Were the American strikes on Syria legal? On the recent American strike on Syria, Leeds University, UK writes: Demonstrates Trump is willing to go it alone and conduct illegal air strikes if needed by appealing to the moral necessity to do something. My questions are: Were the strikes legal? If they were illegal, what are the potential legal consequences? (We can ignore political consequences for this question)
Was International Law Violated? When it used chemical weapons to kill large numbers of civilians in his own country, Assad's regime in Syria was violating its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention, an international treaty obligation that the regime acknowledged was binding upon it in 2013 when at U.S. insistence and with Russian supervision, the Assad regime purported to destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles. It was also an action violating generally recognized standards of the customary international law of war that have been recognized since they were first clearly articulated in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 that took effect in 1928. This kind of action has also been recognized as a crime against humanity under customary international law, and this principle is why international criminal tribunals set up after crimes against humanity occur are not considered to be applying ex post facto laws. Also, since early on in the Syrian Civil War, during the Obama Administration, the U.S. ceased to recognize Assad's regime as the legitimate government of Syria. According to official U.S. policy, since 2012, the Syrian National Council, and not Assad's regime, has been the legitimate government of Syria. So, rather than being an attack on a sovereign regime, this was an act in defense of a different sometimes allied regime recognized as legitimate, with whom the U.S. is not at war. Moreover, given that fact that the U.S. now has a artillery combat ground troop unit deployed in Northern Syria as of earlier in 2017, in support of a Congressionally authorized military action in the same theater of conflict, the U.S. has a legitimate interest in protecting its own troops, as well as those of allies it supports in the part of the conflict that it is involved in under the 2001 AUMF, from chemical weapons attacks in Syria by preemptively disabling the Assad regime's ability to deploy those weapons, even though they were not directed at somewhat nearby U.S. forces in their most recent utilization this week. So, while there may not be entirely clear international legal authorization for this particular remedy for the Assad regime's clear violation of international law, there is not a clear prohibition on doing so either, and the general rule is that sovereign states have wide discretion to take military action in support of their perceived interests, particular when violations international obligations of the offender targeted for military action provide a justification for the use of military force under international law. This is because the main way of punishing a violation of international war while a conflict is still pending is called a reprisal which the Syrian strike fits to a tee. A reprisal is a limited and deliberate violation of international law to punish another sovereign state that has already broken them. . . . Reprisals refer to acts which are illegal if taken alone, but become legal when adopted by one state in retaliation for the commission of an earlier illegal act by another state. Article XII(3) of the Chemical Weapons Convention authorizes those remedies allowed under customary international law of which reprisal is one. Did The President Have Authority To Make The Strike Under U.S. Law? This said, the harder issue is whether this strike was legal under U.S. law, and not international law, which really has no meaningful binding enforcement mechanism other than politics, diplomacy and domestic law anyway. While the U.S. does not recognize the Assad regime as legitimate, it is not actually at war with that regime because the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) from 2001 that has been the main legal authorization for the "war on terror" against ISIS, pretty clear does not extend to Assad's regime in Syria. ISIS has been declared to be a successor to a branch of the organization the launched the 9-11 attack upon which the AUMF declared war. But, the formerly legitimate government of Syria (Assad's regime) is very difficult to treat as coming within that definition. However, while Congress has not authorized the use of military force by the U.S. against the Assad regime in Syria in this manner, Congress has approved appropriations to fund and support anti-Assad rebels, even though it may have been a bit of a fiasco, which at least provides some tacit evidence of Congressional consent to some sort of involvement in the Syrian civil war by the United States government against Assad's regime. In absence of an authorization of use of military force against the Assad regime, one alternative source of legal authority to make this strike is legislation (whose constitutionality has often been questioned, but has never actually challenged, was determined by the Justice Department to be constitutional in 1980, and which is arguably not justiciable) called the War Powers Act of 1973. This Act, on its face, purports to give the President the authority to make limited use of military force for short periods of time. Specifically (per the link): It provides that the U.S. President can send U.S. Armed Forces into action abroad only by declaration of war by Congress, "statutory authorization," or in case of "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." The War Powers Resolution requires the President to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing armed forces to military action and forbids armed forces from remaining for more than 60 days, with a further 30-day withdrawal period, without a Congressional authorization for use of military force (AUMF) or a declaration of war by the United States. The question of whether this incident is within the scope of the War Powers Act is disputed with U.S. Senator Rand Paul arguing the conditions triggering its use such as an attack on U.S. forces or the United States, have not been met. The issues presented by this incident under the War Powers Act are similar to those presented in the missile strike and follow up airstrikes made by the U.S. in Libya in 2011. There is also legitimate room for dispute regarding where the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution ends, and where the power of Congress to declare war and to enact other legislation pertaining to the U.S. military under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution begins. Arguably, directing U.S. forces to make an isolated military strike from a location where they are already lawfully deployed in support of an AUMF authorized military mission in the region, in exigent circumstances, against a military force that is not recognized by the United States as the legitimate government of Syria, does not constitute a true act of war and is instead merely day to day management of the operations and discipline of the United States military that is within the Commander in Chief's authority, particularly when Congress has already tentatively recognized the Syria's Assad regime is an enemy of the United States in legislation short of an authorization for use of military force. Moreover, given that President Trump surely has majority support in both houses of Congress for this strike, the possibility that Congress may end up granting forgiveness rather than making much of the fact that he didn't ask for permission, may be mostly a formality in this case. Generally speaking, even if this issue is justiciable (i.e. amenable to resolution through the court system), court action to enforce separation of powers questions must be authorized, at least, by a resolution of a majority of one of the two houses of Congress. Generally speaking, taxpayer standing or just plain U.S. citizen standing, does not exist to enjoin or seek a remedy from a separation of powers violation.
