What does the US Constitution mean by &quot;bribery&quot;? The US Constitution mentions several specific crimes as impeachable offences. Among these is "bribery". In the English language as it existed at the time of the framers, did this single term refer to "offering a bribe", "soliciting a bribe", or both?
TL;DNR: At the time of the Founding, bribery covered both giving and taking a bribe. Two definitions of bribery from the Founding Era. It is often hard to say exactly what a word meant &quot;in the English language as it existed at the time of the framers.&quot; However, in this case, it's not hard. It’s easy! There are plenty of examples of people defining bribery to include both giving and receiving. I’ve picked two. The first is Lord Mansfield, one of the most distinguished English judges of the 18th century. In 1769, he defined bribery in the case of Rex v. Vaughan, which involved an attempt to bribe a privy councilor. Mansfield’s definition was widely quoted by American judges and treatise writers well into the 20th Century: Wherever it is a crime to take, it is a crime to give. They are reciprocal. And in many cases...the attempt is a crime. The second definition comes Noah Webster. He defined bribery in 1828, in the first edition of his American Dictionary of the English Language. Bribery: The act or practice of giving or taking rewards for corrupt practices; the act of paying or receiving a reward for a false judgment, or testimony, or for the performance of that which is known to be illegal, or unjust. It is applied both to him who gives, and to him who receives the compensation… A Bonus: James Madison on the language of the Constitution James Madison was one of the architects of the Constitution. He played a major role in drafting the Constitution and the Bill of Right, and in the campaigns to get them ratified. It is not clear that he thought the meaning of the words at the Founding would be all that useful in figuring out what the Constitution means. In Federalist 37, he discussed the role of language in deciding what the Constitution meant. He was writing to answer critics who claimed the text of the Constitution was too unclear and vague. Here is what he said: All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications. Madison went on to say that human language is so deeply flawed that when God uses it, even His messages are “rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.” Although Madison's prose can be hard to follow, Federalist # 37 is worth a look.
Trespass to chattels — which is &quot;intentionally… dispossessing another of the chattel, or using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another.&quot; But don't hold your breath re having a valid case. An attempt to sue would likely be dismissed as de minimis. This is just a trivial interpersonal issue.
I don't think that's an accurate interpretation of the statement. The key difference between the two scenarios is the defendant's legal assessment of who owns the necklace. In the first he thinks he is the owner and can claim mistake of law; in the second, he he thinks someone else is the owner, so he cannot. To say he believes "the law allows for someone to do whatever they want with lost property even if they know who the rightful owner is" is very different from saying he thinks he's the owner. He doesn't think he's the legal owner, he just thinks he has legal rights that include some rights associated with ownership. So if the defendant's statement had actually been, "I thought I was the owner," that would have been a successful defense when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. The defense was actually, "I thought I was allowed to deprive the owner of the property," which is an admission of guilt when the crime requires depriving the owner of the property. There are a couple questions here: a. A different crime that did not require intent -- or even required a different kind of intent -- could still lead to a conviction. A legislature is free to define larceny differently, so it could say that anyone who recklessly or negligently deprives another of property is guilty. Or it could say that your state of mind doesn't matter and that depriving another of property is larceny regardless of intent. b. In most cases, the mistake of law defense requires that the defendant honestly believe in the mistake; unlike mistake of fact, it does not require that his belief also be reasonable. Either way, the question of reasonableness would probably be a question for a jury, so a judge wouldn't be able to reject it (except in a bench trial). c. Mistake of law is a potential defense to any crime that requires an intent to do something that requires an assessment of what the law is. So if it's illegal to intentionally have sex with a woman who is not your wife, and you mistakenly believed you were in a legal marriage, sex with your non-wife would not be a crime. It has potentially very broad implications, but keep in mind that in many cases, the mistake a defendant would have to claim would be pretty far out there. If it were illegal to intentionally let anyone under 21 years old into your bar, I guess you could argue that you only let a 20-year-old in because you thought the law started calculating at conception, but I doubt you'll convince a jury. Mistake of law defenses still pop up pretty regularly. Here's one just yesterday from the Tenth Circuit. And this one is a Kansas case where a conviction for carrying a weapon while a felon was overturned because the court wouldn't allow a mistake-of-law defense. The Kansas case, though, uses the more modern definition of mistake of law, which also includes reasonable reliance on official statements from the government. In that case, the felon's parole officer had told him that it was OK to carry a pocketknife, but in reality, the law titled "Criminal possession of a firearm by a convicted felon" prohibited carrying knives, as well.
