Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'jerry blackmon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project is important because of its methodological contribution to         game theory and its substantive contributions to our understanding of           industrial organization, wage negotiations and bargaining with imperfect        information.  Although he is just beginning his career, the investigator        has already made significant contributions to economic applications of          game theory.                                                                                                                                                    The methodological contribution comes from extending the concept of             strategic stability beyond the current range of economic                        applications.  This is important because there are multiple outcomes            intrinsic in the strategic behavior of economic agents and the                  concept of strategic stability permits researchers to rigorously                identify specific sensible outcomes and in this way make testable               predictions. The project develops computationally tractable                     algorithms for determining strategic stability.                                                                                                                 Substantively, the project examines entry deterrence, i. e., firms              within an industry deter potential competitors by signalling tough              competition against any future entrants.  Preliminary results                   obtained by the investigator suggest the solutions of current models            of entry deterrence depend crucially on a minor assumption and,                 therefore, are not strategically stable.  The investigator also                 proved that a unique stable solution exists for entry deterrence.               The contribution of this project comes from generalizing these                  results and determining the specific characteristics of the stable              solution.                                                                                                                                                       The project also studies the use of strikes in wage negotiations.               Recent work demonstrated that wage negotiations between two rational            players, management and union, may involve strikes, even though a               strike is costly for both parties.  The contribution of this project            comes from explaining why wage negotiations often involve a                     take-it-or-leave-it offer by the management, which frequently leads             to a costly shutdown of the firm.
{'FirstName': 'In-Koo', 'LastName': 'Cho', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'In-Koo Cho', 'EmailAddress': 'in-koo.cho@emory.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000198663', 'StartDate': '06/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of Chicago', 'CityName': 'CHICAGO', 'ZipCode': '606375418', 'PhoneNumber': '7737028669', 'StreetAddress': '5801 S ELLIS AVE', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Illinois', 'StateCode': 'IL', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '01', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IL01', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'ZUE9HKT2CLC9', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': 'ZUE9HKT2CLC9'}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
[{'Code': '126600', 'Text': 'APPLIED MATHEMATICS'}, {'Code': '132000', 'Text': 'Economics'}]
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1986&All=true', 'xml': '8618596.xml'}