Sellers and Heterogeneous Bidders at Auctions: Non          Cooperative and Collusive Strategic Behavior
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Lynn A. Pollnow', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Most of the existing research on auctions has been conducted within a           non-cooperative framework with homogeneous risk neutral bidders where           the risk neutral auctioneer can announce a reserve price.  The                  contribution of this project comes from working in the relatively               unexplored areas of heterogeneous bidders and bidder collusion.  This           research is motivated by observed behavior at auctions such as nested           buyer ring formation, non-inclusive rings and lift-lining (phantom              bidding) by auctioneers.  The previous work explained the generation            of phantom bids by practicing English auctions and the durability of            bidder collusion.  Further research is needed to generalize these               results to more complex and realistic environments and to study other           aspects of auctions.  The high quality of the investigators' past               research shows that they have the ability to do the work.                                                                                                       The project investigates the behavior of heterogeneous bidders and              the auctioneer at first price, Dutch, and second price auctions.                Distributional information regarding bidders is usually unknown by              the seller, so the processing of bid data by a Bayesian auctioneer              and consequent strategic behavior are explored.  The project explains           why only all inclusive bidder coalitions are viable at first price              and Dutch auctions and why coalitions of all sizes are observed at              English auctions.  The project investigates if certain bidder types             are either undesirable to, or, unwilling to join a coalition in an              English auction.  Finally, the project explains how bidder coalitions           try to avoid the incentive problems created by sharing the gains of             coalition formation.  Both simultaneous and sequential game models              are used to study nesting of bidder coalitions and other ways of                efficiently sharing the gains.
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[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}, {'Code': '9120', 'Text': 'CROSS-DIRECTORATE PROGRAMS'}]
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