Is growing and consuming plants a “natural right” in the United States? The Declaration of Independence says: ”We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are not part of the Bill of Rights, but they are recognized as unalienable rights. The Ninth Amendment of the Constitution says: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. So we have many other rights besides those included in the Bill of Rights. Even in the Bill of Rights, we are told we have a natural right to “bear arms” and that it shall not be infringed, so it seems self-evident that growing and consuming plants would surely be a natural right. Is growing and consuming plants a natural human right in the United States?
US constitutional law does not refer to "natural rights", it refers to "fundamental rights". This enters into the doctrine of strict scrutiny vs. lesser scrutinies. If the US Constitution specifically names it, it is a fundamental right: bearing arms, speaking and worshiping freely, protections against search and seizure and so on. The Supreme Court can also recognize a right as being fundamental, even if it is not directly protected in the Constitution; for example there is no explicit provision protecting the right to self defense, interstate travel, marriage, privacy and freedom of contract, but these are or have been treated as fundamental rights. Sometimes a fundamental right can be downgraded, such as the right to freedom of contract. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, the right to contract is taken to be a case of the right to liberty. The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power. Liberty of contract relating to labor includes both parties to it; the one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell labor. But later, in Chicago, B. &amp; Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, the court backpedaled a bit and said that it was recognized in the cases cited, as in many others, that freedom of contract is a qualified, and not an absolute, right. There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from legislative supervision that wide department of activity which consists of the making of contracts, or deny to government the power to provide restrictive safeguards. Liberty implies the absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 relied on this to essentially overturn Lochner (without expressly saying so). Parrish agred to work for less than state minimum wage, then sued for the difference. This court dismissed the supposed fundamental right to contract saying: In each case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Sometimes, a fundamental right is explicitly recognized and relied on in a court ruling, such as the right to privacy in Union Pacific v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, where the court said that No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge Cooley; "The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity: to be let alone." Note that the ruling does not call it a "fundamental right", but the notion of fundamentality is clearly there in the ruling. Other examples are the right to marry (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1): The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and survival. Also, the right to chose to use contraceptives is a fundamental right (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 – note how this depends on and elaborates the right to privacy) If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. Roe v. Wade also relies on the right to privacy. The court notes that "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy", and then lays out how it is implicit in the Constitution. There is a vast area of actions that might reasonably be taken to be fundamental rights, but have not been ruled on one way or the other. If (in some bizarre dystopian future scenario) a law were passed that made it a crime to grow and use plants, it would not be surprising if SCOTUS ruled that such a law violates a fundamental right, but it almost certainly would be something much more general than "growing plants". Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 already spells trouble for a supposed fundamental right to grow plants. In this case, appellee grew wheat, but the growing of wheat (and a few other crops) were subject to federal regulation. The court ruled that The effect of the Act is to restrict the amount of wheat which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing for his own needs. The Commerce Clause of the Constitution authorizes Congress to limit interstate commerce. Even though Filburn was not selling the wheat to another state, he also was not buying it from another state, and he was thus (minutely) affecting interstate commerce: that the production of wheat for consumption on the farm may be trivial in the particular case is not enough to remove the grower from the scope of federal regulation where his contribution, taken with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. Another indication that there is no absolute fundamental right to grow plants is Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, which held (relying on Wickard) that "Congress' Commerce Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law".
A state's criminal jurisdiction normally applies to acts committed in that state's territory. So if you consume something in state A, you can't be charged in state B for violating state B's prohibition against consuming that thing. However, if state B has a prohibition against public intoxication, and you enter its territory while intoxicated, you could be charged for violating state B's prohibition on public intoxication. The fact that you're crossing state lines also increases the possibility that the federal government would want to get involved; the location of the federal prosecution could be in either state, although neither state's court system would be involved.
States have a general police power, meaning that they can pass laws about whatever they want unless there's a specific reason they can't. A state does not have to give special justification for why something is in the realm of stuff they can regulate; someone challenging it has to say what specific section of the Constitution it violates. For a time, the Due Process clause of the US Constitution was considered to imply freedom of contract. This time ended in the 1930s. The doctrine of a constitutionally protected freedom of contract is pretty much completely dead. A state can't abridge the freedom of contract for no reason, but that's because just about any law needs some reason to be allowed. The level of review is that the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest; this is not a very demanding level of review. Source State bar associations are given power by laws making it illegal to practice law without being a member of the bar and requiring licensed lawyers to comply with bar rules. State bars that control admission to practice are generally government agencies (specifically, agencies of the court system). When the state bar is not a government agency, attorney discipline and licensing is handled by a government agency (lawyers might have to join the bar, but the bar has to accept licensed lawyers as members; the bar's power in these cases is limited to recommendations to the courts).
