Who are the &quot;inferior officers&quot; of the federal government? A part of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States says this: He [the President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. News reports recently suggest that the director of the FBI, although "inferior" to the attorney general, is not one of those "inferior officers" who do not need to get confirmed by the Senate. I suspect maybe the head of the Federal Aviation Administration or the Postmaster General or the Director of the Census is one of those. (For some decades before the late '60s -- maybe the Nixon administration -- the Postmaster General was a member of the Cabinet.) If I'm not mistaken, all members of the Cabinet and all ambassadors and all federal judges need to get confirmed by the Senate. What is the current list of those officers who need to get confirmed by the Senate and those "inferior officers" who are appointed by the President without the need for confirmation, and those "inferior officers" who are appointed by department heads, and those "inferior officers" who are appointed by the judiciary? Would this list be on the web somewhere?
I conclude (contrary to an earlier expression) that there is no such list, nor can there be, because the term "officer" is not well enough defined. The inferior officers are those officers who are not principal officers (as specified in the Constitution, e.g. ambassadors, cabinet members, judges), since there are only two kinds of officers. There is no constitutional or statutory definition of "Officer of the United States", so we have to figure it out from case law. As noted in Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654 The line between "inferior" and "principal" officers is one that is far from clear, and the Framers provided little guidance into where it should be drawn. Officers of the US cannot be appointed by Congress (Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976), so that narrows down the possibilities – if in fact an appointment can be made by Congress, that is not an inferior office (since Congress has no such authority). That court also said that We think that the term "Officers of the United States," as used in Art. II, defined to include "all persons who can be said to hold an office under the government" in United States v. Germaine, supra, is a term intended to have substantive meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an "Officer of the United States," and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article. To take a specific example, "special trial judges", authorized in 26 USC 7443a are an example of an officer. We know they are officers, because Freytag v. Commissioner 501 U.S. 868 says so (since they read Buckley): A special trial judge is an "inferior Office[r]" whose appointment must conform to the Appointments Clause. Such a judge acts as an inferior officer who exercises independent authority in cases governed by subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3). The fact that in subsection (b)(4) cases he performs duties that may be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform his status. The Dept. of Justice offers an analysis of "Officer of the United States". The main elements in their opinion are that the position must possess delegated sovereign authority of the Federal government, and the position must be continuing. There are other criteria possibly applicable (things that were invokes at some time) including method of appointment, having been established by law, taking an oath of office, an emolument (not a volunteer), and receiving a commission. Still, Congress authorizes (by law) the hiring of federal employees, and not all employees are "officers". An earlier memorandum on the topic is here. Footnote 54 notes that It is at least arguable, however, that the authority exercised by second lieutenants and ensigns is so limited and subordinate that their analogues in the civil sphere clearly would be employees. Warrant officers and non-commisioned officers would likewise have quite limited authority. Since the definition of "Officer of the United States" is up for grabs, there can't be a complete list of inferior officers, especially if all military officers are included. There is a long list of civilian officers under the executive branch published in United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions, after each presidential election. The so-called Plum Book is on a government web page here in the 2012 version, and here for 2016. However, you will not find special trial judges of the tax court in the Plum Book, which were held in Freytag to be officers, and are civilians in the executive branch. The special trial judges are apparently listed here, as are the sitting judges (who are also not in the Plum book).
The Supremacy Clause makes Federal laws superior to state laws and even state constitutions, but that is only true for Constitutional federal laws. If Congress passed a law seeking to restore the effect of the now overruled Roe decision, there would be a question as to what provisions of the constitution empowered Congress to do so. Such a law might be challenged, and if no convincing source of congressional authority to pass such a law was cited, it could plausibly be overturned. One supposes that the members of the majority in Dobbs would be reluctant to see that decision superseded by a new Federal law. One hopes that they would take a principled stance, and only overturn such a law if there was good legal reason to do so. Without seeing the text of such a law, and the constitutional arguments for and against it, there is no legitimate way to judge if it would be within the power of Congress. As a political matter, I doubt that the current Congress will pass such a law.
