In England &amp; Wales, is self-harm a legal defence to possessing a bladed object? Buried in this BBC article is the following paragraph about a girl caught in public possessing a blade which she used to self-harm: [The girl] later appeared in court accused of possession of a bladed weapon and was found not guilty after magistrates accepted the items were used for self-harming. This seems to imply that there is a defence to possessing a bladed object that the intention was for self-harm as a reasonable excuse. However, I find this press report contradictory to this previous report of a sentence by His Honour Judge Jefferies QC who noted his regret that a woman caught with blades for self-harm was 'not really the person [the statute was] aimed at', but nonetheless imposed a sentence on her. So which is it: is self-harm (where proven or accepted as the intent for carrying the blade) a defence to carrying a bladed object? For reference, the offence I am referring to is the one in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 139. That act provides the following defences to the either-way offence: (4). It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority for having the article with him in a public place. (5). Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had the article with him— (a)for use at work; (b)for religious reasons; or (c)as part of any national costume. So the question is: is 'self-harm' a 'good reason'?
Theoretically, yes it can, but it is highly fact specific The Court of Appeal explicitly answered this question in the case of R v Bown [2003] EWCA Crim 1989; [2004] 1 Cr App R 13. The Court held per Keene LJ that self-harm was capable of being a good reason within the meaning of subsection 4 of s 139 (para 20). While refraining from any abstract holding as to self-harm (which required a fact-based analysis), Keene LJ held (at para 24–5) that this would depend on evidence as to how and in what manner the bladed article was intended to be used and the time and place relating to said use. The burden of demonstrating this fell on the defence and it would require detailed evidence to be a presentable defence. In the case at bar, the absence of any evidence directly linking the possession of the knife to the tendency of the defendant to self-harm meant that there was nothing which could establish the defence to be put to the jury; a high 'degree of particularity was requisite' (para 27). NB: yes, the name of the defendant in this case is actually 'Bown', not 'Brown'—I know it looks like a typo!
Clauses (a) and (c) are potentially relevant. You have to look in the Rules &amp; Regulations to see what exceptions are permitted. Although firearms and especially shotgun shells are of a "dangerous, flammable or explosive character", it is reasonable to believe that when stored properly, they do not unreasonably increase the danger of fire or explosion, and would not be considered hazardous or extra hazardous by any responsible insurance company. On the latter point, you could ask any responsible insurance company if they would consider such shells to be hazardous. While in ordinary language simple possession of a firearm is not a threat of violence, the wording of clause (c) is open to a wider interpretation, since acts considered to be a threat of violence include displaying or possessing a firearm, knife, or other weapon that may threaten, alarm or intimidate others. The fact is that many people are alarmed by the simple existence of a weapon, so simply possessing a weapon could be interpreted as a "threat" in this special sense. Since you are not in the position of having signed the lease and now need to deal with the consequences of this clause, the simplest solution is to explain your interest, and ask them if having your gear in your apartment would be a violation of the lease. Be really clear about this and get it in writing in some form, if they say "no problem". Then either pick a different place, pick a different hobby, or find a separate storage facility.
Why would he not have been charged with &quot;housebreaking&quot;? In england-and-wales neither &quot;house breaking&quot; nor &quot;breaking and entering&quot; are legal terms: the offence is called burglary contrary to s.9 of the Theft Act 1968 which in 1983 was: (1) A person is guilty of burglary if— (a) he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent to commit any such offence as is mentioned in subsection (2) below; or (b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals or attempts to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict on any person therein any grievous bodily harm. (2) The offences referred to in subsection (1)(a) above are offences of stealing anything in the building or part of a building in question, of inflicting on any person therein any grievous bodily harm or raping any woman therein, and of doing unlawful damage to the building or anything therein. There is no difference between nightime and daytime entry, and there is no requirement for a forced entry. All that's needed is to go in without permission intending or attempting to do one of the relevant offences. I can only surmise that the reason(s) theft, rather than burglary, was charged was a (pre CPS) prosecutorial decision based on the admissible evidence, Fagan's mental state and what was in the public interest because the quoted text seems to meet the criteria for burglary. (ETA subject to the actual circumstances surrounding the alleged theft of the wine, which are not clear from the quoted text.)
Yes. It is a crime almost everywhere to throw something at someone, even if it causes little or no injury. Usually it would be classified as "assault and battery" although if it damages clothing or other property, it could also be called, for example, "criminal mischief" which is intentional damage to property. It would also be a tort that could be enforced with civil damages in most places, although only nominal damages would be awarded and there would be no award for attorneys' fees. In practice, however, few people would press charges or turn to the police in such an incident, few police would take action based on the complaint because it is so trivial, and few people would sue in such a case. For what it is worth, the "living law" in Japan recognizes that someone has a duty to pay to clean your clothes or replace them if they can't be cleaned in such circumstances and most people appear to comply with that obligation without court involvement if the victim insists. Also, pie throwing as a political protest in Europe is also almost surely illegal under European law, although, again, this is rarely enforced by common political culture and tradition.
Murder Which is the unlawful taking of a life with intent to do so. However, the doctrine of self-defence can make killing lawful: A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large. if the prosecutor is of the opinion that the force used "is reasonable in the circumstances" they may not lay charges. If they do lay charges the judge may decide that there is no case to answer before going to trial if self-defence applies. If there is a trial this will probably be the strategy the defence employs and they may or may not be successful. If convicted the penalty is life imprisonment. Also, there is no UK law: there is the law of England and Wales, the law of Scotland and the law of Northern Ireland.
