TEXT: TM
  
  9!BMF@JA:RSTXSSoYjZ\Z\ZdZj
  FIRST EDITION, FIRST PRINTING
  PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER 2002
  ISBN 1-55634-594-1
  SJG01195 8004
  Printed in 
  the USA
  
  GURPS System Design
  Steve Jackson
  Managing Editor
  Andrew Hackard
  Creative Director
  Philip Reed
  GURPS Line Editor
  Sean Punch
  GURPS WWII Line Editor
  Gene Seabolt
  Project Administrator
  Monique Chapman
  Design and Production
  Gene Seabolt
  Print Buyer
  Monica Stephens
  Errata Coordinator
  Andy Vetromile
  Sales Manager
  Ross Jepson
  GURPS, Warehouse 23, and the all-seeing pyramid are registered trademarks
  of Steve Jackson Games Incorporated. GURPS WWII: Return to Honor,
  Pyramid, and the names of all products published by 
  Steve Jackson Games Incorporated are registered trademarks or trademarks of
  Steve Jackson Games Incorporated, or used under license. 
  GURPS WWII: Return to Honor is copyright © 2002 by 
  Steve Jackson Games Incorporated. All rights reserved. Printed in the USA. 
  Some art based on photographs copyright www.arttoday.com. 
  Some art based on photographs from the National Archives.
  ISBN 1-55634-594-1
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
  STEVE JACKSON GAMES
  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
  1. France at War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
  Map of France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
  2. The French Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
  3. France Underground . . . . . . . . . . 24
  4. Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
  5. The French Armory . . . . . . . . . . . 37
  Weapons Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
  6. Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
  References and Index . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
  C
  O
  N
  T
  E
  N
  T
  S
  Useful Suggestions: Douglas Cole.
  Playtesters: Brandon Cope, Peter Dell’Orto,
  John Freiler, Richard Gadsden, Jonas Karlsson,
  Vincent Lefavrais, Erik Manders, and Robert Prior.
  Special thanks to the gasification e-mail list 
  and the Hellions for putting up with me.
  Edited and
  Illustrated by
  Gene Seabolt
  Additional Material by
  Michelle Armellini,
  Kenneth Peters,
  Jeffery K. McGonagill,
  Gene Moyers, and 
  Hans-Christian Vortisch
  TM
  
  INTRODUCTION
  “Only he is vanquished who accepts defeat.”
  – Marshal Ferdinand Foch
  France. From the Maginot Line to the Falaise
  Gap, this land was home to some of the most
  memorable affairs of World War II. After 60
  years, terms such as Vichy, de Gaulle, Maquis,
  Normandy, Dunkirk, and the French Foreign
  Legion still evoke images of great courage and
  heartbreaking loss. GURPS WWII: Return to
  Honor is a roleplayer’s guide to France during
  that tumultuous time, providing an overview of
  the era complete with examples of the heroism
  and tragedy that make for great adventure.
  After a crushing defeat by Germany and a
  surrender many considered cowardly and treason-
  ous, a small group of French men and women
  continued to fight the Nazi regime using whatev-
  er means was at hand. Though ill-prepared for
  war in 1940, Free French soldiers and under-
  ground Resistance fighters held tenaciously to
  their belief in France and their ability to regain
  their freedom. That belief was not misplaced; by
  1945, the German interlopers were defeated, and
  France was free once again.
  Delineating six years of occupation, resist-
  ance, and war in only 48 pages is impossible; cap-
  turing the spirit that sustained the French, and the
  moral issues that haunted them, even more so.
  But what’s contained in the pages that follow
  should provide GMs and players with enough
  background, atmosphere, history, and plot seeds
  to last through many adventures. The information
  can be used in campaigns featuring French sol-
  diers, underground Resistance fighters, legion-
  naires, spies, and British SOE agents. It can also
  be used together with other GURPS WWII sup-
  plements as a backdrop for Allied or Axis soldiers
  fighting across the war-torn country.
  Regardless of its place in any given cam-
  paign, it’s the author’s hope that Return to Honor
  does justice to the brave men and women of
  France who never gave up hope.
  Vive la France.
  About the Author
  Brian J. Underhill first began writing for
  Steve Jackson Games in 1987, and, after a lengthy
  hiatus, has recently returned to the fold. This
  prodigal author’s most recent releases include
  GURPS Cliffhangers and GURPS Traveller
  Heroes 1: Bounty Hunters. Return to Honor is
  Brian’s first supplement for GURPS WWII.
  ABOUT GURPS
  Steve Jackson Games is committed to full
  support of the GURPS system. Our address is
  SJ Games, Box 18957, Austin, TX 78760.
  Please include a self-addressed, stamped
  envelope (SASE) any time you write us!
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  Our online magazine includes new GURPS
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  New supplements and adventures. GURPS
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  you know what’s new. A current catalog is
  available for an SASE. Or check out our web-
  site (below).
  Errata. Everyone makes mistakes, includ-
  ing us – but we do our best to fix our errors.
  Up-to-date errata sheets for all GURPS releas-
  es, including this book, are available from SJ
  Games; be sure to include an SASE. Or down-
  load them from the Web – see below.
  Gamer input. We value your comments, for
  new products as well as updated printings of
  existing titles!
  Internet. Visit us on the World Wide Web at
  www.sjgames.com for an online catalog, erra-
  ta, updates, Q&A, and much more. GURPS
  has its own Usenet discussion group, as well:
  rec.games.frp.gurps.
  GURPSnet. This e-mail list hosts much of
  the online discussion of GURPS. To join, 
  e-mail majordomo@io.com with “subscribe
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  The GURPS WWII: Return to Honor web
  page is at www.sjgames.com/gurps/books/
  ww2/returntohonor/.
  Page References
  Rules and statistics in this book are specifi-
  cally for the GURPS Basic Set, Third Edition.
  Any page reference that begins with a B refers
  to the GURPS Basic Set – e.g., p. B102 means
  p. 102 of the GURPS Basic Set, Third Edition.
  Page references that begin with CI indicate
  GURPS Compendium I. Others are CII to
  Compendium II, HT to High-Tech, W to
  WWII, W:HS to WWII: Hand of Steel, and
  W:IC to WWII: Iron Cross. The abbreviation
  for this book is W:RH. For a full list, see 
  p. CI181 or visit the updated web list at
  www.sjgames.com/gurps/abbrevs.html.
  2
  INTRODUCTION
  
  In their bid to avenge 1871, the French
  reached back to the chivalric precepts of 1371.
  Plan 17
  As Germany prepared to invade France under
  the Schlieffen Plan (see p. W6), France created a
  grand strategy of its own, Plan 17. It called for
  invading Alsace with one thought in mind: What-
  ever the circumstances, attack. Plan 17 was more
  of a mystique than a military plan. It was not
  founded on the principles of steel and strategy, but
  on élan and impetuousness. This idea that high
  morale could defy shrapnel would unnecessarily
  spill French blood throughout the war.
  Soon after the Germans invaded Belgium, the
  French commander Joffre began his own attack.
  Dragoons in horsehair plumes and metal cuirasses
  marched forward alongside infantry in red trousers
  and blue jackets. Soon, the French tricolor waved
  above liberated cities up and down the front. Plan
  17 was, briefly, a success, but the horsemen in tra-
  ditional armor and riflemen in traditional colors
  would soon discover the modern merits of the
  Kaiser’s drab MGs and artillery.
  Stalemate
  In only six days, Germany shattered the col-
  orful French forces. By Aug. 25, 1914, the tricol-
  or flew nowhere in Alsace. Ironically, had the
  Germans feigned retreat before the French attack,
  their own Schlieffen Plan might have worked, but
  they themselves hesitated to give these traditional
  foes even the illusion of victory. As Plan 17 failed
  spectacularly, refugees crowded the roads before
  the advancing Germans. Echoes of 1871’s shame
  haunted France’s generals.
  FRANCE AT WAR
  3
  “On these battlefields, my lovely, safe world
  blew itself up.”
  – F. Scott Fitzgerald
  France felt secure and self-satisfied in the
  early years of the 20th century. It was a time of
  enlightenment and intellectualism, of culture and
  decadence. In the last week of June 1914, a Paris
  editorialist declared, “What spoiled children we
  are!” Some readers probably agreed with delight.
  But a decade of war threats and brinkman-
  ship had pushed Europe toward the inevitable.
  With the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand
  (see p. W6), diplomatic channels flooded with
  activity. Despite those who spoke with the voice
  of reason, France wanted to go to war. Still bitter
  over their 1871 loss to Prussia, the French gener-
  als saw the impending conflict as an opportunity
  to gain back what was lost – a chance to restore
  Alsace-Lorraine, France’s honor, and her undis-
  puted place atop the continental powers. 
  WORLD WAR I
  
  On Sept. 2, the French government packed up
  and moved from Paris to Bordeaux, believing the
  fall of Paris to be imminent. The city’s military
  governor, Gallieni, had an idea for avoiding that.
  He made some of the few troops that Joffre sent
  him move farther north – placing them on the
  advancing Germans’ flank. The southern German
  line stopped to meet Joffre’s frontal assault and
  the northern portion spread out in fear of the
  flanking attack that was little more than a shrewd
  Parisian’s bluff. The nervous Germans fell back a
  bit and began digging in – and the real combat of
  the Great War began, battles for which neither
  side had done any planning.
  The Western Front
  Germany had every reason to avoid a war of
  bitter stalemate in the trenches – it could not feed
  itself for a long war nor fight effectively on two
  fronts for that length of time. France had neither
  factor to worry about, but was no more psycho-
  logically prepared to dig in and wait things out.
  Hunkering down in the mud offered no opportu-
  nity to display the fighting spirit that the French
  command felt sure held the keys to victory. 
  Refusing to accept their reality, the French
  generals attempted several costly assaults. Thou-
  sands of Frenchmen hurled themselves out of
  their trenches, only to be cut down by a hail of
  bullets. Their visions of glory and hope soon
  transformed into a war-weary pessimism. 
  The Mutiny of 1917
  In 1917, the crisis reached its breaking point.
  Years of ill-advised slaughter had bled the French
  dry, and the survivors were sick of mud and cer-
  tain death. Joffre was pushed upstairs, promoted
  to marshal and removed from planning the war. 
  His replacement, Gen. Robert Nivelle, ordered
  French troops forward to the second battle of the
  Aisne in April. Unfortunately, Nivelle’s plan had
  been intercepted by Germany. When the French
  troops charged, they were mowed down in yet
  another massacre. By the end of the day, France
  had advanced only 600 yards – Nivelle had prom-
  ised six miles – and France had taken 40,000 casu-
  alties. Unable to admit his plan was a failure,
  Nivelle continued the attack for two weeks, result-
  ing in 350,000 casualties for France and its allies.
  After the first day, many French units refused
  to go over the top again; some soldiers shot their
  own officers rather than charge the German line.
  By the end of the offensive, more than 50 divi-
  sions had refused to obey orders in a mutiny that
  left great stretches of the front undefended.
  French counterintelligence leapt into action,
  blocking all news of the mutiny from the Ger-
  mans. The undefended front was never breached.
  On May 15, Nivelle was replaced by Henri-
  Philippe Pétain (see p. 13). More than 100,000 sol-
  diers were court-martialed; 23,000 were found
  guilty; 432 were sentenced to death, but only 55
  were shot. (Many others were shot without trial.)
  Pétain also ordered changes in the structure of the
  French army. Leave time was doubled, food was
  improved, and Pétain assured troops there would
  be no more bloody offensives while he was in
  charge. Morale began to improve, but at that point
  it had but one direction to go from rock bottom.
  Echoes of the 1917 mutiny would ring until 1940.
  The End
  With the U.S. entry into the war, the tide
  began to change. After four exhausting years of
  bloodbaths and barbed wire, almost entirely on its
  own soil, France won its costly victory. The sol-
  diers returned home to victory celebrations. As
  spoils, the country claimed Alsace-Lorraine. 
  Despite the celebrations, France felt beaten in
  many ways. For a short time following the war, the
  French population actually declined; the country’s
  huge loss of citizen-soldiers partially explains this,
  but very few males are required to expand a popu-
  lation. A continuing pessimism also contributed. 
  The quintessential French joy in life – and its
  appreciation of fine dining, fine romance, and fine
  living – would return, but the staggering horrors of
  the Great War would not be forgotten.
  4
  FRANCE AT WAR
  
  After WWI, France found itself the focal point
  of world politics. Peace negotiations were held in
  Paris; the treaties of Versailles, St. Germain,
  Tianon, Neuilly, and Sevres were all signed in
  France; and the new League of Nations was to be
  headquartered in Geneva, just across the border. In
  the midst of all this peace, war was still brewing.
  Syria
  Modern Syria was part of the Ottoman
  Empire (now Turkey) prior to WWI. When Turkey
  joined the Central Powers, Great Britain offered a
  guarantee of independence for all Arab lands
  roughly corresponding to modern-day Syria and
  Iraq. Four months later (May 1916), Britain and
  France secretly concluded the Sykes-Picot agree-
  ment, dividing Arab land between the British and
  French governments. Syria and Lebanon were
  assigned to France, Palestine and Jordan to Great
  Britain. The Arabs, allied with Britain and France,
  fought the Turks for the rest of the war, aiding in
  the capture of Damascus in 1918. In 1919, Britain
  withdrew, leaving French troops in control, and a
  year later France was granted a mandate over
  Syria and Lebanon by the League of Nations.
  The anti-Turkish movement quickly turned
  anti-French, and rebellion sprung up in Syria in
  1920, and again from 1925 to 1927. The second
  uprising was well organized and executed, but the
  better-armed French forces smashed the rebellion
  with artillery, tanks, and aircraft.
  The region was a hotbed of revolt and skir-
  mishes; French soldiers would find all sorts of
  opportunity for adventure defending against sur-
  prise attacks, assaulting Arab fortresses, infiltrat-
  ing anti-French cells, guarding supply convoys,
  and navigating the twisting streets of exotic 
  Middle-Eastern cities.
  Morocco 
  In 1920, war broke out in Morocco between
  Spanish troops and Rif tribes led by Abd el-Krim.
  The Rif soldiers trounced the European troops,
  and by 1924 they had driven the Spanish forces
  from most of their territory. Spanish losses were
  heavy, due in part to poor leadership and inade-
  quate weapons.
  After defeating Spain, Abd el-Krim turned
  his attention to the French. In 1925, he pushed
  French forces nearly to the ancient city of Fès in
  retaliation for the capture of the Rif supply base in
  the Wargha valley. That same year, faced with
  Abd el-Krim’s string of successes and growing
  concerned over the possibility of losing their
  colonies in North Africa, France and Spain began
  planning a joint military action. 
  As Spanish forces landed near Ajdir, a French
  army of 160,000 men, led by a Marshal Pétain
  fresh from his Great War laurels, attacked from
  the south. Faced with a combined army of a quar-
  ter-million men armed with superior weapons,
  Abd el-Krim surrendered on May 27, 1926.
  PCs in the region will find many opportuni-
  ties for action and adventure, and may even come
  face to face with one of the key Spanish generals
  in this campaign, Francisco Franco.
  THE YEARS BETWEEN
  FRANCE AT WAR
  5
  
  THE DECLINE OF THE
  FRENCH MILITARY
  Given the lessons of the Great War, France
  concentrated on a policy of fortified defense,
  despite evidence that new technology would favor
  the offensive. French politicians viewed another
  war as costly and self-defeating, thus they intend-
  ed to deter Germany from ever trying again. In
  addition, the better the fortifications the fewer men
  it takes to adequately man them. Given its popula-
  tion declines, France had grave concerns about
  fielding the manpower to beat Germany again, so
  planned to substitute concrete for soldiers. 
  The politicians argued stridently about the
  cost of these fortifications, with many viewing just
  about any military expenditures as wasteful. In
  1925, War Minister Paul Painlevé described what
  became the compromise policy when he said
  France’s role was to “achieve a rational system of
  national defense, adequate in times of danger but
  unsuited to adventures and conquests.”
  Pinching francs while building costly forts
  caused other programs to fall behind. Confident
  that they never would actually have to fight,
  France’s leaders let the general standards of mili-
  tary training and equipment lag behind throughout
  the interwar years – the same period in which Ger-
  many was setting a record pace for improvement.
  THE MAGINOT LINE
  The Maginot Line was built between 1929
  and 1940 to defend traditional invasion routes
  across the eastern frontier of France. It was
  intended to hold off a German invasion long
  enough for the French army to mobilize, and to
  act as a sort of “Great Wall of France” behind
  which the French could feel safe and secure –
  a doctrine that would later become known as
  the “Maginot mentality.” This mindset in many
  political leaders and a few generals would ulti-
  mately contribute to France’s fall.
  The line consisted of a string of forts, usu-
  ally running along naturally defensible terrain,
  often the Meuse River. In the south, it ran from
  the Alps to the Mediterranean. In the north, it
  stretched from Switzerland to the Ardennes. The
  gaps bordered upon generally friendly coun-
  tries, Belgium and Switzerland. The latter
  would not provide an ideal invasion route under
  any circumstances, and the French intended to
  enter Belgium and assist in manning its defen-
  sive belts should the Germans invade again
  from that direction. Belgium had reservations
  about defending France in Belgium, and ended
  its alliance with France in 1936. From that point,
  France began extending the Maginot Line to the
  coast, but had little work done by 1940.
  Much of this vast defensive network boast-
  ed state-of-the-art features. The facilities were
  as much as 35 yards underground; the surround-
  ing earth would give up to DR 44,000 in game
  terms! Each fort actually consisted of several
  turrets for 75mm guns; observation posts; and
  cupolas and casemates that could house more
  75mm guns, MGs for close defense, 37mm and
  47mm antitank guns, or 81mm and 135mm
  mortars for attacking out-of-view crevices that
  might otherwise protect attacking infantry. The
  casemates usually were placed to provide flank-
  ing fire, at an angle to the line of attack. 
  Major concrete structures facing Germany
  were usually 3.5 yards thick, providing about
  DR 18,000. Lesser features had 1.5-yard-thick
  fronts for DR 3,400, with the rear walls of most
  being about DR 1,500. The steel turrets had 
  DR 1,200 or 1,350, depending on their model.
  The forts could withstand their own fire, so
  if the Germans got right on top of a fort’s works,
  adjacent fortresses could shell them with little
  fear of harming their fellow Frenchmen. Anti-
  tank and infantry weapons defended a fort’s
  rear, but most of the average fort’s weapons
  could not turn back into France, being sited on a
  forward slope or in a casemate with a 45º field
  of fire pointed roughly toward the enemy.
  About 800 troops manned a large Maginot
  fort. They typically lived in two barracks behind
  the fort, but could live for months inside the
  complex if need be. They drew power from the
  state electrical grid, but typically had four 250-
  kW diesel generators for backup, with a 2-3
  month supply of fuel. Miles of brick-lined corri-
  dor connected the fort’s various scattered hard-
  points, ammunition stores, and other features,
  with small electrified trains and elevators mov-
  ing men and ammo to and fro. If an attacker did
  force one of a fort’s two rear entrances, pre-
  emplaced demolition charges could collapse the
  tunnel connecting them to the fighting systems.
  Ultimately, the line’s failure to cover the
  Ardennes provided a fatal opening that the
  French did not foresee. In addition, many of its
  features were not fully fitted, and some forts
  were poorly situated, creating gaps in fields of
  fire. Regardless, the line would have presented
  a formidable obstacle for any head-on assault.
  6
  FRANCE AT WAR
  
  On Sept. 1, 1939, France declared
  a general mobilization after Germany
  invaded Poland (see p. W12). Two
  days later, the French declared war. At
  that time, the nation had some 30
  infantry divisions in the field: 14 were
  in North Africa, defending the Mareth
  Line and keeping watch on Italian
  forces in Libya. Nine were deployed
  on the Alpine front. Only seven were
  available along the German border. 
  The manpower shortage was
  worsened by a sluggish mobilization
  that took weeks. Millions of soldiers,
  as well as plenty of tanks and artillery,
  were available – enough to mount
  some 105 divisions – but calling them
  into service and making them battle-
  ready was a painfully slow process. 
  In addition, the army’s plans did
  not include any contingency for invad-
  ing Germany, even though France had
  promised an attack in Poland’s
  defense. The French scrambled to
  organize an offensive, one for which
  they did not possess a clear goal.
  Operation Saar
  On Sept. 7, Gen. Gaston Prételat,
  commander of the French 2nd Army
  Group, launched Operation Saar, an attack aimed
  between the Rhine and Moselle. Some 31 divisions
  were put at Prételat’s disposal, but only nine were
  used in the initial tentative assault. Gen. Erwin von
  Witzleben’s German 1st Army was facing them
  with far too few men or weapons for the job,
  though the wary French had convinced themselves
  that Hitler had many more forces on their border.
  The Germans retreated in front of the leisurely
  French advance, leaving traps in their wake.
  The explosive-laden houses and other tricks
  made a deep impression upon the French, as did
  the handful of skirmishes that took place before
  the Germans melted away again. Many of the
  invaders thought that they were enduring hard
  combat, and certainly the Poles were told as
  much, but by Sept. 13 Operation Saar had gained
  only a few miles and cost the French 27 dead,
  trivial statistics given the forces involved. The air
  force had lost nine fighters and 18 reconnaissance
  aircraft skirmishing with the Luftwaffe. 
  The French settled in for a long wait, build-
  ing up their defenses in preparation for the blow
  that they strongly suspected would come.
  FALL GELB
  The original German invasion plans for France –
  Operation Fall Gelb (Case Yellow) – did not fully replay
  the Schlieffen Plan. The Wehrmacht intended to invade
  Belgium, the Netherlands, and northern France to secure
  ports and airfields, but not as a staging area to further
  encircle the French army in a counterclockwise sweep as
  attempted in the Great War. The plan’s critics seized
  upon this very lack of a decisive stroke in endorsing their
  alternate plan for a surprise, clockwise sweep entering
  France from farther south. 
  In December 1939 and January 1940, the original
  plan was scheduled and canceled four times – and the
  German generals were scrambling to make their men
  ready with the jump-off date never more than two weeks
  away. On Jan. 10, 1940, a Fiesler Storch crashed in Bel-
  gium, and the Allies captured parts of the operational
  plan, seriously compromising it: Belgium and the
  Netherlands mobilized immediately. 
  On Jan. 16, 1940, Hitler canceled the original plan
  one last time, and ordered the Wehrmacht staff to create
  a new one. Operation Sichelschnitt (Sickle Stroke) – an
  unalloyed invasion of France – was born. Had the
  Wehrmacht stuck to its original plan, and succeeded, it
  likely would have felt compelled to attempt a great
  “right hook” as its next operation, repeating 1914.
  THE BATTLE
  OF FRANCE
  On May 10, 1940, Germany invaded Bel-
  gium and the Netherlands. Using revolutionary
  tactics (including paratroops, gliders, and feints),
  they pressed into the Low Countries, drawing
  British and French forces northward to defend
  France in front of its borders, exactly in accor-
  dance with the existing French plans. Meanwhile,
  panzer divisions slowly made their way through
  the supposedly impassible Ardennes forest, split-
  ting the Belgian and Maginot defensive lines and
  breaking out in what would become the ultimate
  example of blitzkrieg.
  The Ardennes
  May 10, 1940: Seven panzer divisions were
  placed at the disposal of Germany’s Army Group
  A to punch through the Ardennes. Several Ger-
  man commanders believed the operation would
  fail, but a number of factors conspired in favor of
  the German plan. 
  FRANCE AT WAR
  7
  BEATEN BY BLITZKRIEG
  
