How does personal drug possession affect interstate commerce? According to the Controlled Substance Act: § 801. Congressional findings and declarations: controlled substances.... ...(3) A major portion of the traffic in controlled substances flows through interstate and foreign commerce. Incidents of the traffic which are not an integral part of the interstate or foreign flow, such as manufacture, local distribution, and possession, nonetheless have a substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce because - (A) after manufacture, many controlled substances are transported in interstate commerce, (B) controlled substances distributed locally usually have been transported in interstate commerce immediately before their distribution, and (C) controlled substances possessed commonly flow through interstate commerce immediately prior to such possession. (4) Local distribution and possession of controlled substances contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such substances. (5) Controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate cannot be differentiated from controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate. Thus, it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate. (6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic. (7) The United States is a party to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, and other international conventions designed to establish effective control over international and domestic traffic in controlled substances. From what I understand, this means that because of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power: To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. ...Controlled Substances may not be exchanged through interstate commerce. Also, because it is impossible to determine whether drugs produced for intrastate commerce are also crossing state lines, then: (5)...it is not feasible to distinguish, in terms of controls, between controlled substances manufactured and distributed interstate and controlled substances manufactured and distributed intrastate. (6) Federal control of the intrastate incidents of the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate incidents of such traffic. Therefore, no intrastate commerce is allowed. However, I don't understand how possession or manufacturing of drugs for personal consumption is covered in the Commerce Clause. For example, let's say I wish to grow one cannabis plant for personal consumption. In what way does this affect the cannabis market in other states so that Congress has the power to prohibit it?
To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').
The law is here (too long to quote, or understand). There is a proposed modification of the law which may be enacted. In the section Justification, it is noted that under the existing law a global corporation may technically &quot;own&quot; five subsidiary corporations. Company A may own a winery in France while Company D may own a hotel containing a restaurant in New York. Under New York Law, the liquor license for the restaurant would be prohibited - and it could be subject to financial penalties. So the restrictions are broader that you mention (ownership of stock is an &quot;interest&quot;), but certainly what you mention is prohibited. The proposed law limits the effect to an interest in a restaurant or brewery &quot;licensed under this chapter&quot;, i.e. in the state of New York (currently, a NY manufacturer cannot have an interest in an alcohol-selling restaurant anywhere).
It depends on the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, speed limits are implemented via Chapter 46.61 RCW, the very first section of which states: The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except: (1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. (2) The provisions of RCW 46.52.010 through 46.52.090, 46.61.500 through 46.61.525, and 46.61.5249 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state We then turn to the question of what a &quot;vehicle&quot; is (this is the discussion of a number of legal treatises). Title 46 is about motor vehicles, but still you should look at the definition, if any, of &quot;vehicle&quot;. We have two definitions of vehicle in RCW 46.04.670. Definition 1 says that &quot;Vehicle&quot; includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles Definition 2 omits the italicized bicycle inclusion, and explicitly excludes A bicycle, for the purposes of chapter 46.12, 46.16A, or 46.70 RCW, or for RCW 82.12.045((.)) This is a bit of a mess arising from legislative screwup, which should be resolved by appeal to RCW 1.12.025. The explicit-exclusion sections are about registration, dealers and taxes, and not speed limits. The latter version was recently reaffirmed effective July 23, 2023. The courts could therefore be somewhat inclined to not apply speed limits to bicycles, because bicycles were recently removed from the set of explicit vehicles. But as notes in the Eskridge's extensive discussion of a hypothetical ban on vehicles in Lafayette Park, there are multiple principles for interpreting laws, and &quot;legislative intent to assure safety&quot; would be one prominent consideration, in case the wording of the law is not crystal clear – as it is not, in this case.
