What does an administration need to show in court so that its change-of-policy decisions are not judged &quot;arbitrary and capricious&quot;? Regarding a recent SCOTUS decision on the &quot;remain in Mexico&quot; program, I've read that: The Supreme Court on Tuesday said the Biden administration likely violated federal law in trying to end a Trump-era program that forces people to wait in Mexico while seeking asylum in the U.S. [...] The court offered little explanation for its action, although it cited its opinion from last year rejecting the Trump administration’s effort to end another immigration program, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. In that case, the court held that the decision to end DACA was “arbitrary and capricious,” in violation of federal law. Is there some general test for whether an administration's change of policy (like rescinding something initiated by a previous administration) is &quot;arbitrary and capricious&quot;? Or failing that, are there opposite examples, where such a policy change was challenged on &quot;arbitrary and capricious&quot; grounds, but the courts didn't find it to be so by ruling on the merits of that challenge (instead of side-stepping it—e.g., by dismissing it as a &quot;political question&quot;)?
The agency must have provided &quot;reasoned analysis&quot; for rescinding its previous rule The Supreme Court in Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) held that (emphasis added): An agency changing its course by rescinding a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance. While the scope of review under the &quot;arbitrary and capricious&quot; standard is narrow, and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, the agency nevertheless must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. In reviewing that explanation, a court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there was a clear error of judgment. The Supreme Court's denial of the application for a stay in the &quot;Remain in Mexico&quot; case cited Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., which (citing the above case) overturned the rescission of the DACA program because: In short, the Attorney General neither addressed the forbearance policy at the heart of DACA nor compelled DHS to abandon that policy. Thus, removing benefits eligibility while continuing forbearance remained squarely within the discretion of Acting Secretary Duke, who was responsible for “[e]stablishing national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.” 116Stat. 2178, 6 U. S. C. §202(5). But Duke’s memo offers no reason for terminating forbearance. She instead treated the Attorney General’s conclusion regarding the illegality of benefits as sufficient to rescind both benefits and forbearance, without explanation.
Congress can't override substantive rules of constitutional law Marbury v. Madison is a binding interpretation of what the U.S. Constitution permits or denies, and in substance, this law seeks to change that interpretation of the scope of the judicial power, so that interpretation may not be overruled except via a Constitutional amendment. Neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court, under their appellate jurisdiction, will declare unconstitutional or otherwise adjudicate unconstitutional any law passed by Congress; neither the Supreme Court nor any lower federal court will hear or otherwise engage in cases or controversies in which one or both parties put into discussion the constitutionality of a law passed by Congress, or ask for a law or a statue passed by Congress to be declared unconstitutional. The language in italics is jurisdiction stripping language, which I discuss below, and which is also discussed in another answer. But, the language in bold is enunciating a substantive rule of law regarding how the judicial branch may resolve a case that is otherwise properly before it. And, Congress does not have the power to change that to make the U.S. Constitution a dead letter under its Article III jurisdiction regulation powers. The language in bold language is a direct attempt to overrule a binding interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and that is beyond the authority of Congress to do, so the statute would be unconstitutional, at least, in part. Jurisdiction stripping Yes, Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to Article III, Section 2 which states: In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under the Regulations as the Congress shall make. But, there are parts of Article III that apply in addition to the power of Congress to create "Exceptions" the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court, and the power to create and modify the "inferior courts" that exist. The first sentence of Article III, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution states: The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts, as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. This is crucial, and interacts with the Exceptions power. The default provision is that all judicial power as defined in Article III, Section 2 is vested in the "supreme Court" unless and until that power is instead vested in an "inferior Court" established under Article III that Congress creates by law. Therefore, Congress does not have the power to deny every court (or even every federal court) both original and appellate jurisdiction over any constitutionally justiciable claim arising under Article III, even if the claim is not within the express original jurisdiction of SCOTUS. If they deny every inferior Article III federal court jurisdiction over something within the constitutionally defined scope of the judicial power, then it reverts to the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court even though it is not expressly made a part of the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. The judicial power of the federal courts collectively is defined in Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and extends to all cases arising under the U.S. Constitution which would include a claim to have a provision of federal or state law declared unconstitutional as in violation of the constitution. It says: The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; . . . (This analysis is attributed to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.) Now, this is not to say that Congress couldn't do something to make it harder procedurally to have statutes declared unconstitutional. For example, there would be a much harder claim of unconstitutionality if Congress vested original jurisdiction in all such cases in the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, and then only assigned one judge to that district, and denied the U.S. Courts of Appeal or the U.S. Supreme Court, appellate jurisdiction over those decisions. At some point, however, even this lesser restriction, rather than elimination of a judicial power would still be subject to challenge under the due process protections of the 5th Amendment. Writ jurisdiction Notably, Marbury v. Madison was a case brought in the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court under a writ of mandamus, under the All Writs Act, and not in connection with its appellate jurisdiction. So, Congress would also have to repeal or amend the "All Writs Act" to pull off the intent of the proposed statute, because the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends by statute to writs that are not appellate in nature even though this power is very rarely exercised. A writ is a court order directed at a government official directing that government official to do something, or to refrain from doing something. But, there are many ways to back door a seemingly private cause of action, particularly one related to constitutionality, into a writ. And, if a court has jurisdiction over a writ, it has jurisdiction to entertain requests by litigants to have such writs issued. Congress can't remove a state court forum It is worth noting that every single state court from traffic court on up has concurrent jurisdiction with the federal courts to declare that a statute is unconstitutional, and that state courts frequently do declare state statutes to be unconstitutional. Congressional jurisdiction to regulate jurisdiction is largely limited to regulation of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. It can put a federal question (e.g. copyright enforcement or disputes with the IRS) in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, but there are no cases in which Congress has been permitted to place a federal law in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts while also denying any federal court jurisdiction over claims arising under that law. Otherwise, state court jurisdiction isn't regulated by Congress. And, the Constitution specifically requires all federal, state and local officials to swear to uphold the U.S. Constitution which arguably provides an independent basis for state court jurisdiction over constitutionality claims arising under the U.S. Constitution. This is a really important point. For example, suppose that someone who lives in the same state as you do sues you entirely under state law in a state court, and that state's courts require you to bring any claim you have against that person in state court over which that state court has jurisdiction as a counterclaim or you forfeit that claim forever. If you have federal claims against the person who sued you in state court, and your claims are not one of the handful of issues (e.g. copyright enforcement) that are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, you must enforce your federal claims against that person as counterclaims in that state court case, or you will lose them forever. For example, suppose that your employer sues you in state court for conversion (i.e. stealing company property) and you have a right to sue the employer for not paying you the right amount for your overtime work under federal law. Then, you must bring your federal overtime claims in state court as counterclaims to the conversion action, rather than in federal court. Similarly, even though state criminal charges are always brought in state courts, a criminal defendant in a state court criminal case, can raised arguments arising under the U.S. Constitution including a determination that a state criminal law is unconstitutional, in state court as a defense, even though the only federal court recourse a criminal defendant has is through an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court or a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus brought in federal district court after all state direct appellate relief is exhausted, after petitioning to the U.S. Supreme Court, and after all state post-conviction relief (including petitioning the final state order to the U.S. Supreme Court) is exhausted. In practice, this means, criminal defendants have no meaningful access to the federal courts other than two petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which are discretionary, until they have been incarcerated wrongfully for five or ten years. But, federal defenses can and routinely are raised in the state court trial (and indeed, federal defenses that could be raised in a state trial court may not be raised in a habeas corpus petition in federal court unless they were first raised in or before the original state court trial). N.B.: Federal claims in the exclusive original jurisdiction of state courts The extremes to which jurisdiction stripping is allowed are explored in the handful of claims arising under federal law that are expressly not within the scope of the jurisdiction of any federal trial court or intermediate appellate court, or within the express non-appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most notable of these are affirmative private individual civil lawsuits against offenders under the federal robocall and junk fax law (a.k.a. the Telephone Consumer Protection Act a.k.a. the TCPA a.k.a. 47 U.S.C. § 227), which do not not require a writ, which may only be brought in state court, subject to an ultimate appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. But, the federal courts have exclusively jurisdiction over litigation many kinds of claims other than private civil actions arising under the TCPA. This law is much less constitutionally concerning than the one proposed in the question, however, because while Congress can't repeal the U.S. Constitution, it doesn't have to pass a law giving private individuals a private cause of action when they receive robocalls or junk faxes at all. It could pass a law that was enforceable by the FCC alone, for example, and in the case of the TCPA, there are persons, including the FCC and regulated persons who want to challenge a regulation issued by the FCC, who are entitled to utilize the federal courts to enforce the TCPA or to dispute it. For example, there is no private cause of action to enforce most federal criminal laws (as such, not just involving the same harm) with a civil lawsuit by the victim against the criminal, in either federal court or state court, but that is not unconstitutional. This is because federal criminal laws can be enforced by government prosecutors and defended against by private individuals, in Article III federal courts. Also, even private causes of action under the TCPA are subject to ultimate U.S. Supreme Court appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court is an Article III federal court.
The first paragraph on the nature of the concern in the ICIG letter to McGuire clarifies what the alleged violation of the law is: Here, the Complainant's Letter alleged, among other things, that the President of the United States, in a telephone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on July 25, 2019, “sought to pressure the Ukrainian leader to take actions to help the President’s 2020 reelection bid.” U.S. laws and regulations prohibit a foreign national, directly or indirectly, from making a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value, or to make an express or implied promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election. Similarly, U.S. laws and regulations prohibit a person from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such a contribution or donation from a foreign national, directly or indirectly, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election. Further, in the ICIG’s judgment, alleged conduct by a senior U.S. public official to seek foreign assistance to interfere in or influence a Federal election would constitute a “serious or flagrant problem [or] abuse” under 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5)(G)(i), which would also potentially expose such a U.S. public official (or others acting in concert with the U.S. public official) to serious national security and counterintelligence risks with respect to foreign intelligence services aware of such alleged conduct. That is, it is alleged that it is a violation of federal election law for a foreign national to aid a US election (by providing information, which might be of value). The underlying statute is ambiguous. One reading is that the term refers to a deficiency relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information and also A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law or Executive order The alternative is to take the entire list and limit the scope of the violations etc. to those within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information The interpretive canon known as the "last antecedent rule" favor the narrowest scope possible the immiidately above phrase. The law does not require a Supreme Court quality analysis of the underlying law: the proper interpretation of that statute is far from obvious, see here. Whether or not the last antecedent rule would be actually invoked in a final appeal is very hard to say, but generally the courts disfavor the supposition that any statute is ever written ambiguously (that still doesn't tell us what the scope of the last phrase is). The wording of the ICIG letter clearly indicates his interpretation of the scope of the DNI phrase, as not being limited to only intelligence activities within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National Intelligence involving classified information. However, the ICIG letter also notes that the Director of National Intelligence has responsibility and authority pursuant to federal law and Executive Orders to administer and operate programs and activities related to potential foreign interference in a United States election Additionally, Executive Order 13848, Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Influence in a United States Election declares that the ability of persons ... outside the United States to interfere in or undermine public confidence in United States elections... constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States putting the combination of foreign + elections within the scope of the DNI. The ICIG letter also reasons that alleged conduct by a senior U.S. public official to seek foreign assistance to interfere in or influence a Federal election would constitute a “serious or flagrant problem [or] abuse” under 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5)(G)(i), which would also potentially expose such a U.S. public official (or others acting in concert with the U.S. public official) to serious national security and counterintelligence risks with respect to foreign intelligence services aware of such alleged conduct.
The court receives petitions for something like 8,000 cases annually, but it only hears something like 75 to 100 cases. There is not enough time or manpower to address each case that comes up, so the vast majority of the cases are simply rejected without comment. There are some notable exceptions, but a review of the order list from the day before Trump's order might give you a better feel for the caseload the court is dealing with and how unremarkable it is for an order to be brief, unsigned, and with no noted dissents. The only significance of the Court disposing of Trump's case this way is that it indicates none of the justices considered the issues he was raising to be serious enough to merit their attention.
Such a lawsuit is known as a strategic lawsuit against public participation, or SLAPP. In the United States, several states have enacted laws that penalize those whose file SLAPPs. The provisions of these laws vary from state to state, but they usually allow a defendant to file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that their statements were constitutionally protected free speech about a public figure. These laws may allow discovery to be halted until the motion to dismiss is decided; they may also require a plaintiff who files a SLAPP to reimburse the defendant's attorney's fees, possibly also with punitive damages. Some state's laws require the speech to be before a government forum (as opposed to, say, on Twitter), or to be aimed at procuring government action. And several states have no such laws at all. A summary of various US states' anti-SLAPP laws can be found on the website of the Public Participation Project, an organization advocating the establishment of such laws. Note that these motions to dismiss are not always brought by "the little guy" against "the big guy". A notable recent case was Stormy Daniels's libel suit against Donald Trump, which was dismissed earlier this year. Daniels had filed suit against Trump claiming that one of Trump's tweets about her was defamatory. Trump moved to dismiss under Texas's anti-SLAPP law, on the grounds that his tweet was protected political speech about a public figure (namely Daniels); and the judge agreed.
Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in both scenarios. The first scenario leaves no room for issues of collateral estoppel. Whether or not charges for "no-registration" proceed would strictly depend on whether the statute sanctions an offender's mere intent not to register his or her new address. If the elements of the claim require both (1) actual change of address, and (2) intent not to register it, the fact that the woman in your hypothetical scenario did not actually move precludes any claims about her failure to register what she [unavailingly] alleged to be her "new" address. In the alternative, where mere "intent not to register" meets all the prima facie elements for the new charges, her relocation (if any) as well as the prior judgment on grounds of the Fourth Amendment are irrelevant to these new charges. In the second hypothetical scenario, collateral estoppel is precluded from the standpoint that issues are not identical and therefore do not involve double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,, 444, 448 (1970). HHS's prior failure to produce FOIA records did not involve litigation, does not negate, and is not essential to the fact, that the physician committed fraud. VanDEVENTER v. MNB, 172 Mich.App. 456, 463 (1988) ("Collateral estoppel conclusively bars only issues "actually litigated" in the first action."). Edited to add/correct reference (see comments) Beyond these hypothetical scenarios, it should be obvious that collateral estoppel may apply to criminal cases. This is reflected, for instance, in footnote 4 of Yeager v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 2360; 557 U.S. 110 (2009): Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel had developed in civil litigation, we had already extended it to criminal proceedings when Ashe was decided. Another treaty of interest might be Kennelly, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases (cited here).
This answer is under United States law. Usually, when a court interprets the law in a way that was previously ambiguous, parties are not given any leniency for not knowing in advance how an issue will be resolved. Sometimes, when a court overrules prior precedent with a new precedent the court will grant some leniency, if there is an easy way to do so. For example, in the Colorado case of Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, the Colorado Supreme Court made the level of detail required in documents commencing civil lawsuits in the state was made much more strict, reversing long standing prior binding precedents in the state on the issue. The U.S. Supreme Court had done the same thing in federal cases, but the Colorado Court of Appeals at the time had repeatedly declined to apply the federal standard to state court cases. In Warne, the party whose legal documents were held to be insufficiently detailed was allowed, on remand to the trial court for further proceedings, to try to amend those documents to meet the new standard (for what it is worth, he didn't succeed on remand). This is usually not done, however, in &quot;writing on the wall&quot; situations where the new decision overruling prior law was obvious from an amendment to the statute that an older case interpreted, or from a previous new court precedent that overruled prior law in some circumstances and made it very likely that addition related binding case law would also be overruled, even if the previous landmark precedent didn't necessarily have that result. An exception applies in cases where a law enforcement officer is accused of violating someone's civil rights. In those cases, liability is only imposed on the officer if the fact that the conduct violated the plaintiff's legal rights was &quot;clearly established&quot; by statutes and case law at the time that the law enforcement officer took the action giving rise to the lawsuit, under a doctrine known as &quot;qualified immunity&quot;. If the law was ambiguous at the time that the law enforcement officer took action, &quot;qualified immunity&quot; bars the lawsuit. Similar considerations apply in favor of the government in some habeas corpus litigation in federal court (where a state court conviction is collaterally attacked after direct appeals are exhausted).
The State Department has what I believe are deliberately awful FOIA processing guidelines, which categorize virtually every request as complex, unless all the requested documents are &quot;readily available for release.&quot; Exactly what that means, I don't know, but I think it's safe to assume that they would not consider a 30-year-old document readily available. Nonetheless, that designation does not, as I understand it, have any effect on the statutory deadline to respond to the request, which is 20 days, regardless of whether it's been designated standard or complex. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(6)(A)(i). Of course, all of this could vary somewhat depending on exactly what you've requested. If you've requested a press release from 1992, they should adhere to the 20-day deadline. But if you've requested a compendium of classified diplomatic cables, and they've decided to actually consider declassifying them, that might constitute the kind of &quot;unusual circumstances&quot; where the statute permits more than 20 days. Even then, though, the statute requires them to give you written notice of the circumstances, and the extension usually should not be more than another 10 days. At this point, you have the option of continuing to wait, calling the FOIA office for some polite sabre-rattling, going through the OGIS dispute-resolution program, or treating the delay as a denial and filing an appeal. You cannot go into court until you have gone through the full administrative appeal process.