How many people can legally contest a given mandate at the same time in the United States? How many people can legally contest a given mandate at the same time in the United States? A lot of companies intend to legally contest the vaccine mandate that was announced by Biden. I am wondering if judges are allowed to reject some legal contests if too many individuals are contesting it. Sources &quot;State AG Promises Court Challenge of Federal Vaccine Mandate&quot; from US News &quot;A vaccine law expert explains the 3 most likely legal challenges Biden's federal vaccine mandate might face&quot; from Insider &quot;Current constitutional issues related to vaccine mandates&quot; from Constitution Daily &quot;Biden is requiring the vast majority of federal workers to get vaccinated or face disciplinary measures&quot; from the NY Times
As many parties as have standing. The First Amendment protects the right to petition for redress of grievances, so any limitation on that right would be highly disfavored. When there's a rush of cases like this, though, there are a few option for dealing with them. For instance, a plaintiff may seek class certification, permitting him to stand in for similarly situated parties so they don't need to litigate themselves, or a court may consolidate the cases if they are sufficiently similar.
In an extreme hypothetical situation: at a meeting where there is a quorum present, there are 50 members qualified to vote in attendance. An issue comes up for a vote, and 45 people abstain, 3 vote yes, 2 vote no. Would this pass 3 to 2, or is there some overriding part of &quot;majority present and voting&quot; that I am just not understanding? The measure would pass 3-2. The words mean what they say. Quorum requirements prevent the small number of people voting from being unfair.
The true answer is this is fundamentally unclear and ratification would definitely set up for a Supreme Court showdown. The Supreme Court would in my opinion need to resolve 3 issues: Are Congressionally imposed deadlines in resolutions proposing an amendment to the States for ratification binding? Does a state withdrawal of its ratification of an amendment annul its ratification of the amendment? Who decides when an amendment is ratified? For the first question this is perhaps the most unresolved question. Clearly if the deadline is imposed in the text of the amendment it is binding. For example, see the text of the 18th amendment, Section 3. What is not clear is what if any binding effect a deadline in the text of the resolution proposing an amendment has as to the validity of the proposed amendment. Article V makes no provision on such deadlines. In fact the most recent amendment ratified was submitted for ratification on September 25, 1789, but ratified May 5, 1992. In this instance the Archivist of the United States declared the amendment ratified, but Congress also acted to do so and several members scolded the Archivist for doing so before Congress acted. However, there was no resolution of who had to actually approve the ratification. For the second question there is absolutely no answer to this question except Coleman v. Miller which suggests this is a political question. This essentially means that the question should be resolved by Congress, not the courts. Lastly, for the third question see also my response to the first question. If Congress is indeed the ratifier, what happens if one Congress decides the amendment was not ratified, but a future one decides it was? Honestly, ratification of the ERA would open a whole can of worms and make it difficult to really resolve this issue. Probably the most direct method to force the Supreme Court to rule on this issue would be someone challenging their requirements to register with the Selective Service System.
No Once a state has accused a person and tried that person for a particular act or set of acts, the state can't later hold a different trial for the same act or acts. That is the Double Jeopardy rule (or the basics of it at least). Some limited exceptions: If a person is convicted and appeals, and the conviction is overturned, the appellate court may order a new trial. *If there is a mistrial, such as a hung jury (jury cannot agree) then there can be a new trial. If an act is both a state and a Federal crime (in the US) then both can have separate trials, and possibly two convictions. If the accused bribes the judge or jury, that trial will not count, and there may be a new trial. If an act is a crime in two different countries, each can have its own trial (but often they don't). If it is later discovered that the accused committed a quite different act than the one s/he was tried for, a new trial for that act may be possible. But otherwise, whether the accused is acquitted or convicted, only one trial for a given alleged crime. The state cannot later change its mind on what to charge the accused with for the act.
