Multiagent Incentives, the Limits of Coordination, and      Efficiency
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
It is now well understood that in economies with asymmetric                     information, a contract between a principal and an agent                        typically generates informational externalities.  The goal of                   this research is to understand the interaction between two                      important restrictions on economic agents' abilities to reach                   efficient outcomes:  incentive problems resulting from imperfect                information and the difficulties of coordinating the actions of                 groups of individuals.  An example of such an environment is one                in which agents are subject to moral hazard and trades cannot be                publically monitored.  Criteria will be developed for describing                constrained efficiency in such environments and for use in                      analyzing models of market games played by agents subject to this               combination of restrictions.  Cooperative and non-cooperative                   solution concepts will be developed to investigate the sense in                 which the outcomes of such games are or are not constrained                     efficient.  The extent to which the outcomes in such economies                  can be characterized in terms of competitive equilibria or                      Lindahl equilibria of Arrow-Debreu economies for a suitably                     augmented commodity space also will be studied. The results will                be used to reinterpret the role played by government in improving               the allocations in economies subject to these restrictions and                  how the government's role varies,  depending upon its monitoring                powers.                                                                                                                                                         The issues of asymmetric information addressed in this research                 are fundamental but potentially also they have great practical                  importance.  The proposed modelling of the advantages the                       government has in monitoring vis-a-vis private agents can reshape               the advice given to policy makers concerning appropriate                        government intervention in the presence of informational                        asymmetries.
[{'FirstName': 'Charles', 'LastName': 'Kahn', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'M', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Charles M Kahn', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000347945', 'StartDate': '06/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'Dilip', 'LastName': 'Mookherjee', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Dilip Mookherjee', 'EmailAddress': 'dilipm@bu.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000452577', 'StartDate': '06/01/1989', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'National Opinion Research Center', 'CityName': 'CHICAGO', 'ZipCode': '606035713', 'PhoneNumber': '7732566000', 'StreetAddress': '55 E MONROE ST', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Illinois', 'StateCode': 'IL', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '07', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IL07', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'MPYFY5UMSDP4', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': 'MPYFY5UMSDP4'}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8821723.xml'}