The Political Economy of International Debt
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{'SignBlockName': 'Lynn A. Pollnow', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
The lack of a supranational legal authority places important                    limitations on the integration of world capital markets.  The ongoing           negotiations over debt rescheduling between major Latin American                debtors and their Western bank creditors illustrate the kind of                 problems which can arise.  Recently, there has been considerable                progress in understanding the economics of debt-restructuring                   negotiations, and the first part of this project builds on that                 research.  The work will involve bargaining-theoretic approaches to             analyzing implicit sovereign debt-contracts. There will also be work            attempting to compare different assessments of the possible costs to a          country of repudiating its debt.                                                                                                                                Another part of the project involves developing a two-country,                  general-equilibrium model of the bargaining over gains from trade in            both goods and financial assets.  The analysis represents an attempt to         provide a fully specified model of country risk.  The last part of this         project  deals with exploring how electoral pressures within debtor             countries can cause a cyclical, over valuation of the real exchange             rate, and over accumulation of foreign debt.  The starting point will           be a recently developed framework for analyzing political budget                cycles.  This research is important because it will provide a better            understanding of the economic relations between debtor and creditor             trading partners.
{'FirstName': 'Kenneth', 'LastName': 'Rogoff', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Kenneth Rogoff', 'EmailAddress': 'krogoff@harvard.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000184638', 'StartDate': '06/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
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