text:
What are the neurological and psychological bases for chromophobia
According to this amusing, yet informative Cracked article, Phobia-source article and Chromophobia: do you have a fear of colours website, chromophoba is a fear of bright colours.  This condition is also known as chromatophobia
There are no Wikipedia references for the alternate name and checking Wikipedia for chromophobia only reveals a movie by the same name, which is in a small part, why I am asking.
What are the neurological and psychological bases for this phobia?

Chromophobia has at least two distinct meanings in the sciences:

in cultural studies it denotes a (supposed) cultural deprecation of colors in general or of specific colors (e.g. http://www.academia.edu/1100717/Late_Antique_Aesthetics_Chromophobia_and_the_Red_Monastery_Sohag_Egypt);
in histology it denotes a tissue that does not stain when preparing samples (e.g. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC503209/pdf/jnnpsyc00293-0005.pdf).

I was unable to locate any reliable source on a psychological fear of colors. I searched the most relevant digital databases: Web of Science, Academic Search Premier, PsychINFO, and Psyndex (the latter listing publications in German). And I went through all the handbooks on mental disorders that we have at our university library and the institute of psychology. There is not even anecdotal evidence. Chromophobia as a mental disorder appears only in lists of phobias on the internet that have been created by laypeople.
Or in a list of 273 phobias compiled by Jack D. Maser as an appendix to the handbook on Anxiety and Anxiety Disorders (Tuma & Maser, 1985):

But as you can see from this top part of page 807 of his list, his Latin is not the best. Probably he couldn't decipher his own (or someone else's) handwriting, mistaking "col" for "od". But the basic problem with this list, which might well be the grandmother of all the lists of phobias found on the internet today, is that Maser does not provide any sources for his phobias. And if you look at the fears of time, food, or defecation, listed in it, it seems quite unlikely that anyone might actually be able to suffer from these.
Eminent expert Richard J. McNally, a member of the specific phobia and posttraumatic stress disorder committees of the DSM-IV task force, thinks (1997, p. 183) that in Maser's list "terminological proliferation has been driven more by etymology than by etiology. ... In fact, suffer[er]s of hellenologophobia (i.e. fear of 'pseudoscientific terms') will surely tremble to contemplate many of [the] entities uncovered by Maser in his search through the literature."
In the DSM, phobias, or "specific phobias" as they are classified (to distinguish them from social phobias and other anxiety disorders) are subclassified by their trigger:

objects, sometimes called: blood-injection-injury (syringes, blood, medical procedures)
situations (being in an elevator)
animals (snakes, spiders)
environments (heights, water)
other

The category that would interest us here, is the "other" category. The standard examples given in the manual and expansively discussed in McNally's article on "Atypical Phobias" (McNally, 1997), are: "phobic avoidance of situations that may lead to choking, vomiting, or contracting an illness; in children, avoidance of loud sounds like balloons popping or costumed characters like clowns".
I'm not a specialist on phobias, but from my perusal of quite a volume of literature today, I have the impression that in adult phobias all triggers are either potentially harmful, or are related to similar objects that are harmful: all animals are either predators or poisonous or look like them (a cat might be essentially harmless to an adult human, but it is an animal that can cause pain; there is no lamb phobia); all "situations" involve technical appliances that might fail (airplanes, elevators) or harm you by their characteristics (getting stuck in a narrow tube); all environments can cause death (drowning, falling from a height, getting struck by lightning). Phobias are essentially reasonable in their choice of a trigger, they never choose triggers that are always and totally harmless. From this (non-specialist) result of my search, a fear of color appears impossible.
Of course this is only my personal, non-specialist impression, after a short research, and it will be falsified as soon as someone can come up with a reliable source.
But I admit that I was not truthful in my summary, and have lied to you when I wrote that I found no reference to chromophobia as a psychological disorder. PsycINFO turned up one result, an article published in Italian in a journal that unfortunately is not available online:

Gebhardt, E., & Giorgini, L. (2007). La ragione non ha colore: ipotesi sulla cromofobia [Reason has no colour: Hypotheses on cromophobia]. Il Sogno Della Farfalla: Rivista Di Psichiatria E Psicoterapia, 16(4), 35-57.

An English abstract is given:

Stemming from an analysis of a case study this research proposes to study a symptomatology where the sight of colour provokes anguish, known in literature as chromophobia, in order to allow us to develop the correct nosography and to identify the underlying psychic dynamics. The immediacy with which an unaltered perception in itself can be given an abnormal meaning to the point of becoming a terrible anguish brings us to consider chromophobia as an example of delusional perception and as such falling within the psychotic syndromes. As far as the object perceived is concerned, that is colour, it is worth noting that Western thought views it as negative for a twofold reason. Religious dogma views colour as dangerous given that it is alien to man, belonging to the body of another who is different from oneself and as such it has been given female, infantile, primitive or pathological attributes. Rationalist thought has, on the other hand, underestimated the importance of colour viewing it as superficial, supplementary and not warranting serious study. Colour has always been subordinate to the drawn figure. Both these approaches have proposed a dichotomy between line and colour attributing the former to the world of rationality and the latter to the non-conscious world. This splitting, according to the authors, can be overcome only if we consider that in the theory of birth the ego is not split at its origin and as such neither is perception. Line and colour therefore are connected to birth and the first year of life.

I admit, that I don't consider this source reliable. The journal, Il sogno della farfalla, as described in a Wikipedia article, is focussed on the psychotherapeutic theory and practice of its founder, the famous but controversial Italian psychiatrist, screenwriter and movie director Massimo Fagioli. This is not the place to discuss Fagioli or the authors of the article (who are both members of the journal's editorial board), but we should note that the journal appears not to have a peer review process.

Sources:

Maser, J. D. (1985). List of phobias. In A. H. Tuma & J. D. Maser (eds.), Anxiety and the Anxiety Disorders (pp. 805-813). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
McNally, R. J. (1997). Atypical phobias. In G. C. I. Davey (ed.), Phobias: A handbook of Theory, Research and Treatment (pp. 183-199). Chichester: Wiley.

With this last edit my research is now complete.

You don't need to say that you were 'untruthful in your summary' - it seems that you may have found the reference after you wrote the summary.  This is looking very interesting - I will be very interested in what, if anything, the reference "Atypical phobias" says about chromophobia.

No, I withheld the reference until after I had given the summary, knowing of it all the time. I preferred to make my argument in this order. But in fact I was truthful, because I said that I had not found a reliable source, which, I argue, I haven't.


text:
Waking around the same time without an alarm
Anecdotal background
I find that regardless of what time I go to bed, or how exhausted I am, I always wake up the next morning between 5 and 6am.  This is despite my alarm being consistently set for 6:15am.  I used to work in an industry, over 15 years ago, where earlier morning starts were part of the job (started work at 6am then), but none quite as drastic since then.  I do not take naps, either.
This happens irrespective of the conditions (temperature, etc).
So, I do not have a fixed time of sleep and it is not necessarily easy to get of bed at that time (some mornings here are very cold).
The question
What are the neurological triggers that cause someone to continually wake up at a set time in the morning, regardless of time of sleep and conditions?
Note - this not a self help question.  I have read the questions and answers for "What defines the easiest time to get out of bed in the morning for humans?" and "How are people able to wake themselves up after a pre-specified amount of time?" and they did not quite have the answers I am after.

The same happens with "hunger": If you eat at the same time each day, your body learns this rhythm and adapts to it, releasing the hormones etc. you need to digest shortly before the expected food intake, causing you to feel hungry about half an hour before your regular meal time. So what you really want to know is not the mechanism for waking up, which is the same no matter if you wake up regularly or irregularly, but about your biological clock and how that works. Because in a regular life style the normal phyisological mechanisms are triggered before the expected event.

@what, yes, this kind of thing I am after a referenced answer to.

You might want to rephrase your question to attract the right kind of experts and instigate the right kind of research. Just using "biological clock waking up" in Google turns up a multitude of results, the first one being my answer below.

Ever wondered why you wake up in the morning—even when the alarm clock isn't making jarring noises? Wonder no more. Researchers at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies have identified a new component of the biological clock, a gene responsible for starting the clock from its restful state every morning.

http://www.salk.edu/news/pressrelease_details.php?press_id=521

Thank you!  That kind of article is what I am after - answers my question with bonus genetics and physiology.

source: Stack Exchange

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Why do "cool" colors, which are actually warmer, look cool, and vice versa?
Why do cool colors look cool that are in fact warmer, and why do warm colors look warm when they are actually cooler?
Blue wavelength has higher energy than red, i.e, blue flame is hotter than red flame, but still blue seems cool. Is it due to it being the color of water or the sky?

