How did Dominion justify the 1.6 billion value they&#39;re suing Fox News for? Dominion is suing for 1.6 billion in their defamation case against Fox News. Google tells me they make an annual income of less then 100 million and their entire company is only valued at 80 million. To be frank, regardless of whether or not Fox is found liable of defamation it seems hard to believe that the alleged defamation from Fox News alone resulted in losses equal to twenty times Dominion's current net worth. So I'm wondering if the filing specifies how Dominion came up with such a high number, and what their legal justification for it is. Do these sorts of lawsuit just always toss out some value known to be exaggerated expecting it to be lowered by the court even if they win, or - presuming they did win their lawsuit - would Dominion have reasonable expectation of being awarded the full 1.6 billion claim?
The complaint is available online. In fact, it asks for more than 1.6 billion, because it doesn't suggest any amounts for certain categories. The amounts that are specified include things such as the cost of providing security in the wake of death threats they received. Starting on page 136, they ask for General compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial, Damages of not less than $600,000,000 for lost profits, not less than $1,000,000,000 for lost enterprise value, not less than $600,000 for security expenses, and not less than $700,000 for expenses to fight the disinformation campaign waged against them, Punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial, Pre- and post-judgment interest, and Expenses and attorneys' fees. Justification for the amounts in the second item is found in the complaint.
This very much depends in BigCorp and the whole situation. BigCorp has three sums of money: what they pay you, the cost of turning it into a product, and the profits of the product. Usually the first amount is much smaller than the second, and that is much less than the third. Ripping you off won’t save them much. Having a contract that rips you off but can be challenged later successfully would be the worst case for them. So the best case for BigCorp is lawyers that set up a contract that is fair, bullet proof, and is created by lawyers that cooperate to keep the cost down. BigCorps lawyers probably know someone who will work in your interest just fine. Their worst bet would be lawyers that don’t work for your benefit, and then you manage to throw the contract out when it turn out to be not in your interest.
The company probably owes U.S. and state corporate income taxes because income from services performed in the United States are usually considered "effectively connected" with the United States. The fact that the servers are located in the U.S. is pretty much irrelevant, relative to the fact that the services are performed while located in the United States. I can't think of a single tax case that has ever turned on the location of the servers in a company. Unlike a U.S. company, a foreign company is not taxed by the U.S. on its worldwide income, nor is the individual, a non-resident alien (having an F-1 visa rather than a green card) taxes on the individual's worldwide income. But, a non-U.S. person is still taxed on income that is effectively connected with the United States. Generally speaking income from property is not effectively connected with the United States merely because it is managed by someone located in the U.S., so if the company had owned an apartment in Brazil that it received rental income from, for example, that would not be subject to U.S. taxation. Also income from intangible property (like interest payments on loans or dividends on publicly held stock) is generally not subject to U.S. taxation if paid to a non-resident, non-citizen of the U.S. But, generally speaking, income from the performance of services is taxable in the place where the services are performed. For example, Colorado can impose state income taxes on income earned by a Texas baseball player while playing at a stadium in Denver. The lack of a salary or employee status shouldn't change the fact that the income received by the company from performance of services in the U.S. is effectively connected with the United States. When the owner performs services in the U.S., the company is performing services in the U.S. and so it is subject to taxation in the U.S. Dividend payments from the offshore company probably wouldn't be subject to U.S. taxation in this scenario, but the company itself would be subject to corporate income taxes in the U.S. from the profits it earned from the services performed in the U.S.
It first depends on what state you are dealing with. This expression shows up in standard forms in Georgia, where it is not defined. You can read the associated statutes (Georgia Code, Title 53) especially the definitions, and it won't tell you. The probate court rules also don't tell you. So in Georgia, it would be &quot;what a reasonable person would conclude&quot; (good luck there). Searching for legal blogs that might give a hint, this article refers to &quot;Significant assets that are solely titled to the decedent- property, automobiles, boats, homes&quot;, which seems obvious – they don't suggest a lower value, because that is not legally determined and they don't want to get in trouble for advising that $1,000 (or $500) is &quot;an insignificant value&quot;. The purpose of the form is to put beneficiaries on notice as to what is at stake, and for purposes of that form, it is an estimate, not a binding promise. You have pretty much identified the indeterminacy of the law (in Georgia).
This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know.
There's an interesting philosophical debate you can have. By the plain text of the First Amendment, it protects libel. Aside: Yes, the First Amendment does apply to libel cases. A libel case, like all lawsuits, involves the government's judicial branch using its coercive power to make you pay money as a result of your speech, based on a law requiring you to pay money for certain kinds of speech. Tort law is not optional; a libel case isn't "you promised not to say bad things and then said bad things," it's the government saying "what you did is bad, now pay the person you hurt because of your speech." The idea that "you can say it, you just have to face the consequences" isn't enough and hasn't been for quite a while now. Traditionally, the main point of freedom of speech was that a court couldn't stop you from saying something, but could only seek to punish you after the fact (and for that you get a jury, a public hearing, etc.) But more recently, courts realized that subsequent punishment had similar effects to prior restraint. If you're going to be punished for some kind of speech, you're going to steer clear of saying anything a jury might think is that kind of speech. Libel law is heavily influenced by the First Amendment, and has been for over 40 years. The First Amendment looks like it protects libel, but it also looks like it should protect your right to reprint any book you want. It also looks like it should protect your right to tell someone "go and murder this person." It also looks like it should protect your right to say whatever you want in court, whether or not it's true. It also looks like it should protect your right to falsely shout "fire" in a crowded hall, with the intent to cause a stampede (this isn't just a turn of phrase, there was an actual incident in which 73 people were killed which is believed to have started when someone falsely shouted that there was a fire). It also looks like it should protect your right to post a sign saying "There is a bomb at this elementary school." Yet the Constitution explicitly sanctions copyright, and no one would seriously conclude that Congress may not protect the integrity of the judicial process by punishing perjury. Ordering a hit, making bomb threats, intentionally causing panics -- the fact that speech is a key part of these can't mean that the government isn't allowed to criminalize them. You cannot run a civilized society in which death threats are legal. So, the courts interpret. Language in the Constitution that appears absolute is understood to have implied exceptions. The people writing the document were well aware that perjury was generally a crime. The same Congress that proposed the First Amendment passed a law criminalizing perjury. Sure, you're punishing someone based on their speech, but it's clearly not meant to be protected. You can't run a court system without perjury laws, and its absence from the First Amendment doesn't mean that the First Amendment thereby upended this basic principle. The courts have identified a number of kinds of speech that, by longstanding practice, are not protected. Intellectual property violations are one. Obscenity is another. So are threats. So is "speech integral to criminal conduct" (e.g. "what'll it be, your money or your life?") And so is defamation. The text of the First Amendment may not exclude it, but courts have uniformly held that it's not something the amendment was ever meant to protect. The First Amendment does still pose constraints, which are some of the most defendant-friendly in the world (interestingly enough, US law is descended from English law, and English libel law used to be among the most plaintiff-friendly in the world). It's not libel if it's true. It's not libel if it's an opinion (unless it's a statement of fact dressed up as opinion). It's not libel unless you were at least negligent; if it was about a public figure, you have to have known it was false or seriously doubted its truth. But these restrictions leave a core of speech that is and always has been punishable.
Does criticizing public figures constitute libel especially in a private group? It depends on the specifics, but a priori your description suggests that the defense of honest opinion would be applicable. This is regardless of whether the subject is a public figure and regardless of whether the statements were in private --albeit non-privileged-- communications. Case law surely provides guidelines or precedents on how the details and circumstances of the events would fare on the parties' legal position, but I am not knowledgeable of UK/English law. Does X have a counterclaim for illegally accessing the data? The matter seemingly depends on how the religious leader had or gained access to the data. Even if he gained access by stealing or hacking a device or account, X would not have standing to [counter-]sue unless the device or account belongs to X. Be mindful of the possibility that third party might have made the disclosure to the religious leader. In that case, actionability (if any) of the disclosure only encompasses the third party, not the religious leader. X's intent that his statements stay only among the participants does not necessarily imply that participants' disclosure elsewhere is unlawful.
This feels like a political hit job carried out by the courts rather than the wheels of justice doing their thing. The wheels of justice are doing their thing; the answer and legal reasoning is in the court transcript, as quoted and commented on by a news source: see Michael Cohen raid and first day in court. Transcript: 04/16/2018. The Rachel Maddow Show | MSNBC. The overall argument made by the press lawyer - which convinced the judge and the court - is that if the third client's name is given to the court as sealed information, it should be public, according to the 1st Amendment and in the public interest. (Transcript edited and condensed by me) Mr. Balin: Your Honor, I apologize for interrupting. I`m a lawyer representing the press. ABC, “The New York Times”, “Associated Press”, CNN, and “Newsday”. The judge says, quote: I think you'd better come to the podium. Mr. Balin says, quote: I think I'd better too, your honor. I've sat and listened until we got to the point where I realized there's a public access issue here. Your honor, I'm Robert Balin from Davis Wright Tremaine. Thank you very much. ...There is no credible claim that this client`s mere identity is attorney-client privileged information. Michael Cohen makes the argument that it would be embarrassing to be associated with what he terms a raid at a house, in a home. Your Honor, I hardly need to remind the court of the intense public interest in the issues that are currently before this court. I look around and I see that every other seat is occupied by a member of the press. ...That's the very nature of the First Amendment access right, so that we the people and the press can monitor our institutions and have a rational basis for agreeing or disagreeing... ...It was Justice Burger who I think put it well. People in our open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing. That was in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia many years ago. ...Your honor, I see no basis for denying public access. If your honor is going to order disclosure of this name, I see no basis for denying public access to that name. Maddow's comments: This is the lawyer for news organizations coming in and pressing this point. The judge at this point has basically agreed that she's going to take the name in a sealed envelope. The lawyer for the press comes in and says, if you're going to take that name, there's no good argument, there's no good legal precedent for keeping that name from the public. The secret name of Michael Cohen`s secret third client in his legal business, if that's going to be disclosed to the court, it should be disclosed to the people. And here is an interview with Balin where he explains the how and why of his arguments: Q&amp;A: Lawyer behind Hannity revelation at Cohen hearing speaks - Columbia Journalism Review. Other points: Help me understand the public/private nature of courtroom findings, requests as it pertains to this case. Court proceedings are public; nearly everything that happens in a court is public information (aside from issues of national security as decided by panels of judges and/or grand juries; or issues of safety for individuals and/or witnesses who are party to the proceedings). So far it seems like none little of the evidence has actually been reviewed. The nature and content of the evidence or its review has nothing to do with the identity of the clients. The issue is the secrecy of the client list, not the content of the relationship between the client and Cohen.