Does US law make a distinction between fair and unfair discrimination? In South Africa the term fair/unfair discrimination is often used to illustrate between lawful and unlawful discrimination. I get annoyed when they have the anti racism campaigns in English football when they say that society has to eradicate all forms of discrimination. I think they may mean all forms of unfair discrimination but it still seems ignorant to what discrimination really means. There was a landmark case in the Western Cape where a rich wine farm was left in a will to the land owner's nephews. The land owner's 5 daughters sought to have the will deemed invalid because the daughters believed it was discriminated based on gender, because right or wrongly the land owner believed farming was a man's job. After years of litigation the SA courts said that although the sister was indeed discriminated against that it does not invalidate a will. People are free to leave their possession in a will in accordance with any reason they may choose. In effect deeming it fair discrimination. Also noting an inheritance is a gift and nobody has a right to it. So in closing, I would like to know if the US system has a similar concept of fair and unfair discrimination. If they even use those words. After all you discriminate against Pepsi everytime you buy Coke.
In the United States, what is &quot;fair&quot; and &quot;unfair&quot; is typically not a legal question, in large part because it is so subjective. There are some exceptions -- such as in copyright law or competition law -- but in the discrimination context, we use the lawful/unlawful distinction. Bequeathing a house to your child solely because he is your child, for instance, is not fair but it is lawful. The same is true for giving more to your oldest child simply for being the oldest, or cutting a black relative out of your will: not fair, but lawful. Assuming there's a valid will, a court will rarely make a serious inquiry into the fairness of the decedent's discrimination among beneficiaries. The same types of issues come up in contexts that are more routine subjects of discrimination law. In employment, for instance, you might have two employees: a lazy white salesman who's been around for 20 years and a new black woman who does an excellent job answering the phones. If you only have enough money to give one raise, giving it to the black woman is both fair and lawful. Giving it to the white guy because he's been around longer is probably not fair but still lawful, while giving it to him strictly because he's white is probably neither fair nor lawful. The inutility of the fair/unfair distinction can become especially clear in the affirmative-action context, where the question of fairness remains hotly debated. If an employer has two equally qualified candidates, would it be fair to require him to choose a black applicant over a white applicant as a means of redressing centuries of discrimination against blacks? What if the black applicant is only marginally less qualified? What if the black applicant is far less qualified? There are many who think each of these would be fair, and there are many who think none of them would be. In the end, then, the courts tend only to ask whether discrimination is lawful, which can usually be resolved by applying the facts to the law, leaving questions about what is fair to lawmakers and commentators.
Is blocking certain people while allowing everybody else to view some content discrimination Yes. and violate anti-discrimination laws Probably not, at least in the US. There is no federal law prohibiting "discrimination" in general. There are specific laws regarding discrimination against certain groups in certain contexts. They would probably not apply to an individual determining who is allowed to view their social media posts. That said, there are some specific contexts where this might be illegal. They would generally involve non-personal use of the account. The courts recently ruled that Donald Trump may not block people on his Twitter account, because he's using it in an official presidential capacity rather than just his individual capacity. Also, racial discrimination in housing is illegal, so if you're selling your house and you block all black people from viewing your house photos, that would probably be illegal as well. Also is not being able to consume information available on a public platform a violation against right to freedom. I'm not sure what you think a "right to freedom" would entail. But I don't think you have the right to demand that a person allow you to access their social media accounts.
The dichotomy between solicitors and barristers in the UK isn't one based on verbal definitions in the English language. In other words, the fact that barristers argue and solicitors don't isn't something that's inherent to the words, it's just how British law decided to divide it. Since those countries with solicitor generals don't have this dichotomy, they generally don't have anything actually called a barrister, and there's no reason why the solicitor general couldn't be called that, since solicitor doesn't require that he not argue in court.
Justice Gorsuch attempts to explain (at p. 20 of his concurrence): In the years following Bakke, this Court hewed to Justice Powell's and Justice Brennan's shared premise that Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause mean the same thing. ... As a result, for over four decades, every case about racial preferences in school admissions under Title VI has turned into a case about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. A journalist's account on scotusblog also notes that the tests under Title VI and under the 14th amendment have been understood as identical: Private universities like Harvard are not subject to the 14th Amendment, but Title VI applies the same test to private universities that receive federal funds, as Harvard does. See also commentary from a law firm blog in 2022: Harvard, as a private university, is not explicitly regulated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the case against Harvard relies on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits any entity receiving federal financial assistance – as Harvard does – from discriminating on the basis of “race, color, or national origin.” The Supreme Court has held that Title VI’s protections match those of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and thus, the analyses are essentially identical. I read the majority reasons to be a continuance of this conflated meaning. In footnote 2, Chief Justice Roberts is careful to say that the Court is evaluating Harvard's admissions program &quot;under the standards of the Equal Protection Clause&quot; (emphasis mine), rather than stating that the Equal Protection Clause applies against Harvard. Later, he does slip back into language that could be read as suggesting the Equal Protection Clause is being applied directly: &quot;For the reasons provided above, the Harvard and UNC admissions programs cannot be reconciled with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause,&quot; but a better reading is that he is merely recognizing that Title VI imports the same guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Gorsuch would prefer to re-introduce the analytical clarity about the source of the constraints.
