If a U.S. jurisdiction secedes, can they still keep the old laws? I've heard that most municipal code is actually copyrighted material, thus, for example, you can't just re-publish it without violating the copyright law. The issue becomes interesting in the case of secession. If, say, a California or Colorado county, city or a set of such were to secede from the rest of the State, or from an existing county or city within the State, do they have to start their legal framework pretty much from scratch, could they reference prior state/county/city law as of date of secession, or do they somehow get some kind of a special right to the collection of statutes? Can the old jurisdiction prohibit such access? From the copyright perspective, would it at all be easier for a state to secede (e.g., whole of Texas), since I presume constitution is in the public domain? What about the rest of the federal laws? (What about most state laws, in case of a county-to-state succession?)
Under United States copyright law, according to the Copyright Office, 206.01 Edicts of government. Edicts of government, such as judicial opinions, administrative rulings, legislative enactments, public ordinances, and similar official legal documents are not copyrightable for reasons of public policy. This applies to such works whether they are Federal, State, or local as well as to those of foreign governments. Referencing laws is even clearer: copyright doesn't protect referring to something like "Section 830 of the Penal Code of the State of California." Note that this is assuming that they remain within the US, where copyright law is a federal issue. Other countries don't all have the edict of government rule. If a place were to legally secede and become their own country, they would cease to be bound by US copyright law. They would get to decide if it was legal for them to do it or not; this is just like how it works between the UK and US (the UK claims copyright on its laws, but US courts will not enforce that copyright because it's incompatible with US law). Treaties complicate things, but the Berne Convention allows the edict of government exception. That said, seceding from the US unilaterally is both legally and practically impossible; seceding from a state is likewise generally going to be legally and practically impossible without permission from the state. So, it all depends on the agreements made. EDIT: To specifically address the model codes issue, Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int’l, 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002) was a case specifically about what happens when model codes are adopted wholesale into law. The Fifth Circuit (after initially finding that the model codes were protected) reversed en banc, finding that a model code produced for the purpose of being incorporated into law, and which has been incorporated into law, and which is then reproduced as the law of the place that incorporated it into law, is not subject to copyright. Veeck may not apply to cases where the law merely references the model code, or where the thing in question was not made to be incorporated into law (e.g. state laws referencing the Red Book valuation of a car didn't make the Red Book public domain). If both of those are true, it probably doesn't apply; if one holds but not the other, it's unclear. However, if the actual municipal code directly contains the text of the model code, and you reprint it as the law of that municipality (rather than as the model code), there is no copyright in the law.
Early in the history of the US, various states passed laws adopting the then extant common law and at least some of the statutory law of Great Britain (much of which was in origin the Law of England) as law in those states. Such laws would still be valid, unless later acts had amended or replaced particular provisions. Tracing which provisions had since been altered would be a massive task. Basic common law, particularly definitions of crimes such as fraud, theft, murder, and of torts such as conversion, slander, libel, and the like will probably be largely unchanged, with some modifications. Blackstone's Commentaries remained a significant legal text used in training lawyers and in legal practice in the US through much of the nineteenth century.
