Legal status of pre-natal gender screening by Indians outside India India has banned pre-natal gender screening under the The Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 Does the said law (or any other law or treaty) prohibit Indians to get the pre-natal gender screening test done outside India (in any country where this is legal)?
Does the said law (or any other law or treaty) prohibit Indians to get the pre-natal gender screening test done outside India (in any country where this is legal)? YES, in theory but I cannot find any relevant case law where this has been considered by the court. Section 23(3) of the Pre-Conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act 1994 (PCPNDT) creates the offence for non-medical practitioners etc: Any person who seeks the aid of any [medical practioner etc] or any other person for sex selection or for conducting pre-natal diagnostic techniques on any pregnant women for the purposes other than those specified in sub-section (2) of section 4, he shall, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to fifty thousand rupees for the first offence and for any subsequent offence with imprisonment which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees. And section 4(1) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction for any offences committed by: any citizen of India in any place without and beyond India... Normally, criminal justice action would only be considered once the parties returned to India, but note that section 299 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 allows for trials in absentia. However I cannot find any relevant case law to say whether this has actually happened in this type of scenario.
Article 15(2) of the Indian Constitution prohibits restriction to any citizen of India on entry to a public hotel, restaurant or place of entertainment on the grounds "only of religion, race, caste, sex [and/or] place of birth". It is a fundamental right guaranteed to all citizens of India. The Supreme Court of India has held a "public place" to mean any place which is open to the public and to also include private places functioning to serve a non-exclusive group of people. Hence, a club or premise opened only to serve its affiliates or members shall not be considered a public place for the purpose of this provision of law. Hence, if a citizen of India is not denied admission purely on the basis of his/her religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, his admission to a restaurant or a hotel owned and operated by the government or private concerns may be prohibited as the rights of admission may be reserved with the management of the premises. Just to conclude you can sue the hotel for denying entry
I'm not sure if the information is accurate, but according to the above text, when a wife cheats, it is marriage not biology that decides the paternity of the child. I got some questions: If my wife cheats on me, I would still be the legal parent of the child. If I don't want this paternity, is there a legal process to disavow it? In most states, yes (I can't think of any exceptions, but there are 50 states and more self-governing territories and this is a matter of state law). Typically there is a statute of limitations of one to five years from the date of birth for a husband or person listed as a father on a birth certificate to bring a legal action to disavow paternity. See, e.g., California Family Code §§ 7540-7541 (setting a two year statute of limitations from a child's birth for a person with standing to dispute that a cuckolded husband is the legal father with genetic evidence). Note also that the process and statute of limitations are usually not the same, if, for example, a child wishes to prove that the child's biological father is someone other than the legally presumed father of that child. If I fall in love with a married woman and we give birth to a child, I am the biological but not legal parent of the child. Is there a legal process for me to claim paternity of the child from the woman's husband? Sometimes yes, and sometimes no. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), held that a state is not constitutionally required to make such a process available, but some states do anyway. The details of how this plays out under New York State law are described in this Law.SE question and answer. An analysis of the relevant portions of Minnesota law can be found here. For example, in California, Family Code Section 7541 limits standing to dispute paternity to spouses, people &quot;presumed to be a parent&quot; under Family Code Section 7611, or representatives of children seeking to establish or disestablish the paternity of someone &quot;presumed to be a parent&quot; under Family Code Section 7611. So, the only people eligible to be found to be parents are (excluding spent provisions of only historical interest): A husband who was married to the mother at the time of the birth or within 300 days before the birth. § 7611(a). A putative husband who would have been a spouse under § 7611(a), who marriage is annulled (e.g. because a marriage license expired or a husband was too closely related to the mother or either spouse is already married). § 7611(b). A putative husband who cohabited with the mother within 300 days before the birth whose attempt to married was too obviously defective to require an annulment (e.g. two fifteen year olds who have a church wedding without a marriage license). § 7611(b). A husband of the mother who marries the mother after the birth and is also named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A putative husband who attempt to marry the mother after the birth and is named as a father on the birth certificate, in a voluntary written promise, or in a court order. § 7611(c). A person &quot;who receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child.&quot; § 7611(d). A parent who dies while the &quot;child is in utero&quot; if this is established in a probate court proceeding. § 7511(f). Thus, in California, a father of the child of a woman married to someone else, who is still alive, (or someone of behalf of the child seeking to establish that he is the father) can only dispute the paternity of the husband of the child's mother (if the husband himself or the mother does not challenge the husband's paternity) if he &quot;receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child.&quot; Simply claiming paternity without &quot;receiving the child into his home&quot; isn't sufficient to overcome the presumption that the mother's husband is the father in California unless the mother of the child or her husband disputes this presumption. The document says &quot;The reverse is not true&quot;. Why the decision about paternity is different between a wife cheats on a husband and a husband cheats on a wife? Because maternity (absent a surrogacy arrangement) is almost never in doubt, while paternity is often in doubt. Furthermore, it wasn't possible when these doctrines were formulated (centuries ago) to determine paternity reliably in all cases anyway, at least at an affordable price. Cheap and reliable paternity tests, that can be used in pretty much any circumstances{1}, have only been possible for less than forty years, which is why a case like Michael H. v. Gerald D. didn't come up until then. {1} There have been particular cases, for example, when mother and father are both white and a child is at least partially black, where it has always been possible to do so (although even that scenario isn't 100% accurate, as illustrated by a famous historical case in which both parents had a modest amount of African ancestry that wasn't visible phenotypically). Similarly, there was the scenario of @MartinBonner where husband &quot;was away at sea/war at the time conception would have had to occurred&quot;. Later on, blood types could disprove paternity in some cases, but not prove it with any certainty. There is a quasi-magical process described in the Old Testament for resolving such disputes involving the wife drinking a semi-poisonous liquid. In the Roman Empire, those cases were resolved by the husband who had a right to commit infanticide if he wished. In modern times, something close to the existing legal process has usually been available, complicated in certain eras by criminalized adultery, &quot;heart balm&quot; civil actions, and fault based divorce.
