&quot;Equity&#39;s darling&quot;: How do U.S. courts overcome bona fide purchasers? This is a follow-up question to this question and this question; the accepted answers to each appear to conflict the concept of bona fide purchasers. According to a Wikipedia page on the topic: &quot;A bona fide purchaser (BFP) – referred to more completely as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice – is a term used predominantly in common law jurisdictions in the law of real property and personal property to refer to an innocent party who purchases property without notice of any other party's claim to the title of that property. A BFP must purchase for value, meaning that he or she must pay for the property rather than simply be the beneficiary of a gift. Even when a party fraudulently conveys property to a BFP (for example, by selling to the BFP property that has already been conveyed to someone else), that BFP will, depending on the laws of the relevant jurisdiction, take good (valid) title to the property despite the competing claims of the other party. As such, an owner publicly recording their own interests (which in some types of property must be on a court-recognised Register) protects himself or herself from losing those to an indirect buyer, such as a qualifying buyer from a thief, who qualifies as a BFP.&quot; This would suggest that any statute that superseded detinue and/or replevin causes of actions in equity would overrule this doctrine. But looking at it closer, even detinue and replevin would be in conflict with this doctrine; how were they concurrently recognized? What principles may be read out of the equity practice of the courts in the U.S.? Are bona fide purchasers still recognized in U.S. law, and if so, how does that affect statutory provisions in place of detinue and replevin?
Background The general common law rule in the U.S. is that someone who transfers property can not give the person receiving the transfer more rights than they have themselves. But, usually, as set forth more specifically in a number of circumstances set forth below, a bona fide purchaser for value without notice (BFP) has greater rights in the property purchased than the person from whom the BFP purchased the property if there are certain kinds of qualifications or imperfections in the seller's title or rights to the property. Also, note that for this purpose, a creditor benefitting from a mortgage, deed of trust, lien, or other security interest in property hat is collateral for that obligation is a BFP if the creditor lacks notice of the issue with the debtors interest in the property that is collateral and if the creditor obtained these rights in the collateral for substantially equivalent value (rather than, for example, as a gift or a &quot;sweetheart deal&quot; not entered into a armed length). With some narrow exceptions, outside of bankruptcy, these are questions of state law, but most of the relevant state statutory law is close to uniform across almost all U.S. jurisdictions, because all U.S. jurisdictions have voluntarily and independently (without any federal mandate or monetary incentive) adopted model laws promulgated by the National Commissioners on Uniform State laws on these subjects. There is some minor variation in the real property laws pertinent to this matter between U.S. jurisdictions (i.e. the 50 U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and the self-governing territories of the U.S. such as Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa). There are also minor variations in the common law and statutory law regarding invalidating restraints on alienation as contrary to public policy between these jurisdictions. But even in these non-uniform areas, the majority rules are very widely adopted. Real Property The General Rule In Race-Notice Jurisdictions In real property law, U.S. jurisdictions have predominantly adopted a state &quot;race-notice&quot; statute which provide that bona fide purchasers for value take title to property free of any unrecorded interest in the property at the time of the transfer. There are narrow exceptions to this rule for void titles arising, for example, from a forged deed or a &quot;wild deed&quot;, when the adverse possession deadline has not yet expired. Adverse possession is almost always governed by a state statute. Title 11 of the United States Code, i.e. the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, however, applies in cases where the sale is by a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession in lieu of a bankruptcy trustee, and provides even greater BFP protections. Under a race-notice statute regime, by statute or as supplemented by common law cases, a buyer of real property is deemed to have constructive notice, however, of all properly indexed real property records and of anything that can be discerned from a physical inspections of the property (including, for example, the existing of a unrecorded leasehold interest of a tenant in possession of the property). As noted above, a creditor for whom real estate is collateral for a debt (most frequently a mortgage lender) has the same BFP rights with respect to its collateral interest in the property, as a buyer of outright ownership of the property who receives a deed does in BFP's ownership interest in the property. General Rules For Registered Title And Pure Race Recording Statutes A tiny percentage of U.S. real estate is subject to what is usually called Torrens' Title or registered title which has been copied by most non-U.S. common law jurisdictions from Australia that originally invented the