Can data from computer forensic investigation be denied as evidence? 3 computers were sealed and taken from a person's apartment. Investigators invited him to unseal the PCs; the seals were intact and confirmed by owner and they started the cloning process. However, the hashes were just photographed by an expert without putting them into a document and giving it to the person who's being investigated, saying that they will invite him the next day to finish the paperwork. He wasn't invited, not even after 4 days, meaning that all devices remained unsealed all these days. Considering the above facts: Can evidence found by computer forensic expert be used in a court? Could a lawyer challenge this evidence in court given the procedure of investigation? Is there any applicable case law? Note: All hard-drives were cloned using a write-blocking device. Click this link to see what it looks like. Software that was/is used in investigations is FTK if I am not mistaken.
Short Answer Chain of custody is a common challenge to the admissibility and weight of evidence. Qualification This sounds like a real case. Not a hypothetical. The outcome can go either way. It sounds like it's heading for litigation. The result will depend on the facts and legal arguments. If this is meant to be a hypothetical there are too few facts described to be able to analyze it. I suggest you hire an attorney and forget about getting the question answered here. Generally speaking, it's impossible to prove a negative. So on that basis, proving they did not tamper with the data will be a challenge at best. Lawyers can always challenge evidence. And chain of custody is a common challenge to the admissibility and weight of evidence.
What does one do if, a party at trial denies having made a statement in a published article? A combination of a) and b). The plaintiff should gather other evidence with which to disprove the denials of authorship, or at least to question the reliability the publisher's testimony. The jury needs that evidence in order to discern who is credible. Whether decisive or not for credibility purposes, any material inconsistencies the plaintiff is able to point out from the witness's testimony(-ies) tend to guide the fact-finder (i.e., the jury) on matters of credibility. Whenever possible, the evidence should include admissible documents from when the events took place. For instance, records reflecting the submission &amp; editing process of that article. Those documents typically are obtained by subpoenaing the publisher and/or relevant non-parties, accordingly. That will reduce the chances of testimony deficiencies, whether these stem from witnesses' perjury, lack of memory, inability to clearly articulate what they know, or inability to testify at all (due to witness's illness or death by the time the matter goes to trial).
The police (and any other involved public agencies) do not work for Steve. They make their own decisions. You didn't specify a location, and requirements to consent to a search vary by location. It wouldn't be surprising, though, if Steve can't legally consent to a search of someone else's room (but possibly could consent to search of common areas). One possibility you don't seem to have considered is that the police or prosecutor would, if Steve is willing to testify, use Steve's testimony as probable cause to get a warrant. Then they could obtain text messages from Mike's service provider (even if he's deleted them from his phone), search his room without his consent, etc. Details again vary by location. Finally, any jail/prison term is typically up to a judge or jury, not the police. Pre-trial detention is typically up to a judge or magistrate. (Also, outside the scope of your question, but if there is any chance Steve has allowed himself to become involved in the misdeeds, even slightly, Steve would be wise to talk to a lawyer. Or if he suspects the police could believe that.)
Yes and No See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967): What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. The glass has clearly been "knowingly exposed" and if that glass was, on the normal methods of examination by the officer (sight, smell etc.), evidence of a crime then it would be able to be used as evidence. However, any DNA on that glass is not "knowingly exposed" - finding the DNA requires a laboratory, specialised equipment and trained technicians.
I assume these are digital photos that were electronically transferred (not prints physically delivered). If they were prints physically delivered, he owns those prints, since you used to own them but you unconditionally transferred ownership to him by giving them. No backsies under the law. The photos are protected by copyright law, which means that the person who took the pictures has the exclusive right to make copies, disseminate them, and authorize making copies. In order for anyone to make a copy, they need permission – a license – from you. In the world of pre-planned business deals, the copyright holder writes up a document granting B some right to use the protected material, which typically means "you can install it on your various devices but may not give copies to others". In this case, however, you didn't create an explicit written license. So if this ends up in court, the question is what implicit license you granted. The courts will not decide that you granted him the license to unrestrictedly sell or give away copies of the protected material. The most likely outcome would be that he can only keep his copy, i.e. he will not be forced to erase the copy that you sent him. What the courts would do is try to discern what license you most likely intended to grant to him. There is a provision in copyright law that allows a licensee to make backup copies of a computer program (17 USC 117), but a digital photo is not a computer program. So the lifespan of the copy that you sent would be the lifespan of the phone (I assume) that you sent it to. Since actually using a digital photo technically requires making a copy (from disk storage to computational memory), there is a legal direction (dead-end) that you could go where the photo could exist on the phone, but never be opened again. Again, the courts would have to discern what license you probably intended w.r.t. ever opening the photo – obviously you intended that the file could be opened / viewed any number of times. You could argue that the license which you granted was conditional, i.e. "you can have and use these pictures as long as we are a thing", but establishing that this was part of the license would be tricky. Free digital content often has some "as long as" condition attached to it, i.e. "you can use this program as long as you are affiliated with University of Whatever". I don't consider a conditional license to be a ridiculous interpretation, on the other hand the particular court (judge) might decide that people who sext should be forced to live with the unpleasant consequences of their decisions. If we exclude such a line of thinking, I don't see a compelling counter-argument that your ex-partner inequitably loses a right by construing the license as conditional. I don't know if there is any case law that addresses this: at any rate, copyright law would severely limit what he could do with the pictures (the tort "invasion of privacy" also limits dissemination).
