Blasphemy in the Context of Freedom of Speech So my country is currently exhausting herself with a blasphemy case. It makes me wonder because such case in other countries (Western countries in particular) are not considered a crime because it's a part of the freedom of speech AFAIK. Is blasphemy really not a crime even though it could be severely offending certain people? Is blasphemy, in and of itself, really not a crime especially under Universal Declaration of Human Rights or international law?
In the United States, blasphemy is really not a crime even if it severely offends certain people and tends to cause them to want to riot and kill the person who offends them. Most Americans who are familiar with the law and the U.S. Constitution strongly support this policy and think it is obviously right. Not every country interprets its freedom of speech laws (if it even has freedom of speech laws) in this way. For example, Canada has a law against blasphemy, as do almost all countries which have an official state religion (which is called the "establishment" of a religion). Also many countries have seemingly contradictory constitutional provisions and courts have to resolve their relative priority. For example, many Muslim countries have constitutions that simultaneously contain a right to freedom of speech and a provision that says that Sharia law is the supreme law of the land (e.g. both Afghanistan and Iraq recently enacted constitutions that say both of those things). A court could decide that the Sharia law provision prevails over freedom of speech in the event that the two conflict, or could reach the opposite conclusion. Nothing on the face of a constitution like that will tell the court how to resolve the issue. Many other countries have laws against intentionally and publicly offending someone's religious beliefs, which is similar to, but not the same as, a blasphemy law. Blasphemy, narrowly interpreted, means saying something that contradicts the doctrines of the nation's official religion, without regard to whether it is offensive - so, for example, saying that Mary the Mother of Jesus got pregnant the ordinary way, rather than having a virgin birth, would be blasphemy even if no one was offended by you saying that in a country where Roman Catholicism or Lutheranism or the Anglican Church was the official religion. A narrow Blasphemy law offends the idea of separation of church and state because it makes the government the ultimate determiner of what the doctrines of the nation's official religion says and allows a government to have an official religion. It is also notable that there are two parts to the freedom of religion in the United States. One part is the "free exercise clause" which allows people to practice the religion of their choice. The other part is the "establishment clause" which prohibits the government from favoring one religion over another or even favoring being religious over being not religious. The "free exercise clause" is similar to the stance that the Koran takes towards "People of the Book" but applied to any kind of religious belief not just Jews and Christians. Many conservatives in the United States are strong supporters of the free exercise clause, but think that the establishment clause should only apply to the federal government (so the state and local governments can establish a religion). Other conservatives think that the establishment clause should only prevent the government from preferring one denomination of Christianity over another denomination, even though the drafters of the constitution and courts ever since then have made clear that this was not the intent of the establishment clause. Article 11 of the Treaty of Tripoli, signed by the President and ratified by the Senate so that it took effect in 1797, just six years after the Bill of Rights was adopted, for example, specifically noted that the freedom of religion in the United States included Muslims. Many countries have a freedom of religion that protects free exercise but does not have an establishment clause. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights similarly protects only free exercise and does not prohibit governments from having an established religion. Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights is usually not enforceable in the courts unless a country decides that it will enforce it. It does not usually have the effect of causing the laws of a country to be invalidated the way that an unconstitutional law would be invalidated. Put another way, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and most other international human rights treaties are usually determined by courts to be not "self-executing". So, it is up to the legislative process in a particular country to decide how to implement human rights if it does so at all. In contrast, Europe has a treaty that is part of the Council of Europe organization with similar provisions, that is binding on member states even if it violates their laws (i.e. it is "self-executing").
Sometimes rights conflict with each other, and the courts decide which right takes priority. The Sixth Amendment provides that a defendant is entitled to "compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor". The Fifth Amendment says "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself". And the First Amendment gives the right to free speech, which includes the right to not be compelled to speak. If you're on trial and try to get someone else to confess on the stand, his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination trumps your Sixth Amendment right to have him testify. But if he couldn't take the fifth (for example, if he had already been acquitted), your Sixth Amendment right would override his First Amendment right to free speech.
