Experiments on Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games  (REU Supplement)
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{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Laboratory experiments, such as the experiments in this project,                test and enrich economic theory.  This project uses laboratory                  experiments to examine questions of equilibrium selection in                    coordination games.  These games are characterized by the                       existence of multiple equilibria which are rankable.  In these                  games, coordination failures occur when all players are better                  off in one equilibrium relative to another yet may be unable to                 explicitly coordinate their strategies to achieve the preferred                 outcome.  The project explores whether coordination failures                    arise and provides a characterization of the factors which                      increase the likelihood of such failures.  It examines the                      ability of different mechanisms, e.g., communication and pre-play               experience, to attenuate these failures.  The project also                      considers an economic application of a coordination game by                     examining a double moral hazard problem in product markets.                                                                                                     Economic theory suggests that coordination failure could be a                   major factor in macroeconomic instability and microeconomic                     market imperfections.  This project will provide some of the                    first empirical evidence of the existence and significance of                   coordination failures in a controlled laboratory environment.                   This project is also methodologically important because it tests                widely used game-theoretic concepts such as mechanisms for pre-                 play communication.  Preliminary results suggest that a plausible               pre-play communication mechanism fails laboratory experimental                  tests.
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{'Name': 'University of Iowa', 'CityName': 'IOWA CITY', 'ZipCode': '522421316', 'PhoneNumber': '3193352123', 'StreetAddress': '105 JESSUP HALL', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Iowa', 'StateCode': 'IA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '01', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IA01', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'Z1H9VJS8NG16', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}, {'Code': '9120', 'Text': 'CROSS-DIRECTORATE PROGRAMS'}]
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