{{Israel}}{{byline|date=November 17, 2004|location=[[w:Tel Aviv|TEL AVIV]]}} [[w:Prime Minister of Israel|Prime Minister]] [[w:Ariel Sharon|Ariel Sharon]] considered a temporary [[w:coup d'état|coup d'état]] of the [[w:Politics of Israel|Israeli government]] with other members of the [[w:Israel Defense Forces|Israeli military]] shortly before the 1967 [[w:Six-Day War|Arab-Israeli War]], it has been revealed.

Days leading up to the '67 Arab-Israeli War featured a build-up of [[Egypt]]ian, [[Syria]]n, and [[Iraq]]i forces on the border that was perceived by many as a threat to the very existence of [[Israel]]. Military advisors pressured for a preemptive strike, which was felt necessary to offset Israeli numerical inferiority. Then-Prime Minister [[w:Levi Eshkol|Levi Eshkol]] was under intense pressure from his cabinet and military on the decision to pursue diplomacy or war. Many pro-war officials considered war inevitable and a delay only harmful to Israel.

Ariel Sharon was a [[w:Major General#Israel|Major General]] in the Israeli military during the war. On May 28th, he advised the [[w:Chief of General Staff (Israel)|Chief of Staff]] [[w:Yitzhak Rabin|Yitzhak Rabin]] that the cabinet could be detained and a coup declared. Sharon and others felt that the civilian government was unable to reach a necessary decision. The military would make the decision the government would not, and begin war in the government's best interests.

He explains: "We often asked whether in the State of Israel there could arise a situation in which the army takes control. And I always said it was impossible, that this couldn't happen in the State of Israel."

"And then, after the meeting on May 28, I said to the chief of staff and others who were present, that there had arisen a situation in which this could happen, and that it would also be well accepted - that is to say, to seize control not in the framework of wanting to govern, but in the framework of making a decision, the fundamental decision, and that [the] army can make it without the government."

"I don't remember if he agreed or not, but I think he also viewed it in this way."

Sharon stressed that no definite plan existed. However, he defended giving it serious consideration, saying: "They [the civilian government] would have accepted it with a sense of relief. That was my feeling."

Prime Minister Eshkol later decided in favor of war on June 5th. Ariel Sharon served as a commander of the [[w:Southern Command (Israel)|Southern Division]]. His comments may be found in full in ''Ma'arachot'', a publication by the [[w:Ministry of Defense (Israel)|Israeli defense ministry]].

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== Sources ==
*{{source|url=http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/1476849/Sharon-considered-1967-coup-to-force-war-with-Egypt.html
 |title=Sharon considered 1967 coup to force war with Egypt
 |author=Inigo Gilmore
 |pub=The Daily Telegraph (UK)
 |date=November 17, 2004}}
*{{source|url=http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=502026
 |title=On eve of '67 War, Sharon proposed Israel start fighting without cabinet okay
 |author=Amir Oren
 |pub=Haaretz
 |date=November 16, 2004}}

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[[Category:Israel]]
[[Category:Politics and conflicts]]
[[Category:Israel Defense Forces]]
[[Category:Middle East]]
[[Category:Ariel Sharon]]
[[Category:Yitzhak Rabin]]
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon considered a temporary coup d'état of the Israeli government with other members of the Israeli military shortly before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, it has been revealed.

Days leading up to the '67 Arab-Israeli War featured a build-up of Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi forces on the border that was perceived by many as a threat to the very existence of Israel. Military advisors pressured for a preemptive strike, which was felt necessary to offset Israeli numerical inferiority. Then-Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was under intense pressure from his cabinet and military on the decision to pursue diplomacy or war. Many pro-war officials considered war inevitable and a delay only harmful to Israel.

Ariel Sharon was a Major General in the Israeli military during the war. On May 28th, he advised the Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin that the cabinet could be detained and a coup declared. Sharon and others felt that the civilian government was unable to reach a necessary decision. The military would make the decision the government would not, and begin war in the government's best interests.

He explains: "We often asked whether in the State of Israel there could arise a situation in which the army takes control. And I always said it was impossible, that this couldn't happen in the State of Israel."

"And then, after the meeting on May 28, I said to the chief of staff and others who were present, that there had arisen a situation in which this could happen, and that it would also be well accepted - that is to say, to seize control not in the framework of wanting to govern, but in the framework of making a decision, the fundamental decision, and that the army can make it without the government."

"I don't remember if he agreed or not, but I think he also viewed it in this way."

Sharon stressed that no definite plan existed. However, he defended giving it serious consideration, saying: "They the civilian government would have accepted it with a sense of relief. That was my feeling."

Prime Minister Eshkol later decided in favor of war on June 5th. Ariel Sharon served as a commander of the Southern Division. His comments may be found in full in Ma'arachot, a publication by the Israeli defense ministry.