Yes, such as this limitation on free speech. Initially, the limitation was "Clear and Present Danger" test (Schenk v. United States, 1919) which held that speech inciting lawless action was not protected speech and thus could be crimilized speech (i.e. Schenk publishing anti-draft fliers during World War I, which advocated draft dodging which at the time was a crime under the Espionage act of 1917). This was later over ruled to the "Bad Tendency" test which allowed for advocacy of criminal actions to be criminilized (Whitney v. United States, 1927. Whitney was accused of helping establish the American Communist Labor Party (ACLP), which held as a party platform the violent overthrow of the U.S. Government in favor of one advocated by the ACLP. This is standard to most Communist Parties at the time around the world. The difference between Schenk and Whitney was that Schenk actively called for a criminal action, where as Schenk was speaking of a future action following other party successes). This was overturned again by Brandenberg v. Ohio (1969) which introduced the "Imminent Lawless Action" test. This explicitly overturned Whitney in addition to other cases not mentioned such as Abrams v. United States (1915), Giltrow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951). It does not overrule Schenk, but it did cast doubt upon the decision made. In the case, KKK leader Brandenburg made a speech advocating for revenge against African Americans and Jews as well as expressing the belief that the United States government actively surpressed White Americans and needed to be opposed. He was charged as advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Imminent Lawless Action added the important componant that the violation must be advocacy of lawless action (revenge against racial minorities) must have a definite future date (like "tonight", "tomorrow", or specific time and date) and a vague future time will not count. And must show intent to break the law (Brandenburg did not specifically intend to break the law... he wanted it changed so it would not be legal before he took action). Additionaly, they found that the mere advocacy of resisting the government did not have any language componant that suggested violent resistance. Brandenburg, as discussed, overturned the reaffirmed B and put Schenk on some shaky ground as parts of Shenk were still relevant (Schenk first introduced that Free Speech was not without restrictions, but some of the case law was not relevent anymore, as Whitney used it as a basis in that decision, as did to a limited extent Dennis, which didn't work well with Whitney for other reasons. It should be pointed out that the Supreme Court does not typically take cases that wholly reaffirm past cases. Typically, their rulings are to clarify situations in a previous case that are not stated by the current extant rulings. For example, if the Supreme Court took a case that called Roe v. Wade into question, the case would more likely test whether Roe allows for a particular practice that isn't all that clear in Roe. It may affirm that Roe is still law, but the new case is not consistent with Roe, which will place a restriction on Roe, but not, figuratively, (pardon the pun) throw the baby out with the bath water.
The First Amendment is never interpreted as a complete prohibition against laws that could affect a religion, nor is it interpreted to mean that you can say or write anything whatsoever that you want. You cannot sacrifice humans when in the name of a religion, and you cannot sacrifice (murder) humans for fun. One part of the First Amendment regarding religion is the Free Exercise clause which says that you cannot prohibit the exercise of a religion, and another, the Establishment Clause, prohibits favoring a religion, or favoring religion over atheism. The clauses about free speech also do not mean that you can commit fraud and you cannot threaten people's lives. What decides how far the government can go is &quot;strict scrutiny&quot;, a doctrine that limits the extent to which the government can infringe on fundamental rights – First Amendment rights are the canonical example of a fundamental right. The main hurdle that a law so scrutinized has to pass is that the law is necessary for a compelling government interest. Preventing massive deaths is generally seen as such an interest. Then, the law has to be narrowly tailored to affect &quot;just those cases&quot;, and it has to be the lest restrictive means of accomplishing that end. Although the prevention of massive deaths is a compelling government interest, a government might screw this up in their legal arguments, as they seem to have done in Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, where mass political protests were allowed but smaller religious meetings were prohibited. The government essentially &quot;waived&quot; that compelling interest, replacing it with an interest in preventing church meetings, which is plainly a violation of the First Amendment – they substantially burdened religious practices.
The key limiting factors are the language: and the conduct has the purpose or effect of violating B’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. And, also, the context of the term "belief" in the statute in conjunction with religion which is defined in the same section, which suggests that in this context it is intended to be understood as the kind of belief that constitutes a core worldview for a person, even if it is secular (e.g. Confucianism or a Stoic philosophy of life), rather than isolated particular ideas about factual things. There is also considerable room for judicial interpretation over whether, for example "effect of" is limited to an "effect" reasonably derived from the "conduct" in question. Still, in general, the U.K., has higher standards mandating civility in dealings with others than the U.S., and there is lots of conduct barred by the Equality Act of 2010 which would not be barred under U.S. law, for example. The closest analog in U.S. law is really the tort of "outrageous conduct" also sometimes known as "intentional infliction of emotional distress."
