A Neoinstitutional Theory of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Justices
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Lisa Martin', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Despite the importance of the Senate role in the confirmation of                Supreme Court justices, knowledge of the factors affecting the votes of         senators is sparse.  This project attends to this deficiency by                 developing a theory of roll call voting that portrays senators as               operating primarily in the interests of their consitutents.  Senators,          however, have their own personal preferences about the composition of           the Supreme Court.  In addition, presidents can bring rewards and               punishments to bear on senators in attempting to influence their vote.          Accordingly, senators must weigh the costs and benefits of 1)                   supporting the opposing constituent desires, 2) pursuing their own              policy goals, and 3) supporting or opposing the president's nominee.                                                                                            To assess the weight senators put on the various actors seeking to              influence their vote on confirmation, this project develops a testable          model of how public opinion, the perceived ideology of the nominee, and         the political circumstances surrounding the nomination came together to         influence a senator's vote.  Components of the model include the                popularity and power of the president, the ideological preferences of           both senators and their constituents, the ideology and qualifications           of the nominee, and the importance of the open seat on the Court.                                                                                               The theory is tested on the 2,214 individual confirmation votes from            Tom Clark (1949) through Anthony Kennedy (1988).  The chief technique           used to test the theory is probit analysis, an approach that permits            the estimation of how important various factors are in determining              whether or not a senator votes to confirm a nominee's appointment to            the Court.                                                                                                                                                      The research improves on earlier investigations in several respects.            It focuses on a significant period of change for the Court, not just on         the events surrounding a particular nomination.  It attempts to explain         the votes of individual senators, not just the Senate as a whole.  It           casts its net widely to include not only controversial nominations but          noncontroversial ones as well.  It takes seriously the notion that a            nominee's ideology and qualifications for the Court may prove to be             major influences on a senator's confirmation vote.  In exploring the            role that these factors play as vote determinants, the research                 develops measures for perceived ideology and qualifications.  The               project assesses these factors through a systematic content analysis of         major newspaper editorials on each nominee.                                                                                                                     The theory underlying the model tested in the project - - "principal-           agency theory" - - has proved to be useful in numerous other contexts.          The theory has not previously been developed, however, to explore how           institutional and political circumstances actually work to affect a             legislator's voting decision.  Thus, the theory itself should be                enriched by this novel extension and application.  The research,                therefore, has broad theoretical payoffs as well as helping us                  understand better the dynamics of a major part of the confirmation              process.
[{'FirstName': 'Albert', 'LastName': 'Cover', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'D', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Albert D Cover', 'EmailAddress': 'Al@DataLab 2.SBS.sunysb.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000349624', 'StartDate': '08/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'Jeffrey', 'LastName': 'Segal', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'A', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Jeffrey A Segal', 'EmailAddress': 'jeffrey.segal@stonybrook.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000166852', 'StartDate': '08/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'SUNY at Stony Brook', 'CityName': 'STONY BROOK', 'ZipCode': '117940001', 'PhoneNumber': '6316329949', 'StreetAddress': 'W5510 FRANKS MELVILLE MEMORIAL L', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'New York', 'StateCode': 'NY', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '01', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'NY01', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'M746VC6XMNH9', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'THE RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
[{'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}, {'Code': '1372', 'Text': 'LSS-Law And Social Sciences'}, {'Code': '9120', 'Text': 'CROSS-DIRECTORATE PROGRAMS'}]
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8812935.xml'}