Does partiality discredit witnesses? In criminal trials, when a regular (non-expert) witness does not like the defendant (and admits it when asked), does that alone give a valid reason to discredit them to any extent at all? Can the jury be given directions along the lines &quot;this witness does not like the defendant, and that may have been why they testify against him, and hence they may lie&quot;? On the one hand, it makes perfect sense. But on the other, if such witnesses were routinely legally discredited, then no victim's testimony would ever be allowed weight. Where does the balance lie? Are there any rules, principles, tests that are applied to decide whether witnesses disliking defendants are to be believed or not, or to what extent? Related, but not dupe as it is much broader: Witness credibility questions on cross-examination
Only a jury can answer your question, and then on a case-by-case basis. When a witness testifies, the question of whether and to what extent to believe/disbelieve a witness is nearly 100% the decision of the jury (or the judge in a bench trial). In a criminal trial, at least, if a thousand disinterested nuns can take the stand and give identical testimony that Defendant robbed the bank, and Defendant's mother says he was actually with her on a Bahamas cruise at the time of the robbery (nevermind the fact that he was arrested exiting the bank), the jury is 100 percent free to conclude the nuns are lying and the mother is telling the truth. Likewise, if Superman is on trial, the jury would be free to believe or disbelieve whomever they chose if the only evidence they had to rely on was (1) Lex Luthor's testimony that he hates Superman and saw him kill Doctor Light; and (2) Lois Lane's testimony that she loves Superman and saw Lex Luthor do it. The jury's right to weigh credibility is hundreds of years old. The question of how to weigh this evidence -- and the answer, which is that it is essentially left entirely to the jury -- is among the most well-settled principles of common-law evidence. See, e.g., Blackstone, Commentaries, 3:354 (1768) (&quot;All others are competent witnesses; though the jury from other circumstances will judge of their credibility.&quot;). Jury instructions therefore routinely advise jurors that they may consider a witness's prejudices for or against the defendant and conclude that his statements are not reliable, whether because he is lying or simply too biased to reliably remember the events in question. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S. Ct. 465, 469 (1984) (&quot;Bias is a term used in the 'common law of evidence' to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or fear of a party, or by the witness' self-interest.&quot;). You can follow the trail of cases supporting this position quite a ways back. I stopped when I reached Honegger v. Wettstein, 94 N.Y. 252 (1883), a case where a manufacturer sued members of a firm that had bought its goods but never paid. At trial, a principal of the firm testified about the invoiced amount to be paid, and because the testimony was uncontradicted, the judge ordered a directed verdict in favor of the buyers. But the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the credibility of a biased witness's testimony must be left to the jury: Although not contradicted, he was an interested party, and had a direct interest in increasing the fund in the hands of the receiver, and in preventing its payment to the plaintiffs. His evidence was given for the purpose of showing the alleged violation of law by the plaintiffs, and in explanation of the three invoices which were made of the goods, of which duplicates were made, and it was a fair question for the jury to say whether he might not have been influenced by the circumstances stated. Ten years later, the Supreme Court addressed your question a bit more directly. In Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301 (1895), a defendant who took the stand was convicted after the trial court told the jury that &quot;Where the witness has a direct personal interest in the result of the suit the temptation is strong to color, pervert, or withhold the facts.&quot; But the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that &quot;the court may, and sometimes ought, to remind the jury that interest creates a motive for false testimony.&quot; Modern courts permit, but do not require, instructions highlighting a specific witness's bias. These cases of course deal with witnesses who have a bias in favor of a party, but the rule is no different in cases where a witness, as in your question, admits to a bias against a party. In United States v. Coleman, 887 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1989), for instance, a defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit arson. Because the only direct evidence of his agreement to the arson was testimony from a witness &quot;who admitted a bias against defendant,&quot; he sought a judgment of acquittal, but the trial court denied his motion and sent the case to a jury. The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction, holding that it was up to the jury to decide whether the witness was credible: As defendant points out on appeal, Boscaglia's credibility was very much in issue at trial, but the jury resolved the issue against defendant. The jury's decision on &quot;the credibility of witnesses is not reviewable on appeal.&quot; Although such instructions are allowed, this does not mean that a court is always required to give an instruction addressing the credibility of a specific witness. Depending on who the witness is biased for/against, there are likewise cases saying that no instruction was necessarily required, Kovacich v. Spearman, No. 2:13-cv-0985 KJM DAD P, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108233 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015) (denying habeas claim by defendant who unsuccessfully sought jury instructions highlighting the bias of the investigating officer), or that such an instruction is a bad idea but not disallowed, United States v. Jones, 372 F. App'x 343, 345 (3d Cir. 2010) (&quot;While such an instruction that singles out the defendant's interest in the case is not advisable, we find that here it did not constitute reversible error.&quot;). I haven't found any saying that such an instruction was a reversible error, though I suspect that there are cases out there in which verdicts were reversed because the judge went overboard in suggesting to a jury how much credibility they should extend an admittedly biased witness.