Here are the Washington state proclamations with legal force, for example this proclamation amending proclamation 20-05. The legal authority is the paragraph starying &quot;NOW, THEREFORE, I, Jay Inslee, Governor of the state of Washington&quot; and what follows is what is legally proclaimed, in this case the effect is to &quot;waive and suspend portions of Title 79 RCW that require in-person meetings&quot;, pertaining to Dep't. of Natural Resources. Here is 20-25, the original stay-home proclamation. It claims Chapters 38.08, 38.52 and 43.06 RCW as authority, and prohibit[s] all people in Washington State from leaving their homes or participating in social, spiritual and recreational gatherings of any kind regardless of the number of participants, and all non-essential businesses in Washington State from conducting business, within the limitations provided herein. 43.06.220 is the main hammer that the governor can wield. The powers granted by the legislature include: (1) The governor after proclaiming a state of emergency and prior to terminating such, may, in the area described by the proclamation issue an order prohibiting: (a) Any person being on the public streets, or in the public parks, or at any other public place during the hours declared by the governor to be a period of curfew; (b) Any number of persons, as designated by the governor, from assembling or gathering on the public streets, parks, or other open areas of this state, either public or private; (c) The manufacture, transfer, use, possession or transportation of a molotov cocktail or any other device, instrument or object designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion; (d) The transporting, possessing or using of gasoline, kerosene, or combustible, flammable, or explosive liquids or materials in a glass or uncapped container of any kind except in connection with the normal operation of motor vehicles, normal home use or legitimate commercial use; (e) The sale, purchase or dispensing of alcoholic beverages; (f) The sale, purchase or dispensing of other commodities or goods, as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace; (g) The use of certain streets, highways or public ways by the public; and (h) Such other activities as he or she reasonably believes should be prohibited to help preserve and maintain life, health, property or the public peace. One could argue that some order is not reasonable, and perhaps it would fail strict scrutiny, if anyone sued. At present, though, there is no legal order. There is a guidance, a statement of best practices. There may well be a formal proclamation on this topic, which would wrap this in the legalities of other official proclamations. It boils down to RCW 43.06.220(1)(h).
Wikipedia says: Open containers in vehicles Prohibition of Open Containers of Alcohol in Motor Vehicles as of 2009 To comply with the TEA-21 rules of the federal Department of Transportation, a state's motor vehicle open container laws must: Prohibit both possession of any open alcoholic beverage container and consumption of any alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle; Cover the passenger area of any motor vehicle, including unlocked glove compartments and any other areas of the vehicle that are readily accessible to the driver or passengers while in their seats; Apply to all open alcoholic beverage containers and all alcoholic beverages, including beer, wine, and spirits that contain one-half of one percent or more of alcohol by volume; Apply to all vehicle occupants except for passengers of vehicles designed, maintained or used primarily for the transportation of people for compensation (such as buses, taxi cabs, and limousines) or the living quarters of motor homes; Apply to all vehicles on a public highway or the right-of-way (i.e. on the shoulder) of a public highway; Require primary enforcement of the law, rather than requiring probable cause that another violation had been committed before allowing enforcement of the open container law. Currently, 39 states and the District of Columbia are in compliance. Alaska, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Wyoming have similar limits on the possession of open containers in vehicles, but not to the level of TEA-21 compliance. TL;DR: Open container not allowed in vehicle, even if it's a passenger using it. Exception for buses, taxis, limos. There may be differences in some states.
Note, Washington State Senate Bill 5061 seeks to block certain "untracable" firearms without a serial number. This relates in part to "3D printable" guns, but the act of milling of a 80% lower (in Washington) could be a violation, if and when it passes. But it appears the bill hasn't been made a law yet... Is Washington specific news this issue what drives the question? Federally, the ATF web site says: Receiver blanks that do not meet the definition of a "firearm" are not subject to regulation under the GCA. The ATF has long held that items such as receiver blanks, "castings" or "machined bodies" in which the fire-control cavity area is completely solid and un-machined have not reached the "stage of manufacture" which would result in the classification of a firearm per the GCA. But this gets a bit technical. For further risk mitigation, the Texan could mitigate any risk related to both Federal and Washington state law by shipping it to a federal firearms licensee (FFL) in Washington as if it were a firearm, per ATM instructions which say (in part): Generally, for a person to lawfully transfer a firearm to an unlicensed person who resides out of State, the firearm must be shipped to a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL) within the recipient’s State of residence. He or she may then receive the firearm from the FFL upon completion of an ATF Form 4473 and a NICS background check. That FFL is then responsible for ensuring the transaction properly conducted in the state of Washington, including federal and state requirements. The FFL I contacted only charged $25.00 (plus collecting the state sales tax). Form 4473 was easy enough; only about one page for me to fill out. Of course, I've got a clean record, so going through channels isn't a problem for me, it took less than an hour. The FFL confirmed for me that it wasn't necessary for something like an antique musket, which legally isn't a firearm by the federal defeinitions. In my case the sender was a nervous "trust" lawyer who wasn't sure, hired yet another lawyer to advise him. The FFL didn't charge me anything for receiving that musket.
