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How do you raise the stakes in an experiment without actually paying people money?
I am trying to run a psychology experiment for one of my courses and it involves people trying to guard some "treasure" of theirs and trying not to lose it.
My problem is that I can't ethically (or legally) force them to offer up their own money and then actually penalize them for not doing well.  At the same time, many of the participants that I've run so far have figured out that it's all a ruse and it's fake and they're not going to actually lose any money so the data may not accurately show how people react in those situations when there is something on the line.    Or I could give them a hypothetical scenario in which their job is tied to how well they do but again, it's not real so people often just don't try.
Ideally, I would have some sort of funding for this where I can offer them $10 if they do well and slowly start taking away money as they fail to give them some incentive.  However, I don't have any of that (it's a course project) and I'm trying to figure out how to incentivize them.
Any help or ideas would be greatly appreciated.  Thank you!

Can't you just pay them a fixed amount (you have to pay them anyway for a psychological experiment, no?) and deduct from that?

No, I'm not paying them anything.  These are fellow students and it is a course project.  There is no funding for a course project.

Are you sure that fake coins don't work just as well? People can be quite competitive over trivial games...

Brownie points may just do fine.

Make them create something with their own hands, something hard to make and use that as currency.
I first became aware of this type of experiments from a ted talk by Dan Ariely which I recommend you watch, specially the last part:
What Pushes Us To Work Hard — Even When We Don't Have To?
The gist from these behavioral economics experiments, is that we value things we make substantially higher than an impartial evaluator,even more if making them was difficult,challenging or rewarding; so if you don't have money but have willing  experimenters, you could possibly make them create something, let them assign a value and then use it as currency.
You experiment would be as follow:

Create something - Origami,painting, sculpture of themselves
Assign Value - Ask them how much would they sell it for
Substitute for currency - Take their thing away from them, now you have something you can reward them with or even fraction.

I have run a number of studies with incentive paradigms.  There are several ways to do this without spending any/very much money.
One of my favorite methods that works quite well is called a "hall of fame" manipulation.  The paradigm is set up such that participants earn arbitrary points during the task.  After I explain the rules of the game, I explain that they will have a chance to make our hall of fame, which is simply a high scores list.  It's made up, but it comes up on the screen for them to view, and they are asked to enter in a user name in case they have a high enough score to make the list.  Of course, for anonymity I don't actually record their user name or update the list based on participants' performance.  At my school, undergraduates seem highly motivated by this because they are competitive.
Another thing we do in my lab is associate arbitrary points with earning candy at the end of the experiment.  I like this manipulation less because many undergraduates are trying to watch what they eat, and are not very motivated by this.  However, in combination with the hall of fame list, it seems to work quite well.
If you are able to get a little bit of money, what you can do is buy one Amazon gift card for say, 50 or 100$ and tell participants they'll win raffle tickets which you will draw from to select one winner after you've run your experiment.  This has obvious pros and cons, namely, it's good that you don't have to pay each participant, and it's bad because some participants will decide that they have no chance of winning the raffle and they won't be motivated by it at all.
Finally, another option that is good for if you want to have several levels of incentives is to use symbols during the experiment such as: \$ for low incentive, \$\$ for medium, and \$$$ for high. In reality these amounts can correspond to pennies, allowing a participant to earn, say, $10 max over the study, but they don't have to see on each trial how minuscule the money is. The symbols will motivate them more so than the amount of money would.
Given that you are doing this for a course, I recommend using points and a high scores list.
One thing that is annoying about doing an incentive manipulation is that if you fail to find an effect, it may be that there is no effect of incentive, or it may be that your incentive wasn't strong enough; you'll have no way of knowing.  As with any study, a good idea is to have some other aspect of the data that you're interested in studying so even if your incentive manipulation isn't successful, you can still address some other question.
Hope this helps! Good luck.


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Searching for real biological neuron firing data [numeric]
I am searching for real neuron firing data, so I can look at each neuron for fire timing (frequency) and incoming/outgoing signal-strength. I already found short youtube videos of real neuron firing footage (measured via calcium), but I am searching for numeric data.
Data-Requirements

Region is not important
the longer time range, the better

The website crcns.org hosts open source data recorded from neurons in various brain areas.

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What really is 'Consciousness'?
I'm more concerned about the biological aspect of this question than the psychological one (although both are equally bewildering). But what makes our brain conscious of one thing and unconscious of another?

...what makes our brain conscious of one thing and unconscious of another?

Under normal conditions, our brain itself regulates what we are conscious of and what we suppress (or don't perceive). By conscious, I'll assume you mean aware. Why are we aware of the news on the television, but not consciously aware of someone outside mowing the lawn, for example? Or why are we aware of ringing in our ears (tinnitus) in the evening, but less so during our workday?
All stimuli is 'perceived' at the input point. All stimuli is then processed at some level(s) in the brain. But only some of the constantly incoming information makes it to our consciousness. At multiple levels of the CNS, specialized brain tissue/areas "decide" whether or not to let that information through to the higher brain levels (responsible for consciousness).
Depending on the stimulus, different areas of the brain are responsible. Noise is processed differently than vision or sensations of pressure on our bodies, etc.
If you want an example of the processes involved in only one area of consciousness, the paper below is a quick read. (You'll have to google it; it's a PDF.)
Conscious Perception of
Emotional Stimuli: Brain Mechanisms, Derek G.V. Mitchell et al., The Neuroscientist, 2011

What makes our brain conscious of things?
Different brain parts triggered by parts of our nervous system.
Selective attention is primarily mediated by the frontal and parietal cortices. The prefrontal cortex plays a pivotal role in the top-down control of attention, directing our focus towards things that are relevant to our experiences, knowledge and biology. Some things are learned and the result of neuronal connections that have been reinfoced over time, and some were seeded from our DNA. Is the frontal lobe involved in conscious perception? (2014)
The salience network, centered around the anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, is crucial for determining what information is biologically or behaviorally important, and thus worthy of our attention. Salient stimuli, ie. "surprising" stimuli, especially ones that could signal danger, have a greater chance of reaching our consciousness. Salience Network (2015)
According to the "global workspace" theory, for a us to become conscious of something, it needs to win the competition from everything else fighting for our attention, through reinforcement via recurrent amplification, which strengthens the signal and ensures its survival in the face of competing stimuli. Global workspace theory of consciousness (2005)
The thalamus and the cortex are interconnected in a series of feedback loops which are thought to play a key role in consciousness and is believed to be critical for maintaining conscious awareness. When these loops are disrupted, as in certain stages of sleep or under anesthesia, consciousness fades. Breakdown of Effective Connectivity During Slow Wave Sleep (2005)
What is "consciousness" generally:
I am studying neuroscience so that I can either add more substance to, or refute my intuition on the subset of "phenomenal consciousness" we refer to as "self awareness" or more commonly just "consciousness":
It is one part of the brain perceiving itself, through another part. Ie. Two tightly integrated cognitive parts, noticing and understanding that the other part notices it. A kind of feedback loop, or a collaborative experience of cognition.
It could be a more fundamental part and a more supplementary part, or it could be two similar parts, or it could be a "depth first search" part and a "breadth first search" part collaborating.
A metaphor that might work is someone seeing a mirror for the first time. Except the mirror is in the mind; or perhaps more apt: a monkey seeing its reflection in the screen of a super computer. (Except the monkey is also the super computer. (And no disrespect to monkeys, who can often be much smarter and to the point than humans.)
Either way, a less intense version of "self consciousness."
Neurobiologically, consciousness and self-awareness emerge from complex and distributed networks within the brain rather than being tied to a specific area.
Two key components are the thalamocortical system, associated with alertness and perception, and the Default Mode Network (DMN), a large-scale brain network implicated in self-referential thinking and introspection.
From a neurofunctional perspective, consciousness and self-awareness are thought to be associated with a process called 'global workspace theory'. This theory suggests that different brain regions work together to process information and create a holistic perception of reality. When a signal becomes dominant in this 'global workspace', we become consciously aware of it.
Self-awareness specifically is associated with areas such as the prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, and anterior cingulate cortex, regions involved in higher cognitive processes and social cognition. Damage to these areas can disrupt self-awareness, resulting in conditions like anosognosia (denial of illness) or somatoparaphrenia (denial of ownership of one’s limbs). Studies conflict on theories about the roles contributed by each.
Consciousness is mostly studied trough neuroimaging data, which is used to identify common patterns of neural activation across different conscious states.
There is no shortage of papers, many cited hundreds of times, on this when you look for terms like "consciousness", "social understanding", "sapience", "emotional", "DMN", and the different brain regions.
Understanding how mere neuronal firing can give rise to subjective experiences, the so-called "hard problem" of consciousness, I think will be greatly alleviated when people come to grips with what AI can do, as we march towards AGI. (Which in my opinion will form communities, come to grips with the their place in the multiverse, and have consciousness likely more vast than what we can conceive of.)
Some papers that study artificial consciousness and "emergent phenomena" are over 30 years old already. eg Artificial emotions as emergent phenomena (1993) Keep your eyes peeled for new ones.

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What is the optimal contrast ratio for best readability?
I have asked the same question half a year ago on Graphic Design but received no useful answer.

According to the W3C (and another question on this site), the contrast ratio between body text and text background should be at least 7:1 for good legibility. Google takes this up in their typography guidelines, but they also maintain that

Text with too much contrast can also be hard to read.

