Before his arrival at St Helena, was Napoleon legally a prisoner of war? I would like to know whether in law Napoleon was a prisoner of war when he surrendered himself to the British after the Battle of Waterloo, did he retain that status up to the point when he was landed at St Helena and did his legal status change at St Helena because it belonged to the East India Company rather than the British government? Napoleon surrendered himself to the HMS Bellerophon on 15 July 1815. He was transported to the southern coast of England and eventually set sail for his imprisonment at St Helena on HMS Northumberland on 7 August. He reached St Helena on 1 October. I think two treaties are relevant. First, the Convention of St Cloud was signed on 7 July 1815. This signified the end of hostilities and allowed the British and Prussian troops to freely enter Paris. Napoleon surrendered himself after this date. More importantly (I think), the Treaty of Paris was signed by Britain and France on 20 November 1815. Article 10 of this stated: “All Prisoners taken during the hostilities, as well as all hostages which may have been carried off or given, shall be restored in the shortest time possible.” A search of news stories in the London Times suggests in practice the British government did not start releasing French prisoners until late December 1815: “Government gave directions in the course of last week, of the agents of the prison depots at Forton and Dartmoor (Captains MOTTLEY anti SHORTLAND) to provide vessels and send home all the French prisoners that are under their charge. Yesterday those in confinement at Forton commenced being shipped, either for Havre or Cherburgh. (The Times, 26 December 1815, p 3). The relevance of all this is that Napoleon arrived at St Helena on 1 October, BEFORE the Treaty of Paris was signed. Since St Helena belonged to the East India Company, I suspect the island lay outside the jurisdiction of British courts AFTER the Treaty was signed. In other words, once he had been taken there, the British authorities were no longer obliged to release him according to the terms of the Treaty of Paris. It may be that that this was an important motive for sending Napoleon to St Helena, not just because it was very isolated.
Napoleon was never a prisoner of war, since he surrendered, as you say, after the conclusion of hostilities. If a label is necessary, he was probably a prisoner of State; but the important point was that in Rochefort he surrendered not, as in 1814, to the Allied Powers but to the British Government specifically: he dictated a letter on 13 July 1815 to George III including the lines "I come, like Themistocles, to throw myself on the hospitality of the British people. I put myself under the protection of their laws". (Since the French government had declared several of Napoleon's followers traitors and written to one of his staff "The interests of the State and the safety of his person make it absolutely necessary [for Napoleon to leave France as soon as possible]" and the Prussian and Russian governments would cheerfully have hanged him [no citation, but the behaviour of the occupying armies leaves little doubt], it is probable that this was less a grand gesture and more a necessity.) It is clear from his correspondence that Napoleon was envisaging some sort of genteel retirement like that of his brother Lucien, who was living in a country house under the supervision of a single police inspector; but this was never realistic, and the captain of the Bellerophon wrote specifically "I have no authority to agree to any such arrangement...I cannot enter into any promise as to the reception he may meet with" [from the British Government]; Napoleon decided to surrender nevertheless. It is interesting that Lord Liverpool (the Prime Minister) decided not merely not to imprison Bonaparte in the Tower as the newspapers were suggesting, but not to allow him to set foot in England: whether this was to avoid legal complications or to prevent a possible rescue attempt will never be known. But is is clear that after 15 July 1815 Napoleon had placed himself entirely in the power of the British Government, to be imprisoned or dealt with as they pleased. [Quotations as in Cordingly's Billy Ruffian, since it is to hand; but the best treatment of those days is Gilbert Martineau's Napoleon Surrenders.]
Is it legal to cross the channel in a private rowing boat or sailing boat? Yes. Can he land on any old beach, or does he have to go to a port to identify himself? It depends. Who is on board, where did they come from, what have they got in their pockets, etc. This may be helpful Notice 8: sailing your pleasure craft to and from the UK When arriving direct from a country outside the EU (the Channel Islands are regarded as outside the EU for this purpose), you must phone the National Yacht line on Telephone: 0845 723 1110. You will need to inform the Yachtline if any of the following apply: etc etc Since France is in the EU, whether you need to phone the NYL to report your departure from the UK depends on a complicated bunch of conditions you can read in the link above. Maybe the French have similar rules? The RYA say Some countries specify ports of entry (ports where one may lawfully enter a country), which should be used by a vessel arriving from abroad. It is often a requirement that you proceed directly to such a port of entry on entering territorial waters. A vessel arriving in a country from outside its customs territory should fly the Q flag until it has been given clearance from the authorities. Even once clearance has been given, some countries may ask to inspect the vessel’s papers periodically, for example at each port of call. and so on.
As a matter of law, the Duchy is correct, because a superior court of record agreed, and dismissed the arguments made on the other side. The cited claims from Republic come from a case in the First-Tier Tribunal (EA/2010/0182) about whether the Duchy was a &quot;public authority&quot; for the purpose of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. The FTT said that it was, since either the Duchy or the Duke were carrying out certain functions of public administration (as the harbour authority for St Mary's Harbour on the Isles of Scilly), and whichever one it was, the Duke was in charge of the Duchy; and meanwhile, the Duchy appeared to have some elements of legal personality, as cited in the question above. This decision was appealed to the Upper Tribunal, The A-G for the Prince of Wales v the IC and Mr Michael Bruton [2016] UKUT 0154 (AAC), which disagreed as to the Duchy being a body with its own separate identity - see paragraphs 71-102 - and reversed the ruling below. The basic issue is that the Duchy of Cornwall was brought into being by a royal charter of 1337. It predates modern common-law or statutory developments about bodies corporate, income tax, corporation tax, and so on. It also precedes the not-exactly-modern developments of the limited scope of royal authority and the prerogative, norms of statutory construction, the Crown as separate from the royal person, and other apparatus of constitutional monarchy. It is true that it sits uncomfortably in the modern world, as a sui generis feudal creation that is not something we would create today. However, as a matter of law, the UT said that what counts is what the Duchy is, not what it ought to be. Figuring out the law means looking at the actual law as opposed to ancillary indications, such as what Duchy officers have said from time to time, or administrative actions of the Health and Safety Executive. Parliament has had the opportunity to consider the position of the Duchy several times and has so far declined to change it. The charter of 1337, which was deemed to be an Act of Parliament by a court case in 1606 (!), grants land and privileges to the Duke of Cornwall, whoever that might be from time to time, and with a reverter to the Crown when there is no Duke. The UT found that this &quot;creates something that has similarities to a trust, but without trustees&quot; (there was a nascent body of law relating to trusts in 1337, but it was nowhere near its modern flourishing). Unlike with the creation of the Duchy of Lancaster, this charter does not incorporate the Duchy as an entity in its own right - the &quot;Duchy&quot; is just a word used to describe the possessions of the Duke or King held under the charter. If it is a separate entity then that is not because of the charter. The UT examined various of the claims made in the FTT but rejected them, saying that &quot;such examples cannot create such an entity or body and each investigation of the submissions based on them that took place before me showed such statements or implications to be wrong (e.g. that the Duchy owns Highgrove was shown to be wrong by the production of the Land Certificate).&quot; It also rejected the idea that the people who administer the Duchy could be regarded as some form of partnership or unincorporated association, finding that they had not come together in that fashion. It said that therefore, the only remaining route to the Duchy being a corporation would be if the other primary legislation dealing with its management had created it as such by &quot;necessary implication&quot;. Those Acts, of 1844, 1863 and 1982, deal with accounting and management for the Duchy of Cornwall. From their context and content, the UT said that they seem to envisage the property in question as belonging to the Duke (not the Duchy) as &quot;the legal owner of the assets etc. comprising the Duchy estate&quot;, and that &quot;the relevant officers and employees work for the Duke, or the Duke’s guardian when he is a minor, or the Sovereign when there is no Duke, and not for an entity or corporation called the Duchy.&quot; Therefore: [T]he Duchy of Cornwall or the Duchy is no more than a name that has been used correctly to describe the possessions of the Duke of Cornwall (the Duchy estate), or to the Duke (or his title), or collectively and conveniently to describe the officers and persons who from time to time act for and on behalf of the Duke as the owner of the Duchy estate. Save to the extent that it is a reference to the Duke as a natural person the Duchy of Cornwall has no legal personality and is not a person, body or entity that has its own functions and powers or a separate identity of its own. Although this was not before the UT, it would seem to follow for tax purposes that if the Duchy is not a body corporate, then it is not liable for corporation tax under the Corporation Tax Act 2010 - see section 1121, which defines &quot;company&quot; for that and the companion Corporation Tax Act 2009. It also does not fall within section 443, &quot;Companies controlled by or on behalf of Crown&quot;, firstly because if it's not a company, then that section fails immediately, and secondly because &quot;Crown&quot; here refers to the Crown in the sense of governmental public functions, not the Queen (or her family members) personally.
The US courts (including the US Supreme Court) do not have an army or even a police force under their direct control, except for a few court bailiffs. Ultimately, if the executive simply defies the courts, the only remedy is a political one. A court can order a person held unlawfully to be released from detention, but the jail/prison authorizes might ignore such an order. A court might order DACA applications to be accepted, and if they are not, might rule that deportations or other negative actions are unlawful. A court might hold persons who defy its orders in contempt, and send marshals to jail such persons. But if the executive branch in an organized way defies such orders, there is no judicial power to compel obedience to court orders. This is why the judiciary has famously been called the &quot;least dangerous branch&quot; of the government: it cannot actually do anything without at least the tacit cooperation of the executive. Cherokee Case (Worcester v. Georgia) There was a reference in the comments above to the the Cherokee Indians case, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). In that case the US Supreme Court, in a decision written by Chief Justice Marshall held that the Georgia laws purporting to seize Cherokee lands were invalid as violations of Federal treaties. President Jackson was strongly displeased by this ruling. He was supposed to have said: John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it. It appears that President Jackson probably did not say that, at least not publicly. But in fact Jackson did not take any steps to enforce the decision, and the decision was in fact not enforced. The lands were seized, and the Cherokee were forcibly relocated across the infamous trail of tears. This event shows that a court ruling (proper or improper) may have no effect if the executive branch refuses to obey or enforce it.
The &quot;letter&quot; you quote says more than what Ionos says publicly, the latter not mentioning any date. The most obvious possibility is Treasury Department sanctions against Russia: while the sanctions don't necessarily prohibit servicing and any all Russian nationals or residents, Russia is subject to sanctions and that's what the TOS says. A problem is that the TOS refers to a &quot;country subject to U.S. Treasury Department embargo restrictions&quot;, which is not legally defined. Here is the Treasury Department's explanation of that point (which is that there are very many types of restrictions: there is no legal category of &quot;embargo restrictions&quot;). One could then argue, in one's breach of contract arbitration hearing, that the clause cannot reasonably be interpreted the way the company (possibly) intends it to be. The force majeure clause does not seem relevant unless they see some way in which the invasion of Ukraine makes it impossible for the company to fulfill the contract with Russians.
It is possible in principle, in the US, under the Bureau of Prison Treaty Transfer program, so that one could serve your time in Australia for example -- but not New Zealand, which isn't part of a bilateral or multilateral treaty with the US: here is the list. Canada and Australia are on the list via the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons. New Zealand is (by choice) not a participant.
I haven't found any cases where this defence has worked. I strongly suspect that that's because it never has. Every piece of advice I've read on this unsurprisingly suggests you'd be a fool to attempt to rely on this defence in court, including some cases in which defendants have attempted to rely on it and have failed. There are a couple of Freedom of Information requests to the government which state very clearly that it won't work: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/statute_law_4 https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/consent_of_the_governed The last link is particularly clear on the matter: every citizen of the UK tacitly consents to be governed, according to Blackstone. And this one makes it even clearer: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/18097/response/56511/attach/html/3/TO%20255452%20TO09%205866.doc.html Under the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, Acts of Parliament override common law. So it simply wouldn't be possible to argue that you choose to live under the common law alone; no court in the land would allow it, as it's a cornerstone of our legal system that Parliament is sovereign, and therefore that statutes enacted by Parliament will 'trump' the common law. Parliament derives its sovereignty from the fact that the current government is elected and therefore represents the citizens of the UK, and for this reason, Acts of Parliament take priority over case law. On that basis, it wouldn't be possible for a citizen to argue that they choose not to abide by statute: their consent is tacitly assumed. Based on all the above, then, I would say no: the 'common law' defence will never hold water if relied on in court.
Is this unique to the USA, or now common elsewhere? No. It is common throughout the developed world. How long has this been done, as opposed to keeping all the inmates constantly locked in their own cells and only seeing each other when eating in a dedicated eating place or when brought outdoors once a day for an hour or so? Before the late 18th century, imprisonment was not a punishment - it was a place where you were held while awaiting trial or punishment: execution, corporal punishment, humiliation or transportation. However, it was not uncommon for prisoners who had been acquitted to still be held because they couldn't pay the cost of their pre-trial imprisonment. The 1779 Penitentiary Act introduced solitary confinement, religious instruction, and a labour regime. These types of prisons were not actually built until the 19th century and saw increasing use as the death penalty became applicable to fewer and fewer crimes. These types of prisons spread across the western world and it is this 100+-year-old image that you are thinking of. However, for some reason, solitary confinement and individual prayer seemed to cause no improvement in the moral state of prisoners. Therefore, since the early 20th (yes, 20th) century most prisons had communal mess halls and recreation yards for use on the weekend. In most, prisoners worked during the week, around the prison or outside in things like quarries and road construction. Starting in the late 20th century &quot;hard labour&quot; was largely done away with and prisoners were offered work or education opportunities. They were confined to their cells at night in medium-security and higher-level prisons but low-security prisons often work on an honour system and cells are not locked. Developments such as day-release and weekend detention have influenced prisons. Many northern European countries have literally open prisons where you are free to come and go so long as you spend the nights there. Only the worst of the worst are kept in super-max prisons and only the worst of them are kept to their cells and isolated from the rest of the prison population. Those are the people who get 1 hours recreation only. That said, prisoners have rights and their physical and psychological well-being are the responsibility of the State. Doctors and psychologists examine prisoners and balance risks to society against the rights of the prisoner. I've worked inside super-max prisons as a contractor and they are bleak and scary places but most inmates are free to roam around the grounds and other common spaces. I've also worked in low-security prisons and they are very different - still not nice places but spartanly comfortable. If you get sent to such a prison, can you choose to get a normal cell if you don't want anything to do with these violent, crazy people? Or are you forced to endure that living nightmare and constantly be on guard? You're a prisoner. One of your punishments is having your freedom of choice taken away from you. The system will tell you where you sleep, where you eat, where you can go and when you can go there. If you are a &quot;violent, crazy&quot; person then you will be in a super-max prison with other &quot;violent, crazy people&quot;. If you are a white-collar criminal, you won't be.