Why is red light seen as "warm", although it is still lower in energy than blue?
Red and blue light differ in energy density, they are located on opposite sides of the rainbow. Blue light oscillates almost twice as fast as red and has a correspondingly shorter wavelength. And because it swings faster, the particles of blue light are also higher in energy. Nevertheless, red light appears warmer.
This is the difference between physics and psychology. How a color affects us depends not just on whether or not the corresponding rays are energetic, but it depends on how the brain processes signals. And especially when it comes to colors, very archaic associations play a role.
Red, yellow and orange - these are the colors of fire, of embers. The sun appears red in the evening sky. And red is also the color of blood. Blood means heat: If we are hot and our fingers are warm, they are red. This already happened to our early ancestors, and that's why this association of red = hot is probably anchored deep in our perceptual apparatus. Conversely, if we consider what is blue: blue is, for example, water - and water is cool.
Now you can take this even further and say: Red light is not only psychologically warm, but also physically warm - if we think for example of infrared lamps, they really warm us. Which is why they are used in medicine, while, conversely, of course, no doctor would think to treat a person with UV lamps. Because UV light is aggressive, it can damage the skin and cause cancer.
This is because UV light is even higher in energy than blue light - the high energy density makes the light so aggressive. Conversely, infrared light, while physically even lower in energy than red light, is seen as heat radiation.
This has the following background: Basically, every body has a natural radiation, and this characteristic radiation depends only on the temperature. Therefore, one can, even if it is pitch dark, distinguish hot and cold items with an infrared camera, because warm objects glow stronger in the infrared spectrum. There is a clear relation between the temperature of a body and the kind of radiation that it emits.
If something has room temperature, then we do not see this radiation, it lies in the infrared and our eyes can not see infrared radiation. But when things get warmer, the radiation changes and shifts into the range of visible light - in other words, it shifts from infrared to red. That is why red-hot objects are red.
At still higher temperatures, the heat color would in fact shift to blue, but when a body glows blue, it would be even hotter than the sun, and in everyday life, we almost never have to do with such extremely hot objects. That is why red is the color of a warm, glowing body.

Translated from http://www.swr.de/blog/1000antworten/antwort/16474/warum-gilt-rotes-licht-als-warm-obwohl-es-doch-energiearmer-ist-als-blaues/

nice copy pastery!

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Is workaholism similar to any addiction or are there other neurological mechanisms at play?
Some people are seemingly 'addicted' to their work and by doing work itself, almost to the point of precluding all other activities and interactions (usually social).  By this question, I mean when people go beyond a 'passion' for the work, into an almost obsessive approach.  (I have met a few people like this).
Is this addiction to work similar to other addictions?  or is there something else triggering this almost obsessive work-ethic to the preclusion of almost all other activities?
I am after peer-refereed articles about any studies that have been performed on this.

thank you for the fixup of the title, Chuck...don't know how I missed that one - was sneezing while posting.

This is a great question - one that resonates with me especially when reflecting on my own professional life.
My answer to your question would be both speculative and (hopefully) empirical. From personal experience, I have met people in my professional life that may exhibit 'workaholic' behaviours but it is unclear whether it is driven by fear and anxiety or behaviours aligned to values to achieve almost perfect work performance.
I would start with defining precisely what workaholism is. Spence and Robbins (1992) defines a workaholic exhibiting three specific properties:

Highly work involved
Compelled or driven to work because of inner pressures
Low in enjoyment of work

If we compare those properties against an addictive disorder such as Bulimia Nervosa, some surprising similarities arise. Compensatory self-vomitting behaviours tend to be a product of overevaluation of body weight and shape (Lamparda et al., 2011). Let's assume that "inner pressures" represent an individual's need to achieve their body weight and shape. Analogously, "inner pressures" such as perfectionism and responses to fear can cause this seemingly addictive workholic behaviour. I would dare say that the cognitive processes involved between these two cases would be quite similar.
Examining workaholism from a neurological perspective, in my opinion, would mimic neurological studies on addictive disorders. However, I couldn't find much. Randles et al. (2010) make reference to neurological mechanisms in describing how perfectionism and rumination can contribute to goal-oriented behaviours.
The drive to work harder and harder is likely to be influenced by the level of perfectionism and anxiety experienced by an individual (Shafran & Mansell, 2001). Catastrophising and ruminating about work performance can theoretically compel an individual to work harder to the point of psychopathology (of course, we lack the criteria). On another note, personality traits such as narcissism would probably play a role in triggering workaholic behaviours.
References

Spence, J.T. & Robbins, A.S. (1992). Workaholism: definition, measurement, and preliminary results. Journal of Personality Assessment, 58(1), 160-178
Lamparda, A.M., Byrnea, S.M., McLeana, N. & Furslandb, A. (2011). An evaluation of the enhanced cognitive-behavioural model of bulimia nervosa. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49, 529-535
Randles, D., Flett, G.L., Nasha, K.A., McGreggor, I.D. & Hewitt, P.L. (2010). Dimensions of perfectionism, behavioral inhibition, and rumination. Personality and Individual Differences, 49, 83-87
Shafran, R. & Mansell, W. (2001). Perfectionism and psychopathology: A review of research and treatment. Clinical Psychology Review, 21(6), 879-906.

+1 great answer. To be honest, I never linked workaholism to bulimia nervosa - but I can see the link now.

Thanks, nor did I. It only occurred to me looking through some basic information about addictive disorders. I'm also curious to know, if possible, whether workaholism can manifest itself as a compulsive behaviour within OCD.

that is an interesting point about the OCD - I would imagine that there would be a definite link, possibly even a phobia-like mechanism involved.

Another possible complex issue arises - if workaholic behaviour is a compulsive behaviour within an OCD diagnosis - there must be an associated obsession causing that behaviour. However, a diagnosis of Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) could also trigger workaholic behaviours. How then do we make the singular diagnosis? Or can OCD and GAD be comorbid and both contribute to workaholic behaviours? Hmm. I'm aware that this is deviating from your original question.

not really deviating, I'd say, adding to the understanding of this 'condition', because if workaholism is not so much a condition, but a symptom then I think you are on to something.


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Why do people walk in a circle when they are blindfolded and intend to walk in a straight line?
Why does someone with eyes tied follow a circular path if left to walk in a huge yard(kilometers), that occurs even if he thinks that he is walking in a straight line?
In my opinion once you drawn a well enough curve your balance shift towards inner side of circle and you fullfill to spiralate inwards. But what shifts the balance inward?

It has nothing to do with perception.
It's simply because there are infinitely many ways to go in circles, while only one way to go straight. Even a slightest bias towards one side will produce a circle. When other cues are given to correct the bias, one is able to track straight lines.
Even robots (or toy cars) that are designed to go straight lines will go in circles without sensory feedback!

@WaqarAhmad I do not see anything wrong with my answer. I have updated it to include a robot example.

One thing more even when they are lost in jungle or market they follow the circular trend, but that seem kind of fear for not go too far away from the safe niche.


text:
How does the personality of a successful leader influence the development of his children?
Successful leadership appears to depend on the personality of the leader. Judge et al. (2002) found the following correlations with the "big five" personality factors in a meta-analysis:
Personality trait       Correlation with leadership success

Neuroticism           -.24
Extraversion           .31
Openness               .24
Agreeableness          .08
Conscientiousness      .28

Kock (1965) found the following correlations between the needs for achievement, power, and affiliation, and economic success:
                         Achievment   Power   Affiliation   Ach+Pow-Aff

Gross Production Value   .39          .49*    -.61**        .67**
Number of Employees      .41          .42     -.62**        .66**
Turnover                 .46*         .41     -.53*         .60*
Gross Investment         .63*        -.06      .20          .45*
Profit                   .27          .01     -.30          .34

These two studies found that leaders must not be neurotic, need not be agreeable, and must not have a need for affiliation.
But personality influences not only a person's workplace behavior and success, but also his choice of a romantic partner and how he shapes his relationships to the members of his family. I wonder therefore:
Are there studies on the family situations of leaders, how they relate to their spouses and children, and how they influence their children's development?

Sources:

Judge, T. A., Bono, J. E., Ilies, R., & Gerhardt, M. W. (2002). Personality and leadership: A qualitativ and quantitative review. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 765-780. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.87.4.765 Available online at http://workforceuniverse.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Judge_2002.pdf
Kock, S. W. (1965). Management and motivation. Summary of a doctoral thesis presented at the Swedish School of Economics, Helsingfors, Finland.

+1 Thank you for this great question, what. I am highly interested in organisational development and leadership theories - stay tuned for a reply.

