How is it legal for the US miltary to decide to help a film maker based on the script? According to this article on TV Tropes and this article in The Guardian, the US military will provide facilities to film makers, as well as advice to help them get the details right. However this is on condition that the film portrays the military in a positive light. There's a catch — a Department of Defense project officer will keep an eagle eye on the script and production phases. If they don't like the portrayal of the military in your film, they will yank the co-operation. This was a major reason for the failure of the TV series Supercarrier. Other movies DoD rejected include Forrest Gump (because the army protagonist was stupid), Mars Attacks! (because everyone was stupid), and Independence Day. However the First Amendment prohibits the government from making such decisions based on the content of the speech. The first amendment reads: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. According to this article on Viewpoint Discrimination: Viewpoint discrimination is a form of content discrimination particularly disfavored by the courts. When the government engages in content discrimination, it is restricting speech on a given subject matter. When it engages in viewpoint discrimination, it is singling out a particular opinion or perspective on that subject matter for treatment unlike that given to other viewpoints. Later on the article cites a particular case: In Rosenberger, the Court held that a student religious journal at the University of Virginia was entitled to the same subsidy from student activity funds received by secular student journals. The Court concluded that the university’s policy of withholding the subsidy from student religious journals was a form of viewpoint discrimination: "[T]he University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints..." The DOD behaviour would seem precisely parallel to that of the University of Virginia in Rosenberger, in that it does not exclude criticism of the military as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those films with critical viewpoints. How is the selection of movies for support by the DOD not a form of viewpoint discrimination? Edit: Government Speech Doctrine A couple of responses have raised the government speech doctrine. This allows the government to make statements that are not content-neutral, and to pay others to do the same. The doctrine was first defined in a case where government subsidies for medical clinics included a condition that the clinics not provide advice about abortion. The Supreme Court held that since the government was paying for the doctors to give advice it could require them to say or not say anything it wanted. However this would seem to be in clear contradiction with the Rosenberger case mentioned above, where the government (through the University of Virginia) was prohibited from putting a viewpoint condition on its subsidies to student journals. In Matal vs Tam the Supreme Court followed a three-part test to determine if a particular instance of speech is by the government or not: Does the medium have a history of use to convey messages by the government? In the case of popular films where the government is not clearly identified as the maker this would seem to be false. The customary "the producers would like to thank..." at the end of the credits is insufficient to override this. Does the government maintain direct control over the messages conveyed? This is a grey area; the Guardian article above seems to show the DOD having veto power over aspects of the scripts, but paradoxically the fact that the film makers could always choose to walk away and make the film without government help seems to suggest that this control is only indirect. "Direct control" would mean the DOD themselves writing a script and then hiring film makers and actors to produce it. Does the public closely identify the message with the government? Again this would seem to be false. People go to a film to see a good story, not to listen to government propaganda, and the films in question do not advertise themselves as presenting the government point of view. So the claim that a film which receives DOD assistance is thereby deemed to have been made by the government does not seem to stack up. At the very least it would be a significant expansion of the government speech doctrine.
