Circuit court misquotes supreme court: what precedent does district court follow? In United States v. Bowman (1922), the Supreme Court ruled that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of a statute does not apply to statutes that are &quot;not logically dependent on their locality for the government's jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers, or agents.&quot; (I call this the Bowman quote) The Seventh Circuit later wrote in United States v. Leija-Sanchez (2010) that: &quot;what Bowman had said is that the same rule of interpretation (for whether a statue applies extraterritorially) should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, 'not logically dependent on their locality for the Government's jurisdiction'&quot;. This wording by the Seventh Circuit misconstrues what the Supreme Court had said. The Supreme Court essentially said that the presumption against extraterritoriality doesn't apply when the government exercises its right to self-protection, but the Seventh Circuit's partial quote of the Bowman decision says that the presumption against extraterritoriality doesn't apply when the crime isn't logically dependent on its location. Would a district judge within the Seventh Circuit be allowed to consider the full Bowman quote, or is it restricted to the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Bowman quote?
Would a district judge within the Seventh Circuit be allowed to consider the full Bowman quote, or is it restricted to the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the Bowman quote? &quot;Bowman quote&quot; aside, in case of conflict between SCOTUS and appellate precedents, a district judge ought to follow SCOTUS precedent to the extent that it directly controls the matter at issue. Otherwise, the district judge would propagate the appellate contravention of the principle formulated in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989): If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. Bowman states that the legislative intent of extra-territorial operativeness is obvious for some types of crimes. In other words, that the legislator does not need to expressly indicate extra-territoriality for certain classes of crimes. Leija-Sanchez 602 F.3d 797 (2010) does not misconstrue Bowman. Instead, it truncated a statement therefrom. A truncated citation does not create precedent. Furthermore, that truncation is inconsequential because &quot;indeed, all of the conduct ascribed to Leija-Sanchez took place here&quot;, Leija-Sanchez at 801 (emphasis in original). That defeats defendant's argument regarding extra-territoriality. Even if a party attempted to take advantage of the truncation in Leija-Sanchez, the adversary would defeat that attempt by pointing out the material portion being omitted.
The decision which Assange sought to appeal, United States v Assange [2021] EWHC 3313 (Admin), was a decision of a divisional court of three judges. That is because s 26 of the Extradition Act 2003 provides for an appeal from &quot;the appropriate judge&quot; to the High Court, not the Court of Appeal. A divisional court of the High Court, called the Administrative Court, exercises this appellate jurisdiction and as an intermediate appellate court of three High Court judges, has a similar status to the Court of Appeal. When a point of law has already been considered by a single judge, and a panel of three judges on appeal, it makes sense for the Supreme Court to consider whether to grant leave to appeal directly under the provisions cited by Jen rather than requiring the parties to go through another intermediate court. An example of this is R (on the application of Highbury Poultry Farm Produce Ltd) v Crown Prosecution Service [2020] UKSC 39, an appeal from a divisional court exercising judicial review jurisdiction. However, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal from the divisional court in Assange's case.
Usually, but not always. In California, this is governed primarily by the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act. California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1713-1724. The general rule is that the judgment of a foreign court in a country with a legitimate legal system (like New Zealand), that had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, is enforceable through a summary process that does not reconsider the merits of the foreign money judgment, if the person seeking to enforce the judgment can establish those facts. See § 1716(a)-(b). But there are many exceptions to the general rule. See §§ 1715(b) (taxes, fines, penalties, some domestic relations judgments), 1716(c) (seven grounds for procedural irregularities, a ground for public policy exceptions, and certain defamation judgments). Section 1717 of the Act provides for certain exceptions to the exceptions. There are also federal law exceptions in addition to those in the act, including one applicable to foreign defamation case judgments. But these laws rarely have much practical effects beyond the California statute in cases involving purely money judgments that are governed by the California statute. Injunctive and other non-monetary relief granted by a foreign court is less frequently enforceable, and when it is, is not governed by a simple, summary statutory process from this statute. Special rules apply, in particular, to foreign child custody judgments. The summary process, when there is no other pending case in California between the parties is as follows: &quot;If recognition of a foreign-country judgment is sought as an original matter, the issue of recognition shall be raised by filing an action seeking recognition of the foreign-country judgment.&quot; § 1718(a). It is legally possible to file and prosecute a case like this one pro se in California, and it is unlikely that an in person hearing would be required in a case like this one. Usually, one could prevail in motion practice or with a remotely conducted hearing (especially in the COVID era). Whether an in person evidentiary hearing was required in a case like this would depend a great deal on the nature of the defense to recognition of the foreign judgment asserted. But, the better practice would be to hire a California lawyer to handle it for you. Typically, the cost of doing so would be the filing fee, the cost of serving the judgment debtor with process, and something on the order of $1000-$3000 in legal fees. So, it would be much less expensive than a full fledged new lawsuit, but would be too expensive to be practical in the case of a small claims sized judgment in most cases.
