TEXT: ROBERT N. WATT
  ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK
  APACHE WARRIOR 
  1860–86
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  ROBERT N. WATT 
  ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM HOOK 
  Series editor Marcus Cowper
  WARRIOR 172
  APACHE WARRIOR 
  1860–86
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  CONTENTS
  INTRODUCTION 
  4
  CHRONOLOGY 
  7
  BELIEF AND BELONGING 
  10
  TRAINING 
  16
  LEADERSHIP 
  23
  APPEARANCE 
  26
  EQUIPMENT 
  27
  ON CAMPAIGN 1860–86 
  31
  EXPERIENCE OF BATTLE 
  55
  AFTER THE BATTLE 
  58
  FURTHER READING 
  62
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  4
  INTRODUCTION
  Any mention of the Chiricahua 
  Apache warrior evokes the idea 
  of endurance, the image of a 
  man who is elusively cunning, 
  ferocious and cruel. Such 
  portrayals of warriors were 
  prevalent during the Apache 
  Wars of the 1860s to the 1880s 
  and are, to some extent, still 
  believed today. General George 
  Crook admired Apache warriors 
  as “Human Tigers,” yet other 
  members of the US Army took a 
  very different view. For example, 
  Lt. Charles P. Elliott1 stated that:
  The Apache Indian is as perfect 
  a savage as this country has ever 
  produced, and it is impossible 
  to conceive of greater cruelty 
  and less natural affection in any 
  creature that walks on two legs. 
  The fiendish cruelties committed 
  by them when on the warpath give one a creepy feeling while among them, and 
  when a son brings in his father’s head on which a reward had been placed, not 
  because he had trouble with him, but because he happened to know where 
  he was in hiding and wanted the reward, it makes one doubt whether they 
  are human.
  The truth of the matter is that most opponents of the Chiricahua Apaches 
  simply did not understand their culture and hence their approach to warfare.
  1 
  Elliott was an officer in the 4th Cavalry from 1883 until his retirement in 1898. He was 
  detached from the 4th Cavalry soon after his arrival at Fort Lowell in 1883 to serve as a 
  provost officer on the San Carlos Reservation. As such, he would have had very close contact 
  with Apache warriors during the last phase of the Apache Wars. However, he does not seem to 
  have felt the need to familiarize himself with Apache culture. See Charles P. Elliott, ‘An Indian 
  Reservation Under General George Crook’, Military Affairs, Vol. 12, Issue 2 (Summer 1948), 
  pp. 91–102.
  APACHE WARRIOR 1860–86
  Mangus, son of the great 
  Mangas Coloradas, was the 
  last leader to surrender to 
  the US authorities in 1886. 
  His role in the late 1870s and 
  early 1880s is obscure but some 
  US Army correspondence 
  portrays him as leading a 
  significant following among the 
  Warm Springs Apaches who 
  survived Tres Castillos in 1880. 
  The US civil authorities clearly 
  assumed him to be closely 
  associated with Victorio in 
  1880, as his arrest warrant 
  shows. He appears to have a 
  Springfield carbine laid across 
  his lap. While the popular 
  image of the Chiricahua 
  Apache warrior armed with a 
  Winchester repeating rifle is 
  not inaccurate, single-shot, 
  breech-loading rifles/carbines 
  of Springfield or Remington 
  manufacture were equally 
  popular and archaeological 
  evidence strongly suggests that 
  the Apaches appreciated the 
  longer effective range of such 
  weapons. (Photo courtesy of 
  National Archaeological 
  Archives, Smithsonian)
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  5
  Thus even sympathetic opponents gave the Apache warriors credit for 
  being very effective guerrilla fighters while at the same time implying that 
  they were not quite human as understood by civilized society. Chiricahua 
  warriors were depicted as superhuman and any sign of success against the 
  USA was seen as being due to inherent traits rather than because they 
  belonged to a culture that, on their own territory, was equal or even superior 
  to that of their American opponents. This biological explanation of the 
  success of the Chiricahua Apache also implied that there was no evolutionary 
  element driving their success. In other words, this view failed to realize that 
  part of the effectiveness of Chiricahua Apache resistance was that a key 
  element of their continued survival was their ability to evolve in response to 
  new opponents or tactical and technological changes among existing enemies.
  What this book will seek to establish is that the Chiricahua warrior’s 
  approach to survival was carefully calculated and shaped by years of 
  preparation. It was adaptable enough to allow individuals to develop and 
  disseminate new information concerning the strengths and weaknesses of their 
  enemies in the light of their ongoing contact with their foes. The expertise 
  required to survive in their environment was beyond mere inherited ability, 
  but the result of clear thinking by very intelligent and adaptive human beings. 
  The reason they had to become so successful as raiders and hunters was their 
  refusal to bow to colonization: first Spanish, then Mexican and finally 
  American efforts to settle in, and economically exploit, Apacheria. If the 
  Apaches were quite ruthless opponents, it was because their foes were just as 
  brutal when encountering opposition whilst, in their eyes, bringing light to 
  darkest Apacheria. A lack of numbers forced the Apaches to focus their 
  abilities upon becoming adept guerrilla fighters. A study by Lekson shows that 
  from the very start of contact with colonization, the Chihenne Apache, who 
  relied upon being able to harvest food at certain locations at certain times 
  Mangus’ arrest warrant for 
  “Stealing Horses, Mules and 
  Pistols” issued on March 29, 
  1880. On the reverse it is 
  endorsed: “The United States 
  Viz/Vs Victorio et al. Warrant. 
  I certify that after diligent 
  search, I am unable to find the 
  Indian named ‘Mangus’ in my 
  District so that I may have him 
  before this Court as I am within 
  commanded. John Sherman 
  for United States Marshal.” One 
  suspects that while the search 
  may have been diligent, John 
  Sherman was probably lucky 
  not to have found or been 
  found by Mangus. (Author’s 
  photo – courtesy of access 
  given by the Parrish Collection)
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  6
  of  the year, found their subsistence range was 
  increasingly constricted. This encouraged the 
  Chihenne to increase their raiding activities and 
  thus also increase the instances of conflict between 
  them and their would-be colonizers.
  Organization of Chiricahua Apache society
  The organization of Chiricahua Apache society is 
  a bit of an anthropological minefield, as Chiricahua 
  Apache society was a complex network of both 
  hostile and friendly family and friendship links. 
  The easiest way to understand how they fitted 
  together is to remember that the US Army of the 
  time applied the term ‘Chiricahua’ generally to a number of related groups 
  of Apaches. As such, what have been termed the Central (Chokonen), Eastern 
  (Chihenne) and Southern (Nehdni) Chiricahua Apaches will be the focus of 
  our study. This can also be extended to the Bedonkohe Apaches who lived to 
  the east of the Chihenne and to the north of the Chokonen Apaches. To see 
  these groups as clearly distinct is convenient but not particularly accurate. 
  For example, Geronimo was born a Bedonkohe but married into the Nehdni. 
  Other Chiricahua Apaches married into the Western or Mescalero Apache 
  and vice versa – the custom was that the man left to join his wife’s family. 
  Equally, while there may have been instances of alliances or conflicts between 
  the Chiricahuas and other Apache groups, internal disputes could easily 
  erupt into violence within, for example, the Chihennes. In 1873 Chihenne 
  leaders Loco and Nana dealt with a leadership challenge by the four sons of 
  the late Chihenne leader Cuchillo Negro by using violence. Two of the four 
  sons of Cuchillo Negro were killed in a point-blank gun battle and a third 
  was badly wounded. Nevertheless, two leaders who were widely believed to 
  dislike each other, Victorio (Chihenne) and Juh (Nehdni), were capable of 
  putting aside their differences to briefly ally against a common enemy in 
  October and November 1879. In doing so, they inflicted a sharp defeat upon 
  pursuing US forces in northern Mexico.
  The hazards of relaxing one’s 
  guard can be seen in this 
  memorial to four soldiers killed 
  by Apaches in 1866. 
  This monument can still be 
  seen in the graveyard at 
  Fort Cummings. The heavily 
  weathered inscription reads: 
  “SACRED TO THE MEMORY OF 
  THOS RONAN AGED 45 LS 
  HUNTER AGED 33 CHAS
  DEVLIN AGED 28 THOS DALY 
  AGED 28 LATE PRIVATES OF CO 
  G 1ST VETERAN INFANTRY CAL. 
  VOLS. KILLED BY APACHES AT 
  OAK GROVE NM JAN 17 1866” 
  (Author’s photo)
  The lower slopes of the 
  San Mateo Mountains in 
  New Mexico looking 
  approximately southwards 
  towards the settlement of 
  Canada Alamosa, the inhabitants 
  of which maintained good 
  trading relations with 
  the Chihenne Apaches. 
  In January 1880, approximately 
  five companies of 9th Cavalry 
  (Buffalo Soldiers) and a company 
  of Apache scouts, commanded 
  by Major Albert P. Morrow, 
  pursued about 60 well-armed 
  and well-mounted Apaches up 
  this valley. Morrow recorded that 
  for almost five days he engaged 
  in an exhausting pursuit, 
  punctuated by several 
  inconclusive firefights with the 
  Apaches, through this type of 
  terrain. (Author’s Photo)
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  7
  CHRONOLOGY
  December 1860 
  An unprovoked attack on an Apache village by a party 
  of miners incites Mangas Coloradas to go to war with 
  the Americans. 
  February 1861 
  A false accusation of raiding and kidnapping provokes 
  Cochise into open warfare with the USA. He and Mangas 
  Coloradas join forces to fight the Americans. 
  1861–62 
  With the outbreak of the Civil War the few troops based 
  in Arizona depart and those citizens left in the territory 
  find themselves besieged by the infuriated Apaches. 
  1862 
  As part of an effort to drive Confederate forces out of 
  Arizona and New Mexico, General Carleton advances east 
  at the head of volunteer Union troops raised in California. 
  The advance guard is ambushed in Apache Pass by a large 
  group of Apache warriors led by Cochise and Mangas 
  Coloradas. The deployment of two mountain howitzers 
  wins the day for the Californians. 
  1862–71 
  A prolonged guerrilla war of attrition against the USA is 
  undertaken by the Chiricahua Apaches led by Cochise 
  and Mangas Coloradas. The latter was taken prisoner 
  under a flag of truce and “shot while trying to escape” in 
  January 1863, but Cochise continued the fight. Neither 
  side gained the upper hand. However, throughout this 
  period US and Mexican forces both inflicted steady 
  casualties upon the Chiricahua Apaches, which ultimately 
  proved unsustainable. By 1871, Cochise was willing to 
  consider peace overtures. 
  June 1871 
  Crook arrives to take command of US troops in Arizona. 
  His use of Apache scouts and mule trains would prove 
  instrumental in the fight against the Apaches. 
  September–October
  1872 
  General O. O. Howard concludes a peace treaty with 
  Cochise and the latter agrees to settle on a reservation 
  based around the Dragoon and Chiricahua Mountains. 
  This audacious act brings an end to Cochise’s 11-year 
  war with the USA. It also prevented Crook targeting the 
  Chiricahua Apaches as part of his up-coming offensive 
  against the Apaches in Arizona. 
  1876 
  The Chiricahua reservation based around Fort Bowie 
  is closed under the auspices of the Dept. of the Interior, 
  which instituted a new policy to concentrate all Apaches 
  on one reservation. This policy is probably responsible for 
  the Apache Wars of 1877–86. Juh, leader of the Nehdni/
  Southern Chiricahuas, refuses to accept this closure and 
  leads his followers back into Mexico. He is accompanied 
  by Geronimo, widely regarded as Juh’s right-hand man. 
  Most of the Chokonen/Central Chiricahuas under the 
  leadership of Taza and Naiche accept the move to San 
  Carlos after gunning down the two leading Chokonen 
  opponents (Eskinya and Pionsenay) to the closure.  
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  8
  1877–79 
  The concentration policy gathers momentum as the 
  Warm Springs Apache reservation at Ojo Caliente, 
  New Mexico, is closed and the Apaches led by 
  Victorio, Loco and Nana are transferred to San Carlos 
  in May 1877. They quickly voice opposition to the 
  move and leave the reservation in September 1877. 
  Between October 1877 and August 1879, Victorio 
  and Nana fought for a return to Ojo Caliente while 
  Loco chose to return to the reservation and pursue 
  the same goal peacefully. In fact, it is probable that 
  there were individuals and small groups of Chiricahua 
  Apaches who never accepted the reservation system also 
  at large during the period 1872–86. These individuals 
  would have continued raiding independently and on 
  occasion in alliance with leaders such as Victorio, 
  Nana, Juh, and Geronimo.  
   
   During the closure of Ojo Caliente Geronimo, 
  who had been raiding on both sides of the border and 
  periodically taking refuge at Ojo Caliente, is arrested 
  and transported to San Carlos in chains. Geronimo 
  leaves the reservation in 1878 and rejoins Juh in Mexico.
  1879–80 
  Having caused minimal casualties in the USA between 
  1877 and 1879, Victorio loses patience and wages 
  an all-out war against the USA and Mexico. From 
  September 1879 to May 1880 he outwits and defeats 
  every force sent against him. His warriors inflict heavy 
  casualties upon the citizens and soldiers of both 
  countries. He is gradually worn down by a defeat at 
  the hands of Apache scouts in May 1880 and by being 
  outmaneuvered by the 10th Cavalry in Western Texas 
  during July and August 1880. On October 14/15, 1880, 
  Victorio is finally trapped and killed at Tres Castillos by 
  Mexican state troops.  
   
   Juh, having briefly allied with Victorio in 1879, had 
  negotiated a return to San Carlos in January 1880 after 
  sustaining a stinging defeat at the hands of Mexican 
  troops. He was accompanied by Geronimo.
  July–August 1881 
  Nana, Victorio’s successor, having regrouped the 
  survivors of Tres Castillos, launches a legendary raid 
  into New Mexico. Aged around 75, he led his raiders 
  approximately 1,500 miles in six weeks and held off 
  or defeated at least seven US Army detachments and 
  inflicted heavy casualties among the ranching and 
  mining communities in southern New Mexico. 
  September 1881 
  Juh, Naiche, Geronimo and many Chiricahua Apaches 
  flee the San Carlos Reservation, having become alarmed 
  at the level of army activity in the aftermath of a revolt 
  by Western Apaches, who had been provoked by their 
  poor treatment on their reservations. After a couple of 
  skirmishes with pursuing US Forces at K-H Butte and 
  down the eastern edge of the Dragoon Mountains, the 
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  9
  Chiricahua Apaches take refuge in the Sierra Madre. 
  They soon join forces with Nana and his followers 
  recently returned to Mexico from their raid into 
  New Mexico. 
  April 1882 
  The Sierra Madre Apaches arrive at the San Carlos 
  reservation and force Loco and his Chihenne Apaches 
  to return with them to Mexico. They hold off the 
  4th Cavalry in a rearguard action at Horseshoe 
  Canyon in Arizona. They are then surprised by 
  a force of 6th Cavalry and Apache scouts near the 
  Sierra Enmedio in Mexico, but after the initial surprise 
  manage to hold off their attackers. On fleeing further 
  south into Mexico, they are ambushed by Mexican 
  troops who inflict catastrophic losses on the 
  Chiricahuas. Of the 400 Apaches who left the 
  reservation over 100 are killed before they 
  reach the Sierra Madre. 
  May–June 1883 
  General Crook, with a force mainly made up of Western 
  Apache scouts, penetrates the Chiricahua strongholds in 
  the Sierra Madre Mountains in Mexico and persuades 
  the Apaches to surrender. 
  February 1884 
  Geronimo becomes the last of the Chiricahua Apaches 
  to arrive from Mexico after the peace agreement with 
  General Crook arranged during the Sierra Madre 
  expedition of 1883. 
  May 1885 
  Geronimo, Naiche, Mangus, Nana, Chihuahua, 
  and Ulzana flee the San Carlos reservation. 
  November–December 
  1885 
  Chihuahua’s brother, Ulzana, leads a small party of 
  warriors into the USA and cause widespread disruption 
  before returning to Mexico. 
  March 1886 
  General Crook meets with the Apaches at Canon de los 
  Embudos and agrees to their surrender. Geronimo and 
  Naiche then flee. Nana, Chihuahua, Ulzana and their 
  followers surrender and are sent back to the USA. 
  Crook resigns and is replaced by Nelson A. Miles. 
  The Chiricahua Apaches who surrender and those 
  who remained on the reservation are deported to 
  Florida.Mangus had separated from the rest of the 
  Apaches and did not take part in the negotiations. 
  September–October 1886 Geronimo surrenders in Skeleton Canyon. He and 
  his followers are deported to Florida along with 
  those Chiricahua Apaches who served as scouts.  
  A small group led by Mangus returns to the USA 
  and surrenders in mid-October; it is also deported 
  to Florida. 
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  10
  BELIEF AND BELONGING
  The Chiricahua Apaches followed a radical version of a principle of warfare 
  common to all American Indians, that of sustaining the minimum of loss for 
  the maximum damage inflicted on the enemy, be that through plunder 
  acquired and/or casualties inflicted. Unlike professional opponents such as 
  those serving in the US Army at the time, the loss of a warrior’s life could 
  have a direct and extreme economic effect, not just on his dependents but on 
  the community as a whole. The man’s family would become more dependent 
  upon other warriors and their families in their struggle for survival, whereas 
  the loss of a few enlisted men to Apache ambush would have little knock-on 
  effect on US industrial society.
  The Chiricahuas made this principle a lynchpin of their definition of 
  success or failure in raiding or warfare. A leader who was seen to have lost 
  followers by taking unnecessary risks would soon lose his following. 
  For example, if during a raid the Apaches had taken many horses but lost 
  a warrior due to the leader taking what was judged to be unnecessary risks, 
  then his standing as a leader would soon fall as his followers sought other 
  more successful leadership.
  Effectively, Chiricahua Apaches were encouraged to conduct a thorough 
  risk assessment of their intended actions in order to absolutely minimize the 
  losses taken in warfare. Potential targets could be quietly monitored for days 
  before undertaking an attack was even considered. The principle of “if there 
  is doubt there is no doubt” was a key element of the risk analysis. In other 
  words, if an Apache leader remained unsure as to the results of his intended 
  action it would not reflect badly upon his status among his following if he 
  chose not to attack. As we shall see, leadership was a key position for a 
  Chiricahua warrior, as it bore a great deal of responsibility for the well-being 
  of his followers. The art of persuasion was a key element of the decision to 
  attack, or not, and would have been discussed with his warriors.
  Nevertheless, while risk analysis may have minimized the dangers 
  involved, it could not guarantee that there would be absolutely no risk at all. 
  An unforeseen variable could always intervene and Chiricahua Apaches had 
  to be able to react to these factors as quickly as possible. For example, on 
  January 23, 1881, Chihenne Apaches, probably led by Nana, ambushed and 
  pinned down seven civilians near Palomas in New Mexico until their siege 
  was broken by a small detachment of the 9th Cavalry led by Sergeant 
  Madison Ingoman2:
  The Regimental Commander takes great pleasure in announcing the gallant 
  conduct and excellent judgement of Sergeant Madison Ingoman, Company D, 
  9th Cavalry, in two affairs with hostile Indians. On the 23rd of January, 1881, 
  when in command of six men of Company D, 9th Cavalry, escorting a train 
  of ten wagons en route to Ojo Caliente, New Mexico, at the sound of sharp 
  firing, he corralled [sic] his train, and leaving it to be guarded by the teamsters, 
  moved quickly in the direction of the firing, and found seven citizens defending 
  themselves in a ravine against twenty-five Indians. He at once charged the 
  Indians, routing them. On the 25th of January, 1881, while escorting the same 
  2 
  The original citation for gallantry names Madison Ingoman but other sources name him 
  as Daniel Ingoman.
