Is a written promise relating to the “workmanship” of software and hardware components create an express warranty under Magnusson-Moss or U.C.C.? A U.S. auto manufacturer promises in writing that its vehicles will, for the life of their vehicles, receive free hydrogen at its charging stations. Bob buys such a vehicle. Turns out the vehicle communicates with the hydrogen wells, and commands them wirelessly or otherwise that it is entitled to initiate charging without a payment method setup associated with the VIN number or other ID of the vehicle. Turns out the vehicle, once coupled with a hydrogen well, runs computer executable instructions stored on the vehicle which will block the vehicle to open its tank for hydrogen to enter unless a payment method is added and then authenticated with the manufacturer wirelessly. The promise, although undisclosed in such detail, related to computer executable instructions which coupled with the vehicle which coupled with a hydrogen well, causes the tank of the vehicle to open and allow the pooring/blowing of hydrogen inside the vehicle. (It also communicates with the well to open ordinarily) The written promise was related to the workmanship of the vehicle in connection with its software and hardware components. Was a warranty created? Was a warranty created even if the manufacturer failed to clearly and in readily understood language disclose what it was going to do in case of malfunction or defect with the vehicle relating to its ability to cause a hydrogen well to open and start filling up? Is this a warranty?
A U.S. auto manufacturer promises in writing that its vehicles will, for the life of their vehicles, receive free hydrogen at its charging stations. . . . The written promise was related to the workmanship of the vehicle in connection with its software and hardware components. Was a warranty created? It sounds like there were two separate promises. A promise to provide free hydrogen (which is a contractual obligation, although not a warranty) which amounts to prepayment of hydrogen, and a warranty that the vehicle had adequate workmanship in software and hardware components. Was a warranty created even if the manufacturer failed to clearly and in readily understood language disclose what it was going to do in case of malfunction or defect with the vehicle relating to its ability to cause a hydrogen well to open and start filling up? Whether this is a breach of the agreement to provide free hydrogen, or a breach of the warranty agreement that the vehicle's recharging feature would work properly, or both, taken together it is a breach of contract by the automobile manufacturer. There were agreements, and taken as a whole, those agreements as reasonably interpreted in light of the intent of the parties and construing against the drafter of the agreements, were breached. Therefore, you should be entitled to the damages for breach of contract as measured by the benefit of the bargain test applicable to contracts. Most likely, repair of the defeat at the cost of the manufacturer and reimbursement of money you had to spend on hydrogen due to the defect.
Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).
It is cl;early not legal to charge for an optional warranty without ever having gotten approval for it. The customer could simply ask for a refund on teh ground that this was an error, and take it to small claims if that was refused. I am sure it is legal to offer such an optional warranty and point out its (alleged) benefits. I do not know if consumer law forbids making this pitch multiple times in the same selling encounter.
On the one hand, there are statutes that prohibit the delivery of instructions which distort or circumvent the official/intended use or safety of a device. For a somewhat related example of this, see MCL 750.540c(1)(3). On the other hand, the company/manufacturer is unlikely to prevail under contract law no matter how clearly and conspicuously its EULA prohibits the disclosure of discovered weaknesses. That is because the prohibition in the EULA is outweighed by the severe vulnerability to which all other unsuspecting customers are subjected. From the standpoint of public policy, people's awareness of the discovered vulnerability is certainly in the public's best interest. The disclosure will warn both (1) potential customers not to purchase a product that fails or misses its primary purpose, and (2) current customers to adopt precautions now that the product's reliability has been disproved. Thus, the effectiveness of broadcasting the discovery of such weakness is in stark contrast with the technical deficits and managerial politics that typically hinder a company's ability (or its will) to respond to the issue. If the weakness was known to the manufacturer prior to the disclosure, the release of that product would constitute fraudulent misrepresentation. The details of the demonstration in the video supports the argument that the manufacturer knew --or should have known-- about that weakness, since a padlock design is supposed to pass all kinds of tests of breakability and not be disabled by a screwdriver. It is hard to deny that the notion that "the padlock is secure" induces customers to purchase the product. As such, the misrepresentation violates the contract law principle that a contract --such as a purchase-- be entered knowingly. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts at § 161-167. With respect to the publisher of the weakness, that misrepresentation renders the EULA-prohibition void. See Restatement at § 164(1). Regardless of whether or not the manufacturer incurred misrepresentation, the manufacturer's decision to sue the publisher is only likely to backfire by bringing more attention to the poor design of the product. In all, the manufacturer's best option is to do a product recall ASAP and enhance the design.
