A Theory of Moderating Elections
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Frank P. Scioli  Jr.', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Divided governments are becoming the norm, rather than the                      exception in countries where the executive and the legislature                  are both directly elected.  In the United States, for instance,                 the Republican Party appears to have a solid grip on the                        Presidency, while the Democratic Party appears to have an                       advantage in Congress.                                                                                                                                          In this project the investigators explain this phenomenon as the                result of a process where moderate voters bring about a balance                 of power that insures a moderate policy outcome.  The                           investigators start from the presumption that the two political                 parties have different objectives. That is, when in office, the                 two parties follow different policies because they pursue the                   interests of different constituencies. However, the final policy                outcome is not only a function of which party is holding the                    Presidency, but also of the composition of Congress. Moderate                   voters, that is voters who prefer policies in between the                       policies most preferred by the two parties, have two                            opportunities to"moderate" the President.  In Presidential                      election years some voters may vote, Republican for President and               then "balance" by voting for a Democratic candidate for Congress.               This explains the common observation of split.ticket voting.                    Second, in mid.term Congressional elections some additional                     moderation can take place.  In these elections there is no                      uncertainty about the identity of the President. This makes                     "moderation" easier relative to Presidential election years when                there is uncertainty about the outcome of the Presidential race.                Thus, some additional moderation can take place in mid-term.                    This explains a second widely observed phenomenon:  the mid-term                cycle. That is, the party holding the White House almost always                 loses votes and seats in mid-term elections relative to the                     preceding Congressional elections held in Presidential election                 years.                                                                                                                                                          The researchers have developed a model of this process and                      consider a specific policy issue:  the inflation/unemployment                   tradeoff.  The researchers generate several testable propositions               of the correlations between economic conditions and electoral                   outcomes.  Using aggregate voting data for Congressional                        elections for the period 1950-1984 the researchers assess the                   extent to which the model predicts aggregate Congressional                      election outcomes in terms of incumbency effects and state of the               economy.
[{'FirstName': 'Alberto', 'LastName': 'Alesina', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Alberto Alesina', 'EmailAddress': 'aalesina@harvard.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000107219', 'StartDate': '02/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'Howard', 'LastName': 'Rosenthal', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'L', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Howard L Rosenthal', 'EmailAddress': 'hr31@nyu.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000204761', 'StartDate': '02/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'Carnegie-Mellon University', 'CityName': 'PITTSBURGH', 'ZipCode': '152133815', 'PhoneNumber': '4122688746', 'StreetAddress': '5000 FORBES AVE', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Pennsylvania', 'StateCode': 'PA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '18', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'PA18', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'U3NKNFLNQ613', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': 'U3NKNFLNQ613'}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}, {'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}]
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8821441.xml'}