Justification for, and Developments of, Solution Concepts   for Games
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project is part of mathematical economics, a crucial body of               research that defines the analytical framework for rigorous                     economic reasoning.  More specifically, this project extends the                investigator's axiomatic characterizations of the rationality of                players in non-cooperative games.  The players' rationality is                  defined in terms of single person decision theoretic axioms and                 players are allowed to have "lexicographic" beliefs.  This                      approach is extended (1) to a more general single person                        framework; (2) to incorporate into the beliefs the notion of                    forward induction rationality; (3) to allow for non expected                    utility preferences in order to examine the applicability and                   relevance of such preferences which have recently been developed                quite extensively; (4) to incorporate both "satisficing" and                    "cautious" behavior within a unified approach; and (5) to allow                 for players to signal their intended strategies by adding a                     preplay communication device to a game.                                                                                                                         The overall objective of this project is to increase our                        understanding of solution concepts prevalent in the applications                of game theory, and to apply this to see how certain properties                 can be incorporated into non-cooperative game theory.  This is                  important because non-cooperative solution concepts of games, in                particular Nash Equilibrium, are often applied to economic                      models.  By examining the assumptions underlying several of these               solution concepts, this project makes explicit the assumptions                  underlying predictions of the economic models which apply these                 game theoretic tools.  Since for most economic models there are                 multiple equilibria, examination of the assumptions underlying                  the different solutions helps the analyst select among the                      equilibria and provides a unified way to make sharper predictions               in many models.
{'FirstName': 'Eddie', 'LastName': 'Dekel', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Eddie Dekel', 'EmailAddress': 'eddiedekel@gmail.com', 'NSF_ID': '000177888', 'StartDate': '07/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of California-Berkeley', 'CityName': 'BERKELEY', 'ZipCode': '947101749', 'PhoneNumber': '5106433891', 'StreetAddress': '1608 4TH ST STE 201', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '12', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA12', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'GS3YEVSS12N6', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, THE', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8808133.xml'}