The Effect of Market Size on the Efficiency of Markets with Private Information
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
Within a market the reservation value that a trader places on the               good being traded may be private, known to him alone.  This                     privacy enables him when he makes a bid or an offer to misreport                strategically his true value.  In small markets, because of this                strategic misreporting, trading mechanisms implement inefficient                allocations at least part of the time.  In large markets this                   inefficiency vanishes because each trader is negligible and can                 not manipulate the price effectively.                                                                                                                           This project identifies and verifies fundamental conjectures                    about the characteristics of markets.  One such conjecture is                   that under general conditions doubling the number of traders (1)                halves the maximal amount by which traders misreport their                      reservation values and (2) quarters the mechanism inefficiency.                 Another conjecture is that no equilibrium of a sealed bid double                auction has ex ante efficient performance, no matter how many                   traders there are.                                                                                                                                              The project also compares the performance of structured markets                 such as double auctions with decentralized exchanges.  The                      results of this study should improve our understanding of the                   advantages of organized markets and the reason why such                         institutions developed.
{'FirstName': 'Mark', 'LastName': 'Satterthwaite', 'PI_MID_INIT': 'A', 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Mark A Satterthwaite', 'EmailAddress': 'm-satterthwaite@kellogg.northwestern.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000092542', 'StartDate': '04/01/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Northwestern University', 'CityName': 'EVANSTON', 'ZipCode': '602080001', 'PhoneNumber': '3125037955', 'StreetAddress': '633 CLARK ST', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Illinois', 'StateCode': 'IL', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '09', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IL09', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'EXZVPWZBLUE8', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8721283.xml'}