question: Ex parte Milligan and Loving v. Virginia, are cases regarding which organization?
answer: United States Supreme Court
context: Title: Criminal law in the Chase Court
  Passage: The Chase Court (1864–1873) issued thirty-five opinions in criminal cases over nine years, at a significantly higher rate than the Marshall Court or Taney Court before it.  Notable such cases include "Ex parte Milligan" (1866), "Pervear v. Massachusetts" (1866), "Ex parte McCardle" (1867, 1869), "Ex parte Yerger" (1868), and "United States v. Kirby" (1868).
  Title: Criminal law in the Waite Court
  Passage: During the tenure of Morrison Waite as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (March 4, 1874 through March 23, 1888), the Supreme Court heard an unprecedented volume and frequency of criminal cases.  In just fourteen years, the Court heard 106 criminal cases, almost as many cases as the Supreme Court had heard in the period from its creation to the appointment of Waite as Chief Justice.  Notable cases include "United States v. Cruikshank" (1875), "United States v. Reese" (1875), "Reynolds v. United States" (1878), "Wilkerson v. Utah" (1879), the "Trade-Mark Cases" (1879), "Strauder v. West Virginia" (1880), "Pace v. Alabama" (1883), "United States v. Harris" (1883), "Ex parte Crow Dog" (1883), "Hurtado v. California" (1884), "Clawson v. United States" (1885), "Yick Wo v. Hopkins" (1886), "United States v. Kagama" (1886), "Ker v. Illinois" (1886), and "Mugler v. Kansas" (1887).
  Title: Ex parte Endo
  Passage: Ex parte Endo, or Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), was a United States Supreme Court ex parte decision handed down on December 18, 1944, in which the Justices unanimously ruled that the U.S. government could not continue to detain a citizen who was "concededly loyal" to the United States.  Although the Court did not touch on the constitutionality of the exclusion of people of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast—which they had found not to violate citizen rights in their "Korematsu v. United States" decision on the same date—the Endo ruling nonetheless led to the reopening of the West Coast to Japanese Americans after their incarceration in camps across the U.S. interior during World War II.
  Title: Ex parte McQuillon
  Passage: Ex parte McQuillon, 16 F. Cas.  347 (1861), was a case decided in August 1861 by United States district court for the southern district of New York involving a writ of habeas corpus.  Judge Betts issued the writ for Purcell McQuillon, who was being held in military custody at Fort Lafayette, but the commandant of the fort declined to bring McQuillon before the court as demanded, citing an order from Gen. Winfield Scott.  Over the objection of McQuillon's attorney, Judge Betts took no further action on the case, declaring that it would be indecorous to openly disagree with Chief Justice Taney's reasoning in "ex parte Merryman", but that the Constitution must be defended in whatever way it can be and the public would not want everyone to have access to habeas corpus during the Civil War.
  Title: Ex parte Milligan
  Passage: Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall. ) 2 (1866) , was a U.S. Supreme Court case that ruled the application of military tribunals to citizens when civilian courts are still operating is unconstitutional.  In this particular case the Court was unwilling to give President Abraham Lincoln's administration the power of military commission jurisdiction, part of the administration's controversial plan to deal with Union dissenters during the American Civil War.  Justice David Davis, who delivered the majority opinion, stated that "martial rule can never exist when the courts are open" and confined martial law to areas of "military operations, where war really prevails," and when it was a necessity to provide a substitute for a civil authority that had been overthrown.  Chief Justice Chase and three associate justices filed a separate opinion concurring with the majority in the judgment, but asserted that Congress had the power to authorize a military commission, although it had not done so in Milligan's case.
  Title: Lambdin P. Milligan
  Passage: Lambdin Purdy Milligan (March 24, 1812 – December 21, 1899) was a lawyer and farmer who was known for his extreme opinions on states' rights and his opposition to the Lincoln administration's conduct of the American Civil War.  Believing that the Confederate states of the South had the power under the U.S. Constitution to secede from the Union, he opposed the war to reunite the nation.  Milligan became a leader of the secret Order of American Knights (formerly the Knights of the Golden Circle, and later the Sons of Liberty, and advocated violent revolution against the U.S. government.  U.S. Army forces arrested him at his home and tried him and other conspirators by military commission for disloyalty and conspiracy.  Found guilty, he was sentenced to death.  A habeas corpus appeal made its way from the federal circuit court in Indianapolis to the U.S. Supreme Court, which in 1866 ruled that the application of military tribunals to citizens when civil courts are open and operating was unconstitutional.  See "Ex parte Milligan" 71 U.S. (4 Wall. ) 2 (1866) .  Following the Court's ruling on April 3, 1866, Milligan and the others were released from custody.  He returned home and practiced law in Huntington, Indiana, where he later filed a civil suit claiming damages for the military arrest and trial.  On May 30, 1871, the jury found in Milligan's favor, but federal and state statutes limited the award for damages to five dollars plus court costs.
  Title: Loving v. Virginia
  Passage: Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) is a landmark civil rights decision of the United States Supreme Court, which invalidated laws prohibiting interracial marriage.
  Title: Criminal law in the Marshall Court
  Passage: The Marshall Court (1801–1835) heard forty-one criminal law cases, slightly more than one per year.  Among such cases are "United States v. Simms" (1803), "United States v. More" (1805), "Ex parte Bollman" (1807), "United States v. Hudson" (1812), "Cohens v. Virginia" (1821), "United States v. Perez" (1824), "Worcester v. Georgia" (1832), and "United States v. Wilson" (1833).
  Title: Ex parte Quayle
  Passage: Ex parte Quayle, 25 USPQ 74, 1935 C.D. 11; 453 O.G. 213 (Comm'r Pat.  1935) is a United States patent law decision.  When a patent application is in condition for allowance, prosecution on the merits is closed.  At this time, further amendments of the patent application are allowed only to correct formal objections, which typically include minor and obvious mistakes.  The presence of such formal objections precludes the full closing of prosecution; therefore, in these situations, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issues an "Ex parte Quayle" Office action requesting the applicant to correct the formal objections.
  Title: Ex parte Bowman
  Passage: Ex Parte Bowman 61 USPQ 2d 1669 (Bd.  Pat.  App.  & Int.  2001) was a decision by the U.S. Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences which asserted that in order to be patent-eligible, a process had to involve or promote the technological arts.  This decision was overruled by the Board's subsequent "Ex Parte Lundgren" decision, but the Board's and then the Federal Circuit's In re Bilski opinion then superseded "Lundgren".  "In re Bilski", however, rejects use of "not in the technological arts" as a basis for a rejection, although it seems to accept the concept when differently named.  "Bilski" is now pending on writ of certiorari.
citations: Ex parte Milligan Loving v. Virginia