Can AI-generated text be considered defamation? This question is inspired by recent news about some of the strange, out-of-control behavior from Microsoft's new Bing chat AI, but I am asking hypothetically here. If an AI chatbot such as Bing Chat or ChatGPT said factually untrue things that did measurable harm to a real person's reputation, would that person have a case against the company that owns the chatbot for defamation? If not defamation, maybe something else? My understanding is that a key part of defamation is malicious intent, which does not really apply to a non-sentient piece of software. However, if the AI says something that does real harm to a persons reputation, couldn't the company be held responsible for this? What if the company was aware of the harm being done but chose not to take action? This seems similar to the situation where a company is held responsible for the words or actions of an employee.
If an AI chatbot such as Bing Chat or ChatGPT said factually untrue things that did measurable harm to a real person's reputation, would that person have a case against the company that owns the chatbot for defamation? There can be liability for defamation, although the circumstances would determine who the liable party is. For instance, an owner's warning to the user about a risk of inaccuracies may have the effect of shifting to the user the issue of requisite degree of fault. See In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 593 (2015). The user ought to be judicious as to whether to publish the chatbot's output. Ordinarily, negligence suffices for liability in a scenario that involves special damages, i.e., concrete, ascertainable harm. My understanding is that a key part of defamation is malicious intent, which does not really apply to a non-sentient piece of software. Under defamation law, malice is not about feelings or emotional state. The term refers to reckless disregard for the truth or falsity or the statement or to publication despite publisher's awareness of the falsity of the satement. Id at 593. Regardless, malice needs to be proved only if the plaintiff is a public figure or in claims of defamaton per se, where damage to a person's reputation is presumed (and hence the damage does not need to be proved). What if the company was aware of the harm being done but chose not to take action? The terms of use might protect the company against liability. Absent any such protections, the company might be liable because its awareness and inaction are tantamount to the aforementioned reckless disregard for the truth of its product's publications.
Any written communication is generally admissible Subject to all the normal rules for admissibility of course. For texts between you and a third party the major issue that springs to mind is relevance. As in, how are they relevant to the dispute between you and this man? If they are not, your lawyer should have objected to them on this basis, however, its too late now. I'm curious as to how he obtained these and whether it was done legally or not. Illegality will not affect their admissibility as the exclusionary rule doesn't apply to civil matters, however, it does speak to the gentleman's character.
A creative prosecutor could probably come up with a raft of charges. But you could start with the federal wiretapping statute, 18 USC 2511, and the anti-hacking statute, 18 USC 1030. Here is an indictment brought in 2012 under the anti-hacking statute against someone who distributed and used this kind of software. Depending on the facts and the jurisdiction, this may also constitute the tort of intrusion on privacy or seclusion, a tort recognized by the Restatement (Second) and actionable in many jurisdictions. The most common test is whether the invasion would be "offensive to a reasonable person." And no, contrary to the commenter's view, a "click to accept" license is not a get out of (literal) jail free card here. Courts interpret adhesion contracts liberally to favor the signer, and outrageous terms hidden in small print are not guaranteed to be enforceable, especially if the software is clearly designed to trick people into installing it. The license terms might even hurt you, by providing evidence of your intent to use the software for perving rather than its ostensible use. This is not an exhaustive list, and there may be additional state-level statutes that apply. Bottom line: yes, this is clearly illegal, and the courts will be reluctant to let you trick people into getting away with it.
Defamation is a suit that can be brought by anyone, however, there are extra hurdles if the plaintiff is an official. Following New York Times Co v Sullivan, the plaintiff must prove actual malice: that the defendant knew the information was untrue or acted with reckless disregard for its truth.
In the general case, it seems unlikely, based on the wording (which is convoluted). In certain cases, if the president of Russia posts "My name is Vladimir Putin", that post is personal data. On the other hand, you might, based on my writing, conclude that I am from the US, and you might even conclude that I'm in Washington state, but that doesn't distinguish me from 7.5 million others, so on those grounds that is not personal data. Eventually, though, you might identify me specifically from other things that I may have said on SE. The definition depends on two parts. First, personal data is "information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person". Any "information" provided by a natural person is "related to" that person (as is any "information" that is about such a person). The second part defines "identifiable natural person", that is, who is an "identifiable person"? Every person can, in principle, be identified by reference to some label or description of fact about them, so every person is an identifiable person, under this definition. This means that every piece of text that refers to an individual (not even text which can identify the person) is "personal data". Obviously, any individual can be uniquely identified by some collection of identifiers; the problem is that the wording of the law does not explicitly say "using that supposed personal data". If I mention that I have a relative named Knudt, that would technically be personal data: I've given information that relates to a person, though you have no idea (and could not possibly figure out) who that person is. Another term that the regulation defines and uses in a few places is "pseudonymization", which is defined as the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data are not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person The point of interest here is that this says that "personal data" which cannot be attributed to an individual is, nevertheless, still personal data. I think the most important part of the regulation is art. 6, which defines lawfulness of processing, especially para 4., which allows consideration to be given to safeguards such as pseudonymization.