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  11
  train through the Canon of Canada Alamosa, the train was attacked by fifteen 
  Indians; parking the train and preparing to defend it, it was apparent that the 
  animals would soon be killed from the plunging fire of the Indians from the 
  heights; he at once charged them on foot, the ground being impracticable for 
  horses, and routed them, losing one man killed in the assault. He then skilfully 
  covered and conducted the train eight miles to the out-post of Ojo Caliente, 
  after the Indians had received an increase to their first party.
  Army & Navy Journal, Volume 18, February 26, 1881, p. 608
  In launching his attack to relieve the trapped civilians, Ingoman effectively 
  forced the leader of the group of 25 Apaches to make an immediate 
  calculation of the risk taken in standing their ground against this unexpected 
  assault. By charging in with six men, Sgt. Ingoman was doing something no 
  Apache leader would contemplate. The sudden arrival of a small detachment 
  of Buffalo Soldiers might herald the approach of a larger force. The safest 
  option for the Apaches was to abort their attack and review the situation 
  from a safe distance as there was nothing to be gained by risking unnecessary 
  fatalities. The Apaches, when realizing the small size of Ingoman’s detachment, 
  clearly thought that the numbers were in their favor. Realizing the train’s 
  destination, they were able to pick an ideal spot for an ambush a couple of 
  days later.
  The Apaches were almost certainly Chihenne, whose homeland centered 
  around the hot springs at Ojo Caliente, and they would have known the 
  surrounding countryside intimately. However, even when they had chosen 
  the  ground and had their opponents exactly where they wanted them, 
  Sergeant Ingoman again did something that no Apache leader would have 
  done – he charged a superior number of enemies who were well protected by 
  the terrain. Once again the Apache leader was forced to make an immediate 
  risk analysis and probably decided that the risk of taking fatalities was too 
  great for the possible rewards, and again withdrew.
  Reading the report carefully, one suspects that, by 
  targeting the draft animals and cavalry mounts, the Apaches 
  were trying to force a withdrawal, which would allow them 
  to ransack the wagons undisturbed. While they shot and 
  killed one of the men from the 9th Cavalry during Ingoman’s 
  charge, they did not consider standing their ground was 
  worth the risk of taking fatalities. The Apaches would 
  probably not have known the exact content of the wagons, 
  and the loss of a couple of men for the chance that there 
  may have been ammunition among the loads was not worth 
  the risk. An Apache leader would not contemplate risking 
  fatalities for unknown rewards, especially as these same 
  Apaches had earlier found out that wagon loads could be 
  a bit of a lottery. On January 14, 1881, they destroyed a 
  wagon and stagecoach in the Goodsight Mountains, about 
  60 miles to the south, and five people were killed. The 
  wagon contained a load of fish, which, according to Opler, 
  many Apaches considered taboo as a food staple.3 
  3 
  Opler interviewed his subjects in the 1930s and noted that this dislike of fish appeared to be 
  more prevalent among the older generation of Chiricahua Apaches.
  Canada Alamosa Canyon. 
  This is the type of terrain 
  chosen by the Apaches to 
  ambush Sergeant Ingoman’s 
  detachment as it made its way 
  to Ojo Caliente on 25 January 
  1881. One can see how the 
  Chiricahuas would have been 
  able to occupy well-protected 
  positions not only high above 
  but also close to the canyon 
  floor. This would give them the 
  best chance to fulfi their ethos 
  of maximum damage to their 
  enemies with minimum 
  damage to themselves. 
  (Author’s photo)
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  12
  Developmental psychology 
  helps us to understand why 
  the  Apaches were so adept at 
  survival by hunting and raiding. 
  Jean Piaget’s concept of “formal 
  operations” states that formal 
  operational thinking marks the 
  most advanced level of thinking 
  as the adolescent moves into 
  adulthood and develops abstract 
  reasoning. Some critics of Piaget 
  argue that not all individuals 
  attain this level of development, 
  pointing out that many members 
  of both literate and, particularly, 
  non-literate cultures fail to 
  reason at this level. One response 
  to this argument is that many 
  individuals only utilize formal 
  operational thinking in specific 
  situations, especially where they 
  are dealing with matters that are 
  essential to their continued survival. A study of pre-literate bushmen society by 
  Tulkin and Konner (1973) discovered that bushman hunters, who appear to 
  fail Piaget’s tests (which are designed to demonstrate an ability to deploy 
  formal operational thinking), do think at this level when hunting. Here the 
  bushmen clearly demonstrate a systematic testing of inferences and hypotheses 
  when tracking their prey, which are essential for their continued survival. 
  12
  THE APACHE WARRIOR, EARLY 1860S
  The Apache warrior of the early 1860s (1) was aware of the danger of cloth infections in wounds. 
  Therefore, when raiding or going to war he would wear the minimum of clothing: a breechclout, 
  worn narrow and short at the front and wider and longer to the rear; long Apache boots, which 
  provided some protection from the spiny flora ubiquitous to Apacheria; and a headband. His 
  primary weapon would be the bow and arrow (2) with the quiver (3) carried in one of two ways:
  When the Chiricahuas are on the march and are not using their arrows, they carry them so that the 
  feathers come over the top of the right shoulder. When they are fighting, they reverse the bag so that 
  the feathers come under the left armpit, and they can be snatched out of the quiver with the right 
  hand. For a left-handed person it is just the opposite. Sometimes the quiver is carried over the chest 
  so it will be more handy. (Opler, 1996, p.341.)
  This particular warrior is carrying his quiver in the “march” position and is probably hunting game. 
  Sometimes the lance, wielded two-handed on foot, would be used. The one illustrated (4) is held 
  in the museum of the Arizona Historical Society. Captured or traded knives or broken sabres would 
  be used to provide lance blades. This example is unusual in that most of the sabre blade has been 
  incorporated into the lance. Normally, sabre blades would be broken and the upper part used as the 
  lance blade. The blade would be shorter and straight if a knife was used. The flop-headed war club 
  was also carried and a skilled warrior would make maximum use of the deadly impact of its slingshot 
  effect (5). By the early 1860s, muskets were fairly common (6). The Springfield and Enfield rifled 
  muskets would have been the most modern varieties in Apache hands at that time. However, 
  one suspects that older trade muskets would have been more common. Much less common 
  would have been the Sharps carbine and the Spencer and Henry repeating rifles.
  A
  This photo shows an Apache 
  scout from 1888 dressed in 
  traditional garb and armed 
  with traditional weaponry. His 
  hairstyle is unusual and may 
  reflect European influence. 
  However, of more interest 
  are the crosses worn round 
  his neck. They might have 
  reflected Christian influence. 
  However, early Jesuits noticed 
  the Apache use of cross 
  iconography and had mistaken 
  them for a lost Christian tribe 
  when in fact the cross reflected 
  the four sacred directions and 
  thus had nothing to do with 
  Christianity. (Photo courtesy 
  of National Archaeological 
  Archives, Smithsonian)
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  13
  1
  2
  3
  4
  6
  5
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  14
  Where  the Apaches were concerned, they 
  concentrated their formal operational thinking 
  upon the key skills of hunting, gathering and 
  raiding. As the activity of raiding could often 
  lead into warfare, this too became the focus of 
  their highest level of thinking.
  If we return to the attack upon Sergeant 
  Ingoman’s detachment in Canada Alamosa 
  Canyon on January 25, 1881, the Apaches, once 
  they had had time to quietly look over their 
  unexpected opponents of 23 January, had 
  realized their small numbers. They had clearly 
  judged that this new target was worth ambushing 
  and, realizing where the detachment was bound, 
  worked out exactly where they could be attacked. 
  That the attack failed does not detract from the 
  abstract thinking behind the ambush.
  A more involved example would be the 
  period between September 4 and 18, 1879, when 
  Chihenne leader, Victorio, pinpointed a number 
  of threats and dealt with them consecutively. 
  On  September 4, his warriors ambushed the 
  horse herd belonging to Company E, 9th Cavalry, 
  at Ojo Caliente, New Mexico. This was the only 
  US Army unit actually stationed in the immediate 
  vicinity of the hostile Apaches. The supply lines 
  for Ojo Caliente were constantly harassed during 
  this period, and, with the majority of its horses 
  lost, the small garrison was effectively neutralized 
  until replacement horses were delivered in 
  December 1879. The September 4 attack 
  attracted the general attention of three 9th Cavalry detachments that were in 
  the field looking for Victorio. On September 10/11, Victorio’s warriors struck 
  the community of Jaralosa and McEvers Ranch. These attacks led to an armed 
  posse of citizens, drawn from the large mining camp at Hillsboro, being 
  ambushed just outside McEvers Ranch. This drew the above US Army 
  detachments to that ranch and a fairly obvious trail was laid by the Apaches 
  along the Rio Las Animas into the Black Range. Here the cavalry detachments 
  were ambushed and the mauling they received forced them to withdraw to 
  Fort Bayard. In the space of 15 days, the Chihennes had neutralized the 
  immediate threats to their continued independence and they had clearly 
  thought up this perfectly executed plan in advance.
  Risk-analysis style of warfare was also demonstrated by the difference 
  between Chiricahua Apache “raiding” and “warfare.” For the Apaches, 
  “raiding” was not intended to provoke conflict but to appropriate property 
  from enemies, whereas the intention of “warfare” was to wreak vengeance 
  for losses inflicted by enemies. This distinction makes a lot of sense when one 
  appreciates the Chiricahua attitude towards risk. If the intent during a raid 
  was only to take property, then the chances of sustaining fatalities were 
  clearly reduced. However, this does not mean that warriors would not kill 
  unwary travellers or sentries in order to take property, nor that pursuing 
  This and the following three 
  photographs are dated 
  either 1886 or 1888 by the 
  Smithsonian. However, British 
  historian Allan Radbourne notes 
  that these photos date to 1884 
  and are photographs of 
  Chiricahua Apaches shortly 
  after  they arrived at San Carlos 
  having surrendered to General 
  Crook in the Sierra Madre 
  Mountains in Mexico. This 
  man is named Frijole and his 
  body language is interesting; 
  he is very relaxed with his 
  Springfield carbine across his 
  lap but his gaze into the camera 
  is very alert. He is listed as being 
  part of Nana’s following. 
  (Photo courtesy of National 
  Archaeological Archives, 
  Smithsonian)
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  15
  enemies might not catch up and kill or wound some Apaches, but the risk of 
  such losses would be considerably reduced if the raiders did not seek battle. 
  On the other hand, war was clearly associated with revenge. Long-time 
  American Indian and Mexican communities would quickly come to realize, 
  through trade contact with the Chiricahuas, that if they killed a raider they 
  could expect some form of fatal retribution. This knowledge in itself might 
  reduce Apache losses as their enemies might refrain from killing raiders even 
  if they recovered their property.
  The numbers involved in raiding were also small:
  As few as five or six would be in the party. About ten is the most that would 
  go. Usually, but not always, one who had power connected with war was 
  along… Each man took a robe or two along. Each took along a little food in a 
  bag tied to his belt. Often no food was taken along, and the men killed 
  something to eat on the way. Water was brought in a little bag made of entrails, 
  which was carried in the hand. One of the party would bring along a fire drill 
  which was carried in the quiver… If they were discovered by the owners of the 
  cattle, they would usually run away without fighting. (Opler, 1996, p.334.)
  The raid was not seen as an occasion for pomp or ceremony as, along with 
  hunting, it was an integral part of being an Apache providing for his family. 
  However, should war be contemplated then a war dance was proposed by 
  those who had suffered loss. If the leading men agreed that vengeance was 
  required then this would go ahead, and the numbers volunteering would not 
  be restricted as with raiding parties. The dance gave all those intending to 
  confront the enemy a chance to declare their intentions to their audience, and 
  the Apache believed that the dance would bring success and protect the 
  warriors in the coming fight.
  The use of an individual’s name also had clear significance as, if during 
  the dance, a man’s name was called upon to volunteer, it was very unusual 
  for him to decline as this would undermine not only his general social 
  standing but also his self-esteem.
  These three photographs are of 
  two Chiricahua warriors: José, 
  or Joe, and Petal (this no doubt 
  being an Anglicized phonetic 
  reproduction of the warrior’s 
  Apache name). José is listed 
  as a 28-year-old member of 
  Geronimo’s following. Both 
  men appear more tense and 
  suspicious than Frijole but 
  just as alert. Having recently 
  returned to San Carlos they 
  were probably still wary of 
  possible treachery on the 
  part of the US authorities. 
  (Photos courtesy of National 
  Archaeological Archives, 
  Smithsonian)
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  The number four had clear religious significance for the Chiricahua Apaches. 
  According to Opler’s account of the war dance there were a number of 
  variations, but his informants noted that four men might start the dance, or that 
  the dancing would last four days, or that in praying the warrior might blow 
  smoke to the four directions (east, south, west and north). As we shall see, these 
  cultural beliefs reinforce the Apache emphasis upon success in raiding and 
  warfare: “The men doing the dance did not shout. They just made a noise softly 
  under their breath like, ‘Wah! Wah!’ You can’t shout in a war dance or in war. 
  The belief that has been handed down is that, if you shout in battle, many of 
  you will be killed. Those along the sides shout though.” (Opler, 1996, p.337.)
  For the Chiricahua warrior, success in both raiding and battle depended 
  upon stealth. Thus, a young Apache would be surrounded by stories and 
  beliefs designed to produce an adult steeped in these values. Apache children, 
  seeing the audience making a lot of noise but the warriors dancing making 
  the minimum of noise, had the value of stealth reinforced.
  Once we understand how the roles of raiding and warfare were key to the 
  lives of the Chiricahuas, we can also see the source of their proficiency in 
  guerrilla warfare. Apache warriors were the products of a culture that lauded 
  formal operational thinking as it could be applied to hunting, gathering, 
  raiding and warfare. They fought specifically to their own strengths, waging 
  guerrilla warfare on their own terms and not allowing their opponents to set 
  the agenda. This could only be developed by training children through 
  adolescence to adulthood in a culture of survival, where promotion to 
  leadership roles was by merit. It also fostered the promotion of individuals 
  who could adapt to changes in their opponent’s practices and technology in 
  order to continue to survive.
  TRAINING
  James Kaywaykla, a young child in Victorio’s following, recounted how a 
  “creep and freeze” game twice saved his life when the Apaches were attacked 
  by Mexican soldiers. When Victorio was trapped and killed at Tres Castillos 
  during October 14/15, 1880, Kaywaykla was guided to safety by his mother, 
  Gouyen, during the hours of darkness. One of the techniques they used to 
  work their way through the Mexican lines was the “creep and freeze” 
  method. This is probably based upon the idea that a combination of careful 
  or minimal movement and patient waiting is an excellent means of avoiding 
  visual detection. Opler notes that to point with the hand was seen as impolite 
  and generally only done when angry.4 Therefore, Apaches generally pointed 
  with their noses or lips, rather than using the hands, to alert others to some 
  object or danger. However, this etiquette around pointing could have had a 
  particularly practical application during warfare, as to point with the nose 
  or lips requires a minimum of movement. Much of Chiricahua Apache 
  warfare techniques required concealment until the enemy was at the greatest 
  possible disadvantage, and the more movement one makes when trying to 
  remain hidden the more chance there is of being spotted prematurely.
  I have traveled widely in Apacheria and find the flora and fauna to be of 
  great interest. However, spotting a stationary mule deer in good cover is very 
  4 
  Opler, 1996, p.432.
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  difficult unless it moves. I have detected 
  a deer which remained absolutely still but 
  was vigorously flicking its ears to keep off 
  the flies. On scanning the terrain I was 
  attracted to the specific movement and 
  then spotted the rest of the animal. The 
  same principle would apply to experienced 
  Mexican and US troops and most 
  particularly to Apache scouts scanning 
  the  terrain for any sign of danger. If a 
  concealed Chiricahua spotted something 
  unexpected and needed to alert his 
  compatriots, the alarm needed to be raised 
  with the absolute minimum of movement 
  and noise.
  Obedience, trust, initiative and observation were key elements in the 
  training of Apache children for their future lives as adult hunters, gatherers 
  and raiders. Kaywaykla also recalled asking his grandmother how he could 
  earn an Apache name rather than the Spanish one he was given as a child:
  Not until a boy insulted me did I go to Grandmother for an explanation.
  “It is true that your name is Spanish, but you have no drop of white blood. 
  Your grandfather lived long among the Mexicans, but you need not be ashamed, 
  for you are pure Apache blood. When you are older you will have an Indian 
  name, but not until you have deserved it.”
  “How can I earn another name?”
  “First by obedience. An Apache obeys or dies. Not only his life but that of 
  the tribe may depend upon his obedience and his truthfulness. In all your life 
  nobody has ever struck you. Nobody will, unless you fail in the things that mean 
  safety to the group. Few Apaches ever strike a child, but for disobedience and 
  lying they must, in order to protect the lives of all.”
  Vaguely I comprehended these things.
  “Above all, you must be truthful. If you are you will be respected; and 
  without respect no human relationship is of any value. No liar is permitted to 
  give evidence in a trial, although he may have witnessed what occurred. No liar 
  is ever permitted to carry messages for fear that he may endanger the whole 
  tribe by not giving his message truthfully. The liar is despised by all.
  “And you must be useful and observant. You see how the older boys 
  compete for the honor of serving the warriors. They care for the horses, run the 
  errands, cook the food, and try to anticipate and supply the needs of him whom 
  they serve. They listen respectfully and ask no questions unless they are necessary 
  for obeying commands. They eat poor food, fast for long intervals, are faithful 
  in every way, and above all, do not discuss things they may overhear.”
  “When may I begin this training?”
  “You have already begun it. I’ve taught you these things since I took you 
  and released your mother to go on the warpath with your father. Continue to 
  practice these things faithfully if you wish to become a warrior. Just this morning 
  you showed plainly that you did not want to break the ice in the little stream 
  and bathe with the older boys.”
  I was ashamed. I had shrunk from that ordeal, although I had finally 
  endured it. (Ball, 1970, pp.28–29.)
  Tres Castillos (the three castles) 
  looking northwards along the 
  eastern side of these three 
  rocky hillocks. Victorio and his 
  followers were trapped on the 
  southernmost hill (off camera 
  to the rear of this photograph) 
  Gouyen and Kaywaykla worked 
  their way carefully out of the 
  encircling Mexican state 
  troops using the creep and 
  freeze technique during the 
  night. It is probable that they 
  worked their way through the 
  many scattered boulders from 
  left to right along the base of 
  this side of the Tres Castillos 
  until they reached the gap 
  between the central and 
  right hills. They passed over 
  the saddle between these two 
  hills (the notch in the middle 
  left of the photograph) and 
  eventually rendezvoused with 
  the survivors in the nearest 
  mountains to the west. 
  (Author’s photo)
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  18
  The above passage is very revealing in a 
  number of ways. The virtues of obedience, 
  trust, initiative and observation were all 
  emphasized to children from a very early age. 
  The penalties for failure – including social 
  exclusion – were also clearly outlined and 
  quietly, but firmly, reinforced by comment 
  from the surrounding adults. What is also very 
  clear is that women also took a leading role in 
  reinforcing this basic training. The mentioned 
  breaking ice in mountain streams was one of 
  the ways in which Chiricahua boys would be 
  toughened up for the hard life of a warrior. 
  Daklugie, son of Juh, recalled having to do this 
  in the Sierra Madre supervised by a stern 
  Geronimo who was unprepared to brook any 
  shirking. He also remembered that Geronimo 
  never had to resort to using the stick he carried 
  to enforce his orders.5 
  Other endurance training involved running 
  for long distances with a mouthful of water, the 
  purpose of which was to practise breathing 
  through the nose rather than the mouth. Many 
  other skills of survival and concealment would 
  be picked up during the routine of camp life. 
  The young Apaches would be shown how to 
  locate water and to select the least obvious 
  cover for concealment, as the thickest cover 
  would be the first place an enemy would search. 