The terminology used may vary some by jurisdiction, but in many it will be said that Bob provoked the confrontation, or that Bob was the aggressor, or that Bob was engaged in a felony and so cannot claim self-defense. This fact patter is highly unlikely to arise in real lie, because if Bob has even a half-competent lawyer, the issue of self-defense, sure to fail, will not be raised. Doing so only wastes the court's time, and may well make them think worse of Bob, which may cost him. In less open-and-shut cases, the general rule is that one who provokes a confrontation, or who is the aggressor, may not claim self-defense. But the exact rule varies by jurisdiction, and the line will be drawn in different ways in different jurisdictions. In some one who seeks a confrontation may be denied a right of self-defense.
Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581.
Falsification of evidence, forgery of documents, destruction of evidence (which is called &quot;spoliation&quot;), giving false testimony under oath or otherwise, and all manner of other similar conduct can make it hard to impose civil liability in the court system (or to prevent its imposition when it isn't called for), and does happen from time to time. Sometimes it is more blatant and verifiable. Other times it involves testimony that you know is clearly false but proving that is difficult or impossible. In my experience, medical malpractice defendants who are medical doctors routinely lie in testimony in ways that are non-verifiable, but very rarely falsify documents or provide false testimony regarding verifiable facts, frequently setting up a credibility fight for a finder of fact (i.e. judge in bench trial or jury in a jury trial). Medical doctors tend to be more honest and use fewer fraudulent litigation tactics than law enforcement officers sued in civil rights actions, but are less honest on average than business managers who are in commercial litigation who aren't in sales, and also less honest on average than professionals in mechanical and engineering fields. Fraudulent litigation conduct tends to be more common when the alleged wrongdoing is emotionally charged and personal. Judges usually take great pains to refrain from calling any witness out for lying, unless there is unequivocal evidence that an intentional lie, rather than a situation where a failure of memory or misperception led to a disputed issue of fact. This kind of conduct almost never gives rise to criminal charges when it does happen in civil litigation. It often leads to sanctions against the litigant who uses this tactic in the context of the court case (often quite draconian ones) and it sometimes leads to ethical complaints against an attorney for someone who does this (or who does this personally) knowing that it is being done in the case, often resulting in a lengthy suspension of a license to practice law or disbarment. The consequences of this kind of conduct can be career ending and economically unsurvivable when a court feels that someone has done so. I've seen awards in excess of $1 billion in lawsuits involving large publicly held companies where this has been documented. Identifying cases where this happens is more art than science, and often involves a healthy amount of good luck. There is no one strategy involved in identifying it, but seeking the same information from multiple sources and finding inconsistent results, noticing subtle irregularities in documents, understanding the context of the situation and what usually happens when people are honest, are among the methods used. It is very difficult to defeat this fraudulent efforts to present false evidence, and even when falsification is discovered it is often discovered at such a late stage that it may be difficult or impossible to remedy the harm done. It is always more expensive to deal with these kinds of tactics, although the magnitude of the extra costs varies wildly. Most of the time, it is never discovered at all unless the stakes in the case are so high that extraordinary efforts to leave no stone unturned are justified economically in the litigation. There are tactics that can be taken to reduce the likelihood of misconduct (like securing access to documentation and taking witness statements as soon as possible and ideally before a records custodian realizes its significance), but none are foolproof. A fairly typical example of this was in a securities fraud case that I once represented plaintiffs in, in which the defendant submitted one set of bank statements in response to discovery requests from us, and the same bank statements obtained by subpoena directly from the bank revealed that the defendant had photoshopped years of bank statements in an effort to deceive the plaintiffs. Generally speaking, the larger the bureaucracies involved in the case, and the more people who were involved in the situation, the harder it is to get away with something along these lines. For example, in a medical malpractice case, an instance of malpractice that happens in the office of a doctor who practices alone with only one staff person who is also her husband, demonstrated by a single in house document is much easier to cover up with fraud than a pattern of conduct in a large health care provider network involving encounters with dozens of professionals at multiple large hospitals generating thousands of pages of documentation, and managed by third-party administrators. Ultimately, there is only so much you can do to hedge against the risk that parties to lawsuits will engage in fraudulent conduct. But, because of the dire consequences that arise when someone is caught red handed doing so, this kind of litigation conduct is very rare. While false or misleading testimony on &quot;squishy&quot; issues of motive or opinion, or on impossible to verify points like recollections of unrecorded conversations, happens in perhaps one in five or so actively litigated cases, outright fraudulent tactics of the kinds discussed in the OP probably happens in significantly less than one case in twenty actively litigated cases, but probably does happen in at least one actually actively litigated case in two hundred cases. In the absence of omniscience, or Wonder Woman's lasso of truth, this is the best that lawyers and the judicial system can do. This kind of conduct is sufficiently rare that it doesn't materially upset the usefulness of the legal system for seeking recourse in civil actions. There are backstops like bankruptcy that exist, in part, in recognition of the fact that courts sometimes reach unjust results. Far more cases are wrongly decided due to attorney or judicial incompetence in cases with a complete absence of fraudulent litigation conduct, or from the misguided whims and misunderstandings of juries in cases with a complete absence of fraudulent litigation misconduct, than are wrongly decided as a result of successful fraudulent litigation misconduct. Also, even when fraudulent tactics are used in litigation and aren't caught, these tactics don't always turn the tide in favor of the party using them in litigation, because the people who use those kinds of tactics often don't have a good understanding of what facts are and are not legally important in their cases. It also isn't uncommon for fraudulent litigation tactics to be used in cases where the person employing them is actually in the right on the merits in the absence of these tactics, even though they are unscrupulous when it comes to their responses to accusations of wrongdoing. So, fraudulent litigation conduct doesn't always do substantive harm in the sense of producing a wrong judicial outcome, even when it is successful.
