Hastening execution in response to actions by third parties This year Jordan hastened the execution of terrorists in retaliation to daesh killing Jordanian hostage Moaz al-Kaseasbeh, having threatened to do so. That is, Jordan treated its own prisoners as hostages in some respects. Apart from the application of the death penalty, and potential issues relating to the fairness of trials, are there any theoretical and/or legal human rights, either in Jordan or internationally, that could be violated as a result of this action, since the timing of the executions weren't in response to actions by the prisoners themselves? For example, would it be seen as collective punishment?
No, if, as you say we put aside the human rights questions surrounding the death penalty itself and assuming that the prisoners had been legitimately charged, convicted and had exhausted their appeals process. Once a person has been convicted, sentenced to death and has exhausted their appeals then the timing of the execution passes from the judicial branch to the executive branch of government. This is why governments can implement and remove moratoriums on executions at their discretion. Doubtless there are administrative rules and logistical issues involved in the actual timing of the execution but if these have all been correctly dealt with then they are essentially held at the pleasure of the person in the government charged with the decision. Was it legal? Probably. Was it ethical? ...
canada You have tagged this 'criminal law', so I will stick to that, and avoid non-criminal anti-discrimination regimes. Criminal Code, s. 319 makes it an offence to wilfully incite or promote hatred against an identifiable group. It does not matter whether the person that is being communicated to is a member of the identifiable group (meaning &quot;any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin&quot;). What matters is a strict mens rea requirement that the communication was done with the intent of promoting or inciting hatred against such a group. If the accused holds such intent, it is no defence that they mistook the person they were communicating with as not being a member of such a group. See generally, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697. Hypothetical laws If instead you are asking about what a hypothetical law could require (since you ask, &quot;If a law for example criminalises intimidating or assaulting someone who suffers from dwarfism...&quot;), then as a matter of statutory interpretation, the law could be written in a way that makes the mistake you describe a defence or it could be written in a way that does not allow that defence. E.g. &quot;Any person who assaults another, knowing that the other person is X, commits an offence...&quot; This phrasing of the law clearly would require the accused to know that the person they have assaulted is in the category X in order for the assault to fall within this specific variant of assault. E.g. &quot;Any person who assaults a person that is X, regardless of whether they know the other person to be X, commits an offence...&quot; Under this phrasing of the law, knowledge of the status of the target of the assault clearly does not matter. However, Canadian law has constitutional minimum mens rea requirements for elements of crimes that bring risk of imprisonment. If the offence is punishable by imprisonment, then the variant that essentially removes the mens rea from the element relating to the target's status would be unconstitutional.
The embassy is not technically the sovereign territory of the sending country; it remains the sovereign territory of the receiving country, although it does enjoy special protections from interference from the receiving country. The sending country could do anything they like to you once you enter the embassy - including hanging you for treason - as long as they keep you in the embassy. This may be illegal according to the receiving country's laws - hence illegal in actual fact, since the receiving country's laws apply in theory - but the receiving country would be legally prevented from interfering with the sending country's actions if they take place in the embassy. What if the sending country does something the receiving country disagrees with? Well, that's sort of where the law stops and politics begins. The countries can negotiate, diplomats can be expelled and embassies closed, sanctions can be imposed and wars declared. This category of thing also includes the receiving country reneging on its agreement and violating the protections of the embassy and/or its diplomats, which would create an international incident and may lead to some or all of the above. In summary: - The Syrian embassy would be violating the law of the receiving country to punish you in such a way as to break the laws of the receiving country for having broken Syrian law while you are visiting an embassy abroad - The receiving country would be violating its diplomatic and political agreements not to interfere in the embassy if it decided to interfere with the embassy if the embassy chose to broke the law of the receiving country by punishing you - If the sending country break's the receiving country's laws in a way the receiving country cares about, or if the receiving country violates the immunity of the embassy in a way the sending country cares about, there will be an international incident which will be resolved by political processes. Odds are if it gets to this stage you're not in great shape.
The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.
Extradition treaties/agreements The general principle of international law is that all countries are sovereign and have jurisdiction over all people within their borders; in this regard they are not required to render any persons within their borders to another country, not even to be prosecuted for a crime. However, if the country the person is in has an extradition treaty or agreement with the country seeking to extradite them (in your case India) then the government may, in some circumstances, apprehend and render the person. Bars to extradition Commonly, the crime for which the person is to be extradited may be a bar to extradition, either because it is not illegal in the country that would surrender the person, or because it is of certain natures (usually political crimes), or because of the penalty the crime attracts (death penalty, for instance). As for this particular case, if I've read the news article correctly and that Mallya now resides in the UK, then there are extradition treaties between the UK and India and the subject could be extradited.
