What are the formal requirements to cite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in U.S. courts? I understand that there has been no attempt to broaden protections subject to civil rights in the U.S. on the grounds of human rights so there is likely no example for such a reference, but U.S. courts probably see UDHR references in immigration cases, and I would be curious to see how that looks. My understanding is that the UDHR is a multilateral agreement which may or may not be binding on the U.S. absent necessary authority to enter into it in a binding fashion. I also understand that similar international treaties and other pacts will be cited in the U.S. in, for example, the following format: “Treaty title, Parties (if applicable), date of signature, treaty source designation, optional treaty source | pinpoint reference (date of entry into force and optional information).“ — https://guides.library.ubc.ca/legalcitation/intlaw A cite, according to my research in the matter, would, for example, look like this: Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries, United States and Canada, 10 September 1954, Can TS 1955 No 19, 6 UST 2836 (entered into force 11 October 1955). How would the international treaty of, say, Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights look like in a U.S. complaint or elsewhere wherever it may be deemed binding law? Are there any case laws that specifically outrule that U.S. courts be bound by the legal cornerstones of the UDHR? Any for the opposite?
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not self-executing and may not be applied in U.S. courts as binding law. See, e.g., Barbara Macgrady, Note, Resort to International Human Rights Law in Challenging Conditions in U.S. Immigration Detention Centers, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 271, 300 (1997) (&quot;Since Congress has made its intent clear [by adopting NSE declarations], it is certain that the courts will not enforce these treaties in a domestic action.&quot;). See also this 1999 Yale Law Review Article. Sometimes these treaties and declarations are cited by parties in litigation, but these are always losing arguments. These arguments are made to encourage diplomatic pressure and generate PR, not to convince U.S. judges to rule in their favor. Also keep in mind that the U.S. takes the minority position that an ordinary domestic statute that conflicts with an earlier adopted Senate ratified treaty overrides the earlier adopted Senate ratified treaty. Almost no other country in the world takes this extreme position. See generally here (general background on treaties as U.S. law). The citation form for Article 3 this document under the prevailing &quot;Bluebook&quot; standard is Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), Art. 3. The link also provides citation forms for other common international human rights treaties in Bluebook form. But this would generally be used in law review articles and the like rather than in legal briefing in the courts.
Different jurisdictions have different laws about arbitration and there can be a distinction between domestic and international arbitration. Notwithstanding, most jurisdictions use the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as the basis for their domestic law so there is a lot of commonality between jurisdictions. 1. Can I be compelled to arbitrate? No, arbitration requires the agreement of all parties to the dispute. However, you may have given your consent to arbitration when you entered a contract or agreed to terms and conditions; if so, then that agreement is binding and you will be required to arbitrate. If a matter for which there is a valid arbitration agreement is nevertheless brought before a court, a party can argue that the proper venue is arbitration and the court will almost certainly agree and refuse to hear the case. Arbitration agreements are subject to what is called the "severability" principle which means that they remain binding even if the contract they are contained in is ultimately found to be void. So it remains within the power of an arbitrator appointed by a contract to validly decide the contract that appointed them is void. 2. If I don't think the tribunal has jurisdiction, what can I do? You make submissions to the arbitration tribunal on jurisdiction and they are required to consider if they have it or not. This is the "competence-competence" principle: an arbitrator is competent to decide if they are competent to hear the dispute. Depending on the size of the matter, the tribunal may rule on their competence in the final decision or issue an interim ruling. If a party thinks the tribunal has wrongly decided they do or don't have jurisdiction then they can, within the limited time usually allowed, ask the court to review the decision - in the meantime the arbitration continues. 3. If I disagree with the award, what can I do? Not a lot. Arbitration is intended to be a final and binding method of dispute resolution. Because, unlike a court summons, it was agreed to by all the parties (see above), the legal attitude is "you made your bed, you lie in it". Article 34 provides that a court can set aside the decision for: incapacity in the arbitration agreement. Since the arbitration agreement is itself a contract it can be void for all the same reasons a contract can (see What is a contract and what is required for them to be valid?) that you weren't told about the arbitration that the dispute is outside the scope of the arbitration agreement that the arbitration tribunal wasn't composed as agreed the matter is not subject to settlement by arbitration by law (e.g. workplace disputes are often excluded from arbitration) the award is against public policy (e.g. the award requires illegality) Article 35 provides that a court can refuse to enforce an award for all of the reasons above plus if a court has set the decision aside under Article 34. Appeals are rarely allowed and even more rarely successful. For example, stats from the UK under s68 and s69 of their domestic Act (equivalent to Article 34 and 35 respectively) indicate that success rates for challenges are about 3%.
