*Buecking* holding finds that cooling-off days for decrees of transitory legal separation do not count for in rem decrees of divorce The Buecking holding unambiguously finds that cooling off days for transitory decrees of legal separation do not count for cooling off days in rem decrees of divorce. The Dissolution Act of 1973 regarding RCW §26.09.030 supports the conclusion that the 90 day waiting period applies to legal separations: [WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW Volume 49 Number 2 Symposium: Recent Washington Legislation 2-1-1974 The Dissolution Act of 1973: From Status to Contract? Luvern v. Rieke University of Washington School of Law page 390] “It should be noted that legal separation cannot be decreed until the end of the 90 day cooling-off period required by the Act. Immediate needs may of course, be met by temporary orders pursuant to § 26.09.060. There is no more reason for a hasty entry of a coerced decree of legal separation than there is for a decree of dissolution.&quot; https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2028&amp;context=wlr There was never any finding that the original legislative intent was unconstitutional. The decision in Buecking was for a case where there was both a petition for legal separation and petition for dissolution. Legal separation is in personam/transitory, Dissolution however is in rem; basically legal separation cooling-off days don’t add up for divorce decree cooling off days, and that’s why the day counts are separate. Buecking never says there is no wait period for a decree of legal separation, it’s just that wait days for DLS do not count for the tolling to a divorce decree. “Decrees of legal separation are in personam and may be thought of as transitory actions. When more than a persona order is sought – when status is to be changed – the action acquires an in rem quality and different jurisdictional requisites are involved.15 https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2028&amp;context=wlr THE PROBLEM IS that this particular case (Buecking) is important because it [[[wrongfully]]] up-ended (in some WA counties, not all) SPECIFIC written legislative intent for a 90 day cooling-off period to be applied to legal separations as well as divorces (Washington 1973 Dissolution Act). A first-glance reading of the holding without reading the full the context of the two types of actions misrepresents the decision. RCW 26.09.030(a) refers to &quot;the decree&quot; when it is a dissolution, and (d) refers to &quot;the decree&quot; when it is a legal separation; the other parameters remain the same. Amy Buecking's &quot;cooling off&quot; post petition for legal separation did not sum into the entirely different &quot;cooling off&quot; post petition for her divorce. Further, after Amy properly filed for legal separation day 1 (12/12/08), she should have, if the court has SMJ, long before day 476 (4/2/10) have been granted a decree of legal separation (DLS). Why wasn't the petition signed? The appellate brief says that on day 476 (4/2/10) Amy filed &quot;an amended petition for dissolution, replacing the petition for legal separation she filed more than a year earlier.&quot; [[[Amy would have long ago had a DECREE for legal separation by day 90 or April 2, 2010, then per RCW 26.09.150 because it had been far more than 6 months (180 days) since filing for said legal separation. By 6 months plus 90 days or 270 days since, on 9/8/09, Amy could have easily gotten an immediate conversion of the decree of legal separation to a decree of dissolution: &quot;RCW 26.09.150(2)(a) No earlier than six months after entry of a decree of legal separation, on motion of either party, the court shall convert the decree of legal separation to a decree of dissolution...&quot;]]] The case goes on to say that on day 558 a judge entered a decree of divorce &quot;on the amended petition.&quot; [[[The judge should have been abe to enter a decree of divorce on the decree of legal separation per RCW 26.09.150(2)(a) immediately after motion to convert on 4/2/10.]]] Then on day 707 Tim's motion to vacate the DD because it was issued before the end of a 90 day wait period (day 82) was denied so Tim filed an appeal. [[[But per RCW 26.09.150 there would have been no wait at all on top of the 6 months had the petition for legal separation been signed.]]] Then in September of 2011 the Appellate Court ruled that there is NO applicability of the wait period for legal separation petitions to the wait period for divorce petitions. The appellate briefs do not ever call out the missing the decree of legal separation, in fact the term &quot;decree of legal separation&quot; is totally missing. The fact that the divorce decree was signed on day 82 did not impinge on the subject matter jurisdiction, so Tim lost on this point. It's obvious that a 90 day cooling-off period for legal separations alone, is irrelevant to this case. It makes no sense to remove it against the will of the legislature's Dissolution Act of 1973. If you have any thoughts I'd appreciate them, thank you.
