GDPR account verification I am having trouble in deciding what information I should be recording in order to verify an account user in the event that a) the user is locked out of their account for some reason b) they make an erasure/portability request. I can create a very bare bones system in terms of user data (ie. No name, no birthdate, no address info), but this leaves me with very little to work with in the event of scenarios a) and b) occurring. I have read the question, Identity verification prior granting access to personal data [GDPR] , but I take issue with the GDPR reference in the answer, where it states: Per Recital 64, you should use “all reasonable measures” to verify the identity of the data subject who requests access. However, you should not keep data for the sole purpose of being able to respond to requests. (Compare also the data minimization principle and Art 11). I have problems with this statement because if I don't store the name of my user, how can I possibly ever verify that it is the owner of the data who is requesting either i) erasure, or ii) portability of data? The only way I could possibly envision this is by only offering the option to logged in users, but surely there must be an offline option as well, for users who no longer have access to the system? So, what is the minimum gathered user details that I would need in order to satisfy a) and b) whilst still meeting GDPR?
This is less of a compliance question, and more of an infosec question. On one hand, you want to be able to restore access to an account to users who have lost their access. On the other hand, you must prevent unauthorized access e.g. from hackers. These factors must be balanced. Whether you'll fulfil a data subject access request will generally follow the same criteria as deciding whether you'll reset someone's access credentials, so I'll mostly discuss identity verification in general. Trying to validate names is generally pointless from a security perspective, since the name on the account might not be real, or because validation documents like scans from a passport can be easily forged. When a service has identity validation measures like requesting a copy of photo ID, or requesting a photo of you holding up a validation code written on paper, that doesn't actually help validating that the person requesting access is the account owner, but that the person requesting access appears to be a natural person, and now documents about their identity are on file. A lot of information like names, birthdates, or addresses is also not at all secret and could be easily guessed by a malicious actor. Most websites work by equating access with control over an email account. If you can receive a password reset code over email, you have access. In effect, this delegates the responsibility of account recovery to the email or OAuth provider. So the issue is what happens when someone loses their email account, which is not entirely uncommon for accounts that are multiple years old. One reasonable (and likely GDPR-compliant solution) is to deny access when someone loses their account. Quite a lot of services operate this way. A milder form of this is to email the old address that someone is trying to take over the account, and turn over the account only if you have other evidence of ownership and there has been no reply over multiple weeks. Since this is part of an identity verification measure, I don't think the GDPR's normal 1 month deadline would apply. However, this approach is very risky: an attack can succeed through the mere inaction of the true account holder, and it would arguably be a data breach if you give access to the wrong person – safer for erasure requests only. Also, emails like “click here or we'll delete your account” look a lot like spam (I get a lot of those about alleged problems with my Paypal account). A potentially more reasonable approach is to use questions about the account to verify ownership. When did they create the account? When did they last use it? Can they answer questions about non-public content of the account? (But don't let an attacker choose the questions!) You see some older sites that ask the user to select a “security question” for recovery purposes. But this isn't a best practice – they are frequently the weakest link in an authentication system. If the user answers truthfully, the answer may be easy to guess or discover for an attacker. E.g. the infamous “what is your mother's maiden name” question is horrendously insecure in the age of Facebook. If the user provides a more secure answer, that is essentially just another password that's even easier to lose than an email account. High-value accounts typically offer a secondary authentication method as a fallback. E.g. my bank can send me new access codes via physical mail. GitHub can optionally link a Facebook account for recovery purposes. But these measures would be overkill for most cases. Especially collecting a physical address for the sole purpose of offering account recovery would likely violate the GDPR's data minimization principle, though it may be fine when the user opts in with freely given consent. To summarize: what you're trying to do is extremely difficult, because you've need to balance different security aspects: keeping malicious actors out, and letting legitimate account owners in. Whereas I'd resolve that by denying any account recovery or subject access requests, other approaches exists with other risk profiles. The GDPR requires you to perform reasonable identity verification measures, but what is reasonable depends on the business context and is ultimately an infosec question.
The GDPR actually does require you to follow DNT in Article 21: In the context of the use of information society services, and notwithstanding Directive 2002/58/EC, the data subject may exercise his or her right to object by automated means using technical specifications. I think this is quite explicit.
