Electoral Accountability
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Frank P. Scioli  Jr.', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Previous research on coalition formation in legislatures has focused            on general hypotheses to derive predictions concerning which parties            would agree to form a government.  This generality implies a lack of            uniqueness in the predictions, inhibiting their use as a basis for              studying the preceding stage of interaction, namely that of actual              election of the parties to the legislature.  The goal of this research          is to develop a model applicable to all types of coalition governments          regardless of differing institutional arrangements (e.g. which party            initially attempts to form a government) that  structure the  process           of government formation.                                                                                                                                        This project has as its motivation a deeper understanding of the                institutional structures within which coalition governments form.               These institutional structures typically generate strategic                     possibilities for the parties in terms of the proposals and concessions         to make to other parties, on policy, cabinet portfolios, and so on.  By         employing the techniques of non-cooperative game theory, the                    investigators will generate predictions of coalition formation and              legislative outcomes as a function of the institutional rule in place,          thereby allowing for the comparison of the effects of different                 structures.  These techniques will also allow the investigators to              "roll-back" the analysis to the electoral stage, where the voters will          be modeled with specific predictions of what will happen if they vote           one way or another.  In this way the investigators hope to unify the            study of electoral competition and coalition formation in multi-party           systems of government.                                                                                                                                          Recent advances in non-cooperative game theory permit the development           of these more sophisticated models.  One of these advances has been             toward relaxing the informational assumptions of previous work and              allowing some participants to possess information that is both                  valuable, in that it effects payoffs to other participants, and                 private, in that no one else has it.  The knowledge of exactly what it          would take to convince another party to agree to a government is an             example of such information.  Incorporating these advanced techniques           will result in a model that is both rich in strategic possibilities for         the participants, and more realistic than its predecessors.  This will          enhance the theoretical unification of elections and coalition                  formation described above, and lead to a better comprehension of the            motivations and behavior of participants in this type of political              setting.
[{'FirstName': 'Jeffrey', 'LastName': 'Banks', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'S', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Jeffrey S Banks', 'EmailAddress': 'bnks@hss.caltech.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000447160', 'StartDate': '07/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'David', 'LastName': 'Austen-Smith', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'David Austen-Smith', 'EmailAddress': 'dasm@kellogg.northwestern.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000171593', 'StartDate': '07/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'University of Rochester', 'CityName': 'ROCHESTER', 'ZipCode': '146113847', 'PhoneNumber': '5852754031', 'StreetAddress': '910 GENESEE ST', 'StreetAddress2': 'STE 200', 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'New York', 'StateCode': 'NY', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '25', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'NY25', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'F27KDXZMF9Y8', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8700468.xml'}