  First, the Belgians had only light forces in
  the Ardennes; Belgium believed that France
  would advance into the Ardennes to defend it.
  Second, French forces near the Ardennes were
  poorly equipped and tasked with holding an over-
  sized front. Third, the French simply didn’t
  believe that Germany would attack through the
  Ardennes – the region was, after all, impenetra-
  ble when properly defended. Unfortunately for
  France, it was hardly defended at all.
  Luxembourg was defeated in the first day of
  the attacks. The Netherlands fell in four days as
  Fallschirmjäger (German paratroops) seized vital
  bridges. Belgium fared no better as Fallschirm-
  jäger captured Eben-Emaël, a fortress that pro-
  tected the bridges of the Albert Canal. Thirty-five
  British and French divisions, including the best
  France could muster, rushed to the aid of Belgium
  and the Netherlands. But drawing Allied troops to
  the north had been Germany’s intention all along.
  Across the Meuse
  May 13, 1940: Germany did not outnumber
  the French and BEF (British Expeditionary Force),
  but the German armies were better trained and
  equipped. In fierce fighting, Germany expanded
  three bridgeheads into a 50-mile gap in the French
  line. Stukas from the Luftwaffe terrified the French
  troops with their accuracy, and the Me-109 umbrel-
  la over the bridgeheads prevented the Allies from
  bringing in bombers of their own.
  The French response also suffered terribly
  from a slow, top-down command structure. Low-
  level commanders held little authority to respond to
  changes in the battle, while senior French officers
  acted with an odd lethargy. For example, Gen.
  Gamelin didn’t order up divisions from the reserve
  until May 16 – nearly a week after the invasion
  began. Throughout the campaign, the French gen-
  erals failed to coordinate their units well. 
  The Drive to the Channel
  May 16, 1940: It took Germany four days to
  pass through 80 miles of the Ardennes, but only six
  to advance 150 miles against the French 9th Army.
  The German High Command, unnerved by their
  own success, believed they were misreading the
  reports or missing some kind of vital information.
  Their hesitance to take advantage of the advance
  was, at times, more of a hindrance to the German
  advance than the French and British forces.
  France mustered one of her few counter-
  attacks on May 17, aiming at the southern flank of
  the German advance. Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s
  4th Armored Division made three efforts from
  Laon on May 17-19. German counterattacks and
  8
  FRANCE AT WAR
  PARIS
  Paris was a beacon of personal and
  artistic freedom in the 1930s. The cos-
  mopolitan city had rebounded from
  WWI in a celebration of creativity that
  attracted thousands of painters, writers,
  and musicians from around the world.
  The Germans and French alike per-
  ceived occupation of this special city as
  the symbol of who controlled France.
  Refugees from the battlefront had
  begun pouring through Paris shortly
  after the invasion, and on June 1 the
  government closed Paris schools and
  advised all noncombatants to join the
  exodus. Typically, no actual evacuation
  plan had been prepared for this contin-
  gency, so residents only slowly trickled
  away as they could find transportation.
  The government began a hasty con-
  struction of fortifications, which ulti-
  mately served only to get in the way of
  the military units defending the city.
  On June 10, Gen. Weygand decid-
  ed that Paris should be declared an “open
  city,” that is, the French promised not to
  defend it so that the Germans wouldn’t
  destroy it. The government agreed, but
  neglected to announce the decision, even
  to Gen. Héring, the city’s military gover-
  nor! As feisty as his WWI predecessor,
  Héring was forming a makeshift army to
  resist the Germans, hard-won house by
  hard-won house. On the 12th, Weygand
  told him to stand down. 
  On the 13th, the frightened
  Parisians finally took to the roads en
  masse, so that 3 million of them were
  gone when the Germans entered a quiet
  “City of Lights” on Friday, June 14,
  1940. Machine-gun posts were set up
  along the way, and key buildings (gov-
  ernment offices, radio stations) were
  seized. Those Parisians that remained
  watched in an unsettled silence. No gun-
  fire or exploding bombs marked the fall
  of the “open” city – only the drone of
  Wehrmacht tanks and planes as they
  poured down the Champs Elysées
  exactly 35 days after invading France.
  See p. W:IC120 for more informa-
  tion on the occupation years.
  
  heavy Luftwaffe support kept de Gaulle’s lone
  effort from achieving any significant results.
  Northern Advance
  May 21, 1940: On reaching the Somme, Ger-
  many focused on the Allied armies that had been
  trapped with their backs to the sea. On May 21,
  the British launched an attack from the south,
  which was to be coordinated with a French attack
  from the north (from the Somme). The French
  attack never happened, in part because one of
  their key generals was killed. Germany repulsed
  the British attack, using 88mm antiaircraft guns
  against the British tanks.
  On May 26, Hitler ordered the Panzers to
  stop; the reason for his decision is still hotly
  debated (see p. W:IC12). Two days later, they
  were released from the hold order, but the damage
  had already been done – the Allied line had solid-
  ified. Still, Belgium officially surrendered on the
  28th, though it wasn’t until the next day that the
  last of the Belgians ceased fighting.
  Dunkirk
  May 28, 1940: With Allied forces sur-
  rounded and backed up to the sea, Germany
  continued to press the attack. A motley col-
  lection of some 850 commercial vessels
  and 39 destroyers evacuated Dunkirk dur-
  ing Operation Dynamo. In only eight days,
  338,226 troops – nearly a third of whom
  were French – escaped to England. Most of
  the French later returned to France after the
  signing of the armistice and the installation
  of the Vichy government. 
  France lost seven destroyers and torpe-
  do boats; Britain lost another six. More than
  200 commercial ships were either sunk or
  damaged. In the air, Britain’s Royal Air
  Force lost 106 planes, the German Luft-
  waffe 156. Despite the losses, the evacua-
  tion was a success, lending an air of
  heroism and victory to what was actually a
  devastating loss.
  The French XVI Corps stayed 
  at Dunkirk as a rearguard, gallantly pro-
  viding cover during the evacuation. They
  surrendered on the morning of June 4, once the
  evacuation was complete.
  France Divided
  With the fall of Paris and the evacuation at
  Dunkirk, the French government admitted defeat.
  The cabinet voted in favor of surrender, and the
  84-year-old Pétain, the new premier of France,
  asked Germany for its terms. Hitler’s conditions
  shocked the French, but the Germans ignored
  their attempts to negotiate a less harsh peace.
  The armistice was signed on June 25, 1940
  (see The Franco-German Armistice, p. 10), but
  much of France was unwilling to accept defeat,
  much less on Germany’s terms. De Gaulle
  escaped to Britain (see Charles de Gaulle, p. 12),
  and thousands of troops simply refused to stop
  fighting. With de Gaulle claiming leadership of
  “Free France” from London, and Pétain installed
  in Vichy, France was divided.
  It is possible, even likely, that more French-
  men would have sided with de Gaulle if not for his
  affiliation with the British. Emotions ran high, and
  the dilemma over loyalties demoralized France
  and divided French citizens and soldiers.
  INEFFECTIVE SHIELD
  The Wehrmacht simply went around the fear-
  some Maginot Line (see p. 6). By the time that Paris
  fell in mid-June, only a single Maginot fort had actu-
  ally been conquered, Villy la Ferté (see p. 44).
  The rest of the Maginot was still intact and still
  ready to fight – unfortunately, the soldiers manning
  it rarely had any targets for their relatively short-
  range artillery aimed primarily toward the east. By
  July 1, the last of the Maginot garrisons had surren-
  dered to the Germans, by then on their west.
  GMs could create many opportunities for players
  on both sides of the battle to get involved in either
  holding or storming a Maginot hardpoint. The net-
  work of underground tunnels is an ideal location for
  exciting gun battles as French soldiers hold out
  against German invaders. Later, out-of-the-way forts
  might host Resistance caches or secret Nazi projects. 
  FRANCE AT WAR
  9
  
  The French delegates sent to sign the
  armistice with Germany were dismayed to dis-
  cover that the signing would take place in the
  forest of Compiègne, in the same railway car in
  which France had dictated harsh terms to Ger-
  many 22 years earlier at the end of WWI. A
  gloating Hitler then had the rail car shipped to
  Berlin, where Allied bombs later destroyed it. 
  The armistice was unconditionally bind-
  ing upon the French. Germany reserved the
  right to terminate it at any time, and did so after
  the Allied invasion of North Africa in 1942.
  The papers dictated France’s surrender,
  and mandated the German occupation of
  France, the compliance of French citizens and
  soldiers with German authority, the establish-
  ment of the Vichy government (see p. 13), and
  so forth. Some specific examples follow.
  Article V: “As a guarantee for the obser-
  vance of the armistice, the surrender, undam-
  aged, of all those guns, tanks, tank-defense
  weapons, war planes, antiaircraft artillery,
  infantry weapons, means of conveyance, and
  munitions is demanded from the units of the
  French armed forces.”
  Article X: “The French government is
  obligated to forbid any portion of its remain-
  ing armed forces to undertake hostilities
  against Germany in any manner. The French
  government also will prevent members of its
  armed forces from leaving the country and
  prevent armaments of any sort, including
  ships, planes, etc., being taken to England or
  any other place abroad.”
  Article XII: “Flight by any airplane over
  French territory shall be prohibited. Every
  plane making a flight without German
  approval will be regarded as an enemy by the
  German air force and treated accordingly.”
  Article XIV: “There is an immediate pro-
  hibition of transmission for all wireless stations
  on French soil. Resumption of wireless con-
  nections from the unoccupied portion of
  France requires a special regulation.”
  Article XIX: “The French government is
  obliged to surrender upon demand all Germans
  named by the German government in France
  as well as in French possessions, colonies, pro-
  tectorate territories, and mandates.”
  The last measure, in particular, would
  prove fatal to untold thousands of political dis-
  sidents, Jews of various nationalities, and other
  targets of Nazi persecution. Prior to the inva-
  sion, they had taken refuge in France, which to
  that point had held a long history of harboring
  other nation’s exiles.
  THE FRANCO-GERMAN ARMISTICE
  The Germans had won their most spectacular
  victory of the war, acquiring lands they had hard-
  ly dreamed of possessing. As they moved to con-
  solidate their gains, the once and current Allies
  scrambled to minimize the damage.
  The Holdouts
  Not every British soldier, and only a relative-
  ly few Frenchmen, had made it across the channel
  at Dunkirk. The Germans had captured about 
  2 million Allied combatants in their rampage
  across France, an immense number for which
  they had not prepared. Held in makeshift con-
  fines, many of these men kept a keen eye open
  and made good on any chance to escape.
  If they avoided the German guards’ bullets,
  and any patrols sent to retrieve them, these men
  joined other soldiers who had been lurking in the
  woods of northeastern France since the defeat.
  These men slowly filtered back toward civilization
  and sought help in getting back home to England,
  crossing the Pyrenees into Spain, or back to their
  civilian French lives. The Germans knew about
  these former soldiers – at the beginning of Sep-
  tember they put up posters demanding that French
  civilians turn over all British fugitives by Oct. 20,
  or be shot for failing to do so – but they had a lot
  to do, and simply could not watch every farm-
  house and factory neighborhood at once.
  Even those men who sought to escape France
  often ended up staying, because in those days no
  organized resistance network existed. Many a
  French woman did what she could, providing a
  bowl of hot soup or even passing her fugitives on
  to a friend who lived close to a border or coast, but
  these good Samaritans themselves were amateurs,
  and often ended up in Gestapo custody before too
  long themselves. Regardless, they provided an
  invaluable service, keeping the former soldiers
  alive long enough to get their bearings.
  Many of these fugitives would form the core
  of the Resistance (p. 14) in years to come.
  10
  FRANCE AT WAR
  SEEDS OF DEFIANCE
  
  The British Seizure 
  of French Warships
  Shortly after de Gaulle established his gov-
  ernment-in-exile, many French naval vessels
  joined his banner or were simply taken by force in
  British ports. Twelve days after the surrender,
  Britain took military action against the French ves-
  sels that had yet to side with the Allies. Churchill’s
  decision to do so (against most advice) had two
  motives: to show the world that Britain was
  resolved to continue fighting, and to prevent the
  Axis military from gaining control of any part of
  the French fleet.
  On July 3, the British naval squadron Force H
  arrived at the French port of Mers-el-Kébir on the
  gulf of Oran. Adm. Somerville delivered an ulti-
  matum to French Adm. Marcel-Bruno Gensoul:
  join Britain or scuttle your ships. Gensoul refused
  to do either. When the French fleet attempted to
  leave the port, the British opened fire.
  Force H included the aircraft carrier Ark
  Royal, the battlecruiser HMS Hood, and the bat-
  tleships Valiant and Resolution, as well as two
  cruisers and almost a dozen destroyers. The
  French forces comprised the battleships Provence
  and Bretagne, battlecruisers Strasbourg and
  Dunkerque, six destroyers, a seaplane tender, and
  the 12 Oran shore batteries.
  Damage to Force H was light, but the French
  lost some 1,200 sailors. The damaged French bat-
  tlecruiser Strasbourg reached open sea and
  escaped, the Dunkerque and Provence were heav-
  ily damaged, and the Bretagne was sunk. Many
  French felt bitter about the attack by a recent ally.
  German propaganda and elements in the Vichy
  government capitalized on the event, portraying
  the British as murderous traitors.
  At Alexandria, Britain’s Adm. Cunningham
  chose a different approach. Acting against orders
  from their respective governments, Cunningham
  met with French Adm. Godfrey and the two
  worked out an alternative to the British ultima-
  tum. On July 4, the French flotilla demobilized by
  offloading its fuel and handing over the breech-
  blocks for its guns and detonators for its torpedoes
  to the French consulate at Alexandria. The French
  ships could neither sail nor open fire.
  FRANCE AT WAR
  11
  
  THE FREE FRENCH
  On June 28, 1940, the British gov-
  ernment recognized de Gaulle as the
  leader of Free France. Working from
  London, de Gaulle began building the
  Forces Françaises Libres – the Free
  French Forces. Initially, de Gaulle’s small
  army was made up of French troops that
  had escaped to England, French civilian
  volunteers in England, and a few units of
  the French navy. In late 1940, several
  French colonies rallied to de Gaulle’s
  banner, including Chad, Cameroun,
  Moyen-Congo, French Equatorial Africa,
  and Oubangi-Chari. French colonies in
  India and the Pacific followed suit. By the
  end of the war, more than 400,000 French
  men and women had come forward to
  fight for their country (see Free French
  Forces, p. 20).
  Dakar
  In September of 1940, Free French
  forces were sent to capture the Vichy city
  of Dakar, in French West Africa. Britain
  supported the invasion in order to prevent
  the port city from falling into German
  hands. De Gaulle believed it was only
  proper that “the seat of the French gov-
  ernment desiring to continue the fight be located on
  French soil,” and Dakar was an ideal location.
  Initially, a group of Free French soldiers was
  sent by airplane in an effort to sway the city’s gov-
  ernor to join the Free French. They were prompt-
  ly arrested.
  On Sept. 23, some 2,400 Gaullist troops land-
  ed at Dakar, supported by ships from the British
  Royal Navy (including the aircraft carrier Ark
  Royal). The Vichy French air force took to the
  skies, shooting down British aircraft that were pri-
  marily dropping leaflets. Vichy France lost one
  aircraft and managed to dump six tons of explo-
  sives on the ships of the Royal Navy. 
  The ground troops were repulsed by the Vichy
  forces, and the invasion was called off on Sept. 25.
  Free French forces had seen their first full-scale
  battle, and been defeated by Vichy troops.
  Bir Hakeim
  The first engagement between Free French
  and German forces occurred in May 1942, when
  an outnumbered French army clashed with Rom-
  mel’s Afrika Korps at Bir Hakeim, Libya. 
  French forces included the 1e Division Légère
  d’Infanterie (1st Light Division) commanded by
  Gen. Marie-Pierre Koenig. The division was made
  up of several brigades, including the 13 Demi-
  Brigade de la Légion Etrangère (13th half-brigade
  of the Foreign Legion) and the Bataillon du Paci-
  fique (Pacific Battalion), which had been created
  in Nouméa, French Polynesia, and was made up of
  some 300 Tahitian volunteers. Koenig’s driver at
  that time was an Englishwoman, Susan Travers –
  known by her nom de guerre, “La Miss.” She is
  the only woman ever allowed to join the French
  Foreign Legion.
  Koenig and his troops were severely out-
  numbered, but held out against German and Ital-
  ian forces for over two weeks. Rommel offered
  terms of surrender, but Koenig refused. In an
  audacious nighttime attack, his troops assaulted
  the heart of the German lines. The determined
  Free French soldiers opened a gaping hole in the
  lines, allowing for the escape of more than 2,400
  French soldiers in one of the most dramatic mili-
  tary breakouts in history.
  Travers and Koenig led the column that broke
  through the lines. Their car passed directly
  through a minefield, came under heavy machine-
  gun fire, and drove into a bomb crater. By the time
  that they had cleared Rommel’s lines, Koenig’s
  car alone had 11 bullet holes.
  12
  FRANCE AT WAR
  CHARLES DE GAULLE
  Described by H.G. Wells as “an utterly sincere mega-
  lomaniac,” Charles Andre Joseph Marie de Gaulle was
  not an easy man to like, but the strength of his often self-
  important convictions would save France at least twice.
  De Gaulle’s star rose rapidly with the invasion. Alone
  among French tank commanders, he defended his country
  vigorously. As undersecretary of state and minister for
  national defense, he was one of the few cabinet members
  who resisted surrender, proposing that the government
  withdraw to a French colony to continue the fight.
  After the surrender, he fled to London. Churchill
  later said, “De Gaulle carried with him, in that small air-
  plane, the honor of France.” On June 18, de Gaulle made
  his first stirring radio broadcast calling on the French to
  resist the occupation. It became perhaps the most famous
  speech in French history and spawned his rallying cry:
  “France has lost a battle, but France has not lost the war.”
  During the remainder of that war, other Allied lead-
  ers conspired to replace the sensitive and stubborn leader
  with a more reasonable man, and the Vichy government
  sentenced him to death for treason, but only his own
  country’s Communists could goad him into a 1946
  retirement. He returned to power and averted a major
  political crisis in 1958, retiring again in 1968. He died a
  year later, a far more popular figure than during the war.
  
  VICHY FRANCE
  Shortly after Germany invaded, many
  Frenchmen felt that the Germans would win, that
  they would conquer Great Britain shortly there-
  after, and that this wouldn’t necessarily be a bad
  thing altogether. Prewar France did have many
  political and social problems that a little Teutonic
  or Fascist efficiency would improve, after all. A
  France that took a willing, proactive role in the
  upcoming une Europe allemande would be able
  to claim an equal place within it.
  In July 1940, Pétain took the helm of a gov-
  ernment that fairly willingly surrendered to Hitler.
  Its capital in the city of Vichy bestowed its popu-
  lar name. Pétain himself would later coin the term
  for this voluntary submission – collaboration – a
  word that quite correctly suggests that the Vichy
  did not see themselves as taking the role of con-
  quered territory in the Nazi’s New Order.
  The Vichy regime called a short parliament to
  abolish the former French government. A new
  constitution – and a fascist government – were
  created to replace it. The Vichy government was
  given control over unoccupied France (roughly
  the southern half minus the Atlantic seaboard) and
  the French colonies, but it was little more than a
  German puppet state controlled by
  French and German fascists.
  The Vichy government ruled
  with Germany’s approval, appoint-
  ing government officials, controlling
  the press, and practicing arbitrary
  arrests. They passed anti-Semitic
  laws and actively pursued Article
  XIX of the armistice (see p. 10),
  rounding up more than 70,000 Jews
  to be added to the even greater Ger-
  man collection of French and other
  Jews in the Occupied Zone.
  The regime also sent more than
  a half-million workers to Germany
  to support the war effort, primarily
  as farmhands but also as the Third
  Reich’s leading source of imported
  skilled labor. In addition, French
  industry usually found itself in a
  captive relationship with the insa-
  tiable appetite of the Wehrmacht’s
  war machine.
  During this interval, the Vichy
  attempted to create a “leader cult”
  for Pétain much like that created by
  Goebbels for Hitler. The Nazis, in
  turn, overlooked this French Führer
  initiative and other Vichy public
  statements alluding to an independent status. As
  long as the Vichy were compliant, they could
  delude themselves in whatever fashion that they
  preferred. A small minority of Nazi leaders advo-
  cated favorable treatment of France, but most of
  them still held a grudge over the terms of Ger-
  many’s own Great War surrender.
  Though the Vichy regime wanted to remain
  neutral in the war, it was committed to defending
  its soil, which meant fighting the Allies invading
  its colonies. In turn, the Allies did not recognize
  the Vichy government, choosing to throw their
  support behind de Gaulle and the Free French
  government that he led from exile. 
  When the Allies invaded North Africa in
  November 1942, Hitler annulled the armistice and
  occupied all of France. The Vichy government con-
  tinued in a weakened form. By July 1943, French-
  men were serving in the Waffen-SS and a Vichy
  army called the Milice was savagely fighting the
  Resistance. Vichy France had become an integral
  part of the Nazi war effort. 
  After France was liberated in August ’44,
  some Vichy politicians fled to Germany, where the
  Allies caught up to them within a year. Most of
  them were arrested, and several were tried and exe-
  cuted for war crimes.
  FRANCE AT WAR
  13
  HENRI-PHILIPPE PÉTAIN
  Born in 1856, Henri-Philippe Benoni Omer Pétain
  attended the Saint-Cyr military academy and the École
  Supérieure de Guerre (army war college) in Paris. He dis-
  tinguished himself and gained great popularity during
  WWI (see p. 4). In 1934, he became the French minister of
  war, and later served as an ambassador to Spain.
  At the age of 84, Pétain was recalled to active duty as
  an adviser to the minister of war of May 1940. He soon
  became vice premier, and after the surrender the Vichy
  “chief of state” with sweeping powers.
  Unlike his own vice premier, Pierre Laval, Pétain
  wanted to keep the Nazis at arm’s length. Ultimately, this
  led him to oust Laval in 1940, but the Germans forced him
  to reinstate their admirer in April 1942, after which Pétain
  became a figurehead with little real authority. He secretly
  prepared to turn Vichy troops in Africa over to the Allied
  side in November 1942, but never made the commitment.
  After the war, Pétain fled to Germany and then
  Switzerland. Eventually caught, he was tried and sen-
  tenced to death. De Gaulle, who had chosen to serve under
  Pétain after his own graduation from Saint-Cyr, commuted
  his former commander’s sentence to life in solitary.
  Pétain died on Ile d’Yeu, an island off the coast of
  Brittany, in 1951.
  