If the government withholds information that is pertinent to the credibility of a witness is that cause for a mistrial? Only if the error is not harmless under the standard applicable to evaluating harmless error in criminal cases (there is a voluminous case law on that point). Basically, it means that a new trial may be held and a conviction vacated on a charge against a particular defendant if there is a reasonable possibility that the withheld evidence, when considered in light of the total picture of evidence presented at trial, might have changed the outcome on guilt or innocence. Does whether the government knowingly or unknowingly withheld this information influence whether a mistrial will be granted? Not really. Knowledge is imputed. If someone in the prosecution team including the police knows, then it is known to the entire team for Brady purposes. If no one knew that it had the information (e.g. a key exculpatory document in possession of the prosecution was misfiled in one of dozens of bankers boxes of documents that it seized in a search and no one reviewed those particular boxes knowing to look for a document like that one or attuned to its potential significance, since it wasn't supposed to be in the place where it was filed), then it hasn't been withheld in the Brady sense unless someone specifically asked for the information in question with enough specificity that it could have been located if they looked at what they already had. The knowledge that must be disclosed is what the prosecutor's office or the police the prosecutor's office is working with knows. So, if a beat cop hides exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor's office, that is a Brady violation, but if the cops do a sloppy investigation that fails to reveal exculpatory evidence that is out there to be found, it isn't a Brady violation. Likewise, if a cop in another department halfway across the state knows something that impacts the credibility of a witness and the prosecutor is totally unaware of the existence of that information as are all the cops working on the case, then that isn't a Brady violation. What If It Isn't A Brady Violation? Exculpatory evidence discovered after the trial that isn't a Brady violation not to disclose may still be grounds for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence in a motion for post-trial relief. But, the standard to get the court to grant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence that was not withheld in a Brady violation is much more stringent than the mere harmless error standard. Instead: With a single exception, criminal defendants in the United States seeking a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are required to establish only that the new evidence makes it more likely than not that, in a new trial, they would be acquitted. Ohio requires clear and convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. There's a lot of case law on what constitutes newly discovered evidence which is &quot;new, material evidence that was unavailable at the time of the original trial[.]&quot; If evidence was available, but not used at trial, it can't be presented in a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Often this means that it can't be considered even if the salience of the evidence previously available is only clear later in the light of other evidence that is genuinely newly discovered, or the defense attorney's failure to use that evidence in the first trial was negligent to a level constituting legal malpractice.
The general rule is that in the opening statement, the lawyer may describe what he expects the evidence and testimony to show: We will present Mr Smith, who will tell you that he saw the defendant miles away at the time of the crime But cannot make statements of fact as such. I don't see why this rule would be different for a pro se defendant. In a closing argument, as i understand the rule, the lawyer may and often will say things like "As witness X testified, there was no time to stop" but is not supposed to introduce new alleged facts not supported by the evidence. However, in a closing, a lawyer can and often does draw conclusions from facts supported by testimony. "My client was proved to have been in the next town 20 minutes earleri, so obviously he could not have committed the crime." Again, i don't see any reason why these rules would be different for someone acting pro se.
