Theoretical Study of the Economics of Law
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Lisa Martin', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
During the past decade, one of the most significant developments                in the scientific study of law is work at the intersection of law               and economics.  Among those who have contributed to this area,                  Dr. Shavell is among the most respected for his innovative work                 and productivity.  Under this project, Dr. Shavell plans to                     continue and extend his theoretical research on the economic                    analysis of law to a set of problems where economic principles                  can generate new knowledge about the effects of legal rules and                 the nature of law-related relations.                                                                                                                            Three problems will be addressed.  The major topic concerns an                  alternative to property rights regimes (patent, copyright,                      trademark protection) in intellectual works.  The alternative is                for the government to give rewards for creation of intellectual                 works and then have the works enter the public domain.  The main                problem with patents is that they create a monopoly, and hence                  inefficient pricing above marginal cost; on the other side, not                 having patents (or another system of reward) may reduce the                     private returns to innovation.  A theoretical analysis will be                  made of how the registry and reward system compares to a system                 of protection of property rights.  Given that productivity,                     competitiveness, and technological change are important economic                issues, the possibility of assignment of property rights for                    intellectual works can play an important role in improving                      productivity of American industry and increasing U.S. technical                 progress.                                                                                                                                                       The second problem is an extension of the investigator's previous               work on optimal sanctions and enforcement costs.  A distinction                 will be made between two types of enforcement costs--fixed costs                that the government must bear regardless of the number of                       individuals sanctioned and variable or marginal costs which                     increase with the number of individuals sanctioned or engaging in               harmful acts.  The essential idea to be explored is whether the                 offender should also pay for the cost of being caught.  The third               problem, also an extension of the investigator's previous work,                 considers optimal incentive contracts when there are non-monetary               outcomes.  The economic model of the principal and agent                        relationship generally assumes that the risky outcome that                      results from the agent's action is monetary.  This analysis will                pertain to the case in which the outcome affects the principal's                utility in a way other than by affecting his wealth, such as a                  lawyer seeking custody for a client's children or a physician                   seeking to cure a patient.  This study should increase our                      understanding about the qualitative aspects of optimal contracts.
{'FirstName': 'Steven', 'LastName': 'Shavell', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Steven Shavell', 'EmailAddress': 'NBER@HARVARDA', 'NSF_ID': '000232291', 'StartDate': '07/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'National Bureau of Economic Research Inc', 'CityName': 'CAMBRIDGE', 'ZipCode': '021385359', 'PhoneNumber': '6178683900', 'StreetAddress': '1050 MASSACHUSETTS AVE', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Massachusetts', 'StateCode': 'MA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '05', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'MA05', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'GT28BRBA2Q49', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH INC', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}, {'Code': '1372', 'Text': 'LSS-Law And Social Sciences'}]
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8821400.xml'}