Unfortunately, they don't state what "too much contrast" exactly is, and I was unable to find anything definite on the web.
What is the optimal contrast ratio for best readability – that is, neither too little nor too much contrast – for subjects with normal vision ?

I think it is hard to state there is one true optimal ratio. People are different in many ways and probably there is a range of ratios that appear to be optimal for different people.

Of course, @RobinKramer, I thought that would be understood. "Optimal" would be something like the mean and standard deviation of the normally distributed shortest reaction times to stimuli with different contrast ratios. Basic psychophysics.

Are you referring to digital content or printed materials? In the former case, are you referring to CRT screens, LCD, LED .... I think some background would help here. Also, are you referring to colors or grayscale material?

@Christiaan With respect to contrast ratio the medium of presentation does not matter. The contrast ratio is what the eye sees (i.e., the number of photons emitted or reflected per one unit of surface area of text compared to the number of photons emitted or reflected per one unit of surface area of background). Contrast ratio is perceived and must be measured, it is not something the designer types into their markup in the form of HTML color codes or a printer chooses from their Pantone coded inks. Devices only matter in so far as their differing resolutions will confound legibility.

@what - in terms of citable literature the medium does make a difference. If electronic media suit your answer you may want to express that - it expands the available papers to a great extent. The color contrast versus black-and-white question above still stands, however.

@Christiaan Finding the optimal contrast will require manipulating both wavelength and luminance. But I suspect no study has ever attempted to research this, so I will be grateful for anything that you can find.

User Experience SE has a tag for questions related to contrast.

Short answer
Higher contrast increases readability.
Background
In a series of papers under the umbrella "Psychophysics of Reading" (link is to first paper in the series of five) the authors investigate parameters that affect readability in normally sighted folks, as well as people with impaired vision. These studies seem particularly relevant to your question.
The authors investigated reading rates as an outcome measure for readability. In paper V of the series (Legge et al., 2007) they tested the dependence of letter size and contrast (black-and-white) on reading rate. Rates were highest (about 350 words/min) for letters ranging in size from 0.25° to 2° visual angle. Within this range, reading rates proved to be tolerant to contrast reduction. For 1° letters, reading rate decreased by less than a factor of two for a tenfold reduction in contrast. The results were very similar for white-on-black and black-on-white text. Reading rate declined more rapidly for very small (<0.25°) and very large (>2°) letters with lower contrast.
Based on these findings, the intuitive answer to your question is, the larger the contrast, the better. I've never heard of decreasing contrast enhancing reading abilities, barred under some very specific conditions of ultra-low vision, regardless of Google's statements on this. Your first reference clearly supports 'higher contrast is better', without the presence of a sort of optimum.
Reference
- Legge et al, Vis Res (1985); 25(2): 239–52


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What do you call sensations without stimuli?
Sometimes, when you close your eyes in the dark, you see what looks like sparks or flashes. Sometimes when you are tired, your vision seems to shift sideways and realign, like someone bumped into a camera, although you didn't move your eyes. It seems to me that some of these apparent sensations are not caused by (external) stimuli to the sensory apparatus but rather by an "overexcited" nervous system.
Is there a term for such "mistakes" of the visual system? I don't know what terms to use to describe these phenomena in scientific reports.

You could try visual disturbances but searching this term can lead to all sorts of items which my be unrelated to your question.  The medical term for involuntary eye movements is Nystagmus and can occur in anxiety as well as tiredness and other problems.

Short answer
Visual hallucinations and, more specifically, phosphenes are the terms you are probably after.
Background
I'll basically provide a list of terminologies below, as your question seems to indicate you're walking on unfamiliar grounds with your research.

For a starters, sensations refer to the peripheral detection of stimuli. Perceptions are the higher cognitive, central correlate of those sensations involving the conscious awareness of them.
The sparks or flashes you're talking about may be caused peripherally (sensation level), but likely find their origins centrally (perceptual). This, because people with low-vision, or blind people lacking functional photoreceptors in their retinae can experience them too, and sometimes in exaggerated and pathological forms.
The visual field shifts are most likely caused by eye movements, unless you can provide solid sources to back up your thoughts that it can happen without eye movements. Likely, nystagmus or related involuntary eye movements are involved, which can be exaggerated by some physical conditions, again including blindness.
Now, as my knowledge is restricted to visual impairments, I can say that spontaneous spots of light are not sensations, but hallucinations. A hallucination being "...a sensory experience, possessing the compelling sense of reality of a true perception, but occurring without external stimulation of the relevant sensory organ. Specifically, they are elementary visual hallucinations, as opposed to complex visual hallucinations. An example of the latter is the Charles Bonnet Syndrome, where blind folks experience complex visual scenes, including faces.
Back to your question on elementary visual hallucinations, they are referred to as phosphenes, photopsiae, or unformed visual hallucinations, Typically they consist of colored or colorless bright lights, such as points, flashes, stars, and sparks. To provide some context to these terms: Phosphenes are generally used to describe benign phenomena, as well as for stimuli evoked by electrical stimulation of the retina or other visual centers (forget about the latter for the sake of simplicity, as these are not hallucinations anymore). Photospsias are generally used in the literature associated with retinal disease. Unformed hallucinations, personally, I've never encountered in my field of research, but the linked article below gives it as a last option, so I simply included it here too.

Reference
- Menen et al (2003), Survey of Ophthalmology; 48(1): 58–72


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Is the feeling of consciousness simply a perceived effect of a functional working memory and focus?
I do not have much knowledge, if any, on cognitive sciences so bare with me if this question is trivial or absurd.
I wonder this question because, personally, I feel less or more conscious during days where I'm less or more cognitively active. I'm sure this is not an uncommon experience. On days where I am very 'slow', I zone in and out of focus quite frequently and I cannot retain focus for long periods of time. During these moments out of focus and inside of my mind, thinking, I don't feel conscious. I feel as though I am waking up each time I come back to attention.
Then, when I really try hard to focus on, say, a beautiful scene (like a setting sun) I feel extremely more conscious because I am actively processing the definition of the image quality (requiring working memory, correct?).
It feels wrong posting something like this because it's entirely anecdotal but I'm not sure how else to research this 'feeling'..

I think you can find the answer in my answer to another question about attention and mind-wandering: http://cogsci.stackexchange.com/a/13973/11318 . I believe your experience of "lack of consciousness" is perceptual decoupling, where people are less capable of perceiving external stimuli.


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Do the results of psychological studies change our behaviour?
This is a question that has been bugging me for a very long time.
Let me illustrate with a silly example. Suppose that a study finds out that the majority of the population associate the number 1 with the colour blue (again, this is is a very silly example). Suppose this study becomes very popular and the result comes to be known to most people. How will this knowledge of the experiment change behaviour?
Will the result still be the same after the study is known to the entire population?
EDIT :
I am not talking about the kind of results where we do not have influence on our behaviours, like our heart rate during a tense situation or how we react when our life is threatened. I am talking about experiments where we can make a conscious choice and is apparently "inconsequential" (so, nothing that poses harm to us).
EDIT 2:
//New Example//
The use of canned laughter in sitcoms -- Many of us by now have realised that laugh tracks are used in sitcoms to direct how the audience should react and make them think that what they are watching is funnier than it actually is (Example of Social Proof, which is nicely explained by Robert Cialdini). After I knew this, I actually found TV shows employing the technique to be less funny and in some cases, even annoying. (I assume that many people reacted the same way after finding out about it).
So the study of this particular behaviour actually made me react in the opposite way that the TV show producers intended and how the study says I should be behaving. Thus, changing the results of the study.
Are there other studies like this? How do we design experiments that are tolerant to this?

I don't think that psychological studies would necessarily change behaviour but can help to understand behaviours. Look at Milgram's Conformity Experiment and Phil Zimbardo on TED Talks for examples

@Chris I was talking about studies we can make a conscious choice, like Baba Shiv's experiment. What if this result is known to the entire population? Won't there be people who will deliberately choose salad because they know the already established results and hence change the results?

Baba Shiv's experiment is another case in point with what I was saying. Even if everyone on this tiny planet knew of the experiment and its conclusions, how can change be achieved if we don't have the prefrontal cortex structure to affect the change? The experiment just allows us to understand why these things are happening.

Just saw your edit and my first 2 links refer to experiments where we do make conscious choices

@Chris (In the case of Baba Shiv's experiment) Once people know they are in an experiment, they can choose the salad over the cake simply because they want to disapprove the existing results.

@Chris (In the case of Milgram's conformity experiment) Suppose this result is known to everyone who are participating in a recreation of the study. Once they know they are in an experiment and since they also know how they are "supposed" to behave, they can simply choose the exact opposite behaviour.

In a serial process if our behaviour would change after knowing the results of a psychological study, then we would have to agree with its results (ok let's assume this) but them still have want to change our behaviour and to remember wanting to change our behaviour just before having our "regular" behaviour. Even in that serial process, the likelihood is low. The real life also shows that we generally speaking (!) do not change our behaviour (we may want to however).

Hey Tony, thanks for the response! Do you know of any studies (etc) that support this view? I would think that something along the lines of the Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon may also come into play (whether or not you agree with the results).

