What 2012-2015 SCOTUS decisions make &quot;letter[s] from the grave&quot; inadmissible into evidence? I've read this interesting bit: In a 2008 trial where a man was accused of poisoning his wife with antifreeze, Schroeder allowed into evidence a letter the wife wrote a neighbor accusing the husband should anything happen to her. The so-called &quot;letter from the grave&quot; evidence proved key to conviction. Wisconsin's Supreme Court this year ordered a new trial for the man and ruled the letter should not have been admitted as evidence. Schroeder sentenced the defendant to life in prison without a chance of parole. Before announcing his sentence, Schroeder told the defendant: &quot;Your crime is so enormous, so monstrous, so unspeakably cruel that it overcomes all other considerations.&quot; I have tracked the case to its Wikipedia page but from a quick read of the latest decision in this saga, it's not clear why the Wisconsin Supreme Court has decided the evidence was inadmissible... other than them saying The State asserted, as it does on appeal, that United States Supreme Court cases decided in 2011, 2012, and 2015 modified the definition of what constitutes a “testimonial” statement and that under the revised definition, Julie’s letter and other statements do not qualify. The circuit court agreed and ruled that the letter and statements are nontestimonial and could be admitted at trial. The State subsequently filed a motion to reinstate the original jury verdict without a retrial, and the circuit court did just that, reinstating the original conviction as well as Jensen’s life sentence, explaining that there was no need for a new trial because the evidence would be “materially the same as the first trial.” Jensen appeals. Somewhat strangely for a legal decision, the exact SOCTUS cases don't seem explicitly cited. The decision mentions the Confrontation Clause; upon looking at the Wikipedia article on the latter... two 2011 cases are mentioned (one of them rather confusingly summarized, IMHO): [In] Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), the Court ruled that admitting a lab chemist's analysis into evidence, without having him testify, violated the Confrontation Clause. In Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011), the Court ruled that the &quot;primary purpose&quot; of a shooting victim's statement as to who shot him, and the police's reason for questioning him, each had to be objectively determined. If the &quot;primary purpose&quot; was for dealing with an &quot;ongoing emergency&quot;, then any such statement was not testimonial and so the Confrontation Clause would not require the person making that statement to testify in order for that statement to be admitted into evidence. So what were the 2012 and 2015 cases?
The general problem with a &quot;letter from the grave&quot; is that it violates a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. The major decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause from the years in question are: Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of hearsay statements whose primary purpose was to address an ongoing emergency) Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit expert testimony as to hearsay statements assumed to be true for purposes of informing her opinion) Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, (2015) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of hearsay statements that &quot;were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence&quot;)
united-states In U.S. practice in almost all jurisdictions, court orders must be memorialized in a signed or electronically signed writing transmitted to the parties and/or counsel. But, this can be a bare recitation of the result. The extent to which it must be reasoned is discretionary, and the reasoning can be supplied by an oral statement of the judge in lieu of a writing. Oral statements of reasoning in lieu of written judgments are common in courts of limited jurisdiction comparable to English County Courts, but written opinions are issued now and then in more complex cases or where legal issues were argued in closing arguments. A ruling of a judge sitting without a jury may be vacated and remanded by an appellate court for further proceedings, if the factual and legal basis for the ruling is not articulated with sufficient clarity to allow an appellate court to determine if the trial court's decision was legally correct and supported by the trial court record. Juries, of course, are not requires to articulate their reasoning and enter a bare verdict of liability and damages, or guilty and not guilty as to each charge (and in rare instances also answer one or more &quot;special verdict&quot; questions) in the manner set forth on the jury verdict form provided to the jury. In limited jurisdiction courts where the sole appeal is a trial de novo in a higher court, called &quot;courts not of record&quot;, a written statement of reasons is unnecessary as any appeal will not be based upon the trial court record.
Appeal proofing decisions is a common practice of trial judges (and even intermediate appellate court judges and state supreme court judges) well known to practitioners and even discussed by law professors in class at times, but I'd have a hard time coming up with a reference where it was discussed. There is probably a law review article that discusses the practice somewhere. It also comes in several versions. One is to make copious findings of fact (especially on credibility) that are hard to reverse on appeal. A judicial finding that someone had an intent to defraud another party based upon his demeanor when he testified about that issue can overcome all sorts of technical objections to a claim in a lawsuit on a more strict liability basis like breach of contract. Another is to give a "soon to lose" party everything he wants procedurally, even when he isn't entitled to it so he can't appeal on procedural grounds. For example, a court might admit otherwise inadmissible evidence over the objection of the other party and then rule against the party seeking to admit that evidence anyway on the merits. Lawyers often assume that this is happening when a judge starts making blatantly incorrect rulings on procedural issues against them repeatedly in an otherwise strong case in a bench trial. A third is to provide an alternative holding that reaches the same conclusion in case for a different legal reason in the event that an appellate court does not agree with the primary holding. A fourth (mostly limited to appellate contexts) is to decide a case on grounds that make the case uninteresting to review on further appeal (e.g. finding that a factual conclusion is supported by evidence in the record, or that an issue wasn't preserved adequately in a trial court) or beyond the jurisdiction of other courts (e.g. deciding a case based upon state law so that the U.S. Supreme Court won't review it).