Absolutely not. Lack of authority Law enforcement officers do not have the authority to grant immunity from prosecution. The decision to prosecute lies with the district attorney's office. Courts have sometimes held that a promise of immunity by a police officer can make resulting statements inadmissible, but that's it -- the state is not bound by the police officer's promise to not prosecute, except in exceptional cases. They can gather other evidence and prosecute anyway. Prospective immunity The contract claims to provide immunity against prosecution for future crimes. Contracts against public policy are void, and I'm having trouble thinking of something which is more against public policy than a license to commit crimes. No one can offer that immunity through contract. In a recent trial of a Boston mob boss, he attempted to claim that a federal prosecutor had given him immunity for any and all future crimes for some time period; the court did not accept that, because a license to break the law is not a valid contract. Public authority There is a situation in which certain officers can grant authority to break certain laws: to catch bigger criminals. However, for fairly obvious reasons, there are extremely strict rules on when this is valid, both on the government procedure side and the claiming-the-defense side. The defense can only work if the defendant honestly believed the government had authorized his actions, if the government actually had authorized them, or if he followed official government legal advice. In this case, the defendant has no idea if government officials have agreed to the terms; he would have approximately no chance of convincing anyone he legitimately thought that the government approved of his actions. They certainly wouldn't be actually properly authorized, and he hasn't sought advice from the government. Other issues Police aren't the only people on this site. An investigation tends to involve one or more non-government agents who provide testimony in court. No contract with a private party can stop them from testifying in a criminal trial; certain relationships mean testimony isn't allowed (e.g. a lawyer can't testify about dealings with their client without client permission), but regular users could be required to testify against the site operator (possibly on the basis of actual immunity). Sources Public authority stuff: this Justice Department page, plus some discussion in this order. Prospective immunity: that same order. Lack of authority: myriad readings.
Yes. The absence of immunity for a U.S. President's unofficial acts was established both in the Nixon Administration and later in the Clinton Administration. In practice, a prosecutor would be loath to file such charges absent very, very solid probable cause, and a court would often be very deferential in accommodating the President's schedule and, for example, in allowing appearances by telephone when allowed by law, or by electing not to seize the President's passport as a bail condition to be free pending trial, as would be common for someone facing felony charges pending trial. But, ultimately, the President does not have the right to either defer the charges until the completion of his term, or to any immunity from charges for his or her unofficial acts.
Does this mean that all four of the above are &quot;equipotent&quot;? No. The inclusion of these foundational documents in the Front Matter of the United States Code does not indicate anything regarding their legal status. It is more of a political statement, as a preamble to all laws in today's sovereign federal state, describing the foundation of the United States of America and its constitutional order. The only constitutional law in force today in the U.S. is the Constitution for the United States of America, beginning with We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. and the subsequent amendments. The ratification of the Constitution replaced any previous constitutional orders in effect between the States. A new government was created by the Constitution and replaced the old one under the Articles of the Confederation: Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The New Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is apparent that the government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day proceeding that on which the Members of the new Congress were directed to assemble. Owings v. Speed The States abandoned their old agreement (the Articles of Confederation) and subjected themselves to the new Constitution. Of course, the other documents remain historically very significant and may shine lights on the interpretation of the present Constitution, for example, in Texas v. White, the reference made to the concept of &quot;perpetual union&quot; found in the Articles. The Declaration of Independence is not so much a legal document per se but a declaration of the existence of the States sovereign from the British Crown; but such sovereignty is not a result from the declaration, but from the acts of war. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, while remaining in effect under the Constitution by Acts of (the new) Congress, is in any case spent as its territorial extent is extinguished by the establishment and admission of states, who enjoy equal status under the Constitution. See for example, Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans and Strader v. Graham.
There are several possible ways to get there, but the answer is "there is no such position." Acting President vs. President Under the Constitution: In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. When William Henry Harrison died, there was some question as to what "the same" that devolved on Tyler (his VP) meant. Some thought it meant that Tyler was Acting President; others thought the office itself went to Tyler. Tyler was in the latter group, and set a precedent that the VP became the President (finishing out the President's term) if the President died; the VP wasn't just acting. The 25th Amendment later clarified that presidential death, removal, or resignation made the VP the President; if the President was unable to exercise the powers and duties of the office, the VP was Acting President. Further down the line, the Constitution explicitly says Congress decides "who shall act as President." Congress only talks about succession further down the line in terms of the Acting President and the officer acting as President. So, if that interpretation is correct, the answer is "the VP is the only officer who can assume the office of President in the event of the President's death." Of course, a new precedent could potentially be set if this situation ever arises; if someone will definitely act as President until the end of the term, then it makes a certain amount of sense to say they just assume the office itself. Eligibility for office The Constitution doesn't say "you can't be elected President unless over 35, natural-born citizen, and 14 years a resident." It says you are not eligible for the office unless you meet those requirements. That would include any way of assuming the office, including succession. You can't become President if you are not eligible to hold the office, period (that's what eligibility for an office means); the only requirements you'd get around are those covering eligibility to be elected. Succession It's unclear whether the Constitution's eligibility requirements apply to a person acting as President who does not assume the office. However, Congress has decided that they should. 3 USC &sect;19, which sets out who acts as President if both President and VP are unable to, says: (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section [i.e. the ones listing people who can act as President] shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.