@Chris Whole fields of therapy (CBT) are based entirely on the premise that we can change our learnt behaviours. Not that I'm saying we will, but if we don't it won't be because we can't.

I do have to note this question is broad and opinion based, according to the stack conventions. Nonetheless, I think it's an important question, given that scientific publications may alter the behavior of people en mass and even generate entire movements that, e.g., argue and campaign against vital medical interventions.
A notorious example being the retracted Lancet publication of the adverse effects of vaccination causing autism, based on fraudulent data (Rao & Andrade, 2011) by Wakefield (1998). This unfortunate paper has resulted in global anti-vaccine movements based on the fictional assumption that vaccination can cause autism.
References
- Rao & Andrade, Indian J Psychiatry (2011); 53(2): 95–6
- Wakefield et al., The Lancet (Retracted)

I never thought about publications leading to the creation of entire movements! Thank you! But I was trying to ask about how the knowledge of the results of behavioural studies can in turn change its results. I have explained it better (tried to) with another example in my second edit (new one). Sorry, but it's incredibly hard to put my question into words.

Probably another example worth knowing about is the huge influence the Pygmalion effect paper had on US education, as described in The Self-Fulfillment of the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy. Perhaps about to be repeated in a way with Duckworth's grit: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/opinion/sunday/dont-grade-schools-on-grit.html


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What is the term for two mutually exclusive, contrasting emotions
I am a psychology student and I vaguely recall a term being used to describe two emotions that cannot be expressed simultaneously. The example was fear and relaxation in terms of Systematic Desensitization. Can anyone help me out with this? Many thanks in advance.

In terms of systematic desensitization, you're thinking of reciprocal inhibition (see, e.g., Wolpe, 1954).
For what it's worth, beyond this literature, there's a general debate about whether positive and negative affect can be experienced simultaneously.  (Indeed, Emotion Review just published a series of articles about this.)  It's fair to say that the debate has not been resolved.

Interesting. But, as I've been told before, I've got to say what the examiner wants, even if it's not necessarily true or confirmed haha


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What qualitative studies are there into mindfulness?
What qualitative studies, e.g. open ended interviews, are there into mindfulness therapy?
I've been skeptical about its use, wondered if it was kinda faddy. But it occurs to me that a lot of despair type emotions may have their root in being unable to relax and enjoy life. Surely meditation is linked with that?

I've voted to close this as "too broad" even thought @Chris gave an awesome answer, because it basically involved him citing an entire Wikipedia article. As a general rule of thumb, if someone has to go to Wikipedia and copy giant sections to answer a question, the question is too broad.

Wikipedia often provides references to scientific studies and the Wikipedia article on Mindfulness is no exception.
The main section of the article has

...Studies have also shown that rumination and worry contribute to mental illnesses such as depression and anxiety,[13][14] and that mindfulness-based interventions are effective in the reduction of both rumination and worry.[13][15]
Mindfulness practice is being employed in psychology to alleviate a variety of mental and physical conditions, such as bringing about reductions in depression symptoms,[16][17][18] reducing stress,[17][19][20] anxiety,[16][17][20] and in the treatment of drug addiction.[21][22][23] Recent studies demonstrate that mindfulness meditation significantly attenuates pain through multiple, unique mechanisms.[24] It has gained worldwide popularity as a distinctive method to handle emotions.
Clinical studies have documented both physical and mental health benefits of mindfulness in different patient categories as well as in healthy adults and children.[3][25][26]

plus

Research on the neural perspective of how mindfulness meditation works suggests that it exerts its effects in components of attention regulation, body awareness and emotional regulation.[34] When considering aspects such as sense of responsibility, authenticity, compassion, self-acceptance and character, studies have shown that mindfulness meditation contributes to a more coherent and healthy sense of self and identity.[35][36] Neuroimaging techniques suggest that mindfulness practices such as mindfulness meditation are associated with “changes in the anterior cingulate cortex, insula, temporo-parietal junction, fronto-limbic network and default mode network structures."[37][38] Further, mindfulness-induced emotional and behavioral changes have been found to be related to functional and structural changes in the brain.[38]

There is also a scientific research section

Mindfulness has gained increasing empirical attention ever since 1970.[120][unreliable source?] According to a 2015 systematic review and meta-analysis of systematic reviews of RCTs, evidence supports the use of mindfulness programs to alleviate symptoms of a variety of mental and physical disorders.[25] Other reviews report similar findings.[19][22][33] Further, mindfulness meditation appears to bring about favorable structural changes in the brain,[32][37][121] and may also prevent or delay the onset of mild cognitive impairment and Alzheimer's disease.[122] Mindfulness proved to be effective also in enhancing people’s capacity to self-regulate.[123]

References
These are provided in the full article
This question is close to being put on hold or closed and to indicate why, it would produce a posting which is much longer than the standard laid out in the help center,

if your question could be answered by an entire book, or has many valid answers, it's probably too broad for our format

plus, there are so many referenced studies and articles of scientific research connected to this (I counted 25 in total - 156 in the full article) that providing a full list of references here would take me an age to provide in full (with weblinks etc.) on this site.

well i was specifically asking for qualitative studies -- which makes sense right?


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Are there empirical studies that falsify propositions rooted in evolutionary psychology?
Conway III and Schaller (2002, p. 153) argue that "There is a long history of lodging charges of non-falsifiability against evolutionary thinking in the biological  sciences". One of the critics they refer to, is Karl Popper.
Can anyone cite examples of empirical studies that falsify propositions (hypotheses, explanations etc.) rooted in evolutionary psychology, in order to argue against Conway III and Schaller (2002)?
References:
Conway III, L. G., & Schaller, M. (2002). On the verifiability of evolutionary psychological theories: An analysis of the psychology of scientific persuasion. Personality and social psychology review, 6(2), 152-166. Link to the article: http://neuron4.psych.ubc.ca/~schaller/528Readings/ConwaySchaller2002.pdf, retrieved 2017, Apr. 11

What exactly is it that you wish to see refuted in the articles you request? The question is broad and according to your own comments elsewhere this question is more of a probe toward discussion than a specific question.

Dear @AliceD , many thanks for your question. One the one hand, in my very humble opinion, on this site I have noticed a tendency (I cannot quantify) to reduce psychological questions to the evolutionary paradigm of psychology. While I'm not questioning nor its legitimacy nor its explanation power for certain aspects of human behavior, I believe that it is important to understand its limitations. Moreover, it's important not to over-estimate its usefulness or even its adequacy at understanding human action. -- That is my motivation -- On the other hand, as discussed, I understand that ..

doing so may be, or rather is off topic within this site. I have realized that fulfilling my motives on this site may cause tensions or at least may not be compatible with the site's goals. Therefore, I have requested to close my account and I'm waiting to do so until I will be sure that another discussion elsewhere on cogsci will not bring about any more comments which I couldn't reply to. Having said this, please allow me to sincerely wish all the best, thanks again for your work.

Closing your account is not necessary you know. Other questions from you have been received very well. Please feel welcomed.

@AliceD Why, thank you. I do feel welcome, and there isn't any resentment behind my intention to close my account. Kind regards


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Are there any variants of pathological lying?
Are there any variants of pathological lying? As far as I understand it, that means either lying for no discernable reason, or to your advantage but a lot.
Are any other verbal behaviours themselves pathologised: pathological false confession, or pathological irony?


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Is there a conventional use of the term "empirical grounding"?
Background
The notion of grounding theory in empirical data, originates from the work by Glaser & Strauss (1967). At present, while reputable scholars, for instance Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), make use of the term "empirical grounding", it doesn't seem to be used quite frequently in (English-language) psychological literature. For instance, today, the database "PsycINFO" returns not more than 66 journal articles where the mentioned term is used.
Question
Does the term "empirical grounding" designate a distinct methodological procedure (or result) that exists independently from the grounded theory methodology?
References
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), 25–32. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2007.24160888
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: strategies for qualitative research (4. paperback printing). New Brunswick: Aldine.

A search of "empirical grounding" in my small personal article database showed more results in test validation than in qualitative (though this could be a personal bias: I'd be curious what kinds of articles your search brought up). Searching this term in the university database brings up a large variety of results, really highlighting the diversity of the use of the term (from policy to measurement).
Additionally, a reading of the Eisenhardt and Graebner article makes it clear to me that their definition of "empirical grounding" is primarily focused on the thought that the theory is grounded in the data, and not as its own distinct methodology. In their sense, this could be viewed as an aspect of grounded theory (when done correctly, it is grounded in data).
Based on this, I would say that empirical grounding is not its own method (or, if it is, certainly not a standard/well-known method). To address the second part, I do think that the term has meaning independent of grounded theory: specifically, as its name implies, it is the practice of grounding theory/methods/conclusions within data (and this has a range of applications). In my understanding, "empirical grounding" is almost an epistemology in terms of its practice and scope. Thus it could, in the larger sense, be considered a broad methodology, under which traditional grounded theory (and perhaps all of quantitative) could fall.
I did find the below article that discussed the broadening of grounded theory from "empirical grounding". They, however, seem to come to this term merely by similar processes as Eisenhardt and Graebner (simply trying to communicate that the method is grounded in data) and do not seem to view it as its own proper method or name.
Goldkuhl, G., & Stefan, C. (2010). Adding Theoretical Grounding to Grounded Theory: Toward Multi-Grounded Theory. International Journal Of Qualitative Methods, 9(2), 187-205.
In example of the multiple uses, below is an article where Messick uses "empirical grounding" to mean "trustworthiness" regarding score interpretation (a pretty well known article and author in the measurement sphere).
Messick, S. (1980). Test validity and the ethics of assessment. American Psychologist, 35(11), 1012–1027. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.35.11.1012
All in all, for the purposes of your question: no, it doesn't appear that this is a well known or accepted methodology distinct from grounded theory. It seems to have many definitions in many contexts. Based on the Eisenhardt and Graebner article, it seems to a desirable outcome of a grounded theory. Based on definitions in the Goldkuhl and Stefan article, it is a piece of multi-grounded theory (and appears to capture the goals of traditional grounded theory).