  They would hear the arrangements made to 
  scatter and rendezvous at a specific point should 
  the camp be attacked. The children were taught to keep a small supply of 
  food in a pouch around their neck and to keep their blanket so that they 
  would to be able to survive on their own for short periods if, during such an 
  attack, they became temporarily separated from the adults as the Apaches 
  scattered. The Apaches routinely cached surplus supplies such as dried food, 
  textiles, utensils, guns and ammunition throughout their territory in order to 
  be able to quickly replace any losses should their camp be surprised and 
  supplies lost. Again, the children would have seen this happening and had the 
  reasons for these practices explained to them. Kaywaykla also recalled being 
  allowed, along with other boys, to very occasionally fire a rifle with the help 
  of his step-father Kaytennae: “If we got far enough from camp that there was 
  little danger of discovery,6 he permitted us to practice with his rifle. He knelt 
  behind me to hold the weapon, but let me sight and pull the trigger. Scarcity 
  of ammunition prevented much practice with firearms.” (Ball, 1970, p159.)
  5 
  See Debo, 1976, p.195.
  6 
  This particular practice occurred while on the San Carlos reservation, so the intention was 
  to minimize the possibility of discovery by reservation employees supervising the Chiricahua 
  Apaches. Nevertheless, such practice, on or off reservation, was fraught with the danger of 
  discovery and it would be routine for target practice, on the rare occasions that there was 
  sufficient ammunition, to be carried out away from camp.
  This picture shows how the 
  terrain almost swallows the 
  Apache youth hunting for 
  squirrels with his bow and 
  arrow. It shows how Apaches 
  could conceal themselves at 
  close range to an enemy. The 
  hunting of squirrels would 
  develop stealth, as these 
  creatures are very shy. Their 
  speed and agility would make 
  them good target practice for 
  an aspiring Apache warrior. 
  As squirrels are also preyed 
  upon by rattlesnakes, hunting 
  squirrels would also provide 
  good practice at spotting 
  and avoiding snakes. 
  (Photo courtesy of 
  National Archaeological 
  Archives, Smithsonian)
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  In other words, the Apache equivalent of basic training was embedded in 
  the everyday upbringing of the children.
  Finally, through Kaywaykla’s grandmother, we get an insight into how 
  a growing Apache boy would try to gain the attention of the warriors. If he 
  could develop a reputation for reliability among his seniors an adolescent boy 
  would volunteer for, and be accepted as, an apprentice warrior and so 
  accompany the warriors on a raid. If the youth was seen to have passed his 
  apprenticeship he would be regarded as a fully fledged warrior. To achieve this 
  status the apprentice had to take part in four raids. From a European point of 
  view successful transition to warrior status could be seen as the “coming 
  of age” of a Chiricahua Apache youth. The word used by the Chiricahua 
  Apaches was dikohe, which Opler and Hoijer translate as “novice on the raid 
  or war-path.” (Opler & Hoijer, 1940, p.618.) In practice, the experience of the 
  dikohe was wider than accompanying warriors on four raids:
  My father did his best to bring me out just as he was brought out when he was 
  a young boy. He trained me as he was trained, gave me all the ceremonial 
  training he had been through once himself. When I was ten or twelve years old 
  he began to teach me and was very strict with me. He would say to me, “You 
  must have your arrows and bow where you can grab them. You must have 
  your knife right beside you. You must have your moccasins right beside you. 
  Be on the alert in peace or in war. Don’t spend all your time sleeping. Get up 
  when the morning star comes out. Watch for the morning star. Don’t let it get 
  up before you do.” (Opler & Hoijer, 1940, p.618.)
  Opler and Hoijer confirm that the general toughening up of aspiring Apache 
  warriors commenced around puberty and ended when they had completed 
  their fourth raid. However, Kaywaykla’s account above shows that before 
  this period younger boys would be actively encouraged to take part in this 
  toughening process. The other point made by Opler and Hoijer was that the 
  dikohe training was not standardized within the Chiricahua Apaches and 
  that many variations could occur between individual families. This training 
  would, however, usually be mediated by an outsider respected by the family.7  
  The critical aspect of becoming a dikohe was that this was a period during 
  which disobedience of one’s elders would not be tolerated. All manner of 
  physical tests were routinely sprung on the dikohe and he would be expected 
  to complete them without question. The dikohe would not dare to refuse, 
  as this would be noted, and his chances of being ultimately selected to go on 
  a raid would be dashed, as the acceptance of an aspiring apprentice warrior 
  was by no means guaranteed. If the warriors judged the applicant to be less 
  than reliable in the key traits of obedience, trustworthiness, etc. then he 
  would not be accepted as an apprentice. It is not quite clear what happened 
  if a youth failed to be accepted; the likelihood is that while he would probably 
  be tolerated there would be little chance of social advance. There are a 
  number of accounts of what are termed “bronco Apaches” and pre-1886 
  these appear to refer to adult males who had seriously transgressed the rules. 
  7 
  In fact, Opler and Hoijer provide an excellent guide to the training of a Chiricahua Apache 
  apprentice warrior and while I shall try to do their work justice over the space of a couple of 
  pages there is no substitute for reading the original article. See the further reading section at 
  the end of this book.
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  However, one could see how failure to measure up during the dikohe training 
  might produce the occasional bronco Apache.
  If accepted, there was quite a clear set of rituals designed to test the 
  applicant’s resolve and suitability for warrior status. In the first place, his 
  family would try to discourge him by outlining the dangers with which he 
  would be confronted on a raid. If this did not shake the youth’s resolve, then 
  a shaman would outline the apprentice’s spiritual responsibilities and instruct 
  him on the use of certain equipment unique to the apprentice warrior. 
  The shaman would also clearly warn the apprentice of the dire consequences, 
  both to the apprentice and to the other members of the raiding party, of being 
  found wanting on the four raiding trips. Any failings would potentially mark 
  the aspiring warrior as being unreliable, untrustworthy or even dangerous to 
  his fellow Apaches. The young Apache was continually exposed to tales and 
  myths designed to reinforce the virtues of obedience, trust, forbearance, 
  respect for one’s elders, initiative and observation. Such morality tales were 
  a key ingredient of a culture that intended to produce tough and disciplined 
  guerrilla warfare experts.
  In keeping with this, the apprentice had to follow a series of ritual 
  practices and beliefs while accompanying the warriors on the four raids. 
  First and foremost, it was made clear to the dikohe that he was not expected 
  to take part in the raid. He was there to serve the warriors and to act as an 
  observer. Thus, the menial work of the camp was his domain and he had to 
  be prepared to be at the beck and call of any of the warriors. Even if good 
  food was available, he was expected to abstain from eating the best cuts of 
  20
  TRAINING – FINAL MOONRISE PREPARATIONS FOR A RAID
  In this training scene an Apache dikohe (1), can be seen wearing breechclout, belt with knife, 
  cotton shirt and trousers, headband and boots. He is carrying a bow and his quiver is slung in 
  the “march” position. He is holding the reins of five horses belonging to the raiding party (2). The 
  leader of the raiding party (3) is dressed in breechclout, boots and headband with his quiver and 
  bow swung in the “active” position. He holds a Sharps carbine in the crook of his arm and carries a 
  cartridge belt. He is giving the apprentice warrior final instructions as to where to make for if the 
  raid went according to plan. Another warrior (4) keeps an eye upon the distant intended target, 
  a Mexican hacienda complex (8), which was most probably chosen because of the fiesta under 
  way – if the Apaches knew of such an event they might choose to steal some horses, hoping 
  that the guard would be somewhat lax. The warrior is peering between two rocks so as not to 
  silhouette himself against the skyline. He is also watching a signal fire (7) on the mountain range 
  many miles away. The signal fire would have been lit, in a prearranged location, by a scout sent 
  on ahead with instructions to survey the target. One lit fire would indicate that the raiding party 
  should execute their raid, whereas two lit fires would be used to warn them off.
  One of the warriors (5), armed with a lance, flop-headed war club and slung bow and quiver, 
  sets out towards the target. The final warrior of the party (6) has swung round and is waiting for 
  (5) to join him. He is armed with an Enfield musket and slung bow and quiver. He is below any 
  line of sight from the hacienda as there is a thick wood of pines and mountain oaks just below 
  his position. The raiding party are going to use this cover to approach as closely to the hacienda 
  as possible. He is dressed in a poncho and Mexican sombrero. Apaches were known to try to pass 
  themselves off as Mexicans in order to evade or, in this case, get as close to any sentry as possible 
  without raising suspicion.
  An obvious landmark, in this case a standing rock (9), would have been chosen as a rendezvous 
  point if the raid was successful. If the raid should go wrong, the warriors would rendezvous at 
  another, far more distant, site. It should be noted that while it would be unusual for Apaches to 
  fight at night, it was not so unusual for them to use night to close in on a target for a raid. The 
  aim of this raid would not have been to fight a full skirmish but to spirit away horses, with the 
  odd sentry being knocked out or killed in the process.
  B
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  7
  8
  6
  4
  5
  3
  1
  9
  2
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  food and to eat the food cold and in moderation. This was accompanied by 
  the statement that to disobey these strictures would destroy any power he 
  had over horses. These practices were a means by which the apprentice would 
  become acclimatized to the worst privations a raiding party might have to 
  deal with if things went wrong. This was backed up with tales of dire moral 
  consequences should the dikohe fail to adhere to these practices.
  Other examples of ritual practices included the use of the drinking tube 
  and the scratching stick and often the wearing of a buckskin hat by the 
  apprentice warrior. The scratching stick and drinking tube were carried on 
  the belt and again their use was accompanied by the direst warnings 
  concerning the failure to use them. If the dikohe allowed water to touch his 
  lips then he would grow facial hair, which the Chiricahuas considered 
  extremely ugly. If he scratched his head without using his stick then his skin 
  would lose its toughness. Once more, the purpose behind these rules was to 
  test the basic discipline and concentration of the apprentice warrior.
  The buckskin cap worn by the apprentice warrior was made by a man 
  known to have “power” to ensure the safety of the dikohe through the 
  making of such hats. One of Opler and Hoijer’s informants told them that:
  The hat was yellow with a black zig-zag design on it representative of the 
  lightning. For his second expedition a blue design was substituted. The third 
  time a white figure was put on, and on the fourth trip the hat was decorated 
  with a yellow lightning symbol. The black, blue, white and yellow of the 
  design stood for the east, south, west and north respectively … which 
  constitutes the Apache ceremonial circuit. (Opler & Hoijer, 1940, p.622.)
  While the apprentice was being tested, some elements of the rituals and beliefs 
  surrounding his raiding experience were intended to promote his safety. 
  The dangers facing the apprentice were very real, the clearest being when a raid 
  went wrong and the raiders had to fight. Every attempt would be made to keep 
  the dikohe out of harm’s way, but apprentice warriors were sometimes killed 
  during their novitiate. The loss of an aspiring warrior would usually, depending 
  upon the specific circumstances, reflect badly upon the accompanying warriors, 
  particularly the leader of the raid. Thus, while an apprentice might be treated 
  as a camp servant during a raid, the warriors had a clear responsibility to take 
  every step to ensure the survival of their dikohe. If it were judged that an 
  apprentice warrior had been lost unnecessarily, then the leader of the raiding 
  party stood to lose his position of respect and lose most or all of his following. 
  Therefore, deciding to take an apprentice was a risky venture for a raiding 
  party and explains why the adults, such as Kaywaykla’s grandmother, would 
  keep a close day-to-day eye upon the attitude and behavior of children and 
  adolescents. Any doubts as to the reliability of a potential warrior would 
  almost certainly destroy any chance of them being selected as a dikohe. If, once 
  selected, an apprentice did not measure up, then he would not be taken on any 
  further raids and his social standing would be destroyed.
  The most important skill that an apprentice had to learn was a special 
  vocabulary that would be used by the dikohe during the raid. For example, 
  one of Opler and Hoijer’s informants stated that “Instead of saying ‘I want 
  to drink some water,’ we had to say, ‘I begin to swim the specular iron ore.’” 
  (Opler & Hoijer, 1940, p.623) and “A mule, for instance, is called a ‘tail 
  dragger.’” (Opler in Eggan, 1955, p.232.)
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  Opler and Hoijer noted that it was not clear if both the dikohe and the 
  warriors used this language, and concluded on the balance of probability 
  that it was only the apprentice who utilized it. This would make sense, as it 
  appears that the purpose of the exercise was to see how much complex 
  information a dikohe could assimilate and remember in a relatively short 
  space of time. If he were successful in remembering and correctly using this 
  language over the space of four raids, then he could be trusted to remember 
  complex instruction and planning as a fully-fledged warrior embarking upon 
  a raid or going out to make war upon his enemies.
  If the dikohe completed the four raids to the satisfaction of the warriors, 
  he was accepted as an adult warrior. As such, he would be free to marry and 
  smoke, but from the point of view of his new warrior peer group he was no 
  longer to be protected but was expected to engage fully in any raid or war in 
  which he volunteered his participation.
  A final comment made by one of Opler and Hoijer’s informants is 
  revealing and demonstrates that before the dikohe actually ventured on their 
  first raid they were already very well prepared: “In fact, many a young boy 
  at fourteen was as well trained and dangerous as a soldier.” (Opler & Hoijer, 
  1940, p.618.) In other words, the key period for producing the Chiricahua 
  Apache warrior was from mid to late childhood into adolescence. It involved 
  an intensive training program accompanied by the teaching of a series of 
  cultural beliefs and practices that underlined the rationale behind that 
  training regime.
  LEADERSHIP
  The first point that can be made about leadership within the Chiricahua 
  Apaches stems from the strict training of the dikohe. At first glance, the strict 
  obedience enforced upon the apprentice warriors by this training program 
  would appear to act against the development of the sophisticated and flexible 
  guerrilla warfare techniques alluded to earlier.
  However, one has to realize that each adult Chiricahua warrior was a 
  leader in his own right. The minimum family group could consist of one fully 
  trained warrior, his immediate female kin and male and female offspring. 
  As such, even if this individual did not aspire to lead other Chiricahua 
  warriors on a raid or in battle he was still responsible for his own survival 
  and that of his immediate family group. Thus, on a daily basis the individual 
  warrior had to be an alert, adaptable individual.
  Nevertheless, the immediate family groups provided the building blocks 
  for individuals such as Cochise, Mangas Coloradas, Victorio, Juh, Nana, 
  Chihuahua, Jolsanny (also known as Ulzana) and Kaytennae to rise to the 
  position of leading relatively large numbers of Chiricahua Apache warriors.
  The basic condition of leadership was success in raiding and warfare. 
  Those leaders able to maintain this success could still be seen leading their 
  warriors to a great age. Nana was believed to be approximately 75 years old 
  when he led his raid into New Mexico in 1881. Jolsanny was believed to be 
  in his late sixties when he directed his raid in November and December 1885. 
  The only reason that these leaders were still in power was because they had 
  been able to maintain their reputation for success. This success was usually 
  judged on the basis of whether the minimum loss (ideally no losses) had been 
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  24
  sustained for the maximum damage inflicted 
  upon the enemy. However, this was not quite as 
  straightforward as it might first appear. A raid 
  designed to capture 20 horses from a particular 
  hacienda might be judged a failure if a single 
  warrior was perceived to have been lost 
  unnecessarily. If one remembers that the basic 
  social unit of the Chiricahua Apache was the 
  immediate family unit, the unnecessary loss of 
  a  warrior could have an immediate impact 
  upon that group’s economic well-being. Thus, 
  on November 13, 1882, when the Chiricahua 
  Apaches trapped and killed Mexican commander 
  Juan Mata Ortiz and 21 other Mexican soldiers, 
  they did not hold a victory celebration as the 
  loss of two warriors to gain such a victory was 
  seen as too costly.
  A younger warrior could quickly garner the 
  support of the warriors from closely related 
  family groups by building up a reputation for 
  success in raiding and warfare. If he maintained 
  this success he could even rise to prominence in 
  one of the sub-divisions of the Chiricahua 
  (Chokonen, Chihenne, Nehdni or Bedonkohe) 
  or beyond. This perceived success had to be 
  maintained and could suddenly be lost, though 
  there was no hard and fast rule as to what 
  would lose a leader support. Juh, often seen as 
  the leading man of the Nehdni from the 1860s through to 1883, seems to 
  have lost his position as a result of a surprise attack upon his camp by 
  Mexican troops during which his wife was killed. In following the attackers 
  he lost four warriors who were killed in the subsequent skirmish. Victorio 
  suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of Apache scouts in May 1880 but did 
  not lose his position of authority. In both incidents it was the perception of 
  the leader’s followers that led to him either losing or retaining support. Juh 
  was clearly judged to have been at fault whereas Victorio seems to have been 
  exonerated of any blame by the majority of his followers.
  Leadership was not hereditary, though Sweeney argues that the offspring 
  of a successful leader might find themselves better placed for future leadership 
  simply by dint of the training received from their father. If a new leader was 
  required he would usually be elected from among the warriors. Being the son 
  of a previous leader might give a candidate an advantage but this would soon 
  be lost if the successful candidate failed to develop a reputation for minimizing 
  losses and maximizing gains. Being elected leader did not necessarily grant 
  wide-ranging power. Opler stated that successful leadership was “a process 
  in which birth and wealth have their place, but in which ability and personal 
  magnetism are always the leavening factor.” (Opler, 1996, p.470.) The role 
  of leader in Apache society would be achieved through a warrior’s record as 
  a raider and warrior. However, this role also involved being an effective 
  mediator between the various family groups who accepted his leadership; 
  a leader would be expected to speak publicly on important matters but the 
  Chato, a famous, though 
  controversial, Chiricahua 
  warrior who was at first hostile 
  but then signed up as a scout 
  for the US Army. The interesting 
  feature of this photograph is 
  that, at first glance, he is 
  holding a Springfield carbine. 
  However, the barrel is much 
  longer than carbine barrels in 
  earlier photographs. This rifle 
  may be a Springfield rifle with 
  the wood cut back or a carbine 
  with a replacement barrel. 
  (Photo courtesy of National 
  Archaeological Archives, 
  Smithsonian)
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  25
  rest of his following was under no duty to follow his advice. Nevertheless, 
  a leader’s word was likely to carry more weight with his audience than that 
  of any other individual. Thus, if individuals in his following came into conflict 
  it would often be the leader who would try to step in to avoid bloodshed, 
  or at the very least to minimize the bloodshed. If such conflict happened in a 
  large group of Apaches the overall leader could often count on the backing 
  of the leaders of smaller family units who had chosen to follow him.
  However, Apache leaders whose positions were seriously challenged were 
  by no means helpless; if they had retained a high level of support within their 
  following, leadership challenges could quickly become lethal. Victorio shot 
  dead a leading allied Mescalero Apache leader called Ca-bal-le‐so, preventing 
  those Mescalero Apaches allied to his cause leaving him. The result of this 
  incident was that less than a month later these Mescalero Apaches sustained 
  about half the casualties when Victorio was trapped and killed at Tres 
  Castillos. In 1876, the sons of Cochise, Taza and Naiche were faced by a 
  leadership challenge from Eskinya and Pionsenay. They gunned down and 
  killed Eskinya and seriously wounded Pionsenay in a murderous exchange at 
  point-blank range.
  A key element of Chiricahua Apache leadership was also the perception 
  that the leader was endowed with some form of power. The clearest picture 
  left by Apache informants concerns two Chihenne: Nana and Lozen, Victorio’s 
  sister. However, there is some information given about others such as Juh, 
  Chihuahua and Geronimo himself. Before these examples are examined in 
  detail it should be noted that this concept is, for a contemporary audience 
  whose education is heavily influenced by notions of scientific rationalism, 
  quite difficult to pin down. Ball, Sanchez and Henn point out that: “Power is 
  a mysterious, intangible attribute difficult to explain, even by one possessing 
  it. It was, even above his courage, the most valuable attribute of a chief.” 
  Their informants also pointed out that the Chiricahua Apaches believed 
  that an individual could use their power for good or ill. Witchcraft, to the 
  Chiricahua Apaches, was the conscious misuse of power to do another 
  person harm.
  Both Juh and Geronimo were believed to have the power to tell the future. 
