Are times zones, (i.e. a geo-spatial frame of reference) considered in age based regulations? Bob was born in British Columbia (GMT-7) on March 7th at 11 p.m. local time. Alice was born the next day, March 8th, in Nova Scotia (GMT-3) at 1 a.m. local time, which is 2 hours before Bob was born, due to the time zone difference. Bob and Alice are in Vancouver (GMT-7). It is Bob's 19th birthday. Bob is of legal drinking age according to Canadian law and the birthdate listed on his driver's license, Alice is not. They both have a glass of wine with dinner. The legality of drinking is based on age, so could Alice be arrested for underage drinking based on the birth date listed in her driver's license even though she is technically &quot;older&quot; than Bob based on a geo-spatial frame of reference? Or would the law consider her to be of legal age based on the time zone of her birth, and the exact time of day she drew her first breath when compared to local time?
british-columbia I am not aware of any judicial consideration of this issue. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 78(1) says: A minor must not, except as provided under this Act or unless the minor does so with other lawful excuse, ... consume liquor. (One of those exceptions are when the alcohol is supplied by the minor's parents, spouse or guardian in a residence for consumption in the residence. There are other exceptions, too. But I'll assume you're asking about a circumstance where no exception applies.) The Liquor Control and Licensing Act defines a &quot;minor&quot; to be a person under the age of majority established by the Age of Majority Act, which is age 19 today. The Liquor Control and Licensing Act, s. 57 makes it an offence to contravene s. 78(1). The Interpretation Act, s. 25.1 states that &quot;A person reaches a particular age expressed in years at the beginning of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date.&quot; The Interpretation Act also clarifies that the reference to time &quot;is a reference to Pacific Standard Time&quot; (or Pacific Daylight Saving Time, when it is in effect). Thus, a person is a minor until &quot;the beginning [in Pacific time] of the relevant anniversary of the person's birth date.&quot; It is most clear in relation to the identification requirements when selling to a minor, but the Regulations (s. 158) refer to the date of birth as displayed on the person's identification card. This all suggests that when consuming alcohol in the greater Vancouver area, a person just about to reach the age of majority must wait until the date in the Pacific time zone is that which is displayed on their identification. Or barring any identification, until the date in the Pacific time zone is the date that is the person's birth date.
Bob has no defense Speeding in western-australia, as it is throughout australia, is a strict liability offense. That means that intention to or knowledge that you are breaking the law is not required. Don’t know the limit? Doesn’t matter, you are still legally obliged to comply. However, all the way up the chain, from the police officer, through the administrative arm to the judge, each person has discretion to waive the infringement notice. Basically, they can do that if they don’t think it’s “fair” on Bob in the circumstances. Given that Bob managed to reach 40+km/h within 20m of a more than 90 degree corner I think the infringement notice is very fair. Negligent Driving is possibly the more appropriate offense. However, it’s possible to imagine circumstances where waiving the infringement notice is fair. For example, if a speed limit sign has been removed or completely obscured by foliage or a parked vehicle and Bob could show he was not familiar with the area. The question on Alice is, from above, moot.
canada In Canada, there are the separate offences of: sexual assault (premised on lack of consent, no matter by what means consent is lacking; R. v. G.F., 2021 SCC 20) and administering a stupefying substance. If someone were to use a &quot;substance such as everyday alcohol&quot; (I would reject the premise that this is &quot;benign&quot;) for the purpose of facilitating sexual assault, this would be an offence under s. 246 of the Criminal Code. Section 246 makes it an offence for a person, &quot;with intent to enable or assist himself or another person to commit an indictable offence&quot; to administer or cause any person to take a &quot;stupefying or overpowering drug, matter, or thing.&quot; The Court of Appeal for Ontario has accepted that the element of administering a stupefying thing could be established by oversupply of alcohol. They have said that alcohol is a &quot;stupefying substance&quot; (R. v. Vant, 2015 ONCA 481) and can support a conviction under s. 246. &quot;Date rape&quot; has no legal significance and even criminologically, misframes the circumstances in which people experience sexual assualt. Further, your premise that intimate partner sexual assault &quot;usually happens when someone uses narcotics to drug another into an unconscious state&quot; is not supported by the evidence. While this is a criminological point, rather than a legal point, it is important context for understanding such crimes. This 2005 study estimated that 4.6% of intimate partner sexual assaults were facilitated by surreptitious drug use. These two fact sheets describe the variety of circumstances, completely unrelated to incapacitation by drugs, in which people experience intimate partner sexual assault/violence: Fredericton Sexual Assault Crisis Centre Info Sheet; Centre for Research &amp; Education on Violence Against Women &amp; Children Backgrounder on Intimate Partner Sexual Violence.