A good starting point would be the SCOTUS opinion, or everything on SCOTUSblog, especially the application for injunctive relief filed on Aug. 30. There is a long sequence of petitions and orders which ask the courts either to issue an injunction preventing the law from taking force, or to vacate an administrative stay of proceedings by the lower court regarding petitioner's challenge. The lower court denied the petitions, therefore petitioners turn to SCOTUS to get an injunction against the law. Then you can turn to the SCOTUS opinion to see what the reasons were, for and against the petition. The majority position is that an applicant must carry the burden of making a “strong showing” that it is “likely to succeed on the merits,” that it will be “irreparably injured absent a stay,” that the balance of the equities favors it, and that a stay is consistent with the public interest. The majority concludes that The applicants now before us have raised serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the Texas law at issue. But their application also presents complex and novel antecedent procedural questions on which they have not carried their burden. Immediately after this the court comments that federal courts enjoy the power to enjoin individuals tasked with enforcing laws, not the laws themselves. However, it is unclear whether the named defendants in this lawsuit can or will seek to enforce the Texas law against the applicants in a manner that might permit our intervention The law states that Any person, other than an officer or employee of a state or local governmental entity in this state, may bring a civil action against any person who and the named respondents (government workers of various sorts) all appear to be precluded from filing an action – thus an injunction against the judge is superfluous since he cannot file a lawsuit anyhow. It is also unclear whether SCOTUS can issue an injunction against state judges asked to decide a lawsuit under Texas’s law. When SCOTUS say &quot;it is unclear&quot; in this context, they mean that petitions did not adequately demonstrate that the court can in fact issue such an injunction. It's not that SCOTUS cannot decide such matters after extensive consideration of the facts / arguments and discussion, it's that the standards for an emergency action require something that the court found lacking in the petition: we cannot say the applicants have met their burden to prevail in an injunction or stay application. In reaching this conclusion, we stress that we do not purport to resolve definitively any jurisdictional or substantive claim in the applicants’ lawsuit.
That remains to be determined. This article (100 Tex. L. Rev. 56 (2021)) discusses the possibility. To start, the Constitution does not directly say that a sitting president cannot be prosecuted. The lack of an express presidential immunity and the fact that an attempt by Madison to create such an immunity is an indication of &quot;original intent&quot;. The view that an incumbent president cannot be indicted, prosecuted, convicted or punished is a policy stance set forth by the Dept. of justice, but is not constitutional law. Alito in Trump v. Vance points to some apparently negative consequences of allowing indictment of a sitting president, but this was in a dissenting opinion. Practical considerations of policy might argue for not prosecuting a sitting president, but the Constitution itself does not expressly forbid it. As we know from numerous SCOTUS rulings, the court is also capable of finding implicit support for a rule in the Constitution. For example theimpeachment provisions do not demand or even hint that impeachment must precede trial and punishment. An argument that prosecution would &quot;incapacitate&quot; the president is met with the fact that there is a provision for replacing an incapacitated POTUS with VPOTUS as acting president. The idea that a trial interferes with a person's ability to do their job (or that they can't adequately participate in their defense if they are doing their job) has not actually prevented ordinary people with jobs from being prosecuted for their crimes.
Federal countries usually define the separation (and sometimes sharing) of legislative competencies in their constitutions. There will also usually be a "default" case for if the competency is not explicitly defined in the constitution. For example, in the United States, the default is to give legislative power to the individual states via the Tenth Amendment. If criminal law is left to the sub-national entities, then the nation can usually still enact a penal code with respect to its competencies (again, the U.S. is a good example). So, I decided to make this a mini-research project by checking the countries Wikipedia lists as federations. I wasn't able to find an explicit statement as to whether there were competing penal codes in most cases, but was able to find in which level of government the constitution placed criminal law. In some cases where there are "competing" penal codes, the constitution specified which level has supremacy, making for less "competition". Without further ado, here's what I've been able to find. Links are either to an appropriate Wikipedia page, or the part of the applicable constitution dividing the legislative competencies. Take these with a grain of salt. Competing penal codes Australia Bosnia and Herzegovina Ethiopia India Iraq Mexico Nigeria Pakistan Sudan United States Single national penal code Austria Brazil Canada Comoros Germany Malaysia Nepal Russia Switzerland Venezuela Unclear Argentina Belgium Micronesia St. Kitts and Nevis Somalia South Sudan United Arab Emirates
It is difficult to keep track of the rapidly changing legal variables, but it would be illegal and unconstitutional for state police to set up an unauthorized stop-and-search checkpoint on the road ("due process" means "following the law"). As a prelude, there would have to be some higher authority that empowers them to do this. You would have to scrutinize the emergency powers legislation of every state to be certain, but no governor has the power to mandate blanket body searches in case of a medical emergency. (Martial law shifts enforcement of the law to the military, but doesn't generally create arbitrary decree-writing powers). The legal foundation of such searching would have to be a new law: then the question is what the law requires that could make on-the-road body searches constitutional. Since the right to be free of unreasonable searches is a fundamental constitutional right, this law would be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Searches "just for fun" will not pass such scrutiny, nor will "because it's an emergency" or "keep the public safe". Having the disease is not and cannot be a crime, so this law would have to be founded on a strict no-travel requirement. That brings the matter within the sphere of the "officer safety" exception in the case of an arrest. I'm not suggesting that an absolute travel ban would be upheld as constitutional in the US, but that is the kind of legal foundation that would be required for state police to force people to be Covid-searched.