What is the authority of the clerk of court? In the United States, does the Clerk of Court typically have any type of decision-setting power, or does the Clerk's authority extend only to carrying out directives of judges?
The answer is going to vary from state to state and, even within a state, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. However, in general terms, non-judicial court officers, such as clerks of court and prothonotaries, will have specific tasks delegated to them by the court; they can make decisions on matters that the legal system does not consider to require judicial discretion and judgment. These are often described as "ministerial." They may include significant decisions with significant consequences: for example, dismissing a case, or granting judgment against a party, where a party has missed a deadline. In some if not all cases, these decisions can be appealed to a judge, but are unlikely to be overruled. There are also another class of non-judges, such as magistrate judges and administrative law judges, who take on more traditional, non-ministerial judicial roles, acting and making decisions that call for the exercise of judgment; again, these are generally appealable to a regularly appointed or elected judge. The short answer, then, is: Clerks of court cannot do everything a judge can do, but they can act on their own discretion when the matter falls within their ministerial authority. This authority can include, in appropriate cases, deciding who wins and who loses a lawsuit.
Generally speaking, British courts, when making judgments on constitutional matters regard themselves as interpreting existing law, rather than creating new law. But technically speaking, any legal precedent established by a court can be interpreted as "creation of new law". For the avoidance of doubt, the sources of law in the law of England and Wales include: statute law, constitutional convention, prerogative powers, common law, and legal commentary. I may have missed some out and may edit those in later. Common law refers to the judgments of courts. So here we come to your question: Several legal principles and precedents were established by this judgment, and you may consider this new "law": The court held that prerogative powers are justiciable - courts can limit the scope of these powers The prerogative power in question had limits. It can be limited when its use has an extreme detrimental effect on the democracy of the UK and parliamentary sovereignty. What is important with point one is that the court recognised that this power has always existed, stemming as far back as the bill of rights in the 17th century. As such, the court is implying that it is creating nothing new, but recognising a law that has always existed. You will see a LOT of this when studying constitutional law.
Generally, No Contempt powers are rather broad, but not that broad. A judge has power to find anyone in the courtroom in contempt, if that person acts in violation of he rules or of the judge's instructions. A judge has the power to find any party to the case in contempt if that person violates orders from the judge, unless there is some overriding circumstance, for example if the person's action was an exercise of a constitutional right, or if the judge's order is held (by a higher court) to be unreasonable. A judge will have the power to issue orders to people not otherwise parties if this is needed to preserve the judicial process, such as "gag orders" to prevent bias from contaminating a trial. These often have conflicts with first amendment rights or other rights, and there have been various cases on exactly how far a judge can go in such matters. But if the Judge is within those rules, violations of the judge's orders may be punishable as contempt. But an ordinary individual who is simply expressing disapproval of the judge, even in a highly disrespectful fashion, neither in nor near the courtroom, should not be subject to a contempt citation, and few judges would try to invoke such a power. Note that a judge can always issue a contempt decree or citation, and may be able to have the person jailed, if the person is within the court's jurisdiction. But if the citation was an abuse of discretion, it can be overturned and the judge may be subject to a damage suit, in an egregious case. Charles Rembar in The Law of the Land wrote of one case where the judge had had a bailiff purchase coffee during a recess, and found it not at all to his liking. He had the coffee-shop owner arrested, and brought into his presence, and proceeded to scream at him over the poor coffee. The owner later sued the judge, and received a 6-figure damage award. as Rembar put it "The price of coffee is going up all the time, and it seems that the jury felt that Coffee with scream was extra."
The Constitution does not state your opinion of SCOTUS's job, instead it just says that there shall be one supreme court with judicial power, and it says what kind of cases are within the jurisdiction of that court. Thus The Constitution does not mandate whether rulings will adhere to the doctrine of stare decisis, will be based only on a narrowly literal interpretation of The Constitution, or will be based on a general sense of justice. The Constitution also does not say anything about the rules of that Supreme Court, therefore the court is free to set its own rules, and to allow or to not allow amicus briefs. Many points raised in amicus briefs fall on deaf ears, sometimes because they are based on non-shared legal assumptions. You can read a very brief summary of the over 140 amicus briefs in this case here. If you read various SCOTUS opinions over the past 225+ years, you will see that the court does make reference to fact, not just statements of the law and constitution. This brings it well within the scope of &quot;potentially relevant&quot; to determine some fact. The lawyers get to argue how facts relate to legal conclusions, but the basic fodder for any legal decision is some set of facts. The specific briefs you mentioned are: Pro-Life Obstetricians and College of Obstetricians. The latter's argument is self-summarized as Amici’s position is that laws regulating abortion should be evidence-based, supported by a valid medical or scientific justification, and designed to improve—not harm—women’s health Pro-Life Obsetricians' position is self-summarized as support for a law that rationally furthers Mississippi’s interest in protecting women’s health from risks posed by later- term abortions, which are now well established in the literature These statements refer to interpretive doctrines previously established by SCOTUS, but not literally expressed in The Constitution. In US v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144 introduced concepts of constitutionality (not literally stated in The Constitution) whereby cases could be reviewed either with &quot;strict scrutiny&quot; for protection of Constitutional rights or else discernment of a &quot;rational interest&quot; in government taking a certain action. Either of these kinds of judicial review require a comparison of law to &quot;the facts&quot;. Hence &quot;the facts&quot; can be legally relevant.
