Can congressional leaders &quot;expel&quot; elected members of Congress? According to a Washington Post article about Alabama Senate candidate Roy Moore, in the spotlight for an apparent history of sexual relations with teenagers, congressmen are trying to... pressure GOP nominee Roy Moore to withdraw from the Alabama Senate race amid allegations of sexual misconduct, declaring him “unfit to serve” and threatening to expel him from Congress if he were elected. That last part is the interesting one. Do members of Congress have the power to "expel" a democratically (if controversially) elected senator from the United States Congress?
The leaders can't do it unilaterally, but the members collectively can expel other members. It requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate. US Constitution, Article I, Section 5: Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member. Normally this would be preceded by a committee investigation, which might issue a recommendation as to whether the member should be expelled. To date, fifteen US Senators have been expelled via this process: see https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Expulsion_Censure.htm. Fourteen of them were in 1861 for supporting the Confederacy, and the other was in 1797 for "Anti-Spanish conspiracy and treason". There were several more cases in which the Senate considered expulsion but ultimately voted not to, and others in which the Senator in question resigned under threat of expulsion.
A lawsuit would be unsuccessful. Prosecutors have discretion to prioritize whichever offenses they think are most important, and they are generally immune from civil liability. This is a political grievance, and it comes with a political remedy; voters can recall the DA or vote for a new one when his term ends.
Only "legislative acts" give rise to legislative immunity. Perhaps surprisingly, being a legislator is neither necessary nor sufficient for the privilege to apply. A defendant would need to assert the act in question was essentially a legislative activity. Quoting from the Federal Judicial Center's extensive paper on section 1983: State and local legislators enjoy absolute immunity for their legislative acts. Under the functional approach to immunity, the critical issue is whether the official was engaged in legislative activity. The determination of an act’s legislative or executive character “turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the official performing it.” Legislative action involves the formulation of policy, whereas executive action enforces and applies the policy in particular circumstances. The primary case cited is Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998), Bogan further cites Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367, 372, 372-376 in clarifying questions of the defendant's intent or motive are irrelevant as long as the act is part of a legislative activity. So proposing, drafting, voting or debating (for or against) a specific measure fall within the immunity, regardless of the claimed improper motive for doing them. For example, in Bogan, Scott-Harris made arguments that closing of a government department was motivated by racial animus which violated her civil rights as the only employee in the department. The high court found that closing the departmental was essentially a legislative activity regardless of claims about improper motive for the action. Officials outside the legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative functions. Bogan also shows the privilege applied not only to the legislators, but the mayor (an executive), because his actions in drawing up a budget proposing the closing of the department, and his signing the action into law were of essentially parts of the legislative process. IMHO, the hypothetical examples now in the question, only act #1 seems to be making a policy decision similar to legislation activity.
Each state has its own election laws, so you will get 50 different answers depending on what state you are interested in (perhaps 49, since Washington doesn't have polling places - depends on what you mean by &quot;poll watcher&quot;). This page is a starter list of legal resources. This page starts you on deconstructing this notion of &quot;poll watcher&quot;. Colorado is one state that explicitly allows partisan observers, here are the rules. No person is compelled to be an observer, so I don't understand who you think might be abusing a poll watcher. Perhaps you are referring to the possibility that an election official will prevent an observer from doing their job. Or perhaps you are thinking that being a poll watcher abuses the intent of some law. Whatever you have in mind, there are laws in each state that say what is allowed and what is forbidden, so you have to address this at a local level. No state has a requirement that observers must come from or swear allegiance to the majority party of that polling jurisdiction (e.g. county, or precinct). Any attempt by election officials, or anyone else, to block observers from the minority party would be rebuffed by the courts. The courts will not attempt to divine inner motivations for sending an observer. Most states allow partisan observers. Michigan distinguishes &quot;challengers&quot; and &quot;poll watchers&quot;, and there are distinct rules and powers for the two sets. A crucial difference is that a watcher cannot legally challenge a claimed right to vote or a precinct board action, but a challenger can. There are rules of conduct imposed on both kinds of observers, one of them being that you cannot challenge a voter for the purpose of annoying or delaying the voter. This is a misdemeanor (a crime) under MCL 168.727, and as a criminal prohibition, the state would have to prove intent beyond reasonable doubt. Blog posts by the observer might provide sufficient evidence, but speculation by the majority party would not.
