Economic Analysis and Information in a Dynamic Setting
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
It is now widely recognized that the acquisition of information plays a         key role in real world economies as well as in theoretical economic             analyses.  This project studies experimentation by consumers and firms          with different decisions to acquire better information for future               decisions.  For example, firms will choose output levels above or below         what they think is profit maximizing in order to test and improve their         information about the market.  This type of experimentation is widely           observed but is not adequately explained by existing economic theory.           This project will help improve our understanding of experimentation by          consumers and by producers by formulating general models of information         acquisition through experimentation and analyzing the comparative               statics and the existence of solutions to these models.                                                                                                         Specifically, the project studies a maximizing consumer who chooses             output to get both present utility and better information for making            future decisions.  Preliminary results show that consumption with               experimentation will be greater than myopically optimal levels of               consumption.  But these results depend on very restrictive assumptions          about consumer uncertainty.  This project relaxes these assumptions in          order to find more general and realistic results and to examine                 interesting special cases.                                                                                                                                      The project deals with models of entry in which the incumbent firm has          more information than potential entrants.  Preliminary work by the              investigator demonstrates that the incumbent firm can discourage new            entrants by producing more than the output that maximizes current               profits.  This result holds even when the potential entrants know that          the incumbent firm is trying to persuade them through its pricing and           output policies that the industry is less profitable than it actually           is.  These entry models assume that potential entrants choose either to         enter or not.  This project analyzes the much more complicated but also         more realistic situation in which potential entrants can test the               market by output decisions.
{'FirstName': 'Leonard', 'LastName': 'Mirman', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'J', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Leonard J Mirman', 'EmailAddress': 'mirman@virginia.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000149586', 'StartDate': '12/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of Virginia Main Campus', 'CityName': 'CHARLOTTESVILLE', 'ZipCode': '229034833', 'PhoneNumber': '4349244270', 'StreetAddress': '1001 EMMET ST N', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Virginia', 'StateCode': 'VA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '05', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'VA05', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'JJG6HU8PA4S5', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'RECTOR & VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8711265.xml'}