Difference between 364 and 366 days sentence I just read that a relatively famous US TV personality has been sentenced to 366 days in jail for fraud (hiding about $750,000 in a bankruptcy case). Is there a significant difference between a 366 days and a 364 days sentence (other than the two extra days obviously)? I learned in another question that there can be a significant difference between crimes with a maximum sentence of less than a year and more than a year, independent of the actual sentence, but that's a different situation. In that case "six months sentence for a crime punished with up to one year in jail" and "six months sentence for a crime punished with up to two years in jail" can make a difference.
As explained in the comments, a sentence is more than one year is the operational definition of a felony in many context concerning the collateral consequences of a sentence. For example, a sentence of more than one year causes a person to be deportable, while one of less than one year generally does not. Another consequence is that the offense will count as a prior felony in the event of a new conviction which can result in a much longer sentence for a subsequent offense. In many states, a prior felony means losing the right to vote and the ability to have or obtain a license in many professions. Sentences of more than one year are also generally served in a state prison rather than in a county jail. Both of these factors make a sentence of 366 days significantly more serious than one of 364 days.
Was This An Egregiously Lenient Sentence? Yes. Did he get lighter punishment than he &quot;should have&quot; (in some sense)? Yes. A six month sentence for a non-negligent homicide was virtually unprecedented then and remains extremely low. Even a six month sentence for the rape of an adult woman (which is generally a comparable or less serious offense than manslaughter) by a privileged white offender generates immense controversy today as it did in the case of the sentencing of Brock Turner for that offense in 2016 (something that ultimately cost the judge imposing that sentence his job). There is no way that intentionally hitting someone is negligent homicide. It is at a minimum reckless, and honestly, is hard to see as anything other than intentional conduct. While it wasn't premeditated and hence wouldn't qualify as first degree murder eligible for the death penalty, this would be a fairly straightforward case for a second degree murder charge and a sentence of a decade or more. The intentional part apples to the act of hitting someone, not the result of causing their death. This intent was present here. Where Did The System Fail? in what way did the legal process fail? Or do you think that there was any failure at all in the legal process? Was the substantive law at fault? No. The substantive criminal law in 1963 was very similar to what it is now and would have authorized a much more severe sentence on the crime of conviction and would have made a more serious charge of murder viable. Arguably the substantive law should have had a mandatory minimum sentence for homicide, but since judges very rarely impose such lenient charges for homicide in cases like this one where there was no good reason for leniency, many states don't do that now and it isn't a problem that legislators would reasonably have believed that they had to worry about. Allowing leniency in some extraordinary cases that capture considerations that the law does not expressly mention is often a good thing, rather than a bad one. Did The Appellate Process Fail? No. The defendant's conviction was not wrongfully reversed on appeal, and it is generally not possible for a defendant's sentence to be increased on appeal in these circumstances. Arguably, this is not an ideal rule of law (and it is not the law in most countries in these circumstances). But this was not a major problem with the legal system that was a primary reason causing the outcome in this case to be an exceptional miscarriage of justice. The Judge's Sentence Was An Abuse Of Discretion. The judge imposed a very light sentence within the statutorily allowed range of discretion. While we can't literally read the mind of the judge and the judge doesn't acknowledge this as a basis for the sentence, given a larger pattern of similarly lenient sentences of similarly situated people given light sentences by judges, we can make a very reasonable guess about the most likely and plausible reason for the lenient sentence. The most likely and plausible reason for the sentence is the one identified by Bob Dylan. A high status white man killed a low status black woman, and the judge felt that, as a result, it didn't justify as serious of a sentence. The actual chain of reasoning in the judge's mind consciously may have involved considerations like the view that the victim was an &quot;eggshell&quot; victim, and the likelihood that the defendant was capable of reforming his conduct after a short sentence and thus didn't present a threat to the public. But the courts very rarely grant leniency to someone on the grounds that the victim was &quot;fragile&quot; - usually this justifies a more severe sentence. And the documented fact that the perpetrator routinely assaulted others with his cane casts grave doubt on the extent to which he could be rehabilitated more easily than a typical defendant. Also, even if the charge of conviction was manslaughter, this case would have been considered at the high end of the range in terms of the culpability of the offender who went around assaulting many people at a public gathering seriously enough to cause harm, and to in one case cause a death of a more fragile victim. The sentence should have been at least at the midpoint of what is allowed (currently about five years out of ten possible) in a case like this one. Further, while Maryland is not in the &quot;Deep South&quot; it is a Southern state with a history of slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, and the judge in this case