Can a state stop implementation of a bill passed in the parliament? Yesterday Indian parliament passed citizenship amendment bill which seeks to provide citizenship to religious minorities which have to come to India before Dec 2014 as a refugee due to their persecution in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. I know it can be challenged in Supreme Court if the President of India signs it which he is most likely to do. Today Kerala Chief Minister said that he would not allow it to be implemented in his state. So does a state in India has power to stop implementation of a bill unilaterally?
India is a quasi-federation Powers are split between the state and national government as detailed in the constitution. India is a halfway point between full federations (e.g. USA, Australia) and unitary nations (e.g. France, Austria) - it still has sovereign states like a federation but the national government has much more power to intervene. Notwithstanding, citizenship is solely the province of the national government - Indian states have no power over it.
I fear that it may mostly be defined by common sense and context, rather than any particular statute. I've certainly not been able to find anything quite as explicit as, for example: An Act of Parliament is an Act passed by the Parliament of Canada and definitely not in any way an Act of a provincial legislature. Nevertheless, if you'll bear with me while I slog through a sea of clauses that all imply the above, then the best places to look for usage and definition are the Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982, as they form (the basis/bulk of) the Canadian Constitution. I've also (credit to Zizou212) included some definitions from the Canadian Criminal Code. Looking at the Constitution Act 1982 (as amended, via the Canadian justice department's website) and taking the crudest possible approach (i.e. looking for instances of &quot;Act of&quot;) there is, in the main body of the text, only one reference to Acts of Parliament, or to Acts of the provincial legislatures, namely in the notwithstanding clause (section 33 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms): Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. Not, I fear, not a full answer to your question, but it's worth noting that a distinction is drawn between &quot;Parliament&quot; and &quot;the legislature of a province&quot;. For context, section 32, directly above, reads, This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of Parliament [...]; and (b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province. We're getting closer. I would argue (though IANAL) that from these two sections alone it's pretty clear that Acts of Parliament are Acts passed by the Parliament of Canada (&quot;This Charter applies [...] to the Parliament and government of Canada&quot;) while Acts of &quot;the legislature&quot; of each province are Acts passed by the legislature of that province (&quot;This Charter applies [...] to the legislature and government of each province&quot;). Going back to the original question, I think it's pretty clear that &quot;Parliament&quot; – with a capital P – is (fairly) explicitly the Parliament of Canada. Note that it's the only body of the 4 mentioned there that gets a capital letter, and I imagine that it's because it's the only one referred to by its proper name. Whereas &quot;the legislature and government of each province&quot; is, presumably, just a common sense descriptor and a stand-in for the proper names of those governments and legislatures – it would be tedious to say &quot;the Legislative Assembly of Ontario, and the National Assembly of Quebec, and [...]&quot; – while &quot;the government of Canada&quot; is, I assume, not capitalised because it's also just a descriptor (the 'proper' name being Her Majesty's Government) but I'm descending now entirely into the realms of wildest speculation, as the Constitution Act 1867 is perfectly happy to use the phrase &quot;Government of Canada&quot; (though those were, seemingly, more capital-heavy times). Furthermore, as Zizouz212 pointed out, the Criminal Code of Canada contains an interpretation section: In this Act, Act includes (a) an Act of Parliament, (b) an Act of the legislature of the former Province of Canada, (c) an Act of the legislature of a province, and (d) an Act or ordinance of the legislature of a province, territory or place in force at the time that province, territory or place became a province of Canada; Again, the mention of &quot;Parliament&quot; alongside – and distinct from – provincial legislatures, makes fairly clear that it's the Parliament of Canada. Going back to the typesetter's nightmare that is the 1867 Act, we can eke out a few more puzzle pieces in the definitions: In the Constitution Act, 1867, Part IV: There shall be One Parliament for Canada, consisting of the Queen, an Upper House styled the Senate, and the House of Commons [...] The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Senate and by the House of Commons, and by the members thereof respectively, shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the Parliament of Canada Part V: There shall be a Legislature for Ontario [...] There shall be a Legislature for Quebec [...] the Legislature of each of the Provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick shall [...] continue as it exists at the Union Part VI: It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces [...] In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated Between those three Acts, I'm hoping there are enough bits of context to make clear that Parliament only ever refers to the Parliament of Canada, and not to the provincial legislatures. If, however, you want one more bit of evidence, I can offer the pre-amble to the Canada Act, 1982 the Constitution Act's slightly older, British twin. This was the law that finally patriated the Canadian Constitution, passing (at the British Parliament in Westminster) an Act that defined how Canada could amend its own Constitution, and renouncing any power for the British Parliament to do the same. In that text, (emphasis mine) there are, by necessity, two Parliaments discussed and accordingly it's always made very clear which one is being talked about: An Act to give effect to a request by the Senate and House of Commons of Canada Whereas Canada has requested and consented to the enactment of an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to give effect to the provisions hereinafter set forth and the Senate and the House of Commons of Canada in Parliament assembled have submitted an address to Her Majesty requesting that Her Majesty may graciously be pleased to cause a Bill to be laid before the Parliament of the United Kingdom for that Purpose. Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: The Constitution Act, 1982 set out in schedule B to this Act is hereby enacted for and shall have the force of law in Canada and shall come unto force as provided in that Act. No Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 1982 comes into force shall extend to Canada as part of its law. ...ergo, in the main body Constitution Acts etc., &quot;Parliament&quot; was presumably felt to be clear enough.
