Adverse Possession: Chaplin v Sanders The “hostility/claim of right” element of adverse possession requires only that the claimant treat the land as his own as against the world throughout the statutory period. 183The nature of his possession will be determined solely on the basis of the manner in which he treats the property. His subjective belief regarding his true interest in the land and his intent to dispossess or not dispossess another is irrelevant to this determination. Under this analysis, permission to occupy the land, given by the true title owner to the claimant or his predecessors in interest, will still operate to negate the element of hostility. The traditional presumptions still apply to the extent that they are not inconsistent with this ruling. Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d at 436. My question is regarding the bolded portion of the case. Here, when it says negate does it mean that the hostility element no longer applies? Or does it mean that there is a failure to meet this element?
It means: if I give you permission to occupy my property then you are not occupying it with "hostility" and adverse possession will not come into effect providing that we both remain within the terms of our agreement for your occupation.
The phrase in question is clarifying that if the wall (excluding the support) is on one person's property, and the support crosses into another person's property, then it is not a party fence wall. Why make this clarification, given that if a wall doesn't stand "on lands of different owners", it can't be a party wall anyway? Architect's Legal Handbook: The Law for Architects suggests that this is because there is a different rule for walls which separate buildings, hence the need to highlight the difference (emphasis mine): ...rights of adjoining owners do not arise where only the foundations project on the to the adjoining land if the wall concerned is a boundary wall, not being part of a building, but they do arise if such a wall separates buildings belonging to different owners.
The Theft Act 1968 replaces the Larceny Act 1916, which replaces in part the Larceny Act 1901, ad nauseum. In the current act, the exception is accomplished in the definitions section. Redefinition is a device commonly used by legislatures to clarify intent, where traditional wording does/did not express the desired prohibition. In addition, a special definition excluding a case makes it easier to define the general rule. To be certain, one would need a historical record of legislative discussion (and I suspect that there is no record), but it is reasonably likely that it was not previously against the (common) law to pick a wild blackberry for a snack. A reading of various prior versions of the larceny statutes suggests that it was never a crime to pick a wild blackberry, instead the crime was taking cultivated goods (which a person put some effort or resources into creating), and destroying resources on a person's land. Those are the kinds of actions explicitly identified in the prior statutes. §4(3) does state a traditional view of "property" (which is why it's in the "property" section), and would have the (presumptively desired) effect without complicating other parts of the statute. Moreover, s1(3)(a-b) of the 1916 act conveys similar "exceptionality". Norwegian theft law has a similar provision Tilegnelse av naturprodukter, herunder stein, kvister, vekster mv., av liten eller ingen økonomisk verdi under utøvelse av lovlig allemannsrett, straffes likevel ikke Appropriation of natural products, including stones, twigs, vegetation etc. with little or no economic value (taken) under the exercise of the legal right to roam is not punished
The earliest I know of is Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (N.C. Super. 1787), which dealt with a North Carolina statute that confiscated land held by British subjects and required the courts to dismiss any lawsuits attempting to reclaim confiscated property. The North Carolina Superior Court held that because the state constitution conferred a right to a jury on questions of property ownership, the legislature could not require the courts to dismiss lawsuits requesting such a resolution to property disputes: By the Constitution every citizen has a right to a decision in regard to his property by a trial by jury. The act of Assembly, therefore, of 1785, requiring the Court to dismiss on motion the suits brought by persons whose property had been confiscated against the purchasers, on affidavit of the defendants that they were purchasers from the commissioners of confiscated property, is unconstitutional and void. So the British subject was entitled to a trial, but the admission that he was a British subject meant that he was an alien and enemy of the government, and therefore not permitted to hold property.
Is entry into the yard subject to 24 hour notice? Most likely it is. Note that section § 47-8-3 defines both dwelling unit and premises. The latter encompasses the term &quot;appurtenances&quot;, which the Black's Law Dictionary defines, inter alia, as &quot;an adjunct; an appendage; [...] garden [...]&quot;. At least in the context of fenced backyard, the fact that § 47-8-3 defines dwelling unit and premises separately does not exclude &quot;premises&quot; from the scope of § 47-8-15. That is because the fence is &quot;a structure [...] or part of a structure [...] that is used as a home, residence&quot;. Indeed, the existence of the fence suggests that the backyard is intended for only that tenant's exclusive use/enjoyment, with the implications it has on tenant's privacy.