Not Allowed Under the GDPR The suggested method does not seem to comply with the GDPR, and would not be lawful for a Data Controller that is subject to the GDPR. Specific Provisions Let's consider some specific provisions of the GDPR: Article 4 Article 4 paragraph (11) states: &quot;consent&quot; of the data subject means any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her; If the choice is &quot;obscure&quot; then it is not clear, and legal consent has not been given. Article 7 Article 7 paragraph 3 reads: The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw as to give consent. It does not appear in the situation described that the data subject has been clearly informed that consent is being given. Recital 42 Recital 42 reads in relevant part: In accordance with Council Directive 93/13/EEC a declaration of consent pre-formulated by the controller should be provided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language and it should not contain unfair terms. ... Consent should not be regarded as freely given if the data subject has no genuine or free choice or is unable to refuse or withdraw consent without detriment. The specified means do not seem to comply with R42 Recital 32 Recital 32 reads: Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute consent. ... If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is provided. The format in the question seems to rely on inactivity as a way of giving consent, and is surely not clear.
Does GDPR prohibit reading unsolicited emails from people who have not explicitly opted in to a mailing list? tl;dr: No. I have never heard of this, and I don't see how this could follow from the GDPR. You should follow up with the Secretary to find out how she came to her conclusion. Detailed reasoning: The GDPR restricts the processing of personal data, so it does in principle cover reading email, since reading counts as "processing", and an email may contain personal data. However, Article 2 (emphasis mine) says that: This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. I would read this to mean that a human reading emails is only covered by GDPR if the emails are part of a "filing system" or intended to be. So reading the emails is ok, it's only problematic if you intend to systematically store them. Even filing them, while covered by GDPR, would presumably be allowed, because to actually act on the email, you would have to keep it, and Article 6 allows processing of personal data to "take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract" and when "processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller". One caveat: If the email contains data that falls under special categories of personal data (Article 9) you may need explicit consent for storage. That covers things like racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious beliefs and health information. So if someone discloses a health problem or their religious belief in their mail, you may need to ask them for permission to keep it. In summary: At most, GDPR would require you to promptly delete the email once you no longer need it (which could be immediately if the email is irrelevant to you). If the email contains data you legitimately need (e.g. a complaint you need to follow up on), you are allowed to keep it as required (based on Article 6 (f)). Note that in both cases no explicit consent is required from the email sender, unless the email contains particularly sensitive data, such as political/religious beliefs or health data.
You clearly cannot provide data that you haven't stored – and not storing data is a good thing under the Art 5(1)(c) Data Minimization Principle. Despite the Art 20 data portability right being conditional on that the data subject has provided data and not on that data has been stored, I think responding to such a request with “sorry, as per our privacy policy we do not store this data” would be perfectly fine. It is also curious that you are using consent as the legal basis for the purpose of selecting the website language. How do you obtain consent from visitors? How can you prove that you got consent? In many ways, consent is the legal basis of last resort, and I'd think that legitimate interest would be a much more straightforward approach in your case.
IANAL, But the information commissioners office (UK) describe personal data as: (bolding mine) The GDPR applies to ‘personal data’ meaning any information relating to an identifiable person who can be directly or indirectly identified in particular by reference to an identifier. This definition provides for a wide range of personal identifiers to constitute personal data, including name, identification number, location data or online identifier, reflecting changes in technology and the way organisations collect information about people. https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/key-definitions/ So I would say that in your case it is personal information. In principle, regardless of if you can identify an individual, personal data is that which can be used to potentially identify an individual. For an extreme example of why this is important: Lets say your app sells AIDs medication. Can a hacker who got in and stole your database, be able to use that with information they stole elsewhere to identify people with AIDs and blackmail them, in a way that they wouldn't if you had not stored this identifier? Plus, if you want to err on the side of caution, there's no legal penalty for telling the user about non-personal information you store.
The conditions for lawfulness of processing are spelled out in Article 6 of the GDPR. As for it being legal for website operators to log the IP-addresses of visitors, this is covered by the following paragraph (also pointed out by phoog in a comment). The paragraph says it is legal to process personal data if processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child. (my emphasis) You are not the only web site that logs IP addresses for the purpose of security. Every web site I've ever worked on - from those controlled by large corporations to tiny NGOs - do this. This security practice will not be impacted by the GDPR (if it were, I am sure we would have heard about it by now). there is the EU cookie law too If your website are going to be accessible to European citizens and not only accessible by your friends and familiy, you have to comply with the EU cookie directive of 2002 (a exemption for "personal websites" does not exist).
Yes, their waiver has no legal basis and is invalid under the GDPR. They should have hired a better lawyer. GDPR rights cannot be waived (mrllp.com). The last bit should have been: Therefore, in consideration of my participation in any project, I understand that retaining my name and email address, as described above, does not require my consent and that the right of erasure, as spelled out in the GDRP Article 17 (1) b does not apply. The legal basis for our lawful processing of this personal data is Article 6 (1) f ("processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller"). I.e. there is nothing in the GDPR that compels GitLab to erase this information, but their waiver is bogus. Keeping track of individual contributions in a software projects is necessary for a number of reasons, including security (if somebody contributes code that jeopardizes security, you want to audit everything that person has contributed).