Let's back up. It's premature to say that SB 8 &quot;avoids the constitutional restrictions on banning abortions&quot;. The constitutionality of SB 8 has not been resolved; the Supreme Court said so explicitly (page 2). In fact there is good reason to think that is unconstitutional under existing interpretation of the Constitution per Roe v. Wade and the like. (Whether the court will actually follow existing interpretation is another question, of course.) But the courts do not determine the constitutionality of laws just because someone asks them; they only do so when it needs to be decided to resolve a particular case. For instance, if a person is charged with a crime, they can challenge the constitutionality of the law under which they are charged, and courts will address that question unless the case is resolved some other way. There are also ways that a person who wants to violate the law can pre-emptively sue the government to prevent them from enforcing the law, if they can show such enforcement is likely to affect them. The issue in SB 8 is that since it wouldn't be the government enforcing the law, it's unclear who an abortion provider can pre-emptively sue. In Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, they tried to sue the State of Texas, its courts, and a private party who they thought might be likely to sue them. The SCOTUS majority found that none of those defendants were relevant. However, if and when an abortion provider actually does get sued, there'll be a clear case which has proper parties and is ripe, and courts then will have to consider whether SB 8 is constitutional or not. So if your hypothetical gun control statute were treated similarly, the law might avoid pre-emptive challenges, with a chilling effect on gun sales. But sooner or later, someone would probably violate the law (maybe deliberately as a test case), and the courts would consider whether it was constitutional or not. Under prevailing interpretations of the Second Amendment, they'd probably find that it wasn't. A key difference, of course, is that abortions are much more time-sensitive than gun purchases; being temporarily blocked from having an abortion is much more consequential in most cases than being temporarily blocked from buying a gun. The other subtext is that, although SCOTUS said their decision in Whole Woman's Health is not based on the constitutionality of SB 8, it's widely suspected that several of the justices are not all that keen on the constitutional right to abortion found in Roe v. Wade, and might look to overturn Roe when it comes up. As such, they may not be very motivated to look for procedural avenues to block SB 8 in the short term, since they might be inclined to uphold it in the long term. The dissenters in Whole Woman's Health certainly thought those avenues were available. But in the case of your hypothetical gun control bill, if a majority of justices were pretty convinced that the law was unconstitutional, they might try harder to come up with grounds to block it pre-emptively.
The ICERD would not apply to the natural born citizens clause by its own definitions. Part 1, Article 1, secs 2 and 3 read: This Convention shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens. Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality.
This is a very straightforward point of constitutional law. Chapter and verse from the Constitution, art 224: (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.
Not in US courts. It would be more accurate to say the UDHR overrides nothing and is not US law. It is a nonbinding UN General Assembly resolution; while it is very powerful persuasive authority and much is customary international law, it is persuasive authority only. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692. The US has ratified the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, which unlike the UDHR is a treaty, meaning that is a legal obligation for the US. However, the ratification was subject to many reservations and declarations, whose net effect is that the ICCPR is not in and of itself enforceable in US courts. The US considers the US Constitution to provide the rights in question, and basically assumes no further obligations. Even if it was possible to enforce the ICCPR in US court directly, Reid v. Covert established that the Constitution overrides treaties in US court. While as a matter of international law treaties override domestic law, this is not necessarily enforceable in domestic court.
S88 Closing roads and public places: ...totally or partially prohibit or restrict public access, with or without vehicles, to any road or public place... S91(1)(a) Power to give directions: direct any person to stop any activity that may cause or substantially contribute to an emergency That is what "this Act otherwise provides"; S6 that you cited only works "unless": Unless this Act otherwise provides, this Act does not limit, is not in substitution for, and does not affect the functions, duties, or powers of any person under the provisions of any enactment or any rule of law. Also, from another angle, "functions, duties, or powers" are not the same thing as "rights": the Act does not limit the former (unless provides otherwise), but nowhere does it say it does not limit the latter.
Under the present constitution . . . Are there any consequences of the fact that the Constitution of Massachusetts and the Constitution of the United States use two different names for that state? No. Lots of the language in the United States Constitution is no longer in place or in common usage or is invalid due to subsequent amendments, and that language is still effective as originally intended. The U.S. Constitution has never been "amended and restated" and can't be understood properly without annotations to its raw text. Might a federal statute be needed for some states (e.g. Vermont, because of what is noted above) but not for others, because of differences in the federal statutes that admitted the state, or because of the lack of any need for admission by Congress in the case of the original thirteen states? Not really. Every state's name is embedded in myriad federal laws and regulations in addition to the statute that admitted the state to the United States, e.g. laws assigning names to post offices, laws allocating judgeships, laws purchasing property, laws appropriating funds, laws assigning states to various districts for purposes of executive branch departments and the judiciary, tax laws (e.g. the Obamacare tax credit), etc. Would a state statute suffice? Would a state constitutional amendment suffice? Would a federal statute suffice without a state statute or a state referendum? Would a federal constitutional amendment be needed? A federal constitutional amendment would not be needed. The Constitution vests Congress with the authority to admit states and to change their boundaries with the permission of the affected states. This would be within the power over states that could be inferred from those powers. A state and the federal government could each pass a statute to call itself something different for various purposes. For example, the official name of the state of Rhode Island is "State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations" but various state and federal statutes authorize the use of the short form of the "State of Rhode Island" for most purposes. As a practical matter a state constitutional amendment would probably be desirable on general principles to officially change the name of a state, whether or not it was strictly required, in part, because a state constitution usually sets forth an official name of a state in its body text. It would be possible for a state to change its constitution and statutes and change its name in a move that the federal government did not accept, and if that happened, the federal government and its officials would probably continue to use the old name and the state government and its officials would probably use the new name. I think it is as a practical matter, unlikely that a standoff like this would persist, but I think that this is the most likely outcome. A federal government move to change a state's name without its consent proactively, however, would probably be struck down as violating federalism concerns. Of course, all of this is speculative, because there are really no precedents for disputes over the changing of a state's name. Context would influence the outcome of any such case.