This is an extremely interesting question. I'm going to take a different approach to the question by focusing on both personality traits and leadership theories (e.g. authentic leadership, transformational leadership, servant leadership etc) to answer whether those two distinct areas can influence leaders' children's development. I will admit that I didn't come across specific studies on the actual family situations of leaders and the developmental impacts of the leader's personality traits towards their children.
Experiential learning and development by children
See Murphy and Johnson (2011) about how early life experiences and parenting styles can shape the development of a children in relation to general development and leadership potential.

but parents undoubtedly work to inﬂuence their children's thoughts on
  leadership, through role modeling leadership and through the leader
  behaviors and experiences they encourage in their children ... “[Parents…] contribute to their children's religious beliefs,
  intellectual and occupational interests, feelings of self-esteem or
  inadequacy, adherence to traditional or modern notions of masculinity
  and femininity, helpfulness to others, skills, and values (Beer,
  Arnold, & Loehlin, 1998; Kruger, Hicks, & McGue, 2001; McCrae et al.,
  2000)” (Wade & Tavris, 2008, p. 502).

Servant leadership promotes spirituality and servant behaviours in leaders, i.e. serve your employees first before you serve the company. This type of behaviour from a leader would most likely influence the parent's value and style of parenting. For example, leaders who are recognised as servant leaders may be generous and selfless - this may spill over into their parenting style to be compassionate and caring towards their children which in turn, influences their children's development into similar characters.
ADDED: Destructive leaders, narcissism and potential impact on children
Behaviours of destructive leaders tend to be correlated to narcissism (Padilla et al., 2007). Assuming that these behaviours manifest in the home/family environment, there is some evidence that child narcissism can arise from the parent's control over them (Horton, 2010):

There is also substantial evidence supporting the object relations
  viewpoint that child narcissism comes from a parent’s selﬁsh use of
  the child that is manifest in excessive or inconsistent parental
  control. For example, both Horton and colleagues (2006) and Miller and
  Campbell (2008) found that psychological control correlated positively
  with maladaptive narcissism...

Similarly, destructive leadership involves an element of the urge to control (Padilla et al., 2007):

... destructive leadership involves control and coercion rather than
  persuasion and commitment (Howell & Avolio, 1992; Sankowsky, 1995)

I would dare say that if we compared destructive leaders (core trait: narcissism) and servant leaders (core: selflessness) - both would exhibit different parenting styles that both impact a child's development. Children of the former group may grow up to develop childhood narcissism which may stretch out to adulthood. Children of the latter group may grow to develop selfless behaviours in childhood and adulthood. Yet, I wish there would be a study demonstrating this.
References

Murphy, S.E. & Johnson, S.K. (2011). The beneﬁts of a long-lens approach to leader development: Understanding
the seeds of leadership. Leadership Quarterly, 22, 459-470
Horton, R. S. (2010). On environmental sources of child narcissism: Are parents really to blame? (pp. 125-143), In Barry, C, Kerig, P. K, Stellwagen, K. K, & Barry, T. T (Eds.) Narcissism and Machiavellianism in Youth: Implications for the Development of Adaptive and Maladaptive Behavior. Washington, D.C.: APA Press.
Padilla, A., Hogan, R. & Kaiser, R.B. (2007). The toxic triangle: Destructive leaders, susceptible followers,
and conducive environments. The Leadership Quarterly, 18, 176-194

I realise some of this could only point to the various leadership traits/behaviours developed based on certain variables of the childhood so I will edit if necessary.

+1, but it seems to me you are answering the question how leaders are made by their parents, instead of how the children of a parent who is a leader (politician, manager) develop differently from parents who are not leaders.

That's true. Unfortunately, I couldn't find any articles directly addressing your original questions. I'm alluding to the possibility that leaders' behaviours and traits may spill into the personality development of their children. I've added more information that might address your question (though no articles directing studying the comparison you mentioned in your comment).

I've removed content that doesn't seem to really answer your question.

@what: try to read Daniel Goleman - Social Intelligence on the machiavellic leaders. The chapter is entitled "dark triad". According to his searches many "leaders" are Narcissistic.


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What is the neurological basis for 'daredevil' behaviour?
What is the neurological basis for people being seemingly fearless and engaging in risk-taking and daredevil behaviour?
I am talking about those that frequently perform or participate in activities that are often described by a lot of people as reckless and life-threateningly dangerous.

I would include 'risk-taking' as a quality for daredevil behaviour in the scope of the question as well.

Would the downvoter care to explain?

+1 from me. The literature on sensation seeking might be relevant.

To complement Jeromy's comment, maybe look at Borderline Personality Disorder - "marked tendency to act unexpectedly" in conjunction with sensation seeking. See also Soloff et al - "Impulsivity and prefrontal hypometabolism in borderline personality disorder".

@JeromyAnglim it was a reasonably difficult question to answer thoroughly. Required a but of digging to exclude different types of personality disorders, psychopathy etc.. they participate in a different type of risk taking. You were spot on with the Sensation seeking.

Dopamine receptor agonists related to reckless driving and gambling
There are three case reports provided by Reactions Weekly (2010) demonstrating correlations between treatment with dopamine receptor agonists and reckless driving:

Reckless driving occurred in three patients during treatment with
  dopamine receptor agonists (DA) ... DA are associated with impulse
  control disorders, and may alter how the brain perceives and avoids
  risk. DA-associated impulse control disorders include pathological
  gambling and hypersexuality. Reckless driving may be another
  manifestation of DA-associated impulse control disorders.

Some further evidence is provided to suggest neurological correlates between dopamine receptor agonist and risky choices in a gambling task (Riba et al., 2008):

In summary, the present findings indicate that the dopamine D2/D3
  receptor agonist pramipexole is capable of blocking reward-related
  activations in the rostral basal ganglia and midbrain and may lead to
  a behavioral disinhibition characterized by increases in risky choices
  in a gambling task.

Neurological correlates between voluntary and involuntary risk taking in the brain
A study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and administered a modified BART with an active choice mode and a passive no-choice mode in order to examine the neural correlates of voluntary and involuntary risk taking in the human brain (Rao et al., 2008):

In summary, the present study modiﬁed the BART in both active and
  passive modes for use during fMRI and the ﬁndings provide direct
  visualization of voluntary and involuntary risk processing in the
  human brain. Regardless of the involvement of voluntary decision
  making, risk in this task is processed in visual pathway regions in
  the occipital and parietal lobes. However, during active
  decision-making, risk is associated with additional robust activation
  in dopamine rich mesolimbic (VTA-striatum) and frontal regions
  (insula, ACC/MFC, and DLPFC). Voluntary decision making per se, is
  associated with activation in the right DLPFC, which is absent in the
  involuntary no-choice condition. These results contribute to
  understanding the neural basis of normal and high risk behavior.
  Extending this paradigm to pathological populations characterized by
  impaired decisionmaking, such as patients with drug addition and
  compulsive gambling, may allow the speciﬁc neural components of
  impaired risk behavior to be distinguished, and may ultimately inform
  more effective clinical treatment interventions.

References

Reactions Weekly. (2010). Dopamine receptor agonists: reckless
driving: 3 case reports.(Adverse Reaction Case Reports)(Case
study)(Brief article), 1300, 18(1)
Riba, J., Kramer, U.M., Heldmann, M., Richter, S. & Munte, T.F. (2008). Dopamine agonist increases risk taking but blunts reward-related brain activity. PLoS One, 3(6)
Rao, H. Korczykowski, M., Pluta, J., Hoang, A. & Detre, J.A. (2008). Neural correlates of voluntary and involuntary risk taking in the human brain: An fMRI study of the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART). Neuroimage, 42, 902-910

Sensation Seeking behaviour:
Sensation Seeking behaviour, is a better description of the type of extreme dare devil or extreme sport type of behaviour, as opposed to risk taking generally. Reckless risk taking is associated with a variety of psychological conditions that do not necessarily display this specific style of risk taking. There are gender differences with sensation seeking behaviour (and risk taking generally), with more men exhibiting this type of behaviour. From an evolutionary perspective, it makes sense that men, classically the hunters and protectors, would be more inclined to take risks.
Type T personality:
People who are high on the sensation seeking scale, are not necessarily anti social, but a personality type, which propels them to push the limits of life. The best description I have of this type of personality is the description of being a Type T personality. Channeled positively, this type of personality has the potential to be a high achiever.

