Approval Voting: Empirical Effects and Theoretical          Extensions
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Frank P. Scioli  Jr.', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Approval voting is a system in which voters can vote for as many                candidates as they like, or approve of, in a multicandidate                     election. Each candidate approved of by a voter receives one                    vote, and the candidate with the most votes wins.  Approval                     voting has a number of advantages over plurality voting, and                    plurality voting with a runoff, as well as ranking systems such                 as the Borda count and the Hare system of single transferable                   vote.                                                                           Approval voting has been used in universities, professional                     societies (e.g., the Econometric Society), internal elections of                political parties in some states, and the United Nations Security               Council to elect a Secretary General.  Approval voting ballot                   data from the Institute of Management Science (TIMS), with about                6,000 members, were recently analyzed and provided important                    tests of several theoretical propositions.  Data from the 1987                  elections of the Mathematical Association of America (MAA), with                about 26,000 members, and the 1988 elections of the American                    Statistical Association (ASA), with about 15,000 members, and the               Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), with                  about 280,000 members, will be available for analysis and provide               additional bases for analyzing patterns of support of candidates                under approval voting.  The analysis of these data should shed                  considerable light on how approval voting might work in public                  elections.  For example, is it likely to elect so.called                        Condorcet candidates .. those who, if they exist, can defeat                    every other candidate in pairwise contests . . as it has                        consistently done in private elections.                                         The use of approval voting in public elections has not gone                     without controversy and has been debated in numerous scholarly                  journals. Nevertheless, bills to enact approval voting have been                introduced in several states; in 1987, an approval voting bill                  was passed by the North Dakota Senate by a vote of 34.16 but                    failed in the House.  In this project the empirical analysis of                 the MAA, ASA, and IEEE approval voting ballot data will be vital                in assessing the use and practicality of approval voting in                     public elections, as will data collected in the 1988 National                   Election Survey that will include an approval voting item.                      Further, an extension of approval voting to party.list systems                  using proportional representation (PR) in Parliamentary                         democracies will be analyzed.  In particular, models to assess                  whether approval voting might encourage parties to split up in a                PR system wil be investigated in order to evaluate the                          feasibility of marrying approval voting and PR using the                        combination in parliamentary elections.  This research will                     contribute not only to the social choice literature but also                    indicate if there are any serious limitations to using approval                 voting to elect legislators in parliamentary democracies.
{'FirstName': 'Steven', 'LastName': 'Brams', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'J', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Steven J Brams', 'EmailAddress': 'steven.brams@nyu.edu', 'PI_PHON': '2129988510', 'NSF_ID': '000086398', 'StartDate': '02/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
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{'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}
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