This question is addressed in "Viewpoint Discrimination in the Military's Filmmaker Assistance Program and the First Amendment", Communication Law and Policy 19:3 (paywall). Support of media is enabled under a DoD policy "Assistance to Non-Government, Entertainment-Oriented Picture, Television, and Video Productions" (version available in the wild here), which states that [W]hen cooperation of the producers with the Government results in benefitting the Department of Defense or when this would be in the best national interest, based on consideration of the following factors: 3.1.1 The production must be authentic in its portrayal of actual persons, places, military operations, and historical events. Fictional portrayals must depict a feasible interpretation of military life, operations, and policies. 3.1.2. The production is of informational value and considered to be in the best interest of public understanding of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Department of Defense. 3.1.3. The production may provide services to the general public relating to, or enhancing, the U.S. Armed Forces recruiting and retention programs. 3.1.4. The production should not appear to condone or endorse activities by private citizens or organizations when such activities are contrary to U.S. Government policy It should be noted that the policy has not been challenged in court. As the author observes, "[t]he military has a legitimate need to engage in advertising and public relations, as it needs to promote a positive image to attract and retain personnel for an all-volunteer military service, as well as for other purposes". The author observes that the Supreme Court has noted that "'judicial deference… is at its apogee' when Congress legislates under its authority to raise and support armies," which is granted to Congress in the Constitution. that is, one should expect deference to the military by the courts. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, which held that The First Amendment does not prohibit the challenged regulation from being applied to petitioner, even though its effect is to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his religious beliefs. That Amendment does not require the military to accommodate such practices as wearing a yarmulke in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by dress regulations. A general law prohibiting wearing of a yarmulke in public would be tossed out on 1st Amendment grounds in a heartbeat: but the military enjoys not well defined latitude to restrict expression. For example, exclusions of protests on military bases has been upheld (US v. Apel, which kicked the the First Amendment can down the road). One possibilitiy is that the court may engage in forum analysis (Cornelius v. NAACP Leg. Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, see also Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666) as a means of determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes Public streets would be a public forum: the nature of military facilities is the threshold question. If a limited or nonpublic forum is involved, a restriction on speech may be valid if it is reasonable and viewpoint neutral (Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings College of Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661). Military bases fall in the nonpublic forum category. This is one prong of reasoning possible (which the author does not endorse), that in a nonpublic forum it is reasonable to consider the purpose of the underlying program. The author observes that "[u]nder an unconstitutional conditions analysis, a court would need to find that the restriction on speech at issue -- not presenting the military in a negative light -- only applies within the confines of the program itself. Along with that, the program must allow producers to engage in such speech outside of the program. That is the case here, as producers are free to make productions that are critical of the military, or that portray it in a negative light, just without the full support provided to producers who portray the military more positively". The court in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 found that When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles...it was not constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as Communism and Fascism. ... when the government appropriates public funds to establish a program, it is entitled to define the limits of that program. Under the assistance program, the military does not place "a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program" (Rust at 197). Producers can be critical of the military in their productions, but have no constitutional right to do so while being assisted by the government. The final answer is far from obvious: perhaps someone will sue and we can get a definitive answer.
There's no question about what was done or who did it, but there appears to be a jurisdictional mess: the host country won't prosecute because everyone involved, on both the victim and perpetrator sides, is a US citizen and it took place on a US military base, and the military can't prosecute because the perpetrator is a civilian who is not subject to the UCMJ. The host country probably has jurisdiction because a military base, unlike an embassy, is not generally immune from domestic criminal law jurisdiction, although the host country is within its rights to decline to exercise that authority and the status of forces treaty with that country would control. The belief that the military cannot prosecute the perpetrator under the Uniform Code of Military Justice because the perpetrator is a civilian who is not subject to the UCMJ is mistaken, and the easiest way to address the issue may be to point this out to the responsible JAG officers and commanding officers with jurisdiction over the case. Generally speaking, as set forth more fully below, the UCMJ does apply to civilians on military bases. See 10 USC 802(a)(11) and 10 USC 802(a)(12). There is also probably U.S. civilian criminal law that is applicable to civilians on a military base much like other federal territories. Historically, these offenses could be presided over in ambassadorial courts of the U.S. ambassador to the country in question, but the current practice is for such prosecutions to be made by the Justice Department before a U.S. District Court judge (I believe from the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, although I may be mistaken on that point). Who Is Subject To The UCMJ? Section 802 of Title 10, set forth in the block quote below expressly states who is subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Mostly, the UCMJ applies to members of the