The Economics of Self-Selection
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'jerry blackmon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Over the last ten years there have been very significant advances               in both the theory of noncooperative games and in the application               of the theory to explain economic phenomena.  The primary goal of               this proposal  is to develop better theoretical insights into the               role of institutions when individuals have different information.               An important subclass of institutional arrangements deal with                   one.sided competition. In such "contests" agents compete  with                  each other for some form of invisible reward.  This may take the                form of a race for some patentable process, bidding for a                       contract or spending by interest groups in the pursuit of a                     political payoff.                                                                                                                                               The first part of the research is concerned with the development                of a more basic model of this last activity.  The objective is to               enhance our understanding of the relationship between the value                 of the political prize (such as a franchise or tariff barrier)                  and the resources that agents are willing to spend in pursuit of                this prize.  The second part of the project involves extending                  the theory of auctions, in particular, further exploring the                    properties of the common sealed high bid and open ascending bid                 auctions. The final part of the research is to investigate the                  basic model of two.sided competition with private information.                  To reveal private information, individuals can undertake costly                 signalling activity.  The goal of the project is to shed light on               the equilibrium of choice signals.  There is now a considerable                 body of research formally characterizing a "competitive"                        equilibrium in which differences in product quality are only                    learned because sellers undertake some activity which signals                   such differences.  A difficult theoretical problem, however,                    remains to be resolved when it is that the buyers must move                     first.
{'FirstName': 'John', 'LastName': 'Riley', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'G', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'John G Riley', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000103748', 'StartDate': '07/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of California-Los Angeles', 'CityName': 'LOS ANGELES', 'ZipCode': '900244200', 'PhoneNumber': '3107940102', 'StreetAddress': '10889 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 700', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '36', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA36', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'RN64EPNH8JC6', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8720345.xml'}