Topics in Implementation Theory and Mechanism Design
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project contributes to implementation theory, one of the                   most important areas in the last ten years of economic theory.                  Implementation theory tells us in very general terms what can and               cannot be accomplished through incentive contracts.  This project               pursues three directions:  mechanism design in dynamic or                       repeated environments, application of general results of                        implementation theory to specific economic settings, and                        theoretical modelling of processes by which agents choose a                     mechanism.                                                                                                                                                      The first part extends the basic model of full implementation to                dynamic settings, i.e., settings in which allocations and payoffs               occur over a sequence of periods.  The second part applies                      implementation theory to problems of public goods provision,                    bargaining, and auctions.  The third part explores the question                 of how mechanisms are selected.  In particular, if the decision                 of which mechanism to play is made by the players themselves at                 the interim stage, then the actual process of selecting the                     mechanism may reveal information.  The project studies the                      effects of this information transmission on mechanism choice.  It               applies this to the study of how cartels of diverse firms share                 information and collude.                                                                                                                                        Advances in implementation theory are important because this                    theory provides analysts with powerful analytical tools for                     studying institutional design.  The early work in this field                    resulted in general impossibility theorems, proofs that certain                 basic societal goals could not be reconciled and that trade-offs                were necessary.  Recent work by the investigators and others have               obtained remarkable results about what can be accomplished by                   changes in economic institutions.  By extending these models to a               dynamic setting, the investigators will be able to rigorously                   study the economic implications of the evolution of institutions                over time.
{'FirstName': 'Thomas', 'LastName': 'Palfrey', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Thomas Palfrey', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000286188', 'StartDate': '08/15/1988', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'California Institute of Technology', 'CityName': 'PASADENA', 'ZipCode': '911250001', 'PhoneNumber': '6263956219', 'StreetAddress': '1200 E CALIFORNIA BLVD', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '28', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA28', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'U2JMKHNS5TG4', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
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{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1988&All=true', 'xml': '8815097.xml'}