Experimental Bargaining Games
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Recent research has shown much progress in the theory of games and its          applications to economic analysis, particularly to situations                   involving bargaining.  However, it has become evident that some parts           of this theory are likely to be relevant in realistic economic                  applications, and other parts show little explanatory or predictive             power.  What remains unclear are the circumstances under which even             the simplest and most fundamental principles of game theory can be              expected to be useful as part of a genuinely predictive theory of               human behavior.                                                                                                                                                 This research examines the precepts of game theory, namely the                  information available to the players either at the outset or through            learning, the rules of the game, and the likely outcomes, in a                  systematic and rigorous manner.  Starting with a two-person zero-sum            game, the experiments become more complex to include multi-stage                bargaining games and auctions.  At each phase of the work careful               analysis is done to allow for the the effects of the environment of             the game and the experience of the players on the outcome.                      %%%                                                                             One of the fundamental contributions to the analysis of human behavior          is the 1928 work of John von Neumann in which the concept of human              interaction modeled as a game between players is developed.  The game           has rules which must be followed and penalties for breaking the rules.          Each player has varying amounts of information about the game, the              other players, and the likely outcomes of strategies.  In this                  environment the players react to incentives provided by the rules of            the game, and endeavor to guide the game to an outcome in concert with          their own interests.                                                                                                                                            During the past several decades game theoretic analysis has been                widely applied to economic environments including cartel formation and          stability, auctions and bidding, international trade, market analysis,          contracting and other types of bargaining, and the formulation of               government policy.  However, the results of game theoretic studies              have often been questionable when they are used to explain economic             behavior or predict the future behavior of economic agents.  In                 particular, game strategies which seem optimal in the short run often           break down over the longer term.  The contribution of this project is           that it examines game theory applications to economic analysis from a           fundamental standpoint.  It explains what aspects of game theory are            in concert with the basic precepts of economic theory.  This research           also isolates the properties of game theoretic analysis which are               inherently flawed from the standpoint of economic behavior, and when            applied to economic problems will lead to ambiguous or erroneous                conclusions.
{'FirstName': 'Kenneth', 'LastName': 'Binmore', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'G', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Kenneth G Binmore', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000149175', 'StartDate': '03/15/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor', 'CityName': 'ANN ARBOR', 'ZipCode': '481091079', 'PhoneNumber': '7347636438', 'StreetAddress': '1109 GEDDES AVE, SUITE 3300', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Michigan', 'StateCode': 'MI', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '06', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'MI06', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'GNJ7BBP73WE9', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8821521.xml'}