The UN has a copy of the extradition treaty between the US and Brazil, the short version of it is that the treaty lays out in Article II an exhaustive list of crimes that are extraditable, skimming the list I don't see defamation (since of course in real life it's not a federal crime). As a general principle, Country A won't extradite someone to Country B if the conduct they are accused of in Country B is not a crime in Country A, if Country A does not think Country B would provide a fair trial, or if the person is convicted if the punishment likely to be imposed by Country B would be illegal under the laws of Country A (this comes up a lot with extradition from Europe to the US if a possible punishment for the crime is death). So in your hypothetical Brazil would probably be unwilling to extradite its own citizen for the crime the US accuses them of. I think another part of your question is whether the US or Brazil would have jurisdiction over this defamation. In theory, both could claim jurisdiction over it. In practice most criminal conduct is criminal relatively universally, especially among similarly geolocated countries, so the rest of this paragraph is assuming both countries did consider the defamation criminal and extraditable. As a matter of judicial effectiveness an Internet crime would probably be prosecuted in the country where the person resides. There would likely be a language barrier too, if the US court would have to employ a Portuguese translator. However, this is all largely a political question more than a legal one, if the US really wanted to make an example of this person in their own country the US could try to use political leverage to get Brazil to extradite them. The US could also wait until the person travelled abroad and petition the third country to imprison and extradite them. That's something that happens more commonly for citizens of a country that the US does not have an extradition treaty with.
Generally speaking if it is substantively unconstitutional for the government to punish a certain kind of criminal conduct, then this provides a basis for a &quot;collateral attack&quot; on the conviction to set it aside (in a post-conviction motion in state or federal court), even if the criminal defendant serving a sentence has already appealed the conviction directly (i.e. to the court of appeals and all higher appellate court that review that court of appeals) to the fullest extent possible and lost. But this is not self-executing. Someone has to file a court case on behalf of the person incarcerated to make it happen. It does not generally entitle the criminal defendant to compensation for wrongful incarceration or to a return of fines paid, although it would end the authority of the state to incarcerate the individual going forward or the compel that individual to pay the balance of unpaid fines. There might be a right to have the case sealed, but the ruling does not automatically remove the conviction from the criminal record of the defendant. And, getting the case sealed is likely to be harder in the circumstance where all of the sentence for the unconstitutional offense has been fully served. When a past conviction does not meet the standards of current law from a procedural context, in contrast, this may be raised in pending direct appeals, but is rarely something that can be brought up in a post-decision collateral attack on the conviction unless certain other exceptions apply (e.g. sometimes if a collateral attack pending before the decision is still pending at the time of the decision or in certain extraordinary cases involving due process concerns that cast deep doubt on the validity of all convictions obtained by that means), and even in cases where it is set aside, does not pose a double jeopardy bar against a new prosecution for the crime that meets the appropriate procedural standards. The U.S. Supreme Court is currently considering the proper treatment under these rules of its holding that non-unanimous juries were an unconstitutional manner by which to convict someone of a felony, which is a procedural rule, but may fall within the exception that makes the new rule retroactive anyway. For cases on direct review, a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past Justice Harlan's habeas approach was first adopted by a plurality in Teague v. Lane and then by the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh. Thus, for collateral review in federal courts of state court criminal convictions, the general rule is that new rules of constitutional interpretation—those not 'dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final'—will not be applied. However, [a] new rule applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a 'watershed rul[e] of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Put another way, a new rule will be applied in a collateral proceeding only if it places certain kinds of conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to prescribe or constitutes a new procedure[ ] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished. In Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Court extended the holding of Teague beyond the context of federal habeas review, such that when a new substantive rule of constitutional law controls the outcome of a case, state collateral review courts must give retroactive effect to that rule in the same manner as federal courts engaging in habeas review. As a result, at least with regard to the first exception, the Court has held that the Teague rule is constitutionally based, as substantive rules set forth categorical guarantees that place certain laws and punishments beyond a state’s power, making the resulting conviction or sentence . . . by definition . . . unlawful. In contrast, procedural rules are those that are aimed at enhancing the accuracy of a conviction or sentence by regulating the manner of determining the defendant’s guilt. As a consequence, with respect to a defendant who did not receive the benefit of a new procedural rule, the possibility exists that the underlying conviction or sentence may still be accurate and the defendant’s continued confinement may still be lawful under the Constitution. In this vein, the Court has described a substantive rule as one that alters the range of conduct that the law punishes, or that prohibits a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense. Under the second exception it is not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of a trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding. From here.
united-states Under US law, any citizen may hold a person caught in the process of committing a felony (which kidnapping surely is) for the police. A soldier has no special authority. Indeed under the Posse Comitatus Act, the military has more restricted authority in such matters than citizens in general. However note that the book doesn't say the soldier was justified. I do not find it implausible that a soldier might have believed that the military had such authority.