  THE RESISTANCE
  As 1940 turned into 1941, organized French
  resistance developed only slowly. Some of the
  French simply felt beaten and resigned; the Ger-
  mans split France into several zones (p. 11) that
  required papers to cross, making it harder to find
  the help one needed, and some French pinned
  their hopes on Pétain quietly preparing a master-
  stroke of double-cross to be sprung on the Nazis.
  Regardless, minor acts of defiance continued,
  and spread from simply aiding fugitives to modest
  attacks. Adding sand while changing the oil in a
  Gestapo car wasn’t much, but it was something. 
  In the meantime, farmers and schoolgirls kept
  looking for someone to help the soldiers they had
  been harboring for months (see p. 10). Regular 
  networks of mutual acquaintances began to knit
  together to move these men out of hiding. The
  Resistance was coalescing.
  As 1941 continued into 1942, the
  Wehrmacht and SS administrations in Occu-
  pied France had to devote more and more
  resources to curbing the still-young Resistance.
  Some cells, particularly the Communist ones,
  began random assassinations of German per-
  sonnel on the street. The Germans responded
  with tighter curfews, more random identifica-
  tion checks, and – in the case of the killings –
  with mass reprisals, killing several French citi-
  zens for every German slain.
  These measures never proved enough, for
  the Resistance recruited members more quickly
  than the Germans could arrest, torture, and kill
  them. Resistance members also held a small
  advantage because they could always sneak
  across the border into Vichy France. Though
  most of the Resistance probably didn’t realize it,
  on average Vichy officials hunted them far less
  vigorously than did Hitler’s German wardens.
  1943 turned grimmer. The Germans wasted
  no time in stepping up their attacks after seizing
  all of France in November 1942. With nowhere
  to hide, the Resistance suffered massive losses
  throughout the year. Nevertheless, it continued
  to grow. At this time the Nazis began scouring
  France for men to transport to Germany as
  forced labor. This prompted countless men who
  had sat out the conflict until then to join the rural
  Maquis bands of Resistance fighters (see p. 24)
  – more than offsetting the Gestapo’s work.
  By the spring of 1943, the Resistance was
  beginning to anticipate an Allied invasion of
  France. Morale improved despite the losses. In
  September, French Communists on Corsica –
  birthplace of the Maquis tradition – began oust-
  ing the Germans with only minimal support.
  The Resistance had taken the field of battle and
  won against quality German units.
  The Germans outlawed the French holiday of
  Nov. 11, the anniversary of Germany’s WWI sur-
  render and the French equivalent of Memorial Day.
  In the face of this prohibition, a Maquis band seized
  the out-of-the-way town of Oyonnax and held a
  formal parade before slipping away again. 
  In 1944, with hints of the Allied invasion in the
  air, the eager Maquis began seizing mountain
  redoubts, then taking heavy tolls among the coun-
  terattacking Germans before slipping away. The
  largest such initiative seized the Alpine plateau of
  Vercors in June 1944. The Maquis’ luck ran out
  there. The Germans annihilated them, even as a far
  larger threat exploded on the Normandy coast. 
  See Chapter 3 for more on the Resistance.
  VARIAN FRY
  Thirty-one-year-old American writer Varian
  Fry arrived in Marseilles, France, in August 1940
  with $3,000 strapped to his leg and a list of refugees
  in danger of persecution by Nazi Germany. He had
  planned to stay one month, but the Mediterranean
  port was jammed with thousands of anti-Nazi
  refugees – Jews and non-Jews alike – that swarmed
  to Fry’s American Rescue Committee (ARC). 
  For over a year, Fry and a few helpers defied
  authorities, set up secret escape routes, forged pass-
  ports and visas, laundered money on the black mar-
  ket, conspired with gangsters, and chartered illegal
  transports. In 13 months, they spirited 1,500 people
  out of the country and gave aid to 2,500 more.
  Fry’s work could provide all sorts of campaign
  settings. American or European PCs may work
  with the ARC as forgers, spies, couriers, or escorts.
  Vichy soldiers may be assigned to counter Fry’s
  operations, while some Vichy bureaucrats quietly
  sabotaged the Nazi roundup themselves. Resistance
  fighters may rub elbows with ARC members. Any-
  one cooperating with ARC operations will be in
  danger of arrest by French or German authorities,
  and even the American consulate will rarely be
  helpful. In January 1941, Fry’s passport expired,
  and the U.S. State Department – which disapproved
  of his activities – refused to renew it. (To be fair,
  U.S. officials in Vichy France bent over backward
  in their own efforts to aid refugees from the Nazis.
  Most likely they perceived Fry as an amateur who
  would draw too much attention and cause the Vichy
  and Germans to close all avenues of escape.)
  U.S. officials later aided the Vichy in expelling
  Fry for the “crime” of protecting anti-Nazis and
  Jews. He returned to New York in September 1941.
  14
  FRANCE AT WAR
  
  The Free French got their first taste of fighting
  under Anglo-American command in Italy, where
  more than 100,000 French soldiers would take part
  in the grueling campaigns of 1943. Most of these
  forces had been organized in Africa, and the Free
  French government had moved its base of opera-
  tions to Algiers in June 1943.
  Shortly, select units would return to the first
  home of the Free French – England – in prepara-
  tion for the day that they all had been awaiting, the
  day they returned to France itself.
  D-Day
  The liberation of France began with the
  Allied invasion at Normandy on June 6, 1944 (see 
  p. W30). French operatives in the Jedburgh teams
  (see p. 29) already had helped pave the way. A
  few Free French commandos joined the British
  and Canadian troops storming the beaches. At
  Pegasus Bridge, the first French home became
  free again after four long years of occupation.
  Within days, French troops in the SAS would be
  parachuting into Brittany along with much-need-
  ed weapons to help the Maquis get organized into
  a proper fighting force.
  The Resistance had gotten busy long before
  their weapons arrived. Though only half of them
  were armed, the French operatives struck out on
  the night before the landings. They crippled the
  railroads and locomotives essential to a German
  counterattack in Plan Vert, destroyed telephone
  cables across France in Plan Violet, cut electrical
  lines in Plan Bleu, and destroyed bridges and
  roads in Plan Tortue. In all, these measures kept
  some dozen German divisions from rapidly con-
  verging on the Allied beachheads.
  The Americans and British had not made 
  de Gaulle part of their planning. Summoned back
  to England from Algeria on June 5, he raised
  objection after objection about the manner in
  which his hosts had overlooked French sover-
  eignty. Even his staunchest supporters raised their
  eyebrows at his intransigence, and the irritated
  Anglo-Americans did not get around to transport-
  ing him to Normandy until June 14.
  Once on French soil, he stayed.
  Bloody Breakouts
  As the American, British, and Canadian
  armies fought to break out of their beachhead and
  roll up northern France (see p. W32), Free French
  units accompanied them. The premier such unit
  was the 2nd Armored Division, commanded by
  Gen. Jacques-Philippe Leclerc, who had slipped
  through German lines in 1940 to join another
  armored unit when his first one was surrounded. 
  Having arrived in France on Aug. 1, the 2nd
  Armored ran into the 9th Panzer Division 10 days
  later as the Wehrmacht troops were settling into
  their defensive positions. Despite the opposition,
  the French took the bridges at Alençon intact. 
  The next day, they battled elements of the
  German 2nd and 116th Panzer divisions. Despite
  being outgunned in his U.S.-made Sherman tanks
  and outnumbered, Leclerc advanced to the out-
  skirts of Argentan, helping to close the Falaise
  Gap and hasten the German retreat to Germany. 
  The Allied forces had swept clean all but the
  coast of northern France. German garrisons in
  coastal cities would hold out for months to come,
  but for all purposes they had lost their highly
  prized conquest.
  FRANCE AT WAR
  15
  LIBERATION AND BEYOND
  
  Operation Anvil-Dragoon
  South of the grand Allied penetrations, the
  Resistance had kept the Germans busy. One large
  Maquis unit moved to ensure that the Wehrmacht
  couldn’t flee into Spain. (They intended to, until
  they discovered that Franco would not greet them
  warmly, but planned to disarm and intern them.)
  On Aug. 15, 1944, Allied troops
  landed in southern France. French com-
  mandos covered the flanks of the inva-
  sion, but opposition proved light. A
  group of these commandos led by Col.
  Bouvet captured the Cap Nègre fortifi-
  cations. By nightfall of Aug. 15, they
  had marched nine miles and taken
  1,000 prisoners.
  The next day saw the vanguard of
  the French 1st Army, under the com-
  mand of Gen. de Lattre de Tassigny,
  enter the fray. The French attacked with
  extraordinary spirit and élan, capturing
  Toulon and Marseilles on Aug. 28, and
  Lyons on Sept. 3. They linked up with
  Leclerc’s 2nd Armored at Châtillon-
  sur-Seine on Sept. 12.
  By Sept. 15, 1944, all of France
  was free once again.
  Leclerc was sent to wrest Indo-
  China back from the Japanese, but only
  arrived in time to accept their surrender.
  POST-WWII
  FRANCE
  By the end of the war, France was
  war-weary but jubilant, proud of her
  restored honor but tortured by the mem-
  ory of collaboration. At first opportunity,
  those seeking to address this shame had
  shaved the heads of French women who
  had associated with Germans. They
  would continue to hunt down collabora-
  tors with more passion than prudence in
  a process of épuration (purification) that
  would cost an estimated 30,000 to
  40,000 lives. Many an important Resis-
  tance operative who had masqueraded
  as a collaborator would fall prey to this
  backlash, when the few people who
  knew his real role were either dead or
  unwilling to testify on his behalf.
  Continuing to push his “allies,” de
  Gaulle had prodded them into allowing
  France an occupation zone in con-
  quered Germany. This would later be
  combined with the U.S. and British
  zones to form West Germany.
  In 1948, France participated in the Marshall
  Plan – an American aid package aimed at restoring
  the economies of Europe. It would soon return to
  economic health, though the social and political
  fallout of les années noires (the dark years) would
  continue to haunt the country for decades to come.
  16
  FRANCE AT WAR
  THE LIBERATION OF PARIS
  “Paris must not fall into the hands of the enemy
  except as a heap of rubble.”
  – Adolf Hitler
  On Aug. 19, 1944, some 20,000 of Paris’ 3 million
  residents began to revolt against the Wehrmacht occu-
  piers. Resistance fighters threw up crude barricades and
  turned their weapons on the Germans in a series of guer-
  rilla attacks that left the occupying force reeling. As Tiger
  tanks machine-gunned cafes, Resistance fighters slipped
  up behind them and flung Molotov cocktails down their
  hatches. The poorly armed French irregulars rooted out
  German troops across the city.
  The Allied plan had been to bypass the city; they
  feared getting embroiled in a long-term battle that would
  slow the advance and do unnecessary damage to the
  countless French landmarks. On hearing of the uprising,
  the Free French command persuaded Eisenhower to
  allow Gen. Leclerc and his 2nd Armored to charge
  toward the French capital. Parisians consider it the height
  of rudeness to drop in unannounced, so for the first time
  in four years Leclerc called his father in Paris, and told
  him he would be visiting soon!
  On the night of August 24-25, the 2nd Armored,
  together with troops from the U.S. 4th Infantry, rolled
  into Paris. They were greeted by thousands of cheering
  French citizens showering them with handshakes, hugs,
  kisses, and champagne. A war correspondent later com-
  mented that by the time his jeep had reached the Seine, it
  contained 67 bottles of champagne! Maj. Frank Burk
  later said it was “without a doubt, the happiest scene the
  world has ever known.”
  Lt. Gen. Dietrich von Choltitz surrendered Aug. 26,
  having chosen for various reasons to disobey Hitler’s
  orders to reduce the city to rubble. A few diehard troops
  took a little longer to throw down their arms, but it was
  shortly over. Champagne flowed freely; women donned
  their best dresses, some pieced together from scraps of
  black-market fabric. Paris was free at last. De Gaulle
  made his entrance into the city the same day, Eisenhow-
  er on the next. As a strategic objective Paris had mattered
  little, but as a symbol it was overpoweringly important.
  Afterward, 123,000 Parisians claimed to have been
  part of the 20,000 Resistance fighters that began it all.
  
  France fielded a wider variety of armed
  forces than any other combatant nation in WWII,
  from nervous conscripts to dedicated expatriates
  to desperate guerrillas. This chapter briefly
  describes the nature of these forces.
  Basic Training
  In 1939, the French army had almost 1 mil-
  lion soldiers, with another 5 million reservists
  who had been trained and could be called to serv-
  ice. Given that the nation resisted spending a great
  deal on defense – but already was spending a
  great deal on the Maginot Line – this training
  often proved minimal and outdated. Most troops
  were serving three-year conscriptions.
  These troops would begin their active service
  as raw or green soldiers (see p. W71), buying
  down the attribute and skill levels in the Rifleman
  template on p. W72. Relatively few would be
  trained for the air force or armor, but these would
  average a higher quality, since these were special-
  ist arms less able to utilize reservists.
  Service Culture
  By the spring of 1940, France had mobilized
  one man in eight, mostly through conscription.
  Many of these men would have preferred to wait
  and see if Germany would negotiate a peace, or if
  the Nazi regime would collapse under internal
  pressure, rather than leave their good lives and put
  on a uniform in anticipation of the worst. This sud-
  den increase in the ranks combined with spotty
  morale created an unwieldy, undisciplined mess.
  French military professionals struggled to quickly
  create fighting units of men with inadequate train-
  ing and equipment who did not want to be there.
  These circumstances made life in the French
  army an unpleasant one. The French had long
  believed in harsh standards of discipline for their
  troops, and the French regulars could not afford to
  ease them while attempting to prepare for the
  upcoming crisis. This discipline, in turn, made a
  black impression on the newly called-up
  reservists. A French soldier once joked: “You
  Americans have it easy. In the French army, we
  get shot for not wearing our berets!”
  After the invasion, the former complainers
  tended to melt away, either dead or fled. The
  troops who kept fighting in the Free French or
  Resistance tended to have tightly knit communi-
  ties. They were mostly volunteers prepared to sac-
  rifice their lives in the daunting quest to restore
  French honor. Those units in Vichy service often
  would retain something of the mixed morale and
  perspectives that troubled the pre-war army.
  Commendations
  In the following text, the numbers in paren-
  theses represent Reputation bonuses (see p. W63). 
  The silver Colonial Medal was instituted in
  1893, with a number of bars authorized for cam-
  paigns in WWII. Examples include service in
  Libya (created March 1942), Ethiopia (August
  1942), Bir Hakeim (October 1942), Tripoli (Janu-
  ary 1944), and Tunisia (April 1944). Individual
  service medals of this sort carry no Reputation
  bonuses, but a combination of them, especially in
  large number, might raise an individual’s Reputa-
  tion by +1 at the GM’s discretion.
  De Gaulle created the bronze French Resis-
  tance Medal (+1) in February 1943 to acknowledge
  the courage of its members. On the front side, the
  starting date of the German occupation (June 17,
  1940) is engraved in Roman numerals under a Lor-
  raine cross. The reverse side reads Patria Non
  Immemor – “The Fatherland is not forgetting.”
  MILITARY ORGANIZATION
  “I ask all Frenchmen, wherever they may be,
  to unite with me in action, in sacrifice and in
  hope. Our country is in danger of death. Let us
  fight to save it!”
  – Charles de Gaulle
  THE FRENCH ARMY
  17
  
  The Croix de Guerre (+3) was meant to
  honor bravery; stars or palms on the ribbon desig-
  nated individual citations. (Pétain instituted a
  Vichy Croix de Guerre on Mar. 28, 1941.)
  France also issued the prestigious Médaille
  Militaire (+3) – roughly equivalent to the U.S.
  Distinguished Conduct Medal.
  De Gaulle instituted the Order of Liberation
  on Nov. 16, 1940, as an award to those render-
  ing exceptional services in liberating France.
  Recipients of the commendation are known as
  Compagnons de la Libération. An inscription
  on the reverse reads Patriam Servando Victori-
  am Tulit – “He brought victory by serving the
  homeland.” This order was highly regarded and
  carries a +3 Reputation.
  The highest French distinction, awarded for
  civilian or military gallantry, was the Légion
  d’Honneur, (+4). When awarded for military serv-
  ice, it included the Croix de Guerre with palm.
  The Vichy government instituted a number of
  commendations of their own, most of which will
  carry Reputation bonuses only toward Vichy sup-
  porters. Free French and Allied soldiers may be
  impressed by the awards; a soldier is a soldier,
  after all. They may simply ignore the medals,
  since they were awarded by a puppet government.
  They may even react negatively toward the bear-
  er, viewing him as a traitor to the Allied cause.
  The attitude adopted by any particular non-Vichy
  soldier is up to the GM. 
  Sample Vichy medals include the Colonial
  Medal for action in Somalia (+0), the Combat-
  ant’s Cross (+1), the Medal of Merit for Black
  Africa (awarded only to native troops for partici-
  pation in French actions in French Somaliland,
  French Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar –
  worth +1 in most cases, usually enough to over-
  come the inherent Social Stigma of being an
  African native), and L’Ordre de la Francisque
  Gallique (+1), awarded for “acts in promotion of
  the national revolution” starting May 16, 1941.
  STANDARD UNITS
  The bulk of the army was infantry. Armored
  divisions had just been formed in 1940, and only
  three were fully available to meet the invasion.
  At the start of the war, French infantry units
  could be categorized along the following lines:
  Line infantry formed the bulk of the peace-
  time army. A large portion of the French line
  infantry qualified as “fortress infantry,” serving
  on the Maginot Line, and as alpine infantry facing
  Italy. Officers sent to command the fortress
  infantry were often of mediocre caliber.
  Reserve infantry comprised new conscripts,
  young reservists, and semi-retired veteran
  reservists. Most reserve units were led by a token
  number of officers and had less than a year’s serv-
  ice. These units were categorized as A, B, or C
  reserves according to their viability as front-line
  troops. The A reserves were made up of younger
  soldiers and had a higher percentage of regular
  officers and NCOs. The second-line B reserves
  included veteran reservists who were often better
  prepared than their younger counterparts, but
  received second-rate equipment. C reserves were
  made up of the oldest veterans, some of whom
  had seen battle during WWI, and were assigned to
  work with the Gendarmerie (French police) to
  guard the home front and rear line. Class C units
  usually had third-rate weapons and equipment.
  Chasseurs started the war as dismounted cav-
  alry that fought as infantry; they were better
  trained than average infantry units. Some were
  used to form motorized infantry battalions for the
  newly established armored divisions, although
  they kept their original names. Because of their
  origins as cavalry, chasseur battalions were usual-
  ly organized into brigades rather than regiments.
  Colonial infantry consisted of second-line
  troops drawn from many sources. Zouaves were
  recruited from metropolitan French citizens to
  serve in North Africa. Tirailleurs drew their
  troops from North African natives and from
  French colonists. Other colonial infantry often
  recruited members from both indigenous popula-
  tions (e.g., Senegalese, Malagasies, Indochinese)
  and even from petty French criminals living in
  distant colonies. 
  In fighting effectiveness, colonial infantry
  was a mixed bag. A few units such as the Moroc-
  can mountain troops provided first-rate service,
  while many other units were of no value in com-
  bat. Another notable exception was the Algerian
  colonial units made up of native-born Europeans,
  the Pied Noirs. By the late 1940s, these highly
  motivated and disciplined units could be com-
  pared to the elite French Foreign Legion units.
  18
  THE FRENCH ARMY
  
  Unit Size and Composition
  A standard French infantry squad consisted of
  a squad leader plus 11 men assigned to two ele-
  ments: a demi-groupe de voltigeurs (shock ele-
  ment) and a demi-groupe de fusiliers (fire
  element). The voltigeurs consisted of four riflemen
  (armed with rifles) and a rifle grenadier (armed
  with a rifle and rifle grenades). The senior soldier
  in the shock element was titled the “first rifleman.”
  The fusiliers were led by a corporal (carrying a
  rifle), and included a light machine gun (usually an
  FM 24/29), an LMG loader (armed with a pistol),
  and three ammo carriers (armed with carbines and
  loaded with extra squad ammo, including both the
  older 8mm and the new 7.5mm cartridges).
  Platoons were made up of a command squad
  (an officer, an NCO, a signal operator, and an
  observer) and three infantry squads. Beginning in
  late 1940, a 50mm grenade launcher squad was
  added to some platoons, but there was a serious
  shortage of ammo and training in the new weapon.
  French infantry companies usually consisted
  of a command platoon, a 60mm mortar squad, and
  four infantry platoons.
  Battalions were made up of a headquarters
  (with battalion commander, three officers, NCO,
  secretary, three bicyclists, a motorcyclist, and a
  car driver), a command platoon (with signal
  squad, medical squad with a doctor and four nurs-
  es, and supply squad), three infantry companies,
  and a heavy weapons company consisting of four
  machine-gun platoons, two 81mm mortars, and
  two 25mm antitank guns.
  Division d’Infanterie: A standard French
  infantry division consisted of three infantry regi-
  ments, each including a command/HQ company,
  a heavy weapons company (six 25mm AT guns
  and two 81mm mortars), and three infantry battal-
  ions. In addition, each division included cavalry
  or a motorized recon regiment, an antitank/anti-
  aircraft company, a heavy artillery company, two
  engineer companies, two signal companies (one
  radio, one telegraph), two transport companies
  (one horse, one motorized), a medical group, and
  a supply group.
  Division légère d’infanterie: Light infantry
  divisions had only six infantry battalions (instead
  of nine) and a single artillery group. Divisions
  created from troops that remained after Sedan
  were light divisions with a second field artillery
  group and a recon squadron.
  Division infanterie motorisée: A motorized
  infantry division was largely identical to a stan-
  dard infantry division, but with lorries added for
  transport. The independent Groupes de Transport
  de Personnel (GTP) could be attached to infantry
  divisions during strategic movement. Each GTP
  consisted of about 150-200 trucks (including a
  company of Transport Toute Nature trucks
  designed to carry horses) and 300-400 buses.
  Division légère mécanique: France’s light
  mechanized divisions typically consisted of a
  recon regiment (with two motorcyclist squadrons
  and two armored car squadrons), a combat
  brigade (tanks and armored cars), a motorized
  brigade (infantry, armored cars, and motorcy-
  clists), and an artillery regiment.
  Division légère de cavalerie: When war
  broke out, France had three cavalry divisions. By
  early 1940, they had been broken up and reformed
  into five light cavalry divisions (DLCs), each con-
  sisting of a cavalry brigade, a light motorized
  brigade, and an artillery regiment. They were
  deployed to the Ardennes as a delaying tactic, but
  saw heavy losses. The remaining units, sent to the
  Somme to cover the left wing of the still-forming
  French army, were at half-strength at best. By the
  end of the Battle of France, the DLCs had all but
  ceased to exist.
  Heavy antitank batteries were crewed by
  artillerymen and consisted of eight 47mm AT
  guns. Others, which later functioned in an antiair-
  craft role, were crewed by infantry and contained
  a dozen 25mm guns. A typical French infantry
  division contained both.
  Field artillery regiments had three groups of
  75mm guns. Heavy artillery regiments contained
  two groups of larger guns (105mm and/or
  155mm). Some B-reserve infantry divisions had a
  non-standard mix of artillery consisting of four
  groups of 75mm guns and one group of 155mm
  guns. An artillery group usually had 12 guns.
  A Tank by Any 
  Other Name . . .
  French tanks and armored cars often
  had a name, written on the hull in large
  white letters. Early in the war, the names
  were often fanciful, such as Le Terrible or
  Ouragan. By 1944, they tended toward the
  patriotic, and included historical figures
  (Richelieu), place names (Alsace), or battles
  (Austerlitz). The 2nd Armored Division,
  which contained both French and foreign
  soldiers, often had tanks with foreign
  names, such as the Spanish Guadalajara or
  Polish Poniatowski.
  French PCs are encouraged to name
  their tank and paint the moniker on the side
  with great pride.
  THE FRENCH ARMY
  19
  
