Union Power, Partisan Control and Economic Performance      of OCED Countries, 1960-1985
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Frank P. Scioli  Jr.', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
A number of recent studies of economic performance among the OECD               countries report that those countries which have strong unions and              social-democratic governments and those countries which have weak               unions and right-wing governments both do better in terms of growth,            investment and unemployment than countries in which the political               patterns are more mixed.  What is not clear from this research is why           this would be the case:  is it because governments with different               ideological orientations choose different policies in the presence of           strong and weak unions or is it because the same policies have                  different consequences when unions are strong than when they are weak?                                                                                          This investigation focuses on fiscal policies, in particular, on                different kinds of tax policies.  Economic theory leads to the belief           that investment can be financed by maintaining a high level of after-           tax profits or by using taxes on income from capital that are neutral           in their effect on investment.  Given this alternative, one would               expect that governments with different ideological orientations would           use different tax policies.  In particular, that social-democratic              governments would impose investment-neutral taxes on incomes from               capital and develop extensive welfare services.  The effect of taxes,           however, depends on the power of unions.  When unions are strong, they          can adjust wage rates in response to taxes and transfers, increasing            their demands when incomes from employmnet are taxed and decreasing             their preferred private wage in response to transfers and welfare               services.  Weak unions can rarely do the same.                                                                                                                  A database comprised of political and economic data on OECD countries           from 1960 to the present will be gathered for this research.  The               investigator then analyzes these data to assess which of the aspects of         unions do in fact matter in influencing investment, union wages, union          vs. non-union wage differentials, as well as private and public                 employment.  The investigator will examine whether governments with             different orientations, facing unions with different strength, do in            fact choose different fiscal policies.  The effects of these policies           on investment, economic growth, wages, transfers and welfare services,          and income inequality will also be evaluated.                                                                                                                   The contribution of this research will be twofold.  First, the project          should illuminate the causes and consequences of government policies.           Studies of economic performance have thus tended to jump from political         conditions to economic outcomes, leaving the entire policy process in a         black box.  The purpose of the research is to determine why governments         choose different policies and if the same policies have different               consequences given the power of unions.  Secondly, the research should          identify what it is about unions that matters:  from what do they               derive the strength to act strategically vis-a-vis employers and                governments.  More generally, this investigation should contribute to a         more realistic understanding of the economy as a system of strategic            interaction among governments, firms and unions, acting within an               institutional framework.
{'FirstName': 'Adam', 'LastName': 'Przeworski', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Adam Przeworski', 'EmailAddress': 'adam.przeworski@nyu.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000224926', 'StartDate': '02/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of Chicago', 'CityName': 'CHICAGO', 'ZipCode': '606375418', 'PhoneNumber': '7737028669', 'StreetAddress': '5801 S ELLIS AVE', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Illinois', 'StateCode': 'IL', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '01', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IL01', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'ZUE9HKT2CLC9', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': 'ZUE9HKT2CLC9'}
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{'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8821520.xml'}