Will Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India, be back on a US visa blacklist once he retires? India's sitting prime minister Narendra Modi was USA's visa ban list for several years for inciting a pogrom in Gujarat in 2002, where around 900 Muslims were murdered. He was removed from the list once he became the PM. What does the US law say about him when he retires? Will he be a natural candidate for a ban again?
Modi was found inadmissible under 8 USC 1182(a)(2)(G): (G) Foreign government officials who have committed particularly severe violations of religious freedom Any alien who, while serving as a foreign government official, was responsible for or directly carried out, at any time, particularly severe violations of religious freedom, as defined in section 6402 of title 22, is inadmissible. There may be some discretion in determining whether an individual participated in violations of religious freedom, but once that determination has been made, there is no discretion: the person is inadmissible. There is a provision for this inadmissibility to be waived by the Secretary of Homeland Security, but without such a waiver, the Department of State cannot issue a visa. He was removed from the list once he became the PM. This isn't precisely true. What happened, rather, is that because he became India's head of government, he became eligible to enter the US with an A-1 visa as a foreign head of government (and only with an A-1 visa, regardless of the purpose of his visit). Under 8 USC 1102 the aforementioned ground of inadmissibility does not apply to diplomatic visa classes: Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, for so long as they continue in the nonimmigrant classes enumerated in this section, the provisions of this chapter relating to ineligibility to receive visas and the removal of aliens shall not be construed to apply to nonimmigrants— (1) within the class described in paragraph (15)(A)(i) of section 1101(a) of this title, except those provisions relating to reasonable requirements of passports and visas as a means of identification and documentation necessary to establish their qualifications under such paragraph (15)(A)(i), and, under such rules and regulations as the President may deem to be necessary, the provisions of subparagraphs (A) through (C) of section 1182(a)(3) of this title; Modi was ineligible to visit the US as a &quot;visitor for business or pleasure&quot; before he became prime minister, and he still is, and he will continue to be after he ceases to be prime minister. However, while he is prime minister he is eligible to visit the US as an official representative of the Indian government. In this circumstance, the State Department can prevent him from traveling to the US by declaring him persona non grata, for which no justification is needed. This is a purely political decision that does not need to be linked to any statutory provision nor to any particular behavior or other set of facts. What does the US law say about him when he retires? Will he be a natural candidate for a ban again? No, he won't be a candidate for a ban. His existing inadmissibility will automatically resume its effect of preventing him from traveling to the US.
tl;dr My assumption: the U.S. government is considering whether to accept refugees and immigrants (given your Syria comment). The background section talks about State attempts to restrict entry. The answer is nuanced since there are different standards for an entrance decision than there are for someone who is already in the U.S. This is because foreign nationals in their home nations aren't "persons within the jurisdiction of the United States," and so laws like the Civil Rights Act only apply in spirit. What does that mean? We wouldn't expect to see the federal government discriminate based on religion, but we might expect to see decisions made about groups that incidentally share an common religion. This is because the federal government has wide latitude when it comes to alienage---which is just a formal name for policies related to non-citizens. While religion is afforded a high degree of protection, the federal government's alienage policies are governed by the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. This implies a practical challenge: things like religion and national origin can be very difficult to disentangle from questions that pertain to the alienage category. For example, a policy might restrict some group's entry "because of" a particular alienage reason and "in spite of" the fact that most of the affected people happen to share a common religion. Background The Equal Protection Clause U.S. Const. Am. XIV § 1 prohibits States from denying any person within its jurisdiction "equal protection of the laws." The Clause is often applied to the federal government as well, via the Due Process Clause U.S. Const. Am. V. See, e.g. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In relation to the clause, laws are reviewed for their constitutionality using either strict, intermediate, or rational basis scrutiny. Strict scrutiny would mean that in order to distinguish based on a particular trait, the government has to have a compelling, narrowly tailored interest, and no less restrictive alternative available. Rational basis just means the government's interest is subject to a lower level of scrutiny (e.g. benefits exceed costs, or don't let in felons). Things like, race, religion, national origin, and some forms of alienage are suspect classes that merit strict scrutiny. This bit about alienage is important. As we'd expect from the above, when States enact alienage statutes, they're subject to strict scrutiny, and when those statues cross the line, the courts have found that State attempts to restrict resident or non-resident aliens encroach upon the federal government's exclusive control over entrance of aliens. Graham v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). In other words, the federal government, not the States, decides whether various "aliens" are admitted. Note: State scrutiny levels when dealing with undocumented immigrants may be context specific. See, e.g. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (children and education). The federal government's authority over immigration is further solidified by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Const. Article VI. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1967). As such, the courts have applied rational basis scrutiny to the federal government's immigration policy. One reason alienage is interesting is that it tends to encompass things like national origin and religion. This doesn't imply the federal government makes its decisions on the basis of religion. In fact, it'd be hard to make an argument that they do. However, since the categories can be so closely entwined, many scholars have argued for a change in standard. Edit In hindsight, this topic seems quite forward looking. A couple weeks after the OP's question a U.S. presidential candidate (Donald Trump) came out in favor of a ban on entry into the U.S. by Muslims. That led to a flurry of activity, and to this insightful blog post by Professor E. Posner.
