Are the relative levels of fines and imprisonment disproportionate? Most non-violent crimes are punishable by fine or imprisonment. But the maximum term of imprisonment has often struck me as far out of line with the maximum fine. For example, even if I am a minimum-wage worker I could pay the maximum fine in a small fraction of the time I would spend behind bars if sentenced to the maximum imprisonment. Examples: Florida 775.02 Punishment of common-law offenses: $500 or 1 year. Pennsylvania 15.66 First degree Felony: $25,000 or 10 years. Is there a custom or reason behind these ratios? One explanation I can imagine is that the real ratio of fines-to-imprisonment was initially comparable, but dates back so many generations that inflation has taken them far out of proportion; and, further, whenever a new law is passed the existing penalties are referenced without thinking about the fact that one side has deflated.
As @cpast says in their comment, these are not equivalent punishments, the fine is for the lower end of the scale where incarceration is not warranted and the maximum gaol term is for the most egregious cases. That said, your supposition is almost certainly correct; statutes tend to be a &quot;set and forget&quot; thing, legislatures have a lot to do and going back to old laws to update fines in line with inflation is probably not high on their list of priorities. In order to overcome this problem all jurisdictions in Australia have adopted the Penalty Unit; fines in statutes are stated as a certain number of penalty units and the value of a penalty unit is set in various ways that usually do not require a vote in parliament.
Considering that the US legal system is more or less similar in practice to the English Courts, yes it is possible to plea bargian a deal. I'm linking to the wikipedia article on the matter with a specific link to the England and Wales for guidence. Normally, I'd explain, but I'm an American and the differences between Magistrate and Crown courts are big enough differences that I can't tell you what the differences in the case is. I should point out this is a legal area where America differences with much of the world. 90% of the United States criminal cases (and a good number of civil cases, which are settled privately before discovery phase) are plea bargained to lesser sentences. Additionally remorse has nothing to do with the plea bargain. You might only be sorry that you got caught breaking the law and can still plea. The lighter sentence is sort of a "thank you" for saving the state money in not having to build their case against you. It is also used to coerce cooperation with the police, as they may have the accused dead to rights and can prosecute him successfully, but he's a little fish who can give intel to a big fish (this usually comes with the caveat of it being a sworn statement, so they can still prosecute you for something if you're lying... OR that the deal holds on condition that everything is factually true. If evidence contradicts you, you're charged as if you never made a deal). It's also important to note that the police will not honor their deals made for your confession... but they will offer you deals (In the United States, police are allowed to lie to you and do it all the time). However, the prosecutor will honor their deals. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. Finally, most jurisdictions allow the judge final say at sentencing, so if the prosecutor does honor the deal and advises the sentence, don't get upset if the judge is tougher and gives you a harsher sentence on the crime, or rejects your plea outright (expect him to scold the prosecutor for wasting his time with a horrible deal, too. Watch the Law and Order SVU episode Raw for a particularly wonderful instance of this rare event occurring). As a part of US federalism, the rules about this change from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, so make sure you understand this. Another thing to be aware of is that a prosecutor who offers a plea could be doing so because they have a weak case. If you are absolutely sure the prosecutor has the wrong guy, it may be to your benefit to go to trial and have them prove it. Innocent people do go to jail all the time because they think there is something worse on them than the plea deal and its hard to fight off as you cannot appeal a plea deal as easily as a court conviction. I would definitely do some leg work into the English Legal system's opinions on plea bargains. Just because they have it does not mean the state lawyers like employing it and many jurisdictions see it as full on corruption in other parts of the world, even the Common Law jurisdictions.
Ignorantia juris non excusat You can say I didn't know: it won't keep you out of jail. Rather than delving into the specifics of your question, I will keep my answer general. If you break the law, you break the law. It doesn't matter if: you don't know what the law is, you didn't think the law applied to you, you thought what you were doing was in accordance with the law. "Break the law" is an objective fact - there is no subjectivity involved. The state of mind of the person is, in most jurisdictions, irrelevant; the common law doctrine of mens rea or "the guilty mind" has almost universally been done away with. Now specific offences have specific defences. Generally, in underage sex cases genuine ignorance of the age of the person is one such defence. A court may decide that ignorance that the person was underage under US law may qualify for this defence.
Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he &quot;should have&quot; (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an &quot;eggshell&quot; victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was &quot;fragile&quot; - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the &quot;Deep South&quot; it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the &quot;Deep South&quot; at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.
