Could Trump shoot 100 House Democrats and avoid prosecution, at least while in office? A lawyer for Trump named Consovoy said in court that Trump was immune from prosecution even if he shot someone in the street. If Trump killed 100 House Dems, then the Democrats would certainly no longer control the House.
This is technically an open question, but there is a general consensus that Consovoy's argument is unprecedented and unsupportable. If the president can be dragged into civil litigation over private matters in the middle of his presidency, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), it seems unlikely that the courts would give him a pass on prosecution for a midterm murderous rampage. If Consovoy is right, though, the answer would have to be that yes, Trump could avoid prosecution. Posing the question that way sort of helps to highlight the problem with Consovoy's theory. As I understand it, Consovoy's argument is that impeachment is the only remedy for crimes committed by a president. But if the president can just kill of Congress, there's no one left to impeach him, leaving the country with no way to remove him. So again, the answer is almost certainly no.
There is no current authorization to bar any member of the house from the floor, so the answer depends heavily on what actually happens. Since remote voting was approved, no constituency would be disenfranchised. But we could imagine the house adopting a rule barring remote participation, and also barring entry to the House floor for any person not wearing a mask. The House is constitutionally allowed to set its own rules. The House did bar Adam Clayton Powell from being seated, and he did indeed sue. SCOTUS, most importantly, asserted that this is a justiciable question, and most importantly &quot;In judging the qualifications of its members under Art. I, § 5, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution&quot;. This could be overcome by expelling the member who refuses to wear a mask (Congress has the power to expel, but not exclude). There would be a significant conflict of rights in this case. Residents of the district has a right to representation (equal protection clause), but Congress has the right to expel members. But Congress has expelled 5 members, and most recently, Ohio's 17th district was without representation in the US House for a half a year after Traficant was expelled. That did not prevent the House from exercising its right to expel a member.
In various states, you may shoot a dog attacking livestock or running at large (the latter possibly only in Indiana). In Ohio, ORC 955.28 allows shooting a dog that threatens (etc.) "livestock, poultry, other domestic animal, or other animal, that is the property of another person, except a cat or another dog". So in fact, dog against cat is specifically exempted. The Kentucky law allows shooting a dog that trespasses and attempt to harm livestock (not cats). Texas has such a law, which says "A dog or coyote that is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked livestock, domestic animals, or fowls may be killed", if they witness the event. This law is not limited to livestock and does not specifically exclude cats.
There is no definitive answer, which can only be determined by SCOTUS if faced with a case. DOJ has opined twice that "the indictment or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions". The Impeachment Clause (art.I, §3, cl.7) says Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indict­ment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law The exegesis of this clause is that this means a sitting president cannot first be prosecuted for a crime, but must first be removed from office. The counter-argument is that "nevertheless" indicates that this clause only states that a president can be removed and then prosecuted, and that removal does not preclude further action. In other words, the law has yet to be determined on this matter.
The law you cite says that the Secretary shall furnish such committee with any return or return information specified in such request That includes specific individual returns. That it was intended to include such returns is made clear by the provisions restricting identifiable individual data to executive session. Whether this ought to be the law might well be debated. Whether the House ought to use this law as a way to get at Trump's returns could also be debated. Those are matters of politics, or perhaps ethics, not law. Whether some other provision of law overrides this provision in this case is pretty clearly going to be argued in court, and we will see what the decision is. I won't try to predict it here.
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 says The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Therefore, the House cannot try an impeachment. The wording of the Constitution does not say "The Senate must try any impeachment delivered by the House". The option to reject an impeachment by simple majority runs completely counter to Senate tradition. But analogous to deployment of the "nuclear option" to change Senate rules, it is a conceivable outcome. The first impeachment presented to the Senate was against a Senator, William Blount in 1797, and in that instance the Senate appears to have voted that Blount was not an impeachable officer (so they did not vote on impeachment, but they did vote to expel him). In Nixon v. US, SCOTUS ruled that Senate impeachment actions are not justiciable. While current Senate rules require a trial, the rules can be changed by the Senate by a majority vote, and SCOTUS will not review such actions. The Senate can also adjourn and not take up one or more articles, as happened in Andrew Johnson's case.
