TEXT: e23.sjgames.com
  Stock #82-0142
  Version 1.0 August 23, 2004
  STEVE JACKSON GAMES
  ®
  GURPS,  Warehouse 23, and the all-seeing pyramid are registered trademarks of  Steve
  Jackson Games Incorporated. Pyramid, GURPS WWII: Leyte Gulf, e23, and the names of
  all products published by Steve Jackson Games Incorporated are registered trademarks or
  trademarks of Steve Jackson Games Incorporated, or used under license. Some art copy-
  right © 2004 www.clipart.com. All rights reserved. GURPS WWII: Leyte Gulf is copy-
  right © 2004 by Steve Jackson Games Incorporated. The scanning, uploading, and distri-
  bution of this material via the Internet or via any other means without the permission of
  the publisher is illegal, and punishable by law. Please purchase only authorized electronic
  editions, and do not participate in or encourage the electronic piracy of copyrighted mate-
  rials. Your support of the author’s rights is appreciated.
  By Vincent Cooper
  Edited by Gene Seabolt
  Maps by Ed Bourelle
  A N  E 2 3  S O U R C E B O O K  
  F O R
  G U R P S ®
  F R O M
  S T E V E  J A C K S O N  G A M E S
  F O R  3  T O  6  P L A Y E R S
  Leyte Gulf
  
  The Battle of Leyte Gulf is neither widely known
  by the general public nor the subject of exciting war
  movies. It is, however, famous for several reasons. It
  remains the largest naval action ever fought, and on the
  Japanese side included the two largest warships the
  world had seen. It also witnessed the return of
  MacArthur to the Philippines. Finally, the infamous
  Japanese kamikaze suicide pilots first sortied in this
  engagement.
  COLLISION
  COURSE
  U.S. General Douglas MacArthur had convinced
  Filipino President Manual L. Quezon to appoint him to
  the splendid rank of field marshal – but the egotistical
  MacArthur was a defeated man when he boarded a
  patrol boat on the night of March 11, 1942, to flee the
  Philippines. Regardless, head held high, he made a vow
  to return, one that bordered on arrogance given the
  overwhelming Japanese victories of the time. In the
  next two years, however, the United States turned the
  tide and began to bear down on the Japanese empire
  with overwhelming might. In early 1944, the Allied
  advances reached a decision point: Should their main
  thrust continue toward Formosa (the direct route to
  Japan) or divert to the Philippines (an important
  resource in what remained of the Japanese conquests)?
  MacArthur skillfully argued against U.S. Admiral
  Chester Nimitz to convince U.S. President Roosevelt in
  late July 1944 that the Philippines should be given pri-
  ority. The landing of U.S. forces at Leyte was scheduled
  for December 20, 1944. Admiral William Halsey
  already was roaming the area with his 3rd Fleet, how-
  ever, meeting little opposition and overwhelming those
  Japanese forces he did encounter. Given that intelli-
  gence, the aggressive U.S. commanders brought the
  invasion date forward.
  American troops went ashore on October 20 and
  met some opposition, but not nearly enough to prevent
  the establishment of beachheads. Four hours later,
  MacArthur fulfilled his promise to return, and prompt-
  ly made it clear that Leyte was as much a personal vic-
  tory as a political or military goal. “I have returned,” he
  intoned in a speech on the landing beach, ignoring the
  thousands of troops and sailors also involved in the
  invasion. “I now call upon your supreme effort. . . .
  Rally to me.”
  Meanwhile, the increasingly desperate Japanese
  had anticipated that the Americans might return to the
  Philippines; their high command drew up four plans for
  counterattacks depending on whether the main Allied
  thrust targeted the Philippines, Formosa, the Ryukyus,
  or Kyushu. Sho Ichi Go (Operation Victory One) dealt
  with the Philippine archipelago. The plan was for the
  various elements of the Japanese fleet to converge on
  the invasion area and utterly wipe out the Allied land-
  ing force. No provision was made as to what would
  happen next, and it isn’t clear that even the planners
  LEYTE GULF
  2
  1. AN EPIC
  END
  
  expected the desperate measure to succeed. At a mini-
  mum, though, they intended to inflict so many casual-
  ties that the United States would feel compelled to offer
  easier terms for ending the war.
  The effort was to be an “all-or-nothing” rush to
  glory or defeat. Japanese Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s
  force of mostly empty aircraft carriers would act as a
  decoy; they would approach from the north to lure
  Halsey’s deadly 3rd Fleet away from the battle. Mean-
  while, a Center Force and two southern fleets of surface
  warships would converge on Leyte Gulf in a pincers
  movement.
  The complex plan called for precise timing and a
  great deal of luck. The center and two southern groups
  would take direct routes to Leyte Gulf through narrow
  straits that would leave them highly vulnerable to air
  attacks if detected, but offered good odds of rapidly
  slipping under the “umbrella” of aerial reconnaissance
  undetected. With good fortune, and if the Japanese
  admirals coordinated the attack well, it held the possi-
  bility of achieving complete surprise.
  Fittingly, Japanese prewar naval strategy – prior to
  the rise of the aircraft carriers – had anticipated a final
  fleet encounter between Japan and the United States in
  the region of the Philippines. The superbattleships Yam-
  ato and Musashi had been built to carry the day in
  exactly this sort of epic confrontation. Now, for the first
  time, these two vessels would join the war. The hopes
  of the Japanese military leadership sailed with them.
  THE
  BATTLE OF
  LEYTE
  GULF
  The following narrative does not weigh events as a
  standard history would, presenting the ebb and flow of
  the Battle of Leyte Gulf from an admiral’s perspective.
  Instead, it briefly describes the larger scheme of things,
  while isolating particularly good opportunities for role-
  playing in greater detail.
  The events take place from October 23-25, 1944.
  To maintain the proper feel, times are given in military
  format, with p.m. times adding 12 to their civilian nota-
  tion. Thus, 0630 is 6:30 a.m. while 1830 means 6:30
  p.m.
  This chapter only briefly describes the types of
  ships and composition of units involved in the battle.
  Those with no previous familiarity with the Battle of
  Leyte Gulf can find more complete descriptions of the
  forces in Chapter 2.
  LEYTE GULF
  3
  ADMIRAL TAKEO
  KURITA
  Takeo Kurita was born in 1899. He graduat-
  ed from the Japanese Naval Academy at Etiji-
  ma and commenced a career that included
  service on destroyers and cruisers. He was
  present at Midway, Guadalcanal, and the Battle
  of the Philippine Sea. He was uncertain, if not
  defeatist, in the exercise of his commands, to
  the extent that he had retreated and abandoned
  his shore bombardment when faced with four
  torpedo boats at Guadalcanal. His willingness
  to retreat in the face of a strong fighting spirit
  (not to be confused with a numerically stronger
  or more powerful opposition) was underscored
  at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, when Kuri-
  ta quickly advocated withdrawal. This tenden-
  cy to avoid risk became an important factor in
  the battle off Samar Island on October 25. On
  the other hand, he was a recognized expert in
  the use of torpedoes, and for his entire career
  had served on surface ships, which would play
  the dominant role in the fighting this day.
  
  BATTLE STATIONS!
  The U.S. military command knew that the defense-
  less supply ships and transports anchored in Leyte Gulf
  would make a very tempting target for their opponents,
  so deadly Navy submarines prowled the waters around
  the staging area, serving as the eyes of the 3rd and 7th
  fleets. They included the Darter under Commander
  David McClintock and the Dace under Commander
  Bladen Claggett. These vessels had formed a two-sub
  wolfpack to patrol the entrance of Palawan Passage,
  near the treacherous Dangerous Ground. These waters
  that led into the Sibuyan Sea had earned their no-non-
  sense name because of the large number of ships that
  had been wrecked over the centuries on their coral
  reefs.
  As October 23 began, Darter and Dace loitered on
  the calm surface, a short distance apart, exchanging
  information. At 0116 the radar screen on Darter picked
  up a contact at 30,000 yards. Eager for an engagement,
  both subs immediately dived and maneuvered into a
  position to shadow the approaching contact. It proved
  to be more than two dozen ships . . . the Japanese Cen-
  ter Force, under Admiral Takeo Kurita. This was rather
  more opportunity than they had anticipated. The U.S.
  submariners refrained from attacking immediately.
  Instead, they tailed the Japanese, in order to assess the
  fleet’s strength in the dawn light. In the meantime, they
  made preliminary estimates and radioed them off. The
  first reached Halsey around 0630.
  Kurita’s fleet was sailing in two columns. The port
  (or left) column was led by Kurita in his flagship, the
  heavy cruiser Atago. The starboard column was cen-
  tered on the Yamato and the Musashi, the two superbat-
  tleships built secretly in defiance of prewar naval
  treaties. Inexplicably, Kurita had not set a destroyer
  screen ahead of his force to prowl for submarines. Fur-
  thermore, though his fleet could sail at speeds that few
  submarines could match, it maintained only a stately 16
  knots. Japan had very little oil left, and Kurita’s bunkers
  had not been filled even for this decisive assignment.
  He had to nurse his fleet’s fuel.
  After making a final report, the Darter took an
  attack position to launch torpedoes at the port column.
  The Dace maneuvered so as to be able to make a later
  run on the starboard ships. The first kills of the largest
  naval battle in history were only moments away.
  TORPEDOES AWAY
  At 0632, the Darter fired six torpedoes at the lead
  target at a range inside 1,000 yards. Immediately turn-
  ing, McClintock was able to fire four more “fish” from
  the stern tubes. The noise of explosions was heard
  shortly after, and the view that greeted the commander
  through his periscope was “the sight of a lifetime.” The
  Atago was burning fiercely and already sinking. Torpe-
  does also slammed into the Takao, behind the flagship,
  but the heavy cruiser did not sink. It did withdraw from
  the battle, however, and took with it two destroyers for
  protection, furthering weakening the Center Force. The
  Darter dove to avoid vengeful destroyers.
  Minutes later, Claggett patiently controlled his
  excitement, allowing two light cruisers to pass him by
  as he waited for richer pickings. The third vessel of the
  starboard column came into view and Dace fired off its
  brace of torpedoes at 0654. Shortly after, explosions
  were heard on both the Dace and the Darter. The
  Japanese heavy cruiser Maya had been hit and sank
  within four minutes. Had Claggett waited for just one
  more target to come into view, it would have been the
  Yamato. Dace then began to evade reprisals from the
  Japanese ships, enduring two depth-charge attacks
  without damage, despite the proximity of the explo-
  sions.
  DD To the Rescue
  As Atago sank beneath the waves, Kurita was
  forced to find safety in a rubber lifeboat. Command of
  the Center Force transferred to Vice Admiral Matome
  Ugaki, commander of Battle Division 1, aboard the
  mighty Yamato. He ordered a radical change of course
  LEYTE GULF
  4
  WHAT IF?
  If Darter and Dace had not detected Kurita’s
  Center Force, then the Japanese plan could
  have worked, perhaps even resulting in the sin-
  gle most deadly day in U.S. naval history.
  There were no other Allied submarines in the
  Sibuyan Sea to intercept Kurita, though he
  might well have been spotted by air patrols. As
  described in the main text, Halsey set off in pur-
  suit of Ozawa’s northern carrier force though
  he had spotted Kurita, because he believed him
  to be retreating. Had the U.S. commanders had
  either more or less information, it is likely that
  as the Japanese fleet emerged from San
  Bernardino Strait, Halsey would have been
  waiting for it – though with less information the
  Americans would have been taken by surprise,
  and been considerably less ready to fight.
  Regardless, the U.S. 3rd Fleet would have gone
  up against both the Yamato and the Musashi
  (which would not have been sunk without the
  reports from Darter and Dace). Such a battle
  would no doubt have been grand, bloody, and
  decisive for one side or the other.
  
  as a precaution against further torpedo attacks, but soon
  after resumed the previous course.
  Kurita was fished out of the seas near Palawan
  Island by the destroyer Kishinami. He would eventual-
  ly board the Yamato (his new flagship) in the afternoon
  of October 24 and once again take command.
  Aside from the losses inflicted by the Darter and
  Dace, the Allied forces had obtained three other impor-
  tant victories. The foremost was the detection of the
  Center Force. The second was that the Atago suffered
  so much damage and sank so rapidly that key commu-
  nication personnel were lost, a fact that would eventu-
  ally come to haunt the Japanese fleet. Finally, the seeds
  of doubt and defeat had been planted in the mind of a
  commander not known for his steely resolve under fire.
  DANGEROUS GROUND
  As the Center Force, under the temporary com-
  mand of Ugaki, left the area, McClintock bided his
  time. He returned to periscope depth at 0920 and
  observed the damaged Takao withdrawing under guard
  with air surveillance loitering overhead. For five hours,
  the Darter tried to maneuver into an attack position, but
  McClintock had to finally give up for the moment and
  settle on joining the Dace to seek another kill sometime
  after dark.
  Then disaster struck. The Darter had been navigat-
  ing the torturous Palawan Passage by dead reckoning
  for more than 24 hours. Shortly after midnight on Octo-
  ber 24, the luck of the USS Darter ran out. The subma-
  rine ran aground on Bombay Shoal, a jagged coral reef.
  Immediately, a Japanese destroyer headed to the area,
  but was unable to locate the source of the noise it had
  picked up and retreated again. Attempts to free the
  Darter failed, and with dawn approaching McClintock
  was forced to order abandon ship. The crew transferred
  to Dace. Explosives failed to suitably destroy the
  rugged sub, as did torpedoes and gunfire from the
  Dace. As dawn broke, a Japanese plane arrived and
  promptly bombed the hapless Darter, presumably
  believing it to be a viable target and more easily hit than
  the Dace, which was under way. Darter remained intact
  in the face of the additional abuse. (Six days later,
  friendly forces finally were able to send the submarine
  to the bottom of the ocean.) The Dace, crammed with
  two full crews, sailed back to Fremantle, in Western
  Australia. A lack of sleeping space and a diet of soup
  and peanut-butter sandwiches on the return journey
  didn’t stop the sailors from celebrating their victories.
  ENEMY FLEET
  SIGHTED
  Despite the losses suffered in Palawan Passage, the
  Center Force remained formidable. After Kurita
  resumed command, his group continued sailing through
  the night to the Sibuyan Sea.
  Owing to the report from the Darter on the morn-
  ing of October 24, Halsey had ordered reconnaissance
  planes to take to the air and track down the Japanese
  force. Each team was comprised of one Helldiver
  bomber and two Hellcat fighters, and would sweep 10º
  of an arc extending over the search area. Crucially,
  Halsey didn’t order searches to the north or northeast at
  this time; he was worried about the lack of available air
  cover should a Japanese attack be launched against his
  ships.
  Lieutenant Adams, a Helldiver pilot aboard the
  Intrepid, took off just before 0600. A veteran of many
  air battles since the summer, he welcomed the complex
  geography of the Philippine islands that contrasted
  sharply with the large expanses of featureless water that
  he was used to navigating.
  Near Mindoro Island, he picked up his first radar
  contract. Soon, he and his wingmen spotted the white
  churning wakes of the Japanese ships, easily detected
  on the ocean below. Minutes later, the ships themselves
  could easily be seen. A rapid radio broadcast followed,
  and was relayed to Halsey. Aggressive to the bone, the
  Bull immediately ordered an air attack, bypassing Vice
  Admiral Marc Mitscher, the resident expert on carrier
  warfare. Halsey’s orders from Nimitz prohibited him
  from sailing through San Bernardino Strait to seek a
  surface battle. The U.S. Navy suspected that the Japan-
  ese had laid lethal minefields throughout the internal
  seas of the Philippines.
  DOGFIGHT
  Though Halsey was predictably eager for a fight,
  and issued orders to that effect, it still took time to make
  the necessary arrangements. In the meantime, the
  Japanese launched aircraft from Luzon at Rear Admiral
  Frederick C. Sherman’s Group 3, part of Task Force 38
  (designated TG 38.3), which was itself part of Halsey’s
  3rd Fleet.
  The Japanese planes came in three waves. All the
  attacks were broken up, but not without some heroic
  piloting. Commander David McCampbell led seven
  Hellcats that scrambled from the USS Essex and coura-
  geously climbed to engage about 60 enemy planes (an
  assortment of fighters, bombers, and torpedo-bombers).
  They won an incredible victory. The bombers were
  quickly scared away, leaving the fighters flying to
  maintain a tight protective circle. For over an hour,
  LEYTE GULF
  5
  
