Given SCOTUS precedent, how do I legal counter specifically religious solicitation? (USA) USA Supreme Court has ruled that politicians, religious groups, the Girl Scouts and others have a constitutional right to go door-to-door promoting their causes without first getting permission from local officials. Banning door-to-door religious solicitation may violate rights of free speech, free exercise of religion and freedom of the press depending on the circumstances. It is noted that some religious groups knock on doors occupied by tenants and not occupied by the landlord. What then can a reasonable person, tenant or landlord do to protect their right to quiet enjoyment when religious solicitors selectively knock on the doors of private residences? Clearly, law favors and protects free exercise, so what are the possible solutions to peacefully counter the religious solicitors? Given the fact that the solicitors do not visit every house and selectively choose which door to knock, is there any law, case law, municipal code, ordinance that applied in this situation to convey to solicitors to keep out based on non-uniform business practices? Installing a gate/fence is not practical in this situation. Reporting to the police is not legally viable due to Supreme Court precedent.
California state law criminally restricts trespassing via Cal. Pen. 602.8(a): Any person who without the written permission of the landowner, the owner's agent, or the person in lawful possession of the land, willfully enters any lands under cultivation or enclosed by fence, belonging to, or occupied by, another, or who willfully enters upon uncultivated or unenclosed lands where signs forbidding trespass are displayed at intervals not less than three to the mile along all exterior boundaries and at all roads and trails entering the lands, is guilty of a public offense. However, subdivision (c) states exceptions, that this does not apply to: ...(2) Any person on the premises who is engaging in activities protected by the California or United States Constitution. (There are other exceptions for process-servers, surveyors, and labor union activities). Additionally, anyone who remains on property after having been told to go away is guilty of trespass: simple entering when there is a no-trespassing sign is allowed in the case of religious or political canvassing. So at the state level, a division is made between protected activities (First Amendment issues) and non-protected ones (Commerce Clause issues), where criminal trespass is not applicable to religious or political solicitations. Aliso Viejo limits canvassing thusly: No person shall enter upon any residence or place of business and ring the doorbell, or rap or knock upon any door, or create any sound in any other manner calculated to attract the attention of any occupant of such premises, for the purpose of securing an audience with the occupant and engaging in peddling, solicitation or canvassing in defiance of a notice described in subsection (C) of this section. and subsection (c) says: Notice by the owners or occupants of any residence or place of business of their unwillingness to receive any uninvited peddlers, solicitors, canvassers, or handbills shall be given by displaying a weatherproof card, decal, or sign easily seen from the public right-of-way or the normal entryway to a house or dwelling. The notice must be placed upon or near the main entrance door to the residence or place of business and must state: “No Solicitors,” or words to that effect, with the letters at least one inch high. Solicitors and peddlers, but not canvassers, are also required to have a license. By their definitions, solicitors request things of value, and peddlers engage in commerce: canvassers engage in First Amendment protected activities, including disseminating commercial information (but not making sales). Violation of the code is punished variably, basically at the discretion of the prosecutor (there being a choice between infraction and misdemeanor dispositions). The Santa Monica police say that "There are many legitimate organizations that solicit door-to-door, either to sell products and services or to promote a religious, political or charitable cause. However, there are also a growing number of individuals who illegally solicit with the purpose of committing fraud. So when someone knocks at your door, ask the person to produce the required license before he/she begins a sales pitch". The implication is that you have to have a license to engage in "canvassing", which is almost guaranteed to be incorrect (First Amendment thing). The Santa Monica Code says in 6.32.040 that "Every person engaged in soliciting, canvassing, taking orders or peddling of goods, wares, merchandise or services shall pay a license fee in accordance with Section 6.12.010(a) of this Code" (that section however does not demand a fee for activities not generating money, i.e. political and religious disseminations). Santa Monica also limits door to door operations via a signage ordinance: No solicitation or peddling shall be conducted at any place of residence in the City where any sign prohibiting trespassing or solicitation has been posted or displayed. If the sign posted or displayed limits the hours of trespassing or solicitation, no solicitation or peddling shall be conducted at any place of residence in the City during the time period posted or displayed It is of interest that the signage ordinance does not mention canvassing (and canvassing is not defined), but the license law does. So in terms of legal prohibitions, it depends on municipality, and perhaps interpretation of local ordinances. Of course, one can always put up a sign saying "No Religious Solicitations" and hope that persuades the person, and one can sue for damages, if there are arguably any damages. "Do Not Disturb" might be more effective. SCOTUS noted in Martin v. City of Struthers that "Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed to depend upon the will of the individual master of each household, and not upon the determination of the community" and ruled that Struthers may not "make this decision for all its inhabitants" (on First Amendment grounds). Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell addressed a licensing requirement (struck down as overly vague and broad) that covered canvassing, and said A municipality has the power to enforce reasonable door-to-door soliciting and canvassing regulations to protect its citizens from crime and undue annoyance. The Court has consistently recognized that a narrowly drawn ordinance that does not vest in municipal officials the undefined power to determine what residents will hear or see may serve these interests consistent with the First Amendment so a license requirement for religious canvassers could be consistent with the SCOTUS stance: if it is narrowly tailored. Subsequently, in Watchtower v. Stratton, the court stated (regarding a licensing requirement) that § 107 of the ordinance, which provides for the posting of "No Solicitation" signs and which is not challenged in this case, coupled with the resident's unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling listener A "No Solicitation" sign then has the desired effect: it is legal to make it illegal to solicit in the presence of a No Soliciting sign. The specific ordinance was not narrowly tailored (to "preventing fraud"); requiring a surrender of anonymity. Other cases such as Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 have overturned anti-solicitation laws as not being narrowly tailored: for instance, solicitations too early in the morning or too late at night are constitutional; and in general, a sign by the owner means "keep out", and the first amendment does not overrule private property rights. It is unlikely that any ordinance mandating "uniform business practices" would survive; the concept is too vague and unlimited, and would be a significant burden on any business. And, of course, religions have constitutional protections that businesses lack.
There is no law against lying in these circumstances. In fact, for a very modest sum, security companies sell dummy CCTV cameras to make this lie more convincing. However, trespass only happens if people have been warned so this works for literate people who speak English and see the sign. That leaves a very large group of people who would not be trespassing even with the sign. A further problem with a sign on the house is that people have no idea how far away they have to get in order to stop trespassing. In addition, legitimate visitors (uninvited or not) are not trespassers. It seems that people are coming onto your property because they are thirsty. A better way to deal with this is go to your local hardware store and replace the tap with a vandal proof tap that has a removable head. Keep that inside and put a sign next to the tap saying "Refrigerated Water $2 - knock on front door".
The only real answer is that the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the constitution, and specifically the argument that the 13th Amendment prohibits a draft for compelled military services has totally rejected that argument. For many years now the US has not used a draft, and it is obviously possible for the US to have an enduring and powerful military without any draft, which was perhaps not apparent to the Justices in 1918. A draft had been common in this country from the colonial period, through the Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. In reaction to the problems during the Vietnam War, and the great opposition to any draft at that time, the US has not used a draft since, although it retains a legal requirement to register for a possible draft, and the legal authority to impose one should it be thought wise. Note that this was not because of the 13th Amendment. Note also that compelled service by the citizens (or residents) in a locality, particularly to fight fires and floods, when the usual forces are inadequate to that end, has been commonly used. Such compulsory service has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th Amendment. Also, as mentioned in comments, citizens can be compelled to do jury duty, which could in theory be considered &quot;involuntary servitude&quot; but has never been thought to be prohibited by the 13th amendment. The answer by Trish (now deleted) thoroughly described the many differences between a slave and a drafted soldier. Still, drafted military service might be thought to be a form of involuntary servitude. But the Court (and the laws and other courts as well) have not treated it as such. In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) the Court thought the idea that compulsory military service constituted involuntary servitude was so wrongheaded that it thought a very brief mention sufficient to refute this contention. It wrote (at 245 U. S. 390): Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement. It is clear from the text of that opinion that the justices thought that the existence of a power to draft soldiers was essential to the implementation of the constitutional power (article I section 8): To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; The opinion discusses the history of compelled military service in the United States, in the colonies before there was a United States, and in Great Britain before that. The opinion says that: Compelled military service is neither repugnant to a free government nor in conflict with the constitutional guaranties of individual liberty. Indeed, it may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the right of the government to compel it. and Further, it is said, the right to provide is not denied by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot include the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertion is in no substantial sense a power. One may disagree, but that is the law of the land as interpreted by the final body authorized to make such interpretations, the Supreme Court, and it remains good law today.
