"Narrow Content" in the Foundations of Psychology
{'Code': '08080301', 'Directorate': {'LongName': 'Direct For Biological Sciences'}, 'Division': {'LongName': 'Div Of Biological Infrastructure'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Ronald J. Overmann'}
Professor Block is exploring the case for and against an internal               aspect of intentional content -- what has come to be called                     "narrow content."  Intentionality is usually characterized in                   terms of the "aboutness" of beliefs, desires, etc.;  Professor                  Block's concern is whether there is a purely internal aspect of                 this aboutness that is itself a kind of content.  If two people                 are thinking about different kinds of things, but are unaware of                any of the differences between the two things, so that they are                 thinking of them in exactly the same way -- their "point of view"               on the two things is the same -- is there a kind of content that                they therefore share?                                                                                                                                           The field of study for this project is the foundations of                       psychology.  The overall objective is to determine whether                      intentionality has a role to play in the science of mind, and, if               it does, whether the appropriate scientific concept of                          intentionality is narrow intentionality.  More specifically, the                questions are:  Is psychological practice committed to                          intentional content?  Should it be?  Assuming psychology should                 be concerned with content, why narrow content?  Is narrow content               holistic?  Must any scientific psychology that relies on narrow                 content be radically different from common sense psychology?                    Professor Block will address these questions by first giving some               prima facie motivation for postulating narrow content, and then                 moving to objections to it.  He will try to produce a substantial               rationale for narrow content and a theory of what it is.
{'FirstName': 'Ned', 'LastName': 'Block', 'EmailAddress': None, 'StartDate': '07/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Massachusetts Institute of Technology', 'CityName': 'Cambridge', 'ZipCode': '021394301', 'PhoneNumber': '6172531000', 'StreetAddress': '77 MASSACHUSETTS AVE', 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Massachusetts', 'StateCode': 'MA'}
{'Code': '1353', 'Text': 'Hist & Philosophy of SET'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8812559.xml'}