  McCampbell and his group took their time in finding
  targets of opportunity. The group battled until low fuel
  and ammunition forced a return to first the Essex, then
  the Lexington, and finally the Langley. (The first two
  carriers had no deck space to land a plane, and AA
  crews on the Essex actually opened fire on McCamp-
  bell in confusion.) McCampbell shot down at least nine
  planes, a combat record that still stands to this day. His
  wingman scored six, and the other pilots shot down at
  least two each. For his exploits, McCampbell was
  awarded the Medal of Honor. He would finish the war
  with 35 confirmed kills, the most recorded by any naval
  pilot.
  DISASTER STRIKES
  As successful as the American pilots were in
  repelling the waves of enemy planes, one Japanese
  plane – a “Judy” dive bomber, skillfully piloted –
  dropped out of low cloud cover over the USS Princeton
  at 0938. Breaking through a veritable hail of AA gun-
  fire, the pilot dropped his 550-lb. bomb on target before
  being shot down. The ordnance tore through three
  decks before exploding in the bake shop. The blast
  wave reached six stowed Avengers, armed and ready
  for an attack. The aviation fuel carried by the planes
  then ignited, and in turn set off the torpedoes slung
  below each fuselage. At 1000, the Princeton came to a
  stop and soon after all crew members except the fire-
  fighting parties were ordered to abandon ship.
  Sherman arranged his forces to provide air cover –
  thus delaying an attack on Kurita for the time being –
  and several destroyers came alongside the flaming
  Princeton to provide support in fighting the fires and
  removing the crew. Captain Thomas Inglis of the Birm-
  ingham took command of this operation, and several
  volunteers boarded the carrier to help fight the fires
  more directly.
  During the course of the attempt to save the
  Princeton, a false submarine sighting was reported.
  Meanwhile, a large raid from Ozawa’s Northern Force,
  using almost all of his available planes, was broken up
  several miles from the task group. (Ozawa had intend-
  ed the attack to lure 3rd Fleet into pursuing him, but for
  the moment the Japanese timing appeared to be badly
  bungled, with the Luzon-based attack and sighting of
  Kurita’s force pinning the Americans in place.) No fur-
  ther damage was inflicted on the men and ships of TG
  38.3.
  Five hours passed, and the commanders in the res-
  cue-and-salvage operation decided that anything that
  would explode on Princeton already would have
  exploded. It seemed that both crew and ship would be
  largely saved. At 1523 the Birmingham moved into
  position to tow the heavily damaged vessel.
  Then everyone’s luck ran out.
  DD Carnage
  As the Birmingham closed to set up a towline with
  the Princeton, the deck of the rescuing vessel was alive
  with seamen. Firefighters, medics, AA crews, and
  sailors setting up the towlines were all hard at work.
  Meanwhile, the flames on the stricken carrier finally
  reached the torpedo stores.
  The resulting explosion was colossal. Sharp shards
  of metal rocketed through the air as the Princeton
  became a huge fragmentation grenade. The deadly
  shrapnel cuts its way across the crowded decks of the
  Birmingham. “Blood ran freely down the waterways
  and continued to run for some time,” said one eyewit-
  ness – 229 crewmen were killed, while 420 more were
  wounded. The volunteer firefighters on the deck of the
  Princeton were similarly torn to pieces.
  Rent and bleeding sailors, many barely adults,
  refused immediate treatment. They directed medics to
  give aid to fallen comrades with even more serious
  wounds. Others demanded to be simply hit over the
  head to dull the pain, rather than be given morphine
  when others, in far worse condition, clearly needed it
  more.
  Finally, it was conceded that the Princeton could
  not be saved. The USS Irwin had bumped into the car-
  rier on several occasions during the rescue attempt,
  damaging its torpedo director. Nevertheless, it fired its
  fish to scuttle the vessel. The Irwin’s misguided torpe-
  does almost hit their own ship on two occasions, doing
  U-turns in the water. It was finally left to the Reno to
  sink Princeton, which became the U.S. Navy’s first
  major warship loss to air attack since January 1943. The
  toll included 108 men on board with another 190
  wounded.
  The warships Birmingham, Gatling, Irwin, and
  Morrison all left the battle area to journey to Ulithi for
  repairs.
  ENTERPRISE ENTERS
  THE FRAY
  The Japanese Center Force was not the only one to
  fail to reach Leyte Gulf undetected. Also on the morn-
  ing of October 24, U.S. planes detected the larger of the
  two groups approaching from the south, called the
  Southern Force. Under Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura,
  this fleet was heading into the Mindanao Sea, between
  the islands of Negros and Mindanao, when spotted
  about 0900. (Sources disagree on the precise time.)
  Planes from the USS Enterprise launched an attack
  at 0918, but it had little effect and certainly did not deter
  Nishimura. The battleship Fuso and destroyer Shigure
  suffered some damage. No further attacks were forth-
  coming that day, as Halsey chose to concentrate TG
  38.4 – the southernmost of his task groups, under Rear
  LEYTE GULF
  6
  
  Admiral Ralph E. Davison – against Kurita. Halsey
  also considered that Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid’s
  7th Fleet was more than capable of dealing with the
  southern threat, though on this occasion – as at a crucial
  time later in the battle – Halsey neglected to make his
  conclusion or his intentions clear to his comrade.
  At this point in the battle, late in the morning of
  October 24, the Japanese had lost almost all surprise on
  both the center and southern prongs of their pincer
  attack. Both fleets had attempted to reach Leyte Gulf by
  stealth, and failed, while the Northern Force – which
  wanted to be detected – remained beyond American
  notice. The Japanese still had a minor element of sur-
  prise on their side because the smaller southern group,
  under Admiral Kiyohide Shima, was operating inde-
  pendently of the Southern Force proper – but Shima’s
  ships had to pass through the same confined waters in
  which the Southern Force had been spotted. A reason-
  able Japanese observer could conclude that the
  empire’s proud warships were steaming toward a deba-
  cle – but circumstances would soon reopen their win-
  dow of opportunity.
  THE BATTLE OF
  SIBUYAN SEA
  At the same time that the Birmingham was fighting
  to save the doomed Princeton, U.S. pilots were sav-
  aging Kurita’s Center Force. For most of October 24,
  Kurita’s vessels were under almost constant attack, as
  six waves of aircraft soared through the clouds to dis-
  pense death and destruction on the ships of war that cut
  through the waves below.
  Kurita had sighted Adams and his escort of Hell-
  cats at 0810 and immediately put his group on full alert.
  Trained AA crews took their positions, and all available
  eyes turned upward to survey the blue, cloud-dotted
  sky. Then, at 1020, the first specks appeared on the
  horizon, some 40 minutes after the Princeton had been
  struck.
  The first wave was from TG 38.2, under Rear
  Admiral Gerald F. Bogan, and consisted of Hellcats,
  Helldivers, and Avengers. Defensive fire was reason-
  ably accurate, but was not successful enough to deter
  the Americans. Both the Musashi and Myoko were
  struck, the latter being forced to retire and return to
  Brunei. As the Sho Ichi Go plan stipulated, no air cover
  was provided – instead, the few Japanese planes that
  remained available would be consolidated to attack
  American ships at a decisive moment. Kurita and his
  brave crews could only grit their teeth and bear the
  brunt of the assault.
  The second wave, also from TG 38.2, swooped
  down at 1245. By this time, Kurita’s force had entered
  the Sibuyan Sea. The planes concentrated on the
  Musashi, and were able to inflict enough damage to
  force the great battleship to slow and drop behind the
  main formation. The third wave faced still-accurate AA
  fire at 1330, and several planes from TG 38.3 were
  destroyed. Both the Musashi and Yamato were targeted
  successfully. By this time, the Musashi was in serious
  trouble, and the heavy cruiser Tone was dispatched to
  provide cover for the limping giant.
  Three more attacks followed, often overlapping,
  one from each remaining task group under Halsey. The
  Yamato suffered further damage, as did the Nagato and
  the Haruna. The Musashi’s death knell was sounded by
  planes from TG 38.4 under Davison. This was the only
  sortie flown by the pilots of this group against Kurita,
  though they had earlier attacked Nishimura. The pilots
  from the Enterprise and Franklin had a field day
  against the slow-moving superbattleship. At the end of
  the attack, Admiral Toshihei Inoguchi, commander of
  the Musashi, was ordered to beach his titan on Sibuyan
  Island. Escorted by two destroyers that replaced the
  Tone, the Musashi never made it. At 1935, the behe-
  moth sank beneath the waters of the Sibuyan Sea.
  Shortly after, a huge underwater explosion erupted. The
  Musashi was slain. Inoguchi, 38 other officers, and 984
  men went with it. The survivors eventually made their
  way to Manila and participated in the defense of that
  city in February and March of 1945. As Admiral
  Isoroku Yamamoto had earlier predicted, the Musashi
  was sunk before being able to engage its huge guns
  against an enemy ship. Air power reigned supreme.
  As Kurita and his men came to terms with the fact
  that an “indestructible” superbattleship had been sunk
  in a few hours of air attacks, the sixth and final wave
  flew in. The planes were again from TG 38.2 and the
  pilots were making their third sortie of the day. Tired
  LEYTE GULF
  7
  VICE ADMIRAL SHOJI
  NISHIMURA
  Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura had estab-
  lished a less-than-exemplary service record
  during the Pacific War. In February 1942, the
  failure of his destroyers to challenge U.S.
  ships allowed a victory in the Makassar Strait
  to go to his enemy. Later in the same year, he
  bungled a torpedo attack in the Battle of the
  Java Sea. He lost more ships in the Guadal-
  canal campaign and more the following year
  in an attack on Vella Lavella. One author has
  suggested that Nishimura may have had a
  death wish owing to the loss of his son, Teiji,
  in the Philippines. This may explain in part his
  fearless charge through Surigao Strait on
  October 24.
  
  and nervous above the targets, the aviators apparently
  achieved very little in the way of material damage
  against the Center Force. But, as the last plane turned
  away toward its home carrier, a remarkable sight could
  be discerned below. It seemed that this final attack had
  proved too much for Kurita. At 1600, his force began
  reversing course. It appeared that Halsey had won, and
  it seemed that the beaches of Leyte Gulf would be safe
  from an attack from this central approach.
  MISCOMMUNICATION
  In the hours following the American victory in the
  Sibuyan Sea, a series of decisions and miscommunica-
  tions occurred that very nearly meant disaster for the
  invasion force on the beaches of Leyte.
  The U.S. pilots, like all combat aviators, were
  prone to confusion over their targets. As a result, claims
  of damage were almost inevitably wildly inflated. This
  was an understood fact of life for experts on carrier-
  based warfare, such as Mitscher, commander of Task
  Force 38 Fast Carrier Force and an adviser to Halsey.
  Unfortunately, Halsey himself seems to have taken the
  reports of his victorious airmen at face value. He was
  inclined to believe what his pilots told him – that they
  had severely damaged Kurita’s force, rendering it unfit
  LEYTE GULF
  8
  WHAT IF?
  History points to the Japanese failure to
  provide Kurita with air cover as a potentially
  battle-turning mistake. GMs who want to
  explore variations on this epic battle might
  have the Japanese planes from Luzon provide
  combat air patrols for Kurita (which would
  require flying in relay) rather than attack Task
  Group 38.3.
  This would deny the pilot McCampbell and
  his men the opportunity to stage their aerial
  heroics. Nor would the Princeton have been
  sunk, nor the destroyers that came to aid her
  have been damaged while doing so. The disas-
  ter that befell the Birmingham would not
  therefore have happened, either. On the other
  hand, the U.S. pilots attacking Center Force
  might have had a much tougher time of it.
  Consider also the repercussions for later in
  the battle, particularly with regard to Halsey’s
  decision to move northward. Depending on the
  success (or lack of it) that his pilots had expe-
  rienced above their targets, his fateful choice
  to head north, based on the observation that
  Kurita appeared to be retiring, might well have
  been different.
  ADMIRAL WILLIAM F.
  HALSEY
  Admiral William F. Halsey’s aggressive
  nature earned him the popular nickname
  “Bull.” He led the naval counterattack against
  the Japanese in the Pacific, striking against the
  Marshall Islands in January 1941. He then led
  the task force that enabled the “Doolittle
  Raid” to be carried out against Tokyo. Both
  actions inflicted minimal damage, but caused
  a surge of confidence. Halsey’s first major
  victory came in the Guadalcanal campaign
  when, after relieving the former commander,
  he was able to finally secure victory against
  superior Japanese naval and air forces that had
  been highly confident of their own success.
  Like many other colorful commanders,
  Halsey cheerfully ignored rules when he felt
  that they got in the way of results. His fighting
  spirit and “loose cannon” image played a part
  in his decision to head north after Ozawa on
  the evening of October 24. A cooler head,
  however, might have reached the same con-
  clusion: The commander of 5th Fleet, Admiral
  Raymond Spruance, was roundly criticized
  for failing to pursue the Japanese fleet when it
  put in an appearance at the Marianas in the
  summer of 1944 during the Allied invasion.
  Spruance had instead decided to follow his
  orders and maintain the defense of the land-
  ings. Halsey was determined not to repeat
  what he and many others saw as a mistake.
  
