Legality of IRS requiring taxpayers to swear to statements The IRS requires taxpayers to swear under &quot;penalties of perjury&quot; to their statements and figures given concerning their income. Since obviously this constitutes a potential incrimination, it would appear to violate the 7th Article of the Bill of Rights which provides that noone &quot;shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself&quot;. Since perjury is a criminal offense and tax fraud is also a criminal offense, it would seem the IRS is requiring taxpayers to act as witnesses against themselves. Has this been tested in court?
The IRS requires taxpayers to swear under &quot;penalties of perjury&quot; to their statements and figures given concerning their income. Since obviously this constitutes a potential incrimination The privilege against self-incrimination applies to giving testimony that reveals that you have committed a crime, not to doing something prospectively in a way that does not violate criminal laws. The solution is that you may truthfully report the amount of income that you have on your tax return. Ordinarily, the information that you had a certain amount of income, without a specific description of its source, would not in and of itself be incriminating. So, it is not &quot;obvious that this constitutes potential incrimination[.]&quot;, at least in the general case. There might be some circumstance in which merely filling out the information on a tax return required by law and signing it under penalty of perjury would be incriminating, although this is far more narrow that your question suggests. In those circumstances, the solution would be to file an unsigned tax return accompanied by a disclaimer stating that you are not signing it under penalty of perjury as it would be potentially incriminating for you to do so would on a signed and attached explanation that explicitly claims the 5th Amendment privilege. There is actually an IRS form for doing that or similar things on: IRS Form 8275. This would result in serious civil tax penalties, but would probably protect you from a criminal tax law violation (at least for the failure to file offense, not necessarily from the failure to pay offense).
If there is a divorce case and through the process of declaring a parties financial position it comes out that one of the parties has dodged a bit of tax can that evidence be held against them? Generally speaking yes, unless the relevant prosecutor's office provides a grant of immunity from prosecution for the matters disclosed, which basically never happens in a divorce case or ordinary civil case. This is why it is sometimes necessary to invoke the 5th Amendment in the context of a civil case. Does a judge have the duty to report any law-breaking that arises in civil cases No. It isn't improper for a judge to report law-breaking that is observed in the course of litigation before that judge, but the judge has no duty to do so (absent some very specialized exceptions like treason), and, in practice, rarely does report law-breaking not directly before the judge to evaluate. In contrast, in criminal cases, during the pre-trial phase of a case (and especially in the pre-arrest phase of a case), a judge often has a duty to keep knowledge of crimes obtained in that way secret until it is disclosed by the prosecution (unless the prosecution improperly fails to disclose something that it is required to disclose). This is so that criminals aren't &quot;tipped off&quot; by a judge of an impending arrest. A judge in Colorado was recently prosecuted and removed from the bench for a disclosure of that kind. or is a civil case confidential between the two parties? A judge can seal a civil case, or limit public access to certain documents, but that is the exception and not the norm and has to overcome constitutional protections of the public's right to public trials that media organizations frequently enforce successfully. Confidentiality between the parties can only be imposed for &quot;good cause.&quot; Hiding the fact that you cheated on your taxes from tax collection agencies does not constitute good cause. Footnote Most U.S. jurisdictions have an ethical rule for lawyers that prohibits them from threatening to take administrative or criminal actions to gain advantage in a civil case, although the exact details vary quite a bit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This does not apply to clients of lawyers acting unilaterally and without guidance from their lawyers.
Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns.
I have encountered this problem in Pennsylvania. The PA Code requires a District Attorney to approve all private criminal complaints. If the DA declines to prosecute, then an affiant can petition the Court of Common Pleas to review the decision. However the affiant bears the burden of convincing the court that the DA abused his descretion in declining to prosecute, which is a pretty high hurdle. In the United States the only other legal appeal I am aware of is through federal courts under broad federal laws like 18 USC 242 or 42 USC 1983.
In a landmark document-production case, Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, it was held that The Fifth Amendment does not independently proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence, but applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating ... A subpoena served on a taxpayer requiring him to produce an accountant's workpapers in his possession without doubt involves substantial compulsion. But it does not compel oral testimony; nor would it ordinarily compel the taxpayer to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of the contents of the documents sought. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment would not be violated by the fact alone that the papers, on their face, might incriminate the taxpayer, for the privilege protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled testimonial communications...The taxpayer cannot avoid compliance with the subpoena merely by asserting that the item of evidence which he is required to produce contains incriminating writing, whether his own or that of someone else. By way of background (and as cited by the Fisher court), Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 where the accused was intoxicated and blood was drawn involuntarily, the court held that The privilege against self-incrimination is not available to an accused in a case such as this, where there is not even a shadow of compulsion to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature. In other words, the self-incrimination clause is about actual testimony, and not other physical acts (such as fingerprints, DNA, records) which are used as evidence of guilt.
Don't even think of going there. If you refuse to pay taxes with this argument, the IRS will take this as a "frivolous tax return", and give you a fine of up to $5,000. If you are trying to argue that this is illegal, you only make things worse. The IRS gets about 20,000 to 30,000 frivolous tax returns every year, so every argument you could come up with they have heard a dozen times.
