Has there been a SCOTUS case which clarified the meaning of the phrase &quot;to promote the progress of science and useful arts&quot;? The US constitution article 1 section 8 gives the Congress an enumerated power &quot;to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.&quot; Generally, this is understood to be the power which allows Congress to create intellectual property laws (supporting copyrights, trademarks, and patents). Has there been a case which clarified what constitutes a &quot;useful art&quot; or &quot;progress of science&quot;? Specifically, this power can easily clash with the 1st amendment prohibition on the restriction of speech and press. So it's not hard to imagine that there would have been some conflicts that the court would have opined on. Has that happened? If so, what's the case? This is not a question about &quot;fair use&quot;, by the way. Fair use is an exception to the existing restrictions on intellectual property. This is a question about what type of expression may not be copyrighted at all.
The issue is discussed in quite a few cases, including an in depth discussion in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The Official Syllabus of that decision summarizes its analysis: The Copyright and Patent Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: &quot;Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote the Progress of Science ... by securing [to Authors] for limited Times ... the exclusive Right to their ... Writings.&quot; In the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), Congress enlarged the duration of copyrights by 20 years: Under the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), copyright protection generally lasted from a work's creation until 50 years after the author's death; under the CTEA, most copyrights now run from creation until 70 years after the author's death, 17 U. S. C. § 302(a). As in the case of prior copyright extensions, principally in 1831, 1909, and 1976, Congress provided for application of the enlarged terms to existing and future copyrights alike. Petitioners, whose products or services build on copyrighted works that have gone into the public domain, brought this suit seeking a determination that the CTEA fails constitutional review under both the Copyright Clause's &quot;limited Times&quot; prescription and the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. Petitioners do not challenge the CTEA's &quot;life-plus-70-years&quot; timespan itself. They maintain that Congress went awry not with respect to newly created works, but in enlarging the term for published works with existing copyrights. The &quot;limited Tim[e]&quot; in effect when a copyright is secured, petitioners urge, becomes the constitutional boundary, a clear line beyond the power of Congress to extend. As to the First Amendment, petitioners contend that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails inspection under the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations. The District Court entered judgment on the pleadings for the Attorney General (respondent here), holding that the CTEA does not violate the Copyright Clause's &quot;limited Times&quot; restriction because the CTEA's terms, though longer than the 1976 Act's terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore fit within Congress' discretion. The court also held that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others. The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. In that court's unanimous view, Harper &amp; Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, foreclosed petitioners' First Amendment challenge to the CTEA. The appeals court reasoned that copyright does not impermissibly restrict free speech, for it grants the author an exclusive right only to the specific form of expression; it does not shield any idea or fact contained in the copyrighted work, and it allows for &quot;fair use&quot; even of the expression itself. A majority of the court also rejected petitioners' Copyright Clause claim. The court ruled that Circuit precedent precluded petitioners' plea for interpretation of the &quot;limited Times&quot; prescription with a view to the Clause's preambular statement of purpose: &quot;To promote the Progress of Science.&quot; The court found nothing in the constitutional text or history to suggest that a term of years for a copyright is not a &quot;limited Tim[e]&quot; if it may later be extended for another &quot;limited Tim[e].&quot; Recounting that the First Congress made the 1790 Copyright Act applicable to existing copyrights arising under state copyright laws, the court held that that construction by contemporaries of the Constitution's formation merited almost conclusive weight under Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 57. As early as McClurg v. Kingsland, 1 How. 202, the Court of Appeals recognized, this Court made it plain that the Copyright Clause permits Congress to amplify an existing patent's terms. The court added that this Court has been similarly deferential to Congress' judgment regarding copyright. E. g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417. Concerning petitioners' assertion that Congress could evade the limitation on its authority by stringing together an unlimited number of &quot;limited Times,&quot; the court stated that such legislative misbehavior clearly was not before it. Rather, the court emphasized, the CTEA matched the baseline term for United States copyrights with the European Union term in order to meet contemporary circumstances. Held: In placing existing and future copyrights in parity in the CTEA, Congress acted within its authority and did not transgress constitutionallimitations. Pp. 199-222. The CTEA's extension of existing copyrights does not exceed Congress' power under the Copyright Clause. Pp. 199-218. (a) Guided by text, history, and precedent, this Court cannot agree with petitioners that extending the duration of existing copyrights is categorically beyond Congress' Copyright Clause authority. The case most squarely on point to your question held that a telephone book is not sufficiently original as a constitutional matter to be subject to copyright. It held that originality, for copyright purposes, is constitutionally mandated for all works. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). See also: Under the Copyright and Patent Clause, Congress' copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent authority, to the progress of the useful arts. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302 (2012). Under this clause, Congress, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation, may guarantee to authors and investors a reward in form of control over sale or commercial use of copies of their books. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). This clause is both grant of power and limitation; this clause is limited to promotion of advances in useful arts. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). The economic philosophy behind this clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is best way to advance public welfare through talents of authors and inventors in Science and useful Arts. Mazer v. Stein , 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The Copyright Act of Congress, R.S. § 4952, as amended by the Act Mar. 3, 1891, c. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, giving to authors the exclusive right to dramatize any of their works, is valid as applied to pantomine dramatization by means of moving picture films. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). This section does not limit the useful to that which satisfies immediate bodily needs, and painting and engraving not intended for a mechanical end are among the useful arts, the progress of which Congress is empowered by this section to promote. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). No authority exists for obtaining a copyright beyond the extent to which Congress has authorized it; a copyright cannot be sustained as a right existing at common law, but depends wholly on the legislation of Congress. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888). Legislation concerning trademark protection is not authorized by this clause. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879). A list of U.S. Supreme Court cases on the issue of copyright at Wikipedia includes many additional copyright cases that don't implicate the U.S. Constitutional language. It is also worth noting that while the U.S. Supreme Court is the final and most authoritative interpreter of the U.S. Constitution, that any court presented with an issue of constitutional interpretation can, and indeed, is duty bound, to interpret the constitutional in a legally authoritative way, which in the case of appellate courts (state and federal) serves as a legal precedent for other cases that &quot;makes law&quot; on the issue.
NOTE: This answer assumes jurisdiction in the US. No. Length does not determine whether or not something is fair use or not. There was a court case (Harper &amp; Row v Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985), all credit to Dawn) where it was determined that just a few paragraphs from a 300+ page biography were infringing content, due to them capturing the "heart of the work". As user6726 said, in your example the clips you mentioned are most likely licensed. Also, courts tend to look poorly on things that are simply "shared" claiming fair use against copyright claims. Now, if you were to use a short clip as an example of something you were explaining, teaching, or critiquing, that would be different and would more likely be fair use. It is important to note that there is (by design) not a clear cut line if something is or is not fair use. There is a set of guidelines, but determination is made on a case by case basis There are a couple of cases that it is out and out NOT fair use, but none for fair use. This is because fair use is an affirmative defense, which is to say, you admit to the offense, but claim an exception to the rule. Self-defense as a defense to charges of homocide, assault, etc. works in a similar manner.
In United States law, this distinction has been justified by First Amendment values. See Harper &amp; Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). copyright's idea/ expression dichotomy &quot;strike[s] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression.&quot; No author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates. If copyright protected ideas, it could effectively prohibit the communication of particular thoughts, topics, facts, propositions, etc. By restricting the protection to expression of those ideas, copyright is giving protection to (and incentivizing) the production of a expressive work in the world. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one's expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas. However, ideas can be protected by patent. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The manner of doing something--a process--this is an idea that can be protected by patent.
Software qua property is protected by copyright *perhaps patent, in some jurisdiction). The general rule is that whoever creates the thing (book, song, software) has the exclusive right to the thing. If an employee of Company 1 writes software for Company 2, that employee might (rarely) hold the copyright, but typically that scenario would involve a "work for hire", where the employee is hired by Company 1 to do such tasks as part of his duties with Company 1 (which might then be given to Company 2). This would then be a work for hire, and the copyright is held by Company 1. If the actual author was an independent contractor, he would hold the copyright – see Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reed for analysis of the subtle nuances in making that determination. The concept "work for hire" which crucially involves the "employee" relationship would not be applicable to Company 2 paying Company 1 for a product, and as long as the actual author is an employee of C1, C1 has not created a "work for hire" in the legal sense. Without some explicit disposition of copyright, Company 2 is in a sketchy position. Since C1 holds copyright, they must grant a license to C2 so that C2 can legally use it; or, C1 must transfer copyright to C2. This does not happen automatically, and (if C1 does not want to remedy the situation after the fact) C2 would need to take C1 to court to force a resolution to the situation. At that point, the issue would be what C1 implicitly promised, even though they didn't put it in writing. It is likely that the initial exchange was along the lines "Can you make us a program that will do X?", and the answer was "Sure, that will cost Y", and then "Okay, go ahead, looking forward to the product". The courts would not simply say "Well, you didn't explicitly require a license, so you don't get to actually use the software that you paid for". However, it's a somewhat open question whether the court would order a license (of what nature?) or a transfer of copyright. The disposition would depend heavily on the facts of the case (what was said, what C1 actually did, what kind of business they are, what did creating the work involve...).
