Is there an authoritative definition of what a terrorist is? An intelligent unbiased observer from another galaxy wants to understand the notion of a 'terrorist' because the alien sees: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” Is there an authoritative definition of terrorism that would enable a set of unbiased observers arrive at consistent labeling of terrorism and freedom fighters?
There is a definition Or rather, there are as many definitions as there are jurisdictions who have passed laws about them. In australia, a terrorist is a person who commits a terrorist act. A terrorist act is an act, or a threat to act, that meets both these criteria: it intends to coerce or influence the public or any government by intimidation to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. it causes one or more of the following: ◦ death, serious harm or danger to a person ◦ serious damage to property ◦ a serious risk to the health of safety of the public ◦ serious interference with, disruption to, or destruction of critical infrastructure such as a telecommunications or electricity network. Advocating, protesting, dissenting or taking industrial action are not terrorist acts where the person doing the activity does not intend to cause serious harm to a person or create a serious risk to public safety. If the Crown accuses someone of being a terrorist then they have to convince, beyond reasonable doubt, a set of unbiased observers (a jury) that they did these things. “Freedom fighter” is not a term defined in Australian law so it would take on its normal meaning as someone who fights or otherwise struggles for “freedom” - a word that is so broad and subjective that it would be context dependent. Fighting could range from peaceful protest to armed insurrection. The hypothetical “freedom fighter” might or might not engage in “terrorist acts” so the terms “freedom fighter” and “terrorist” are not mutually exclusive.
They could be prosecuted in any state where there was evidence that part of the crime was committed. Realistically, either State A or State B could prosecute for conspiracy to murder as an additional charge, because the conspiracy clearly spanned more than one state, even if they can't prove where the crime was committed, although physical evidence (e.g. traces of camp sites, footprints, testimony about landmarks, evidence of poop with human DNA from the victim in it), would usually make it possible to show that some part of the crime was committed in the state. There is probably also a federal crime that could be implicated such as "murder involving flight across a state line" (hypothetical, but I'm sure that there is something similar on the books). I'm not going to address the further hypothetical as it is too bizzare and law is ultimately very context specific. Find a more plausible fact pattern, perhaps with a different crime, and ask a separate question if you want to really address the issue.
Labeling is document-scoped. Each will start labeling their exhibits with "A". If anyone needs to refer to exhibits from another document they will say "Document XXX, Exhibit A".
No. Assuming both the Fire Nation and Water Tribes are signatories to the Geneva conventions, the rules only apply to uniformed members of the signatory member nations. Such as the water tribes have uniformed members, Sokka is not (at least not at this time, as its shown that Southern Water Tribe warriors use black and white face paint when in battle and Sokka does don this paint prior to going into key battles. Additionally, the Mechanist is more likely the &quot;pilot&quot; of the balloon and has no uniform that ties him to any Nation's military. Additionally, neither is acting under apparent orders from a higher ranking member of a foreign military. All involved look to be refugees and travelers trying to keep away from the military and would be subject to the Fire Nation Criminal Justice System (In the Fire Nation Criminal Justice System, the people are represented by two separate but equal entities: The military, who capture enemies of the Fire Lord, and the Crematorium who prosecutes them. These are their stories DOING DOING).
The Department of Homeland Security is a cabinet-level arm of the Executive Branch. The Sec'y of Homeland Security directly "runs" that branch, and serves at the pleasure of the President of the United States. There is a House committee on Homeland Security which conducts "oversight" and handles legislation related to security. There is likewise a Senate committee. This is the DHS page on aviation security; and this is a house report on TSA oversight, connected to this bill which did not become law, but is on the topic as an example of what legislative oversight would mean.
