Experimental Tests of Nash Refinements
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
A major unresolved issue in the study of noncooperative games is                the appropriate refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept.  A                  "refinement" is a theory with equilibrium outcomes that are a                   proper subset of the set of Nash outcomes.  A sequence of                       successively stronger refinements has been proposed, many of                    which are motivated by specific examples of simple games in which               the weaker refinement permitted equilibria which were thought not               to be sensible.                                                                                                                                                 In this literature, discussions about what behavior is sensible                 are typically based on the author's subjective opinion about how                "rational" individuals would play the game.  Even though game                   theory is sometimes said to be a normative theory about how                     rational agents ought to behave, the theory is widely applied in                industrial organization and other areas of economics to analyze                 specific issues, so the positive (empirical) content of game                    theory is also relevant.  In addition the discussions of                        intuitive and unintuitive equilibria are often in the context of                examples that are inspired by market applications.                                                                                                              The contribution of this project comes from using carefully                     designed laboratory experiments to test competing refinements.                  In these experiments financial rewards are used to induce                       players' preferences in a manner such that competing theories                   give distinct predictions.  The results of the experiments will                 provide badly needed empirical evidence on which of these                       refinements repeatedly fail to predict the results of controlled                laboratory experiments.
{'FirstName': 'Charles', 'LastName': 'Holt', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'A', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Charles A Holt', 'EmailAddress': 'holt@virginia.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000246482', 'StartDate': '04/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
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