  Jason Betzinez, one of Geronimo’s apprentice warriors in 1882–83, recorded 
  a number of such instances. On one occasion Geronimo correctly predicted 
  the arrival of some Mexican troops who duly appeared the following day, as 
  and when predicted. The most interesting incident recorded by Betzinez was 
  when Geronimo, in camp far away from their base camp in the Sierra Madre, 
  suddenly sat up and announced that US troops had taken their camp. As it 
  turned out, General Crook’s 1883 expedition into the Sierra Madre 
  Mountains had surprised the Chiricahua Apaches who had taken refuge in 
  these rugged Mexican mountains. In later life, Betzinez made every effort to 
  assimilate into US society and consciously rejected the beliefs of his 
  upbringing, a stance which did not endear him to some other Chiricahua 
  Apaches. However, he noted that, many years after this event, he simply 
  could not explain how Geronimo knew their camp had been taken.
  Chihuahua was believed to have power over horses to the extent that 
  he  could calm the wildest of horses. Nana was said to have power 
  over rattlesnakes and ammunition. In the latter case, this power translated 
  into the belief that if Nana was present on a raid designed to garner 
  fresh  ammunition then a supply of fresh cartridges would be found. 
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  26
  Finally Lozen, Victorio’s sister, was 
  believed to have the power to 
  locate enemies who were too close 
  for comfort. She would slowly 
  revolve with arms spread wide 
  with her palms upward. If there 
  were enemies close by: “As she 
  turned slowly, following the sun, 
  her hands tingled and the palms 
  changed color when they pointed 
  toward the foe. The intensity of the 
  sensation indicated the approximate 
  distance of the enemy. The closer 
  the adversary, the more vivid the 
  feeling.” (Ball, 1970, p.11.)
  James Kaywaykla remembered 
  seeing Lozen doing this many 
  times and firmly believed that 
  had  she been with Victorio he 
  would never have been caught at 
  Tres Castillos. No matter what a 
  non-Chiricahua Apache audience might make of these beliefs, the concept of 
  a leader’s “power” was clearly a key element of their leadership’s success. 
  The  fact that Nana, Chihuahua, Lozen and Geronimo maintained their 
  reputations until the end of the Apache Wars means that nothing happened 
  to shake their followers’ beliefs in the efficacy of their power. If that had 
  happened, these individuals would have lost their leadership role and have 
  escaped the attention of history. As noted earlier, Juh appears to have been 
  perceived to have lost his power. However, one of Ball’s main informants 
  was Juh’s last surviving son, Daklugie, so Juh’s reputation has been preserved 
  for history.
  A final comment upon the influence of an important leader is that if he 
  was killed then revenging his death was not just a matter for his immediate 
  family, but his entire following, and all were expected to exact vengeance.
  APPEARANCE
  We are, at first glance, fortunate to have some excellent photographic studies 
  of Apache warriors taken in the 1870s and 1880s. The most famous of these 
  would be the series of images recorded by C. S. Fly during General George 
  Crook’s negotiations with Chiricahua Apaches led by Geronimo and Naiche 
  at Cañon de los Embudos in March 1886. However, it is clear from Apache 
  testimony that, if warriors knew that they were going to go into battle, they 
  would usually strip down to the minimum of clothing and equipment. As a 
  witness to the battle between the Chiricahua Apaches and the 4th Cavalry in 
  Horseshoe Canyon in April 1882, Betzinez noted that prior to fighting the 
  warriors all removed their shirts. Thus a Chiricahua Apache warrior would 
  tend to fight wearing boots, breechclout and headband plus whatever 
  equipment, such as belts or quivers, he happened to need for fighting. The 
  removal of surplus clothing would suggest that the Apaches were aware of 
  These two photographs of the 
  same Apache warrior show 
  the increasing influence of 
  European/Mexican dress 
  upon the Apaches. Despite 
  this influence, the long hair, 
  breechclout, headband and 
  boots are retained even after 
  the addition of a fine waistcoat. 
  The photos also show a flop-
  headed war club and a bow, 
  giving a good idea of the 
  relative proportions of these 
  weapons. The warrior would 
  also have added a couple of 
  cartridge belts, at least one 
  knife and possibly a revolver. 
  (Photos courtesy of National 
  Archaeological Archives, 
  Smithsonian)
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  27
  the dangers of infection caused by cloth fragments 
  lodged in bullet wounds. Therefore, in many of the 
  photographs taken of Chiricahua Apaches they are 
  probably wearing the Apache equivalent of their 
  “Sunday best” and the resulting photographs do not 
  necessarily reflect exactly what they would look like 
  in battle.
  This is not to say that these photographs have no 
  value. For example the famous shot of Geronimo and 
  Naiche, mounted on horses and flanked by two warriors 
  on foot, one of whom is holding an infant balanced upon his left 
  hip, shows some very interesting detail. The warrior on foot to the right is 
  wearing a jacket and what appears to be a “fireman’s shirt.” In battle he would 
  probably have taken off both but would have retained the two cartridge belts, 
  breechclout, boots, necklace and headband. The ammunition clearly visible in 
  one of the belts suggests that he would be armed with a Springfield 45/70 rifle 
  or 45/55 carbine. The empty ammunition belt looks designed to hold revolver 
  ammunition and suggests that he was also armed with a revolver. The other 
  dismounted warrior would have retained the same clothing and equipment as 
  the first, having gotten rid of the waistcoat and, if time allowed, the cotton 
  leggings. He too has two cartridge belts and both appear to be filled with 
  Springfield carbine/rifle ammunition. The edge of what might be a flap holster 
  appears to be hanging from his left side. A good knife would be carried at all 
  times, though none are visible in this particular photo.
  The boots worn by the Apaches were more than just protection against 
  the many thorns and spines encountered in the flora of Apacheria; they could 
  also hold small objects such as awls and thread (natural or woven) for 
  repairing the boots. The drinking straw and scratching stick mentioned 
  earlier as part of the equipment of an apprentice warrior were said to have 
  been strung together and attached to the dikohe’s belt.
  The basic dress of high boots, breechclout and headband and the carrying 
  of a knife remained unchanged from 1860 to 1886, though there was also 
  an increase in the wearing of European hats as an alternative to the headband 
  over the period.
  EQUIPMENT
  The period 1860–86 shows an interesting pattern of both continuity and 
  change amongst the equipment carried by the Chiricahua Apache warrior. 
  In the early 1860s the bow and arrow, lance, flop-headed war club, musket, 
  occasional Sharps carbine and the very occasional Spencer or Henry repeating 
  rifle could be seen. This sort of equipment meant that the Chiricahua Apaches 
  relied upon more immediate hit and run tactics unless they had their enemies 
  at the most extreme disadvantage.
  The Chiricahua Apache bow was between three and four feet long and 
  the preferred source was wood from the mulberry tree. Smaller bows for 
  hunting birds and rodents were also made, but usually given to boys to help 
  them develop their shooting skills in preparation for using the full-sized bow. 
  There were two types of arrow: “those of carrizo or reed into which a 
  hardwood foreshaft is fitted and those with the entire shaft of hardwood.” 
  ments 
  f the 
  ey are 
  their
  do not 
  k like 
  ve no 
  o and 
  warrior
  ced upon his left 
  i
  f
  t t
  th
  i ht i
  rs 
  hi l f
  Examples of different Apache 
  arrowheads. The different 
  means by which individual 
  fletchers would attach the 
  arrowheads to the shafts 
  of the arrows can be seen. 
  (Author’s photo – courtesy 
  of access given by the AHS)
  An arrowhead made from a 
  barrel hoop. Part of the hole 
  by which the hoop would have 
  been pinned to the barrel can 
  still be seen. (Photo by Eric 
  Fuller – courtesy of access given 
  by the Romero Collection)
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  28
  (Opler, 1996, p.388.) The carrizo or reed arrows were slightly longer 
  (approximately 30 inches long) than arrows made wholly from hardwood. 
  Opler also noted that warriors would usually carry between 30 and 40 arrows 
  and keep a fresh supply in camp. The size and shape of arrowheads seem to 
  vary, but all were attached to the shaft by splitting the shaft and holding the 
  arrowhead in place with tightly wrapped sinew.
  Opler also noted that the bow and arrows would be decorated as follows:
  The outer surface [of the bow] is usually painted a solid color; on the inner 
  surface the maker puts a design by which his handiwork is known – a star, a 
  cross, serrated lines, parallel lines or a naturalistic figure. This may refer to his 
  supernatural power or may be simply a decoration or an identification mark… 
  the shaft [of the arrow]… is decorated with bands of black, blue or red paint. 
  On the upper portion of the shaft, at about the middle of the area which will 
  be covered by the feathers, a narrow band of green or red is often traced. 
  (Opler, 1996, pp.387–388.)
  By the 1860s the Chiricahuas rarely used stone arrow heads.
  Chiricahua Apache lances would be made either from the Sotol plant or 
  spruce. The shaft would be cleaned and left out to dry. By the 1860s the 
  blades of knives or broken-off sabre blades would be used for the head of 
  the lance. The length of the shaft would be between five and seven feet. 
  According to Opler, the lance was not thrown but used as a two-handed 
  weapon on foot.
  At the beginning of the 1860s, the Chiricahua Apaches would also carry 
  what is known as a flop-headed war club. A round stone would be wrapped 
  in flexible rawhide and attached to a shaft of wood. The wooden handle 
  would often be decorated with buckskin and horsehair, or a cow’s tail could 
  be attached to the base of the shaft. In hand-to-hand combat a skilled warrior 
  could make full use of the slingshot effect of the flexible attachment of the 
  head of the club by stopping a downward blow just short of the target’s head.
  As breech-loading and repeating arms, accompanied by metallic 
  cartridges, came into more common usage, the Chiricahua Apaches developed 
  far more aggressive tactics. They would be more likely to hold a good 
  defensive position against well-armed opponents; maintain their positions 
  during a successful ambush; and even launch flowing counterattacks, 
  infiltrating towards and around their foes using the terrain and the ease with 
  which their weapons could be reloaded to “psyche-out” their opponents. 
  However, for these tactics to work they needed to have a good supply of 
  ammunition. By the 1870s and 1880s the Chiricahua Apaches, by rapidly 
  ABOVE LEFT
  Two Apache arrowheads found 
  in the vicinity of Massacre Gap 
  (also known as Massacre Peak), 
  New Mexico, where Apache 
  warriors wiped out a Mexican 
  carreta train in October 1879. If 
  the tip of the arrowhead to the 
  right is carefully examined, one 
  can see that it is slightly bent 
  backwards. Thus, if the arrow hit 
  or glanced off bone the tip 
  would tend to bend or even 
  break off making it even harder 
  to withdraw from the wound. 
  (Karl Laumbach)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  The same two arrowheads 
  compared with an Apache 
  arrowhead found in Hembrillo 
  Canyon, San Andres Mountains, 
  New Mexico, where the US army 
  fought the Apaches in April 1880. 
  The Hembrillo arrowhead shows 
  an even more prominent bent 
  back point which would have 
  been very difficult to withdraw 
  without causing further damage. 
  (Karl Laumbach – inclusion of 
  Hembrillo arrowhead courtesy of 
  White Sands Missile Range)
  BELOW
  The manufacture of arrowheads 
  was accomplished by chiselling 
  the point into a rough point and 
  then it was filed down to its final 
  shape. This process did not 
  always reach fruition and the one 
  below is an example of an 
  unfinished point where the 
  warrior decided that his initial 
  shaping of the arrowhead had 
  failed and discarded to be found 
  by archaeologists over a century 
  later. (Photo by John Fitch 
  courtesy of Karl Laumbach and 
  the Cañada Alamosa Project)
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  29
  adopting the modern weaponry developed by the USA, transformed 
  themselves into far more dangerous opponents than ever before.
  The Chiricahua Apache warriors of 1860 were fearsome adversaries, 
  if allowed to dictate the conditions of the conflict. However, with the advent 
  of new weapons technology they were able to widen the range of options 
  through which they could attempt to determine such conditions. By 1882, 
  Betzinez recorded that: “The older warriors were using single-shot Springfields 
  of the Civil War pattern while the younger ones were armed with repeating 
  rifles – Winchesters and Marlins. In addition many of the men had pistols and 
  other miscellaneous firearms which had been taken in raids on the settlements 
  or attacks on travelers [sic] on the lonely roads in Arizona and New Mexico.” 
  (Betzinez, 1959, p.77.)
  This pattern in the distribution of modern rifles types also reveals something 
  suggested by the archeological record of battles between the US Army and 
  Apaches in 1880. It would appear that the Apaches, through their appreciation 
  of the relative pros and cons of single-shot carbines/rifles and repeating rifles/
  carbines, deployed these weapons in order to maximize their advantages and 
  minimize their drawbacks. At Hembrillo Canyon it was discovered that the 
  Apaches had tended to deploy their single-shot Springfields and a few 
  Remingtons to take advantage 
  of  their longer effective ranges. 
  Warriors using these weapons 
  were stationed on ridges further 
  away from their enemies, whilst 
  warriors armed with repeating 
  rifles were used to picket the water 
  source nearest their foes, thus 
  allowing a high rate of fire to be 
  brought down on anyone trying to 
  reach the water. The warriors who 
  launched probing infiltration 
  attacks also tended to be armed 
  with repeating rifles. If the Apaches 
  had enough ammunition, then 
  with the use of rapid fire and 
  movement through difficult terrain 
  the rifles were used to give the 
  impression that there were more 
  warriors present than actually 
  were. It should also be noted that 
  ABOVE LEFT
  The above metal fragments are 
  examples of arrowhead 
  manufacture recently 
  discovered by archaeologists in 
  New Mexico. These are the 
  offcuts from the production of 
  arrowheads left in camp. (Photo 
  by John Fitch courtesy of Karl 
  Laumbach and the Cañada 
  Alamosa Project)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  The range in size and shape of 
  arrowheads can be seen in this 
  photograph. (Author’s photo – 
  courtesy of access given by the 
  Parrish Collection)
  BOTTOM LEFT
  Lance belonging to the Western 
  Apache leader Alchise. Here, 
  virtually the entire blade of a 
  sword has been used. The lance 
  is held in the archives of the 
  Arizona Historical Society 
  (AHS), Tucson, Arizona. 
  (Author’s photo – courtesy of 
  access given by the AHS)
  BOTTOM RIGHT
  A sotol plant in Magdalena Gap 
  on the Butterfield Trail. The 
  stalk of this plant would be 
  used to make lances. (Author’s 
  photo)
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  30
  such deployments of types of rifle are a further illustration of the operational 
  thinking that governed the actions of the Chiricahua.
  It should also be noted that Betzinez’s information also suggests that the 
  deployment of such weapons was also age-related, with the older and 
  relatively less active warriors taking the longer-range weapons while the 
  younger, more active warriors were armed with repeating rifles. Obviously, 
  Chiricahua warriors did not always have the luxury of making these 
  deployments for, as we shall see, one of their main problems was finding 
  a  reliable source of rifles and ammunition. Therefore, depending upon 
  availability, young Apaches would happily use single-shot weapons while 
  older Chiricahuas would carry repeating rifles. One should remember that 
  compared with a muzzle-loading musket, single-shot weapons would still 
  allow a far higher rate of fire while on the move if a 16-shot repeating rifle 
  was not available.
  Conversely, while lances and bows and arrows would be common 
  weapons in the early 1860s, Betzinez reported that they were rarely used by 
  1882. However, archeology confirms the use of the bow by the Chiricahua 
  and Mescalero Apaches who attacked Lt. John Conline’s Company A, 
  9th Cavalry, on April 5, 1880. In this case, some Apaches had managed to 
  infiltrate round his right flank and used bows and arrows to target the horses 
  and their guards in an attempt to stampede the company’s horses.8 
  As they became available, the Apaches also developed a liking for field 
  glasses. Kaywaykla remembers Victorio using field glasses and Nana was also 
  recorded as carrying a beautiful modern telescope on his famous raid in 
  1881. The Arizona Historical Society has two fine specimens of field glasses, 
  one carried by General Crook and the other by Geronimo.
  8 
  The author has seen on this site a marker where an arrowhead was found approximately three 
  feet away from one of the horse guard’s spent cartridges.
  Replica of a flop-headed war 
  club. (Author’s photo – courtesy 
  of access given by Dan Aranda)
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  31
  The Apaches would also use captured materials to replace natural 
  materials. A Texas Ranger report of a skirmish with Mescalero Apaches in 
  Mexico discovered a bag, made out of a shirt sleeve tied off at one end, on 
  the body of a slain Apache. It was filled with approximately 250 rounds of 
  ammunition for a Winchester repeating rifle. There are examples of a small 
  metal file being cut down and fashioned into an awl and small scissors being 
  broken apart to create awls – the awl was an essential item for moccasin 
  repair. Furthermore, there are examples of cartridge cases being fashioned 
  into tweezers and one fascinating example of a cartridge case being fashioned 
  into a powder measure to refill spent cartridges. The Chiricahuas would also 
  use metal barrel hoops to make arrowheads.
  ON CAMPAIGN 1860–86
  The distinction between raiding and warfare is crucial to understanding the 
  changing nature of warfare for the Chiricahua Apaches between 1860 and 
  1886. The key factor at play was the increasing development of the Southwest 
  of the USA by Anglo-American ranchers, miners and settlers. By 1870 the 
  ongoing warfare with the Chiricahua Apaches resulted in the US Army 
  beginning to pay more attention to the “Apache problem.” It also prompted 
  the Department of the Interior to make overtures of peace to the various 
  groups of hostile Western and Chiricahua Apaches, with the aim of settling 
  the Apaches upon reservations. The key issue for the Chiricahua Apaches, 
  straddling the Mexico-US border, was that pre-1860, if in conflict with the 
  Chihuahuan and/or Sonoran authorities, the Apaches could move northwards 
  and be relatively safe from retaliation from Mexico. With the increasing 
  US political and military commitment to the settlement and development of 
  New Mexico and Arizona, the experience of raiding and warfare changed for 
  the Chiricahua Apaches.
  Before the 1860s, raiding and warfare with the Mexicans tended to follow 
  a pattern of regular bouts of raiding and warfare punctuated with periods of 
  truce and trade. This pattern certainly continued with Hispanic communities 
  on the Mexican side of the border up until the surrender of Geronimo in 
  1886. The Chihennes maintained peaceful trade relations with a number 
  of Hispanic communities in the USA until 1880–81. These relationships 
  came under increasing pressure as the USA increased its involvement in 
  To refill a cartridge a warrior 
  would first take a spent 
  cartridge, in this case a 50/70 
  cartridge, and preferably clean 
  it out. Next a scoop would be 
  used to pour in loose powder 
  and finally a fresh bullet or 
  ball would be placed into 
  the cartridge case. Refilled 
  cartridges were not the most 
  reliable of ammunition. If the 
  calibre was too small, there 
  was the risk of damage to the 
  inside of the barrel and if the 
  case were to split, the weapon 
  might jam. If the powder 
  charge was too weak there 
  would be reduced range and 
  if it was too high there was the 
  potential risk of an exploding 
  gun, if the cartridge fired in 
  the first place. Even if the 
  calibre was gauged correctly, 
  the ammunition could still 
  be less than reliable. 
  (Author’s photo.)
  Small file cut down, sharpened 
  at both ends and used as an 
  awl. (Author’s photo – courtesy 
  of access given by the Romero 
  Collection)
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  the Southwest. After the end of the Civil War the steady increase of the 
  US Army presence in the Southwest meant that the Chiricahua Apaches faced 
  growing pressure upon what had previously been their relatively safe 
  heartland. Thus, raiding and warfare against the USA became a much more 
  drawn out affair, and leaders such as Cochise in the 1860s and Victorio as 
  late as 18809 were forced to sustain campaigns over months and years. This 
  was because the Americans were pushing into every part of the territory and 
  it became increasingly difficult for the Chiricahua Apaches to maintain such 
  safe havens. It was the steady attrition of a warrior lost here and a warrior 
  crippled there that persuaded the Chiricahua Apaches to meet with peace 
  envoys from the USA in 1871 and to accept two reservations – one centred 
  around Fort Bowie in Arizona and one based at Old Fort Tularosa, which 
  was then moved to Ojo Caliente in New Mexico. The transition was not 
  always smooth, with many warriors continuing to raid the surrounding area. 
