Legal definitions differentiating &#39;corporation&#39; and &#39;private estate&#39; in relation to Duchy of Cornwall The Duchy of Cornwall is classified as a 'private estate' and therefore is exempt from corporation and capital gains tax. Investopedia defines a corporation as 'a legal entity that is separate and distinct from its owners and has many of the same rights and responsibilities as individuals.' The Duchy's 2014 financial statements here say (page 28) 'The Duchy is not subject to Corporation Tax as it is not a separate legal entity for tax purposes.' However, the Organisation 'Republic' claims here that 'The Duchy is wrong to claim it is not a legal person or to suggest it does not exist separately from the Duke of Cornwall.' A full list of reasons they believe this is on the link above but some include: The Duchy’s 1997 financial statements state that “The Duchy of Cornwall is a body created by charter in 1337&quot; transactions between the Duchy and the Duke (ie. Duke paying rent to Duchy, Duchy purchasing timber from the Duke) An employee described himself to the Information Rights Tribunal as “in effect, the Chief Executive Officer” The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) issued an improvement notice against the Duchy of Cornwall under Section 21 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. If the Duchy was not a legal person in its own right the HSE would have had no power to issue the notice against it The Environmental Agency has granted more than fifteen environmental permits to the Duchy of Cornwall, which could only have been granted to a legal person What is correct here - the Duchy's claim or Republic's claim?
As a matter of law, the Duchy is correct, because a superior court of record agreed, and dismissed the arguments made on the other side. The cited claims from Republic come from a case in the First-Tier Tribunal (EA/2010/0182) about whether the Duchy was a &quot;public authority&quot; for the purpose of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. The FTT said that it was, since either the Duchy or the Duke were carrying out certain functions of public administration (as the harbour authority for St Mary's Harbour on the Isles of Scilly), and whichever one it was, the Duke was in charge of the Duchy; and meanwhile, the Duchy appeared to have some elements of legal personality, as cited in the question above. This decision was appealed to the Upper Tribunal, The A-G for the Prince of Wales v the IC and Mr Michael Bruton [2016] UKUT 0154 (AAC), which disagreed as to the Duchy being a body with its own separate identity - see paragraphs 71-102 - and reversed the ruling below. The basic issue is that the Duchy of Cornwall was brought into being by a royal charter of 1337. It predates modern common-law or statutory developments about bodies corporate, income tax, corporation tax, and so on. It also precedes the not-exactly-modern developments of the limited scope of royal authority and the prerogative, norms of statutory construction, the Crown as separate from the royal person, and other apparatus of constitutional monarchy. It is true that it sits uncomfortably in the modern world, as a sui generis feudal creation that is not something we would create today. However, as a matter of law, the UT said that what counts is what the Duchy is, not what it ought to be. Figuring out the law means looking at the actual law as opposed to ancillary indications, such as what Duchy officers have said from time to time, or administrative actions of the Health and Safety Executive. Parliament has had the opportunity to consider the position of the Duchy several times and has so far declined to change it. The charter of 1337, which was deemed to be an Act of Parliament by a court case in 1606 (!), grants land and privileges to the Duke of Cornwall, whoever that might be from time to time, and with a reverter to the Crown when there is no Duke. The UT found that this &quot;creates something that has similarities to a trust, but without trustees&quot; (there was a nascent body of law relating to trusts in 1337, but it was nowhere near its modern flourishing). Unlike with the creation of the Duchy of Lancaster, this charter does not incorporate the Duchy as an entity in its own right - the &quot;Duchy&quot; is just a word used to describe the possessions of the Duke or King held under the charter. If it is a separate entity then that is not because of the charter. The UT examined various of the claims made in the FTT but rejected them, saying that &quot;such examples cannot create such an entity or body and each investigation of the submissions based on them that took place before me showed such statements or implications to be wrong (e.g. that the Duchy owns Highgrove was shown to be wrong by the production of the Land Certificate).&quot; It also rejected the idea that the people who administer the Duchy could be regarded as some form of partnership or unincorporated association, finding that they had not come together in that fashion. It said that therefore, the only remaining route to the Duchy being a corporation would be if the other primary legislation dealing with its management had created it as such by &quot;necessary implication&quot;. Those Acts, of 1844, 1863 and 1982, deal with accounting and management for the Duchy of Cornwall. From their context and content, the UT said that they seem to envisage the property in question as belonging to the Duke (not the Duchy) as &quot;the legal owner of the assets etc. comprising the Duchy estate&quot;, and that &quot;the relevant officers and employees work for the Duke, or the Duke’s guardian when he is a minor, or the Sovereign when there is no Duke, and not for an entity or corporation called the Duchy.&quot; Therefore: [T]he Duchy of Cornwall or the Duchy is no more than a name that has been used correctly to describe the possessions of the Duke of Cornwall (the Duchy estate), or to the Duke (or his title), or collectively and conveniently to describe the officers and persons who from time to time act for and on behalf of the Duke as the owner of the Duchy estate. Save to the extent that it is a reference to the Duke as a natural person the Duchy of Cornwall has no legal personality and is not a person, body or entity that has its own functions and powers or a separate identity of its own. Although this was not before the UT, it would seem to follow for tax purposes that if the Duchy is not a body corporate, then it is not liable for corporation tax under the Corporation Tax Act 2010 - see section 1121, which defines &quot;company&quot; for that and the companion Corporation Tax Act 2009. It also does not fall within section 443, &quot;Companies controlled by or on behalf of Crown&quot;, firstly because if it's not a company, then that section fails immediately, and secondly because &quot;Crown&quot; here refers to the Crown in the sense of governmental public functions, not the Queen (or her family members) personally.
