Collaborative Research in Corporatism, Pluralism and Market Competition
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Frank P. Scioli  Jr.', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
In recent years extensive research in Western Europe has focused on             corporatist systems of industrial relations in which collective                 bargaining is centralized on a national scale and organizations                 representing workers and employers are routinely consulted on major             policy initiatives.  There is by now a large literature detailing the           impact of corporatist arrangements on a wide variety of social and              economic outcomes.  Nations with corporatist systems experience little          industrial conflict and slow growth of nominal and real wages.                  Corporatism is frequently claimed to be a prerequisite for success with         income policies.  Real wage moderation leads, in turn, to superior              economic performance (lower levels of unemployment and more rapid               growth).   At the same time, corporatism is associated with a                   relatively rapid growth of welfare expenditures, leading many scholars          to see in corporatism a political bargain whereby unions receive                extensive welfare programs in exchange for moderation in private wage           negotiations.                                                                                                                                                   This widespread consensus about the empirical pattern does not extend,          however, to a theoretical understanding.  Three issues are particularly         controversial or unclear:  1) the relationship between corporatist              structures and union politics,  2) the impact of the structure of               interest representation on the effects of government economic policy,           and  3) who benefits and who loses from corporatist arrangements.                                                                                               On the first issue, one view holds that corporatism was imposed on              workers against their will.  One variant sees corporatism as                    representing the successful cooptation of the union movement to serve           the needs of the capitalistic social order.  Another variant views              corporatism as the result of non-democratic collusion between labor,            employers, and government.  According to the opposing view, corporatist         arrangements are supported by union leaders because their members               benefit.                                                                                                                                                        With regard to the second issue, little is known about the impact of            corporatism on economic policy other than demand management and                 incomes policies.  Yet there is good reason to think there are                  significant differences between corporatist and pluralist systems in            their responses to a variety of other economic policies, especially             policies concerning investment and growth.                                                                                                                      The third issue is perhaps the most contentious in terms of resolving           the question of who gains and who loses from corporatist arrangements.          Four possibilities exist:  workers gain and employers lose, employers           gain and workers lose, both gain, both lose.  All four positions have           found advocates in the scholarly debate.                                                                                                                        The goal of this investigation is to develop a formal theory of                 corporatism, as compared with pluralism and market competition.  Such           a theory would specify the critical difference between centralized and          decentralized bargaining, explain the empirical findings, provide               tentative answers regarding the effects of policies concerning growth           and investment in different institutional environments, and clarify the         advantages or disadvantages accruing to groups and individuals.  In             addition, the investigators will generate a number of different                 consequences that must be true if the theory is true, thus suggesting           new directions for future empirical research.
{'FirstName': 'Michael', 'LastName': 'Wallerstein', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Michael Wallerstein', 'EmailAddress': 'm-wallerstein@northwestern.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000460095', 'StartDate': '08/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of California-Los Angeles', 'CityName': 'LOS ANGELES', 'ZipCode': '900244200', 'PhoneNumber': '3107940102', 'StreetAddress': '10889 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 700', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '36', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA36', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'RN64EPNH8JC6', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}
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