In most places I imagine the issue would go before a probate judge who would attempt to determine the validity of each presented will, and if both were valid, then they would attempt to reconcile the disparities to the best of their ability. Broadly speaking, the process would look like this (I'm using UK law as an example): You die An individual is chosen to handle your affairs (executor or administrator [or possibly both depending on jurisdiction]) They choose a will to go off of (these steps could be reversed if the wills named different administrators, in which case each administrator would file for the grant of representation and consequently involve the probate judge earlier) Someone challenges and suggests using the other will (probably because they feel they're not getting what's theirs) A probate judge is involved The probate judge decides Appeals would be made to Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court That being said, every jurisdiction is different, and this is more of a template answer for English common law (and derivative courts), than an attempt to describe in detail any specific jurisdiction's procedures.
Why does the one country that promotes constitutional democracies above all others not have a judicial branch specifically for those matters? I know SCOTUS will hear these matters . . . I have had it mention that SCOTUS hears less than a hundred cases a year. Something which sounds incredibly low. A constitutional court profoundly limits the extent to which relief for violations of the constitution are judicially reviewable relative to the U.S. status quo. All courts from traffic court on up hear these matters and adjudicate constitutional issue in the status quo. It is also helpful to recognize that the U.S. Constitution regulates government conduct, not necessarily only though the device of determining that legislation is or is not constitutional. If a police officer stops you without having reasonable suspicion to do so, he has violated the U.S. Constitution, without regard to what the statutes of the state in question say. If evidence is seized without probable cause and this evidence is introduced in court over your objection in a criminal case, the government has violated the constitution and you are entitled (unless it was harmless error) to have your conviction vacated. If a tax collector seizes your property for unpaid taxes without first affording you due process to dispute their right to do so, the government has violated one of your constitutional rights. The Constitution imposes affirmative duties and obligations on the government, it does not merely invalidate laws enacted as unconstitutional. Most instances of constitutional adjudication involve government conduct and not the validity of government enacted statutes.
This is a quite complicated area of evidence law in the U.S. as there are many statements which are inadmissible under the hearsay rule, but there are also many statements that would otherwise be hearsay that fall within exceptions to the hearsay rule. In U.S. federal court practice, hearsay is governed mostly by Federal Rules of Evidence 103, 104(a), 201, 801-807, and 1101. Most state court rules of evidence in the U.S. with regard to hearsay closely track the Federal Rules of Evidence. Some states do not follow this pattern but are substantively very similar as the Federal Rules of Evidence largely track of the common law rules of evidence before they were codified. Rule 801 provides two exclusions from the definition of hearsay and a foundational definition. Rule 802 prohibits the introduction of hearsay into evidence unless an exception applies. Rule 803 provides 23 exceptions to the rule. Rule 804 provides five more exception to the rule. Rule 807 provides a final residual exception. So, in proceedings where the hearsay rule applies there are 31 main exceptions to the general rule, in addition to the argument that the general rule does not apply, but this still excludes lots of statements. Rule 201 (judicial notice) is another exception. Some of the main reasons to admit hearsay are that: It is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted (e.g. to prove the someone was present and talking at a place not that what they said was true, or to prove that someone said something defamatory or fraudulent, or to prove the someone made a &quot;verbal act&quot; with legal significance like agreeing to a contract or ordering someone to do something). It is a statement of a party opponent or someone affiliated with a party opponent (i.e. someone affiliated with the other side in the lawsuit or criminal case). It is a prior statement of a person made under oath and subject to cross-examination. It is a business record or public record or an &quot;ancient document&quot; (currently ancient means before 1998 in the federal courts, and typically more than twenty-years old in the state courts). It is a market quotation. It is a statement made describing things &quot;in the moment&quot;, for medical