  for combat, and that it was now retreating away from
  the Sibuyan Sea.
  At this point, Halsey still had no inkling that
  Ozawa was nearby with his toothless carriers. While his
  waves of planes fought to sink the Yamato and Musashi,
  Halsey finally ordered reconnaissance flights toward
  the north on October 24. At 1540, shortly before the
  sixth wave was to retire, these U.S. flights finally spot-
  ted part of Ozawa’s Northern Force. Soon after, anoth-
  er plane even farther north reported the sighting of two
  destroyers. Then, at 1640, a pilot incorrectly reported
  sighting two fleet carriers, one light carrier, and several
  support vessels forming a protective screen around
  them. Though the details were off, the Americans had
  finally noticed the Japanese bait.
  Ozawa was playing his part in the overall strategy
  of Sho Ichi Go as well as he could. He had begun the
  campaign by breaking radio silence, in the hope of
  alerting the Americans to his presence. Before noon on
  October 24, he launched the majority of the few planes
  that he had to attack Halsey’s force from the north –
  clearly indicating that carriers were in the vicinity. Still,
  Halsey failed to take notice. Ozawa therefore ordered a
  detachment south to threaten 3rd Fleet in the afternoon,
  and it was the destroyer screen of this force that was
  first sighted.
  Halsey was aggressive to the point of being rash.
  He nursed a deep hatred of the Japanese that could lead
  him to underrate his enemy. Though he took pride in
  being a maverick, his superiors greatly appreciated his
  indomitable fighting spirit. As commander in chief of
  the Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT or, more commonly,
  CINCPAC), Nimitz had added a caveat to Halsey’s
  orders prior to operations at Leyte Gulf. He advised his
  subordinate that “in case opportunity for destruction of
  major portion of the enemy fleet is offered or can be
  created, such destruction becomes the primary task.”
  Thus, while Halsey’s primary mission was to help
  ensure the success of the beach landings on Leyte, he
  had a clear “escape clause” allowing him to abandon
  this responsibility to seek out a major naval victory.
  As evening arrived on October 24, Halsey believed
  that Kurita was retreating with a ravaged fleet. Scout
  planes had found a “major portion of the enemy fleet”
  to the north and Halsey possessed more than enough
  firepower to bring about its destruction. Furthermore,
  this new northern target included carriers, the richest
  prize in naval fighting. Halsey also was concerned that
  this northern fleet would allow the Japanese to “shuttle-
  bomb” the American units, which would involve hop-
  ping from carriers to a land base on Leyte’s far side,
  thus doubling the number of bombing runs that the
  Japanese could make with each round trip. Halsey
  decided that his primary task had become pursuing the
  northern Japanese force. Not everyone close to the U.S.
  commander agreed with his evaluation, but he brushed
  off any protests or advice.
  Though his conclusion was sound enough, his fol-
  lowing decision to send his entire fleet in pursuit has
  been debated ever since. It certainly conformed with
  centuries of naval doctrine that stressed concentrating
  one’s forces, but it left San Bernardino Strait unguard-
  ed. Halsey appreciated that – having already tried once
  to attack from that direction – the Japanese might try
  again. At 1512 on October 24, he issued a battle order
  to create Task Force 34 in the event of a renewed attack.
  This would consist of four battleships, three heavy
  cruisers, three light cruisers, and two squadrons of
  destroyers. This task force was to deal with Kurita
  should he turn about and attempt to pass through San
  LEYTE GULF
  9
  WHAT IF?
  Having sailed undetected, Ozawa sent out
  seemingly careless radio messages on October
  21, in hopes that the U.S. 3rd Fleet would pick
  them up and come search for him, leaving San
  Bernardino open for Kurita. Had Halsey
  picked up this traffic, he probably would have
  reacted exactly according to the Japanese plan.
  The Center Force had not been detected yet,
  and the passage through the straits was a very
  bold move by the Japanese given their limited
  air cover.
  In this scenario, allowing a day for searches
  and maneuvering, it is most likely that Ozawa
  would have been attacked, probably at some
  time on the 23rd, and defeated. How much of
  his force that Halsey would have taken north is
  difficult to guess. Perhaps he would have fol-
  lowed the same thought process that he did on
  the 24th and refused to divide his force. A cru-
  cial point, though, is that both Kinkaid and
  Nimitz would have been aware of the situation
  and San Bernardino Strait would have been
  constantly searched.
  Assuming that other events happened as
  they did, Darter and Dace would have
  attacked Kurita on the 23rd and Halsey would
  have rapidly turned back south again. Whether
  he would have returned to the San Bernardino
  Strait in time largely would have depended on
  how successful Ozawa had been in luring 3rd
  Fleet farther and farther north. Most likely,
  Halsey would have just had time to get back
  and engage Center Force.
  With hindsight, it would appear that
  Ozawa’s early failure, as much as it caused
  him no end of concern, might have actually
  worked in favor of the Japanese. As events will
  reveal, the feint proved effective despite hav-
  ing arrived after the initial thrust.
  
  Bernardino Strait. The carriers of TG 38.2 and TG 38.4
  were to remain outside of the range of Japanese guns.
  This, then, was his contingency plan.
  A crucial misunderstanding, however, arose over
  the wording of his order, which stated that Task Force
  34 “will be formed.” Halsey meant this to mean that
  preparations should be made at the time the order was
  issued, just in case, but the force would only be formed
  if a renewed Japanese threat arose. Though Halsey neg-
  lected to even include Kinkaid among those addressed,
  his fellow commander picked up the order off the air-
  waves. (Allied naval commanders were in the practice
  of listening in on everything that they received, whether
  addressed to them or not.) Both Kinkaid and Nimitz,
  among others, understood the order to mean that TF34
  was being formed at the time, in effect to maintain the
  3rd Fleet’s guard over San Bernardino Strait. A further
  communication from Halsey at 1710 clarified the situ-
  ation – but neither Kinkaid nor Nimitz received a copy.
  At 2022, Halsey informed Kinkaid that he was pro-
  ceeding north to engage Ozawa early the following
  morning with three groups. To Halsey, this meant his
  TG 38.2, TG 38.3, and TG 38.4 – basically his entire
  fleet. Vice Admiral John McCain’s TG 38.1 was also to
  make its way north, but was separated from Halsey’s
  main body. Kinkaid, on the other hand, thought that
  Halsey had just finished reordering his ships into four
  groups, or five if TG 38.1 was included. He thought that
  the three carrier task groups (as TG 38.2, TG 38.3, and
  TG 38.4) would head north while the fourth group, the
  new Task Force 34, would remain guarding the strait.
  Kinkaid even made a mental note to himself congratu-
  lating Halsey on how well he had ordered his forces, lit-
  tle realizing that TF 34 did not yet exist.
  Throughout most of the night, as Halsey steamed
  north, Kinkaid and his commanders believed that pas-
  sage through San Bernardino Strait was denied by
  Halsey’s powerful battleship force. Soon enough, the
  7th Fleet commander would realize that things were
  seriously amiss.
  A FATEFUL NIGHT
  As evening fell on the still waters of Surigao Strait
  on October 24, Kinkaid reflected on the events of the
  day and the current situation from his perspective. He
  believed San Bernardino Strait in the north to be guard-
  ed by Halsey’s Task Force 34. He was aware that a
  southern Japanese fleet was steaming toward him. Even
  though his intelligence exaggerated the strength of this
  Southern Force, Kinkaid had decided that he would
  decisively engage the enemy in a night action and effect
  their destruction. At 1215 that afternoon, he had
  instructed 7th Fleet to prepare for combat.
  Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf – the commander of
  Kinkaid’s Bombardment and Fire Support Group (Task
  Group 77.2, with six old battleships, five cruisers, and
  15 destroyers) – was ordered to prepare a hot welcome
  for the Japanese force expected to sail through Surigao
  Strait that night. Oldendorf immediately recognized
  that, given the north-south orientation of the strait, with
  careful positioning of his forces he could engage the
  enemy from three directions as it sailed through the
  channel toward Leyte Gulf. Oldendorf’s battleships
  were to form the battle line extending across the north-
  ern exit from the passage; his cruisers and destroyers
  were to form up on his flanks and farther south.
  Even farther south, around the entrance to Surigao
  Strait, diminutive PT boats were stationed in groups of
  three. The primary mission of these boats was to pro-
  vide advance warning of the advance of Nishimura,
  with torpedo runs to be attempted as a secondary task.
  Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague, the overall com-
  mander of Task Group 77.4, was told to ensure that his
  LEYTE GULF
  10
  WHAT IF?
  It’s possible that Ozawa’s Northern Force
  could have remained undetected, despite his
  every effort to be noticed. (This would require
  that the U.S. commanders either fail to send
  out search planes to the north, or that those
  planes fail to find the carrier group.) Should
  this occur, then Halsey would have remained
  in position to engage Center Force. Probably
  his battle plan would have looked much the
  same as his real-life contingency plan, with the
  surface warships that made up Task Force 34
  directly engaging the Japanese in a massive
  battle, while the carriers loitered to the rear.
  Given the Japanese timing, Kurita and
  Halsey would have clashed sometime in the
  dawn hours of October 25. The U.S. battle line
  would have been formed and, depending on
  the level of daylight available, carrier planes
  would have scrambled immediately or shortly
  after the first of Kurita’s vessels nosed its way
  out of the strait. Not only did the confined
  waters increase the risk from aerial attack –
  giving the warships no room for evasive
  maneuvers – but they also might have spelled
  doom in a surface engagement. Kurita’s ships
  were forced to traverse the narrow passage in
  column formation. This would have allowed
  Halsey the luxury of “crossing the enemy’s T”
  – that is, of being able to arrange all his ships
  to fire simultaneously at each Japanese ship as
  it emerged from the strait. Unless the GM
  invents some new circumstance to improve
  their fortunes, the Japanese would be hard-
  pressed to come away with anything other than
  an utter defeat.
  
  escort carriers were ready to launch planes at first light
  the following morning. These would pursue and finish
  off damaged Japanese ships retreating from the battle.
  This preparation was to have an impact on events the
  following day.
  Finally, Oldendorf summoned Rear Admiral Rus-
  sell S. Berkey and Rear Admiral G.L. Weyler aboard
  the USS Louisville, his flagship. Berkey would com-
  mand the right flank while Weyler took charge of the
  main battle line and Oldendorf himself would lead the
  left flank. The commanders discussed the coming
  engagement. Some concern was expressed over the
  scarcity of armor-piercing (AP) shells, but all agreed
  that Oldendorf’s plan of battle was sound. They decid-
  ed that each of the battleships should fire only five full
  salvos of AP shells, after which they would switch to
  high-capacity (HC) shells normally used against unar-
  mored targets. With no time to waste, the various ships
  made their final maneuvers in the dark and took their
  stations to await the coming storm.
  Sting Like a Bee
  Around 1900, Nishimura received confirmation
  from Admiral Soemu Toyoda, commander of the Com-
  bined Fleet in Tokyo, that “all forces will dash to the
  attack.” Even though the northern prong of the Japan-
  ese attack had been momentarily blunted, the southern
  force was to carry out its orders without delay.
  Aboard PT-131, Ensign Peter Gadd recorded the
  first radar contact with the southern Japanese forces at
  2236. Along with its two mates, PT-131 sped closer to
  the area indicated, and at 2250 the majority of Nishimu-
  ra’s forces could be made out in the darkness. Unfortu-
  nately, two minutes later hawk-eyed Japanese lookouts
  were able to spot the small PTs even without the help of
  radar. The night action had started.
  The three PTs sped in to gain a suitable position to
  launch torpedoes. At this stage in the battle, however,
  Japanese gunnery was extremely accurate and – despite
  the small size, high speed, and comparatively superb
  maneuverability of the PTs – one boat had its gun
  knocked out while taking casualties and a second suf-
  fered a direct hit (though the shell failed to explode).
  The outmatched boats retreated behind their own
  smokescreen. Initially, no signal was given as to the
  sighting or composition of Nishimura’s force (though
  this was the primary mission of the PTs), but a message
  was later sent via PT-127, a member of another section,
  which finally reached Kinkaid at 0026 on October 25.
  Four more PT-boat strikes were launched against
  Nishimura, but with no effect. Around 0230, the U.S.
  destroyers took over the fight. Although it may appear
  that the activities of the PT boats were ineffectual, the
  early warning given and the continued reports allowed
  the destroyer commander, Captain Jesse Coward, to
  engage Nishimura with devastating effect, having
  anticipated his movements.
  Close In for the Kill
  Destroyer Squadron 54 under Coward consisted of
  seven of the small warships. Since the commencement
  of the Army’s landings, these vessels had patrolled and
  guarded Surigao Strait. In the early hours of October
  LEYTE GULF
  11
  VICE ADMIRAL
  THOMAS KINKAID
  Though only an average student at Annapo-
  lis, Vice Admiral Thomas Kinkaid had built a
  solid record at the Battle of the Coral Sea and
  Midway in 1941, then commanding a carrier
  group at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in
  1942. In the Solomons campaign, circum-
  stances forced Kinkaid to demonstrate the
  concept of “island hopping” when he was
  ordered to take Kiska Island with an insuffi-
  cient force. Instead, he passed it by until such
  a time as he had enough men and materiel – an
  interval that also served to weaken the isolat-
  ed Japanese garrison. Nimitz adopted this tac-
  tic, as did MacArthur. In 1943, Kincaid took
  command of 7th Fleet, not so popularly called
  “MacArthur’s Navy,” and quickly earned the
  respect of his Army superior. From this time
  on, a policy came to the fore of bypassing
  enemy strongpoints whenever possible. To a
  large extent, this explains why MacArthur’s
  casualty rate was so low throughout his cam-
  paign in the South West Pacific.
  