The question says: Callahan used torture to get the location of the hostage out of the suspect, and information acquired by torture is not admissible as evidence. In general, evidence obtained by torture is indeed not admissible in US courts. This is particularly true when the person doing the torture is a police officer. If it is done by a private citizen, with no prompting or encouragement by the police or any part of the government, different rules may apply. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) for the inadmissibility of confessions obtained through torture or physical coercion. The Mapp decision, cited below, would have extended this to information or evidence obtained via torture. The question asks: It was not merely information what Callahan acquired, but the physical body of the victim. Doesn't that change anything? No. If the evidence was obtained unlawfully, then the evidence so obtained and all other evidence or information indirectly obtained through the unlawful act is inadmissible. This is the &quot;Fruit of the poisonous tree&quot; doctrine. It applies just as much to physical evidence as to a confession. &quot;Fruit of the poisonous tree&quot; doctrine is an extension of the &quot;exclusionary rule&quot; and like the basic rule, is intended to deter unlawful actions on the part of law enforcement and government generally, and to ensure that the courts are not complicit in such unlawful actions. The rule was first fully established in US Federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) although versions of the rule go back before the founding of the United States. The rule was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) although some states applied a version of the rule even before the Weeks decision. There are exceptions, however, notably &quot;inevitable discovery&quot;. That means if other, lawful, investigations already underway would certainly have uncovered the same evidence, then it may be admissible. Another similar exception is the &quot;Independent source doctrine&quot;. This says that when the same evidence is later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality, it may be admissible. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), for both of these exceptions. There is also a good-faith exception where a warrant was obtained on invalid grounds but used in good-faith by offers who thought it valid. I do not see that any of these exceptions would apply in the situation described in the question. It does not matter how &quot;clear&quot; the evidence may be. If it is obtained unlawfully, and no exception applies, it will not be admissible. The question asks: In case of the hideout and the rifle, is such a clear evidence still inadmissible? Can't the &quot;hot pursuit&quot; rules be applied? He didn't have time for a warrant, he was running against the clock. The doctrine of&quot;hot pursuit&quot; alone does not justify entering a private dwelling without a warrant, but there are a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, one of which &quot;Exigent Circumstances&quot; is one, or rather a group of relates exceptions. In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013), the Supreme Court wrote in its opinion, &quot;A variety of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless search, including law enforcement's need to provide emergency assistance to an occupant of a home . . . engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect . . . or enter a burning building to put out a fire and investigate its cause.&quot; Thus “hot pursuit” can be an exigent Circumstance and justify a warrentless entry, but this will depend on the precise facts of the case. It is not clear that the circumstances described in the question would qualify. The question asks: even if they decide not to press charges because they are afraid they can't win the trial, can't they at least put the suspect under surveillance? Legally, they probably can. Not even probable cause is required to continue an investigation, or to place a suspected criminal under surveillance There might be reasons other than the law of evidence not to use surveillance, for example if the police fear that the suspect will observe the surveillance and thus be alerted. But this seems like a place where the movie plot may have been unrealistic.