You are having difficulty understanding the GDPR because you have an improperly narrow idea of “identification”. In contrast, the GDPR uses an extremely broad definition. In Art 4(1), personal data is defined as any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person It is worth noting that your “auto-generated identifier” would quite clearly be “an identifier such as … an identification number” and/or “an online identifier”. It is also worth noting that indirect identification is still identification. Recital 26 explains the concept of identifiability in more detail: ³To determine whether a natural person is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be used, such as singling out, either by the controller or by another person to identify the natural person directly or indirectly. ⁴To ascertain whether means are reasonably likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments. Key observations: Singling out a data subject already counts as identification, meaning that it isn't necessary to infer their real-world identity! The data subject is still identifiable if you can only identify them with additional data. The data subject is still identifiable if identification can be performed by others. The main limit to this concept is the “means reasonably likely to be used” criterion: as long as there is a reasonable scenario in which the data subject could be likely identified, they are identifiable. Identifiability does not depend on your current intentions or policies, only on objective factors. As an illustration of these points, consider the Breyer case (C-582/14). The pre-GDPR Data Protection Directive had an essentially equivalent concept of identification, except for the “singling out” factor. The CJEU was asked to decide whether this meant that IP addresses collected in a server log file of some website were personal data. Quite clearly, such IP addresses do not directly identify a person, unless you happen to be the data subject's ISP. But here the CJEU constructed a reasonably likely scenario that shows that IP addresses will typically be personal data even without the “singling out” criterion: in the event of cybercrime, the website operator would reasonably provide the IP addresses of visitors to the police for investigation, and they in turn would have the means to get a subpoena/court order to get the ISP to provide the information necessary for identification. What does this mean for your identifiers? These identifiers and any linked information relate to a particular user, the data subject. Thus, these identifiers and any linked information are personal data if the user is identifiable. Since these identifiers allow you to single out a particular data subject, i.e. allow you to distinguish one user from another, the users are identifiable within the meaning of Recital 26 GDPR. Additionally, identification is possible if it is performed by someone other than you – such as the user themselves. How does this mesh with data subject rights? You correctly point out the problem that when a user contacts you to exercise their data subject rights, you wouldn't be able to find their records. But Art 11 GDPR prepares for this: If your processing activities do not require identification, then you are not required to acquire or maintain additional information just for the purpose of complying with data subject requests (this encourages data minimization). If you can demonstrate that you are unable to fulfill a data subject request because you can't identify the data subject, then the data subject rights in Art 15 to 20 do not apply. These are the rights to access, rectification, erasure, restriction, and data portability. Unaffected are the right to information, the right to object, and rights related to profiling. However, you still have to comply if the data subject provides additional information enabling their identification. You have intuitively grasped the correct solution: you can provide a feature where the user can see their automatically generated user identifier. Then, they can provide this ID to you when invoking their data subject rights. A note on privacy-preserving analytics. When it comes to analytics, the GDPR and ePrivacy issues must be looked at separately. From a GDPR perspective, any client IDs or other identifiers are likely to be personal data, regardless of how they are stored or created. But the GDPR does not necessarily require that the user gives consent to such analytics – a legitimate interest (opt out) solution might also work. The ePrivacy Directive does not care about whether such IDs or fingerprints are personal data, only about how they are created and stored. Any access or storage to information on the end user's device is only permissible with consent, unless the access or storage is strictly necessary for a service explicitly requested by the user. Analytics are not strictly necessary from the user's perspective. Thus, while cookies or LocalStorage can be freely used to store user preferences on a site, accessing/storing cookies for analytics purposes, or accessing information for fingerprinting purposes through JavaScript APIs, is only permissible with consent. Compare also the WP29 opinion 9/2014 on fingerprinting (PDF). This leads me to conclude that many so-called GDPR-compliant or cookie-less analytics fail to meet ePrivacy obligations if they include a client-side component such as the typical JavaScript tag without asking for consent, but that they might be OK if they rely on purely server-side data collection. Regardless of how user IDs or fingerprints would be created, those IDs and any linked data would still be personal data though, so that GDPR would still apply. A hash of an identifier is still an identifier and therefore personal data, and at the very least still enables indirect identification. (WhatsApp attempted a “lossy hashing” argument while appealing its fine, but didn't convince many supervisory authorities.)
You've basically described two of the ends of the pole in theories of jurisprudence (there are dozens of ends). There is no theory of law that relies purely on &quot;spirit&quot; (also no theory that actually relies on the letters uses=d in writing law), instead, everybody interprets the text (the words enacted by the government) and some people supplement their interpretation with consideration of &quot;other factors&quot;, such as assumed legislative purpose. Certain scholars and judges are inclined to put most weight on the actual wording of the law, while others are inclined to let purposive considerations dictate the interpretation of a law. Interpreting law by W.N. Eskridge is an informative guide to supplementing a reading of the statute with anciliary considerations. Antonin Scalia is the best-known proponent of the textualist approach.
This is an objective test When a law requires “worry” (or any other state of mind), it is usually not the state of mind of the particular person but of a reasonable person in the same circumstances. The law does not ask “Were you worried?”, it asks “Would a reasonable person in your situation have been worried?” The fact that you have cynophobia is irrelevant if a reasonable person in your circumstances would not have it. Now, if this occurred at a facility for cynophobia treatment then the circumstances change from a reasonable person taken from the general population to a reasonable person who is attending such a facility; in those circumstances the reasonable person would be someone suffering from cynophobia. By the way, this test (worry or fear of harm) is essentially the same as the criteria of assault between humans.