This is known as a retroactive or ex post facto law. Such laws are explicitly forbidden by the US Constitution (Wikipedia reference), and are generally frowned on in jurisdictions where the rule of law applies, partly because it is difficult to prove criminal intent when your action was not at the time criminal.
In principle, the data subject's right to access involves a copy of all personal data the controller holds on them. There are no time limits by default. Of course, the controller can ask a data subject to clarify their request, e.g. to focus on a particular time frame. There is an implied time limit though: personal data may only be processed/stored for as long as the data is necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was collected. Afterwards, it must be deleted. A controller with good data management will be able to limit their effort by having as short retention periods as possible for their different records. Furthermore, a lot of data is not personal data, or falls out of scope of the GDPR because it is not processed with automated means or forms part of a filing system. For example, if thousands of old invoices were archived in paper form in boxes that are only sorted by year, there might be an argument that this isn't a filing system in the sense of the GDPR and that a DSAR would not have to involve looking through all the archived invoices (compare also Art 11). In your scenario, there is a clear retention period of six years. You are asking for records about how that data might have been used further in the past. To the degree that such data is actually available, that could reasonably be personal data and should be included in a response to a DSAR. E.g. they might have information like this: “File #1234 was included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. The entries in File #1234 that are older than 2014 have been purged, so we do not know which entries were included in the data set. The current name on File #1234 is Dave.” This information about the sale would be personal data because it relates to you, and you are identifiable. Of course, the controller might not be set up to perform this search unless specifically asked. However, more unspecific information might not be personal data. For example: “About 70% of our files were included in a data set that was sold to EvilCorp in 2007. We no longer have records indicating whether your file was included.” Since there is no link between the sale and your personal data, I don't think it would have to be included in a DSAR response. The primary reason why you should be told about sales of personal data is that per Art 15(1)(c), you should be informed about “the recipients or categories of recipient to whom the personal data have been or will be disclosed” in a DSAR response. So when making a data subject access request, it could make sense to explicitly referencing this paragraph. So you would be interested in receiving a copy of your personal data as per Art 15 GDPR, and in particular any available information per Art 15(1)(c) GDPR about the recipients or categories of recipients to whom your personal data has been or may have been disclosed in the past. Quite likely the response will be underwhelming, e.g. by just giving a broad category such as “potential creditors who are contractually obligated to use the data only in accordance with our policies”. Whether such responses are compliant (I don't necessarily think so) will not be clear until there's a good precedent, and that would require that someone sorts this out in court.
The place of birth on the birth certificate is where the child was actually born. Indeed, usually it will be more specific than city and state or province and will also identify a hospital or residence or other place where the birth happened. So, for example, if a child is born to U.S. diplomats in Paris, France (in or out of the embassy grounds), the birth certificate will say that the child was born in Paris, France at Charles de Gaulle Hospital. But, that child will still be a U.S. citizen in all likelihood, because that child's mother, and/or married father or unmarried father who acknowledges paternity, is a U.S. citizen (in all likelihood) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401 and 1409. The child may or may not be a French dual citizen depending upon the citizenship law of France. In the case of a French diplomat who has a child born physically in Washington D.C. (inside or outside the French embassy) the birth certificate will likewise state that the child was born in Washington D.C. The French diplomat's child, however, will not be a U.S. citizen since Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's first sentence (which is also found in 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)) states: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. But a French diplomat's child is not &quot;subject to the jurisdiction&quot; of the United States, so the French diplomat's child does not gain U.S. citizenship at birth (assuming for simplicity's sake that both of the child's parents are French citizens and are not U.S. citizens) despite the fact that the child was born in the United States.
