Can getting medical marijuana prescribed prevent you from owning or buying a firearm? The federal law governing possession and ownership of firearms is 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). This prohibits possession or ownership by a person who is “…an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of the Controlled Substances Act 21 U.S.C. 802).” So an unlawful user is; the user of an illegal controlled drug the wrongful user of a legal controlled drug Under the Controlled Substance Act, all Schedule I drugs are illegal to prescribe and use under federal law. So, if you use medical marijuana prescribed by a doctor. Are you automatically an unlawful user of a controlled substance and cannot possess, use, buy, sell, gift, or transfer firearms?
Short Answer if you use medical marijuana prescribed by a doctor. Are you automatically an unlawful user of a controlled substance and cannot possess, use, buy, sell, gift, or transfer firearms? Basically yes. If you use medical marijuana prescribed by a doctor on a regular basis you are a prohibited person pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and you are therefore subject to severe federal penalties for possessing, using, buying, selling, giving and transferring firearms (although case law has held that if, for example, you inherit a firearm, you can promptly negotiate its sale to a third party to divest yourself of ownership of it through a third party broker if you do not use the firearm or possess it; the statute is not intended to operate as a property forfeiture law). Long Answer Not many cases address this question. One of the leading cases is U.S. v. Bennett (10th Cir. 2003). It held that is someone is a regular user of illegal drugs at the time of the offense then that person is a prohibited person, even if he was not under the influence at the moment of offense. In an analysis that really needs to be quoted at length (some case law citations omitted) to capture exactly what was held: The sentencing guidelines define a “prohibited person” in relevant part as a person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n. 6. The statute does not define the phrases “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance” or “addicted to any controlled substance.” It does, however, define “addict” as an “individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his addiction.” 21 U.S.C. § 802(1). Mr. Bennett believes the district court erred in not defining the language “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance” the same as “addicted to any controlled substance.” He argues he is not an “addict,” as defined under 21 U.S.C. § 802(1), because he used methamphetamine and marijuana rather than narcotic drugs. Mr. Bennett's argument presupposes the definition of the word “addict” under 21 U.S.C. § 802(1) is synonymous with the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance” under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). We need not consider whether this presumption is correct because we conclude, whatever the precise meaning of the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance,” its meaning is distinct from the meaning of the phrase “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance.” The words “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance” are written in the disjunctive, implying each has a separate meaning. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (“Cannons of construction ordinarily suggest that terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise; here it does not.”). Even Mr. Bennett agrees the statute “breaks down a prohibited person into two groups: a. User, or b. Addicted.” We therefore conclude the district court did not err in defining the phrase “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance” differently from the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance.” In a related argument, Mr. Bennett argues he is not a “prohibited person” because he passed all drug tests while on bond. He claims this evidence demonstrates he was not an “addict” because “he definitely didn't lose the power of self-control.” We have already concluded the phrase “addicted to any controlled substance” is distinct in meaning from the phrase “unlawful user of ... any controlled substance.” The government only argues that Mr. Bennett was an unlawful user of a controlled substance. In any event, although Mr. Bennett did not fail any drug tests while on bond, we conclude the district court properly held him to be a “prohibited person.” The guidelines do not require a person to be an unlawful user of a controlled substance while on bond in order to qualify as a prohibited person. An individual's status as a prohibited person is measured “at the time the defendant committed the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B). While a court may use evidence of a defendant's unlawful use of drugs while on bond to infer he was a user at the time he possessed a firearm, see Solomon, 95 F.3d at 35, such evidence is not necessary. The government need only show the defendant was an unlawful user of drugs or addicted to drugs at the time he committed the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). In other words, the government must show a defendant's drug use was contemporaneous with his firearm possession. After reviewing the evidence, discussed in detail below, we are convinced the government met its burden in this case. As mentioned previously, the government believes Mr. Bennett's extensive drug history qualifies him as an “unlawful user” of a controlled substance. Mr. Bennett does not dispute he used controlled