Protecting myself against my future self There is always a grey zone between being 100% mentally operational and the beginning of, say, age-related dementia. Before a physician can declare that someone is not able to make clear, rational decisions anymore, there is always a more subtle decline that affects e.g. one's ability to manage money and properties, and often the decision to place someone's finances under supervision/trusteeship requires their mental state to be quite degraded. Before that happens, a senior is sometimes susceptible to suggestion by unscrupulous people and/or family members, or may simply make gross mistakes. Is there any process, in any country, through which one can make a decision that they cannot undo later? A (theoretical!) example: if I decided to disinherit my child because they've been really, really awful, is there any way to protect myself from, say, them convincing me to undo my decision when I'm older and emotionally more vulnerable (especially if there's nobody else to control whether I am being influenced by other people)? Another example with an imaginary horrible heir: could I specify, while I'm mentally OK, that I want to spend my money going into private retirement home XXX rather than public retirement home YYY, even if it is more pricey and my child tries to "force me" to go to YYY because they would inherit more money this way? I'm curious to know if there is such a thing as a "non-modifiable will".
In general, no, if you make a will then you can revoke that will while ever you are still legally competent. Also, in general, this is a good thing. For your first example, you are ruling out all possibility of redemption - people change: a person who is a selfish a*$%^#@e in their 20s may be a kind, caring, dutiful and loving person in their 40s. For your second example, what if XXX gets demolished? Or you move cities? If you are truly serious, you can transfer all your assets to a trust, put your instructions in the trust deed and then nominate someone you really, really, really trust to be the trustee. This would prevent you modifying the instructions but you are then relying on the trustee interpreting them.
There is pretty much never a right to retaliate against harm to oneself, even blatantly unlawful harm. There is a right to defend oneself and others. One can use force to stop someone from inflicting unlawful or unjustified harm, or to prevent someone from inflicting such harm when the harm is imminent. One is not permitted to use more force than is "reasonably required" under the actual circumstances. This is true in pretty much every jurisdiction that i know of. The details on how much force will be considered "reasonable" will vary. In some jurisdictions there is, under some circumstances, a s"duty to retreat". This generally means that if a person attacked can avoid the harm by fleeing with reasonable safety, that person must do so rather than using force in self-defense. In some jurisdictions this "duty to retreat" applies id the victim is attacked in public, but not in the victim's own home. The right to self defense does not apply when the "attacker" is an agent of the state acting lawfully. For example, a prison guard taking a condemned prisoner to a death sentence cannot be attacked on the grounds that the prisoner is engaging in self defense. In theory a police officer engaging an excessive force, particularly unjustified deadly force, may be resisted in self-defense. But courts are quite reluctant to find such resistance justified in practice. There generally must be very clear evidence of egregious misconduct for the court to rule for the non-police person in such a case. Note that "self" defense can equally be defense of another person. Pretty much all the same rules apply. Self defense applies no matter who the attacker is, but that force is reasonable may vary depending on the attacker. Only such force as is reasonably required to stop or prevent the harm may be used with a justification of self-defense.
An adult is normally assumed to be competent to enter into a contract unless there is some reason to think otherwise. It is not usual to demand evidence of competency unless there is something in the appearance or actions of a party that raises such a question, or something about that party, such as a history of mental illness, known to the other party, that raises such a question. I have heard of a party being medically examined just before signing an important document, to provide evidence of competence, but generally in connection with a will, and generally when the signer is elderly and in poor physical condition, and even then such a procedure is rare. If competence is disputed, medical evidence is required to resolve the question, or more exactly to establish lack of competence. In the absence of such evidence, competence will be presumed. That was the conclusion of the MA Supreme Court in FRANCES M. SPARROW vs. DAVID D. DEMONICO &amp; another, 461 Mass. 322* (2011). The court held: without medical evidence or expert testimony that the mental condition interfered with the party's understanding of the transaction, or her ability to act reasonably in relation to it, the evidence will not be sufficient to support a conclusion of incapacity. It was a significant part of the court's reasoning in that case that a reasonable person might well have entered into the agreement in question, and that the party was represented by a lawyer, and acted in accord with the lawyer's advice. That does not, however, seem to be a requirement; merely additional evidence of the reasonableness of the action.