For the sake of argument, I will accept that it could be a new, fringe, or rarely used methodology distinct from grounded theory. Above I speak to information regarding mainstream methods (technically, one could invent a "methodological procedure" at any time). Another note: I am not familiar with the second paper listed above (Eisenhardt and Graebner), and cannot speak to their use of the term.

thanks!. I'm working on a paper in English and I was wondering whether "empirical grounding" might be misunderstood.


text:
What role do the ego and group unconsciousness have in Jungian "individuation"?
What role do the ego and group unconsciousness have in Jungian "individuation"?

What distinguishes Jungian psychology is the idea that there are two
  centers of the personality. The ego is the center of consciousness,
  whereas the Self is the center of the total personality, which
  includes consciousness, the unconscious, and the ego... Jungians also
  saw psychic health as depending on a periodic return to the sense of
  Self... individuation (Source: Wikipedia - Self in Jungian psychology with interpretive liberties)

Though I took some interpretive liberties, this may be inadvisable for wikipedia.
It'd be helpful to know of aything substantial I could read, that is focused on this question, especially if (and I'm not saying it's the case that) individuation involves the externalisation of the ego.

Short answer
The ego, the collective unconscious and the persona collectively help the person to self-actualise and reach individuation through the elements of the psyche being in harmony with each other.
Long answer
A lot of what I am providing in this answer has been put together using my knowledge of Jungian Psychology from my 3 year Psychotherapy course I am sudying at Reading University and information within Wolberg (2013).  Anything not referenced here is from the Wolberg book.
Individuation
Let's first of all define the word Individuation

In the broadest possible way, individuation can be defined as the achievement of self-actualization through a process of integrating the conscious and the unconscious. Once again, any accurate understanding of Jung should come from [Jung]. (Source: Journal Psyche)

Self Actualisation is a term coined by Abraham Maslow with his Hierarchy of Needs, and refers to having a fulfilment and mastery of all your needs from the simplest to the more complex.
Jung, the Psyche, and the Collective and Personal Unconscious
According to Carl Gustav Jung, the psyche is compartmentalised in a different way than Freud proposed. He divided the psyche into

a superficial part, the personaa social mask assumed by the individual, made up of social interests and sanctions
a less superficial aspect, the egowhich is only to some extent conscious and reflects past-personal experiences, and
a deeply unconscious partwhich has within it the collective unconscious and contained archetypes (Creator, Caregiver, Ruler, Jester...).

Difficulties occur when there is a lack of harmony among the persona, the ego, and the collective unconscious. Jung conceived of the idea that baser elements of the soul were present in the collective unconscious, and he characterised these as “the Shadow.”
The psychic reality of the situation created by the psychic images, developed in the conscious, create complexes [e.g. Inferiority Complex] and the issues, and their connected experiences are repressed or suppressed into the "shadow lands" of the personal unconscious.
Jung also believed that the collective unconscious contained

creative fountains of energy. Primitive fears and other untoward manifestations of the unconscious invaded the patient’s conscious mind and created tensions and various neurotic symptoms that were attempts at self-cure. The collective unconscious, unleashed, constituted a source of danger for the person.

The 2 different human characters
Jung also evolved a theory of character, whereby people are divided into two types: introverts and extroverts. The introvert’s interests centred on himself or herself; the extrovert’s interests were on the external world.

A human being, said Jung, had an innate religious craving which powered the need for self-realization. There was, he explained, no retreat from life’s burdens other than to find refuge in spiritual strivings with “acceptance of the irrational and unbelievable.” By experiencing the collective unconscious, an individual no longer would experience personal sorrow "but the sorrow of the world, no longer a personal isolating pain, but pain without bitterness, binding all human beings together.” We are brought “back to ourselves as an existing, living something, stretched as it were between two worlds of images, from which forces proceed that are only dimly discerned but are all the more clearly felt. This something, though strange to us, is yet so near, it is altogether ourselves and yet unrecognizable, a virtual middlepoint of such a mysterious constitution that it can demand anything, relationship with animals and with gods, with crystals and with stars.” These ideas were elaborated by Jung (1961) in his last book, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, a fascinating autobiographical document that explains his relationship with Freud and gives us a broader understanding of the essence and meaning of his work.

Putting it together for psychotherapy
During Jungian psychoanalytic therapy...

an effort is made to explore “archetypes” in order to determine how these imprints contaminate the patient’s present life and interfere with self-development and self-realization (individuation). Bringing the individual into contact with his or her collective unconscious is said to help liberate creative forces that will have a constructive effect on adjustment. Once non-conscious elements are recognized, an attempt is made to guide the patient actively into a productive relationship with the unconscious.

References
Wolberg, L. R., 2013. The Technique of Psychotherapy - Fourth Edition,Chevy Chase, MD:International Psychotherapy Institute E-BooksAvailable free from http://www.freepsychotherapybooks.org

For further in-depth information on Jungian Analytical Psychology:
Frieda Fordham (1991) An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, 3rd Revised Edition,London:Penguin Books Ltd. (ISBN-13: 978-0140135688)
Carl Gustav Jung (1969) The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (Collected Works of C. G. Jung)2nd edition translation in 1981 by Gerhard Adler & R.F.C. Hull. Princeton: Princeton University Press (ISBN-13: 978-0691018331)
exact same edition also printed in 1991 by London:Routledge (ISBN-13: 978-0415058445)

very useful, thanks. specific to my question, the in therapy the "ego" is "harmonised" with the "group unconscious". that may be enough to work with for now...

I realise it is semantics, but group unconscious is referred to in Jungian terms as collective unconscious.

Quoting not only Jung, but Heidegger too.
With Self ≈ Dasein; Individuation ≈ resoluteness

Dasein, as a they-self, gets 'lived' by the common-sense ambiguity of
that publicness in which nobody resolves upon anything but which has
always made its decision. "Resoluteness" signifies letting oneself be
summoned out of one's lostness in the "they". The irresoluteness of
the "they" remains dominant notwithstanding, but it cannot impugn
resolute existence.  (Being & Time, GA2, H.299)

This should result in an improvement of the ego, not an externalisation.  As for group unconsciousness, as groupishness, that is being put in its place, pretty much externalised or dissolved.  Alternatively, and more Jungianly, as collective unconscious (to whatever depth and connectivity), there might be consternation, fear and outrage as St. George grapples the dragon.

He is no hero who never met the dragon, or who, if he once saw it,
declared afterwards that he saw nothing. Equally, only one who has
risked the fight with the dragon and is not overcome by it wins the
hoard, the “treasure hard to attain.” – Carl Jung, CW 14, par. 756

from The Heroic Journey – a Jungian Perspective
Nevertheless

Jung (1935) stressed that individuation requires the integration of
both collective and personal elements.

from Individuation and the Self
Being with the "they", but not being lost in the "they".

Of my vines 2022
I hope It helps
From the perspective of Adler&Jung. The Self, along with the rest of Jung's archetypes, is already present as the germ of the Ego in the Collective Unconscious. He is immersed in the «ecosystemic dialogue initiated, after conception—the fusion of gametes—, within the zygote». As «everything changes and everything flows», the totality advances within the human and ecological community (environment) integrating information for the emergence of the «Pre-consciousness of the Ego». By assimilating lessons, this «Ego» continues to individualize and continues to become a «Person with Identity» up to the «Consciousness», the luminous sphere of the psyche. Now the Ego transports a large amount of data, «encrypted and indecipherable but efficient», due to its roots in the unconscious. When the time comes, the Ego will say «I am who I am, and you are who you are.» In this very first instant, the Ego is externalized.
Desde la perspectiva de Adler&Jung. El Yo, junto con el resto de los arquetipos de Jung, ya está presente como germen del Ego en el Inconsciente Colectivo. Está inmerso en el «diálogo ecosistémico iniciado, tras la concepción —fusión de gametos—, dentro del cigoto». Como «todo cambia y todo fluye», la totalidad avanza dentro de la comunidad humana y ecológica (ambiente) integrando información para el surgimiento de la «Pre-consciencia del Ego». Asimilando las lecciones, este «Ego» se sigue individualizando y se va convirtiendo en una «Persona con Identidad» hasta llegar a la «Consciencia», la esfera luminosa de la psique. Ahora el Ego está cargado de muchos datos «encriptados e indescifrables pero eficientes», por su arraigo en el inconsciente. Cuando llegue el momento, el Ego dirá: «Yo soy quien soy, y tú eres quien eres». En este primerísimo instante se exterioriza el Ego.
Translated by Google from Sp-En

Please provide a reference for the source of this quote.