substances. Instead, he argues the sentencing guidelines are unconstitutionally vague because the phrase “unlawful user” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), adopted by the guidelines in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n. 6, “is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different ways.” A criminal provision “must explicitly convey what it outlaws.” A provision that “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.' ”. Where, as here, a vagueness challenge does not involve First Amendment freedoms, we examine whether the provision is impermissibly vague “in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” We conclude the sentencing guidelines are not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Bennett's conduct. A confidential informant told police Mr. Bennett was distributing methamphetamine. Upon searching Mr. Bennett's residence, the police found “a digital scale with white powder residue, [a] small baggie of suspected marijuana, numerous marijuana pipes and bongs, possible drug ledgers, assorted small containers containing white powder residue, small plastic bindles, and suspected marijuana seeds.” The police also found a small amount of marijuana on Mr. Bennett's person. Mr. Bennett admitted during an interview with police he used, purchased, and sold methamphetamine. Mr. Bennett also admitted to a probation officer he used marijuana and methamphetamine on a daily basis up until his arrest. As a result of the police investigation, Mr. Bennett pled guilty to two misdemeanor charges of possession of a controlled substance, i.e., marijuana and methamphetamine. Based on this evidence, we conclude the district court correctly found Mr. Bennett was a “prohibited person” under the guidelines. His regular and ongoing use of marijuana and methamphetamine during the same time period as his firearm possession qualifies him as a “unlawful user of ... a [ ] controlled substance” and therefore a “prohibited person.” The guidelines are not vague under the facts of this case. U.S. v. Bennett, 329 F.3d 769, 776–78 (10th Cir. 2003). A subsequent trial court decision from the District of Utah further elaborated on the standard set forth in Bennett considering rulings from the 5th and 9th Circuits as well: Mr. Grover refers this court to a decision by a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Herrera, which was subsequently vacated by an en banc panel of the court. The decision of the original panel is the only federal decision to expressly reach a definition of “unlawful user.” After analyzing the text, structure, and legislative history of § 922(g)(3), as well as the relevant case law, the court held: an ‘unlawful user’ is one who uses narcotics so frequently and in such quantities as to lose the power of self control and thereby pose a danger to the public morals, health, safety, or welfare. In other words, an ‘unlawful user’ is someone whose use of narcotics falls just short of addiction, as that term is defined by the Controlled Substances Act. Although the original Herrera court did not arrive at its conclusion by interpreting the phrase “unlawful user of” to be synonymous with “addicted to” (this was the argument of the dissenting judges on the en banc panel that subsequently vacated the decision of the three-judge panel), the end result is essentially the same. The panel did not define the meaning of use that “falls just short of addiction.” Thus, in asking this court to adopt the definition announced by the original Herrera panel, Mr. Grover is asking this court to equate the definition of “unlawful user,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), with the definition of “addict” in 21 U.S.C. § 802(1). For the reasons stated above, this court declines to equate the definition of “unlawful user,” as used in § 922(g)(3), with the definition of “addict” in 21 U.S.C. § 802(1). Furthermore, this court expresses serious doubt that any precedential weight may be accorded to the original panel decision in Herrera. Although the en banc majority did not expressly reverse the original panel's holding, it decided whether the defendant was an “unlawful user” only by asking whether “drug use [occurred] with regularity and over an extended period of time.” The majority never discussed the definition reached by the original panel, which roughly equated the definition of an “unlawful user” with that of an “addict,” requiring the additional element of loss of self-control. In sum, the phrase “unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), may be interpreted as either joining separately definable or synonymous terms. The Tenth Circuit in Bennett clearly ruled that the phrase is written disjunctively, meaning that the phrases “unlawful user of” and “addicted to” have separate meanings, and are therefore not synonymous. This conclusion is consistent with the common, everyday meaning of the terms—a person may be a user of controlled substances without being addicted to them, and conversely, a person may be addicted to controlled substances even when no longer a user of them. Although Bennett did not expressly define the phrase “unlawful user of,” it did explain that the defendant's “regular and ongoing use of marijuana and methamphetamine during the same time period as his firearm possession qualifies him as an ‘unlawful user of ... a[ ] controlled substance’ ....” Consistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Purdy, Bennett impliedly defined three elements for qualification as an unlawful user of a controlled substance: (1) regular use of any controlled substance (or, in the words of Purdy, “[use of] drugs with regularity”); (2) on