While @jqning is absolutely correct in stating that truth is always an "absolute defense" to a claim of defamation, keep in mind that truth can be a subjective thing. What is one person's version of the truth, may not be another's, even with regard to the same exact experience. Also, while "statements of opinion are not defamation" is typically regarded as true, it has very broad exceptions and is not something that can be relied on in isolation. Defamation is generally defined as a false, published statement that is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation. An online posting, even on an obscure website, will likely be seen by a few people, thus satisfying the publication requirement. A plaintiff cannot succeed in his or her online defamation claim if the defendant's defamatory statement is true. So, for example, if a customer posts a review of your restaurant on Trip Advisor claiming that there were roaches crawling around, you may sue them for defamation. You would then have to prove that there was no roach infestation, and thus, the defendant's statement was false. However, what if there was only one? What if he has a witness who saw it? His truth may be different from yours, and it is up to the trier of fact to decide. Also, getting sued, whether or not you prevail, is at minimum a pain and can be a very expensive ordeal. Opinions are exempt? OK: Following that line of reasoning, restaurant owner shows he's had monthly inspections and prophylactic measures to ensure against pests and the exterminator testifies. The defendant, fearing he's in trouble now, claims that his assertion of roach infestation was just his opinion based on his experience. Opinions are privileged under the law of defamation, right? Not always! Importantly, an opinion may be viewed, generally, as a statement of fact (employing the "reasonable person" standard) if it is something that is either provable or disprovable. What this means is that if the reasonable person would construe your statement to be factual, and not mere opinion, it will be deemed as such and if untrue then you're liable for defamation. The courts may interpret, "I think that [restaurant] has a roach infestation problem," as a statement of fact. This has occurred in numerous cases where people think they can say what they want as long as they couch it as an opinion, with words like "I think..." or "In my opinion...". But when someone says something that factual in opinion form, that is not protected. So, if Jane says, "In my opinion Joe Schmoe is a pedophile..." without absolute proof that Joe is, in fact, a pedophile, then this is libelous (defamation if published or spoken to another). This is because the statement in and of itself is one of "verifiable fact couched in opinion" and it is so damaging to Joe's reputation that if it's not true it is libel per se (defamatory if published &ndash; meaning shared). A statement of verifiable fact is a statement that conveys a provably false factual assertion, such as someone has committed murder or has cheated on his spouse. While the law varies some, and sometimes substantially, from state to state, here are some often used examples arising from California courts. Libelous (when false): Charging someone with being a communist (in 1959) Calling an attorney a "crook" Describing a woman as a call girl Accusing a minister of unethical conduct Accusing a father of violating the confidence of son Not-libelous: Calling a political foe a "thief" and "liar" in chance encounter (because hyperbole in context) Calling a TV show participant a "local loser," "chicken butt" and "big skank" Calling someone a "bitch" or a "son of a bitch" Changing product code name from "Carl Sagan" to "Butt Head Astronomer" Since libel is considered in context, do not take these examples to be a hard and fast rule about particular phrases. Generally, the non-libelous examples are hyperbole or opinion, while the libelous statements are stating a defamatory fact. Modified photos that can be shown to scandalize persons or businesses are clearly defamation, and are quite popular on social media. So, for example, if you threw the flyers (I assume you didn't but as an example) all over, and then photographed and published your opinion about the business littering neighborhoods, this would be libelous. The less obvious and absurd the modification, the more likely it is that a court will find it defamatory. So, a picture of a woman with a man's naked torso photoshopped on will not be defamatory, a version photoshopped showing what is to be purported to be her naked body, is. In your case, you face two issues that you should ask yourself: Is your opinion really verifiable (or non-verifiable) facts couched in words that try to make it opinion, or is it truly just your opinion. If fact, is it absolutely true? If the answer is yes, it's fact and yes, it's absolutely true, you're OK. Keep in mind though what I mentioned about truths differing: What if the business didn't know they were put there, or, what if they were placed on cars in a public place and blew in the wind? That could be a problem. While you are most likely fine, you may want to just say, X business's fliers are all over the place, littering the neighborhood and (assuming you called and asked them to pick them up, or wrote them) they refuse to pick up the litter. It sounds like the statements you made are fine, because you don't say that the business littered, or that they put them there; you say they are "plastered" all over, but you don't accuse them openly. That isn't to say it wouldn't be found to suggest fact that they would have to show isn't true (or that they didn't get permission from the property owner). My point is only that, in general, be careful. If he felt that you misrepresented what he did by way of distributing fliers, or if he thought you doctored the photo or set it up, he could sue you if he felt it damaged his business's reputation.
Child Sexual abuse - can you jail person just based on what child said? Under U.S. law, yes. There is no proof whatsoever about this, no facts, or witnesses Testimony of a witness is evidence. There is a witness, the child, and another witness, the psychologist, who heard the child and testified. Those are facts and witnesses. Assuming that an exception to the hearsay rule and confrontation clause can be secured (which it certainly can for purposes of a probable cause determination to make an arrest and sometimes can and sometimes can't for purposes of a conviction), what the child said can be presented through the psychologist, which is admissible evidence. The fact that something was said by a child does not make it not evidence, nor does it make it inadmissible. The rules governing when hearsay is admissible as evidence are arcane at best and very circumstance dependent. A jury can choose to believe that any particular item of evidence is sufficiently credible to constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility and weight are for a jury, not for the judge and not for an appellate court.