Theoretical Analysis of Economic Rationality
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon'}
This interesting project examines the basic behavioral foundations of           economic analysis.  The fundamental concept underpinning economic               theory regarding the purchase of consumer goods and services,                   participation in the labor market, and the establishment of contracts           between people or institutions is the maximization of utility.  That            is to say, people make choices which they perceive will bring them the          most satisfaction, and in doing so they forgo other choices.  This              seeming truism is both self-evident and profound at the same time.              The approach has provided insights into many important questions.  For          instance, faced with a given wage rate, how much will people work?                                                                                              What fraction of their incomes will they save?  What effect will a tax          on gasoline have on the purchase of automobiles or on the number of             miles driven.  Clearly these are important questions to policy makers,          producers, consumers, and other economic agents.                                                                                                                The approach of utility maximization is, however, sometimes not                 readily applicable to observed human behavior.  Many times people               continue in behavior which to an observer appears irrational.                   Economists and psychologists who study such behavior often explain it           as the result of human beings' inability to process effectively the             ocean of information available to them.  Thus they implicitly derive            rules of thumb, or other shortcuts which allow for reasonably rapid             decision making, but might not result in the choice which truly gives           the most satisfaction over the long run.  Economic agents enter into            long term contracts with each other, even though in the short term              each agent might be able to do better by acting independently.  That            is to say, each party to a contract might have the incentive to cheat,          particularly if the cheating cannot be detected.  This very innovative          project explores the incentives to cheat on contracts, the types of             information conveyed by individuals entering into contracts, and                mechanisms which might diminish the incentive to cheat.                                                                                                         Professor Frank uses a game theoretic framework to analyze the so-              called prisoner's dilemma in a variety of interesting settings.  In             this manner he gains a great deal of insight into the information               processing mechanisms of human behavior, and ultimately into the                ability of economic agents to act in a rational manner.
{'FirstName': 'Robert', 'LastName': 'Frank', 'EmailAddress': 'rhf3@cornell.edu', 'StartDate': '08/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Cornell University', 'CityName': 'Ithaca', 'ZipCode': '148502820', 'PhoneNumber': '6072555014', 'StreetAddress': '373 Pine Tree Road', 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'New York', 'StateCode': 'NY'}
[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'ECONOMICS'}, {'Code': '9120', 'Text': 'CROSS-DIRECTORATE PROGRAMS'}]
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8707492.xml'}