Court transcripts of U.S. trials about claims of voter fraud When you argue with QAnon proponents online, a common claim is that none of the “evidence” for voter fraud has ever been tried in court, and that this is all just “fake news” made up by the “mainstream media”, which is controlled by the “deep state” and whatever. They demand actual court transcripts instead. But court transcripts are rarely being referenced directly by the media, so it takes some digging to find them. For instance, after some work, I managed to find Law v. Whitmer in Nevada. The verdict itself is in document 20-44711. Can someone provide me with more, similar court transcripts from the trials where the “evidence” of voter fraud has been debunked?
You'd have to specify the cases you want. All court transcripts are a matter of public record, though a copy may cost you a fee from the court clerk's office to recieve. It should be pointed out that not all cases got to an evidentiary stage to actually evaluate on the record any evidence. A vast majority were decided on pre-evidentiary rules such as standing or laches (timeliness) and not all cases that were able induced evidence debunked the evidence. Any appellent case would also not induce evidence as all appeals cases are strictly matter of law rather than matter of fact (evidence), so those cases would be asking a higher court to double check non-evidentiary decisions. The fact that the party that brought the suit does not have standing to bring the suit OR that the party that brought the suit brought it too late for the courts to proceed on the matter does not debunk evidence that the fraud happened in the eyes of the law... it simply means the questions of fact were never addressed at all
The question actually asked, "what legal theories would support or harm...", is somewhat unclear. But what the questioner seems to be asking is, basically, what would happen if you tried it? The answer, it seems to me, is pretty straightforward. In the hypothetical case, you have been publishing a notice for years, saying "I have not been served with a subpoena." You then get served with a subpoena that includes a gag order. The gag order, presumably, includes wording prohibiting you from revealing the existence of the subpoena. You then cease publication of the warrant canary. By doing so, you have revealed the existence of the subpoena, and you are in violation of the gag order. You will be subject to whatever penalties you would be subject to if you violated it in some other way; for example, by publishing a notice that said, "Hey! We got a subpoena! It's a secret!" The distinction between revealing the existence of the subpoena by action, rather than by inaction, is a false one. It's exactly the kind of cutesy legal formality that non-lawyers love to rely on, but real judges ignore. If you tell someone: "Hey, you know John Smith's three sons, Joe, Ted, and Bill? Joe and Ted are good people; they have never molested any children. As for Bill--well, I don't have anything to say about Bill." If Bill is not a child molester, you have defamed him, and you are not going to convince a judge otherwise. The EFF link you link to tries to claim it'll "work" because courts are reluctant to enforce speech. Even if that were true, that might mean your canary would be effective in the sense of giving the public notice of the subpoena. That doesn't mean you wouldn't be liable for giving the public notice. For example: I put up a billboard saying "Bill Smith is a pedophile." Even if the court can't force me to add the word "not", that doesn't mean the billboard isn't defamatory. Realistically, though, courts compel speech all the time. Court-ordered apologies, disclosures, and notices are not unusual. And if ever a court would be inclined to compel speech, it would be in a situation like this one, where a company intentionally set out to get around a gag order with this kind of convoluted sea-lawyering.
I'm no expert, but I had assumed this clause was present in case of the following situation. Joe is arrested for a robbery of a London bank. Joe says nothing under questioning. At trial, Joe's defense is that at the time of the robbery, he was in Sheffield drinking beer with his brother. On the basis of common sense, a jury could think: "Surely if Joe were really innocent, he would have told the police of his alibi at the time he was questioned, and saved himself a lot of trouble. Since he didn't do that, maybe a more likely explanation is that he wasn't actually in Sheffield, but that sometime between arrest and trial, he came up with the idea of faking an alibi in Sheffield, and convinced people to testify falsely to that effect. Yes, that does seem more plausible. So we are not going to give much credence to Joe's supposed alibi." So it really would be the case that not mentioning the alibi during questioning would harm Joe's defense at trial. The warning, then, is intended to keep Joe from doing this inadvertently. If Joe's alibi is genuine, but out of a misguided desire to exercise his right to remain silent, he doesn't mention it during questioning, he may accidentally increase his chances of being wrongly convicted. Everybody has an interest in avoiding this.
I believe in truth, justice and equality for all What I get is something else. Nobody cares what you believe: what can you prove? And what can they prove? They say they posted you this letter. You say you never received it. If it goes to court they will submit evidence about how their internal letter generation and postal system works, this either will or will not convince the court on the balance of probabilities that the letter was posted. If it does convince the court, you will provide evidence of how you deal with incoming mail and that it never arrived, this will either convince the court that the postal service did or did not deliver the letter to you. Then you’ll know who wins. As to your allegations of fraud: never attribute to malice that which can be adequately explained by incompetence- theirs, the postal service or yours.
Based on the question, this was not perjury; if the officer did not review the footage, the fact that his testimony was in error indicates a mistake, nothing more. To even consider a perjury charge, the prosecuting authorities would need evidence that the officer knew the testimony was wrong when he gave it. You do not indicate the jurisdiction, so nobody can say whether an appeal would lie (since new evidence has come to light), whether the conviction could be quashed for procedural failure (if multiple requests for evidence were really not received) or whether a complaint could be made against the prosecutor, the defence lawyer, or even the judge. But no case has ever been strengthened by brandishing about words like 'perjury' without being able to substantiate them.