Can you always ask for an independent genetic testing when you are asked by the court to support your wife's or your partners children? No. Only sometimes. (Literally, you can always ask, but sometimes the answer will be clearly &quot;no&quot;, as a matter of law.) Some presumptions of paternity are conclusive (either immediately or after a statute of limitations to contest paternity expires) and can't be overcome by contrary genetic evidence. Other presumptions of paternity are rebuttable. The specifics vary in important details from state to state. The theory behind the conclusive presumption is primarily that the presumed parent in those circumstances becomes the psychological parent, and it is not in the best interests of the child to dislodge a psychological parent, even if that parent is not a biological parents. Put another way, a conclusive presumption is really part of the definition of what a father is under the law. Several other answers at Law.SE have addressed this in the context of specific U.S. states. An answer here considers California law and another answers the question under New York law.
Let's back up. It's premature to say that SB 8 &quot;avoids the constitutional restrictions on banning abortions&quot;. The constitutionality of SB 8 has not been resolved; the Supreme Court said so explicitly (page 2). In fact there is good reason to think that is unconstitutional under existing interpretation of the Constitution per Roe v. Wade and the like. (Whether the court will actually follow existing interpretation is another question, of course.) But the courts do not determine the constitutionality of laws just because someone asks them; they only do so when it needs to be decided to resolve a particular case. For instance, if a person is charged with a crime, they can challenge the constitutionality of the law under which they are charged, and courts will address that question unless the case is resolved some other way. There are also ways that a person who wants to violate the law can pre-emptively sue the government to prevent them from enforcing the law, if they can show such enforcement is likely to affect them. The issue in SB 8 is that since it wouldn't be the government enforcing the law, it's unclear who an abortion provider can pre-emptively sue. In Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, they tried to sue the State of Texas, its courts, and a private party who they thought might be likely to sue them. The SCOTUS majority found that none of those defendants were relevant. However, if and when an abortion provider actually does get sued, there'll be a clear case which has proper parties and is ripe, and courts then will have to consider whether SB 8 is constitutional or not. So if your hypothetical gun control statute were treated similarly, the law might avoid pre-emptive challenges, with a chilling effect on gun sales. But sooner or later, someone would probably violate the law (maybe deliberately as a test case), and the courts would consider whether it was constitutional or not. Under prevailing interpretations of the Second Amendment, they'd probably find that it wasn't. A key difference, of course, is that abortions are much more time-sensitive than gun purchases; being temporarily blocked from having an abortion is much more consequential in most cases than being temporarily blocked from buying a gun. The other subtext is that, although SCOTUS said their decision in Whole Woman's Health is not based on the constitutionality of SB 8, it's widely suspected that several of the justices are not all that keen on the constitutional right to abortion found in Roe v. Wade, and might look to overturn Roe when it comes up. As such, they may not be very motivated to look for procedural avenues to block SB 8 in the short term, since they might be inclined to uphold it in the long term. The dissenters in Whole Woman's Health certainly thought those avenues were available. But in the case of your hypothetical gun control bill, if a majority of justices were pretty convinced that the law was unconstitutional, they might try harder to come up with grounds to block it pre-emptively.
Yes. But it isn't illegal discrimination in many places. Laws against discrimination prevent the discrimination based on forbidden categories. Take the national Olympic team: They are allowed to discriminate based on athletic performance, obviously. They are allowed to discriminate based on gender. There are men's teams and women's teams, and men cannot simply apply for a slot on the women's team. They are not allowed to discriminate based on sexual orientation. Discrimination based on a minimum age might be legal, discrimination based on a maximum age probably not. For an employer, it is legal in many places to discriminate based on (formal) qualifications, but not to discriminate based on sexual orientation or race. (It may be legal to discriminate based on nationality, however ...)
The theatre is a private place. You may enter it only with the permission of the owners. They are not obliged to grant you that permission. They have the right to refuse admission on almost any grounds they choose. I say "almost" because many jurisdictions have laws about things like race or gender discrimination. I suspect in India it would be illegal to say "You can't come in because you are Hindu." The point is though, that there is a short list of reasons which they aren't allowed to use. Any other reason is legal.
Nowhere is this legal. Polygamy is legal in 58 countries, polyandry is possibly legal in Sri Lanka and Bhutan. Neither country recognizes same-sex marriage, ruling out a marriage between three women. The law of Bhutan is clear on the requirement of male-female mixing, only allowing marriage between 1 man and 1 woman at a time. In Sri Lanka, the Kandyan Marriage and Divorce Act also allows multiple husbands for a woman, but only for Kandyans (Buddhist from the former provinces of the Kandyan Kingdom).