Maybe I'm reading Walsh wrong, but it seems to me to be saying that Stout might apply in some cases, but it doesn't in that specific case. I think you are indeed reading it wrong. In the Walsh case, the court says: We have not had occasion to decide the question up to this time, but now that it is presented, we not only reiterate the doubt which we expressed in the McAlpin case (supra), but we think that the question of the defendant's negligence was erroneously submitted to the jury in the Stout case, and that we ought not to follow it as a precedent. It's clearly repudiating Stout here, and not just as it applies to that case. It literally says they think it should not be followed as precedent.
In Robinson v. Mandell, the authenticity of a mutual will was in question. Hetty Green (Robinson) claimed that her aunt (Howland) intended to disinherit the father of Robinson and requested that they were both to make a will, so that in case Howland predeceased Robinson but Robinson predeceased her father, the latter would not obtain anything derived from Howland's estate via Robinson. At the centre of the case is the allegation that it was at the same time mutually agreed between the parties that the respective wills, so to be made, were to be exchanged, and that each was to have possession of the will of the other, and that neither was to make any other will without notifying the other, and returning the other's will so to be held in exchange. This is essentially a contract between (at the time) two living persons, and at least at the time, generally enforceable unless there exist motives to nullify the contract. Of course, the parties can also revoke the contracts according to the rules in the contract or provided by statutes. The court made the following observation (among others): Where two persons agree each with the other to make mutual wills, and both execute the agreement, it is held that neither can properly revoke his will without giving notice to the other of such revocation. The death of one of the parties in such a case carries his part of the contract into execution, and the better opinion perhaps is, that the other party, after that event, if the agreement was definite and satisfactory, cannot rescind the contract. The particular contract here would be irrevocably executed by one party due to her death and the contract is definitive and cannot be changed. However, in this case, it was decided against Robinson because the existence of the mutual will was not proved. By contrast, a traditional will is a unilateral declaration made by the testator, who in general cannot bind their future self from making another legally valid decision overriding the previous will, unless another party's interests are adversely impacted under certain conditions (e.g. under proprietary estoppel) or the law provides otherwise in that jurisdiction. Nowadays in Massachusetts, the statutes provide for methods to revoke a will as well as contracts regarding the making or non-making of a will that could make certain wills irrevocable. Section 2–507. [Revocation by Writing or by Act.] (a) A will or any part thereof is revoked: (1) by executing a subsequent will that revokes the previous will or part expressly or by inconsistency; or (2) by performing a revocatory act on the will, if the testator performed the act with the intent and for the purpose of revoking the will or part or if another individual performed the act in the testator's conscious presence and by the testator's direction. For purposes of this paragraph, ''revocatory act on the will'' includes burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying the will or any part of it. (b) If a subsequent will does not expressly revoke a previous will, the execution of the subsequent will wholly revokes the previous will by inconsistency if the testator intended the subsequent will to replace rather than supplement the previous will. (c) The testator is presumed to have intended a subsequent will to replace rather than supplement a previous will if the subsequent will makes a complete disposition of the testator's estate. If this presumption arises and is not rebutted, the previous will is revoked; only the subsequent will is operative on the testator's death. (d) The testator is presumed to have intended a subsequent will to supplement rather than replace a previous will if the subsequent will does not make a complete disposition of the testator's estate. If this presumption arises and is not rebutted, the subsequent will revokes the previous will only to the extent the subsequent will is inconsistent with the previous will; each will is fully operative on the testator's death to the extent they are not inconsistent. Section 2–514. [Contracts Concerning Succession.] A contract to make or not to make a will or devise, or to revoke or not to revoke a will or devise, or to die intestate, if executed after the effective date of this article, may be established only by (i) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the contract, (ii) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic evidence proving the terms of the contract, or (iii) a writing signed by the decedent evidencing the contract. The execution of a joint will or mutual wills shall not create a presumption of a contract not to revoke the will or wills.
I'm based in England, but I'm sure the principle is similar in Canada. The night club or concert venue is private property. When someone owns or rents private property one of the main things they are buying is the right to control who is present on that property, and generally they can use reasonable force to remove people who are not authorised. Security guards generally act as agents for a property owner, tenant or similar.