Information, Uncertainty, and Incentives in Bargaining and  Partnership
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
The project provides insights into such issues as the internal                  organization of firms and the efficiency of large markets.  The                 research emphasizes the role of incentives and uncertainty in                   decentralized economic organizations.  The results show how the                 government can establish rules for bargaining with contractors that are         in its best interest and what bargaining procedures for the transfer of         items between divisions of the same firm promote the best interests of          the organization as a whole.                                                                                                                                    The study of bargaining is focused on the goal of comparing the                 efficiency of different bargaining procedures.  These procedures                are modelled as Bayesian games.  The project emphasizes the equilibrium         bidding strategies and welfare performance of k-double auctions,                procedures used in the London gold market.  Results obtained from the           analysis of k-double auctions are used to derive general insights into          the microstructure of an economy.  A major goal of this project is to           prove for a given bargaining model that a competitive market becomes            efficient in the limit as the number of traders becomes large.                  Partnership is modelled as a game where each partner privately chooses          his own contribution to the joint effort.  This research examines the           existence of rules for fully sharing the joint output that will induce          each partner to choose to contribute the efficient amount of his input.         It is shown that such rules may exist when the joint output is not              completely determined by the partners' inputs.  Sufficient conditions           are derived for the existence of such rules.
{'FirstName': 'Steven', 'LastName': 'Williams', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'R', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Steven R Williams', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000269918', 'StartDate': '07/01/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Northwestern University', 'CityName': 'EVANSTON', 'ZipCode': '602080001', 'PhoneNumber': '3125037955', 'StreetAddress': '633 CLARK ST', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Illinois', 'StateCode': 'IL', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '09', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IL09', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'EXZVPWZBLUE8', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8705649.xml'}