Can a church-run university terminate employees because of their religion? There are a number of churches in the United States that operate universities, and I understand that these universities are legally permitted to give preference to members of the church when hiring for academic and other positions, or even to entirely exclude non-members from the hiring process. My question is whether it is legally permissible for these universities to terminate an existing employee, whom they had hired already knowing that the employee was not a member of the church, for the sole reason that the employee is not a member of the church. For example, Brigham Young University is affiliated with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS). Suppose that the University wants to hire a new professor of mathematics but can't find any qualified LDS candidates for the position, and so gives the job to Alice, knowing full well that she is an atheist. Some time into Alice's contract, the university finds Bob, who has similar qualifications as Alice but is an LDS member. Could the university terminate Alice's contract on purely religious grounds in order to give her professorship to Bob? (That is, assume that there exist no other grounds on which the university could justify a dismissal—i.e., Alice has been maintaining satisfactory job performance, has not been violating the school's honour code, etc.)
It depends on whether Alice is a &quot;minister.&quot; This case plays on the tension between employment-discrimination laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, and the First Amendment, “which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &amp; Sch. v. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012). We resolve the question by asking whether Alice is a &quot;minister,&quot; i.e., whether the religion has entrusted her “with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith” Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069 (2020). If so, she falls within the First Amendment's &quot;ministerial exception&quot; to employment-discrimination laws. But the precise definition of that term remains rather squishy, so we don't really have a test that can give us a reliable answer. In Hosanna-Tabor, for instance, a teacher at a religious school brought an ADA claim after the school fired her after she missed a semester on disability leave. The court rejected her claims based on the religious character of her work, and the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that she was a minister based on the job title she received (Minister of Religion, Commissioned), her own use of the minister title, the religious character of many of her job responsibilities, her religious training, and other factors. Although she was a minister who was replaced by another minister, the Court suggested that the outcome might be the same if she were not a minister. Noting that the school in that case – just like in your hypothetical – hired lay teachers only when ministers were not available, it rejected the argument that an employee falls outside the ministerial exception simply because there are non-ministers with the same job functions: Though relevant, it cannot be dispositive that others not formally recognized as ministers by the church perform the same functions—particularly when, as here, they did so only because commissioned ministers were unavailable.” Hosanna-Tabor at 193. And a few years later, the Court indicated that perhaps none of those factors from Hosanna-Tabor are actually required. Instead, it directed courts to ask whether the school “entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith.” Our Lady of Guadalupe School at 2069. So in your hypothetical, the courts would probably look to see whether BYU treats its professorships as ministerial positions. Although the answer could vary from one religious school to the next, it seems quite likely that the courts would treat BYU professors as ministers, given their Personnel Conduct Policy: It is a condition of employment that all personnel (including student employees) act in accordance with university policies and the Church Educational System Honor Code, including the Dress and Grooming Standards, and refrain from behavior or expression that seriously and adversely affects the university mission or The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Examples include behavior or expression that Contradicts or opposes, rather than analyzes or discusses, fundamental Church doctrine or policy; Deliberately attacks or derides the Church or its general leaders; or Violates the Church Educational System Honor Code. All personnel are expected to be role models of a life that combines the quest for intellectual rigor with spiritual values and personal integrity, and to conduct their work in a professional manner consistent with the values espoused by the university and the Church. Members of the Church in nonstudent positions also accept as a condition of employment the standards of conduct consistent with qualifying for temple privileges. The university regularly contacts ecclesiastical leaders concerning the temple eligibility of all nonstudent personnel who are members of the Church. I couldn't find any cases applying the ministerial exception to Brigham Young, but given its expectation that employees act as &quot;role models&quot; for the church's &quot;spiritual values&quot; and conduct their work in a manner consistent with &quot;values espoused by ... the church,&quot; I would be surprised to see a court get in the middle of the school's decisions to fire Alice and replace her with a member of the church, even if she had not run afoul of those policies herself. The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way. Hosanna-Tabor at 196. Still, Alice could have other bases for suing the school. Based on your tags, I'm assuming you're most interested in employment-discrimination claims. While those might be barred by the First Amendment, Hosanna-Tabor explicitly held open the possibility that a contract claim might still be viable. Hosanna-Tabor at 196 (“We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers.”). So if the school signed a contract agreeing to employ Alice for three years, she would have a strong argument that it had waived its right to discriminate on the basis of religion for that period.