Short Answer There is a fairly vague one sentence answer to this question, in the general rule case that does not involve an escalation of conflict by the person provoked with a deadly weapon that wasn't part of the original provocation, with little case law interpretation in the applicable Wisconsin statute. This sentence states: The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. Beyond that, in any remotely close case, it is up to the jury to decide what this sentence means. Long Answer The relevant Wisconsin statute states that: Provocation affects the privilege of self-defense as follows: (a) A person who engages in unlawful conduct of a type likely to provoke others to attack him or her and thereby does provoke an attack is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense against such attack, except when the attack which ensues is of a type causing the person engaging in the unlawful conduct to reasonably believe that he or she is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In such a case, the person engaging in the unlawful conduct is privileged to act in self-defense, but the person is not privileged to resort to the use of force intended or likely to cause death to the person's assailant unless the person reasonably believes he or she has exhausted every other reasonable means to escape from or otherwise avoid death or great bodily harm at the hands of his or her assailant. (b) The privilege lost by provocation may be regained if the actor in good faith withdraws from the fight and gives adequate notice thereof to his or her assailant. (c) A person who provokes an attack, whether by lawful or unlawful conduct, with intent to use such an attack as an excuse to cause death or great bodily harm to his or her assailant is not entitled to claim the privilege of self-defense. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.48(2). There are two reported appellate case precedents in Wisconsin that have addressed this question and interpreted this statutory provision. One from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals is State v. Cummings, 451 N.W.2d 463 (Wisc. App. 1989). It held that when a prisoner was charged with assault based on his biting officer who was one of several officers restraining him when he became agitated while in hospital for treatment was not entitled to self-defense instruction in prosecution for battery to correctional officer because the prisoner was engaging in unlawful conduct when he refused to obey officer's direct orders and physically resisted officers as they attempted to restrain him, and prisoner's own testimony was that officer's arm was on his throat for only a few seconds, which constituted brief and legitimate response to resistance that prisoner was putting forth. This primarily addresses part (a), however. The other from the Wisconsin Supreme Court is Ruff v. State, 223 N.W.2d 446 (Wisc. 1974) which held that if a person attacked escalated fight beyond that which would be legally justifiable in view of nature of original provocation, aggressor would regain privilege of self-defense, because victim, by resorting to deadly force which was not a justifiable exercise of right of self-defense, would himself become aggressor. Thus, the right to regain right of self-defense was not available to defendant at moment when he pointed gun at intended victim and stated “This is a stickup,” since at that moment, the right of self-defense was limited to the person at whom defendant's gun was pointed, not on side of defendant commencing a stick-up. This primarily addresses part (c), however. There is no binding case law interpreting part (b) in Wisconsin that is squarely on point. Wisconsin's rule on this point codifies the common law rule, so Wisconsin cases prior to the enactment of this statutory rule, and out of state precedents interpreting that common law rule or codifications of it that are very similar to Wisconsin's statutory rule, would probably be considered persuasive by a court seeking to interpret and apply this statutory rule. In the alternative, the judge might simply have a jury instruction that contains the language of part (b) and simply leave the jury to decide what this means based upon its plain language and the facts before them, where the facts of the case present a colorable withdrawal of provocation issue.
He was jailed for breaching an injunction imposed on the Shard in 2018 which was intended to prevent anyone from climbing it, according to a news report from the Guardian at the time. The actual offence he committed was contempt of court which is a criminal offence. Double jeopardy does not apply here because the crime he was cautioned for was not the same crime he was prosecuted for. It appears there was no precedent set, prior to this private prosecution, about whether or not someone could be jailed for breaching an injunction in this manner, as opposed to merely being fined, etc. Obviously, since he has been jailed, people in the future will be reluctant to copy his behaviour and a deterrent has been set.
england-and-wales There isn't a law that defines 'gaslighting' as an offence. Generally it isn't unlawful to mislead, deceive or lie - of course, there are exceptions such as fraud, misleading advertising, perjury and so on. So the answer to your question must depend on what is meant by 'gaslighting' and the circumstances in which it has been said to have occurred. It seems to me that people understand and use the word differently - for me it pertains to intimate or family relationships (as in its alleged origin, the film Gaslight), some people seem to use it for different serious behaviour and other people use it for relatively trivial behaviour. In the intimate or family relationship context, gaslighting might be part or all of the behaviour alleged to be the controlling or coercive behaviour contrary to s76 Serious Crime Act 2015: 76 Controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship (1)A person (A) commits an offence if— (a)A repeatedly or continuously engages in behaviour towards another person (B) that is controlling or coercive, (b)at the time of the behaviour, A and B are personally connected, (c)the behaviour has a serious effect on B, and (d)A knows or ought to know that the behaviour will have a serious effect on B. Here is the Crown Prosecution Service guidance for prosecuting s76 Serious Crime Act 2015. Simply lying about one's job or income to have a one-night stand would not constitute the s76 offence. Behaviour that causes psychological injury that amounts to recognisable psychiatric illness could be assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) contrary to s47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (see CPS Guidance for ABH).