Asymmetric Information Models of Law Enforcement and        Regulatory Compliance
{'Code': '04050200', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Lisa Martin', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Economic considerations have an important influence on the outcomes of          two-party bargaining situations which are subject to enforcement by             law.  Drs. Reiganum and Wilde seek to extend their earlier work under           NSF support, which focused on the conditions that engender income tax           compliance, to a variety of problems involving bargaining situations in         the areas of tax compliance, plea bargaining, and regulatory                    compliance.  They make a series of different assumptions concerning             human behavior and then examine and compare the outcomes of the                 situations which follow from these different assumptions as well as the         degree to which these outcomes can be predicted.  The models they               formulate to study these problems use analytic techniques from economic         theory and the theory of incomplete information.                                                                                                                The research of Drs. Reiganum and Wilde addresses several fundamental           questions regarding compliance in the face of asymmetric information:           To what extent does prosecutorial discretion affect bargaining between          prosecutors (as agents of society) and defendants over reduced                  sentences in exchange for guilty pleas?  How does uncertainty                   on the part of taxpayers affect their compliance behavior, and how does         the incorporation of third-party "expert advisors" affect compliance            and Internal Revenue Service auditing?  How does a firm undertaking             toxicity testing decide whether or not to apply to the Environmental            Protection Agency (EPA) for permission to manufacture the new chemical          and how, in turn, does the EPA choose to accept the firm's application          or, alternatively, to conduct a costly audit of the firm's test                 results?   The rigorous theoretical analysis of Drs. Reiganum and Wilde         promises to further illuminate the causes and underlying dynamics of            compliance and thus is of substantial scientific significance.
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{'Name': 'California Institute of Technology', 'CityName': 'PASADENA', 'ZipCode': '911250001', 'PhoneNumber': '6263956219', 'StreetAddress': '1200 E CALIFORNIA BLVD', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '28', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA28', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'U2JMKHNS5TG4', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}, {'Code': '1372', 'Text': 'LSS-Law And Social Sciences'}]
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