Based on the concepts of Jung's theory, this text has been deductively constructed for a thesis. The work of the therapist community is needed to add empirical inferences.
We know that the zygote, since its gametal conception, is exchanging matter and energy with its environment (its mother, and her environment too). Is its psycho-structure independent or uncoupled from its bio-structures (Maturana&Varela), and consequently Watzlawick's non-communicate 1-axiom false in this case?

You said, "The work of the therapist community is needed to add empirical inferences". I'm sorry, but it is the responsibility of answerers to back claims with reputable sources, not the community.

Only the community of therapists can make inferences from their empirical work, outsiders can only do deductive work from what has been theorized. That is what I have done based on renowned scientists such as Maturana, Varela, Watzlawick, Jung (of course), and... applying Logic.

Not my downvote, but re. your statement "The Self ... is already present as the germ of the Ego in the Collective Unconscious".  Contrast with : "For Jung, the Self is an encompassing whole which acts as a container." ref. Self in Jungian psychology

The Collective Unconscious exists before the Ego as an indeterminate potentiality. It can be said that all possible egos are in states of superposition before any of them is observed, that is, personalized or embodied.  Of course, the Self contains the Ego, still in superimposed states, which will develop after its incarnation.
After this, what arises is given by the development or unfolding of potentialities according to the ecological circumstances. Jung's texts need to be revised by advances in science.
Matrix reloaded!


text:
What makes a book easier or harder to read?
I am interested in books by academics that examine the following. How to Read a Book: The Classic Guide to Intelligent Reading is the only relevant one that I found.
Suppose a reader to be deciding which books to read about a topic. Why do some readers:

judge some books easier to read than others?
comprehend some books faster and retain more than others?
What do authors (not) do that affect 1 and 2 above?

I attempted to clarify question and focus on underlying question (especially in title). Feel free to edit further

A book is never harder or easier to read in itself. It wasnt made that way, it just depends on your Learning skills and how well your brain feeds into the information to process it at a certain pace making it easier or harder to take in. Your life choices affect your reading abilities. Some kids read slower because the age they needed to start reading wasnt met. And now they struggle with Certain books. The book itself was made for enjoyment and knowledge to fuel your brain.

This question is open to some amount of opinion as there can be differences due to education level of the person reading the material etc.  However, there was a study by the American military in order to make their technical manuals as easy to read as possible.  The study was started by Rudolf Flesch with his Reading Ease evaluation, known as the Flesch reading-ease score (FRES) test, and Flesch later worked with J. Peter Kincaid to develop the Grade Level evaluation for the United States Navy, known as the "The Flesch–Kincaid" (F–K) reading grade level or Flesch–Kincaid readability test (Kincaid, et al. 1975)
Using the total number of words, syllables and sentences in the text, the formula for the Flesch reading-ease score (FRES) test is
$Score = 206.835 - 1.015 \left(\frac{total\;words}{total\;sentences}\right)-84.6\left(\frac{total\;syllables}{total\;words}\right)$
The readability tests used by schools is the F–K reading grade test.  The "Flesch–Kincaid Grade Level Formula" instead presents a score as a U.S. grade level, making it easier for teachers, parents, librarians, and others to judge the readability level of various books and texts.
Using the total number of words, syllables and sentences in the text, the Flesch–Kincaid (F-K) Grade Level Formula is
$Grade = 0.39\left(\frac{total\;words}{total\;sentences}\right)+11.8\left(\frac{total\;syllables}{total\;words}\right)-15.59$
Scores can be interpreted as shown in the following

References
Kincaid, J. P. Derivation of New Readability Formulas (Automated Readability Index, Fog Count, and Flesch Reading Ease Formula) Memphis:Naval Air Station Memphis [US Navy Unclassified PDF]
Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a006655.pdf

I recall a significant objection to this scoring, (I was actually in the military and given these "technical orders").   The objection was in the organization of the information, and intuitive associations with other information, (pattern recognition).  So, it was conjectured that the text's own effects that reinforced pattern recognition were a very high consideration.   If I could remember that study, I would provide my own answer. However, it is still a valid objection that this Flesch formula does not consider "organization and presentation of information" as a primary contributor.


text:
What makes something relevant to an argument and how can people improve in determining relevance?
Are there any books that examine questions about relevance in general like the following?
Relevance Theory seems something else and inapplicable.

What makes something (ir)relevant to an argument or discourse?
How can humans improve on deciding whether something is (ir)relevant?

I edited title to focus on the question. We prefer at cogsci.se to focus on the question... you can include a request for sources, but the aim of this site is to provide answers to the underlying question with references to the literature.

I'm voting to close this question as off-topic because it's a better fit for philosophy.SE (Relevance Theory is on-topic here, but Relevance in logic is not).

I'm voting to close this question as off-topic because this could possibly belong on law se

Because of the well-received answer by Chris I've re-opened this question. If anyone objects, just ping me here.

The Wikipedia article on relevance references a couple of books and a few journal articles.
The Wikipedia article says

Cognitive science and pragmatics
Further information: Relevance theory
In 1986, Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson drew attention to the central importance of relevance decisions in reasoning and communication. They proposed an account of the process of inferring relevant information from any given utterance. To do this work, they used what they called the "Principle of Relevance": namely, the position that any utterance addressed to someone automatically conveys the presumption of its own optimal relevance. The central idea of Sperber and Wilson's theory is that all utterances are encountered in some context, and the correct interpretation of a particular utterance is the one that allows most new implications to be made in that context on the basis of the least amount of information necessary to convey it. For Sperber and Wilson, relevance is conceived as relative or subjective, as it depends upon the state of knowledge of a hearer when they encounter an utterance.

The books referenced are:
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (1986/1995). Relevance: Communication and Cognition 2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell. ISBN-13: 978-0631198789Available from:
Amazon UK
Amazon US
Amazon Canada
and
Sperber, D. & D. Wilson (2004). Relevance Theory, In: Horn, L.R. & Ward, G. (eds.) 2004 The Handbook of Pragmatics Oxford: Blackwell: pp 607-632. ISBN-13: 978-0631225485Available from:
Amazon UK
Amazon US
Amazon Canada
There is free access to this part of the book on Dan Sperber's website
When going to the amazon pages for the relevant books, it also suggests other books other people have bought with these books along with other possible related books.

Thanks. But 1. Have you read the books above? 2. I wrote in my post that 'Relevance Theory seems something else and inapplicable.' Will you please explain why this is wrong, because you reference Relevance Theory?


text:
Does taking antidepressants, anxiolytics and sleep pills significantly affect a person's intelligence?
Do antidepressants, anxiolytics and sleeping pills significantly affect the intelligence of a person, for example as expressed by the general (g) factor? Do these compounds affect the g factor each individually? And what about the combinations of the two or three of them?
To narrow down the scope of the question, if necessary, we can go for commonly encountered drugs like Duloxetine (antidepressant), Xanax (anxiolytic), and Zolpidem (hypnotic/sedative).
I did a Google search, but the results were not that satisfying. I couldn't find a reliable resource which properly treats the topic.

The previous question might have been formulated too much like a self-help question. I do need to give you an heads up that here at CogSci we do not have many psychiatric experts who are knowledgeable about the interaction between medication and cognition. There is thus a chance you will not receive an answer here. I'd advice to read the brochure of the medication or ask a medical professional indeed. Those may be your best bets for finding the answer.

@OpenBall It would be better to indicate why you are asking this question, because the answer may depend very much on the objectives to carry it out.

@hexadecimal well, I had to take all of these and happened to have a decline in my intelligence. I am trying to pin down the cause.

@RobinKramer Everyone who has studied psychology has had at least 3 drug-related subjects, including psychopharmacology.

@OpenBall OK I was wondering if it was for research, I'll work on the answer, but surely it's a performance decrease, these medicaments do not generally harm the intelligence and less in the short term.

About intelligence: The subject of intelligence is broadly addressed in research in psychology, one of the most supportive theories is Spearman's bifactorial theory of intelligence, in this theory the factor g is a huge stable factor that explains the common variance (in scores) to all the different cognitive tasks that can be put to a person. Although intelligence would approach a series of constructs that explain the abilities in the resolution of cognitive problems, other factors that modulate these intelligence factors, such as motivation (volition or will) and attention (concentration), should always be taken into account. Among others (tiredness, stress, activation, etc). External factors exert their influence in early stages of information processing, can be identified with physical characteristics (light conditions, letter size, presence of the public, the person requires lenses, etc.). In conclusion, what we call intelligence, which we consider to be very stable, does not explain everything at all in cognitive tasks, there are many other causes that can influence, for example, and as mentioned, the level of activation (sleep, fatigue) or motivation and will.
Before considering an adverse drug effect, a period of adaptation should also be considered, based on factors such as: affinity (ability of the drug to match the receptor), intrinsic activity (ability to activate the receptor after its use ) And effective dose which is the amount of drug that produces the desired effect in 50% of users. In summary there is a period in which the person is adapting to the effects of the drug and even if the dose is adequate the person may experience a great change.