  However, it was the policy of concentrating the Western and Chiricahua 
  Apaches upon one reservation in Arizona that led to the last ten years of 
  the Apache Wars.
  The Fort Bowie reservation was closed in 1876 and a number of Chiricahua 
  Apaches (some of the Chokonens and most of the Nehdnis) did not accept 
  the move to San Carlos and tried to reclaim their independence by resuming 
  their independent way of life in both the USA and Mexico. The Ojo Caliente 
  reservation proved to be a useful rendezvous point where plunder, mainly 
  9 
  As late as 1879, a local New Mexican newspaper warned its readers that to prospect 
  for minerals in the Black Range and San Mateo Mountains of New Mexico was at the 
  prospector’s own risk. It should be noted that this was after the Chihenne Apaches had been 
  twice removed to San Carlos reservation in 1877 and 1878.
  32
   EQUIPMENT
  As well as his weapons, the Apache warrior could carry a variety of equipment. The powder scoop 
  (1) was fashioned from a spent cartridge. It would be used to measure out powder used to refill 
  used cartridges. Bullet or ball moulds could be used to cast a new bullet or ball and then the 
  scoop would be used to fill the cartridge case before the bullet was inserted. The reliability of 
  such refilled cartridges varied. Despite this, given a choice between no ammunition or refill 
  ammunition, the Apaches chose the latter.
  Probably one of the most important pieces of equipment for an Apache warrior was the 
  awl. It was originally made using sharpened bone fragments or thorns. However, contact with 
  Europeans introduced a whole range of metal implements that could be fashioned into awls. The 
  ability to carry out running repairs or make new boots on campaign was essential if the Apache 
  warrior was to protect his feet and be able to keep moving over the stony and thorny terrain of 
  the Southwest. The awls shown have been made from a variety of objects: a cut-down small 
  metal file (2); a cut-down pair of scissors (3); and a horseshoe nail (4).
  Tweezers (5 & 6) were also an important part of the Chiricahua Apache’s equipment. Facial hair 
  was seen to be ugly and to reflect some form of character flaw. Thus, any self-respecting warrior or 
  apprentice would want to remove any sign of a moustache or beard. In this case, a spent cartridge 
  has been flattened and split to form a set of tweezers which would be worn around the neck.
  While the Apaches knew how use pitch to make waterproof baskets (7 & 8) for carrying 
  water, they also used cleaned-out horse entrails to carry water. A European-made canteen, 
  either US Army (9) or civilian (10 & 11) would have been a prized possession of the Apache 
  warrior. These could be acquired by trade or taken in war.
  Field glasses or telescopes became prized possessions of the Apache warrior as they valued 
  anything that could improve their surveillance of their surroundings. These could be obtained 
  through trading or raiding. Here can be seen field glasses that belonged to General George Crook 
  (12) and those belonging to Geronimo (13).
  C
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  taken in Mexico, could be sold. This outlet was closed when the Chihenne 
  were moved to San Carlos in 1877. The resistance to this move by political 
  means (through Loco) and military means (spearheaded by Victorio until his 
  death in October 1880 and Nana until 1881) culminated in one of the most 
  punishing campaigns against the Chiricahua Apaches between 1879 and 
  1881. The resistance by the Chihenne leaders to the loss of their Ojo Caliente 
  reservation did an enormous amount of damage in the Southwest and in 
  Chihuahua, but by 1881 it was clear to the surviving independent Chihennes 
  that they could no longer maintain their old way of life in territory claimed 
  by the USA. Those Chokonen and Nehdnis who did not accept the move to 
  San Carlos in 1876 had, thanks to increasing military pressure from Sonora 
  and Chihuahua periodically aided by the Federal Mexican Army, negotiated 
  a move to San Carlos by January 1880. The ensuing peace with the Nehdnis 
  and Chokonen lasted until the aftermath of an Apache scout mutiny in 
  August 1881, when the increased military presence on the reservation 
  prompted many Nehdnis and Chokonen, fearing treachery, to flee south to 
  the Sierra Madre Mountains in Mexico. 
  There they united with the Chihennes under 
  Nana. The 1882–83 period marks the efforts 
  of these Chiricahua Apaches to maintain 
  their independence in northern Mexico.
  General George Crook’s expedition into 
  the Sierra Madre in 1883 persuaded most of 
  the Chiricahua Apaches that this was not 
  a  viable option and most had returned to 
  San Carlos by February 1884. The Geronimo 
  Campaign of 1885–86 was a last-gasp effort 
  by some Chiricahua Apaches to maintain 
  their independence in the face of a daunting 
  cocktail of internal division and a well-meaning, 
  but probably too rapid, imposition of an alien 
  way of life upon them.
  Although ultimately defeated, the 
  Chiricahua Apache on campaign was a 
  formidable opponent, particularly considering 
  the small number of warriors involved in 
  hostilities. In the most damaging period of 
  Geronimo’s Springfield rifle 
  (top) and a Spencer repeating 
  rifle (bottom) believed to have 
  been used by an Apache 
  warrior. Both rifles have 
  been modified before 
  falling into Apache hands. 
  The Springfield rifle has been 
  shortened, probably for ease of 
  mounted and dismounted use. 
  The Spencer has a much heavier 
  hexagonal barrel added. The 
  bottom photo shows this 
  feature more clearly. The 
  hexagonal barrel makes the 
  weapon much heavier, but it 
  being longer probably increases 
  the rifle’s effective range. This 
  weapon ties in nicely with the 
  earlier photo of Chato with 
  what looks like a Springfield 
  carbine with an exaggerated 
  barrel. This was probably a 
  photographer’s prop, as the 
  famous picture of Geronimo 
  kneeling scowling into the 
  camera appears to use the 
  same weapon. There was 
  clearly gunsmith knowledge 
  amongst the Apaches’ 
  European opponents and 
  such customizations were 
  sometimes traded or captured 
  by the Chiricahua Apaches. 
  (Photos by Frank Brito (top), 
  Bernd Brand (middle) and the 
  author (bottom) courtesy of 
  access given by the AHS)
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  warfare between the USA and the Chiricahua Apaches, 1879–81, Victorio 
  probably led a maximum of 150 Chihennes and allied Chiricahua and 
  Mescalero Apaches. Despite the odds being against the Apaches, it took the 
  USA and Mexico a long time to wear down their resistance. This was due to 
  the techniques employed by the Apaches when on a prolonged campaign. 
  There were a number of factors at play including: the principle of maximum 
  damage for minimal loss; knowledge of the terrain; the role of women; 
  the siting of campsites; long-range communication; illicit trade networks; 
  and an inherent squad leader system. The following pages will look at each 
  factor in turn.
  Maximum damage for minimum loss
  The Chiricahua Apaches’ ethos of maximum gain for minimum loss meant 
  that they avoided direct conflict unless they had carried out what we might 
  call a thorough risk assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of any 
  attack. This could involve careful long-term monitoring of enemy routines 
  to  identify the strengths and weaknesses of a possible target. If this 
  reconnaissance did not show any weakness that could be sufficiently 
  exploited then no attack would be made. Military patrols sent after, or in 
  search of, Chiricahua Apaches would generally be avoided and only attacked 
  if circumstances were particularly favorable. An example of this is General 
  George Crook’s successful demonstration of the use of Apache scouts in the 
  early 1870s, which had an obvious effect upon a Chiricahua leader such as 
  Nana. When Nana led his six-week raid into New Mexico in 1881, a clear 
  OPPOSITE
  Photo of an Apache scout dated 
  1886. Again, the mix of 
  traditional dress with European 
  dress and weaponry can be 
  seen. He wears a cartridge belt 
  with a revolver, and carries a 
  Springfield carbine. As with 
  other photos of Apache warriors 
  and scouts dressed in this 
  manner, this clothing is akin to 
  Apache parade dress rather than 
  campaign dress. (Photo courtesy 
  of National Archaeological 
  Archives, Smithsonian)
  ABOVE
  Although the date of this 
  photograph is uncertain, it clearly 
  shows the Apache practice of 
  carrying rifles/carbines across the 
  front of the saddle while traveling 
  on horseback. One indication that a 
  rifle might have been owned by an 
  Apache is the wear pattern such 
  usage would leave on the 
  underside of the weapon. (Photo 
  courtesy of National Archaeological 
  Archives, Smithsonian)
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  pattern emerged: when he was confronted by US forces accompanied by 
  Apache scouts he made every effort to evade the scouts as quickly as possible. 
  Conversely, the three 9th Cavalry detachments that his warriors did attack 
  were not accompanied by Apache scouts. All three detachments sustained 
  serious casualties, both horses and men, and took no further part in the 
  pursuit of Nana.
  Knowledge of the terrain
  As part of this risk-aware approach the Chiricahuas used their knowledge of 
  the terrain to both ensure their survival and to engineer the downfall of their 
  enemies. They knew where to find water: “One thing White Eyes never learned 
  – to detect the presence of water underground. Many perished, when by 
  digging two or three feet they could have obtained water.”10 This knowledge 
  also allowed the Apaches to pollute obvious water sources without putting 
  their own survival at risk. They also used the higher elevations in the mountains 
  to watch for, and monitor the progress of, any enemies or targets in the vicinity.
  Furthermore, Chiricahua Apaches were able to use the terrain for 
  concealment prior to an ambush, often being able to remain undetected until 
  the enemy was at point-blank range. The attack site would also have been 
  10 Kaywaykla in Ball (note 32) p.74. See also, Bourke, (note 41) pp.36–37 and Opler, (note 18), 
  p.348.
  36
  VICTORIO DIRECTING ATTACK UPON CONLINE
  On April 5, 1880, Lt. John Conline was attacked in the lower reaches of Hembrillo Canyon by 
  Apaches led by Victorio. Conline had some warning of the attack, having deployed advance 
  guards. However, he positioned his skirmish line poorly. This allowed the Apaches to infiltrate 
  through rough terrain to his front. They also used a shallow arroyo to occupy positions above 
  Conline’s left flank. Finally, Conline failed to spot the danger of the dry arroyo running down 
  Hembrillo Canyon. The Apaches used this to infiltrate around Conline’s right flank to attack his 
  skirmish line and horse herd from the rear. Conline was only saved from disaster by the onset 
  of night, when the Apaches chose to break off the attack. Conline reported that: 
  Victorio was heard giving orders in Apache to Chavanaw, one of his chiefs, ‘to turn my right flank.’ 
  He was at the time in the rear of his line, and about 500 yards from us. Chavanaw was then opposite 
  our right flank. Jose Carillo, one of the trailers with me, who speaks the Apache language and 
  personally knows Victorio, reported this to me. 
  This plate shows the early stage of the attack, just as Victorio spotted the opportunity offered 
  by the unguarded arroyo. Victorio (1) crouched on a bastion of the northern side of Hembrillo 
  Canyon shouting instructions to one of his lieutenants, Chavanaw (2), to deploy some of the 
  warriors below (3) to work their way around Conline’s right flank (4) along the arroyo (5) to 
  attack both the skirmish line (6) from the rear and to bring the horse herd and guards (7) 
  under attack. Victorio is placed in this position as the archeology survey found a .44-40 cartridge 
  suggesting that an Apache at that spot was carrying a Winchester 1873 repeating rifle/carbine.
  Other warriors (8) have already worked their way forward through the rocky/bushy terrain to 
  engage the 9th Cavalry’s skirmish line from the front. Some warriors have managed to work their 
  way to within 30–50 yards of Conline’s men. Other warriors have ascended a very shallow arroyo 
  (9) to occupy positions higher than the skirmish line. All are following the Apache dictum of 
  exerting maximum pressure for minimal risk.
  The inset shows some of the Apaches who worked their way behind Conline via the arroyo. We 
  know they were armed with bows and arrows in addition to their modern rifles as archeological 
  evidence shows that arrows were launched at the horse herd from the direction of the arroyo. 
  By 1880, it would be very unusual for Apache warriors to be using the bow as their primary 
  weapon of choice.
  D
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  chosen so as to allow the Apaches a safe and rapid retreat if the ambush 
  failed. If the attack was successful, the Apaches could then use the terrain 
  to infiltrate towards and around the survivors with the minimum risk to 
  themselves. When Kaywaykla described the ambush of two groups of 
  Mexican militia in the Candelaria Mountains in November 1879 he noted 
  the fact that the Apaches’ horses were hidden nearby to facilitate a quick 
  withdrawal should the ambush fail.
  Moreover, lookouts were stationed on the surrounding heights to make 
  sure that the ambush was not surprised by a previously undetected force. 
  Finally, the terrain was used in such a way as to manipulate the militiamen 
  into reacting to the opening move of the ambush in exactly the way the 
  Apaches wanted.11 The basic principle was to always have at least one exit 
  strategy from any camp, route march, ambush or attack while on campaign.
  Another point that becomes very clear when visiting the sites of Chiricahua 
  Apache ambushes is how little terrain was needed to spring the most deadly 
  of ambushes. Thus, choosing to ambush targets in less obviously dangerous 
  terrain was a key technique utilized by the Chiricahua Apaches. When 
  Geronimo agreed to surrender to General Nelson A. Miles in September 
  1886, the US troops escorting Geronimo and his followers out of Mexico 
  were shadowed by a large force of Mexican soldiers. Placing his forces 
  between the Mexicans and the Apaches, the US commander Captain Henry 
  Lawton entered into negotiations but received news from Geronimo and 
  Naiche that if the two forces came to blows12 they would support the 
  11 For a detailed analysis of this ambush see Watt, Apache Tactics, Osprey Publishing (2012), 
  pp. 28 & 30–31.
  12 This is not as strange as it might seem, as feelings were still running quite high in the US Army 
  over the death of Captain Emmet Crawford who was killed by Chihuahuan state militia in 
  January 1886 when leading Apache scouts in Mexico. Many fellow officers, including 
  Crawford’s second in command, Lt. Marion P. Maus, believed that the death was not 
  accidental. Crawford’s Apache scouts, who included the Chiricahua leader Chatto,  
  killed four of the Mexican troops in retaliation.
  The eastern slopes of the San 
  Mateo Mountains on the road 
  into Nogal Canyon. Although 
  high up in the San Mateos, this 
  point is still a good way below 
  the summit. Nevertheless, one 
  can see the line of the Rio 
  Grande, indicated by the dark 
  line running almost horizontally 
  across the photo 
  (approximately 25km away as 
  the crow flies), the Fra Cristobal 
  Mountains (approx. 30km), the 
  northern end of the San Andres 
  Mountains (approx. 96km) and, 
  at the maximum horizon with a 
  tiny white cloud hovering at the 
  peak, the Sierra Blanca (approx. 
  165km). Nobody is suggesting 
  that the Apaches could 
  determine targets at many of 
  these distances, but even a 
  small plume of dust raised by a 
  cavalry patrol or wagon train 
  could be detected from quite 
  far away. (Author’s photo)
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  US Army by circling round and attacking the Mexican troops from the rear. 
  When Lawton realized the Mexicans did not intend to attack he sent his 
  medical officer, Leonard Wood, with a message that the US troops would 
  protect the Chiricahua Apaches. Finding that the Chiricahuas had moved 
  their camp he set out in pursuit: “While following them up, one or two of the 
  hostiles jumped up from behind a boulder along the trail, where they had 
  evidently been lying as a rear guard. They joined me and trotted on. They 
  were so well covered up that I did not see them until well on them. They could 
  easily have shot me.” (Wood, 1970, p.106.)
  Plainly Geronimo and Naiche had no intention of placing blind trust in 
  anybody and had left these warriors behind to make sure no treachery was 
  planned. To Wood it was quite clear that had he been considered an enemy 
  he would have been a dead man. His great relief that the Apaches no longer 
  considered themselves at war with the US Army is clearly evident.
  When threatened, Chiricahua Apaches could move large distances in a 
  surprising short amount of time, often moving at night and using the stars 
  for navigation. It was routine to agree a rendezvous point should the group be 
  attacked and forced to scatter. Even when they had reconvened, the group 
  would often set up a false camp and move on a few miles before setting up 
  their real camp.
  The role of women
  The role of Chiricahua women on campaign was equally important as that 
  of the men. Their logistical support for the warriors was an essential 
  component of the Chiricahua Apaches’ ability to engage in periods of 
  prolonged conflict such as they faced from the 1860s onwards. As we have 
  seen, the women were not only responsible for bringing up children but 
  played a key role in reinforcing lessons about how to achieve warrior status. 
  They gathered, prepared and stored food, fashioned footwear and made 
  clothes. It has been argued that their detailed knowledge of natural food 
  resources made Chiricahua Apache women better placed than the warriors 
  to survive on their own for long periods of time.
  The clearest example of this was the experience of Kaywaykla’s sister and 
  grandmother13 who were captured at Tres Castillos on October 14, 1880. 
  They were eventually sent to Mexico City and sold as slaves to a local 
  landowner along with three other Chiricahua women. According to 
  Kaywaykla’s account of what his grandmother told him, she waited five 
  winters before making an escape attempt. They managed to escape in the 
  winter of 1885–86 and walked all the way from Mexico City to Canada 
  Alamosa, the village nearest to their old reservation at Ojo Caliente, taking 
  over three months to complete the journey. Once they reached their homeland 
  they could rely upon caches scattered around for just such an eventuality. 
  In the Florida Mountains, they found a cache left by Victorio in 1879–80. 
  The bolts of calico had been damaged by mice but they were able to salvage 
  enough to make new clothing.
  Lozen was not the only woman seen to be vested with “power.” 
  Kaywaykla’s grandmother was seen to have power over healing wounds and 
  13 Kaywaykla refers to Nana and his wife as ‘grandfather’ and ‘grandmother’ and though they 
  acted in the manner in which many Europeans would recognize they were actually grand uncle 
  and aunt to Kaywaykla.
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  his mother was seen to have the power of avoiding battle injuries. This 
  perhaps explains why Kaywaykla was so often instructed by his grandmother, 
  as his mother accompanied his father during the fight for their reservation at 
  Ojo Caliente in the late 1870s. Significantly, when his father was killed, 
  Kaywaykla’s mother had not been with her husband. It appears to have been 
  accepted custom that during prolonged periods of warfare some Chiricahua 
  women accompanied their husbands and, along with the dikohe, helped with 
  the feeding and repairing of clothing, etc. However, it was unusual for women 
  to take part in any deliberate fighting and in that respect Victorio’s sister 
  Lozen was very unusual.
  Nevertheless, women could be caught up in hostilities. They could be used 
  as decoys to lure targets into an ambush or they could be caught up in the 
  fighting and killed. Apache warriors did not seem to hesitate to kill women 
  and children if they thought it necessary. In early May 1880, warriors led by 
  Victorio killed a number of Western Apaches, including women and children, 
  as part of an ongoing feud which dated back to 1877 when the Chihennes 
  were removed to San Carlos. In return, Western Apache scouts inflicted heavy 
  casualties upon Victorio’s following when they ambushed his camp in the 
  40
   MCEVERS RANCH, SEPTEMBER 1879
  The Apaches staged their ambush close to McEvers Ranch to lull the posse into thinking that they 
  were about to attack unsuspecting warriors besieging the ranch. If the ambush failed and the 
  Apaches needed to retreat, Victorio could also signal the warriors picketing the ranch to withdraw.
  For the attack, Victorio would have placed himself in a strategic command position (1). From 
  this point he could shout commands to his warriors at (2) and (3) and communicate with his 
  men stationed at (4), (5) and (6) using mirror signals or waved blankets. These signals would 
  be arranged before deployment. From this point Victorio could also keep an eye on the men 
  attacking McEver’s Ranch to make sure that nothing unexpected occurred from that direction.
