Contracting Under Asymmetric Information
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
In recent years it has become clear that the paradigm of a competitive          market with large numbers of buyers and sellers determining price in a          full information environment is not a very useful perspective for the           study of a broad range of interesting economic relationships, such as           the relationship between the shareholders of a firm and its managers,           or between Congress, the military, and defense contractors.  In these           and many other relationships information about important economic               variables is privately held and the response of economic actors                 in these relationships is to construct contractual relationships                which give incentives for correct actions given the informational               constraints of the situation.  Thus shareholders must attempt to                structure contracts which give managers the incentive to choose                 the right mix of projects for the firm as well as to exert sufficient           effort in implementing them.                                                                                                                                    The project contributes to four important unresolved issues in the              study of contracts under asymmetric information.  The first part                develops a new method for determining when necessary conditions for             optimal contracts can be derived from a first-order approach.  The              second topic involves the double-tiered agency problem, i.e., the               principal offers a contract to his agent who in turn offers a contract          to another agent.  For example, society (the chief principal) gives the         shareholders of the firm (the subordinate principal) a liability                rule for accidents.  The firm in turn hires directors and managers (the         agent) who exert effort to reduce the probability that the product will         be defective.  Preliminary work suggests welfare gains if society               directly imposes legal liability on managers.  This will be the first           time that this important problem has been studied within a contract             theory framework.                                                                                                                                               The third topic investigates the nature of optimal contracts when a             better-informed agent must be given incentives to truthfully reveal his         information to the principal.  Finally the fourth topic concerns a              number of approaches to modeling the contracting relationships in               defense contracting among Congress, the military, and defense                   contractors.
{'FirstName': 'William', 'LastName': 'Rogerson', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'William Rogerson', 'EmailAddress': None, 'NSF_ID': '000460885', 'StartDate': '07/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'Northwestern University', 'CityName': 'EVANSTON', 'ZipCode': '602080001', 'PhoneNumber': '3125037955', 'StreetAddress': '633 CLARK ST', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'Illinois', 'StateCode': 'IL', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '09', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'IL09', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'EXZVPWZBLUE8', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8705477.xml'}