The matter was unambiguously resolved for the whole state by the Washington Supreme Court in Buecking v. Buecking, 179 Wn. 2d 438. The trial court erroneously granted the divorce 82 days after the petition for dissolution was files, contrary to state law. Mr. Buecking did not object, and only later argued that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction before 90 days had passed. The Court of Appeals held that if the trial court erred by entering a decree of dissolution before 90 days had passed, it was a legal error that did not involve the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reaffirms the interpretation of the law – 90 days since the filing of the petition for dissolution, not 90 days since the filing of some petition (separation) that ultimately leads to dissolution. Buecking claims that the 90 day period is intended to limit the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court instead finds that &quot;if a court can hear a particular class of case, then it has subject matter jurisdiction&quot;. So the lower court error was a legal error, and not a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Bruening lost because he failed to make the correct legal objection to the trial court, and the 90 day rule is valid state-wide.
@Dale M is basically correct, but fudges a bit on the process. The court issuing the order would issue an order to show cause to a government official who is alleged by the person who sought the order to have violated the order after having received legal notice (i.e. service) of the order. If that individual fails to appear at the appointed time and place in the order to show cause, a warrant issues for that individual's arrest. If that individual does appear, the allegedly contemptuous individual is read their rights and a hearing date is set. At the hearing, if the person appears, the person seeking the contempt finding (or some other attorney appointed by the court) prosecutes the case and if the person is found in contempt, then contempt sanctions issue. If they do not appear, a warrant issues for their arrest and a hearing is held on the merits promptly following that arrest. An individual can also be ordered to show cause in an official capacity in which case the contempt sanctions would be imposed against the organization rather than the individual. Usually, in federal court, the U.S. Marshal's office has primary responsibility for arresting people on contempt warrants. The U.S. Marshal's office primarily reports to the judicial branch, although strictly speaking, it is part of the Justice Department, and ultimately reports to the Attorney-General. There are actually two kinds of contempt - remedial and punitive. Remedial contempt sanction can include indefinite incarceration or a fine (often a per day fine) until the violation of the order of the court ceases and is allowed only when it is possible to comply with the order going forward. Punitive contempt has a sanction comparable to a misdemeanor conviction and applies in cases where the goal is to punish someone for a past violation of a court order whether or not it is possible to comply going forward. (Both of these are examples of "indirect contempt", i.e. violations of court orders that take place outside the courtroom. A different summary process called "direct contempt" applies when someone misbehaves in the presence of the court - this is summary incarceration or fine without a trial on the spot for disrespecting the dignity of the court in the courtroom.) Established practice is to direct a contempt order at the lowest level official necessary to remedy the violation of the order. There are a few examples in living memory of cabinet members being held in contempt, however (e.g. the Secretary of Interior, with regard to Indian Trust fund litigation), and keep in mind that in the case of remedial contempt an official can purge the contempt and be released from any sanction by resigning from office, after which the official no longer has the ability to comply. I am not aware of any instance in which the President of the United States has personally been held in contempt of court, but I am also not aware of any authority that specifically prohibits a court from holding the President in contempt of court. While contempt is the only "hard" remedy for a violation of a court order, the bureaucratic structure of the federal government is also set up in a manner that once a court order definitively resolves a legal issue, the higher ups in a federal agency are supposed to take all reasonable actions to insure that their subordinates follow that order (and they are themselves subject to contempt sanctions if they fail to do so). And, keep in mind that most of the people in the chain of command are civil servants with legal protections from unlawful employment actions hired on a merit basis, not political appointees, and that lots of the people in the chain of command are also members of unions that provide individual employees with the ability to fight wrongful employment action from a superior for violating a court order. In particular, the top lawyers in the executive branch would in ordinary times direct government employees to follow a clear court order and to cease and desist from explicitly disobeying one. Among other things, the courts could probably deny lawyers who refused to do so the right to practice law in federal court. But, usually things never reach this