Economic Consequences of Nonexpected Utility Theory: A Game Theoretic Analysis
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in models of decision            making under uncertainty that do not assume the independence axiom of           the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory.  The interest in these              theories is motivated by the large body of experimental evidence                suggesting that decision makers systematically violate the independence         axiom.  Nonexpected utility theories have been shown to be capable of           explicating this experimental evidence, and, at the same time, under            appropriate assumptions, of preserving many of the useful economic              implications of expected utility theory.  The contribution of this              project comes in identifying the economic implications of this theory           that are different from expected utility theory.                                                                                                                The project explores two main areas using the new theories of                   individual decision making under uncertainty: auction theory and                bargaining theory.  In both cases the project defines the equilibrium           of the relevant game and establishes the conditions for its existence.          The differences in the formulation and in the outcome of the games              resulting from the nonlinearity of the preferences over the space of            probability distributions is examined.  A by product of this effort is          the reexamination of the formulation of extensive form games made               necessary by the introduction of preferences that are not representable         by expected utility functionals.  This is done in the context of                specific games, but the results should be relevant to extensive                 form games in general.
{'FirstName': 'Edi', 'LastName': 'Karni', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Edi Karni', 'EmailAddress': 'karni@jhu.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000316671', 'StartDate': '08/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Johns Hopkins University', 'CityName': 'BALTIMORE', 'ZipCode': '212182608', 'PhoneNumber': '4439971898', 'StreetAddress': '3400 N CHARLES ST', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Maryland', 'StateCode': 'MD', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '07', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'MD07', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'FTMTDMBR29C7', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8708360.xml'}