  SPECIAL UNITS
  The following units displayed a particularly
  high combination of expertise and morale:
  Chasseurs Alpins: These elite mountain
  troops were recruited from local populations with
  experience in skiing and mountain survival. They
  saw moderate duty with the Allies during the
  1940 Norway campaign, and small units of Pyre-
  nean Chasseurs were deployed along the Spanish
  border. An elite scout group, the Section d’E-
  claireurs Skieurs (SES), was drawn from the
  Chasseurs Alpins. Both groups were made up of
  expert riflemen, skiers, mountain climbers, and
  alpine survivalists.
  Chasseurs Parachutistes: Among the French
  soldiers who had escaped to England in 1940
  were men who had fought in special navy and air-
  force units. When the British SAS was created,
  volunteers were selected from other nationalities,
  including Free French. After serving with the SAS
  during 1942 and ’43, these commandos were
  pooled into special forces under French authority,
  forming two regiments of Chasseurs Para-
  chutistes (RCP) in late 1944. The RCP, equipped
  by the British, saw combat when they parachuted
  into Holland in April 1945. A third element of
  RCP (equipped by the Americans) was formed in
  North Africa from French air-force volunteers,
  but was not used in any airborne operations.
  La Légion Etrangère: The French Foreign
  Legion was a hardened group of soldiers drawn
  from other countries (enlisted men were foreign-
  ers; officers were usually French). See p. 23 for
  more information.
  FREE FRENCH FORCES
  With the fall of France in 1940, de Gaulle
  began recruiting volunteers in England from
  among survivors of the Narvik campaign and
  from the evacuation at Dunkirk. In addition,
  wherever French territories bordered British ones,
  French troops often joined the British forces of
  their own accord. Still, by July 1940, fewer than
  7,000 soldiers had come forward to fight for de
  Gaulle’s “Free French.” British attacks on the
  French navy at Mers-el-Kebir (see p. 11) had cre-
  ated hard feelings in the French population, and
  many refused to fight alongside the Allies.
  As support for de Gaulle grew, so did the size
  of the Free French army. Several French colonies
  and territories (see p. 12) threw their support
  behind de Gaulle, and by D-Day the Free French
  forces numbered some 400,000 men and women.
  More than half were stationed in Algeria and did
  not participate in the liberation of the homeland.
  Free French soldiers were usually equipped by
  the British (which, in turn, often meant American-
  made vehicles), and participated in campaigns
  throughout the war: Eritrea, Syria, Libya, Tunisia,
  etc. Elite Free French soldiers were even incorpo-
  rated into the British SAS or Royal Marines.
  VICHY FORCES
  In contrast to the Free French, many French
  units accepted France’s surrender and continued
  to fight for the Vichy government. In practice, this
  meant Vichy forces sided with Germany and Italy,
  even fighting against the Free French.
  Under the terms of the armistice, France was
  required to disband her army, except for a force of
  100,000 men to be used in maintaining domestic
  order. The 1.5 million French soldiers captured dur-
  ing the Battle of France became prisoners of war.
  The colonial army in North Africa, however,
  remained to protect the area from attack by
  Britain. Vichy PCs will most likely be stationed in
  Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, Indochina, Madagascar,
  or in similar colonies or territories.
  A COMBINED ARMY
  As the war progressed, loyalties began to
  change. During Operation Torch, the Allied inva-
  sion of North Africa, the Vichy commander met
  with Allied agents and arranged for his troops to
  surrender. Naval officers – with grudges against
  Britain both old and new – refused. After a bitter
  battle against overwhelming odds, the Vichy
  forces either surrendered or were destroyed.
  Soon soldiers from the Vichy armies in Africa
  began to desert. Some sided with the Free French,
  others returned to occupied France and joined the
  Resistance movement. (Note that although ex-
  Vichy soldiers flocked to de Gaulle’s banner,
  many were still reluctant to throw in their lot with
  the Allies as a whole.)
  The influx of soldiers was a boon for the Free
  French. An entire army – the 19th “French” Corps
  – was eventually formed from French soldiers in
  North Africa. Though poorly equipped, this army
  of 60,000 was tasked to hold the center of the
  Allied line in Tunisia. The six-month Tunisian
  campaign (November 1942 to May 1943) cost the
  French 16,000 casualties as they fought a desperate
  battle and won, a first step in restoring the honor
  that few by then associated with Vichy service.
  Beginning in late 1943, this mixed force of
  Free French and former Vichy soldiers fought in
  nearly every Allied campaign – in Italy, Nor-
  mandy, Provence, and the Ardennes, as well as in
  Germany and Austria.
  20
  THE FRENCH ARMY
  
  OPERATIONS
  AND TACTICS
  Strategically, the 1940
  French army was deter-
  mined to hold onto its
  native soil and prevent any-
  one – particularly Germany
  – from taking it. This
  “Maginot mentality” car-
  ried down to the tactical
  level as well. French troops
  had been taught to dig in
  and hold their ground.
  French tactics – from
  squad level up – were out-
  dated by the time Germany
  roared into the Ardennes.
  Screaming Stukas broke
  defensive lines and morale,
  and the rush of 20-ton 
  panzers erased all thought
  of holding ground from
  some defenders’ minds.
  Just as during the First
  World War, morale was a
  problem for French troops.
  Even when tactical plans were well-laid, they
  could fail because not all of the troops would
  carry them out with vigor. Some riflemen were
  motivated solely out of fear of reprisal from a sen-
  ior officer, rather than any genuine desire to serve
  France’s defense.
  Later in the war, Free French units received
  better training and became highly motivated.
  They picked up Anglo-American tactics as well.
  THE FRENCH
  AIR FORCE
  In September 1939, France had roughly 800
  fighters (including the MS.406; see p. 42) and 250
  bombers, many of which were second-line air-
  craft. By the following spring, they had phased
  out some of the outdated models, and entered the
  war with an effective fighting force of 740 fight-
  ers and 140 bombers. The British Royal Air Force
  supplied some 350 fighters, but because the new
  Hawker Hurricanes and Supermarine Spitfires
  were needed to defend Britain, France received
  mostly second-line British aircraft – most of
  which were used in a front-line role.
  Despite aid from Britain, the French air force
  took heavy losses in the Battle of France. Total
  aircraft losses (including combat, reconnaissance,
  and support craft) exceeded 750 planes.
  With the fall of France and the signing of the
  armistice, some French pilots escaped to Britain
  where they joined de Gaulle’s Free French. Oth-
  ers remained with the newly established Vichy
  government. Pilots stationed at colonial bases
  were split in their loyalty, as well. The British
  naval base at Gibraltar was bombed by Vichy
  pilots in reprisal for the British attacks on the
  French fleet in July 1940.
  THE FRENCH NAVY
  At the outbreak of WWII, the French navy
  consisted of a single aircraft carrier (the Béarn),
  nine battleships and battlecruisers (Lorraine,
  Jean-Bart, Provence, Dunkerque, Strasbourg,
  Bretagne, Paris, Courbet, and Richelieu), 18
  cruisers, 72 destroyers, 78 submarines (including
  the Surcouf – the largest sub in the world), and
  countless smaller vessels.
  Early in the war, France sent several ships to
  support British actions in Norway, but by mid-
  1940 they had been recalled and helped evacuate
  Allied forces at Dunkirk.
  With the signing of the armistice, some French
  ships (mostly smaller craft) sailed for British ports.
  The majority of the fleet proper sailed to the naval
  base at Oran. After the British excursion there 
  (p. 11), the surviving vessels moved to Toulon to be
  eventually scuttled (see p. W:IC19).
  THE FRENCH ARMY
  21
  
  French soldiers were stationed in colonies
  around the world during the 1930s. Some saw
  action prior to 1939; others simply maintained
  garrison duty throughout the war.
  Africa
  French colonial forces were stationed
  throughout Africa. Soldiers in North Africa served
  under the XIXe Région Militaire in Algeria, the
  Commandement Supérieur des Troupes de Tunisie
  in Tunisia, and the Troupes du Maroc in Morocco.
  In French West Africa, European Frenchmen
  served alongside native Senegalese regiments
  under the command of the Afrique Occidentale
  Française command. The Régiment Mixte d’In-
  fanterie Coloniale de l’AOF, a regiment of
  infantry and light mechanized forces, was made
  up of both local and European soldiers. 
  Soldiers stationed in French Equatorial
  Africa likewise served in mixed regiments,
  answering to commanders of the Afrique Equato-
  riale Française forces.
  Indochina
  France had a number of colonial forces
  guarding its interests in French Indochina. These
  Indochine forces were divided into divisions
  according to their assigned region. Examples
  include the Division du Tonkin assigned to the
  Tonkin region, the Division de Cochinchine-
  Cambodge in Cambodia, and the Laos-based
  Brigade d’Annam-Laos, consisting of a motorized
  detachment and three mixed infantry regiments.
  Scandinavia
  In early 1940, troops were sent to Scandi-
  navia as part of the Corps Expéditionnaire
  Français en Scandinavie. The Corps included two
  divisions of chasseurs légère (light chasseurs), a
  division of light infantry (the 1re Division Légère
  d’Infanterie), the Brigade Autonome de Chas-
  seurs de Podhale (made up of Polish officers, with
  enlisted men drawn from both French Poles and
  Polish nationals), and the 13e Demi-Brigade de
  Marche de la Légion Etrangère (a Foreign Legion
  mountain brigade created on Mar. 1, 1940).
  Only parts of the corps actually reached Nor-
  way; large portions were recalled before they ever
  set foot on Scandinavian soil, and returned to aid
  in the defense of France. 
  THE FOREIGN LEGION
  Founded in 1831, the French Foreign Legion
  (La Légion Etrangère) was a volunteer army unit
  surrounded by mystery, intrigue, and glamour.
  Most enlisted men came from outside France, since
  Frenchmen were usually forbidden enlistment.
  (Leaving France and then joining the Legion was
  an easy way around that rule.) The officers were
  mostly French, but foreigners could hold ranks up
  to colonel. Enlistments were for five years, but 12
  years of honorable service in the Legion earned
  French citizenship. The pay was terrible (four cents
  a day for privates) and the discipline brutal, but the
  esprit of the Legion is famous to this day.
  The Legion was a haven for those fleeing
  political or criminal punishment, as were other
  select units (see below). It was an ideal place to
  hide, for no proof of identification was required,
  and most enlistees adopted a nom de guerre which
  the Legion honored. The FFL insignia was a small
  red grenade spouting seven flames; uniforms were
  regulation khakis copied from the Bat d’Af. When
  not fighting, the Legion trained or performed hard
  physical labor. The desertion rate was high, but the
  Legion actively pursued and severely punished
  BEYOND FRANCE ITSELF
  22
  THE FRENCH ARMY
  
  deserters, usually requiring several
  years in the Bat d’Af that did not count
  against the enlistment term.
  Legion headquarters was at Sid-
  bel-Abbes, in Algeria. Recruits were
  shipped from Marseilles to Algeria
  after three to six months of training.
  From there, the recruits could be sent
  to any Legion unit in the French
  empire. In the course of the ’30s and
  ’40s, the Legion served in Algeria,
  Morocco, Dahomey, Senegal, Indochi-
  na, French India, China, Madagascar,
  Syria, and Lebanon. The Legion had
  no units stationed in France, proper.
  The Legion used standard French
  army weaponry. It organized artillery
  and cavalry units, but was primarily
  infantry. Legion units relied heavily
  on mules for their transport needs. A
  veteran often would have high Packing skill.
  The Legion’s motto is Legio Patria Nostra –
  “The Legion is our Fatherland.”
  After the French surrender, nearly all Legion
  units came under the command of the Vichy gov-
  ernment. The German Armistice Commission
  immediately demanded the return of any German
  citizens serving in the Legion, and most legion-
  naires were not unhappy to see them go. But the
  commission also demanded the return of Jewish
  refugees of any nationality. Most soldiers in the
  Legion had little sympathy for the Nazi party or
  the Vichy government, and the Legion itself had a
  reputation for being a safe haven from exactly
  such oppression. Its intelligence system usually
  alerted Legion outposts of German or Vichy visits
  well in advance, and wanted soldiers were given
  new papers and new identities, or simply shipped
  off to another outpost. The Legion also defied
  Article V of the Armistice (see p. 10) by hiding
  caches of weapons and material. 
  Many legionnaires longed to join de Gaulle,
  but few felt comfortable deserting their unit. Those
  who were willing recognized that the mountains
  and deserts surrounding them were a formidable
  obstacle to overcome before they would reach Free
  French troops. For most of the war, the Legion
  remained divided, commanded by the Vichy gov-
  ernment but often unwilling to fight for it.
  A single Legion unit, the 13th Demi-Brigade,
  (see p. 12) followed de Gaulle to England and
  fought for the Free French from 1940.
  Bat d’Af 
  The Infanterie Legere d’Afrique (known
  colloquially as Battalion d’Afrique or Bat d’Af)
  was made up of penal battalions employing
  strict regulations and harsh discipline. Many of
  the legends surrounding the Foreign Legion
  actually have roots in the Bat d’Af. Sometimes
  called Les Joyeux, the Bat d’Af were reserved
  for criminals and are sometimes confused with
  the Compagnies Disciplinaires and Sectiones
  d’Exclus (see below). 
  During the 19th century, the Bat d’Af con-
  sisted of recruited men who had served a term in
  the Compagnies Disciplinaires but had not fin-
  ished their prior term of enlistment. They also
  accepted men released from prison sentences
  who had not yet served their term of conscription.
  Soon a corps of hardened volunteers, seeking
  adventure and service in North Africa instead of
  boring garrison duty in France, became the pre-
  dominant source of recruits. By WWII, the Bat
  d’Af rarely contained criminals convicted of seri-
  ous crimes. Hard-core criminals were relegated
  to the Sectiones d’Exclus.
  The Bat d’Af were often used in dangerous,
  desolate areas of North Africa under grueling
  conditions that required the toughest of men.
  They were pushed to total exhaustion under
  conditions requiring the most brutal discipline.
  But when the bullets began to fly, their conduct
  was exemplary. 
  Other Units
  The Compagnies Disciplinaires were made
  up of men serving punitive disciplinary terms
  who were then returned to their original units.
  Sectiones d’Exclus were made up of the worst of
  the worst. They contained only men considered
  unfit for service and subject to extreme punish-
  ment. Only characters of the lowest caliber – or
  worst luck – belonged to these units.
  THE FRENCH ARMY
  23
  
  In 1940, Germany believed the conquest of
  France was complete, but many citizens refused
  to accept defeat. The Germans did not consider
  them terribly dangerous, but they were founders
  of what would soon become an underground
  army numbering some 200,000. It would have a
  substantial impact on the outcome of the war.
  The life of a Resistance operator was not
  easy. He often dealt with Gestapo raids, German
  spies, Abwehr agents, paid French informants,
  lack of even basic equipment, and a cloak of
  secrecy that made trusting anyone risky at best.
  Even in unoccupied France, with no Germans to
  be seen, he would face the Vichy police and their
  web of informants, some of whom considered
  him little better than a terrorist.
  The Maquis
  Some French soldiers and fugitives simply
  took to the countryside, particularly in Brittany
  and southern France. They formed bands that took
  the name Maquis, after the scrub and thickets of
  Corsica, where the practice of heading for the hills
  during trouble had long been custom. 
  The Maquis began guerrilla warfare against
  the Germans and collaborating French militia.
  Like most partisans, they specialized in guerrilla
  raids and sabotage, keeping direct contact with
  German forces to a minimum. They lacked the
  weapons for a straight-up fight.
  In early 1943, Germany created a forced
  labor draft in occupied France, declaring that all
  men age 20 and up were required to work in Ger-
  man factories and defense installations. Aware of
  the prisonlike conditions involved, thousands of
  French men flooded the ranks of the Maquis. 
  Some Maquis groups gave the Resistance a
  bad name by raiding local farms and fields for
  food, clothing, and equipment, but for the most
  part the local populace supported them, providing
  food and information on German troops.
  The term Maquis, singular Maquisard, some-
  times is applied to the Resistance as a whole, or
  specifically its paramilitary aspects.
  ORGANIZATION
  Initially, small resistance movements devel-
  oped independently across France (see p. 14). At
  the same time, underground newspapers began to
  spring up. These attacked Nazi and Vichy propa-
  ganda in trying to mobilize readers, and played a
  vital part in further knitting together the Resistance.
  Many were run by devoted Communists or aca-
  demics. The Germans and Vichy controlled news-
  print and printing presses, but the undergrounds
  often boasted circulations up to 100,000.
  These basement publishers also helped estab-
  lish intelligence-gathering as a Resistance role.
  The daring British raid on St. Nazaire (see 
  pp. W:HS4-5) benefited from information passed
  on by the Musée de l’Homme, an early Paris-based
  network of academics who branched out from
  publishing until the Germans caught and killed
  their leaders in the spring of 1941. 
  Between these needs to establish escape net-
  works and distribute news, the early Resistance
  groups began to link up. They did not take long to
  discover that too much communication could be a
  bad thing, too. Atraitor or prisoner breaking under
  torture would give up every fellow resistant that
  he could name!
  Compartmentalization
  The Resistance networks formed into cells.
  Secrecy was maintained as to the identity of other
  cells’ members, so that captured operatives could
  not reveal information beyond the makeup of
  their own cell. A cell was led by one member –
  “The most powerful weapon on earth is the 
  human soul on fire.”
  – Marshal Ferdinand Foch
  THE FRENCH RESISTANCE
  24
  FRANCE UNDERGROUND
  
  usually not so much a military leader as a politi-
  cal one – who made contact with other cell heads.
  Even cell heads did not know the specific make-
  up of cells other than their own.
  Urban resistance groups were usually organ-
  ized into small cells of some five members. The
  rural Maquis did not like to exceed 60 members,
  but often did, particularly during 1943 and later. 
  All resistance took place under a cloak of
  secrecy; a slip of the tongue could mean capture,
  torture, and death. Combined with the small cell
  sizes, this meant an active resistant often had to
  deal with complete strangers whose story he could
  not verify, any of whom could be an informer. The
  circumstances could induce paranoia.
  Because men were expected to work during
  the day, women were often used to relay messages
  and smuggle supplies. They raised less suspicion,
  but their assignments required as much bravery
  and skill as their male counterparts. Women
  played a key role in nearly every Resistance group
  in France, and often took part in any fighting.
  THE NETWORKS
  Eventually, the early informal efforts crystal-
  lized into a hodgepodge of Resistance networks.
  These never became too formalized – losses to the
  Gestapo kept turnover high – but they managed to
  establish an identity and hold onto it.
  Occupied-Zone Networks
  Constantly reminded of the Nazi conquerors,
  residents of the Occupied Zone formed the first
  small groups, which were usually limited to pub-
  lishing and intelligence-gathering; usually, sabo-
  tage was too dangerous. Often based in Paris, the
  most important networks included:
  The right-wing Ceux de la Libération,
  formed very early by Vichy air-force officers and
  strong among police and fire departments. It
  worked with the British through SOE (pp. 27-28).
  Ceux de la Patrie.
  Ceux de la Résistance, or CDLR, originally
  affiliated with Vichy intelligence officers but for
  mostly legitimate Resistance goals. 
  Comité National de Salut Public, a particu-
  larly large network that spread from Paris through-
  out the Occupied Zone, particularly to Brittany. Its
  size may have contributed to its downfall – the Ger-
  mans arrested its leadership and nearly killed the
  network twice in 1941 before a massive raid in
  November 1942 did the trick. The survivors slipped
  off to join CDLR and Résistance.
  The Sorbonne-based students and professors
  of the Défense de la France, which specialized in
  forged papers and operating escape routes.
  Défense de la Patrie, which eventually fold-
  ed into the CDLR.
  The socialist La Voix du Nord.
  Le Front National.
  L’Homme Libre.
  Libération.
  The powerful but treason-riddled Organi-
  sation Civile et Militaire, or OCM, which had
  agents throughout the Occupied Zone civil service.
  Résistance (not to be confused with the
  movement as a whole).
  In the forbidden Nord department (see p. 26),
  Libération and La Voix du Nord partially joined
  forces to become Libération-Nord in 1943.
  Networks in Vichy France
  Networks formed slowly in the French-run
  zone, but grew large and powerful because the
  Vichy did not hunt them as ardently as the Germans
  did. This also allowed them to form sabotage and
  combat units from the outset. Usually based in
  Lyon, important networks included:
  The oldest and most powerful network,
  the intellectuals and career officers of Combat,
  affiliated with CDLR in the north and formed
  from the earlier Vérités and Liberté groups.
  The Dupleix serving U.S. intelligence.
  The Marseilles-based socialists of France
  au Combat.
  France d ’Abord.
  The apolitical and diverse Franc-Tireur.
  Le Mouvement Charte.
  The trade unionists of Libération-Sud,
  which had strong ties to Combat but none to
  Libération-Nord.
  Toulon-based Libérer et Fédérer, which
  included a future president of France on its rolls.
  Témoignage Chrétien.
  Combat, Libération-Sud, and Franc-Tireur
  further allied to become Mouvements Unis de la
  Résistance, or MUR, after November 1943 – led by
  the BCRA (see p. 29) and the most powerful non-
  Communist network. Later in the war, many south-
  ern and some northern networks partially united as
  the Armée Secréte, with MUR at its core. Shortly
  before D-Day, the Free French enrolled the Armée
  Secréte and Maquis bands into their own military
  as the Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur, or FFI.
  The Communist Networks
  The Communists kept themselves aloof from
  their Resistance counterparts. Though already
  underground, they did not actively resist until
  Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. At
  that point, though, they showed more organization,
  equipment, and aggressiveness than others.
  FRANCE UNDERGROUND
  25
  
  The Communists kept up a watered-down
  public facade called the National Liberation Front,
  or National Front, which attracted French citizens
  of all stripes. Their Resistance network proper was
  the Francs-Tireurs et Partisans Français, or FTP.
  The FTP gladly enrolled non-Communists, but
  Communists held all decision-making powers.
  The FTP also worked in tandem with non-
  Communist networks on occasion, but treated
  them vary warily. (They kept the FTP at arm’s
  length, in turn.) Most FTP resources came from
  Moscow, which had long had an intelligence ring
  established in France, called FANA. (The Ger-
  mans called it Rote Kapell, or the Red Chapel.) 
  Some French Communists already had joined
  other Resistance networks before the Commu-
  nists began fighting. These members often stayed
  where they were. Suspiciously, just before the lib-
  eration, a number of leaders in non-Communist
  networks met an accidental death or fell into
  Gestapo hands, and Communists in their net-
  works replaced them . . .
  The Ex-Armistice Army
  Pétain had been planning to double-cross the
  Germans, establishing an “armistice army” within
  the Vichy military that hid away weapons in prepa-
  ration for a change of sides that he never ordered.
  When the Germans disbanded the Vichy army in
  November 1942, many members collected the
  weapons and headed for North Africa to join the
  Free French. Others stayed in France to form L’Or-
  ganisation de Résistance de l’Armée, or ORA. The
  ORA kept itself apart from other Resistance net-
  works but operated in much the same way.
  ACTIVITIES
  Certain functions were central to both a net-
  work’s survival and its reasons for existence.
  Communication
  The armistice specifically prohibited wireless
  stations from operating in France (other than a
  handful of government-monitored radio stations),
  and the Gestapo regularly hunted down wireless
  stations and arrested or shot their operators. 
  In 1942, 17 radio operators were parachuted
  into France, providing multiple communication
  links with London. Wireless stations were often
  hidden in basements or false rooms, and could be
  found in cities and in farmhouses scattered
  throughout the countryside. Messages sent by
  wireless were kept short and usually encrypted.
  PCs trained as wireless operators will be skilled in
  Electronics Operation (Communication) and
  Telegraphy. Many also have skills in Cryptanaly-
  sis and Cryptography.
  Receiving messages from London was often
  done via commercial radio channels. For exam-
  ple, an operative might have been instructed to lis-
  ten to the BBC on the 1st, 2nd, 15th, and 16th of
  the month. During any given broadcast, a coded
  phrase was used, warning the Resistance of an
  attack or providing coordinates of an incoming
  supply drop. Coordination of sabotage plans prior
  to D-Day was arranged in exactly this fashion,
  since the date of the invasion could not be given
  to the Resistance for security reasons. By listening
  to BBC broadcasts, advance warning was given.
  Within days, a second code was received con-
  firming the orders, and multiple sabotage plans
  went into effect simultaneously. 
  Identification
  As the map on p. 11 shows, the Germans
  filled France with borders. They strictly regulated
  the few people allowed to cross from the Occu-
  pied Zone to Vichy France. They placed the Pas-
  de-Calais and Nord departments (the French
  equivalents of states) under their Belgian admin-
  istration. Lorraine and Alsace once again became
  part of Germany proper. They cut off the north-
  ernmost portion of Champagne-Ardenne, even
  from the former inhabitants, with plans to colo-
  nize German farmers there. The northern coast
  and other regions also became isolated zones. 
  Crossing any of these borders required prop-
  er papers, and of course both the Gestapo and
  Wehrmacht frequently stopped those inside a
  region and asked for their documents, as well.
  They did not hesitate to telephone the issuing
  agency and confirm that the papers had been
  issued, so the best false identification copied a
  real set of papers. The Germans often caught false
  papers based on a fictitious ID, which meant that
  the high-quality forgeries carried by SOE agents
  (p. 27 and p. 37) sometimes failed this test. 
  The Resistance was always in the market for
  both the equipment to forge papers and safe, real
  identities to duplicate. Undoubtedly, in certain cir-
  cumstances this could cause serious problems for
  the unsuspecting real owner of that identity.
  French soldiers who slipped back into their
  civilian lives without first surrendering to the Ger-
  mans (such as the holdouts on p. 10) usually got
  away with it for months or even years, until
  stopped for a routine ID check. At that point, they
  would lack a crucial demobilization certificate.
  Many pieces of French identification had
  strange little details meant to trip up unwary forg-
  ers; for instance, an upside-down “o” in one word.
  26
  FRANCE UNDERGROUND
  
