What laws protect minority share holders from having their share rights changed by special resolution? A special resolution done by majority share holders can simply change the rights of certain shares and make them useless. They can reduce the share's voting rights or reduce dividend payment.
It is true that a shareholder who controls a majority of the votes can be quite powerful indeed. This is a somewhat murky area of the law, but in many cases, a majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty to do what is best for the corporation as a whole (not just the majority shareholder, but all shareholders), an obligation that logically parallels the obligation of the board of directors (which controls a corporation with much the same effect as a majority shareholder). In Delaware, where most large corporations are incorporated, a major shareholder or group of shareholders can have less than 50% of the vote can still be considered de facto majority shareholder if they have influence over the rest of the shareholders. Majority shareholders, either de jure or de facto, are required to act only with "entire fairness" to all the shareholders, and courts may invalidate or otherwise grant relief on transactions made by majority shareholders that are not fair to all shareholders. If a majority shareholder takes actions directly, it has the burden of proof in court to show that any actions taken accord with the "entire fairness" standard. A more in-depth discussion of these issues can be found in this article out of the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation.
This is neither unusual nor illegal, assuming that the buyback price is specified in the agreement. If your friend does not wish to take advantage of the "nice discount" he can decline the deal, and decide for himself whether he wishes to buy shares without restriction, at the market rate. (It would be interesting to know what happens if he sells his shares and then leaves the company. I am fairly sure the agreement will cover this, but requiring an ex-employee to buy shares and then give them to the company could be considered unconscionable. That might be worth asking a lawyer about).
Education in India falls under the concurrent list -- i.e. both state and union laws apply. However, there do not appear to be any codified "student rights". The relevant national body for "technical education" is the AICTE, which does have a mechanism for grievance redressal, this is often used as the primary source of complaints against ragging. You can submit a grievance here. The 2004 Guidelines for Grievance Processes require a sub-30-day resolution of complaints. In fact, all accredited technical institutions in India are required to have a local Grievance Redressal Cell and Ombudsman as per this 2012 notification. Finally, you could contact AICTE directly Students may also file grievances at the UGC (University Grants Commission). The UGC is a statutory body in charge of "coordination, determination and maintenance of standards of higher education". In 1987, they released "Guidelines for Student Entitlement". See sections 2.5, 2.6 regarding fairness in evaluation and section 5 which deals with discriminatory treatment. At a state-level, you could try Rajasthan Sampark, which only applies to government institutions. As others have stated, you need to ensure that you have documented and clear proof to support your accusation, and that you should not back down in fear of reprisal. The process of collecting evidence may help you determine if you truly have a valid complaint, or are perceiving bias that does not exist. To the best of my knowledge, in answer to your second question, no, Indian jurisprudence does not have a similar concept of student rights as the United States and some of Europe. While reading the links for the other answers and searching for policies for this post, the one thing that becomes clear is a worrying lack of depth in policies and transparently available policies and data. If you choose to take this forward, I hope that you will document and publish your efforts.
Political risk insurance exists, but not in the format hypothesized. What the question is contemplating is more like a gambling bet, or a futures contract (which is a type of "derivative" contract), than insurance. What constitutes an insurable risk of harm to an insurable interest is mostly a matter of common law although there are some state statutes on point in the U.S. which is the level of federalism at which insurance is regulated. Basically, you can only insure against a loss to an "insurable interest" caused by an insurable risk. In practice, this means that insurance has to be linked to an individualized loss of an individual or business that is clearly and directly caused by a covered occurrence. A change in governing political party itself, doesn't give rise to such a loss. The mere fact that a party is elected or that the people elected take an oath of office, doesn't itself change any laws or regulations. It just puts in place people who might do such things in the future. Political risk insurance, when it exists, insures against the nationalization of one's business at a loss, or against the industry that one is engaged in becoming illegal, at a loss. It is the specific action taken by the newly elected regime towards the particular insured firm or individual, and not the actual new regime itself, that gives rise to a loss to an insurable interest in the case of political risk insurance. For example, you might be able to buy political risk insurance against the possibility that your marijuana business which is legal under state law but not federal law, will be seized in a civil forfeiture or shut down by a change in the practical effect of the relevant state law. If you are worried that your company's stock will decline in value due to an election result, the available financial instrument would be to short sell your company's stock, hedging against losses arising from a drop in stock price below a certain dollar value by a certain date for any reason. If your company is not publicly held, the risk of a decline in business due to an election result is not something that can be insured against.
Not as a shareholder The entire point of limited liability companies is that the shareholders are protected from the losses of the company - they can only lose the amount they paid (or still owe) for their shares. The directors and officers of a company have various duties that they owe to the company and can be held liable if they breach those duties. Those duties are: the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, the right to rely on certain information, the business judgment rule, and fiduciary duties in the context of insolvency, corporate opportunities, and interested director transactions (or insider transactions) &quot;[I]ntentional or reckless poor management&quot; would, on the face of it, appear to breach the duty of care and the business judgement rule and could expose the directors to liability. However, Bob is a shareholder; not a director or officer. If he is not involved in the company beyond appointing the directors, he is not liable. If he points himself as a director or becomes an officer by telling the directors what to do, then he could be liable.
Do newer contracts superceed prior ones? It depends on whether the contracts conflict with each other. That is why many contracts contain language akin to &quot;This contract supersedes and replaces any previous or contemporaneous agreements between the parties&quot;. The parties would need to adapt such clause if the contracts are compatible and they intend to maintain them. I have seen many contracts saying tgis &quot;this will happens unless agreed in writing to do something else&quot;.However many contracts do not have this in written. The main purpose of that language is to specify that any amendments to the contract shall be in writing. That precaution makes it easier to ascertain whose version of the contract is binding, such as where party A alleges an oral amendment and party B denies that such amendment was agreed upon. Your outline of the agreements between A and Z is incomplete. At the outset, the contracts are not necessarily incompatible: The first contract does not provide a deadline for payment; it is unclear when the 2nd contract will be in force; there is not enough information to discern whether the 2nd contract is an amendment of the 1st one, or an independent agreement involving unrelated considerations; there is no indication that the 2nd contract replaces and supersedes the 1st one; and if Z is the draftsman in both contracts, the doctrine of contra proferentem could favor A's legal position. Therefore, the matter of superseding contracts depends on various factors.
A statutory instrument that exceeds the limits of the enabling Act is void. For example, an Act that enables the executive to make regulations about companies would not support a regulation that purported to affect companies and partnerships. There are two controls in place: regulations must be tabled in Parliament and any MP can call for the regulation to be debated and voted down. anyone affected by the regulation can go to court to oppose it - there are lots of things they can argue including that the regulation overreaches its enabling Act.
Such an order, like all other orders and decisions, is voted on at a conference of justices. Normally all 9 are present and vote, unless one or more is recused. But if one or more happens to be absent, those present vote. A majority of those present an voting is enough for such an order. Dissents from such orders are quite unusual, but any justice may file one if s/he so elects. Reasons for such orders are not normally provided. The usual standard is that such relief is only granted if A) one party will be irreparably harmed by delay, and B) that party has a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the merits when the matter is finally decided. Presumably a majority of the Justices did not feel that this standard was met. Beyond that, no one can say.