  25, Coward on board his ship and four others of his
  command formed the second wave to be thrown against
  Nishimura’s fleet. Two destroyers were left to protect
  against a possible enemy entry into the strait from
  another direction.
  Coward split the remainder of his squadron into
  two sections, with orders to attack from separate direc-
  tions. They would then escape north by hugging the
  coastline to make detection difficult; the ships would
  not be silhouetted and the proximity of the landmass
  would interfere with the inferior Japanese radar.
  Coward’s ship, Remey, accompanied by McGowan
  and Melvin, sought a position east of Nishimura.
  McDermut (under Commander Richard Phillips) and
  Monssen steamed to the west. By 0245, all of the ships
  had established radar contact and had an accurate pic-
  ture of the strength of the enemy they faced. As Cow-
  ard’s section closed to less than 8 kilometers, the
  destroyers created a smoke screen to aid their eventual
  retreat. Speed was increased to 30 knots and, just as the
  searchlight of the Yamashiro illuminated the shadowy
  waters and picked out the American vessels, the order
  to fire torpedoes was given at 0300. Quickly the
  destroyers turned away, taking evasive action and fur-
  ther increasing their speed. Coward and his men
  escaped unharmed.
  Nishimura made no effort to dodge what he should
  have anticipated as being a torpedo attack, possibly for
  fear of collisions in the confined waters. At 0309, the
  battleship Fuso was hit. The ship took almost an hour
  to sink completely, but it had been ripped in two by
  internal explosions and took no further part in the
  action.
  On the opposite side of the strait, Phillips closed in
  for his attack. Shells began to fall around the destroyers
  at 0308, but no damage was caused. A few minutes
  later, another spread of deadly torpedoes was plowing
  through the waves toward the Southern Force.
  A heart-stopping moment followed for the two
  destroyers’ crews, as a bright green flare lit up the sky
  silhouetting their ships. A Japanese searchlight quickly
  singled out Monssen, and splashes from gunfire reared
  up around the vessel. Luckily, no damage was caused,
  and the two ships skillfully weaved their way back
  through their smoke screens to safety.
  This time, Nishimura had the presence of mind to
  realign his forces to take them out of the path of the tor-
  pedoes that were closing on his fleet. His tactical com-
  mand was lacking, however, and his orders brought his
  own destroyers into the path of the torpedoes. Michisio
  and Asagumo were both hit and forced to leave the
  advancing formation. A third ship, Yamagumo, explod-
  ed violently. Nishimura’s own flagship, Yamashiro, was
  also hit, but to little effect.
  As Coward launched his first torpedoes just after
  0300, Captain Kenmore McManes of Destroyer
  Squadron 24 received orders to leave his position on the
  right of the Allied flank and head south, putting him
  west of the Southern Force and able to gain an attack
  position. His first section consisted of Killen, Beale,
  and HMAS Arunta (an Australian ship); his second sec-
  tion included Hutchins (McManes’ command vessel),
  Daly, and Bache. The first section was able to make a
  run at 0323. Yamashiro was hit again, and slowed tem-
  porarily before regaining speed. The destroyers sped
  away undamaged. The second section targeted
  Nishimura at 0330, but all torpedoes missed. These
  destroyers were also able to return north without dam-
  age, but not without a fright. This time, in addition to
  their guns, the Japanese countered with their own tor-
  pedoes. Two narrowly slid by Daly’s bows. One
  destroyer captain observed that “the enemy torpedo
  deficiency lies in his religion, not in his ballistics.”
  Luck was with the Hutchins that night, also. It
  launched a spread of torpedoes at Asagumo, all of
  which missed, but the hapless Michisio came across the
  path of the errant fish. Several warheads detonated
  against it at 0358. The unfortunate ship sank immedi-
  ately.
  For his part, Nishimura continued to plow straight
  ahead, undeterred by the fact that he had lost several
  ships and all surprise.
  Sailing Into Hell
  Having been found out before their sneak attack
  could properly form, the
  Japanese naval commanders
  knew exactly what they were
  facing by sailing through a
  strait to meet a waiting
  enemy. The Japanese them-
  selves had “crossed the T” of
  the Russian fleet in their
  great naval victory at the
  Battle of Tsushima in 1905.
  Each Japanese ship emerg-
  ing from the confined waters
  would find itself only able to
  fire its forward guns, while
  LEYTE GULF
  12
  
  the entire Allied fleet would be lying broadside to them
  and deliver a withering hail of shells, sinking each vic-
  tim one by one.
  The U.S. commanders, too, knew what sort of
  opportunity that they held. Some even hoped that the
  destroyers would not be too successful and drive
  Nishimura away.
  As Yamashiro advanced to 22,800 yards from the
  U.S. main battle line, Oldendorf ordered all ships to
  open fire. The Japanese flagship was by this time only
  15,600 yards from the U.S. cruisers, which had formed
  a gunnery line in front of their own battleships. The
  cruisers were the first to fire, followed by the West Vir-
  ginia two minutes later. Then all hell broke loose.
  Shells of all calibers punctured the armored skins
  of Yamashiro and Mogami. By 0400, both ships were
  burning. Shigure, a smaller destroyer and therefore not
  considered a prime target, quickly turned tail and set off
  back down the strait. This charmed vessel was the only
  ship of Nishimura’s Southern Force that was able to
  make its way to safety. Valiantly, Yamashiro and Moga-
  mi returned fire, but their ravaged gun crews and con-
  trol systems lacked accuracy; no hits were recorded.
  Mogami was even able to fire off its torpedoes, but was
  finally forced to attempt a retreat. Yamashiro was seem-
  ingly out of control.
  Between a Rock and a
  Hard Place
  Minutes earlier, at 0335, Destroyer Squadron 56
  under Captain Roland Smoot had received orders to
  head south to engage Nishimura. The ships did so
  promptly in three waves. The first (Robinson, Bryant,
  and Halford) approached from the east and failed to
  find a mark for their torpedoes. The second wave (Hey-
  wood L. Edwards, Bennion, and Leutze) came in from
  the west but recorded no hits.
  The Japanese finally got their revenge, if not
  directly, against the third wave. Yamashiro, perhaps
  supported by Mogami and Shigure, brought fire down
  on Newcomb, Richard P. Leary, and Albert W. Grant.
  All three ships, led by Smoot himself, got torpedoes
  away then sped north under heavy fire. The destroyers
  were forced to escape up the center of the strait. The
  American battle line, in the fog of war, ranged their
  sights on these new targets and incoming shells from
  both north and south fell around the third wave. New-
  comb and Leary, at the head of the section, escaped
  damage, but Grant was hit 19 times, over half of the
  hits being U.S. shells. The ship was severely damaged
  and the loss of life was high, in part because the med-
  ical personnel were among the first casualties. In total,
  34 crew died with 94 wounded. At 0420, Grant lost all
  power and floated helplessly in the water.
  The surviving sailors struggled heroically to save
  the ship. Moving in darkness, dodging jets of scalding
  steam 
  and 
  fierce
  flames, they dragged
  injured men to the
  deck so that first aid
  could be adminis-
  tered. The fires were
  controlled and the
  flooding 
  checked.
  Newcombe towed the
  Grant away, allowing
  it to be repaired in
  time to fight along-
  side the Birmingham
  in the invasion of
  Okinawa.
  At 0409, Olden-
  dorf ordered his ships
  to cease firing. Moga-
  mi and Shigure were
  already vacating the
  area, but incredibly
  Yamashiro also began
  somehow to travel back down the strait. Japanese ships
  were deservedly given great respect for the amount of
  damage that they could endure before sinking, and
  Yamashiro was proving to be a splendid example. The
  ship was too close, however, to the American surface
  force, and two torpedoes finally sank it at 0419. Only a
  few crew members were rescued in the daylight hours.
  Nishimura went down with his ship.
  By the time that the end finally came to Nishimura
  and his Southern Force, Shima’s troubles had already
  begun.
  Folly
  Oldendorf received a report at 0038 giving details
  of Shima’s approach as the second Japanese battle
  group braved the southern approach. Shima had
  received reports from Nishimura that PT boats had
  attacked the latter. Shima was prepared with an advance
  screen of two destroyers, though he later recalled these.
  In any case, most of the PT boats had been unable to
  reorganize, and several had no more torpedoes. An
  attack by PT-134 failed to cause any damage, but a sor-
  tie by PT-137 was successful. Its torpedoes missed by
  passing under the destroyer at which they were aimed,
  but then struck the light cruiser Abukuma. The damaged
  Japanese vessel lost speed rapidly and was forced to
  turn about and leave Shima to continue heading north
  up the strait. This action finally blooded the PT boats,
  but it would be their only victory weighed against the
  risks of making several torpedo runs.
  Shima headed toward Leyte Gulf, faithful to his
  orders. Soon, he could see brilliant gun flashes lighting
  the night sky, evidence of the U.S. battle line in action
  against Nishimura. Though he could perhaps guess,
  LEYTE GULF
  13
  
  Shima was at this time unaware of what lay ahead –
  Nishimura had failed to provide clear information.
  Shima next encountered the two halves of Fuso
  still burning in the water. Worse, he concluded that the
  sinking segments were the remains of both Fuso and
  Yamashiro. Then he came across the retreating Shigure
  and Mogami. The former sighting provided a somewhat
  (unintended) comical communiqué. As Shigure
  steamed past, Nachi used light signals to announce, “I
  am Nachi.” Shigure replied, “I am Shigure,” and added
  nothing else other than, “I have rudder difficulties.” The
  Shigure command staff failed to mention the immense
  firepower that had been unleashed farther up the narrow
  passage, or the destruction of Nishimura’s Southern
  Force.
  At 0420, Shima released torpedoes in a token
  attack on what were probably Louisville and Portland.
  The salvo missed wildly, and two of the underwater
  missiles were later found stranded on a nearby beach.
  Whatever stomach that he once had for the fight had
  disappeared, so Shima wheeled about to retrace the per-
  ilous course back down Surigao Strait. Things were not
  quite so simple, though, and Nachi and the slow-mov-
  ing Mogami collided. Both were damaged, and the
  speed of Nachi dropped. Shima contemplated a return
  to the attack later in the morning, but dawn and a real-
  istic evaluation of the situation persuaded him other-
  wise. Accompanied by the remnants of Nishimura’s
  force, Shima’s group sought to live to fight another day.
  Oldendorf’s cruisers and destroyers probed down
  Surigao Strait and brought Mogami under gunfire.
  Apparently indestructible, this heavy cruiser continued
  southward. Mogami, Nachi, and Shigure faced attacks
  by PT boats, but no losses were suffered. A detachment
  of cruiser and destroyers led by Rear Admiral Robert
  Hayler sank Asagumo at 0721. Planes from U.S. escort
  carriers in the unit Taffy 1 finally put Mogami to rest
  three hours after the raid began at 0830. Only Shigure
  of Nishimura’s command was able to make it home.
  THE BATTLE OF CAPE
  ENGANO
  At 2345 on October 24, TG 38.2 and TG 38.4
  joined up with TG 38.3, the farthest north of the three
  task forces under Halsey. This pitted 65 warships
  against the 17 that Ozawa controlled. Clearly, any bat-
  tle to be fought in the north would be short-lived and
  disastrous for the Japanese. The only challenge for the
  Americans was actually locating Ozawa’s fleet.
  Radar-equipped U.S. planes located some convert-
  ed carriers from the Northern Force at 0208 October 25.
  These were under the command of Rear Admiral Chia-
  ki Matsuda, and had been deliberately sent further
  south by Ozawa to “divert the enemy effectively.” The
  main carriers were discovered 30 minutes later. At
  0700, these two groups united once again.
  Despite the sighting, U.S. planning was flawed
  because the spotting pilot greatly miscalculated the dis-
  tance between the Japanese and U.S. fleets. This led
  Mitscher to believe that Ozawa was much closer, so
  much so that he ordered Task Force 34 to be formed to
  engage in surface combat. The final composition of this
  formidable force included six battleships, two heavy
  cruisers, five light cruisers, and 18 destroyers. After
  some redeployment, TF 34 set off again to close the dis-
  tance between the two groups. Planes were ordered to
  be prepared at 0430 for a bombing run at first light.
  Mitscher lost contact with the Northern Force for a
  few hours because one reconnaissance plane broke
  down and the replacement had an equipment failure. In
  the morning light, a new search began. The immense
  first wave of U.S. carrier bombers, under McCampbell,
  took to the air, so as to be ready to move out the
  moment that the Japanese were sighted.
  At 0710, the regrouped Japanese Northern Force
  was finally located slightly east of where the Americans
  had expected it to be. At once, McCampbell led his
  assault screaming onto the targets. By this time, the 3rd
  Fleet aviators were very fatigued, and Japanese
  observers were not impressed by the skills displayed in
  this attack. Nevertheless, their AAfire failed to drive off
  the brave U.S. air crews. The Chitose suffered serious
  bomb damage in the first attack before sinking at 0937,
  as did the destroyer Akitsuki. Both Zuiho and Zuikaku
  were also hit during this first round.
  As the second wave approached, about 25 land-
  based Japanese aircraft under Admiral Shigeru Fuku-
  dome attempted to defend the Northern Force. U.S.
  fighters rebuffed this relieving force, and no further air
  assistance was attempted. The second run began at
  around 1000. The light carrier Chiyoda was brought to
  a halt by dive bombers. Ozawa was forced to divide his
  force and detailed several vessels to either tow Chiyoda
  or remove the personnel from the ship and bring them
  to safety. Ozawa himself took the opportunity between
  strikes two and three to vacate the Zuikaku and board
  the light cruiser Oyodo around 1100, so as to be able to
  take more effective command of the Northern Force.
  Zuikaku was moving too slowly, owing to the damage
  it had suffered earlier.
  Nimitz Steps In
  As the Northern Force endured the incessant U.S.
  attacks, Halsey and his staff were becoming alarmingly
  aware of developments to the south. The first message
  arrived at 0822 from Kinkaid, reporting that Japanese
  forces were targeting the escort carriers around Leyte!
  Despite the terrible beating that his fleet had received,
  Kurita had turned Center Force back onto its original
  course and yet again braved the San Bernardino Strait
  LEYTE GULF
  14
  
