Why was Judge Jacksons ruling in DoJ vs Microsoft overturned in the anti-trust hearing of 2001? In United States vs Microsoft, a 2001 anti-trust case in which the DoJ, 18 states and the District of Columbia alleged that Microsoft had abused its monopoly position was heard by Judge Jackson and he found for the plaintiffs and ordered the company to be broken into two separate units. However, the judgement was overturned on appeal with the appeal judge accusing Judge Jackson of unethical behaviour to which Judge Jackson replied that Microsoft executives had proved, time and time again, to be inaccurate, misleading, evasive and transparently false ... Microsoft is a company with an institutional disdain for both the truth and for rules of law that lesser entities must respect. It is also a company whose senior executives are not averse to offering specious testimony to support spurious defenses to claims of wrong-doing. Q. Given that his findings of fact were not overturned why was Judge Jacksons original ruling overturned by the appeals court?
First of all, the case US v Microsoft was originally a 1998 case, not 2001. Jackson entered his judgment in June 2000. Microsoft appealed timely. It went from Jackson's district court, straight to the Supreme Court, using 15 U.S.C. §29(b), and the Supreme court issued 530 US 1301. While the states filed for being heard, the Supreme Court declined them, remanding the whole case back to the lower courts. In No. 00-139, direct appeal [to the Supreme Court] is denied, and case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Clerk is directed to issue the judgment forthwith. In No. 00-261 [the request of the states to be heard], certiorari before judgment is denied. The case thus went to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, and due to the time it takes to schedule, became a 2000 case. The court noticed, that while Jackson was still on the case he had given interviews about it: The Court of Appeals held that: [...] (6) district judge’s comments to the press while the case was pending required his disqualification on remand. Immediately after the District Judge entered final judgment on June 7, 2000, accounts of interviews with him began appearing in the press. Some of the interviews were held after he entered final judgment. (p.107) Microsoft urges the District Judge’s disqualification under § 455(a): a judge ‘‘shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The standard for disqualification under § 455(a) is an objective one. The question is whether a reasonable and informed observer would question the judge’s impartiality. (p.114) Our application of Liljeberg leads us to conclude that the appropriate remedy for the violations of § 455(a) is disqualification of the District Judge retroactive only to the date he entered the order breaking up Microsoft. We therefore will vacate that order in its entirety and remand this case to a different District Judge, but will not set aside the existing Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law (except insofar as specific findings are clearly erroneous or legal conclusions are incorrect). (p.116) When Jackson gave the interviews, he violated the Code of Conduct for judges because the appeals process was not yet complete and he was still on the case. As such, he created the image, that he might not be impartial: Canon 3A(6). The admonition against public comment about the merits of a pending or impending matter continues until the appellate process is complete. If the public comment involves a case from the judge’s own court, the judge should take particular care so that the comment does not denigrate public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and impartiality, which would violate Canon 2A. A judge may comment publicly on proceedings in which the judge is a litigant in a personal capacity, but not on mandamus proceedings when the judge is a litigant in an official capacity (but the judge may respond in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 21(b)). Jackson did not appear as he was to be heard in the Circuit Court. As shown above, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals found, he did violate the code of conduct and disqualified him under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). While this did suffice to overturn the verdict prescribed by Jackson, the court did not throw out the findings of fact that had been issued well before the interviews and noted that the traditional setup might be inadequate for this case. They remanded back to a different judge to decide a remedy under a different scope. The case didn't end there, Microsoft attempted to get even the findings of fact thrown out based on the very ruling that sent it back for remand, claiming that the judge had shown to be biased way earlier, during the trial and before the finding of facts. They did so by appealing a second time to the Supreme Court in August 2001 but the court rejected to hear the case in October. In the end, DoJ and Microsoft settled in November 2001, the settlement was accepted by the District Court in 2002, and affirmed by the appeals court in 2004, as some states didn't want that one.
Your assumptions are incorrect. Courts allow oral arguments (when they do allow them) so that attorneys have a chance to better address a judge's concerns. The idea is that it lets an attorney not only present the core of his case, but it also lets him address any problems with his reasoning that the judge may have or help the judge explore a complicated question. Without that all you have is the back-and-forth in writing with opposing counsel, which is useful, but may not actually address the issues that are important to the judge. There is some difference in how you present arguments on paper as opposed to in oral argument, but the distinction is largely one of style rather than substance. An argument that is great on paper is still great when presented out loud, you just present it differently because you are presenting it in a different medium. For example, you have to present oral argument with the assumption that the judge may interrupt you at any time to ask a question they are interested in, derailing your entire pre-planned argument into a tangential point the judge considers important. This is great because it lets you address what the judge is concerned about, but it requires a different preparation and some changes to the format of your argument. For example, while you will front-load both oral and written arguments with a roadmap, both your roadmap and your first sentence are much more important in oral argument.
