Religious exemption to vaccines that relies on preservation of life Almost every US state allows a religious exemption to vaccination requirements in schools. Some religions are opposed to vaccination as a basic principle (maybe because healing is reserved for God or something like that), and those obviously fall under the religious exemption. Judaism is not one of those religions. If someone claims that it is and requests a religious exemption on those grounds, I understand that the government is not going to dig any deeper and deal with questions of religious law. But as far as I understand, the more usual claim is along the lines of "mumble mumble dangerous mumble autism mumble mumble and Judaism requires me to keep my kids out of danger, so therefore religiously I'm not allowed to vaccinate them." (See the deservedly downvoted answers to the linked question.) Does that really support a religious exemption? It's not even a religious argument! Or to put it another way, comparing these four claims: vaccination My religion says that healing is reserved for God so I can't vaccinate My religion puts a high value on human life and Dr. Quack says vaccines are dangerous so I can't vaccinate accomodations at work I'm Sabbath observant. I'll have to miss the Friday afternoon meetings during the winter My religion says I should use my time wisely. The Wednesday 2PM meeting is a waste of time, we never do anything productive, so therefore I can't come to it. 1.2 and 2.2 look basically the same to me. Is there a difference between them? Does 1.2 work? (Apparently it does, because people use it.) Does 2.2 work? (That would be really useful!)
The legal question is whether there is a religion-specific exception to mandatory vaccination laws, and if so where does it come from? These are state-specific laws, so one would have to look at a specific state to answer the question. In Washington, this is implemented in the exemptions section, RCW 28A.210.090 (1)(b) A written certification signed by any parent or legal guardian of the child or any adult in loco parentis to the child that the religious beliefs of the signator are contrary to the required immunization measures; or (c) A written certification signed by any parent or legal guardian of the child or any adult in loco parentis to the child that the signator has either a philosophical or personal objection to the immunization of the child.... (2)(c) Any parent or legal guardian of the child or any adult in loco parentis to the child who exempts the child due to religious beliefs pursuant to subsection (1)(b) of this section is not required to have the form provided for in (a) of this subsection signed by a health care practitioner if the parent or legal guardian demonstrates membership in a religious body or a church in which the religious beliefs or teachings of the church preclude a health care practitioner from providing medical treatment to the child. In other words, you have to just say you object for one of these reasons, or you have to show that you are a member of a sect that is known to object. The law does not, however, provide a central registry of churches whose teachings preclude immunization, not is there any investigation of the claim allowed under the law. In Nevada, NRS 392.437 does not expressly include the personal-or-philosophical exception contained in Washington law: A public school shall not refuse to enroll a child as a pupil because the child has not been immunized pursuant to NRS 392.435 if the parents or guardian of the child has submitted to the board of trustees of the school district or the governing body of a charter school in which the child has been accepted for enrollment a written statement indicating that their religious belief prohibits immunization of such child. However, there is, likewise, no further vetting of the claim for exemption where the state determines if the religion claim is real. Nevertheless, under a Nevada-type law, one would have to make the claim that the belief was religious in nature, in order to claim the Free-Exercise exemption. California has no such exemptions – they eliminated an existing exemption – and predictable they were sued (Brown v. Smith). The state district court rejected a free exercise argument, though one based on the California constitution (the court however cited various free exercise rulings in the US). That court points to case law saying that "the state’s wish to prevent the spread of communicable diseases clearly constitutes a compelling interest", suggesting that such a law might pass strict scrutiny (the First Amendment has limited exceptions). The ultimate legal source of such exceptions is the First Amendment, specifically the "Free Exercise Clause". In a nutshell, that says that the government cannot prohibit a person from exercising their religious beliefs. If that means you must pray at noon, you must be allowed to pray at noon; if that means that you cannot eat lettuce, you cannot be forced to eat lettuce. Because "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion", the government also may not get into the business of approving or disapproving religions. The courts have indicated that a personal or subjective belief does not enjoy Free Exercise protection. In Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 the court commented that Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal, rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses. Somewhat contradictorily, in US v. Seeger, the court held that "The test of religious belief within the meaning of the exemption in § 6(j) is whether it is a sincere and meaningful belief occupying in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption", but "The exemption does not cover those who oppose war from a merely personal moral code, nor those who decide that war is wrong on the basis of essentially political, sociological or economic considerations, rather than religious belief", and "There is no issue here of atheistic beliefs, and, accordingly, the decision does not deal with that question" (that is, the court did not rule on atheistic religious beliefs). Under the premise that one claims a religious exemption, there is no further investigation as to how compelling the claim is. On the other hand, if one makes a claim that merely looks like slapping the religion label on a personal objection, one might well run afoul of the state law, and then the courts might be forced to judge that very delicate question. This could arise, for instance, in the context of the Islamic distinction between haram and makruh acts, where the former are absolutely forbidden and the latter are "recommended against".