Was Alex Jones's attorney handing over phone-record evidence a &quot;mishap&quot; or required by law? The discovery phase, which concluded before the trial began, required Alex Jones to provide texts and emails mentioning Sandy Hook (among other things). He did not provide any and testified in writing and in court he could find none. On August 3rd 2022, day seven of the trial, plaintiffs' attorney Mark Bankston claimed he had obtained from Jones's attorneys a digital copy of Jones's cellphone on which there were texts and emails that mentioned Sandy Hook. He said this copy was mistakenly provided to him. Whether accidental or deliberate, this copy or its texts and emails mentioning Sandy Hook were not provided during discovery. Judge Gamble told the jury about the digital copy, &quot;we don't know whether it was on accident or on purpose... but what we do know is that it wasn't properly turned over when it should have been.&quot; https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=7658 A video clip of the part of the hearing in question, when Bankston begins asking Jones about the texts. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tpnSCIak5A8. Or this timestamp in a longer clip https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=6821. Mark Bankston for the plaintiffs, addressing Jones: &quot;Your attorneys messed up and sent me a digital copy of your entire cellphone, with every text message you sent for the past two years. And, when informed, did not take any steps to identify it as privileged or protected in any way, and as of two days ago it fell free and clear into my possession. And that is how I know you lied to me when you said you didn't have text messages about Sandy Hook.&quot; The above quote begins 5mins into the first clip or this timestamp in the longer clip https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=6830). After the texts, Bankston asked questions about emails not being turned over... Jones had sworn he didn't even use email. Bankston showed him emails that appeared to be written by Jones. &quot;I must have dictated them&quot; said Jones. Judge Gamble told the jury about the digital copy, &quot;we don't know it was on accident or on purpose, but what we do know is it wasn't properly turned over when it should have been.&quot; https://youtu.be/qhtz_6JKSh8?t=7665 Bankston told journalist Dan Solomon the phone copy was put in a Dropbox the parties were using to exchange materials. Bankston did not believe it was put there deliberately and notified Jones's attorneys. Apparently Jones's attorneys did not respond. Under Texas law they had ten days to assert privilege or say the material was put there by mistake, Rule 193.3(d) - as of August 3rd Bankston was legally free to read and use the material. (There is some gossip online about what was supposedly heard on 'hot mic' between Reynal and Bankston, I haven't heard it myself and have no timestamps or clips. I do think I heard Jones, after leaving the witness box, ask Reynal &quot;they got my text messages?&quot;) [edit] Incidentally, this isn't the first time that Jones / his attorneys failed to comply with discovery orders in relation to these Sandy Hook cases - a number of sanctions and default judgements have gone against him for that. Indeed this damages phase is the result of the default judgment against him in September 2021 for failing to comply with discovery: &quot;The Court find that Defendants unreasonably and vexatiously failed to comply with their discovery duties. The Court finds that Defendants' failure to comply with discovery in this case is greatly aggravated by Defendants' consistent pattern of discovery abuse throughout the other similar cases pending before this Court.&quot; [edit 2] On August 4th 2022 Jones's attorneys have filed an emergency motion that seems to settle the issue of whether the provision of all the material was a &quot;mishap&quot;: they say it was &quot;inadvertently&quot; supplied. text of the motion They claim they promptly informed plaintiffs' attorneys about the mistake but the latter used the material anyway in violation of privilege, procedure and the court's protective order. Now Twitter lawyers are arguing about whether the language used by the defence was adequate to engage the rules mentioned above. But this doesn't seem to resolve the issue of why the material demanded for discovery was not supplied for discovery or why Jones testifed he could not find such material. Judge Gamble denied the request for a blanket protective order to seal the record of the text messages and denied the motion for mistrial. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dKbAmNwbiMk
If law enforcement is actually requesting an encryption key, talk to a real lawyer. To answer your first question, the answer is &quot;the government probably can't demand the password, but might be able to demand the data.&quot; Some courts have ruled that the Fifth Amendment can prevent courts from forcing someone to decrypt data for the government, because the act of decrypting the data conveys information (see United States v. Doe from the 11th Circuit). Other courts have ruled that there are situations where that is not the case (US v. Fricosu, In re Boucher). Boucher is particularly interesting because the government first asked for the password itself, and then (when that subpoena was quashed by the magistrate) narrowed its request to the decrypted data on appeal. In the magistrate's opinion, we see Also, the government concedes that it cannot compel Boucher to disclose the password to the grand jury because the disclosure would be testimonial. It is not generically a violation of the Fifth Amendment to compel production of documents (the 11th Circuit, quoting the Supreme Court, considered this a &quot;settled proposition&quot;). The issue is that the act of producing the documents can be considered testimony -- by producing the documents, the person is showing that they know the documents exist, where they are, how to read them, etc. Possession of the key to decrypt a file links you to that file, because keys are generally kept secret. In the 11th Circuit case, the court found that the government didn't know for a fact that a) Doe could decrypt the files, and b) what files existed on the encrypted drive. In the cases where forced decryption was allowed, the government had seen enough to independently show that the files existed, were authentic, and that the defendant had actual control/possession over them. The 11th Circuit asked for a bit more (the location), based on a standard that is in effect in some circuits but not others. In any event, courts seem to generally consider this to take a court order to force production of anything; the police can't just order you to do it.