Generally speaking, the law in almost every common law and civil law jurisdiction does not allow incarceration to be a punishment for a mere breach of contract (when that breach of the contract was not intended at the time the contract was entered into by the parties by one of the parties but not the other). Historically, there was a remedy called "body execution" for non-payment of a debt that would result in the person who breached the contract being sent to debtor's prison, but that remedy was abolished almost everywhere. There are still non-payments of debts that can lead to your incarceration. One common example is a willful failure to pay child support which you have an ability to pay. This can result in incarceration for contempt of court, and is also a separate statutory non-support crime in many states. Failure to pay a municipal fine is sometimes treated similarly. These arise from the status of these debts as court orders. Also, many states have criminal penalties for knowingly issuing a check that will bounce, on the theory that it amounts to fraud, rather than a breach of contract, and sometimes that crime is defined rather broadly. Breaches of contracts that someone intended not to honor at the moment that they were entered into are also considered criminal frauds or thefts. For example, a Ponzi scheme falls in this category. Other relatively minor actions that can result in criminal liability are failing to observe the terms of a trust or escrow, certain copyright and trademark violations, and absconding with property that is collateral for a loan. These crimes arise because the actions are considered violations of property rights (which often have criminal implications) as opposed to violations of contract (which generally cannot have criminal implications). Still, as a general rule, parties to a contract, without state sanction through a court order or a prosecution for a violation of a crime established by statute, cannot provide for imprisonment as a consequence of a breach of the contract.
The 1975 ban by the attorney general prohibited prosecutors from offering to reduce charges, dismiss counts, or request a particular sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. (Ad hoc exceptions were allowed, initially only by the AG, later by the head of each local office. For a while, there was also judicial bargaining). The AG's ban was on quid pro quo arrangements by his office, and the AG has absolutely no power over the plea by an accused, so that is how an accused could still plead guilty. The following quote is from the first page of Rubenstein &amp; White: On July 3, 1975, the Attorney General of Alaska, Avrum Gross, issued written instructions forbidding all district attorneys and their assistants from engaging in plea bargaining. This prohibition extended to all felony and all misdemeanor prosecutions filed as of August 15. They could not offer to reduce charges or dismiss counts in multiple-count complaints, informations, or indictments as a quid pro quo for guilty pleas. Nor could they request the court to impose any stated sentence; they could only recite the facts. I can't locate a copy of the actual memo, but also see this quote, esp. "...negotiations with defendants designed to arrive at an agreement for entry of a plea of guilty in return for a particular sentence...". A guilty plea is much cheaper for a defendant than paying an attorney and getting convicted, so if you're actually guilty and the evidence is good, it could be a wiser move to plead guilty. There is little reason to engage in a futile act. It apparently also caused a change in the prosecutorial standard for charging, from probable cause to beyond a reasonable doubt – consequently, the chances that the accused is actually guilty goes up. The re-evaluation study also found evidence some evidence that sentencing was lighter in the case of a guilty plea, and it would be sufficient for the accused to believe that he could get a lighter sentence as a reward for a guilty plea to nudge a person in the direction of a guilty plea.
Your question is the subject of longstanding and ongoing debate that has generated countless articles and books and dissertations, so you're probably not going to get a fully satisfactory answer here. But here's the short version: Different systems operate on different assumptions. Your question suggests you are not a retributivist, i.e., someone who views sentencing as a means for taking retribution for the criminal's offenses. Some systems (most, I imagine) are built around that idea, but some view criminal sentencing primarily as a means of preventing recidivism, or as a means for achieving rehabilitation, the interests you indicated you see as more important. And even within those systems, there are still different ideas about what you're actually trying to do. Again, you've indicated that you subscribe to an intent-based system (a punishment keyed to what the criminal intended to do), but that approach competes with harm-based sentencing (punishment for the harm the criminal actually caused). While equal punishments make sense from an intent-based approach, they are less justifiable from a harm-based approach. Few would say that attempted murder inflicts the same amount of harm as completed murder, and so that system does not call for the same amount of punishment. Because there are different approaches, sentencing guidelines vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which I would classify as adopting a harm-based retributivism, treat attempts less severely than completed offenses, but other systems treat them equally.
Yes, "The offender will receive a criminal record." But, you ask, "How is this squared with s14(1) of the 2000 Act?" Well, you will note that it states that it "shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings." The key here is "other than the purposes of the proceedings" which means that, although there is no further punishment for your crime, you have still been convicted officially and it will be noted (on your record) as per the proceedings, and may be brought up in any subsequent proceedings ( "and of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under section 13 above." ). You will also note section 12(7): "Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a court, on discharging an offender absolutely or conditionally in respect of any offence, from making an order for costs against the offender or imposing any disqualification on him or from making in respect of the offence an order under section 130, 143 or 148 below (compensation orders, deprivation orders and restitution orders)." Which further shows that an absolute discharge is not an absolute pardon, and should not be thought of as such. Rather, "You are very much guilty, but of such a minor crime that the experience of a trial has probably been enough, so we'll let you go without additional punishment."