As edited, this asks two different questions: Is it legal to have a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? Is it legal to preach a religious belief that killing mutants is a moral necessity? The answer to the first question is pretty clearly yes. Your right to think whatever you want is essentially ironclad under the First Amendment, under both the Free Exercise and the Free Speech clauses. The answer to the second question is more nuanced. Although it can be tricky to actually apply, there's little question that merely advocating for murder is generally protected under the First Amendment: The teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 298 (1961) Over time, the courts have developed a two-part test for evaluating whether the advocacy of crime can itself be criminalized. We now assume that speech advocating for the commission of a crime as protected under the First Amendment, unless and until that speech is: (1) intended to cause imminent lawless action; and (2) likely to actually result in imminent lawless action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, (1969). So if Rev. Stryker meets Charles Xavier for a televised debate on the merits of killing all mutants, that speech would likely be protected by the First Amendment. Although he may sincerely hope his words will inspire others to kill mutants, the time between speaking them and any resulting murder is too great to say they are either intended or likely to cause imminent lawless action. But if the X-Men confront Rev. Stryker on television, and Rev. Stryker urges his studio audience to storm the stage and kill them all, that's more likely to result in immediate violence, and therefore more likely to be considered unprotected incitement. There's of course a lot of middle ground between those two options, so the tough part for judges and juries is figuring out the speaker's actual intent and how imminent is too imminent.
(For a definitive answer, consult an employment attorney). According to the federal Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, in general, An employee cannot be forced to participate (or not participate) in a religious activity as a condition of employment. This requirement comes from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Answer 14 on this page elaborates: Some private employers choose to express their own religious beliefs or practices in the workplace, and they are entitled to do so. However, if an employer holds religious services or programs or includes prayer in business meetings, Title VII requires that the employer accommodate an employee who asks to be excused for religious reasons, absent a showing of undue hardship. Similarly, an employer is required to excuse an employee from compulsory personal or professional development training that conflicts with the employee’s sincerely held religious beliefs or practices, unless doing so would pose an undue hardship. It would be an undue hardship to excuse an employee from training, for example, where the training provides information on how to perform the job, or how to comply with equal employment opportunity obligations, or on other workplace policies, procedures, or legal requirements. So the questions would be: Is the activity in question a &quot;religious service or program&quot;? This might be ambiguous, and you might have to consult an employment attorney for a more informed opinion. Does it &quot;conflict with your sincerely held religious beliefs or practices&quot;? Would it be an &quot;undue hardship&quot; for the employer to excuse you? Note that this law might not apply to employers with fewer than 15 employees. It also doesn't apply if you work for an employer such as a church, or a religiously affiliated hospital or educational institution, or the like.
The relevant passage from the opinion in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) is: We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, [Footnote 10] and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs. [Footnote 11] The text of the footnote is: Among religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others. See Washington Ethical Society v. District of Columbia, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 249 F.2d 127; Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal.App.2d 673, 315 P.2d 394; II Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 293; 4 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1957 ed.) 325-327; 21 id. at 797; Archer, Faiths Men Live By (2d ed. revised by Purinton), 120-138, 254-313; 1961 World Almanac 695, 712; Year Book of American Churches for 1961, at 29, 47. This was a case where a man was appointed to the office of Notery Public, but Maryland law required him to declare a belief in God to assume the office. The US Supreme court held that this violated the man's rights under the First Amendment's establishment clause, which had been incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth. The man was not, as far as I can tell, himself a Secular Humanist, and Secular Humanism was mentioned in the footnote merely as an example of a belief system that did not include a belief in God. Why Justice Black used the term "religion" to refer to it, I cannot say, some of the other groups listed in the footnote are clearly religions, and others are belief systems that for First Amendment purposes are often treated similarly to religions. What might better describe the Court's rulings here than the linked site does is that believers in Secular Humanism, Ethical Culture, and other similar belief systems will have their beliefs protected in just the same way that believers in any religion will. Freedom of Religion includes the right not to have a religion. By the way, the passage from Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US 1 which is quoted in Torcaso v. Watkins and to which the linked web site probably refers is: The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.' By the way, any site which proclaims that Hugo Black was a "Marxist agent" has lost much credibility in my opinion. Read the linked article and other easily available sources and judge for yourself.