It’s a common law rule dating from the 17th to 19th centuries Known as the rule against perpetuities “that prevents people from using legal instruments (usually a deed or a will) to exert control over the ownership of private property for a time long beyond the lives of people living at the time the instrument was written.” The rule has its origin in the Duke of Norfolk's Case of 1682. That case concerned Henry, 22nd Earl of Arundel, who had tried to create a shifting executory limitation so that some of his property would pass to his eldest son (who was mentally deficient) and then to his second son, and other property would pass to his second son, but then to his fourth son. The estate plan also included provisions for shifting property many generations later if certain conditions should occur. When his second son, Henry, succeeded to his elder brother's property, he did not want to pass the other property to his younger brother, Charles. Charles sued to enforce his interest, and the court (in this instance, the House of Lords) held that such a shifting condition could not exist indefinitely. The judges believed that tying up property too long beyond the lives of people living at the time was wrong, although the exact period was not determined until another case, Cadell v. Palmer, 150 years later. Historically, the rule was no longer than 21 years from the death of some person alive at the time the trust or estate was created. However, that person(s) must be limited and identifiable. Which led to the creation of Royal lives clauses. The descendants of British monarchs became popular because it’s easy to find out who they are, even many years after the fact, and that family tends to live a long time. Other popular choices, particularly in the United States, are the descendants of John D. Rockefeller or Joseph P. Kennedy. This is often only one of the conditions for the end of the trust and becomes a “savings clause” to prevent violation of the rule if the other conditions are (or become) too far in the future. The period has been changed or abolished by statute in many jurisdictions. For example, England and Wales has adopted a flat 125 year limit. As a state-based law, the United States is hugely variable. Examples For example, one of the businesses I run operates under a trust deed that says: &quot;The Vesting Date&quot; means the first to occur of the following three dates namely:- (i) Sixty years after the date of this Deed. (ii) Twenty years after the date of the death of the last survivor of the lineal descendants of His late Majesty King George V born and living at the date hereof or, (iii) The date (if any) which the Trustee shall in his discretion appoint as the distribution date of this settlement. The deed was made in 1982, which partly explains its style and implicit sexism, but I suspect that the solicitor who drafted it has been using the clause about George V for a lot longer than that. As of today, there are 35 living people who fall into the definition, including Charles III (see if you can work out the others); since there are now less than 20 years to go until 60 years after the deed, the clause will never be relevant. Another business operates under a deed made in 2022: 14.1 Termination date The Trust shall be wound-up and terminate on the first to occur of: a) the date which The Trustee with the written consent of the Leading Member Appointer determines; or b) 80 years from the date of this deed unless a State law allows otherwise including South Australia. Note that the reference to living people is gone. Also, note the specific reference to South Australia, a jurisdiction that has abolished the rule against perpetuities. So long as they don't change their law back, this trust is effectively perpetual. Finally, not how much easier this is to read and skips the implicit sexism; progress. Why doesn’t it affect the property of ‘immortal’ entities like companies or governments? Because, in theory, it isn’t dead people telling living people what they can do with the property. While the organisation may be ‘eternal’ the people making decisions for that organisation aren’t - the directors and legislators/executives in charge today can decide what to do with the property. This includes having the capacity to rewrite the rules of the organisation. While it may be hard to change a company’s rules and very, very hard to change a country’s constitution, it isn’t impossible the way it is with a trust deed or a will. Changing a deed or will too much can result in resettlemet; creating a new trust and usually crystalising tax obligations the delaying of which was often one of the motivations for the trust in the first place.
You're thinking of &quot;unconscionability.&quot; In the United States, the general rule is that a contract provision will not be deemed unenforceable for unconscionability unless it is both procedurally and substantively unfair. A provision is considered procedurally unfair if it results from some sort of unfair asymmetry in bargaining positions. This could include situations where a party was acting under duress, had a diminished mental capacity, or unequal experience in the . A provision may be considered substantively unfair if it imposes disproportinately unfavorable terms on one party, perhaps by imposing costs far out of line with market prices, or by allocating all risk to that party. If the agreement is not both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, it won't be voided. So the Google TOS may be procedurally unfair because Google's market position gives it disproportionate bargaining power, but because they don't really impose any serious costs on you, they aren't unconscionable. Similarly, a contract provision requiring you to give me your house if you ever forget to turn off the porch lights at night wouldn't be unconscionable if it was agreed to after lengthy negotiations between our lawyers.
You can start here, with the attractive nuisance doctrine, which is aimed at children and the fact that they don't have adult common sense. The extent to which you are at risk depends on your jurisdiction. However, a fence does not necessarily protect you, because children can find a way to get around a fence, instead you need to eliminate the risk (so you also have to identify the risk). This article reviews some of the outcomes in attractive nuisance cases: there is no simple rule like "put up a fence and you're safe". Insurance is more predictable, as long as you read the fine print.
This is a matter of state law, so the answer is not precisely the same in all jurisdictions. Many states have laws that prohibit child support orders from being modified retroactively. In those states, they can only be modified back to the date of the motion seeking to modify them. In the case of an adult child in college, where an agreement ends child support at a given date, simply not living in the home while in college or on vacations during college is not likely to be a valid basis for discontinuing child support or modifying it, because this was a circumstance that was foreseeable when the order was entered. The fact that a child has some support from others or from a part-time job does not necessarily discontinue the obligation.
RCW 26.50.060 governs the duration of protective orders. It depends on the reason for the order (and also note that there has been a change in the law, taking effect July 25 this year or next, depending on which section). The key provision is &quot;(6) The court order shall specify the date the order expires if any&quot;, which means that a perpetual order is possible. An order cannot be faked or altered, but a piece of paper purporting to be an order can be. You can obtain a copy of the actual order from the county courthouse. If you read para (2) in the statute, you will note that is says If a protection order restrains the respondent from contacting the respondent's minor children the restraint shall be for a fixed period not to exceed one year. This limitation is not applicable to orders for protection issued under chapter 26.09, *26.10, 26.26A, or 26.26B RCW. 26.09 is about dissolution and separation, suggesting that it is not necessarily faked. But yes, it is possible that the &quot;11&quot; was faked, and you can test that theory.