Is there any way of having sex without risking jail in the United States? I recently read a story about a 19 years old boy sentenced to jail and to be registered as a sex offender for 25 years for having sex with a 14 year old girl who lied about her age. The girl and her mother testified on behalf of the accused, saying that the sex was consensual and that she told him she was 17. Unfortunately, that didn't matter. I read that if she showed him a fake ID so well done it's impossible to discern from a real ID, that wouldn't have mattered either. I also read that even with notarised written statements you will still be found guilty. (Curiously enough the reverse, ie propositioning sex to a person who is over the age of consent but lies saying they're younger, is also illegal) Radiocarbon dating for samples less than 100 years old is so unreliable it's basically useless. Even if the person looks very old, there are certain diseases that cause rapid ageing so they potentially are underage. With all that in mind, is there any way to have sex on US soil without running the risk of being labeled a sex offender?
In many US states (and in the UK), statutory rape is a strict liability offense. This means that there is no intent requirement at all; the only allowable defenses are those that negate the actual act (there was no sex, the person was of age, or sometimes that the action was not a conscious or voluntary action), it falls within a statutory exception to the crime, or there is an applicable defense that has nothing to do with intent. Many general defenses do not apply to strict liability crimes; in particular, "I thought X when Y was true" tries to show there was to intent to commit the crime, which is irrelevant. In Michigan (where the crime took place), statutory rape is evidently such an offense. That throws some standard defenses into doubt, because anything based on negating criminal intent doesn't matter. However, Michigan does specifically say that it is not criminal to have sex with a person under 16 if they are your legal spouse; this is a very common exception to statutory rape laws. So, marriage is a way to not risk jail for statutory rape in Michigan. However, things do vary by state. In Indiana, it is specifically a defense that the defendant had a reasonable belief that the victim was over the age of consent (unless it was a forcible rape).
"Kidnapping is the unlawful taking away or transportation of a person against that person's will" The crime would occur if the second person was taken by the first, the age of the perpetrator is immaterial to the commission of the crime but it will affect where and how it is prosecuted. The age of the victim will matter as the victim must be old enough to competently grant consent - if they are too young to do so then it will be a kidnapping. On the face of it "running away together" does not imply an unwillingness. Note also that kidnapping is the crime of "taking away"; holding a person against their will is the different crime of false imprisonment.
It's naive to assume a college age hacker (or a hacker who bases his/her attacks from an academic institution) is treated differently than a "real" hacker, whatever a real hacker might be. The sentence any convicted hacker receives depends on many factors: the prosecutor, the evidence, veracity of witnesses, jurisdiction (academic or not), previous criminal records, the actual laws the person is being charged under, the judge, the jury, the lawyers, plea bargains, media coverage, etc. There are so many factors that the outcomes of the prosecutions of "hacking" crimes can be very different, re: your examples. Read about each case and you'll find many differences. Academic fraud or any form of fraud are completely different crimes. Hackers can commit fraud, but not all fraud involves hacking. Being convicted of fraud can sometimes happen if the evidence for a hacking charge is weak, or other factors. Again, that involves the specific case, the prosecutor, laws, the evidence, etc.
The question is not properly framed in terms of the law: the relevant question isn't in terms of achieving orgasm or not, it is in terms of consent. Is it rape to continue having sex, when one party withdraws consent? In North Carolina, following State v. Way (rather sparse on details), consent explicitly cannot be withdrawn. In Illinois, on the other hand, under 720 ILCS 5/11-1.70(c) A person who initially consents to sexual penetration or sexual conduct is not deemed to have consented to any sexual penetration or sexual conduct that occurs after he or she withdraws consent during the course of that sexual penetration or sexual conduct. In South Dakota, it is not clear. In State v. Jones, 521 N.W.2d 662, there was a proposed jury instruction stating An act of sexual intercourse does not constitute rape, where the female initially consents to the act, but after penetration, withdraws her consent, and the male, without interruption of penetration, continues the act against the will of the female and by means of force. The proposed authority for such an instruction was the California case People v. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, where it was conclude that continued intercourse after consent is withdrawn is not rape. But the South Dakota court rejected that ruling and instruction, and the defendant was convicted. But: the court also found that the victim submitted, and didn't consent – in other words, South Dakota has not definitively answered the question. The California finding was ultimately overturned by the California Supreme Court in re John Z, finding that A woman has an absolute right to say “no” to an act of sexual intercourse. After intercourse has commenced, she has the absolute right to call a halt and say “no more,” and if she is compelled to continue, a forcible rape is committed. The general answer in the US that it is legally undecided: it is definitely decided in California and Illinois that intercourse past the withdrawal of consent is rape, and in North Carolina that it is not. This article cites other case law, but on average, it has has not been clearly determined if continuing intercourse after withdrawal of consent constitutes rape.
