Rational Expectations with Imperfect Competition
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
There is a large literature investigating the notion that in markets            where knowledge is dispersed across different agents, prices serve not          only to allocate resources but to transmit information.  Agents                 expectations are assumed to be rational in the sense that they are              aware of the information revealed by prices.  Almost all work so far            has concerned competitive markets or monopolies.  A major emphasis has          been on the amount of information that one can expect to be transmitted         in such markets under rational expectations.                                                                                                                    The contribution of this project comes from investigating the nature of         rational expectations equilibrium when some of the agents have                  sufficient market power to be able to affect prices but there is no             monopoly.  This is a very difficult problem because the amount of               information transmitted becomes a matter of strategic choice.  The              project elucidates the nature of rational expectations equilibrium in           such a framework of imperfect competition and compares the degree of            information revelation with that in a competitive model.
{'FirstName': 'Eric', 'LastName': 'Maskin', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'S', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Eric S Maskin', 'EmailAddress': 'emaskin@fas.harvard.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000094204', 'StartDate': '07/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Harvard University', 'CityName': 'CAMBRIDGE', 'ZipCode': '021385366', 'PhoneNumber': '6174955501', 'StreetAddress': '1033 MASSACHUSETTS AVE STE 3', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Massachusetts', 'StateCode': 'MA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '05', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'MA05', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'LN53LCFJFL45', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
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