What was the 1879 law that Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) overturned? Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) overturned an 1879 Connecticut law that forbade married couples from using contraceptives. What was that law, exactly?
The opinion quotes the statute: §53-32 (1958 rev.) Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned. There is still a stub in the Connecticut statutes indicating that the statute was repealed.
Women can get pregnant, so men can be held to stricter rules: From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ages_of_consent_in_the_United_States Although legislation tends to reflect general societal attitudes regarding male versus female ages of consent, Richard Posner notes in his Guide to America's Sex Laws: The U.S. Supreme Court has held that stricter rules for males do not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution, on the theory that men lack the disincentives (associated with pregnancy) that women have, to engage in sexual activity, and the law may thus provide men with those disincentives in the form of criminal sanctions. Posner, Richard (1996). A Guide to America's Sex Laws. The University of Chicago Press. p. 45. ISBN 0-226-67564-5. The case cited is Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). However, to modern sensibilities, this doesn't justify the states that have age of consent lower for women. [The pregnancy argument would mean states could punish an adult male for sex with a minor female, to protect the woman. Whereas a minor male of that same age doesn't necessarily need the same protection, at least for that concern.] Law in those states seems to be an attempt to mirror the historical tendency for men to be slightly older than women when marry - but re goal of discouraging sexual predation, those states have it backwards. I'd have to agree with the answers that speculate this is a patriarchal holdover that eventually will change or be overturned. [But US Supreme Court - having ruled it isn't inherently an Equal Protection violation - seems inclined to leave these laws alone regardless of which age is slightly lower; leaving it to the states to decide the non-symmetric circumstances of the sexes.] More detail from the case itself: (a) Gender-based classifications are not "inherently suspect" so as to be subject to so-called "strict scrutiny," but will be upheld if they bear a "fair and substantial relationship" to legitimate state ends. Reed v. Reed, 404 U. S. 71. Because the Equal Protection Clause does not "demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons" or require "things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the same," Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U. S. 305, 384 U. S. 309, a statute will be upheld where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances. Pp. 450 U. S. 468-469.
This is from an opinion piece (albeit by Law profs.) so you'll have to bear/excuse the tone and check the details... but seemingly there some similar laws introduced earlier this year, on different topics though: But the subversion of private enforcement laws to restrict individual rights goes far beyond abortion. Since the beginning of this year, Tennessee has authorized students and teachers to sue schools that allow transgender students to use the restrooms that match their gender identity; Florida has followed suit, with a law that allows students to sue schools that permit transgender girls to play on girls’ sports teams. My opinion is that the comparison falls short on (2), as the [plaintiff] students seem to have to be from the same school, so it's not as broad as SB.8., in terms of who can sue. (N.B. found a more in-depth news article on the Florida sports law. Some of the writeups on this aren't totally clear on that though, just saying &quot;another student&quot; can sue. I couldn't find the exact text of the law insofar.) The promoter of SB.8, actually gave some inspirational examples in an interview, and they are somewhat older: And this is ground that's been ploughed before - under current Texas law under Medicaid fraud, for example. Any person who discovers Medicaid fraud can bring a civil case to bring that forward. The Chick-fil-A law, Senate Bill 1978 from last session about your religious freedom, that also allowed any person to bring a civil action. So it's not a new concept in Texas law, and if elected officials won't follow the law, we'll empower the people of Texas to do it, and we think it makes sense. (Hat tip to a Politics.SE answer for this latter quote.) Again, I didn't check the details... I suspect there may be some divergence from the strict letter of the (1) requirement. I bet (Medicaid) fraud is criminal as well. It seems the Chick-fil-A law failed to do its (immediately) intended job because it was attempted to be used against a city municipality, but the suit was dismissed (on appeal) due to governmental immunity... The private enforcement of the Medicaid fraud issue was apparently passed because of the huge backlog that existed at one point in the state/agency enforcement in Texas: The Office of Inspector General was lambasted in a state review last year [2015--seemingly] for, among other things, a massive backlog of cases and a failure to recover significant tax dollars from providers it accused of fraud, sometimes incorrectly. N.B., these are referred to as qui tam cases, but they don't quite entirely substitute the plaintiff, at least not in the insurance cases that were won: So-called qui tam cases allow whistleblowers to file lawsuits alleging fraud on behalf of the government. If the claims turn out to be legitimate, state and federal laws award a finder’s fee of between 15 and 25 percent of the total settlement or judgment. Interestingly higher awards are possible if the government declines to intervene, but they are still not 100% going to the private initiator (under the False Claims Act)--from Wikipedia: If the government does not decide to participate in a qui tam action, the relator may proceed alone without the Department of Justice, though such cases historically have a much lower success rate. Relators who do prevail in such cases may potentially receive a higher relator's share, to a maximum of 