Collaborative Research--Corporate Governance and Takeovers
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Recently the effect of corporate governance rules and the                       takeover process on the welfare of investors in the companies                   involved, as well as on that of society in general, has figured                 prominently in both academic and public debate.  Corporate                      governance rules affect the ease with which takeovers occur both                directly and indirectly through the availability and                            effectiveness of various antitakeover devices.  This project                    develops a powerful general theory of corporate governance and                  corporate finance.  The theory is used to derive new insights                   into a number of important issues about corporate control and                   takeovers that have been neglected by economists.                                                                                                               The following specific questions are addressed: Why do most                     corporate charters provide that control contests are decided by a               simple (50%) majority vote?  Why are voting rights never attached               to bonds even though it has never been illegal to do so?  Why are               voting rights generally not assigned to preferred stock?  Why is                the most prevalent assignment of voting rights to common stock                  that of assigning votes proportional to the cash flow claims?  In               particular, what are the welfare consequences of having classes                 of common stock with disparate voting rights?  How can one                      explain simultaneously the design of the cash flow                              characteristics of a security and its voting rights assignment?                 That is, can the commonly observed securities, common stock with                proportional votes and nonvoting bonds, be derived endogenously?                What are the implications for capital structure of investigating                the above issues?  In particular, can an explanation of the                     design of securities and their voting rights also explain                       observed capital structure regularities?  Is mandatory disclosure               of intent to take over a firm optimal and, if so, at what point                 in the takeover process?  In particular, should the rule                        requiring disclosure after accumulating a 5% equity stake be                    modified?  Should incumbent management be allowed, either by the                corporate charter or by regulations, to hold voting rights?                     Should corporations or regulatory agencies prohibit or encourage                the use of such antitakeover devices as targeted share repurchase               (greenmail), exclusionary tender offers, standstill agreements,                 poison pills, and golden parachutes?
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{'Name': 'Northwestern University', 'CityName': 'EVANSTON', 'ZipCode': '602080001', 'PhoneNumber': '3125037955', 'StreetAddress': '633 CLARK ST', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Illinois', 'StateCode': 'IL', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '09', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IL09', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'EXZVPWZBLUE8', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8721128.xml'}