How does the law on &quot;pain and suffering&quot; differ in the UK and US? In the UK, if someone makes a statement that "he is a cripple," or "she has problems holding her water at night," those are potential causes of action if they cause distress, even if the statement is true. (Truth is not an absolute defense.) In the U.S. if I break your antique vase, I could be liable for at least the market value of the vase. But if it has sentimental value because you inherited it from your grandmother, I could be liable for even more, based on pain and suffering. But I couldn't be sued for libelling your dead grandmother. How do these rules differ? Is it that in the UK, there could be "pain and suffering" independently of another tort, while in the U.S. it could take place only in connection with some other offense (e.g. the broken vase)?
Is it that in the UK, there could be "pain and suffering" independently of another tort, while in the U.S. it could take place only in connection with some other offense (e.g. the broken vase)? The whole question is too much for me to take on (there are significant differences in the law of non-economic damages between the U.K. and the U.S. beyond those discussed below), but I'll answer this part. The short answer is "yes," there could be "pain and suffering" awards (more often and more accurately called "non-economic damages" awards) in the U.S. that are not in connection with another offense that cause physical harm to the person bringing the claim or their property, even though defamation liability is more narrow in the U.S. than in the U.K. Non-economic damages may include pain, emotional anguish, humiliation, reputational damage, loss of enjoyment of activities, or worsening of prior injuries; in some states, they are referred to as pain and suffering. The U.S. recognizes a common law tort known as "intentional infliction of emotional distress" a.k.a. "outrageous conduct", that can award damages for purely non-economic harm that is independent of any physical harm to anyone. This has to be a course of conduct intentionally calculated to utterly crush someone emotionally without justification, generally through some form of humiliation. The nature of the conduct must far exceed what would ordinarily be considered harassment or taunting. There is also a closely related concept called a prima facie tort which involves intentional and unjustified harm to others not covered by another recognized tort, which is much less widely recognized. The U.S. also recognizes a common law tort known as "negligent infliction of emotional distress" which applies to allow a non-economic damages recovery from someone in the "zone of danger" of an accident that causes physical injury to another person or to property. The classic case would be brought by a parent holding hands with a child whose child is hit by a car and grievously injured or killed right before their eyes. This tort is not very common and not accepted in all jurisdictions. Closely related to negligent infliction of emotional distress damages are awards for loss of consortium, which is a claim for non-economic harm caused to a spouse by tortious conduct that injures the spouse by the non-injured spouse directly against the wrong doer by the non-injured spouse (in some states a parent can also make a loss of consortium claim with regard to a child). Also somewhat related is the concept of a wrongful death lawsuit, which is typically vested by statute in the next of kin of the person wrongfully killed, rather than in the decedent's probate estate, and can include both economic and non-economic damages. Often in a wrongful death case, rather than seeking economic damages, one can seek a flat compensatory amount fixed by statute called a "solatium" that is primarily representative of non-economic harm to the next of kin. There are also other U.S. torts which can give rise to non-economic damages without physical or economic harm to person or physical property. Non-economic damages without physical harm are frequently awarded in civil rights lawsuits brought against someone acting under the color of law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even when the right violated, such as a right to vote, or a right to use public accommodations in a manner not subject to discrimination, does not involve damage to person or property. Similarly, a violation of a discrimination or sexual harassment statutes, such as the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, by a private individual can give rise to a claim for non-economic damages even without proof of economic damages. The U.S. also recognizes some privacy torts (not all of which are recognized in every state) and claims for breaches of fiduciary duty, for which there may be a cause of action for non-economic damages even in the absence of proven economic damage. For example, if an attorney breaches his duty of confidentiality to publicly reveal highly embarrassing personal facts about you, you could sue the attorney for non-economic damages. Claims for nuisance (e.g. from a neighbor's noisy or smelly conduct on the neighbor's own property) can give rise to claims for non-economic damage, and while they would often include claims for related economic damage (often quantified in the form of lost rental value of property), this isn't always required. Most U.S. states have abolished their heart balm torts such as alienation of affection (i.e. causing someone to divorce their spouse), "criminal conversion" (i.e. adultery), and also torts related to broken engagements to marry, but a few states, most notably, North Carolina, retain them and essentially allow private adultery lawsuits for both economic and non-economic harm (or one without the other). Claims for libel per se, which involve a false statement about another which accuses him/her of a crime, immoral acts, inability to perform his/her profession, having a loathsome disease (like syphilis) or dishonesty in business, can give rise to a claim for non-economic damages, in the absence of any proof of specific economic harm arising from the related damage to your reputation. The U.S. does not recognize defamation lawsuits based upon truthful statements, even though, under many historical criminal defamation statutes, statements tending to harm the reputations of the dead, and statements calling attentions to the natural deficiencies of the living (i.e. mocking mentally or physically disabled people) were actionable. Under U.S. law, freedom of speech protects those statements.