  The warriors at (2) probably opened fire first, stopping the posse in its tracks by firing down the 
  straight part of the road at almost point-blank range. They would have aimed for horses first and 
  men second. They would also have been the best shots in the group. Seconds after them, the next 
  group of warriors (3) would have opened fire into the mass of confused men and wounded horses. 
  Another group of warriors (4) would be responsible for closing the door of the trap, opening fire 
  from behind the ambushed men. Again, these warriors would have been selected on the basis 
  of their good marksmanship.
  A warrior or two would have been stationed higher up (5) at the back of (4) to warn of any 
  reinforcements who might realize what had happened and try to attack the warriors at (4) 
  from the rear and also threaten the flank of the Apaches stationed along (3).
  The ambushed party would have been prevented from retreating away from the main Apache 
  ambush positions at (2), (3) and (4) by two or three older warriors, armed with Springfield rifles, 
  who kept up a harassing fire from the only apparent direction of escape (6). Victorio would also 
  have needed advance warning of the approach of the Hillsboro men and news of their enemies 
  could be easily signaled by mirror from this point. This position also dominated the marshy area 
  where the Hillsboro survivors took refuge.
  It should also be noted that while (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) were at close range and virtually 
  surrounded the target, the chances of “friendly fire” were minimized as all of the Apache positions 
  were several feet above their targets and so all of the Apaches aimed their fire downwards 
  towards (7) and (8).
  Most of the casualties, including horses, were inflicted in the opening volleys of the ambush (7). 
  The survivors were forced into the marshy area to take cover (8) and were kept pinned down for 
  approximately ten hours. A local historian states that ten men were killed and seven survivors 
  managed to hold out.
  The ever-cautious Apaches would have taken precautions to allow a quick flight should the 
  ambush fail. The dead side of the ridge would have provided an ideal spot where a few apprentice 
  warriors could hold the horses ready for an immediate retreat should that prove necessary (9).
  E
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  Black Range later that month. Approximately 55 Apaches in Victorio’s camp 
  were killed and most were women and children. In 1885, Ulzana’s warriors 
  killed approximately 20 Western Apaches including 11 women and four 
  children. It was believed that these killings had taken place as retaliation for 
  Western Apaches serving as scouts against the Chiricahua Apaches. When 
  Victorio’s camp was attacked in the Cuchillo Negro Mountains on September 
  29, 1879 he lost two warriors and a woman to Apache scouts who spearheaded 
  the attack. Chiricahua Apache girls were, therefore, given hard physical 
  training as, given the unforgiving nature of Apache warfare, they could not 
  necessarily expect different treatment from the warriors if caught and thus 
  had to be able to move over the same rough terrain to escape any attack. 
  Goodsight Mountains campsite: 
  one of the tinajas, currently dry, 
  along the upper arroyo (marked 
  D on the map). When it rained 
  these natural rock tanks would 
  fill with water. When this camp 
  was discovered in 1882 by 
  a US Army patrol from Fort 
  Cummings, its commander 
  stated “I found four rock water 
  tanks with enough water for 
  four companies for two or 
  three days.” (Author’s photo)
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  As a result, while generally subordinate to the warriors, experienced women 
  would sometimes be called upon to contribute to councils held by the warriors.
  The choice of campsites
  Throughout the 1860s to 1880s, US Army officers noted that the Chiricahua 
  Apaches would carefully select their campsites for both ease of defence and 
  ease of exit should they be overwhelmed. If there was not enough natural 
  cover, small breastworks were sometimes constructed to enhance the defences 
  of a campsite. While the Chiricahua Apaches were nomadic, they also had a 
  number of favorite camping spots. The Apaches would try to ensure that they 
  remained undiscovered by the enemy. However, if the camp was discovered 
  it would be well fortified and difficult to surround.
  Other semi-permanent locations would be staging points on well-traveled 
  raiding and trade routes. However, 
  as raiding was central to Chiricahua 
  Apache culture, every effort would be 
  made to keep such locations secret. 
  One such example, which was used 
  for a number of years as a staging 
  post for Chiricahua Apache raiding 
  and war parties, was located in the 
  Goodsight Mountains in southern 
  New Mexico. This site remained 
  undiscovered until it was stumbled 
  upon by a routine army patrol from 
  Fort Cumings in 1882. By that time, 
  the Chiricahua Apaches had ceased to 
  use the site as a staging post when 
  moving stolen cattle and horses from 
  Mexico to sell in the USA. The site 
  Goodsight Mountains campsite: 
  shot looking down into the 
  central area where horses, 
  mules and cattle could be 
  corralled under guard  
  (point C on the map). 
  (Author’s photo)
  Goodsight Mountains campsite: 
  the view from the “crow’s nest” 
  at E2. The distinctive flat-
  topped mesa on the horizon is 
  known as Massacre Peak. It was 
  so named as in October 1879 
  a train of 12 Mexican carretas 
  (carts) was wiped out by 
  Chihenne Apaches in the 
  shadow of this mesa. The 
  stage road passed this mesa to 
  the left of the photo and went 
  across the flat ground moving 
  down towards the left side of 
  the photograph, above the 
  cloud shadow. Massacre Peak 
  is approximately 17 miles away 
  as the crow flies. On a day such 
  as this a dust cloud would be 
  clearly detected once its 
  source had passed the 
  mesa. (Author’s photo)
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  was in close proximity to where the road between La Mesilla and Old Fort 
  Cummings passed through the Goodsight Mountains. In September 1880, 
  and again in January 1881, travellers, some on stagecoaches, were waylaid and 
  killed by Apaches whose camp was hidden about two miles from the road.
  This camp was well chosen (see diagram on pp. 42). Even when quite 
  close to the site it did not look as if there could be a camp in the vicinity. 
  It was surrounded by low ridges that gave a good all-round perspective of 
  the surrounding country, yet these ridges were not high and rugged enough 
  to suggest to any foes that they might be worth investigating as a possible 
  campsite. There was a natural opening in a well-hidden canyon where 
  horses, mules and cattle could be corralled with access to plenty of water. 
  In the higher reaches of the canyon there were at least four tinajas, or natural 
  rock tanks, which would hold fresh water for some time after any rainfall. 
  These tanks could not be reached by the corralled livestock, so would provide 
  Goodsight Mountains campsite: 
  “crow’s nest” at E2. (Author’s 
  photo)
  Goodsight Mountains campsite: 
  view down the canyon from the 
  western edge of Point C. Any 
  pursuit of a trail would come 
  up the canyon towards the 
  photographer. Good cover can 
  be seen on either side of the 
  canyon for Chiricahua riflemen 
  to use. (Author’s photo)
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  45
  good water for the Apache camp placed in 
  a shallow depression at the top of one 
  of  one of the canyon branches. If the 
  Apaches stayed there for more than a 
  fleeting instance there were a couple of areas 
  of good grass they could use to feed their 
  animals, and alert Apache guards could 
  easily prevent their animals from straying 
  out to where they might attract the attention 
  of their enemies.
  There were a couple of what could be 
  described as small crow’s nests built on top 
  of the ridges. These offered an excellent 
  overview of the surrounding countryside. 
  One of them overlooked the stage road as it 
  ran through the southern reaches of the 
  Sierra Uvas, crossed the open ground and 
  entered the Goodsight Mountains. The 
  dust  raised by an approaching wagon or 
  stagecoach would give ample warning 
  should the Apaches wish to ambush such 
  a target. Today it takes about 15 minutes 
  to walk from the lookout to the camp, and 
  a fit Chiricahua lookout would be able to 
  raise the alarm in a considerably shorter 
  time. Of course the lookout, armed with a 
  mirror, could summon his compatriots so as 
  the potential target could be evaluated. This 
  would leave plenty of time to lay an ambush 
  if the odds looked favorable.
  Finally, there was no need to construct 
  breastworks, as, should the Apaches be trailed to the canyon by their enemies, 
  there was ample natural cover by which a rearguard of warriors could fall 
  back from position to position up the canyon, thereby giving the rest of the 
  Apaches time to flee.
  This site was an ideal camp from the Apache point of view as it was 
  not discovered until after they had virtually ceased to operate in this area of 
  New Mexico. Thus, while it was very well defended, the intention was that 
  they should not have to defend such a location in the first place.
  Smoke and mirrors: long-range communication
  In an attempt to coordinate their actions, Chiricahua Apaches on campaign 
  used various techniques to communicate with each other over long distances. 
  They mainly used smoke signals (by day), signal fires (by night) and mirrors 
  for this purpose. To understand this means of communicating, we must first 
  divest ourselves of the old Hollywood image of the grizzled old army scout 
  seeing smoke signals and reading off a detailed plan of action. The use of 
  smoke and fire signals was much less complicated, as the Chiricahuas knew 
  their limitations and used such media to convey very simple messages.
  For example, during the late 1870s, an Apache leader might decide that 
  he was going to use the Goodsight Mountains camp to move some stolen 
  Goodsight Mountains campsite: 
  if under continued attack, the 
  Apaches could fall back from 
  one outcrop of rock to another. 
  This photo is taken from the 
  southern mid edge of Point C 
  on the map. The Apaches never 
  had to mount such a defence, 
  as this campsite was not found 
  until after they had ceased to 
  use the location. (Author’s 
  photo)
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  46
  cattle and horses from Mexico up to the Mescalero reservation to sell for 
  guns and ammunition. However, he would have known that the US Army 
  had a string of piquets and patrols looking for signs of hostile Apaches 
  crossing the border. The trail of a herd of stolen stock would be difficult, if 
  not impossible, to hide from such patrols. Therefore, the leader would divide 
  his warriors into two groups. The first group would be made up of the 
  younger warriors and a few senior warriors. They would be instructed to 
  move into the USA ahead of the second group of older warriors who were 
  tasked with driving the herd. The task of the first group was to attract the 
  US Army’s attention and draw them away from the area through which 
  the leader wished to drive his plunder. The use of pre-arranged smoke and/or 
  fire signals was the means by which the second group of Apaches was 
  informed that the attempt to decoy the US Army away from their intended 
  path had been successful. This was possible because of the Apaches’ thorough 
  knowledge of the topography of their land. The plan might be coordinated 
  something like this:
  The whole group crosses the border and camps at the southern end of the 
  Florida Mountains.
  On day one, the first group moves north through, or around, Cooke’s 
  Range with instructions to cut the telegraph line between Silver City and 
  La Mesilla and leave an obvious trail to follow. They are instructed to detach 
  a warrior to a designated point at the southern end of the Black Range and 
  light one fire if successful and two fires if unsuccessful in two days’ time.
  The second group sends out a scout to the top of Cooke’s Range to watch 
  for the signal fires. He then replicates the signal – one fire for success, etc.
  The second group of Apaches also sends a man to the top of the Florida 
  Mountains to watch for the signal from Cooke’s Range.
  On day three, one fire is seen from the Black Range by the lookout on 
  Cooke’s Range and his corresponding signal fire is seen by the man on the 
  Steins Peak, with the remains of 
  the Steins Peak stagecoach 
  station in the foreground. There 
  were regular sightings of signal 
  fires on the top of this 
  mountain during the Apache 
  Wars. The canyon through 
  which the stage road passed is 
  known as Doubtful Canyon, as 
  it was such a popular site for 
  ambushes during the Apache 
  Wars. One of the reasons this 
  would be a popular spot for 
  signal fires is that the peak is 
  clearly recognizable from a 
  distance. (Author’s photo)
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  47
  Florida Mountains. He makes his way down to the camp and the second 
  group now knows it is safe to pass on from the Floridas across to the 
  Goodsight Mountain camp.
  If two fires were seen, then the leader of the second group had to act 
  independently and try to make his way through to the Mescalero Reservation. 
  However, having a scout deployed on Cooke’s Range and on top of the 
  Florida Mountains would also give him a good idea of any US Army 
  detachments or other potential enemies still in the area. Smoke signals could 
  be deployed in the same way during daylight.
  There was also another use for such signals. Fires and smoke signals could 
  be used to deliberately send enemies in the wrong direction. This took 
  advantage of the knowledge that at least some of their opponents knew that 
  the Chiricahuas would use such signals, and would investigate the area. 
  There was at least one incident of signal fires being seen on Steins Peak in 
  mid-January 1881 when Chiricahua Apache raiders appeared to be active far 
  to the east of that point in New Mexico. This caused immediate speculation 
  in the local press and would have provided the US Army with additional 
  intelligence as to potential Apache activity. The army was forced to divert 
  their already scarce resources to check these sightings, taking them away 
  from the attacks in New Mexico. However, there were no attacks reported 
  in the Steins Peak area. It is possible that there was another group of Apaches 
  operating in, or at least passing through, the Stein’s Peak area who were 
  letting their compatriots in the mountains of New Mexico know that they 
  had reached that point safely. It is equally possible that a couple of warriors 
  were simply detached to that point to provide an additional distraction. 
  The modern phrase “smoke and mirrors” to indicate deception and confusion 
  is particularly apt when referring to this use of signals by the Apaches.
  The Chiricahua Apaches were also quick to realize the potential for using 
  the telegraph – their enemies’ long-range communications technology – 
  to their advantage. They could deliberately cut telegraph lines to attract 
  attention to a specific spot. This would either be done to tempt the army into 
  a pursuit of the Apaches or to distract their attention away from where the 
  Apaches intended to strike.
  A much cleverer device was designed to knock out communications and 
  hamper the ability of the army to coordinate its scattered forces against the 
  Apaches. The line would still be cut, but the cut ends were fastened together 
  using rawhide either at the top of a pole or where the line passed through some 
  trees. The failure of the telegraph would be quickly detected but the repair 
  teams would have to check every pole and natural obstruction before the link 
  could be repaired. By such time, the news that Chiricahua Apaches were in 
  a specific area would be obsolete. However, they would not always have left 
  the area. One telegraph repair party of four soldiers was surprised and wiped 
  out by Juh’s warriors on October 2, 1881 as the Apaches were making for 
  Mexico after leaving the San Carlos Reservation. The party had been sent out 
  to find the break in the line made by the Chiricahuas earlier in the day.
  Mirrors were probably used for much shorter-range communication than 
  signal fires. Kaywaykla recalls that mirrors were utilized as part of 
  coordinating the ambush of Mexican militia in the Candelaria Mountains. 
  Here mirrors were used by the group of Apaches tasked with blocking any 
  attempt by the Mexicans to flee back down the canyon, to alert the other 
  Apaches that all of the Mexicans had entered the ambush zone and to 
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  48
  commence firing (see Elite 119; Apache Tactics 1830–86 
  by the same author, pp.30–31) They were usually carried 
  on a thong around a warrior’s neck. The Chiricahuas 
  also used a system of rocks or twigs that would be laid 
  out in such a way as to appear innocuous to an ignorant 
  observer but which could be seen and understood by 
  fellow Apaches.
  Illicit trade networks
  During a prolonged campaign, the main challenge 
  for the Chiricahua Apaches was the maintenance of a 
  secure supply of guns and ammunition. Weapons and 
  ammunition could be picked up during fighting where 
  they could be taken from, for example, dead soldiers, 
  prospectors or ranchers. There were also several 
  instances when Apaches, led by Victorio and Nana, 
  captured mules carrying reserve ammunition packs belonging to US Army 
  detachments. The occasional cavalry courier would yield up a Springfield 
  carbine, a Colt revolver and between 50 and 100 rounds of ammunition. 
  There were also a few instances when small detachments of troops were 
  ambushed and forced to withdraw, allowing the Apaches to loot the bodies 
  for weapons and ammunition. This would supply cartridges that would fit 
  either the Springfield rifle or carbine, though if the rifle round was fired from 
  the carbine the recoil was apparently quite brutal, as the carbine round 
  had 55 grains of powder whereas the rifle round had 70 grains (see photo). 
  48
   SOLDIER HILL AMBUSH, 19 DECEMBER 1885
  A detachment from Company C, 8th Cavalry, was ambushed by Apaches led by Josanie, also 
  known as Ulzana, at what came to be known as Soldier Hill in commemoration of this event. The 
  Apaches took positions above the wagon road as it climbed obliquely up a ridge before turning to 
  the right as it made the ridge, and opened fire at point-blank range. Five men were killed, 
  including Surgeon Maddox who, after being hit for the first time, managed to dismount before 
  being killed by a shot to the head. Two other men, including Lt. De Rosey C. Cabell, were 
  wounded. Interestingly, their Navajo scouts had refused to set out that morning as they thought 
  that the Apaches were in the vicinity and knew the latter would not have any qualms about killing 
  Indian scouts. Lt. Samuel W. Fountain, commanding the detachment, missed the ambush because 
  he had remained behind to try to encourage his scouts to rejoin the expedition.
  This plate shows an Apache warrior (1) armed with a Springfield carbine who has moved a small 
  flat boulder into a position that will help make his first shot count. He has also ensured that his 
  target is only yards away on the road immediately below him. The Apache warrior to his right (2) 
  has spotted the dismounted Surgeon Maddox and shoots him dead with a shot to the head (3). 
  Another warrior (4) reaches for a cartridge case for his Remington rifle in his ammunition belt 
  while yet another (5) blasts away with his Winchester repeating rifle into the surprised 8th Cavalry 
  company. One warrior (6), having just fired his Springfield rifle, reaches to where he has placed a 
  handful of cartridges which are positioned to help speed up his reloading. A group of warriors (7), 
  stationed slightly above where the trail turns and reaches the top of the ridge, fire down the 
  length of the column. The attack caused a confused mass of shot or panicking horses (8) and 
  soldier casualties. Those not hit desperately tried to control their horses (if they have not already 
  had their mounts shot from under them) or free their weapons. One suspects that the column was 
  particularly thrown not only by the closeness of the volley but also by the fact that one of their 
  number sent on ahead of them as a courier had passed through the ambush point without being 
  attacked and was still close enough to hear the gunfire when the ambush was sprung. The 
  Apaches had clearly remained hidden and allowed the man to pass unmolested.
  F
  Replica Springfield 45/55 
  carbine bullet (left) and 
  Springfield 45/70 rifle round 
  (right). Both could be used 
  by a carbine or rifle but the 
  difference in size, evident in 
  this photograph, meant that 
  a rifle round loaded into a 
  carbine would have a vicious 
  recoil. (Author’s photo)
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  49
  1
  2
  4
  5
  6
  7
  3
  8
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  50
  It  should come as no surprise that the archeological surveys of two of 
  Victorio’s battlefields show that a number of his warriors were armed with 
  these weapons.
  The US Army in the Southwest does not appear to have armed itself with 
  repeating rifles, though it is possible that the occasional Spencer repeating 
  rifle may have got into the hands of the Apaches from the US Army in the 
  1860s. From the 1870s, the Apaches appeared to be quite well armed with 
  lever-action repeating rifles and carbines such as the Winchester. These had 
  to be obtained from somewhere, and again one source would be citizens 
  (ranchers, freighters, prospectors, herders, etc.) armed with such weapons. 
  It was rare for the Apaches to directly attack buildings, but occasionally a 
  general store or ranch building might be ransacked and a fair haul of weapons 
  and ammunition taken. However, these sources would not provide a regular 
  supply of modern weapons.
  The old church at Janos, 
  Chihuahua, Mexico, which 
  dates back to the Apache Wars 
  period. Note the heavy and 
  barred windows, most of which 
  are far above ground level. 