system, or a &quot;pure race&quot; recording statute. Property subject to these system of noting real property rights that allows a purchaser to avoid unregistered interests in that real property even if the transferee has notice of the unregistered interests or is not a transferee for value, effectively affording BFP-type protections to a group of people greater than just BFPs. Common Exceptions To The General Rules Notwithstanding this, there are often state law exceptions to the general protections for BFPs in real property purchases which are less generous to them than the general rule that apply to a property tax treasurers sales (if conducted in an irregular fashion), sheriff's sales (if conducted in an irregular fashion), purchases from governmental entities (if made with apparent authority but not actual authority), unrecorded utility liens, unrecorded utility easements not discoverable by inspection, easements by prescription, and unrecorded HOA liens. Other Real Property Litigation From Which BFPs Are Not Protected Sometimes, however, a BFP's claim to real property can be litigated in a dispute over what exactly it was that the BFP purchased. For example, suppose that a BFP receives a deed to land not specifically including or excluding mineral rights, which once had severed mineral rights that arguably came into subsequent common ownership. If there was a merger of the mineral rights into the surface rights under the applicable law, the BFP also gets the mineral rights. If there was not a merger, however, the BFP gets only the surface rights. A BFP of an undivided co-ownership of real property is also not immune to a lawsuit to partition the real property. This is sometimes provided for by a state statute and is sometimes a matter of common law. Personal Property The Role Of The Uniform Commercial Code Many rights of BFPs in personal property are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which has been adopted in close to its current draft by all U.S. jurisdictions with only stylistic variation from the uniform act text in most cases. This originally had Article 1 which contained general provisions, and Articles 2-9 which contained substantive provisions. It has since been amended to add Articles 2A (personal property leases) and 4A (electronic fund transfers), and in most jurisdictions, to omit Article 6 (bulk sales governing sales of substantially all of the assets of a business in a de facto transfer of ownership transaction). Unlike European civil and commercial codes, however, this is supplemented by principles of common law and equity, and by more specific state and federal statutes that often supply essential terms. The General Rule For Personal Property, Tangible and Intangible BFPs of personal property receive non-voidable title if they receive a transfer from someone with voidable title, but not if they receive a transfer from someone with void title (e.g. a thief). Thus, a BFP of someone with void title, such as someone whose chain of title is rooted in larceny, loses to the true owner in a replevin lawsuit (but someone whose title is rooted in a transfer secured through fraud in the inducement, in contrast, may have voidable rather than void title). This is governed primarily by Article 2 and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code and by Title 11 of the United States Code, i.e. the U.S. bankruptcy code (in cases where the sale is by a bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession in lieu of a bankruptcy trustee). Terminology The term &quot;detinue&quot; to describe certain actions seeking possession of tangible personal property has largely fallen into desuetude. The &quot;plain English&quot; terminology for a replevin or detinue claim as a stand alone legal cause of action is &quot;claim and delivery&quot;, and is called &quot;repossession&quot; in the context of an action to enforce a debt secured by a non-possessory security interest (i.e. a personal property mortgage) or non-possessory lien. Personal Property Security Interests In the case of a non-possessory security interest (i.e. personal property mortgage) or a non-possessory lien such as an agricultural lien or tax lien in property property, a transferee for value takes free of the lien if it is not recorded in the relevant state's Uniform Commercial Code filings (or in the case of select kinds of personal property in another designated filing location such as a national registry of aircraft liens, or intellectual property rights arising under federal law, or a motor vehicle certificate of title), even if the transferee has notice of the &quot;unperfected&quot; non-possessory personal property lien (the original party to the security interest agreement is bound by it even if it is not &quot;perfected&quot; by being filed in the relevant place). This is governed primarily by Articles 2A and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and by statutes setting forth special filing requirements for certain kinds of property like intellectual property, aircraft, and motor vehicles. Negotiable Instruments A BFP transferee of a negotiable instrument is called a &quot;holder in due course&quot; and takes free basically of defenses to the negotiable instrument arising from the underlying transaction in which the negotiable instrument was given as consideration. this is governed by Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code enacted in all U.S. jurisdictions. Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code does most of the heavy lifting, however, together with Federal Reserve regulations governing the payment system, while Article 4 plays a lesser supporting rule. Fact patterns involving BFPs rarely arise under Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code governing electronic fund transfers, because usually EFTs are two party transactions rather than often involving a long chain of transferees the way negotiable instruments (such as checks, money orders, and simple promissory notes) do. Other Negotiable Or Transferrable Documents Similar (but not identical) protections are afforded to BFPs in connection with letters of credit, which are governed by Article 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code, negotiable warehouse receipts, which are governed by Article 7 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and with respect to certain interests in &quot;securities&quot; which are governed primarily in this regard by Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Fraudulent Transfers/Conveyances And Preferences With only the rarest exceptions, BFPs are also immune to liability in a fraudulent transfer (i.e. confusingly, a liability as a transferee who received insufficient consideration from an insolvent person to thwart creditors, not a truly forged deed), or preference lawsuit (essentially the same thing in bankruptcy). This is governed either by the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (which is more modern and the majority rule in U.S. jurisdictions), the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (a legacy statute on the books in the remaining U.S. jurisdictions), or Title 11 of the United States Code, i.e. the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, in all U.S. jurisdictions. Public Policy Limitations On Restraint Against Alienation The First Sale Doctrine Also, while it isn't strictly a BFP question, the first-sale doctrine that provides that a buyer of a good at a first retail sale of a good takes free of all intellectual property claims that apply to that particular good, is closely akin to the BFP doctrines. This is largely a matter of federal patent, trademark, and copyright law. Other Public Policy Invalidating Restraints On Alienation State statutory and common law public policies against undue restrains on alienation (including, but not limited to, the rule against perpetuities) also often operate similarly to BFP protections. For example, certain common law future interests in real property (e.g. defeasible estates such as the future interest holders of property held in &quot;fee tail&quot;) are eliminated by a transfer to a BFP under state law in many states. Analysis These analysis questions pertain, in particular, to tangible personal property which can be subject to detinue or replevin claims (a.k.a. &quot;claim and delivery&quot;, or &quot;repossession&quot; claims), so the answers to these omit issues related to intangible personal property and real property addressed above. This would suggest that any statute that superseded detinue and/or replevin causes of actions in equity would overrule this doctrine. Detinue and replevin causes of action are often creatures of court rule that aren't expressly created by any statute. Both detinue and replevin are claims for relief that arise in law, rather than equity. The BFP doctrine can be, and sometimes is, overridden by statute, although it is more common for BFP rights to be expressly stated in a statute as exceptions to the unstated common law default general rule that one can only transfer property to the extent that you own it. But looking at it closer, even detinue and replevin would be in conflict with this doctrine; how were they concurrently recognized? What principles may be read out of the equity practice of the courts in the U.S.? There are lots of transactions that don't involve BFP rights or where BFPs do not have special rights relative to other transferees of tangible personal property. Those are the predominant cases in which detinue and replevin claims are brought. These mostly include the following five categories of cases: Actions to repossess property that is collateral for a debt subject to a duly &quot;perfected&quot; security interest or lien filed or registered in the appropriate place, following a default on the underlying debt, where the creditor chooses not to avail itself of its right to repossess the collateral without court process in order to reduce creditor liability risks, or because this cannot be done without a breach of the peace. Actions to repossess property in the possession of the primary party to the debt and security agreement that is collateral for a debt subject security agreement (even if the security interest or lien is not &quot;perfected&quot;), following a default on the underlying debt, where the creditor chooses not to avail itself of its right to repossess the collateral without court process in order to reduce creditor liability risks, or because this cannot be done without a breach of the peace. Actions to recover possession of property when the person in possession of it did not acquire possession of the property by sale (e.g. an ex-roommate, or a seller holding goods on a consignment basis). Actions to recover possession of property from someone who is not a BFP and has voidable title to the property, by someone with a superior claim to title to the property to the person in possession of it (e.g. someone who acquired the property through a gift that was a voidable fraudulent transfer, or through their own fraud in the inducement of a sale). Actions against BFPs whose chain of title to the tangible personal property is rooted in larceny.
