Are there any major changes in patent law, besides AIA, in the past two decades? I'm referring to important rulings or legislation changes that impact how firms apply for patents or how they approach patent strategies.
There has been lots of U.S. Supreme Court action in patent law, which has collectively mostly weakened patent law, with some exceptions, although there has been little major patent legislation since 2011. (A background report for Congress from the Congressional research service can be found here.) Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court rebuffs the Federal Circuit on a patent law issue related to patent claims in products (basically drugs) biologically similar to products subject to an existing patent making it harder to &quot;puppy guard&quot; such a patent. Impressions Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc. Reversing the Federal Circuit to weaken the rights of patent holders, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the first sale doctrine terminates all patent rights in an item, both in the case of sales in the U.S. and sales outside the U.S., even if the contract of sale purports to reserve patent rights in that particular item produces using the patent. TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC In 1990, the Federal Circuit held that due to an amendment to the general venue statute that patent lawsuits could be brought in any district that has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This gave rise to extreme forum shopping by patent trolls with the Eastern District of Texas arising as a very plaintiff friendly venue in which many patent infringement cases were brought, despite it having only minimal contacts with the patent holder. This 8-0 decision overrules the 1990 decision of the Federal Circuit and holds that the 1957 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that patent lawsuits may be brought only in the state where a defendant is incorporated remains good law. SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC the equitable doctrine of laches cannot be used to bar the recovery of patent infringement damages incurred within the six year statute of limitations; this follows another recent ruling that laches does not bar the recovery of damages for patent infringement incurred within the three year statute of limitations. Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple, Inc. In the case of a multicomponent product, the relevant “article of manufacture” for arriving at a [35 U.S.C.] §289 damages award need not be the end product sold to the consumer but may be only a component of that product. Alice v. CLS Bank, Int'l., prohibited software that generically applied an abstract idea that is not otherwise patentable, have made it dramatically more difficult to obtain patents, particularly the subset of patents called &quot;business method patents&quot; which include most software patents. In January of 2004, only a little more than 2% of patent applications were rejected (on Section 101 grounds which governs what is patentable). By July of 2015, that percentage is about 15%. Before Alice in July of 2014, about 31% of business method patent applications were rejected on Section 101 grounds (already a major increase from 2007 when the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a more expensive definition of &quot;obviousness&quot; under Section 101 for patent law purposes in KSR International v. Teleflex (see below), and 2010 when the U.S. Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos (see below) articulated a new (and functionally more restrictive) legal standard for granting software patents (although not as restrictive as the federal circuit case it reviewed which is linked), while affirming that software patents could still be obtained). After Alice, 82% of business method patent applications were rejected. Limelight Networks v. Akamai Technologies liability for inducing infringement could not exist when there was no direct infringement (the conduct in question involved part of a patented process being carried out by one party, who allegedly urged customers to carry out the balance of the patented process themselves, so that no one person infringed) Nautilus v. Biosig Instruments the Court rebuked a standard for what kind of patent description was excessively vague that was absurdly indulgent to the patent applicant. Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health &amp; Fitness, Inc. (2014) (unanimous) and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Management Systems (2014) (unanimous) (the Federal Circuit had set too high a standard for the recovery of attorneys' fees for frivolous patent prosecutions) Medtronic v. Mirowski (2014) (unanimous) (burden of proof wrongly placed on someone other than the patent holder) Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics (2013) (unanimous) (invalidated patents on naturally occurring DNA sequences) Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. (2012) (unanimous) (district court's factual findings made clear that drug monitoring device patent merely restated a law of nature and was invalid) Caraco v. Novo (2012) (unanimous) (alleged infringers right to bring counterclaims expanded) Global-Tech v. SEB (2011) (8-1) (added knowledge of infringement element in claim for induced patent infringement) Bilski v. Kappos (2009) (unanimous to reverse, complicated holding as to extent of new law) (analysis to determine validity of business method patents tightened, dramatically narrowing their availability) Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. (2008) (unanimous) (disavows Federal Circuit doctrines allowing patent holders to limit use of patented device after a first sale) KSR v. Teleflex (2007) (unanimous) (tightened standard for obviousness in order to qualify for patent protection) MedImmune v. Genentech (2007) (8-1) (allows for contests of patent validity without risking liability by infringing patent prior to legal ruling on question) Microsoft v. AT&amp;T (2007) (7-1) (U.S. patents laws don't have extraterritorial application; U.S. patent law doesn't apply to software copied abroad and not repatriated.) eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (2006) (unanimous) (sets higher standard for obtaining injunctions once infringement is established) Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (2005) (unanimous) (exemption from patent infringement applies to use of patented drugs for narrow purposes of research associated with FDA drug approval process) Bowman v. Monsanto Co. (2012) (unanimous) (first sale doctrine does not invalidate ban on reproducing crops grown with patented GMO seeds) Kappos v. Hyatt (2012) (unanimous)(expanding ability of applicant denied a patent to challenge the denial with additional evidence) Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership (2011) (unanimous) (presumption of validity of patent continues to apply during patent re-examination process conducted by PTO). Stanford v. Roche (2011) (a case over who is entitled to a patent between two potential patent holders) Gunn v. Minton (2013) (unanimous) (overruling Federal Circuit precedents which had held that federal courts have broad jurisdiction over claims of malpractice in attorney malpractice cases where the underlying malpractice involved patent law, while reviewing a Texas Supreme Court ruling). Thryv, Inc. v. Click-to-Call Technologies, LP (2020) (7-2), the Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit and held that the PTAB’s decision on whether a petition for inter partes review is timely is not judicially reviewable replying on Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, the United States Supreme Court decided an important aspect of procedure in IPR cases holding that once an inter partes review is instituted by the Director of the USPTO, the PTAB must decide the patentability of all of the claims challenged. A major case deciding the constitutionality of part of the AIA and the remedy if it is unconstitutional is pending in Arthrex which has had oral arguments but not decision on the merits yet. The AIA eliminated tax strategy patents (a case to resolve the issue had been pending when the legislative fix arrived).