  While places such as Janos, 
  Casas Grandes and Galeana 
  were known for their lively 
  trade with the Apaches, 
  hostilities could erupt with no 
  warning. Therefore, this place 
  of worship would also become 
  a place of refuge which the 
  Apaches would be reluctant 
  to assault. One method of 
  catching the Apaches off guard 
  was to let them get drunk in a 
  tavern before shutting the 
  doors and windows and 
  throwing in a “chili bomb.” This 
  was a simple bag stuffed with 
  dried and powdered pepper 
  leaves mixed in with loose 
  gunpowder and lit with a 
  rudimentary fuse. The effect 
  was similar to the effect of 
  modern pepper spray and 
  would leave the inebriated 
  Apaches as easy prey. However, 
  Apache testimony states that 
  they themselves used such a 
  bomb on a small village church 
  where Mexican villagers had 
  taken refuge. They did not use 
  a fuse but dropped it through 
  a hole in the roof onto an open 
  fire below. In 2013, in India, a 
  chili grenade, a sophisticated 
  version of the above device, 
  was judged fit for use to 
  help flush out terrorists from 
  buildings. (Author’s photos)
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  51
  The main sources of such weapons and ammunition were illicit trade 
  networks on both sides of the border. These networks flourished for as long 
  as state, or even federal, government did not exercise control. South of the 
  border, the 1860s to 1880s was a period of turmoil with both Chihuahua and 
  Sonora, which the central Mexican authorities were unable to control very 
  effectively, riven by internal state rivalries. Occasionally, the Mexican Federal 
  Army intervened in such conflicts and as a result sometimes ended up taking 
  the field against hostile Apaches. However, this did not appear to have been 
  a part of a systematic national policy. The Mexican state troops could be very 
  effective and were sometimes well armed with Remington rifles, carbines, and 
  revolvers, but these were not consistently held in the field and were organized 
  on an almost feudal basis around the patronage of very rich local landowners.
  In this state of anarchy, local communities did the best they could to survive, 
  and a cycle of hostilities and trade relations with Chiricahua Apaches gave 
  the Apaches a clear source of illegal arms and ammunition. Trading was a 
  risky venture, though, as towns might also take advantage of the periodic 
  bounties offered for Apache scalps by the state governments of Chihuahua and 
  Sonora. Such a relationship could be termed a trade/hate relationship and the 
  change from trade to hate could occur without warning. The usual ploy 
  the townspeople would use was to have a big siesta after trading with the 
  Chiricahuas had been concluded. They would then get the Apaches drunk and 
  bludgeon them to death while they were helpless. Equally, if the Chiricahua 
  Apaches realized that they had a clear advantage over their trading partners, 
  then these traders might count themselves very fortunate to emerge from the 
  experience alive but penniless. Apaches and Mexicans thoroughly distrusted, 
  even loathed, each other. When circumstances were right for either side both 
  the Mexicans and the Apaches could be utterly merciless. The problem for the 
  Mexican townships living in a state of anarchy was that trade with the Apaches 
  had clear economic benefits, and the Apaches could see the advantages as well. 
  However, trading with Mexican townships was one of the most potentially 
  dangerous activities for Chiricahua Apache warriors and their families. The 
  danger was so great that leaders such as Victorio and Mangus forbade their 
  The hamlet of Canada Alamosa, 
  now called Monticello, in New 
  Mexico. The peaks of the San 
  Mateo Mountains can be seen 
  in the background. The hamlet 
  maintained very good relations 
  with the Chihenne Apaches 
  and trading was said to occur 
  in the cottonwood groves 
  just outside the village. 
  This relationship was widely 
  condemned by the local press 
  and just before trade between 
  the two ended an ominous 
  letter, probably from one of the 
  more recent American settlers, 
  was published in one of the 
  local newspapers: “We have 
  made up our minds that the 
  cottonwoods in this vicinity 
  shall bear fruit if there are any 
  midnight meetings between 
  Victorio’s men and some of 
  the persons of this town.” 
  (Author’s photo)
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  52
  men to get drunk when trading with these towns and to be on their guard at 
  all times. Not all Chiricahua leaders were so cautious and both Geronimo and 
  Juh had a number of narrow escapes while trading and both were sometimes 
  criticized by other Chiricahuas for the losses incurred during such episodes.
  That said, the Chihenne Apaches had good relationships with a couple of 
  Mexican villages (Las Palomas and particularly Canada Alamosa) in the US 
  near their strongholds in the northern Black Range and San Mateo Mountains. 
  They also had good relations with a few Mexican ranchers in the same area. 
  These relationships were occasionally fraught with violence but seemed to be 
  more cordial than most relations between the Apaches and Mexicans south of 
  the border, to the extent that it was rumored that wounded Apaches were 
  sometimes sheltered by these communities and there was regular trading for 
  guns and ammunition.
  Another source of probably small amounts of munitions was the many 
  isolated Mexican sheep herders scattered across Apacheria. The dealings with 
  them amounted to a small-scale Apache protection racket – it would take 
  The impromptu grave marker 
  of two miners killed by Apaches 
  a short distance outside a small 
  mining settlement in New 
  Mexico called Chloride. 
  (Photo by J. R. Absher)
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  53
  a very brave shepherd to refuse to trade with a group of Apaches if they turned 
  up at his camp. These trades were more likely to provide the Chiricahuas with 
  food than guns, but a small number could still be garnered.
  Modern rifles and ammunition would not necessarily always be available 
  in Mexican towns. More reliable suppliers were US Hispanic communities 
  and Anglo-American traders, including reservation agents and employees, in 
  the USA. However, relations with the Hispanic communities, ranchers and 
  shepherds in New Mexico broke down in 1880. This can be linked to an 
  increase in Anglo-American settlers, who put pressure on their neighbors to 
  The probable area of the 
  McEver’s Ranch ambush site 
  where, in September 1879, 
  Victorio and some of his 
  warriors attacked a posse from 
  the mining town of Hillsboro, 
  New Mexico (see Plate E for 
  detail). Victorio could try to 
  coordinate his different squads 
  from just behind and above the 
  immediate foreground of the 
  photo, but he was also relying 
  upon leaders of each squad 
  to be able to direct their own 
  element of this ambush and, 
  if things went wrong, use 
  their initiative to extricate 
  themselves as quickly as 
  possible. (Author’s photo)
  Opposite view of the probable 
  location of the McEvers Ranch 
  ambush site from the one 
  shown in the previous 
  photograph. A pickup 
  truck is shown for scale. 
  (Author’s photo)
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  54
  cease such trading or suffer the consequences. The irony is that one of the 
  early Anglo-Americans to arrive in the area, who had such a good relationship 
  with the Chihenne that he was suspected of trading illicit goods with them, 
  was also the first to lead the charge against such activities. Unfortunately, 
  when relations started to go sour, the Apaches killed a large number of 
  Hispanic sheepherders in retaliation in April and May of 1880.
  The Apaches also garnered munitions from the miners and prospectors 
  who increasingly penetrated Apacheria in search of silver and gold. Even 
  today the Southwest of the USA is awash with stories of lost mines dating 
  back to the Spanish settlement. What is true is that there were a number of 
  substantial silver discoveries in the region in the 1870s and 1880s. The 
  conflict between prospectors and Chiricahua Apaches was well-known 
  enough to provide the backdrop to one of Sherlock Holmes’ investigations, 
  The Adventure of the Noble Batchelor, published in 1892. The nature of 
  their work made prospectors very vulnerable to hostile Chiricahua Apaches 
  as they tended to act alone or in very small groups – the smaller the group, 
  the larger the share in whatever gold or silver deposits discovered. They 
  might be very well armed but their low numbers worked against them. 
  At  least one relatively well-connected Englishman, Walter Guy Barnes, 
  disappeared in southern New Mexico in 1879 after outfitting himself for 
  prospecting, and even enquiries prompted by the British Minister to the USA 
  found no trace of his fate.
  The notoriously lax and corrupt administration of Apache reservations 
  by agents and their employees, who were appointed by the Department of 
  the Interior through the Office of Indian Affairs, gave the Chiricahua Apaches 
  a major source of munitions. Arms and ammunition could be issued to 
  Apaches for hunting with no concern for how they might utilize such 
  weapons. Furthermore, the way the reservations were run also allowed 
  unscrupulous Anglo-American traders and ranchers to trade alcohol and 
  munitions for plunder taken in both the USA and Mexico, with no questions 
  asked. Again, this was a hazardous venture for both parties, but the trade was 
  more than lucrative enough for some individuals to take such risks.
  Independent squad leader system
  One of the key strengths of the Chiricahua Apaches on campaign has already 
  been alluded to earlier; each individual warrior was capable of leadership or, 
  more accurately, using their initiative while on campaign. Such an emphasis 
  on trust during a warrior’s training meant that a warrior entrusted with being 
  at a certain place at a certain time, for example, to light a signal fire, could 
  be trusted to do the task in hand.
  The successes of major Chiricahua Apache leaders such as Cochise, Mangas 
  Coloradas, Victorio, Juh and Nana were built upon having sub-leaders they 
  could trust to carry out individual elements of their overall planning. This 
  obedience was tempered by the warriors having the initiative to change the 
  plan should it start to go wrong. This ability to immediately act on their own 
  initiative if a circumstance changed was governed by the other key principle 
  of their training – maximum damage for the minimum loss. No Apache 
  leader would complain if his plan started to go wrong and his squad leaders 
  spotted it and acted to avert disaster. Such a leader’s success was often 
  founded upon choosing the right warriors to lead each component of a plan 
  and being able to trust their judgement as the plan was executed. If time 
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  allowed, a leader’s plan would be discussed and analysed by his warriors. 
  If the plan was accepted, or even if modified, it would be very rare for 
  Chiricahua Apaches on campaign not to have discussed and agreed upon at 
  least one alternative plan should what appeared to be an excellent plan 
  suddenly go wrong. The warrior groups involved in attacks were usually 
  small enough for every warrior to know each other by name and this gave 
  the Chiricahua Apache guerrilla a huge tactical advantage in battle.
  EXPERIENCE OF BATTLE
  Patience and nerve were key attributes of the Chiricahua Apaches during 
  combat. The two Chiricahua rearguards, mentioned earlier, who did not 
  reveal their presence to Wood until he was at point-blank range are a good 
  example of these attributes. In 1872, Fuller accompanied some Apaches on 
  a hunting trip and observed that while American Indians were generally poor 
  shots, Apaches were “more certain shots, since they will not fire until almost 
  upon the object.” (Fuller in Cozzens, 2005, p.467.) The same techniques were 
  clearly utilized in warfare and their first shot was liable to be quite accurate, 
  due to the combination of close range and the fact that the Apaches preferred 
  to use a rock or a forked stick to steady their aim. The point that it was 
  standard practice for the Chiricahuas to aim at the horse rather than the rider 
  with their first shot possibly accounts for quite low human fatalities during 
  ambushes. If one reads US Army reports they often comment upon the low 
  or non-existent human casualties but fail to realize the significance of losing 
  high numbers of horses. The reason for this practice was that, at minimum, 
  the Apaches required that an ambush should cripple the ability of their foe 
  to maintain any pursuit of the attacking party.
  If during a Chiricahua ambush or attack one of the warriors got into 
  difficulties, for example by being wounded or isolated, then he would call out 
  Close-up photo of the small 
  cave used by the two trapped 
  Apache warriors at Tres 
  Castillos. It has just enough 
  room for two men to lie down 
  in and any attacker would find 
  it difficult to approach without 
  coming under the fire of the 
  warriors. (Author’s photo)
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  56
  to his nearest compatriots by name and they would be obliged to return to 
  the fight to help extricate him. Obviously, if all was lost then the warrior 
  might still be killed. However, as long as those named had done everything 
  to try to help the stricken fighter then they would not be censured. Whether 
  blamed or not, familial relationships would mean that the loss would be 
  keenly felt by those who had tried but failed to rescue the warrior. Apparently, 
  the Chihenne leader known as “Loco” got his Mexican name after he stopped 
  and rescued a comrade who called out for his aid when their raiding party 
  was ambushed by Mexicans in the 1840s.
  A cornered Chiricahua was very rare, as the warriors would always enter 
  battle with an exit strategy. However, no such plan can be perfect and 
  occasionally warriors would be trapped. When this happened, a very 
  dangerous situation was created. In this type of warfare the Apache warrior 
  could expect little mercy and with no other option: “When a Chiricahua is 
  cornered and desperate and thinks the end has come, he tears off all his 
  clothes but his loincloth, and he goes right into the thick of it. Sometimes he 
  fights so hard that he gets away.” (Opler, 1996, p.349.)
  Given no other option, to come out fighting or at least refusing to 
  surrender might be their only chance of survival. When Chihuahua state 
  troopers cornered Victorio at Tres Castillos, two warriors were trapped in a 
  very small cave and it took the Mexican troops a couple of hours to finish 
  them off. This was despite the troopers using Apache women captives to offer 
  the men quarter. Their refusal to surrender makes sense on two grounds. 
  Colonel Joaquin Terrazas, the Mexican commander, made a fortune out of 
  the scalp bounty offered by the Chihuahua state government, then under the 
  governorship of his cousin Luis Terrazas. Had the warriors surrendered, they 
  56
   CHIRICAHUA APACHE WARRIOR, 1880S
  The Chiricahua Apache warrior of the 1880s would still have worn the practical breechclout and 
  boots of his predecessors. However, while the headband was still very popular, European hats 
  would also have been worn. Field-glasses and telescopes were still sought after (1).
  An Apache warrior armed with a single-shot rifle/carbine would find a revolver a useful 
  addition to his armory. It could be very easily fired on the move, so the rate of fire could be used by 
  Apaches, moving swiftly from cover to cover, to give a false impression of their numbers (2). 
  Breech-loading, single-shot and repeating rifles/carbines were prevalent, with muskets now only 
  being found in the hands of adolescents. By the 1880s even such boys might be quite well armed 
  with modern carbines, etc. Therefore, Springfield rifles and carbines were common (4). 
  Remingtons were less prevalent but still present in some numbers (3). Winchester 1866 and 1873 
  rifles and carbines were also common (6). Sharps rifles were sometimes used by the Apaches (5). 
  Sharps carbines and Henry and Spencer repeating rifles, rare in the 1860s, would have been less 
  prevalent but were still being used in the 1870s and 1880s.
  What must be noted is that the Apaches used a wide variety of weapons as they would pick up 
  a large range of revolvers and rifles in trade and from the bodies of those they killed. Therefore, 
  the weapons illustrated are merely the most common. The archeological surveys of the Hembrillo 
  Canyon battles of April 5–7, 1880 provide a good idea of the variety of weapons carried by 
  Apache warriors in 1880.
  The one weapon the Apache did not appear to favor was the shotgun. In old age one warrior 
  recorded that as apprentices he and a companion stole a couple of shotguns from Fort Cummings. 
  When they handed them over to Mangus, the leader of their group, he tried them out but was 
  knocked over by the recoil and was less than impressed by their accuracy. Mangus was furious and 
  dismissed the shotgun as useless. While the use of shotguns cannot be completely ruled out, they 
  were probably very rare. A rifle or carbine of similar weight to a shotgun could be used at various 
  ranges, whereas the shotgun could only be used at very short range, limiting its usefulness.
  G
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  1
  4
  5
  6
  2
  3
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  would have been, at best, simply shot out of hand. The second reason is that 
  had they managed to hold out until darkness, they might have been able 
  to infiltrate the Mexican troops and escape out of the trap, as Terrazas’ 
  command was short of supplies and could not afford to linger. Also, less than 
  a day later 30 warriors, who had been sent out to replenish ammunition 
  stocks, returned to Tres Castillos.
  In 1882, when the Sierra Madre Chiricahuas were moving those Chiricahua 
  Apaches who had remained on the San Carlos reservation into Mexico, they 
  were ambushed by Mexican troops under the command of Col. Lorenzo 
  Garcia. The opening assault caught the main body, mainly made up of women 
  and children, by surprise, and many were killed. The warriors in the rearguard 
  intervened and made a stand by digging into an arroyo. A furious battle 
  ensued with no quarter given. The warriors were clearly outnumbered by the 
  Mexican soldiers but the manner in which the Apaches used the terrain and 
  firepower to maximum effect prevented far higher casualties being sustained. 
  The actions of a warrior known as Yahe-chul, or Fun, show how this could 
  be done. Armed with a Springfield rifle and holding the bullets between his 
  fingers, he charged towards the Mexicans three times, dodging back and forth 
  to delay their advance. He was later described as running up and down the 
  arroyo firing as he went, giving the impression that there were more warriors 
  present than were actually there. Other warriors concealed themselves and 
  one man was credited with killing five Mexican soldiers before his location 
  was pinpointed and he was killed. An old woman also dashed out of the cover 
  of the arroyo to recover a bag full of cartridges. The Apaches refused to give 
  up and survivors managed to slip away after darkness fell. Nevertheless, the 
  cost was heavy on both sides; the Chiricahuas lost approximately 12 warriors 
  out of the 78 Apaches killed and a further 33 women and children were 
  captured. In return, Garcia lost four officers and 19 other ranks killed and as 
  many as 40 wounded.14 
  AFTER THE BATTLE
  If Chiricahua Apaches held the ground after an ambush, then they would 
  usually finish off any adult male wounded and prisoners. To save valuable 
  ammunition, they often used rocks, clubs and rifle butts to break the skulls 
  of the fallen to ensure that their enemies were truly dead. There was some 
  mutilation of the bodies by lances. However, the regular accounts of 
  mutilation may simply refer to the practice of making sure their enemies were 
  dead. When Juh’s warriors attacked a freight train on October 2, 1881, they 
  thought they had killed all seven teamsters. One man survived as he feigned 
  death after being shot through the leg. A warrior did roll him onto his front 
  using the barrel of what was probably a Springfield rifle and then struck him 
  a hefty blow using the butt of said rifle. However, a US Army detachment was 
  in close pursuit and the Chiricahuas were disturbed and had to move on. One 
  wonders whether the survivor would have been able to keep up his pretence 
  had the Apaches not been forced to leave.
  14 For those interested in more detailed accounts of this battle I thoroughly commend first and 
  foremost Bud Shapard’s biography of Loco, Chapter 14. Sweeney, (2010), pp.222–229 and 
  Robinson, (2000), Chapter 4 also give valuable detail about this particularly savage battle.
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  The Chiricahua Apaches also had a fearsome reputation for torturing 
  some of their adult male prisoners after successful attacks. However, this 
  practice appears to have been more prevalent in the 1860s when the 
  Chiricahuas were trying to hold on to their homeland. At this time, it was 
  clearly intended to send a psychological message to their enemies showing 
  that their presence was unwelcome and could carry grave consequences. 
  In the 1870s and 1880s, the Apaches were much more likely to be on the 
  move to keep ahead of their enemies so would be less inclined to waste their 
  time torturing prisoners. There is an account of a US citizen who escaped 
  from a stagecoach being ransacked in Mexico in June 1881. He concluded 
  that the Apaches must have got what they wanted and returned to the coach 
  against the entreaties of the other passengers. He was later found tied to one 
  of the wheels. However, he had not been tortured but simply dispatched with 
  a single shot to the head. Equally, the same Chiricahuas spared a number of 
  adult males in August 1881 near Monica Springs in New Mexico. The men 
  were ex-reservation employees the warriors had known when they were on 
  one of the Apache reservations in the early 1870s.
  The Apaches used such summary executions as after an attack or ambush 
  they would usually try to put as much distance between themselves and the 
  site of the attack as possible in as short a period of time as was possible. 
  Apaches mounted on good horses could sometimes cover between 60 and 
  80 miles in 24 hours. By the time pursuers got themselves organized their 
  quarry could often be far beyond their reach. However, predictability being 
  the cardinal sin of guerrilla warfare occasionally Chiricahua Apaches would 
  stay in the area to catch out further targets who had assumed that the 
  guerrillas would have departed.
  Concluding comment
  Emile Durkheim, one of the fathers of modern sociology, developed a concept 
  of social solidarity which might help us understand the nature of the conflict 
  between the Chiricahua Apaches and, particularly, the USA. The Chiricahua 
  Apaches belonged to a small-scale, uncomplicated, in Durkheim’s terms, 
  “mechanical society.” Social cohesion was supported by close family ties and 
  a common identity such as “hunter” or “warrior.” Durkheim, however,  would 
  term the USA an “organic society” where the identity and cohesion of 
  individuals was based upon a much more abstract notion drawn from ideas 
  promoted in the Declaration of Independence and the US Constitution, 
  which were designed to form large-scale, complex nations. US citizens 
  performed specific work such as “soldier,” “merchant,” “politician” or 
  “teacher”; such diverse occupations were bound together under these 
  abstract notions to produce a much larger-scale social cohesion.