diagnosis, or when the facts were fresh in the &quot;declarant's&quot; mind. It pertains to rights in real property, or to family relationships. It is a statement contrary to the interests of the person making it. It is a statement made when the declarant's death was believed to be imminent (i.e. a dying declaration). It is a statement made against someone who caused the witness to be unavailable. There are reasons that the statement is reliable and the intent to provide the statement is cleared with the court in advance. The matter upon which a statement is made is of general public knowledge not reasonably subject to dispute, is easily confirmed without doubt by a court, or is from a learned treatise. Hearsay objections are also waived if a timely objection isn't made to them. See Federal Rule of Evidence 103. And, courts have some discretion to allow hearsay testimony on immaterial matters or matters that are not seriously disputed in the case for expediency's sake. Rules 104(a) (excluding preliminary matters) and 1101 set forth when the hearsay rule applies and when it does not. Rule 1101 excludes from the rule a variety of preliminary matters, mostly in criminal cases such as: grand-jury proceedings extradition or rendition; issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; a preliminary examination in a criminal case; sentencing; granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. Rule 805 governs the complicated situation of hearsay within hearsay. Rule 806 coordinates the hearsay rule with rules on how it is proper to introduce evidence about the credibility of a witness. There is also a constitutional rule of criminal procedure, called the &quot;confrontation right&quot; that established minimum standards for the exclusion of hearsay evidence in criminal trials even when a court's procedural rules do not exclude it. Most states also have a hearsay rule pertaining to oral promises made by dead people called the dead man's statute, and limitations on introducing oral statements related to written agreements called respectively, the parole evidence rule and the statute of frauds. In contrast, in the U.K. courts, roughly speaking, hearsay is generally admissible when the person making the underlying hearsay statement is available to testify, or is unavailable, which subsumes a large share of the U.S. hearsay rule, and makes much more hearsay admissible. U.K. practice would also allow admission of almost anything without a U.S. hearsay exception since they are derived from British common law evidence rules related to hearsay. The main purpose of the hearsay rule is to prevent a defendant in a criminal case or lawsuit from being denied an ability to cross-examine witnesses in court because they would like to present evidence by affidavit or letter instead, effectively placing that burden on the prosecution in criminal cases, or on a plaintiff in simple civil cases, rather than forcing the defendant to pro-actively subpoena witnesses for the other side in the case. The rule has a broader sweep than that, but that is its core purpose.
A non-lawyer can bring torts committed against them in their own name as pro se parties in their own name. They cannot sue for torts committed against others including entities in which they are officers, or persons for whom they are guardians, nor can they represent someone else in their efforts to do so. A handbook written for California judges does not anywhere suggest a greater limitation than that. Neither does a guide for pro se parties in federal courts in California (see also here). Labor law and civil rights claims are routinely filed pro se in California's federal courts. California's state courts have standard court forms for pro se parties to use in state court to sue for torts like personal injury and fraud. The comment that: &quot;[L]ay people can't prosecute [torts] in California&quot;, appears to be not literally true. Either the implied meaning was that they cannot prosecute torts committed against someone other than themselves, or the comment was mistaken. It is also possible that the person making the comment meant that it was not as a practical matter possible to be successful in doing so because it is so difficult. There may be a limited exception for law students in a legal clinic working under the supervision of a law school professor.
It is the lower courts' interpretation of a senior court's judgment&mdash;specifically the ratio&mdash;that determines what is the precedent. If a court doesn't want its opinion to bind lower courts, it can be clear in its judgment that this is not what was intended. For example, a court could say that this judgment turns on the particular facts of this case, and should be interpreted narrowly by lower courts. Alternatively, a previous precedent could be narrowed by a later judgment of a senior court if it was later felt that the ratio was being applied too widely. (I have read examples of the explicitly narrow ratio, but haven't been able to find any today)