We're missing a lot of facts that would help drive the analysis. The first question I'd ask was whether this was part of an actual or attempted sex offense. If that's the case, the suspect could be facing particularly serious charges. Other information is also missing, such as the drug involved, whether it's on the list of controlled substances, her knowledge of the drug, her relationship to the suspect, and so on. Still, based on the information we've got and the inferences we can make from them, I could reasonably see the following charges being filed: Sec. 12-3. Battery. (a) A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal justification by any means (1) causes bodily harm to an individual Sec. 12-3.05. Aggravated battery. (g) Offense based on certain conduct. A person commits aggravated battery when, other than by discharge of a firearm, he or she does any of the following: (1) Violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another and any user experiences great bodily harm or permanent disability as a result of the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of any amount of the controlled substance. (2) Knowingly administers to an individual or causes him or her to take, without his or her consent or by threat or deception, and for other than medical purposes, any intoxicating, poisonous, stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance, or gives to another person any food containing any substance or object intended to cause physical injury if eaten. Sec. 12-4.5. Tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. (a) A person who knowingly puts any substance capable of causing death or great bodily harm to a human being into any food, drug or cosmetic offered for sale or consumption commits tampering with food, drugs or cosmetics. Sec. 12-5. Reckless conduct. (a) A person commits reckless conduct when he or she, by any means lawful or unlawful, recklessly performs an act or acts that: (1) cause bodily harm to or endanger the safety of another person; or (2) cause great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement to another person. Sec. 21-1. Criminal damage to property. (a) A person commits criminal damage to property when he or she: (1) knowingly damages any property of another Sec. 11-1.20. Criminal sexual assault. (a) A person commits criminal sexual assault if that person commits an act of sexual penetration and: (2) knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent; Sec. 11-1.30. Aggravated Criminal Sexual Assault. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual assault if that person commits criminal sexual assault and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist during the commission of the offense or, for purposes of paragraph (7), occur as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim, except as provided in paragraph (10); (3) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (4) the person commits the criminal sexual assault during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim without the victim's consent or by threat or deception for other than medical purposes; Sec. 11-1.50. Criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits criminal sexual abuse if that person: (2) commits an act of sexual conduct and knows that the victim is unable to understand the nature of the act or is unable to give knowing consent. Sec. 11-1.60. Aggravated criminal sexual abuse. (a) A person commits aggravated criminal sexual abuse if that person commits criminal sexual abuse and any of the following aggravating circumstances exist (i) during the commission of the offense or (ii) for purposes of paragraph (7), as part of the same course of conduct as the commission of the offense: (2) the person causes bodily harm to the victim; (5) the person acts in a manner that threatens or endangers the life of the victim or any other person; (6) the person commits the criminal sexual abuse during the course of committing or attempting to commit any other felony; or (7) the person delivers (by injection, inhalation, ingestion, transfer of possession, or any other means) any controlled substance to the victim for other than medical purposes without the victim's consent or by threat or deception. Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder (a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide. (a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide. (a) A person commits drug-induced homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance. Sec. 9-3.4. Concealment of homicidal death. (a) A person commits the offense of concealment of homicidal death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person with knowledge that such other person has died by homicidal means. Sec. 9-3.5. Concealment of death. (b) A person commits the offense of concealment of death when he or she knowingly conceals the death of any other person who died by other than homicidal means.
The controlling federal (US) law is: 21 U.S. Code § 812 - Schedules of controlled substances 21 US Code 812 and &quot;Marijuana&quot; is specifically listed among Schedule 1 substances. Just as with any other federal law, for this to be changed, Congress would need to amend or repeal this statute so that Marijuana no longer appears in the list and the act would then need to be signed into law by the President, allowed to take effect without signature, or vetoed and overridden by Congress. I suppose another possibility would be for a federal court to rule that 21 U.S. Code § 812 (or Marijuana's inclusion in the list) is unconstitutional.