30%. As Wikipedia also notes, some such laws that entirely left the prosecution to a private entity were found unconstitutional, at the federal level e.g. In 2011, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio held that the False Marking Statute was unconstitutional. Judge Dan Aaron Polster determined that it violated the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution, because it represented &quot;a wholesale delegation of criminal law enforcement power to private entities with no control exercised by the Department of Justice&quot;. Of some note, the FCA requires that the complaint actually be served on the government and not the actual defendant. This basically ensures that the gov't is notified of all such actions. The Texas-specific legislation on qui tam fraud cases actually seems to mirror the federal one pretty closely: A whistleblower under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention Act [TMFPA] may be entitled to an award between 15% -25% if the state intervenes in the case. If the state chooses not to participate in the litigation, then a whistleblower may be entitled to an award between 25% – 30% of the amount recovered. Nonetheless, a court may reduce the award if the court finds that the action is based primarily on information disclosed by someone other than the person bringing the action. [...] Note: Changes to the Texas laws were enacted by Acts 2015, 84th Leg., ch. 1 (S.B. 219).
Effect of Bill First of all, if this bill (Idaho House Bill 675) is passed in the form linked in the question, section 4, which prohibits transporting a child outside the state, ONLY applies when this is done for purposes prohibited in subsection (1), that is, traditionally defined female genital mutilation. It does not, in its linked form, prohibit transport to violate the new section (2) which prohibits procedures to &quot;change or affirm the child's perception of the child's sex&quot;. Thus the statement in the question that: subsection (4) of the bill purports to criminalize transporting a minor out of state (to neighboring Oregon, say) for the provision of such treatment. is incorrect. Notice that section 4 is not new, nor is it modified (except by changing th4e section number) by the current bill. My understanding is that the travel ban was, when it was passed, aimed at families who took female children outside the US, to African or Middle-eastern countries, for traditional rites that include FGM. This was done by a significant number of people with ethnic origins in such countries, and a number of US states passed laws banning such travel. This law, before the house bill, was one such law. The recent bill added &quot;gender affirming care&quot; into the law, by calling it another form of genital mutilation. However, for purposes of discussion, let us assume that subsection (4) is changed to refer to subsections (1) or (2), thus making the question correct. Right to Travel The right to travel from one state to another is a basic right under the US constitution. The LII page on &quot;Interstate Travel&quot; refers to it as: &quot;a right venerable for its longevity, but still lacking a clear doctrinal basis.&quot; See the Wikipedia article Freedom of movement under United States law The right to travel was recognized early on, in the case of Corfield v. Coryell (6 Fed. Cas. 546, no. 3,230 C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823). This case was decided by Justice Bushrod Washington, a member of the US Supreme Court, but it was decided while he was acting in his role as circuit judge, not by the Supreme Court as a whole. In that decision, Justice Washington included &quot;The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise;&quot; as one of the &quot;privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states&quot; which are guaranteed to all citizens. This passage has been influential, although not undisputed, in interpreting the &quot;privileges and immunities clause&quot; of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1868) The Supreme Court held that the right to travel between states was fundamental, and that a state could not impede it by taxing the exit of people from one state to travel into another. Subsequent cases have deemed the right to travel protected against state restrictions both under the privileges and immunities clause, and under the commerce clause. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) at 383 U.S. 757 the Court wrote: The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized. The Guest court goes on to cite Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, (the case in which a tax on those leaving the state was overturned) and the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 48 U. S. 492 in which Chief Justice Taney wrote: We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.&quot; All this would mean that a law prohibiting travel would need strong justification, and is probably subject to strict scrutiny, a standard of review requiring a &quot;compelling governmental interest&quot; and a &quot;narrowly drawn&quot; law. Medical Judgement The bill declares that procedures to &quot;change or affirm the child's perception of the child's sex&quot; are &quot;never necessary&quot;, any medical opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. Such an override of qualified medical opinion might be hard to justify in a criminal law. Civil Rights In BOSTOCK v. CLAYTON COUNTY, GEORGIA 590 U. S. ____ (2020) #17–1618 the Subreme court ruled that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. prohibits employment discrimination against homosexual or transgender individuals, writing: Because discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their sex, an employer who intentionally penalizes an employee for being homosexual or transgender also violates Title VII. This rule may well carry over to other areas of the law. Equal Protection Clause The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads nor [shall any state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Treating members groups differently because of group membership is often, but not always, an equal protection violation. The provisions oc the bill, if enacted, might constitute such a violation.