canada Evidence of offences other than the one for which the accused is being sentenced is admissable at a sentencing hearing, even evidence of untried offences. R. v. Edwards, 2001 CanLII 24105 (Ont. C.A.): [39] There are statutory provisions that do permit the use of evidence about the offender, even though that evidence also discloses the commission of other crimes. First, s. 718(c) and (d) of the Criminal Code set out as two of the objectives of sentencing: (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; [40] Neither of these objectives can be fairly achieved through sentencing without knowing something, and perhaps quite a bit, about the background and character of the offender. The Crown, in this case, in effect put its case for admission of this evidence on the need to separate this respondent from society. The sentencing judge can consider such evidence of untried offences. (R. v. Jordan, 1991 CanLII 203 (B.C.C.A.)) When there is a dispute about any fact that might aggravate the sentence, the Crown (prosecution) must establish that fact by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal Code, s. 724(3)(e). See also R. v. Roopchand, 2016 MBCA 105: The first ground [of appeal] is whether the sentencing judge erred by taking into account the accused’s pending charge for an untried offence when imposing sentence. The use to be made of evidence will be informed by the purpose for which it is to be admitted. With respect to what use can be made of evidence of untried offences at a sentencing hearing, the case law is clear: while such evidence cannot be used for the purpose of punishing the accused, it is admissible when its purpose is limited to shedding light upon some aspect of the accused’s character and background which is relevant to the objectives of sentencing being considered by the judge R. v. Angelillo, 2006 SCC 55: The fact that Mr. Angelillo had been charged with two new counts of fraud, both of which were allegedly committed while he was waiting to be sentenced, was obviously relevant to the assessment of the danger his release would represent for the community. In Angelillo, the judge could even have &quot;postponed the sentencing hearing to a date after the interim release hearing regarding the new charges in order to be better informed of the risk resulting from the subsequent act.&quot;
Yes. The precedent is President Gerald Ford's pardon of his predecessor Richard Nixon in proclamation 4311 before any possible prosecution had started. The pardon was granted specifically to prevent the disturbance of &quot;the tranquility to which the nation has been restored&quot; by &quot;the prospects of bringing to trial a former President of the United States&quot; (emphasis mine). It is noteworthy though that a pardon can be rejected by the recipient, and that there may be good reason to do so, because accepting one is an admission of guilt.1 In the words of the Supreme Court (Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915): There are substantial differences between legislative immunity and a pardon; the latter carries an imputation of guilt and acceptance of a confession of it [...]. (Again, emphasis mine.) Proactively pardoning large swathes of current and former government officials, family members and other people connected to the Trump administration would therefore be a double-edged sword: It surely may save a lot of the money and headache coming with being the target of an (even unsuccessful!) investigation; but it may also amount to admitting that the Trump administration was essentially a criminal organization. 1 As always, things are a bit less clear-cut when one takes a closer look. Because I googled &quot;prospective pardon&quot; after the correct remark by JBentley I stumbled upon the entirely relevant and eminently readable Congressional Research Service reports on pardons. The first one is a &quot;pardons FAQ&quot;, the second one is a more thorough legal exploration of what pardons actually do. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court and Federal Courts have edged away from a 19th century opinion (Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380-81 (1866)) which viewed a pardon as an all-encompassing expungement. Newer decisions (prominently, Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 86 (1915) which I quoted) don't.
What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission &amp; editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial).
In a trial by judge (bench trial) that could certainly happen. Most substantial parts of the judicial process can be sealed, under numerous laws and theories. The U.S. FISA "Court" is notorious for operating virtually entirely in secret. Various laws allow for secret subpoenas or warrants, with the subjects on which they are served held criminally liable for violating the court's order for secrecy. In a trial by jury it would probably be impossible for an exonerating fact to be presented to the judge only, since the proper role of the jury is to decide all questions of fact in a case. Furthermore, a court can compel a witness to testify, with no requirement to mitigate the damages of such testimony. However, if the accused knew that an exculpatory fact could be provided by a witness, and that the witness might decline to give (honest) testimony to a jury, he would presumably waive his right to a jury trial, at which point the testimony could (in theory) be given only to the judge.
Discovery Basically, you ask. If your opponent thinks your request is out of bounds they object, give their reasons to the judge, you give yours and the judge orders them to produce the evidence or not. A lot of people think court cases have big “ah-ha” movements when a witness reveals something unknown on the stand. This rarely happens because there are no secrets in litigation - both sides have to clearly explain their case before, usually well before, they go to trial.