Do I correctly understand that Federal employees, notably including the Armed Forces, pledge their duty first to the Constitution of the United States and only secondarily to carry out legal orders? And that they have no legal obligation to execute an illegal order? What process allows a subordinate to defy an illegal order if a superior gives the order? What legal protection does the subordinate have? All officers of the United States government (and for that matter also all officers of state and local governments) including soldiers in the armed forces are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Members of the armed forces are not only allowed to disregard illegal orders, they are obligated to not carry out illegal orders. Operationally, disobeying an order due to the fact that it is unconstitutional is a defense to an effort to fire or discipline a federal government civil service employee who may only be fired for good cause after due process. In the military, the issue would usually present itself in the form of a defense in a court martial for refusing to obey a lawful order of a superior. Of course, it would hardly be unprecedented for someone's firing from a job that was unlawful, or for a wrongful court-martial conviction, to be upheld on appeal. Suppose the Congress holds someone in contempt. The Congress, as I understand it, goes to a court to enforce the contempt charge. The court turns to Federal law enforcement to bring action. What if the President directs Federal law enforcement to ignore the court order? What if law enforcement complies with the President? The U.S. Justice Department is charged with bringing contempt of Congress cases at the request of Congress. But, an attorney retained by Congress could probably bring such an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia if the U.S. Justice Department refused to do so. Contempt may be civil or criminal, and unlike ordinary criminal charges (felonies can only be brought based upon grand jury indictments and grand juries are controlled by prosecutors) either civil or criminal contempt charges can be brought by a non-governmental employee attorney. The established practice is to seek contempt sanctions against the lowest level employee who has the authority to take the action requested, or to seek contempt sanctions against everyone from that lowest level employee up through the chain of command to the responsible cabinet officer. The President is generally not named as a party against whom contempt charges are sought. Defiance of the law in the face of a binding and immediately effective court order would be a constitutional crisis and you would need to move to the realm of politics and political realities, and away from the realm of what the law says that people should or should not do, to meaningfully predict how a constitutional crisis turns out. The law assumes that all government officials will obey a lawful court order duly enforced. If government law enforcement officers start defying court orders, then there is a constitutional crisis. On the other hand, the vast majority of law enforcement officers in the United States are civil servants who aren't beholden personally to the President. They were appointed on a merit basis, they are civil servants who can't be fired without good cause and due process, they are in agencies that have an institutional culture of obeying court orders. The civil servants with more seniority (and basically all senior military officers in the U.S. military) have served under multiple Presidents of different political parties. The number of political appointees supervising them is fairly modest. Likewise, most federal judges at any given time were appointed by prior Presidents and even judges appointed by a current President will not infrequently rule against the federal government when the facts and law demand that they do so. There is less politics and there is more unity in interpretation of the law among federal judges and federal law enforcement and legal officials than is generally assumed by more cynical members of the general public. Suppose Congress orders fines. What is to be done if no one will enforce the fines? A court can order that the fines be paid out of the U.S. Treasury. The order itself can have the force of law without the cooperation of any U.S. Treasury official. Sustained defiance of such a court order would lead to a constitutional crisis. Same scenario as 1 but this time it’s impeachment and conviction: the President defies any action to remove him. What if the President simply barricades himself in the White House and orders security and military personnel to protect him? Is there a protocol in the U.S. military hierarchy to deal with this scenario? This has never actually happened, of course, so it is hypothetical. The Treasury Department, General Services Administration and Secretary of State (and all other government officials) should revoke privileges that the President has by virtue of being President and provide them to the new acting President (realistically, in the simple scenario presented, current Vice President Pence). The military should stay out of it, but should immediately start treating acting President Pence, and not the impeached incumbent as the Commander-in-Chief. U.S. military forces are indoctrinated on the Presidential succession and it is unlikely that many military officers would disregard a Presidential impeachment. The Secret Service should stop defending the former President except in an ex-President capacity. In theory, one could imagine acting President Pence bringing an eviction action in the local courts of the District of Columbia just as one would with any holdover tenant. Since the local courts in D.C. are federal, this doesn't present the federalism problems that it would if the same thing were done in a state court with respect to federal real estate, and U.S. marshals would evict him and his family like anyone else. The trickier situation in terms of creating a constitutional crisis, honestly, is really one where the President is clearly and blatantly defying the law and court orders, but the U.S. Senate refuses to convict the President in an impeachment proceeding out of partisan bias. What should common citizens do if any of these scenarios play out? Whatever they want, in a lawful manner. Ultimately, this would be a matter for federal government officials (elected and appointed alike) to figure out.
Yes, it has happened. Charles Evans Hughes served on the Supreme Court from 1910 until 1916, when he resigned to run for President as the Republican nominee. He lost to Woodrow Wilson. Later, in 1930, he was appointed again to the Supreme Court, this time as Chief Justice, and served there until 1941. John Jay, Oliver Ellsworth, and James Iredell all received electoral votes for President in the election of 1796. Jay had recently resigned as Chief Justice in 1795, and Ellsworth and Iredell were still serving and did not leave the court until 1799 and 1800 respectively. It's not clear that any of the three seriously campaigned for the presidency, though.