Is the right to engage in scientific inquiry a fundamental right? I am curious as to whether there is any precedent in the U.S. regarding the level of scrutiny applied to 14th amendment claims against statutes that hinder a person's ability to engage in scientific research. In particular, whether the courts have deemed the right to engage in science as "inherent in the concept of ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in our country's history and tradition." It seems plausible to me that a case could be made for this, which would raise the level of scrutiny above rational basis.
There is some precedent for claiming a right to free scientific inquiry. For example, the primary holding of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 is that "Speech that is obscene and thus lacking First Amendment protection must be without serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" (note the omission of commercial speech). In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, the court overturned a law banning teaching children foreign languages, finding that such a law "invades the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment", and observing While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 the court finds that the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read (Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 319 U. S. 143) and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach (see Wiemann v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 344 U. S. 195) -- indeed, the freedom of the entire university community. In Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62, the court found unconstitutional an Indiana law that would have outlawed research done at the Kinsey Institute at IU (that would have been a later consequence of the law, not the instant matter), stating that "This chilling effect on the research, development and exchange of scholarly ideas is repugnant to the First Amendment", and the state has unconstitutionally intruded itself into two areas of protected activity. The first protected area is the right of scholars to do research and advance the state of man's knowledge. This is the freedom of inquiry referred to in Griswold v. Connecticut Then in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, the court glancingly groups academic research with other forms of First Amendment protected activities: Freedom of the press is a "fundamental personal right" which "is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets. . . . The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion." The informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press in the present cases is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and dramatists. Article 25 of the California constitution recognizes a specific research right There is hereby established a right to conduct stem cell research which includes research involving adult stem cells, cord blood stem cells, pluripotent stem cells, and/or progenitor cells. However, there have also been (failed) attempts at the federal level to prohibit such research. More generally, one might look into rulings on acts which are preludes to any form of expression, such as buying paper and ink, acquiring a printing press, hiring reporters, and investigations of events by reporters – it is unlikely that the courts would uphold a law that outlaws reporters investigating crimes or political situations because that is not yet "expression". Indeed, "freedom of the press" does not just refer to the act of disseminating ideas and information. But a definitive court ruling has not been made.
You have to deconstruct the question on a country by country basis. In the US legal system, the question presupposes something incorrect, that there are &quot;investigators&quot; who play a rule in legal system, and their job is to determine guilt vs. innocence. That is something determined by the &quot;finder of fact&quot;, typically the jury (it could be a judge, when you have a bench trial). The finder of fact may take into consideration testimony provided by a witness, and it is possible that a witness is an expert in some relevant area, who might attest to the significance of a claimed piece of evidence. The expert cannot testify on the question of guilt. For example, a DNA sample might be admitted as evidence that the defendant was present in certain circumstances, which could reasonably lead the finders of fact to conclude that the defendant did strike the victim. A DNA sample cannot testify, therefore some expert must testify about the significance of the sample, specifically whether the sample &quot;might have&quot; come from the defendant, or &quot;definitely came from&quot; the defendant. Others will testify as to the circumstances surrounding the collection of the sample. It is then up to the finder of fact to evaluate all of the evidence plus understand the instructions regarding the criteria for finding the defendant &quot;guilty&quot;. Theoretically, Bayes Law could enter into an expert witness's (scientific) testimony, and likewise an opposing witness could contradict the putative relevance of BL in terms of reaching a scientific conclusion. BL could enter into the discussion at the level of the bottom line &quot;definitely/possibly does come from the defendent&quot;. The only practical way that I can see BL entering into the courtroom at least non-gratuitously would be if there is a dispute over the reliability of a certain test, thus should the testimony be allowed in the first place (it might be excluded as being unreliable). There is a genre of research (for example this) that addresses the problem of sketchy statistic inferences, pointing to a role for BL. I would say that the prospects are dim, not bright.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments are about civil and criminal court proceedings. They do not apply to a university's internal disciplinary procedures, which are the subject of the Dear Colleague letter. Note for example the text of the Fifth Amendment: ... or be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. A university's disciplinary procedures do not deprive anyone of their life, liberty, or property. Typically, they only decide whether to suspend or expel the person as a student at the university, or apply other academic punishments (failing grades, marks on transcript, etc). I don't think there needs to be any law "affirming" this. Rather, there is simply no law that requires universities to use Fifth / Sixth amendment standards in their internal disciplinary procedures.
This falls within the penumbra of Feist v. Rural Telephone. The principle articulated there is that facts are not subject to copyright protection, but the expression of facts can be. Quoting from the ruling, "no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates...however, it is beyond dispute that compilations of facts are within the subject matter of copyright". The distinction between protected vs. not protected hinges on originality: "The sine qua non of copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author". But it is not sufficient that the work is created by the "sweat of the brow" of an author: it must possess at least some minimal degree of creativity. Thus "[t]he writings which are to be protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, engravings, and the like". As a concrete example, the ruling states "Census-takers, for example, do not 'create' the population figures that emerge from their efforts; in a sense, they copy these figures from the world around them...Census data therefore do not trigger copyright because these data are not 'original' in the constitutional sense." But, compilations of facts can be protected: Factual compilations, on the other hand, may possess the requisite originality. The compilation author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effectively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright laws An email list requires nothing more than brow-sweat, and even then, not much. A cleverly annotated and arranged email list would involve substantial creativity and would be subject to protection. That does not mean that you didn't sign some agreement that prohibits you from copying or using the list, but it isn't a matter of copyright.
