Theories of International Financial Institutions
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{'SignBlockName': 'Lynn A. Pollnow', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This is an exciting and timely project on international financial               institutions.  The project continues to develop a general theory                of international financial institutions as a response to the imperfect          ability of contracting agents to enforce international agreements.              This theory provides new insights into such important issues as the             international debt crisis.  The investigator's past work in this and            related areas is responsible for a number of valuable insights into             international finance.  He is capable of continuing this research.                                                                                              The limited incentive to enforce agreements with foreign agents                 constitutes a significant imperfection in world capital markets.                Various institutions that are engaged in the international transfer of          resources have emerged as a partial response to this imperfection.              Banks, multinational corporations, and reserve and vehicle currencies           are three examples.  The contribution of this project comes in                  developing a general theory for these institutions.  In particular, the         reputations of these institutions may allow their equity owners (or             central banks, in the case of reserve currencies) to enter into                 contracts that are self-enforcing.  The reputation of a private bank,           may allow it to make credible commitments to repay deposits and to              penalize borrowers in default.  A multinational corporation may be able         to enter into long-term relationships with creditors and employees, and         to provide a more efficient level of product quality than would be              possible for an anonymous individual agent.  Finally, some governments          may more credibly promise to desist from imposing the inflation tax             than others.  The ability of particular national economies to support           institutions capable of undertaking these tasks can be related to               fundamental aspects of their dynamic behavior derived from                      intertemporal preferences and technologies.
{'FirstName': 'Jonathan', 'LastName': 'Eaton', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'W', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Jonathan W Eaton', 'EmailAddress': 'jxe22@psu.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000663516', 'StartDate': '07/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
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