  under cover of darkness, this time finding the passage
  wide open. Night patrols launched from USS Indepen-
  dence saw the warships approaching (and the naviga-
  tion lights ashore turned on by Japanese units to guide
  them), but someone in the communication’s chain of
  command failed to forward this news to Halsey. Not
  only did Halsey not find out that Kurita had renegotiat-
  ed the strait until after the fact, but that news itself was
  late. The U.S. naval commanders would suffer from
  their “Fox schedule” of communications in which gen-
  eral fleet broadcasts had to first pass through the Naval
  Communications Center on Manus, creating delays.
  The system further failed to distinguish between mes-
  sages of different priorities.
  Halsey downplayed the importance of the news,
  startling as it was. He maintained, even after the war,
  that 7th Fleet was capable of protecting itself. This
  overlooked that the pilots of 7th Fleet’s escort carriers
  only had experience in flying ground-support and sup-
  ply missions – not naval-bombing sorties. Halsey was
  not even prepared to dispatch a part of his surface force
  – which outnumbered Ozawa’s units by about 4-to-1 –
  to assist 7th Fleet. Instead, he ordered an increase in
  speed north, away from Leyte Gulf, to close on Ozawa.
  At 0848, Halsey did request that McCain’s carrier
  TG 38.1 steam to the southwest to lend aid. Still,
  McCain’s planes would not be able to reach the
  engagement for at least another three hours, the time it
  would take for the carriers to close within extreme
  strike range and for the planes to cover the remaining
  miles. Task Force 34, meanwhile, pushed on aggres-
  sively, leaving behind the carriers so as to be able to fin-
  ish off any damaged ships not sunk by the planes.
  More pleas for help followed, and still Halsey
  refused to change course, even though he was made
  explicitly aware of the ships closing in on the small
  escort carriers covering Leyte Gulf, grouped in forma-
  tions called Taffy 1 (p. 26), Taffy 2, and Taffy 3. The
  communiqués also pointed out that 7th Fleet’s warships
  had depleted their stores of ammunition in the night
  action guarding Surigao Strait. In any case, it would
  take them too long to reach the new arena of combat.
  Finally – with 7th Fleet’s baby carriers facing
  destruction and the Army beachheads under peril –
  Nimitz intervened. Like Kinkaid, Nimitz thought that
  Task Force 34 had been guarding San Bernardino
  Strait. How had the Japanese slipped past? At 1000,
  CINCPAC requested confirmation of the situation, with
  Nimitz querying to Halsey, “Where is, repeat, where is
  Task Force 34? The world wonders.”
  The tone of the message (see sidebar, p. 17) made
  Halsey livid, prompting him to throw his hat to the deck
  in disgust. He believed that Nimitz had intended to
  embarrass him, particularly as copies were also sent to
  Admiral Ernest King (commander in chief of the U.S.
  Fleet) and Kinkaid. In his anger, Halsey delayed even
  further, taking almost an hour before finally ordering
  Task Force 34 to turn about a little before 1100. The
  warships were less than 50 miles from their prey –
  Ozawa’s carriers – when they gave up the chase.
  LEYTE GULF
  15
  ADMIRAL CHESTER
  NIMITZ
  Admiral Chester Nimitz was both com-
  mander in chief of the Pacific Fleet (CINC-
  PAC) and commander in chief of the Pacific
  Ocean Areas (CINCPOA). Having been pro-
  moted over older men, he effectively fought
  his way though the Central Pacific area and
  was in command of the majority of the U.S.
  Navy’s strength.
  Nimitz could appear soft to some, and
  always tried to be careful in manner. He lis-
  tened well, and brought out the best in his
  staff. He knew his commanders, and was fair
  in evaluating their skills. It was his innovation
  that had Halsey and Spruance rotate command
  of the same fleet – designated 3rd Fleet when
  under Halsey or 5th Fleet when under Spru-
  ance. This saw both men spend half their time
  aiding in planning (and having their own
  understanding of high command’s desires
  sharpened) and half their time implementing
  this work.
  Originally, Nimitz had favored an attack on
  Formosa, bypassing the Philippine archipela-
  go, but he was eventually won over to
  MacArthur’s way of thinking.
  
  By this point, Halsey was clearly confused and had
  lost his command edge. Only hours before, the Bull had
  refused to split his forces to allow one group to guard
  San Bernardino Strait while another pursued Ozawa.
  As he headed south, he did just this, causing further
  delays as the fleet reorganized. Some ships were left
  under Mitscher to press an air attack on Ozawa. More
  time was lost later when the destroyers were refueled en
  route. Another staggering decision followed late in the
  afternoon. Task Force 34 was disbanded and Task Force
  34.5 formed from the fastest ships then available. These
  were to speed southward ahead of the pack – but this
  could have been rough going for the Americans if the
  relatively small TF 34.5 had met up with a relatively
  intact Center Force.
  Ozawa Escapes
  Of course, Halsey’s decision to turn about also
  afforded Ozawa the chance to make a narrow escape,
  but attacks from 3rd Fleet’s carriers under Mitscher
  continued throughout October 25. The third strike was
  the largest and loitered over the targets for about an
  hour from 1310. Zuikaku was sunk, ending the career of
  the last of the Japanese carriers that had conducted the
  raid on Pearl Harbor. Zuiho was also severely damaged
  and was finally sent down at 1526 by pilots in the fourth
  strike. The fifth strike began at around 1710, and
  achieved near misses against Ise. The final sixth strike
  arrived about an hour later. Some hits were claimed, but
  no more vessels were sunk.
  The Northern Force, meanwhile, was fleeing
  toward the protection of ground-based planes on For-
  mosa and the Sakashima Gunto. A few U.S. ships con-
  tinued to harass the fleeing ships, sinking the light
  carrier Chiyoda and destroyer Hatsuzaki, but the pur-
  suers checked their advance at 2130 and returned to 3rd
  Fleet. The submarine USS Haddock, also in the area,
  claimed hits on one of Ozawa’s ships, but these are
  unverified. The USS Jallao later successfully attacked
  and sunk the light cruiser Tama, the last ship of the
  Northern Force to go down. The survivors returned to
  Amami Island on October 27. The Northern Force
  would become the only one of the four Japanese fleets
  to complete its mission, and ironically largely survived
  it despite having been intended as a sacrificial lamb.
  THE BATTLE OFF
  SAMAR
  Despite all of its initial failings, the Japanese navy
  had a chance to make its Leyte Gulf gamble pay off as
  the remains of Center Force steamed toward the vul-
  nerable support ships off Samar. Miscommunications,
  controversial decisions, and clumsy responses to the ill-
  handled Japanese feints had left 3rd Fleet’s warships
  too far north to help, and 7th Fleet’s warships too far
  south. The crucial shipping – and the beachhead it
  served – was falling within the range of Japanese guns.
  Unfortunately for the Japanese, their enemy was
  about to overcome his own initial failings. In charge of
  a woefully inferior scattering of destroyers and escort
  carriers, Rear Admiral Clifton A. Sprague was about to
  fight one of the U.S. Navy’s finest engagements.
  The Fearless Few
  By 0630 on October 25, the various ships and
  crews of Taffy 3 had completed most of their routine
  jobs. A combat air patrol was aloft and anti-submarine
  sweeps were being undertaken. It was at this moment
  that Kurita was speeding down to descend on Sprague’s
  group, just hidden beyond the horizon.
  Kurita’s Center Force was arranged in four
  columns, each 5 kilometers apart. His surprise was
  almost total and, despite clear weather broken only by
  a few scattered rain clouds, he steamed closer undetect-
  ed. Sprague was not expecting an attack from the north,
  believing San Bernardino Strait to be guarded.
  At 0637, Japanese voices were picked up on the
  radio, and at 0645 AAfire was observed in the distance.
  The pilot of an American plane on submarine patrol
  was busily making the first report of contact. Finally, a
  LEYTE GULF
  16
  VICE ADMIRAL
  JISABURO OZAWA
  By the end of the war, Vice Admiral Jis-
  aburo Ozawa was recognized by his former
  American enemies as being the most compe-
  tent Japanese naval commander other than
  Yamamoto himself. Before the war, he had
  been a respected instructor at the Japanese
  naval academy. He had previously served as
  the chief of staff to the commander of the
  Combined Fleet and had experience com-
  manding both battleships and aircraft carriers.
  He was present at the Battle of the Philippine
  Sea and performed well as the overall com-
  mander of the Japanese forces.
  Ozawa was the natural choice to take com-
  mand of the Japanese effort in Leyte Gulf, but
  the lack of both planes and pilots made his car-
  rier force all but useless, and ensured for his
  ships the thankless and dangerous task of act-
  ing as a decoy. With Ozawa removed from the
  main action, it fell to Kurita to attempt to carry
  out the crucial defeat of the Allied landing
  force. Ozawa nevertheless went to his fate sto-
  ically. “I expected the complete destruction of
  my fleet,” he declared after the war.
  
  radar contact confirmed that the enemy was bearing
  down on Taffy 3.
  Kurita was surprised, too. He did not expect to find
  carriers here, and incorrectly decided that they were
  full-sized fleet carriers from Halsey’s command. Given
  the thrashing that those ships had inflicted on him the
  day before, he prudently decided to take out these car-
  riers before proceeding, unaware that the small escort
  carriers represented only a tiny fraction of the threat
  that he was envisioning. Kurita changed to an easterly
  course so that the carriers would have to approach him
  if they wanted to optimize their air-launch procedure by
  heading into the wind. That ended up placing the com-
  batants on parallel courses.
  The Japanese commander then made a huge mis-
  take. Having stumbled across his prey, every second
  counted, and he’d lost half of his communications staff
  in the sinking of the Atago (p. 4). To keep things sim-
  ple, and quick, he ordered a general attack, in which
  each ship acted independently. While this did get his
  fleet into action with minimal delay, it resulted in the
  captains of the heavy cruisers racing to be first to reach
  the enemy. This in turn made it impossible to stage an
  initial torpedo run by the destroyers and light cruisers –
  and the Japanese were justly famous for the quality of
  their torpedo attacks.
  Soon enough, the first shell splashes began to wash
  over the decks of the escort carriers, particularly those
  of White Plains, which was closest to Kurita. The
  skilled Japanese gunners were getting the range rapid-
  ly. Vision remained good at this point, such that
  Sprague remarked, “It did not appear that any of our
  ships could survive another five minutes of the heavy-
  caliber fire being received.”
  The “jeep carriers” were not alone, however, and
  the destroyers and destroyer-escorts on hand were
  beginning to lay a smoke screen. A timely rain squall
  also provided respite for 15 minutes. Lacking proper
  targeting radar, the Japanese gunners began to lose their
  accuracy.
  In the meantime, the escort carriers launched what
  planes they could while other planes returned from
  patrols. Most of these planes – and pilots – were ill-pre-
  pared for anti-shipping strikes, but in this desperate
  hour they filled the American ideal of making do.
  Depth charges were dropped on the Japanese fleet from
  planes equipped to hunt for submarines. Others simply
  faked a bombing attack to distract the Japanese AA
  gunners from those few planes bearing real weapons.
  One pilot from Gambier Bay spent two solid hours
  “attacking” Center Force without any ammunition.
  Though the first organized air counterattack would not
  take place until 0830, this makeshift reprisal scored
  some hits and did enough damage to the heavy cruiser
  Suzuya to force it to reduce speed a little.
  Against All Odds
  The destroyer Johnston stood closest to the formi-
  dable Japanese force. Without awaiting orders, Com-
  mander Ernest Evans turned his ship to meet the
  oncoming fleet as soon as it was sighted, a single 2,100-
  ton David intent on slowing down a squadron of
  Goliaths. Blazing away with its five 5-inch guns, John-
  ston targeted the heavy cruisers as they attempted to
  outflank the escort carriers. Evans commenced firing at
  0710 against Kumano and barely let up thereafter. The
  formidable Japanese return fire failed to strike his ship.
  Sprague ordered all of his destroyers to press in for
  a torpedo attack at 0716. Johnston was already in posi-
  tion to make an attack run. From a range of 10,000
  yards, its fish struck the Kumano, which dropped
  behind. Suzuya was forced to delay its advance to col-
  lect Admiral Shiraishi, head of Cruiser Division 7.
  LEYTE GULF
  17
  THE WORLD
  WONDERS
  The U.S. Navy had a standard protocol in
  which a random phrase was added to the
  beginning and end of every coded message.
  Called “padding,” this was intended to make
  the messages harder for the Japanese to
  decode, by adding non-military terminology
  that would make guesswork infinitely more
  difficult. In handling the messages, signalmen
  simply stripped off the meaningless portions,
  which were offset by double-letter signals to
  clearly identify them. Their commanders only
  read the relevant text.
  The full text of Nimitz’s fateful query to
  Halsey (p. 8) was transmitted as TURKEY
  TROTS TO WATER GG WHERE IS
  REPEAT WHERE IS TASK FORCE 34 RR
  THE WORLD WONDERS. Clearly, the last
  phrase was intended as padding, but the sig-
  nalman who handled the query for Halsey
  apparently thought it was meant to add a
  snarky tone to the question. He left it in
  Halsey’s copy, transforming a somewhat
  urgent bit of military-speak into something
  that sounded patronizing and (by the standards
  of the time) rather insulting.
  It has been speculated that the unknown
  ensign who added the final line while coding
  Nimitz’s message had in mind Tennyson’s
  poem, “The Charge of the Light Brigade.” A
  passage of that work reads, “When can their
  glory fade? O the wild charge they made! All
  the world wondered.” If so, his clumsy bit of
  literary license ended up playing a pivotal role
  in a pivotal battle.
  