The law is really bad at protecting whistleblowers From my understanding of US law, this is not unauthorised access to a computer: the reporter made a legitimate request to a remote computer, that computer provided data,the reporter accessed the supplied data on their own computer. However, pointing out the failures of people in power is fraught even if it is not illegal. It is certainly within the Governor’s power to authorise an investigation of the reporter. On the face of the law, it seems reasonable to suspect that what was done might be a violation so there is nothing legally wrong with initiating an investigation. I suspect that such a broad interpretation of the law would fall foul of the First Amendment which may partly explain why it wasn’t prosecuted: the government doesn’t want to find out. Similarly they can issue press releases, which, due to the First Amendment, don’t have to be true, just not defamatory. Saying it’s a possible violation is true and not defamatory. Saying the reporter was an evil person who is only doing this for political purposes is a statement of opinion and not defamatory. It’s a fact of the world that people with power can use that power in ways that are malicious, unethical, and unfair but not necessarily illegal.
Perjury is not 'not telling the truth'. It requires (in most jurisdictions) being proven to have deliberately lied under oath. As Xavier pointed out, you are not on oath when entering a plea (among other reasons, you would be required to incriminate yourself). Secondly, "I am not guilty" could mean anything from "the prosecution wrongly think that what I did is illegal" to "this law is unconstitutional" even if the facts are not in dispute; either may be mistaken without being a lie. If the facts are in dispute, the jury will have to deliver a verdict that implies (it does not state, let alone prove) that they disbelieve one party; deliberate falsehood, whether by a defendant or a police officer, would be several steps beyond that.
Yes it affects them. Judges are pursuing their vocation as a career and there are career paths within the judicial system just as there are in every other career. Screw up too many times and your career ends at your present level. Judges are also professionals and most take professional pride in doing their jobs well. Having a decision overturned is professionally embarrassing. As a matter of public policy, there is no sanction that is directly applied to the judge otherwise judges would be too cautious to make decisions. Anyone who makes professional decisions will get them wrong from time to time - they generally are not punished. That said there are judicial errors that stem from making the wrong judgement (so to say) call and judicial errors that stem from royally screwing up. The former are far less damaging than the latter. For an example of the former, a judge is applying a relatively new statute for which there have been no other decisions and interprets the legislation in a reasonable way but one the appeal court disagrees with. For an example of the latter, deciding the matter on a basis which neither party put before the court and which the judge did not draw to the parties attention during the trial - as a common law country, the New Zealand legal system is adversarial: the court exists to decide the dispute between the parties on the basis the parties argue, not to go on a "frolic of its own". In addition, appeal courts can only overrule a decision if the judge has made an error of law, not if they have made an error of fact. A judge is allowed to be wrong about the facts but not about the law. In practice, the distinction is not trivial. In a jury trial, the jury decides the facts, the judge decides the law - appeals can only be on the basis of what the judge did, not on the basis of what the jury did (barring egregious misconduct by the jury). In a judge only trial the judge decides both but an appeal can only be on matters of law.
A party to a civil suit in a US court generally has wide latitude on discovery. If it is not completely implausible that one of those text messages might contain something helpful to the other side, then they might well be able to demand and obtain them. This would be true even if Jan has no plans to use any of them. If Jane thinks that there is something in some of those messages which should not be disclosed, she could, normally with the advice of hr lawyer, file a motion to limit discovery in some way. Whether there is good grounds for such a motion will depend on very specific details of the facts, and is beyond the scope of an answer at this forum. It is true that Jane is only required to produce the messages if the judge in the case has in fact ordered this. It would be highly unethical for Jane's lawyer Arnold to lie to here about this. If he did so and got caught, it might cost him his license to practice law, plus additional penalties. If Jane seriously suspects that he is outright lying to her, and colluding with the opposing party, she needs to take steps to confirm or disprove this, or if she can do neither, to obtain a different lawyer.
If Bob acknowledges how he has altered the evidence at the time he submits it, there shouldn't be any issues with it turning into falsification, which generally only becomes a problem when it's done with an intent to mislead the court. More likely, an opposing party would raise an authenticity objection, i.e, that the evidence has been altered and is therefore not trustworthy. It's probably going to be up to the judge whether to sustain that objection or not, and I'd expect the court's decision to turn in large part on how plausible it finds Bobs allegations of fraud and retaliation. I'd also expect that the Court would be less concerned with the pitch alteration than the redaction of portions of the recording. If we don't know what Bob is saying, it makes it hard to understand the full context of the conversation. Of course, all of this assumes that Bob hasn't already been forced to turn over the original recordings to Company, which he will be. The parties have a right to each other's evidence, and they are required to identify their witnesses to each other. The moment Company knows about the recording, it is going to submit a discovery request demanding a copy, and Bob will be obligated to comply. If Bob objects that doing so would expose the representatives to retaliation, I would expect the court to warn Company against tampering with witnesses and then order Bob to comply with his discovery obligations.
This wouldn't be customary and is probably improper, but the judge may have been trying to do you a favor. In the absence of being under oath, the judge could not consider anything said in your closing statement as evidence. If you are under oath, the judge can weigh something you say in your closing statement against the other evidence when making a ruling.