united-states In the US, such an IOU may be grounds for suit The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) which has been enacted (with minor variations) in every UIS staye, governs such matters. UCC § 3-104 provides that: (a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), &quot;negotiable instrument&quot; means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it: (a)(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder; (a)(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and (a)(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money UCC § 3-106 provides that: (a) Except as provided in this section, for the purposes of Section 3-104(a), a promise or order is unconditional unless it states (i) an express condition to payment, (ii) that the promise or order is subject to or governed by another record, or (iii) that rights or obligations with respect to the promise or order are stated in another record. A reference to another record does not of itself make the promise or order conditional. UCC § 3-108 provides that: (a) A promise or order is &quot;payable on demand&quot; if it (i) states that it is payable on demand or at sight, or otherwise indicates that it is payable at the will of the holder, or (ii) does not state any time of payment. Thus it appears that the IOU described in the question would be a negotiable instrument under the UCC. Since it has no specified date, it is treated as payable on demand, in the absence of any specific language to the contrary. UCC § 3-301 provides that: &quot;Person entitled to enforce&quot; an instrument means (i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to Section 3-309 or 3-418(d). A person may be a person entitled to enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument or is in wrongful possession of the instrument. UCC § 3-303 provides that: (a) An instrument is issued or transferred for value if: ... (3) the instrument is issued or transferred as payment of, or as security for, an antecedent claim against any person, whether or not the claim is due; Thus the person to whom the IOU was originally given would be entitled to enforce it, assuming it had not been negotiated to some other person. The IOU w3as security for the loan, and thus was issued for value, and is binding. UCC § 3-501 provides that: a) &quot;Presentment&quot; means a demand made by or on behalf of a person entitled to enforce an instrument (i) to pay the instrument made to the drawee or a party obliged to pay the instrument or, in the case of a note or accepted draft payable at a bank, to the bank, or (ii) to accept a draft made to the drawee. UCC § 3-502 provides that: (a) Dishonor of a note is governed by the following rules: (1) If the note is payable on demand, the note is dishonored if presentment is duly made to the maker and the note is not paid on the day of presentment. A note that has been dishonored may be sued on to enforce payment. The specific procedures, and what courts such a suit may be brought in, will vary significantly by state. Not all states have smal claims courts, and those that do have significant differences in what cased they will hear.
WWII Supreme Court Cases During WWII, the Supreme Court dealt with three main issues in their cases on Executive Order 9066: curfews, exclusions, and internment of persons with Japanese ancestry. In the lesser-known Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States case, the court had to determine whether imposing a curfew on those of Japanese descent was valid. The main constitutional issue ended up being the effectiveness of the Fifth Amendment in providing for due process of law in times of war. In the end, the court decided that a curfew was indeed justified. Following this, the majority of the court found in Korematsu v. United States, that the exclusion of those with Japanese ancestry from certain military zones (in this case, the West coast) was also constitutional. In their decision, they heavily relied upon the Hirabayashi case. The question of internment of people with Japanese ancestry was not actually decided constitutionally. Another case, a habeas corpus case, Ex parte Endo might have resolved it, but the Court concluded this case in favor of Endo without going to the constitutional level. A day before this decision was announced, the government suspended Executive Order 9066, leaving the question unresolved. In these cases, Justice Frank Murphy's opinions stand out. In Hirabayashi, he sternly warned of the racism involved, but felt that the curfew was indeed justified. However, in Korematsu, he evidently felt that the exclusion was without basis and dissented, calling the majority opinion &quot;legalization of racism.