The ECHR protocols are not meant (and not generally understood) to prohibit taxation or fines by the state in accordance with the rule of law. See e.g. this explanation by the Council of Europe. As to the specific question, this explanation enumerates shares and leases as property, and the text makes it clear that bank accounts or cash would also be covered: [...] in the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or penalties; [...]
You don’t need a company to run a business As an individual (sole-trader) you can operate a business, hire employees and contractors and do everything else a business does. The purpose of a company is to separate and protect your personal assets from your business assets. As a sole-trader you are personally responsible for all the liabilities of the business - if it goes bust, you go bust. If the business is operated by a company, then, providing you and the company follow the law, your personal assets are not at risk if the company becomes insolvent.
A person can be a shareholder or director of a UK company without being in the UK. Being a shareholder or director of a UK company does not give a person a right to be in the UK. The 3C leave extension is unrelated to this. A person with 3C leave may remain in the UK on that basis regardless of whether the person is a shareholder or director of a company. Attending "board-level meetings" is an activity that is allowed under the visitor rules, even if the director is paid (see V4.7), so one may conclude that doing so does not constitute "work." It should therefore be permitted for someone under 3C leave even if the person is not authorized to work. Doing work for the company other than attending meetings would not be permitted until the person gains authorization to work.
Yes. It is fairly common for there to be one owner at law, but another person who has a beneficial interest - such as a long-term cohabiting partner. This may arise because the parties set it up that way, or perhaps more often when courts find that there is a &quot;constructive trust&quot; or a &quot;resulting trust&quot;. See for example the concurring opinion of Lord Hope of Craighead in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17, Parties are, of course, free to enter into whatever bargain they wish and, so long as it is clearly expressed and can be proved, the court will give effect to it. But for the rest the state of the legal title will determine the right starting point. The onus is then on the party who contends that the beneficial interests are divided between them otherwise than as the title shows to demonstrate this on the facts. The resulting court process may find that the beneficial interest exists, or not, and what fraction of the property it represents. It's common to find situations where one party put up most or all of the whole purchase price of a house, which was then registered in both names, and they then disagree about whether it should be split 50-50 or otherwise - that's an example of the beneficial ownership differing in proportion from the (equal) legal ownership. (See Jones v Kernott [2011] UKSC 53 at paragraph 51 for an explanation of this particular pattern.) The same sort of case arises when a cohabiting partner does not own the house, but still contributes to the mortgage and other bills - then, depending on the facts at hand, there may be a &quot;constructive trust&quot;, and the partner is entitled to a share of the sale price of the house even though they are not its legal owner. A &quot;resulting trust&quot; might arise when someone contributed money for the purchase of the property, even though they didn't end up as a registered owner, but the parties acted in other respects as if they were joint owners.