The Example of Colorado Law In Colorado, a private individual who is a victim of theft can bring a lawsuit for civil theft in which a prevailing theft victim can recover the actual economic amount of the theft (including pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate from lost use of the stolen property per a separate pre-judgment interest statute), treble damages (i.e. actual damages plus twice that amount as a civil penalty), and their attorneys' fees and the costs of the litigation. Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-4-405. Rights in stolen property All property obtained by theft, robbery, or burglary shall be restored to the owner, and no sale, whether in good faith on the part of the purchaser or not, shall divest the owner of his right to such property. The owner may maintain an action not only against the taker thereof but also against any person in whose possession he finds the property. In any such action, the owner may recover two hundred dollars or three times the amount of the actual damages sustained by him, whichever is greater, and may also recover costs of the action and reasonable attorney fees; but monetary damages and attorney fees shall not be recoverable from a good-faith purchaser or good-faith holder of the property. Returning the property stolen doesn't change the fact that civil theft was committed, it only reduces the amount of the damages by the amount repaid and prevents interest from continuing to accrue. In practice, it would be very uncommon for someone to bring a suit for civil theft after they are repaid. But, nothing in principle prevents this from happening until the statute of limitations runs (in Colorado that is probably three years from the date that the theft is discovered), although there might be an argument that accepting the funds returned by mutual agreement might constitute a waiver of their claim, or might give rise to equitable defenses of estoppel or laches. Criminal Charges Of course, in the U.S., even if the company doesn't press charges, a prosecutor does have the authority to press criminal charges without their consent. A theft victim does not have the legal authority to relieve you of criminal liability for theft. There are some countries other than the U.S. where a theft victim can relieve someone who committed theft of criminal liability (if I recall correctly, Germany is one of them), but that is a minority position internationally as a legal matter (although actual practice is often different). Civil Lawsuits For Theft In Other Jurisdictions While most states do not have a statutory civil theft statute, almost every state and country would allow a civil lawsuit for &quot;conversion&quot; or the equivalent for taking property that does not belong to you for your own benefit (which is a tort). Other U.S. states and other countries would vary over whether repayment of funds converted prior to commencement of a lawsuit limits actual damages and exemplary damages based upon actual damages to pre-judgment interest, or even constitutes a complete defense, or not. Most U.S. states allow for an award of punitive damages in connection with an intentional tort (statutes of limitations and pre-judgment interest award rules vary greatly). Most non-U.S. jurisdictions would not allow an award of punitive damages in a civil action involving an intentional tort. In the absence of a statutory authorization of the kind found in Colorado, attorneys' fees and costs would normally not be allowed for a U.S. plaintiff in an intentional tort case like this one, but most non-U.S. courts would allow an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing party in a case like this one. Practical Considerations The fact that you repaid the funds makes some defenses to future civil or criminal charges very challenging. You can't truthfully deny that you repaid the funds and that comes close to an admission of guilt. But, if you state under oath that you engaged in this conduct, you make yourself vulnerable to criminal prosecution based upon that testimony under oath. In practice, one reason that the business is actually unlikely to sue you in this situation (unless they discovered that more than $50,000 was taken) is that having lost your job and paid them $50,000 you may not be able to pay even a large judgment if it was awarded against you (although such a judgment, if entered, would probably not be dischargeable in bankruptcy under U.S. law). So, the cost-benefit analysis of such a suit for the company might not make much sense. Also, while having a suit like this filed against you would certainly damage your reputation seriously in a way that could be located with a public records search, it might also moderately harm the reputation of the company which revealed that its internal controls were lax enough to make it possible for the theft to happen. In the case of a large business the damage that this could do to the fair market value of the business and its creditworthiness might outweigh the benefit it would receive from bringing such a lawsuit.
In fact, the first recognition of the First Sale doctrine came about precisely because a publisher attempted to do something of the nature of what you suggest. In Bobbs-Merrill Co. vs Straus, the Bobbs-Merrill Corporation attempted to enforce the following restriction, printed on the inside of a book it published: "The price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright." They made the mistake of attempting to enforce it against, among others, R.H. Macy and Co., who they then had to take to court - and lost. This established the First Sale Doctrine, which then later (in 1976) was codified (in 17 U.S. Code § 109. Textbooks recently tested another element of this; in the 2013 case, Kirtsaeng v John Wiley and Sons Inc., the Supreme Court held that the First Sale doctrine trumped a notice forbidding selling a book outside of a particular territory or region (Kirtsaeng imported textbooks from Thailand, where they were much cheaper than in the US, and resold them at a profit in the US).