point. Then again, we are living in interesting times. There are about 670 political appointee positions in the executive branch, many of which are currently vacant and less than a dozen of which would be relevant to any given dispute in any case. There are about a million, civilian, non-defense department, non-postal service employees in the United States government, of which perhaps 100,000 or so are in the Department of Homeland Security and fewer are in the CBP. As far as I know, the CBP political appointees from the Obama administration have resigned and a replacement has not been confirmed by the U.S. Senate yet (there has been a Department of Homeland Security appointee confirmed if I recall correctly), and there are only a few people in the agency that political appointees can hire without either receiving Senate confirmation or using the merit based hiring process for civil servants (which takes a while, especially given an executive order imposing a hiring freeze). So, realistically, we have a case where the acting head of the CBP is probably a GS-15 or Senior Executive Service grade civil servant, rather than a political appointee, at the moment, who was hired as a civil servant many years ago, who is doing his (or her) best to follow the less than clear guidance he is receiving from his superiors and government lawyers (perhaps errantly). There could also be remedies in the form of declaratory judgment. The Court could declare as a matter of law on a case by case basis that, for example, Fatima Jones is not deportable and is lawfully within the United States and is entitled to be released from custody. This specific finding as to an individual would be very hard for the administration to escape sanction for. And, the Court could also declare that the entire executive order, at least as applied, is invalid (e.g. for failure to comply with the administrative procedures act, or for failing to include an exception for contrary court orders) or is unconstitutional.
B and C have a contract with A In return for paying 3 months rent, B and C will remove A from the lease. This has all the required elements to be a contract. B and C have fulfilled their obligations and A hasn’t. B &amp; C could sue A for damages. They would need to prove that there was such an agreement and that they agreement was a legally binding contract. Is this agreement written down? Was it witnessed by impartial third parties? What evidence of this agreement do you actually have? If A says they agreed to X, yet B &amp; C say they agreed to Y: what evidence exists to show who is right and who is wrong? Failing to fulfill the obligations of a contract is not fraud. For there to be fraud, B &amp; C would have to prove that A never intended to comply by the terms of the agreement. Given that the terms of the agreement are somewhat ambiguous, this would be very difficult. This seems to be more of a case where [Hanlon's Razor]: &quot;Never attribute to malice that which is adequately explained by stupidity.&quot; That is, A's actions are more likely to be the result of a misunderstanding (by A, or B &amp; C, or both) than a deliberate plan of deception. The landlord is not involved - they removed A from the lease at the request of A, B &amp; C; they’ve done what they’re required to do.
is spousal immunity a defense for a forced restraining order by a biological father if he won't even speak to a suitor (i.e. may I take your daughter on a date)? There is no such thing as "spousal immunity". Your post is replete with unclear references, unclear statements, and seemingly unrelated questions. But it is noteworthy that spousal privilege (not "immunity") does not preclude obtaining and enforcing a restraining order. The only relevance of spousal privilege is the evidentiary issue of precluding a spouse's testimony from being obtained and entered as admissible evidence in the court proceedings to which the respondent is a party. In the context of restraining orders, spousal privilege might be available only if the respondent invokes it during the proceedings for civil or criminal contempt that resulted from respondent's violation of the restraining order. If the restraining order is pursuant to, or in the context of, divorce proceedings, spousal privilege is inapplicable. See, for instance, MCL 600.2162(3)(a) and other exceptions listed therein. At least in theory (since courts often do whatever they want), a party's conduct &amp; statements (in or outside of court) regarding his/her spouse may forfeit spousal privilege regardless of whether the respondent or spouse ever spoke to a suitor (whatever that means) at all.
That's the entire point of a summary proceeding. You're allegedly found committing an offence, that isn't worth the court's time to hear but nevertheless requires some penalty. The only way to "unambiguously deny liability" is by requesting a hearing and denying liability in the notice of this. The court doesn't care what you say to everybody else, it cares what you say on its record. The reasoning is, if you're so sure you're not guilty of an offence, why haven't you sought to argue this in court? And if you weren't committing the offence, why did the informant serve the infringement notice in the first place? The act is not silent at all on this. If you don't request the hearing and serve such notice by the date required, you are liable to enforcement action - whether you deny liability out of court is irrelevant.
