Legal challenges against age-restricted housing It’s fairly common when looking for real estate to see “adults only,” “seniors only,” or “55+” restrictions for strata/condominium properties. I would expect this to be a cut and dried case of discrimination – one can imagine a “whites-only” townhouse complex (rightfully) going down like a lead balloon. In BC, this discrimination is explicitly allowed in the Strata Property Act: The strata corporation may pass a bylaw that requires one or more persons residing in a strata lot to have reached a specified age that is not less than 55 years. Has this kind of discrimination been tested in court or by a human rights tribunal before? Is it likely any such challenge would succeed? (I’m specifically thinking about British Columbia but I expect any Canadian jurisdiction would be similar.)
The B.C. Human Rights Code exempts age restrictions for 55+ in relation to tenancy. See Human Rights Code, s. 10. The subsection prohibiting discrimination in tenancy on the basis of age &quot;does not apply&quot;: if the space is a rental unit in residential premises in which every rental unit is reserved for rental to a person who has reached 55 years of age or to 2 or more persons, at least one of whom has reached 55 years of age Further, as to condominium bylaws, in 2022, the Province enacted Bill 44, the Building and Strata Statutes Amendment Act, which makes any strata age restriction below the age of 55 invalid (which you have quoted a portion of). Human Rights Tribunal The Human Rights Tribunal can only provide remedies for claims arising under the Human Rights Code. Given that the Human Rights Code does not provide a basis for discrimination claims in tenancy when the age of distinction is 55+, any valid strata by-law relating to age of residents will by definition fall outside of the scope of a Human Rights Code complaint. And even when the Strata Property Act allowed all sorts of age restrictions, the BC Human Rights Code does not provide a remedy when the distinction is authorized by another act (see s. 41(2); Hallonquist v. Strata Plan NW307 and another, 2014 BCHRT 117): Nothing in this Code prohibits a distinction on the basis of age if that distinction is permitted or required by any Act or regulation. Constitutional challenge in a court You also ask about a challenge in a court. I assume you consider that the challenge would be based on s. 15(1) of the Charter (equality rights). There are three potential targets of the challenge: the strata by-law that restricts residency to people aged 55+; the provincial statute prohibiting strata by-laws from imposing any age restriction unless it is an age restriction based on an age not less than 55 years; the carve-out in the Human Rights Code for tenancy restrictions for ages 55+ The Charter challenge to the strata by-law itself would face the barrier that a British Columbia court has held that stratas are not &quot;government&quot; for the purpose of the Charter, so are not subject to Charter challenges: Strata Plan NW 499 v. Kirk, 2015 BCSC 1487. I have quickly added this final portion in response to a clarification of the question, but there is more to say. I will return to explain the law relating to partially ameliorative legislation.
Even though student status is not on the list of protected classes, this still might be discrimination. By proxy. Status as student can be a proxy for age, race, and/or color. Maybe even religion if there is a religious school nearby! In fairness to the store manager, when a pack of ten kids comes rolling in on the way home from school things can get pretty hectic. Rather than try to kick out the problem kids many managers will attempt to avoid the problem in the first place. Also, a sign like this might help the manager be less discriminatory. For example, let's say he lets all kids in and only kicks out the ones who are causing problems. If those problem kids are all in one protected class and it's different from the kids who don't get kicked out, the manager looks like he's discriminating based on that protected class. Discrimination by proxy can be hard to prove and I am not sure of the burden of proof in Canada. I have read that "Canadian experience" is used as a proxy in employment discrimination and has been getting some attention lately. That might be a good issue to keep an eye on as it may define proxy discrimination jurisprudence.