Is there any legal precedent for suing a city to amend or terminate an agreement due to fiscal nonfeasance? There is not really any legal precedent for prevailing in such a lawsuit. Obviously, of course, the detailed facts and circumstances matter. If a state statute prescribed other terms, for example, and expressly gives someone standing to enforce the statute, then that is another matter. In many states, standing to enforce violations of municipal laws governing their finances and contracts is vested by statute or the state constitution in the state attorney general. Is there any legal recourse for a resident who believes their city is committing financial nonfeasance? Probably not. Certainly not in court. Usually, individual citizens or taxpayers do not have standing to bring suit related to acts which affect all citizens or taxpayers equally or proportionately, but do not constitute an individualized injury to the particular taxpayer. Municipal governments have broad discretion to enter into contracts with other municipalities on rates that they deem fit which do not have to approximate cost or be profit maximizing. Some states and cities allow citizens to petition to have legislation that has been adopted (agreements are generally adopted by city ordinance) to be placed on the ballot for a vote if a sufficient number of people vote on it within a sufficient time of the ordinance or law being passed (this is called a "referendum power"). But, most do not. Otherwise, your sole recourse is to get a majority elected to city council and a new mayor, to change the policy when the agreement expires. wouldn't the city have to prove that there IS a benefit to the city? No. Assuming for sake of argument that someone suing the city had standing to sue, the burden of proof is always on the person bringing the lawsuit. Ordinances are presumed valid unless this is disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. For example: It is an axiom of our judicial system that legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional. Parties attacking their validity carry a heavy burden of proof: invalidity must be established clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt People v. Beaver, 549 P.2d 1315, 1316 (Colo. 1976) The constitutional test in the face of an equal protection challenge (assuming for sake of argument that there was standing) would be a "rational basis test" and there would be a rational basis for (1) saying that the city benefit from its neighbor not having adequate fire protection which could spread to them, (2) on the basis that the marginal cost might be low, and (3) on the basis that the municipality probably has a legal duty to aid a neighboring municipality if it has the ability to do so in the absence of an agreement without necessarily having a right to compensation under a doctrine called mutual aid when the proper conditions are met (sometimes formalized by agreements and/or governed by state statutes such as the Tennessee's Mutual Aid and Emergency and Disaster Assistance Agreement Act of 2004, Tennessee Code Annotated § 58–8–101, et seq.,). The rational basis test is met if you can describe some rational reason why the law might make sense for the city to pass (which is not expressly prohibited by law or a constitutional right), even if the rational reason is not empirically correct, and even if the rational reason wasn't the actual reason for passing the law. This ordinance would almost certainly pass the rational basis test. In general, a disagreement over the price term of an agreement being too high or too low almost always fails. A municipality is not obligated to negotiate a "fair market value" or "fair" price for services that it provides to other municipalities.
You don't say where you are located. Copyright laws are different in different countries, am going to assume US laws. Under US law, a faithful digitization of a book does not get a new copyeight, see Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) and thw Wikipedia article about that case (On the issue of mrequired originality, see also FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. RURAL TELEPHONE SERVICE COMPANY, INC. (No. 89-1909.) (1991) which dealt with copying a telephone directory.) The court in Bridgeman held that: It is uncontested that Bridgeman's images are substantially exact reproductions of public domain works, albeit in a different medium. The images were copied from the underlying works without any avoidable addition, alteration or transformation. Indeed, Bridgeman strives to reproduce precisely those works of art. ... The mere reproduction of a work of art in a different medium should not constitute the required originality for the reason that no one can claim to have independently evolved any particular medium.'&quot; As discussed above, the law requires &quot;some element of material alteration or embellishment&quot; to the totality of the work. At bottom, the totality of the work is the image itself, and Bridgeman admittedly seeks to duplicate exactly the images of the underlying works. ... [O]ne need not deny the creativity inherent in the art of photography to recognize that a photograph which is no more than a copy of the work of another as exact as science and technology permit lacks originality. That is not to say such a feat is trivial, simply not original. The more persuasive analogy is that of a photocopier. Surely designing the technology to produce exact reproductions of documents required much engineering talent, but that does not make the reproductions copyrightable. The Bridgeman court was actually construing UK law, but the earthlier phase of Bridgeman i and the SCOTUS case of Feist show the same result under UIS law. Note that books and other works published before 1925 are now out of copyright in the US. Copyright can also be lost ion other ways, such as publishing without a copyright notice before the effective date of the 1976 act, and failure to properly renew a work published in the US before 1964. Assuming that the book is not under copyright, neither the library nor anyone else has a US copyright in the PFD. Unless the library imposes some additional restriction by contract, any such PDF may be copied or shared freely. It may even be sold or rented. And the validity of such an additional agreement would be questionable, but since the question does not mention such an agreement, I will not go into that further.
