What is the jurisdiction of a decision made by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals? I am not a lawyer so please correct any terminology I have used incorrectly. What is the jurisdiction of the decision made in Warren v. District of Columbia? I.e. supposing the events that led to this court case were to occur again but in a different district, would the decision made by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals also apply in that other district?
Generally speaking, a decision from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is binding only in the District of Columbia. Courts of other jurisdictions are not required to adhere to its decisions. If the issue came up again in Virginia or Maryland, courts there would have no obligation to follow it. Virginia tort law is different from D.C. tort law, so Virginia courts would need to determine whether their law is different on this particular point.
The U.S. Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to set everyday procedural rules in state court, although it can mandate processes that flow from the constitution. In criminal cases, this allows it to regulate courtroom conduct that is prejudicial to defendants. The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has prohibited keeping criminal defendants facing trial in a cage in the courtroom as is common in many jurisdictions elsewhere in the world. The Rittenhouse case took place in state court, over which the U.S. Supreme Court has limited authority in such matters. On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has broad authority to establish court rules in the federal courts and could adopt rules in those courts if it deemed fit, and if its proposed rules were not legislatively vetoed by Congress.
Absent newly enacted law in response to the end of the separate sovereigns doctrine, the first case to which jeopardy attaches (generally speaking when a jury is sworn and the first item of evidence is presented to it) would bar subsequent prosecutions, without regard to whether it arose in state or federal court. It would be a race to the court house rule. This is how it works if there are multiple prosecutions within a state, for example, one commenced in a municipal court that is not part of a state court system, and another commenced in a state court of general jurisdiction.
In this case the Plaintiff, James Maloney, has previously been charged with a crime for possession of nunchucks. He is apparently suing to enjoin further enforcement of the law under which he was previously charged. US Federal courts will only take up a "case or controversy", which means an issue where actual, not theoretical rights are at stake, and in order to vindicate a constitutional right, it must either have previously been violated, or there must be a plausible and immediate threat to it. Claiming that a law is unconstitutional as part of a defense to a charge of violating that law is a common and probably the best known method of challenging a law (or a government action) for unconstitutionality. But there are other ways. One way is to apply for an injunction against enforcement of the law. That is the procedure that was followed in, for example, the recent case where there was a ruling against the ADA in a district court. In order to use that procedure, the plaintiff must present evidence that there is a credible threat that the law will be invoked against him (or her) if the action which the plaintiff claims is protected by a constitutional right is taken. In short, one need not put oneself in a position where one goes to prison or is found guilty of a crime if one loses the case to challenge the constitutionality of a law or of a government policy or action. But one must establish that it is a real "case or controversy", with real parties in opposition to each other, and real rights at stake, not a mere law student's exercise, nor a collusive case, with both "sides" having the same actual goal. In the case reported, the previous criminal charge helps to establish that this is a real issue.
There's been recent publicity about an American diplomat in Britain responsible for a car accident that killed someone. She claimed diplomatic immunity and left the country. Could the victim's family sue her in an American court? They could sue, but the case would probably be summarily dismissed, often one of the following two grounds: (1) related to diplomatic immunity, but not specifically covered by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, such as common law sovereign immunity which bars suits against individuals or their employers for actions taken in an official capacity on behalf of a federal government employer (the scope of which is interpreted broadly in the case of diplomatic personnel abroad, much as it is in the case of what conduct of the President of the United States constitutes an action taken in an official capacity), unless waived. Cf. Cruikshank v. U.S., 431 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Hawaii 1977) ("Alleged activities of agents of Central Intelligence Agency in opening and photographing sealed, first-class letters mailed by plaintiff to colleagues in the Soviet Union fell within purview of general waiver of sovereign immunity statute, despite claim that Central Intelligence Agency agents involved could not have been legally authorized to carry out such activities and consequently, as matter of law, were not “acting within the scope of their office or employment,” as that phrase is used in this section.") If a diplomat is acting in an official capacity, lawsuits can be filed against the U.S. government, but not against the individual, and can't only be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and only then if an exception to it does not apply. The FTCA is the "exclusive means by which a party may sue the United States for money damages ... in tort" (28 USC § 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy). Accordingly, an FTCA action "can be brought only in a United States District Court" (28 USC § 1346(b)). Regarding the timing of filing, FTCA's § 2401(b) states that the action must be brought "within two years after the claim accrues," or "within six months after ... notice of final denial of the claim by the agency". In