{"action":"created","issue":{"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/bitshares/bsips/issues/28","repository_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/bitshares/bsips","labels_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/bitshares/bsips/issues/28/labels{/name}","comments_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/bitshares/bsips/issues/28/comments","events_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/bitshares/bsips/issues/28/events","html_url":"https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/28","id":249096297,"number":28,"title":"Regarding BSIP022","user":{"login":"ThomasFreedman","id":11077042,"avatar_url":"https://avatars1.githubusercontent.com/u/11077042?v=4","gravatar_id":"","url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman","html_url":"https://github.com/ThomasFreedman","followers_url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman/followers","following_url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman/following{/other_user}","gists_url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman/gists{/gist_id}","starred_url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman/starred{/owner}{/repo}","subscriptions_url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman/subscriptions","organizations_url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman/orgs","repos_url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman/repos","events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman/events{/privacy}","received_events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/ThomasFreedman/received_events","type":"User","site_admin":false},"labels":[],"state":"open","locked":false,"assignee":null,"assignees":[],"milestone":null,"comments":1,"created_at":"2017-08-09T16:57:26Z","updated_at":"2017-08-16T13:01:29Z","closed_at":null,"body":"Well done, nice work!\r\n\r\nThe only thing I had concern about was committee power, as their ability to set decay parameters could position them to become a centralized body more easily unless the range of decay they can adjust (max age, rate of decay) has hard coded limits committee must work within that mitigate that concern.\r\n\r\nAlso, I've long held that exchanges should NOT have voting rights, but how can that be accomplished? Blacklisting is not the answer, b/c as you say that power could be extended to individual accounts and thus effectively amount to control / censorship of individuals.\r\n\r\nHow to identify an exchange's account is one method of addressing the problem. Another might be a cap on stake for voting (max_stake_weight - an account with 1M bts = an account with > 1M BTS) it would equalize power of biggest stakeholders, but also discourages holding > max_stake_weight. What would impact on that be? Not saying 1M is the correct limit, just an example. However, the idea may lead to a more decentralized ecosystem.   "},"comment":{"url":"https://api.github.com/repos/bitshares/bsips/issues/comments/322763258","html_url":"https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/28#issuecomment-322763258","issue_url":"https://api.github.com/repos/bitshares/bsips/issues/28","id":322763258,"user":{"login":"rngl4b","id":12060755,"avatar_url":"https://avatars1.githubusercontent.com/u/12060755?v=4","gravatar_id":"","url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b","html_url":"https://github.com/rngl4b","followers_url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b/followers","following_url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b/following{/other_user}","gists_url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b/gists{/gist_id}","starred_url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b/starred{/owner}{/repo}","subscriptions_url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b/subscriptions","organizations_url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b/orgs","repos_url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b/repos","events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b/events{/privacy}","received_events_url":"https://api.github.com/users/rngl4b/received_events","type":"User","site_admin":false},"created_at":"2017-08-16T13:01:29Z","updated_at":"2017-08-16T13:01:29Z","body":"What do you think could happen if accounts were able to vote only with their collateral and vesting stakes?\r\nCould this kind of prediction-market layer encourage voting, with a measurable incentive/compromise ratio?\r\n\r\nEveryone would be voting only with what they are wiling to invest into the network (and with the income they recently generated if vesting balances get weighted too).\r\n\r\n\r\nCentralized exchanges would loose trust if they put their users funds as collateral to trade and vote (if not done with agreement and participation from their users). \r\nTheir possible vesting balances are just a little fraction of what exchanges can have in their wallets.\r\n\r\n\r\nBig stakes would have to weight their votes in the market with their own money, and thus vote wisely. Real proxies would be more incentivized to build (or to emerge from) communities, with users more prone to move between communities/proxies that benefits from betting/voting to fund the same value propositions. \r\n\r\nCould something like this take us closer to a limited but actually functional profit sharing economy?\r\n\r\nSonds strange, is it possible that enforcing futarchy and even meritocracy rules into voting, we could get a fairer power distribution than the actual? \r\neasier consensus building towards funding the mutually, or the clearly most beneficial network development, seems to be the only potentially big scaling threat we can face at some point not so far. I think it deserves a good talk.\r\n\r\nDon't mean to distract from priorities and already discussed, easier solutions. Just raw thoughts trying to simplify and put together some already proposed ideas to keep research up."}}
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