{"push_id":2131330252,"size":1,"distinct_size":1,"ref":"refs/heads/nx-8.0","head":"915f00ac26054fa84a491a5100f75a73267e2ece","before":"11b1c7f2a9965efddace04e03174752421b896ac","commits":[{"sha":"915f00ac26054fa84a491a5100f75a73267e2ece","author":{"name":"Catalin Marinas","email":"6aa257b0f6444d48b36b727fdf3f5c1074b85fd0@arm.com"},"message":"arm64: Introduce execute-only page access permissions\n\nThe ARMv8 architecture allows execute-only user permissions by clearing\nthe PTE_UXN and PTE_USER bits. However, the kernel running on a CPU\nimplementation without User Access Override (ARMv8.2 onwards) can still\naccess such page, so execute-only page permission does not protect\nagainst read(2)/write(2) etc. accesses. Systems requiring such\nprotection must enable features like SECCOMP.\n\nThis patch changes the arm64 __P100 and __S100 protection_map[] macros\nto the new __PAGE_EXECONLY attributes. A side effect is that\npte_user() no longer triggers for __PAGE_EXECONLY since PTE_USER isn't\nset. To work around this, the check is done on the PTE_NG bit via the\npte_ng() macro. VM_READ is also checked now for page faults.\n\nReviewed-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>\nSigned-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>\nSigned-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>\n\n.","distinct":true,"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/TeamNexus/android_kernel_samsung_exynos7420/commits/915f00ac26054fa84a491a5100f75a73267e2ece"}]}
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