Adverse effects of drugs: Adverse effects are defined as an unwanted reaction that can be sometimes harmful and permanent, (not considered adverse effect inappropriate use) a high number of people report adverse effects, it is estimated that around 10 % of people experience effects but for most benefits obtained are greater than undesirable effects.
There are different types of adverse effects (cutaneous, gastrointestinal, respiratory system, cardiovascular system), if a drug produced damage to intelligence, it would be a late cognitive adverse effect, ie it would manifest after a high time consuming drug (sometimes long after withdrawal of the drug).
In relation to adverse effects in the central nervous system, the most common are: tiredness, dizziness, confusion, tremors, headache and seizures. The increase in fatigue occurs in almost all drugs that have a suppressive effect of the central nervous system (analgesics, antipsychotics, antidepressants, hypnotics, sedatives and anticonvulsants)
Depending on the country of residence, there are agencies that freely disclose information regarding the trade names with which the medicines are distributed in the state, these agencies also collect and study information about adverse effects recorded in other countries.
Duloxetine (R) (Duloxetine hydrochloride): Inhibitor of serotonin and noradrenaline reuptake. It weakly inhibits dopamine reuptake without significant affinity for histaminergic, dopaminergic, cholinergic and adrenergic receptors. Adverse effects: Headache, drowsiness, dizziness, lethargy, tremors, paraesthesia; Decreased appetite; Insomnia, agitation, decreased libido, anxiety, abnormal orgasms, abnormal dreams; blurry vision; Tinnitus; Increased blood pressure, flushing; Yawning; Nausea, dry mouth, constipation, diarrhea, abdominal pain, vomiting, dyspepsia, flatulence; Increased sweating, rash; Musculoskeletal pain, muscle spasm; Dysuria; Erectile dysfunction, ejaculation disorder, delayed ejaculation; Falls, fatigue; weightloss.
Xanax (R) (Alprazolam): It is believed to exert its effect by binding to the ester-specific receptors located in SCN. It has anxiolytic, hypnotic muscle relaxant and anticonvulsive properties, as well as a specific activity in distress crisis. Adverse effects: Depression, sedation, somnolence, ataxia, memory impairment, dysarthria, dizziness, headache; Constipation, dry mouth; Fatigue, irritability.
Zolpiden (R) (Zolpidem hemitartrate): hypnotic type non benzodiazepine. Group of Imidazopyrines. Specific agonist of central receptors belonging to the GABA-omega macromolecular receptor complex that modulates the opening of the chlorine ion channel. Adverse effects: bitterness and dry mouth, upset stomach, drowsiness, dizziness and paradoxical reaction that usually disappear with a dose adjustment.
In summary, it seems that they are drugs that, in their phase of adjustment or adaptation, may well cause a temporary reduction in cognitive performance, but this effect should be reduced and temporary, that is to say, very brief, in case the Problem persists or in case of doubt can always be accessed to make consultations to pharmacists or general medicine (even for second opinions beyond the professional who has prescribed these drugs).
Sources:

Stephen M. Stahl. (2000). Essential Psychopharmacology: Neuroscientific Basis and Practical Applications. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Stephen M. Stahl. (2005). Prescriber's Guide. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Request here modifications or more information.

hi hexadeciamal, sorry to bother you again, but it would again be great if you could include some references to back up your statement. Your answer looks amazing, is well thought out and, most importantly, is answering the question. However, without including references it is unknown whether this is factual information or based on personal experiences that may or may not be the truth.

Okay, that's right, you're right I'll include the references for the answers and I should devote more effort to the sources. However, it is also necessary to re-emphasize that there are difficulties to name some sources. For example, there are many things that I remember from my teachers, important things, knowledge of professional courses or full afternoon afternoons looking for articles whose title I do not remember.

I understand that completely. I experience the same thing. What I usually  try to do is do a quick google search to see if I can find the study I was looking for, or otherwise use one that states something similar. If that proves to be difficult, I sometimes allow myself to use a less-scientific source or a figure, like you did already :)

Isn't intelligence a personality trait? In this case both the question and the answer might need to be formulated more precisely. Reading above, I have the impression, that you are speaking mainly about the effect of drugs on cognitive performance. — Having two groups of subjects, one with high and the other with low IQ-scores, it seems plausible to expect different performances for each group under the effect of the same drug. In other words: I would expect both intelligence and drugs to be distinct determinants that affect cognitive performance measures. Regards.

Like any characteristics of a subject intelligence can be considered a trait but judging that trait as a personality trait is conflictive, not all would agree. You say that I speak of the effect of drugs on cognitive performance ... of course, how not. You say that you would expect the drugs and intelligence to be different determinants ... that is a mistake, even depending on how you formulate these relationships may be an artifact error, the correct thing would be to say that in a person, who has a level of intelligence , an effect may occur due to the drugs.

In the supposed experiment in which you think, in the case of finding a statistically significant difference in the groups (established by intelligence level) in performance, you should not conclude that the differences are due to intelligence (should be other biological variables)... correct? Regards.


text:
Can the V * I * E theory of motivation explain the motivation of Nelson Mandela?
Background
The V * I * E theory of motivation (Galbraith & Cummings, 1967; Vroom, 1964) posits that if either the value of a goal, its instrumentality or the expectancy to reach it is zero, then an individual will not be motivated to reach that goal (please correct me if I'm wrong).
Nelson Mandela spent 27 years in jail because he was an anti-apartheid revolutionary. Apparently, he never gave up his mission.
Question
Can the VIE theory of motivation, or newer developments of it, explain thoroughly why some people don't give up their goals even if they to live under adverse conditions for a very long period of time?
More details: One might argue that such a person didn't lose the goal but just didn't try to realize it as long as it wasn't possible. In other words: the value was kept upright but the expectancy was zero. On the other hand, if V, I or E is zero, then the motivation - the drive - is zero as well. It is unclear what kept upright the value in this case. What drives a person in such a situation to keep fighting and can that be explained by the VIE theory of motivation?
References
Galbraith, J., & Cummings, L. L. (1967). An empirical investigation of the motivational determinants of task performance: Interactive effects between instrumentality—valence and motivation—ability. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 2(3), 237–257. https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(67)90020-7
Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and motivation. Oxford,  England: Wiley.

The VIE theory you mentioned can explain why some people don't give up their goals even if they to live under adverse conditions for a very long period of time, and the theory is very similar to a theory followed in Sociology and Psychology.  That is Social Exchange Theory.
Although the theory is generally referred to when talking about social interactions in relationships, it can also be related to the situations you are referring to.
Social Exchange Theory
The basic idea is that the social exchange process brings satisfaction when people receive fair returns for their expenditures. The major difference between social and economic exchange is the nature of the exchange between parties.  The social exchange perspective argues that people calculate the overall worth of a particular relationship by subtracting its costs from the rewards it provides.
$Rewards$ $–$ $Costs = Worth$
If the $Costs$ in the situation you are talking about is bigger than the benefits ($Rewards$), the $Worth$ has a negative value leading to the choice of not carrying out the task in mind.
To use your Nelson Mandella example,

Nelson Mandela spent 27 years in jail because he was an anti-apartheid revolutionary. Apparently, he never gave up his mission.

Mandella perceived that the possible positive $Rewards$ (end to apartheid) outweighed the $Costs$ (imprisonment), therefore the $Worth$ of his social activism was positive (greater than zero).
If Mandella saw the $Costs$ being greater than the $Rewards$, the $Worth$ would have been negative and he may have chosen a different path, but then that is speculation.  The other point of note is that motivation towards social activism is generally towards improving the status quo within society, leading to positive $Rewards$.
What I have put forward is on Social Exchange Theory, however a possible alternative would be that he felt that change was vital and therefore the value of the fight and its goal outweighed the $Costs$ (VIE Theory).  Maybe both theories were in play.  This again is open to speculation.
Social Exchange Theory was introduced in 1958 by the sociologist George Homans with the publication of his work "Social Behavior as Exchange" (Cook & Rice, 2001).  Homans summarised the theory in 5 propositions (University of Amsterdam, n.d.):

The 1st Proposition - Success proposition:When an individual is rewarded for their actions, they tend to repeat the action;
The 2nd Proposition - Stimulus proposition:The more often a particular behaviour has resulted in a reward in the past, the more likely it is that a person will respond to it (possibly with reward); and
The 3rd Proposition - Value proposition:If the expected result of a behavioural action is considered valuable to the individual, it is more likely for that behaviour to occur
The 4th Proposition - Deprivation–satiation proposition:The more often in the recent past a person has received the same reward, the less valuable any further unit of that reward becomes.
The 5th Proposition – Aggression-approval proposition:When the rewards of a social exchange are not as expected, a person will react emotionally, usually in an angry or aggravated manner. Those who receive more than they expect or do not receive anticipated punishment will be happy and will behave approvingly.

References
Cook, K. S. & Rice, E. R. W., 2001. Chapter 31: Exchange and Power - Issues of Structure and Agency. In: J. H. Turner, ed. Handbook of Sociological Theory. New York City: Springer Science & Business Media, LLC, pp. 699-719.
University of Amsterdam, n.d. SocioSite: George C. Homans - General Propositions. [Online]
Available at: http://www.sociosite.net/topics/texts/homans.php
[Accessed 4 August 2016].

Hello, many thanks for adding to the question. However your argument doesn't answer my question, since it "works" with social exchange theory. In your answer you posit that he perceived a possible end of apartheid. What if he didn't -- 27 years is quite a long time to be imprisoned. Why didn't he give up? How could Social Exchange Theory explain that he didn't give up even if no Reward was perceived? Kind regards

Please allow me to add: The (admittedly somewhat disguised) motive of my question is to address the limitations of the VIE theory and also of similar theories like social exchange theory (I agree on the similarity). I maintain that recent research in "meaning" (for instance "meaningful work" and similar concepts) may explain "things" that are beyond the scope of the above mentioned theories. Kind regards.

