What does a search warrant actually look like? How can I recognize one? Suppose the police come to my door. “Open up,” they say. “We have a warrant to search the premises.” How can I tell if they are telling the truth? Do they show me the warrant? If they do, how do I know I am looking at one? What does a real search warrant look like? I could not find a single example online. (In the U.S. there is some sense in which it doesn't matter, because if it later transpired that the claimed warrant didn't exist, the fruits of the search could be suppressed. That is not the question I am asking.)
The exact form used can vary based on the court. At the federal level, the Administrative Office for the US Courts has a standardized form, although I don’t know that district courts have to use it. State courts obviously wouldn’t be expected to use the federal form, and I’m having a harder time turning up a blank state warrant form. The standard elements are in the federal form, though. A search warrant will have a header identifying it as a search warrant and will have something identifying the court that issued it. It will be signed by some sort of judge. The body of the warrant will be written as a command to the police to do a search, telling them where to search and what to look for. There will generally be some standard language about what to do with the property once it’s seized.
Yes, they can. There was a time when no warrant was required at all. There was a time when it was thought that the Fourth Amendment requirement for a search warrant only applied to criminal cases. It was expected that administrative and civil cases did not require a warrant. For example, in 1959 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Frank v. Maryland that the conviction of a Baltimore City person who refused a warrantless search by a Baltimore City health inspector was valid. However, in 1967 the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion in Camara V. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco which held: ...that administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such search, when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment's protections. The standard for issuing such a warrant, the court ruled, is probable cause. Further: Such standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building (e.g, a multi-family apartment house), or the condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling. The court also held that nothing in their ruling requiring warrants would preclude a warrantless inspection in an emergency situation. Portland, Oregon describes on their web site their process for obtaining such a warrant.
In most jurisdictions a peace officer can arrest anyone they have: a warrant to arrest probable cause to arrest, that is, a reasonable belief that that person has committed a crime They (and others) will conduct investigations to determine if they believe they can secure a conviction. If they do they will lay charges and justice will steer it's majestic course to conviction or acquittal.
In the Hicks case, police entered the premise, reasonably, pursuant a bullet having been fired from Hicks' apartment into a person in the apartment below. There were expensive stereo components in plain sight, which raised a reasonable suspicion. But that reasonable suspicion did not justify a further search, which police nevertheless conducted: they turned the stereo to get the serial numbers. Having phoned in the numbers and learning that the items were stolen, they then had probable cause for a seizure. That cause was, however, obtained via an illegal search. Suppose that the serial numbers had been visible from the front: then because they would have been in plain view and since the police were there for a reasonable search related to the shooting, then could have legally seized the stereo, since no additional search was required. There is no distinction between search and seizure w.r.t. 4th Amendment protection ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"). Police could not confiscate the stereo without probable cause, nor could they confiscate cash, or any other thing, again, unless they had probable cause. And they could not search for evidence that would give them probable cause to take stuff. As SCOTUS said, regarding searches versus seizures, We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here.
I think the officer is probably lying, not just mistaken, but they are not required to always be truthful. In addition to the law against possessing ID with intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime, it is also against the law to be knowingly in possession of a stolen credit card, or any other property. An example of a strict-liability possession crime, which the officer knows of, is that it is a crime to possess heroin, period. I am skeptical that the officer actually believes that there is a law making it a crime to be in possession of a credit card with permission, and suspect that he thinks it is stolen.
Conducting an illegal search does not amount to a permanent get out of jail free card (&quot;does that invalidate all evidence against you&quot;. What is excluded is evidence derived from that illegal search, regardless of what crime they were searching for. It would include later evidence for an unrelated crime where the probable cause was uncovered by the illegal search. The doctrine is not absolute, so a grand jury can inquire about a matter brought to their attention via an illegal search (&quot;the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons&quot;, US v. Calandra). Also, the doctrine excludes the product of a bad faith search without probable cause e.g. where the officer lies about the probable cause. There is also a &quot;social cost&quot; consideration, see Pennsylvania v. Scott. Utah v. Strief establishes three related doctrines. Unlawfully-obtained evidence independently acquired by officers from a source may be admittede. Evidence may be admitted if it would have been discovered without the unconstitutional source. Finally, since the poison fruit doctrine is intended to limit illegal police action, it may be admitted when there is a remote connection between illegal police conduct and gathering of evidence (e.g. the existence of an arrest warrant, discovered after the search). Nothing in your hypothetical points to an exception. The &quot;social costs&quot; consideration was specifically related to &quot;social costs of allowing convicted criminals who violate their parole to remain at large&quot;, but the potential for wider application is established (however, it is well-established that evidence of ordinary drug possession is excluded, from the myriad cases of such exclusions over the past century).