  Suzuya was itself later immobilized, most likely in an
  attack from a plane from Taffy 1. At 0730, the Japanese
  finally inflicted a severe wound on Johnston, but the
  destroyer was not out of the fight. The crew frantically
  carried out repairs under cover of the same fortuitous
  squall that had sheltered Sprague and the carriers.
  In moving along, that rain cloud had left behind the
  carriers, however, which appeared to be in dire straits
  despite the harassment that Center Force had endured.
  Kurita’s four remaining heavy cruisers were working
  their way around the fleeing flattops to force them back
  into the path of the battleships, including Yamato.
  Destroyers were also closing on the opposite flank and
  working into position to launch their deadly “Long
  Lance” torpedoes.
  Far to the south, Oldendorf received instructions at
  0850 to face Kurita, though he was some distance away
  and, in the event of a drawn-out fight, dangerously low
  on suitable ammunition with which to damage enemy
  warships. On the other hand, the commander of 7th
  Fleet was able to scramble the aircraft of Taffy 2 and
  Taffy 1 in support of Taffy 3. It would take some time,
  however, for these flights to become organized, because
  many of the aircraft already had taken off on the day’s
  “routine” missions (typically ground support for the
  Army troops still fighting their way inland).
  The escort vessels of Taffy 3 continued their bitter
  fight, aided by the worsening weather and increasingly
  thick smoke. The racing American ships sometimes
  narrowly avoided colliding in the soup, but this was a
  small hazard to face in comparison to the protection
  from Japanese guns.
  The battle deteriorated into isolated fights. The
  destroyer Hoel faced off against the battleship Kongo,
  but the Japanese 14-inch guns shattered the tiny U.S.
  vessel. Shortly after, at 0742, Sprague ordered a second
  torpedo attack. Hoel remained able to lead this, though
  not before Heerman had to quickly reverse direction to
  slip past its burning mate and avoid ramming it. Behind
  Heerman came the even smaller Samuel B. Roberts, a
  destroyer escort more suited to face gunboats than
  cruisers. Its captain, Lieutenant Commander Robert
  Copeland, straightforwardly warned his crew that they
  were facing “overwhelming odds against which sur-
  vival could not be expected.” It wasn’t any more infor-
  mation than most of them could deduce for themselves,
  and his honesty likely only served to harden their
  resolve. Last in line was the irrepressible Johnston.
  Though Evans had fired all his torpedoes, his ship could
  still draw fire from the other ships and lend gun sup-
  port, despite the fact that 5-inch shells would bounce
  off most of its targets.
  LEYTE GULF
  18
  
  Against all odds, these four diminutive warships
  sailed into harm’s way. Hoel failed to inflict any dam-
  age on its target, Haguro, and endured several gun hits
  in reply. At 0830 the destroyer was dead in the water, an
  easy target for Japanese gunners. At 0835, Hoel was
  abandoned, and 20 minutes later sank.
  Heerman also failed to damage Haguro, but avoid-
  ed the return fire. Pushing his luck, Heerman’s captain,
  Commander Amos Hathaway, set course to take on the
  immense battleships. At 0800, he fired torpedoes
  toward Haruna. The warheads missed their mark, but
  Yamato found itself sailing into the path of the errant
  spread. Kurita changed course and was finally forced to
  flee northward for the moment, away from the main
  battle, to escape a fate similar to that of Musashi the day
  before. Japan’s most formidable warship had left the
  fight and would never really get back into it. His com-
  mand and control already impaired by the loss of his
  staff, Kurita was removed from the battle.
  Roberts closed to within 4,000 yards before releas-
  ing torpedoes. A hit was reported on Chokai, though it
  is unconfirmed. (Chokai later sank, and with it the
  ship’s records. It is possible the attack by Roberts con-
  tributed to the loss.) At a minimum, Chokai was forced
  to change course, thereby disrupting the pursuit of the
  carriers. Roberts was able to avoid the immense broad-
  sides that chased it away.
  Unsurprisingly, Johnston failed to inflict any sig-
  nificant damage, but Evans did persuade the cruisers to
  shift their gunfire to target his nearly punchless ship.
  The assault had failed to score any significant damage,
  but did hold up the Japanese advance long enough for
  the CVEs to launch more planes and for the last three
  destroyer escorts –Dennis, John C. Butler, and Ray-
  mond – to join the one-sided fray. These escorts
  engaged the Japanese cruisers without suffering any
  damage, but failed to score any hits of their own.
  As valiant as these efforts were, the Japanese war-
  ships could only be momentarily diverted. Closer and
  closer the cruisers and destroyers came, until the escort
  carriers were able to open fire accurately with their sin-
  gle 5-inch gun each. This fire amounted to mosquitoes
  harassing a grizzly bear, and Center Force began turn-
  ing its guns to the carriers as they came within range.
  Kalinin Bay took the first hits, but the worst of the fire
  began to fall on Gambier Bay.
  The captain of Gambier Bay attempted to “chase
  the salvos” – or deliberately steer a course toward the
  most recent shell splashes, on the assumption that the
  Japanese gunners would shift their aim and not target
  the same place twice. This worked for a time, but as the
  range closed the shells came closer. At 0810, Gambier
  Bay took its first pounding. A near miss tore a hole
  below the water line and flooding was immediate. As
  the carrier lost speed, it attracted more attention, and
  soon shells were plowing into it from all angles. Both
  Johnston and Heerman tried to draw fire away from the
  stricken ship, with the latter having some limited suc-
  cess but also being hit in reply. At 0850, Gambier Bay’s
  Captain Walter Vieweg ordered that his ship be aban-
  doned. At 0907, the carrier sank.
  As the crew of Gambier Bay listened to their cap-
  tain’s orders, Roberts was hit. The resulting drop in
  speed allowed several Japanese guns to pour accurate
  fire into the indomitable vessel. At 0900, a huge explo-
  sion opened a hole in the port side. The ship lost all
  power and was doomed. Despite this, the crew of #2
  gun kept firing, though without power they could not
  clean their gun’s barrel with compressed air after each
  shot. This made it very likely that the gun would burst,
  and everyone manning it knew as much. They got off
  six more rounds before the seventh blew up the barrel.
  Most of the crew was killed, with two mortally
  wounded. A third survivor, his body ripped open from
  neck to thigh, somehow remained standing and trying
  to load the shattered piece. He was pulled to safety, but
  died minutes later. Roberts sank at 1005, fulfilling
  Copeland’s prophecy for many of its crew.
  Meanwhile, the pilots of Taffy 3 continued to fight
  their mostly makeshift battle. Running out of fuel with
  their carriers under fire, they landed at Tacloban Air-
  field to rearm and refuel. The airfield, however, did not
  possess many anti-shipping weapons, so they continued
  to make do with whatever arms could be found.
  Shortly before 0900, an assault wave from Taffy 2
  braved Kurita’s AA fire. The pilots had little practice in
  LEYTE GULF
  19
  
  attacking ships, and also carried an ill-sorted assortment
  of rockets and 100-lb. bombs. Still, they managed to put
  together a quite effective strike, earning praise from the
  Japanese who called the attack “the most skilful work
  of [the American] planes.” Serious damage was inflict-
  ed on the cruisers Suzuya and Chikuma, the latter of
  which broke off from the attack at 0902 before slowly
  sinking. The destroyers Hayashimo and Hamanami
  also were hit. Tone and Haguro were forced away from
  their targets while evading the attacks. At 0905,
  Avenger pilots surprised Chokai and after enduring a
  dive-bombing attack the ship blew up and sank. All of
  this carnage broke the concentration of the Japanese
  gunners, who sought new targets among Taffy 2’s ships.
  This gave some respite for the escort carriers of Taffy 3,
  though Tone and Haguro were still closing and inflict-
  ing damage.
  At this point, the remaining column of four Japan-
  ese destroyers led by a light cruiser was poised to make
  a lethal torpedo run on the escort carriers. The Ameri-
  cans had spent their few resources slowing the main
  Japanese advance, and it appeared inevitable that Cen-
  ter Force was about to even the score quite substantial-
  ly. As the warships churned toward their victims,
  closing the range, out of the smoke steamed none other
  than the USS Johnston.
  Evans opened fire with his guns, inflicted some
  damage, and was battered in return. Somehow, though,
  his fearless attack caused the entire Japanese column to
  panic, launching their torpedoes at extreme range
  before turning in retreat. This gave the carriers much
  better odds of evading the fish. Improving their
  chances, Lieutenant Leonard Waldrop pulled off a stunt
  worthy of Hollywood. Flying an Avenger overhead, he
  lined up one of the torpedoes in his sights and fired
  away with his machine guns, causing it to explode pre-
  maturely.
  The Johnston, though, had finally bitten off more
  than it could chew. Gunfire smashed into it until at 0940
  it was left dead in the water. The Japanese continued to
  fire, so that even as a floating corpse the destroyer was
  helping to save the escort carriers. At 0945, Evans
  ordered the crew to abandon ship, and at 1010 the giant-
  slayer finally slipped under. Eyewitnesses saw Evans
  make it into the water and away from the wreck, but he
  was never seen again. He was posthumously awarded
  the Medal of Honor and had a building named after him
  at the U.S. Navy’s Surface Warfare Officers School.
  Perhaps more poignantly, crew members said they saw
  one of the Japanese destroyer captains come to atten-
  tion and salute the dying Johnston.
  Weakened but still dangerous, Center Force con-
  tinued on course for the landing beaches. Despite all the
  sacrifices, it seemed that MacArthur’s landing was to
  be challenged after all. There was precious little left to
  protect the escort carriers, and Taffy 2 was now threat-
  ened. The outlook was about as bleak as it could get –
  then the Japanese armada inexplicably turned and
  steamed away. At his moment of victory, Kurita gave
  up on Japan’s quest to score a telling, heartfelt blow
  against the United States.
  The wave of relief that coursed through the spent
  U.S. Navy forces was not quite shared by all. “God-
  dammit, boys!” shouted one of Sprague’s signalmen in
  disgust. “They’re getting away!”
  Kurita’s Retreat
  Though he survived the war, Kurita never provid-
  ed a clear explanation as to what caused him to give up
  the fight. Apparently, the initial plan had been to disen-
  gage only long enough to reorganize his forces – nor
  did he know at the time how close to victory that he
  was. Instead of reorganizing, however, or at least com-
  ing together to provide the most formidable screen of
  AA fire possible, the ships of Center Force simply loi-
  tered, for about three hours.
  Kurita, it appeared, was of two minds and strug-
  gling to make a decision as to his best course of action.
  He also was very tired, having survived having a ship
  blown out from under him the day before. His orders
  were to attack the beachhead at all costs – and he knew
  that meant sacrificing his entire fleet if need be – but
  making such promises while staring at a neat map miles
  away was one thing, while living them out was anoth-
  er. He expected the American air attacks to increase in
  frequency and viciousness. His officers were routinely
  LEYTE GULF
  20
  WHAT IF?
  Some criticism was leveled at Kinkaid
  after the action for failing to order a routine
  surveillance flight of the area around the exit
  of San Bernardino Strait. As mentioned, Kin-
  caid had assumed that such a search would be
  a waste of resources given his belief that Task
  Force 34 was in position to provide protection.
  Had Kurita been seen from the air, then
  Sprague would have had much more time to
  both head south and to ensure that his planes
  were recalled and refitted with different muni-
  tions. At the same time, Taffy 1 and Taffy 2
  could have made their way to the edges of the
  probable battle area to lend more air support.
  Task Group 38.1 would also have been in bet-
  ter position to launch air support at an earlier
  time. Finally, the warships under Oldendorf
  could have steamed north, despite being low
  on AP ammunition and generally outclassed.
  Whether the information, and a presumably
  hurried message to Halsey, would have
  brought 3rd Fleet south at an earlier time is
  impossible to say.
  
  overstating the nature of the U.S. defenders, reporting
  destroyers to be cruisers and destroyer escorts to be
  destroyers. He had no air cover and he knew that
  Nishimura and Shima would not be arriving from the
  south to close the pincer. Finally, he suspected that
  Halsey’s armada would be arriving at any moment.
  The Americans launched a large and mostly coor-
  dinated air assault at 1220, which appears to have made
  up Kurita’s mind. At 1236, he radioed Tokyo that he
  was abandoning the plan, and with that he began to
  retrace his steps through San Bernardino Strait in hopes
  of quickly escaping the range of carrier aircraft. Still,
  McCain’s Task Group 38.1 managed to fly two sorties
  against Center Force and Taffy 2 flew one more before
  the Japanese ships got too far away. Later, the destroy-
  er Nowake was sunk by the fast ships of Task Group
  34.5. Halsey, however, had missed his chance to engage
  Kurita’s fleet decisively. By 2140, Kurita had entered
  the strait and spent the night traversing the narrow pas-
  sage.
  DIVINE WIND
  Almost as an afterthought, the first suicidal attack
  by kamikaze pilots began at 0740 on October 25 against
  Taffy 1, which at that time was far removed from the
  action farther north involving Kurita and Taffy 3.
  American AA gunners were caught off guard in the
  opening moments. The first plane of the Asahi flight
  buried itself in the fleet carrier Santee, causing
  immense damage and fires that were nevertheless
  brought under control by 0751. The second plane was
  brought down by gunfire from the carrier Suwanee, and
  it crashed near the carrier Sangamon. The third was also
  hit and fell from the sky while on target for the carrier
  Petrof Bay.
  In the lull between attacks, the submarine I-56
  appeared at an opportune moment and put a torpedo
  into Santee at 0756. The lone wolf escaped, but was
  unable to sink Santee. The final kamikaze plane dived
  down and, despite suffering some apparent damage,
  still managed to slam into Suwanee. The crew worked
  tirelessly at repairs, and the carrier remained afloat and
  ready for action.
  To the north, the planes of the Shikishima group
  arrived near Taffy 3 at 1049. The combat air patrol was
  unable to intercept the fast-flying marauders, though
  some AA fire was thrown up. The first plane caused
  some fires on Kitkun Bay. The second and third planes
  were broken up by gunfire before they could fly into the
  same target. The fourth plane was destroyed above the
  flight deck of White Plains, raining material as well as
  bodily remains down on the crew below. St. Lo was not
  so lucky, and the fifth plane succeeded in crashing into
  the flight deck. Internal explosions followed, and at
  1100 the carrier was abandoned. It sank at 1125. The
  kamikaze had claimed their first victim.
  A third group of 15 planes, this time “Judy”
  bombers, approached at 1110. Kalinin Bay of Taffy 3
  was struck but remained afloat. A fourth sortie, around
  noon against Taffy 1, saw Suwanee nearly mortally
  wounded. It required several hours and numerous acts
  of bravery to save the carrier before it could retreat to
  Manus for repairs. This ended the kamikaze attacks.
  Despite some scattered successes, the Sho Ichi Go plan
  had failed to thwart the American invasion of Leyte.
  LEYTE GULF
  21
  WHAT IF?
  What if Halsey, upon learning of Kurita’s
  move against Taffy 3, had instantly reversed
  his course and sailed back south to close in on
  Center Force? Halsey received his first call for
  help at 0822, sent by Kinkaid at 0707. The 3rd
  Fleet by this time was some 350 miles north of
  Leyte Gulf. It would have been impossible for
  Halsey to return in time to lend support with
  his battleships, yet he could have brought the
  experienced pilots of the fleet carriers within
  striking distance far more quickly. Further-
  more, if Halsey had turned back to help
  Kinkaid, his ships would not have had to have
  been refueled – as they were on the afternoon
  of October 25 – to make the extra distance
  back to Leyte Gulf. This could have put the
  battle line of 3rd Fleet in position to intercept
  Kurita as he attempted to file back into San
  Bernardino Strait.
  
