Private Information, Communication and Contracting          (Computer and Information Science)
{'Code': '05020000', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'CSE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'IIS', 'LongName': 'Div Of Information & Intelligent Systems'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Lawrence Rosenblum', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project studies the organization of markets when buyers                    and sellers are asymmetrically informed.  The research is                       divided into two parts.  The first part concerns contracting                    under asymmetric information when specialized investments                       lock a buyer into one or more suppliers over some time                          horizon.  Several specific studies develop theoretical models                   that characterize optimal contracts and the optimal design of                   mechanisms for awarding contracts under various environmental                   assumptions, including information assumptions.  The second                     part of this research studies the performance of experience                     goods markets, where the seller is privately informed about                     product characteristics, and where information about the                        existence of the product diffuses gradually. This research                      derives predictions about the equilibrium time-paths of                         price, advertising, and quality in such markets.                                The research is significant because it will add to our                          understanding of how different organizational hierarchies,                      whose design is driven by the nature and availability of                        information, affect private and public decisions.
{'FirstName': 'Michael', 'LastName': 'Riordan', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'H', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Michael H Riordan', 'EmailAddress': 'mhr21@columbia.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000200238', 'StartDate': '07/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Stanford University', 'CityName': 'STANFORD', 'ZipCode': '943052004', 'PhoneNumber': '6507232300', 'StreetAddress': '450 JANE STANFORD WAY', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '16', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA16', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'HJD6G4D6TJY5', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}, {'Code': '6850', 'Text': 'DIGITAL SOCIETY&TECHNOLOGIES'}]
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8706150.xml'}