What would happen if Protagoras v Euathlus were heard in court today? So, I was browsing Wikipedia today, and I came across this article, detailing a lawsuit in Ancient Greece. Basically, what had occurred was that a man, Protagoras, had entered into a contract with another, Euathlus, to provide him with training in oratory and law, in exchange for a sum of money that was to be paid upon Euathlus's first win in court. After this training was provided, Euathlus decided not to go into the legal profession, so eventually Protagoras elected to sue Euathlus for the sum owed to him. The two men made the following arguments: Protagoras stated that regardless of the court's decision, he would be paid the money he was owed, since if the court found in his favor, he was be paid the money the court awarded him, and if Euathlus won, then the terms of the contract would have been met and he would be obligated to pay the money. Euathlus rebutted, however, that he would owe no money, regardless of the court's decision: if he won, then the court would have ruled in his favor and annulled the debt, and if he lost, then he wouldn't have won any cases yet, and thus wouldn't owe any money to him in accordance to the terms of the contract. What I was wondering was what would have happened if this case were to be tried in a modern-day courtroom? Has thousands of years of legal development created a resolution to the paradox?
What would happen if Protagoras v Euathlus were heard in court today? what would have happened if this case were to be tried in a modern-day courtroom? Generally speaking, Protagoras's position would prevail under contract law. Protagoras and Euathlus entered a contract in which the exchange of considerations involves tutoring and compensation therefor. Since the agreement nowhere portrays compensation as contingent on Euathlus not declining to exercise as lawyer, the most reasonable inference is that the parties' understanding at the time of the formation of their contract implicitly ruled out that scenario. Or at least that risk, which is under Euathlus's control, was not disclosed to Protagoras. Thus, the contingency cannot be said to be knowingly entered by Protagoras (contract law is premised, inter alia, on all the conditions being entered knowingly and willfully by the parties). The paradox conveys that Euathlus changed his mind "after been trained". Even if ruling out Euahtlus's change of mind is viewed as a mistake of both parties which could make their contract voidable, Protagoras would entitled to restitution for the performance of his duties. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 152(2). The condition that compensation be made after Euathlus's first win in court can be interpreted twofold; namely, as: Protagoras's acting as creditor towards Euathlus while the latter obtains funds with which to pay the tutoring; or Protagoras's form of guarantee that the tutoring he provides to Euathlus is effective, since winning a case in court may be taken as evidence (again, if we assume that nowadays courts are "all integrity and honesty") of having received competent training. Both interpretations strengthen Protagoras's legal position, as these evidence his commitment to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, respectively. By contrast, Euathlus only benefited from both standpoints without giving anything in return to Protagoras. Furthermore, Euathlus's eventual decision not to work as lawyer amounts to forfeiting the aforementioned guarantee, since his unilateral decision precludes testing the effectiveness of the tutoring he received. Has thousands of years of legal development created a resolution to the paradox? The Paradox of the Court is more of a philosophical challenge for beginners that stays there and leaves out many (im-)practicalities and legal issues. But an assumption that the Ancient Greeks would not have considered these aspects in a real-life controversy would be naive and oversimplistic, especially if we bear in mind the great intellectual development they achieved. Here I only cited the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which is frequently cited by U.S. courts deciding contract disputes. But I can assure you that many of these principles as well as issues of impracticalities were essentially (and perhaps similarly) addressed by Aristotle.
It is possible that a court would hold Comapny X's agreement with Bob to be unconscionable for overbredth and therefore void. This would depend on the state having jurisdiction, and on the specific facts of the case and the language of the contract between X and Bob. Some states do not favor such broad agreements on automatic assignment of IP rights. If the Contract between X and Bob was held to be void, then Sam would own the rights. Otherwise X would own the rights, as their contract came first. As the answer by Dale M says, Bob entered into the contract with Sam fraudulently, by concealing a materiel fact (Bob's existing employment with X). Bob would potentially be liable to Sam for damages. One possible measure of damages would be what it would cost Sam to buy the rights from X.