  LEYTE GULF
  22
  
  The Battle of Leyte Gulf remains the largest naval
  engagement fought in history, and the last occasion on
  which great warships fired broadsides at one another. In
  terms of the number of ships involved, more were
  engaged from October 23-25, 1944, than at the epic
  Battle of Jutland between Britain and Germany in the
  Great War (282 at Leyte compared to 250 at Jutland). In
  terms of tonnage, estimates are that 1.6 million tons of
  combat shipping was present at Jutland compared to 2
  million tons at Leyte. Additionally, the U.S. Navy was
  fielding this awesome force some 7,000 miles away
  from its Pearl Harbor home. Even the arena was vast,
  with the fighting spread across some 100,000 square
  miles, and the fighting included every aspect of naval
  warfare then in existence, including the suicide attacks
  of the kamikaze.
  This chapter describes the many ships and forces
  that took part in this historic battle. The following mil-
  itary designations are used to describe the type of each
  ship involved:
  BB – Battleship
  CA – Heavy Cruiser
  CL – Light Cruiser
  CV – Fleet aircraft carrier
  CVE – Escort Carrier
  CVL – Light Carrier
  DD – Destroyer
  DE – Destroyer Escort
  LCI – Landing Craft, Infantry
  PC- Patrol Craft
  THE U.S.
  ARMADA
  The U.S. armada was without a doubt the most
  powerful naval force in the world by late 1944. At its
  core was the Pacific Fleet, designated 3rd Fleet at the
  time of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The smaller 7th Fleet,
  dedicated to support of MacArthur’s Army operations,
  also took part. These two fleets represented the majori-
  ty of American naval strength at the time.
  THE PACIFIC FLEET
  As mentioned on p. 15, Nimitz alternated the com-
  mand of the “Big Blue Fleet,” as the Navy proudly
  called the Pacific unit. Under Spruance it was called the
  5th Fleet, while under Halsey the same unit became the
  3rd Fleet. Halsey’s rotation had been under way since
  August 26, 1944, when the Battle of Leyte Gulf took
  place.
  The combat core of the Pacific Fleet was Task
  Force 38, or the Fast Carrier Force, under Vice Admiral
  Marc A. Mitscher. TF 38 was further divided into four
  task groups, TG 38.1 to TG 38.4. The fleet was sup-
  ported and supplied by Task Group 30.8, or the At Sea
  Logistics Group 3rd Fleet. It gained further offensive
  capability from Task Force 17, the Supporting Sub-
  marines Pacific Fleet. (In the case of this battle, though,
  submarines of the 7th Fleet held the most important
  role; see p. 25.)
  LEYTE GULF
  23
  2. THE
  ARMADAS
  TALKING PAST ONE
  ANOTHER
  One of the major failures in the U.S. opera-
  tions in the Philippines was that 3rd and 7th
  fleets lacked a direct line of communications.
  Subordinated to MacArthur, 7th Fleet reported
  directly to him. As an attached Navy resource,
  3rd Fleet reported to Nimitz at Pearl Harbor.
  Some blame MacArthur – in his role as
  supreme commander of Allied forces in the
  South West Pacific Area – for this oversight.
  Of course, the Navy itself should have been
  acutely aware of the lack of coordination.
  Regardless of who was to blame, the complex
  lines of communication directly contributed to
  the Japanese Center Force’s ability to slip
  through the American net into Leyte Gulf.
  
  Task Force 38
  By itself, Task Force 38 was a supremely powerful
  fighting force. Given the right conditions, there was no
  other navy to match it in the world. The fleet combined
  long-range capability utilizing planes from fleet and
  light carriers with modern, heavily armed battleships
  and a host of destroyers capable of making darting tor-
  pedo runs at close range. Such tactics were further
  enhanced by the improvements seen in the performance
  of American torpedoes since the early days of the war.
  Earlier types had exploded prematurely, run too deeply,
  or had gone badly off target, among other problems.
  Various ships from each of the task force’s four
  groups were designated to join the ad hoc Task Force 34
  during the course of the battle. These vessels are indi-
  cated with a “34” after their name, below. As originally
  compiled, Task Force 34 was never assembled, though
  several What If? scenarios in Chapter 1 describe how it
  might have faced Center Force in a truly colossal battle
  royale. An altered composition was ordered, made up
  of speedier ships, to chase Ozawa’s carriers to the north.
  (Halsey’s plan was to pound Ozawa’s carrier group
  with air attacks and have the fast-moving task force fol-
  low up to finish off any cripples or any ships giving
  protection to damaged vessels.) Those vessels marked
  with a star (*) pursued Ozawa to the north. Additional-
  ly, Task Force 34.5 was created under Rear Admiral
  Oscar Badger. This again included the fastest remaining
  ships of 3rd Fleet. Badger was to drive south to lend
  support to 7th Fleet or to head off a retreating Center
  Force. A relatively intact Center Force might have out-
  gunned TF 34.5, however. Those ships included in TF
  34.5 are also indicated below, with a 34.5 after their
  names.
  The pilots of Task Force 38 had been in combat
  from the first weeks of September, flying missions
  against targets in the Southern and Central Philippines.
  The success of these missions had led to the invasion of
  Leyte being moved forward. Halsey believed that
  Japanese air strength was by then negligible (and he
  was essentially correct, though the high command
  scraped up a few squadrons to throw into this last-stand
  effort). In early October, strikes were conducted against
  Okinawa, Luzon, and Formosa.
  Task Group 38.1
  Under Vice Admiral John S. McCain, TG 38.1
  spent most of the Battle of Leyte Gulf arriving too late
  to take part in various fights. It had originally been
  ordered to Ulithi by Halsey to replenish its stores. The
  most powerful group in terms of available aircraft, it
  was recalled on the morning of October 24 once Center
  Force had been detected and Halsey was preparing to
  launch air assaults. McCain dutifully changed course,
  though he was over a day’s sail away.
  On the following morning (October 25) Center
  Force had emerged from San Bernardino Strait and was
  laying into Sprague’s Taffy 3. Halsey issued new
  orders. McCain was to sail to the Leyte Gulf area to
  offer what support he might to 7th Fleet. It was clear to
  McCain how desperate the situation was, and in
  response he ordered one of the longest-reaching carrier
  strikes of the war. His planes could not be armed with
  torpedoes, as the extra weight would have prevented
  them from reaching their targets and returning safely.
  Still, by the time that the pilots of TG 38.1 arrived at the
  site, Center Force was already heading north, having
  disengaged from Taffy 3. TG 38.1’s planes nevertheless
  prosecuted their attack, and this may have had some
  LEYTE GULF
  24
  
  effect in shaping Kurita’s final decision to completely
  retire from the action.
  Strikes were launched from fleet carriers Wasp and
  Hornet along with assaults from light carriers Monterey
  and Cowpens. Fleet carrier Hancock also supplied
  pilots for the action against Kurita, having been tem-
  porarily detached from TG 38.2 to TG 38.1 on October
  22.
  Task Group 38.1 included the following ships:
  Wasp (CV), Hornet (CV), Hancock (CV), Monterey
  (CVL), Cowpens (CVL), Boston (CA), San Diego
  (CL), Oakland (CL), Izard (DD), Charrette (DD), Con-
  ner (DD), Bell (DD), Burns (DD), Cogswell (DD),
  Caperton (DD), Ingersoll (DD), Knapp (DD), Boyd
  (DD), Cowell (DD), McCalla (DD), Grayson (DD),
  and Woodworth (DD).
  TG 38.1 also included TG 30.2 under Rear Admi-
  ral Allan E. Smith. This group was formed on October
  6 and was made up of the following vessels: Chester
  (CA), Pensacola (CA), Salt Lake City (CA), Dunlap
  (DD), Fanning (DD), Cummings (DD), Cassin (DD),
  and Downes (DD).
  Hancock was detached from TG 38.2 over the
  course of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. San Diego and Oak-
  land had previously been detached from TG 38.2 on
  October 15.
  Task Group 38.2
  TG 38.2 was commanded by Rear Admiral G.F.
  Bogan. The group was initially located east of San
  Bernardino Strait and included the following ships:
  Intrepid (CV), Cabot (CVL), Independence (CVL),
  Iowa (BB) (34.5), New Jersey (BB) (34.5), Biloxi (CL)
  (34.5), Vincennes (CL) (34.5), Miami (CL) (34.5),
  Owen (DD) (34.5), Miller (DD) (34.5), The Sullivans
  (DD) (34.5), Tingey (DD) (34.5), Hickox (DD) (34.5),
  Hunt (DD) (34.5), Lewis Hancock (DD) (34.5), Mar-
  shall (DD) (34.5), Cushing (DD), Colahan (DD),
  Halsey Powell (DD), Uhlmann (DD), Yarnall (DD),
  Twining (DD), Stockham (DD), and Wedderburn (DD).
  Biloxi was transferred from TG 38.4 on October
  22.
  Task Group 38.3
  TG 38.3 was commanded by Rear Admiral F.C.
  Sherman. The group was initially located to the east of
  Luzon. TG 38.2 and TG 38.4 headed north to unite with
  TG 38.3 during the night of October 24-25. This task
  group included the following ships: Essex (CV), Lex-
  ington (CV), Langley (CVL), Massachusetts (BB) (34),
  South Dakota (BB) (34), Santa Fe* (CL) (34), Mobile
  * (CL) (34), Reno (CL), Porterfield* (DD), C.K. Bron-
  son* (DD) (34), Cotton* (DD) (34), Dortch* (DD)
  (34), Healy (DD) (34), Cogswell* (DD) (34), Caper-
  ton* (DD) (34), Ingersoll* (DD) (34), Knapp* (DD)
  (34), Callaghan (DD), Cassin Young (DD),
  Preston (DD), Laws (DD), and Longshaw
  (DD).
  For his bravery and skill during the attack
  on the Musashi, Lt. Warren Parish of the USS
  Essex, piloting a Helldiver, was awarded the
  Navy Cross for scoring a confirmed direct hit
  on the battleship.
  Task Group 38.4
  Rear Admiral R.E. Davison commanded
  TG 38.4. This group was initially the closest
  to 7th Fleet, operating east of Leyte Gulf. The
  following ships made up TG 38.4: Enterprise
  (CV), Franklin (CV), San Jacinto (CVL),
  Belleau Wood (CVL), Washington (BB) (34),
  Alabama (BB) (34), New Orleans* (CA) (34),
  Wichita * (CA) (34), Maury (DD), Gridley (DD), Helm
  (DD), McCall (DD), Mugford (DD), Ralph Talbot
  (DD), Patterson* (DD) (34), Bagley* (DD) (34),
  Wilkes (DD), Nicholson (DD), Swanson (DD), and
  Irwin (DD).
  Alabama and Irwin joined TG 38.4 from TG 38.3
  on October 23. Wichita was detached from TG 38.1 on
  October 21.
  U.S. 7TH FLEET
  The 7th Fleet, under the strategic command of
  General MacArthur and the tactical command (in Octo-
  ber 1944) of Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, had
  been operational since March 1943, growing from a
  small nucleus of a few submarines and a tender. In
  preparation for action off Leyte, numerous warships
  were transferred to 7th Fleet to be able to lend direct fire
  support to the invasion by bombarding beach targets.
  These ships would also provide protection for the
  transport units in the case of air assault (and any possi-
  ble attack from the sea, though Japanese interference
  was not expected). Eighteen diminutive escort carriers
  also came under the temporary control of Kinkaid.
  LEYTE GULF
  25
  