The Type T personality has been described as a personality dimension referring to individual differences in stimulation seeking, excitement seeking, thrill seeking, arousal seeking, and risk taking. (1)

Physiological differences:
Sensation seekers have notable physiological differences from individual's with average risk taking profiles. Their orienting reflex (OR) works in reverse to other individuals. In brief,  OR is a creatures natural response to external stimuli, change in environment. An event that would, usually, cause a stressful response in the autonomic nervous system will trigger an entirely different response in this type of personality. Physiologically this personality type is primed for adventure.

One study found that when subjects with high disinhibition scores were presented with a moderate-intensity tone, their heart-rates slowed down on the first exposure, while the heart rates of low sensation-seekers quickened.
  Another of his studies, published in the Journal of Personality (Vol. 58, No. 1, pages 313-345) in 1990, indicates that the differences between high and low sensation-seekers extend to the cortex of the brain, with high sensation-seekers showing an "augmenting" electrochemical reaction, or increasing amplitude of cortical-evoked potentials (EPs) in response to increasing intensities of stimulation. Low sensation-seekers, however, demonstrate a reducing reaction, showing little EP increase in relation to increasing stimulus intensity, and sometimes showing a reduction in EP amplitudes at the highest intensities of stimulation. (2)

Monoamine oxidase (MAO) is needed for the chemical cascade in the release of dopamine.
The brain chemistry is also  deficit in MAO, which could explain the need for a self induced high, from thrill seeking, to increase the release of dopamine.
Conclusion:
In conclusion these extremists, may be an evolutionary necessity for the species. As mentioned in one of the articles, it is this drive to push the boundaries that has caused the species to explore the earth and, even, outer space.

References:

Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-analysis.
Byrnes, James P,et al  doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.125.3.367
Type T personality and the Jungian classification system.
Morehouse RE, et al  PMID: 2313544 (1)
Risk taking in Extreme Sports: A phenomenological perspective
Brymer, Eric PDF
Frisky, but more risky
Christopher Munsey, American Psychological Association  (2)
Higher Nervous Functions: The Orienting Reflex
E N Sokolov  DOI: 10.1146/annurev.ph.25.030163.002553
Natural selective attention: Orienting and emotion
Margaret M. Bradley  DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.00702.x
Risk taking: A study in cognition and personality.
Kogan, Nathan; Wallach, Michael A,  Oxford, England: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. (1964)
Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior.
Atkinson, John W  doi: 10.1037/h0043445
The life attitudes schedule: a scale to assess adolescent life-enhancing and life-threatening behaviors.
Lewinsohn PM, et al

All supporting evidence for all my claims are within these references


text:
What is the psychological basis of "survivor's guilt"?
Context
I have just been watching a documentary about survivors of the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of March 2011.  Specifically the interviews with ordinary residents of the towns affected.
One thing came through time and again was the notion that was best stated by a friend of mine*- a volunteer firefighter on duty in one of the affected towns on the day of the tsunami:

what gives me the right to survive, when so many others died?

Question
Obviously, this doesn't just occur in Japan, it seems to happen a lot, where people seem to feel guilty to have survived and feel a sense of responsibility for those who perished.  What is the psychological basis behind this?
Are there any studies that have addressed this?
Side notes
I lived in Japan for 4 years and have many friends from the affected area, this friend of mine was and is still inconsolable that he, in his own mind, could not save more people.

1. Psychological basis of survivor guilt
Psychosocial and evolutionary perspective on survivor guilt
Survivor guilt may be a psychological response that is associated with depression. Loss of a beloved one, which constitutes a psychosocial attachment, can precipitate a proneness towards experiencing survivor guilt. In clinical samples, the clinically depressed tend to suffer from pathogenic cognitions in which they view themselves as harmful to others are an effect of feeling guilty from surviving a beloved one's death (O'Connor et al., 2002). In that regard, we can hypothesise that survivor guilt is probably a self-protective mechanism involving self-denunciation to combat guilt about surviving a beloved one's death.

Tendency toward self-reproach which death invariably leaves among the
  survivors (Freud, 1987, cited in Ernest Jones, 1960)

Survivor guilt could have evolutionary roots as well: survivor guilt may be a product of evolutionary pressures with living in small groups as a means to promote social organisation (O'Connor et al., 2002). The loss of an individual within these close socially-knit arrangements creates dysfunction and survivor guilt is an evolutionary means to understanding the changes experienced.
Existential crises, anxiety and ambivalence
Drawing from logotherapy, survivor guilt can be understood further from an existential point of view by referring to existential dynamics (Tate et al., 2012):

Mental health is based on a certain amount of tension [or existential
  dynamics], the tension between what one has already achieved and what
  one still ought to accomplish, or the gap between what one is and what
  one should become. (p. 104)

Survivor guilt may be the tension created between an individual's past experiences and future possibilities. Past experiences such as traumatic events create tension with an individual understanding his or her existence compared to future potentialities. A person narrowly escaping death may physically survive the traumatic experience but in the present moment, they experience excessive amounts of worry about why they are here and what the future holds. This cognitive dichotomy of being shameful about the past and fearful of the future can lead to survivor guilt.
2. Studies on the psychological basis of survivor guilt
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), cognitive distortions and survivor guilt
Jones and Okulate (2006) conducted a study on the relationship between PTSD and survivor guilt by administering a questionnaire to 1,131 patients from the 68 Nigerian Army Reference Hospital, Lagos, Nigeria. Of these, 194 (22.09%) met the criteria for current
PTSD. Survivor guilt was found in 336 responders (38.26%). The following explanation is given by the authors:

The
  reason for the very high rate of survivor guilt may be related
  to the intra-group identification and cohesiveness that usually
  develops in combat-effective military units after several years
  of training together. Unfortunately, loss of men resulting from
  death or injury in battle is inevitable. For those who survive,
  witnessing the death of comrades is additional psychosocial
  stressor to the combat situation itself, and the survivor guilt
  that may result is understandably very distressing.

Survivor guilt and chronic illness
Vamos (1997) provides cases on patients and their experiences of survivor guilt in the face of chronic illness and witnessing other people's illnesses:

Miss A had visited her frequently and  had repeatedly had the
  experience of trying to bright-  en her friend by accounts of shopping
  expeditions or  other excursions, only to feel profoundly guilt-ridden
  that she could still be enjoying herself when her  friend’s life was
  so limited. Since the death, she had  been unable to weep but had
  found herself compelled  to clean both the house and herself
  repeatedly, and  had often wondered whether she should take a  ‘break’
  from dialysis

References

O’Connor, L.E., Berry, J.W., Weiss, J. & Gilbert, P. (2002). Guilt, fear, submission, and empathy in depression. Journal of Affective Disorders, 71(1), 19-27
Tate, K.A., Williams, C. & Harden, D. (2012). Finding purpose in pain: Using logotherapy as a method for addressing survivor guilt in first-generation college students. Journal of College Counselling, 2012, 16(1), 79-92
Okulate, G.T. & Jones, O.B.E. (2006). Post-traumatic stress disorder, survivor guilt and substance use – a study of hospitalised Nigerian army veterans. South African Medical Journal, 96(2), 144-146
Vamos, M. (1997). Survivor guilt and chronic illness. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 1997, 31, 592-596

Survivor's Guilt as a medical condition:

Are there any studies that have addressed this?

There have been many studies on Survivor's Guilt, in fact Survivor's Guilt or Syndrome;  known as concentration camp syndrome or  KZ syndrome, was a recognised condition in the DSM, it has been removed and replaced as a symptom of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

...where people seem to feel guilty to have survived and feel a sense of responsibility for those who perished. What is the psychological basis behind this?

The concept of social guilt:
An approach to guilt as a social, rather than individual process. Survivor's guilt is borne from human beings, as a social species, as opposed to being an individual cognitive crisis. It has been demonstrated that guilt serves as a social emotional safety net; ensuring the strong protect the weaker, an important dynamic for the survival of  our species.

Multiple sets of empirical research findings on guilt are reviewed to
evaluate the view that guilt should be understood as an essentially
social phenomenon that happens between people as much as it happens
inside them. Guilt appears to arise from interpersonal transactions
(including transgressions and positive inequities) and to vary
significantly with the interpersonal context. In particular, guilt
patterns appear to be strongest, most common, and most consistent in
the context of communal relationships, which are characterized by
expectations of mutual concern. Guilt serves various
relationship-enhancing functions, including motivating people to treat
partners well and avoid transgressions, minimizing inequities and
enabling less powerful partners to get their way, and redistributing
emotional distress (1)

Effects of being spared:
The concept that random as opposed to deserved misfortune serves to motivate human beings to strive harder, in accord with an appreciation of their good fortune, at having been spared.
This case refers to the effects of arbitrary redundancies within the workplace, but still illustrates the effects of survivor's guilt.