Courts, particularly traffic courts, tend to take a police officer's word over that of an accused person. While legally the limit is 70, the driver has very little recourse if the officer claims falsely that the actual speed was over 70. But the deterant effect of a posted limit is lost, since drivers in general have no way to know that Officer O will ticket anyone going over 60. I suppose that driver D, or D's lawyer, could subpoena calibration records of any radar gun or other measuring devise used, and could insist on its being tested. However, unless they had reason to think there was an issue, I wonder if D and D's lawyer would go through that process. Some speed measuring devices print a paper slip showing the date and time along with the reading. If such a device was used that record would be harder to alter. Some cars are now equipped with devices provided by insurance companies that record speeds and other driving info in a secure way to help judge a driver's safety and allow individual rate setting. It might be that the record from such a device would be admissible to show the speed was under the posted limit. But there is a sense in which the law is what the police and the courts enforce. If anyone who drives the road over 60 is cited and must pay, one could say the effective limit there is 60.
One place to look is the incest statute, 18-6602, which says: Persons being within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are declared by law to be incestuous and void, who intermarry with each other, or who commit fornication or adultery with each other, are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not to exceed life. The relevant statute pertaining to consanguinity and marriage (32.205) states: Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, and between brothers and sisters of the half (1/2) as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, or aunts and nephews, are incestuous, and void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate. A literal reading of the law with attention to the bold part tells you that the prohibition of marriage between brothers and sisters of full or half blood does not preclude marriage between blood-unrelated sibling. It does, however, not grant the same right to aunts and nephews etc. (including those by adoption), which could engender competing claims about legislative intent. It would then be relevant to look at the Washington analog of this statute, RCW 26.04.020, which prohibits marriage: (1)(b) When the spouses are nearer of kin to each other than second cousins, whether of the whole or half blood computing by the rules of the civil law. (2) It is unlawful for any person to marry his or her sibling, child, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew. Here, the blood-relation rule applies to (second) cousins and is absolute for aunts and sibling. It would seem that various legislatures had different intents, in forming these statutes. In Oregon, ORS 106.020 prohibits marriage When the parties thereto are first cousins or any nearer of kin to each other, whether of the whole or half blood, whether by blood or adoption, computing by the rules of the civil law, except that when the parties are first cousins by adoption only, the marriage is not prohibited or void In this case, the Oregon law explicitly equates blood and adoption, and then could cast doubt on the concept of "whole or half blood" as actually referring to blood relationship (although, Oregon is not Idaho, or Washington). Given the literal reading of the Idaho statutes (and without there being any clarifying case pertaining to relationship by adoption), it may take a court order to compel the county clerk to obey the law, especially if the clerk is dispensing life choice recommendations. That is especially so if the law is not clearly established. Montana likewise restricts (40-1-401) a marriage between an ancestor and a descendant or between a brother and a sister, whether the relationship is by the half or the whole blood, or between first cousins That statute also says Parties to a marriage prohibited under this section who cohabit after removal of the impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of the impediment. However, there is no obvious way to get legally unadopted, especially when the parties are adults. An additional wrinkle is that in Idaho under 32-209, valid marriages entered into elsewhere are valid in that state unless they violate the public policy of this state. Marriages that violate the public policy of this state include, but are not limited to, same-sex marriages, and marriages entered into under the laws of another state or country with the intent to evade the prohibitions of the marriage laws of this state. But it is established law that same-sex marriages are legal. The bold section is clearly unconstitutional; the question then is whether if you took this to SCOTUS, they would strike down the entire statute (a number of states still have such language on their statute books, e.g. Montana still declares that marriage is between a man and a woman). At any rate, a lawyer is probably mandatory.
I did a lot of digging through case law and statutes, but I don't see a definition for "biological sex" anywhere in federal law, though after looking through those cases, it seems pretty clear that courts think of "biological sex" as a definition of "sex," and that they take it to mean the sex listed on your birth certificate. Even if we could find a straightforward statutory definition, it probably wouldn't do much to inform the interpretation of this memorandum, as it would only apply to the specific section of law in which the definition was included.
Sometimes running away is a juvenile offense, but it is not an offense for which an adult aged eighteen or over would be arrested or punished. An adult would not be returned home.