Under US regulations pertaining to Iran sanctions, §560.201, Except as otherwise authorized pursuant to this part, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted prior to May 7, 1995, the importation into the United States of any goods or services of Iranian origin or owned or controlled by the Government of Iran, other than information and informational materials within the meaning of section 203(b)(3) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(3)), is prohibited. where that acts grants the President the authority to regulate various things but The authority granted to the President by this section does not include the authority to regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly... the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, of any information or informational materials, including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD ROMs, artworks, and news wire feeds. The exports exempted from regulation or prohibition by this paragraph do not include those which are otherwise controlled for export under section 4604 3 of this title, or under section 4605 3 of this title to the extent that such controls promote the nonproliferation or antiterrorism policies of the United States, or with respect to which acts are prohibited by chapter 37 of title 18 So information isn't generally regulated, except potentially under section 50 USC 4604 – which was repealed. For the moment, here is what that law said (huge, not gonna copy). But that doesn't matter too much because the exception to the exception is for exports, not imports: it is legal to import technology into the US. (OTOH, how is it possible to import programs without exporting at least shred of programming technology?) Also under §560.419 The prohibitions in §560.201 make it unlawful to hire an Iranian national ordinarily resident in Iran to come to the United States solely or for the principal purpose of engaging in employment on behalf of an entity in Iran or as the employee of a U.S. person, unless authorized pursuant to §560.505. See also §560.418 with respect to the release of technology and software. You cannot bring an Iranian resident to the US for this purpose, unless you get authorization. It does not say you can't pay a guy in Iran to work remotely. And finally, §560.505 which is about the &quot;authorized pursuant to&quot; clause: The release of technology or software in the United States, or by a United States person wherever located, to any person violates the prohibitions of this part if made with knowledge or reason to know the technology is intended for Iran or the Government of Iran, unless that technology or software meets the definition of information and informational materials in §560.315. There are other clarificatory notes attached to this section. Finally, §560.505 explicitly allows importation of certain non-immigrant services, but what you intend doesn't seem to be covered. So it is not crystal clear, especially since your plan might involve &quot;exporting technology&quot;. It's not safe to interpret these regulations on your own, and you need to hire an attorney who specializes in this area, where you would discuss in detail what you will be &quot;exporting&quot; (even if you don't think it is exporting, it could be legally deemed to be exporting). That, I think, is the main legal issue.
More or less, but this manual gives details on the "less" part, as interpreted by the US State Department. See The 1963 Vienna Consular treaty for the general agreement. Facilities derive immunity from their relationship to consular personnel and their duties. That means that in some cases, a consulate has no immunity. Diplomatic agents (such as ambassadors) and their families enjoy total immunity. However, some staff only enjoy "official acts" immunity. Immunities only apply to foreign nationals of the sending nation, and not to citizens or permanent residents of the US. Quite often, nations have consular offices outside the capital manned by locals with an interest in the sending nation, and they may carry out business in their own home. The individuals do not have regular consular immunity, they have only official acts immunity, and the premise where they do their business is not unsearchable, unless the premise is used only for official consular business (thus, not their own homes). Under the Vienna treaty, "consular premises" is a term of diplomatic art, referring to a subset of consulates, as the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used exclusively for the purposes of the consular post An honorary consul may uses his home for conducting consular business, but it is not immune from search (it is a de facto consulate, but does not qualify as a "consular premise" in the sense defined by the convention). Since such a consul does not enjoy absolute immunity, his residence is not un-enterable, as would be the case for an ambassador or regular consul.
The Twenty Second Amendment is quite clear on this: No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice In your question, the President has been elected twice - unless of course the President was actually the Vice President (or elsewhere in the line of succession) at the start of the first term, in which case theres other limits: and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. So, someone who has held the office of President after being elevated to it rather than elected to it, but served no more than 1 year 364 days of that first term, could possibly, by the wording of the Twenty Second Amendment, be eligible to resign within their second term and stand again but only once more.
No. Refusing to tell the address alone is not a reason to detain somebody. But there are situations where the authorities can demand that a person identifies himself or herself, including such details as the address (or lack of a permanent residency). In such a situation, failure to identify yourself can get you locked up. Also, the tone of your posting seems to question the legitimacy of the UK government and legal system as a whole. That is a box you're putting yourself into, and the company you find there is not very pleasant.
As far as I can tell, one can hold any beliefs or lack thereof, and there is no need to register your beliefs with the government per se. However, there are laws where religion is relevant, such as the Hindu personal laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or the Hindu Succession Act, such as stating who gets your stuff if you die intestate. These laws apply to Hindus, and since Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists are treated as legal Hindus (!), it applies to them; and to any other person who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. and don't ask me to interpret that "unless clause". That is, the Hindu laws do not apply to Muslims, Christians, Parsis or Jews. On the face of it, that would mean that Yazidis would be treated as Hindus, w.r.t. the subject matter of those laws. Registering a religion isn't relevant to the question: what matters is that the Indian Government decided to create these particular laws, and they have not created any Yazidi-specific laws. There are currently no national laws prohibiting religious conversion, and I can't find the state laws. This article discusses such laws, noting that some states require a person to register their conversion. I seems that the restriction is on A converting B, and not on B converting sua sponte.
However, in the last 233 years, only a handful of people have been prosecuted for violating this law. The census bureau has noticed that a more effective way to get everyone counted is to follow up in person if someone neglects to respond to the questionnaire. Once they follow up and the person has responded, there's no longer a basis for prosecuting. What is the point of one of the oldest laws, in which some people have cared enough to amend, but not enough to actually enforce? The possibility of prosecution is presumably thought to increase the response rate even if virtually nobody is ever prosecuted. The law also serves as a formal statement by congress that responding to the census is important, even if the executive doesn't prosecute people for failing to do so. Another thing to consider is that an element of the offense specified in 13 USC 221 is refusal or willful neglect. Without evidence of an affirmative refusal to respond, the prosecutor would need evidence of willfulness, which goes to state of mind, and that is notoriously difficult to prove. Any defendant who claims to have intended to respond but for chronic forgetfulness would introduce reasonable doubt unless the prosecutor had something to show that the defendant intentionally refrained from responding.