An Experimental Study of Bilateral Accidents
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Lisa Martin', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
The incentive effects of various legal rules governing                     liability for accidents have been the subject of both social                    scientific and policy debate.  Interest has focused especially on               the deterrent effect of a legal rule of strict liability relative               to one of negligence or negligence with contributory negligence.                During recent years, scientists have developed economic theories                of accident law which predict the deterrent effects of various                  legal rules.  Verification of these models by econometric                       techniques has been hampered, however, by a scarcity of relevant                data.  Much of the most relevant information is unavailable in                  naturally occurring data sources.                                                    Drs. Schotter and Kornhauser are investigating                             experimentally the theory of bilateral accidents and the                        behavioral implications of the liability laws governing them.  A                bilateral accident is one which is determined by the actions of                 two parties (i.e. their choice of caution levels).  Motorist-                   pedestrian accidents exemplify this phenomenon.  The                            investigators will perform a series of experiments to test how                  the basic forms of liability--strict liability (with a defense of               contributory negligence) and negligence rules--affect the                       accident-preventing behavior of potential injurers and potential                victims.  The experiments will involve 35 rounds of 18 different                experiments which ask a pair of subjects to choose levels of                    caution and levels of activity.  At the end of each round                       subjects lose or receive money, depending on their activity                     level, their standard of caution, and whether or not they are                   victims or injurers and are or are not liable.                                       This research will extend the investigators' earlier                       research on the theory of unilateral accidents.  Unilateral                     accidents are accidents in which the actions of only one agent,                 the injurer, determine the probability of an accident (i.e. an                  airplane crash). In that research the investigators presented                   results refuting a number of hypotheses existing in the                         literature about the impacts of various liability laws.  Using a                measure of efficiency, a negligence rule outperformed a rule of                 strict liability.  The aim of this research is to see if these                  results generalize to the behavior of subjects in bilateral                     accident experiments.  The results of this study should be                      important from both a theoretical and policy perspective on a                   vital topic at the intersection of law and economics.
[{'FirstName': 'Andrew', 'LastName': 'Schotter', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Andrew Schotter', 'EmailAddress': 'andrew.schotter@nyu.edu', 'PI_PHON': '2129988952', 'NSF_ID': '000181634', 'StartDate': '06/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'Lewis', 'LastName': 'Kornhauser', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'A', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Lewis A Kornhauser', 'EmailAddress': None, 'PI_PHON': None, 'NSF_ID': '000277720', 'StartDate': '06/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'New York University', 'CityName': 'NEW YORK', 'ZipCode': '100121019', 'PhoneNumber': '2129982121', 'StreetAddress': '70 WASHINGTON SQ S', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'New York', 'StateCode': 'NY', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '10', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'NY10', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'NX9PXMKW5KW8', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NEW YORK UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': 'NX9PXMKW5KW8'}
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{'Code': '1372', 'Text': 'LSS-Law And Social Sciences'}
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