This study explored the effects of layoffs on survivors. We assessed subjects' work performance as a function of whether a co-worker had been laid off and the circumstances of that layoff. Consistent with equity theory, subjects worked harder when they believed that a co-worker's dismissal was based on a random process rather than on the relative merits of their and their co-worker's prior performance. Data drawn from questionnaires lent further support to equity theory as an explanation of these results. (2)

Guilt of being spared:
In some circumstances guilt may be borne in the individual being saved, at the seeming expense of another individual (this is most clearly defined in the holocaust "Selection Parades"), more subtle in the case of escaping a fire and being unable to rescue another in the process. In other cases it may stem from decisions, which resulted in the loss of a loved one, where the survivor feels the guilt of helping to change the course of that person's life, even though they would have no real knowledge that it would lead to that person's death.
Exaggerated sense of responsibility:
It seems the survivors  over exaggeration  one's human abilities in the face of tragedy. Overlooking our human frailties and utter powerlessness in some situations. Personalising the death of another; as if they could somehow have made a diFference, coupled with the concept, of why am I more deserving than another?. The relief of being saved is mixed with guilt at the loss of others and apprehension (possibly a form of dissociation) of it could have been me.
Disruption of the grief process:
In cases where people lose close ones, the grief process is disrupted; conflicting emotions surrounding grief can be amplified for example the relief of freedom felt when a young man's father dies and he feels he is an autonomous being; flooded by guilt at feeling this, in the face of such disaster.
Long term effects:
This sense of guilt can increase, rather than become ameliorated,  over time.
The psychological damage  from Survivor's Syndrome can be passed onto the next generation.

The stigma of KZ-syndrome is present in a second generation in different forms: personality disturbances, emotional and/or social immaturity, social disadaptation, higher frequency of neurotic states, divorce, alcoholism, and suicide. The camp stress has left in human nature traces so painful that they cannot disappear when the generation of former prisoners is gone. (4)

References:

(1) Guilt: An interpersonal approach.
Baumeister, Roy F.; Stillwell, Arlene M.; Heatherton, Todd F.
doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.243

(2)Layoffs, Equity Theory, and Work Performance: Further Evidence of the Impact of Survivor Guilt
Joel Brockner et al doi: 10.2307/256193

(3) The Sense of Guilt within Holocaust Survivors
Ruth Jaffe http://www.jstor.org/stable/4466613

(4) The evolution of mental disturbances in the concentration camp syndrome (KZ-syndrom).
Ryn Z


text:
Differences between anger and rage
Can rage be considered a subset of anger or possibly a separate neurobiological process.
What are the neurobiological, evolutionary and psychological differences between anger and rage?
In more detail an examination of the similarities and differences between anger and rage, their roles and purposes for us as a species.

what is the difference in neurochemistry
what are the evolutionary advantages of these states.
how do these two neurochemical processes assist us psychologically with regard to survival of our species

An examination of misplaced anger or rage, as possibly less useful states, although perhaps not entirely redundant, and possible pathology arising from this may or may not be included within answers.

The American Psychological Association appears to view this emotion as a continuum of intensity, whith annoyance at the mild and rage at the extreme end.
http://www.apa.org/topics/anger/control.aspx
Excessive anger and rage might be caused by suppressing milder forms of anger until this repression becomes unbearable and "the pot cooks over". Psychology Today calls anger a "corrosive emotion": it eats away at you, if you don't express it.
http://www.psychologytoday.com/basics/anger
The continuum and boiling-over idea of anger are nicely summed up in this paragraph of another Psychology Today article:

Irritation, frustration, anger, rage: these are all forms of anger. And they are feelings first. But when a person’s rage becomes behavior even before thought has a chance to plug in, it is usually because of one of two reasons:  1) it’s been repressed for a long time, and when someone drops the proverbial straw, it explodes; 2) it works for manipulative purposes.

http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/traversing-the-inner-terrain/201205/is-rage-choice


text:
How to enhance brain functioning through neurological stimulation?
Many emotional and behavioral dysfunctions, such as bad decision-making (http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/brain/awg177), appear to be symptoms of impaired brain functioning. Conversely, stimulating brain function may alleviate these dysfunctions. For example, electric stimulation of the vagus nerve decreases depression (source).
How can brain function be improved through neuroelectrical, neurochemical and/or neurosurgical stimulation?
I am interested in general answers as well as in answers specifically addressing

the ventromedial prefrontal cortex,
the amygdala, and
the insular cortex,

which, according to the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, might make up the mechanism behind emotional intelligence.

Somewhat related: Can learning be facilitated by transcranial magnetic stimulation?

This is an interesting and well-supported question, but the scope is really broad--it would be entirely reasonable to write a dissertation on any number of components of this one question.

The question seems to be too broad to be answered in a useful way

This topic already exists which is called cognitive enhancement, and the neurochemical aspect is called nootropics. There has been huge debate about societal impact of cognitive enhancements, they in fact work, but there has been a debate that it may create a societal inequality that is who do not have the access to cognitive enhancement or those who refuse to receive cognitive enhancement, may get lesser success rate or lesser payment or lesser employment. "Brain dope" is indeed a concept.

I have read that Cognitive enhancement methods may be useful for specific learning disabilities, intellectual disabilities, depression, etc whereas there are arguments about why healthy and typically developing people too should have access to cognitive enhancements.  There are counterarguments too.

I dont see any doctors prescribing any kind of cognitive enhancement methods or  nootropics for people suffering intellectual disabilities or dementia. Instead they tend to overuse antipsychotics though antipsychotics reportedly have dementia-inducing effect. Except for very old patients with ssay 80+ and with stroke and other visibly bad neuromotor condition some doctors use nootropics but not all doctors. If a doctor is requested for it, as i saw they usually  yell or laugh or criticise & treat the honest need as paranoia or self-anxiety or delusion. That may be a medical malpractice.

However i also read that engineers at silicon valley secretly use nootropics and cognitive enhancement for better performance.


text:
What are the key predictive traits of therapeutic success?
In my answer here, to this question : Does hypnotherapy/hypnosis, in any form, for any type of disorder, work?
It brought up the valid question of why people quit therapy. Obviously, if the therapy is not helpful, it is could be construed as a straightforward cause and effect.
People stop therapy or positive coping techniques for a vast number of reasons.
What are the the key predictive factors that cause people to succeed or fail a longer term therapy which has been giving shorter term successes for that individual?

I would differentiate between the success of a treatment and quitting a therapy. Both are not related in my opinion. Some psychotherapeutic theories say that patients quit at the exact moment that the therapy begins to show a first effect. I'd either ask, why people quit a therapy, or, what personality characteristics predict successful treatment. Why not create two questions? I'll attempt to answer both -- though not today :-)