It is certainly possible for the same action to break multiple laws, and be chargeable as multiple crimes. For example, shooting and killing someone may be assault, assault with a deadly weapon, and murder all at the same time. For a different example a person who simply omits to file an income tax return may be guilty of both failure to file a required return, and failure to pay tax due, and in some cases failure to par required estimated tax due as well. For yet another example, driving well above the speed limit may be a violation of the speed limit law, and also careless driving, and possibly also reckless driving. In the first case the assault etc may be lesser included offenses in the charge of murder. That means that they are automatically available to a jury (or judge) trying the accused, who can convict on one of the lesser included charges if they do not convict on the primary count. For the more general case, I don't know of any special term for the situation. It is not usual to have law A which says "do not do X", and also law B which says "you must follow law A". There is no general principle against having such redundant laws, nor is there, in the US, any Constitutional rule against such laws. But legislatures do not normally bother to enact such redundant laws. Laws which will sometimes overlap in their coverage, but in some cases do not overlap are common.
I exclude Shari`a law because I don't know, but generally there would be no legal recourse that depends on the lie. A marriage is not legally viewed as a contract with enforceable obligations, so a woman could not be forced to bear a child against her will if she had earlier promised to do so, and she could not be penalized in any way. The man still has the ability to obtain a divorce. There is a difference between a fault-based divorce and a no-fault divorce, where a fault-based divorce may be quicker (dispenses with the requirement for months of separate living). In a jurisdiction that has fault-based divorce, the traditional grounds are cruelty, adultery, desertion, imprisonment, and physical inability to engage in sexual intercourse undisclosed before marriage. The latter does not include the inability to get pregnant. Division of marital assets is governed by law, where the principles of division are not punishment, they are equity (although states split into "community property" vs. "equitable distribution" based on the distinction "what is equitable" versus "50-50" – equitable distribution states do not sanction punishing a spouse for misconduct). There are also "marital torts" for certain kinds of wrongful acts, such assault, infecting a spouse with an STD, defamation etc. But as is the case with any tort, there has to be a legal duty between the parties, and that duty has to come from operation of law and not just agreement. There is no legal duty to always tell the truth or to bear children.
The relevant portion of the U.S. Constitution is the full faith and credit clause (which the Respect for Marriage act is primarily an implementation and enforcement of). This requires states to honor marriages and divorces entered into in different states (subject to limited public policy exceptions that the Respect for Marriage act further limited), and also, for example, paternity determinations and court judgments from other states. This was one argument among many used to argue that same sex marriages from other states should be recognized in other states. But the U.S. Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), in which it established a right to same sex marriage in all U.S. states, relied instead mostly upon a substantive due process clause analysis similar to that of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that bans on interracial marriage were unconstitutional. The Article IV privileges and immunities clause protects very little (mostly the right to interstate travel and the right for an out of state resident to be licensed in a profession in a state). The Slaughterhouse cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872), in the late 19th century gave a very crabbed interpretation to the 14th Amendment privileges and immunities clause, limited that only to rights arising from federal citizenship. The logic of the Slaughterhouse line of cases spilled over into the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution. The Article IV privileges and immunities clause applies to rights specific to state citizenship to prevent those rights from being denied to out of state U.S. citizens. But those rights are few and far between, and court crafted exceptions have been carved out in cases where it does exist (hunting and fishing license fees and college tuition, for example).
One widely-used book on the topic is Brown's Boundary Control and Legal Principles. I have the 4th edition published in 1995, and the relevant chapter is 8, "Locating Easements and Reversions". The law varies from state to state. In New England, it is likely for interstate, US, and state highways, the state will own the roadbed in fee. Smaller roads are likely owned by the adjoining private owners, with the public holding a right-of-way that allows the government to build and maintain a road; the adjoinders are restricted from using the right-of-way in any manner that would interfere with the transportation use. The meaning of "right-of-way line" depends on context, but is likely to be the line between the pubic's right of way and the portion of the adjoining private property that is exclusively under the control of the private property owner. If the public records do not reveal the width of the road, there is likely to be a statute that states a default width of the road. This is discussed, for Vermont, in The History and Law of Vermont Town Roads by Paul Gillies