It sounds less like bribery (where you give someone a benefit in exchange for an official act) than like extortion (where you threaten some harm in the absence of an act).
I've retracted and replaced my previous answer. It is a citation to legal authority. It is probably a reference to the book &quot;Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown Hale PC&quot; (originally published 1736 with later editions also printed) (see 4.2.3) with Hale abbreviated &quot;Hal.&quot;, &quot;pl.&quot; being an abbreviation for &quot;plea&quot; (see 4.2.2) and &quot;cr.&quot; being an abbreviation for &quot;crown&quot;. Standard citation form is to spell it out, but if it is cited repeatedly later instances might be abbreviated. The link is to a scanned version of the out of copyright historical legal treatise on criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. Wikipedia also discusses it as does a law library Wiki.
Is official misconduct simply the act of "abusing public office" (or close to that)? There is no clear definition of malfeasance in office, or rather, there are many different definitions because there are so few appeals court judgments about it. Common elements of what definitions there are, are: First, malfeasance in office requires an affirmative act or omission. Second, the act must have been done in an official capacity—under the color of office. Finally, that that act somehow interferes with the performance of official duties—though some debate remains about "whose official" duties. It does not, necessarily, require that the malfeasance be criminal or unlawful in and of itself (i.e. things that would be unlawful if the person wasn't a public official), however, it really helps in obtaining a conviction. Did the judge act outside of the scope of his duties by even considering standing in a probable cause determination? Absolutely not. Standing is one of the matters a judge is required to consider. He may have got the decision wrong but that is why we have appeals courts. What in the citizen's complaint rule provides for the citizen's "closeness" to the crime? If nothing, then what else could the judge have based that decision on? It is a fundamental part of the common law that a person must have standing to bring a case. A statute can specifically grant or deny a class of people standing but if it doesn't the common law rule flows through. For a person to have standing absent a grant in the specific statute they must be sufficiently close to the act or omission that they have suffered damage or may yet do so. In general, just because the act or omission affects "all citizens" or "all taxpayers" is not generally enough - it must affect you personally and substantially enough to warrant the state dedicating scant resources to it. Time a court spends dealing with any particular case is time it cannot spend on every other case - probable cause is the judicial equivalent of medical triage.
The main legal impediment to such action is that nonviolent political actions are not rebellion or insurrection. Interpreting the meaning of these terms arises in litigating insurance claims (where there is often a clause denying coverage in case of insurrection or rebellion), e.g. Younis Bros. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. where the matter was the Liberian civil war. Neither "insurrection" nor "rebellion" are defined under the statute, therefore they have their ordinary meanings. The ordinary meaning of "insurrection" does not include Congress overstepping its authority (if that happened), nor, in general, would it include an illegal act by a public official. Reference to 18 USC 2381, 2382, 2383 2384 is common in suits files under sovereign citizen theories of law, which courts deftly dispose of because the plaintiff has no standing in criminal matters. However, various Freedom of Information cases involving FBI investigations such as Shaw v. FBI, Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306 have suggested that the FBI can investigate a possible violation of 18 USC 2383 which does not involve open civil war. Various cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (Scalia dissent), Padilla v. Hanft have supported the proposition that persons engaged in open war against the US can be prosecuted under this section. As far as I can determine, no case has supported the notion that a nonviolent action exceeding legal authority constitutes violation of that law. In US v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 the court mentions that "conspiring to overthrow the Government by force and violence" is prohibited by that statute. Furthermore, since the actions in this specific instance involve stuff that happened on the floor of the House, they are constitutionally completely immune. Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution says of Congress They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place. So while a Congressman can be arrested for racketeering or breach of the peace traveling to a session, they cannot be tried for what they say in session. I think they could be arrested for assassinating the Speaker while in session, but not for advocating assassination in a speech or debate.
In general, you cannot contract to do anything illegal. However, ... An argument could be made that permission has been granted to, for example, enter property and remove the item. If permission has been granted, entering property and taking an item is not a crime.