Catch 22 laws - only have 2 options and both are illegal? Just out of curiosity I'm looking for examples of laws that require you to do something that puts you in conflict of another law. This question was sparked by something that happened to my neighbour recently. He found an injured deer in his garden, and trapped it in his shed whilst he tried to find someone to help. A few phone calls later and he found that 1) trapping a wild animal without a license is illegal, and 2) releasing a non-indigenous animal into the wild is also illegal. So, if he keeps the animal he's breaking the law, and if he releases it he's also breaking the law. I suspect that if he killed and ate it he'd probably also be guilty of 'butchery in an unlicensed premises' or something similar. Are they any similar examples of mutually exclusive laws? Update - the deer was a muntjac deer, apparently these are not indigenous (despite being in the UK for over 100 years). According to Wikipedia they are on the list of 'Invasive Alien Species' and cannot be 'intentionally released into the environment'. I'm not suggesting that there was any realistic likelihood of anyone prosecuting my neighbour, I'm just using this as an example of seemingly mutually exclusive laws.
There's a bit of confusion in the question's comments as to whether &quot;trapping&quot; in these circumstances is unlawful: He found an injured deer in his garden, and trapped it in his shed whilst he tried to find someone to help. It's not an offence, so there is no Catch 22 - it would be permissible under two seperate pieces of legislation: First, there's Section 4 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 which puts the onus on preventing unnecessary suffering to animals: 4 Unnecessary suffering (1)A person commits an offence if— (a)an act of his, or a failure of his to act, causes an animal to suffer, (b)he knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that the act, or failure to act, would have that effect or be likely to do so, (c)the animal is a protected animal, and (d)the suffering is unnecessary. Section 2 of the 2006 Act defines &quot;protected animal” to include: (b)it is under the control of man whether on a permanent or temporary basis And secondly, on the basis that the shed is considered a &quot;trap&quot; then the defence to an allegation of unlawful trapping contrary to Section 4 Deer Act 1991: (1)Subject to sections 6 and 8 below, if any person— .. (b)uses for the purpose of taking or killing any deer any trap ... he shall be guilty of an offence Would be at Section 6 of the 1991 Act: ... (3)A person shall not be guilty of an offence under section 4(1)(a) or section 4(1)(b) above by reason of setting in position, or using, any trap or net for the purpose of preventing the suffering of an injured or diseased deer. As the OP rightly points out, releasing a Muntjac deer is an offence under Section 14, Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 ...any person releases or allows to escape into the wild any animal which— (a)is of a kind which is not ordinarily resident in and is not a regular visitor to Great Britain in a wild state; or (b)is included in Part I, IA or IB of Schedule 9, he shall be guilty of an offence. Schedule 9 of the 1981 Act includes: Common Name: Deer, muntjac Scientific Name: Muntiacus reevesi
Part answer to Q1: Is my conceptualization correct? No, insofar that your Points 1 to 4 are all &quot;completely illegal&quot; regardless of how the authorities deal with them, and the rest are not, on the face of it, crimes but presumably civil wrongs (which can be dealt with by, for example, fines or restraint / good behaviour / banning orders etc without one having a &quot;criminal conviction&quot;). Also: if the authorities, for whatever reason, decide against dealing with crime then it hasn't been &quot;decriminalised&quot; - that is the remit of the law makers, not the law enforcers. It's still a crime but with a lower political/ operational etc priority.
This is covered by Sections 1 to 6 of the Theft Act 1968. A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. Each relevant word is then dealt with. Dishonestly does not apply in the circumstance where you have in law the right to deprive the other of it. Here, you have no right: the fruit's owner has every right to the fruit he owns. You have no right just to come along and take it. A right to deprive the other of something would be relevant where he had misappropriated it from you. Appropriation is any assumption by a person of the rights of an owner. Here, you are assuming the rights of the owner by taking the fruit. Property is fairly self-explanatory. Everything except land is property. Belonging to another: &quot;Property shall be regarded as belonging to any person having possession or control of it, or having in it any proprietary right or interest.&quot; Here, the owner of the tree has possession and control and a proprietary right and interest. Permanently depriving means that you treat the thing [fruit in this case] as your own to dispose of regardless of the other’s rights. All of these apply in your case of taking fruit from a tree owned and grown by someone else. There is an exception, which may be relevant to the &quot;by hook or by crook&quot; quote: A person who picks mushrooms growing wild on any land, or who picks flowers, fruit or foliage from a plant growing wild on any land, does not (although not in possession of the land) steal what he picks, unless he does it for reward or for sale or other commercial purpose. But this doesn't apply where the tree is not growing wild. It is generally held that you can cut off foliage or whatever which is overhanging your land — I can't find a reference specifically, but I expect it's to do with nuisance and free enjoyment of your own land — but the severed parts and any fruit on them are still the property of their owner, and you can't deprive him of them permanently. Public land isn't yours, so you can't cut off branches overhanging it: the public authority can. Even there, they must give them back to the owner. The 1968 Act repeals a number of prior Acts (all the way back to the First Statute of Westminster in 1265), but I can't see anything relevant to the restriction of common law. If what you quote as common law still applied in 1968, it was that Act which restricted it to wild fruit (as opposed to fruit overhanging public land). It's quite likely that the common law was simply codified and made unambiguous than it was deliberately restricted.