"I contacted LG directly over the phone eight days ago, bypassing the retailer because I assumed they were off the hook after two years and ten months, and it should be the manufacturer assuming responsibility." Nope. In the EU (and Britain still is), the retailer is the only party with a legal warranty duty (at least 2 years, national law may deviate to the benefit of the customer). The manufacturer may offer any additional warranty, but even if they do that does not absolve the retailer. The UK does have a longer warranty period than the EU minimum if you can prove the product was faulty, but this is a reversed proof, and it still binds the retailer instead of the manufacturer.
Is a text message legally binding? Yes, but the terms of the message need to be clear enough to ascertain the parties' intent at the formation of that contract or agreement. A contract does not even need to be in writing. There are also oral contracts and implied contracts, the latter referring to contracts which are inferred from the parties' conduct. A contract such as the agreement you describe here is binding regardless of its form. It is just easier to prove the existence of a contract if it is in writing. You did not specify your jurisdiction. If it is in the US, the price tag --rather than the downpayment-- of the object of the contract (i.e., the puppy you intend to buy) determines whether your complaint would need to be filed in Small Claims court. Generally speaking, parties to a dispute in Small Claims court have to represent themselves. Two remarks are pertinent. First, developing writing skills is utmost important not only for litigating a dispute, but also during the process of formulating the terms and conditions of a contract/agreement. Your post indicates that you seriously need to work on that. Second, the end of your post reflects that one of your managers violated labor law(s), which to most of us would be more worrisome than the controversy about the puppy. Legislation in most or all jurisdictions outlaws the act of withholding an employee's compensation regardless of its form (salary, commissions, and so forth). You might want to gain acquaintance with the labor laws of your jurisdiction so you can assess whether or how to proceed (does legislation require the employee to "exhaust administrative remedies" prior to filing in court? are administrative remedies optional? do these exist at all?), even if only to ascertain whether the deadline for filing the corresponding claim has elapsed.
england-and-wales The government grants limited rights of return (thanks Jen), for which you are entitled to a cash or cash-like refund (e.g. reversal of a credit card charge as described below). The vendor has the option to go above and beyond that statutory minimum as a courtesy to the customer. In that non-compulsory zone, they have the liberty to offer store scrip rather than a cash refund. Of course, any business can try to cheat you, and then you have to stick up for your rights by insisting or reporting to relevant authorities. united-states If you buy with a credit card, the rules and contractual obligations of the credit card companies oblige the merchant to accept returns by doing a refund to the card. It's important to understand how this happens: the merchant isn't just picking an arbitrary amount of money and doing a new &quot;sale in reverse&quot;... they are identifying a specific past transaction that already happened, and modifying or reversing it. That is a system safeguard so they don't credit the wrong person or be tricked into a reversal on a transaction that never happened. That's why they want your receipt. On a cash transaction, it is sellers prerogative whether to issue cash or store credit. Issuing store scrip is a reasonable option to deter theft and fraud. For instance someone who wanted an item could get it for free, by buying the item, taking it home, returning the next day without the item, grab another identical item off the shelf and sneak over to the CS line and &quot;return&quot; it with yesterday's receipt. With cash sales, that would be completely untrackable, and the thief is gone. With credit card, they have your identity; with scrip they can &quot;flag&quot; the scrip in their system to either prevent its use and/or have a security officer detain you if you try to use it. For instance American home stores will cheerfully take re-saleable condition items back even without a receipt, but will issue a store voucher for the value rather than cash. That policy would be a disaster if they refunded cash. As it is, I find it rather convenient! So if you want the convenience of cash refunds, you can just use credit cards - gaining the feature at the expense of anonymity.
Can they have a clause in the fine print that in laymans terms just says 'we might just not fulfill our side of the deal'. That paraphrase appears to trivialize the actual terms of the contract (of which fine print you mention you don't know in detail). Germany's Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) at §262 entitles the shipping company --insofar as obligor-- to a choice of service, provided that the company duly informs the customer, Id. at §263. The latter section of the BGB is not explicit as to whether the obligor's notification ought to happen at the formation of the contract, although I am almost positive that that is so and is premised on the BGB itself. Since delivery at the post office and delivery at the home address are mutually exclusive (i.e., they preclude each other), by virtue of §262 the company may outline in the contract both alternatives and thereafter decide for one of these unilaterally. If the company makes its contractual [post office] alternative contingent on &quot;being too busy with other things&quot; and the customer proves that the company opted for post office despite not being that busy, the customer could prevail on grounds that the company contravened Treu und Glauben. See Id. at §162(2). The &quot;I will mow your lawn&quot; example you outline is not a good analogy. The shipping company may argue that, even if the product is not delivered at customer's home address, the customer still benefited by having to retrieve it from a location --such as a nearby post office-- that is closer from the location where the product was commercialized or manufactured. The customer would prevail only if delivery were at a location which is more inconvenient to him than if he discarded transacting with the shipping company. See Id. at § 226.