Strategic Behavior in Industrial Organization
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Traditional analyses of industrial behavior typically link the                  exercise of market power in an industry to the internal features of             that industry such as demand conditions, concentration ratios,                  barriers-to-entry, and specifc anticompetitive practices.  Some                 economists have argued that the sheer size of a firm, even when size            is measured in absolute terms rather than relative to any particular            market, is an important determinant of potential collusion.  One                aspect of this concern relates to the way multimarket contact among             large, diversified firms may blunt competition.  Despite the                    prevalence of multimarket contact among firms, relatively little                research has focused on the potential link between multimarket contact          and economic performance.  The contribution of this project comes               from extending preliminary work by the investigator that finds that             multimarket contact does support collusion under certain natural                conditions.  The results of this project could show that antitrust              policy should consider both the relative and absolute size of firms.                                                                                            The project considers other significant and unresolved issues in                industrial organization such as the process of exit in declining                industries for multiplant firms.  The project examines the phenomena            of learning-by-doing if consumers rationally forecast future price              declines that result from learning and delay their purchases to take            advantage of these declines.  It considers the effects on the nature            of collusive equilibria in repeated price-setting games of allowing             firms to voluntarily limit their sales.                                                                                                                         Although the investigator is just starting his career, he has already           published important papers on related topics.  He can do the research.
{'FirstName': 'Michael', 'LastName': 'Whinston', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'D', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Michael D Whinston', 'EmailAddress': 'mwhinston@northwestern.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000155621', 'StartDate': '06/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'National Bureau of Economic Research Inc', 'CityName': 'CAMBRIDGE', 'ZipCode': '021385359', 'PhoneNumber': '6178683900', 'StreetAddress': '1050 MASSACHUSETTS AVE', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Massachusetts', 'StateCode': 'MA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '05', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'MA05', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'GT28BRBA2Q49', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH INC', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1986&All=true', 'xml': '8618775.xml'}