What are the Powers of the office of the United States Vice President? The Constitution lists the powers of the Vice President as President of the Senate and provides him or her a tie-breaking vote. Also the Vice President is granted powers under the 25th amendment to declare the President with the consent of the majority of the Cabinet as incapacitated. However, the Vice Presidency is typically viewed as a position of little power. Over time, various laws and executive orders have added to this position. For example executive order 13526 permits the Vice-President to classify documents. Are there other little-known powers of the Vice-Presidency?
Answer Additional (extra-constitutional) powers of the Vice President (V-POTUS) are whatever the President (POTUS) says they are — subject to the limitations of the authority of POTUS. You are correct in that the constitution enumerates specific powers and authority to V-POTUS. As you have outlined. However, the additional powers you ask about are at the discretion of POTUS. As Chief Executive, POTUS can delegate powers and authority (within the executive branch) according to his sole discretion — except for where the constitution requires senate approval. As in the case of cabinet appointees. Each president has a unique management style and the variable nature of the skill sets of the executives around him require Presidents to have some flexibility in the extra-constitutional duties they delegate to V-POTUS.
The US Constitution Article II, Section 2 grants sayt that the President "shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment". It does not anywhere say that a pardon can be rescinded. Until a constitutional amendment is added giving the president the power to rescind a pardon (zero chance of that happening), a pardon is permanent. For reference, Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 addresses the question of limiting the presidential pardon power, where the losing side argued that criminal contempt is not an "offense against the United States", and the Supreme Court held that criminal contempt is such an offense. Nothing has legally changed since then.
Because an "Order, Resolution, or Vote" is not the same as a Bill, and does not become a law. Thus the procedure for presentation, leading to signing, pocket acceptance, veto, or pocket veto, does not apply to Orders, Resolutions, or Votes. Therefore it is repeated to indicate that it applies to those legislative acts also. A "Vote", in the sense used here is a legislative decision or action that is neither a Bill nor a resolution. For example, the decision on when to adjourn to, that is, when Congress will come back into session after an adornment, is a Vote. A "Bill" is a proposed law. If it is passed by Congress and not vetoed, or if any veto is overridden, it becomes a law. Other legislative actions do not become laws, but otherwise go through much the same procedure. Note that some legislative actions do notneed the "Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives". For example, when the House votes on a new Speaker, it is a vote of the House only, and neither the Senate nor the President has a say.
The president alone has power, under Article II, Section 2, Clause 1, to grant pardons for federal offenses. Many states have an analogous power for governors, to pardon state offenses. In some states, though (for example Minnesota), there is a board in charge of the process (made up, in Minnesota, of the Governor, Chief Justice and Attorney General). Likewise, in Canada, pardons are granted by a board. Although POTUS has the power, in terms of implementation it is a bit more complicated, since he doesn't sit around wondering "Who should I pardon": he has an Office of the Pardon Attorney who makes recommendations. However, there are other ways to get out of jail (besides doing the time), namely having the conviction overturned, being paroled, and credit for good behavior. Federal parole is no longer an option, but the other avenues are open, at least in principle.
Sort of The 25th Amendment is crystal clear that the VP and a majority of the cabinet can declare in writing to the president pro tem of the Senate and the speaker of the house a presidential inability, whereupon the VP becomes the acting president. The president can then immediately transmit in writing his declaration that there is no inability, and then he resumes his position as president until the VP and majority of cabinet (not necessarily the same members) again declare a disability, within 4 days. If that happens, then Congress decides the matter. There is a 28 day period for a super-majority of Congress to make that decision, plus 48 hours for assembling of Congress is not in session. The problem is that the amendment says that the president resumes his powers unless something happens within 4 days. It does not say that he must wait 4 days to see what the VP response is. If the VP does not counter-respond immediately, then it is possible, but not guaranteed, that the president regains power until the VP reaffirms the disability. This is a question that would have to be decided by SCOTUS. In the presumably short interim, there would be serious constitutional questions as to the legality of the actions of either POTUS or VPOTUS.
50 USC 1702 states that (a) In general (1) At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of this title, the President may, under such regulations as he may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise— (A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit— (i) any transactions in foreign exchange... (B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States §1701 says that (a) Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat. and §1621 enables the president to declare a national emergency. In addition and in lieu of a declaration of national emergency, §1708 specifically addresses economic and industrial espionage cyberthreats, and (b)(1) says that The President may, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property of each person described in paragraph (2), if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or are or come within the possession or control of a United States person. Paragraph (2) says that A person described in this paragraph is a foreign person the President determines knowingly requests, engages in, supports, facilitates, or benefits from the significant appropriation, through economic or industrial espionage in cyberspace, of technologies or proprietary information developed by United States persons. and b.t.w. &quot;person&quot; is defined as &quot;person or entity&quot;. It's not certain that that is the path that the ban will follow, if it happens, but it is a possible path.
