The Nature of Truth in the Realism Debate in Philosophy of  Science
{'Code': '08080301', 'Directorate': {'LongName': 'Direct For Biological Sciences'}, 'Division': {'LongName': 'Div Of Biological Infrastructure'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Ronald J. Overmann'}
A debate has been raging especially fiercely in the philosophy of               science over a realist or antirealist interpretation of                         scientific theories.  The heart of the issue consists in                        questions about the autonomy and accessibility of theoretical                   facts.   Professor Horwich's aim in this research is to present a               theory of truth which he will show is independent of these                      matters.  He will then defend this approach against a wide                      variety of objections, and elaborate its implications for some                  long-standing problems in the philosophy of science.  The theory                of truth will be highly deflationary, involving little more than                claims of the form, '"Quarks exist" is true if and only if quarks               exist,' and implying that being true is a descriptive property of               sentences (such as, for example, 'correspondence with reality' or               'verifiability') -- so that the traditional search for its                      underlying nature is a pseudo-problem.  This point of view will                 be defended against criticisms of four types:  (1) that the                     theory cannot be adequately formulated given difficulties raised                by foreign languages, indexical expressions, and the 'liar'                     paradoxes;  (2) that the theory is inconsistent with the uses of                truth in semantics and logic; (3) that the explanatory function                 of truth in cognitive science implies that truth does have an                   underlying nature;  and (4) that the role of the notion of truth                in the philosophy of science cannot be accommodated.  In the                    course of responding to these objections the substantial                        philosophical import of the theory will be displayed.  Professor                Horwich's general strategy is first to argue that many issues                   traditionally thought to revolve around the concept of truth do                 not really do so; and second, to show that the clarity and                      simplification gained by this insight is significant enough to                  enable solutions finally to be found.  The primary application of               this strategy will be to the problem of scientific realism.  In                 particular, he argues that the main sources of difficulty in                    resolving questions over scientific realism have been confusion                 stemming from a distorted picture of the relationships between                  meaning and truth, and between confirmation and truth.  A good                  account of truth will provide the basis for an accurate view of                 these relationships -- which will in turn enable us to achieve a                proper understanding of the autonomy and accessibility of                       theoretical facts, and thereby to resolve the central questions                 in the realism/antirealism debate.
{'FirstName': 'Paul', 'LastName': 'Horwich', 'EmailAddress': None, 'StartDate': '07/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology', 'CityName': 'Cambridge', 'ZipCode': '021394301', 'PhoneNumber': '6172531000', 'StreetAddress': '77 MASSACHUSETTS AVE', 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Massachusetts', 'StateCode': 'MA'}
{'Code': '1353', 'Text': 'Hist & Philosophy of SET'}
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