U.S. military, broadly defined, with some of the potentially close cases described with specificity. A lot of the detail in this definition goes to the issue of when non-active duty military personnel (1) are subject to the UCMJ, (2) are subject to state versions of the UMCJ in lieu of the UCMJ, or (3) are not subject to the UCMJ at all. The UCMJ also applies to some civilians and people who belong to other military forces, most of which involve (1) people who are civilian employees of the military or civilian military contractors, (2) civilians and members of foreign militaries who are traveling with the military or present on military bases, and (3) prisoners of war broadly defined. These exception cases are emphasized in bold in the blockquote setting forth 10 USC § 802 below. (a) The following persons are subject to this chapter: (1) Members of a regular component of the armed forces, including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their terms of enlistment; volunteers from the time of their muster or acceptance into the armed forces; inductees from the time of their actual induction into the armed forces; and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order to obey it. (2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen. (3) Members of a reserve component while on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States only when in Federal service. (4) Retired members of a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay. (5) Retired members of a reserve component who are receiving hospitalization from an armed force. (6) Members of the Fleet Reserve and Fleet Marine Corps Reserve. (7) Persons in custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial. (8) Members of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Public Health Service, and other organizations, when assigned to and serving with the armed forces. (9) Prisoners of war in custody of the armed forces. (10) In time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field. (11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. (12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is under the control of the Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States and outside the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. (13) Individuals belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done at Geneva August 12, 1949 (6 UST 3316), who violate the law of war. (b) The voluntary enlistment of any person who has the capacity to understand the significance of enlisting in the armed forces shall be valid for purposes of jurisdiction under subsection (a) and a change of status from civilian to member of the armed forces shall be effective upon the taking of the oath of enlistment. (c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person serving with an armed force who— (1) submitted voluntarily to military authority; (2) met the mental competency and minimum age qualifications of sections 504 and 505 of this title at the time of voluntary submission to military authority; (3) received military pay or allowances; and (4) performed military duties; is subject to this chapter until such person’s active service has been terminated in accordance with law or regulations promulgated by the Secretary concerned. (d)(1) A member of a reserve component who is not on active duty and who is made the subject of proceedings under section 815 (article 15) or section 830 (article 30) with respect to an offense against this chapter may be ordered to active duty involuntarily for the purpose of— (A) a preliminary hearing under section 832 of this title (article 32); (B) trial by court-martial; or (C) nonjudicial punishment under section 815 of this title (article 15). (2) A member of a reserve component may not be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) except with respect to an offense committed while the member was— (A) on active duty; or (B) on inactive-duty training, but in the case of members of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States only when in Federal service. (3) Authority to order a member to active duty under paragraph (1) shall be exercised under regulations prescribed by the President. (4) A member may be ordered to active duty under paragraph (1) only by a person empowered to convene general courts-martial in a regular component of the armed forces. (5) A member ordered to active duty under paragraph (1), unless the order to active duty was approved by the Secretary concerned, may not— (A) be sentenced to confinement; or (B) be required to serve a punishment consisting of any restriction on liberty during a period other than a period of inactive-duty training or active duty (other than active duty ordered under paragraph (1)). (e) The provisions of this section are subject to section 876b(d)(2) of this title (article 76b(d)(2))
From Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). The sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes, or, indeed, is merely capable of substantial noninfringing uses. [...] there is a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would not object to having their broadcast time-shifted by private viewers (i.e., recorded at a time when the VTR owner cannot view the broadcast so that it can be watched at a later time); and (2) that there is no likelihood that time-shifting would cause nonminimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, respondents' copyrighted works. The VTR's are therefore capable of substantial noninfringing uses. Private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home satisfies this standard of noninfringing uses both because respondents have no right to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing such time-shifting for their programs and because the District Court's findings reveal that even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' programs is legitimate fair use. [...] we must conclude that this record amply supports the District Court's conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use. This is distinguishable from downloading movies because in the case of videotape or PVR recording, the copyright owner authorized the broadcast, and private, non-commercial time-shifting at home has been held to be fair use. When downloading a movie, the copyright owner did not authorize the communication, and copying movies by downloading them from an unauthorized source is not generally considered fair use. One policy reason why this difference might make sense is that when time-shifting, you are usually paying for the channels, and they are in turn paying the copyright owner for the permission to transmit their work. However, this is only a guess, and not really relevant to your legal question.