canada It depends on what the mens rea requirement is. Mens rea if not specified in a criminal offence In Canada, if this is a criminal offence, and a mens rea is not specified in the Criminal Code, the presumption is that the mens rea would be satisfied by recklessness, knowledge, willful blindness, or intention (Pappajohn v. The Queen, [1980] 2 SCR 120; R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13). The prosecution would have to show that Alice was at least subjectively aware of the risk that she was doing XYZ during the prohibited hours and proceeded nonetheless (this is recklessness; Sansregret v. The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 570 ). Based on the facts as you've presented in the hypothetical, you may have ruled out the possibility that Alice was reckless. Although, depending on the time of year, it may be that the sun sets around 9pm, which may present some awareness of the risk that you have not accounted for in your hypothetical. Mens rea if specified If the text of the statute does specify a mens rea then that is what the prosecution needs to show. For example, if one is prohibited from doing XYZ while &quot;knowing&quot; that it is after 9pm, then the prosecution will have to demonstrate actual subjective knowledge of the time, or wilful blindness (which Canadian law takes to impute knowledge: Briscoe). Additional burdens to make use of some mistakes of fact Some offences put an even higher burden on the accused in order to rely on a mistake of fact. In sexual offences where the age of the complainant is relevant (e.g. that they 14 or younger, or 16 or younger, or 18 or younger), the accused cannot make out a mistake-of-age defence without showing they took reasonable steps to ascertain the age (see Criminal Code, s. 150.1).1 Presumptive mens rea for regulatory offences is much lower: strict liability, subject to a due-diligence defence However, if this were a public-welfare/regulatory offence, like a provincial traffic law, or a licensing restriction on an aviation licence, or municipal by-law, there is no mens rea presumption. Rather, public-welfare/regulatory offences prima facie fall into the category of strict liability offences, subject only to a due-diligence defence (R. v. Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] 2 SCR 1299). Alice would have to show that she had a &quot;reasonable belief in facts which, if true, would have rendered the act innocent&quot;. What it means to have a &quot;reasonable belief in facts&quot; is very fact-specific.2 Alice has to hold the belief herself, and the trier of fact must accept that a reasonable person would also have held that belief. Just as in the case for recklessness, I can imagine that the timing of sunset might pose a problem for a due-diligence defence in your particular example. Absolute liability If the penalties for the offence do not include the risk of imprisonment, the offence can even be declared to be an absolute liability offence, in which due diligence is not even a defence (Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486). 1. For example, simply relying on a complainant's &quot;language and statements indicating that she could be 14 years of age or older did not constitute taking reasonable steps or all reasonable steps to ascertain her true age in all the circumstances, especially after being warned by her mother to stop all contact or she would call the police and stating that the complainant was way too young for him&quot; (R. v. Dragos, 2012 ONCA 538). 2. For example, for the sale of alcohol, &quot;when the individual clearly appears to be underage, ... a duly diligent permittee would require at least two more pieces of ID confirming that the person was not a minor, question the individual about the ID, then decide if it is reasonable to serve the individual alcohol versus the youthful appearance of the individual&quot; (Citynski Hotels Ltd. v. Saskatchewan, 2003 SKQB 314).
Can the Secretary of State exempt people over 75 requiring a TV licence? Yes. s.363(6) introduces the power to exempt those listed at (a) to (d) by way of Regulations. s.6, paragraph 1 of the Communications (Television Licensing) Regulations 2004 states: No fee shall be payable for a TV licence of a type referred to in the first or second entry in column 1 of the table in Schedule 1 where— (a) the licence is issued to a person aged 75 years or more or to a person who will attain that age in the calendar month in which the licence is issued; and (b) the single place, vehicle, vessel or caravan specified in the licence is the sole or main residence of that person. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/692/regulation/6?timeline=false The first and second entries in column 1 at Schedule 1 refer to black and white or colour TVs in a domestic setting or business purposes. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2004/692/schedule/1?timeline=false