A case for negligence or some other tort would likely never reach the stage where we could answer this question, as lawyers are generally immune from suit for their litigation conduct. I don't know of any case with facts likey you've described, but my understanding is that the litigation privilege precludes virtually any tort action based on a lawyer's statements in the course of the proceedings. Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal, for instance, has specifically acknowledged that claims for defamation, extortion, fraud, perjury, forgery, slander of title, injurious falsehood are unavailable: The policy reasons for the privilege have often been repeated: In fulfilling their obligations to their client[s] and to the court, it is essential that lawyers, subject only to control by the trial court and the bar, should be free to act on their own best judgment in prosecuting or defending a lawsuit without fear of later having to defend a civil action for defamation for something said or written during the litigation. Ponzoli &amp; Wassenberg, P.A. v. Zuckerman, 545 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
Note: The answer to the question is not the same in every U.S. state and territory. I have provided definitive answers only when there is unanimity or near unanimity. Did the deceased's family obligate themselves by not returning the the first service, that of the Notice of Appeal? No. Unless they expressly agree to do so in writing to be responsible for a decedent's debts (which almost never happens in the U.S.) next of kin of have liability regarding the debts of a decedent (at least by virtue of being next of kin, obviously, if they were, example co-defendant in a case who participated in the wrongful conduct, that could be another matter), except that it may result in a claim against the probate estate which reduces the size of their inheritances (potentially to zero), if timely asserted in the probate estate. As the next of kin are they obligated to receive the mail addressed to the deceased? No. Also, counsel for a decedent are terminated as counsel as a matter of law upon the death of a client. It is customary for a lawyer in the case (often, although not necessarily, the lawyer for the decedent if the decedent was represented by counsel at the time of death) to file a document usually entitled "suggestion of death" in the pending case when someone dies. But, no one is obligated to do so, and if the party is self-represented in the case (a.k.a. pro se), or that party's lawyers have withdrawn from the case, neither the decedent's former lawyers, nor anyone else in the case, may even be aware of that fact that the party to the case has died. What would be a possible remedy to keeping the claim active against this defendant albeit deceased defendant? File a claim in the estate of the decedent if the deadline for filing claims has not lapsed (which two years later, it may very well have). Normally, either a claims deadline that functions by operation of law (e.g. a state law non-claim deadline one year after the date of death), or a claim deadline arising from publication of a notice to creditors in the legal section of a newspaper in the area where the decedent died in a manner prescribed by state statute, would bar the claims, especially if the status quo was that they had been dismissed at the time of the decedent's death, even if there were still undistributed assets left in the probate estate after the deadline for filing claims has expired. It may also be possible to do a substitution of parties of the decedent's probate estate for the decedent in the pending case, if a probate estate has been opened and the deadline for filing claims has not yet lapsed. If a probate estate has not been opened, usually, after a certain amount of time, a creditor may open up the estate without the consent of the next of kin, or a public administrator will be appointed if there are no next of kin who have done so, and there are assets left to be managed in the probate estate. The law governing exactly when a probate estate has liability for the debts of a decedent incurred during life is a matter of state law that varies in significant detail between different states within the United States and is quite technical. I've written a couple of Colorado Bar Association journal articles on that subject applying Colorado law (Andrew Oh-Willeke, "Creditor's Rights In Probate - Part I and II", The Colorado Lawyer, May 2015 and June 2015). Note that the general rules may not apply in all cases to lawsuit brought "in rem" (i.e. adjudicating rights in a particular piece of property) although those kinds of cases aren't very common in federal court and would rarely involve the fact pattern set forth in the original post. Footnote Re Federal Civil Procedure For many years there was a lack of clarity, and/or a split of authority between U.S. Court of Appeals Circuits, over the proper time to appeal a ruling dismissing a party entirely from a case as a matter of federal civil procedure in various circumstances. It was resolved a few years ago, but I don't recall the outcome of that case. The general rule, expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is that the dismissal of a party in a case cannot be appealed unless the trial court certifies that decision as final for purposes of appeal which is a discretionary decision for the trial court judge.