&quot; Current Law In theory, these cases still stand. This is because they haven't been explicitly overruled, and the changes to the constitution since Hirabayashi aren't relevant: Amendments XXII and XXV have to do with procedural issues with the office of the President, amendments XXIII, XIV, and XXVI are related to voting rights, and XXVII addresses Congressional salaries. The constitution for the purpose of a similar order is thus unchanged, and so should theoretically be covered under Korematsu &amp; Hirabayashi. However, its effective status as precedent is shaky. For one, it has been widely condemned, and courts would likely avoid using Korematsu &amp; Hirabayashi if possible, or attempt to make a distinction from them given a slightly different order. Second, the convictions against Korematsu and Hirabayashi were overturned in the 1980s based on evidence being possibly concealed by the government. This was confirmed by the Department of Justice in 2011. However, this is an error of fact, and as such the ratio decidendi (legal reasoning) used would still technically stand as precedent. Lengthy Update: The Supreme Court has since declared Korematsu incorrect in Trump v. Hawaii. However in doing so, the court explicitly distinguished the two cases. Thus, many consider the declaration to be obiter dictum, i.e. an aside that is non-precedential. I'll quote the relevant portion so that readers may decide for themselves: Finally, the dissent invokes Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944). Whatever rhetorical advantage the dissent may see in doing so, Korematsu has nothing to do with this case. The forcible relocation of U.S. citizens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on the basis of race, is objectively unlawful and outside the scope of Presidential authority. But it is wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission. [...] The dissent's reference to Korematsu, however, affords this Court the opportunity to make express what is already obvious: Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—&quot;has no place in law under the Constitution.&quot; Additionally further muddying the issue is that the judgment directly moves from referencing Korematsu to referencing concentration camps. But as noted above, Korematsu dealt with exclusion, not internment in concentration camps as is often popularly believed (though Murphy's &amp; Roberts's dissents dispute the distinction so the Trump v. Hawaii judgment may implicitly be validating this). Korematsu paragraph 20: It is said that we are dealing here with the case of imprisonment of a citizen in a concentration camp solely because of his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty and good disposition towards the United States. Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprisonment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. Regardless of the true nature of the assembly and relocation centers—and we deem it unjustifiable to call them concentration camps with all the ugly connotations that term implies—we are dealing specifically with nothing but an exclusion order. Future Challenges If another such order occurred, it would almost certainly reach the Supreme Court. The Court would then have to adhere to, reconcile with, or overrule Korematsu &amp; Hirabayashi. In Hirabayashi, the following key piece of reasoning was given (and quoted in Korematsu): Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry, we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be taken to guard against it. Regardless of personal beliefs, it is hard to argue the logic behind this particular statement (mainly because it is so broad, in my opinion). However, these &quot;prompt and adequate measures&quot; would still have to be weighed against the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, we now have a historical example of what may happen if race-based exclusion were allowed, and this could inform the justices' decision. A completely different way that such an order could be ruled unconstitutional could be through separation of powers violations. It could be ruled that Congress cannot constitutionally delegate the powers expressed in Executive Order 9066, but this is rare. It was mentioned in Hirabayashi, but the court did not consider this issue, saying that since Congress agreed with the order, this point was moot. Conclusion Though the letter of the law suggests that another order like Executive Order 9066 is possible, in practice it would face significant hurdles. Such an order would likely face challenges based on the Fifth Amendment and almost certainly make its way to SCOTUS. Then, it would be up to them to decide. I'll end with this quote from the late Justice Antonin Scalia: Well, of course, Korematsu was wrong [...] But you are kidding yourself if you think the same thing will not happen again.
Does a treaty have to be compatible with the US constitution to be implemented? Yes. A treaty that is incompatible with the U.S. Constitution is void to the extent it is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (&quot;The treaty is . . . a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate the Constitution of the United States.&quot;); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 620 (1870) (&quot;It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument.&quot;); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (&quot;It would not be contended that [the treaty power] extends so far as to authorize what the constitution forbids.&quot;); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (&quot;The treaty-making power of the United States . . . does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.’&quot;) (quoting De Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (&quot;This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty.&quot;).
