Tax Compliance: The Role of Opportunity, Sanctions and Tax  Practitioners
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{'SignBlockName': 'Lisa Martin', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Why taxpayers do or do not comply with tax laws is emerging as a focal          point of scholarly research.  The patterns of noncompliance are                 influenced by incentives and opportunities.  To a considerable extent           the anatomy of noncompliance can be uncovered by empirical inquiry into         line-by-line statements on tax returns which are influenced by                  enforcement efforts and the quality of opportunities to conceal income          or exaggerate deductions.  Paid third parties prepare nearly half of            all tax returns and these returns account for about 75 percent of the           tax deficiencies identified in all returns submitted to the Internal            Revenue Service.  Concentrating on the factors that affect compliance           behavior for those individuals who voluntarily file a tax return and            who also account for the large majority of estimated noncompliance and          utilizing information from a variety of sources importantly including           Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program audit data; Drs. Nagin and              Klepper develop, formalize, and test the limits of the perspective that         incentives and opportunity play an important role in compliance                 behavior, and they examine the role of tax practitioners as an                  information conduit by which threats of audit and fine are channeled            into changes in reported income and deductions.  Since, for the sake of         simplicity, modelling in the area of tax compliance has generally been          based on an idealized tax code, an important scientific contribution            that the research of Drs. Nagin and Klepper makes is in linking the             wide variation in opportunities available for noncompliance to the              detailed structure of the actual tax code.
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