Strategic Complexity in Extensive Games
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project incorporates notions of bounded rationality and                    measures of complexity into economic analysis.  The importance of               bringing complexity considerations into economic models is shown                by the organizational structures, social mechanisms, and data                   base systems designed for the purpose of simplifying the process                of decision making as well as simplifying implementations of                    strategies.  This need takes on an added importance now since                   economic agents are beginning to relegate decisions and                         strategies to computers.  Thus, studying the effects of finite                  computational ability, computational costs, and computing power                 in general becomes an essential part of the strategic analysis.                                                                                                 In their previous work the investigators demonstrated that the                  concept of an automaton is a natural way of characterizing the                  needs for simplicity and the notions of bounded rationality of                  players in the types of strategic games central to modern                       economic analysis and other social sciences.  This project                      continues to expand existing results in several directions.  It                 investigates automaton-complexity and alternative notions of                    complexity in repeated games with emphasis on algebraic (group                  theoretic) measures.  It extends complexity results on repeated                 games to stochastic games.  This extension is especially                        important because stochastic games are more useful to economists                than repeated games.  Complexity results are extended to general                extensive games with imperfect information.
{'FirstName': 'William', 'LastName': 'Stanford', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'G', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'William G Stanford', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000294641', 'StartDate': '06/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of Illinois at Chicago', 'CityName': 'CHICAGO', 'ZipCode': '606124305', 'PhoneNumber': '3129962862', 'StreetAddress': '809 S MARSHFIELD AVE M/C 551', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Illinois', 'StateCode': 'IL', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '07', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IL07', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'W8XEAJDKMXH3', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '132000', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8720334.xml'}