Theories of the Firm
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
The project advances the frontiers of the economic theory of                    the firm.  The project can be divided into the following five                   sub-parts.  First, the project continues to determine just when                 long-term incentive contracts can be replaced by a series of                    simpler short-term contracts.  This is important because modern                 economic organization theory rests on the hypothesis that                       organizations emerge on account of the incompleteness of market                 contracts.  Second, in modern economies, much of the coordination               between successive stages of production are managed, rather than                arranged more loosely through the price system.  The project                    analyzes the role played by non-price communications within a                   firm and between a firm and its suppliers.  Third, the project                  develops a theory of long-term contracting as a way of avoiding                 the transaction costs associated with negotiating efficiently                   short-term contracts period after period.                                                                                                                       Fourth, the project expands the investigation of rent seeking to                encompass both public and private sector organizations.  Property               rights are emphasized.  A person's property rights to a desirable               job, a house, or a favorable office location, serve (among other                functions) to limit the authority of others over that property.                 Such rights will discourage person B from attempting to grab                    person A's property and reduce A's need to protect the property,                leaving more time available for productive activities for both                  parties.  This framework is used to explore the failure of "zero                base budgeting" systems, in which departments have no property                  rights to their budgets but must justify every penny each year.                                                                                                 Fifth, the last topic is monitoring in infinitely repeated games                ("supergames") with incomplete information.  Supergames are used                to analyze the different kinds of small scale interactions that                 arise on a frequent basis in firms and markets, i.e., keeping                   promises and being helpful if one's partner does the same.
{'FirstName': 'Paul', 'LastName': 'Milgrom', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'R', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Paul R Milgrom', 'EmailAddress': 'milgrom@stanford.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000323580', 'StartDate': '07/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Stanford University', 'CityName': 'STANFORD', 'ZipCode': '943052004', 'PhoneNumber': '6507232300', 'StreetAddress': '450 JANE STANFORD WAY', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '16', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA16', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'HJD6G4D6TJY5', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '132000', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8720782.xml'}