Who Owns The Bunker? Your relative obviously owns the cellar up to their land property boundary. The people who own the other land would have originally been the owners of that portion of the bunker, assuming that it was not permissive (if it was permissive, an easement by estoppel probably would have arisen). So, then the question is, whether the people in the chain of title to the relative acquired ownership of that portion of the bunker by adverse possession. Normally, adverse possession is acquired when someone occupies land under a claim of right that is open, notorious and hostile. While the use of the bunker would be "hostile" in this case (because the other property owners didn't have access to the bunker), it is not at all clear that it was "open and notorious". Indeed, apparently, the other land owners weren't aware that it existed. So, there would probably not be "squatter's rights" in this situation. Also, adverse possession can't run against the sovereign, so to the extent that the bunker goes under public land (e.g. a public street), that also can't be adversely possessed and that portion of the bunker remains the property of the sovereign land owner. @PaulJohnson in a comment to another post notes that: It sounds like your relative has one of the secret bunkers built for the "Auxiliary Units" who were to wage guerilla war from behind the lines after a successful German invasion. bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-37947840/… If this were the case, and the government authorized its construction, there would probably be an implied easement that would allow the bunker to be the property of the person owning the entry to it, rather than the other property owners. But, as you note, proving that case would be difficult. It might be possible to scour declassified civil defense records from the WWII era to determine if this was the case, but you might need to employ an archivists or historian to get to the bottom of this question. What if they sell it? Suppose that they do sell it. What happens? Since title is certificated in Britain, there would be no title insurance company to compensate the buyer if someone later claimed to own the property. Your relative would have a warranty of title inherent in the deed to the portion of the property that is legally described in the deed (unless the property were sold by a quitclaim deed specifically disavowing any promise that what was sold was owned by the seller), but that warranty would probably not include the portions of the bunker outside the boundaries of their lot because that is not included in the legal description of the property on the property certificate or the deed. So, if it was sold, the buyer might not have any claim against the seller if the buyer did not get good title to the entire bunker, and would have no one to sue at all, if your relatives died before litigation over ownership of the bunker arose. The buyer might sue your relatives for common law fraud if the bunker were described in the marketing materials for the sale, but if they were told that some of the bunker went outside the lot and that its legal status was unknown, or if the property was sold by a quitclaim deed, that suit would probably not be successful. Other Options Depending upon whether the owner is on good terms with his neighbors, the owner could probably buy the subsurface rights or some sort of easement to that property from the neighbors under whose land it runs, and might even be able to purchase such rights from the local council where it runs under a street. Negotiating the price would be tricky. On one hand, it doesn't hurt the other owners at all. On the other hand, they have the power to deprive your relatives of all use of the property. Often deals like this are done for nominal consideration between people on good terms with each other, but for extortionate prices when people are not on good terms with each other.
No The argument is vacuous in any event because AFAIK all jurisdictions that enforce sex discrimination laws have parental leave (paid or unpaid), not maternity leave so a man is just as likely to need it as a woman. This, of course, raises the issue of discrimination by marital status (on the basis that unmarried people are arguably less likely to have children) or age (on the basis that people outside 'childbearing' age are less likely to have children; fortunately these types of discrimination are also illegal. Notwithstanding, the loopholess you think there are in the laws are simply not there. For example s14 "Discrimination in employment or in superannuation" of australia Sex Discrimination Act 1984 starts with: (1) It is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, intersex status, marital or relationship status, pregnancy or potential pregnancy, breastfeeding or family responsibilities: Later in s30 "Certain discrimination on ground of sex not unlawful" it says: (2) (a) the duties of the position can be performed only by a person having particular physical attributes (other than attributes of strength or stamina) that are not possessed by persons of a different sex from the relevant sex; If the job requires excessive strength or stamina, then you test your recruits for the level of strength or stamina the job requires.
It is entirely legal to discriminate on arbitrary grounds. What is not legal is to discriminate on the basis of a protected category, for example race. The law say that you cannot favor or disfavor a customer because of their race. Federal law specifically prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, but not age or gender (disability is more complicated). Moreover, the grounds are not arbitrary. The establishment is at legal risk if a customer does not wear eye-protection, and you have no right to compel them to assume that risk: it's a perfectly normal business decision. The law states that "Customers are not allowed to use a tanning device unless the customer uses protective eyewear", and verifying that you have such eyewear is the minimal way of assuring compliance with the law.
I gather that the numerous ramifications you outline are merely contexts and that your main concern is about the application of contract law (contract law in the U.S. does not really vary among states). Thus, I will not really delve in the intricacies of --for instance-- privacy or copyright issues arising from the commercial use of a person's likeness that you mention in one of the scenarios. As a starting point, one needs to bear in mind that: a contract is an exchange of considerations under terms and conditions entered knowingly and willfully by the parties, which can be evidenced by the parties' subsequent conduct (that is, not just by signing a document); and a contract is unenforceable if it contravenes public policy and/or the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the questions are (1) whether a person knew or reasonably should have known about the terms &amp; conditions at or by the time of those events which trigger obligations pursuant to the contract; and (2) whether the provisions therein are unreasonable, illegal, or tantamount to a penalty, especially in the event that the party breaches or repudiates the alleged contract (see the Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 356(2)). The scenario of house for sale entails various difficulties as per contract law and otherwise. Here are some of those issues: Are visitors properly (including "beforehand") notified about the "walkway clause"? If not, the contract is void because it cannot be said that visitors knew about &amp; accepted that condition. Does the house provide alternatives for lawful &amp; informed visitors to safely avoid the walkway? If not, then the seller/owner might end up incurring premises liability with respect to those visitors who get injured in making their reasonable effort not to trigger the "walkway clause". Is the house owner realistically able to prove that use of the walkway by lawful &amp; informed visitors is sufficiently "inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property" so that triggering a house sale is a reasonable consequence (see Restatement at §69(2))? Is the owner-imposed mortgage rate compliant with state law pertaining to granting of credit &amp; loans? These exemplify only some of the burdensome complications when trying to enforce "contracts" which are extravagant or quite one-sided. Lastly, as a side note, the presumption that a person reading the poster and walking in the intended area does not thereby receive consideration is not necessarily accurate. As an example, the "intended area" could have been devised by an entity in the business of enjoyment and recreation, such as a private park. The person who deliberately walks in (regardless of whether he read the poster) certainly receives a consideration, which is the amusement or recreation for which the park was designed.
