Statutory authority to order business to close their doors In Maryland, Governor Hogan just ordered with "the full force of law" all restaurants, bars, movie theaters, gyms, etc. to close their doors to the public starting at 5 p.m. What is his statutory authority to do this? I've read the MEMA code (§ 14), and read some of the health code. I'm not seeing it.
The key statutory tool is §14-303 of Title 14. Having previously declared a state of emergency, (b) After proclaiming a state of emergency, the Governor may promulgate reasonable orders, rules, or regulations that the Governor considers necessary to protect life and property or calculated effectively to control and terminate the public emergency in the emergency area, including orders, rules, or regulations to: ... (2) designate specific zones in the emergency area in which the occupancy and use of buildings and vehicles may be controlled; (3) control the movement of individuals or vehicles into, in, or from the designated zones; (4) control places of amusement and places of assembly;
Businesses are not required to do what the card says, they are required to do what the card-holder says, to the extend that what the card holder says relates to giving or denying consent to be vaccinated. Since they don't vaccinate people who are unconscious, consent will always be directly obtained from the patient and the card has absolutely no effect. Also, control subjects are selected at random and the subject does not know what group they are in. Possession of such a card therefore has zero scientific effect.
California Penal Code 647f states that being intoxicated in public is prohibited. When the police arrived, they were confronted with probable cause for an arrest. They (presumably) became aware of the matter because the doctor called the police, since she believe that you would drive drunk. (We can inquire into whether that was a reasonable belief, but it doesn't matter, what matters is that she had the belief and acted on it). Now the question is whether the doctor acting on the belief (making the call) was legal. A negative answer does not affect the legality of the arrest. There is also a law imposing on medical professionals a duty to report, which is fairly wordy, but does not seem to directly require reporting the fact that a person is publicly intoxicated. However, attending circumstances could have suggested one of the triggering causes for mandatory reporting (wounds, for example). Again, it does not matter (to a point) if, in the light of close scrutiny, the doctor's conclusions were mistaken. When doctors are required to report facts to the police, reasonable over-reporting is not penalized. There is also no law against calling 911 to report a potential DUI (the usual public-campaign focus is on those actually driving). So calling the police under the circumstances falls between "allowed" and "required". The HIPAA privacy rule could be relevant because that theoretically could block the doctor from making the call. (Note that the doctor, and not the patient, is bound by the confidentiality requirements). §160.203 allows exceptions to the confidentiality requirement if "necessary... For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare", so an exception may have been granted. If this was done within the scope of a mandatory reporting law, it is legal to disclose PHI; under §164.512 it is allowed, "to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public". A confidentiality agreement would not increase your chances of being arrested. If the doctor's confidentiality statement were less restrictive than HIPAA, HIPAA prevails (the law trumps contract terms). If it is the same as HIPAA, it has no effect (and simply states what HIPAA says – the normal case). If the agreement were more restrictive, it is possible that the doctor calling the police would be a breach of contract, unless the call was required by law. You would have to see what in the agreement would have prohibited calling the police. But that would not affect the validity of the arrest. To re-phrase the matter: the arrest was because you were found to be intoxicated in public. The police were there and could judge your state (probable cause). They were there by permission of the property owner, so the arrest was not unlawful for lack of a warrant. That is as far as one can go in searching for an illegality to the arrest itself. One might go further and ask whether the doctor has committed an actionable wrong by calling the police with her suspicions. This could go either way: it really depends on the full set of details, regarding your condition. If the doctor suspected that your actions fell under one of the mandatory reporting categories, she had to report, and otherwise it is not prohibited under HIPAA. If a person is intoxicated and answers the question "Would you normally proceed to drive home in this state?" in the affirmative, then it is a reasonable inference that the person will do so. An answer "No, absolutely not", on the other hand would work against the "public danger" inference: that has no effect on the arrest, but could have an effect in a suit against the doctor (violation of the privacy rule). In such a suit, the doctor's defense would presumably be that despite the answer, she still had a reasonable belief that you were a public danger. Then the matter would reduce to what other facts she knew of that would support a public danger conclusion.
Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.
Farmer's Market is private property, which means that the owner gets to set the rule according to which you are allowed to enter and remain on their property. There is no fundamental right to be in a business, either under the US Constitution or California's. While you have a constitutional right to put a soapbox on the public sidewalk and denounce or extol whatever you like, there is no such right on another person's property. You also have a right to express racially and sexually abhorrent content on the street. Your right to express your viewpoint ends at the store's doors. The manager has a property right to withdraw the implicit permission to enter and remain that is implicit in running a publicly accessible store. Your constitutional right to say whatever you want has to do with government action,not private action. You have no right to compel individuals to listen to your viewpoint on private property. It is a business decision, well within the rights of the property owner, for him to find your conduct unacceptable and grounds for expulsion. You do have a recourse: shop somewhere that doesn't care what you say to their customers.
Section 2 (a) of the order says: The heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) shall immediately take action, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, to require compliance with CDC guidelines with respect to wearing masks, maintaining physical distance, and other public health measures by: on-duty or on-site Federal employees; on-site Federal contractors; and all persons in Federal buildings or on Federal lands. (emphasis added) It would seem that if, in future, the CDC changes its guidelines to indicate that mask wearing is no longer needed (presumably in the wake of a large decline in cases) the order would mean compliance with such revised guidelines, and thus reduced or eliminated mask wearing, when and if that is advised. The order does not contain any dated sunset or reevaluation provision. But the President can at any time revise or rescind this or any other Executive Order. The Twitter comments could be taken as an intention to reevaluate and a hope to be able to remove, the order within 100 days. In any case Twitter comments are not legally binding, nor are press conference statements or other public statements by the President. Evert if the order had contained a fixed sunset date, the President could always issue a new order extending this one at any time. Note also that the order only instructs department heads to &quot;take action, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law.&quot; This leaves significant room for judgement as to what is &quot;appropriate.&quot;
Why would this be a concern? The adults have some duty in an elementary school setting to monitor the children in the restroom in any case. Separate restrooms are an employee perk, not a liability driven decision.
The grain of truth is what you've read is that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149 § 19 says No person shall, by intimidation or force, prevent or seek to prevent a person from entering into or continuing in the employment of any person This is referenced in a compendium of state laws loosely subsumed under the notion of &quot;blacklisting&quot;. In Arkansas, this would be writing, printing, publishing, or circulating false statements in order to get someone fired or prevent someone from obtaining employment; in Indiana it is using any means to prevent a discharged employee from obtaining employment. The Massachusetts law only prevents use of intimidation or force to prevent a person from getting employed. In other words, &quot;blacklisting&quot; is not the same thing in all jurisdictions.