A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Balance of Power and the   Costs of War
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Frank P. Scioli  Jr.', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Numerous researchers have sought to reformulate in game-theoretic terms         the explicit rationalism of the Realist view of balance of power                politics in international affairs.  However, they fail to consider two          important features of the balance of power politics:  first, the games          which nations play are sequential, and second, the outcomes of initial          plays can affect profoundly the strategic character of subsequent               games.  This research will offer a model of balance of power politics           which corresponds to the Realist view of international affairs - -              specifically, of nation states which bargain to secure advantage in the         overall distribution of some fixed supply of resources.  This                   bargaining may, of course, lead to the eventual elimination of                  countries, but systems in which the investigators predict, on the basis         of a version of the bargaining set appropriate to this scenario, that           no country will be eliminated are termed "system-stable."                                                                                                       In this game theoretic modeling exercise the investigator seeks to              include war costs into the model and to establish the necessary and             sufficient conditions for an international system to be system stable.          The research also seeks a generalization of the analysis in which               assumptions about costs are more general.  Finally, the investigator            will complete the acquisition of data relating to coalitions and                conflicts during the Warring States period of China, and the                    development of appropriate indirect measures of resource capabilities           for an analysis of the coalitional structures observed over time.
{'FirstName': 'Emerson', 'LastName': 'Niou', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Emerson Niou', 'EmailAddress': 'niou@duke.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000365987', 'StartDate': '03/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Duke University', 'CityName': 'DURHAM', 'ZipCode': '277054640', 'PhoneNumber': '9196843030', 'StreetAddress': '2200 W MAIN ST', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'North Carolina', 'StateCode': 'NC', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '04', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'NC04', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'TP7EK8DZV6N5', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'DUKE UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8822308.xml'}