What is the opposite of argumentative? From the Wikipedia article: Argumentative is an evidentiary objection raised in response to a question which prompts a witness to draw inferences from facts of the case. ... For example, if a lawyer on direct examination were to ask his (My Note: or her) witness, &quot;So he was driving negligently?,&quot; opposing counsel could raise an argumentative objection. This is because negligence is a legal term of art, and the witness cannot reasonably answer the question. Since the lawyer is &quot;arguing&quot; his (My Note: or her) case through the witness, the objection would be sustained, and then stricken from the record. (My Note: I guess what is meant is '...then the question would be stricken...') So what is the adjective for questions that do not ask to draw inferences or, I guess additionally, to state opinions? I think not 'objective' otherwise we might say 'subjective' instead of 'argumentative'. Same for 'direct': 'indirect' Update: I can't believe I didn't say this before, but I believe factual vs argumentative relates to, respectively, positive vs normative.
The word argumentative can mean a number of things. However, when defined as in the passage quoted from Wikipedia, it is not the opposite of 'conciliatory.' It has nothing to do with whether the witness is cooperating with the lawyer examining them. In this context, an argumentative witness is one who gives evidence about a legal conclusion (that is, the answer to a legal 'argument'). This is not allowed, because witnesses must give evidence of fact and not opinion. Sometimes, the distinction is murky. The example given is 'was the driver negligent?' The answer could well be seen as 'conciliatory' if it is consistent with the case being advanced by the advocate. It is still an impermissible argumentative question, because it is a question of law for the court to decide, not a question of fact. Suppose the lawyer wants to prove that a driver was negligent. An eyewitness could give evidence about what he or she saw and heard. A qualified professional could give expert evidence about what can be inferred from the physical evidence or agreed facts (eg. whether anybody was speeding). In the unlikely event that the driver admitted fault but a trial was still necessary, the driver could give evidence that they were drunk or not paying attention. None of these witnesses can express an opinion as to whether or not the driver was negligent, because that is the argument that the court has to decide by drawing inferences from the witnesses' factual evidence. In this context, the opposite of argumentative could be admissible, factual, direct or non-opinion.
Is it acceptable for person A (representing themselves) to refer to person B as &quot;their neighbor&quot; instead of by their name, or would that cause the suit to be dismissed? Omitting the neighbor's name in the pleadings &amp; proceedings cannot singlehandedly cause the dismissal of a defamation suit. The matter would result in dismissal only if the plaintiff repeatedly disobeys court order(s) (if any) to disclose that information. Before the proceedings get to that point, the plaintiff will have had one or more hearings to dispute the defendant's alleged need for identifying a non-party by name. When opposing to that disclosure, the plaintiff's goal is to establish that the false narrative about robbing a neighbor at gunpoint is defamatory regardless of neighbor's name. Keep in mind that the focus in a claim of defamation is the defamed person, whereas the relevance of details such as who the non-parties are pertains to context and evidence. Lastly, the fact that a party to the suit is a pro se litigant is irrelevant from both substantial and procedural standpoints.
