Political Design of Trade Policy with Incomplete Information
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project studies the design of international and domestic                   policies when a government has incomplete information about its                 own citizens or firms, or about its trading partners.  Examples                 of incomplete information include the moving costs of trade-                    displaced workers, production costs of domestic or foreign firms,               or political pressure faced abroad.                                                                                                                             The project applies for the first time the theory of the design                 of incentive compatible mechanisms to problems in international                 trade policy.  In this theory, a government or international                    organization maximizes some social choice function, recognizing                 that the various agents may optimally misrepresent the private                  information they have.  According to the revelation principle it                is possible for the government to achieve its objectives by using               truth-revealing or "incentive compatible" policies, i.e.,                       policies which are designed so that the agents choose to tell the               truth.  In the examples given above, incentive compatible                       policies would lead workers to reveal their disutility of moving                or foreign firms to reveal their production costs.  Another                     feature of this research is that governments maximize an                        objective function based on political interests (such as votes or               lobbying).                                                                                                                                                      Specific policy problems considered include: the ranking of trade               and domestic instruments; international regulation of domestic                  policies; design of "status quo" trade, to be used when countries               cannot agree on a policy; and design of incentive compatible                    mechanisms when countries cannot commit to a trade policy over                  time.
[{'FirstName': 'Robert', 'LastName': 'Feenstra', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'C', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Robert C Feenstra', 'EmailAddress': 'rcfeenstra@ucdavis.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000098394', 'StartDate': '04/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}, {'FirstName': 'Tracy', 'LastName': 'Lewis', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'R', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Tracy R Lewis', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000462404', 'StartDate': '04/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Co-Principal Investigator'}]
{'Name': 'University of California-Davis', 'CityName': 'DAVIS', 'ZipCode': '956186153', 'PhoneNumber': '5307547700', 'StreetAddress': '1850 RESEARCH PARK DR STE 300', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '04', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA04', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'TX2DAGQPENZ5', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': 'NUDGYLBB4S99'}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8720898.xml'}