SCOTUS suggests in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, that a subject's confession was constitutionally inadmissible if it was adduced by police questioning during a period when petitioner's will was overborne by a drug having the properties of a &quot;truth serum.&quot; In Miranda v. Arizona, it is held that If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 490, n. 14. This Court has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), and we reassert these standards as applied to in-custody interrogation. Subsequently in Colorado v. Connelly, defendant suffered from psychosis that &quot;interfered with his ability to make free and rational choices and, although not preventing him from understanding his rights, motivated his confession.&quot; The court found that Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not &quot;voluntary&quot; within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Here, the taking of respondent's statements and their admission into evidence constituted no violation of that Clause. While a defendant's mental condition may be a &quot;significant&quot; factor in the &quot;voluntariness&quot; calculus, this does not justify a conclusion that his mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional &quot;voluntariness.&quot; In the Massachusetts case Commonwealth v. Hilton, 443 Mass. 597, the Mass. Supreme Court (in the first ruling) said that We see no error in the judge's finding that the defendant's mental infirmities were such that she did not understand the Miranda warnings, and we therefore conclude that statements made after the interrogation did become custodial were properly suppressed. On remand and after in a second appear, in Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823 N.E.2d 383, the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a finding that the defendant was unable to make a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of her Miranda rights is not enough, standing alone, to support the finding that her statements were involuntary. The court found that the defendant was competent to stand trial contrary to the trial judge's determination, and said that because we are unable to determine if the judge would have allowed the supplemental motion to suppress without the erroneous findings, we vacate the order for suppression and remand for further consideration. The point here is that being mentally disabled is not per se proof that a confession is involuntary. Turning specifically to intoxication, in Colorado v. Jewell, the trial court suppressed a confession while intoxicated &quot;based on its finding that Jewell was too intoxicated to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to remain silent.&quot; The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the suppression [b]ecause the facts do not support the trial court's determination that Jewell's intoxication was so severe that he was demonstrably unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights which leaves open the possibility that there is some such degree of intoxication. The court determined that Intoxication only invalidates an otherwise valid Miranda waiver if the court finds through a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was incapable of understanding the nature of his rights and the ramifications of waiving them. Subsequent discussion partially fleshes out how one might determine whether a waiver is unknowing or unintelligent. Citing Colorado v. Kaiser, the court suggested considering whether “the defendant seemed oriented to his or her surroundings and situation; whether the defendant's answers were responsive and appeared to be the product of a rational thought process; whether the defendant was able to appreciate the seriousness of his or her predicament, including the possibility of being incarcerated; whether the defendant had the foresight to attempt to deceive the police in hopes of avoiding prosecution; whether the defendant expressed remorse for his or her actions; and whether the defendant expressly stated that he or she understood their rights.” One issue was raised regarding &quot;cases where, as here, the intoxication is self-induced.&quot; A fundamental result of the mass of Miranda case law is that coercive actions by police invalidate a confession. Getting a suspect drunk(er) would be a clear case of a coercive police action, and presumably would be inadmissible under Townsend v. Sain.
"Civic obligations" are based on one's personal moral philosophy, best discussed on Philosophy SE. On the legal front, in the US, there is no (existing) legal basis for simply declaring some random thing to be "top secret", even if it has great potential to be used for evil purposes. If this is research conducted under the umbrella of the Dept. of Defense, it might be classified, but a garage inventor is not subject to the laws regarding classified documents. Congress could pass a law prohibiting promulgating research on time travel, but even if such a law were found to be constitutional (unlikely, on First Amendment grounds, see this), one cannot be penalized for breaking the law before it becomes a law.
The general problem with a &quot;letter from the grave&quot; is that it violates a defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. The major decisions interpreting the Confrontation Clause from the years in question are: Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of hearsay statements whose primary purpose was to address an ongoing emergency) Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit expert testimony as to hearsay statements assumed to be true for purposes of informing her opinion) Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, (2015) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction of hearsay statements that &quot;were not made with the primary purpose of creating evidence&quot;)
I'm sorry to deflate what is clearly a very philosophically interesting question, but the law is straightforward here. The truth, essentially, is the set of facts that you believe to be true. Yes. It means that you will not lie by omission, and that you will provide the relevant facts. No, you don't need to recount history since the first instant of the big bang. Only expert witnesses may answer by giving their opinion or evaluation. This is presumed accurate by their experience and where it is not accurate, the other side may present opposing expert witnesses to contest their conclusion or evaluation. Laypeople are permitted to answer only with their recollection of facts. Lawyers may not ask them what their opinion is, although by your definition every question is about opinion, since perception and memory is limited. But the question "What colour was Mr Smith's house?" and "What architectural style informed the facade of Mr Smith's house?" require different amounts of expertise and opinion. "Truth" isn't jargon, or even technical language here. I generally aim to be truthful, and so when someone asks me what time it is, I don't feel compelled to answer to the nano/picosecond. Would you call me a liar? Am I lying by omission? Similarly, if someone asks me what colour a car is, I don't feel compelled to say "I can't possibly know, because my perception may differ from yours. If you honestly feel that when someone asks you to be truthful about something, then you must either be lying, or lying by omission if you don't start your answer with the first instant of the big bang, your problem is not one of law.