Exemption from chapter What does an the point #7 in § 46.2-2101 (VIRGINIA ACTS OF ASSEMBLY) exactly mean? Citing from the web (link here): § 46.2-2101. Exemptions from chapter. The following are exempt from this chapter: ... Electric personal delivery devices as defined in § 46.2-100. The linked text amends "Electric personal delivery device" (EPDD) and few other terms to the Act. Therefore I do not understand WHAT exactly is the EPDD exempted from? For me the statement negates everything about EPDD that was written above which does not really make sense. It would only make sense to me that EPDD would be exempted from any general clauses in the document except where EPDD is specifically mentioned in the text... Would be nice to have this assumption confirmed by someone else.
The amended section 46.2-2101 is in Chapter 21 of Title 46.2. Chapter 21 deals with regulation of property carriers (e.g. moving companies). So the amendment to 46.2-2101 says that EPDDs are exempt from these Chapter 21 regulations. 46.2-2102 says, in general, that the Section 21 regulations apply to anyone who gets paid to transport property using motor vehicles. So without the exemption, there might be confusion as to whether those regulations would apply to someone using an EPDD. The legislature therefore made it clear that it did not intend those regulations to apply in that case. Most of the rest of the cited Act amends Chapter 8 of Title 46.2, which deals with traffic laws and regulations. The amendment to 46.2-2101 does not exempt EPDDs from those regulations; as you say, that would defeat the whole purpose of the law.
The ordinance is not very specific about how notice is to be given: therefore, it need not be in writing, and it need not be sent by mail. It would not be surprising if the "notification" came in the form of a city person inspecting the reported obstruction, walking up to the house and knocking and finding nobody home (thus triggering the "In case the owner cannot be found" condition), whereupon the city removes the rocks. That clause does not mean "In case we do not know who the owner is", it almost certainly means "in case the owner cannot be contacted immediately". Article III is in general about obstructions on streets, which are not allowed, except by permit in section 78 under "Permit to Obstruct Traffic Lane". Assuming that no obstruction permit was obtained, what usually happens is that an officer is sent to tell the owner to remove the obstruction (more or less immediately), and if nobody is at the site whom they can tell, they probably won't go any further (e.g. asking neighbors where the owner is). There is no legal definition of "reasonable time", instead the law simply takes that to mean "the amount of time a reasonable person would require". It would thus depend particularly on the size of the obstruction and the volume of traffic. One measure would be how quickly the rocks were moved -- if it was a matter of days and there was no notice, written or otherwise, then there would not be the kind of urgency that might justify the "We knocked and nobody was home" version of notification.
An affirmative defense is a way of avoiding conviction by acknowledging you did the act claimed, but that such act was among the exceptions provided by the law which makes such acts otherwise an offence. That is, you affirm (acknowledge, admit) your action of using the device, but you are claiming that your use of the device (handsfree as a GPS guide) is okay, and therefore you should not be convicted. For all intents and purposes in this situation, your "2" and "3" are the same thing. The device is supported by something other than you holding it, and you are able to keep both hands on the wheel while using it in this way. Finally, a plain language reading of the definition for "hands-free accessory" suggests that using an object in the car to support the device where it can be seen, or using a feature of the device that speaks directions which you can hear, neither of which requires moving your hands off the wheel, will be considered such an accessory. It is also worth pointing out that such usage of a device (placed in a cradle or on the dashboard or turned up so it is heard) will be well-known to the legislators, and there is a reasonable interpretation of the law that would allow such usage. If this ever went to court, and somebody used this defence for this situation, they would probably be okay.
This area of law is dependent on affirmative defenses that states may choose to provide. I found two law review articles that present the situations in Georgia and Indiana.1, 2 Georgia Georgia Code 16-3-23 provides a defense for the occupant in this situation. Epstein argues that this statute is somewhat ambiguous but it most likely even applies when the occupant only has a reasonable belief that the entry is unlawful (i.e. the entry doesn't have to actually be unlawful).1 Indiana Indiana Code 35-41-3-2 provides a similar defense. The Indiana Legislature enacted 35-41-3-2 in response to a court decision that did not allow a jury to consider self-defense to an unlawful police entry. Patterson analyzes Indiana's statute and comes to the same conclusion as Epstein did about Georgia's: "the statute allows an individual to use force on a reasonable belief that a police official is unlawfully entering their home".2 Policy conflict Both Epstein and Patterson note the policy conflict that arises when states allow both no-knock warrants and affirmative defenses when an occupant reasonably believes an entry may be unlawful. They both suggest that states with such defenses available remove the permission for no-knock entries. 1. Epstein, Dimitri (2009) "Cops or Robbers? How Georgia's Defense of Habitation Statute Applies to No-Knock Raids by Police," Georgia State University Law Review: Vol. 26: Iss. 2, Article 5. 2. Patterson, C. (2014) "Don't Forget to Knock: Eliminating the Tension Between Indiana's Self Defense Statute and No-Knock Warrants," Ind. L. Rev., 47, 621.
