Can I ask potential jurors in a prima facie state if speeding is legal? In some jurisdictions, e.g., Texas, driving faster than the posted speed limit is only the prima facie evidence of an unreasonable speed, where, if charged with a violation, one could still argue in the court of law, in front of a jury of one's peers, that the speed was nonetheless safe, reasonable and prudent. Some potential jurors may be too conservative to appreciate the intricacies of the law (especially if such ideas are very new to them), or hold a grunge against people going over the posted speed limit. What would be the best way to determine such bias during Jury Selection (Voir Dire)? Can you ask potential jurors simple questions like: "Do you think exceeding the posted speed limit is illegal?" "Do you think that the posted speed limits should never be exceeded?" "Do you think that people exceeding the posted speed limit are guilty, and should pay a fine?"
It is the job of the judge to instruct the jury about the law. If Texas had pattern instructions I'd look up what the instruction is for this matter, but you don't, so I don't know what the judge would say. But it is the judge's sole prerogative to instruct the jury in the law. If the question is a "commitment question", then it is an improper question and should be disallowed, see Stendefer v. State. The question "Would you presume someone guilty if he or she refused a breath test on their refusal alone?" is such a commitment question, and is disallowed. Similarly, "If the evidence, in a hypothetical case, showed that a person was arrested and they had a crack pipe in their pocket, and they had a residue amount in it, and it could be measured, and it could be seen, is there anyone who could not convict a person, based on that" (Atkins v. State, 951 S.W.2d 787). An improper commitment question could be of the type "could you refrain...": Let us assume that you are considering in the penalty phase of any capital murder case, okay? And some of the evidence that has come in shows that the victim's family was greatly impacted and terribly grieved and greatly harmed by the facts․Can you assure us that the knowledge of those facts would not prevent you or substantially impair you in considering a life sentence in such a case (Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715). One way in which a commitment question can be legal is if it asks basically "can you uphold the law?", for example "can you consider probation in a murder case?", or "are you willing to consider mitigating circumstances". The wrong answer to those questions will lead to a for-cause dismissal. The third question is flagrantly improper, the first is rather improper, and the second probably is. If the question can be framed in terms of a candidate's willingness to follow the law, then it should be legal.
The judgement actually gives reasons: The criminal law insists that every person driving a car must attain an objective standard measured by a skilled, experienced and careful driver. That is shown by McCrone v Riding ... the standard is an objective standard, impersonal and universal, fixed in relation to the safety of other users of the highway. It is in no way related to the degree of proficiency or degree of experience attained by the driver. And the judgement goes on to quote R v Evans [1962] 3 All ER 1088: if a man in fact adopts a manner of driving which the jury think was dangerous to other road users in all the circumstances, then on the issue of guilt it matters not whether he was deliberately reckless, careless, momentarily inattentive or even doing his incompetent best. [Such considerations are] highly relevant if it ever comes to sentence. Primarily, it is to protect other road users. It is only on the matter of guilt that skill and experience are irrelevant. When it comes to sentencing, it may be a factor. And, if I might add my own interpretation, part of the reason that the skill of the driver is irrelevant is that the other users of the road cannot know whether a driver is skilled and experienced - they must therefore be able to expect this, and the law reflects this expectation. As much as we complain about other road users, we only complain because we expect them to meet a certain standard - we most likely would not complain if we truly expected them to be incompetent.
I know one can "make a complaint" but I'm wondering if there's generally any legal obligation for these complaints to be taken seriously, and if there's any feasible way a driver could validate the encounter. . . . Furthermore, even with evidence, is there any way a citizen could ensure that legal action be taken against the officer for a proven traffic violation? Beyond reporting it to the department and hoping for the best? A prosecutor is under no legal obligation to press charges (and police have no affirmative duty to enforce the laws on the books) ever, even if there is blatant and clear evidence of murder, let alone a traffic violation. Usually, there is absolutely no way to compel charges to be brought against the offender (with a handful of states providing an exception where one can seek the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and prosecute if the circumstances warrant that would never be invoked for a mere traffic offense). Very few states allow anyone other than a prosecutor (or sometimes in minor cases, a law enforcement officer) to bring criminal or quasi-criminal charges. Of course, if compelling evidence of a violation is found and shared with the media, there may be powerful political pressure to bring a prosecution, but how that is developed would entirely depend upon the circumstances. Still, the relationship between prosecutors and law enforcement is so symbiotic, that prosecutors are loathe to press charges against law enforcement officers in all but the clearest of cases, especially for offenses occuring while a law enforcement officer is on duty in his home jurisdiction. Legally speaking, do civilians have any right to apprehend an officer for a traffic violation? While this would depend upon state law, most states treat traffic violations as a class of offense different from other misdemeanors and infractions and never authorize a citizens arrest for a traffic violation. Normally, only law enforcement officers can stop and cite people for traffic violations that aren't actually misdemeanor crimes. For example, in Colorado, true traffic infractions are defined as civil matters for which someone may be stopped and subjected to a citation but not arrested (even by a law enforcement officer). See Colorado Revised Statutes § 42-4-1701(1). In Colorado, only more serious traffic offenses (e.g. hit and run) are crimes subject to arrest. In the case of a traffic offense which is a crime (probably not speeding), the general rules applicable to citizens arrests would usually apply.
I haven't found a recent case like this where it constitutes evidence. Military members didn't have an express right to remain silent until somewhere in the 1950s, so one chances are there might be cases prior to that point. The present right is codified in 10 U.S.C. 831, which is Article 31 of the UCMJ. That said, there is certainly a well documented adverse inference effect. While jurors aren't supposed to take the silence into account (e.g. when a defendant elects not to testify or exercises a right against self-incrimination), it's a difficult thing to do, practically speaking.
The jury isn't told what the law allows. They are told to come up with a number and if it exceeds what the law allows, the judge modifies it in response to post-judgment motions.
There is virtually no chance this would be admissible. When a defendant argues that abuse at the hands of third party led to a mental defect that excuses her from culpability, the prosecution is free to rebut that argument. However, the prosecution's evidence must be relevant, i.e., it must have a tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less likely to be true. Here, none of the proffered evidence has any real bearing on any fact of consequence: The fact that the defendant is taller than the alleged abuser does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. The fact that the defendant's &quot;fake&quot; voice (what does that even mean?) is deeper than the alleged abuser's does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. The fact that young white women have more Tinder matches than middle-aged Indian men does not make it less likely that the defendant was abused. Even if you could find some thin reed on which to hang the relevance of these racial and gender stereotypes, the evidence would likely still be excluded under Rule 403, as the probative value would be so trivial that it would be outweighed by the likelihood of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury.
If a sitting juror, or a prospective juror during voir dire, cannot see or hear something clearly, what is the protocol for the juror to alert the court of this? Say something immediately? Raise your hand or number card? Write a note? Saying something immediately or raising your hand or number card are appropriate. Ideally, you get the attention of the bailiff whose job it is to supervise the jury (often also the judge's clerk of court), but if you get the attention of the judge, a lawyer, or the court clerk, they will normally interrupt to fix things as well.
Yes The normal remedy for not receiving a fair trial or due process is the declaration of a mistrial. A mistrial legally never happened so it is up to the prosecution to decide if they want a retrial. Unless the appellant can demonstrate that no reasonable jury would have convicted on the evidence (which seems unlikely verging on impossible), the appeal will not acquit the accused.