would have lived under and seen enforced to his benefit, Jim Crow laws in Maryland during his lifetime. The Civil Rights movement had not succeeded to the point that racism was a completely disavowed and unacceptable form of motivation in 1963, particularly in even parts of the South outside of the &quot;Deep South&quot; at that time. As a reference point, President Biden, in nearby Delaware, was starting to make a name for himself in politics at the time as a defender of segregation in the school system and an opponent of busing to desegregate schools. This issue got him elected and re-elected. Biden reformed his views later, but racism was alive and well in Chesapeake Bay area at the time. Was Prosecutorial Discretion An Issue? Possibly To Some Extent. The prosecution's decision to press charges for manslaughter rather than murder was also questionable, but less obviously so. Today, common practice would be to bring both murder and manslaughter charges in a case like this one. The facts would have supported a second degree murder charge. The fact that the prosecution originally brought a murder charge suggests that it knew that the facts supported that charge, and was influenced by some political or tactical consideration, or by judicial pressure, to drop the more serious charge before trial. But without insight into what that reason was (which is much less obvious than the judge's motivations) it is hard to judge whether the prosecutor should have acted differently under the circumstances. The fact that the prosecution pressed charges, took the case to trial, and got a conviction at all also suggests that the prosecutor's conduct was not at the bottom of the barrel compared to more racist prosecutor exercises of discretion in 1963 elsewhere in the U.S. The prosecutor had the full legal ability to decline to press charges at all without facing any legal consequences for failing to do so. Further, while it is certainly plausible that prosecutor's racism figured into this decision, it is also important to note that the prosecutor has to consider the attitudes of a likely jury pool when bringing charges. Even if the prosecutor believes that the defendant is guilty of murder under the law, the prosecutor has to consider whether the odds of getting a conviction from a local jury that is likely to have considerable racial bias influences what charges are right to bring in order to get a maximum conviction, as opposed to what charges the prosecutor believes are legally justified. Likewise, if the judge indicated the he would be likely to dismiss the murder charge before trial in a preliminary hearing, that would also make a prosecutor's decision to comply with an implicit judicial suggestion to stay in the judge's good graces for the remainder of this case, and for future cases before the same judge, understandable. However, if electoral public pressure, or the defense counsel's pressure or influence, caused the prosecutor to give up on a murder charge that a conviction would probably have been secured upon, this is much more problematic and would suggest racial and status bias on the part of the prosecuting attorney's office. Was Jury Conduct An Issue? No. The conduct of the jury in this case was not an issue, even though the potential of jury nullification that didn't happen was a factor that may have influenced the charge brought by the prosecution. The jury convicted the defendant on the most serious charge presented to it.
also, what is &quot;cannot be punished on account thereof because they lacked criminal responsibility due to the intoxication or if this cannot be ruled out&quot;? I can not understand This means that if a person, while drunk, does soemthign that would otherwise be a crime, but the person cannot be charged because s/he was too drunk to know that s/he was committing a crime, such a person can insted be charged with having become intoxicated, and given up to the same punishment that would have been given for conviction for doign the unlawful act. For example, if a person damaged property while under the influence of alcohol (drunk), it might be impossible under German law to prosecute for the crime of intentionally damaging property, because one could not prove that the person knew what s/he was doing, and knew that it was criminal. In such a case the person could be charged with having intentionally or carelessly become drunk, but the penalty can't be more than the penalty for having damaged property would have been, nor can it be more than five years. As a practical matter, I think it very unlikely that the police would seek to impose a fine if they didn't issue any ticket or other paperwork at the scene, nor mention any such intention. However, they might be legally able to do so.
We cannot stipulate that a 6 year old does not understand the concepts of life / death / murder / assault, but that stipulation might be baked into the laws of the jurisdiction. In Washington, a child under age 8 is statutorily incapable of committing a crime. Between 8 and 12, there is a statutory presumption that a child is incapable of committing a crime, but that is rebuttable. The statute says &quot;Children under the age of eight years are incapable of committing crime&quot;, and it say nothing about understanding concepts. Florida law used to allow that a 6 year old can commit a crime, then when they arrested a 6 year old, they changed the law. But, the law says A child younger than 7 years of age may not be taken into custody, arrested, charged, or adjudicated delinquent for a delinquent act or violation of law based on an act occurring before he or she reaches 7 years of age, unless the violation of law is a forcible felony as defined in s. 776.08 so a 6 year old can be arrested (charged, tried, convicted) for murder. Virginia does not appear to have any statute declaring 6 year olds to be categorially incapable of committing a crime. The question of capacity is of course a real consideration – insanity remains a defense against criminal charges.
