The Deadline Effect and Related Bargaining Phenomena:  Some Experimental Studies
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project is part of a rapidly growing body of research that                 uses laboratory experiments to test and enrich economic theory.                 In this case the economic theory is the game theoretic approach                 to bargaining.  In a series of earlier experiments in which                     relatively unstructured bargaining was allowed to proceed during                a fixed time period, there was a striking concentration of                      agreements reached in the very last seconds before the deadline.                The "deadline effect" appears to be quite robust, in the sense                  that the distribution of agreements over time appears to be much                less sensitive to the various experimental manipulations than is                the distribution of the terms of agreement or the frequency of                  disagreement.                                                                                                                                                   The experiments in this project are designed both to obtain a                   better understanding of the effect of deadlines, and to                         investigate particular hypotheses raised by various parts of the                theoretical literature.  The experimental research will continue                to investigate the robustness of the observed deadline effect to                changes in the mechanics of bargaining and to different kinds of                deadlines.  For example, the sharp deadline used in earlier                     experiments is replaced by a deadline after which there is a                    positive and rising probability that the game will end abruptly.                One of the main hypotheses is that the deadline effect arises out               of a screening effect similar to what is seen as separating                     equilibria of incomplete information models.  This project                      derives and experimentally tests a theory about what factors                    might be screened for.                                                                                                                                          Last-minute agreements are neither uncommon nor overwhelmingly                  difficult to observe in naturally occurring negotiations.  But                  the deadline effect is not predicted or explained by standard                   bargaining theories.  This project provides the first scientific                study of deadline effects and it extends bargaining theory to                   capture the factors which cause deadline effects to occur.
{'FirstName': 'J.Keith', 'LastName': 'Murnighan', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'J.Keith Murnighan', 'EmailAddress': 'keithm@nwu.edu', 'PI_PHON': '8474913566', 'NSF_ID': '000300386', 'StartDate': '08/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign', 'CityName': 'URBANA', 'ZipCode': '618013620', 'PhoneNumber': '2173332187', 'StreetAddress': '506 S WRIGHT ST', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Illinois', 'StateCode': 'IL', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '13', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IL13', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'Y8CWNJRCNN91', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}, {'Code': '1321', 'Text': 'Decision, Risk & Mgmt Sci'}]
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