addition, under the FTCA, "Liability is determinable in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" (§1346(b)(1)). More fully, 28 USC § 1346(b)(1) states: Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. But, 28 U.S.C. 2680(k) expressly precludes the exercise of jurisdiction under the FTCA over "[a]ny claim arising in a foreign country." See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (FTCA does not apply to claims arising in Antarctica). "It is a longstanding principle of American law `that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' " Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). Basically, sovereign immunity is absolute for torts committed abroad in an official capacity by a U.S. government official of any kind. So, if the official capacity conduct claim is barred by diplomatic immunity where it occurred, it is barred everywhere. or (2) in cases not arising from actions taken in the diplomat's official capacity, on the discretionary quasi-jurisdictional grounds of forum non conveniens, even thought American courts, as a general rule, have jurisdiction over all civil claims of private persons arising anywhere in the world against a person who is domiciled in the state where the state or federal court in question is located. For over a quarter century, federal judges have assumed that foreign injury cases, particularly those filed by foreign plaintiffs, are best litigated abroad. . . . Federal judges approach the forum non conveniens decision as if it were a species of choice of law, as opposed to a choice of forum question. Elizabeth T. Lear, "National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non Conveniens", 41(2) U.C.-Davis Law Review 559 (2007). One of the leading forum non conviens cases pertinent to this fact pattern is Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), involving an airplane crash in Scotland in which U.S. defendants were allegedly at fault. Potential loopholes in that decision have been closed by subsequent cases. Federal judges are all that matter in a lawsuit between a foreigner and a U.S. person involving claims in excess of $75,000 (which essentially all personal injury cases worth bringing internationally do), such as the one contemplated in this case, which fall within the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and can be removed from a state court to a federal court. (And, state courts tend to defer to federal precedents in diversity cases in claims which are not removed from state court to federal court.) The Alien Tort Claim Act expressly authorizes certain lawsuits in U.S. Courts for violations of international law or treaties committed abroad (although whether the judicial power extends to cases where all of the defendants are non-U.S. persons is an issue of ongoing dispute), but not for simple common law torts like the negligence actions that are the basis of most automobile accident cases. There are also other specific statutes that might authorize lawsuits (e.g. civil rights statutes, patent laws, copyright laws, etc.), but none of them would ordinarily apply to a simple automobile accident allegedly causing a wrongful death. It is conceivable that an attorney could find some way to thread a needle through these two strong limitations on bringing suit against U.S. diplomats in U.S. courts for personal injuries caused by ordinary common law torts committed abroad which are barred by diplomatic immunity where they occurred, but it would take extraordinary facts that do not appear to be present in this relatively routine automobile accident allegedly wrongfully causing a death of a non-U.S. person. Could she be criminally prosecuted in America because of what she did in Britain? No. The Vienna Convention only directly limits criminal prosecutions of people with diplomatic immunity in jurisdictions where someone is a credentialed diplomat or head of state. But, usually criminal cases can only be prosecuted in the jurisdiction where they are committed or the jurisdiction to which the crime was directed if a crime is committed outside a prosecuting jurisdiction but directed at a victim or target in the prosecuting jurisdiction. There are federal statutes criminalizing conduct victimizing various U.S. government officials, but very few criminalizing conduct that would otherwise not be a crime subject to U.S. criminal prosecution if it is committed by a U.S. government official abroad (in some cases, a violation of civil rights claims might apply, but not in a car accident case like this one). Note that I am limiting this to a criminally culpable automobile accident against a non-U.S. person while diplomatic credentials were in force. There might be a U.S. prosecution of a diplomat, for example, for espionage in the form of revealing U.S. secrets, or as another example, for a rape of one U.S. person who has diplomatic immunity by some other U.S. person at the same embassy. The cases could arguably be directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person. The most negative U.S. consequence that could arise from criminal conduct that did not take place in the U.S. and was not directed at the U.S. or a U.S. person (for civilians not subject to the U.S. Code of Military Justice) would usually be termination of employment at the U.S. State Department and termination of diplomatic credentials, both of which would have prospective application only.
The US has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in the US. Canada has jurisdiction because you committed a crime in Canada. As added complications, if you are a Mexican citizen then Mexico has jurisdiction and if your victim is Chinese then China has jurisdiction. If you get arrested on an Interpol warrant in Spain then Spain has jurisdiction. And so on ... Your implicit assumption is that jurisdiction is exclusive, it isn't. Any country (or sub-national jurisdiction) that claims jurisdiction has jurisdiction, at least to the extent of testing that claim. Whether any given polity has jurisdiction depends on the particular law involved, some laws are only applicable within that countries borders others are extra-territorial, some are applicable to citizens but not non-citizens or vice-versa, etc.
The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.