Now the party in question is threatening to sue (but of course refuses to point to which sections he believes are libelous) ... do we have to pay the $$ to &quot;lawyer up&quot; if we want to be safe? If you get sued, you will definitely want a lawyer. If you don't get sued, well, in that case you're safe. So your first question is whether the supposedly aggrieved party will actually sue. Your second question is, if they sue, do they have a good case? That question will be useful in deciding whether to settle. If the threats are empty then you might want to hire a lawyer to call their bluff. Otherwise you may have to endure the continual empty threats. This is especially true if the libel case is weak. Your lawyer can write a letter that explains why there is no case. If they do sue, they will have to identify the specific libelous statements, so you will at that point be able to refute the claims. But you'll also want a lawyer at that point, so you won't have to be directly concerned with the details; your lawyer will take care of them. As suggested in a comment, do keep in mind that a true statement cannot be libelous, by definition. To the extent that you can prove that every statement in the piece is true then you don't have much to worry about. But even then you'll want a lawyer's advice, because even if you know yourself that everything is true, you don't know what it will take to prove that in court. (Another aspect of the element of falsity is that statements of opinion are generally not defamatory.) To learn for yourself about the elements of libel you can start with Wikipedia or a bit of internet searching. To get a thorough analysis of the facts of your case in light of the laws of the relevant jurisdictions, you will need to engage a lawyer. It might not cost as much as you fear.
In a civil rights action in which someone prevails (which is by no means certain in this case, but not impossible either), there is at a minimum an award of nominal damages (i.e. $1) and the reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs incurred in the lawsuit. A jury could also award a prevailing party non-economic damages, and/or exemplary damages (a.k.a punitive damages) in connection with a violation of civil rights. There might also be injunctive or declaratory relief stating that this was a violation of civil rights and requiring the government to adopt practices to prevent harm going forward. It is hard to see how there would be any economic damages at issue in this case, but it isn't impossible to imagine some circumstances in which they could be proven, perhaps.
If an adult had physically restrained the miscreant brat, they could be sued for / charged with battery (which does not mean "beating up", per Cal Penal 242, it is the "willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another". In either case, there is a defense that can be mounted, the "defense of others" defense, to the effect that the person had a reasonable belief that it was necessary to prevent physical harm to others. Which means, the jury would imagine themselves in that situation and guess how likely it is that someone might get hurt. Lofting 5 lb chess pieces at a 2 year old could poke out an eye, especially since they haven't learned to duck at that age – however, I question (as would an opposing attorney) the characterization "quite dangerous". At any rate, it would depend on the level of danger posed. There is also a "proportionality" requirement for the defense of others defense: "The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger" (CalCrim instruction 3470). The battery might not have been necessary, since simply getting between the criminal and his victims could have been sufficient. As to whether there would actually be a lawsuit, that depends in part on the mind-set of the parents. Assuming that the level of force did not rise above simple bodily contact, it is unlikely that a jury would vote to convict / find liable, but certainly not impossible. If under those circumstances the results would not be in serious doubt, then it is unlikely that the person would be prosecuted (the prosecutor wouldn't bother with such a case). We may also assume that a decent attorney would persuade the offended parent-client that it is not a good use of their money to pursue he matter. Still, the risk is not negligible, since you don't know whether you'll have bad luck with the jury, or whether the child suffers from eggshell skull syndrome and then you would be is serious trouble. I don't think the fears are unrealistic, though they may be improbable, and they could be definitive for people who live in fear.
The earliest mention of the principle that I can find is in Rolston v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [1975] NI 195, where the matter of compensation for the widow of a police officer murdered in Northern Ireland arose. I am sure there are earlier cases that express the same principle in different terms, however. It is a broad principle that applies to most areas of civil law, and I cannot find an original source for it. I imagine that it is simply &quot;received wisdom&quot; that has been repeated long enough to become a cornerstone of the law of restitution in England and Wales. There is currently no statutory basis for the principle so I cannot cite any relevant Acts of Parliament either.
Its worth actually reading through the law again - they're meant for different categories of drugs - and its worth looking up the relevant laws as a whole. You can't cherrypick which law you charge them under in this case. It depends on what the suspect has in posession, and if you have more serious charges, they're probably going to be preferred unless the prosecution decides to throw the entire library at the suspect and charge them with everything they can, or a larger subset. A quick search on the internet - which shouldn't be taken as legal advice, brings up this link. Category 1 drugs are addictive and seen as therapeutically useless - you shouldn't have any realistic reason to have quantities of it in your posession. Category 3 is drugs with therapeutic use - stuff like codine. You could get a prescription for that, but there's potential for abuse. They're aimed at different classes of drugs - and the confusion is over a misinterpretation of what the law is about. As an aside, this is why you need to usually read more than just a specific statute or law to get what its about.