From the holdings of May 14, 2018 in NJ. v. NCAA, As the Tenth Amendment confirms, all legislative power not conferred on Congress by the Constitution is reserved for the States. Absent from the list of conferred powers is the power to issue direct orders to the governments of the States. The federal law in question forbids legislatures from passing certain laws, but PASPA’s anti-authorization provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do. The distinction between compelling a State to enact legislation and prohibiting a State from enacting new laws is an empty one. The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies in either event. The anti-authorization provision does not constitute a valid preemption provision. To preempt state law, it must satisfy two requirements. It must represent the exercise of a power conferred on Congress by the Constitution. And, since the Constitution “confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States,” New York, supra, at 177, it must be best read as one that regulates private actors. There is no way that the PASPA anti-authorization provision can be understood as a regulation of private actors. It does not confer any federal rights on private actors interested in conducting sports gambling operations or impose any federal restrictions on private actors. The Commerce Clause does not enter into the majority opinion, though in Thomas' concurring opinion, he indicates he is not entirely happy with purely in-state applications of the Commerce Clause. But, at present, interstate gambling does not differ.
Do I correctly understand that Federal employees, notably including the Armed Forces, pledge their duty first to the Constitution of the United States and only secondarily to carry out legal orders? And that they have no legal obligation to execute an illegal order? What process allows a subordinate to defy an illegal order if a superior gives the order? What legal protection does the subordinate have? All officers of the United States government (and for that matter also all officers of state and local governments) including soldiers in the armed forces are sworn to uphold the Constitution. Members of the armed forces are not only allowed to disregard illegal orders, they are obligated to not carry out illegal orders. Operationally, disobeying an order due to the fact that it is unconstitutional is a defense to an effort to fire or discipline a federal government civil service employee who may only be fired for good cause after due process. In the military, the issue would usually present itself in the form of a defense in a court martial for refusing to obey a lawful order of a superior. Of course, it would hardly be unprecedented for someone's firing from a job that was unlawful, or for a wrongful court-martial conviction, to be upheld on appeal. Suppose the Congress holds someone in contempt. The Congress, as I understand it, goes to a court to enforce the contempt charge. The court turns to Federal law enforcement to bring action. What if the President directs Federal law enforcement to ignore the court order? What if law enforcement complies with the President? The U.S. Justice Department is charged with bringing contempt of Congress cases at the request of Congress. But, an attorney retained by Congress could probably bring such an action in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia if the U.S. Justice Department refused to do so. Contempt may be civil or criminal, and unlike ordinary criminal charges (felonies can only be brought based upon grand jury indictments and grand juries are controlled by prosecutors) either civil or criminal contempt charges can be brought by a non-governmental employee attorney. The established practice is to seek contempt sanctions against the lowest level employee who has the authority to take the action requested, or to seek contempt sanctions against everyone from that lowest level employee up through the chain of command to the responsible cabinet officer. The President is generally not named as a party against whom contempt charges are sought. Defiance of the law in the face of a binding and immediately effective court order would be a constitutional crisis and you would need to move to the realm of politics and political realities, and away from the realm of what the law says that people should or should not do, to meaningfully predict how a constitutional crisis turns out. The law assumes that all government officials will obey a lawful court order duly enforced. If government law enforcement officers start defying court orders, then there is a constitutional crisis. On the other hand, the vast majority of law enforcement officers in the United States are civil servants who aren't beholden personally to the President. They were appointed on a merit basis, they are civil servants who can't be fired without good cause and due process, they are in agencies that have an institutional culture of obeying court orders. The civil servants with more seniority (and basically all senior military officers in the U.S. military) have served under multiple Presidents of different political parties. The number of political appointees supervising them is fairly modest. Likewise, most federal judges at any given time were appointed by prior Presidents and even judges appointed by a current President will not infrequently rule against the federal government when the facts and law demand that they do so. There is less politics and there is more unity in interpretation of the law among federal judges and federal law enforcement and legal officials than is generally assumed by more cynical members of the general public. Suppose Congress orders fines. What is to be done if no one will enforce the fines? A court can order that the fines be paid out of the U.S. Treasury. The order itself can have the force of law without the cooperation of any U.S. Treasury official. Sustained defiance of such a court order would lead to a constitutional crisis. Same scenario as 1 but this time it’s impeachment and conviction: the President defies any action to remove him. What if the President simply barricades himself in the White House and orders security and military personnel to protect him? Is there a protocol in the U.S. military hierarchy to deal with this scenario? This has never actually happened, of course, so it is hypothetical. The Treasury Department, General Services Administration and Secretary of State (and all other government officials) should revoke privileges that the President has by virtue of being President and provide them to the new acting President (realistically, in the simple scenario presented, current Vice President Pence). The military should stay out of it, but should immediately start treating acting President Pence, and not the impeached incumbent as the Commander-in-Chief. U.S. military forces are indoctrinated on the Presidential succession and it is unlikely that many military officers would disregard a Presidential impeachment. The Secret Service should stop defending the former President except in an ex-President capacity. In theory, one could imagine acting President Pence bringing an eviction action in the local courts of the District of Columbia just as one would with any holdover tenant. Since the local courts in D.C. are federal, this doesn't present the federalism problems that it would if the same thing were done in a state court with respect to federal real estate, and U.S. marshals would evict him and his family like anyone else. The trickier situation in terms of creating a constitutional crisis, honestly, is really one where the President is clearly and blatantly defying the law and court orders, but the U.S. Senate refuses to convict the President in an impeachment proceeding out of partisan bias. What should common citizens do if any of these scenarios play out? Whatever they want, in a lawful manner. Ultimately, this would be a matter for federal government officials (elected and appointed alike) to figure out.