an ongoing basis (or, in the words of Purdy, “over an extended period of time”23); and (3) during the same time period as (or, in the words of Purdy, “contemporaneously with”) the possession of a firearm. Combining language from both Bennett and Purdy, this court holds that an unlawful user of any controlled substance, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), is an individual who regularly and unlawfully uses any controlled substance over an extended period of time that is contemporaneous with the possession of a firearm. U.S. v. Grover, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1302–03 (D. Utah 2005). On the other hand, evidence of a single use of marijuana six hours before the arrest with a firearm was not sufficient to show that someone was a controlled substance user, as this could have been &quot;an isolated occurrence.&quot; U.S. v. Augustin, 376 F.3d 135 (3rd Cir. 2004). In general, evidence that one has a medical prescription for marijuana would tend to show that one is a &quot;controlled substance user&quot; and hence a prohibited person with respect to firearms. The only real out in this case would be the Congressional appropriations bill prohibiting the expenditure of federal funds to prosecute people who are using marijuana in a manner that is legal under state law and related U.S. Attorney statements to that effect. But, it is not at all obvious that these protections extent to prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). The case closest to addressing the question of whether someone was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) for possessing a firearm while regularly using marijuana on a basis that was legal under state law, considering among other things, a Second Amendment challenge, is Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2016), certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1396, 197 L.Ed.2d 555. The 9th Circuit in Wilson v. Lynch held that the provision of federal Gun Control Act prohibiting sales of firearms to individuals whom sellers had reasonable cause to believe were drug users, and the accompanying regulation and administrative policy effectively criminalizing the possession of a firearm by the holder of a state marijuana registry card (in Nevada) did not violate the Second Amendment. The 9th Circuit reached this conclusion because the government had a substantial interest in preventing gun violence, and because empirical data and other evidence supported strong link between drug use and the risk of irrational or unpredictable behavior, including gun violence. Therefore, the 9th Circuit held that it was reasonable for federal regulators to assume that registry cardholder was more likely to use marijuana that an individual who did not hold such a card. In sum, it is safe to assume that someone with a medical marijuana prescription that is legal under state law is still a &quot;prohibited person&quot; pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and is subject to severe penalties for possessing a firearm.
There are no rules against private sales of firearms in Arizona. If you (or your mother) own the guns, you can sell them to anyone you like unless you have reason to believe they are a prohibited possessor. There is no legal requirement for you to validate their identity. There is no limit on the number of guns you can sell to one person. A bill of sale is optional. You don't need a lawyer and, honestly, I'm not sure what a lawyer would do to help you sell a gun. The laws, being what they are, lead some to conclude that this must be how prohibited possessors get their guns. It's not. Most &quot;illegal&quot; guns are bought through straw purchases in which a person with a clean record buys a gun for someone who is not legally allowed to own one. You can work through a licensed dealer if it makes you feel better. If you don't want to use a dealer, you can simply require that a buyer have a concealed carry license as evidence that they are not a prohibited possessor. The CCW is not a surefire way to guarantee anything though. Personally, I would transact a private party sale with individuals via a dealer. You're in AZ. There is no shortage of gun buyers! At the risk of breaking site rules, you can also list guns online. For example, www.gunbroker.com is a popular site and follows an eBay-style bid structure (I have no affiliation to them). This model ensures that you get market price for the gun rather than trusting that a dealer is going to give you a fair price (they won't; they make their money buying cheap and selling at market rate).
Law Enforcement can return a firearm to its owner so long as the owner is not prohibited from possessing firearms, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). A person can demand the return of property seized as evidence, if both: The property is not needed for evidence in a criminal trial. The property is not &quot;contraband&quot; (meaning illegal for the claimant to possess). If Law Enforcement does not agree to return the property then the owner can petition a Court of jurisdiction for an order that it be returned.
There is no general law requiring a doctor to report to the government that they have given medical treatment. On the contrary, there is a federal rule (the "Privacy Rule") that somewhat requires keeping medical information private. There may be certain instances where a report must be made, such as the obligation to report gunshot wounds or suspected child abuse. There could be entanglements regarding use of drugs that require a prescription, where there is a required paper trail.
We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means.