  The British Special Operations Executive was
  created July 22, 1940, to “coordinate all action by
  way of subversion and sabotage against the enemy
  overseas.” In practice, this meant spiriting atomic
  scientists (see p. W28) and other important persons
  to England just ahead of the Gestapo. Later, the
  SOE expanded to support other countries, at which
  point aid to France became the province of its 
  F Section, under Col. Maurice Buckmaster.
  F Section did not work with de Gaulle, and in
  practice often went out of its way to work around
  the Free French in representing British interests in
  France. Still, the general had resources that could
  not be ignored, so the SOE created an R/F Section
  (for Resistance/France) shortly after F Section.
  The British assets in R/F Section worked under
  Free French supervision (via the BCRA, p. 29) to
  support the Resistance. 
  The R/F (usually referred to as “Free French”)
  and F (called the “SOE” proper) sections had iden-
  tical missions, simply different masters, and the
  rivalry fostered by F Section often caused the
  British R/F operatives – who quite reasonably saw
  beating the Germans as an “everybody wins” sce-
  nario – to sympathize with their French overseers
  and work around their countrymen. (This rivalry is
  in addition to the rivalry between MI6 and SOE
  mentioned on p. W41. Even more than the Resis-
  tance itself, British intelligence spent a great deal
  of energy on infighting before turning its attention
  to the Germans . . .)
  SOE candidates were selected on the basis of
  a personal recommendation only. An initial inter-
  view with prospective candidates was carried out
  in French in a bare hotel room, with only a single
  desk, two chairs, and a lone light bulb. 
  FRANCE UNDERGROUND
  27
  SOE, F AND R/F SECTIONS
  Supply
  Lack of air transport hampered British efforts
  to supply the Resistance. The SOE (see below)
  requested more aircraft, but supplying the French
  Resistance seemed an ineffective use of planes
  compared to dropping bombs on German industry.
  During 1942-43, SOE was assigned some 40 air-
  craft to carry out their missions, which included not
  only dropping supplies and personnel to France,
  but supplying agents in other countries as well.
  (Throughout 1943, for instance, supplying Balkan
  guerrillas had a higher priority for SOE than sup-
  plying the French Resistance.)
  Small boats often made clandestine runs from
  Gibraltar to the southeast coast of France to deliv-
  er equipment and personnel. Sea deliveries were
  especially important during winter, when bad
  weather made airdrops nearly impossible.
  Despite the SOE-F’s best efforts, the total
  amount of supplies delivered was very small – for
  example, only a ton of explosives was delivered
  to all of France in 1943. PCs with the Resistance
  will find it a struggle to acquire weapons, ammu-
  nition, explosives, communications equipment, or
  much of anything else. A high Scrounging skill
  will be very useful.
  In January 1944, U.S. planes began to fly
  supply missions into France, increasing the flow
  of both supplies and personnel into the country.
  Sabotage
  The French Resistance conducted countless
  sabotage raids against Germans, hitting both indus-
  trial and military targets. The most widespread (and
  arguably most effective) sabotage was directed
  against French railroads as agents cut track,
  derailed troop and supply trains, destroyed bridges,
  and sabotaged locomotives. As many as 50 railroad
  sabotage attempts were being made daily by late
  1943; more than 1,800 locomotives and 8,000
  freight cars were damaged that year alone. 
  The rail workers themselves often committed
  these acts of defiance. Having already proven
  their bravery during the fighting (p. 47), these for-
  mer union men served the Resistance’s purposes
  with little regard for danger. In addition to sabo-
  tage, they routinely smuggled fugitives disguised
  as brakemen or firemen, and slipped contraband
  past German and Vichy surveillance. 
  In addition to railway sabotage, PCs may be
  called upon to destroy automobiles, roadways,
  telephone and telegraph lines, power stations,
  troop barracks, port facilities, supply dumps, con-
  struction sites, and even fortresses. The possibili-
  ties are limited only by the GM’s imagination.
  The Resistance often turned to more subtle
  methods, by sabotaging things in a way that was
  not obvious until the Germans tried to use them.
  For instance, cannon shells would be assembled
  such that they wouldn’t actually fire, or a French
  architect would slyly redraw blueprints so that a
  fort’s gun ports didn’t quite cover the crucial
  angles of their field of fire. This often proved
  more effective than more standard sabotage,
  because the Germans often didn’t realize they had
  a problem until it was too late. GMs could base
  more than one adventure on requiring Resistance
  operatives to figure out some such method for dis-
  creetly disabling various Nazi assets.
  
  If the interviewer believed the candidate
  could pass for a French national, the applicant’s
  file was passed to MI5 for a security check. 
  Once the background check was complete, the
  applicant was called to a second interview, where
  the true nature of the job was revealed. The inter-
  viewer did not mince words – the applicant stood a
  50% chance of being killed in the line of duty.
  Applicants were given several days to consider.
  The rigorous training consisted of four weeks
  of small-arms practice and physical training, then a
  two-week parachute course in Manchester. Gradu-
  ates were sent to Arisaig in the Western Highlands
  of Scotland where they learned commando tactics
  and unconventional warfare. Radio operators
  received 14 more weeks at Oxfordshire.
  SOE-F and -R/F operatives were then sent into
  France – often by parachute – to make contact with
  Resistance groups, train and equip them, and carry
  out specific missions as assigned by SOE or the
  BCRA leadership in London. They were instruc-
  tors, spies, saboteurs, and soldiers, who often
  worked alone or with untrained civilian patriots
  whose loyalty they could never take for granted. 
  SOE-F and -R/F operatives make great PCs.
  A template appears on p. 36.
  SOE-F dispatched 39 female agents into
  the field. They were ordinary women: wives,
  mothers, dancers, fashion designers. Two out-
  standing examples are described below. Both
  were posthumously awarded the French Croix
  de Guerre and the British George Cross. 
  Violette Szabo
  Violette Bushell, the daughter of a French
  mother and an English father, spent much of her
  childhood in Paris, but was raised in south Lon-
  don. In 1941, at the age of 20, she met Capt. Eti-
  enne Szabo, an officer in the French Foreign
  Legion. The couple married, but her husband
  was killed at El Alamein in 1942, shortly after
  the birth of their daughter.
  Heartbroken and angry, she immediately
  accepted an offer by the British SOE to “go into
  enemy occupied France and make life bitter for
  the Germans.” After extensive training – includ-
  ing parachute training that left her nursing band-
  aged legs – she was flown into Rouen, where she
  was arrested twice while assessing the current
  state of the French Resistance. She was rushed
  back to London upon completion of her first mis-
  sion – but not until she had purchased gifts for
  her daughter along the Champs Elysées.
  In April 1944, Szabo – codenamed “Louise”
  – parachuted into France a second time. Togeth-
  er with several other SOE operatives and French
  Resistance fighters, she was trapped in a house in
  southwest France. Surrounded by the Gestapo,
  she grabbed a Sten gun and as much ammunition
  as she could carry and engaged the Germans in a
  blazing firefight that left many of them dead and
  many more wounded. She was captured only
  after running out of ammo and strength.
  She was repeatedly beaten and tortured, but
  refused to give away any secrets. She was trans-
  ferred to the Ravensbruck concentration camp,
  and in 1945, at age 23, she was shot in the back
  of the head along with two other female SOE
  agents. She had not revealed a single secret.
  Noor Inayat Khan 
  Noor Inayat Khan was a princess. Born to an
  American mother and Indian father (Pir Inayat
  Khan, a direct descendant of Tipu Sultan, the last
  Muslim sovereign of South India), Noor was
  raised primarily in Paris, where she gained some
  repute as a Paris Radio children’s-story writer. 
  With the German invasion of France, she
  moved to London, where she became an assis-
  tant section officer in the Women’s Auxiliary Air
  Force. Her knowledge of France and fluency in
  the language landed her a position with SOE-F,
  and on June 16, 1943, using the codename
  “Madeleine,” Noor was smuggled into occupied
  France as a radio operator.
  The Gestapo made countless arrests in the
  Resistance group to which she had been
  assigned. Noor was given the opportunity to
  return to England, but refused, unwilling to aban-
  don her comrades and leave them without a radio
  link to London. In October, she was betrayed and
  taken to Gestapo headquarters. Despite an
  intense interrogation, she refused to divulge any
  information; she even made two unsuccessful
  attempts to escape during her stay there. In
  November, she was shipped to Germany (the
  first SOE-F agent so deported) and imprisoned at
  Karlsruhe. Her cell was separated from the main
  body of the prison, as she was considered espe-
  cially dangerous and crafty.
  On Sept. 12, 1944, the 29-year-old Indian
  princess was taken to the Dachau concentration
  camp and shot. She uttered a single word before
  she was killed: “Liberté.”
  WOMEN OF THE SOE-F
  28
  FRANCE UNDERGROUND
  
  In 1940, de Gaulle formed a special staff
  known as the Bureau Central de Renseignements et
  d’Action (Militaire) (BCRA) to aid in organizing,
  directing, and supplying the French Resistance.
  From the summer of 1941 to the spring of 1943, the
  BCRA and de Gaulle’s personal representative,
  Jean Moulin, worked with Resistance leaders to
  integrate the groups. They created an underground
  army under the command of Gen. Delestrain
  (known to the underground as Gen. Vidal) that
  served as a liaison between the Resistance and the
  Allied armies that would soon arrive.
  Jean Moulin
  Jean Moulin is often considered the father of
  the French Resistance. Though he never derailed
  a train or blew up a bridge – he never even carried
  a pistol – he organized those who did. 
  Moulin was a civil servant and politician. He
  aided the French Republicans during the Spanish
  Civil War, and refused to cooperate with Germany
  during WWII. On June 17, 1940, Moulin refused to
  sign a German document that wrongly blamed
  French troops for a civilian massacre. He was
  arrested by the Gestapo, severely beaten and tor-
  tured, and even attempted suicide in his makeshift
  prison. (This left him with a vicious scar on his
  neck and distinctively hoarse speech, which might
  qualify as an Unusual Feature and Disturbing Voice
  respectively in a cinematic campaign. He used a
  scarf to conceal the former.) By November 1940,
  the Vichy government had had enough of the 
  41-year-old politician and stripped him of his offi-
  cial status, declaring him persona non grata.
  Moulin was not deterred. He settled in Saint-
  Andiol in Alpilles where he began making contact
  with the various – often mutually antagonistic –
  factions of the French Resistance such as Libéra-
  tion, Liberté, and Mouvement de Libération
  Nationale. In October 1941, he was smuggled out
  of France and soon met with Charles de Gaulle.
  De Gaulle convinced the prefect to take on an
  important mission for France: to unite the factions
  of the Resistance and create an underground army
  from the existing fragments of one. Moulin para-
  chuted into France on the night of Jan. 2, 1942,
  and began building this impossible army.
  In June 1943, Moulin was captured in Lyon.
  The Gestapo again savagely beat and tortured
  him, breaking his arms, legs, and ribs. Moulin
  died soon thereafter, but his work with the rapid-
  ly unifying Resistance could not be undone.
  Moulin’s role with the Resistance is
  unmatched, but later allegations were made
  claiming Moulin was a Communist, or more
  recently, that he was an American intelligence
  agent. Though there is little historical evidence to
  support these claims, and an abundance of evi-
  dence demonstrating Moulin’s faithfulness to
  France, GMs may find interesting storylines and
  plot threads in these possibilities. Certainly, a man
  in Moulin’s challenging position would find it
  useful to claim to secretly sympathize with any-
  one with whom he was dealing at the moment.
  THE BCRA
  Allied three-man teams were parachuted
  behind enemy lines shortly before D-Day. Desig-
  nated Jedburghs, these teams were to include a
  French officer, a U.S. or British officer, and a
  radio operator, though in reality the mix of nation-
  alities often was not perfect (see p. W168). The
  Jedburghs functioned not as spies, but as soldiers.
  They contacted Resistance groups, rallied and
  trained them, and put Allied plans into action.
  Jeds, as they were often called, were trained
  to face any situation. Besides the military training
  provided by their respective governments, Jeds
  also spent several months in England learning
  demolitions, marksmanship, telegraphy, ciphers,
  stealth methods, knife-fighting tactics, hand-to-
  hand skills, and other guerrilla tactics.
  Jedburgh teams usually parachuted into Brit-
  tany and southern France. From there they spread
  out to cover all of France, as well as parts of Ger-
  many, Italy, and the Low Countries. The three-
  man teams wore their military uniforms as much
  as possible – seeing Allied soldiers in full military
  dress behind enemy lines was a great psychologi-
  cal boost for Resistance fighters, and a blow to
  captured enemy soldiers.
  The teams were amazingly successful, given
  the conditions in which they worked. Every one
  experienced a degree of success, some outstand-
  ingly so. Many Jedburghs were honored with
  commendations including the Distinguished Ser-
  vice Cross, the Croix de Guerre, the Legion of
  Merit, the Silver Star, and the Bronze Star. 
  Of course, many also earned the Purple Heart
  or posthumous honors. Of the 85 French Jed-
  burghs who parachuted into France, 22 were
  killed – usually shot by the Germans as spies. 
  FRANCE UNDERGROUND
  29
  THE JEDBURGHS
  
  “Nothing great will ever be achieved without
  great men, and men are great only if they are
  determined to be so.”
  – Charles de Gaulle
  GURPS WWII provides several templates
  for creating soldiers. French soldiers can be creat-
  ed by following the instruction outlined on 
  pp. W68-85 and applying the following national
  Advantages and Disadvantages:
  French Advantages
  Purchase Military Rank and resulting Wealth
  (see p. W63), with remaining points spent among:
  Acute Senses (p. B19) [2/level]; Alcohol Tolerance
  (p. CI19) [5]; Charisma (p. B19) [5/level]; Combat
  Reflexes (p. B20) [15]; Pitiable (p. CI29) [5]; Rep-
  utation from Medals (pp. 17-18 and p. W63) or
  good performance of duty (p. B17) [varies];
  Strong Will (p. B23) [4/level]; Toughness (p. B23)
  [10 or 25]; Voice (p. B23) [10]; Light Hangover 
  (p. CI27) [2] or No Hangover (p. CI28) [5].
  Characters fighting in France also might have
  one or more Contacts (see p. B234) within the
  French Resistance.
  French Disadvantages
  Native colonial soldiers must take Social
  Stigma (Colonial) (p. B27) [-5].
  French officers may choose from Hidebound
  (p. CI91) [-5]; Intolerance (p. B34) [-5]; Odious
  Personal Habit (Harsh Disciplinarian) (p. B26) 
  [-5]; or Overconfidence (p. B34) [-10]. Some offi-
  cers might have Code of Honor (Officer’s) 
  (p. W64) [-10]. Harsh discipline was considered a
  duty of a responsible French officer, and does not
  violate the French version of this Code of Honor.
  Many soldiers are conscripts, and often do
  not want to be in the army. These conditions are
  reflected by disadvantages such as Cowardice (p.
  B32) [-10]; Laziness (p. B34) [-10]; Semi-Litera-
  cy (p. CI94) [-5]; Status -1 (p. W66) [-5]; Odious
  Personal Habit (p. B26); and Reputation (p. B17)
  for being lazy, disrespectful, or rebellious [varies].
  Volunteers and dutiful conscripts may have Code
  of Honor (Enlisted Man’s) 
  (p. W64) [-10]. 
  Officers and enlisted men
  alike may substitute: Bad
  Sight (p. B27) [-10]; Bad
  Temper (p. B31) [-10]; Blood-
  lust (p. B31) [-10]; Bully 
  (p. B31) [-10]; Compulsive
  Behavior (Binge Drinking) 
  (p. W64) [-10]; Fanaticism
  (Vive la France) (p. B33) 
  [-15]; Gullibility (p. B33) 
  [-10]; Honesty (p. B33) [-10];
  Indecisive (p. CI91) [-10];
  Lecherousness (p. B34) [-15];
  Odious 
  Personal 
  Habits 
  (p. B26) [-5/-10/-15]; Post-
  Combat Shakes (p. CI93) [-5];
  Sense of Duty (p. B39) (Men
  in their unit) [-5] or (The
  Honor of France) [-10]; Stub-
  bornness (p. B37) [-5]; or
  Truthfulness (p. B37) [-5].
  CREATING A FRENCH SOLDIER 
  30
  CHARACTERS
  
  See pp. W62-67 for guidelines on specific
  advantages, disadvantages, and skills. Specific
  notes for French soldiers are included below.
  ADVANTAGES
  Claim to 
  Hospitality
  p. CI21
  Soldiers and Resistance fighters in occupied
  France were often given aid by the French popu-
  lace. This is considered a 5-point Claim to Hospi-
  tality advantage. PCs may be given food and
  water, minor supplies (such as bandages, a knife,
  matches, etc; no firearms, explosives, or other
  combat equipment), directions, information on
  local troops, medical aid, shelter, concealment,
  and so forth. Much of this hospitality will come
  from French women, since many French men
  were either at war, in prison camps, or missing in
  action. In return, PCs should be willing to help out
  civilians from time to time, often by doing manu-
  al labor (e.g., chopping wood, repairing a roof).
  The GM should allow this advantage to be
  purchased during the course of a campaign.
  Combat
  Reflexes
  pp. W182, B20 
  At the beginning of the war, few French sol-
  diers will have Combat Reflexes. Exceptions may
  include soldiers who have previous combat expe-
  rience (such as in Syria or Morocco during the
  1920s) or soldiers in elite units with above aver-
  age training (such as the Foreign Legion). As the
  war progresses, the advantage will become more
  common, particularly among Resistance fighters.
  Danger Sense
  p. B20
  Resistance legends often tell of this advantage
  saving lives (or costing them, when ignored). The
  Resistance placed a great deal of faith in the “sixth
  sense.” Anyone in the Resistance who displays this
  ability more than once would be likely to enjoy a
  hefty Reputation (+2 or even +3) with some cell
  mates, but also a negative Reputation (possible
  double agent) with others. 
  CHARACTERS
  31
  FRENCH RANKS
  MR
  Armée de Terre (Army)
  Marine Nationale (Navy)
  Armée de l’Air (Air Force)
  8
  Général d’armée 
  Amiral
  Général d’armée Aérienne
  8
  Général de corps d’armée 
  Amiral d'escadre
  Général de corps d'armée aérien
  7
  Général de division 
  Vice-amiral
  Général de division aérienne
  7
  Général de brigade
  Contre-amiral
  Général de brigade aérienne
  6
  Colonel
  Capitaine de vaisseau
  Colonel
  5
  Lieutenant Colonel
  Capitaine de frégate
  Lieutenant Colonel
  4
  Chef de bataillon/d’escadron
  Capitaine de corvette
  Commandant
  4
  Capitaine
  Lieutenant de vaisseau
  Captain
  3
  Lieutenant
  Enseigne de vaisseau 1re classe
  Lieutenant 
  3
  Sous Lieutenant
  Enseigne de vaisseau 2e classe
  Sous Lieutenant
  2
  Sergent-chef
  Mâitre
  Sergent-chef
  2
  1re Sergent 
  Second Mâitre*
  1re Sergent
  1
  Sergent* 
  Quartier Mâitre de 1re Classe*
  Sergent*
  1
  Caporal Chef/Brigadier-chef 
  Quartier Mâitre de 2e Classe
  Caporal Chef
  1
  Caporal/Brigadier 
  Matelot Breveté
  Caporal
  0
  1re Classe† 
  Matelot
  Aviateur de 1re classe
  This compares to the table on p. W63 except that this table has no equivalent for the top and
  bottom lines of the GURPS WWII table.
  * These ranks increased in authority after the holder’s term of conscription expired.
  † Military Rank 0 soldiers’ titles varied, depending on their specialty. E.g., soldat (infantry),
  canonnier (artillery), cavalier (cavalry or reconnaissance), legionnaire (French Foreign Legion),
  etc. Hence, a Rank 0 infantryman would be a soldat 1re classe (soldier, 1st class).
  ADVANTAGES,
  DISADVANTAGES, AND SKILLS 
  
  Fashion Sense
  pp. CI24
  Despite war and privation, many a French man
  and woman will work wonders to appear elegantly
  dressed. A Parisian woman’s hat might be an old
  tablecloth and discarded table centerpiece, and a
  man may be coloring his ankles blue with ink to
  conceal the holes in his socks, but the end effect is
  worth the work. In addition to its usual benefits,
  this advantage also bestows a +1 to any skill rolls
  for keeping up appearances, including Scrounging
  when seeking material for a new outfit. 
  Fearlessness
  pp. W182, B25
  Historically, many French units broke and ran
  after undergoing Stuka attacks and being overrun
  by German panzers. Fearlessness (and other
  advantages that increase a character’s Fright
  Check) should generally not be allowed for the
  average conscript. 
  Conversely, specialty units often maintained
  perfect composure under fire. Those in the For-
  eign Legion, the SOE-F, the Chasseurs Para-
  chutistes, etc., should be allowed to take such
  advantages at the highest levels the GM allows.
  Reputation
  pp. W179, B17
  Traditionally, French officers needed to
  enforce harsh discipline upon their often recalci-
  trant troops; some were even viewed (accurately
  or not) by their men as being bullies. Hence,
  French officers that are unusually kind to their
  subordinates may garner a Reputation bonus from
  their men as being respectable and a good fellow. 
  Likewise, soldiers who rise above the stereo-
  type of being lazy and undisciplined may gain a
  Reputation from their superiors as being a good
  soldier. In either case, use a +1 Reputation, small
  group, all the time; a 1-point advantage. 
  Note that either type of behavior is likely to
  be frowned upon by the soldier’s peers. See the
  Reputation disadvantage on p. 33.
  Free French soldiers that distinguish them-
  selves while fighting with the Allies may elect to
  receive a small Reputation bonus (+1) from both
  the Allies and from patriotic French citizens; this is
  a 1-point advantage (large group, 10 or less). Par-
  ticularly heroic actions may merit larger bonuses,
  but only de Gaulle himself (and only from 1944
  among the French) would purchase a +4.
  For information on medals and commenda-
  tions, see pp. 17-18 and W63.
  32
  CHARACTERS
  
