Imperfect Competition and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
The macroeconomic consequences of imperfect competition have                    attracted increasing research interest in recent years.  Models                 of imperfectly competitive product markets have been developed by               the principal investigator which provide important insights into                economies with inefficient but rankable equilibrium outcomes.                   The coordination problem,  on which he focuses,  consists in how                individual agents acting non-cooperatively may move from an                     inferior equilibrium position to a better one.  If optimizing                   individual agents lack the capability to coordinate their actions               to reach a preferred equilibrium,  then an economy can become                   stuck at bad outcomes relative to the set of equilibria.  A key                 question that arises is what role the government might play in                  obtaining or facilitating the necessary coordination.                                                                                                           One emphasis of the proposed research is on the dynamic behavior                of these economies through both entry and exit of firms and the                 intertemporal linkage created by inventory holdings.  Second,  it               is planned to analyze the role of strategic complementarities in                synchronizing discrete decisions of firms.  Strategic                           complementarity appears in multi-sector models of imperfectly                   competitive economies due to the demand flows across sectors.  As               a consequence of these complementarities, shocks in these models                also are propagated across time and over sectors.  The third main               research emphasis of the research is on extensive form games.                   These are studied to gain a better understanding of the game                    theoretic foundation of coordination problems and to shed light                 on the equilibrium selection process in economic settings with                  multiple,  (Pareto-)ranked,  equilibria.
{'FirstName': 'Russell', 'LastName': 'Cooper', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'W', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Russell W Cooper', 'EmailAddress': 'rwc165@psu.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000266758', 'StartDate': '03/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'National Bureau of Economic Research Inc', 'CityName': 'CAMBRIDGE', 'ZipCode': '021385359', 'PhoneNumber': '6178683900', 'StreetAddress': '1050 MASSACHUSETTS AVE', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Massachusetts', 'StateCode': 'MA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '05', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'MA05', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'GT28BRBA2Q49', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH INC', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8822281.xml'}