Which powers can the President delegate to other officers or employees of the Executive Branch? The President is the head of the Executive Branch of the United States Government. As the head of the branch a lot of things are formally done by the President, but in actuality many tasks are performed by other Executive Branch employees. What determines which acts must be done by the President and which acts the President can delegate? It seems pretty clear that signing of legislation must be done by the President directly. How about other things? Can the President delegate the authority to commute or issue pardons? What is the test by which this is analyzed?
As an example, POTUS does not undertake the entire pardon process on his own, instead they are preliminarily processed by the Department of Justice, which makes a recommendation. Only POTUS can "grant" the pardon, and we lack substantive information on how deeply he gets involved (does he just sign documents based on staff recommendations? does he do his own research?). I don't know what physical form Clinton's 450 pardons on January 20, 2001 took, but a president might use an autopen (Obama did use such a device). Questions have been raised and definitive answers from SCOTUS are lacking as to whether hand-to-paper signatures are demanded by the Constitution. DoJ at one point thought it was okay. This article lists the Constitutional functions which cannot be delegated: reporting to the Congress on the state of the Union; convening either or both Houses of Congress and adjourning Congress; signing and vetoing bills; receiving ambassadors and public ministers (recognition); appointing and removing ambassadors, ministers, and certain other public officers; nominating federal judges; and making recess appointments However, the Constitutional function of negotiating treaties or numerous functions as commander in chief of the armed forces is generally delegated, within the executive branch. Numerous statutory functions can be delegated (and Congress may say explicitly that some function can be delegated, in passing the law). The matter of implied power to delegate statutory function is the topic of a couple of centuries of litigation, but as an example in Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. 290 SCOTUS held that a law prohibiting the advance of public money in any case whatsoever to the disbursing officers of government except under the special direction of the President does not require the personal and ministerial performance of this duty, to be exercised in every instance by the President under his own hand. SCOTUS has not established bright lines regarding the extent of permissible delegation.
I would argue the Constitutional basis of these actions would be the Constitution itself, namely Article II, Section 4: The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. and Article I, Section 3, Clause 7: Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. Note also, that as Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers, the Impeachment process was a check brought over from England (it predated the formation of Britain by several centuries) as a check on Executive (read Monarchal) power of royal appointments, including Judges. So, to answer your questions directly: Serving out one's term or resigning is not a shield to impeachment, otherwise one could simply play &quot;whack-a-mole&quot;, appointing the same individual repeatedly (which is also why future barring of the individual from governmental office is an option). The purpose of impeachment is, per Hamilton, to react to &quot;political crimes&quot;; &quot;mundane&quot; crimes are to be handle by the normal judicial system. Nixon did famously resign rather than be impeached, but he was barred from running again anyway, having served two terms as President. Congress at that time chose not to continue the impeachment process after his resignation (note that disqualification is an option, but not required, punishment that can be levied by Congress in the event of impeachment). See Article I, Section 3, Clause 7, quoted above.
All of them. The "cabinet" refers to the heads of the executive departments listed at 5 USC 101. "Cabinet" isn't defined in the Constitution or legislation, but this interpretation is supported by the American Heritage Dictionary (cabinet), the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, and some discussion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976). All of these are consistent with an interpretation of "cabinet" to mean heads of departments of the executive branch. All cabinet appointments require the advice and consent of the Senate (except for recess appointments). The requirement for advice and consent of the Senate is given in individual statutes relating to each department. For the Secretary of State, for example, see 22 U.S. Code § 2651a (a) (2): The Secretary, the Deputy Secretary of State, and the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. That statute also happens to require some deputies to gain the consent of the Senate. For the Secretary of the Treasury, see 31 U.S. Code § 301: [...] The Secretary is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. There are hundreds of non-cabinet positions that require the advice and consent of the Senate. These are presented in the report, "Presidential Appointee Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation and Committees Handling Nominations".
colorado No Colo. Rev. Stat. § 1-4-304 (5) Each presidential elector shall vote for the presidential candidate and, by separate ballot, vice-presidential candidate who received the highest number of votes at the preceding general election in this state. By law, the electors have to vote for the winner of the statewide popular vote. Nobody has the authority to make them do anything else. And if they try to vote differently of their own accord, the Colorado Secretary of State may void their vote and replace them with another elector. This happened in the 2016 election, and the voiding of the vote was eventually upheld by the US Supreme Court (Baca v. Colorado Department of State). I suppose the legislature might be able to repeal 1-4-304, but the governor could veto, and a 2/3 majority of both chambers would be needed in order to override. There would likely also be court challenges as to whether the repeal could affect an election that had already taken place.
Not directly However, a President who is unable to discharge their duties (by being on vacation or otherwise) can be dealt with by either: the vice-President and Cabinet invoking the 25th amendment and declaring the President unable to perform their duties, by the House impeaching the President for the “high crime and misdemeanour” of not doing her job. If convicted by the Senate, the person is no longer President.
A Presidential candidate has no legal immunity for litigation or prosecution different from that of any other political candidate. The First Amendment provides significant protections for expressive conduct of a candidate for political office. Presidential candidates do have a few special privileges, most notably, secret service protection and at a late stage, access to certain intelligence briefings not available to the general public. Judges and prosecutors often seek to avoid the appearance of impropriety interfering with a Presidential election campaign and this may influence, for example, the scheduling of proceeding against a candidate. But there is no actual immunity from either criminal or civil liability for a Presidential candidate that is different from anyone else.
It looks to me like this is authorized under New York State's Executive Law Section 24. The text is long, but I think it addresses most of the points in your question. The law allows the chief executive of a local government (e.g. mayor of a city) to declare a local state of emergency "in the event of a disaster, rioting, catastrophe, or similar public emergency". Under such a state of emergency, the executive can promulgate local emergency orders, that can include provisions like travel bans, curfews, mandatory evacuation, etc. Violating such an order is a Class B misdemeanor (see paragraph 5). I didn't see any explicit requirement for the executive to weigh safety benefits against restriction of personal liberties. The executive just has to "find" (i.e. decide) that a disaster exists and imperils public safety. However, there are some safeguards. The local state of emergency is limited to 30 days (some orders can be extended for an additional 30 days); see paragraph 1. And the state legislature has the authority to terminate the state of emergency by a concurrent resolution (paragraph 8). Further good reading is a primer (PDF) written by the legal counsel of New York's Office of Emergency Management, giving a guide in layman's language for local chief executives on how to handle state of emergency declarations. I'm slightly puzzled as to why, in this case, the order was given by the governor, when it looks from the law like it should be the mayor's role to do so. It could be that the mayor took the appropriate legal action and just let the governor make the public announcement. Also, Executive Law Article 2-B (Sections 20-29) have many other provisions regarding emergencies. Section 28 gives the governor the power to declare a "disaster emergency", though it's not clear from that section whether this includes the power to issue similar emergency orders.
The law does not require any reference to science of any kind – that is a political choice. The law grant a certain authority to the governor, under certain circumstances, go give extraordinary orders at the governor's discretion. No actions are mandatory during an emergency. The laws may or may not require legislative approval for extending an order beyond a certain point, where the order is issue pursuant to declaring a state of emergency. There are two main bases for appealing to the courts to enjoin against some aspect of an order: lack of initial authority (the statute does not actually grant that power), or, violation of fundamental constitutional rights. The latter is the predominant basis for appeal in the present instances.