Possibly, but probably not. Personal data is any information relating to an identifiable person. The statement “Alice is sick” is information, and relates to Alice who is identifiable. Processing personal data is not inherently illegal, but does require a legal basis per Art 6 GDPR, such as a legitimate interest. Here, the information is data concerning health, processing of which is prohibited unless one of the explicit exceptions applies (such as explicit consent, or legal obligations). So it is legitimate to have concerns on whether disclosure of this information would be legal. If these rules were breached, that would be on the data controller. Here, the company would be the data controller, not Bob (unless Bob acted against training and instructions and processed the personal data for his own purposes). However, GDPR probably doesn't apply to this specific interaction. In Art 2(1), the GDPR says that This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system. A conversation itself would not be subject to GDPR rules – there is no filing system or similar structured data involved. What GDPR would prevent is to keep records on Alice's health status, but doesn't necessarily prevent talking about it informally. For example, the EUR 35.3M fine against H&amp;M in Germany was imposed not because managers talked with employees about personal matters, but because they then maintained detailed files about those personal matters. Data controllers are responsible though for ensuring security and compliance through appropriate technical and organizational measures (TOMs). TOMs can include things such as non-disclosure agreements and training for staff. If Bob acts against such training, there could be repercussions along the Bob–Company employment relationship. But that would mostly be an employment law thing, not so much a GDPR thing.
In the united-states, there is no general right for a person to control or approve a biography or other account of that person's life. Many biographies are &quot;unauthorized&quot;, which simply means that the subject, or in some cases the subject's heirs or family, did not cooperate with the biographer. Sometimes this is even considered to be a point in favor of such a work, on the assumption that an &quot;authorized&quot; biography would tend to slant or even censor things to meet the approval of the subject or the subject's family. There are some restrictions on an unauthorized biography. The first and most obvious is the law of defamation. A biography that includes statements that are both false and defamatory about a living subject could be the subject of a winning lawsuit. Damages in such cases can sometimes be sizable. However, the person suing must show false facts in the work. In many cases damage to reputation must also be shown, although there are some categories of statement that are considered defamation per se, where injury to reputation is assumed and need not be proved. These include a false statement that a person committed a crime, and a statement that a person was guilty of professional misconduct. It used to be considered defamation per se to allege that a woman had had sex outside of marriage, but I doubt that a court would so hold today. Beyond that, in the US, if the subject is a public official or public figure, s/he must show actual malice, that is that the false statement was made knowing that it was false, or with reckless disregard for its possible falsity. This can be hard to prove. In most jurisdictions only the person defamed can sue for defamation. Once that person is dead, no such suit can be brought. Moreover, in the very rare case where a person's reputation is so bad that a court finds that it can suffer no meaningful further injury for certain allegations, even if these were found to be false, the court may dismiss such a suit. See Dykstra v St. Martin's Press New York Superior Court, New York County, Docket Number 153676 for an example. However this would only be relevant in the very unusual case of a &quot;libel-proof&quot; plaintiff, and even then if the conduct of the author or publisher was egregious, the court might hold that punitive damages were possible. The defenses of truth, lack of actual malice, and newsworthiness are far more common. Indeed defamation suits in general are hard to win and expensive to bring. In some US states there is available the tort of publication of private facts. This is different from defamation in that it can still be brought when the facts published were true, while truth is a total defense against a defamation suit. However a private facts suit must establish that the facts were in fact private, or at least not widely known, and that they were published in a way that would be grossly offensive to a reasonable person. Facts that are considered of &quot;legitimate public interest&quot; or &quot;newsworthy&quot; are also not generally protected. Moreover, not every US state allows such suits at all. See Diaz vs Oakland Tribune, Inc 188 Cal Rpt 762 (1982) for a case in which a Private Facts case was sustained, and the steps taken by the subject to keep a sex transition private were a significant issue in the case. In Hawkins vs Multimedia inc 344 SE 2nd 145 (1986) a South Carolina court held that a news story identifying a teenage boy by name as the father of an &quot;illegitimate&quot; child was not newsworthy and a private facts judgement including punitive damages was upheld. In the US, First Amendment protections have been taken to indicate that the courts will not suppress or punish speech or writing without good reason. This makes it harder to win suits over biographies. There have been cases of magazine articles about a particular person who is in no way famous but who was considered &quot;typical&quot;. Such stories have in several cases been upheld against challenges as of &quot;legitimate public interest&quot;. See Arrington vs New York Times Company 434 N.E. 2nd 1319 (1982) In that case the objection was to the use of a person's photo on the cover of the New York Times Magazine who was not actually mentioned in the story, and who alleged that he was not similar to those who were mentioned. The use was upheld.
I know of no cause of action related to &quot;misrepresentation of intellectual property&quot; (I believe it may be a phrase used colloquially in the context of academic integrity). If such a cause of action exists, I'll leave it to another answer to discuss. This answer approaches your question through the lens of copyright infringement and moral rights. A reproduction is an infringement if it substantially reproduces the original. Short quotes, properly attributed, will often be fair use, even if exactly reproduced. If an exact reproduction is not an infringement (e.g. because it copied too short a phrase) or if it is fair use, then a slightly altered reproduction a fortiori would also not be an infringement or would be fair use. In jurisdictions that recognize moral rights, there may be circumstances where an alteration, even to spelling, would be a violation of an author's moral rights. But to make out a violation of an author's moral rights based only on a spelling alteration, the spelling would have to be critical to the integrity of the work (e.g. perhaps the choice of dialect) and the alteration would have to be prejudicial to the author's honour or reputation.