I will assume B.C. as your specific jurisdiction: there could be provincial differences. As phoog says, you certainly may mention this problem to management, who have an interest in keeping you happy. No law against that. As for the "legality" of sexual harassment, the CBA BC branch says that "Sexual harassment, which is discrimination based on sex, is illegal under the BC Human Rights Code". It is interesting to see what the code actually says. Section 8 Discrimination in accommodation, service and facility says (1) A person must not, without a bona fide and reasonable justification, (a) deny to a person or class of persons any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public, or (b) discriminate against a person or class of persons regarding any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or class of persons. The question is whether using the term "babe" constitutes discrimination against a person regarding service because of sex. This article on the Law Society of BC web site specifically identifies "verbal harassment" as an instance: Verbal harassment – This comes from anyone within the firm and or other workplace or a person who does business with the firm or company. Some examples are: referring to an adult as a babe, honey, girl or stud; whistling at someone; turning work discussion to sexual topics; asking personal questions of a sexual nature; making sexual comments about a person’s clothing, anatomy or looks; or asking someone repeatedly for dates and refusing to take no for an answer. (emphasis added). In case you're thinking that maybe there's a difference in what the code says regarding services and what it says regarding employment, section 13 Discrimination in Employment says: (1) A person must not (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person, or (b) discriminate against a person regarding employment or any term or condition of employment because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, political belief, religion, marital status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation or age of that person or because that person has been convicted of a criminal or summary conviction offence that is unrelated to the employment or to the intended employment of that person. In other words, it is defined simply in terms of "discrimination", which means "making a distinction". It is known that unwanted sexual advances constitute illegal discrimination, see Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] 1 SCR 1252. The court found that Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Sexual harassment in the workplace is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that detrimentally affects the work environment or leads to adverse job‑related consequences for the victims of the harassment. They did not, however, find that this is the only form of sexual discrimination (obviously, since it isn't). I can't point to case law indicating whether gender-biased expression are actionable, but that would be consistent with the letter of the law and "babe" is indeed an example cited in the Law Society article.
Your bank is not discriminating against you. Your reasons for not having the required amount of funds pass thru your account has nothing to do with your marital status. In general, it's problematic to make a chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination. For example. Your argument is analogous to the following. My boss fired me for being late to work. But I was late to work because my child woke up late and missed the school bus; so I had to drive her to school. Therefore, my boss fired me for having children. That type of chain-of-cause-and-effect argument for discrimination just doesn't hold water. It is non sequitur and a requires a leap of logic.
Washington State is an "At Will" employment state meaning that, with exception to some protected classes and bargaining, the employer may terminate the employee for any reason the employer can cite, or no reason at all. If the firm used it as a benefit of the job but it wasn't agreed upon on the contract, its not a deception as if you can hold the job to the down season, you have less work to do. If a promise was made for employment into the down season during the negotiating of the job, and this was documented, it could be. It could be that he did all the work required of him, but another higher went above and beyond and he got the ax because he was the newest and the lesser performer. Either way, the employer is well within their right to fire an employee for any reason they choose absent discrimination based on protected class status.
Without prejudice in a legal communication has a similar effect as off the record does in journalism. Without prejudice can be applied to any form of communication written or verbal; mediations, for example, are almost always conducted on a without prejudice basis. The legal effect is that anything said or written in the communication is inadmissible in a court. A typical example is in a settlement offer: "We have your claim for $1,000,000 and we think its a load of c**p for reasons A, B &amp; C, however, without prejudice we offer the amount of $3.50 as full and final settlement of your claim. This offer remains open for 7 days." The party that receives such a letter can not use or rely on anything it says in legal proceedings. It is a practical and invaluable method of allowing real negotiation and concessions to be made without the risk that these will be used against you if it all falls in a heap and you end up in court. Without prejudice, save as to costs has the same effect with the addition that you are specifically making a settlement offer (like my example above). If a matter is resolved by a trial the judge will award costs either against each one party or order that each party pays their own costs; in general, the costs "follow the event" i.e. the losing party usually gets stuck with the costs. If the "losing" party can show that they made a reasonable offer of settlement then they can apply to have the "winning" party pay their costs from that point on. For example see NSW Costs. Now, a document either is or is not without prejudice irrespective of if it carries the words or not - you can’t make a document that is not part or a bona fide negotiation without prejudice just by writing the words on it and one that is part of a negotiation is without prejudice even if it omits the words.