It does not need to be expressly defined in statute in order to be legally effective. Courts have no trouble interpreting ordinary words used in their conventional way. And there is no other definition that could work instead, considering the full body of law that (1) intends to apply to the whole of the United Kingdom, (2) often distinguishes between &quot;Great Britain&quot; and &quot;Northern Ireland&quot;, (3) often distinguishes between &quot;England&quot;, &quot;Wales&quot;, &quot;Scotland&quot; and &quot;Northern Ireland&quot;, (4) treats &quot;Great Britain&quot; as synonymous with England, Wales and Scotland, and (5) often uses &quot;Great Britain&quot; without further ceremony, as if it's a term that doesn't need to be explained. It is helpful that legislation (at least in the modern era) is consistent about the view that &quot;Great Britain&quot; refers precisely to England, Wales and Scotland all together. By virtue of the Interpretation Act 1978, &quot;United Kingdom&quot; means Great Britain and Northern Ireland. from which we may deduce immediately that Great Britain means the United Kingdom except for Northern Ireland. There is no sibling '&quot;Great Britain&quot; means...' clause, but construing it any other way than the normal meaning would not work. From the combined definitions of &quot;England&quot;, &quot;Wales&quot;, &quot;British Islands&quot;, etc. - which by reference, also deal with such historically doubtful areas as Berwick and Monmouthshire - there is no other way to interpret the term &quot;Great Britain&quot; without distorting the required meaning of &quot;United Kingdom&quot;. Including too much or too little in &quot;Great Britain&quot; would give the wrong result, in particular for statutory extent clauses that refer to the whole United Kingdom and ought not to accidentally leave out Cornwall or include Hanover. We do not need to go as far as the Acts of Union, which is lucky since that would entangle us in concerns about whether &quot;England&quot; includes &quot;Wales&quot;, or other historical anomalies that are not relevant in current law. I would treat the Acts of Union as giving added force to the conventional meaning, rather than being the source of that meaning, since there are uses of the term which seem to be more about Great Britain considered as a place than the political entity. For example, the Food Safety Act 1990 s.18(3) talks about &quot;any food which has not previously been used for human consumption in Great Britain&quot;, which seems to talk more about the food culture of the place, even predating the Acts of Union, than about the Kingdom of Great Britain or its successors. The term &quot;Great Britain&quot; is frequently used in statutes in the customary way. For example, The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 s.28 creates a &quot;Great Britain register&quot; and a &quot;Northern Ireland register&quot; of political parties, and s.38(1)(3)(b) provides for the &quot;Great Britain register&quot; to cover precisely England, Scotland and Wales. The Northern Ireland Act 1998 s.87 is about provisions of UK social security law that operate differently in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Electricity Act 1989 (as amended) provides for the issue of &quot;GB certificates&quot; as opposed to &quot;NI certificates&quot;, and also defines &quot;the relevant part of Great Britain&quot; as meaning either &quot;England and Wales&quot; or &quot;Scotland&quot; (s.32M(1)). The Agriculture Act 2020 s.35 provides for a &quot;red meat levy&quot; to be paid between &quot;one country in Great Britain&quot; and &quot;another such country&quot;, and goes on in 35(8) to list the levy bodies for England, Scotland and Wales. So all of this points to the same common meaning as in everyday life. In court, for example, Lord Hoffman in Serco v Lawson [2006] UKHL 3 had to consider the Employment Rights Act 1996 s.196, since repealed, which governed &quot;work wholly or mainly outside Great Britain&quot;. (And by the way, in 196(1)(b) is a listing of &quot;England and Wales&quot; and &quot;Scotland&quot; as the two possible bodies of law relating to Great Britain.) In his judgement, he says: It is true that section 244(1) says that the Act &quot;extends&quot; to England and Wales and Scotland (&quot;Great Britain&quot;). But that means only that it forms part of the law of Great Britain and does not form part of the law of any other territory (like Northern Ireland or the Channel Islands) for which Parliament could have legislated. That is, he does not find it difficult to gloss the extent provision in 244(1), which doesn't include the exact words &quot;Great Britain&quot;, as actually referring to Great Britain. Other legislation refers to &quot;Great Britain&quot; as a locale, like the Wild Animals in Circuses Act 2019 which talks about &quot;an animal of a kind which is not commonly domesticated in Great Britain&quot;. This is a straightforward reference to the kind of activities typically going on in that location, treating it as the island(s) and not the political entity. The expression does not include the territorial sea, by default; some statutes include it, like the Gas Act 1986 s.5(9) which says: For the purposes of this section a place is within the jurisdiction of Great Britain if it is in Great Britain, in the territorial sea adjacent to Great Britain or in an area designated under section 1(7) of the Continental Shelf Act 1964. There are several other instances of particular statutes defining &quot;Great Britain&quot; to include adjacent waters, but they do not define the core concept of Great Britain otherwise. They do not need to.
This would be a co-operative society, or a 'co-op': A Co-operative Society is a membership organisation run for the mutual benefit of its members – serving their interests primarily by trading with them or otherwise providing them with goods, services and facilities – with any surplus usually being ploughed back into the organisation, although profits can be distributed to members. A Co-operative Society may or may not be a social enterprise, depending on its activities and how it distributes its profits. From A GUIDE TO LEGAL FORMS FOR BUSINESS, UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills What you describe would be known as a Housing Co-operative which are common in many countries. The NCDA are the US associated for Co-operatives.
Why do you think they have the same shareholders? There’s no reason to believe that they are related corporations just because they share an address. I am shareholder and director of 4 corporations. 3 have the same shareholders in the same proportion. The other has different shareholders. All of them have their registered office at my accountant’s premises. It’s a small suburban practice so there are probably only a few hundred companies at that address. A large city practice would have thousands or tens of thousands. The property management company probably provides the same service.