Is there a legal system or theory where punishment is proportional to the probability of an offence? In common criminal law in order for a defendant to be punished, they must be found guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence, there is a threshold for the probability of guilt, beyond which the punishment is proportional to the offence and/or consequences. I want to know if there is a legal system where punishment is proportional to the probability of guilt. For example, Alice and Bob are equally likely to have committed a known crime and one of them must have committed the crime. Hence, each faces 50% of the normal penalty. Such a legal system could be from anywhere in the world at any point in time, from modern roman legal systems, to small systems governing tribal communities. Any of these are interesting to me if researched. I am also interested if such a punishment system has been investigated theoretically. Primarily, what the benefits are, but the ethical side is also of interest. If anyone can help that would be most helpful, I have not been able to find any scholarly or other types of article. I am interested from a mathematical perspective, but I'd like to know whether such systems exist in reality. UPDATE Just to be clear, I am not asking whether there has been implemented a mathematically precise decision procedure, weighting level of punishment proportional to probability of guilt. But rather, if there is or has ever been an informal (i.e., imprecise) system. There are good reasons for there not to be, I am asking whether there has been or is such a system. Thanks for the answers so far, I just wanted to clarify that.
A series of answers were proposed to similar questions in the world building forum. https://worldbuilding.stackexchange.com/questions/29880/how-could-a-legal-system-whose-punishments-were-based-off-of-level-of-certainty https://worldbuilding.stackexchange.com/questions/29941/how-to-handle-plea-bargains-in-a-court-where-punishment-is-based-off-confidence The relationship to plea bargaining is as follows: When the prosecution has a strong case with a high probability of winning, it insists on going to trial and will make only slight concessions relative to the result that could be obtained at trial. When the prosecution has a case of typical strength with an intermediate chance of winning, it will normally make a significant concession in the severity of the offense charged or other agreements that impact the length of the sentence, relative to the result that would be obtained if the prosecution fully prevails at trial, rather than "roll the dice" and usually the defense will agree in exchange for a more lenient sentence. When the prosecution has a case that is weak (but being ethical, believes that there is probable cause to support), it will normally make very deep concessions such as agreeing to a much less severe charge or for example to probation or a deferred judgment, to at least impose some punishment, in order to avoid going to trial, even when the potential punishment if the prosecution full prevails is very high. Plea bargaining rates in the federal system are in the mid- to high 90%s, while plea bargaining rates in state systems are often in the 70% to 90% range (federal prosecutors can leave weaker cases to state prosecutors if they want to and have a stiff hammer due to high mandatory minimum sentences for many offenses and the sentencing guidelines, but state and local prosecutors have to take what their less elite law enforcement officers come up with). At trial, prosecutors typically win convictions well over 50% of the time (although not too much more, because the more clear cases are either dismissed by prosecutors as unproveable prior to trial or are plea bargained). The net effect of the current system is that the severity of the sentence imposed in the vast majority of cases is proportional to the probability of the prosecution prevailing at trial times the likely sentence if it does prevail, as evaluated mutually by the prosecution and the defense. When there is not a sufficient consensus on the fair sentence in light of those factors the rare trial happens (and more often than not the defense rather than the prosecution overestimates its chances). Unfortunately, this also means that the biggest penalties for going to trial are in the weakest cases in which the prosecution just barely manages to convince the jury and there is a strong probability that the defendant is actually innocent, as opposed to the cases where it is fairly clear that the defendant is guilty. And, people who are actually innocent of everything are most likely to roll the dice and go to trial, since people who are guilty of something know that in any fair resolution that are going to face the significant downsides of having any criminal conviction on their record, while people who are actually innocent may reasonably (although sometimes inaccurately) believe that the system will protect them and allow them to escape all consequences except the costs of defending themselves in court (if they can afford it). Another option that prosecutors have in a case where proof beyond a reasonable doubt may be difficult or impossible, is to bring a civil lawsuit or to seek an administrative penalty, which may result in loss of a licenses or payment of a fine or compensation, rather than bringing criminal charges. In these cases, the prosecution only has to prove a case by a preponderance of the evidence in most cases, and usually, the defendant has no right to an attorney at public expense even if the defendant is indigent. These fines (or civil forfeitures) can also help fund the criminal justice system that pays prosecutors and other participants in the process. Below that standard, prosecutors can seek search warrants, wire taps and arrest warrants in cases where there is merely probable cause to believe that a person committed a crime, which in addition to setting up future prosecutions can also be used as a form of punishment/harassment of someone prosecutors believe to be guilty of a crime even though they may not even have the evidence necessary to prove a civil suit, but the amount of impact that a search warrant, wire tap, or arrest can have on a suspect is much less than a full blowed prosecution.
It is an unquestioned pre-American axiom, expressed in Latin as actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (&quot;the act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty&quot;) which has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since at least the 17th century. It is thus presupposed in all criminal proceedings. It's not that a person only commits a crime with free will, it's that it is not deemed to be a crime if there is no free will. A person can be held at gunpoint and required to commit a criminal act: the person does indeed have free will to choose to be killed rather than commit the act, but the act is legally excused since dying is never held to be the only acceptable alternative to committing an otherwise-criminal act.
