Bargaining in Long-Term Economic Relationships
{'Code': '04050100', 'Directorate': {'Abbreviation': 'SBE', 'LongName': 'Direct For Social, Behav & Economic Scie'}, 'Division': {'Abbreviation': 'SES', 'LongName': 'Divn Of Social and Economic Sciences'}}
{'SignBlockName': 'Daniel H. Newlon', 'PO_EMAI': None, 'PO_PHON': None}
This project contributes to our understanding of the way economic               agents communicate and coordinate in bargaining.  It also                       develops a new bargaining model which can explain both the                      duration of negotiations that end without strikes and the                       frequency and duration of strikes.  The research builds on the                  impressive past contributions of the investigator.                                                                                                              The first part of the project is a theoretical investigation of                 how agents learn how to cooperate in repeated coordination                      games with complete information.  These games allow a clearer                   characterization of what rationality means in the presence of                   multiple equilibria, and present the problem of learning how to                 cooperate in its purest form.  The project studies how agents'                  optimal strategies depend on whether they begin with a common                   language in which to describe their actions and/or their                        positions in the game to each other.  This research helps                       explain how social conventions evolve.  It clarifies the concept                of a rational response to multiple-equilibrium problems.                                                                                                        The second part uses dynamic bargaining models to explain the                   timing and duration of strikes.  Such models typically posit                    private information for one bargainer, and rely on differences                  in the costs of delaying agreement among his types to sort them                 in equilibrium.  The project develops a bargaining model in                     which production usually proceeds during contract negotiations,                 and calling a strike requires an overt action by the union, with                consequences vastly different from failing to accept the firm's                 last offer.  Striking increases delay costs for both bargainers,                and may also entail sunk costs.
{'FirstName': 'Vincent', 'LastName': 'Crawford', 'PI_MID_INIT': None, 'PI_SUFX_NAME': None, 'PI_FULL_NAME': 'Vincent Crawford', 'EmailAddress': 'vcrawfor@weber.ucsd.edu', 'NSF_ID': '000236871', 'StartDate': '07/15/1987', 'EndDate': None, 'RoleCode': 'Principal Investigator'}
{'Name': 'University of California-San Diego', 'CityName': 'LA JOLLA', 'ZipCode': '920930021', 'PhoneNumber': '8585344896', 'StreetAddress': '9500 GILMAN DR', 'StreetAddress2': None, 'CountryName': 'United States', 'StateName': 'California', 'StateCode': 'CA', 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': '50', 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_ORG': 'CA50', 'ORG_UEI_NUM': 'UYTTZT6G9DT1', 'ORG_LGL_BUS_NAME': 'UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO', 'ORG_PRNT_UEI_NUM': None}
{'Name': None, 'CityName': None, 'StateCode': None, 'ZipCode': None, 'StreetAddress': None, 'CountryCode': None, 'CountryName': None, 'StateName': None, 'CountryFlag': None, 'CONGRESSDISTRICT': None, 'CONGRESS_DISTRICT_PERF': '""'}
{'Code': '1320', 'Text': 'Economics'}
{'url': 'https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/download?DownloadFileName=1987&All=true', 'xml': '8703337.xml'}