I see lots of possible issues here, including: Will the Apprendi decision be given retroactive effect? Were the constitutional issues raised at the time of trial, and if not will a court permit them to be raised later? Will a court agree with the law review publication? Will the facts in your case be sufficiently similar to the cited case? Beyond those, in a section 1983 suit many public employees have qualified immunity unless the legal point was already "well established" when the violation occurred. To pursue this you will need to work with a lawyer skilled in this area. No one on this forum can possibly given you a reliable answer as to whether you have a reasonable case.
I found a mention of this issue here, where the case Rhonda Eddy v. Ingenesis was cited. Eddy worked from home in West Virginia, but had signed her contract with a company headquartered in Texas. The link is the decision of The State of West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, namely, that the Circuit Court did not have the authority to hear Eddy's petition against her employer because she was out of the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. The circuit court found that it did not have personal jurisdiction over respondent under West Virginia’s personal jurisdiction statutes, and that respondent did not have sufficient minimum contacts with West Virginia to satisfy federal due process considerations. The circuit court also found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over petitioner’s WPCA claim because petitioner’s employment contract contained a valid choice of law clause that mandated Texas law would govern any dispute between the parties. Emphasis mine. It all depends on stipulations made in the employment contract. This (in the United Kingdom) states 4. Place of Work Allows the employer to specify the location where the employee will work. However, it also allows for the employer to specify any other location in the future. This gives the employer much greater flexibility. That would seem to indicate that (at least in the U.K.) the place is specified in the contract.
No, it is not illegal to use the symbol of the federal government for your own personal use as it is a public domain symbol. However, the USMC will frown upon it. Marines have a sort of warrior culture ethos to them, when compared to the other branches of the U.S. military and a strong culture among those who served. Among Marine culture "there is no such thing as a former Marine"... that is, once you enter the service, you are a marine even if you retire (a former Marine is usually someone who was dishonorably discharged OR committed an action that would have gotten him/her discharged had they not retired). They do not take kindly to Stolen Valor (pretending or seeming to pretend you served when you did not). While this is legal to do per SCOTUS rule, it's not considered advisable. Most of the US military have dim views of Stolen Valor and will react very negatively. And seeing as how the Marines like to boast in song that they Guard Heaven for God upon Death, these are not enemies you would like to make. Tread extremely cautiously while doing this.
The statute of limitations is quite relevant. A couple points to help explain why: First, there are a lot of different legal actions that could arise from someone stealing property. You could have criminal charges for theft, you could have a civil claim for conversion (to pay the value of the stolen property), you could have a civil claim for replevin (to return the stolen goods), and you could have a civil action to determine the true owner of the property. All those cases arise under different laws, and all of them could have different SOLs. The fact that time has run out for one doesn't necessarily mean that time has run out for all of them. Second, improperly obtaining title does not mean that you are not and never will be the true title holder. Take a look at the doctrine of &quot;adverse possession,&quot; which basically allows you to become the true owner of real or personal property by simply acting like the owner for a long enough period of time -- ranging from 5 to 21 years, depending on the jurisdiction. Third, SOL is a restriction on when you can start a lawsuit. Sometimes, as Dale M said, it starts when you actually learn about the transfer, but it could also start when you would have learned about the transfer if you had exercised reasonable diligence. So the fact that a lawsuit is happening now regarding something that happened a long time ago doesn't necessarily mean the SOL was inoperative; it may just mean that the SOL didn't start until long after the transfer, or it majy just mean the litigation is dragging out. Fourth, the Facebook example is not a good one. That lawsuit is primarily focused not on the transfer of property, but on breaches of contract, for which the relevant statute of limitations is six years. Second, those breaches are focused on a contract reached in 2004. Because the lawsuit began in 2010, it was started within the statute of limitations. Had Ceglia waited until today to file it, he probably would time-barred.