The already existing rule 11 penalizes baseless litigation. The modifications in this bill makes sanctions obligatory rather than optional, removes escapes for what would be sanctionable actions, and expands the range of sanctions. The clause in question strikes me as redundant, because existing rule 11(b)(2) says of the action that (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; Without either of these clauses, sanctions could be imposed on a bright guy who comes up with a new legal argument that actually works, which I think is clearly contrary to the intent of the original rule. Such a clause is a way of telling the courts "No, that is not the legislative intent". But the existing rule already covers that outcome. It may be that the added sanction "striking the pleadings, dismissing the suit, or other directives of a non-monetary nature..." was thought to potentially threaten "creative lawyering", but again that seems to be already covered by 11(b)(2). The words "assertion or development of new claims, defenses, or remedies under Federal, State, or local laws, including civil rights laws, or under the Constitution of the United States" differ from "nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law", but they seem to describe the same kind of facts. Perhaps a historical reading of the various versions since 1983, especially related to the advisory committee notes, would reveal more precisely why this is necessary.
The "Crabs" game can be legal if it is seen as a form of parody. That is one of the forms of "fair use" that allows copying (within limits). This is to allow the use of limited amounts of copying for critical or "mocking" pieces, which are considered a form of free speech. Two other issues come into play under "fair use." The first is whether or not this is "commercial" (yes) or non-commercial (e.g educational) use. That is mildly negative for "Crabs" but by no means dispositive. The second is the likely market impact, whether the new use tends to compete with the old use in its "home" market, or whether it is likely to open a new market of a very different, perhaps "opposite" audience that might later buy the original as a "crossover." The "Crabs" game seems to address the "green" or at least "pro animal" (PETA) market. If the defendant can show that the "Cards" market addresses e..g., your "inner Nazi," making it "opposite," that would be ideal. It would be less convincing if "Cards" were addressing e.g. human rights, because that might be seen to overlap with the green market in terms of social conscience.
It is the use of a "menace" which creates the crime, not the nature or validity of the demand. That's not correct. You've inadvertently missed the other element of the offence: that it's an "unwarranted demand". A person is guilty of blackmail if, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent to cause loss to another, he makes any unwarranted demand with menaces; and for this purpose a demand with menaces is unwarranted unless the person making it does so in the belief— (a) that he has reasonable grounds for making the demand; and (b) that the use of the menaces is a proper means of reinforcing the demand. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/60/section/21 For example, I may have reasonable grounds under the Consumer Rights Act to demand a refund for a faulty good. It might be sensible to moderate one's language, e.g. "If I do not receive a satisfactory response from you within 30 days of the date of this letter, I intend to issue proceedings against you in the county court without further notice. This may increase your liability for costs." vs. "If I do not receive the money from you within 30 days of the date of this letter I'll take you to the f***ing cleaners, sunshine." But the language doesn't make the demand unwarranted.
Strictly speaking, that principle isn't even true everywhere in the US. The maxim "nulla poena sine lege" (i.e. "no punishment without a prior penal statute") was historically applicable to civil law systems, such as are found in continental Europe. In common-law systems, there was never a tradition in which a crime wasn't a crime unless it violated a penal law, because crimes themselves were traditionally defined by court precedent instead of by statute. In US federal court, the only allowable common-law offense is contempt of court. This is due to a court decision (United States v. Hudson), in which the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts do not have the constitutional authority to hear a case in which someone is accused of committing a common-law crime. Even so, and even though there is a federal contempt statute, the Supreme Court has ruled that contempt is an inherent power of any court, and statutes around it only regulate the power (but the power would be there even without a statute). At the state level, some states have explicitly passed laws saying something is not a crime if it doesn't violate the penal code (although this doesn't necessarily apply to contempt); see section 6 of the California Penal Code for an example. In other states, like Florida, common-law crimes still exist; Florida has a statute saying that any common-law offense is still a crime unless a statute has explicitly covered that same subject matter (section 775.01), and specifies a generic penalty for anything which is an offense at common law and not addressed by any Florida penal statute (section 775.02). While this is sort of statutory (as it's a statute giving the penal provision), it's also basically not (as no statute has to say "X is illegal," because it's enough that English common law makes X illegal).
If you cannot legally purchase a gun in Utah due to any restriction, such as residency, and you engage someone else to knowingly buy or gift you a gun (such as a "straw man" purchase from a dealer or private sale), that is illegal. From the same link you posted (my emphasis): Can I buy a firearm as a gift for someone? Yes, as long as the receiver is not a prohibited person and the gifting is not being used to circumvent a background check or other laws. Calling a purchase intended in place of another is a straw purchase.