  DISADVANTAGES
  Fanaticism 
  (France)
  pp. W184, B33
  Fanaticism may manifest itself in various
  ways, especially with the establishment of two
  opposing French governments (Vichy and Free
  France). Soldiers with this disadvantage may
  make diametrically opposed choices as to which
  government to support. Vichy supporters see
  Pétain as their country’s rightful leader and view
  de Gaulle and his Free French army as traitors.
  Gaullists have exactly the opposite view. Both
  sides fervently believe that they are doing what is
  best for France.
  Late in the war, as the tide begins to shift
  against Germany, Vichy soldiers may shift their
  allegiance from Pétain to de Gaulle. This has
  nothing to do with a lack of fanaticism. On the
  contrary, the fanatical French soldier believes in
  France above all else, regardless of the politics
  involved. He supports what he believes is the best
  course of action for France itself at that time,
  regardless of who is in charge.
  Social Stigma 
  (Colonial)
  pp. W180, B27
  Native (non-European) colonial soldiers will
  suffer a Social Stigma amongst most European
  French. Many such units were no better than a
  poorly trained militia, while others distinguished
  themselves as being reliable and hardy. Regard-
  less of the reputation of the unit itself, individuals
  will still face an unfair negative reputation due to
  the color of their skin. Because of this, colonial
  soldiers rarely rise above Military Rank 0.
  Reputation
  pp. W179, B17
  Vichy supporters were viewed as traitors by
  the Allies beginning in June 1940. The reputation
  was widespread enough that Vichy soldiers will
  receive a -1 Reputation from the Allies (a large
  group, all the time; -2 points) – a reputation car-
  rying over even after Vichy forces began to
  change allegiances late in the war.
  French officers that are especially kind
  toward their troops may be viewed by their fellow
  officers as being soft or undisciplined (-1 Reputa-
  tion, small group, 7 or less; -1 point). French
  enlisted men who strive to rise above otherwise
  average conscripts may gain a negative Reputa-
  tion from fellow soldiers for showing off or mak-
  ing their peers look bad (-1 Reputation, large
  group, 7 or less; -1 point).
  SKILLS
  Area Knowledge
  pp. W188, B62
  French soldiers will have Area Knowledge
  related to their primary areas of operation. French
  “fortress infantry” will have Area Knowledge
  (Maginot Line Fortress), which will come in
  handy finding their way around the labyrinthine
  tunnels, especially if the fortress is being overrun
  by German troops! French Resistance fighters
  will do well to have high levels of Area Knowl-
  edge (France) to help them find safe havens,
  ambush sites, and key locations for sabotage.
  Bicycling
  p. B68
  Due to severe rationing of gasoline, many
  French citizens took to using the bicycle as a pri-
  mary means of transportation. Anyone spending
  any amount of time in occupied France will find
  many opportunities to pick up this skill.
  Scrounging
  pp. W191, B67
  Anyone in Occupied France will find this an
  invaluable skill. Finding the right equipment or
  supplies often means the difference between life
  and death. Scrounging rolls often will lead to the
  black market, where an unwary trader runs con-
  siderable risk of being ripped off or turned over to
  the Gestapo. Often, a skill roll will locate goods,
  but reveal that only the Germans have what is
  needed. A daring midnight raid, using skills other
  than Scrounging, would be required to actually
  obtain them. NCOs and Resistance cell leaders
  often have this skill at 12+.
  Survival
  pp. W191, B57
  Basic military training did not prepare most
  French soldiers with any kind of survival skills,
  since most of the fighting was expected to take
  place near supply lines and civilization. As the
  war progressed, seasoned soldiers often picked up
  survival skills through experience, depending on
  their theaters of operation.
  Troops in North Africa should have some
  knowledge of Survival (Desert); sunstroke, freez-
  ing overnight temperatures, and lack of water
  were often more deadly than enemy troops. Resis-
  tance fighters will usually develop Survival
  (Woodlands) if in the Maquis or (Urban) other-
  wise. City-dwelling Resistance fighters routinely
  will find themselves penniless on the street and
  looking for a place to lie low!
  CHARACTERS
  33
  
  Jedburghs in France will generally be Ameri-
  can, British, or French, though a handful of Bel-
  gian, Canadian, or Dutch Jedburghs operated as
  well. A three-man Jedburgh team will usually
  include an American or British officer, and a
  French officer whenever possible, leaving the third
  member of the team to act as a radio operator.
  More details on the Jeds can be found on p. 29.
  Attributes: ST 11 [10]; DX 13 [30]; IQ 12 [20];
  HT 11 [10].
  Advantages: Fit [5] and 25 points in National
  Advantages (see p. 30 or p. W68). As part of
  their National Advantages, U.S. Jedburghs
  may upgrade from Fit to Very Fit [a net +10
  points], and British Jeds may include Dare-
  devil [15]. Jedburghs of any nationality may
  take Alertness [5/level] and Fearlessness
  [2/level] as part of their National Advantages.
  Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty 
  [-20] and -30 points in National Disadvan-
  tages (see p. 30 or p. W68).
  Basic Skills: Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-12;
  Climbing (P/A) DX-2 [1/2]-11; First Aid
  (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-11; Guns (Light Automatic)
  (P/E) DX+2 [1]-15*; Guns (Pistol) (P/E)
  DX+2 [1]-15*; Guns (Rifle) (P/E) DX+1
  [1/2]-14*; Hiking (P/A – HT) HT-1 [1]-10;
  Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [1/2]-12; Knife (P/E)
  DX [1]-13; Parachuting (P/E) DX [1]-13;
  Savoir-Faire (Military) (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-11;
  Soldier (M/A) IQ+2 [6]-14; Spear (P/A) DX-1
  [1]-12; Stealth (P/A) DX-1 [1]-12; Tactics
  (Guerrilla) (M/H) IQ [4]-12; Throwing (P/H)
  DX-2 [1]-11; Traps (M/A) IQ [2]-12.
  Secondary Skills: Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-13;
  Demolitions (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-11; Electronics
  Operations (Communications) (M/A) IQ-2
  [1/2]-10; Engineer (Combat) (M/H) IQ-2 
  [1]-10; Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A) DX+1
  [1]-14*; Orienteering (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-11;
  Scrounging (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-11; Survival
  (Urban, Forest, or Plains) (M/A) IQ-2 
  [1/2]-10; Swimming (P/E) DX-1 [1/2]-12;
  Telegraphy (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-11.
  Optional Skills: Spend 4 points on any of Bicy-
  cling, Guns (Flamethrower, Grenade Launch-
  er, or LAW), or Motorcycle (all P/E);
  Boating, Driving (Automobile), Gunner
  (Cannon or Mortar), Powerboat, or Riding
  (Horse) (all P/A); Carousing (P/H); Area
  Knowledge (France or Low Countries),
  Cooking, or Savoir-Faire (all M/E); Armoury
  (Small Arms), Forward Observer, Gambling,
  Intimidation, Leadership, Mechanic (Gaso-
  line Engine), NBC Warfare, Shadowing, or
  Tracking (all M/A); Explosive Ordnance Dis-
  posal (M/H); or foreign languages (Belgian,
  Dutch, or French) (M/A). 
  *Includes +2 for IQ.
  Customization Notes: National Advantages
  and Disadvantages for French Jedburghs should
  be chosen from p. 30. Players should refer to 
  p. W68 (or an appropriate nation book) for a list
  of National Advantages and Disadvantages for
  Jeds from other Allied nations.
  Non-English-speaking Jedburghs must put at
  least 1/2 point into the English language; all char-
  acters may find it advantageous to speak another
  foreign language, as well. Someone on the team
  should always speak fluent French!
  Commissioned officers and NCOs must ful-
  fill the skill requirements on p. W70.
  Radio Operators: All Jeds were trained in
  basic radio and telegraph use, but soldiers chosen
  as radio operators were given specialized training
  in wireless operations. Radio operators must raise
  Electronic Operations (Communications) to 12
  and Telegraphy to 13, and gain Cryptanalysis
  (M/H) IQ-3 [1/2]-9 and Cryptography (M/H) IQ-
  3 [1/2]-9. This leaves 1 point for Optional Skills.
  34
  CHARACTERS
  Several character templates appear in the
  core rulebook on pp. W72-85. Those templates
  can be used as is by applying the French national
  advantages and disadvantages described on p. 30.
  Additionally, three new particularly French tem-
  plates appear below:
  CHARACTER TEMPLATES
  JEDBURGH
  85 POINTS
  
  The French Foreign Legion was
  famous for creating hardened, elite
  soldiers, both in the foreign-born
  enlisted ranks and the predominantly
  French officer corps. (In fact, serv-
  ing in the Legion was considered a
  distinguished post for a career offi-
  cer. It in no way reflected lack of
  favor, as foreign postings often did
  in other armies.)
  With the exception of Susan Tra-
  vers (p. 12), women did not join the
  French Foreign Legion during WWII,
  unless they were disguised as men, a
  rarely used but occasionally successful
  ploy. Background information on the
  Legion can be found on pp. 22-23.
  Attributes: ST 11 [10]; DX 12 [20]; 
  IQ 11 [10]; HT 12 [20].
  Advantages: Fearlessness +1 [2], Fit
  [5], and 20 points in National
  Advantages (see p. 30 or p. W68).
  Legionnaires also may take addi-
  tional levels of Fearlessness
  [2/level], add Toughness [10] or High Pain
  Threshold [10], or upgrade from Fit to Very
  Fit [a net +10 points] as part of their Nation-
  al Advantages.
  Disadvantages: Extremely Hazardous Duty [-20]
  and -30 points in National Disadvantages
  (see p. 30 or p. W68). Men often joined the
  Legion to escape from a checkered past. An
  appropriate Secret [varies] can be included as
  part of a legionnaire’s National Disadvan-
  tages. Not having one might merit a Reputa-
  tion -1 (Crazy) among other legionnaires!
  Basic Skills: Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-11;
  Climbing (P/A) DX-1 [1]-11; First Aid (M/E)
  IQ-1 [1/2]-10; Gunner (Machine Gun) (P/A)
  DX [1/2]-12*; Guns (Light Automatic) (P/E)
  DX+1 [1/2]-13*; Guns (Rifle) (P/E) DX+2
  [1]-14*; Hiking (P/A – HT) HT-1 [1]-9;
  Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [1/2]-11; Knife (P/E)
  DX-1 [1/2]-11; Soldier (M/A) IQ+2 [6]-13;
  Spear (P/A) DX-2 [1/2]-10; Stealth (P/A)
  DX-1 [1]-11; Survival (Desert) (M/A) IQ-1
  [1]-10; Throwing (P/H) DX-2 [1]-10; Traps
  (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-9.
  Secondary Skills: Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A)
  IQ-1 [1/2]-9; Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-12;
  Demolition (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-9; Engineer
  (Combat) (M/H) IQ-3 [1/2]-8; Scroung-
  ing (M/E) IQ [1]-11; Orienteering (M/A) 
  IQ [2]-11.
  Optional Skills: Spend 6 points on any of Guns
  (Flamethrower, Grenade Launcher, LAW, or
  Pistol) or Motorcycle (both P/E); Driving
  (Automobile or Construction Equipment),
  Gunner (Cannon or Mortar), or Riding
  (Horse) (all P/A); Carousing (P/A – HT);
  Area Knowledge (North Africa or other),
  Cooking, Savoir-Faire (Military), or Telegra-
  phy (all M/E); Electronics Operation (Com-
  munications), Forward Observer, Freight
  Handling, Gambling, Intimidation, Leader-
  ship, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine), Packing,
  Streetwise, Teamster, or Tracking (all M/A);
  Animal Handling or Explosive Ordnance
  Disposal (both M/H); or a foreign language
  (usually one of Arabic, French, or English; all
  three are M/A).
  *Includes +2 for IQ.
  Customization Notes: French officers should
  use the French National Advantages and Disad-
  vantages; enlisted men (almost exclusively for-
  eigners) and the rare foreign officer should refer
  to p. W68 or an appropriate nation book. 
  Specialists (e.g., artillerymen, combat engi-
  neers) should look over the appropriate template
  in the core rulebook for ideas on background and
  optional skill choices to flesh out their character.
  French officers should consider a small addi-
  tional Reputation to reflect their favored status
  among the nation’s officer corps.
  CHARACTERS
  35
  LEGIONNAIRE
  65 POINTS
  
  Operatives of the Special Operations Execu-
  tive (French Branch) provided leadership, train-
  ing, and support to isolated Resistance groups.
  They were often sent into occupied France on
  blind missions – unsupported and alone in enemy
  territory. Most of them were brave, but ordinary,
  patriots carefully selected for linguistic ability and
  a bent for the rigors of clandestine operations.
  SOE-F agents often were recruited from Allied
  armed forces, but some had no prior military
  experience. Additional information on the SOE-F
  can be found on pp. 27-28.
  The following template covers the basic
  training received at SOE; characters with a mili-
  tary background may have additional appropriate
  skills (see pp. W72-85 for guidelines to these).
  Attributes: ST 10 [0]; DX 12 [20]; IQ 12 [20]; HT
  11 [10].
  Advantages: Composed [5], Strong Will +2 [4],
  and 25 points in National Advantages (see 
  p. 30 or p. W68). SOE-F operatives also may
  take Common Sense [10], Danger Sense
  [15], Fit [5], Intuition [15], or additional lev-
  els of Strong Will [2/level] as part of their
  National Advantages.
  Disadvantages: Enemy (German/Vichy security
  forces, 6 or less) [-20] and -30 points in
  National Disadvantages (see p. 30 or p. W68).
  Basic Skills: Acting (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-11; Area
  Knowledge (France) (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-11;
  Camouflage (M/E) IQ [1]-12; Cartography
  (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-10; Disguise (M/A) IQ-2
  [1/2]-10; Electronics Operations (Communi-
  cations) (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-10; Escape (P/H)
  DX-2 [1]-10; Fast Talk (M/A) IQ [2]-12; First
  Aid (M/E) IQ-1 [1/2]-11; Guns (Light Auto-
  matic) (P/E) DX+1 [1/2]-13*; Guns (Pistol)
  (P/E) DX+1 [1/2]-13*; Holdout (M/A) IQ-2
  [1/2]-10; Intelligence Analysis (M/H) IQ-3
  [1/2]-9; Interrogation (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-11;
  Language (French or English) (M/A) IQ 
  [2]-12; Leadership (M/A) IQ [2]-12; Para-
  chuting (P/E) DX [1]-12; Scrounging (M/E)
  IQ+1 [2]-13; Stealth (P/A) DX-1 [1]-11;
  Swimming (P/E) DX-1 [1/2]-11; Tactics
  (Guerrilla) (M/H) IQ-1 [2]-11; Teaching
  (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-10; Throwing (P/H) DX-2
  [1]-10; Traps (M/A) IQ-1 [1]-11.
  Secondary Skills: Armoury (Small Arms) (M/A)
  IQ-1 [1/2]-11; Brawling (P/E) DX [1]-12;
  Climbing (P/A) DX-1 [1/2]-10; Demolitions
  (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-10; Driving (Automobile)
  (P/A) DX-1 [1]-11; Engineer (Combat)
  (M/H) IQ-3 [1/2]-9; Forgery (M/H) IQ-3
  [1/2]-9; Jumping (P/E) DX-1 [1/2]-11; Knife
  (P/E) DX-1 [1/2]-11; Orienteering (M/A) 
  IQ-1 [1]-11; Streetwise (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-10;
  Survival (Urban) (M/A) IQ-2 [1/2]-10.
  Optional Skills: Spend 5 points on any of Bicycling
  or Motorcycle (both P/E); Boating, Powerboat,
  or Riding (Horse) (all P/A); Skiing (P/H);
  Cooking or Savoir-Faire (both M/E); Intimida-
  tion, Mechanic (Gasoline Engine), Shadow-
  ing, or Tracking (all M/A); Sex Appeal 
  (M/A – HT); or languages (mostly M/A). 
  *Includes +2 for IQ.
  Customization Notes: Because SOE agents
  were often from Great Britain, the United States,
  or another Allied nation, players should refer to 
  p. W68 or an appropriate nation book for a list of
  National Advantages and Disadvantages. Agents
  recruited from France should choose their advan-
  tages and disadvantages from p. 30.
  Radio Operators: The SOE-F sent many
  agents into occupied France to act primarily as
  radio operators. Recruits assigned to this task
  received specialized training before being para-
  chuted in. Radio specialists must raise Electronic
  Operations (Communications) to 12 and gain
  additional skills as follows: Cryptanalysis (M/H)
  IQ-3 [1/2]-9; Cryptography (M/H) IQ-2 [1]-10;
  Telegraphy (M/E) IQ+1 [2]-13. This raises the
  template cost to 75 points.
  36
  CHARACTERS
  SOE-F OPERATIVE
  70 POINTS
  
  “Thunderstruck today by
  the mechanical force, we will
  be able to win, in the future, by
  a superior mechanical force.”
  – Charles De Gaulle
  French soldiers carried standard personal
  gear (e.g., blanket, canteen, mess kit, entrenching
  tool, knife, etc). Gas masks were issued – includ-
  ing specially designed masks for horses – but
  were seldom used, and by late in the war, rarely
  carried. Officers and reconnaissance troops were
  issued binoculars.
  SOE-F Equipment 
  SOE-F operatives were given money, food,
  and specialized equipment to help them survive in
  enemy territory. GMs can use the equipment list
  on pp. W87-90 to equip SOE-F agents prior to
  their infiltration of occupied France.
  Operatives were given a knife to quickly cut
  their parachute shroud; a shorter, serrated knife
  was usually carried to puncture and slash tires. A
  small caliber pistol was often carried in an outside
  pocket of the specially designed jump suit worn
  during insertion. The suit protected the wearer
  during the jump, then was to be quickly removed
  and stowed, allowing the agent to blend in with
  the French populace.
  Agents may receive even more specialized
  equipment. GURPS WWII: Hand of Steel pro-
  vides some examples. Others include:
  Cyanide Pills – Agents were often issued poi-
  son tablets to enable them to commit suicide if
  arrested. Such pills were generally issued to any
  SOE operative flying over enemy territory
  whether they intended to land or not. See 
  p. CII141 for details on cyanide poisoning.
  False Identities – Great care was taken to pro-
  vide authentic German uniforms, military
  insignia, and German-made clothing (or British
  fakes with labels from German companies).
  Agents posing as indigenous French were provid-
  ed with French papers, identity cards, travel pass-
  es, ration cards, and so forth. Forgery kits –
  including expertly crafted police, government,
  and military stamps, and appropriately colored
  inks – were sometimes included to aid in creating
  papers as needed. Even seemingly unimportant
  items – such as a matchbox from a well-known
  French or German nightclub – were included to
  lend credence to the agent’s cover story.
  Jewelry – Expensive jewelry, cigarette cases,
  and other valuables could provide the agent with
  a ready source of cash should he find himself low
  on funds. They were also useful for bribing offi-
  cials. Specially designed items could include
  secret compartments that could hide other equip-
  ment or documents (such as an agent’s list of
  radio codes, contact names, and escape routes).
  Money Belt – A leather money belt, with an
  opening on the underside, could be used to conceal
  money or documents. Slender pieces of steel
  embedded in such a belt could double as makeshift
  lockpicking instruments, or as a shiv. $2.50, 0.5 lbs.
  PERSONAL GEAR
  THE FRENCH ARMORY
  37
  
  See pp. W92-93 for some common French
  arms. The following tables cover other weaponry
  typically used by French forces. These troops
  were sometimes equipped by Britain or America,
  and may be found using anything from Thompson
  M-1A1s to Belgian Brownings. Resistance fight-
  ers gratefully used whatever weapon was handy.
  Pistols
  Astra Pistolet Automatique Modele 21
  (1921): A Spanish pistol (called Mod 400 by the
  manufacturer) used in large numbers by the Span-
  ish and French militaries. It had the unique ability
  to chamber various different rounds: originally
  designed for the 9mm Bergmann-Bayard used in
  Spain, it could also fire the 9mm Browning Long,
  9mm Glisenti (Dam 2d+1), 9mm Parabellum,
  9mm Steyr, and .38 Super Auto (Dam 2d+3) with-
  out modification.
  Gabilondo Pistolet Automatique Ruby
  (1915): A cheap Spanish pistol patterned after the
  Belgian FN-Browning Modele 1910, which was a
  standard weapon of the French military up to the
  adoption of the MAS Modele 35A, and still com-
  mon during WWII. 
  MAB Pistolet Automatique Modele D (1935):
  This was a slightly modified copy of the Belgian
  FN-Browning Modele 1922. While never adopted
  as standard, it was widely used by the French mil-
  itary and police. 
  MAS Pistolet Automatique Modele 35A
  (1938): The French standard sidearm, which saw
  only little service before the start of the war. Many
  were captured by the Germans, who used it as the
  P625(f). It was replaced in production with the
  simplified Modele 35S (1940), which had the
  same statistics.
  Revolvers
  MAS Pistolet-Revolveur Modele 1892
  (1892): This obsolete design was the first swing-
  out cylinder revolver adopted in Europe, and still
  in service during WWII. Widely known as the
  Lebel, though M. Lebel had nothing to do with it.
  The Modele 1892’s cylinder swung out to the
  right, rather inconveniently for right-handed users
  (except for left-handed shooters, add 1 second to
  the time required for reloading as per p. W91). 
  Rifles
  Lebel-Berthier Fusil Modele 07/15 M34
  (1934): This was one of the last of a long line of
  weapons based on the Lebel-Berthier Modele 1886
  bolt-action rifle (p. HT114). It used Mauser-style 5-
  round clips. Despite being officially replaced by the
  MAS Modele 36 (p. W95), it soldiered on through-
  out the war, as did many of the older marks. The
  older Lebel-Berthier Fusil Modele 07/15 M27
  (1927) had the same stats except for Wt 9.1.
  Lebel-Berthier Mousqueton Modele 1886/93
  R35 (1935): This was the last of the Lebel-
  Berthiers (p. HT114). It was slightly shortened for
  issue to motorized infantry. It retained both the
  unwieldy 3-round tube magazine below the barrel
  and the old 8mm Lebel cartridge (rather than the
  newly introduced 7.5mm MAS).
  MAS Fusil Modele 36 CR39 (1939): The car-
  bine variant of the standard MAS Modele 36 
  (p. W95) featured a shortened barrel and folding
  stock. It was intended for airborne and mountain
  troops, but few were made. 
  Submachine Guns
  MAS Mitraillette Modele 38 (1939): The
  standard French submachine gun at the beginning
  of the war was the American M-1928A1 Thomp-
  son (called the Modele 39; see pp. HT115-116,
  W96). The Modele 38 was a domestic design,
  which had only just entered service when the war
  began. Production continued until 1944, even
  under German occupation. (The Germans also
  used it themselves.) It had an odd broken appear-
  ance, since stock and barrel were at a slight angle;
  this was supposed to make it more controllable.
  Users complained about the weak round it fired. 
  Machine Guns
  Instead of belts or magazines, French machine
  guns often used strip feeds; these were light metal
  strips holding a number of cartridges. They were
  inserted from one side and emerged empty on the
  other. It takes a loader 1 second to insert a new
  strip, after which the gunner can resume firing.
  Hotchkiss Mitrailleuse Modele 14 (1914):
  This air-cooled weapon was the French MMG
  dating to before the war (also see p. HT118). It
  was a heavy but reliable design, feeding from 24-
  round strips.
  Hotchkiss Mitrailleuse Modele 30 (1931):
  The standard French HMG was derived from the
  Modele 14, but scaled up in caliber. It could use
  20-round strips, 30-round magazines (AWt 9.4),
  or 100-round disintegrating belts (AWt 32 in an
  ammo can). The Modele 30 was used mainly for
  antiaircraft fire, and also installed in armored
  vehicles (p. W130). 
  38
  THE FRENCH ARMORY
  SMALL ARMS
  
