Can someone be penalized for an &quot;unlawful&quot; act if no penalty is specified? If a US federal statute specifies that an act is unlawful without specifying a penalty, without using any of the words &quot;misdemeanor,&quot; &quot;felony,&quot; or &quot;crime,&quot; and without invoking Title 18 CFR, can a penalty be imposed? Asked another way, is there some provision of US law that provides for a blanket penalty that could apply in such a case in the absence of a specific penalty in the statute that makes the act unlawful? Alternatively, could a judge impose a penalty without a statutory basis (beyond the designation of the act as unlawful)? The specific statute that prompts this question is subsection 215(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 USC 1185(b): (b) Citizens Except as otherwise provided by the President and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, it shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid United States passport. Between 1978 and 1994, the last clause read &quot;unless he bears a valid passport.&quot; Before 1978, the original version of section 215 was in force, which provided for a requirement to bear a valid passport only during times of war or national emergency when invoked by presidential proclamation. The section specified that willful violators would be subject upon conviction to a fine of up to $5000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years. Furthermore, this question was prompted by a comment discussion on my answer to a question at Travel: What is the penalty for US citizens entering/leaving the US on a foreign passport?, here in summarized form: Q: I'm not facile with US federal law, but there are often provisions in State law that provide if act x is deemed criminal by the code and a penalty not specified, then the penalty will be y. So even though there's no penalty in 8 USC 1185(b), there may be a penalty specified by another section of the USC. A: The section in question only makes the act &quot;unlawful,&quot; however, not criminal. I am unaware of a default civil penalty. Q: I acknowledge the difference between saying something is &quot;unlawful&quot; and saying it's a &quot;crime.&quot; I don't know federal law; in that arena, however, the two terms may be construed the same. At random (I searched for &quot;federal crime&quot;), I pulled 21 USC 841(a). It begins &quot;(a) Unlawful acts. Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally...&quot; So it's not clear that use of the magic word &quot;crime&quot; is required. A: Note how 841(b) provides explicit penalties for violations of subsection (a). The provision of penalties makes those unlawful acts criminal. The 1978 repeal of the penalties related to 8 USC 1185(b) meant that violations were no longer criminal. I've yet to encounter an analysis that holds otherwise, including in reported opinions. The magic word &quot;crime&quot; is not required, but if it is not mentioned then mention of &quot;felony,&quot; &quot;misdemeanor,&quot; &quot;sentence,&quot; or &quot;Title 18&quot; will do. See 8 USC 1325 and 1326 for further examples. Q: The conclusion in your second sentence might be true, but I don't know enough about federal practice to agree that there is a federal law distinction between &quot;unlawful&quot; and &quot;criminal.&quot; Maybe there is. Absent a more sophisticated understanding of how the USC is drafted, or a section-by-section examination of the USC to demonstrate there are no USC sections that prescribe punishments for &quot;unlawful acts,&quot; or a citation discussing the distinction, however, I can't (yet) agree.
There are some statutes that have a section that says "any violation of this action is punishable by . . . ." but the INA is not one of them. Generally speaking, the way it would be imposed would be: (1) to deny entry on a departing commercial airplane flight or ship (which is enforced by the private enterprises involved pursuant to Transportation Department regulations that the private enterprises may be sanctioned for not obeying) and (2) to set up presumptions about the reasonableness of, for example, laws requiring someone to have brought a passport to secure embassy access. One of the reasons that no penalty is stated is because the constitutionality of this statute is doubtful. Geographical restrictions on travel in some cases have been upheld as constitutional with regard to specific countries and in war time, but are even then strictly construed. But, no case has upheld the restriction as applied to travel to a country to which geographical restrictions do not apply. Likewise, I doubt that the provision denying entry to U.S. citizens without a passport, even during times of war, would be upheld today. For example, 215(b) was given a narrow construction (disallowing criminal prosecutions when someone went to Cuba and returned via a third-country while holding a valid U.S. passport) in part out of concern for the constitutional right to travel. U.S. v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 481 (1967). See also See L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-15, at 957 n.22 (1978) (arguing that ‘the power approved in Zemel must be limited to the most extraordinary situations'). For background see, e.g. Right to Travel Abroad, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 184, 195 (1984) (student note published anonymously) and Thomas E. Laursen, Constitutional Protection of Foreign Travel, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 902 (1981). The fundamental right of a citizen is to enter his own country so that he is not stateless with no place he can lawfully be, and that analysis has been developed more in the law now than it had been in 1967. Alternatively, could a judge impose a penalty without a statutory basis (beyond the designation of the act as unlawful)? Historically, some U.S. states provided this authority which was called the power to impose punishment for "common law crimes", and there are some that still do and there are others, such as Michigan that don't define key crimes that were crimes at common law, such as murder, other than in case law and simply set punishments by statute for these otherwise undefined crimes. As recently as 1947, a majority of U.S. states had at least some common law crimes. Many states codified their criminal laws in the wake of the Model Penal Code in the 1960s even though all states adapted it to their local needs and only a minority of states adopted a penal code close based upon it. The Model Penal Code made it easier to think of what had previous been an ill defined and massive legislative task into a more manageable and finite project for ambitious reformist legislators (an attitude and approach that was common in the U.S. in state legislatures in the late 1960s and early 1970s). But, the federal judiciary has never had this authority (as formally determined by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1812, just 23 years after the current constitution was adopted), in part, because the federal government does not have plenary legislative authority on all matters and federal courts are likewise courts of limited jurisdiction (while all or almost all states have at least one court of general jurisdiction that can handle any matter that no other court has jurisdiction to handle). From Wikipedia: The notion that common law offenses could be enforced in federal courts was found to be unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). Some have argued that they are inconsistent with the prohibition of ex post facto laws. At the state level, the situation varies. Some states, such as New Jersey, have abolished common law crimes (see State v. Palendrano), while others have chosen to continue to recognize them. In some states, the elements of many crimes are defined mostly or entirely by common law, i.e., by prior judicial decisions. For instance, Michigan's penal code does not define the crime of murder: while the penalties for murder are laid out in statute, the actual elements of murder, and their meaning, is entirely set out in case law.
While there are certainly statutory and procedural vehicles for sanctions, they are almost never requested or allowed when moved for, and are almost never imposed by judges. Something very severe needs to occur and not just your typical discovery violation ("speaking objections" during depositions, being late with responses, failure to cite to affidavits, affidavits citing conjecture rather than fact, et). It would have to be something quite serious....like misleading the court or directly failing to comply with a direct order or ruling on a motion. It is exceedingly rare. It is most seen in Federal Court.
A list of potentially expatriating acts may be found at https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal/travel-legal-considerations/Advice-about-Possible-Loss-of-US-Nationality-Dual-Nationality.html As the page explains, one will lose one's citizenship when performing one of these acts with the intention of losing one's US citizenship. In most cases, the presumption is that such intention does not exist. One obvious exception is an explicit renunciation of citizenship before a consular officer. The others are accepting a &quot;policy-level position&quot; in a foreign government, serving in a foreign military engaged in hostilities with the US, and committing treason.
No. The federal perjury statute applies only when there has been an oath taken to assert that the false statement was true, or the false statement was otherwise submitted under penalty of perjury. There is another statute concerning false statements generally, but it is also limited in such a way that it would not apply to the state of the union speech.
If I attempt to carry such a product into the country, but then honestly declare it at the border (I would like to declare 10 kg of marijuana, sir), can I be prosecuted for attempted smuggling? This depends on the jurisdiction and its definition of "smuggling." In the US, as an example, smuggling implies fraud or "clandestine" action. Openly bringing a forbidden item and declaring it would not meet the definition of this crime. Or will I simply be faced with the choice of turning around or forfeiting my goods and continue without trouble? Depending on the product in question, probably not. In the marijuana example, even if you are not guilty of smuggling, you are guilty of possessing and transporting a controlled substance (see 21 USC subchapter I). You could also be charged with intent to distribute, which would likely be a more serious crime. You could also be charged under the laws of the state in which the port of entry is located. With regard to the methyl alcohol example, I do not know whether bringing it to the customs desk at a port of entry would constitute a crime.
The statute of limitations 775.15(13) extends the period, tolling from the victims 18th birthday per (a), or, without limitation under (c) If the offense is a violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 16 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before July 1, 2010. Subsection 2 states the general limitations, which are severity-related: (a) A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within 4 years after it is committed. (b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed. (c) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the first degree must be commenced within 2 years after it is committed. (d) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the second degree or a noncriminal violation must be commenced within 1 year after it is committed. A death-penalty or life-imprisonment offense has no time limit, and some forms of sexual battery do carry those penalties, but not the situation described. There is also a provision (16(a)) for prosecution at any time after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused which we may assume is not applicable in the instant case. We may assume from the description that the violation took place before 2003, and the longest limit (for a first degree felony) is 4 years i.e. 2006. However, subsection (b) states a different complicating factor: If the offense is a first degree felony violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before October 1, 2003. In other words, if it is a first degree felony, then it can be prosecuted anytime (given the presumption that the violation was not before about 1999, which seems to be what you're describing). The age of the parties at the time matters, so I assume the minor was under 16 but above 12, and the adult was over 24. Florida Code 794.011 subsumes all forms of sexual battery, and different sections assign punishments (including death) and degree of felony. Subsection (5) defines the possibly-applicable second-degree felony sexual battery charges, which either involve a victim 18 and over, or a perpetrator under 18, which we assume is not the case here. Under (5)(a): (a) A person 18 years of age or older who commits sexual battery upon a person 12 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age, without that person’s consent, and in the process does not use physical force and violence likely to cause serious personal injury commits a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, s. 775.084, or s. 794.0115. It should be mentioned that a minor is legally deemed incapable of giving consent, thus the "without consent" part is true. There is a further wrinkle in the law: (8) Without regard to the willingness or consent of the victim, which is not a defense to prosecution under this subsection, a person who is in a position of familial or custodial authority to a person less than 18 years of age and who: ... (b) Engages in any act with that person while the person is 12 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age which constitutes sexual battery under paragraph (1)(h) commits a felony of the first degree, punishable by a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084. If a teacher is "in a position of custodial authority", then that also applies (and constitutes a life felony). This all said, the opinion of the internet seems to be that the limit is 4 years. Either I'm missing something else, or the specifics of the case matter: first degree violation, took place around 2001 which put it within the SOL on October 1, 2003.
26 USC 7206: Any person who— (1) Willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter [...] shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution. ("Return", as defined in 26 USC 6696, includes an income tax return.) This clause notably doesn't care whose favor the falsification was in, or why you did it. You knew it wasn't true and you put it on your tax return anyway, and you declared under penalty of perjury that it was true and correct. That's a felony, end of story. (Paragraph (4) of this section covers some other types of fraud done "with intent to evade" taxes, but that restriction does not apply to paragraph (1).) The likelihood of actually being prosecuted in such an instance is beyond the scope of this site. But in the given case, the falsification really isn't in the government's favor. The purpose was to become eligible to collect government social security benefits, which you otherwise wouldn't be eligible for. Presumably you would only bother to do this if you thought you'd collect more in benefits than you pay in extra tax, which means the government loses in the long run. This also eliminates any chance you'd have of claiming the falsification was "immaterial": it affected your eligibility for social security, and you knew that - it was the whole reason you did it.
A judge can only impose sentences as prescribed by law. Suppose, as a random example, that a person is convicted in federal court of fraudulently mutilating coins, in violation of 18 USC 331. That section of the statute states the punishment for such a violation: ...Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. The scale of fines is to be found at 18 USC 3571; for this crime, which is a felony, the maximum fine would be $250,000 (with certain exceptions, which let us suppose do not apply here). So in principle, the judge may sentence the offender to any of the following: Five years in prison and a fine of $250,000 Five years in prison and no fine Three days in prison and a fine of $6.25 No prison and a fine of $5000 You get the idea. (In practice, the judge is likely to follow official sentencing guidelines, but is not legally required to do so.) But the judge may not sentence the offender to any of the following, because the statute does not authorize it: Death A fine of $250,000.01 Five years and one day in prison Wearing a silly hat for a week Slavery I do not know of any federal criminal statute authorizing slavery as a punishment for any crime, so therefore, a federal judge cannot impose this sentence. Congress could in principle create such a law, and if they did it would not violate the Thirteenth Amendment, but they have not done so. (The Eighth Amendment might be a separate question, as slavery might very well be considered a cruel and unusual punishment by today's courts. And as you point out, such a law might also be in violation of treaty obligations.) (I assume here that &quot;slavery&quot; is understood to be something distinct from &quot;imprisonment&quot;, although I know some would disagree.)