Formal Models of Committee Behavior
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Frank P. Scioli  Jr.', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Collective action is fraught with difficulty.  The difficulties of              coordinating the actions of individuals exists in all segments of               society.  Though scholars have reported on general problems confronting         communities - - largely dilemmas resulting from an incompatibility              between the individuals' incentives and the collective goal - -                 relatively little attention has been directed toward understanding the          principles by which communities solve these problems.  For example, why         do communities solve some problems via a decentralized system of                individual property rights while other problems require hierarchical            organizations?  Why are some organizational arrangements, for example           firms and committees, successful at mitigating collective difficulties          for their communities, while other organizational structures, for               example communes, are not successful?  The failure of communities to            accomplish their collective goals is a failure of institutional design.                                                                                         This project focuses on the institutional structure of legislatures and         parties.  It is common in studies of party-dominated legislatures, such         as the British House of Commons, to see changes in the rules of                 procedure as intimately linked to changes and developments in the party         system.  In the U.S. House of Representatives, however, with its                relatively weak parties, legislative structure is more often linked to          the electoral concerns of individual legislators, rather than to any            collective electoral concerns.  This is especially true of research             that is in or influenced by the rational choice perspective.  In this           research investigation the researchers explore the degree to which              specifically partisan factors enter into, and have historically entered         into, the structure of the House of Representatives.                                                                                                            The investigators focus on the committee system and articulate a view           of committees as agents of political parties.  This necessitates                answering a number of broader questions:  What is a party and how can           it control any agents that it might appoint, committees or not?  What           are agency relationships like when they involve collective principals,          such as a party?  What is the role of the party leadership?  How do the         specifics of committee appointment affect their responsiveness to               partisan demands?  What is the relationship between committees and the          floor?  Employing an approach that is consistent with rational choice           premises, the investigators develop and test this model of committee            behavior, based on principal agent theory.
[{'FirstName': 'Gary', 'LastName': 'Cox', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'W', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Gary W Cox', 'EmailAddress': 'gwcox@stanford.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000459129', 'StartDate': '07/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'Mathew', 'LastName': 'McCubbins', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'D', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Mathew D McCubbins', 'EmailAddress': 'mat.mccubbins@gmail.com', 'NSF_ID': '000464253', 'StartDate': '07/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'University of California-San Diego', 'CityName': 'LA JOLLA', 'ZipCode': '920930021', 'PhoneNumber': '8585344896', 'StreetAddress': '9500 GILMAN DR', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '50', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA50', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'UYTTZT6G9DT1', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8811022.xml'}