"Does threatening to attack cultural heritage constitute conspiracy to commit a war crime..." Almost certainly not. It's a threat to commit a war crime, but is probably not illegal in and of itself. On the other hand, if the Commander In Chief were to ask his generals what would be involved in mounting a cruise missile attack on the Meidan Emam in Esfahan, that would be conspiracy to commit a war crime (as would supplying the requested information).
It is not the case that treason must be tried by a military tribunal. See for example US v. Kawakita, which was an ordinary civilian jury trial. I cannot even imagine why one would think that there is any such requirement. Here is the federal law against treason, and nothing says "offenses must be tried in a military court". Perhaps that misconception was based on the use of military tribunals during the American Revolution, which preceded the creation of a US legal system.
Denver lawyer David Lane has said, “The First Amendment lives in a rough neighborhood and if you can’t stand the neighborhood move to China … or somewhere the First Amendment does not exist.” "One man's vulgarity is another's lyric." Cohen v. Cali. 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) At this point, we need to define illegal as used in your question. For instance, do you mean "you can face any form of punishment"? If so, this question is extremely broad and governed by multiple sets of laws. Additionally, one should note that this is a Federal Question. The First Amendment, through the Due Process clause applies to states as well. Therefore, there will be extremely little discrepancy (if any - first impression issues being the main differences probably) between the States,. The FCC can limit profanity on air. Additionally, Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 1464, (Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. ) prohibits the utterance of any obscene, indecent or profane language by means of radio communication. The USPTO can limit Trademarks with "vulgar" meaning. (See EDIT below for update.) In School: High school student's First Amendment rights were not violated in suspension for uttering obscenity, regardless of whether she was merely repeating and returning words originally directed at her, particularly where words were clearly disruptive as they were heard by 90 students in cafeteria and, in opinion of assistant principal, were “fighting words.” Heller v. Hodgin, S.D.Ind.1996, 928 F.Supp. 789. Fighting Words: These seem to be words that would invoke, or are likely to invoke a fight. Fighting words claim upheld: Arrestee's speech when crowd gathered near fallen tree that had blocked traffic constituted unprotected fighting words, so that his arrest under city disorderly conduct ordinance did not violate his First Amendment free speech rights; arrestee's repeated use of the word “bitch,” his accusation of matricide directed toward his sister, his use of the phrase “fucking queer,” his pushing of third party and his raised voice all tended to show that his conduct, under the circumstances, had tendency to provoke physical altercation. Fighting words claim not upheld: Detainee's profane words to police officer as officer conducted Terry stop, “son of a bitch,” while unpleasant and insulting, were not “fighting words,” given officer's confirmation of fact that words did not cause anyone to fight or become angry; thus, words could not constitute violation of disorderly conduct statute and in turn could not supply probable cause for disorderly conduct arrest. In addition to fighting words, true threats and incitement to imminent lawless action are not protected under the First Amendment. Additionally, the government can regulate free speech in public schools (hence Free Speech Zones) and while in their employ (no yelling at your boss if you want to keep your job). It is not part of the main question, but free speech inside the court room. Well, the Judge is pretty much king in a courtroom. What he says goes. (more or less, like nothing toooooo crazy). In a courtroom, if you do something a Judge doesn't like, he can hold you in contempt of court. (You get no jury for contempt cases.) EDIT: Since I wrote this answer, new law came out from the Supreme Court in Matel v. Tam, 582 U.S. ___ (2017). The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the Federal Circuit that the disparagement clause [is] facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Simon Tam, lead singer of the rock group “The Slants,” chose this moniker in order to “reclaim” the term and drain its denigrating force as a derogatory term for Asian persons. Tam sought federal registration of the mark “THE SLANTS.” The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) denied the application under a Lanham Act provision prohibiting the registration of trademarks that may “disparage . . . or bring . . . into contemp[t] or disrepute” any “persons, living or dead.” 15 U. S. C. §1052(a). Tam contested the denial of registration through the administrative appeals process, to no avail. He then took the case to federal court, where the en banc Federal Circuit ultimately found the disparagement clause facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The decision aptly concludes with: "If affixing the commercial label permits the suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social “volatility,” free speech would be endangered."