I have been pondering your last statement in your first comment for a while and I am at a loss with where you are coming from on this.  Mandella perceived the possibility of the $Rewards$ he fought for and that is what made him continue the fight.  According to social exchange theory, if he couldn't perceive the Reward being possible, then there would be no point in continuing to fight for change as the $Costs$ outweigh the $Rewards$ which would be negative.  The possible alternative would be that he felt that change was vital and therefore the fight outweighed the $Costs$ (VIE Theory)

Reward: "satisfying event that is obtained when some requisite task has been carried out" (Penguin Dic. o. Psy.). Reward expectancy: "internal process that occurs when an organism recognizes that it is in a circumstance that has previously been associated with a reward" (idib.). I'm sure you also pondered about my second comment: There are better suited theories to explain "Mandelas" (or comparable) state of mind than social exchange th. or VIE. Claiming that he perceived the possibility of reward is speculative; the concept of "meaning/personal sense" on the other hand seems better suited ..


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Understanding Melatonin
Is my understanding roughly correct?

Melatonin is 'generated' in the absence of specific wavelengths of light.
It accumulates and is only reduced by sleep, in particular REM sleep.
Melatonin and sleepiness have a causal relationship.

There is an entry in the Encyclopædia Britannica on Melatonin which gives a run-down on how melatonin is produced and it's use within sleep, regulating reproductive hormones, and helping the immune system.

In humans, melatonin plays an important role in the regulation of sleep cycles (i.e., circadian rhythm). Its production is influenced by the detection of light and dark by the retina of the eye. For example, the production of melatonin is inhibited when the retina detects light and is stimulated in the absence of light. Special photoreceptor cells in the retina send signals about light status to the suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN) in the hypothalamus of the brain. These signals are then transmitted to the pineal gland. Melatonin generation by the pineal gland, which peaks during the nighttime hours, induces physiological changes that promote sleep, such as decreased body temperature and respiration rate. During the day, melatonin levels are low because large amounts of light are detected by the retina. Light inhibition of melatonin production is central to stimulating wakefulness in the morning and to maintaining alertness throughout the day.

Therefore, to correct points 1-3 in your question...

Melatonin is produced when the retinas do not pick up any light.
Melatonin accumulates in the body during sleep and is reduced when the retinas pick up light.
Melatonin regulates sleep cycles by inducing physiological changes that promote sleep, such as decreased body temperature and respiration rate.

Because melatonin regulates sleep cycles, melatonin has a big role to play in mental wellbeing.  Deregulation or misregulation of circadian rhythms can cause mood spectrum disorders, including bipolar disorder (BD), major depressive disorder (MDD), and seasonal affective disorder (SAD). (De Berardis, et al. 2015)

Reference
De Berardis, D., Orsolini, L., Serroni, N., Girinelli, G., Iasevoli, F., Tomasetti, C., Mazza, M., Valchera, A., Fornaro, M., Perna, G., Piersanti, M., Di Nicola, M., Cavuto, M., Martinotti, G. & Di Giannantonio, M., 2015. The role of melatonin in mood disorders. ChronoPhysiology and Therapy, 5, pp. 65-75DOI: 10.2147/CPT.S41761


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Is there anything comparable to the IPIP for IO psychology, work psychology and the like?
The International Personality Item Pool is a public domain collection of over 3000 items and 250 scales.
Is there anything comparable for work psychology and the like?

I'm not aware of any such initiatives. But it would be great to see.
In general, I think I/O psychology has been a bit less proactive in engaging with the open science approach than some disciplines of psychology. More generally, many researchers are silent on the issue of licences for their scales. Thus, it can be ambiguous about what you are allowed to do with a scale, say, that you find in a published journal article. Furthermore, many scales in organisational psychology are explicitly free to use for research purposes are not free for commercial purposes.


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What do we know about schizophrenia and mathematics?
Schizophrenia is usually associated with intellectual problems. I don't think that cognitive deficits are only associated with vulnerability to schizophrenia, though there is the much cited

Russell et al (1997) recently proposed that intellectual decline in
  schizophrenia was a nothing more than a ‘myth’. They followed up
  patients who had received an intelligence test as a child, who then
  developed schizophrenia, and had their intelligence re-tested some 19
  years later. There were no differences between the child and adult
  IQs. However, others have criticised this study on the grounds that
  the sample was unrepresentative in that the individuals had presented
  to child psychiatry units and were far more intellectually impaired
  than subjects in other studies of children who subsequently developed
  schizophrenia.

From my research prior to this question, it seems that there is a loss of ability, but likely not chronic decline over the course of the illness, one before or during the transition to psychosis. Another well known meta review claims this, that there's

no support for hypothesizing a degenerative
  process in schizophrenia once positive symptoms appear... a static encephalopathy rather than a degenerative process

I've seen it said that it is centered on mathematical ability.
What do we know about mathematical ability pre and post psychosis, in schizophrenia? e.g., was John Nash a worse mathematician after he went mad?
References
Russell, A. J., et al. (1997) Schizophrenia and the myth of intellectual decline. American Journal of Psychiatry, 154(5), pp 635–639.
DOI: 10.1176/ajp.154.5.635 PMID: 9137118 WOS: A1997WX13000009

I spent times of the order of five to eight months in hospitals in New
  Jersey, always on an involuntary basis and always attempting a legal
  argument for release. And it did happen that when I had been long
  enough hospitalized that I would finally renounce my delusional
  hypotheses and revert to thinking of myself as a human of more
  conventional circumstances and return to mathematical research. In
  these interludes of, as it were, enforced rationality, I did succeed
  in doing some respectable mathematical research.

Seems like he himself is saying his research suffered while unwell and not staying in institutions.
However, the standard deficit in IQ, of it seems around 10 points, may be inconsequential in someone like Nash. Even if the executive function and memory impairments are more significant.

Where is this quote from?


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Antonym for apophenia
I understand that apophenia is the standard term in psychology to describe the tendency to spot patterns where none exist (analogous to a Type I error - false positive).
Is there a standard term to describe the opposite phenomenon? The tendency to miss a pattern where one exists (analogous to a Type II error - false negative).

Where apophenia is seeing patterns in randomness, there is an unofficial term "randomania" that is seeing randomness in patterns.  It's not used very much though.

@ArnonWeinberg: Thanks that's useful. Googling I find some guy on a LinkedIn page claiming that "apophenia, agenticity, patternicity, randomania, respectively defined as: tendency to seek patterns in random information, to infuse patterns with meaning, tendency to find meaningful patterns in meaningless noise, attributing to chance what are apparently patterned or related data." Perhaps there are more authoritative references for this claim.

I wouldn't call this reference authoritative, but after a bit of research the first article in this journal (originally published in the Journal of Parapsychology) introduces the term "randomania" as "attributing chance probability to (apparently) related phenomenon." Note that this term is specifically defined in contrast to apophenia.
As an aside, this blog post discusses the history of the term apophenia (and potential modern misapplications of its current definition).


text:
In the digit span test, why do some strategies work and others don't?
I got a free copy of PEBL, psych experiment software, which includes a couple of standard working memory tests.
When I perform the digit span working memory test, I can repeat the numbers as they appear, and do some basic chunking. For example, I can repeat '3-1-8-4' as "thirty one" "eighty four". But when I try any other chunking or rehearsal technique I find it impossible to do the task. I think my working memory just empties. My question is why that happens? More specifically -
What cognitive functions do more complex rehearsal and chunking techniques tap into? Is there a means to improve / train those specific cognitive functions?

Chunking leverages long-term memory for the chunks, i.e. we recognize and remember much easier the familiar chunks, sometimes algorithmically. This is much easier explained in the domain of letters/words, e.g. we'd recognize USA as substring among random letters. Similarly most would recognize the pattern 1945 (WWII end) by paired association, or 12321 algorithmically.
In the classic case of SF he used sequences familiar to him (running times) to greatly improve his performance. More unusual (cf. Memory Search By A Memorist) is Rajan's ability to recognize 13- to 17-digit chunks visually/syntactically, without assigning them meaning. Ishihara, who could memorize overall longer sequences than Rajan [under controlled settings], but was much slower, used a method to convert them into syllables; he was naturally very gifted at remembering nonsense syllables though (cf. Superior Memory).
A few other association methods exist, including with places ("loci"), which relies on visual memory etc. It's possible to train the average person using these and attain significant improvements; the graph below (3rd one bein relevant, but I've included all for the caption) is from a recent PhD thesis. It takes a significant amount of practice/time to become proficient/fast in the encoding/decoding techniques.

Some clarification in regards to these graphs:

The other two tests are self-paced (just with overall time limit) memorization tests, i.e. how many words/digits in a sequence can be retained in a 5-minute interval with no time pressure for learning each word/digit.
The digit span was tested with 2 second intervals, which probably helped with learning a bit. Other authors have used 1 second, which makes it harder to apply encoding/decoding techniques.
The training protocol (for the blue lines) was fairly involved using the Memocamp software which can display the memorization aids (loci or images), and can also display a configurable metronome.
"SEM" stands for "Standard Error of the Means (the error bars).