If Party C amends their filing, does party A become a joint applicant, a third party or something else? A is a non-party. It is unclear from your description why C would need to amend the filing, but there is no need for A to become a joint applicant. By virtue of C's buyout of A, only C has standing to sue B. Your description does not specify B's reason for non-payment, but generally speaking that does not defeat's C's standing for suing B. Had B's contract with A reflected that B's intent is to not be in a contract relation with C, the matter might involve (1) rescinding B's contract with C; (2) a judgment on grounds of equity; (3) C's claim against A for the latter's omission; or (4) a combination of these. But the description has too many gaps in that regard, thereby precluding a more precise assessment. Does Party A need to make a demand from party C and restart the whole application? No. A has no viable claim against C. And A's sale to C implies that A can no longer have a viable claim against B either.
What you're talking about is a liquidated-damages clause, where the contract explicitly spells out the damages to be awarded in the event of a breach. The law will vary some from state to state, but these clauses are generally enforceable. Some courts limit their use to cases where calculating the damages resulting from the breach would be impossible or impractical. But in the United States, along with all other common law jurisdictions, courts generally agree that if the liquidated-damages clause appears to penalize the breach instead of simply compensating for it, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Ridgley v. Topa Thrift &amp; Loan Ass'n, 17 Cal.4th 970, 977 (Cal. 1998) (“A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under section 1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would flow from a breach.”) The trillion-dollar damages clause &quot;bears no reasonable relationship&quot; to the damages that would actually result from a breach of a software license, so you can safely expect a court to refuse to enforce it, and limit you to whatever damages you could actually prove in court. Even if you were to drastically reduce it to &quot;all the money you have, and then some,&quot; &quot;all the money you have,&quot; &quot;half the money you have,&quot; or even &quot; &quot;1 percent of all the money you have,&quot; the language still makes clear that the contract is not aimed at compensating for the breach, but rather penalizing the breaching party. In the end, what you're talking about isn't going to work, because contract law is generally less concerned with penalizing people than with making them whole.
&quot;Property in&quot; in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 is an archaic phrase, carried over from previous versions of the Act adopted in the 1800s (which in turn carried on terminology from prior British common law cases), that means &quot;Ownership of&quot;. The archaic language was retained because it has such a rich case law (not just in the U.K., but throughout the British Commonwealth) interpreting it that would be lost or hard to access if the terminology were revised, in a situation where the case law was seen as a positive worth keeping.
Does Florida state law require that an estate go into probate in the event the seller in a real estate transaction passes away prior to closing? Yes, if the seller is the owner of the property which is not in joint tenancy with right of survivorship or something similar (such as a transfer on death deed). A will is meaningless until it has been admitted to probate (which is a term that in the narrow sense means &quot;validating the authenticity and validity of a will). Likewise, an adjudication that someone had no will cannot be made without a probate proceeding. There is no exception for a clear an uncontested will. &quot;Will&quot; means &quot;probate&quot; pretty much by definition. This doesn't mean, however, that the closing of the property has to waive until the probate proceeding including a full administration of the probate estate and closing of the probate estate is required. Often, a will can be admitted to probate and an executor can be appointed to manage the estate in a matter of a few weeks to a few months if there is no contest to either the validity of the will or the appointment of a particular person as an executor. Generally, once the executor is appointed in the probate case, the real estate closing can go forward, sometimes with some additional uncontested motion practice. Once the property is sold, the proceeds are put in an estate bank account pending further administration of the estate's assets and liabilities. Indeed, even if the will is contested, as long as a consensus can be reached among the interested parties regarding who the executor should be, the real estate closing could go forward despite the fact that the will is contested. Powers of attorney are sometimes granted to real estate agents to complete a transaction in the event of a seller's incapacity. But powers of attorney are void no later than the point at which the person with the power of attorney learns of the death. (The common law rule was that a power of attorney was void at the moment of death, even if no one involved in the transaction knew that fact yet.) The only person with authority to sign the deed to sell the property, if the property is titled in the name of the seller individually, with no co-owner (or with a tenant-in-common co-owner), is the probate estate's executor. The real estate contract is a claim in the probate estate, which the probate estate is required to carry out if it is able to do so. But a real estate contract, in and of itself, doesn't transfer the property by operation of law at closing. Until the probate estate is opened, the buyer doesn't even have anyone who can be sued to demand that the real estate contract be performed.