The circuits all over the place on this one but I don't see these facts fitting according to the strictest rule. It is within the discretion of the police to decide whether delaying the arrest of the suspect will help ensnare co-conspirators, as exemplified by this case, will give the police greater understanding of the nature of the criminal enterprise, or merely will allow the suspect enough "rope to hang himself." U.S. V. Garcia 79 F.3d 74 (7th Cir. 1996) See also Hoffa v. United States 385 U.S. 293 (1966) A suspect has no constitutional right to be arrested when the police have probable cause. The police are not required to guess, at their peril, the precise moment at which they have probable cause to arrest a suspect, risking a violation of the Fourth Amendment if they act too soon, and a violation of the Sixth Amendment if they wait too long. Law enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to a criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish probable cause, a quantum of evidence which may fall far short of the amount necessary to support a criminal conviction. EDITING THE ANSWER in light of some comments. Florida recognizes sentence manipulation and outrageous government conduct as defenses. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) Outrageous government conduct and sentencing factor manipulation focus on the government's behavior. Outrageous government conduct occurs when law enforcement obtains a conviction for conduct beyond the defendant's predisposition by employing methods that fail to comport with due process guarantees. Under this standard, the conduct must be so outrageous that it is fundamentally unfair. See United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir.1987) In the Ciszkowski case, the defendant was charged with murder for hire as part of a sting. As part of the sting, the government provided Ciszkowski with the gun. The gun had a silencer, the silencer converted his crime to a more serious offense. Ciszkowski argued that he did not know the gun had a silencer and accused the government of sentence manipulation. He lost. The court tells us that the standard for establishing that the government's conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to constitute sentencing factor manipulation is high as gives us some cases where the court declined the finding. See United States v. Bohannon, 476 F.3d 1246, 1252 (11th Cir.2007 (government's selection of age of "minor" victim for sting operation was not manipulation even though the selected age resulted in enhancement under guideline); United States v. Williams, 456 F.3d 1353, 1370-71 (11th Cir.2006) government's purchase of crack cocaine rather than powder cocaine was not manipulation despite sentencing differential); United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1412-13 (11th Cir.1998) (government informant's selection of a fictitious amount of drugs to be stolen by defendants was not manipulation of the quantity) Now, about this doctor. The reason this is might be troubling is that this doctor might have entrapped the suspect. For example, if the suspect went to the dr and just wanted some aspirin but the dr convinced him to ask for vicodin and pain killers in some excessive amount (I don't know, I do not want to make up facts). This could be entrapment by a citizen acting purely on his own; if this is the case there is no entrapment. See Worley v. State, 848 So. 2d 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) However, when the person making the inducement is acting as an agent of the government, courts may allow an entrapment defense. The government is responsible for the actions of its agents. But keep in mind that you still need to establish both elements of entrapment. Per United States v. Isnadin, No. 12-13474 (Feb. 12, 2014): The entrapment defense involves two separate elements : (1) Government inducement of the crime, and (2) lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant. The defendant bears an initial burden of production to show that the first element, Government inducement, is met. Once the defendant makes this initial showing, the burden shifts to the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. For any of these defenses to work, the guy who was filling the prescription can not have been predisposed to commit the crime except for the actions of the government and its agents inducing him.
The relevant law, Article 175 of the Criminal Code, says A person who distributes, sells or displays in public an obscene document, drawing or other objects shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than 2 years, a fine of not more than 2,500,000 yen or a petty fine. The same shall apply to a person who possesses the same for the purpose of sale. Hence production is not illegal.
There appears to be no specific number of hours. This article touches on the matter, presenting a slew of cases where e.g. the prisoner was on a hunger strike (self-imposed starvation is not cruel and unusual punishment). Gardener v. Beale upheld a 2-meal plan with 18 hours between dinner and brunch to be allowed. This was, however a temporary exception rather than a long term policy which was to provide 3 meals not spaced further apart than 12 hours. There does not seem to be any period deemed to be legally too long, however a prison system may have (probably does) have a policy, which cannot simply be ignored.
It is constitutional to imprison a person for committing a crime, though I suspect that a life sentence for brawling would be held to be cruel and unusual punishment. It's rather hard to tell what punishments will be held to be cruel and unusual, but 2.5 years for involuntary manslaughter is not unusual. The crime of involuntary manslaughter in Massachusetts does not require any physical aiding. It is unlawful killing unintentionally caused by wanton and reckless conduct... Wanton and reckless conduct is intentional conduct that created a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another person.... It is conduct involving a grave risk of harm to another that a person undertakes with indifference to or disregard of the consequences of such conduct Whether conduct is wanton and reckless depends either on what the defendant knew or how a reasonable person would have acted knowing what the defendant knew The First Amendment does not give one carte blanche to say anything you want. There are a number of crimes and torts which involve saying something: threatening and extortion, bribing, fraud, incitement to riot, disturbing the peace, defamation, perjury and lying to a government official, and so on.