Indemnity to help in another&#39;s defense? What does that mean? I am reading through legal materials, and I came across this line: "We reserve the right to exclusive control over the defense of a claim covered by this clause. If we use this right, you will help us in our defense." This is regarding indemnity in the company's ability to relinquish all legal actions taken directly toward it in the event that someone using their platform is to be sued. Can anyone tell me specifically what these sentences mean -- especially the last one? I mean more particular to plain English. This is not asking for legal advice -- it's asking for interpretation of a statement in legal terms.
This is part of an indemnification clause. Basically, the idea is that the service provider guarantees that if your business gets harmed because they let in an intruder, then they will absorb the losses if somebody sues you, as long as they have control of the court case and you cooperate with them in defending the court case. So, for example, imagine you are using a web hosting service. Suppose there is a vulnerability in the hosting service computers, and a hacker is therefore able to break into your web site and steal your customer information. Your customer sues you for allowing their credit card to fall into the hands of a hacker. The web hosting service's insurance will pay the damages if the lawsuit succeeds, as long as you let their lawyers (ie the insurance company's lawyers) run the defense of the lawsuit and you cooperate with them. The reason this language is there is because the "service provider" has an insurer that is guaranteeing them if they get hacked or something, then the insurer will cover any damages. The insurer requires them to make all their clients (like you) sign an indemnification agreement which includes the control clause.
The clause refers to what might be a lawsuit, which can be adjudicated in appropriate government courts (cf. the choice of law clause), but instead would be submitted to an arbitrator. The contract will spell out the details. An offence is a punishable criminal act, which is outside the scope of civil suits. In US law, the government prosecutes the wrong-doer, not e.g. one of the parties to the contract (if for example the vendor ships an illegal substance to a customer). The same goes for a &quot;breach of law&quot;, depending of course what you mean by breach of law. A breach of contract could not be pursued in court, given a mandatory arbitration clause. The fact that the two parties are in different countries does not nullify a mandatory arbitration clause, at least between the US and the UK.
Certainty is better than uncertainty You know the law and I know the law and this company knows the law but there may be people taking this job who do not know the law. By putting it explicitly in the contract they are now aware that they don’t own the IP and this may avoid a dispute later on. A dispute avoided is way better than a dispute resolved.
My lawyer answers my question, thinking he is giving legal advice to a non-client when he is actually answering a client's question. But if you read the FAQ, posts at law.stachexchange are not legal advice. In fact, questions that are so specific as to risk becoming a request for legal advice are routinely closed. But let's go further: The issue at hand is not the one your lawyer is hired to help you with. He is not your lawyer for that issue. Even if we considered the relationship through law.stackexchange legal representation, the conversation would not be privileged. You are posting in a public forum, and expecting reply in the same way. You are free to waive the privilege of communication with your lawyer, and you are doing that by using this way of communicating with him. At this point, the only thing your lawyer would have done would be voluntarily giving for free some info that he could have billed you for. What exactly would be the issue here? It is exactly what pro bono is for. The only way to breach confidentiality would be if your lawyer were to convey things that you said to him confidentially to the public, but here it would not be relevant if the OPs author were already his customer or not.
You are referring to 32 CFR 47.4. The only reasonable interpretation of that list is that one must meet all of the 5 requirements. The alternative interpretation would make any group that "[has not] already received benefits from the Federal Government for the service in question" eligible to apply. Since this is a regulation, the interpretation of the agency that wrote the regulations is given great deference. An agency's interpretation of the regulations it writes itself is controlling unless "plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation". (Auer v. Robbins 1997) Regarding whether there is ambiguity at all, read King v. Burwell for several restatements of the principle that one must read words in context before deciding they are ambiguous: A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law. They refer to the "fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme".
You're thinking of &quot;unconscionability.&quot; In the United States, the general rule is that a contract provision will not be deemed unenforceable for unconscionability unless it is both procedurally and substantively unfair. A provision is considered procedurally unfair if it results from some sort of unfair asymmetry in bargaining positions. This could include situations where a party was acting under duress, had a diminished mental capacity, or unequal experience in the . A provision may be considered substantively unfair if it imposes disproportinately unfavorable terms on one party, perhaps by imposing costs far out of line with market prices, or by allocating all risk to that party. If the agreement is not both procedurally and substantively unconscionable, it won't be voided. So the Google TOS may be procedurally unfair because Google's market position gives it disproportionate bargaining power, but because they don't really impose any serious costs on you, they aren't unconscionable. Similarly, a contract provision requiring you to give me your house if you ever forget to turn off the porch lights at night wouldn't be unconscionable if it was agreed to after lengthy negotiations between our lawyers.
What you are describing seems to raise the defense of necessity. I cannot pinpoint the line for you or tell you whether any particular action would lie on one side or the other, but I can describe the test. In Maryland, there are &quot;five elements necessary to consider before applying the defense of necessity&quot; (Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95, 135-36 (2005), citing Sigma Reproductive Health Center v. State, 297 Md. 660, 677-79 (1983)): The harm avoided — this need not be physical harm but also may be harm to property as, for instance, where a firefighter destroys some property to prevent the spread of fire which threatens to consume other property of greater value. The harm done — this is not limited to any particular type of harm but includes intentional homicide as well as intentional battery or property damage. An illustration is supplied: `[A]s where A, driving a car, suddenly finds himself in a predicament where he must either run down B or hit C's house and he reasonably chooses the latter, unfortunately killing two people in the house who by bad luck happened to be just at that place inside the house where A's car struck — it is the harm-reasonably-expected, rather than the harm-actually-caused, which governs.' Intention to avoid harm — to have the defense of necessity, the defendant must have acted with the intention of avoiding the greater harm. Actual necessity, without the intention, is not enough. However, an honest and reasonable belief in the necessity of his action is all that is required. The relative value of the harm avoided and the harm done. The defendant's belief as to the relative harmfulness of the harm avoided and the harm done does not control. It is for the court, not the defendant, to weigh the relative harmfulness of the two alternatives. To allow the defense the court must conclude that the harm done by the defendant in choosing the one alternative was less than the harm which would have been done if he had chosen the other. Optional courses of action; imminence of disaster. The defense of necessity applies when the defendant is faced with this choice of two evils: he may either do something which violates the literal terms of the criminal law and thus produce some harm, or not do it and so produce a greater harm. If, however, there is open to him a third alternative, which will cause less harm than will be caused by violating the law, he is not justified in violating the law. For example, &quot;[a] prisoner subjected to inhuman treatment by his jailors is not justified in breaking prison if he can bring about an improvement in conditions by other means.&quot; Marquardt at 137: in order for the defense of necessity to have been warranted in this case, appellant must have presented &quot;some evidence&quot; that there was a choice between two evils, that no legal alternatives existed, that the harm appellant caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided, and that the emergency was imminent.
I take that to mean that section 14 alone should not be construed to give a department the power to sue under sub section (1), nor the ability to be sued under sub section (2). Rather, if some other law, or some other section of that law confers such a power or ability, section 14 indicates how the power should be used, that is, gives the proper procedure. But if no such other law is in effect, section 14 alone won't do. If the law has simply said: civil proceedings under this Act by the Crown may be instituted by (a) the appropriate government department in its own That might have been construed to grant such powers to every "appropriate " department, which apparently was not desired.