Why doesn&#39;t law take into account probability? My question is based on my layman understanding, I'm not in law When I think of &quot;[damages]&quot;* I think of &quot;what is the expected liability from an interaction,&quot; as opposed to &quot;what is the real damage of an interaction.&quot; For example, let's say you get into a car crash (that was not your fault) but do not sustain injuries. Why can't you sue for potential injuries that might have occurred based on probability, despite the fact that you did not sustain injuries? Another example, let's say you almost get run over by a car, but don't. There was a very real probability that you may have been runover in that scenario, but you didn't. Why isn't there some civil repercussions for that? Maybe there is, but my understanding is that most law does not incorporate probability. * The original question included the word &quot;[s]tanding&quot; here which was not the proper term.
[L]et's say you almost get run over by a car[; t]here was a very real probability that you may have been runover […], but you didn't. Why isn't there some civil repercussions for that? Construing the first question broadly, and in line with the one reading &quot;[w]hy isn't there some civil repercussions for [a missed although very real probability of a car run-over]?&quot;, the question is, admittedly, based on a few incorrect premises. There are &quot;repercussion&quot; some of them being of criminal nature (reckless driving, vehicular assault etc.), and others may become of civil nature as follows: Common law tort of negligence — Mere threat of harm can be harm for purposes of damages &quot;“When there is a breach of duty, &quot;a person who is in the path of negligent conduct and reasonably fears for his or her own safety may recover for resulting emotional distress.&quot; In re Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, Cal., 973 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1992). ” […] See Potter, 863 P.2d at 833 (George, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing hypothetical pedestrian narrowly avoiding speeding car and indicating that threat of injury is the relevant issue); Wooden v. Raveling, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891, 897-98 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Potter hypothetical and holding plaintiff was not precluded from relief simply because car did not actually hit her) (Taylor v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc. (9th Cir. 2015) 599 F. App'x 664, 2) (bold type added) Accordingly, broadly construing the question so as to effect the greatest scope of the spotting of damages, one may sue, although not for injuries per se, but instead damages under an emotional distress legal theory and its particular categories like anxiety, depression, recurring nightmares, sleeplessness, anger, angst etc. depending on the actual facts of the case, and typically supported by expert testimony when possible. Strictly construing the question, the mere possibility or even probability of injuries do not merit a cause of action for damages in and of themselves, as such damages never occurred. It may be possible that in certain scenarios the mere possibility is so outrageous that it exceeds all bounds of a civilized society, that nominal damages, say, of $1 are awarded and punitive damages are awarded so as to deter such conduct, but even in that case such a hypothetical case the cause of action will not be the damages under a personal injury tort, but one for nominal damages and for punitive damages even if the factual underpinnings are the same. Standing Standing is one's positive relation to at least one event that is the basis of a legal proceeding in a court, that is, one being the presumptive subject of some sort of wrongdoing that merits their recognition as a party to a legal proceeding. The term there would have been &quot;damages&quot; instead of standing. Why doesn't law take into account probability? It does. Rarely enumerated probabilities other than in case of the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof where the quality of the evidence must weigh in favor of the one who has the burden of proof, in other words the fact finders job is to decide whether something is greater or smaller than 50 percent probability. Although it is rather the exception than the rule, probabilities other than the greater-than-50-percent standard also appear here an there in the judicial process, for example, in asylum cases “&quot;[t]o effect a well-founded fear [from persecution so as will constitute protected for purposes of U.S. asylee or refugee status], a threat need not be statistically more than fifty-percent likely [to have been made; however,] the [U.S.] Supreme Court has suggested that even a one-tenth possibility of persecution might effect a well-founded fear.&quot; Lim,224 F.3d at 934-935 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. 421, 430, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987)). Kaiser v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2004) (see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, [“ &quot;Let us ... presume that it is known that in the applicant's country of origin every tenth adult male person is either put to death or sent to some remote labor camp.... In such a case it would be only too apparent that anyone who has managed to escape from the country in question will have 'well-founded fear of being persecuted' upon his eventual return”]) In less enumerated forms many other aspects of the judicial process rely on probabilities.
In the US it's very simple: How does the party that makes the lawsuit get the money in this scenario? They don't. Winning a lawsuit against a person is a legal confirmation that they really do owe you the money. It also gives you the ability to do certain things to try to collect: you could seize their assets or garnish their wages. If they don't have any assets or any income then you are out of luck. You can't take what doesn't exist. As the saying goes, "you can't squeeze blood from a turnip". A bit of legal jargon sometimes used here is to say that such a defendant is judgment proof. Even if you win a lawsuit against them, it won't do you any good, because they just don't have any money. If the person cannot pay it off, does it transfer over to their relatives? No. People are not responsible for the debts of their relatives.
united-states You may be confusing the right to an attorney if you cannot afford one that is applicable only in CRIMINAL cases, not civil cases like you are discussing. You may be able to get an attorney to take your case on a contingency basis but there are two things to keep in mind: The attorney has to have some expectation that the case is winnable. The amount to be recovered must be worth the risk of taking on this case. In other words, for the attorney it's more of a business question that a legal one. Many attorneys will give you a free 30 minute, more or less, consultation. Perhaps you might give that a try.