Was/is it permissible for judges in the US to talk ex-parte like that? No. Ex parte interactions of that sort are not allowed. See, for instance, Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-732 (Dec. 18, 2020) and Maze v. Judicial Conduct Commission, 2019-SC-0691-RR (Dec. 17, 2020). An example of less recent decision but with a reporter citation number is Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bozeman, 302 So.3d 1217 (2020). For situations of imminent risk of irreparable harm, procedural law provides for ex parte motions and ex parte petitions, such as this granted petition for Personal Protection Order. See M[ichigan]CR 3.7003(G). But the scenarios you depict fall short of the necessity for which ex parte provisions are intended. do the above scenes in the movies essentially portray judicial misconduct? Yes. A judge's house is inappropriate for communicating, let alone ex parte, his ruling (I am not knowledgeable of the films but my understanding of your description is that that judge made the ruling on the application). As for The Untouchables, any evidence of jurors' &amp; judges' conflict of interest and likely bias has to be filed in court and comply with procedural law so that all parties have an opportunity to litigate the matter.
This is very, very weird. I've never heard of a case like this one. Is there some context that could explain why anyone would refile a divorce someplace new twelve years after getting divorced the first time around? The logical thing to do if Canadian civil procedure is at all analogous to U.S. civil procedure on this point, would be to have a Canadian lawyer file a motion in the Canadian divorce case to set aside the judgment on the extraordinary grounds that you were not married any longer at the time that the 2015 divorce was filed, seeking to set aside the 2015 case ruling. In most U.S. jurisdictions with civil procedural rules modeled on the federal rules of civil procedure (California's are not), this would be a motion under Rule of Civil Procedure 60, but obviously, the Canadian rule numbering would probably be different. Alternatively, if the home is in California, you could bring an action for declaratory judgment declaring that the Canadian judgment is invalid because it was brought in a divorce action between people who were already divorced and probably also lacked jurisdiction over you and the property. I'm not sure what you mean by CPL in this context. Normally, in a real estate context, a CPL would mean a "closing protection letter", but in the context you are using it, it sounds like you are referring to something akin to a lis pendens or a lien. Perhaps you mean a "certificate of pending litigation" which is another name of a lis pendens in at least some Canadian jurisdictions (but is terminology rarely used in the U.S.). This sounds like slander of title, or "abuse of process" or the filing of what is known as a spurious lien, any of which are actionable, but without knowing what a CPL actually is, it is hard to know.
To pick up on your comment 'Does this mean if I wish to build a chair for personal use, then since trade of chairs exists between states, Congress has the authority to outlaw possession or manufacturing of chairs?': Yes. For example, the US Congress can legislate to prohibit a farmer from growing wheat for use on his own farm, on the basis that there is interstate trade in wheat and therefore the Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate the growing of wheat: Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111. If you grow marijuana, or build a chair, or whatever, you conceivably affect the number of marijuanas, chairs, etc that are traded between states. Therefore you affect interstate commerce. Therefore the US Congress can regulate you. The fact that your marijuana or your chair or your what is trivial in the scheme of the national economy is irrelevant if the aggregation of all regulated marijuana, chairs or wheat is significant: 317 US 111, 127-128. If the law didn't prohibit possession of marijuana absolutely but instead prohibited, say, the carrying of marijuana in schools, then the US Congress might have trouble relying on the Commerce Clause: see United States v Lopez (1995) 514 US 549 and replace 'marijuana' with 'handguns' (OK the marijuana/handgun analogy is bad but hopefully this illustrates that there are at least some limits on Congress' power -- it's not just 'any physical object that relates whatsoever to interstate trade therefore unfettered federal legislative power').
