Nuclear Deterrence Theory and the Strategy of Limited       Retaliation as a Game of Sequential Bargaining with         Incomplete Information
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Lynn A. Pollnow', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
The purpose of this project is to analyze the strategic aspects                 of nuclear deterrence and limited retaliation within a game-theoretic           framework.  Special emphasis will be given to examining the effects of          incomplete information.  Most existing formal work on deterrence theory         focuses on some form of nuclear brinkmanship.  In a nuclear                     brinkmanship crisis, a state attempts to protect its interests by               manipulating the risk that the crisis will end in an unlimited,                 all-out, nuclear exchange.  The crisis is a competition in taking risks         in which each state tries to convince its adversary that the risk is            too high and that it should back down.  There is, however, another              approach to deterrence that is not based on brinkmanship and                    manipulating the risk of an unlimited nuclear attack.  In this                  approach, a state attempts to protect its interests by inflicting a             limited amount of punishment in order to make the threat to inflict             more damage in the future credible.  During a crisis, then, a state             tries to make the threat of future punishment sufficiently credible             that its adversary backs down.  This second approach, based on limited          retaliation, has received little attention in the formal literature.            The primary goal of this project is to extend the formal analysis of            deterrence theory to the study of the strategy of limited retaliation.                                                                                          This research is important because it will shed some light on the issue         of the relation between limited nuclear options and the likelihood that         a crisis will escalate into a war.  Does increasing the number of               limited options make a nuclear war more "thinkable" and, thus, reduce           crisis stability by making war more likely?  Or, does increasing the            number of options enhance the credibility of a state's retaliatory              threats, strengthen deterrence and, therefore, increase crisis                  stability?
{'FirstName': 'Robert', 'LastName': 'Powell', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Robert Powell', 'EmailAddress': 'RPowell@Berkeley.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000464161', 'StartDate': '07/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Harvard University', 'CityName': 'CAMBRIDGE', 'ZipCode': '021385366', 'PhoneNumber': '6174955501', 'StreetAddress': '1033 MASSACHUSETTS AVE STE 3', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Massachusetts', 'StateCode': 'MA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '05', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'MA05', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'LN53LCFJFL45', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8810611.xml'}