Conflict Between Third Circuit and NJ Appellate Division Regarding Stay Pending Appeal? NJ Rule 2:9:1 states: When an appeal is taken from an order compelling or denying arbitration, the trial court shall retain jurisdiction to address issues relating to claims and parties that remain in that court unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court possessing supervision and control How is this rule consistent with the ruling by the Third Circuit in Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc., 482 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2007)? In the above case, the Third Circuit noted the existence of “a circuit split on the question of whether the filing of an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Section 16(a) of the FAA automatically deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed until such time as the appeal is fully litigated or determined to be frivolous or forfeited,” and “expressed agreement with the majority rule of automatic divestiture where the Section 16(a) appeal is neither frivolous nor forfeited.” Isn't the the Appellate Division in NJ required to uphold the ruling of the Third Circuit in such matters?
Isn't the the Appellate Division in NJ required to uphold the ruling of the Third Circuit in such matters? It is not. There can be no conflict on procedural issues between the Third Circuit, which is interpreting federal rules of civil and appellate procedure, and a ruling of a New Jersey court which is interpreting state rules of civil and appellate procedure. Different court systems have different procedural rules. Federal rules of procedure are inapplicable in state courts. State rules of procedure are inapplicable in federal courts. The circuit split referred to is between different federal appellate court circuits interpreting the federal rules of civil and appellate procedure. But none of those rules are applicable to state courts. Furthermore, even if a question of substantive federal law were involved, the state courts of New Jersey are only required to follow precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court and higher appellate courts in the New Jersey state court system. Decisions of the Third Circuit on questions of federal law are not binding on the courts of New Jersey despite the fact that New Jersey is located in the Third Circuit, even though they are persuasive authority on questions of substantive federal law that are equally applicable in both court systems.
In the US, there are many possible sanctions A frivolous case, or pattern of cases, can result in a number of punishments: Paying the other side's legal fees -- Mind you, in the U.S, it is normal for each party to pay their own fees, and that will happen in &quot;honest disagreement&quot; type cases in which both parties have a valid perspective. &quot;Loser pays&quot; only happens when a) the loser has filed a ridiculous lawsuit, or greatly burdened the other side with frivolous filings; and b) the winner asks for fees. Transferring other costs to the plaintiff as the court sees fit. Again, winner must ask. Barring a plaintiff from filing future cases, without advance permission from the court. Again, winner must ask! Barring attorneys or firms from practicing in certain areas of law. Disbarment of the attorneys. That is decided by the state's Bar Association, typically a nonprofit trade association who in effect regulates lawyers in this manner. For instance, California is one of only four states allowing cash awards for ADA violations. A clever person named Mr. Molski went around to different restaurants and checked their bathrooms for ADA compliance. If a toilet paper roll was 1/2&quot; out of position from where ADA required, Molski would take notes. Molski checked dozens of restaurants every day, and passed these notes onto a San Francisco law office. The law office filed hundreds if not thousands of these lawsuits against the various restaurants. The lawsuits all claimed that Molski was injured as a result of the ADA noncompliance. Mind you, this was in the age before easy merging of databases and MS-Word documents. Since these hundreds of cases were so similar, they simply made Xerox copies of the relevant paperwork, only leaving a few fields blank to be typed in by hand. To reduce secretarial workload, they didn't bother customizing the date of injury: so all cases claimed Molski was injured on the same day. Hundreds of defendants simply settled for amounts in the $5000 range (about half the cost of hiring a lawyer to grind through a trial). However, one defendant, a Chinese restaurant, fought. Their counsel discovered the hundreds of other same cases, and pointed out to the court that Molski was claiming to have suffered the same injury at dozens of restaurants on the same day. What an unlucky fellow! The defendant then claimed Molski and attorneys were Vexatious Litigants, and the court wholeheartedly agreed. Molski was barred for life from filing any lawsuit without advance court approval (in which Molski would need to show a body of evidence to the court that yeah, a real and valid case was there). The law firm was barred for life from filing any ADA related cases. The law firm folded up, and is no more. The lawyers involved in the case quit practicing law. Then we have Righthaven, who purchased from newspapers the &quot;right to sue and collect damages&quot; for copyright violations. Many bulletin boards, chatrooms, forums and Q&amp;A sites allow/rely on &quot;User Generated Content&quot; (UGC), such as this here answer. They used search engines to find forums where users had copy-pasted newspaper articles. Generally, forums are protected from user behavior by the DMCA. Then, like Molski, they sued the forums, offering a settlement number below the cost of litigation itself. Again, hundreds paid; but a few fought on principle, with support from EFF. Again, Righthaven got destroyed in court - the right to sue cannot be sold. Courts ordered them to pay their victims' legal fees, bankrupting the operation. Prenda tried a similar thing against people who BitTorrent porn. I was in a case where we asked for fees. I got them, with such ease that I am kicking myself for not asking that the plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigant (which would have saved many others from this person). Further, the judge laid a heavy hint to the 3 other co-parties that if they asked for fees, they'd get them too. They did not ask. Amusingly, one of the lawyers who should have asked, was unable to collect from the client. Should have asked...