It would not prohibit Colorado from passing the law, but it could prohibit implementing the law. SCOTUS rulings (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486; Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779) establish that neither Congress nor the States can require additional qualifications of federal candidates beyond those listed in the Constitution. The relevant question is whether a law imposes an additional &quot;qualification&quot; on a candidate for president. Every state imposes at least one requirement on a person seeking to be a candidate on the ballot in a state: they must somehow &quot;register&quot; as a candidate. So the Qualifications Clause is not interpreted to mean &quot;anybody can run for president as long as age and natural-born&quot;. The Anderson-Burdick doctrine allows certain kinds of requirements to be imposed on candidates, namely those that relate to a state's interest on properly managing elections. A no-felon law would clearly go way beyond the accepted state interest (regarding management of elections) reflected in Anderson-Burdick, and would be found to be as unconstitutional as requiring a candidate for president to have a law degree, or prohibiting a candidate from having a law degree.
First, there is no definitive correct answer to this question because it has never happened over the course of 45 Presidencies. But, it certainly could come up. If the President purports to pardon himself for a federal crime and is then prosecuted, the judicial branch would have to decide if the pardon was valid. But, I would disagree with the answer from @user6726, and would instead take the position that the concept of a pardon inherently implies that one is pardoning someone else. This is why President Nixon, when he resigned, had Vice President Ford, when he became President upon Nixon's resignation, pardon him, rather than pardoning himself. President Bush, in connection with the Iran-Contra scandal also took the position that he did not have the power to pardon himself. Basically, a pardon is an event that is ordinary conceived of as involving two persons, a giver of the pardon and a recipient. Also, recognizing the power of a President to pardon himself or herself would be to give him or her impunity to disregard the law not just in areas where he or she has Presidential immunity, but in anything that he has ever done in his life. (Also, the President can only pardon federal crimes, not state crimes.) There is, of course, an academic literature on the subject (which none of the answers in the PoliticsSE refer to and which the other answer here does not refer to). The two leading law review articles addressing the question are: Brian C. Kalt, &quot;Pardon Me: The Constitutional Case against Presidential Self-Pardons&quot; 106 Yale L.J. 779 (1996-1997) (obviously adopting my position). An expanded version of this article became a chapter in a book called &quot;Constitutional Cliffhangers: A Legal Guide For Presidents and Their Enemies&quot; by the same author. Robert Nida and Rebecca L. Spiro, &quot;The President as His Own Judge and Jury: A Legal Analysis of the Presidential Self-Pardon Power&quot; 52 Okla. L. Rev. 197 (1999) (closed access). It opens with the following language (in part): [C]an the President pardon himself for criminal acts committed while or before holding office? Article II of the Constitution prohibits a President from using the pardon power to overturn an impeachment.5 The Framers of the Constitution placed only this limitation on the ability of the President to exercise his pardon power,6 and the only sanction for the abuse of the pardon power is the removal of the President through impeachment.7 The Constitution is silent, however, as to whether the President may grant himself a pardon from prosecution and, if so, when such a pardon may be issued.8 In the over 20,000 instances that Presidents have used this exclusive power,9 no President has used this power to pardon himself.10 One viewpoint is that a presidential self-pardon is inherently inconsistent with &quot;natural law,&quot; which proclaims that one may not judge oneself.11 This article is cited in Comparative Executive Clemency by Andrew Novak who calls it an unresolved question but believes many legal scholars believe that it is possible. Leading Constitutional law scholar Adrian Vermeule analyzes but does not resolve the issue in his book &quot;The Constitution of Risk&quot;. A 2017 Vox review from 15 legal experts is here. Their views are mixed and nuanced. A 2017 op-ed in the Washington Post from a former member of Congress who was involved in the impeachment proceedings for President Nixon says &quot;no.&quot; Another review of expert opinion in 2017 can be found here. This also noted a dispute within the realm of academic legal opinion. There has also been debate over whether treason is treated differently for pardon power purposes than other federal crimes, but the precedent of the pardons issued after the U.S. Civil War pretty definitively resolved this question in favor of the power of the President to pardon treason, so the nature of the federal offense wouldn't matter. Note also that the pardon power is not limited to cases where criminal charges have been brought or convictions have been obtained. This issue is irrelevant to a President's self-pardon power.