In the case of the US, the only anti-discrimination laws that would cover an event is the Civil Rights Act of 1964, under the rubric "public accommodation", in Title II. But that law does not prohibit sex discrimination. The extent of "public accommodation" is not clearly defined, but generally is held to be about "a place", and would include "entrance into this facility". It might be illegal in California, though, since the Unruh Civil Rights Act is more generic, not excluding sex on this point. The main issue would be whether this organization is a "business".
Is this interpretation correct? YES Encounters such as this should normally fall within the non-statutory stop &amp; account which covers police-initiated conversations with members of the public to ask general questions about their activities when there are no reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. The terminology varies from Force to Force, but can be summarised as: What are you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? What are you carrying? There is no legal requirement or obligation to answer any of these questions, and the police cannot lawfully detain anyone to ask them - unlike the statutory powers under Stop &amp; Search and Arrest covered by the OP.
Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules &amp; Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.
Would any offence be committed for: Having this on your person? Buying or selling this? Leaving it around for people to plug in to a computer? In the abstract, I don't think that this conduct would violate either Section 36 of the U.K. law or U.S. law, although, obviously, purposefully destroying a computer itself (i.e. actually using the device without the consent of the owner of the computer) would violate many U.K. laws and would also violate many U.S. laws at both the state and federal level. I also don't think that possession or buying or selling this product would be a crime absent some intent that it be used illegally, in which case there might be an "attempt" to commit a crime offense, or an offense that would make one part of a conspiracy to commit a crime. In the "leaving it around" example, there is arguably an intent to use it to harm another improperly, although the phrasing is ambivalent. While many statutes in the U.S. criminalize possession of burglary tools, or drug paraphernalia, sometimes with an associated intent element (although even these crimes often have an express or judicially implied intent to use element), I'm not aware of any statute that criminalize possession of tools for malicious destruction of property. So, if the tools aren't possessed or used in a manner intended as a step in the facilitation of a crime, I don't think that any law is violated. So far as I know, the U.S. does not have a counterpart to Section 37 of the British statute cited above (it isn't a terribly easy thing to search for to definitively rule out the existence of such a law because federal law has many uncodified crimes in unexpected statutes and there are many sets of state criminal statutes, not all of which are codified either). The example giving in the comments by @gnasher729 of possession of a hammer which could be used to do the same things that this object could be used to do is instructive. Arguably, this USB-like tool is more specifically targeted at malicious conduct. But, for example, when I used to work as a radio news reporter, we had a machine that was basically a high powered magnet that was specifically designed to destroy all information on magnetic media. This was, in part, so that it could be reused, but it was also so that confidential interviews wouldn't fall into the wrong hands once they were no longer needed, in much the way that one might shred paper documents. It isn't so implausible to think that a device like this one might be necessary for individuals or firms with national defense secrets embedded in their hardware and software to have on hand in order to destroy a sensitive computer in order to prevent a security breach, if necessary. In a case like that, leaving one of these devices around the office unlabeled might be negligent, but wouldn't have the intent necessary to be an intended crime. And, it is hard to imagine that the device itself, which seems pretty simple, would itself involve any technology that is a national security secret, so it probably wouldn't violate export control laws. Of course, possession, purchase or sale of such a specialized device, or leaving it around unlabeled would certainly be powerful evidence of an intent to use the device in a wrongful manner, and hence, of an attempt to commit a crime. Indeed, possession of such a device or purchase of one might very well be sufficient to establish probable cause to seize the device and arrest the person holding it on charges of an attempt to destroy a computer. But, this device would be merely powerful evidence of an intent to commit a crime, rather than something that is a crime to commit in and of itself. There are no international laws that govern this kind of thing. The only international laws applicable to individuals pertain to war crimes and nuclear and chemical weapons. Even then, most international laws direct member nations to adopt domestic laws on the subject rather than being self-executing.