What kind of a legal action a man needs to take prior to having sex with a woman in order to make sure she can&#39;t accuse him of rape? A marriage contract? I have been told the wife can claim that her husband has raped her. A signed document stating that she is having sex willingly? I have been told she can claim later that she asked the man to stop.
A woman can always accuse you of rape. In the U.S., at least theoretically, you are presumed innocent until proven guilty, so unless there is actual evidence you raped her, odds are you won't be convicted. If you are wrongly and maliciously accused, you can probably win a defamation suit as well. There is nothing you can legally do to prevent being accused - only principles which protect the innocent against conviction (e.g., presumption of innocence) and means for being made whole (e.g., civil suits).
The liability shield is the big one, and it can't be achieved with a contract. Just because the contract says you're not liable, that doesn't make it true. If I sign a contract with my friend that says "Nate Eldredge is hereby the King of France", that won't make me the king, nor will it force anyone except maybe my friend to acknowledge me as the king. By its nature, a contract can only bind the parties to the contract, and has no effect on the rights of anyone else. Suppose, then, that Alice and Bob agree to start a pizza delivery business, using a contract like you suggest. Their delivery car crashes, injuring Carol, a bystander, who incurs medical bills that exceed the assets of the business. Carol decides to sue Alice and Bob personally. Sure, Alice and Bob have a contract, and maybe it prevents them from suing each other, but it certainly doesn't prevent Carol from suing them; Carol never signed it. So Carol can still go after Alice and Bob's personal assets. Thus contract law cannot give them a liability shield. However, the government can, since it makes the laws about who can sue whom under what circumstances. And it has made laws saying that Alice and Bob can be protected from such suits, but only if they form a company according to the process that the law sets forth. So that's what they have to do.
The question didn't mention marital status, but since states formally recognize that relationship it's helpful to start there. tl;dr: The Supreme Court decided state laws that required a woman to notify her spouse were unconstitutional. Thus it's unlikely there'd be grounds for suit. Background The central mechanism of Roe v. Wade (U.S. 1973) was a balancing act between what it decided was a 14th amendment right to privacy and the state's interest in both the health of the woman and the potentiality of life. Because Roe explicitly recognized a state interest, Pennsylvania passed a statute in 1982 that required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period. It also mandated parental consent for minors (with some exceptions) and spousal notification. This reached the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of SE Penn. v. Casey (U.S. 1992). There, the court upheld most of the Pennsylvania law (reinforcing its statement in Roe that a state does have an interest) but struck down the spousal notification portion. To do that, it determined the appropriate test was whether a state was placing an undue burden---a significant obstacle---in the path of a woman seeking an abortion prior to fetal viability. It reasoned that: state regulation impacts a female's liberty more than male's during pregnancy (by way of biology) if a man and woman disagree, only one can prevail not all women are equally impacted by a notification mandate (for reasons of domestic violence, etc.) Combining this with the notion that women do not lose any constitutionally protected liberty upon marriage, it decided spousal notification would be a significant obstacle and thus an undue burden. In other words, unmarried women don't have spouses to notify, so placing a notification requirement on married women creates an additional burden that the court found undue. To get back to the question, the father certainly has a right to file a suit against the female (...and it happens from time to time). However, it likely wouldn't go far. Since unmarried women were the baseline in Casey, it's unlikely there'd be grounds for either married or unmarried fathers to sue their female partners. This comes up frequently under the moniker of "Father's Rights," which has gained less traction in the U.S. than in other countries. That said, Wisconsin recently introduced a bill that would allow fathers to proceed against abortion providers.
