When the VP is Acting President When the Vice-President is serving as Acting President on account of a temporary disability of the President, do they retain their Vice-Presidential powers, including the power to preside over the Senate and cast a tie-breaking vote?
The 25th amendment §3 says Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. Nothing in the Constitution deprives the Vice President of his powers / duties when he is also Acting President. Alternatively, the VP can become acting President under §4, without presidential cooperation, by declaration of the VP and a majority of the cabinet. Then either the President asserts that there is no inability, or Congress decides there is. But: unless the president dies or resigns, or is impeached, the VP is Acting President and actual Vice President, and therefore breaks ties in the Senate. Note that under §4, the VP plus cabinet must declare POTUS unable, and must do it again if POTUS denies the inability. That means that there must still be a VP, who along with the cabinet re-affirms the disability.
The Twelfth Amendment states that "no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States." Thus, to serve as vice president, an individual must: Be a natural-born U.S. citizen; Be at least 35 years old. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vice_President_of_the_United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twelfth_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution Because the age requirement for President is 35 years old, the Vice President must also meet that requirement.
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 says The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Therefore, the House cannot try an impeachment. The wording of the Constitution does not say "The Senate must try any impeachment delivered by the House". The option to reject an impeachment by simple majority runs completely counter to Senate tradition. But analogous to deployment of the "nuclear option" to change Senate rules, it is a conceivable outcome. The first impeachment presented to the Senate was against a Senator, William Blount in 1797, and in that instance the Senate appears to have voted that Blount was not an impeachable officer (so they did not vote on impeachment, but they did vote to expel him). In Nixon v. US, SCOTUS ruled that Senate impeachment actions are not justiciable. While current Senate rules require a trial, the rules can be changed by the Senate by a majority vote, and SCOTUS will not review such actions. The Senate can also adjourn and not take up one or more articles, as happened in Andrew Johnson's case.
There is no such restriction. At the time the Constitution was written it was the common practice to use &quot;he&quot; for a person of unknown or unspecified sex. The use of that word cannot be taken to imply a restriction to males. If it were not settled before, the 19th Amendment granting voting rights to all adult women would have settled the matter. While it is true that no woman has yet been elected to, or held, the office of President, women have been elected to Congress. But the 2nd paragraph of Article I section II provides that: No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. If the use of &quot;he&quot; were a restriction to male office holders, no woman could be elected to the House. And in fact the Hon Nancy Pelosi, a woman, is currently Speaker of the House, and would become President in accordance with law should both the current President and Vice-President die, resign, or become ineligible without a new VP being appointed and confirmed as provided for in the 25th Amendment. The argument made in the question is without merit.
The US President is indeed bound by the Constitution, and indeed by the ordinary laws. Current Justice Department policy is that a sitting president may not be indicted. No court has ever held this, the US Constitution does not give explicit presidential immunity the way it gives limited immunity to members of congress (in the &quot;speech and debate&quot; clause). No sitting US President has ever been charged with a crime, much less indicted, so the matter has never come before a court. An old news story indicated that President Grant was stopped for a traffic offense (speeding, in a horse-drawn carriage), accompanied the officer to a police station, paid an appearance bond for the traffic court, and then failed to appear, forfeiting the bond. Even if this is accurate, no claim of presidential immunity was made, and no court decision was rendered. So no precedent was established by that event, one way or the other. Any President may be impeached and convicted, if Congress sees fit to do so. There is no enforceable standard on just what is and is not an impeachable offense. That is left to the sound judgement of Congress. Nor is Congress required to act if it chooses not to, no matter how strong the evidence may be. Nixon's Vice President , Spiro Agnew, was investigated for alleged corrupt practices. It appeared that Maryland (where he had been Governor) was ready to indict him on several charges. He was persuaded to plead &quot;no contest&quot; in a plea bargain to a single count, and was sentenced to probation with no jail time. At the same time, he resigned as VP. No one knows what would have happened had he continued to insist on his innocence, and claimed before the court that a sitting VP could not lawfully be indicted (a claim he had made earlier in the process). Even assuming that a sitting President cannot be indicted or tried, nothing prevents such a person from being charged and perhaps convicted after his or her term has ended. The constitution explicitly says that if an official is impeached and removed from office, there may be a subsequent trial on any relevant charges. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. (Art I; section 3; clauses 6&amp;7) Whether any statute of limitations would be tolled (paused) while the president was in office cannot be determined until and unless the matters comes before a court for a decision. Note that the US Constitution imposes few duties or obligations on individuals. it is mostly concerned with specifying he structure of the federal government, and the powers of and limitations on its various parts. It also specifies the relations between the Federal and State Governments. It also declares a number of rights held by individuals, most of which can be regarded as limitations on the power of the government. If the President were to be accused of a crime, it would almost surely be one established by statute, not by the constitution directly, because treason is the only crime defined directly by the constitution. However, the official acts of the president are clearly limited by the Constitution, and in a number of cases have been held void as being unconstitutional. One of the more famous cases is Youngstown Sheet and Tube vs Sawyer 343 U.S. 579 (1952), also known and the &quot;steel mills seizure case&quot;. During the Korean War, President Truman attempted to take control of a number of steel mills to stop a labor dispute, on the ground that this was hindering the national defense. The US Supreme Court ruled that he lacked the power to do this, and that his action was void.