You have to start with the pertinent ADA regulations, 28 CFR Part 36, and esp. subpart B which gets to the prohibition. Under §36.201(a), No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any private entity who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. After that under activities, it is stated that A public accommodation shall not subject an individual or class of individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation. and also A public accommodation shall not afford an individual or class of individuals, on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals. moreover &quot;separate but equal&quot; is not allowed. The sign does not articulate any denial of opportunity, so that should be the end of the discussion. OTOH I suspect that a sign saying &quot;Please do not enter this store if you are white&quot; would be held to be discriminatory, as an indirect denial of permission to enter based on race. §36.208 introduces two important exceptions. First, This part does not require a public accommodation to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of that public accommodation when that individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. That means that (irrespective of the fact that covid is not a legal disability) it is legal to exclude direct threats to the health of others. And furthermore, In determining whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, a public accommodation must make an individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment that relies on current medical knowledge or on the best available objective evidence, to ascertain: The nature, duration, and severity of the risk; the probability that the potential injury will actually occur; and whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or procedures or the provision of auxiliary aids or services will mitigate the risk. Based on reasonable medical judgment and innumerable official government proclamations, it is reasonable to believe that a person with covid symptoms pose a threat to public health. The law doesn't require you to be omniscient and actually know that customer A has covid and customer B has asthma. §36.301 then says more about possible screening requirements. It is generally expected that everybody knows the law and will follow the law: ignorance of the law is no excuse, nor is it a cause for a discrimination claim. It would not be legal to exclude a person from a public accommodation when they pose no threat to public health. The customer with asthma is expected to know this law, and is expected to not infer incorrectly that the sign implies that he is being illegally excluded. The customer with covid is also expected to know this law, and is expected to know that it refers to him – as is allowed under the law. Potentially illegal discrimination enters the picture once actual exclusion happens, getting you back to &quot;individualized assessment, based on reasonable judgment&quot;. A rule that &quot;anybody who coughs gets thrown out&quot; is most likely to not pass muster as a reasonable health-based criterion. Including a temperature scan is likely to put the practice within the realm of the reasonable.
Can a private company refuse to sell a franchise to someone solely based on being black? No. Racial discrimination in franchising by a private company in the United States is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and also under many state laws such as Cal. Civil Code §§ 51, 51.8, and is further informed by the definitions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. See also, this commentary. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides in the pertinent part: All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . . [T]he term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. Many cases have enforced this protection from racial discrimination in the franchising context. See, e.g., Int’l House of Pancakes, Inc. v. Albarghouthi, No. 04-cv02264-MSK-MEH, 2007 WL 2669117 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2007); Elkhatib v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 493 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2007); Harper v. BP Exploration &amp; Oil, Inc., 134 F.3d 371 (6th Cir. 1998); Pointer v. Bldg. Stars Advantage, No. 4:03-cv-01237-HEA, Bus. Franchise Guide (CCH) ¶ 12, 960 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 26, 2004), aff’d, 115 F. App’x 321 (8th Cir. 2004); Home Repair, Inc. v. Paul W. Davis Sys., Inc., No. 98 C 4074, 1998 WL 721099 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 1998) (motion to dismiss); 2000 WL 126905 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2000) (motion for summary judgment); Smith v. Molly Maid, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Employment law protections rarely apply to franchise relationships. See Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that because Chrysler did not control day-to-day operations of dealership, dealer would not be considered employee for sex discrimination claim); Mangram v. Gen. Motors Corp., 108 F.3d 61, 63 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that General Motors dealers are not employees of General Motors and that plaintiff, at best, demonstrated that as a participant in General Motors’ Minority Dealership Development Program he was a trainee for a nonemployment relationship with General Motors for purposes of age discrimination claim). This question was a result of a recent conversation regarding Chick Filet only selling their franchises to Christians. I thought that was discriminatory, but was told a private company can do anything they want because they are privately owned. I find this very hard to believe is the case in 2021. Can anyone shed some light on this subject? Not all kinds of discrimination are prohibited by Section 1981 (which was enacted shortly after the adoption of the 14th Amendment in the post-U.S. Civil War context and is the only or primary federal non-discrimination law applicable to franchise contracts), although state law protections are often broader. See Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987)(holding that § 1981 does not address discrimination claims based on national origin); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (noting that § 1981 does not cover discrimination based on gender or religion); Kodish v. United Air Lines, Inc., 628 F.2d 1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding age discrimination claim not addressed by § 1981). In particular, discrimination on the basis of religion in franchising contracts is not prohibited by federal law, although it is prohibited by state law in some states. But a franchisee in operating the franchise business must follow all state and federal non-discrimination laws that apply to public accommodations with respect to their customers, and must follow all state and federal non-discrimination laws that apply to employees with respect to their employees.