&quot;Mathematician&quot; is not a legally regulated term, so there are no laws that would prohibit me from calling myself a mathematician (I am not one). I do know a tiny bit about number theory, set theory, formal language theory and logic, but mostly I know about African languages. If I have no shame, I can legally call myself a mathematician. My employing institution has no policy that regulates self-appellation. In fact it is very common for people to self-mislabel in the fashion that you describe. Many people claim to be &quot;linguists&quot; when they are actually &quot;English teachers&quot; or are &quot;translators&quot;. However, if I were to claim to have a PhD from the Department of Mathematics at Yale University, that would be a false statement of fact, and potentially internally-actionable by the institution. My actual mathematician colleagues cannot sue me for damages (they have not been objectively harmed), but an institution could sack me for material misrepresentation of credentials (for which reason they might actually demand a copy of said credential). It is possible that a materially false statement of credential could be actionable as fraud, though I can't come up with a plausible scenario at the moment.
The only time that this conduct has to be prohibited in a private university is when state or federal law prohibits it in any case. In those circumstances, no separate university policy to restate the applicable law is required. Best practices are to make students and teachers aware of any applicable laws, because knowing that, the the parties are less likely to be involved in illegal conduct. But private universities aren't required to adopt policies of that type if they aren't bothered to do so. With federal grant funding, private universities are required to have a mechanism in place for addressing sex discrimination complaints, but the policy doesn't have to articulate that particular conduct is or is not prohibited, beyond what federal law provides in the absence of a formally adopted policy. Incidentally, a few private colleges, almost all religious, specifically decline federal funding in order to be free of the regulations and strings that come with accepting it. Also, while private universities are not required to have such policies legally, private universities are required, as a matter of practical reality (e.g. in order to be considered eligible to borrow money from banks and to be eligible for many charitable grants) to have liability insurance in place, and liability insurers will often insist that their insured have certain policies in place, especially if the insured private university has a history of prior claims of this type.
Setting aside everything but the title, the Title IX coordinator does not have a federal obligation to email questions to anyone. They may, however, have an institutional obligation to act in a particular way, which might include always email questions, or never emailing questions (the latter is most likely). Assuming someone filed an institutional grievance against you, you have some right to answer these charges – it will be spelled out in the institution's rules. The federal regulations are between the institution and the government, and the institution then creates rules to keep themselves in compliance. The usual worst-case scenario is that someone files a grievance, which is reviewed by the institution. As the accused, you will be informed of the charges against you, and will have the opportunity to defend yourself at least by the "committee decision" phase. Prior to that point, the institution can gather any data deemed relevant, and may well require that all questioning be conducted in a face-to-face meeting. Universities generally have minimal specification of procedural requirements, until they run into a problem and impose rules. To determine a person's authority to require something of you, you can ask them to tell you the university rules that give them that authority. Your attorney can then compare their demand with their authority and advise you whether you must comply, or perhaps strategically should comply, or should refuse. The federal regulation which drives this is 34 CFR 105 subpart A. The logic of this is that the institution cannot discriminate on the basis of sex, if they do, they can be punished, but they can also "erase" the discrimination if they "overcome the effects" of the discrimination. §106.8 requires the institution to have a coordinator who assures compliance and does what is necessary including investigating. There must also be a grievance procedure: (b) A recipient shall adopt and publish grievance procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action which would be prohibited by this part. There is absolutely no further federal specification as to what this coordinator can do, instead the government leaves it up the the institution to come up with procedures. The only requirement is that there be no judgment of discrimination.
What stops a university form doing anything it wants is the contract you entered with the university when you enrolled. (I'm writing from the perspective of a student, not faculty). You and they are bound by the contract, and part of that contract will be a clear outline of academic processes such as ethics, grading, class requirements and test taking, as well as penalties for cheating and plagiarism. That contract will be outlined in your student handbook. That handbook and contract will also clearly outline (or should) the grievance process and remediation for both students and faculty. Since you feel that the university is not being fair, you need to start with investigating that formal grievance process and look into gathering your materials and filing a complaint. The college will have an office that handles such grievances; you need to find it and talk to them. If they are a private college, yes, they do have their "own rules," but some aspects of federal, provincial and local civil and criminal law will still apply. Be aware that the school contract may bind you to arbitration - which means you have to deal with the college on all matters - and you may not be able to go to a public court on a civil matter. A lawyer will be able to tell if you are bound by arbitration and if so, that's the end of the road. If not, a lawyer will tell you if you have a criminal or civil case. In any event, the grievance process at the U will more than likely be your first step. If by chance criminal misconduct is found during the grievance process, then a federal, provincial or local prosecutor would be involved; we would assume the university would be forthcoming if that need appeared.