Federal rules concerning carrying firearms generally apply only to federal buildings, military bases and Indian reservations. National Forests, BLM lands and National Parks are governed by state law. The Concealed Carry web site contains more detailed information summarizing the legal situation.
If the police confiscate a weapon that isn't owned by the suspect, would they have grounds to keep it? Not forever. For example, let's say the gun was owned by a friend or parent? What if the gun was owned by a Trust with several trustees? Third party owners of property lawfully seized from someone else can recover it. For example, I once took legal actions to recover a gun for a client that was in a gun repair shop that was seized in a criminal investigation because most of the inventory of the shop where it was being repaired consisted of stolen firearms and the primary business of the gun repair shop was fencing stolen property (a fact of which my client was completely unaware and shocked to discover). But, that was only possible once the trial was over because the guns seized were part of the evidence in that trial. A similar process applies when there is a civil forfeiture of property owned by a third-party. Could the owner (personal or trustee) recover the gun from police custody independently of a court finding on the suspect? Sort of. But it isn't entirely independent, since the firearm might be needed as evidence or might need to be kept out of the possession of the person from whom it was seized to effect the red flag order while it was in place in a way that that the third-party owners would have to assure. An example might be where a gun is confiscated via red-flag law, where no crime has been committed, but the suspect won't get his day in court for 6 months. Would the true owner, or partner owners if in a Trust, be denied their property or could they go ahead and recover it pre-trial (ie. the day after it was confiscated)? In the case of a red-flag seizure, the existence of the gun wouldn't be evidence in the court proceeding, so it wouldn't have to be retained for that purpose prior to trial. But, the owner of the gun would probably have to petition the court to regain possession and would have to demonstrate that the red-flag order would continue to deny the person who had the gun possession of it until the red-flag order period expired (if ever). If the trustee was the red-flag order target, or was someone related to him (or her), that might be a showing that the trustee could not make. Caveat Of course, red-flag laws are specific pieces of state legislation. Each one is different. Many would provide a specific statutory procedure for how this issue would be handled. For example, in some places, the proper means to regain possession of property held by law enforcement in connection with a criminal case is a motion filed by a third-party intervenor in the criminal case, while in others, the property process is to bring a civil action for replevin (a lawsuit to regain physical possession of particular items) against the law enforcement officer in possession or constructive possession of the property in question.
As far as I can tell, it was punished severely, but not quite that severely. I found Nevada's 1971 controlled substances statute, AB 107. &quot;Marihuana&quot; appears in Schedule I, the list of drugs which are most tightly restricted (Section 31, subsection 4(j)). Section 65 makes it a crime to possess such substances. Under subsection 1, a first offense was punishable by 1 to 6 years in prison, a second offense by 1-10 years, a third or subsequent offense by 1-20 years. There were also fines of up to about $2000-$5000. There was an exception in subsection 3 for marihuana possession of less than one ounce: a first offense could alternatively be punished by up to one year in county jail, probably at the discretion of the prosecutor or judge. Second offenses were treated as a first offense under subsection 1, and so on. Selling and distributing drugs including marihuana was punished more severely. Under Section 62, the punishment was 1 to 20 years in prison for a first offense, and for a second offense, life in prison without possibility of parole. If the drug was distributed to a person under age 21, a first offense was punishable by life in prison, but with possibility of parole after 7 years. There was no exception for small quantities of marihuana. I didn't find a reference to the specific 25 year term you mention. It's possible that it comes from some version of the law as it existed before or after the 1971 statute; I didn't check. Also, marijuana was (and still is) also illegal under federal law; I didn't check what punishment federal law would have prescribed at the time. It's unlikely that the City of Las Vegas would have had separate laws; this sort of thing would normally be done at the state level. As far as I know, this is in keeping with other state drug laws of the time, and given the prevailing politics, I'm not surprised by the law. Drug use was treated very differently under the law than the other &quot;vices&quot; you mention. It'd be outside the scope of this site to discuss the possible factors behind this, but you could perhaps take it to Politics.SE or History.SE. Nevada eventually legalized recreational marijuana for adults in 2017, according to https://norml.org/laws/nevada-penalties-2/. It was not the first state to do so; Washington State had taken a similar step in 2012.