The original filed case would have been &quot;Government v. Item&quot;, with the government (plaintiff) suing the item (defendant), not the other way around. But these are appellate cases, and the title convention there is &quot;Appellant v. Respondent&quot;, regardless of who was the original plaintiff or defendant. So in each case, the item presumably lost in some lower court and is now appealing to SCOTUS. Taking 62 Cases of Jam as an example and chasing the citations, the original case in US District Court for the District of New Mexico was United States v. 62 Cases, 87 F. Supp. 735 (D.N.M. 1949). The government sought to condemn the jam on the grounds that it was only 25% fruit, where federal standards for jam required that it must contain at least 45% (or more depending on the type of fruit). The District Court dismissed the &quot;libel&quot; on the grounds that the product was clearly labeled &quot;imitation&quot;. The government appealed to the Tenth Circuit (183 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir. 1950)); here the case was still titled &quot;US v. 62 Cases&quot; since the United States was the appellant; appeals cases are always titled &quot;Appellant v. Respondent&quot;. The circuit court reversed, ruling that since it looks and tastes like jam, it has to meet the standards for jam, its label notwithstanding, and ordered the jam to be condemned. The jam petitioned for certiorari to the US Supreme Court, (340 U.S. 593 (1951)), and now for the first time the title of the case is &quot;62 Cases of Jam v. US&quot; since the jam is now the petitioner. Again, &quot;Petitioner v. Respondent&quot; is the norm. As the defendant party was &quot;62 Cases of Jam&quot; throughout the lower courts, it wouldn't make sense to change it to &quot;Fred Smith, Owner of 62 Cases of Jam&quot; at this point. SCOTUS reversed, and the jam was finally exonerated, free to resume its ordinary jammy activities.
Defendants cannot switcheroo whenever they want. There are good reasons why this is almost never done. The lawyer in any of these scenarios is violating an ethical duty of candor to the tribunal, if it is done without court permission (which is unlikely to be granted), even if the client suggested or insisted upon the idea. The lawyer would be responsible for his or her client's actions by cooperating in it, rather than calling out his client in open court over the objections of the client to prevent the switcheroo from working, as the lawyer would have an ethical obligation to do. I would not really consider this to be a gray area. The relevant ethical rules and the related official commentaries to them are quite clear, even if they are not absolutely perfectly clear. Those rules create an affirmative duty of an attorney to prevent his or her client from misleading members of a tribunal (either a judge or a jury or both). Cooperating with this scheme could (and likely would) result in professional licensure related sanctions ranging from a private censure to disbarment for the lawyer, just as it did in the linked 1994 case. Also, while a "not guilty" verdict was entered in the 1994 case, the prosecution would have a good chance of success if they demanded that the judge declare a mistrial, and also a good chance of avoiding double jeopardy limitations in this situation, because the mistrial arose from the actions of the defendant trying to bring about the situation. On the other hand, if this trick worked so well that the prosecutors came to the conclusion that their primary witness linking the defendant to the crime was wrong and that the defendant was not actually the person who committed the crime, the prosecutors would have an ethical duty to not attempt to prosecute the individual whom the prosecutors now believed to be factually innocent (the analysis is actually a bit more complex than that, but that is the gist of it). The defendant and the attorney could (and likely would) also each be held in direct, punitive contempt of court by the judge for this conduct, allowing them to be summarily punished by imprisonment or a fine to an extent similar to a misdemeanor violation, on the spot, without a trial other than an opportunity to explain themselves to the judge in a sentence or two each, since it would be conduct in violation of the good order of the court and disrespectful of its rules and decorum conducted in the actual courtroom in the presence of the judge. Each could easily end up spending several months in jail on the spot for that stunt and perhaps a $1,000 fine each, if the judge was sufficiently displeased. There would be a right to appeal this contempt of court sanction, but the contempt of court punishment would almost surely be upheld on appeal in these circumstances. In a case where the criminal defendant faces extremely severe sanctions if found guilty, such as the death penalty or life in prison, and the defense attorney was a self-sacrificing idealist or close family member of the criminal defendant, one could imagine the defense attorney and client deciding that the professional and contempt citation sanctions were worth being punished with, in order to save the life of the criminal defendant, if they also were convinced that this trick would work so well that the prosecutors would be persuaded of the criminal defendant's innocence sufficiently to not insist on retrying the criminal defendant in a new trial. This would be somewhat analogous to an intentional foul in basketball, but with much higher stakes. But, this would be an extraordinarily rare situation in court, because the punishment for this "intentional foul" in the courtroom are much more severe, and because the likelihood of it producing a beneficial result is much smaller. It isn't hard to understand why a successful switcheroo feels morally justified. It prevents a witness whose testimony would have been much less reliable than it actually would have been from being used to convict a criminal defendant who might conceivably be factually innocent. And it might be very hard to discredit the testimony of that witness in any other way in order to prevent a wrongful conviction of the criminal defendant. Eye witness misidentifications are one of the leading causes of wrongful convictions, and are especially common in death penalty cases because jurors are "death qualified" making them more pro-prosecution than a typical jury. Preventing innocent people from being convicted of crimes is one of several important values of the criminal justice system, and this is the instinct that probably motivated the dissents in the professional misconduct process in the 1994 case. But, the court system also strongly values candor on the part of attorneys, and likewise values not having the court systems be used to trip up witnesses who may sincerely think that they are telling the truth even if they are mistaken about the accuracy of their testimony, in a deceptive manner. In this situation, the latter candor consideration usually prevails, because the rules prohibiting this kind of conduct and scheme, which admits no "moral justification" or "necessity exception", are quite clear. In the same vein, a prosecuting attorney can be sanctioned (and has been on at least one occasion in Colorado) for not being truthful in communications to third parties, even when the lies are used to peacefully defuse a potentially deadly hostage situation. For attorneys, the duty of candor and truthfulness really knows no exceptions. Cops, in contrast, however, are allowed to lie in many circumstances to secure confessions or stop criminals.