  MAC Mitrailleuse Modele 31 (1931): This
  was a variant of the MAC Modele 24/29 LMG 
  (p. W97) for use in fortress installations and
  armored vehicles (p. W130). It was originally
  installed in bunkers of the Maginot Line, but later
  many were incorporated into the Atlantic Wall. It
  was also popular for air defense, mounted on var-
  ious tripods, and the Germans even used captured
  guns on bipods. Two feed devices were available,
  both inserted from the right side: a 36-round box
  magazine (AWt 2.3) or the much more common
  150-round drum magazine. The weight in the
  table does not include any mount. 
  Hand Grenades
  Grenade à Main Defensive Modele 37
  (1937): The standard French fragmentation hand
  grenade, replacing the earlier Modele 15 (which
  the Americans had adopted as the Mk II grenade,
  pp. HT117, W98). 
  Grenade à Main Offensive Modele 37
  (1937): A French concussion grenade. It was
  almost identical to the unpainted fragmentation
  type, but was painted gray to avoid lethal mixups.
  AMMO TABLE
  Common Name
  Modern Name
  7.5mm MAS
  7.5×54mm
  .32 ACP
  7.65×17mmSR
  7.65mm Browning Long
  7.65×20mm
  8mm Lebel Revolver
  8×27mmR
  8mm Lebel
  8×50mmR
  13.2mm Hotchkiss
  13.2×99mm
  WEAPONS TABLE
  Hand Grenades – use Throwing
  Weapon
  Damage
  Wt
  Fuse Hold
  Gr Ma Df Modele 37
  2d-1 [2d]
  1.1
  4
  0
  Gr Ma Of Modele 37
  2d+1 [1d]
  0.7
  4
  0
  Semiautomatic Pistols – Use Guns (Pistol) Skill
  Weapon
  Malf
  Dmg
  SS Acc 1/2D
  Max
  Wt AWt RoF Shots ST Rcl Hold Cost
  Astra Modele 21, 9mm Bergmann-Bayard
  Crit.
  2d+2
  10
  3
  150 1,850
  2.3
  0.4
  3~
  8+1 9
  -1
  -1
  $40
  Gabilondo Ruby, .32 ACP
  Crit. 2d-1- 10
  2
  130 1,600
  1.5
  0.3
  3~
  8+1 7
  -1
  0
  $15
  MAB D, .32 ACP
  Crit. 2d-1- 10
  2
  130 1,600
  1.8
  0.3
  3~
  9+1 7
  -1
  0
  $25
  MAS Modele 35A, 7.65mm Browning Long
  Crit.
  2d-
  10
  3
  150 1,850
  2
  0.3
  3~
  8+1 9
  -1
  -1
  $50
  Revolvers – Use Guns (Pistol) Skill
  Weapon
  Malf
  Dmg
  SS Acc 1/2D
  Max
  Wt AWt RoF Shots ST Rcl Hold Cost
  MAS Modele 1892, 8mm Lebel
  Crit.
  2d+
  10
  2
  150 1,700
  2
  0.15 3~
  6
  9
  -1
  -1
  $20
  Rifles – Use Guns (Rifle) Skill
  Weapon
  Malf
  Dmg
  SS Acc 1/2D
  Max
  Wt AWt RoF Shots ST Rcl Hold Cost
  Lebel Modele 07/15 M34, 7.5mm MAS
  Crit.
  6d+2
  14 10 1,000 3,900
  8.4
  0.3
  1/2
  5+1 11 -3
  -7
  $25
  Lebel Modele 1886/93 R35, 8mm Lebel
  Crit.
  6d+2
  14
  8
  800 3,900
  8.6
  0.2
  1/2
  3+1 11 -3
  -6
  $25
  MAS Modele 36 CR39, 7.5mm MAS
  Crit.
  6d+1
  12
  8
  800 3,900
  8
  0.3
  1/2
  5+1 11 -3
  -5
  $35
  Submachine Guns – Use Guns (Light Auto)
  Weapon
  Malf
  Dmg
  SS Acc 1/2D
  Max
  Wt AWt RoF Shots ST Rcl Hold Cost
  MAS Modele 38, 7.65mm Browning Long
  Crit. 2d+1- 10
  6
  160 1,900
  7.5
  1.1
  10
  32
  9
  -1
  -5
  $70
  Machine Guns – Use Guns (Light Auto) or Gunner (Machine Gun)
  Weapon
  Malf
  Dmg
  SS Acc 1/2D
  Max
  Wt
  AWt
  RoF Shots ST
  Rcl
  Cost
  Hotchkiss Modele 14, 8mm Lebel
  Crit.
  6d+2 20 14 1,000
  3,900 58/118
  2
  8
  24
  29T -1
  $300
  Hotchkiss Modele 30, 13.2mm Hotchkiss Crit.
  12d+ 20 14 1,300
  5,000 88/177 5.3
  7
  20
  41T -1 $1,000
  MAC Modele 31, 7.5mm MAS
  Crit.
  6d+2 19 10 1,000
  3,900
  45.2
  17.7
  12
  150 22T -1
  $150
  THE FRENCH ARMORY
  39
  
  Five French vehicles are detailed below. As
  described elsewhere, the Free French forces also
  extensively used U.S. and British vehicles that
  can be found in the WWII corebook and other
  supplements. Additional French vehicles may be
  found in future WWII supplements.
  THE FRENCH MOTOR POOL
  The SOMUA S-35 may have been the best
  medium tank in the world as WWII began. The
  first tank of all-cast construction, it balanced
  speed, armor, and firepower. It had one serious
  flaw: The one-man turret required the commander
  to spot targets, direct his crew, load both weapons,
  and aim them. Unsurprisingly, his efficiency in
  any one of these jobs dramatically declined when
  he juggled all of them. In action, S-35s sometimes
  fired HE rounds at other tanks or AP rounds at
  infantry, because the overwhelmed commander
  didn’t have time to switch to the proper ammo.
  A second drawback was a radio shortage.
  Though the S-35 was to be equipped with a two-
  way radio, France ran frightfully short; three out or
  four S-35s in service did not have a radio installed.
  The S-35 began as a 1931 “cavalry tank”
  concept. The Société d’Outillage Mécanique et
  d’Usinage d’Artillerie (SOMUA) produced the
  first prototype in 1934, and the first 50 tanks
  entered service in Spring 1936. By May 1940,
  France had more than 400 in its arsenal.
  The driver and radio operator sat in the body,
  with the latter passing ammunition up to the com-
  mander. The S-35 burns 6.4 gallons of gas per hour
  at routine usage. The powered turret rotates at
  roughly 12° per second, or 2.4° if manually turned
  by the commander. Fuel and ammo cost $750.
  SOMUA S-35 
  Subassemblies: Medium Tank chassis with
  medium slope +3; full-rotation Medium
  Weapon turret [Body:T] with mild slope +1;
  fixed Mini cupola +0; tracks +3.
  Powertrain: 142-kW standard gas engine with
  142-kW tracked transmission and 108-gallon
  standard tanks; 16,000-kWs batteries.
  Occ: 2 CS Body, 1 Both Cargo: 7.5 Bod, 1 Tur, 1 Cup
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  5/230 4/155
  5/200
  4/80
  4/80
  Tracks:
  4/50
  4/50
  4/50
  4/50
  4/50
  Turret:
  5/270 4/145
  4/145
  4/100
  –
  Cupola:
  4/100 4/100
  4/100
  4/100
  –
  Weaponry
  Ground LMG/Modele 31 [Tur:F] (3,750 rounds).*
  47mm Short Tank Gun/SA-35 [Tur:F] (118).*
  * Linked.
  Equipment
  Body: 2-kW traversing gear for turret; medium
  radio receiver and transmitter.
  Statistics
  Size: 18’×7’×9’ Payload: 1.1 tons Lwt: 21.7 tons
  Volume: 94
  Maint: 52 hours
  Cost: $15.1K
  HT: 12. HP: 1,500 Body, 540 each Track, 75 Tur, 30 Cup.
  gSpeed: 26 gAccel: 2 gDecel: 20 gMR: 0.25 gSR: 5
  Ground Pressure Low. 2/3 Off-Road Speed.
  Design Notes
  The design includes 4,000 rounds of MG and
  120 of 47mm ammo. Historical values were sub-
  stituted. The S-35’s best sloping actually was on
  the hull rear, but the oddly shaped hull front appar-
  ently served well in combat; German antitank gun-
  ners regarded the S-35 as hard to kill. For these
  reasons, the tank is given medium slope, but the
  benefits are split between the hull front and rear.
  Often, tank cupolas are assumed to be part of
  the turret, but the cupola on this turret (also used
  by the Char B1-bis) was very large. It did not
  include a hatch in French service; the commander
  stuck his head up into it to get a bit better view
  through slits. (He still suffered a Poor View per 
  p. W144. His crew station had no means of obtain-
  ing a clear view.) The Germans replaced it with a
  hatched version on captured tanks they deployed.
  The S-35 had armor covering the sides of its
  track assemblies, but not true standoff armor per 
  p. W140. This feature is represented as a modest
  improvement in the tracks’ DR.
  Variants
  In 1940, construction began on the S-40, an
  improved model with a modified suspension and
  a 220-hp (164 kW) engine. Few had been com-
  pleted by the fall of France. The SAu-40 was a
  self-propelled 75mm gun based on the S-35 chas-
  sis; only a single prototype was completed.
  The Germans considered the S-35 the best
  tank they faced during the Battle of France. By
  mid-1941, captured S-35s were being issued to
  German units as the PzKpfw 35-S 739(f). Many
  were used as trainers; others saw duty in Finland
  (June 1941) and Normandy (June 1944). The
  Vichy government gave Italy 32 of the machines.
  CHAR SOMUA MODÉLE 1935-S
  40
  THE FRENCH ARMORY
  
  The B1-bis was the main battle tank of the
  French army in 1940, and was considered one of
  the most powerful tanks in the world. Unfortu-
  nately, it was expensive and painfully slow. It was
  also hampered by the same problems that plagued
  the S-35, for it used an identical turret. As with the
  S-35, the tank commander had to fire and load the
  47mm SA-35 cannon and Modele 31 machine
  gun. In some ways, the B1 tank commander’s job
  was even more difficult, since he also needed to
  spot targets for the 75mm howitzer.
  The driver sat next to the 75mm gun, with the
  radio operator behind him and the loader behind
  the gun. The loader loaded both hull guns and
  passed ammunition to the commander for his turret
  guns. The radio operator sometimes assisted in
  passing ammunition; tank antennas were often
  sheared off during combat, rendering the radio use-
  less. The driver aimed and fired the 75mm gun; a
  special auxiliary transmission allowed him to pre-
  cisely rotate the tank to aim his gun. (This is mod-
  eled as a casemate mounting from p. W132 for the
  75mm gun, with the special effect that the whole
  tank must turn with the gun.) The driver also pos-
  sessed a gyroscopic compass driven by com-
  pressed air, to help him retain orientation while
  spinning his vehicle to and fro in pursuit of targets.
  The Char B1-bis burns 10.3 gallons of gas
  per hour at routine usage. The turret is powered
  and rotates at roughly 12° per second, or 2.4° if
  manually turned by the commander. Fuel and
  ammo cost $940.
  Renault Char B1-bis
  Subassemblies: Large Tank chassis with mild
  slope +4; full-rotation Medium Weapon tur-
  ret [Body:T] with mild slope +1; fixed Mini
  cupola [Tur:T] +0; tracks +3.
  Powertrain: 229-kW standard gas engine with
  229-kW tracked transmission and 99-gallon
  standard tanks; 16,000-kWs batteries.
  Occ: 3 CS Body, 1 Both Cargo: 5.2 Bod, 1 Tur, 1 Cup
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  5/345 4/230
  4/215
  4/100 4/80
  Tracks:
  4/70
  4/70
  4/70
  4/70
  4/70
  Turret:
  5/270 4/145
  4/145
  4/100
  –
  Cupola:
  4/100 4/100
  4/100
  4/100
  –
  Weaponry
  Ground LMG/Modele 31 [Tur:F] (2,550 rounds).*
  Ground LMG/M 31 [Body:F] (2,550 rounds).
  47mm Short TG/SA-35 [Tur:F] (50 rounds).*
  75mm Short TG/SA-35 [Body:F] (74 rounds).
  * Linked.
  Equipment
  Body: casemate mount for 75mm Short Tank Gun;
  2-kW traversing gear for turret; medium radio
  and transmitter; navigation instruments.
  Statistics
  Size: 22’×8’×9’ Payload: 1.6 tons Lwt: 34.7 tons
  Volume: 118
  Maint: 39 hours
  Cost: $26.8K
  HT: 10. HP: 1,800 Body, 600 each Track, 75 Tur, 30 Cup.
  gSpeed: 17 gAccel: 2 gDecel: 20 gMR: 0.25 gSR: 6
  Ground Pressure Low. 2/3 Off-Road Speed.
  Design Notes
  The tank is designed with 5,000 rounds of
  MG ammo, 40 of 47mm ammo, and 80 of 75mm
  ammo. Historical values were substituted. Top
  speed should be 26 mph. Since the B1 was
  designed as a slow infantry tank, a new (and less
  reliable) transmission might improve speed. 
  Only HE and smoke were carried for the
  75mm gun, though AP rounds were available. 
  The B1-bis had very large tracks, with much of
  the running gear beneath the hull armor. This
  robust design justifies a steep upgrade in the tracks’
  DR. On the other hand, the left rear hull side fea-
  tured a vulnerable radiator grill with only DR 80.
  The grill can be specifically targeted with a +0 size
  modifier. Additionally, any shot targeting the left
  hull side has a 1-in-6 chance of hitting the grill.
  Also see the S-35 design notes, p. 40.
  Variants
  The original Char B1, with lighter armor,
  entered lengthy trials in the early 1930s. The B1-
  bis (second) upgrade began production in 1935,
  with 365 entering service before the invasion. In
  1937, the French built a handful of heavier B1-ter
  (third) prototypes. Neither the B1 nor B1-ter saw
  combat. Secret design staffs kept working on the
  B1-ter during the Occupation. After the war, this
  work formed the basis of the ARL-44 tank.
  THE FRENCH ARMORY
  41
  RENAULT CHAR DE BATAILLE B1
  
  The MS.406 was not the
  best plane in the Armée de
  l’Air, but it was the most com-
  mon in 1940. Its saving grace
  was that it was easy to fly. French
  pilots also found it easy to die in this
  underpowered and undergunned mount.
  The fighter entered the prototype stage in late
  1935 as the MS.405. At the time, it was a revolu-
  tion in French aircraft design. The government
  ordered 1,000 planes in March 1938, but many of
  them went to fill export deals with several coun-
  tries, notably China, Finland, and Turkey. When
  the war broke out, France had four squadrons, with
  three 25-plane groups in each, flying the MS.406. 
  The 406 retained its previous-generation
  roots from the original 405. It could hold its own
  – barely – against the earliest Messerschmitt Bf-
  109s, but usually fell prey to those improved 109s
  taking part in the Battle of France. Overall, France
  lost more than 400 MS.406s during the invasion
  against 175 confirmed kills for the plane.
  The MS.406 continued to serve with the
  Vichy government, but French industry was real-
  located to producing German designs and the air-
  craft drifted into obscurity. A total of 1,064 were
  built from 1938-1947.
  The plane uses 29 gallons of gasoline per
  hour at routine usage. Fuel and ammo cost $45.
  MS.406.C1
  Subassemblies: Medium Fighter chassis +3;
  Light Fighter wings +2; 3 retractable wheels +0.
  Powertrain: 642-kW aerial turbo/supercharged
  gas engine with 640-kW prop and 108-gallon
  self-sealing tanks.
  Occ: 1 CS
  Cargo: 4.1 Body, 2.4 Wings.
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  All:
  2/3
  2/3
  2/3
  2/3
  2/3
  Cockpit:
  0/+0 0/+10 0/+20 0/+10 0/+10
  Weaponry
  20mm Long Air AC/HS.404 [Body: F] (60).*
  2×Air LMG/MAC M34 [Wings:F] (300 each).*
  * LMGs linked and all three guns linked together.
  Equipment
  Body: Medium radio transmitter and receiver;
  navigation instruments; autopilot.
  Statistics
  Size: 27’×35’×9’Payload: 0.5 tons Lwt: 2.7 tons
  Volume: 200
  Maint: 56 hours
  Cost: $12.8K
  HT: 9. HPs: 120 Body, 70 each Wing, 12 each Wheel.
  aSpeed: 302 aAccel: 7 aDecel: 19 aMR: 4.75 aSR: 2
  Stall Speed 72.
  gSpeed: 225 gAccel: 11 gDecel: 10 gMR: 0.5 gSR: 2
  Ground Pressure Very High. 1/8 Off-Road Speed.
  Design Notes
  The design purchases 500 rounds of MG and
  90 rounds of 20mm ammunition. The historical
  values have been used, instead.
  Variants
  The MS.405 was essentially a prototype for
  the MS.406. (Each of the 16 MS.405 prototypes
  varied slightly. Numbers 13 and 15 were shipped
  to Switzerland as pattern aircraft for the Swiss 
  D-3800 while prototype number 16 became the
  standard for the MS.406.) The most notable dif-
  ference between the MS.405 and MS.406 was the
  plywood/aluminum skin on the prototype, and a
  different engine (with a troublesome radiator).
  Despite these and other subtle differences, treat
  the MS.405 as an MS.406 with an aSpeed of 275.
  The MS.410 was a product-improved version
  with a redesigned wing, a more reliable oil cool-
  er, and 2×Aircraft LMG/MAC Modele 34 in each
  wing. Some 500 aircraft were scheduled to be
  converted, but only five had undergone the
  upgrade by the time France fell.
  At least 96 captured MS.406s entered service
  in the Luftwaffe as trainers. These are identical to
  the French-service plane except for the installation
  of German electronics. Sixty-nine were upgraded
  to the MS.410 standard under German supervi-
  sion, but many lacked the upgraded radiators. Two
  later went to Finland, 44 to Croatia, and 52 to Italy.
  Switzerland built 74 MS.412s (D-3800s) that
  were little more than MS.405s modified with
  Swiss electronics, the better engine from the
  MS.406, and belt-fed (instead of drum-fed)
  machine guns in the wings. Later, 207 Swiss 
  D-3081s were built using most of the MS.406 fea-
  tures, and the upgraded radiator of the MS.410.
  The 41 MS.406 and MS.410 airframes in
  Finnish service were modified to use captured
  Russian 820-kW Klimov M-105P engines, skis,
  and a German 20mm Medium Air AC (MG151/20)
  in place of the Hispano-Suiza cannon. The result-
  ing plane was known as the Mörkö (“Ghost”).
  42
  THE FRENCH ARMORY
  MORANE-SAULNIER MS.406 
  
  René Gillet produced motorbikes known for
  their power and reliability, and the French military
  and police received large numbers of the 750cc
  and 1000cc V-twins during the 1930s. Soldiers
  used them for scouting, courier errands, transport-
  ing officers, and other duties. 
  The René Gillet L1 listed below was a chain-
  driven motorcycle, with a side-valve engine and a
  crossover gearbox. The frame employed rigid,
  tubular construction. 
  The René Gillet 750cc burns 0.7 gallons of
  gas per hour at routine usage. Fuel costs $0.75
  René Gillet 750cc Type L1
  Subassemblies: Motorcycle chassis +0, large
  wheels -1.
  Powertrain: 16-kW standard gas engine with
  16-kW wheeled transmission and 5-gallon
  standard tank. 
  Occ: 1 MCS, 1 MPS
  Cargo: 0.1
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  2/4
  0/0
  2/4
  00
  00
  Wheels:
  3/5
  3/5
  3/5
  3/5
  3/5
  Statistics
  Size: 4’×3’×3’ Payload: 430 lbs. Lwt. 1,252 lbs.
  Volume: 2.4
  Maint. 697 hours
  Cost $85
  HT: 8. HPs: 20 Body, 8 each Wheel.
  gSpeed: 80 gAccel: 4 gDecel: 10 gMR: 1.5 gSR: 2
  Ground Pressure High. 1/6 Off-Road Speed.
  Design Notes
  A 6-gallon tank was included in the design,
  and weight was increased to match the very heavy
  historical weight of 822 lbs. empty. The small bat-
  tery was ignored; see the design notes on p. W107.
  The French army often attached sidecars (use
  the sidecar statistics on p. W107) to the motorcy-
  cle. The Wehrmacht used confiscated Gillets after
  their victory, as well.
  RENÉ GILLET V-TWIN MOTORCYCLE
  CITROËN TRACTION AVANT
  Citroën pioneered many automotive advance-
  ments, including hydraulic brakes, front-wheel
  drive, rack-and-pinion steering, monococque con-
  struction, rubber mounts for the engine, and tor-
  sion-bar suspension. The results were reliable,
  very safe automobiles with excellent handling.
  After the invasion, the Gestapo confiscated
  every Citroën they could get their hands on. The
  sight of a black Traction Avant in a French street
  soon came to mean that trouble was brewing . . .
  The Traction Avant 11L burns 1.5 gallons of
  gas per hour at routine usage. Fuel costs $1.80.
  Citroën Traction Avant 11L
  Subassemblies: Small Wheeled chassis with
  Civilian option +3, standard wheels +1.
  Powertrain: 34-kW standard gas engine with
  34-kW wheeled transmission and 12-gallon
  standard tank; 4,000-kWs battery. 
  Occ: 1 CS, 3 PS
  Cargo: 6.7
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  3/8
  3/8
  3/8
  3/8
  3/8
  Wheels:
  3/5
  3/5
  3/5
  3/5
  3/5
  Statistics
  Size: 15’×5’×5’ Payload: 0.5 tons Lwt. 1.7 tons
  Volume: 36
  Maint. 349 hours
  Cost $700
  HT: 9. HPs: 65 Body, 7 each Wheel.
  gSpeed: 72 gAccel: 4 gDecel: 10 gMR: 1 gSR: 5
  Ground Pressure High. 1/6 Off-Road Speed.
  Design Notes
  The chassis’ high DR represents its extreme
  sturdiness. The design includes a WWII-era proto-
  type of an improved suspension (p. VE20), costing
  $10 times wheel area for +0.25 gMR and +1 gSR,
  but without the modern improvements to gSpeed. 
  Variants
  The few civilians who did not have their cars
  confiscated had no gasoline. Many installed wood-
  chip burners called gasifiers that extracted hydro-
  gen and carbon monoxide to be used as fuel. A
  gasifier includes 1 VSP of filters and tubing, plus a
  burner of any size. Each VSP of burner holds 120
  lbs. of wood chips (up to 2” wide) costing $0.5
  (mostly for the chipping). This 120 lbs. of wood
  will produce gases replacing 1 gallon of gasoline.
  Most setups greatly curtail power output to limit
  wood consumption. Agasifier divides maintenance
  interval by 3. The burner is very hot and a careless
  handler will suffer carbon-monoxide poisoning. A
  gasifier weighs 40 lbs. plus 20 lbs. per VSP of
  empty burner. It costs $25 plus $2 per VSP of burn-
  er. Starting a cold gasifier takes 10 minutes.
  Installation usually costs $20 for labor and
  parts, taking 8 hours and a Mechanic skill roll.
  Traction Avants came pre-plumbed for a gasifier:
  $5, 2 hours, and +3 to the skill roll.
  Any civilian vehicle still running in Occupied
  France will be using a gasifier to burn wood. Ger-
  many, Britain, Australia, and many other nations
  also used gasifiers extensively.
  THE FRENCH ARMORY
  43
  