Doing nothing is legally safer than doing something, but you're not without hope if you pull the lever. Although you'll likely have committed murder or at least manslaughter, case law is littered with lenience in exigent circumstances, even where convictions have been affirmed. Because this is a philosophical problem, there are plenty of opinions from that perspective, but not so many from a legal standpoint. Let's assume that you're an innocent bystander, (not an employee of the railway company or the train company, etc) and have no duty to act. If you do nothing, then it is unlikely that you would be charged with a crime - you had no duty to fulfill, and therefore not negligent. There's little doubt that not pulling the lever is the safer option. More interesting is when you choose to pull the lever - then it's probable that you would have charges of murder, or at least manslaughter, brought against you by the state. What defenses does the law offer? Let's assume that you are aware that pulling the lever will kill a person. The primary defence is a legal principle of necessity: where your criminal actions are not protected or excluded by some other statute or principle, the fact that you were obliged to take this action in order to prevent some greater harm may safeguard you from penalties. There are certain elements of necessity: That you did not create the danger that caused you to commit the crime; That you ceased the criminal activity as soon as practicably possible; That you had no reasonable alternative; and The harm that you prevented was greater than the harm that you caused. I see such a defense only possibly falling over on (4), where the prevented and caused harm, in the case of human lives, are inherently very subjective. Unfortunately, each state has different rulings regarding the threshold for evidence of this defense. One of the most famous cases where necessity was attempted as a defense to murder, with remarkable parallels to this hypothetical, is that of R v Dudley and Stephens: A crew of four found themselves on a lifeboat at sea with no food and no water, and with no prospect of rescue. One of them was a child (Parker) and was nearing death and unconscious. Two of them (Dudley and Stephens), after some discussion over drawing lots, decided that the child would be killed before his natural death, in order that his blood be better preserved for drinking. The last crew member, Brooks, was silent on the matter. After killing Parker, Dudley, Stephens and Brooks fed on Parker's body. During the trial, the matter of necessity as a defense to murder was considered. The judges found that there was no common law defence of necessity to murder, and Dudley and Stephens were sentenced to death with a recommendation for mercy. The Home Secretary commuted their sentences to six months' imprisonment. This case concerns essentially the choice you're making in the trolley problem: either the four crew members were going to die, or one of them would definitely die and the others might live. It's easy to say that they should have just waited, but they didn't have the benefit of hindsight. It's also a great example of a situation where although the law says one thing, it doesn't align with our morals and ethics, and while it's a UK case, I would wager that almost every lawyer in common law countries would have heard about it.
You always run some legal risk when you drive. As long as you are insured (you have a card in your hand) and you have permission to drive the car, it does not matter who owns the car. There is a difference between the legal minimum insurance coverage and actually adequate coverage, and since you are not getting separate insurance where control the insurance levels, you theoretically run some liability risk if you have an accident and the coverage is less than the damages (insurance doesn't mean that the other guy can't take you to court for the rest of the amount). There is also a risk that the housemate will do something crazy like cancel the insurance coverage for you, or report the car stolen, so you have to decide how worried you are about that possibility.
What you are talking about here is the tort of negligent misstatement, a subset of the tort of negligence. First, there is no presumption in any jurisdiction that I am aware of that anyone is or is not a lawyer (or doctor, or engineer etc.). If people knew that you were, however, then it is reasonable that they would give your statements more weight then if they did not know. It may also be reasonable if they suspected you were. The practical purpose of such a disclaimer is to ensure that they know you aren't. For the specific facts you give, you would certainly be in a better position if you said: "But I'm not a lawyer, so you should seek professional advice"; not so much because you told them you weren't a lawyer but rather because this changes your advice to "seek professional advice". It's impossible to be wrong with that advice! The standard form in Australia is: "this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice". If the statement is limited to "I'm not a lawyer" or if your neighbour knew you were, for instance, a dog catcher with no professional qualifications, then you could still potentially be liable. Your neighbour would need to demonstrate: You had a duty of care; by giving advice you potentially do, however, a for negligent misstatement there must be a 'special relationship' [Hawkins V Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539, MLC Assurance V Evatt]. You breached that duty; the advice given was "unreasonable". There was a factual cause in a "cause and effect" sense; 'but for' your advice there would have been no loss. There was a legal (proximate) cause; damage to the neighbour as a result of the advice must be foreseeable. Harm; the neighbour must suffer real loss. The main point of the disclaimers is on the 2nd point: what is "unreasonable" for a professional is different than for a "lay person". Oh, and by the way: this advice is general in nature and not to be taken as personal professional advice.
The mechanic could be held liable, indeed this attorney explains what you have to prove in exactly this case (not necessarily involving a million dollar car). The mechanic was negligent in diagnosing and repairing the brakes. You then have to prove that you mad the mechanic service the brakes (receipts / invoices). You need an attorney to figure out exactly why the brakes failed – maybe he messed up reassembling the brakes, maybe the brakes were defective (product liability) and he was negligent in detecting the defect – then the manufacturer is also liable, and it becomes an issue of what percentage of blame goes to each person. This doesn't mean that you are off the hook, because you still might have taken action to avoid the collision (emergency brake? steer to the right? how fast were you driving, how close were you following?).
Civil claims have statutes of limitations too Usually shorter than 10 years. Therefore, Bob cannot sue anyone for recovery and therefore does not practically own the bike. In some jurisdictions, limitations acts make it explicit that Bob loses title to the goods meaning he doesn’t own the bike de jure as well as de facto. It’s not possible to say what a “typical” limitation period is but periods above 10 years typically only apply to actions on real property (land) not personal property (bike). However, that just begs the question. The criminal limitation is irrelevant to the civil action They are completely independent so whether a criminal action has happened, is in progress or can’t happen doesn’t affect the civil action. Bob doesn’t need the information The person who has the bike may or may not be the one who converted it: Bob doesn’t care because they are presently the one detaining it. So Bob sues for detinue: you have it, it’s mine, give it back, or, give me monetary compensation. Whether the person who has it acquired it lawfully or not is a matter of complete indifference to Bob. If they did acquire it lawfully then they have a breach of contract cause of action against the person who sold them goods without good title. But that’s their problem, not Bob’s.