Information and Timing in the Theory of Repeated Moral      Hazard
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
In many economic settings the efficiency of explicit and implicit               contractual arrangements is limited by the presence of imperfect                monitoring: some agents cannot observe perfectly the actions of                 others.  Often the economic problem of interest involves the indefinite         repetition of some strategic situation such as an oligopoly, a                  partnership, or any organizational hierarchy.  Cooperation in such              problems depends upon the participants responding aggressively to               indications that not all participants are honoring the implicit                 agreement.  It would seem then that the possibilities for cooperation           are enhanced when signals related to players' behavior are observed             without delay, and when players can respond quickly to new information.         Under their previous grant the investigators demonstrated that the              opposite is true.  Cooperation is enhanced by delays in the observation         of signals and slower reaction speeds for players.  The delays and              slower reaction speeds made it possible to use a single punishment to           deter a multitude of different potential deviations from the implicit           agreement.  This is described as "reusable punishments."  Exploiting            reusability enhances organizational efficiency dramatically.                                                                                                    In their previous work the investigators used standard repeated games           with discounting.  These games assume a fixed frequency with which              players take actions and fixed frequency with which players receive             information regarding the play of the game.  The contribution of this           grant comes from relaxing these assumptions, studying information flow          in other problems, and generalizing the results into a new theory of            organizational design.  The new topics considered include implicit              contract theory in competitive markets, renegotiation in supergames,            strategic complexity, partial moral hazard in repeated agency, and the          strategic dynamics of collusion in markets with renewable resources.
{'FirstName': 'David', 'LastName': 'Pearce', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'David Pearce', 'EmailAddress': 'david.pearce@nyu.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000203683', 'StartDate': '07/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Yale University', 'CityName': 'NEW HAVEN', 'ZipCode': '065113572', 'PhoneNumber': '2037854689', 'StreetAddress': '150 MUNSON ST', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Connecticut', 'StateCode': 'CT', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '03', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CT03', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'FL6GV84CKN57', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'YALE UNIV', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': 'FL6GV84CKN57'}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
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