See Holt v. Hobbs 574 U.S. ____ (2015) and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 573 U.S. ____ (2014): Under RLUIPA, the challenging party bears the initial burden of proving that his religious exercise is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief The test is ignorant as to whether the person's belief happens to match an "expected" profile of a particular religion, although if it did, that would go some way to establishing that the belief is a sincerely held religious belief. In Holt v. Hobbs, Gregory Holt requested that he be allowed to grow a 1/2 inch beard in prison. In oral argument, Justice Scalia noted that the religious requirement is to grow a full beard [...] I mean, you're still violating your religion Counsel for Holt responded: Well, the religious teaching is a full beard. He testified that religiously half an inch is better than nothing. [...] A partial beard is better than none. And that's not just in secular terms. That's also in religious terms. The court ruled in favour of Holt. That his belief differed from the strictest interpretation of the religious text was not relevant.
This is known as the "ministerial exception". Because the Free Exercise and Estalishment clauses of the First Amendment prohibit the government from interfering with religion, the government cannot override a doctrine that contradicts the teachings of a religion (so women and gays cannot sue the Catholic church for not being hirable as priests). In Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, an individual taught classes and led prayer at a religous school, but was fired ultimately due to a disability (narcolepsy). The Lutheran church does not have any known doctrine condemning narcolepsy: but it was unanimously ruled that "the Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own". Thus the church was legally permitted to fire the individual due to her disability.
There are venue restrictions where political speech is restricted, such as on military bases; content restrictions (transmitting classified information to the world); you cannot defraud by saying false things in order to get something, you cannot defame a person, you cannot speak obscenely (though it's hard to tell what counts as "obscenity"). You cannot appropriate other people's property in speaking (i.e. copyright law is a restriction on speech). The type of speech restrictions seem to pertain to speech and violence caused by such speech. A classic limitation is that you cannot speak "fighting words" (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 315 U.S. 568), which in 1942 meant calling someone a "damned racketeer" and "damned Fascist", which the court characterized as "inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction". The court subsequently refined its position on "provocative" speech. In Virginia v. Black 538 U.S. 343 a law against cross-burning was found to run afoul of the First Amendment as a restriction on political expression, but it would be fully consistent with The Constitution to outlaw "cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate". This states may "prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm". The current position is that you cannot incite to the imminent use of force. In Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444, the court stated that the First Amendment does not "permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". There are myriad laws against threats, for instance in Washington you may not "knowingly threaten(s) to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other person", and you can't do that ("knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person") in Ohio either. You can't get away with threatening "to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person" in California. This class of restrictions on speech seems to be quite robust. You may not induce panic in Ohio, e.g. shout "fire" in a theater -- I don't know if any other state has such a law.
Since you asked, and it's a perfectly legitimate question, here's why it doesn't violate the Fifth Amendment (from Garner v. US): The Fifth Amendment doesn't say "you can't be made to say anything that hurts you." It says "no person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The only time Fifth Amendment protection applies is if you are being forced by the government to make a statement that could open you up to an accusation or conviction of a criminal offense. It's fairly broad (if it would help prove any aspect of the charge, you can claim immunity), but it's also restricted (you can't claim it unless it really would tend to incriminate you). That means that you could only argue the Fifth Amendment if your tax return might help prove a criminal case against you (the fact that disclosing income leads to you needing to pay tax does not qualify as "self-incrimination"). But the amount of income is not one of those things that might incriminate you -- you can get income through all sorts of ways. The thing that is incriminating is revealing the source of the income, and you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that. So: The only time you could possibly claim privilege is if you were being forced into a statement that might tend to incriminate you in a criminal proceeding. A statement that makes you liable for tax doesn't mean it might incriminate you. Filing an income tax return isn't inherently incriminating. The fact that you have income not included in any other part of the return (illegal income goes under "other income") doesn't imply you've committed a crime -- lots of people have other income. The amount of income can't be incriminating. The source can be, but you can claim Fifth Amendment privilege for that if it might incriminate you. And lawful income under "other income" still might give rise to a reasonable fear of prosecution, so the fact that you're justified in claiming Fifth Amendment privilege in source of income doesn't mean you're guilty of a crime. Note that there are cases where you are flat-out exempt from filing tax returns under the Fifth Amendment: Marchetti v. US and Grosso v. US found that registration and tax on gambling could be blocked by a Fifth Amendment claim, which didn't even have to be asserted at time of filing, because merely filing the special return would establish you as a gambler (heavily regulated/often criminalized at the state level). The difference with the normal income tax form is that everyone (just about) files one, and so filing it doesn't mean you're a criminal. If there was a separate line along the lines of "Income from Illegal Drug Sales," that might be one thing (anything other than $0 is inherently incriminating). But all the questions are broad, and have many legal sources of income associated with them.