Questions about "why a law is ..." are political questions not legal questions and you may get better traction on politics. However, I will address the legal issues and offer some speculation on the politics. The states named in the preamble to the Constitution (an Act of British Parliament) as original states were New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania. Western Australia was not named at the time of the passing of the Act or Royal Assent because the people of that colony had not vet made their mind up. Legal Issues WA decided to join in a vote held on 31 December 1900 and Australia came into being on 1 January 1901. Therefore, even though not named as such, WA was an "original state". Since all 6 states in the Federation are "original states" the clauses have no practical effect at present. However, there have been a number of proposals to add new states, either by subdividing existing states or by granting statehood to the territories of Northern Territory and/or the Australian Capital Territory. If such were to come to pass, the clauses would have practical effect. In 1998, Norther Territorials rejected an offer of statehood that would have given them 3 senators as a state and 2 representatives based on population (currently they have 2 senators and 2 representatives). Clearly, they were not being given the same privileges as an "original state". In 2015 all Australian governments agreed in principle that the NT should become a state by 2018, however, as it is now 2017 and no action has been taken this seems unlikely. Political Issues Politics is complicated: just as much in the late 19th century as it is in the early 21st. Negotiations between the colonies were fraught and federation was by no means a certain outcome. New Zealand and Fiji dropped out early and each forged its own path to nationhood. However, by the late 1890s it was clear that the 5 eastern colonies would federate with or without Western Australia. It seems likely that this provision served multiple purposes including: putting pressure on WA to join at the outset - the deal they got as a "Johnny come lately" may not have been as good. protecting "white" Australia - the drafters of the Constitution were men of their times, that is to say: racist, misogynist bigots. Any non-original states were likely to be former British colonies in the Pacific or South-East Asia, this clause would allow the nation to reduce the influence these non-white states might have.
Treason is basically the only crime explicitly defined by the Constitution. According to Article III, Section 3: Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. So, no. What this hypothetical president is calling for is unconstitutional, is almost certainly grounds for impeachment, and may even be criminal, but treason it ain't. And that's assuming he actually does it. Simply calling for it, without acting (or directing others to act) to bring it about, may well be protected by the First Amendment.
I believe you are using rule of law when you mean due process. The former refers to equality before the law and the subjugation of executive government to the law while the latter refers accepted measures of justice and fairness in the administration of the law and, in the United States, to the supremacy of the judiciary over the legislature (the situation is reversed in the UK). Assuming that to be the case, the due process clause in the fifth amendment provides that "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...". That is, actions against Huawei must only be taken as permitted by the law. The law that permits the President to institute the Huawei ban is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. As such, at face value, this is a legitimate exercise in executive power. Huawei has the right to challenge the ban in US courts, as such, they have been afforded due process.
Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (of which both China and the UK are signatories) provides that all states are liable for damages caused by the objects they launch into space: Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. This was further elaborated upon in the Space Liability treaty of 1972 (of which, again, China and the UK are signatories.) In particular, it lays out a procedure under which one state can bring claim against another for any space junk that lands on its territory. So if a rocket lands in your back garden &amp; crushes your schnauzer, it would be up to the Foreign Office to take it up with the PRC. If Wikipedia is to be believed, the only time such a claim has been filed under this treaty is when the Soviet satellite Kosmos 954 crashed in the Canadian Arctic in 1978. In that instance, the location was remote and the satellite was nuclear-powered, resulting in substantial cleanup costs. Your options to bring suit on your own, without the assistance of Dominic Raab, are limited. As a general rule, governments have state immunity from suit in the courts of other countries (i.e., if you tried to sue the goverment of China in a UK court), and sovereign immunity in their own courts (i.e., if you tried to sue the government of China in a Chinese court.) In particular, in the UK other countries are immune from suit according to the State Immunity Act of 1978, except for commercial transactions (which this would not qualify as.)