I don't believe your premise is necessarily true. As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can be prosecuted for perjury after being convicted for another offense at trial: The conviction of Williams, at a former trial, for beating certain victims is not former or double jeopardy. Obviously perjury at a former trial is not the same offense as the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 242, of depriving a person of constitutional rights under color of law. . . . It would be no service to the administration of justice to enlarge the conception of former jeopardy to afford a defendant immunity from prosecution for perjury while giving testimony in his own defense. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58, 62 (1951) (emphasis added). Now as a practical matter, trying a convicted person for perjury is most likely rare, since the prosecutor has already obtained a conviction for the underlying offense. Starting another prosecution for perjury might be excessive or unnecessary. But that doesn't mean it's categorically prohibited. Note also that perjury by the defendant can be considered by the judge to enhance the defendant's sentence. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 96 (1993).
That book provides advice on legal writing; it is not a source of rules for legal writing. Rather than repeatedly identifying themselves using their full name, parties customarily refer to themselves in the third person, e.g., &quot;The defendant refused to waive his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.&quot; In practice, though, pro se litigants regularly refer to themselves in the first person, and there is no formal consequence for this.
Was Alex Jones's attorney handing over phone-record evidence a &quot;mishap&quot; or required by law? The discovery phase, which concluded before the trial began, required Alex Jones to provide texts and emails mentioning Sandy Hook (among other things). He did not provide any and testified in writing and in court he could find none. On August 3rd 2022, day seven of the trial, plaintiffs' attorney Mark Bankston claimed he had obtained from Jones's attorneys a digital copy of Jones's cellphone on which there were texts and emails that mentioned Sandy Hook. He said this copy was mistakenly provided to him. Whether accidental or deliberate, this copy or its texts and emails mentioning Sandy Hook were not provided during discovery. Judge Gamble told the jury about the digital copy, &quot;we don't know whether it was on accident or on purpose... but what we do know is that it wasn't properly turned over when it should have been.&quot; https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=7658 A video clip of the part of the hearing in question, when Bankston begins asking Jones about the texts. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tpnSCIak5A8. Or this timestamp in a longer clip https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=6821. Mark Bankston for the plaintiffs, addressing Jones: &quot;Your attorneys messed up and sent me a digital copy of your entire cellphone, with every text message you sent for the past two years. And, when informed, did not take any steps to identify it as privileged or protected in any way, and as of two days ago it fell free and clear into my possession. And that is how I know you lied to me when you said you didn't have text messages about Sandy Hook.&quot; The above quote begins 5mins into the first clip or this timestamp in the longer clip https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=6830). After the texts, Bankston asked questions about emails not being turned over... Jones had sworn he didn't even use email. Bankston showed him emails that appeared to be written by Jones. &quot;I must have dictated them&quot; said Jones. Judge Gamble told the jury about the digital copy, &quot;we don't know it was on accident or on purpose, but what we do know is it wasn't properly turned over when it should have been.&quot; https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=7665 Bankston told journalist Dan Solomon the phone copy was put in a Dropbox the parties were using to exchange materials. Bankston did not believe it was put there deliberately and notified Jones's attorneys. Apparently Jones's attorneys did not respond. Under Texas law they had ten days to assert privilege or say the material was put there by mistake, Rule 193.3(d) - as of August 3rd Bankston was legally free to read and use the material. (There is some gossip online about what was supposedly heard on 'hot mic' between Reynal and Bankston, I haven't heard it myself and have no timestamps or clips. I do think I heard Jones, after leaving the witness box, ask Reynal &quot;they got my text messages?&quot;) [edit] Incidentally, this isn't the first time that Jones / his attorneys failed to comply with discovery orders in relation to these Sandy Hook cases - a number of sanctions and default judgements have gone against him for that. Indeed this damages phase is the result of the default judgment against him in September 2021 for failing to comply with discovery: &quot;The Court find that Defendants unreasonably and vexatiously failed to comply with their discovery duties. The Court finds that Defendants' failure to comply with discovery in this case is greatly aggravated by Defendants' consistent pattern of discovery abuse throughout the other similar cases pending before this Court.&quot; [edit 2] On August 4th 2022 Jones's attorneys have filed an emergency motion that seems to settle the issue of whether the provision of all the material was a &quot;mishap&quot;: they say it was &quot;inadvertently&quot; supplied. text of the motion They claim they promptly informed plaintiffs' attorneys about the mistake but the latter used the material anyway in violation of privilege, procedure and the court's protective order. Now Twitter lawyers are arguing about whether the language used by the defence was adequate to engage the rules mentioned above. But this doesn't seem to resolve the issue of why the material demanded for discovery was not supplied for discovery or why Jones testifed he could not find such material. Judge Gamble denied the request for a blanket protective order to seal the record of the text messages and denied the motion for mistrial. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKbAmNwbiMk