Are there legal limits to U.S. states taxing out-of-state income? When a New York State non-resident has NYS income, NY's tax rates are based NOT on the absolute amount of the NYS income, but on the non-resident's federal income, pro-rated to the percentage earned in NY. For example, if the non-resident earns $5000 in NY, and $95,000 elsewhere, her tax is not based on a $5000 income, but rather, she pays 5% of the tax on a $100,000 income. In this example 5% is the percent earned in NY. The computation is on NY's form IT203, lines 31 to 46. (I understand the progressive mindset behind this, and my question is not about whether it is fair or just). My question: Are there constitutional limits on how aggressive a state could be in doing such things? I'm surprised NYS can compel a non-resident to even disclose out of state income, let alone set a tax that is based on that entire income. They are not formally &quot;taxing&quot; that other income .... but could they? If I drive from New York to LA and pay tolls and sales taxes in every state along the way, establishing a very weak and dubious &quot;nexus&quot;, does every state become entitled to, say, impose an income tax on my entire global income? Is there anything to stop states and local governments from setting taxes that accumulate to more than 100% of my income? A couple of straw man theories Perhaps an overly aggressive approach to taxing out of state revenue would intrude on the rights of Congress by having the side-effect of discouraging (therefore &quot;regulating&quot;) interstate commerce? The NY approach to income tax (and apparently CA does the same thing) do not appear to have that effect. Perhaps there is no constitutional limitation to what a state can do, but economics and politics regulates this? If a state is overly aggressive, outsiders will cease to contribute to its economy, and the voters will respond. So it can be self-regulating. I'm skeptical, however, about whether 50 states would benevolently &quot;self regulate&quot; this way over 200 years. If no state has ever attempted a wild non-resident money grab it must be because they cannot.
Both the Due Process Clause and the Dormant Commerce Clause impose meaningful limits on states' ability to tax income on residents. The Due Process Clause requires &quot;minimum contacts&quot; between the state and the taxpayer. Under the Due Process Clause, states may only tax a nonresident's income when there is a &quot;some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.” North Carolina Dept. of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, 139 S. Ct. 2213, 2220 (2019). Despite the word &quot;minimum,&quot; there isn't any fixed threshold at which contacts become sufficient to permit a state to impose a tax. Instead, the courts will ask whether the state's assertion of jurisdiction to tax the person offends &quot;traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.&quot; A critical question in this analysis will be whether the taxpayer enjoyed the &quot;benefits and protection&quot; of the state in connection with the subject of the tax. In your examples, then, you can probably guess how the courts would view each transaction. If you are a Connecticut resident but perform a $5,000 job in New York, you have physically entered New York, likely conducted business with another New York entity, and you can go to the New York courts if the other party breaches the contract by which you earned the money. You have meaningful contacts with the state and enjoy the protection of its laws, so the state is permitted to impose a tax on the income from that transaction. But if you drive from New York to California, your presence in each state is likely highly transient. You pay tolls for using the highways and sales taxes for lunch or something, but you aren't generating any income from those transactions. Your presence in New Jersey would not, for instance, entitle you to go into New Jersey courts to sue for a breach of your New York contract. New Jersey has no meaningful connection to that income, so it may not tax it. But contrast that with your lunch purchase, which creates sufficient connections to New Jersey to permit it to tax that transaction: you are physically in New Jersey, you are protected by New Jersey's food-safety laws, and you can go into New Jersey courts if Burger King intentionally poisons you. So the state can impose a sales tax on that transaction, but not income tax on out-of-state transactions. The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing the &quot;unfair burden&quot; of double taxation on interstate commerce. The Dormant Commerce Clause prohibits the states from regulating, restricting, or substantially burdening interstate commerce without the consent of Congress. The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear time and time again that income taxes violate the Dormant Commerce Clause when they create a risk of double taxation that doesn't exist for taxpayers with no out-of-state business: Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) (“Interstate commerce would thus be subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to which intrastate commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids.”) Gwin, White &amp; Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 440 (1939) (“Such a multiplication of state taxes, each measured by the volume of the commerce, would reestablish the barriers to interstate trade which it was the object of the commerce clause to remove.”) Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801-2 (2015) (“The tax schemes held to be unconstitutional ... had the potential to result in the discriminatory double taxation of income earned out of state and created a powerful incentive to engage in intrastate rather than interstate economic activity.”) So even though New York and Connecticut have sufficient contacts from a due-process perspective to permit both of them to tax your business, they many not tax all of your income if not all of it if another state has a claim to it as well. This has of course led to debates over exactly how much of your income New York and Connecticut is entitled to, and the question only gets more complex for businesses with larger footprints. Amazon, for instance, is doing business in every state and territory, so how do we divide its income among the 50+ entities looking to take a bite of those hundreds of billions of dollars in income? For quite a long time, most states used a three-factor calculation that apportioned income among the states based on how much of they taxpayer's property, payroll, and sales were in each state. Oversimplified, this means that if you had 5 percent of your property in New York, 40 percent of your payroll in New York, and 15 percent of your sales in New York, that would average out to 20 percent, so you would pay New York taxes on 20 percent of your income. Over time, the three-factor apportionment method has fallen out of favor, and many states adopted other methods -- especially calculations that more heavily weight the sales factor -- to encourage economic development. Because most large companies have only a small portion of their sales in almost any given state, they can substantially reduce their tax bills by setting up their headquarters in a state that is going to ignore the value of their real estate, equipment, and payroll when calculating their tax bills. tl;dr: Under the Due Process Clause, a state can't impose tax on anything it doesn't have some meaningful connection to. Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the states have to find a way to make split up taxes that they might share a claim to.
Maybe, but it is not a de jure taking. There are vast numbers of restrictions on what one can do with one's property and on businesses that one can conduct on that property. Zoning ordinances prevent me from setting up a chemical factory where I have my house; I can't build it up 4 stories and there is an obligatory setback from the property line for any extension. I can't freely build on my land, I need government permission in the form of a permit. This is allowed (Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255), when the regulatory action advances a legitimate governmental goal and therefore the action is not a taking. The government might &quot;take&quot; land by rendering it useless without the formality of condemnation (United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745). But a moratorium on evictions does not render the property useless. The tenant remains liable for rent.
It is more complicated. From Wikipedia “The United States has income tax treaties with over 65 countries. These treaties reduce the chance of double taxation by allowing each country to fully tax its citizens and residents and reducing the amount the other country can tax them. Generally the treaties provide for reduced rates of tax on investment income and limits as to which business income can be taxed. The treaties each define which taxpayers can benefit from the treaty.”
Yes, that would be legal, indeed required According to the Michigan Dept of the Treasury: Individuals or businesses that sell tangible personal property to the final consumer are required to remit a 6% sales tax on the total price (including shipping and handling charges) of their taxable retail sales to the State of Michigan. Sales of electricity, natural or artificial gas and home heating fuels for residential use are taxed at a 4% rate. Michigan does not allow city or local units to impose sales tax. According to the official Michigan State Sales Tax Handbook Groceries and Prescription Drugs are exempt from sales tax, but prepared food is not. This includes restaurant food, and would, I think, include drinks served in a bar. When I worked in a Michigan restaurant and bar about 40 years ago, sales tax was charged, to the best of my memory.
This Wikipedia article says that Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947): ...applied the Establishment Clause in the country's Bill of Rights to State law. Prior to this decision, the First Amendment's words, &quot;Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion&quot; imposed limits only on the federal government, ... However, the Everson opinion does not say that. Rather it quotes Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) which says: The First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states, declares that &quot;Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .&quot; Everson did say: Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the First Amendment did not apply as a restraint against the states. Most of them did soon provide similar constitutional protectionsfor religious liberty. Murdock goes on to say that: It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license tax, the payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40, 292 U. S. 44-45, and cases cited. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have a full purse. and goes on to say It is contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax -- a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution. Thus, it may not exact a license tax for the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce (McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U. S. 33, 309 U. S. 56-58), although it may tax the property used in, or the income derived from, that commerce, so long as those taxes are not discriminatory. Id., p. 309 U. S. 47, and cases cited. A license tax applied to activities guaranteed by the First Amendment would have the same destructive effect. The Murdock case was not in a school context. It was a case of a license tax on door-to-door sellers of religious literature (Jehovah's Witnesses), which tax the court found unconstitutional under the Establishment clause. It does not proclaim the first incorporation of the Establishment clause, but it does not clearly cite any earlier case that does so incorporate that clause. Everson v. Board of Education is the earliest case which I can find that applies the Establishment Clause to a state law in the context of public schools. Specifically, it was a case where a NJ law which provided that tax funds be spent to provide transport for children to private schools, including religious schools -- in this case Catholic schools. The Court in Everson took it as unquestionable that the state could not set up religious institutions, including schools, but held that the payment of transportation at issue in the case was permitted, because its primary purpose was to aid the students, not the religious school, it was open to various private schools, not merely religious ones (although in practice only students of Catholic schools benefited in the district sued), and because it aimed to improve public safety, lest children otherwise walk or hitchhike along busy roads. The court wrote: The people there [in Virginia], as elsewhere, reached the conviction that individual religious liberty could be achieved best under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any religious individual or group. The movement toward this end reached its dramatic climax in Virginia in 1785-86 when the Virginia legislative body was about to renew Virginia's tax levy for the support of the established church. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the fight against this tax. Madison wrote his great Memorial and Remonstrance against the law. In it, he eloquently argued that a true religion did not need the support of law; that no person, either believer or nonbeliever, should be taxed to support a religious institution of any kind; that the best interest of a society required that the minds of men always be wholly free, and that cruel persecutions were the inevitable result of government-established religions. Leaving history the Everson opinion goes on to say that: In recent years, so far as the provision against the establishment of a religion is concerned, the question has most frequently arisen in connection with proposed state aid to church schools and efforts to carry on religious teachings in the public schools in accordance with the tenets of a particular sect. Some churches have either sought or accepted state financial support for their schools. Here again, the efforts to obtain state aid or acceptance of it have not been limited to any one particular faith. The state courts, in the main, have remained faithful to the language of their own constitutional provisions designed to protect religious freedom and to separate religions and governments. The Everson opinion did not directly consider the case of a government actually running a religious school. It said that the meaning of the Establishment clause from cases applying it to the Federal Government before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment should also be used in cases applying it to state actions. It cited as earlier cases following that rule: Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413; Largent v. Texas, 318 U. S. 418; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, supra; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573; Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501. In particular West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette was in a school context, specifically about a law requiring school children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance, against claims of some Jehovah's Witnesses that this constituted an act of idolatry, and was religiously forbidden. (Children who refused were expelled, and their parents were prosecuted for failure to have their children attend school) The Barnette opinion said: Over a decade ago, Chief Justice Hughes led this Court in holding that the display of a red flag as a symbol of opposition by peaceful and legal means to organized government was protected by the free speech guaranties of the Constitution. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 35 ... It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to prevent and punish. It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence. ... The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education not excepted. ... The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. it is important to distinguish between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. ... It is important to note that, while it is the Fourteenth Amendment which bears directly upon the State, it is the more specific limiting principles of the First Amendment that finally govern this case. This is clearly the language of incorporation of the 1st into the 14th against an agency of state government, specifically a school board. The The Barnette opinion goes on to say: Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embracing. Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. ... If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us. [Footnote 19] We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power, and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control. Somewhat later the case of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) considered an official school prayer used in the public schools of New York state, and held that it was unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause applied to states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion said: We think that, by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the Regents' prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. There can, of course, be no doubt that New York's program of daily classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer is a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplication for the blessings of the Almighty. The nature of such a prayer has always been religious, none of the respondents has denied this, and the trial court expressly so found[.] [T]he constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that, in this country, it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government. That would seem to firmly dispose of any idea of a goverment-run religious school. As most if not all states had (and still have) their own versions of the Establishment Clause somewhere in their state constitutions prior to the passage of the Federal 14th Amendment, such schools might have been prevented by such state provisions.
Generally speaking, fraud in connection with an affirmative statement, in both criminal and civil cases, is limited to false statements of a presently existing material fact. Future income is not a presently existing fact. So, simply incorrectly stating your future income is not fraud. But, you are affirming when you make such a statement that you presently sincerely believe that you will have a future income of approximately the amount stated. And, if you make a statement about your future income when you do not actually believe that you will have that future income, then you have still committed fraud. In practice, there are lots of gray areas where a judge or jury considering the case would have to weigh the facts and your credibility. If you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $1,000,000 in the next year, when you had never done so before and didn't even have any plausible plan other than playing the lottery for doing so, this would almost surely be credit card application fraud. On the other hand, if you represented that you predicted that you would have an income of $50,000 in the next year, when your income in past years had ranged from $30,000 to $45,000 from self-employment, and you believed sincerely that improvements in your marketing efforts and current economic trends were going to make the coming year your best year ever for income from self-employment that would give you a $50,000 income in the coming year, that would not be fraud. Where exactly the line between not fraud and fraud is drawn would be for the tier of fact to decide when and if the case went to trial.
It depends in part on what you mean by &quot;money&quot;. US $100 bills are a prime example of &quot;money&quot;. Art 1 §10 Cl. 1 of the US Constitution says No State shall ...coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts... Under the constitution, only the federal government can &quot;print money&quot; in the &quot;universally usable&quot; sense. Anyone can print or otherwise &quot;emit&quot; objects with economic value, and such objects can be voluntarily accepted in trade. State and local governments can incur debts and thus spend money now that they do not yet have, as long as there is no legal limit on a government's ability to go into debt. California could issue IOU-bucks with the intent that a holder could redeem them as real federal money or as gold or silver at some point. This limits the ability of a state treasury to print money, since in principle and practice it is redeemable in gold or silver. Each state has some set of laws and constitutional provisions that prevent writing rubber checks ad infinitum, for example only allowing debt for large capital projects (building) and requiring voter approval; requiring expenditures to not exceed projected revenues; granting emergency debt-mitigation powers (e.g. hiring freezes) to the governor when a state does go into unauthorized debt. In California, Art IV §12 of the state constitution requires a balanced budget, meaning that the state cannot create infinite obligations without infinite revenues. From the legal perspective, private banks do not create money, although non-legally, people may talk about what banks do as &quot;creating money&quot;. At that point in the discussion, we will have left law and moved to the realm of economic theory.
Is it legal? Yes. You can make just about any payment arrangements you like. You wouldn't be able to verify compliance, though, without some connection to the student's employer. The IRS won't tell you how much money a third party earned, or how much tax they paid, in a given year. Pretty sure they can't provide that info, which is why companies wanting to verify your income ask for copies of your tax returns rather than permission to get those returns.