Topics in Game Theory
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{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This is an important project because its results have a wide range of           applications in economics.  The project consists of work on the                 properties that imply stability in non-cooperative games, repeated              games with bounded complexity and stable equilibria of repeated games.                                                                                          The research on stability addresses a major difficulty associated               with the application of game theory to economics, i.e., multiple                solutions for non-cooperative games.  Game theory does not provide              sharp conclusions or testable predictions because there are many                possible outcomes intrinsic in a game.  Past work by the                        investigators has dramatically changed this area of research by                 demonstrating that the concept of stability can be used to                      distinguish specific sensible outcomes to economic games with an                infinite number of possibilities.  But multiple solutions reappear if           investigators can use different definitions of stability based only             on their judgement about what is or is not intuitively plausible.               The contribution of this project results from establishing the first            convincing axiomatic foundation for stability.  Stability will not be           defined but derived from a minimal list of properties in this way               limiting the number of acceptable definitions of stability.  Stable             equilibria are calculated for some of the more important economic               problems such as the chainstore paradox and the prisoners' dilemma.                                                                                             The classical theory of repeated games assumes full rationality and             does not put any bounds on the complexity that a strategy can have.             But there are strategies in the repeated games that could not be                calculated using the most advanced computers available.  This project           develops a more reasonable theory of repeated games in which there is           some upper bound on the complexity of strategies.  This one                     modification of repeated games theory is shown to explain apparent              anomalies in observed repeated games.                                                                                                                           Finally, these two lines of research are joined in an effort to prove           that long-term interaction described by stable repeated games must              inevitably lead to efficient cooperative outcomes.  The investigators           have made numerous fundamental contributions to our understanding of            game theory.  They are capable of successfully pursuing this                    exciting and very ambitious research agenda.
{'FirstName': 'Abraham', 'LastName': 'Neyman', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Abraham Neyman', 'EmailAddress': 'cwallahora@datalab2.sbs.sunysb.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000455778', 'StartDate': '07/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
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