Firms' Choice of Method of Determining Pay:  Evidence from  the Industry Wage Surveys
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{'SignBlockName': 'Lynn A. Pollnow', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Monitoring the performance of workers is a costly and difficult                 procedure for many firms and, thus, the information about worker                productivity is often very imperfect.  While this fact is fairly                obvious, the implications of this for the way in which workers are              compensated is not.  Because compensation schemes can have an enormous          impact on worker productivity, the implications of worker compensation          arrangements have been an important theme in labor economics and                economic theory generally.                                                                                                                                      The extent to which employers monitor workers and use what they                 learn from monitoring in setting wages is a topic which has been                tackled from a number of theoretical perspectives.  Of these, the               literature on piece rates vs. salaries is closest to the framework              developed in this study.  In order to better reflect choices actually           faced by firms, this project will extend this two-way choice situation          to a three-way choice situation of piece rates, merit pay (which links          wages to supervisory ratings) and standard rates (in which there is             only a weak link between pay and performance).  Within this framework,          some of the key insights of the related principal-agent and                     efficiency-wage literature will be incorporated.  This framework will           be developed using data from the Industrial Wage Survey, the Census             of Manufacturing and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.
{'FirstName': 'Charles', 'LastName': 'Brown', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Charles Brown', 'EmailAddress': 'charlieb@umich.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000271819', 'StartDate': '10/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
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