 220, 55 S.E. 337 (1906) (owner of the dominant estate cannot materially interfere with use and enjoyment of servient estate's easement; owners must be held during continuance of easement to have abandoned every use of the land except such as might be made consistent with the reasonable enjoyment of the easement). See also Brown v. Gaskins, 284 S.C. 30, 33, 324 S.E.2d 639, 640 (Ct.App.1984). ( A footnote to the opinion mentions that: The circuit court ruled that, in any event, Faulkenberry was entitled to an easement by necessity to cross the railroad tracks. In light of our holding, we need not address this alternate ruling. Note that in the Faulkenberry case there was apparently a road crossing the tracks, although not an authorized crossing. The doctrine of an easement by necessity might apply in the case described in the question. Detailed legal advice would be needed to determine this, and quite probably a court case.
The state of Washington does not have an absolute requirement that vehicles must be registered. What it has is RCW 46.16A.030 (2): (2) It is unlawful for a person to operate any vehicle on a public highway of this state without having in full force and effect a current and proper vehicle registration and displaying license plates on the vehicle. Therefore you already have a means to comply with the law: simply refrain from operating this vehicle on any public highway of the state of Washington. In other words, don't drive or park it on public roads; keep it on private property. (In many states, &quot;operating&quot; includes parking; I could not immediately find out whether this is the case in Washington.) So now your question instead becomes: &quot;What is the state's obligation to make it possible for me to lawfully drive this particular vehicle on the public roads?&quot; And the answer to that is much more clearly, &quot;none&quot;. Driving in general is considered a privilege and not a right, so your &quot;personal liberty&quot; is not at issue. The state is not doing a good job of providing a service which they generally do provide, which is certainly annoying, but is not a legal issue, and does not give you the right to break the law. I have considered proceeding with the restoration, and drafting an &quot;Affidavit in lieu of registration&quot; document detailing my numerous attempts to follow the process, and indicating a sincere desire to comply, but my concern would be having the vehicle impounded if/when I get pulled over. Yes, it probably would be. I have even considered asking local law enforcement to just issue me a citation so that I might appear in court and plead for an opportunity to be given the means to comply. (i.e. move to the head of the line...) You would still lose, unless the judge is particularly sympathetic. I have also considered writing to my state representative. That's a better idea - at least it doesn't involve violating the law. And legislators usually do make some effort to help constituents when they have problems with government offices. However, if the issue is simply that the State Patrol is overloaded with work, there may not be much they can do. Is there a statute of limitations for asserting ownership that might alleviate my concerns about proceeding with the project? The requirement to have an inspection before getting a title seems to be from RCW 46.12.530 (2): &quot;The department may require additional information and a physical examination of the vehicle or of any class of vehicles, or either.&quot; So there is no exception written into statute. The implementing regulation looks to be WAC 308-56A-150. There are several criteria listed for when inspection is required, and I'm not sure which would apply to your vehicle. It may perhaps be &quot;(g) ownership in doubt (WAC 308-56A-210)&quot; which applies when you do not have the documentation described in WAC 308-56A-265. Or it may be the catchall &quot;(c) One on which the identification number needs verification as requested by the department, county auditor, or authorized agent&quot;. You'll have to research this further. There doesn't seem to be any exception based specifically on the long time period that the car has been unregistered, or the fact that no theft is known to have been reported in the past 20 years, or anything like that.