Does copyright law protect a translation of an ancient work from being translated into a third language? Jurisdiction: California, USA. If a book was written in Greek two thousand years ago, and someone translated it into English more recently (say, yesterday), and then someone else wants to translate that English translation into French, would that be a violation of copyright law? This resource suggests to me that it may be: https://www.translatorsbase.com/articles/42.aspx However I haven't found really clear legal information about such re-translation.
The English translation is a copyrighted work While the original Greek is public domain, the English translation is a new literary work with its own copyright running for 70 years after the author(s) death(s). The French translation of the English work would require the permission of the author(s). A French translation of the original Greek wouldn't. This assumes that the translation was not simply mechanical; like running it through Google translate. A purely mechanical translation lacks the originality required to create a literary work - an English translation obtained algorithmically is a copy; just like a zip file is a copy.
You're largely correct, though there's some vocabulary you're using that could go either way in terms of proper understanding. My comments on your understanding, presuming we're dealing with two Berne countries (UCC is largely irrelevant these days): My understanding of copyright is that it grants the author an exclusive right to distribute their work in whatever manner they'd like for some amount of time (determined by the copyright duration in a country). Generally correct though there can be many exceptions here (fair use, technical/temporary copying, first-sale doctrine, etc.). Can a person in Country A legally use the adapted work? I'm assuming no [...], Basically correct, whoever holds rights to the original work could theoretically still assert their rights in Country A on any portion of the derivative work that was part of the original. [...] does that mean that the author of the work created in Country B does not technically have all the rights to the work they created, since they have no control over whether their work can be distributed in Country A? This is splitting hairs, but while the derivative author has the rights given to them by copyright law, they aren't absolute. In particular in this case, regardless of which country, they still don't have any inherent exclusive rights over the original work. With respect to country B, those exclusive rights have expired so they don't bind the derivative author, but they haven't expired in country A. If that is the case, then would these rights be &quot;granted&quot; to the author of the adaptation when the copyright finally expires in Country A? Again splitting hairs, but its more helpful to express that no rights are actively granted by the expiration of copyright in Country A, it's just that no one holds those rights anymore (here there might be a language issue too, generally in copyright law &quot;rights&quot; refers to those exclusive actions that may be taken by the copyright holder, and not always to the &quot;right&quot; i.e. &quot;freedom&quot; for someone to do something).
"The rights to this work reverted to the author in 1951" means that back in 1951 the publisher's contract to print the book ended, and the author resumed full rights. (This might have been done by the author, or the publisher, depending on their contract.) It does not mean that the copyright lapsed or that the work entered the public domain. "Ms. Margaret Wilson" was presumably the author or the author's agent, or perhaps the publishers representative back in 1951. She may or may not be alive, and the firm of "Duell, Sloan &amp; Pearce, Inc" may have been the new publisher (unless it was the old one, the question is not clear, and without the title I can't cross check). If DS&amp;P was the new publisher, the rights might now be held by E. P. Dutton, as they seem to have acquired the rights to the bulk of the DS&amp;P catalog. In any case, the copyright would (if it is in force) now be held by the author's heir, or whoever the author might have sold or given it to. Someone will be the legal owner. That it is not being marketed does not release the copyright or license the work for general use. If there was no other heir, it would have become government property. In the US, it would become the property of the state where the owner was a legal resident. If this was a work by a US author first published in the US, copyright needed to be renewed after 28 years, which would have been in 1959 (plus or minus one year, I believe). If the work required copyright renewal, and this was not done, then the work is in the public domain, and can be freely used by anyone. Records of copyright renewals, by year, are available for download from Project Gutenberg, or can be searched at the US Copyright Office. There is no way to be sure how the "scanning institution" determined that "No known copyright restrictions" apply, short of asking that institution. It is possible that they checked for a copyright renewal and did not find one. If you use content from this work, and the copyright is still in force, the copyright holder or an exclusive licensee could sue for copyright infringement. There is no way to tell if this would in fact happen. It may well be that the legal holder does not even know that s/he owns this copyright. Obviously, in that case, a suit is highly unlikely. But that would be entirely at the risk of anyone who used such content. Under US law, such use might or might not be considered "fair use". This would depend on several factors, and there is not enough information in the question to even guess. Fair use is an active defense, that an accused infringer may assert in court. It also does not apply in non-US cases. The odds are probably against any such suit being brought, but the amount at stake if one was brought could be large.