If a trespasser openly and notoriously, exclusively and continuously possesses your property by building a fence on your land for the right time period, they automatically own the land. It still takes a court proceeding to record the passing of title (the trespasser has to prove in court that it is legally theirs). The trespasser would also have to establish that the recent survey was correct (survey errors do exist): was there an earlier survey in connection with the fence that established different boundaries? If (as it turns out) this has become his property, he abstractly has title to it, but only you and he know about it. The trespasser may have an interest in officially changing the property description, because it will officially increase the size of his lot and thus the value of the house+land. This also will increase their tax burden (while decreasing yours). The county has no knowledge of the fence: they go off of the official record, which says that you own that wedge. You also may have an interest in changing the property description, primarily to reduce your tax bite. There could also be issues with your resale of the property, since a mortgage company may require a survey of the property. Whether or not that is bad is hard to say: the consequence could be that the buyer is alerted to the fact that the lot is smaller than advertised and so on; in the current market I doubt anyone would care. If the fence goes away and you start using the land, then it will officially revert to you after a while. If you catch the party and complain within 10 years, you may recover the property (RCW 7.28.010). The limitations statute says that The period prescribed for the commencement of actions shall be as follows: Within ten years: (1) For actions for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof; and no action shall be maintained for such recovery unless it appears that the plaintiff, his or her ancestor, predecessor or grantor was seized or possessed of the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of the action. That ship has (apparently) long since sailed. There is a different law pertaining to "Adverse possession under title deducible of record" which shortens the limit to 7 years, which is even less useful to the original owner. RCW 7.28.070 also shortens the time limit for an adverse possession case, to 7 years: Every person in actual, open and notorious possession of lands..who shall for seven successive years continue in possession, and shall also during said time pay all taxes legally assessed on such lands or tenements, shall be ... the legal owner of said lands There is another (more recent) tax-related provision, RCW 7.28.083. (1) A party who prevails against the holder of record title at the time an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession was filed, or against a subsequent purchaser from such holder, may be required to: (a) Reimburse such holder or purchaser for part or all of any taxes or assessments levied on the real property during the period the prevailing party was in possession of the real property in question and which are proven by competent evidence to have been paid by such holder or purchaser; This does not require them to have paid taxes, it say that the victor in the dispute may nevertheless be ordered to reimburse taxes paid by the other party (assuming the other party has paid the tax). So there is some chance of getting the taxes back. The reimbursement is at the court's discretion (continuing that section): (2) If the court orders reimbursement for taxes or assessments paid or payment of taxes or assessments due under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall determine how to allocate taxes or assessments between the property acquired by adverse possession and the property retained by the title holder. In making its determination, the court shall consider all the facts and shall order such reimbursement or payment as appears equitable and just. One should also pay attention to the last provision in that statute: (3) The prevailing party in an action asserting title to real property by adverse possession may request the court to award costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. The court may award all or a portion of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an award is equitable and just. That means that the victor can request the loser to pay his attorney's fees. This is delicate math, balancing the chance of recovering some paid taxes vs. paying the other guy's costs. You could try calling the assessor to find out how much the decrease in lot size might net you (the land vs. improvement proportion of taxes is all over the map in KC, easily ranging from 60% to 250% depending on year). One additional feature of adverse possession is that it must be "hostile", i.e. without permission. If a neighbor builds on your land, you can explicitly give them revocable permission (to avoid "no you didn't" arguments, explicit and revocable written permission, signed by the neighbor, would bar an adverse possession claim). This raises an interesting question, to which I don't know the answer. Suppose the prior owner gave permission to the fence builder, and did not demand the removal of the fence when he sold the property or right after the neighbor sold his property (there was only on act of granting permission). Does the clock start from your acquisition of the property (whereupon the element of hostility is satisfied)? Or does it start from the point where they acquired the property and were in hostile possession of the land (I would bet a quarter that that's the answer). If (or, given that) the fence was moved further onto your property more recently, there is a chance to recover the newly-taken piece of land. If you grant them revocable permission to build a fence on your property, you would not be subject to an adverse possession taking for the newly-taken land. If at some point you tell them to tear down the fence and they refuse, you can sue them and the court will (almost certainly) order the removal of the fence. The neighbor might then initiate an action to quiet title on the originally-taken piece of land, so you'd be back to where you were 4 years ago. From a practical perspective, this is well-worth the small amount of money involved to consult with an attorney to get legal advice. The legal matter probably will not go away quickly, and they may be presently inclined to settle in a manner more in your favor.