"Precedent" refers to a finding of what the law is. A jury only finds facts, and operates (supposedly) within the meaning of the law as already established. All the jury reports is "yes" and "no" to questions of fact (with some reference to existing law): they do not report, at least in any official way "we interpret the law as saying X". So it would be impossible for a jury to "set precedent" in the case law sense. In a notorious case, they might "set precedent" in inspiring other jurors to act similarly, but this is not enforceable precedent in the way that case law precedent is. In the US, if the jury acquits the defendant, that is the end of the matter and there is no re-trial. As for the UK, I am not sure but I think that the prosecution being unhappy with the jury's decision does not create an exception to the double jeopardy rule.
Before getting into the technical answer to this question it is worth noting that when matters of a constitutional nature are involved then in practice it is not just a matter of a technical &quot;legal&quot; answer. Students and academics like to pose hypothetical questions such as &quot;What would happen if the Queen refused assent to a Bill?&quot; or &quot;If Parliament is supreme, could it abolish the courts?&quot; etc. The practical reality is that a liberal democracy, such as ours, ultimately relies on those in positions of power to respect the democratic conventions and preserve the constitution. When there is a legal angle to some constitutional issue the courts will play their part but, whatever legal analysis their judgments may contain, they will always have in mind the importance of maintaining our democratic system. It is also worth noting that where an Act contains an &quot;ouster&quot; clause (saying that a certificate of X shall not be questioned in any court of law) the courts always find a way to interpret that so that it does not apply in any case where the courts think they should adjudicate! Those preliminaries out of the way, I think the technical legal answer to your question is that first of all the Speaker decides and provides a certificate under s.2(2). You will see that s.2(1) deals with &quot;any other bill&quot; (your third bullet point) and s.2(2) requires a certificate from the Speaker that &quot;the provisions of this section have been duly complied with&quot; (i.e. that it is indeed in the &quot;any other bill&quot; category). Of course there is a further question of whether, if the Speaker gets it wrong, the courts could intervene and exactly how that might happen (the so-called &quot;John Bercow question&quot; of what if a Speaker goes rogue), but the initial technical answer to you question is &quot;the Speaker of the House of Commons&quot;.
It doesn't matter if a debt arises as a result of normal commercial transactions or because of liability for a legal wrong - if you owe money you owe money. While you are alive you are responsible for settling your debts out of your assets as and when they fall due. When you die, your executor has the same responsibility. The executor's first responsibility is to settle the debts of the deceased - only after they have done this can they make distributions to the beneficiaries. One of their duties is to advertise the death of the person and invite anyone who has a claim against the estate (as a creditor or beneficiary) to come forward - the law puts time limits on how long they have to do so. If some of these liabilities are disputed then the executor must hold back enough funds to cover the disputed amount (and the costs of defending against it). Intangible assets (copyright, patents etc.) are no different from tangible assets - they can be offered to the creditor to (part) settle the debt or the can be liquidated (sold) to get cash to settle the debt if there is insufficient cash in the estate. Once all known debts have been settled or successfully denied the executor can distribute whatever assets are left in accordance with the will (or the law if there is no will). If they do all this in accordance with the law then they have no liability. The beneficiaries never have any liability. Sometimes the estate will be insolvent - its liabilities are greater than its assets. The executor's duty in that case is to follow the applicable bankruptcy law.
No. A plaintiff may travel to the defendant's jurisdiction to file suit if desired. Nobody usually does this, though, due to travel and logistical considerations. The defendant is the one who decides whether to challenge jurisdiction. Good contacts will include a forum selection clause which would lay out what happens where in the event of a dispute. And this can be anywhere, it is not limited to the locations of the plaintiff and the defendant. N/A.