Dynamic Games, Reputation, and the Theory of the Firm
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This is pathbreaking research that has already reshaped and advanced            the economics of information, finance, decision theory, game theory             and industrial organization theory.  For example, under the previous            grant the investigator developed a conceptual framework for                     sequential equilibria which everyone now uses; launched a major new             branch of signalling theory; defined a new way of representing                  bargaining among a large number of opponents; and obtained many                 subtle but important insights into the way reputation affects                   business behavior.                                                                                                                                              Renewed support permits the investigator to pursue an ambitious                 research agenda in these areas.  Specifically, the agenda includes              (1) the study of models of reputation where the party holding the               reputation is not subject to perfect monitoring; (2) investigation of           whether in such models, it is possible that unverifiable but useful             information will go entirely unused; (3) further study of                       organizations as reputation bearers, focusing on models where a                 number of parties share and affect a reputation contemporaneously;              and (4) the development of models of dynamic choice with unforeseen             contingencies, the use of these models to study dynamic bilateral               relationships, and a comparison of those models with neoclassical               models of dynamic choice.
{'FirstName': 'David', 'LastName': 'Kreps', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'M', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'David M Kreps', 'EmailAddress': 'kreps@stanford.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000195415', 'StartDate': '07/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Stanford University', 'CityName': 'STANFORD', 'ZipCode': '943052004', 'PhoneNumber': '6507232300', 'StreetAddress': '450 JANE STANFORD WAY', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '16', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA16', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'HJD6G4D6TJY5', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
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