To the title question, yes, of course, Justices are subject to the law same as anyone else is (at least in theory; whether actual practice bears that out is another matter). Chief Justice Roberts (and the rest of SCOTUS, and a good chunk of the judiciary to boot, and then some) was a named defendant in the case Shao v. Roberts that was appealed to SCOTUS. The Justices all recused themselves rendering the court short of a quorum and leaving the prior appellate court decision to dismiss the case sua sponte in place. However, Justices essentially police themselves. As the head of the judicial branch they are largely independent of Congressional or Executive attempts to control how they go about their business. Recent calls to create a legal code of ethics for Justices exist because such a code perhaps cannot, and currently does not, exist under the current constitutional order. As such Justices make their own decisions on when to recuse (see my answer here for further details). Your hypothetical justice would do the same, and the court would proceed as it always does whether they do or don't.
Any court from a municipal traffic court on up can declare a law unconstitutional and the U.S. Supreme Court is almost never the court that does so in the first instance. Also, while the jurisdiction stripping law that you suggest might be unconstitutional, it is not obviously unconstitutional. The relevant language is in Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution (this has been modified by the 11th Amendment in ways that are not pertinent to the issue at hand): The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-- to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;--between Citizens of different States;--between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make. The key language being the language in bold, who scope and limitations are the subject of hot debate in legal scholarship. For example, both military tribunal law for non-soldiers and the collateral review of death sentences implicate this provision. An issue related to U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction over military court-martial court composition will be heard this year in oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court. There is also debate over whether the jurisdiction of every single federal court can be removed from a matter within the judicial power of the United States. In that regard, keep in mind that the United States federal court system did not have direct appeals of criminal convictions at all until the 1890s, although you could challenge, for example, the jurisdiction of a criminal court over your case with a writ of habeas corpus which is a collateral attack on a conviction in a separate civil lawsuit formally directed at your prison warden. That being said, as far as I know, a law is considered in effect until declared unconstitutional. It is illegal to break an unconstitutional law, until declared so. You are wrong. A law that is unconstitutional on its face is, in terms of legal theory, unconstitutional immediately upon enactment and a court simply acknowledges that fact. It is not illegal to break an unconstitutional law even if no court has yet declared it to be unconstitutional (in U.S. jurisprudence). A law that is unconstitutional as applied is unconstitutional in application at the moment it is applied unconstitutionally, and again, a court merely acknowledges that fact.
Judicial appointments in England and Wales (plus courts that cover the whole of the UK) are made by the Judicial Appointments Commission. This was set up in 2006 to improve the separation of powers in the UK, removing the ability of a government to select sympathetic judges. The committee comprises ...the judiciary, the legal profession, non-legally qualified judicial office holders and the public. So it could be said that judges in the UK are to some extent self-selecting, but the commission responsible also has members who are not judges.
The Constitution of the United States: Analysis and Interpretation, also called the &quot;Constitution Annotated&quot;, is the constitution of record: the only constitutional law treatise formally authorized by federal law, the Constitution Annotated functions as the official Constitution of record What version is authoritative can be meaningful. See William W. Van Alstyne, &quot;A Constitutional Conundrum of Second Amendment Commas&quot;. And although phoog and I have provided different answers, I think we are both correct. The text as shown in the Constitution Annotated is what is universally accepted as the version to quote from in judicial submissions and reasons. But it's because it has drawn from the version in phoog's answer. Basically, the document in the archives is authoritative, but there is no need for writers and judges to go look at that when they are quoting, because the Constitution Annotated is deemed to have replicated that content faithfully.