There is a substantial body of literature addressing each of these questions (why do people quit therapy and what predicts positive outcomes); unfortunately there are no easy answers. In part, this is because the literature has looked at these questions from a range of angles, including client characteristics (age, race, gender, motivation, education level, diagnosis), therapist characteristics (demographics, years of experience, therapeutic orientation [cognitive vs psychodynamic]), therapeutic dynamic characteristics (client-therapist demographic match, therapeutic alliance),  and treatment characteristics (whether treatment is manualized, group vs individual therapy, type of therapy). I’ve provided brief answers to both below, but you’ll likely need to do additional literature searches if you have a question about a specific group of patients or therapy.
Why do people quit therapy?
Swift & Greenberg (2012), conducted a meta-analysis of 699 studies and found a nearly 20% dropout rate for therapy. They found that younger clients, clients who were attending university clinics, those with personality or eating disorders, and those seen by providers-in-training had higher dropout rates. Some of these factors may be correlated; younger clients may be more likely to attend university clinics, and those clinics often use graduate student therapists-in-training to provide services. The study also found dropout rates were higher in studies where the therapist rated/decided if a client had dropped out, which may reflect the therapists’ perspective. Additionally, therapy that was not time-limited and not manualized had higher dropout rates. Whether it was group vs individual therapy, the orientation of therapy, provider race or gender, and client race or employment status had no effect. Results were mixed for other client demographic variables such as gender, education and marital status.
Another meta-analysis of 11 studies found that dropout was higher when therapeutic alliance, the relationship between the client and therapist, was weaker (Sharf, Primavera, & Diener, 2010). However, the authors noted that this was moderated by the client’s level of education and the length of treatment. Clients with more education were less likely to dropout. The longer the treatment the higher the dropout rate, though, as in the Swift & Greenberg (2012), it may also reflect the perception of the person reporting dropout. Clients may have felt the therapy was completed, while therapists may have felt the client “dropped out.”
Finally, a recent meta-analyses examined the impact of accommodating client preferences on treatment outcomes and dropout rates (Swift, Callahan, Ivanovic, & Kominiak, 2013). There is extensive literature exploring the importance of client preferences related to type of therapist (sex, race), type of treatment (therapy and meds, therapeutic orientation), or style (collaborative, prescriptive) on therapeutic outcomes. Swift and colleagues (2013) found that accommodating client preferences resulted in better outcomes and decreased dropout; these effects did not vary based on client demographic characteristics (age, sex, marital status, etc.). They also noted that clients who were not accommodated were especially likely to dropout of short term therapy.
What predicts therapeutic outcome?
Several recent studies examined the role that therapeutic alliance had on outcomes. A Swedish study of 646 patients found that alliance impacted symptom level in the next therapy session in a feedback loop, such that stronger alliance predicted stronger change in symptoms, which in turn strengthened alliance (Falkenstrom, Granstrom, & Holmqvist, 2013). However, the authors noted that the effect was stronger for some clients (personality disorder patients), than others, indicating that client factors also impact outcomes. Therapy type (supportive, CBT, psychodynamic) did not impact symptom reduction.
Another study found only a weak indication that therapeutic relationship impacts outcomes in complex treatment for psychosis (Priebe, Richardson, Cooney, Adedeji, & McCabe, 2011); these results may reflect a similar finding to Falkenstrom and colleagues (2013), in that diagnosis impacts the role of alliance in outcomes. McEvoy, Burgess, & Nathan (2014) found that another client factor, level of interpersonal problems, predicted dropout and poorer outcomes, regardless of alliance. They also found that type of treatment impacted this relationship, as those patients in CBT who had better alliance were more likely to stay in treatment, but that neither alliance nor personal problems predicted outcomes in those clients.  A 2012 meta analysis questioned previous findings that found alliance predicted outcomes (Fluckiger, Del Re, Wampold, Symonds, & Horvath); they found small effects of alliance and outcomes early in therapy, but not for longer-term therapy and did not find sustained relationships with any other commonly noted predictors, such as type of therapy. In contrast, a recent study (Gullo, Lo Coco, & Gelso, 2012) found that a genuine and real (i.e. accurate and not distorted by past conflict or bias) therapeutic relationship predicted successful outcomes for those clients who stayed with treatment, but not those clients who terminated early.
In terms of other client characteristics that can impact outcomes, one study of 60 Caucasian and Asian American clients found that those with more somatic symptoms and who used avoidant coping had poorer psychosocial functioning and psychological discomfort at end of treatment (Kim, Zane, & Blozis, 2012). They also found that those who preferred Non-English language therapy had worse outcomes and that this was mediated by avoidant coping. The authors proposed that Asian American patients who preferred non-English language therapy may have used coping styles that were culturally relevant to them, but which fit poorly with the style of therapy they received. The expression of psychological symptoms and illness is culturally defined, and should be kept in mind when reading meta-analyses that may reflect the dominant culture.
Another meta-analysis of 23 studies found a small to medium effect of homework compliance (completing therapeutic assignments given by the therapist) on client outcomes, which was present regardless of the client’s primary symptom presentation (Mausbach, Moore, Roesch, Cardenas, & Patterson, 2010). This may reflect the importance of client buy-in and effort in therapy, though it should be noted the effect size varied according to certain methodological factors.
Other analyses have examined the importance of therapist characteristics or client-therapist match on outcomes. A meta-analysis of 64 studies found therapist sex did not impact client outcomes or dropout (Bowman, Scogin, Floyd, & Mckendree-Smith, 2001). As noted in my answer to the dropout question above, Swift and colleagues (2013) noted a range of domains in which clients can prefer to be matched in regards to therapy. A 2011 (Cabral & Smith) meta-analyses of 52 studies found almost no effect for race-ethnicity matching and outcomes when looking across all studies. However, the authors did note that African Americans had mildly better outcomes when matched with African American therapists, a trend which did not hold for the other racial and ethnic groups in the study (Caucasians, Hispanics, and Asian Americans). A second meta-analyses of 7 studies found similar results, with a negligible effect size for ethnic match across all samples, though matching had a greater effect for ethnic minority samples than Caucasians in terms of preventing dropout and increasing the number of sessions attended (Maramba & Hall, 2002). Again, these findings call attention to the importance of multicultural conceptualization when identifying treatments and approaches for clients; this diversity is also an excellent example as to why your questions have no simple answers.
Note: None of the studies I found, focusing on recent, meta-analytic literature, addressed whether the clients found the therapy “helpful” (as indicated in your question) as a primary research question.
Bowman, D., Scogin, F., Floyd, M., & Mckendree-Smith, N. (2001). Psychotherapy length of stay and outcome: A meta-analysis of the effect of therapist sex. Psychotherapy, 38(2), 142-148
Cabral, R. R., & Smith, T. B. (2011). Racial/Ethnic matching of clients and therapists in mental health services: A meta-analytic review of preferences, perceptions, and outcomes. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 58(4), 537-554. DOI: 10.1037/a0025266
Falkenstrom, F., Granstorm, F., & Holmqvist, R. (2013). Therapeutic alliance predicts symptomatic improvement session by session. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 60(3), 317-328. DOI: 10.1037/a0032258
Fluckiger, C., Del Re, A. C., Wampold, B. E., Symonds, D., Horvath, A. O. (2012). How central is the alliance in psychotherapy? A multilevel longitudinal meta-analysis. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 59(1), 10-17. DOI: 10.1037/a0025749
Gullo, S., Lo Coco, G., & Gelso, C. (2012). Early and later predictors of outcome in brief therapy: The role of real relationship. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 68, 614-619. DOI: 10.1002/jclp.21860
Kim, J. E., Zane, N W., & Blozis, S. A. (2012). Client predictors of short-term psychotherapy outcomes among Asian and White American outpatients. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 68, 1287-1302. DOI: 10.1002/jclp.21905
Maramba, G. G., & Hall, G. C. N. (2002). Meta-analyses of ethnic match as a predictor of dropout, utilization, and level of functioning. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 8(3), 290-297. DOI: 10.1037//1099-9809.8.3.290.
Mausbach, B. T., Moore, R., Roesch, S., Cardenas, V., & Patterson, T. L. (2010). The relationship between homework compliance and therapy outcomes: An updated meta-analysis. Cognitive Therapy Research, 34, 429-438. DOI: 10.1007/s10608-010-9297-z
McEvoy, P. M., Burgess, M. M., & Nathan, P. (2014). The relationship between interpersonal problems, therapeutic alliance, and outcomes following group and individual cognitive behavior therapy. Journal of Affective Disorders, 157(20), 25-32. DOI: 10.1016/j.jad.2013.12.038.
Priebe, S., Richardson, M., Cooney, M., Adedeji, O., & McCabe, R. (2011). Does the therapeutic relationship predict outcomes of psychiatric treatment in patients with psychosis? A systematic review. Psychosomatics, 80(2), 70-77. DOI: 10.1159/000320976
Sharf, J., Primavera, L. H., & Diener, M. J. (2010). Dropout and therapeutic alliance: A meta-analysis of adult individual psychotherapy. Psychotherapy Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 47(4), 637-645. Doi: 10.1037/a0021175
Swift, J. K., Callahan, J. L., Ivanovic, M., Kominiak, N. (2013). Further examination of the psychotherapy preference effect: A meta-regression analysis. Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, 23(2), 134-145. DOI: 10.1037/a0031423
Swift, J. K., & Greenberg, R. P. (2012). Premature discontinuation in adult psychotherapy: A meta-analysis. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 80(4), 547-559. doi: 10.1037/a0028226


text:
How effective is court imposed therapy compared to self-initiated therapy?
People are frequently court ordered to some form of therapy, whether it be in the form of a course, group therapy or individual therapy.
Some examples being; road rage, anger management, drunk driving, parenting.
As one would consider, much of the success of the therapeutic process lies within the individuals motivation. However, it is also balanced by the fact that the consequence of being under a court order, may provide enough impetus to motivate an individual to change a behaviour.  It leads me to ask:
What is the effectiveness of court imposed therapy, as compared to self initialised therapy options?

Yeah haha. Just to say It doesn't really matter why someone gets into therapy, what matters is their state once they are there.

Court Imposed Therapy may not be very helpful until the person himself tries to imbibe the lesson within him.

Yes I am looking for studies

I think this is a very interesting and timely question. The effect of therapy in general is being heavily debated these days. To me it seems court ordered therapy might primarily serve the purpose of giving a varnish of "civility" to the rest of society. It might mainly give a sentence an air of "rehabilitation". Personally; I do not think it is generally effective. The person ordered by court have other and bigger incentives to parrot, claim effect of the therapy, to agree on the effect (wether it is there nor not).

