Is it legal in the US to watch pornography in public places? This question popped up on the HNQ sometime over the last couple of days and it started a discussion in one of the chat rooms. https://academia.stackexchange.com/questions/66409/is-watching-porn-in-university-a-crime We all began to wonder about US law and whether or not it was legal to watch pornography in public places. Imagine walking up to Starbucks dragging along a 1st and 3rd grader and running into streaming porn on laptops throughout the store. Not that they would allow it but, you get the idea. So my question Is it legal in the US to watch pornography in public places? I imagine this may trail out into state laws and skip Federal altogether but I seem to remember Larry Flint having a Supreme Court victory related to pornography sales and Hustler magazine as a product being visible to potential consumers in stores. So there's that. Edit Regarding localization to US States and commentary to that effect. This is a Federal question. This seems to pertain. Flynt vs Fallwell in the Supreme Court regarding the 1st Amendment. Flynt won regarding the display and definition of pornography vs expression. This addition doesn't change the question, it simply justifies it as a Federal question rather than one for the States as this is primarily a Constitutional issue.
tl;dr there is at least one instance of a disorderly conduct charge for watching pornography in a public library. I bring you the story of STATE OF WISCONSIN v DAVID J. REIDINGER. From the most recent (January 2016) appeals court decision: David Reidinger was found to have violated WIS. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 18.11(2), which prohibits disorderly conduct in University of Wisconsin System buildings or on university lands. The evidence at trial established that others witnessed Reidinger viewing pornography in a public library on the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire (UWEC) campus. On appeal, Reidinger argues he has a First Amendment right to view legal adult pornographic material at a public library. Reidinger also vaguely alludes to a conspiracy between numerous public officers and employees to harass him. We reject these arguments and affirm. Background Following a bench trial, Reidinger was found to have violated WIS. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 18.11(2) and was fined $295. Shannon Riley, a student supervisor at the McIntyre Library on the UWEC campus, testified she received a complaint from a student at 10:40 p.m. on December 14, 2014. The complaining student testified that she and her roommate were working on homework at the library when they noticed Reidinger watching pornographic material on the computer next to them. Two university police officers, Edward Lancour and Amanda Henry, responded to the complaint. Lancour and Henry met with the complaining students, who showed the officers a picture they had taken of Reidinger’s computer screen that showed open pornographic images. Lancour then personally observed Reidinger watching pornographic material on the computer for approximately thirty seconds before asking him to close the browser and move with him to a library stairwell to discuss the matter. Lancour testified he told Reidinger his watching pornography was causing a disturbance, to which Reidinger responded that he had a constitutional right to view pornographic material at a public library. Lancour then told him they had received several complaints, and witnesses had stated that Reidinger viewing pornography at that location made them feel uncomfortable. Reidinger was issued a citation for disorderly conduct under WIS. ADMIN. CODE § UWS 18.11(2) the following day. I am actually mildly surprised by this decision, because United States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) seems to indicate that the ability of adult users of a public library to disable Internet filters in order to view lawful content is constitutionally critical to the question of whether such filters are allowed, as stated in a concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy: If, on the request of an adult user, a librarian will unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter without significant delay, there is little to this case. Specifically, as stated in the dissenting opinion on Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg'l Library Dist., 2010: "Even accepting for the moment that these libraries are not a limited public forum, eight justices found the ability of a patron to disable the filter constitutionally critical." Thus there are many reports of libraries refusing to stop adult patrons from viewing pornography on these grounds: Seattle libraries: No sleeping or eating allowed, but porn-watching OK Is Web Surfing For Porn At The Public Library Legal? City libraries say ‘checking out’ porn protected by First Amendment Public library okays porn viewing despite parent complaint However, a Washington State Supreme Court decision (Bradburn v. N. Cent. Reg'l Library Dist., 2010) found that public libraries do not have to disable Internet filters by request of an adult user. (Note: I also posted this answer on Academia.SE)
This will ultimately depend on the specific laws, but the scope of EU laws like Directive 2006/114/EC is generally restricted to the EU Single Market. Thus, we would have to consider whether the advertisement in question is directed at that market. In your scenario, you have two US-based companies that engage in comparative advertising via an US-based platform. But where these companies are headquartered is not directly relevant, as non-EU companies can participate in the EU Single Market as well. Instead, EU rules are applicable if either: the comparative advertising occurred in the context of the activities of an EU establishment such as an EU-based subsidiary; or the advertising was directed to a country in the EU Single Market, for example by fulfilling the criteria listed in the Pammer and Alpenhof cases. For example, lets assume that the companies do not have a direct EU presence, but that they offer goods or services to consumers in the EU and the comparative advertisement was in German and mentioned prices in Euros. If so, there would be a good argument that EU rules apply and that the comparative advertising was potentially illegal. But as another example, lets consider two restaurants/diners in Memphis, Tennessee, US, that made unfair comparative advertisements which were distributed via YouTube. It is possible to view the advertisement from the EU. But is there any reason for this ad to be illegal in the EU? No. This ad falls out of scope of EU law as the ad is not directed towards the EU Single Market, and it is unlikely to mislead consumers in the sense of fair competition laws as there won't be any potential customers for the Memphis restaurant in the EU. National laws could take a more narrow approach though. Does YouTube have any responsibility here? No, fair competition laws generally only address the competitors, not the platforms through which advertisements are distributed (e.g. newspapers or social media platforms). Online platforms with user-generated consent benefit from safe-harbor laws. However, there are some legal theories such as the German Störerhaftung under which it might be possible to hold an otherwise-privileged service provider responsible for acts committed by an unknown third party. Note that while comparative marketing is quite regulated in the EU and thus rare, it is not actually illegal when done fairly. For example in Germany, § 6 UWG defines criteria to determine whether comparative advertising is unfair.
'Is it legal?' could mean one of two things. Does it break the criminal law; could I be arrested? There is no law criminalising photography or filming in a private place (assuming you're not doing something amounting to harrassment, or making something inherently illegal like child pornography). The act of filming per se is therefore not illegal in a criminal sense. However, the proprietor of a private place can ask you to stop filming or demand that you leave; if you fail to comply then you will be trespassing. Trespass is not a criminal offence (although the police will undoubtedly remove you if called). However, if your intent was to intimidate, obstruct or disrupt activity within the premises, you could be charged with Aggravated Trespass under s68 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Could the owner, or someone else, have a civil claim against me? This is more difficult to answer. Trespass is a tort, so the owner could in theory have a claim against you if you were filming against his wishes. However, he would have to prove some measurable amount of damage, and this is why few trespass cases come to court. The occupants of the premises may be able to sue if you breach their right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR, incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998); however, a court will balance this against your Article 10 right to freedom of expression. A court will consider all circumstances: for example, if you were filming in the toilets of a nightclub, the occupants' right to privacy may well outweigh your right to freedom of expression. A copyright owner may have a claim against you if you include their work in your film; for example, if you film inside a nightclub and substantial parts of songs are captured on your film, this may give rise to a claim. I am not a lawyer. Don't rely on free advice from strangers on the Internet.
This is an important question that affects consumer advocacy, blog-based-journalism, political speech and spending, and probably other things. People disagree about what the answer is. This podcast episode features both sides of the argument. Professor Volokh holds the view that the freedom of the press is "freedom to print", "freedom to use the printing press". Freedom of the press is the freedom of everybody to use the printing press. Assessing the grammar of the clause, he argues that this points in the same direction. The text says "freedom of speech or of the press". He points out that speech is not a group of people. It would be odd to treat "speech" as an activity, but to treat "press" as a group of people given the parallel construction. This side of the argument is described more in this article by Prof. Volokh. Professor West argues that there is a defined group of people called "the press" that deserves protection under this clause. This article explains Prof. West's position in detail. The main point is that "An expansive definition of the press means virtually complete overlap between press and speech and thus no meaningful way to interpret the Press Clause." If "press" means simply the right to publish speech, then it becomes redundant because courts have held the right to publish speech is given under that "speech" portion of the clause. Justice Stevens's concurrence in Citizens United also argued for "some kinds of identity-based distinctions" regarding whether a person is a member of the press. Each side can give examples of the term "the press" being used at the time of the First Amendment that is consistent with their favored interpretation. I think to get the best idea of the two sides to this question, you should read Citizens United (including all dissents and concurrences), read the two articles linked above, and listen to the podcast episode.
No, absent a state law to the contrary (and I am aware of no such law in this case) it is not illegal. Universities, as institutions, are permitted to express opinions on political issues, especially political issues that are pertinent to their operations. Indeed, they often do so. (Political candidates are arguably a different matter and certainly involve a more complex analysis to determine if the Johnson Amendment applies to a public university, but that isn't at issue in this case.) Governmental entities may not take religious positions, but may take political ones. Generally, even public colleges like Rutgers have this autonomy. Indeed, lobbying is frequently necessary for the survival of a public university - it has no choice but to lobby and a free hand regarding the issues upon which it does lobby.
It is not legal for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex anywhere in the US (see http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm). Exemptions exist where the discrimination is for bona fide occupational qualifications and, irrelevantly, religious reasons. It is completely legal for a consumer to discriminate on the basis of anything they want to. It is also legal for a business to assist the consumer in that discrimination. Bona fide occupational qualifications generally only apply to instances in which the BFOQ is considered reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business. Mere customer satisfaction, or lack thereof, is not enough to justify a BFOQ defence, as noted in the cases Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. and Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.. Therefore, customer preference for females does not make femininity a BFOQ for the occupation of flight attendant. However, there may be cases in which customer preference is a BFOQ—for example, femininity is reasonably necessary for Playboy Bunnies. Customer preference can "'be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to perform the primary function or service it offers,' that is, where sex or sex appeal is itself the dominant service provided." None of the occupations you mention would, on the face of it, meet the requirements to be BFOQ. Allowing their customers to express a preference for a specific gender may impact on the capacity for the business to deliver on that preference but it would not generally allow a BFOQ defence if this impacted their hiring policies. A possible exception is if the business catered to that preference exclusively, for example, an all female gym with all female staff but I am not aware that this has ever been tested and if a male personal trainer wanted to take them on he may very well win. As an aside, there is no BFOQ defence for racial discrimination except for artistic works where the first amendment rights overrule the anti-discrimination laws.
Taking the US as an example, the Constitution states Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Congress or a state government hasn't prohibited you from comparing platforms. Another private entity has. And, that's fine. You're free to launch the app as a separate website, or print out the flyers and hand them to people on the bus, or publish your own monthly magazine comparing various platforms, so you still have freedom of speech and of the press. As an example, if you write a letter about how great the government of North Korea is to the letters department at Stamp Collectors Magazine, and they don't publish it, have they violated your human rights? The app store restriction may be quite dumb. After all, the built-in web browser allows the reading of the exact same news. But there's no law against being dumb.
Owing to the First Amendment, in the United States your recourse would be limited to civil action based on violations of terms of service (meaning that "the authorities" are not going to knock on their doors to tell them to behave). This is not "spam" (which could be regulated) as the term is generally understood. It is annoying, but probably does not constitute threatening or child porn. It might involve violation of an anti-impersonation law such as this one from Texas, if the offender uses the persona of a real person as opposed to a fictitious person). That law, moreover, does not criminalize simple annoying. Prosecution may be possible in the UK.