Regardless of whether the first copyright holder is the author (always a natural person) or an employer (natural or non-natural), the copyright under British law expires 70 years after the death of the author. British law makes a distinction between the author of a work and the owner of a copyright that is not present in U.S. copyright law. This gives the author of the work "moral rights" which are absent in U.S. copyright law and also changes the analysis of how long a copyright lasts. Under Section 9 of the law, the author of the work is always a natural person according to the rules set forth there, and if no natural person can be associated with the work, it is a work of unknown authorship. Section 11 governs who owns a work, not who its author is, so the fact that a work is made for hire under a corporation does not mean that the author of the work is the corporation. Indeed, by definition, the author of the work cannot be a corporation. If no individual can be associated with a corporate work it is simply a work by an unknown author. A work by an unknown author enters the public domain 70 years after it is created, or 70 years after publication if it is first published within 70 years after its creation, pursuant to Section 12. The authorship of a work is fixed under Section 9 at the moment of its creation, so neither the first owner of the copyright (under Section 11) nor an assignment of ownership of the copyright from the author or first copyright owner to someone else (in your scenario where an author transfers ownership of the copyright to a corporation) changes the author of work. Hence, neither the fact that a work is made for hire, nor the fact that the author transfers ownership of the copyright, changes the duration of the copyright.
How close is such a statement corresponding with the reality? Legally, such language is a meaningless statement of future intent that at best makes clear that the person making the statement isn't waiving any of their legal rights. Certainly, no infringer would have standing to sue if they failed to do so. Whether a joint venture member or foreign reseller could sue the company for failing to enforce its IP rights is another question that presents itself very differently and depends upon much more than what the warning labels state, such as the language in the joint partnership or reseller's agreement with the copyright owner. Also, in criminal copyright violation cases, even if the copyright owner asks for the maximum possible consequences, the U.S. Justice Department is under no obligation whatsoever to go along with that request. Likewise, a judge has no obligation to impose the maximum penalty allowed by law following a criminal conviction, even if the copyright owner and the U.S. Justice Department both request a maximum sentence for someone who pleas guilty or is convicted of the offense following a trial. In practice, something like 98% of federal criminal cases, and a similar percentage of federal civil cases, result in agreed resolutions which result in less severe penalties than the maximum penalties allowed by law. This happens as a result of a mutual agreement to resolve the case with a guilty plea, or a settlement agreement in a civil case, or both. Also, in practice, none of these companies, nor the federal government's prosecutors, have the resources to press anything but the most clear and serious copyright violation cases, and cases that are valuable for P.R. purposes. Anything else is essentially a random lottery from myriad cases that could have been brought in order to counteract the argument (both political and legal) that their copyright protections are empty and completely unenforced is a large part of the cases to which the statutes would make it seem that they apply. Also, in a case brought by a joint venture owner or reseller for failure to enforce a copyright which causes the partner damages, presumably in some sort of breach of contract or breach of fiduciary duty action, there would be no way to prove damages from all of the non-enforcement, since enforcing every known infringement would not be cost effective and would reduce the net profits of everyone involved.
I would argue that no, there is no copyright for the restored work. Independent copyright is only possible for any original material added, as previously discussed on this site. In this case, the added work was a technical process rather than a creative process, and technical processes cannot be protected by copyright. Copyright licenses would therefore be ineffective. However, I believe one could still impose a license based on owning the copy as opposed to the copyright (contract might be a better term in this case). However, if a third party managed to obtain a copy through some other avenue, any such contract would not be binding on them and nothing could be enforced against them unlike with copyright laws. Another way a license might be imposed is through patent protections, as technical processes can be protected via patents. However, I'm not as familiar with patent law, and this doesn't appear to be the claim being made.
No, it's still copyright infringement. When you modify a copyrighted work in any way, you generate a derivative work which you are not allowed to distribute without the permission of the original copyright holder.
If you're in the USA, this almost certainly falls under fair use, or if you are in another jurisdiction, it almost certainly falls under an analogous exception for educational use. The fact that the excerpt is short contributes to this conclusion. You can also avoid having to rely even on these exceptions by choosing sources that are in the public domain. The specific date before which a work is guaranteed to be in the public domain depends, again, on your jurisdiction, but it's probably sometime in the early 20th century. For example, you're certainly on solid ground if you use Dickens.