Texas excessive fining I am just curious if it is legal for Texas to issue a ticket, once the ticket is issued you are automatically also required to pay a surcharge to keep your license from being suspended and on top of that you are also required to carry SR-22 insurence for a minimum of 3 years as I understand from the clerk that explained it to me and failure to keep the SR-22 insurence will result in your licences being suspended. How can it be legal to be fined twice and required to obtain special insurance for a minimum of 3 years just for a speeding ticket or some other driving infraction?
Yes. This doesn't remotely approach the threshold to which the excessive fines clause applies. Also SR-22 insurance isn't a fine, it is a requirement that you take extra responsibility because you are a high risk driver. In general, states have broad authority to regulate the right to drive a car.
They don't treat right-of-way persistence at all You are required to follow the car ahead at a distance that is reasonable and prudent, having regard for both speeds, traffic generally, and road condition (i.e. curves, rain). CVC 21703. This would apply to the other driver. You must only shift lanes left or right when possible with reasonable safety and only after signaling. CVC 22107. That applies to you. If you &quot;cut them off&quot; such that they must make adjustments to re-acquire a distance that is reasonable and prudent, then you are guilty of 22107. If you changed lanes properly, then it is immediately and continuously THEIR duty under 21703 to maintain safe distance despite whichever lawful maneuvering you may need to do. Note that 22109 forbids you to stop or suddenly decrease speed without first giving an appropriate signal, unless there is no opportunity to give that signal. 22109 is a civil infraction that assumes accidental or negligent braking. (i.e. me going for the clutch and not remembering the car is an automatic). Intentionally brake-checking someone is a crime with risk of jail and other more serious consequences than &quot;fine and points&quot;.
In Spain, most traffic offenses are usually considered administrative sanctions and involve just a relatively small fine, and perhaps losing some points in your licence. In those cases, if the driver if the vehicle cannot be established (your example, or a far regular one of a parking violation in which the officer did not see who did park it and will not wait by the side of the parker until the driver appears), the fine just goes to the registered owner. When the fine is reported to the registered owner of the vehicle, he can report who was the actual driver who broke the law at the time of the offense. I do not know what would happen if the person named does not recognize his responsability, but my guess is that the owner has to pay the fine (HINT: do not lend your car to someone who cannot be trusted). If the infraction is so excessive that it becomes a matter of penal law then there must be a trial and then the accused must be established without reasonable doubt, so in that case such a stunt maybe could work.
Despite the lengthy background, the only question seems to be: Can a police officer lie about a consequence of a traffic violation they charge you with? As a matter of constitutional law in the United States, that answer is generally &quot;yes.&quot; States can impose more limitations if they like. Only a small minority of states actually do so. Incidentally, an attorney, such as a deputy district attorney, is not allowed to lie about the consequences of a traffic violation, or anything else (even in extreme circumstances like a hostage situation). This violates the rules of professional conduct applicable to all attorneys. This sounds like a classic &quot;driving while black&quot; situation and is probably involves unconstitutional discrimination by a government official, although proving that in an individual case is virtually impossible.
It depends on the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, speed limits are implemented via Chapter 46.61 RCW, the very first section of which states: The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways except: (1) Where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section. (2) The provisions of RCW 46.52.010 through 46.52.090, 46.61.500 through 46.61.525, and 46.61.5249 shall apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout the state We then turn to the question of what a &quot;vehicle&quot; is (this is the discussion of a number of legal treatises). Title 46 is about motor vehicles, but still you should look at the definition, if any, of &quot;vehicle&quot;. We have two definitions of vehicle in RCW 46.04.670. Definition 1 says that &quot;Vehicle&quot; includes every device capable of being moved upon a public highway and in, upon, or by which any persons or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, including bicycles Definition 2 omits the italicized bicycle inclusion, and explicitly excludes A bicycle, for the purposes of chapter 46.12, 46.16A, or 46.70 RCW, or for RCW 82.12.045((.)) This is a bit of a mess arising from legislative screwup, which should be resolved by appeal to RCW 1.12.025. The explicit-exclusion sections are about registration, dealers and taxes, and not speed limits. The latter version was recently reaffirmed effective July 23, 2023. The courts could therefore be somewhat inclined to not apply speed limits to bicycles, because bicycles were recently removed from the set of explicit vehicles. But as notes in the Eskridge's extensive discussion of a hypothetical ban on vehicles in Lafayette Park, there are multiple principles for interpreting laws, and &quot;legislative intent to assure safety&quot; would be one prominent consideration, in case the wording of the law is not crystal clear – as it is not, in this case.
The principle of constitutional law is that in order to arrest you, the officer would need probable cause. Certain acts are in themselves violations of the order (being closer to another person that 6 feet, illegal sneezing). Walking in public does not per se constitute a violation. In order to briefly stop a person walking on the street (a "Terry stop"), the officer needs a reasonable suspicion that the person is in violation of the law. That means there has to be a reason, and a gut feeling does not count. An officer would not (legally) be able to stop every person they see walking down the street / driving, and demand an explanation of where they are going. If a person is just aimlessly wandering down the strees with friends (even if they are sufficiently separated), that could suffice to justify a stop, given the limited legal excuses for being outside your home.
There are only two rules I am aware of that apply to rear-end collisions on a roadway (in which all vehicles are properly headed in the same direction): The first vehicle that hits another in the rear is at fault for the collision, and any collateral collisions. The preceding rule is always true unless there is evidence that the vehicle that was struck did something reckless or intentional to cause the collision. For example, "cutting" in front of a truck and decelerating unnecessarily and faster than the truck can brake. (Before dashcams became widespread this was a common tactic of fraudsters, who would subsequently sue the "rear-ender's" insurance company for "whiplash" injuries.) You seem to be asking whether there is a law or rule against coming to a stop too close to a vehicle in front. Tailgating is generally illegal, but I have never heard of the concept being applied to vehicles that are not moving. (Clarification on your question: "Stop far enough behind the car in front of you so that you can see the bottom of their back tires" is a safety heuristic that allows you to pull around the vehicle in an emergency without shifting into reverse. It's a "rule" of defensive driving, but I have never heard it written into law.)
Some kinds of companies (e.g. freight shipping companies and banks) often do have those policies. The real issue is not whether those policies are permitted, but what the consequences are for breaking them. The fact that a company forbids its employees from exercising a legal right doesn't mean that the employee ceases to have that legal right. It simply means that if the employee exercises that legal right, then the employee has breached the contract and may suffer the consequences for breaching that contract. Violations of those policies are grounds for termination from employment, and this would probably not be void as a matter of public policy. For an employee at will this is really pretty meaningless, although it could conceivably affect unemployment benefit eligibility. But, for a unionized or civil service employee who can only be fired for cause, this is a big deal. But, in theory, a company policy does not impact the tort liability or the criminal liability of the individual engaging in legally privileged self-defense to anyone. This is because two people can't contractually change their legal duties to third parties with whom they are not in privity (i.e. with whom they do not have a contractual relationship). And two people also can't contractually change the terms of a country's penal laws. The policy may be a defense of the company from vicarious liability for the employee's use of force in violation of the policy that gives rise to civil liability for the employee because the grounds for authorizing self-defense were not present. If the employee using force did so wrongfully and was sued for negligence rather than battery, the existence of the company policy might also go to the issue of whether the employee was acting negligently since a reasonable person in the employee's shoes might have been less likely to wrongfully use force in purported self-defense if there was such a policy than if there was not such a policy (and instead there might arguably have been a legal fiduciary duty as an agent to protect the property and workers of the principal in the absence of the policy).