Tacit Bargaining and Tacit Cooperation in Arms Control
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Frank P. Scioli  Jr.', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
A state tacitly bargains with another state when it attempts to                 manipulate the latter's policy choices through its behavior rather              than by relying on formal or informal diplomatic exchanges.  The                process is tacit because actions rather than rhetoric constitute the            critical medium of communication; it is bargaining and not coercion             because the actions are aimed at influencing an outcome that can only           be achieved through some measure of joint voluntary behavior.  In the           past few years, the slow progress and modest achievements of formal             negotiations have prompted speculation about the potential of tacit             bargaining as an alternative mechanism for promoting arms control.  It          has been argued, for example, that the reduction of nuclear weapons             can be most effectively pursued by way of unilateral or reciprocal              restraint (e.g., slowing the deployment of new weapons) outside the             context of negotiations.                                                                                                                                        This project evaluates the capacity of specific tacit bargaining                strategies to stabilize or reduce arms races.  Formal analysis and              simulation are used to explore the ability of these strategies to               cope with uncertainty about the motives of the rival state, bluffing,           misinterpretation, the time-preference of decision makers, and a                multiplicity of response options.  Despite the complexity created by            the simultaneous operation of these factors, recent work in this area           suggests that certain generalizations will emerge that can aid a                nation in deciding how to conduct tacit bargaining as well as to help           social scientists understand tacit bargaining as an alternative                 mechanism for promoting arms control.
[{'FirstName': 'David', 'LastName': 'Rocke', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'M', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'David M Rocke', 'EmailAddress': 'dmrocke@ucdavis.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000309054', 'StartDate': '08/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'George', 'LastName': 'Downs', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'George Downs', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000203364', 'StartDate': '08/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'University of California-Davis', 'CityName': 'DAVIS', 'ZipCode': '956186153', 'PhoneNumber': '5307547700', 'StreetAddress': '1850 RESEARCH PARK DR STE 300', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '04', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA04', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'TX2DAGQPENZ5', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': 'NUDGYLBB4S99'}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8708271.xml'}