I'm just going to talk about the US. The First Amendment to the US Constitution codifies that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;... What is clearly prohibited by this Amendment would be Congress (or any inferior legislature via the 14th Amendment) restricting the ability of religions which refuse to marry same-sex couples from marrying opposite-sex couples, or in general outlawing any kind of religious law about who a particular church is willing to marry (e.g. only marrying if both parties are of the religion). However, legislatures are generally allowed to influence action via government inducements (I'll just use inducements to describe subsidies, tax breaks, etc). The current precedent for determining whether a particular legislative action violates the Establishment Clause is the "Lemon Test," from Lemon v. Kurtzman, which has the following test: Government action violates the Establishment Clause unless it: Has a significant secular (i.e., non-religious) purpose, Does not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and Does not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. On the first point, I think the law fails - inducing religious establishments to perform same-sex marriage does not have a "significant secular purpose" because ultimately the government doesn't care whether or not you have a marriage ceremony, just that you sign a marriage certificate with an appropriate witness, which can be a government official. The law could survive on the second point if it could be shown to have at least the preponderance of being for social good, if it is argued that the law's purpose is to make church marriage ceremonies more accessible for same-sex couples by inducing more churches to perform them, and not to harm churches that don't perform them. However, this would probably be an uphill battle, since the law has the practical effect of promoting some religions' beliefs over others. The law probably fails on the third point as well, going back to the previous point that it effectively results in the government choosing one religious practice to promote over another. However, the Lemon Test often criticized or entirely disregarded by the current Supreme Court, for example in the case American Legion v American Humanist Association (a case decided by the current Supreme Court): This pattern is a testament to the Lemon test's shortcomings. As Establishment Clause cases involving a great array of laws and practices came to the Court, it became more and more apparent that the Lemon test could not resolve them. It could not "explain the Establishment Clause's tolerance, for example, of the prayers that open legislative meetings, . . . certain references to, and invocations of, the Deity in the public words of public officials; the public references to God on coins, decrees, and buildings; or the attention paid to the religious objectives of certain holidays, including Thanksgiving. Even without the Lemon Test, we can look at Walz v. Tax Commission of New York for an idea of when tax breaks for religious establishments is allowed (emphasis mine): The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion... New York, in common with the other States, has determined that certain entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its "moral or mental improvement," should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes. It has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such;... The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest. This paragraph seems to provide some argument both ways. First, the bolded section would seem to prohibit using government inducements to promote one religious practice over another, and that the government can only assist religious institutions when the assistance is applied equally. On the other hand, states are allowed to grant tax relief to religious organizations "that foster..."moral or mental improvement,"..." A legislature could argue that the law promotes "moral improvement" by encouraging acceptance of same-sex marriage, rather than a particular religious belief. However, I don't think that such an argument would prevail over the general prohibition on promoting any religious exercise over another. Government assistance for religious organizations is very thinly held to be permissible only when it is equal. In my opinion, the Supreme Court already has to use twisted gymnastics to argue in favor of any government assistance of religious organizations granted because of their religious status, so they are unlikely to allow something this far (especially since it is usually the conservative justices arguing in favor of these policies, and they are less likely to do same-sex marriage any favors). On the other hand, a permissible policy may be to have government grants for any organization that performs same-sex marriage ceremonies, whether or not that organization is religious. Whether or not that is allowed is likely going to depend on what proportion of the receiving organizations are religious in nature, but there may be enough hotels and other non-religious venues that would qualify that such a law might survive.
The only religious matter I'm aware of that are inadmissible are for special circumstances where one's religious beliefs may be compromised if asked in court. The classic example tends to be clergymen/women being subpeonaed for information against a defendant in court. Conversation with clergy is protected in the United States and is one of a few times cops are not allowed to listen to your one phone call or visit. The typical invocation of this would be a criminal, who confesses his sins to a Catholic priest, and may confess to a crime while receiving the Sacrament of Penance. Since Catholic Priests are bound by the &quot;Seal of Confession&quot; to not speak about the identity of the sinner or nature of the sin. The Priest can be excommunicated if he does this. However, if the religion of the witness is relevant to the case (say a discrimination case) it might be prudent to inquire into the witness's religious beliefs. Suppose a major employer has a special menu in their cafeterias for Hala and Kosher observers but does not offer a fish or non-meat option for meals on Fridays in Lent, then a Catholic's belief in this practice might be called into question.
The matter is not clear-cut (and the university lawyers are presumably relying on that fact). The bold part and following overstates the situation, especially the unconstrained &quot;publishing anything&quot; edict. You can publish whatever you want that the university doesn't have a legal interest in. The clause that says &quot;If you have co-authors or co-researchers you must ask their permission before publishing, and include their names&quot; is true, and defines a limit on their control. If you don't have co-authors, it's none of their legal business. (There can be issues regarding publishing an affiliation, so let's put that on hold). They can, however, prohibit you from claiming an affiliation with Pod U, unless you submit your works to some internal vetting organization. This requirement should, however, be stated somewhere perhaps in the rules of the graduate school (not just the student handbook); or the other legally-enforceable rules. You should also pay attention to the exact words that they use. You must ask permission to publish work done with a co-author (that's a fact: it's a standard requirement in universities). It is important to be sure that the information you publish is correct (clearly that is not in dispute). They are allowed to ask you to get X's approval. The First Amendment does not prohibit them from urging you to follow a course of action.