@boblet I totally agree, however we need citations to back this up.

@Skippy yes, exactly; I was hoping someone with more knowledge would come to the rescue.

Why do you necessarily want to compare with self-initiated therapy? It's not a very interesting research question... so few will address it. Compare to the effectiveness of court ordered treatment on (say) not reoffending vs. those with no therapy... on which you'll find tons of studies.

@Fizz perhaps you can write an answer on reoffending - as that would be an indication of therapy success. OR as it does not interest you, you can always go and comment on a post that does.

I found a few papers published on the topic of therapy by court order and while incarcerated. Psychotherapy doesn't seem to work most of the time without the full and willing cooperation of the patient.

Over the past decade, the use of court-ordered psychotherapeutic treatments as a pretrial diversion or dispositional alternative has increased dramatically. Currently, little published research has documented the effectiveness of these court-ordered treatments. The studies reviewed here cast doubt on the assumption that mandatory psychotherapeutic treatments are effective in reducing future incidents of violence between spouses. The incremental benefit of court-ordered treatment over the deterrent effects of traditional criminal justice system remedies is unclear. Differences in abuse recidivism between subjects court-ordered into treatment and subjects arrested and untreated have been small. In addition, subjects withdraw from treatment despite a court order to attend, indicating that legal system involvement does not motivate many unwilling subjects. Furthermore, subjects who discontinue treatment prematurely remain violence-free almost as often as subjects who complete treatment programs, thus drawing into question the, specific impact of clinical treatment for men who abuse their spouses. Future research is necessary to elucidate the precise benefits and appropriate focus of court-ordered treatment programs.

-Court-ordered treatment of spouse abuse

Interestingly, those who were mandated demonstrated less motivation at treatment entry, yet were more likely to complete treatment compared to those who were not court-ordered to treatment. While controlling for covariates known to be related to treatment completion, the logistic regression analyses demonstrated that court-ordered offenders were over 10 times more likely to complete treatment compared to those who entered treatment voluntarily (OR=10.9, CI=2.0-59.1, p=.006). These findings demonstrate that stipulated treatment for offenders may be an effective way to increase treatment compliance.

-Does mandating offenders to treatment improve completion rates?

Patients who require court-ordered medication over objection constitute a group that is high risk for nonadherence after discharge and being refractive to treatment.

-Outcomes Associated With Court-Ordered Treatment Over Objection in an Acute Psychiatric Hospital

A significant decrease in the dynamic scale scores of the J-SOAP-II [Juvenile Sex Offender Assessment Protocol II] was found only for the moderate treatment group (9 to 23 months).

-Treatment Impact of an Integrated Sex Offender Program as Measured by J-SOAP-II

I found one 2009 review by Snyder and Anderson that attempted to answer your question, i.e. whether external coercion makes a difference in therapy outcomes. From its sheepish abstract, you can probably guess that no firm conclusion can be drawn. The review is narrative, not systematic, although they do split their discussion by field of intervention: domestic violence, child abuse, incest, and substance abuse.
Alas most of the papers cited in there fall in two categories: those that (like your question) cast doubt on the outcomes from a theoretical perspective, or are empirical papers that don't directly compare voluntary to mandated therapy outcomes, but rather present correlational evidence why mandated therapy is a good idea. For example, in the case of domestic abuse, the number of abusive incidents is inversely correlated with the length of stay (number of sessions) in therapy. And--so the logic goes--it's better to have the batterer stay in therapy for longer no matter how that's achieved. But there's not a single paper cited in that section that directly evaluated the contrast you want (mandatory vs self-initiated). The same can be said for child abuse and incest, areas in which there's hardly any self-initiated therapy.
Only in the area of substance abuse there are some direct contrast papers, but most are of rather low quality and varying methodology and thus have fairly contradictory results:

While some outcome research reports that mandated clients did better than voluntary
  clients (Chopra, Preston, & Gerson, 1979; Dunham & Mauss, 1982), others (Smart, 1974)
  report that voluntary clients fared better. The majority, however, have found similarly beneficial outcomes for both groups (Anglin, Brecht, & Maddahian, 1989; Brecht, Anglin, & Wang,
  1993; De Leon, 1988; Flores, 1983; Freedberg & Johnston, 1978; Hubbard et al., 1989;
  McGlothlin, 1979; Watson, Brown, Tilleskjor, Jacobs, & Pucel, 1988). Illustrative of these findings
  was a study by Anglin et al. (1989), who found that outcomes (length of stay in treatment,
  posttreatment gains) did not differ for addicts with legally coerced versus voluntary treatment
  entry. They suggested that given these findings, it made little sense to promote a social policy
  that allowed drug-dependent individuals to choose when to enter treatment and when to leave.
  Instead, a less costly and more efficient process would be to implement a more externally constraining
  system that does not rely on the individual’s fluctuating motivational state. In a literature
  review covering up to the year 2000, Miller and Flaherty (2000) concluded that the
  preponderance of the literature confirms the efficacy of mandated addiction treatment and that
  coercion helped motivate clients to comply with treatment.
The inconsistent findings that have emerged in this literature may be due to the fact that
  outcome research in the area of substance abuse treatment has suffered from various methodological
  shortcomings (Howard & McCaughrin, 1996; Rotgers, 1992; Shearer, 2000). These
  include differences in outcome measures (e.g., measuring recidivism rates rather than client
  drinking levels, measuring employee job performance rather than level of substance use) and
  differences in comparison groups (e.g., comparing young, mandated, relatively healthy individuals
  with voluntary, older, chronic addicts). Differences may also be due to definitional inconsistencies
  as to what constitutes a mandated client (De Leon, 1988; Rotgers, 1992), addicts’
  personal characteristics that affect response to treatment (such as the existence of personality
  disorders), or variations in treatment plans (Anglin et al., 1989). Others point to the inevitable
  problem of lack of control groups and random assignments (Howard & McCaughrin, 1996)
  and selection or recruitment bias (Dunham & Mauss, 1982). As it is virtually impossible to
  secure random assignment to treatment conditions, any quasi-experimental design which is
  implemented will be unable to definitively determine which effects on the outcome variable are
  due to treatment effects, rather than preexisting differences in the groups such as severity of the
  drinking problem, age, education, or social class. Finally, others point out that treatment programs
  vary widely and thus program sources of variance obscure the measurement of treatment
  effectiveness for legally referred clients (Inciardi, 1994).
In what has been described as one of the only research studies that has tried to address
  many of these methodological problems, and ‘‘probably the best designed and executed study
  of coercion and treatment outcome to date’’ (Rotgers, 1992), Walsh et al. (1991) compared
  results of three treatment options for employees referred by their employee assistance plan for
  alcohol problems (compulsory inpatient; mandatory Alcoholics Anonymous [AA] meetings
  only; or voluntary option to do either). The employees were randomly assigned to these treatment
  programs and followed for 2 years. All three groups were found to have improved in
  terms of job functioning and reduced drinking, with the inpatient clients faring the best. As the
  employer could back up the referral to treatment with firing if drinking continued, the researchers
  opined that clients’ motivation for succeeding in the more intensive inpatient condition
  might have been confounded with employer coercion.
Research shows that length of time in treatment affects outcome, and mandated clients do
  appear to remain in treatment longer than voluntary clients (De Leon, Melnick, & Tims, 2001;
  Goldsmith & Latessa, 2001; Leukefeld & Tims, 1988; Satel, 2000). In an interesting study, Dunham
  and Mauss (1982) compared the differential rates of alcoholism treatment success rates for courtmandated
  and voluntary clients in a community alcoholism treatment center, statistically controlling
  for pretreatment differences. Clients were divided into four groups: self-referrals, informal
  agency (AA, physician) referrals, driving while impaired (DWI; court) referrals, and other
  legal⁄ court referrals. While it was found that certain socioeconomic traits had a powerful impact on
  outcome (i.e., no prior treatment experience, active employment, education, not dependent on social
  assistance, stable marriage and family life), type of referral was a stronger predictor of outcome.
  The more coercion that was applied, the better the outcome. Treatment success was greater for
  those referred from the justice system than those attending voluntarily. The success rate for DWI
  clients was almost double that of voluntary clients (43% vs. 22%). The authors concluded that the
  certainty of the consequences for noncompliance with treatment for the DWI clients, and their having
  the most to lose (as they had the best occupations, highest education, etc.), was an important
  factor. Dehmel, Klett, and Buhringer (1986) also found that more socially integrated clients (e.g.,
  employed, stable home, and family life) had a greater likelihood of completing treatment.