If you comply without protest, this will be taken as consent to a search, and make anything found admissible. One can verbally object. The ACLU suggests the form &quot;I do not consent to searches&quot; to any request to search your car, your house, your person or any other property of yours or under your control. There is no need to give any reason for your refusal. However, one is required to follow any &quot;lawful orders&quot; given by police officer during a traffic or pedestrian stop.[1] Failure to follow lawful orders may well be a separate crime. Even if the lawfulness is suspect, it is usually better to comply and challenge the order later, in court. One might make a second objection, such as &quot;I don't see that you have probable cause for a search, and I do not give consent. Are you ordering me to permit a search?&quot; If the officer clearly orders you to open the trunk, one might place the keys in reach of the officer, while not opening the trunk oneself. That might help establish that there was no consent to the search, and require probable cause to be established before anything found could be used in a trial. One might also repeat, as the officer opens the trunk &quot;I am not consenting to any search.&quot; If it is possible for any person present to record video without obstructing the officer(s) that might hrlp to establish the absence of consent and other relevant facts, later. People in general have a right to make such recordings, but not to obstruct or interfere with police activity. Duty to Obey The Washington Post in an opinion article dated July 23, 2015 &quot;Sandra Bland and the ‘lawful order’ problem&quot; wrote: The Bland video brings up an overlooked problem with the law of police-citizen encounters. The police can back up their orders with force because it’s often a crime to disobey a lawful order from a police officer. But from a citizen’s perspective, it’s often impossible to know what is a lawful order. As a result, it’s often impossible for citizens to know what they can and can’t do during a police encounter. The first problem is knowing what counts as an “order.” If an officer approaches you and asks you to do something, that’s normally just a request and not an order. But if there’s a law on the books saying that you have to comply with the officer’s request, then the request is treated as an order. You can’t know what is an “order” unless you study the law first, which you’re unlikely to have done before the officer approached you. In the case of Oregon v Rose Mary ILLIG-RENN, 42 P.3d 62 (2006) The Supreme Court of Oregon held that ORS 162.247(1)(b), a statute that makes it a crime to &quot;refuse[] to obey a lawful order by [a] peace officer.&quot; is constructional against challenges under the Oregon and US Federal constitutions. Sources [1]: Virginia Code section 18.2-464. Failure to obey order of conservator of the peace Virginia Code Section § 18.2-463. Refusal to aid officer in execution of his office. Florida Statutes 316.072(3) &quot;*OBEDIENCE TO POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS.—It is unlawful and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083, for any person willfully to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law enforcement officer, traffic crash investigation officer as described in s. 316.640, traffic infraction enforcement officer as described in s. 316.640, or member of the fire department at the scene of a fire, rescue operation, or other emergency. *&quot; (Oregon) ORS 162.247(1)(b) Interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer A person commits the crime of interfering with a peace officer or parole and probation officer if the person, knowing that another person is a peace officer or a parole and probation officer ... Refuses to obey a lawful order by the peace officer or parole and probation officer. California Vehicle Code - VEH § 2800 (a) It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order, signal, or direction of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace officer is in uniform and is performing duties pursuant to any of the provisions of this code, or to refuse to submit to a lawful inspection pursuant to this code. North Carolina § 20-114.1. Willful failure to obey law-enforcement or traffic-control officer (a) No person shall willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any law-enforcement officer or traffic-control officer invested by law with authority to direct, control or regulate traffic, which order or direction related to the control of traffic.
I'm not aware of case law on point, other than Riley, which you mention (which doesn't mean that there isn't any - I'm not a specialist in this area). But, I think that the answer would be that you do have an expectation of privacy because the Riley holding that there was an expectation of privacy in a smart phone didn't really hinge in any meaningful way on the existence of a password. The linked summary of the Riley decision explains the court's reasoning as follows: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote the opinion for the unanimous Court. The Court held that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with massive amounts of private information, which distinguished them from the traditional items that can be seized from an arrestee's person, such as a wallet. The Court also held that information accessible via the phone but stored using "cloud computing" is not even "on the arrestee's person." Nonetheless, the Court held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be permitted in an emergency: when the government's interests are so compelling that a search would be reasonable. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which he expressed doubt that the warrantless search exception following an arrest exists for the sole or primary purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving evidence. In light of the privacy interests at stake, however, he agreed that the majority's conclusion was the best solution. Justice Alito also suggested that the legislature enact laws that draw reasonable distinctions regarding when and what information within a phone can be reasonably searched following an arrest. The 4th Amendment expressly protects "papers" in your possession, which can't be password protected, and a smart phone file is analogous to a "paper" for 4th Amendment purposes. Your expectation of privacy in an unlocked smart phone flows from your exclusive possession of the phone as a piece of tangible personal property containing information, and not just from the password protection. In the same vein, I don't think that you would need to have a lock on a diary to have an expectation of privacy in it. This said, this is a cutting edge area of the law and password protection for a smart phone provides both more practical protection and potentially a less ambiguous cases of legal protection from search (since it brings you closer to the facts of Riley), and is therefore still a good idea.