Analyticity:  The Carnap-Quine Debate
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{'SignBlockName': 'Alicia Armstrong', 'PO_EMAI': 'aarmstro@nsf.gov', 'PO_PHON': '7032924743'}
The Carnap-Quine debate in the first half of this century addressed             nothing less than the very foundations of scientific truth.  The                central issue concerns the differing bases for asserting the truth of           analytic versus synthetic statements in science.  "Analytic"                    statements are those which are true a priori while "synthetic"                  statements are contingent and based on empirical evidence.  Rudolf              Carnap (1891-1970) argued that the axioms of arithmetic, logic and              other bodies of a priori doctrine can be construed as implicit                  definitions of the terms they contain.  Thus, in order to be                    justified in believing such axioms, we need only understand the                 meanings of the terms; no appeal to intuition is required.  Because             these claims and those which follow from them could become known                through an analysis of meaning, Carnap called such claims analytic;             all others were called synthetic.  Around these central notions of              meaning and analyticity, Carnap built a systematic theory of                    knowledge and that an approach to most of the other major problems of           philosophy of science.  This approach was the foundation of "logical            positivism."  W. V. O. Quine (1908-   ) challenged this theory                  beginning in 1934.  He went to the very foundations of logical                  positivism by rejecting outright any distinction between analytic and           synthetic truths.  He went on to develop an epistemology to replace             Carnap's without retreating to a reliance on intuition, but instead             justified the body of our beliefs as a whole based on the outcome of            suitable processes of revision operating on antecedent totalities of            belief.   This debate between Carnap and Quine is one of the central            episodes in the development of contemporary philosophy of science.              Dr. Creath, under this grant, will examine this debate using a                  massive amount of documentary evidence which has only just recently             become available.  His purpose is to show that the debate is not                merely of parochial semantic interest but concerns fundamental                  strategies in the theory of knowledge of central importance for our             understanding of the nature of science.  The project will contribute            both to our historical understanding of philosophy of science and               advance our systematic treatment of ongoing issues as well.
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{'Code': '1353', 'Text': 'Hist & Philosophy of SET'}
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