Is an attorney permitted to ask questions like those in either paragraphs two and three? Yes. That does not mean that they will be considered relevant or even appropriate, though. Is the witness allowed to decline to answer such questions for reason of irrelevance, or other grounds? Yes. In general, though, it would be safer for the witness to state an objection (be it on the basis of irrelevance, confrontational, asked &amp; answered, as to form, etc.) and answer the question nonetheless, rather than simply refusing to answer it. By simply declining to answer a question regardless of the basis for refusal, the witness risks affording a crooked lawyer the opportunity to falsely generalize that the witness was uncooperative. One exception to the idea of "object-and-then-answer" is where some privilege is the alleged basis for the objection, since the substance of the answer could be such that it amounts to waiving the privilege even where that privilege is legitimate. The witness may also opt to answer the lawyer's irrelevant questions even without stating an objection. Some questions are so obviously irrelevant, dull, or stupid that a failure to raise an objection will be inconsequential. In such scenarios, raising objections can only lengthen the deposition transcript and make it harder to read. For a real-life example of deposition with plenty of dull questions, take a look at the transcript (which I split in parts one, two and three) of the 4-hour deposition where I myself was the witness (you can download the case file, almost in its entirety, from this page). You will notice that I did not raise objections during the deposition, the main reason being what I explained above: To avoid giving the opposing counsel an opportunity to falsely accuse me in court of being uncooperative during deposition. Furthermore, addressing the crook's futile questions (1) projects transparency and helps on the witness's part, and (2) precludes a false &amp; misleading impression as if the witness had something to hide. After all, wrongdoers are the ones most interested in eluding testimony in ways very similar to this other deposition. The reason of being of objections is precisely that the law "is aware" that, as a matter of fact, lawyers indulge in all kinds of abusive questions when taking sworn testimony --be it in trial or at deposition-- of a witness.
First, no, given the wording of the question: &quot;by demanding identity first&quot;. US courts have never held that citizens must immediately comply with non-emergency orders free of back-talk. Let's assume that the refusal is conditional: &quot;I won't comply until you show me your ID&quot;. In most (?) jurisdictions, there is no obligation imposed on police to show ID, though I am excluding home searches. There is a policy requirement in Seattle (§7) that Employees may use a Department-issued business card that contains their name and serial number to satisfy the request for the information. Employees will also show their department identification card and badge (sworn) when specifically requested to do so. Exception: Employees are not required to immediately identify themselves if: An investigation is jeopardized A police function is hindered There is a safety consideration Massachusetts has a law saying that &quot;Such identification card shall be carried on the officer's person and shall be exhibited upon lawful request for purposes of identification&quot;. In the domain of search and seizure law, the court reasoned in Doornbos v. Chicago, regarding a seizure by plainclothes police that Absent reasonable grounds to think that identification would present an unusual danger, it is generally not a reasonable tactic for plainclothes officers to fail to identify themselves when conducting a stop. The tactic provokes panic and hostility from confused civilians who have no way of knowing that the stranger who seeks to detain them is an officer... it is usually unreasonable for a plainclothes officer to fail to identify himself when conducting a stop or frisk As you can see, this identification requirement is tied to constitutional search and seizure limits for which there is voluminous case law regarding what is &quot;reasonable&quot;. The scenario that you propose is fairly far from the kind of case identified in Doornbos: is the order from a uniformed officer in a police vehicle? That seems to be what you're describing. Now we must inquire as to the legality of the order. Picking on Washington state law, RCW 46.61.015 requires that No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any duly authorized flagger or any police officer or firefighter invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. RCW 46.61.021 requires a person driving to stop for a LEO, and to identify himself: failure to comply is a misdemeanor. There is no statutory provision that a person can refuse to obey these (or similar sections in the motor vehicle title) until the officer provides ID. A police officer (in Washington: and I suspect any other state) does not have unrestricted authority to give people orders, there are specific statutory circumstances giving police the power to order people to do things. Obstructing a police officer is a crime, but obstructing an officer is where one &quot;willfully hinders, delays, or obstructs any law enforcement officer in the discharge of his or her official powers or duties&quot;, and not &quot;doesn't cooperate&quot;. There is a provision, RCW 9a.76.030 where A person is guilty of refusing to summon aid for a peace officer if, upon request by a person he or she knows to be a peace officer, he or she unreasonably refuses or fails to summon aid for such peace officer and the &quot;knows to be a peace officer&quot; clause implies either that the officer is uniformed, or has provided identification. Finally, we have &quot;failure to disperse&quot; when a person congregates with a group of three or more other persons and there are acts of conduct within that group which create a substantial risk of causing injury to any person, or substantial harm to property; and (b) He or she refuses or fails to disperse when ordered to do so by a peace officer or other public servant engaged in enforcing or executing the law. These laws are attuned to emergency needs, thus outside the penumbra of your scenario. In short, the primary question must be, when can police lawfully give you an order that you must obey, which narrows the matter down to traffic-related matters. The seizure must be reasonable: it is reasonable to require a person to stop for a uniformed officer. Reasonability does not entail that all officers must produce ID when effecting a seizure, but this may be the case with plain-clothes officers. Even when in Seattle with a departmental policy requiring officers to identify themselves, an officer's failure to identify does not render the seizure illegal.