Short answer: Yes. There are some matters in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, which consists of suits between U.S. states and/or foreign states with each other and suits involving diplomats. On average, one or two such suits are filed each year. The original jurisdiction in these cases is created by Article III of the United States Constitution (Section 2, Clause 2), and is exclusive in these cases by virtue of the 1789 Judiciary Act. The 11th Amendment also plays a role in this analysis. Long answer: The original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court is set forth in Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United State Constitution, which states: In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. Basically, these are cases of a state against the United States and/or another state, often regarding boundary disputes, interpretations of interstate compacts, or water rights, or cases involving diplomats adjudicating the extent of diplomatic immunity. (Incidentally, almost all, but not all of the cases in the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction are discretionary, but appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court from three judge panels ruling in certain election law cases are of right.) How rare are these suit in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court? On average, the U.S. Supreme Court has considered about one per year on the merits since it came into existence. This has been between 0.5% and 2% of the U.S. Supreme Court's overall caseload of merits cases in modern times. (These days the U.S. Supreme Court typically decides about 70 case a year on the merits and evaluates about 5,000 certiorari petitions each year.) Between 1789 and 1959, the Court issued written opinions in only 123 original cases. Since 1960, the Court has received fewer than 140 motions for leave to file original cases, nearly half of which were denied a hearing. The majority of cases filed have been in disputes between two or more states. The Court has generally accepted state party cases dealing with boundary and water disputes, but it has been much less likely to field original cases dealing with contract disputes and other subjects not deemed sufficiently substantial for the Court's resources. In practice, when a case in the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is filed, it is almost always assigned immediately to a "special master" who develops the case until it is ready for U.S. Supreme Court review. The U.S. Supreme Court briefly allowed non-residents of a state to sue state governments in its original jurisdiction, but this authority was quickly eliminated by the passage of the 11th Amendment (which has also been interpreted as codifying the principal of a state's sovereign immunity from suits by its own citizens outside its own courts without its consent). In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress made the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction exclusive in suits between two or more states, between a state and a foreign government, and in suits against ambassadors and other public ministers. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the remainder of suits to which a state was a party was to be concurrent, presumably with state courts since the statute did not expressly confer these cases upon the inferior federal courts. Notably, this exclusivity rule does not apply to suits between a state and the United States, or to suits brought by states against non-residents (whether or not they are U.S. persons), although such suits have been interpreted to be within the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court: In the 1892 case of United States v. Texas , Justice John Marshall Harlan ruled that since the federal judicial power extended to "cases in which the United States was a party," and the Court was granted jurisdiction over cases to which a state was a party, the Court would take jurisdiction in a United States suit against a state. Such suits by the United States increased after the 1890s and usually involved disputes with states over land, though in the late twentieth century they also included a few suits to enforce provisions of the Federal Voting Rights Act. As a result of the 11th Amendment and the 1789 Judiciary Act, the U.S. District Courts only have jurisdiction over states when they consent to suit in the forum (usually for federal law cases involving bankruptcies), or when the United States is a party and no private individuals are parties (as in the federal district court case Arizona v. United States mentioned in the comments) since U.S. District Courts have jurisdiction over all suits to which the United States is a party. U.S. District Court jurisdiction is limited, however, by doctrines of state sovereign immunity, to cases seeking only injunctive relief that seek to enforce the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution (although this is circumvented, in part, by bringing suits against state officials as opposed to state governments themselves). So basically, states themselves can only be sued in U.S. District Courts by the United States for injunctive relief under the 14th Amendment. (For this purpose, unlike many other purposes under the U.S. Constitution, the term "state" does not include local governments which can be sued in federal court, and often are sued there for civil rights violations.) Also, despite the seemingly mandatory nature of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, it declines to hear about half of the cases presented to it in that capacity. The Supreme Court further limited its original docket by declaring that it would exercise discretion over whether to hear cases even if they were legitimately within the Court's jurisdiction. In a series of cases in 1971, including Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp ., the Court declined to hear environmental pollution claims brought by states against corporations that dealt with complex and technical factual questions. The justices ruled that the states had other available forums to bring their claims and that the cases were not "appropriate" for the Court in light of its primary function as the nation's highest appellate tribunal. The Court resolved to examine the "seriousness and dignity" of claims so as to preserve its resources for consideration of appeals involving federal questions. The Supreme Court soon expanded its appropriateness doctrine to decline to hear some cases between two states, even where the Court's jurisdiction was exclusive. The U.S. Supreme Court also has the statutory authority (almost never used) under the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. § 1651) to issue writs of habeas corpus filed directly in the U.S. Supreme Court rather than a lower court, although strictly speaking it doesn't add to the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction. About 60 habeas corpus cases are filed directly in the U.S. Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction each year, although very few are granted. The text of the All Writs Act is as follows: (a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. (b) An alternative writ or rule nisi may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction. According to Wikipedia (with appropriate citation to authority): Application of the All Writs Act requires the fulfillment of four conditions: The absence of alternative remedies—the act is only applicable when other judicial tools are not available. An independent basis for jurisdiction—the act authorizes writs in aid of jurisdiction, but does not in itself create any federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Necessary or appropriate in aid of jurisdiction—the writ must be necessary or appropriate to the particular case. Usages and principles of law—the statute requires courts to issue writs "agreeable to the usages and principles of law".