The relevant section of US patent law was already posted in an answer on one of the questions you linked, but I'll repeat it: 35 USC 271 (a): Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent. Merely making a patented invention is infringement; it isn't relevant whether you sell it. It is also infringement if you use it yourself, regardless of who made it or whether you paid them, or whether you would have otherwise bought it from the patent holder. There are some special exceptions for things like certain kinds of pharmaceuticals, but I browsed the rest of 35 USC Chapter 28, and didn't see anything that would appear to be relevant in this case.
Congratulations, intrepid legal enthusiast or learner! What you'll need A legal dictionary, especially if you're just getting started. If you don't own one, you can try Black's Law Dictionary A little bit of patience and time. Or maybe a lot, depending on the particular case and the particular question you're trying to answer. Maybe a normal dictionary, too. Again, if you don't own one, there's plenty online. Onelook is a dictionary search engine, so it'll search a lot of dictionaries at the same time. Okay, I've got those things, now what? Alright, there's a few things you should know. Firstly, decisions of superior courts are binding only on those inferior courts within the same hierarchy. This means that you can appeal to a higher court so long as it has appellate jurisdiction. Generally, a state (meaning a country) will have a supreme or highest court, with appellate jurisdiction over all other courts - in Australia, this is the High Court of Australia, in the United States, this is the Supreme Court of the United States, and in the United Kingdom, this is the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom. Secondly, decisions of a court are generally binding only on the matter in dispute. For example, if in a case, the matter of whether the police owe a duty of care to citizens in detecting crime, a comment on whether the police had correctly parked their vehicle is not binding - it is called obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta). What we're looking for in a judgement is the ratio decidendi (plural rationes decidendi), which is the reason for the decision. This is what is binding, and would be considered in future decisions. The problem? It's not always easy to tell the ratio from the obiter. Finally, often, the only way to know whether our interpretation of a case is right is to see whether it is applied in a future case, or overruled. Examples, examples! Sure. Let's try something easy to start with. Do product manufacturers owe a duty of care to their customers? Yes. The decision in Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 found that product manufacturers - in this case, a ginger beer manufacturer - have a duty of care to ensure their products are safe for use or consumption. Lord Atkin said: The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. Okay, so the answer to this question is yes. How do I verify it? Get the source of the judgement. Without this, you're going to be relying on hearsay. The next best thing is a subsequent judgement that applies the one you're looking for, because if the judgement says what it's supposed to, it'll be mentioned in the subsequent judgement. I've found this one. Decide whether the matter in dispute is actually being decided. In our case, it is. But if I was quoting this from a judgement on whether product manufacturers have an obligation to transfer title for goods supplied on a credit agreement, it wouldn't be binding. Find the quote. If you've been given a quote. Otherwise, grab a cup of tea or coffee and get ready to read. A lot. If you can't find something that says, or means, what it's supposed to, it's probably not accurate. Make sure the judgement hasn't been overruled This is tricky, unless the judgement database you're using has a way of searching it. Most do. In any case, it's much like trying to prove a negative. In fact, it's exactly that. But always check whether the judgement has been overturned on appeal. Make sure the judgement hasn't been obsoleted by statute Again, this is tricky. It's proving a negative, again. And trying to find statute might be an answer for another time. Is that it? Pretty much, I think. These are at least the main points. There's a whole laundry list of things you shouldn't do with judgements, but they're more about reasoning than legal principles. It's a skill you can really only develop by using, and I'm constantly practising myself. Many discussions about cases are precisely about what their effect is. Yes, the decisions and orders are usually pretty clear-cut - for example, the decision is that the manufacturer has a duty of care, and the orders are for damages and costs to be paid. But what it means beyond that can be murky. Luckily for us, judges have become better at writing their judgements so that others can understand. Also, for more important cases, where the entire country, or world, is watching, others will interpret it for you - consider Obergefell v Hodges, for example. Not everyone can be trusted, but everyone, taken together, is a much more trustworthy source than just one person. In the end, there's not a mathematical formula for determining what judgements mean. There's some interpretation involved, some judgement. There's not always going to be one judgement that's enough to prove your matter. I'm struggling to end this post neatly so I'll just finish it with a cliff-
You need to check if the original game developers patented the mechanics/rules of the game. For your example, Monopoly was patented, but expired in the 50s and while it would not be a copyright violation to mimic the rules/mechanics, it would be a different intellectual property violation (patent infringement). Spry Fox vs LOLAPPS is also relevant as it extends copyright protection to the implementation of an idea, but ideas (like rules/mechanics) cannot, by themselves, be copyrighted. This means that there is an avenue for the original developer/company to sue even if the visual/audible aspects are different, but the overall gameplay is the same. Also see Tetris Holding LLC vs Xio Interactive Inc. as it relates to the visual aspect of the game.
Does this mean that if the employee leaves the company, and then creates or gain an intellectual property right, does the company own that right ? No. The reference to &quot;the future&quot; pertains only to the IPRs of inventions that ensued in the course of his employment. Even if the employer alleged that the clause also encompasses post-employment creations and/or post-employment acquisitions of IPR, such extension would be unconscionable (and therefore null and void).