There are several possible ways to get there, but the answer is "there is no such position." Acting President vs. President Under the Constitution: In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. When William Henry Harrison died, there was some question as to what "the same" that devolved on Tyler (his VP) meant. Some thought it meant that Tyler was Acting President; others thought the office itself went to Tyler. Tyler was in the latter group, and set a precedent that the VP became the President (finishing out the President's term) if the President died; the VP wasn't just acting. The 25th Amendment later clarified that presidential death, removal, or resignation made the VP the President; if the President was unable to exercise the powers and duties of the office, the VP was Acting President. Further down the line, the Constitution explicitly says Congress decides "who shall act as President." Congress only talks about succession further down the line in terms of the Acting President and the officer acting as President. So, if that interpretation is correct, the answer is "the VP is the only officer who can assume the office of President in the event of the President's death." Of course, a new precedent could potentially be set if this situation ever arises; if someone will definitely act as President until the end of the term, then it makes a certain amount of sense to say they just assume the office itself. Eligibility for office The Constitution doesn't say "you can't be elected President unless over 35, natural-born citizen, and 14 years a resident." It says you are not eligible for the office unless you meet those requirements. That would include any way of assuming the office, including succession. You can't become President if you are not eligible to hold the office, period (that's what eligibility for an office means); the only requirements you'd get around are those covering eligibility to be elected. Succession It's unclear whether the Constitution's eligibility requirements apply to a person acting as President who does not assume the office. However, Congress has decided that they should. 3 USC &sect;19, which sets out who acts as President if both President and VP are unable to, says: (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section [i.e. the ones listing people who can act as President] shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution.
The presidential line of succession is governed by the U.S. Constitution, specifically Article II section 1: In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. The 25th amendment reinforces this and says "Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress." So, after the vice president, the constitution lets Congress pass laws governing the rest of the succession. This is governed by the Presidential Succession Act. 3 U.S. Code Chapter 1, Section 19 lays out the rest of the line of succession: Next come the Speaker of the House of Representatives (subsection a) and the President pro tempore of the Senate (subsection b) and "then the officer of the United States who is highest on the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties of the office of President shall act as President: Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation, Secretary of Energy, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security" (subsection d). So you have the Attorney General at number 7. However, the next subsection says the following (emphasis mine). (e) Subsections (a), (b), and (d) of this section shall apply only to such officers as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitution. Subsection (d) of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the President pro tempore, and only to officers not under impeachment by the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office of President devolve upon them. I think the bolded text answers your question. The Acting Attorney General has not been confirmed by the Senate, so is not in the presidential line of succession. Now there is potentially room to argue that, if the Acting Attorney General has been confirmed by the Senate for some other office (most likely Deputy Attorney General), then they qualify. Of course, there is no case law to clarify this, since the presidential succession has never gone beyond what is listed in the constitution. However, I don't think it's a very compelling argument, particularly for the current Acting Attorney General who was not appointed on the basis of his previous confirmation. (Interestingly, a Bill was introduced to the House in 2003 that would have explicitly removed acting officers from the line of succession. Ultimately, that Bill did not progress.)
The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.
House Rule XI(m), p. 19, states the power of committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas. (1)…a committee or sub-committee is authorized (subject to subparagraph (3)(A)) …to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such witnesses… (3)(A)(i) Except as provided in sub-division (A)(ii), a subpoena may be authorized and issued by a committee or subcommittee under subparagraph (1)(B) in the conduct of an investigation or series of investigations or activities only when authorized by the committee or subcommittee, a majority being present. A subcommittee could therefore authorize the chair of the subcommittee to issue subpoenas with no vote at all. Otherwise, the (sub)committee must "authorize" a subpoena, which conventionally means "vote on the motion". There is no requirement that the entire house must vote on subpoenas. There is no question that POTUS did not obey the demand of the House subcommittee. The argument that will most likely be proffered is not that the House violated its rules, but that the House rules exceed constitutional authority in issuing the subpoena. As pointed out in this analysis, this is not a well-established and settled question of constitutional law. There is no rule that requires a full House vote on all subcommittee rules established by a subcommittee that forwards articles of impeachment to the full House. That is, a subcommittee does not have to get prior approval of the full House in order for a subcommittee to conduct business and recommend an action to the full house. Instead, the House simply votes yes or no on the particular articles, following the rules for House votes.