Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Frank P. Scioli  Jr.', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
The Federal Reserve is one of the most powerful institutions involved           in the formation of national and international economic policy.  It has         the formal power to manipulate interest rates and the money supply,             which are crucial determinants of inflation, unemployment, and the              value of the dollar.  Moreover, the Fed can act without the approval of         the president or congress, and in this way is insulated from the                pressures of electoral politics.  With such enormous power and scope in         this politically sensitive area, it is all the more paradoxical that            the Fed, and central banking more generally, receives such little               attention from political scientists.                                                                                                                            In this investigation the researcher will explore the origins of the            Federal Reserve.  The techniques of modern political economy are                applied to the topic to trace the change from the National Banking              System to the Federal Reserve System.  First, why did modern central            banking come to the United States when it did?  This question is                particularly relevant since many other countries possessed central              banks by 1913, and the theory of central banking had been widely                understood since at least the 1870s.  Second, why was the                       organizational structure of the Federal Reserve so different from the           structure of other central banks and other agencies in American                 government?  What explains, for example, its level of decentralization          and its peculiar mixture of public and private control?  Public choice          theory and the new institutional economics provide the analytic tools           for examining these questions.  The proximate objective is to present a         comprehensive explanation of the origins of the Federal Reserve, from           the shift in the institutional preferences of powerful social actors to         the final legislative outcome.  Support allows the investigator to              gather statistical and literary data from archives in New York,                 Cambridge, and Washington, D.C.
[{'FirstName': 'Jeffry', 'LastName': 'Frieden', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'A', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Jeffry A Frieden', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000160599', 'StartDate': '03/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'J. Lawrence', 'LastName': 'Broz', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'J. Lawrence Broz', 'EmailAddress': 'jlbroz@ucsd.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000462846', 'StartDate': '03/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'University of California-Los Angeles', 'CityName': 'LOS ANGELES', 'ZipCode': '900244200', 'PhoneNumber': '3107940102', 'StreetAddress': '10889 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 700', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '36', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA36', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'RN64EPNH8JC6', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8819707.xml'}