What are the different kinds of rules/procedures that describe what counts-as/constitutes a rule change and what kinds of problems can they cause? This is a question about legislation, including constitutive rules and administrative law To give some context, I am interested in legal reasoning (as in a logic of law), but I am not a legal-expert. For research, I was hoping to look at rules which govern the change of other rules. Specifically, rules which state what constitutes a rule change (presumably for different types of rules). To give an example, I can cross off a rule in a constitution, but due to not being empowered that presumably would not mean I have changed any rules. It would not count-as a rule change. What I would like to know is: 1) What sub-types of these rule types are there? For example, some would state when a retroactive rule change is made - what other types are there? 2) What kind of absurd outcomes can come as a result of rule changes, due to the way rule changes are governed? For example, I can imagine that retroactively annulling a rule that states I can retroactively annul a rule is paradoxical, are there other similar absurdities that can occur? I am ideally looking for some legal theory on this and if that isn't available then some examples covering different possibilities, but I don't know where to look. Thanks in advance!
Why do you want to know? I think that the reason this question seems so obscure is because it does not involve sufficient context and specificity. It can't be answered until one knows the reason that it matters to know if a rule is new or not. In a particular context, these questions usually have obvious and clear answers. The murkiness arises only when one tries to overgeneralize. The life of law is not reason, it is experience. In general, it is almost never fruitful to try to apply legal principles of any kind to their logical conclusion without grounding that logic in fact specific and context specific precedents and applications. That approach to legal reasoning is a classic rookie mistake that gets a lot of young associate attorneys doing legal research into trouble by overstating the confidence that they should have in their conclusions when there is no case right on point addressing a situation. For example, if a federal government agency publishes something in the federal register that does not exactly restate an existing regulation, then it is a rule change, in the narrow sense that is changes an existing published narrowly defined Code of Federal Regulations rule. The process by which one does so derives from the Administrative Procedures Act and other authorizing legislation passed by Congress and also custom and case law interpreting these, so it isn't self-referential. A completely different context in which the question of whether there is a "new rule" of law is when a court according to the principles of stare decisis makes a ruling interpreting the constitution in a manner different from or expanding upon previously rulings interpreting the constitution in a similar circumstance. In this context, this matters because a "new rule" of constitutional law is generally given only prospective effect, while an interpretation of an existing rule of law that merely expands upon existing precedents in a foreseeable way has retroactive effect. In this situation, as in any case in which one tries to determine the best definition to apply under the law, the best approach is to look for a definition that produces just results given the consequences of a particular definition v. another particular definition. In that context, the determination of whether a rule is a "new rule" should depend upon foreseeability and the amount of reliance that people put on the old rule as opposed to the new rule being in force. There is no good reason to have transsubstantive legal meta-rules that apply to both of these situations. The former mechanistic rule makes sense in its context and makes the status quo clear and the events that constitute a change in the rule clear, while the latter consequence oriented definition makes sense in the completely different context where it is used. Surely, there are other contexts in which the question of what constitutes a "new rule" could have different consequences still. For example, to determine what constitutes a new v. old rule of U.S. Senate procedure, or to determine which statute is newer or older for purposes of determining which statute of two that conflict should be given effect when there was a cosmetic recodification of the section numbers of one of the titles but not the other without changing the substantive meaning of the recodified statute. The determination should generally be made on a case by case basis as there is no important purpose served by having a uniform metarule to answer these questions. If you are getting paradoxes trying to apply your legal theory, you are probably doing it wrong. For what it is worth, I have a dim opinion of Hart as someone who uses lots of words to say nothing of consequence or use, and I am not familiar with Biagoli or Suber. In general, legal theorists are not terribly influential in how the law is applied and interpreted in practice, although, of course, there are always exceptions.
Dale M's answer is not supported at all by history, or any mode of constitutional interpretation. I also don't find it likely. I'd say that if a duly ratified amendment said as much, that would be the law. It is certainly correct that the court could try to narrow the meaning. It's also possible to simply not follow the Constitution (as we do with state immunity and the 11th amendment). But to assume that would be done here is just speculating blindly. Of course, this question doesn't warrant much more attention than blind speculation, so my comment is not a very offensive accusation. As a few counter points, we have radically change the form of our government many times within the current constitution. Reconstruction, The New Deal and so on, all represented huge changes. Most importantly, the 17th amendment can easily be viewed as more radical than the question's proposed amendment. It completely flipped the political system upside down, orienting power in the people and the federal government, and treating the states as some weird intermediary: but we now see it as a relatively boring enactment. Certainly we could come to see the formal abolishment of the amendment process similarly, especially if it were (which it would need to be) accompanied with a new found comfort with non-textual interpretation to effectively &quot;amend&quot; through interpretation, i.e. If the textualists lost badly this amendment would seem like a relatively natural way of announcing their demise. Remember that Scalia's whole point, is that strict originalism (not saying he was actually so strict himself) would democratize by forcing change through the amendment process. If we rejected that notion (as deceptive, for example) we could (as in its not completely ridiculous to imagine) announce that rejection with the proposed amendment.
The future prospects are negligible, and the present status of such influence is non-existent. In a few cases, you may find an appellate decision citing some statement from a reputable law review. Here is an article that addresses such influences on SCOTUS (which, the authors note, have decreased over time). However, you are describing a wingnut legal theory, and courts do not rely on wingnut legal theories, they rely on what the actual law is.
Yes, a contract implied in fact can supersede a written contract: if it both (1) arises after the parties have entered into their initial agreement and (2) if the subject matter of the agreement is not subject to the statutes of frauds (i.e. to a statutory requirement that agreements of this kind must always be in writing). A course of dealings before a written contract is signed if the contract states that it is the entire agreement of the parties, or appears from context to be the entire agreement of the parties, may not be considered pursuant to something known as the parole evidence rule (which is actually a rule of substantive law and not evidence, despite the name). An agreement that is required by statute to be modified in writing, something called a statute of frauds, might or might not be susceptible to being modified in this way. Sometimes, failure to comply with a statute of frauds is excused if the parties have partially performed the unwritten agreement, sometimes the statute is applied more strictly and cannot be overcome. Indeed, in Colorado, where I practice law most of the time, there is actually case law that specifically provides that even if a written contract states that it may only be modified in writing, that any oral or implied in fact agreement which could form a contract in the first place may supersede the written agreement. Proving that the course of dealings actually constituted an actual modification of the contractual obligation, may, in practice, be a challenging matter, however. In practice, there is probably a stronger argument on the available facts in the question, that there has been a waiver of the requirement for further provision of the service that may not be undone retroactively, but may be reasserted prospectively with fair notice to the other party, with the written contract remaining in force. The judge or jury would have to listen to the facts from the parties about their course of dealings and communications, about the nature of the &quot;requirement&quot;, and about the pertinent terms of the written contract, and more generally, the larger context of the transaction, and then would decide which interpretation seemed closer to the truth, or if another explanation of what happened was more plausible. This dilemma and uncertainty is generically a problem any time that the parties course of dealings deviates significantly from a written instrument. These kinds of cases are never clear slam dunks for either party in the event of litigation.
Does B have a legal obligation to inform A that changes were made to the document? This is definitely not a simple yes-no question. One ought to consider not only the tenets of contract law, but also notions of equity and of public policy. On the one hand, courts acknowledge modified contracts that result from a battle of the forms. On the other hand, sliding changes in the contract without adequately directing the counterparty's attention to them tends to contravene the contract law covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In the scenario you outline, imagine the inefficiency and risk of mistake if the parties engage in several rounds of offers and counter-offers by sliding changes scattered all over the latest draft of a contract (this is totally feasible, especially as laws nowhere limit the number of times a party can make a counter-offer). Unless each party is conspicuous about his latest changes to the contract, the dynamics can easily become a matter of which party inadvertently binds himself to unacceptably detrimental clauses (some of which might re-occur after being stricken in a previous draft). This hinders the contract law prerequisite that a contract be entered knowingly and willfully. Although the parties are responsible for reading the contract, subjecting the offeror/offeree to devote valuable resources each time a newly altered contract goes from one direction to the other seems contrary to public policy. Furthermore, that defeats the purpose of negotiations and of the prior efforts each party spent toward the contract (such as valuations and risk analysis). I'm just curious to understand what legally prevents this type of things from happening in general. An offer may include language to the effect of accepting the contract 'as is'. See the provision in the Uniform Commercial Code (for instance, see MCL 440.2207(2)(a)) whereby alterations are precluded "[if] the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer". The aforementioned statute also precludes terms which significantly alter the contract. See MCL 440.2207(2)(b). In a context of loan contracts --apropos of your example--, a borrower's unilateral alteration of the interest rate, of payment schedules, etc. constitute material alterations. Indeed, financial institutions are utmost sensitive to changes in interest rates and the timing of cash flows. Even in the case of an offeree's immaterial alterations of a contract, an offeror might prevail under principles of equity. This is more evident in the case of entities which enter and manage a multitude of contracts simultaneously, be it via contracts of adhesion or upon negotiations with each counterparty. In line with my point on public policy, the additional cost of filtering a counterparty's last minute occurrences would make it impossible for economies of scale to develop.
No state can amend the US Constitution by itself. Technically, an amendment to the Constitution can be proposed a constitutional convention that is called for by two-thirds of the State legislatures (though this is has never happened; all 27 amendments have been proposed by the Federal Congress, which is the alternative path). This can be done without any kind of Federal approval what so ever. After proposal, an amendment must be ratified by three-fourths of state legislatures. EDIT: Regarding how to &quot;get a convention started&quot;: This hasn't been tested, since a non-Congressional amendment has not, to my knowledge, been attempted, but I would imagine a Convention would be called if 2/3rds of the states submitted requests to Congress (which would probably either be a law or a joint-resolution, which is like a law without executive approval, but the form would probably be governed by each state's respective Constitution). Alternatively, it may be sufficient for state legislatures to designate delegates who meet up somewhere (as that is essentially what happened with the Constitutional Congress, i.e. the delegates who met and drafted the US Federal Constitution). A point has been raised in another answer that there may be an issue; however, I'm not convinced of this being a bar to a Convention. The delegates at the Constitutional Congress were original chosen to discuss changes to the Articles of Confederation, but wound up throwing the whole thing out and starting from scratch instead. Therefore, I do not see calls for a convention with differing but related objectives to be a problem; the whole point of a Convention in the Constitutional Amendment process is to discuss and compromise; otherwise, why require it before skipping to the 3/4ths of states ratifying, if the 2/3rds of states already have to agree on exactly what is being proposed before sending delegates.
Amendments to regulations adopted contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are invalid, or at least, voidable if contested in a timely fashion (which they usually are). The APA does authorize emergency temporary regulations in some circumstances.
In practice, common law courts turn to academic writing, either law review articles or legal treatises or the &quot;Restatements of Law&quot;, on a regular, but infrequent basis. These sources are not binding sources of legal authority but can shed persuasive light on the logic behind a legal rule or the course of action that has been taken in previous similar cases. In civil law countries (i.e. those not descended from the legal system of England), there are far fewer circumstances in which court precedents are sources of law. Much of the gap in credible sources for how ambiguities in the statutory law should be interpreted in these countries comes from academic writing. In a typical civil law country, a leading law professor has more impact on how the law is interpreted than senior appellate court judges. Again, academic writings are not binding legal authority, but in the absence of alternative sources for material interpreting statutes, they are very persuasive.