Generally, &quot;yes&quot;, but it isn't a constitutional or federal right. It is a right that flows from the right of the owner of real property to determine who is allowed on real property, and the fact that generally speaking, a concealed weapon carrier isn't a protected class that cannot be discriminated against. Thus, while this is the default rule in the U.S. and the predominant rule in the U.S., a state has the authority to prohibit businesses that are otherwise &quot;public accommodations&quot; from discriminating against concealed weapon holders if a state wishes to do so. I wouldn't be surprised if there were some exceptions, either for all concealed weapon holders, or for some subclass of them (e.g. undercover police officers). For example, a law review note, a.k.a. student written law review article, cited in the comments notes that some states require a business owner to post a sign prohibiting concealed carry in order to have the right to remove someone from the premises of their business for this reason.
The Meme is Incorrect Law enforcement in the united-states may disturb or dig up plants that are listed as endangered species while unearthing evidence of a serious crime. 16 U.S. Code § 1538 subsection (a) ,(2) provides that: (2) Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any endangered species of plants listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title, it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to— ... (B) remove and reduce to possession any such species from areas under Federal jurisdiction; maliciously damage or destroy any such species on any such area; or remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy any such species on any other area in knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State or in the course of any violation of a State criminal trespass law; Digging up a member (or members) of an endangered plant species during a legitimate criminal investigation as part of a focused search for evidence would not be to &quot;maliciously damage or destroy&quot; them, nor would it be in &quot;knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State&quot;. This notion (that evidence is safe if buried under endangered plants) misunderstands what is prohibited by the law.
This is an important question that affects consumer advocacy, blog-based-journalism, political speech and spending, and probably other things. People disagree about what the answer is. This podcast episode features both sides of the argument. Professor Volokh holds the view that the freedom of the press is "freedom to print", "freedom to use the printing press". Freedom of the press is the freedom of everybody to use the printing press. Assessing the grammar of the clause, he argues that this points in the same direction. The text says "freedom of speech or of the press". He points out that speech is not a group of people. It would be odd to treat "speech" as an activity, but to treat "press" as a group of people given the parallel construction. This side of the argument is described more in this article by Prof. Volokh. Professor West argues that there is a defined group of people called "the press" that deserves protection under this clause. This article explains Prof. West's position in detail. The main point is that "An expansive definition of the press means virtually complete overlap between press and speech and thus no meaningful way to interpret the Press Clause." If "press" means simply the right to publish speech, then it becomes redundant because courts have held the right to publish speech is given under that "speech" portion of the clause. Justice Stevens's concurrence in Citizens United also argued for "some kinds of identity-based distinctions" regarding whether a person is a member of the press. Each side can give examples of the term "the press" being used at the time of the First Amendment that is consistent with their favored interpretation. I think to get the best idea of the two sides to this question, you should read Citizens United (including all dissents and concurrences), read the two articles linked above, and listen to the podcast episode.
"Public space" is not a relevant criteria when considering trespass or other crimes/torts against property. The relevant criteria is who owns it and what they allow you to do on it. All land in the USA is owned by someone. That someone may be a government; that does not make it a public space - Camp David is owned by the US government; it is certainly not public. The owner of the land can decide (subject to the law) who has access to their land and in what circumstances. If they erect a fence then they are saying "You cannot access my land here" - if you ignore this then you are trespassing. This is true even if there are legitimate ways to access the land i.e. there is a place where there isn't a fence; to avoid trespass you would have to access the land from there. If you think of this in terms of a public building like a courthouse you are free to enter through the unlocked front doors but not by climbing through a window. The trespass is in the act of crossing the fence - that is the act that you have been implicitly denied permission to do. Being on one side or the other is not trespass. For the specific image that you show it is quite likely that those roads are owned by different people - the highway is probably owned by the state while the cul-de-sac is a local government road.
The 5th amendment protects you from self-incrimination. If by possessing a firearm you are in violation of the law you cannot be compelled by law to reveal this information. If the police discover you have a gun in violation of the law you can be arrested and prosecuted for that offense. They cannot additionally prosecute you for not telling them about a gun. I thought there was a supreme court case about this specific situation, but the closest I can find for now is Haynes v. United States. The 7-1 majority held that people prohibited from possessing firearms cannot be compelled to register their firearms that they are possessing illegally. They are stopped by the police and asked this question. They answer truthfully. Then they can be arrested and prosecuted for the illegal possession of the gun. How does this square with the right not to self-incriminate? Or is asking the question considered to be a search? Police can generally ask whatever they want. If you choose to waive your 5th amendment rights, that's your mistake. Can the state prosecute this person for carrying the illegal weapon? The state can generally prosecute crimes it knows about. So yes, in this case they can. Suppose that next to the weapon a stash of illegal drugs is discovered, which was only found due to the action taken to secure the weapon. Can the state prosecute for that? The state can generally prosecute additional crimes it uncovers during investigations or other lawful actions. So yes, this can be prosecuted.