  The conflict between the Chiricahua Apaches and the USA can be seen as 
  the conflict between the differing conception of warfare of a mechanical 
  society and an organic society. In the short term, the close ties and warrior 
  culture combined with an adept approach to guerrilla warfare gave huge 
  tactical advantages to the Apaches. However, in the long term, an organic 
  society such as the USA could simply divert a fraction of its resources to this 
  conflict and still wear the Apaches down.
  For example, the Chiricahua Apaches killed 28 men from the 9th Cavalry 
  between May 1879 and August 1881. This appears to be a small number, yet 
  between 1866 and 1890 that regiment lost a total of 44 men killed in action. 
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  In other words, in less than three years Chiricahua Apaches with Mescalero 
  Apache allies inflicted 64 per cent of the regiment’s total fatalities in the first 
  24 years of its history. Between September 4 and 30, 1879, Chiricahua 
  Apaches killed ten men from the 9th Cavalry, so in the space of four weeks 
  they inflicted 23 per cent of the fatalities sustained between 1866 and 1890. 
  However, while the Chiricahua Apache warriors could clearly inflict physical 
  and psychological damage far in excess of what could be expected of their 
  small numbers, they simply could not inflict enough damage on the USA to 
  deter its expansion into the Southwest. It is a testament to their ability as 
  guerrillas that it took the USA almost 30 years to break their resistance.
  60
  AFTER THE BATTLE – CHIVALO WATERHOLES, NOVEMBER 1880
  About one month after Victorio was killed at Tres Castillos on October 14/15, 1880, a nine-man 
  Chihuahua state cavalry patrol was wiped out by survivors of Victorio’s band. Some of Victorio’s 
  possessions and his saddle were recovered from one of the soldiers. The furious Apaches then 
  hacked the man’s body into bits. This was an extremely unusual action for Apaches. One Apache 
  recalled many years later that while they did not fear death they did fear the dead and so they 
  minimized their contact with dead bodies. It was for this reason that the Apaches rarely scalped 
  and usually only did so in retaliation for the scalping of their own people by their enemies. They 
  never retained scalps as trophies. In this case, one suspects that this was an extreme reaction to 
  the loss of their leader. There is no clear account of how Victorio was killed at Tres Castillos and the 
  Apaches clearly state that he committed suicide rather than be taken alive. The Mexican soldier 
  may have killed Victorio and taken the possessions or taken them from his body; either way this 
  would have outraged these Apaches.
  After battle, it was standard practice for the Chiricahua Apaches to make sure that the enemy was 
  dead. They either used rocks or rifle butts to the head and/or lances to stab the body. Reports of 
  Apache attacks often talk about lurid mutilations. However, these were mainly the warriors making 
  sure that their enemies were not capable of suddenly rising up and taking them by surprise.
  H
  The grave of a 6th Cavalry 
  soldier, one of two men who 
  had just deserted from their 
  regiment and were ambushed 
  by Apaches led by Nana in 
  March 1880. Both men were 
  killed but, according to the 
  Apache scouts who found their 
  bodies, they both had put up a 
  courageous fight. Theirs was 
  the fate of many individuals 
  who underestimated the risks 
  of traveling through Apacheria. 
  The fact that one can simply 
  stumble across such graves 
  today gives a very tangible 
  link to events of the past. 
  (Author’s photo)
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  FURTHER READING
  The two key books on understanding Apache warriors and society are:
  Opler, M. E., An Apache Life-Way: The Economic, Social, & Religious Institutions 
  of the Chiricahua Indians, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln (1996). 
  First published by University of Chicago Press in 1941.
  Goodwin, G., Western Apache Raiding and Warfare, University of Arizona Press, 
  Tuscon (1998)
  The following article gives an excellent overview of the apprenticeship of a 
  Chiricahua warrior:
  Opler, M. E. & Hoijer, H., ‘The Raid and War-Path Language of the Chiricahua 
  Apache,’ in American Anthropologist Vol. XLII, (Oct–Dec 1940), pp.617–34.
  There was an online version of this article at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/663656 
  as of 15 August 2013.
  Below is listed some of the more easily accessible and available material which gives 
  a good introduction to the Apaches and the Apache Wars.
  Ball, E., In the Days of Victorio: Recollections of a Warm Springs Apache, 
  University of Arizona Press, Tucson (1970)
  Ball, E., with Henn N. &. Sánchez, L. A., Indeh: An Apache Odyssey, University of 
  Oklahoma Press, Norman (1980)
  Betzinez, J., I Fought with Geronimo, University of Nebraska Press, London (1987). 
  First published by Stackpole in 1959.
  Cozzens, P., Eyewitnesses to the Indian Wars 1865–1890 Volume 1: The Struggle 
  for Apacheria, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsville (2001)
  Cruse, T., Apache Days and After, University of Nebraska Press, London (1987). 
  First published by The Caxton Printers Ltd in 1941.
  Eggan, F. (Ed), Social Anthropology of North American Tribes, University of 
  Chicago Press, Chicago (1955)
  Haley, J. L., Apaches: A History and Culture Portrait, University of Oklahoma 
  Press, Norman (1981)
  Hook, J., The Apaches, Osprey Publishing, London (1987)
  Laumbach, K. W., Hembrillo, An Apache Battlefield of the Victorio War: The 
  Archaeology and History of the Hembrillo Battlefield, Prepared for the White 
  Sands Missile Range, New Mexico by Human Systems Research Inc. (2001)
  Laumbach, K. W., Scott, D. D. & Wakeman, J., Conline’s Skirmish: An Episode of 
  the Victorio War. Archaeological and Historical Documentation of an 1880s 
  Skirmish Site on White Sands Missile Range. Prepared for the Directorate of 
  Public Works, White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico by Human Systems 
  Research Inc. (2005)
  Roberts, D., Once They Moved Like The Wind: Cochise, Geronimo and the 
  Apache Wars, Pimlico, London (1998)
  Robinson, S., Apache Voices: Their Stories of Survival as Told to Eve Ball, 
  University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque (2000)
  Shapard, B., Chief Loco: Apache Peacemaker, University of Oklahoma Press, 
  Norman (2010)
  Sweeney, E. R., Cochise: Chiricahua Apache Chief, University of Oklahoma Press, 
  Norman (1991)
  Sweeney, E. R., Mangas Coloradas: Chief of the Chiricahua Apaches, University of 
  Oklahoma Press, Norman (1998)
  Sweeney, E. R., From Cochise to Geronimo: The Chiricahua Apaches 1874–1886, 
  University of Oklahoma Press, Norman (2010)
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  Thrapp, D. L., The Conquest of Apacheria, University of Oklahoma Press, 
  London (1967)
  Thrapp, D. L., Victorio and the Mimbres Apaches, University of Oklahoma Press, 
  London (1974)
  Wood, L., Chasing Geronimo: The Journal of Leonard Wood May – September, 
  1886, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque (1970). Edited & 
  Introduced by Jack C. Lane
  Worcester, D. E., The Apaches: Eagles of the Southwest, University of Oklahoma 
  Press, Norman (1979)  
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  References to images and illustrations are in bold; 
  captions to illustrations are in brackets.
  ambushes  7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 28, 36, 38, E40, 45, 
  46, 47, F48, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60
  American Indians  10, 15, 55
  ammunition  11, 18, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, C32, 
  46, F48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 58
  Anglo-Americans  31, 53, 54
  Apacheria  5, A12, 16, 27, 52, 54, 60
  Apache Wars  4, 7, 26, 32, 46, 50, 62
  apprenticeship  19, B20, 22, 23, 25, 27, C32, E40, 
  G56, 62
  archeology  29, 30, D36, 50, G56
  Arizona  7, 9, A12, 29, 30, 31, 32
  arrows  A12, 18, 19, 27, 28, 30, D36 
  arrowheads  27, 28, 29, 30, 31
  arroyos  D36, 42, 58
  awls  27, 31, C32
  barrels  24, 27, 31, 34, 58 
  carbine  24; hexagonal  34; hoop  27, 31; 
  replacement  24 
  Bedonkohe Apaches  6, 24
  Betzinez, Jason  25, 26, 29, 30
  Black Range  14, 32, 42, 46, 52
  bows  A12, 18, 19, B20, 26, 27, 28, 30, D36
  breechclout  A12, B20, 26, 27, G56
  California  7
  campsites  35, 42, 43, 44, 45
  Canada Alamosa  6, 11, 14, 39, 51, 52
  Candelaria Mountains  38, 47
  Canon de los Embudos  9, 26
  canyons  11, 44, 45, 46, 47 
  Canada Alamosa  11, 14; Doubtful  46; 
  Hembrillo  28, 29, D36, G56; Horseshoe  9, 
  26; Nogal  38; Skeleton  9
  carbines: 
  repeating  28, 29, D36, 56; Sharps  A12, 
  B20, 27, G56; single-shot  4, 29, 30, G56; 
  Springfield  4, 14, 24, 27, 35, F48, G56
  Carleton, General  7
  cartridges  25, 28, 31, D36, F48, 58 
  belt  B20, 26, 27, 35; case  31, F48; refill 31, 
  C32; spent  30, 31, C32
  cattle  15, 43, 44, 46
  cavalries: 
  4th  4, 9, 26; 6th  9, 60; 8th  F48; 9th 
  (Buffalo Soldiers)  6, 10, 11, 14, 30, D36, 59, 
  60; 10th  8
  Chato  24, 34
  Chiricahua Apaches  4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, A12, 
  14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 
  28, 29, 30, 31, C32, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 
  43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, G56, 
  58, 59, H60 
  Central (Chokonen)  6, 7, 24, 32, 34; 
  Eastern (Chihenne)  5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 14, 24, 
  25, 31, 32, 34, 35, 40, 43, 51, 52, 54, 56; 
  Southern (Nehdni)  6, 7, 24, 32, 34
  Civil War  7, 29, 32
  clothing  A12, 26, 27, 35, 39, 40, 56
  Cochise  7, 23, 25, 32, 54
  colonization  5
  Coloradas, Mangas  4, 7, 23, 54
  concealment  16, 17, 18, 36, 58
  Confederate forces  7
  Conline, Lt. John  30, D36
  Cooke’s Range  46, 47
  cover  11, 16, 18, B20, 28, 39, E40, 43, 44, 45, 
  G56, 58, 59
  creep and freeze  16, 17
  Crook, General George  4, 7, 9, 14, 25, 26, 30, 
  C32, 34, 35
  crow’s nest  43, 44, 45
  Cuchillo Negro Mountains  42
  dikohe  19, B20, 22, 23, 27, 40
  Dragoon Mountains  8
  Eskinya  7, 25
  field glasses  30, C32, G56
  flop-headed war clubs  A12, B20, 27, 28, 30
  Florida  9, 47 
  Mountains  39, 46, 47
  forts: 
  Bayard  14; Bowie  7, 32; Cummings  6, 42, 
  43, 44, G56; Lowell  4
  Geronimo  6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 18, 25, 26, 27, 30, 
  31, C32, 34, 38, 39, 52
  Goodsight Mountains  11, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47
  hacienda  B20, 24
  headbands  A12, B20, 26, 27, G56
  Hillsboro  14, E40, 53
  Hispanic  31, 53, 54
  Hoijer, H.  19, 22, 23
  horses  5, 10, 11, 14, 17, B20, 22, 24, 25, 
  27, 30, C32, 36, 38, E40, 43, 44, 46, F48, 
  55, 59 
  herd  14, D36; horseback  35; 
  horseshoe nail C32
  Howard, General O. O.  7
  hunters/hunting  5, 6, A12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 
  27, 54, 55, 59
  illicit trade networks  35, 48, 51
  Ingoman, Sergeant Madison/Daniel  10, 11, 14
  Juh  6, 7, 8, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 47, 52, 54, 58
  Kaytennae  18, 23
  Kaywaykla, James  16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 26, 30, 
  36, 38, 39, 40, 47
  knives  A12, 19, B20, 26, 27, 28
  La Mesilla  44, 46
  lances  A12, B20, 27, 28, 29, 30, 58, H60
  Lawton, Captain Henry  38, 39
  leadership  4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 16, B20, 22, 
  23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 32, 34, 35, 38, 45, 46, 
  47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, G56, H60
  Loco  6, 8, 9, 34, 56, 58
  long-range communication  35, 45, 47
  lookouts  38, 45, 46
  Lozen  25, 26, 39, 40
  Mangus  4, 5, 9, 51, G56
  Massacre Gap/Peak  28, 43
  maximum damage/minimal loss  10, 11, 24, 
  35, 54
  McEvers Ranch  14, E40, 53
  Mescalero Apaches  6, 25, 30, 31, 35, 60
  Mexico  6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38, 43, 
  46, 47, 50, 54, 58, 59 Mexico City  39; 
  Mexican forces  7; New Mexico  6, 7, 8, 9, 
  10, 14, 23, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 43, 45, 47, 
  51, 52, 53, 54, 59
  Miles, Nelson A.  9, 38
  mirrors  45, 47 
  signal  E40
  Morrow, Major Albert P.  6
  muskets  A12, B20, 27, G56 
  Enfield  A12, B20; muzzle-loading  30
  Naiche  7, 8, 9, 25, 26, 27, 38, 39
  Nana  6, 8, 9, 10, 14, 23, 25, 26, 30, 34, 35, 
  36, 39, 48, 54, 60
  Negro, Cuchillo  6
  Ojo Caliente  8, 10, 11, 14, 32, 34, 39, 40
  operational thinking  12, 14, 16, 30
  Opler, M. E.  11, A12, 15, 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 
  28, 36, 56
  Pionsenay  7, 25
  plunder  10, 32, 46, 54
  Point C  43, 44, 45
  power  15, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 39, 40
  quivers  A12, 15, B20, 26
  raiders/raiding  5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, A12, 14, 15, 
  16, 17, 19, B20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 
  C32, 35, 43, 47, 56
  ranchers  31, 48, 50, 52, 53, 54
  rearguard  9, 45, 55, 58
  Remington  4, 29, F48, 51, G56
  reservations  4, 7, 8, 9, 18, 31, 32, 34, 53, 
  54, 59 
  Chiricahua  7; Mescalero  46, 47; 
  Ojo Caliente  32, 34, 39, 40; San Carlos  4, 
  7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 18, 32, 34, 40, 47, 58; Warm 
  Springs Apache  8
  revolvers  26, 27, 35, 48, 51, G56
  rifles: 
  breech-loading  28, G56; Henry  A12, 27, 
  G56; repeating  4, A12, 27, 28, 29, 30, 
  31, 34, D36, F48, 50, G56; Sharps  G56; 
  single-shot  4, 29, 30, G56; Spencer  A12, 
  27, 34, 50, G56; Springfield  4, A12, 24, 27, 
  29, 34, E40, F48, G56, 58
  Rio Las Animas  14
  risk analysis  10, 11, 14
  rituals  20, 22
  sabres  A12, 28
  San Mateo Mountains  6, 32, 38, 51, 52
  scratching sticks  22, 27
  Sierra Enmedio  9
  Sierra Madre Mountains  9, 14, 18, 25, 34, 58
  signal fire  B20, 45, 46, 47, 54
  slingshots  A12, 28
  smoke signals  45, 47
  Southwest, the  31, C32, 34, 50, 54, 60
  Steins Peak  46, 47
  Taza  7, 25
  telegraph lines  46, 47
  telescopes  30, C32, G56
  tinajas  42, 44
  trading  6, A12, 15, 31, C32, 34, 35, 43, 48, 
  50, 51, 52, 53, 54, G56
  training  16, 17, 18, 19, B20, 23, 24, 42, 54
  trains  7, 10, 11, 28, 38, 43, 58
  Tres Castillos  4, 8, 16, 17, 25, 26, 39, 55, 56, 
  58, H60
  Ulzana/Jolsanny/Josanie  9, 23, 42, F48
  United States, the  5, 7, 8, 9, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 
  43, 46, 53, 54, 59, 60; US Army  4, 6, 8, 10, 
  14, 24, 28, 29, 31, C32, 38, 39, 42, 43, 46, 
  47, 48, 50, 55, 58
  Victorio  4, 5, 6, 8, 14, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
  30, 32, 34, 35, D36, 39, E40, 42, 48, 50, 
  51, 53, 54, 56, H60
  war dance  15, 16
  warfare  4, 7, 10, 14, 16, 23, 24, 31, 32, 35, 
  40, 42, 55, 56, 59 
  guerrilla  16, 20, 23, 59
  Warm Springs Apaches  4, 8
  warriors  4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, A12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
  18, 19, B20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
  30, 31, C32, 34, 35, D36, 39, E40, 42, 43, 
  45, 46, 47, F48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, G56, 58, 
  59, H60, 62
  women  18, 35, 39, 40, 42, 43, 56, 58
  INDEX
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
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  First published in Great Britain in 2014 by Osprey Publishing,
  PO Box 883, Oxford, OX1 9PL, UK
  PO Box 3985, New York, NY 10185-3985, USA
  E-mail: info@ospreypublishing.com
  © 2014 Osprey Publishing Ltd
  OSPREY PUBLISHING IS PART OF THE OSPREY GROUP.
  All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private 
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  Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be 
  reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form 
  or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, 
  photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written 
  permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed 
  to the Publishers.
  A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
  ISBN: 978 1 4728 0352 8
  E-book ISBN: 978 1 4728 0354 2
  PDF ISBN:  978 1 4728 0353 5
  Editorial by Ilios Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com)
  Index by Mark Swift
  Typeset in Myriad Pro and Sabon
  Artwork by Adam Hook
  Originated by PDQ Media, UK
  www.ospreypublishing.com
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  the images in this publication. If there has been any oversight we would be 
  happy to rectify the situation and written submission should be made to 
  Osprey Publishing.
  ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
  The author would like to thank the following for their help 
  and encouragement:
  Catherine Edwards, Willy Dobak, Dan Aranda, Emilio Tapia, Lynda Sanchez, 
  Deni Seymour, Berndt Kuhn, Ed Sweeney, Bill Cavaliere, Eric and Kathy 
  Fuller, Spike Flanders, Frank Brito, Mary Williams, Karl Laumbach, Toni Sudar 
  Laumbach, Ron Burkett, James Irby, Allan Radbourne, Robert Wooster, 
  Durwood Ball, Bruce Dinges, Diana Hadley, Bob Roland, James Rees, 
  Richard North, Craig Springer, Jay Van Orden, Richard Wakefield, Frank 
  Parrish, Stephen Lekson, Anthony Romero, Joe Arcure, Kathy Klump, Alan 
  Ferg, Bernd Brand, Laraine Daly Jones, J.R. Absher, Kira Watt, Lincoln County 
  Historical Society, Arizona Historical Society (AHS), Geronimo Springs 
  Museum, Deming Luna County Museum, Hillsboro Historical Society, 
  Chiricahua Regional Museum.
  ARTIST’S NOTE 
  Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour 
  plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. The 
  Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries 
  should be addressed to:
  Scorpio, 158 Mill Road, Hailsham, East Sussex BN27 2SH, UK 
  scorpiopaintings@btinternet.com
  The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon 
  this matter.
  Front cover: 
  Four Chiricahua Apache warriors photographed by C. S. Fly of Tombstone 
  during General Crook’s conference with Geronimo in Canon De Los Embudos, 
  March, 1886. From left to right Yanozha, Chappo (son of Geronimo), 
  Yahe-chul (also known as Fun) and Geronimo. Yahe-chul was a particularly 
  courageous fighter winning particular distinction in a savage battle with 
  Mexican troops in 1882. (See p. 58) They are armed, again from left to right, 
  two Winchester repeating rifles, a Springfield carbine and a Springfield rifle. 
  (US Army Heritage and Education Center)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Osprey System/Campaign Series (CAM)/Osprey - WAR 172 - Apache Warrior 1860-86.pdf