Neither with or without a warrant, if the confession is all there is. For a felony, the question is whether there is probable cause (4th Amendment). This is true whether the police arrest you, or they get a warrant – the difference being that in the latter case the warrant is issued by a guy with much greater knowledge of what constitutes probable cause. The question then would be whether a confession alone constitutes probable cause. There is a venerable rule, the corpus delecti rule (300+ years old) that requires there to be independent evidence of a crime, the point of this rule being to to prevent mentally ill people from being convicted of a crime that never even happened. Under that rule, a confession alone would not be probable cause (but a confession and a bloody glove could be). This article reports that at the federal level and in 10 states, there is a lower bar of mere "corroboration" without the need to argue that there was an actual crime. Exemplifying this relaxing of the traditional rule, in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, the court held that "[a]n accused's extrajudicial admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, made subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions, and corroboration by independent evidence is required". However, "[t]he corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti" and "[i]t is sufficient if the corroboration supports the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth; but those facts plus the other evidence must be sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt". In such jurisdictions, courts take a "totality of circumstances" approach focusing on whether the confession is trustworthy.
In England and Wales, under section 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 (as amended by section 59 and Schedule 12 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009) it's a criminal offence to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting someone to commit suicide. I think that applies to Scotland too, and there is similar law in Northern Ireland. Encouraging suicide is also a criminal offence in some other common law jurisdictions, e.g. in Australia. While in other common law jurisdictions, if there isn't such a law, the person might instead be prosecuted for manslaughter - or not at all. The minimum, maximum and recommended penalties may well differ between jurisdictions. I don't know what you mean by "vengeance rampage" but I'm not aware of any jurisdictions where it is lawful for a person to cause harm to someone for revenge. States tend to reserve for themselves a monopoly on the use of force.
The concept is known as lesser included offense. The prosecution believed that they have a chance to prove murder, so they charged murder, but they understood that the judge and jury might not convict on murder. So they said in effect, &quot;and if you won't find him guilty of murder, at least convict for manslaughter.&quot;
Under German law, if you are sentenced to a fine because you committed a crime, that fine is measured in Tagessätze (day fine). One day worth of fines is the 30th part of your monthly income, adjusted according to the criminal's personal and economic situation. Basis for that is Criminal Code sec 40 (§ 40 StGB). There is, however, no corresponding principle for prison sentences. The reasoning behind that is, that a wealthy person would hardly be able to &quot;improve&quot; their time in prison compared to a less wealthy one. In fact, they would &quot;lose more money&quot; in the meantime.
"Ignorance of the law" refers to a (non)-defense for committing a crime ("I didn't know it was against the law"). In this case, the government hasn't passed a law saying that "the term 'simple majority' shall always be defined as..." – there is no law saying that "simple majority means more than half of the total number of votes". Instead, terms are generally given their "common meaning". A reasonable case can be made that the common meaning of "majority" is "more that any other choice", and one can point to ample evidence showing that, such as this. However, one can also argue that extra weight should be given to to specialized definitions appearing in The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure or Robert's Rules of Order (or other such document), in support of a competing definition of "simple majority". Both sides will need to provide evidence that supports their interpretation of the phrase, based on external sources (parliamentary handbooks, dictionaries, and so on), as arguments for a particular interpretation of the term. The courts will be most impressed by evidence pertaining to the behavior of the parties, so that if everybody agrees that they understood "simple majority" to be "the choice with the most votes", then that is how the term will be interpreted.
Is there something in the language of the act that makes sexual harassment a civil rather than a criminal offence? Yes. Laws that create criminal offenses have to have language to the effect of "violation of this law is punishable by up to X years of imprisonment or a fine of up to $Y", or "violation of this law is a Class Z felony." Sometimes it is not entirely clear if violation of a law can form a basis of a private civil lawsuit, or if it can only be enforced by government officials, from the language of the statute alone. When it is unclear the courts have to resolve that ambiguity. In rare instances, it may be clear that some parts of a statute have criminal penalties, but due to unclear wording and punctuation in the statute, it is hard to tell precisely which parts of the statute these criminal penalties apply to, and in those cases, courts also have to resolve that ambiguity. There is also some conduct that it is constitutional to punish with a civil penalty, but not as a crime that can result in incarceration. For example, it is unconstitutional in most states to incarcerate someone for failing to pay a debt, but there can be a civil penalty for failing to pay a debt. Courts decide if these constitutional limitations are violated. Similarly, while Congress can enact both crimes and civil penalties, there are some governmental bodies, like school districts or water boards, that have the power to enact certain civil penalties, but do not have the authority to create new crimes. Was that up to the lawmakers to decide, or is that just something that evolved out of the ways the courts and prosecutors responded to sexual harassment claims? And who decides such things in general? Generally, this is decided by lawmakers. Obviously, however, anyone can lobby legislators to take one position or another. Also, the fact that something has a civil penalty does not necessarily mean that prosecutors aren't the people who enforce the law. Sometimes violations of the law prosecuted by prosecutors have civil rather than criminal penalties. For example, many tax law violations are prosecuted by government lawyers with civil penalties, but only a small minority of tax law violations are prosecuted criminally. Further, it isn't uncommon for a type of offense, like securities fraud, to have both civil penalties and criminal charges available as remedies that can be enforced by prosecutors. And, when that happens, prosecutors get to decide which tool to use. For example, even if exactly the same conduct could be prosecuted with either a civil penalty or a criminal charge, prosecutors might prefer a civil penalty because the burden of proof is much lower, the 5th Amendment protection against self-incrimination does not apply (you can refuse to testify but that fact can be used against you in a civil penalty case), and a defendant in a civil penalty case doesn't have a right to a lawyer at government expense. Also, enforcing a civil penalty generates net revenue for the government most of the time, while criminal punishments normally cost the government more money to carry out than any revenue the government may receive from the person found guilty for fines and court costs. On the other hand, trying to enforce a significant enough civil penalty to discourage misconduct against someone who has no money or property may be a futile effort, while criminal sanctions could discourage misconduct from other similarly situated people in the future.