Someone has pulled a sample motion of this type off of PACER (the public access Internet portal to civil filings in federal court). The example is more formal and structured than a lot of state court motion practice would be, however (e.g. few state court's require or encourage motions with a table of contents and a table of authorities). This example is 36 pages long, and many states don't even allow motions to run for more than 10-15 pages without leave of the court to do so in advance. There is a New Jersey federal court example here which is also on the formal and fussy side (although, in part, because the motion isn't just an arbitration motion and is also raising several additional unrelated issues which if omitted would cut it in half). See also one here. Another example, from a California state court, is closer to the mark for a typical state court filing. A court that handles residential landlord-tenant matters is probably even more &quot;casual&quot; and probably expects motions to get to the point more quickly. The core content is probably solid, although it would have to be customized to reference the state law statutory and procedural rules rather than the federal rules of civil procedure, and to analyze and set forth the facts of your case rather than those of some random person whose pleading is linked. This would also have to be adopted to state court practice standard, which typically uses different formatting for captions, signature blocks, whether or not line numbering is required, etc., and is often subject to other requirements. Some require that a certificate of service be filed as a separate document, while others routinely incorporate it in the main document. Many state courts require that a proposed order be submitted with a motion as a matter of state or local court rules, a few states require a cover sheet to be filed with motions, many states require you to confer with the other side in the case and to recite their position opposing or supporting the motion, or something in between, before filing it, and some courts require you to notify them once the deadline for a response has passed, regarding whether an opposition has been filed to the motion's request for relief or not. Similarly, some states courts require that motions be &quot;verified&quot; (i.e. have their allegations confirmed under oath) or supported by an affidavit setting forth the factual matters alleged in them. New York State structures a lot of motions as &quot;orders to show cause&quot; in which the court preliminarily reviews the relief requested and issues an order telling the other side that it will do something if they don't file an objection showing good cause for the court not to rule in that way by a given day, which must be formally delivered (i.e. &quot;served&quot;) upon the other side by a deadline. I don't know if New Jersey local motion practice is similar. Many court systems also charge a &quot;new case&quot; filing fee for motions to compel arbitration that does not apply to other kinds of motions. Ideally, you'd want to review some motions (about pretty much anything) to get a feel for how this is usually done in New Jersey.
The 5th amendment of the US constitution reads: No person shall ... be deprived of life ... without due process of law and the 14th amendment reads: ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life... without due process of law In Roe v Wade the majority opinion expressly acknowledged: The appellee and certain amici argue that the fetus is a &quot;person&quot; within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of this, they outline at length and in detail the well known facts of fetal development. If this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the Amendment. (emphasis added) The majority in Roe v Wade then concluded: the word &quot;person,&quot; as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn In Dobbs, the majority instead stated: Today’s decision therefore does not prevent the numerous States that readily allow abortion from continuing to readily allow abortion ... all of the States may evaluate the competing interests and decide how to address this consequential issue ... There is ample evidence that the passage of these laws was instead spurred by a sincere belief that abortion kills a human being. Many judicial decisions from the late 19th and early 20th centuries made that point. [numerous citations] One may disagree with this belief (and our decision is not based on any view about when a State should regard prenatal life as having rights or legally cognizable interests) ... Our opinion is not based on any view about if and when prenatal life is entitled to any of the rights enjoyed after birth. In conclusion, though it is recognized in Roe v Wade that if the unborn is considered a &quot;person&quot; then there is a &quot;right to life&quot;, no justice has indicated in an opinion (including concurring or dissenting opinions) that &quot;person&quot; in the constitution includes the unborn.
This is controlled by 8 U.S.C. § 1401 which details who qualifies for "birthright citizenship". Including of course the condition mandated by the 14th ammendment, Congress is otherwise free to bestow such citizenship essentially as it pleases by duly enacted legislation. One of the cases that receives birthright citizenship is a person of unknown parentage found in the United States while under the age of five years, until shown, prior to his attaining the age of twenty-one years, not to have been born in the United States. So the presumption for young children found in the US is that they are citizens by birth. The law in particular requires positive proof that the individual in question was definitely not born in the United States. Lacking this, or it failing to be found prior to reaching the age of 21 years, they are citizens. For other cases, this will likely end up falling to the courts, who will decide the matter on the preponderance of the evidence. In this case it becomes the burden of the individual claiming citizenship to establish that they are a citizen*. Birth certificates can be filed after birth, and can be submitted as evidence. The laws controlling the validity of birth certificates is locally determined. If there are other birth certificates from other countries, or conflicting witness testimony, then it will fall to the court to decide which case is more likely based on the evidence available. *More accurately the burden generally falls on the entity making the claim about someone's citizenship (their own or someone else's). In a deportation hearing, for example, it falls to the government to establish the individual is not a US citizen. Deporation only applies to aliens, so the defendant must be established as such.