Patent Law, Competition and the Advancement of Technical    Knowledge
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Lisa Martin', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Regulatory laws are intended to produce socially desirable outcomes.            In particular, the granting of patent protection is intended to                 encourage the creation of incentives for firms to undertake Research            and Development and the acceleration of innovation through the                  disclosure of inventions.  The choice of trade secrecy over patenting           is a well documented phenomenon.  Since this decision has an impact on          future innovations and the competitiveness of rivals, it is important           to determine why this choice is made and how a particular patenting             arrangement affects the choice.  Similar issues arise in conjunction            with the novelty requirement.  Specifically, Drs. Green and Scotchmer           develop game theoretic models to study incentives for disclosure in             patent races, as they depend on two legal requirements for                      patentability; namely, (1) the stringency of the novelty requirement            and (2) whether the patent can issue if the applicant was "first to             file," but not "first to invent."                                                                                                                               Little research has been conducted on the structure of the patent               system; yet, its impact on innovation and the importance of continuing          innovation in today's economy suggest the utility of such research.             The project has the potential to contribute to the development of               theory which will serve to increase our understanding of the effects of         law in regulating competitive relationships.  This research can                 also provide normative guidelines for the development of commercial law         in an area where economics and law intersect.
[{'FirstName': 'Jerry', 'LastName': 'Green', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'R', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Jerry R Green', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000146437', 'StartDate': '08/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'Suzanne', 'LastName': 'Scotchmer', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'A', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Suzanne A Scotchmer', 'EmailAddress': 'scotch@garnet.berkeley.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000472928', 'StartDate': '08/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'National Bureau of Economic Research Inc', 'CityName': 'CAMBRIDGE', 'ZipCode': '021385359', 'PhoneNumber': '6178683900', 'StreetAddress': '1050 MASSACHUSETTS AVE', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Massachusetts', 'StateCode': 'MA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '05', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'MA05', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'GT28BRBA2Q49', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH INC', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}, {'Code': '1372', 'Text': 'LSS-Law And Social Sciences'}, {'Code': '9145', 'Text': 'SPECIAL PROGRAMS-RESERVE'}]
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8809197.xml'}