Topics in the Theory of Optimal Cooperation in Dynamic      Games
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
The project contributes to our understanding of economic applications           of repeated games.  It builds on important new techniques for                   characterizing repeated games developed by the investigator and it              extends surprising and potentially significant results obtained by              the investigator about repeated games under imperfect information.              The high quality and significance of the investigator's past research           show that he has the ability to successfully complete this project.                                                                                             The project consists of two parts.  The first part develops an                  ingenious theory of implicit and explicit contracts.  The theory is             based on a model in which a principal negotiates a contract with an             agent, making the latter's compensation contingent upon output (or              some other publicly observable variable) but not upon some choice               variable of the agent (perhaps the level of effort or care taken by             the agent).  Implicit inter-temporal contacts emerge in repeated                games when the authorities (the courts) take into account only the              output and not the choice variables but the principal can observe the           choice variables and can retaliate against an agent who deviates from           the implicit agreement.  Implicit and explicit contracts are shown to           coexist, but the principal will always pay the agent more than the              amount called for in the explicit contract, if behavior is                      efficient.  This is original research because this problem has never            been rigorously analyzed. The results promise new insights into                 contracts (Why are non-binding clauses included in contracts?) and              the relationship between business cycles and implicit labor contracts.                                                                                          The second part concerns the strategic dynamics of implicit collusion           in markets with renewable resource, the so-called "Great Fish War"              problem.  The investigator shows how previous work can be generalized           into a solution for this complicated and important problem.
{'FirstName': 'Ennio', 'LastName': 'Stacchetti', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Ennio Stacchetti', 'EmailAddress': 'ennio@nyu.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000336179', 'StartDate': '07/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
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