Imperfect Competition and Price Stability in General        Equilibrium
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project addresses two major gaps in general equilibrium theory: a          full treatment of monopolistic competition and an explanation of the            convergence of prices towards their equilibrium values.  These are              fundamental and as yet unresolved problems in economic theory.  The             insights from this project should improve the basic paradigm used by            economic theorists to study market performance.                                                                                                                 Imperfect competition is modelled by taking firms to be "moderately             small," although not so small the situation is essentially perfectly            competitive.  "Smallness" should be defined endogenously, by free entry         in large markets, not by assuming that firms having rising average cost         curves after a point.  Prices are chosen by firms, but production               requires time so that the competition is effectively Cournot-like.                                                                                              Stability theory has to be reconsidered as a learning process.                  Prices should be formed by firms making rational decisions.  This is            made possible by recognizing that out of equilibrium either sellers or          buyers have market power.  There is incomplete information.  Each round         yields a set of signals in the form of excess supplies or demands for           individual firms.  From this they can update their priors on the                unknown parameters of the economy.  In the next round, they choose              production before the market opens and also choose new prices.  Since           the process is one of cumulative information (past signals still enter          into present decisions), the failure of standard stability theory may           not prevent better results in convergence.
{'FirstName': 'Kenneth', 'LastName': 'Arrow', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'J', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Kenneth J Arrow', 'EmailAddress': 'arrow@leland.stanford.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000120906', 'StartDate': '08/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Stanford University', 'CityName': 'STANFORD', 'ZipCode': '943052004', 'PhoneNumber': '6507232300', 'StreetAddress': '450 JANE STANFORD WAY', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '16', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA16', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'HJD6G4D6TJY5', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8713818.xml'}