(My expectation is that the proof has to be replicated and the conviction cannot be introduced as evidence). Your expectation is incorrect. The name of the legal doctrine that allows a criminal judgment to have this effect in a civil case is called "collateral estoppel" which is also sometimes called "issue preclusion". See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair &amp; Detail, Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 2004) ("Hardy contends Colorado law does not allow courts to apply collateral estoppel, now commonly known as the doctrine of issue preclusion, when the first adjudication is criminal and the subsequent litigation is civil. We disagree.") Similarly, a case out of California stated: To preclude a civil litigant from relitigating an issue previously found against him in a criminal prosecution is less severe than to preclude him from relitigating such an issue in successive civil trials, for there are rigorous safeguards against unjust conviction, including the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and of a unanimous verdict, the right to counsel, and a record paid for by the state on appeal. Stability of judgments and expeditious trials are served and no injustice done, when criminal defendants are estopped from relitigating issues determined in conformity with these safeguards. Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal.2d 601, 606, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, 441 (1962) (citations omitted). To the best of my knowledge, this is the rule in every U.S. jurisdiction (with the possible exceptions of Puerto Rico and Louisiana which are not common law jurisdictions). It is also the historical rule in British common law, although I don't know if this continues to be the case in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Procedurally, the determination that collateral estoppel applies would usually be made on a motion for summary judgment, or in the preparation of jury instructions which state that liability has been established and that the jury is to limit itself to determining causation and damages, rather than as an evidentiary matter. I've used this doctrine once or twice. For example, I used it in a case where someone fraudulently sold ditch company shares worth several hundred thousand dollars (in Colorado, water is gold) that he didn't own (a transaction that could not be unwound because the buyer was a bona fide purchaser for value and the seller had apparent authority as a trustee of a trust owning the shares even though he didn't have the actual authority to sell them under the trust) and then spent the money he received before he was discovered (if I recall correctly, for gambling debts). He was convicted criminally and then my client, the victim, sued for money damages including statutory treble damages for civil theft and attorney's fees based upon collateral estoppel and an affidavit as to damages in a motion for summary judgment. From a practical perspective the four main difficulties are that (1) people convicted of crimes often lack the income or assets to pay judgments, (2) there are double recovery issues involved in reconciling restitution awards in a criminal case (where the measure of damages is narrower) and damage awards in a civil case (where the measure of damages is broader), (3) there are priority issues involved in reconciling criminal awards for fines, restitution and costs, in each case with civil awards for damages, and (4) if the defendant declares bankruptcy, the non-dischargeability of the civil judgment must be affirmatively raised and proved (often this is elementary but there are strict time limits) in the bankruptcy proceeding. Tactically, it is often better to sue first, collect what you can, and to bring a criminal complaint only when it turns out that the perpetrator is judgment-proof.
Lower courts are only bound by US Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law once the US Supreme Court releases an opinion on an issue. Until that point in time, the US Supreme Court is officially undecided on an issue. You ask: if the U.S Supreme Court says it hasn't decided as to what the law is in this regard, can a lower court issue a ruling that might eventually be in conflict with the Supreme Court? This is commonplace. For many matters, the US Supreme Court is undecided (new statutes, novel circumstances, etc.). In order for a matter to even get to the Supreme Court in the first place, it is often the case that a lower court ruled on a question for which the Supreme Court had not previously announced its opinion. I know you are asking about the circumstance where the US Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal but has not yet issued judgment. However, with respect to precedential value, it is the same until the time of judgment.
Nothing prevents firms from putting clauses like that in the disclaimer. If you're talking about goods (rather than services), much contract formation is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, which 49 states have adopted (and which Louisiana has adopted part). However, the real question relates to whether that kind of language will be enforceable in court. A common way to attempt to avoid litigation is to insert a clause that requires arbitration of disputes (instead of litigation). The Supreme Court upheld the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), so this can be successful. Contracts that have class-action arbitration provisions are a little dicier, but in AT&amp;T Mobility, LLC v. Conception, 563 US 333 (2011) , the court held the FAA preempts state laws that disallow class arbitration.
Part XVIII of the Criminal Code addresses the power and procedure for appeals. Appeals of indictable offences are appealed to the provincial Court of Appeal. The Crown can generally appeal where there is an error in law. The Crown has a limited appeal on the basis of questions of fact. This includes appeals for unreasonable verdict.1 However, the Crown cannot appeal on issues of credibility unless it amount to an error in law. The Defence can appeal both issues of fact and law.(ss. 675 and 676) R. v. Kendall, [2005] O.J. No. 2457 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 46 from a Canadian Criminal Procedure Wiki. Unlike in U.S. law, the government can directly appeal an acquittal on certain grounds in Canada (without regard to whether it was a jury trial or a bench trial), although those grounds aren't quite as broad as those of the defense. This would also be true in modern English law. In practice, it is somewhat easier to appeal a verdict in a bench trial than in a jury trial, because in a bench trial you know why the judge says he or she came to the verdict and can determine if those reasons were incorrect, while in a jury trial, the appellate court presumes that the jury followed the law and use any even implausible basis for their opinion even if that isn't what really happened. The complete bar on appeals of acquittals of criminal charges in U.S. law due to the double jeopardy clause of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights, is a rare exception to the global norm.