Dominant Strategy Theory and (NON-) Homogeneous Economies
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
The contribution of this project comes from developing a new approach           to an issue central to economic theory, i.e., the determinants of               market failure.  Economists have compiled a taxonomy of exceptions to           market efficiency.  For example, optimality theorems for markets do not         hold if the returns to production are increasing or if public goods are         bought or sold.  This project uses developments in mechanism theory and         models of economies with a continuum of agents to develop a more                general and more powerful anatomy of market failure.  This research             builds on past work by the investigators.  They are capable of doing            the work.                                                                                                                                                       The study of mechanisms is an attractive approach because of its                generality.  Markets are one of many different types of mechanisms for          allocating resources, so markets may fail to achieve economic                   efficiency where some other mechanisms might not fail.  The                     investigators have shown in their previous work that the source of              mechanism failure is the presence of monopoly power due to increasing           returns, externalities and public goods.                                                                                                                        In this project they characterize efficient dominant strategy                   mechanisms applicable to transferable or non-transferable utility and           finite agent or nonatomic models.  For the existence, or feasibility,           of such mechanisms, homogenity of the environment is shown to be the            decisive condition without which there is mechanism failure.                    Connections are drawn between mechanism failure and market failure.             Comparisons are made between Bayesian Nash equilibrium and dominant             strategy equilibrium.  A special case, the double-auction model, is             examined for dominant strategy properties and the findings are applied          to the question of attainment of equilibrium in a market with a small           number of agents.  Theoretically, asymptotic properties of                      double-auction markets are investigated.                                                                                                                        The issue of homogeneity versus non-homogeneity in nonatomic models is          addressed with special reference to the existence of Walrasian                  equilibrium, the characterization of Walrasian equilibria that are not          perfectly competitive, and the phenomenon of monopolistic competition.
{'FirstName': 'Joseph', 'LastName': 'Ostroy', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'M', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Joseph M Ostroy', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000223081', 'StartDate': '07/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of California-Los Angeles', 'CityName': 'LOS ANGELES', 'ZipCode': '900244200', 'PhoneNumber': '3107940102', 'StreetAddress': '10889 WILSHIRE BLVD STE 700', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '36', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA36', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'RN64EPNH8JC6', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8711519.xml'}