What are standards of proof that are lower than &quot;preponderance of evidence?&quot; Two standards that I've heard of are "compelling" evidence, and "reasonable indication." Apparently, they may be used to defend certain actions where the level of proof is less than 50-50 but "non-trivial." How, for example, can evidence be "compelling" while being "less likely than not?"
The standard of proof required to survive a motion to dismiss is very low. The factual (not legal) assertions of the plaintiff are assumed to be true, and the case is dismissed if the defense shows that even when the plaintiff is given that benefit, the assumed facts don't establish the case. This standard is somtimes referred to as "sufficiency of the claims".
"Hearsay" is a term used for statements offered in evidence in court that are not admissible because the person who originally made the statement has not testified to it. The hearsay rule is complex, and has many ramifications and exceptions. Legal texts take hundreds of pages to explain all these complications. But the term is not appropriate unless the statement is offered as evidence in court, or there is a plan to offer it. An ordinary email that no one plans to offer in court is neither hearsay nor not-hearsay, it is just a set of statements that may be true or untrue, accurate or mistaken. If for some reason this email were to be placed in evidence in court, the default procedure would be to call the person who originally wrote it to testify, and ask questions like "Did you write this? When did you write it? was it the truth to the best of your knowledge when you sent it?" If the original sender cannot or will not be a witness, then whether the email will be accepted as evidence will depend on what is sought to be proved by the email, and what evidence there is that the email was sent, and by whom, and was the truth as far as the sender knew. If what you really want to know is whether the email accurately quotes the organization's lawyer, just email or write that lawyer, saying something like "Does the attached email accurately represent an opinion that you gave to {organization} as I have been told it does?"
Yes to everything. Justified use of force is assault / battery / homicide (as appropriate). "Assault" means that a person has placed someone in fear of their life or person. "Battery" means that a person has physically struck someone in some way. "Homicide" means that a person has killed another human. None of these definitions speak to the legality of the action. You are right about the example being assault. Justified use of force is de facto legal. Assault, battery, and homicide are normally crimes, but the justifications for using force carve out exceptions. If the circumstances fit within the justification, the person using the justified force has not committed a crime. (Generally speaking, the person targeted by said force has.) If the situation you describe fits within the laws of justification within the state (and to be fair, it probably does), then your co-worker is right about the actions being perfectly legal. Police are picky about what they investigate, and prosecutors are picky about what they charge. If it's 100% clear from the evidence that you were justified in your use of force, prosecutors will (typically) not press charges, and so police will not bother with an arrest or further investigation. It's really not worth the time and effort for a case that has 0% chance of producing a conviction. However, if the police and prosecutors have some doubts (e.g., they think your force was excessive and therefor not justified), they can still press charges. Being charged with a crime does not mean you have committed a crime. And vice-versa. Justification is an affirmative defense against charges of assault / battery / homicide. An affirmative defense does not mean "I confess to the crime but have a really good excuse." It means that you admit to certain facts that would normally be beneficial to the prosecution, but claim additional facts that either mitigate or make you innocent of the given charges. In the case of justified force, you are admitting to the action of assault, but claiming innocence. When making your defense, your theory of defense must be internally consistent. You cannot admit to a fact when convenient and deny it when it is inconvenient. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, Sam did it," is an example of a self-consistent theory that gives multiple reasons to acquit. That's good, because the jury only needs one reason that gives them pause, and now you've got two chances at that. "I was in Santa Fe at the time, and anyway, he was threatening my life," is not internally consistent. If you argue justification, you explicitly declaim any alibi. This situation is more dangerous, because your defense rests entirely on the credibility of the justification. But if you argue an alibi, you implicitly declaim any justification. So building your defense on things the prosecution can disprove is much worse than taking an affirmative defense of justification.
Does that mean that the &quot;reasonable person&quot; standard also changes over time? The reasonable person standard changes every time a new finder of fact, either a judge or a jury, considers a case. To a great extent the whole point of a &quot;reasonable person&quot; standard is to inject irreducible uncertainty into the question of what conduct someone can be held liable for, thereby giving juries (or judges in bench trials) discretion to evaluate complex factual situations and consider those situations in light of the fact finders' collective moral judgment. There are seemingly objective tests by which reasonableness can be measured, such as the &quot;Learned Hand test&quot; which compares the risk of harm caused by not taking a precaution times the likelihood that the harm will manifest itself. But ultimately, this is very rarely so clear a standard that it overcomes the broad discretion of the finder of fact to determine what is and isn't reasonable under a particular set of circumstances.
First we should be more specific about a person being &quot;accused&quot; – we should disregard lunatic rantings, and limit our attention to a person who has been officially, legally accused of a crime (which is the class of acts to which the concept &quot;guilt&quot; applies). In all jurisdictions, a formal accusation must be supported with some evidence. In light of that, by definition it is possible that the accused is guilty. The fact-finders will then weigh that evidence and conclude that the evidence meets the standard of proof for guilt, or does not. It is then logically incoherent to deny that guilt is a possibility, unless the intent is that all accused persons should be found innocent irrespective of the evidence. The finder of fact must allow both possible outcomes. The reason for the &quot;innocent until proven guilty&quot; viewpoint is that it puts a specific burden of proof on the government: the government has to not just knock down all of the accused's defenses, it has to conjure up a certain level of sufficiently-convincing evidence proving guilt. This is to avoid the situation that characterizes totalitarian regimes where the tyrant can accuse a person of a random crime, offer no evidence, then insist that the accused somehow prove their innocence.
What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission &amp; editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial).
Your translation of the first statement is not correct. Saying that one promises to tell the truth is not saying that one promises to not tell a falsehood. If telling truth and telling falsehood are items labeled T and F, then this is a logical statement ~(T > ~F) for ~ negation and > implication. The combination of the first and third statements is necessary to obtain what you have called Statement 1, while the combination of the first and second statements is necessary to obtain what you call Statement 2. It could also be argued that the first statement is not even necessary, as it is just a less strict version of the second statement (and a less desirable one at that, if one values the honest sharing of complete knowledge), but the redundancy does not harm the meaning or impact of the following statements.
Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial.