Corporate Financial Structure and the Theory of the Firm
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon'}
This project continues the principal investigator's work on                     contracting and control issues in firms and corporations.  Its                  aim is to gain a better understanding of several critical                       unanswered questions:  (1) What determines the structure of                     securities in corporations and the allocation of voting rights                  across these securities?  For example, why do shareholders                      typically have votes, while bondholders do not except when a firm               is in financial distress?  (2) How do friendly mergers and                      hostile takeovers differ as mechanisms for achieving changes in                 corporate control?  (3) What determines the nature and extent of                a firm?                                                                                                                                                         Still other questions must be addressed before a full-blown                     theory of the firm can be achieved.  But that prospect, and the                 successes to date, provide a powerful spur for persisting on the                present course.
{'FirstName': 'Oliver', 'LastName': 'Hart', 'EmailAddress': 'ohart@harvard.edu', 'StartDate': '04/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology', 'CityName': 'Cambridge', 'ZipCode': '021394301', 'PhoneNumber': '6172531000', 'StreetAddress': '77 MASSACHUSETTS AVE', 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Massachusetts', 'StateCode': 'MA'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'ECONOMICS'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8720769.xml'}