I don't believe Canada uses the public official/figure distinction. American defamation law uses the distinction to determine whether to require proof of actual malice, but Canada does not require proof of actual malice. Canadian defamation law has a lot of other parallels to American defamation law, though, especially in terms of privilege. I'd expect the University could claim any of several available privileges, including truth, qualified privilege, and fair comment. And because it's a government institution, it's conceivable that it might even claim absolute privilege, though I definitely don't know enough about their interpretations of the privilege to say one way or another. For a broad primer on defamation law in Ontario, you can check out this report from the Law Commission of Ontario.
"Is there really any law that makes it illegal to own copies of a publication?" I couldn't find exact confirmation of which law Rahman was prosecuted under, but an article from 2012 describes it as "possessing an article for a terrorist purpose". A BBC article from 2007 uses the same phrase, with regard to "Section 57 of the Terrorism Act", which appears to refer to the Terrorism Act 2000: 57 Possession for terrorist purposes. (1)A person commits an offence if he possesses an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. (2)It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that his possession of the article was not for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism. (3)In proceedings for an offence under this section, if it is proved that an article— (a)was on any premises at the same time as the accused, or (b)was on premises of which the accused was the occupier or which he habitually used otherwise than as a member of the public, the court may assume that the accused possessed the article, unless he proves that he did not know of its presence on the premises or that he had no control over it. (4)A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable— (a)on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years,* to a fine or to both, or (b)on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or to both. *Interestingly, the maximum term of imprisonment appears to have originally been 10 years, but was increased in 2006. That law's not specific to publications, but in an attempt to answer your question more fully there does seem to be at least one law that "makes it illegal to own copies of a publication": the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, for example, renders possession of 'extreme pornography' illegal, and the definitions do not require (to reference your footnote) that the materials "imply an illegal act took place". Rather, the materials are illegal because (to quote a government consultation, via the Wikipedia page linked above) such material may encourage or reinforce interest in violent and aberrant sexual activity to the detriment of society as a whole That may or may not bother you from a freedom of speech point of view, but it leads me nicely onto a discussion of the underlying ethics/morality/rights debate that you impled in your question: "We punish thoughtcrime, these days?" As far as I understand, Rahman was in physical possession of the magazine. So no &ndash; not "thoughtcrime". Merely thinking about the magazine &ndash; or believing the views expressed in its contents &ndash; would not, of itself, be illegal. Indeed, as the article points out in its description of main case under discussion (i.e. the "Three Musketeers" case, not Rahman's prior conviction), the prosecution described as the defendants’ “hateful beliefs” – but the judge, Mr Justice Globe, told them they could not convict based on “mindset evidence” alone. However, like hate speech (speech, not thought), or conspiracy to commit a crime (which is what the men in the Three Musketeers case were being charged with), saying (or writing) certain things is, quite reasonably, illegal, if the intent of those words is incitement to commit a crime. Restrictions on free speech exist everywhere, and any (political) debate around it generally centres less on an absolute right to free speech, and more on where the line should be drawn. Even in the US &ndash; which tends to draw the line at the permissive end of the spectrum &ndash; speech intended solely to cause damage is not immune from reproach. The classic example is "[falsely] shouting fire in a crowded theater": The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic. [...] The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger Similarly, the publication of a magazine, the sole purpose of which is to (inspire or facilitate) damage, can be illegal. It would then seem reasonable for supplying that magazine to others to be illegal. Possession with a clear intent to supply (like with drugs) would also, reasonably, be illegal. And if drug possession, with no intent to supply, can be illegal, then why not possession of illegal material, even if there's no intent to supply? I make no attempt here to justify (nor even to outline fully) the exact details of English law when it comes to these matters; however, there's an important distinction between freedom of speech (with regard to which nearly everyone accepts some restriction or regulation) and freedom of thought or conscience. To the best of my knowledge, there's no law (in Britain) that restricts either of those.
It is illegal in Scotland. There is currently no law specifically against it in the rest of the UK. If you find this is unbelievable, yes it is. There are attempts now to change the laws. PS. There are no photos taken "of the act". Taking the photo is the act. The pervs use a selfy stick or just get down on the floor to take photos, or take photos on stairs. PPS. News on Jan 16th 2019: "A new law will now be introduced in the next couple of months. It could mean that perpetrators might face up to two years in prison and are added to the sex offenders register."