Physicalism and the Role of Content in Psychological        Explanation
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{'SignBlockName': 'Ronald J. Overmann', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Professor Field's first goal in this project is to clarify the                  content and methodological function of the doctrine of                          physicalism.  This doctrine has played an important                             methodological role in guiding science, but exactly how to                      formulate it is a difficult question.  It is also an important                  one, not only because of the importance of understanding this                   aspect of scientific methodology for its own sake but also                      because the answer one gives to it makes a real difference to how               one approaches certain subjects.  One of the more difficult                     subjects which philosophers consider is intentional psychology                  whose status and methods are very much in dispute.                                                                                                              A related goal for Professor Field is to clarify the explanatory                role of talk content or truth conditions in intentional                         psychology. There appear to be some difficulties in achieving for               intentional psychology the same high physicalist standards that                 we demand for other sciences.  So Professor Field will examine                  whether the explanatory role of content or truth conditions might               be so different from the role of the typical notions of the other               special sciences that those high standards might be inappropriate               to content or truth conditions.  Even if the answer is 'no', the                investigation should shed light on how to reconcile intentional                 psychology with physicalism. If that can be done, it will remove                the motive that some have had for trying to do without the use of               intentional talk in psychological explanation.
{'FirstName': 'Hartry', 'LastName': 'Field', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'H', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Hartry H Field', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000103571', 'StartDate': '07/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
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{'Code': '135300', 'Text': 'Hist & Philosophy of SET'}
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