Let's look at the Ur-example of a free-speech law, and the most wide-ranging, the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. It says (my emphasis): Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. This limitation applies only to the government. Indeed, it has been argued that this limitation only applies to the legislative branch of government and not to the executive (except when exercising legislatively delegated power) or judicial branches. Certainly, the courts have held that it is within their power to issue "gag" restraining orders. Notwithstanding, it imposes no restrictions on how non-government actors can limit your free speech. The owner of a shopping centre can require you not to evangelise, the owner of a stadium can require you not to use offensive language and the owner of a social media platform can restrict your speech in any way they wish. You have a right to talk - they have a right not to give you a platform.
At least in the United States (and I'm pretty sure this is true around the world), facts and information cannot be copyrighted. Just because a work is copyrighted, doesn't mean every part of that work is copyrighted, and factual information conveyed by the work is a part which is not subject to copyright. Copyright on a collection of facts is limited to the selection and arrangement of those facts, and only if that selection and arrangement has some bare minimum amount of originality. See Feist v. Rural, 499 U.S. 340. In this case, it looks at first glance like the person who made that site made their own selection of which materials and which sources would be included; the one place where they really seem to have copied their selection is from glass catalogs with datasheets from specific manufacturers, who would have a hard time arguing that "everything we manufacture in this widely-recognized class of substances" is an original selection. What the author of the website has done is relinquish his rights in his selection and arrangement of the data. In some places, there are other rights besides copyright that do apply to databases; for instance, the EU recognizes database rights to protect significant investment in compiling a database of stuff. But the US does not have that concept. For citing stuff, that's not really a legal question, and has more to do with academic standards. Ask your adviser or teacher if you have one.
It is a vanishingly small possibility. First, someone would need to bring a case that an appropriation for the Air Force was unconstitutional. A Federal court is unlikely to find that it is because: The constitution would be interpreted broadly where the thing being considered did not exist when it was ratified. That is, the court would consider if, had the Air Force existed the drafters of the constitution would have wanted it governed by the Federal government or the State governments. Almost certainly they would decide on the Federal government. The Air Force is a direct descendent of the Army - originally being the United States Army Air Force. As such, an alternative line of reasoning for the court is that the army contemplated by the constitution consists of both the Army and the Air Force - the fact that they have been split is not relevant.
No The term "sword and shield" is allegorical rather than legal and may be called up in any number of contexts. Such as ... Waiver of privilege In the particular instance, Anthem was claiming that the reports were privileged and hence protected from discovery, presumably because they were prepared in contemplation of litigation - this litigation, one supposes. However, privilege is lost or waived if the privileged information is disclosed, as it was by relying on the conclusion of the report in its defense. As such, the entire suite of reports is no longer protected. Basically, if you want to keep privilege you have to keep what is privileged secret. Note, the could have lost privilege if they had disclosed the findings of the report in any way such as by press release or by simply leaving the document in a public place. In this context, the judge is stating that they cannot use the "shield" of privilege to protect a report that they have used as a "sword" to make a attack their opponent.
LegalZoom did not get it wrong. The case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission was under Colorado law (hence it was against the Colorado Civil Rights Commission), not federal law. LZ stated that 20 states have enacted laws against discrimination based on sexual orientation, and Colorado is one of those states. The issue was heard by SCOTUS because the plaintiff raised claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, hence he could make a federal case of it. A prior case (Azucar Bakery) cited by LZ was about refusing to make a cake with anti-gay slogans, and was decided by the commission. Here is a brief filed by that plaintiff in that and two related cases, arguing a pattern of religious discrmination. LZ got it mildly wrong in saying "the court ruled that this was not discrimination because...", because the case did not go to court, it ended at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The second case appears to refer to Charge No. CP2018011310 a complaint filed against Masterpiece, where the same commission found probable cause for an anti-discrimination proceeding. In that proceeding, the Colorado Civil Rights Division finds that complainant Scardina "adequately shows that the Respondent's reason is pretext". This led to a complaint against the commission in US District Court (Civil Action No. 18-cv-02074-WYD-STV). There was a motion to dismiss which had partial success, but which was not about the substance of the case (it had to do with immunity, standing, abstention doctrines). The case was later dismissed, because the parties settled. So at no point did a court rule on the substance of the "pretext" issue – on this point, I think LZ overstated the significance of the commission's decision.