And ultimate reason posited for this is that time in therapy seem to beat other considerations, allowing even a voluntary kind of self-motivation to emerge:

the research literature suggests that what mandated clients
  may lack in terms of initial motivation may be more than compensated for by their tendency to
  stay in treatment longer than their voluntary counterparts, allowing time for intrinsic motivation
  to develop and therapeutic techniques to take effect. Length of time in treatment affects outcome,
  and mandated clients appear to remain in treatment longer than their voluntary counterparts.
[...]
We have found no research to date that has examined whether the strength of the [therapeutic] alliance
  or the mandated versus voluntary referral status is more predictive of outcome. This
  would seem to be a topic worthy of investigation.

But perhaps for substance abuse (the only area where apparently there's enough research for the contrast you want) it does seem to look like "time in therapy trumps everything else" (with the caveat that it may be mediated by actually building a therapeutic alliance...) at least based on this review, which being a narrative one has non-trivial potential for bias.


text:
Why do one's surroundings still seem to rotate when you stop whirling around?
When you spin your head around in circles, the world appears to continue to spin.

Why do one's surroundings still seem to rotate when you stop whirling around in a circle?
What is happening in the brain?

@Waqar I have retagged your question, but please take the time to clarify your point a bit.  I think I do have an answer for you.

On each side of your head, in the middle ear, there is a system of canals in which displacement of a group of hair cells measure the movement along the 3 axes (the canals are tilted a bit back from 90°, so the coordinate system is not identical with that of the head).
So, when you move your head around and around as your body "whirls", the cupula of the horizontal canal (HC), which encases the hair cells, moves in the opposite direction and displaces the hair cells, causing the firing of action potentials. Once your head stops, the viscosity of the fluid in which the cupula is suspended prevents it from snapping right back to it's "default" position, so action potentials continue to be fired, and your nervous system (falsely) senses that your head is still moving.

 Courtesy of Scholarpedia Vestibular System

I believe this answer by Chuck is wrong. Common sense reason: the stimulation of the hair cells stops once the carrousel has stopped accelerating and reached a constant velocity. After that there is no more displacement of hair cells and they remain unaffected as long as the carrousel turns. Only when it brakes is there a stimulation again, and this is in the opposite direction due to braking, so in fact if this was the mechanism behind the aftereffect, the image should turn in the other direction, i.e. in the same direction that the carrousel had turned!

@what the media is highly viscous, and the eyes do react (nystagmus).  This is a standard explanation, yours is a bit abstract.  Read about vertigo or damage to the canals or the cranial nerve.

That's why I said "I believe", @ChuckSherrington :-) Can you provide some quotable sources that explain any one motion aftereffect through the vestibular system?

@what I haven't forgotten about you and I am not ignoring you, I just need to dig up the reference, otherwise I'll be guilty of encouraging others to do the same without doing it myself.

No sweat, @ChuckSherrington. You're not getting paid by me ;-)

You can find similar aftereffects when you stare out the front window of a moving vehicle for a couple of minutes and then stop: the landscape suddenly seems to slowly move away from you for some time; or when you stare out the widow of a train: when it stops the landscape appears to slowly move in the opposite direction. Aftereffects of this type can have any direction: when you stare at a rotating image and the rotation stops, the image appears to rotate in the opposite direction. Depending on the stimulus, this can be a smooth motion or it "jumps" forward and back.
This is called the direction aftereffect (DAE), "whereby prolonged exposure to a moving pattern affects the perceived direction of subsequent motion" (Clifford, 2002). This is an effect of perceptual adaptation, where the brain compensates for a supposed error in perception.
The mechanism behind this phenomenon was tested by Schrater and Simoncelli (1998):

Adaptation to a moving visual pattern induces shifts in the perceived
  motion of subsequently viewed moving patterns. Explanations of such
  effects are typically based on adaptation-induced sensitivity changes
  in spatio-temporal frequency tuned mechanisms (STFMs). An alternative
  hypothesis is that adaptation occurs in mechanisms that independently
  encode direction and speed (DSMs). Yet a third possibility is that
  adaptation occurrs in mechanisms that encode 2D pattern velocity
  (VMs). We performed a series of psychophysical experiments to examine
  predictions made by each of the three hypotheses. The results indicate
  that: (1) adaptation-induced shifts are relatively independent of
  spatial pattern of both adapting and test stimuli; (2) the shift in
  perceived direction of motion of a plaid stimulus after adaptation to
  a grating indicates a shift in the motion of the plaid pattern, and
  not a shift in the motion of the plaid components; and (3) the 2D
  pattern of shift in perceived velocity radiates away from the
  adaptation velocity, and is inseparable in speed and direction of
  motion. Taken together, these results are most consistent with the VM
  adaptation hypothesis.

Sources:

Clifford, C. W. G. (2002). Perceptual adaptation: Motion parallels orientation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 136-143. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01856-8 Available online at http://psy.mq.edu.au/vision/~peterw/corella/315/clifford.pdf
Schrater, P.R. and Simoncelli, E.P. (1998) Local velocity representation: evidence from motion adaptation. Vision Research, 38, 3899-3912. doi:10.1016/S0042-6989(98)00088-1 Available online at: http://www.cns.nyu.edu/pub/lcv/schrater97.pdf

After-effects are not the accepted explanation for dizziness. Also, motion after-effects are rarely observed when the stimulus viewed after adaptation is static, however dizziness is experienced even for static visual input. Indeed, after-effects are much weaker than the dizziness caused by spinning around.

We are not talking about dizziness here. The question asks about the perception of continued rotation. And where is there a static input when you whirl around? All you see is movement. But maybe we have a different idea of "whirling around". I'm thinking of a carrousel.

Are you sitting down on a spinny chair? Close your eyes, spin around and open your eyes. The world still spins even though the your visual system is not adapted to the motion.

Is there actually a misperception of a spinning world when you close your eyes while spinning? I don't think so. There is a feeling of imbalance. The perception of the world moving after you have stopped only happens when you LOOK at the world while you spin. But then, that is my opinion, and you are free to do some research and quote it in your answer. Until you do, I am not convinced, because what you say is disproved by my experience. Maybe you should go to a playground and test your theory by carefully observing what actually happens.

Screw the playground! What would be neat would be to apply TMS to area MT to evoke phosphenes after someone has spun around (eyes open or eyes closed). If the phosphenes are moving in a particular direction then the vestibular system must be influencing the visual signals somehow,

@ChuckSherrington is correct except for a few very minor errors/simplifications.
First, the three semicircular canals that form the Vestibular (or balance) System are located in a safe little pocket of bone called the inner ear. The three canals are oriented at (basically) 90° angles to each other so that we can maintain our balance no matter which position our head is in (e.g. hanging from monkey bars upside down does not make young people dizzy, nor does it change their sensation of gravity.*) Finally, and crucially, they are linked with our ocular system through a neuronal connection called the vestibolo-occular reflex (VOR).[1] Because the connections are excitatory, increased firing from a canal afferent leads to contralateral movement of the eyes (which is how spinning ice skaters can keep track of / focus on where they are visually). I will not elaborate on the role of the vestibulocollic reflex (VCR) in the stabilization of visual acuity for brevity's sake. Normally all this occurs without notice.
The latency of action of the rotational vestibuloocular reflex (r-VOR) is 7-15 milliseconds, which is the time required for the eyes to respond in an equal, but opposite, manner to the motion of the head. This time is remarkably fast compared with the latency for visually mediated eye movements, which is longer than 75 milliseconds.[2]
What happens is that with spinning (say, in one plane), the cilia of the hair cells (see @Chuck Sherrington's diagram) are displaced, and remain displaced as long as one is spinning with the same velocity and direction. Once the spinning suddenly stops, the cilia proceed to move to their default position, tricking the VOC into moving the eyes in the opposite direction repeatedly until the cilia come to a complete stop.[3] You can observe this phenomenon by looking into the person's eyes immediately after they stop spinning (make sure they are safe from falling.) Once things settle down in the inner ear, the vertigo (perception of spinning) stops shortly thereafter as well.
The perception described by @what is different altogether.
[1] Anatomy and Physiology of the Vestibular System Gizzi, et. al.
[2] Vestibuloocular Reflex Testing - Amin, et. al.
[3] Baloh and Honrubia's Clinical Neurophysiology of the Vestibular System
 By Robert William Baloh, Kevin Kerber, MD
*I say young people because some decreased sensitivity to semicircular canal fluid movement occurs as we age, and elderly people may, indeed, become dizzy with drastic changes in position. This decreased sensitivity is often a contributing factor to falls in the elderly.

authors: Святослав Олегович