Under 42 USC 2000a(a): All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin. So a business may be generally prohibited from discriminating against you on the basis of your religion, but I don't know of any law that requires stores to accommodate whatever aversion or hostility you may feel toward gay people or their allies. On the contrary, such businesses have a First Amendment right to display such decor. So legislation that required them to stop speaking out in support of nice gay people would be struck down as unconstitutional.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. One can be served according to the state law or: (2) doing any of the following: (A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized None of those would apply to your facts. Thus you would have to find some jurisdiction that would allow service of process under your fact. I dare say that none will and that due process would come into play. In NJ, due process applies and service may be made (1) Upon a competent individual of the age of 14 or over, by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the individual's dwelling place or usual place of abode with a competent member of the household of the age of 14 or over then residing therein, or by delivering a copy thereof to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on the individual's behalf; It has to be the current place of abode.
This depends on the nature of the "ban" ---i.e., who issued it, what legal power they have, and what it actually requires you to refrain from doing. You say it is "their ban" so I am going to assume that this is just a decision that the store has made not to allow you entry. If it is indeed the store itself that has "banned" you, this would not prevent you from calling them to apologise for whatever you did. Calling a business on the phone cannot generally be considered a trespass --- at most, if you were to repeatedly call and harass a business over and over again, it might give rise to a nuisance suit. Unless you have extremely strange laws in your jurisdiction, it is almost certainly not against the law for you to call a business that has banned you, a fortiori if this phone call is made for the purposes of apologising for whatever you did that led to the ban. Although it does not appear to be the situation in this case, if this ban was an actual restraining order of some kind issued by a Court, then it might indeed prevent you from contacting the business (in which case breaching it would lead to an action for contempt of court, not trespass). If a Court were to issue you with an injunction or restraining order of some kind to ban you from a business, then that instrument would specify what you are prevented from doing. You would then need to be very careful to comply with that order. In short: there is a great deal of difference between a "ban" made by a store as the owner of property, and a ban issued by a court through an injunction or restraining order.
The First Amendment is never interpreted as a complete prohibition against laws that could affect a religion, nor is it interpreted to mean that you can say or write anything whatsoever that you want. You cannot sacrifice humans when in the name of a religion, and you cannot sacrifice (murder) humans for fun. One part of the First Amendment regarding religion is the Free Exercise clause which says that you cannot prohibit the exercise of a religion, and another, the Establishment Clause, prohibits favoring a religion, or favoring religion over atheism. The clauses about free speech also do not mean that you can commit fraud and you cannot threaten people's lives. What decides how far the government can go is &quot;strict scrutiny&quot;, a doctrine that limits the extent to which the government can infringe on fundamental rights – First Amendment rights are the canonical example of a fundamental right. The main hurdle that a law so scrutinized has to pass is that the law is necessary for a compelling government interest. Preventing massive deaths is generally seen as such an interest. Then, the law has to be narrowly tailored to affect &quot;just those cases&quot;, and it has to be the lest restrictive means of accomplishing that end. Although the prevention of massive deaths is a compelling government interest, a government might screw this up in their legal arguments, as they seem to have done in Capitol Hill Baptist Church v. Bowser, where mass political protests were allowed but smaller religious meetings were prohibited. The government essentially &quot;waived&quot; that compelling interest, replacing it with an interest in preventing church meetings, which is plainly a violation of the First Amendment – they substantially burdened religious practices.
There are exemptions, and "justifications", in 24 CFR 100. The exemption is 100.10: (c) Nothing in this part, other than the prohibitions against discriminatory advertising, applies to: (1) The sale or rental of any single family house by an owner, provided the following conditions are met: (i) The owner does not own or have any interest in more than three single family houses at any one time. (ii) The house is sold or rented without the use of a real estate broker, agent or salesperson or the facilities of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings. So such a restriction could be allowed if e.g. you live in the house and rent only a few rooms, or a single family home marketed and managed in the right way. There is also an exemption for religious organizations and private clubs allowing rental to members only. 100.500 lays the groundwork for disparate impact hot water. It says: (a) A practice has a discriminatory effect where it actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin. So only renting to students in a particular seminary would most likely have a disparate impact. There is, however, the possibility of justifying the policy, following 100.500: (b) (1) A legally sufficient justification exists where the challenged practice: (i) Is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3612, or defendant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or 3614; and (ii) Those interests could not be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. (2) A legally sufficient justification must be supported by evidence and may not be hypothetical or speculative. The burdens of proof for establishing each of the two elements of a legally sufficient justification are set forth in paragraphs (c)(2) and (c)(3) of this section. So let's say that the offended party has made the case that the practice will have a discriminatory effect, then the accused can set forth the aforementioned justification: (c)(2) Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant. (c3)(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the charging party or plaintiff may still prevail upon proving that the substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect. The crux of the matter is having a "substantial, legitimate nondiscriminatory interest", i.e. why would you want to rent to only seminary students.