The handful of people (not in this thesis/experiment) who have practiced for years (one of SF's colleagues and two in a replication experiment) have reached 80-100 digits in the digit span test. For that level of performance, not only did they use an associative system, but also a hierarchical chunking method. The chunk size was almost universally 4 for these performers (thus the need for hierarchy). On average it took about 500 hours of practice to decrease decoding/encoding time from an initial 5 seconds to the 1 second required by the digit span test (all this cf. The Neuroscience of Expertise, pp. 110-112).

great answer, thanks. any reason why someone couldn't use long term memory to chunk, very easily? and in what ways (if at all) would improved perceptual speed help in the digit span test

@user3293056 You can always ask new questions in a new follow-up post. Be sure to refer to and include what you learned from the previous question you asked (the question should stand on its own).

@StevenJeuris ok i might do so. fizz, was Rajan using definitely not using any form of chunking? could they be "chunking" unintentionally in some way?

@user3293056: Rajan used chunking for larger things (like memorizing pi to 10,000 decimals), but he is somewhat unique in that he did not transform the data to something else entirely. For pi he memorized a large matrix where each row had ten ten-digit chunks (100 digits per row), and he could recall random rows at will, but all accounts suggests he did this by "rote learning", not associating the rows with anything other than their number/position. That his chunks (of pi) were 10-digit was verified because he could recall the first 5 digits faster than the last 5 for any given/asked chunk.

can chunking make things worse? e.g.: when seeing the letters RFBI 'R' is forgotten when 'FBI' is chunked; when seeing 50202 '5' is forgotten when '0202' is chunked. why might this happen?


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What causes people to betray each other when facing the prisoner's dilemma?
When confronted with the Prisoner's Dilemma, people often refuse to cooperate. Instead, they choose to betray other people, even when cooperation yields a more favorable outcome.
Why do people behave in that way? Is it a genealogical feature which is embedded during evolution?

'Short' answer
The way people respond to the prisoner's dilemma strongly depends on how the experiment is set up. In a repeated game, where the same 'prisoners' meet each other multiple times, the tit-for-tat strategy seems to be favored. This, because contenders learn the other's behavior and start anticipating the choice from their opponent to manipulate the outcome. It is not so that people by default betray their opponent. The betrayal (confession) is the selfish option and is favorable when you have no idea what the other will do, as it will always work in favor of yourself. The cooperation (keeping silent) is the most risky one and you only do that when you like to take big risks (unlikely, most people don't), or when you have a fairly good idea what your opponent will do.
Background
The prisoners’ dilemma is about cooperation and competition and applies to social settings, business and politics. In the traditional version of the game, the police have arrested two suspects A and B. Both were involved in he same crime and they are interrogated separately. The police offers A and B to confess and by doing so giving away the accomplice, or to keep silent (source: Library of Economics & Liberty).
When A will confess and gives away B, A will be granted a shorter sentence as A has confessed and has aided the cops in sentencing B, and vice versa when B confesses. If A so confesses, but B holds silent (not knowing he has been given away), B will face an exceptionally harsh sentence because of refusing to admit his crimes (say 5 years in jail).
When both confess they will both face reduced sentences because they are helping the police as a witness (say 2 year in jail).
When both keep silent they can only be sentenced on minor charges because of a lack of proof (say a sentence of just 1 year).
The “dilemma” faced by the prisoners is that, whatever the other does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the outcome obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they would have obtained had both remained silent.
The prisoner's dilemma can be viewed at as a puzzle, illustrating the conflict between individual and group rationality. A group whose members pursue rational self-interest may all end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to rational self-interest. More generally, if the payoffs are not assumed to represent self-interest, a group whose members rationally pursue any goals may all meet less success than if they had not rationally pursued their goals individually (source: Stanford University).
A slightly different interpretation takes the game to represent a choice between selfish behavior and socially desirable altruism (behavior of an individual that benefits another at its own expense). The move corresponding to confession benefits the actor, no matter what the other does (selfish), while the move corresponding to silence benefits the other player no matter what that other player does (altruism). Benefiting oneself is not always wrong, of course, and benefiting others at the expense of oneself is not always morally required, but in the prisoner's dilemma game both players prefer the outcome with the altruistic moves to that with the selfish moves. This observation has led David Gauthier and others to take the Prisoner's Dilemma to say something important about the nature of morality (source: Stanford University).
Now - to come to your question - you talk about 'betrayal' (which is probably referring to 'confessing') and cooperation (probably referring to 'holding silent'). You have to realize that keeping silent means you have to know that the other person will (likely) do that too. In a one-shot situation you cannot know. However, it is only when the game is repeatedly performed, and when the subjects can learn the behavior of their 'accomplice' that subjects start to make educated guesses. A particularly fruitful strategy, surprisingly, in a repeated game is the 'tit-for-tat' approach, an almost childish approach to the dilemma, where people cooperate with their partner on the first round, then adjust their behavior to match your partner’s, as in, you do to them what they just did to you. If your partner cooperated (stayed silent) the last time, you also choose to cooperate (stay silent too) this time; if they defected (confessed) last time, you respond in kind by retaliating (confessing) against them (source: Seltzer in Psychology Today, 2016).

The point about PD is that co-operation is NOT the more favourable outcome - for the INDIVIDUAL. Thus, the best strategy on single shot or fixed session PD games is always to defect.
What if the experiment is open-ended? Then, as Robert Axelrod and numerous other mathematical models have demonstrated, the optimal strategy is to co-operate with Tit for Tat.
The ‘cause’ of defection can thus be seen as ‘self interest’. However, cooperation always decays over time which leads us to consider that Reputation is also a factor, worth a look:
Duca and Nax 2018 Groups and Scores: The Decline of Cooperation
Simply defecting deteriorates ones own reputation, and this in turn becomes a new cause of defection in future rounds

Actually we need to differentiate between two situations: when a perfectly rational subject (think a robot) plays the game and when a human plays the game.
When a robot plays the game, he knows he can't control other subject's actions, so he only considers his own choices and considers the two choices of the opponent equally possible. So put yourself in the shoes of that robot - he has two possibilities:
Betray:
- he gets 0 years or 2 years of prison (both equally possible)
Don't betray:
- he gets 1 year or 3 years of prison (both equally possible)
We see here that both cases are worse if he doesn't betray. The first part shows us that with betraying he gets 0 years, and with not betraying he gets 1 years, which is worse. The other part shows us that with betraying he gets 2 years and with not betraying he gets 3 years, which is again worse.
So he concludes that it's better to always betray (the important thing here is that he can't control what the other subject will do, so he must consider that both of the opponents choices are equally probable). 50% probability to get 0 years is better than 50% probability to get 1 year. On the other hand, 50% probability to get 2 years is better than 50% probability to get 3 years.
But now we come to humans. What's interesting is that, as the Wikipedia article says,

In reality, humans display a systemic bias towards cooperative behavior in this and similar games despite what is predicted by simple models of "rational" self-interested action.

Humans are actually not playing it as a robot would! Humans show a tendency to be more cooperative than robots, which contrasts with what you imply in your question.
The reason for humans being more cooperative could be that they care about their reputation, as the other user said.


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Can we interconnect with other people mentally during dreaming?
In some of my dreams, I have seen people that I know, and I ask them about it the day after and they say that they saw me too. My older sister said that she had exactly the same dream as one of her male friends.
Can we actually connect with other people mentally while sleeping?

Are you sure the "male friend" wasn't toying with her (or vice versa)? Unless there was an objective third party to evaluate the dreams before any discussion between the participants took place, it is difficult to believe it happened that way. But rather one leading and the other agreeing to various details.

Short answer
Telepathy is pseudoscience.
Background
I think you are referring to the phenomenon of telepathy, which can be defined as

[T]he purported transmission of information from one person to another
  without using any of our known sensory channels or physical
  interaction

and you ask whether telepathy is a scientifically established phenomenon.
Telepathy in general is dismissed as being pseudoscience (Jogalekar, 2013) as it has been debunked in various scientific studies (e.g.
Ayeroff & Abelson (1976)).
Likewise, dream telepathy is considered pseudoscience. It was reportedly first documented by Freud in the 1940s. Freud founded many other pseudo-scientific concepts, including psychoanalysis (Jupp, 1977). Ullman & Krippner from the dream laboratory in Maimonides Medical Center in New York City claimed they had proven the existence of dream telepathy in the 1960s and 70s (e.g. Krippner & Ullman (1970). However, the studies were rightfully challenged. For example, many of their studies were based on a few or even on single subjects (e.g. Ullman & Krippner (1966) and Krippner & Ullman (1970)). Indeed, more recent studies have failed to replicate their findings (e.g.., Belvedere & Foulkes, (1971) and Hearne (1989)).
References
- Ayeroff & Abelson, Personality and Social Psychology (1976); 34(2): 240-7
- Belvedere & Foulkes, Perceptual and Motor Skills (1971); 33(3)
- Hearne, J Soc Psychical Res (1989); 55(814): 271-4
- Jogalekar, Sci Am (August 2013)
- Jupp, Philosophy (1977); 52(202): 441-53
- Krippner & Ullman J Nervous & Mental Disease (1970)
- Ullman & Krippner Int J Neuropsych, 2(5): 420-37