My understanding is that defendants in Britain have to prove statements true by the preponderance of evidence, whereas in the U.S. the standard of evidence is "compelling" (a lower standard). This is not the case. Preponderance of the evidence can still be the burden of proof in the United States (in a civil libel case, although it must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal libel case). But, the difference is in what has to be proved. In Britain, it appears to be necessary to show that the statements are true in order to prevail. In the U.S., it is merely necessary to show in a case like this one (because it involves a matter of public concern) that the statements were made with knowledge that they were false, or with reckless disregard to the truth or falsity of the statements made. A factual basis for believing the statements made to be true is a defense if the basis is at all reasonable, and is a complete defense if the factual basis for making the statement is disclosed and that is true or believed to be true by the speaker. It is not necessary for the statements to actually be true under U.S. law in a case such as this one, although actual truth is also a defense, which is not the case in all circumstances in U.K. law, and was not the case under the historical common law. Historically, defamation claims could be brought for statements critical of the monarch, for statements pointing out the natural infirmities of someone for example by mocking a person with low IQ, or for speaking ill of the dead. Furthermore, the U.S. has a variety of doctrines that make it hard to find that a false statement was made in the first place. For example, statements of opinion are not actionable and many of the alleged falsehoods in the McLibel case would be considered to be statements of opinion in U.S. law rather than statements of fact. Similarly, U.S. law does not require that statements be literally true, and instead recognizes that a defendant may have been engaged in using hyperbole, or may have gotten the gist of the accusation right even though strictly speaking the exact statement made is not technically true (e.g. someone might say that a company paid a "penalty" when it actually paid a settlement amount in a lawsuit seeking a penalty or paid an amount representing compensatory damages only rather than a penalty amount). In the same vein, it must be clear from the context of the statement that the person making it intended it to be received as a truthful account and not a mere parody or satire which was intended to be understood as false. For example, I couldn't sue someone who made a knowingly false statement that I assassinated King George V, who died several decades before I was born, or that I was telepathically controlling my uncle because I had a space alien parasite in my spine. Those claims are so absurd that they would be inferred to intended to be fictional on their face. Certain kinds of falsehoods (e.g. lying about one's military record in a a political campaign) are simply not actionable as a matter of law, no matter what, as the harm is not concrete enough. There is not, however, necessarily a defense under U.S. law to defamation liability if the defendant said many things that were true, but something else that would be defamatory in isolation. For example, even if everything else were true, if the defendant had also stated that the CEO of the Plaintiff was convicted of leading a Nazi concentration camp and killed millions of people, which would have been possible given the CEO's age, knowing perfectly well that the person with a similar name to the CEO who did so was someone else who died an untimely death decades ago, that statement might be defamatory and actionable (at least by the CEO personally and probably by the company if it was alleged that he was hired despite the fact that the company was aware of this circumstance).
You are responsible It is unlikely that the arrangement you had with the sitter amounts to a contract. Even though there was consideration on both sides, at first blush it seems unlikely that both of you intended to create legal relations. See What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid? Notwithstanding, if there is a contract it is silent on who is responsible to for injury to the pet so it would fall back on the law of negligence anyway. For the sitter to be responsible, she must have been negligent. She wasn't. See Is there liability for pure accidents? Looking at the elements: a duty to the plaintiff, such a aduty probably exists. breached that duty by failing to conform to the required standard of conduct (generally the standard of a reasonable person), she didn't (see below). the plaintiff must have suffered actual harm, no question that you have. the negligent conduct was, in law, the cause of that harm, and that harm was foreseeable, probably it wasn't (see below). Here are the facts: She took the dog on public transport - not unreasonable, many people do. The fact that you wouldn't is irrelevant since you did not communicate this prohibition to the sitter. She took it to an off-leash park - not unreasonable, that's what they are for. She rode an escalator - it is unclear if she carried the dog or expected the dog to ride the escalator itself. The first is clearly reasonable, the second may or may not be depending on the size of the dog etc. She noted the injury and had it treated - eminentely reasonable. So, in general, she has acted as a reasonable person would. It is also far from clear to me how any of the decisions made would result in foreseeable harm to the dog. Remembering that the standard is would a reasonable person foresee that there was a risk of harm barring extraordinary circumstances. By the way, the legal reasoning is exactly the same if you had entrusted her with your child or your car.