Regulation, Procurement, and Political Economy
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project renews support for research on regulation,                         procurement contracting, and political economy.  The common theme               among these three subjects is the interactions between public                   agencies and institutions and private sector organizations.  The                normative objective of the proposed research is to characterize                 the efficiency of regulatory and public policies in settings                    characterized by incomplete information, limited observability,                 and imperfect verifiability.  The positive objective is to                      explain the choice of regulatory policies, government procurement               programs, public expenditure programs, and other public policies.               A satisfactory explanation must bring together political                        preferences, features of the public institutions that govern the                choice and design of policies and programs, and the interests of                the private parties affected by such policies.                                                                                                                  The specific substantive issues addressed are: 1) the economics                 of regulation with an emphasis on multiparty models and on                      multiperiod regulatory policies that are subject to evasion by                  political institutions, 2) government procurement programs that                 are subject to year-by-year appropriations and annual policy                    review, and 3) the political economy of government regulatory and               expenditure programs.  The approach to be taken in this study is                based on game theory, microeconomics, and positive political                    science.                                                                                                                                                        Although most economic behavior is shaped by public policies and                institutions, these policies and institutions are typically                     modeled as exogenous, resulting in predictions that are either                  incomplete or are inconsistent with the subsequent policies                     adopted by public institutions.  A major contribution of this                   project is to incorporate political behavior into economic                      analysis by treating both as endogenous.
{'FirstName': 'David', 'LastName': 'Baron', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'P', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'David P Baron', 'EmailAddress': 'baron_david@gsb.stanford.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000301329', 'StartDate': '07/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Stanford University', 'CityName': 'STANFORD', 'ZipCode': '943052004', 'PhoneNumber': '6507232300', 'StreetAddress': '450 JANE STANFORD WAY', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '16', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA16', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'HJD6G4D6TJY5', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
[{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}, {'Code': '1371', 'Text': 'Political Science'}]
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8808211.xml'}