Once I figured out the term I was looking for was &quot;cooling off period&quot; a google search led to this SFGate article which seems to say, no, there is no cooling off period in California. breaking a lease, even before moving into a new home, can be a legal challenge. If you must cancel a lease before moving in, be prepared for a financial loss and possible legal difficulties. And this article There is no &quot;cooling off&quot; period for residential releases. In some states, a cooling off period is required for certain contracts, which give signers a window of time, typically one to three days, during which they can void the contract if they change their mind. Unless such a condition is explicitly stated in the lease or there is a rare jurisdictional law that requires a cooling period, your lease is binding the second you sign your name. So, the answer to my question is &quot;No, there is no grace period&quot; and that my current apartment, with the 3 day exception was just a kind offer on their part. I'd just guess because they're a large firm (they run ~80k apartments) they've learned it's better to let people go if they change their mind in 3 days than go through the trouble of forcing them to honor the lease. Interestingly, and related IMO, there is also no cooling off period for car purchases. I thought there was which is why I thought there might also be one for apartments since, at least in California, many apartments yearly rent is more than the entire cost of a car. (avg in SF is $40k a year) But, at least in California, if it's a used car and if the car costs less than $40k, the dealer is required to offer you the option to purchase a 2-day cancellation clause for around 1% of the car's price.
It appears you would need to contact the Calgary courts directly to discover more about the case(s) as any case files will likely be held with them. It's possible that the case was dropped, or that they were found &quot;not guilty&quot; which would explain the lack of further news on them. I searched the Canadian Legal Information Institute's website for you but wasn't able to find any criminal cases involving them — only some civil cases around bankruptcy and creditor claims.
You seem to have put a lot of thought into this - which is good. However, the short answer is: There is no legal solution. To address your points: And legally, my future wife has the right to divorce me even if I did nothing wrong (no-fault). Yes (at least in most jurisdictions). And then, according to the US Census Bureau [1], mothers usually get primary custody (unless she is on drugs or abusive, which she isn't). And according to the Indiana Parenting Guidelines [2], babies only get one night per week with the non-custodial parent. And even as a teenager, only alternating weekends. Here, it depends. What you describe is indeed what happens often, but not always. Rules vary a lot, and change, but there is an increasing trend to have joint custody in case of a divorce. The details vary, but joint custody can extend to joint physical custody or shared parenting, where both parents take turns looking after the child. This is possible in the United States. In practice, in case of separation the parents will have to work out a parenting plan - ideally together, or in court if needs be. What the result is will depend on circumstances, and on the opinion of the court what is in the children's best interest. This may or may not mean joint physical custody. Child support payments are based on custody, so I would need to pay her child support. And since she always planned on her husband financially supporting her, then I would need to pay her alimony too. And because of imputed income, I couldn't afford to take a lower-paying job with more flexibility. Again, this depends. For example, with joint physical custody, there may be only small or no child support payments if both parents care for the children about equal time. And even if child support is due, there may be no alimony payments if the mother can work (even if she chooses not to). Again, a lot depends on the specific case and jurisdiction. Also, while it is not possible to reduce child support in a pre-nup (because theses payments belong to the child), you can (to some extent) limit alimony payments in a pre-nup. Is there any way out of this situation? How can I ensure, starting now before my children are born, that their primary caregiver is me? Here we are leaving legal territory. The short answer is: There is no way to ensure this, certainly not using legal means. The only good approach is to get to know your partner first, and make sure you have similar views on how to approach parenting. If she wants to be a stay-at-home mom, and you want to share both work and parenting (such as in a shared earning/shared parenting marriage) then you need to think (and speak) about how to reconcile these views. You may find that you are just not compatible on that point. Then take appropriate consequences. To put it plainly: In my opinion, if you do not trust your partner to respect your wishes on parenting together, she is probably not the right person for you to have children with.