  “If the blood of France and of Germany flows
  again, as it did 25 years ago, in a longer and even
  more murderous war, each of the two peoples will
  fight with confidence in its own victory. But the
  most certain victors will be the forces of destruction
  and barbarism.”
  – Édouard Daladier
  An overview of military campaign styles is
  found on pp. W158-162. The following points
  add to that discussion when basing a military
  campaign on the French.
  FALLEN FRANCE
  GMs running an intensely realistic campaign
  should consider having players create conscripted
  French soldiers, using only 50 or 75 points. Many
  of them would be reservists, with only a raw or
  green level of skills (see p. W71). 
  These inexperienced troops don’t have to be
  portrayed as cowardly or craven. Many individual
  Frenchmen displayed a classic (that is, almost sui-
  cidal) sense of Gallic bravery during the 1940
  fighting. No matter how they conduct themselves,
  though, they would encounter deserting and rout-
  ing troops in the 1940 campaign. The GM should
  emphasize that these less-than-stalwart souls have
  a point: The Germans are deadly foes and the
  French will be short on weaponry and training. It
  wasn’t an easy time to be brave.
  This sort of campaign could play up the low
  morale and lack of discipline that plagued the
  French army early in the war, and can be used to
  create morale dilemmas for soldiers choosing
  which government to support after June 1940.
  REALISTICALLY GRITTY
  This is probably the campaign style of choice
  for running a long-term French military cam-
  paign, simply because it enables the GM to high-
  light the problems faced by the French (which
  certainly did not go away after the defeat of their
  country!) while giving PCs an opportunity to
  shine as individuals. 
  Characters should be created on 100 points;
  this leaves room for personalization of templates
  found in both this supplement (pp. 34-36) and the
  core book (pp. W72-85).
  Soldiers that begin the war in France can face
  the realistic agony of defeat, retreat, and flight to
  England, and yet come back to fight with the Free
  French in various battles throughout the war. (Or,
  they might even spend a brief tour with the Vichy
  military forces in Africa before turning around and
  fighting with the Allies after November 1942.) For
  those in England, the interlude between Dunkirk
  and D-Day can be filled with adventures centered
  on training, scrounging up the loan of new equip-
  ment, and possibly even dealing with a few insults
  from newly arrived U.S. troops in the pubs . . .
  Later in the war, these French troops may find
  themselves fighting alongside Bouvet in southern
  France, or even liberating Paris with Leclerc (see
  p. 16). Encourage the players to portray them as
  wearing their national pride on their sleeve – the
  legendarily prickly de Gaulle did!
  44
  CAMPAIGNS
  Adventure Seed:
  Fortress on the Brink
  The fortress Villy la Ferté (see p. 9)
  anchored the Maginot Line at the French
  Ardennes. It was surrounded by German
  troops in mid-June 1940. Outgunned and
  outnumbered, the 105-man garrison refused
  to surrender, fighting the German attackers
  to their last breath. GMs looking for a real-
  istic battle can use this heroic last stand to
  depict the slaughter that typified the Ger-
  man advance, while others may choose to
  highlight the heroism and loyalty of the
  brave soldiers that died there. 
  Historically, all 105 defenders were
  killed as the Germans swarmed the subter-
  ranean complex. GMs may choose to alter
  history enough to allow PCs a chance to
  escape or surrender after watching their
  comrades fall to the Germans.
  CAMPAIGN STYLES
  
  Adventure Seed: Fort Coudon
  The battle at Toulon, in the south of France, was
  the source of some of the most heroic – and bloody –
  fighting in the European war. French commandos,
  working under Col. Bouvet, have been assigned to
  climb into the fortress of Coudon, located northeast of
  Toulon, and take out the German forces holed up
  there. The Führer has ordered his troops to fight to the
  last man, an order that they will follow literally.
  Under the cover of night, the PCs must infiltrate
  the perimeter defenses, scale the fortress walls (strong
  ropes and good Climbing skill will be needed), and
  eliminate the fanatical German soldiers before day-
  break. Stealth and deadly force are the keys; once the
  garrison is alerted to the commandos’ presence, the
  firefight will be horrific.
  GMs may wish to run a full-scale French
  campaign, beginning in the 1930s and extending
  through the liberation of France. Others will find
  a smaller, more focused campaign to their liking.
  BEFORE THE WAR
  The 1930s were an era of intrigue and adven-
  ture. GURPS Cliffhangers provides useful infor-
  mation on running a “high adventure” campaign
  set prior to WWII. French soldiers can gather
  some badly needed combat experience fighting in
  Syria and Morocco in the mid-’20s, then begin a
  WWII campaign as seasoned veterans.
  THE BATTLE OF FRANCE
  A campaign that focuses primarily on the
  Battle of France can be effectively handled by
  keeping the timeframe moving slowly. Consider-
  ing that the entire campaign only lasted a month,
  the GM should not be in a hurry to rush through
  the key battles one after another. Rather, he should
  play up the day-to-day uncertainties and non-
  combat incidents, punctuating the lulls with ses-
  sions of deadly, terrifying battle.
  OTHER FRONTS
  French soldiers may find themselves stationed
  in French colonies, or fighting alongside the Allies
  as part of the Free French. Chapter 1 provides an
  overview of France’s involvement in the war, and
  can be used as a stepping stone to more detailed
  research for individual theaters and battles. 
  Two colonial locations that can be used to
  create exciting adventures are Dakar and Bir
  Hakeim (see p. 16). Many other locations in
  Africa or Indochina could host small bands of
  French troops fighting for their lives, on a scale
  too small for history to notice but perfect for a
  campaign. As for the fighting in Occupied France
  itself, see The Resistance on p. 14.
  Adventure Seed:
  Rendezvous
  On Sept. 29, 1942, the SOE-F drops
  American saboteur Thomas Casey into
  occupied France via parachute. That night,
  Casey is to meet his Resistance contact –
  one of the PCs – in the cellar of a farmhouse
  near Arras. Instead, German forces swarm
  the Resistance hideout and engage the group
  in a vicious firefight, torching the house in a
  blaze that lights the sky for miles.
  The PCs must take on the German sol-
  diers if they can, or flee under the cover of
  darkness and regroup elsewhere. In either
  case, they must then decide what happened
  to the SOE operative. Was he injured on
  landing, delaying his trip to the farmhouse?
  How did the Germans learn of the location
  of the rendezvous? Has Casey been captured
  and interrogated? Once they find him, how
  will they rescue him from his German cap-
  tors before he is relocated to a German con-
  centration camp?
  CAMPAIGN SETTINGS
  CAMPAIGNS
  45
  HIGH ADVENTURE
  The daring exploits of the French
  Foreign Legion, the SOE, and Resis-
  tance fighters provide an opportunity
  for truly heroic roleplaying. High
  adventures include daring night drops
  into enemy territory, dangerous liaisons
  with questionable French Resistance
  groups, commando raids on mountain
  fortresses, and amazing battles against
  overwhelming forces (see Bir Hakeim,
  p. 12, for a real-life example).
  In this setting, “cinematic” style
  doesn’t have to bend reality very much.
  A single Resistance agent can defeat a
  panzer regiment – if he attacks their
  train with a wrench rather than each
  tank with a weapon!
  
  THE FOREIGN LEGION
  Legionnaires may be of nearly any nationali-
  ty, most certainly including Americans. (Peter J.
  Ortiz, a New York native who later served as a
  U.S. Marine officer, fought in the Battle of France,
  and was the youngest sergeant in the Legion’s his-
  tory.) This creates excellent opportunities for con-
  flict between PCs from different nations. A U.S.
  Army barracks tended to put together Indiana
  farmboys who picked up the same conversations
  that they’d left off at the grain elevator prior to
  enlisting. A Legion barracks combined a Czarist
  mass murderer with an Italian counterfeiter used to
  silk sheets with a Spanish anarchist who bombed
  one too many post offices, and so forth. 
  Historically, the Legion’s barracks etiquette
  recognized this huge potential for friction, and
  legionnaires were encouraged to keep their per-
  sonal business to themselves. Since this “busi-
  ness” had been awful enough to drive them to flee
  their homes and take up a brutal existence, most
  legionnaires were quite happy to do just that. Still,
  the GM of a Legion-based campaign should pro-
  vide plenty of opportunities for PCs and NPCs
  alike to bring their backstory to the forefront. An
  Italian counterfeiter might come in handy when
  the brutal company sergeant refuses to sign week-
  end passes; a Spanish arsonist might be just the
  man to have in a unit lacking heavy weapons and
  frantically cobbling together Molotov cocktails.
  Regardless of how much campaign emphasis
  is placed on barracks relationships, eventually the
  characters will enter into the thick of combat. His-
  torically, most Legion campaigns took place in
  North Africa, where it was based at the time, as part
  of the British and Commonwealth armies opposing
  the Afrika Korps. Legion units often received
  tough assignments and took huge losses in this
  campaign, though things quieted down consider-
  ably after El Alamein (see p. W26). They also suf-
  fered the occasional attack by Allied planes or men,
  perhaps in part because they didn’t resemble the
  other soldiers on the Allied side in their particular-
  ly heavy stubble and ragged uniforms. 
  On one occasion, some British MPs visited a
  Legion camp to arrest a British Legionnaire who
  had fled from arrest for murder at home. The MPs
  sized up the Legionnaires protecting their mate and
  decided to retreat empty-handed. The GM could
  replicate this sort of tension by having one of the
  PCs come face to face with the circumstances that
  drove him into the Legion while serving with the
  multinational Allied armies. Or, he could place an
  NPC under the spotlight, and make the PCs choose
  between protecting someone accused of a vile
  crime or dishonoring the Legion’s basic pact.
  THE RESISTANCE
  The Resistance provides a wonderful opportu-
  nity to mix military and espionage themes in an
  exciting GURPS campaign. The epic arc from dis-
  mal defeat to the liberation of Paris provides a
  well-known backdrop, but doesn’t diminish the
  drama as agents undertake their low-key missions.
  See pp. W168-169 for basics of a Resistance-
  based campaign. Adventures set in France should
  also take into account the following factors:
  Who They Were
  French men and women made up the majori-
  ty of the Resistance. They came from all walks of
  life, from conservative secret policemen still
  working for the Vichy government while leading
  a double life, to factory workers crowding into the
  Communist Resistance ranks.
  Early on, stranded British soldiers also played
  a significant role, though their lack of integration
  into daily French life gave them little hope for a
  long career. Many Spanish and Polish immigrants
  played a much longer-term role in the Resistance.
  The Spaniards tended to be Communists who had
  fled Franco, but had him to thank for their existing
  military experience. The Poles were more varied,
  and a bit more likely to be working for the British,
  who were hosting their government in exile. 
  Most of these characters should be conceived
  as civilians. If they are to stand a reasonable chance
  of surviving an active part during the entire war, the
  GM should allow 75 or 100 points for character
  creation. Alternately, they could be built on a more
  realistic 50 points, but the GM should give them
  liberal experience points during the campaign.
  Either way, he should keep players from
  investing too much in combat-related skills. A
  French man who recently “released himself” from
  the reserves would have some military training,
  and might be allowed combat skills equivalent to
  those of a raw or green rifleman per pp. W71-72.
  Some civilian pursuits also will provide skills that
  translate into combat utility. For the most part,
  though, characters – particularly women – should
  lack military expertise as the campaign begins.
  The Initial Chaos
  Starting out, the GM cannot overly empha-
  size how much distress that the German invasion
  created. French culture revolved around things
  being “just so.” The mail arrived at a regular time
  daily, the trains ran on time, one exchanged a few
  pleasant words with the florist on the corner while
  walking to work each day. French life thrived on
  an orderly routine full of little pleasantries.
  46
  CAMPAIGNS
  
  War, of course, threw all of this out of sorts.
  Whether the PCs are reservists stranded from their
  units, refugees joining the masses on the roads
  (where the Germans sometimes machine-gunned
  them to clear the lane), or civilians holed up at
  home, they will often find that their job has shut
  down, familiar faces have disappeared, and their
  telephone doesn’t work. This disruption led to
  tense squabbling among the French populace as
  they scrambled to pick up the pieces of their lives.
  The PCs should have to do this, too, whether
  it involves finding a grocer who’s open or travel-
  ing miles to get home and burning an Army uni-
  form. In either case, taxis and buses won’t be of
  much help. Their drivers commandeered their
  vehicles to join the exodus to the south. The trains
  did run; their crews often went to heroic measures
  to perform their duties.
  Little Needs
  During this period, the GM should introduce
  one or more motives for joining the embryonic
  Resistance. Perhaps a British soldier shows up
  bleeding on a PC’s stoop. Perhaps PC dockwork-
  ers in the south watch German supervisors divert
  all incoming fresh vegetables to Germany while
  leaving spoiled fare to resume its journey into
  France. (They eventually got back by pouring
  acid into the Germany-bound produce.) Perhaps
  one of the PCs is caught in the northern Occupied
  Zone and simply wants to return to his family in
  the southern Vichy Zone; lacking the proper
  papers, he needs to find a smuggler to guide him
  during the huge risk of an illegal crossing.
  Whatever the motive, PCs seeking out the
  Resistance in this early phase should encounter a
  vacuum. No one wore lapel pins. Casting about too
  openly for others of a like mind will almost cer-
  tainly end up with an informer calling the Gestapo
  or Vichy police. Proceeding too carefully will find
  the PC, months later, still searching for a smuggler
  or someone to take this mending Tommy off their
  hands. Even worse, many seemingly fruitful con-
  tacts really intended to rob, even kill, those seeking
  their assistance – if a person sets out to disappear,
  who’s to say he didn’t get where he was going?
  Desperate Days
  Even if the PCs give up on finding other con-
  tacts, and form their own cell, by late 1941 or so
  the Resistance will be making itself known,
  whether being sought out or not. 
  The Communists, in particular, will begin
  killing Germans; they don’t often let the occupier’s
  10-to-1 reprisals dismay them, because they don’t
  believe their countrymen should be sitting out the
  war. They presume that the reprisals will goad
  those on the sideline into fighting (preferably for
  the Communist cause, of course). 
  Resistance members of all stripes might also
  approach the PCs at their jobs. Anyone can help
  out the movement; factory workers can sabotage
  products and steal tools; clerks can pass along
  data; cooks can slip a little food away to hungry
  and homeless partisans. French citizens of all
  stripes often invite contact with the movement,
  because increasingly they have to turn to the black
  market to find basic goods, and the market often
  is tied to the Resistance.
  At this point, German security gets more
  intense, with random street stops to check papers,
  radio vans sweeping for illegal transmitters, etc.
  The Germans take a dreadful toll on the Resis-
  tance, killing many members and turning many
  others into double agents. Only the fact that the
  Resistance gains recruits faster than the Germans
  can catch them keeps the movement going.
  For the individual resistant, these are terrible
  days. All of France is struggling to make ends
  meet, and spending most of your energy on the
  fight makes it all the harder. Most members lack
  any sort of weapon and foolproof papers. Many
  also lack jobs or even a place to live. Everyone
  they deal with is a potential informer, leaving them
  one careless word from torture and execution.
  Despite these hardships, the goal is to keep mov-
  ing forward, to get something productive done.
  One small consolation during this period is
  that some “collaborators” began looking the other
  way. Many Vichy officials only served because
  they saw no alternative, not out of any love for Fas-
  cism. If they passed over a nervous man in his 40s
  to check the papers of a woman in her 70s, so be it.
  Each day, the Vichy convictions eroded; each day,
  the Resistance gained in social legitimacy. 
  The Grand Finale
  A campaign of this scope demands an epic
  ending. The PCs’network should be called upon to
  perform some essential task in the night before 
  D-Day, or to hunt down a V-1 launch site that is
  ravaging London, or something of similar magni-
  tude. At this late point in the war, and only this late,
  the freedom fighters may begin seeing the equip-
  ment they need: cash, food, explosives, pistols and
  SMGs, etc. In return, they’ll often be asked to go
  out and look for trouble with the Germans, certain-
  ly not in a frontal assault, but their missions will
  carry great risk all the same. The GM shouldn’t
  hesitate to exact a toll among the PCs as they fight
  to accomplish this goal that legitimates all the hard-
  ships that they’ve endured for liberté.
  CAMPAIGNS
  47
  
  2nd Armored Division, 15-16, 19.
  Advantages, 17-18, 30-32.
  Afrika Korps, 12.
  Air force, 21, 42.
  Algeria, 15, 23.
  Alsace-Lorraine, 3, 4.
  Anvil-Dragoon, 16.
  Ardennes, 6-8, 19-21, 44.
  Armée Secréte, 25.
  Armistice army, 26.
  Armistice, 9, 13, 20; terms, 10.
  Army, 4, 6-9, 17-23; armistice
  restrictions on, 10; special
  units, 20; unit compositions, 19;
  weapons, 38-43.
  Artillery, 19.
  Basic training, 17.
  Bat d’Af, 22-23.
  Battle of France, 7-9, 19-21.
  BCRA, 25, 28-29.
  Belgium, 6, 7-9.
  Bir Hakeim, 12, 17, 45.
  Business, 13.
  Cavalry, 19.
  Cell networks, 24-26.
  Char B1-bis, 41.
  Characters, 30-36; 
  templates, 34-36.
  Chasseurs, 18.
  Citroën Traction Avant, 43.
  Codes, 26, 34, 36.
  Collaboration, 13, 16, 47.
  Colonies, 5, 12, 18, 22-23, 33, 45.
  Communications, 26, 28, 34, 36.
  Communists, 12, 14, 24-26, 46-47.
  Compartmentalization, 24-25.
  Compiègne, 10.
  Conscription, 17, 23, 30, 44.
  Cyanide, 37.
  D-Day, 14-15, 20, 29, 47.
  Dakar, 12.
  de Gaulle, Charles, 8-9, 11-13, 15-
  18, 20-21, 27, 29-30, 33;
  profile, 12.
  Decorations, 17-18, 28-29.
  Disadvantages, 18, 29-30, 33.
  Discipline, 4, 17, 21.
  Dunkirk, 9, 20-21; those left
  behind, 10, 14.
  Equipment, 37-43.
  Escaping France, 10, 14, 27, 47.
  Evacuations, 8.
  Fall Gelb, 7.
  Fascism, French, 13.
  FFI, 25.
  Force H, 11.
  Foreign Legion, 20, 22-23, 35, 46;
  13th Brigade, 12, 22-23;
  template, 35.
  Forgery, 14, 25-26, 37.
  Free French, 9, 12-13, 15, 17, 20-
  21, 26, 45.
  French Foreign Legion, see
  Foreign Legion.
  FTP, 26.
  Gasifiers, 43.
  Gestapo, 10, 14, 24-29, 47.
  Guns, 6, 15, 38-39, 47.
  IDs, 14, 25-26, 37, 47.
  Jedburghs, 15, 29; template, 34.
  Jewelry, 37.
  Jews, collection of, 10, 13-14.
  Laborers, 13-14, 24.
  Laval, Pierre, 13.
  Leclerc, Gen., 15-16, 44.
  Legion, see Foreign Legion.
  Liberation, 13, 15, 47.
  Maginot Line, 6, 9, 17-18, 33, 39,
  44; mentality, 6, 21.
  Map of Divided France, 11.
  Maquis, 14-16, 24-25.
  Medals, 17-18, 28-29.
  Mers-el-Kébir, 11, 20.
  Milice, 13.
  Mobilization, 7.
  Money belts, 37.
  Morocco, 5, 20, 22-23, 45.
  Motorcycle, 43.
  Moulin, Jean, 29.
  MS.406, 42.
  MUR, 25.
  Mutiny of 1917, 4.
  National Front, 26.
  Navy, 11-12, 20-21.
  Networks in Resistance, 25-26.
  Newspapers, 24.
  North Africa invasion, 10, 13, 20.
  Operation Saar, 7.
  ORA, 26.
  Papers, 14, 25-26, 37, 47.
  Paratroops, 20.
  Paris, 4, 5, 8, 16.
  Pétain, Henri Philippe, 4, 5, 9, 13-
  14, 26, 33; profile, 13.
  Pied Noirs, 18.
  Plan 17, 3.
  Population, 4, 6.
  Radios, 26, 28, 34, 36.
  Railway workers, 27, 47.
  Ranks, military, 30-31; Foreign
  Legion and, 22.
  Red Chapel, 26.
  Resistance, 10, 14-16, 17, 24-29,
  31, 46-47; newspapers, 24.
  Saar offensive, 7.
  Sabotage, 14, 15, 27.
  Saint-Cyr, 13.
  Schlieffen Plan, 3, 7.
  Sickle Stroke, 7.
  Skills, 23, 26-27, 29, 33, 45.
  SOE, 25-28, 45; template, 36.
  SOMUA S-35, 40.
  SS, 13-14.
  Strategy, 21.
  Syria, 5, 20, 45.
  Tactics, 21.
  Tanks; naming them, 19.
  Traction Avant, 43.
  Underground, see Resistance.
  Vehicles, 40-43.
  Vercors, 14.
  Vichy France, 9-10, 12-13, 14, 17-
  18, 20-21, 23-26, 33, 40-42, 
  46-47.
  Villy la Ferté, 9, 44.
  Waffen-SS, 13.
  Weapons, 6, 15, 38-39, 47.
  Women, 10, 12, 25, 28, 35.
  Wood-burning car, 43.
  Workers, 13-14, 24.
  Aglion, Raoul. The Fighting
  French (Henry Holt and Compa-
  ny, 1943). An interesting look at
  events from the French perspec-
  tive, written during the war.
  Astor, Gerald. The Greatest
  War,
  Volumes I-III
  (Warner
  Books, 2001). A collection of
  three books covering WWII
  from the attack on Pearl Harbor
  to the bombing of Hiroshima,
  told in the words of the Ameri-
  cans that lived through it. A nice
  collection of oral history; sec-
  tions on France can be used for
  American PCs fighting with the
  Resistance or during the battle
  for liberation.
  Furst, Alan. The World at
  Night (Random House, 1996). A
  top-notch espionage thriller set in
  occupied France, this novel
  details the exploits of Jean Cas-
  son, a civilian movie producer
  turned Resistance operative. All
  of Furst’s novels (including Red
  Gold, the sequel to The World at
  Night) are excellent sources for
  their detail and atmosphere.
  Horne, Alistair. To Lose a
  Battle – France 1940; The Fall of
  Paris; and The Price of Glory
  (Penguin Books, 1979). These
  three books detail various aspects
  of France in WWII. They pro-
  vide a focused look at the mili-
  tary campaign, especially details
  concerning whereabouts and
  actions of commanders and units
  during the war.
  Hoyt, Edwin P. War In
  Europe, Volume Two, The Fall of
  France (Avon, 1991). Part of a
  series of lightly written, easy-to-
  read books covering WWII. Not
  terribly helpful for reference, but
  provides a good overview.
  McCombs, Don, and Worth,
  Fred L. World War II: 4,139
  Strange and Fascinating Facts
  (Random House, 1996). An
  encyclopedia-style book full of
  interesting (and sometimes triv-
  ial) tidbits about the war. Useful
  for fleshing out details in any
  WWII adventure, including
  those set in France.
  McLeave, 
  Hugh. 
  The
  Damned Die Hard (Bantam,
  1993). Story of the French For-
  eign Legion. Includes sections on
  the Legion’s activity in WWII.
  Shirer, William L. The Col-
  lapse of the Third Republic
  (Simon and Schuster, 1969).
  Detailed history of France from
  1871-1940. Covers the French
  military in great detail as well as
  the economic, political, and
  social roots of the fall of France
  in 1940.
  Warner, Philip. The Battle of
  France, 1940 (Cassell Military
  Paperbacks, 1990). From the pre-
  liminaries to the results of the
  Battle of France, provides a
  detailed overview of the battle
  for and loss of France.
  48
  INDEX
  REFERENCES
  INDEX
  
  STEVE JACKSON GAMES
  STEVE JACKSON GAMES
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