Evidence of pre-trial correspondence can be adduced if it is relevant to a fact in issue, and not excluded by another rule of evidence. Commonly, pre-trial correspondence is not relevant to a fact in issue, because it consists of legal argument and rhetoric. In other words, the letter is a solicitor's inadmissible opinion. And when pre-trial correspondence does set out the facts, it is often in inadmissible hearsay form. Pre-trial correspondence is also likely to attract without prejudice privilege (if sent to the other side in an attempt to negotiate a settlement) or legal professional privilege (if private between a party and their lawyer). For all of these reasons, pre-trial correspondence is not usually considered by a judge or jury at trial. However, in some circumstances pre-trial correspondence is admissible, typically as an admission, prior consistent statement or prior inconsistent statement. Depending on the facts which make the correspondence relevant and admissible, it may also be appropriate to cross-examine the client, a director or other agent of the client who instructed the solicitor, or the solicitor, about it. In some cases, a client may be cross-examined about a prior statement of their solicitor on the basis that the solicitor would not have made the statement without the client's authority, and would have relied on the client's instructions. If the court accepts that a prior inconsistent statement was made with the client's approval, this may damage their credibility. If the client asserts legal professional privilege, or testifies that their lawyer acted without instructions, difficult questions arise. Some of these questions were explored by the High Court of Australia in Hofer v The Queen [2021] HCA 36. Lawyers and judges will try to conduct cases in a way which avoids these procedural challenges, if at all possible. In rare cases, a lawyer may be called to give evidence about whether a previous representation was actually made or authorised. This is, for example, the purpose of having a solicitor or other reputable professional witness formal documents. Barristers should take special care not to place themselves at risk of becoming a witness, but in exceptional cases where the client waives legal professional privilege, they can also be required to give evidence about the client's previous instructions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this comes up more often in criminal law. The decision in Hofer was an appeal from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, which had received evidence from a barrister about the reasons for making decisions during the appellant's criminal trial. Conversely, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an application for leave to cross-examine a solicitor, by applying the rules of evidence concerning prior consistent statements, in Hall v The Queen [2015] EWCA Crim 581.
Misstating the truth is not perjury Perjury is deliberately lying under oath to gain a material advantage. For the situation you describe: You might be wrong and they actually do live where they say they do they might be wring and they genuinely think they live where they say they do, being wrong is not perjury it’s unlikely to administrate info in the form actually carries the penalty of perjury, it probably isn’t testimony unless it will positively and substantially affect the outcome of the case in their favour, it isn’t material You lack standing to interfere in the case in any event If this were brought to the attention of the court the most likely outcome would that it would just be corrected.
It is done to prevent or at least provide a defence against a latter argument based on Estoppel; which at the risk of trivialising something that is very complex means that if you indicate to someone that you will or won't do something and they act on that indication then they may have a claim if you don't do what you indicated. When lawyers say this they are usually outlining a client's possible future actions so estoppel is in play. If they include this they are specifically saying "... But we might not do that."
Is it unethical to file a claim against an attorney who lied? No. It is actually encouraged if the claimant can submit proof of attorney's misconduct. The grievance is to be filed in the claimant's jurisdiction rather than with the American Bar Association. An attorney's lies may be severe enough to constitute fraud on the court and possibly warrant disbarment. See Matter of LaRosee, 122 N.J. 298, 311 (1991). The real question from a practical standpoint is whether the Disciplinary Review Board and related entities will follow through or be unduly lenient about that attorney's misconduct. What if the Judge ultimately rejected the attorney's claim? That does not reduce the impropriety of the attorney's misconduct. The so-called &quot;zealousness&quot; with which lawyers advance their clients' position does not justify indulging in dishonesty devised to result in miscarriage of justice. Is it wrong to bring it to the attention of the judge or do judges frown on such things (since the attorney is representing the other party)? No. Judges generally are not up-to-date about attorneys' misconduct. Putting them on notice might frustrate a crook's further attempts to mislead the court in that and other cases the judge presides. By not reporting a crook, the public remains exposed to risks from that lawyer's pattern of misconduct.
What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission &amp; editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial).
This is not legal advice, It is not even primarily a legal opinion. It is a legal position. The lawyer, acting on behalf of the agency from which you requested information, is giving the reasons why that agency is declining your request. The lawyer is presumably either an employee of the agency, or has the agency as a client. In any case, this is notice of the position that the agency would be likely to adopt if you took further legal action, such as a suit to compel disclosure. Lawyers provide such position statements ion behalf of clients or employers all the time. Such statements indicate why certain action is taken, what basis the client or employer has for taking or not taking certain action, and often indicate the nature of the defenses or theories that will be used should a lawsuit follow, although the client or employer is free to change the theory at the pleading stage. Not only is it not unethical for the lawyer to respond in this way, the agency is, I am fairly sure, required by the law to provide a valid reason when a request is declined. That is what they have done, provide a reason that they claim is valid, with some legal reasoning about why it is valid. Note that I express no view on whether the reason given is in fact valid, or would be sustained in a suit. That would be a different question.