There are two kinds of immunity: absolute and qualified. Absolute immunity is limited to the official discretionary acts of judges, prosecutors in the litigation process (but not in the investigatory process) and the President. And, in the cases of judges and prosecutors this is only immunity from civil liability and not criminal liability. Thus, for judges the scope of absolute immunity extends to legal rulings and conduct related to being a judge in a courtroom. In the case of a prosecutor, it pertains to litigation conduct (but not conduct physically dealing with a defendant or investigating a crime). This is usually an open and shut question which can be determined on the face of the legal complaint against the official. Only the President has relatively broad kinds of activities covered and his saying he is immune doesn't mean that a judge trying a case will agree with him. If he's murdering his wife, no judge will believe that he's acting in his official capacity to do so. Other government officials generally have only "qualified immunity" which means that they have liability if they intentionally violate clearly established law, which basically means that there is a binding judicial precedent governing the facts and circumstances at issue.
Art II, Sec 2, Cl 1 of The Constitution says of the president "and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment". The Constitution does not state any further restrictions on the presidential power, and there are no statutory limits, because, as observed in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 The power of pardon conferred by the Constitution upon the President is unlimited except in cases of impeachment. It extends to every offence known to the law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings are taken or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment. The power is not subject to legislative control. Accordingly, presidents have written pardons on and with numerous different writing instruments. Insofar as there are no constitutional restrictions beyond the aforementioned, it is not required that a pardon be signed, or that it be on a tangible semi-permanent medium. It is impossible to know what such a pardon tweet would look like, beyond the limit on length. The one place where a presidential signature is required is under the Presentment Clause, that when presented with a bill that passed the two houses of Congress, "If he approve he shall sign it". Such a signature need not be actually written by the president, it may and often is written by an autopen. The question of the legality of autopen signatures for bills has not been presented to SCOTUS, but the Department of Justice has issued an opinion (July 7, 2005) that it is legal. I have failed to locate a repository of presidential pardons (the actual documents), so I do not know if, so far, all presidential pardons were written down and signed, though I would expect it to be so. The Arpaio pardon was signed (or auto-signed), likewise Obama's final mass-pardon on Jan 17, and previous Obama pardons were, but pre-Obama, DOJ does not provide any document.
If the spouse of the US president filed for divorce, would a) the President have any claim of immunity from any litigation that followed (e.g. the division of assets in the matrimonial pot, child custody etc.), The President could claim it, but the President wouldn't win. Notably, a number of state governors and mayors have divorced while in office, and other foreign heads of state have been divorced while in office. For example, a U.K. court recently handled the divorce of a UAE monarch (over his objections to jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds), applying the same common law principles of head of state and sovereign immunities that exist in U.S. law and concluded that it had the authority to move forward with the case. Also, any Presidential divorce would take place in state court, not in federal court. Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce and custody cases (under the &quot;domestic relations exception&quot; to federal jurisdiction), so the civil action could not be removed to federal court, unlike federal criminal cases involving the official duties of the President and unlike civil cases over which the federal courts have jurisdiction. b) would all the proceedings be fully held in private, This would be in the reasonable discretion of the judge. It would not be a matter of right, but it is quite plausible that a judge might close the proceedings, especially if minor children were involved. c) could the President themselves be compelled to take the stand and Yes. A party to a lawsuit may always be compelled to take the stand, at least if no other person can provide a full substitute for the party's testimony. In ordinary civil lawsuits against the President, a President is usually compelled to testify only if an underling involved in the same matter cannot provide equivalent testimony. In many civil cases naming the President in his official capacity, the President has no personal knowledge of the facts and so can't be compelled to testify. But that would rarely be true in a divorce case, and would never be true in a divorce case where custody was an issue. This said, a state divorce court judge would almost certainly be very deferential to the scheduling concerns of the President for that testimony, and might allow that testimony to be provided remotely via videoconference so as to minimize the interruption this would pose to affairs of state and to address the security concerns of the Secret Service (i.e. the President's official bodyguards). d) what would happen if the President refused to do so? The judge could hold the President in contempt of court, which is punishable by fines and/or incarceration. But a more likely outcome, tailored to minimize interference with government business, is that the Court would sanction a President who defied an order to testify by assuming as a matter of law that any testimony from the President would have been unfavorable to the President and make a conclusive adverse inference on the evidentiary issues about which the President was asked to testify against the President.