canada The law &quot;The [Criminal] Code requires 'ongoing, conscious consent' to 'each and every sexual act' and can be revoked at any time.&quot; See R. v. Sweet, 2018 BCSC 1696, citing R. v. J.A., 2011 SCC 28. &quot;The definition of consent for sexual assault requires the complainant to provide actual active consent throughout every phase of the sexual activity. It is not possible for an unconscious person to satisfy this requirement, even if she expresses her consent in advance.&quot; R. v. J.A., para. 66. The Supreme Court has explicitly declined to decide &quot;whether or in which circumstances individuals may consent to bodily harm during sexual activity&quot; (R. v. J.A., para. 21). However, in the context of a non-sport fist fight or brawl, one cannot consent to another intentionally applying force that causes serious hurt or non-trivial bodily harm: R. v. Jobidon, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 714.1 And at the provincial appellate level, it has been held that &quot;consent is not a defence to a charge of sexual assault causing bodily harm in circumstances where the accused has deliberately inflicted pain or injury upon a person that gave rise to bodily harm&quot; (R. v. Quashie (2005), 198 C.C.C. (3d) 337 (Ont. C.A.)). Consent would be irrelevant in a charge of criminal negligence or manslaughter, if the activities were to escalate this far (R. c. Deschatelets, 2013 QCCQ 1948, para. 175-77). The content of advance negotiations is not relevant to whether the complainant was consenting to the impugned conduct, however, it may be relevant as evidence of expectations about how consent would be communicated between the parties throughout the conduct. See R. v. Barton, 2019 SCC 33, para. 93 (citations omitted): For example, in some cases, prior sexual activities may establish legitimate expectations about how consent is communicated between the parties, thereby shaping the accused’s perception of communicated consent to the sexual activity in question at the time it occurred. American scholar Michelle Anderson puts it this way: “… prior negotiations between the complainant and the defendant regarding the specific acts at issue or customs and practices about those acts should be admissible. These negotiations, customs, and practices between the parties reveal their legitimate expectations on the incident in question.” These “negotiations” would not, however, include an agreement involving broad advance consent to any and all manner of sexual activity. As I will explain, a belief that the complainant gave broad advance consent to sexual activity of an undefined scope will afford the accused no defence, as that belief is premised on a mistake of law, not fact. See also R. v. Sweet, 2018 BCSC 1696, para. 141: ... consenting adults may enjoy the personal autonomy to establish rules such as “no means yes”. If so, in my view, this passage suggests a corollary requirement to establish an alternative “safe word” or other mechanism to ensure that each party is also able to maintain their personal autonomy to put an end to unwanted sexual activity. Application A contract cannot provide advance consent, therefore it is irrelevant as to proof of consent during the acts. However, advance agreements can (and several courts suggests should) set out the expectations about how consent will be communicated. Any evidence of such agreements would be relevant to establishing the defence of &quot;mistaken belief in communicated consent.&quot; None of this would assist an accused in the circumstance where a court finds that any consent was vitiated because the accused deliberately inflicted pain or injury that gave rise to bodily harm (this position has not been confirmed by the Supreme Court). If you are simply asking how to prove a fact in litigation, see this Q&amp;A. 1. Since this is a judicially-developed limit, the conception of &quot;bodily harm&quot; used here does not necessarily have to match that codified in the Criminal Code. But: &quot;The common law definition of 'bodily harm' has been substantially incorporated in s. 245.1(2) of the Criminal Code, and means 'any hurt or injury to the complainant that interferes with the health or comfort of the complainant and that is more than merely transient or trifling'&quot; (R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 633).
The legal term for premarital sex, as a crime, is fornication. I found a paper that gives an extensive and well-referenced history and analysis of such laws: Sweeny, JoAnne. Undead Statutes: The Rise, Fall and Continuing Uses of Adultery and Fornication Criminal Laws. Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 46 (2014), 127&ndash;173. http://www.luc.edu/media/lucedu/law/students/publications/llj/pdfs/vol46/Sweeny.pdf Sweeny finds that many states (or even most) had such laws. As of 2014, six states still do: Idaho, Utah, North Dakota, Illinois, Mississippi and South Carolina (see map on page 156 of the above paper). However, they are likely unconstitutional under Lawrence v. Texas. Virginia and North Carolina also have laws that have already been found unconstitutional, but have not been repealed.
A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.
The simple answer is: if the law says marital rape is not a crime, it is not punishable by the criminal justice system. If there were a loophole, one of the lawyers representing one of the many rape victims who have been seeking justice in India would have found it. There more than likely isn't one. Some Indian marital rape victims have tried prosecutions under the domestic violence laws, but as I understand it -- and I'm no expert -- those laws are fairly toothless. The solution is for India to pass better laws. The majority of Indian judges and legislators want marital rape to be allowed, and as long as that's the case, unfortunately, no clever workaround is going to fix anything.
This is not a true defense. It would only go to the credibility of the defendant's account claiming that he was not the perpetrator. Nothing prevents someone who is homosexual or asexual from sexually assaulting someone of the opposite sex within the meaning of the law. Sexual assault is often motivated by reasons other than sexual attraction in any case. Also, some people who publicly hold themselves out as being homosexual are actually bisexual. It is probably relevant evidence, but ultimately, it is up to the jury to decide who to believe and what happened based upon all of the facts and circumstances.