Maybe. It might fall under &quot;fair use&quot;, which overrides the general requirement to get permission. The way to find out is to do it, get sued, then try to defend your action by using the fair use defense. If they win in the lawsuit, you can't, if you win, you can. There are four &quot;factors&quot; that have to be &quot;balanced&quot;, plus a fifth. The factors are &quot;the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes&quot;, &quot;the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole&quot;, &quot;the nature of the copyrighted work&quot; and &quot;the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work&quot;. The fifth consideration is &quot;transformativeness&quot;. W.r.t. purpose of the use, your use would likely be found to be &quot;fair&quot;, except for the Youtube monetization problem. The &quot;nature of the copyright work&quot; question is primarily about &quot;artistic works&quot; versus &quot;factual works&quot;, so it would depend on what you are taking from. One second might not be substantial, unless that one second is the only reason people pay to watch the copyrighted work. That interacts with the substantiality desideratum: could people get the crucial amusement content of the paid work for free by watching your video? You can read some case law in the links here, and you basically have to get an attorney to analyze your plans to tell you what your risks are.
There is no special exemption where academic work is unprotected by copyright. You can quote from academic sources to the same extent that you can copy from non-academic sources, without getting permission. In fact, it is legally impossible to tell if a source of &quot;academic&quot; versus &quot;non-academic&quot;. Attribution is not particularly relevant for copyright, what matters is permission (when required). It may be that a copyright holder will grant permission for an extensive quote provided you attribute the source, and it may be that academic publishers or authors are more willing to grant permission than other publishers / authors. On the other hand, many academic works are very expensive, so that distributing the text for free may have more &quot;effect on market&quot;, and may result in disinclination to grant permission to quote. On the third hand, such quotes are more likely to be squarely directed at the &quot;commentary&quot; motivation behind fair use law. The point here is that there isn't a special law about just academic sources.
The Fourteenth Amendment generally requires the states to recognize the same individual rights that the Bill of Rights requires Congress to recognize. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), the Supreme Court recognized that this includes the First Amendment right to free speech: For present purposes, we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress are among the fundamental personal rights and &quot;liberties&quot; protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States. We do not regard the incidental statement in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530, 259 U. S. 543, that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no restrictions on the States concerning freedom of speech, as determinative of this question. There is some debate as to exactly which language in the Fourteenth Amendment makes this happen -- probably the due-process clause, maybe the privileges and immunities clause -- but there isn't any real debate as to the outcome. The executive branch is likewise unable to enforce speech restrictions because all its programs are authorized and funded by Congress. There has been some argument in line with your proposed reading to the contrary, but the courts consistently enforce the First Amendment against the executive branch and even against themselves.
The copyright Act gives copyright owners certain rights: right to reproduce the copyrighted work right to prepare derivative works based upon the work right to distribute copies of the work to the public right to perform the copyrighted work publicly right to display the copyrighted work publicly The audiobook you create from a copyrighted work is a derivative work (perhaps it is a reproduction; for the analysis it does not matter). It works the other way also. A derivative work is a work based on or derived from one or more already existing works. Common derivative works include translations, musical arrangements, motion picture versions of literary material or plays, art reproductions, abridgments, and condensations of preexisting works. It is a violation of the copyright to create derivative works without permission. The commercial nature of the derivative work does not come into play in this situation. Commercial use might be an issue in a fair use defense, but fair use is not applicable based on these facts. Fair use might apply given facts such as: Ten students own copies of the printed work. These students are blind. A teacher reads the book and provides the recording to the students.