  These were slow-moving ships whose planes would
  also provide direct ground support for the infantry until
  land airstrips could be captured and established. Final-
  ly, the amphibious landing craft of 3rd Fleet were lent
  to 7th Fleet, to allow the landing to take place and to
  allow Halsey to rove for any Japanese naval threat.
  Three surface groups in particular featured heavily
  in the Battle of Leyte Gulf: the Fire Support and Bom-
  bardment Group (TG 77.2), the Escort Carrier Group
  (TG 77.4), and Task Group 78.12, hastily put together
  after the main action off Samar to search for survivors.
  Task Group 71.1, or Supporting Submarines 7th Fleet,
  also played a large role. Both Darter and Dace (p. 4)
  operated with TG 71.1 under the command of Rear
  Admiral Ralph W. Christie.
  Fire Support And
  Bombardment Group (Task
  Group 77.2)
  Task Group 77.2 was arranged in response to
  Nishimura’s effort to drive north through Surigao Strait.
  The group was essentially comprised of vessels from
  Fire Support Unit North (Rear Admiral G.L. Weyler),
  Fire Support Unit South (Rear Admiral J.B. Oldendorf),
  and TG 77.3 Close Covering Group (Rear Admiral R.S.
  Berkey). TG 77.3 contained ships from the Australian
  Navy. Already present in the area of Surigao Strait on
  the night of October 24 was TG 79.11 (Desron 54)
  under Captain J.G. Coward. This force had been con-
  ducting routine antisubmarine patrols across the north-
  ern entrance of the strait since the invasion. Although
  officially under the command of Vice Admiral Wilkin-
  son, Coward was determined to offer his services to
  Oldendorf and instructed his superior to that effect. (In
  other words, he didn’t wait for orders.)
  Task Group 77.2 was divided into three sections:
  The left flank (under Rear Admiral J.B. Oldendorf)
  included: Louisville (CA), Portland (CA), Minneapolis
  (CA), Denver (CL), Columbia (CL), Newcomb (DD),
  Richard P. Leary (DD), Albert W. Grant (DD) (in
  Desron 56 under Captain Smoot), Robinson (DD), Hal-
  ford (DD), Bryant (DD) (in Desdiv 112 under Captain
  Conely), Heywood L. Edwards (DD), Bennion (DD),
  and Leutze (DD) (under Commander Boulware).
  The battle line (under Rear Admiral G.L. Weyler)
  included: Mississippi (BB), Maryland (BB), West Vir-
  ginia (BB), Tennessee (BB), California (BB), Pennsyl-
  vania (BB), Claxton (DD), Cony (DD), Thorn (DD),
  Aulick (DD), Sigourney (DD), and Welles (DD) (in
  Desdiv “X-Ray” under Commander Hubbard).
  The right flank (under Rear Admiral R.S. Berkey)
  included: HMAS Shropshire (CA), Phoenix (CL), Boise
  (CL), Hutchins (DD), Daly (DD), Bache (DD), Killen
  (DD), Beale (DD) (in Desron 24 under Captain
  McManes), Remey (DD), McGowan (DD), Melvin
  (DD), Mertz (DD) (in Desron 54 under Captain Cow-
  ard), McDermut (DD), Monssen (DD), and McNair
  (DD) (in Desdiv 108 under Commander Phillips).
  Task Group 77.4
  Task Group 77.4 (Escort Carrier Group) was under
  the overall command of Rear Admiral Thomas L.
  Sprague (no relation to the more famous Rear Admiral
  Clifton A.F. Sprague, below). He also retained com-
  mand of Taffy 1. TG 77.4 was composed of 18 carriers
  and various support vessels, including screen destroy-
  ers and destroyer escorts. Details of those vessels not
  directly involved in the fighting in the Battle of Leyte
  Gulf are not provided here.
  TG 77.4 had as its mission the support of
  MacArthur’s landings until land-based airstrips could
  be established. The type of missions typically flown by
  the pilots included combat air patrols, air searches, sup-
  ply drops, and attacks against land targets. The princi-
  pal arms of TG 77.4 were organized into three
  subgroups, each with a “Taffy” identification from their
  respective radio call signs.
  Taffy 1 (Task Group 77.4.1) was located to the
  northeast of Mindanao Island and far to the east of
  Leyte Island. Taffy 1 was the southernmost of the three
  escort carrier groups. It included: Sangamon (CVE),
  Suwannee (CVE), Chenango (CVE), Santee (CVE),
  Saginaw (CVE), Petrof Bay (CVE), McCord (DD),
  Trathern (DD), Hazelwood (DD), Edmonds (DE),
  LEYTE GULF
  26
  7TH FLEET
  AMMUNITION
  When planning the role of 7th Fleet in sup-
  port of the Leyte landings, the U.S. Navy
  expected no major opposition from the Japan-
  ese Navy. The primary role of the fleet was
  determined to be the targeting of shore-based
  units and strongpoints and the protection of the
  escort carriers. As a result, the warships of 7th
  Fleet were issued 75% high-capacity shells
  (basically high-explosive shells, for shore
  bombardment) and only 25% armor-piercing
  shells (AP shells, for use against armor-plated
  enemy ships). This supply situation helped
  shape the tactics decided upon by Oldendorf
  when facing Nishimura in Surigao Strait. The
  lack of AP munitions could have been far more
  telling on October 25, as the American battle-
  ships could not outlast Kurita’s Northern Force
  in a running gun battle had they faced off
  against one another.
  
  Richard S. Bull (DE), Richard M. Rowell (DE), Ever-
  sole (DE), and Coolbaugh (DE).
  Taffy 2 (Task Group 77.4.2) was located in the
  middle of the three carrier task groups, to the north of
  Taffy 1 and southeast of Taffy 3. It lay to the east of
  Leyte Island and was commanded by Rear Admiral
  Felix B. Stump. It included: Natoma Bay (CVE), Mani-
  la Bay (CVE), Marcus Island (CVE), Kadashan Bay
  (CVE), Savo Island (CVE), Ommaney Bay (CVE),
  Haggard (DD), Franks (DD), Hailey (DD), Richard W.
  Suesens (DE), Abercrombie (DE), Oberrender (DE),
  Leray Wilson (DE), and Walter C. Wann (DE).
  Taffy 3 (Task Group 77.4.3) was under Rear Admi-
  ral Clifton A.F. Sprague. It was the northernmost of the
  Taffy groups, cruising to the east of Samar Island and
  northeast of Leyte Gulf. Taffy 3 faced the onslaught of
  Kurita’s Center Force on the morning of October 25. It
  included: Fanshaw Bay (CVE), St. Lo (CVE), White
  Plains (CVE), Kalinin Bay (CVE), Kitkun Bay (CVE),
  Gambier Bay (CVE), Hoel (DD), Heermann (DD),
  Johnston (DD), Dennis (DE), John C. Butler (DE),
  Raymond (DE), and Samuel B. Roberts (DE).
  DD Task Group 78.12
  TG 78.12 was hastily formed on the afternoon of
  October 25 to search for survivors of the action off
  Samar Island. Rear Admiral Barbey (commander of TF
  78), taking the advice of a Captain Charles Adair,
  placed Lieutenant Commander J.A. Baxter in com-
  mand of a small group to locate and rescue sailors in the
  water. TF 78.12 included PC-623 and PC-1119 and five
  LCIs. A doctor and a pharmacist’s mate also sailed with
  the patrol.
  IMPERIAL
  JAPANESE
  ARMADA
  Like its American counterpart, the Imperial Japan-
  ese force assembled for the Battle of Leyte Gulf was, at
  first glance, the most powerful tasked for a mission
  under the Japanese flag since Midway. Details will
  reveal, however, that the Japanese suffered from key
  shortages in air crew, planes, fuel, and ammunition that
  hindered the armada from being as effective as its com-
  position would suggest.
  There were four different groups that operated
  around the Philippines from October 23-25, 1944. Each
  had a crucial role to play if the battle plan was to be exe-
  cuted successfully and the Americans repelled from the
  beaches of Leyte.
  CENTER FORCE
  Center Force was under the command of Admiral
  Kurita. The Japanese referred to this group as Force
  “A” of the First Striking Force (which also included
  Nishimura’s fleet). This was the main attack force; it
  was equipped to deal with the heaviest fighting and was
  able to inflict the most serious damage on the troop
  transports that lay off the Leyte coast.
  Kurita was to sail south of Mindoro Island, pass
  through Tablas Strait into the Sibuyan Sea, head east
  toward Samar, then make his way through the San
  Bernardino Strait. Following this, the Center Force
  would sweep south around Samar to capture the Amer-
  LEYTE GULF
  27
  REVENGE
  Of the battleships of Oldendorf’s battle line
  arrayed against Nishimura on October 24, five
  were refitted “survivors” of the Japanese attack
  on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Pennsylvania, Ten-
  nessee, and Maryland had all been heavily
  damaged. West Virginia and California had in
  fact been sunk, but later salvaged. Though the
  aircraft carrier was now the predominant tool
  of naval warfare, the battleships still had a final
  part to play and the action in Surigao Strait
  demonstrated that they still had a formidable
  punch. In addition, West Virginia, Tennessee,
  and California were all equipped with the
  newest Mark 8 fire-control radar, ideal for
  night actions. (The others were outfitted with
  an older Mark 3 radar.)
  INEFFECTIVE
  JAPANESE AP SHELLS
  The crews of the U.S. escort carriers often
  quipped that the designation CVE stood for
  “Combustible, Vulnerable, Expendable.” Yet it
  was their very vulnerability that saved the car-
  riers from even more serious damage on Octo-
  ber 25. The thin, unarmored sides of the ships
  often caused the Japanese armor-piercing
  shells to fail to detonate on impact. Many
  passed right through the superstructures. More
  dangerous were shots that in fact were off-tar-
  get, but which detonated on the ocean’s surface
  at the waterline.
  
  icans in a pincer movement while Nishimura and
  Shima sped northward from Surigao Strait.
  The Center Force, along with Nishimura’s South-
  ern Force, had been stationed at Lingga Roads, near
  Singapore, to be close to the oil supply there. This
  divided the Japanese fleet (Ozawa sortied from home
  waters) and also made supplying the battle ships with
  ammunition difficult, as the munition factories were
  located on the Japanese homeland. The group (First
  Striking Force) left Lingga Roads for Brunei Bay on
  October 19 where it refueled and Kurita (Force “A”)
  and Nishimura (Force “C”) split apart.
  Kurita was aware that he could not expect to
  receive air cover as he advanced toward his objective.
  He certainly expected no help from any Army fighters
  flying from bases on the islands. Instead he emphasized
  anti-aircraft training and increased the number of
  25mm guns on board all ships appreciably. The crews
  were also trained for night actions, something of a
  Japanese specialty in the early years of the war.
  After leaving Brunei Bay Kurita had the following
  ships under his command: Yamato (BB), Musashi (BB),
  Nagato (BB), Kongo (BB), Haruna (BB), Atago (CA)
  Chikuma (CA), Chokai (CA), Haguro (CA), Kumano
  (CA), Maya (CA), Myoko (CA), Suzuya (CA), Takao
  (CA), Tone (CA), Noshiro (CL), Yahagi (CL), Akishimo
  (DD), Asashimo (DD), Fujinami (DD), Hamakaze
  (DD), Hamanami (DD), Hayashimo (DD), Isokaze
  (DD), Kishinami (DD), Kiyoshimo (DD), Naganami
  (DD), Nowake (DD), Shimakaze (DD), Okinami (DD),
  Urakaze (DD), and Yukikaze (DD).
  NORTHERN FORCE
  Admiral Ozawa’s Northern Force was the “bait”
  dangled to lure Halsey’s 3rd Fleet away from Leyte
  Gulf and allow Kurita to enter unopposed. The Japan-
  ese referred to this force as the Main Body of the
  Mobile Force (under Ozawa). Ozawa’s air fleet was
  seriously underpowered, owing to earlier losses, partic-
  ularly in the Formosa air battle. Ozawa had about 116
  planes, about half the normal strength for his force. Fur-
  thermore, few of the pilots were skilled enough to reli-
  ably land on a carrier, forcing them to fly on to land
  bases after a raid. As a comparison, American pilots by
  late 1944 usually had at least 300 hours of flight time;
  the Japanese pilots were lucky to have just a few hours.
  Though Ozawa disliked his mission on a personal
  level, and later described it as a “bitter experience,” he
  and his men were willing to sacrifice themselves if their
  action would allow Kurita to succeed. On October 20,
  Ozawa’s Northern Force left Bungo Suido at the
  entrance to the Inland Sea. Ozawa expected a fight
  immediately, but was pleasantly surprised to find that
  the American submarines stationed as lookouts had
  decided just the day before that the Imperial Navy
  would not be leaving the protection of the home waters,
  and had left the area to search for merchant shipping
  targets.
  The fleet included: Zuikaku (CV), Chitose (CL),
  Chiyoda (CL), Zuiho (CL), Hyuga (BB), Ise (BB),
  Isuzu (CL), Oyodo (CL), Tama (CL), Akitsuki (DD),
  Fuyutsuki (DD), Hatsutsuki (DD), Shimotsuki (DD),
  Suzutsuki (DD), Wakatsuki (DD), Kiri (DD), Kuwa
  (DD), Maki (DD), and Sugi (DD).
  Both Hyuga and Ise were semi-converted battle-
  ships, retaining the fore guns but having a flight deck
  and hangar grafted onto their sterns. The first six
  destroyers listed were of the larger Terutsuki class and
  were often mistaken for light cruisers.
  LEYTE GULF
  28
  
  SOUTHERN FORCE
  (VAN)
  Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura was to form the
  southern prong of the pincer that was to close upon the
  American troop transports in Leyte Gulf. After depart-
  ing from Brunei Bay, Nishimura split from Kurita and
  swung west then north to avoid detection from the air.
  He then changed course and headed east, skirting the
  southern tip of Palawan and entering the Sulu Sea. At
  the southern end of Negros he picked up Shima’s force
  as a tail. Nishimura was to continue east into the Min-
  danao Sea before turning northeast to pass through
  Surigao Strait into Leyte Gulf.
  The Japanese referred to Nishimura’s group as
  Force “C”, part of the First Striking Force under Kuri-
  ta. After Nishimura left Kurita’s Center Force outside
  Brunei he had the following ships under his command:
  Yamashiro (BB), Fuso (BB), Mogami (CA), Asagumo
  (DD), Michishio (DD), Shigure (DD), and Yamagumo
  (DD).
  SOUTHERN FORCE
  (REAR)
  The Japanese labeled Shima’s group as the Second
  Striking Force and it formed the rear of the Southern
  Force, behind Nishimura’s van. It was part of the
  Southwest Area Force under Mikawa (though perplex-
  ingly, Shima was directly answerable to Toyoda in
  Tokyo). Nishimura on the other hand was responsible
  to Kurita. The next senior commander both Nishimura
  and Shima mutually enjoyed was Admiral Toyoda,
  commander of the Combined Fleet, in Tokyo. Shima
  himself was not a battle-hardened veteran and had spent
  much of his career in staff and school assignments. He
  lacked combat experience, though he was in fact senior
  to Nishimura by a slight margin.
  Despite Halsey’s devastating attacks on Formosa
  (October 12-14), Japanese pilots were overly optimistic
  in their claims of the amount of damage inflicted in
  return. This prompted another of Halsey’s famous com-
  ments that, “[I] am now retiring toward the enemy fol-
  lowing the salvage of all the 3rd Fleet ships reported
  sunk by radio Tokyo.” Shima’s fast group was therefore
  ordered to sail out to finish off any remaining crippled
  ships. Shima probably had a nasty surprise when he
  found that the American fleets were still very much
  active and overwhelmingly powerful! He beat a hasty
  retreat back to Amami Island (northeast of Okinawa).
  Only on October 21 did Shima receive his orders to
  cooperate with the First Striking Force (more precisely,
  Nishimura’s Force “C”) and pass through Surigao
  Strait. Shima had no communication with Nishimura,
  and there was no unified strategy (and no reason for the
  two commanders to seek to forge one, divided as they
  were by different chains of command).
  At the time of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Shima had
  the following vessels under his command: Ashigara
  (CA), Nachi (CA), Abukuma (CL), Akebono (DD),
  Kasumi (DD), Shiranuhi (DD), and Ushio (DD).
  Japanese Naval Aircraft
  Japan’s naval air strength had been pounded in the
  leadup to the Leyte operation, with strikes against air-
  fields on Okinawa, Luzon, and Formosa. Around 500
  Japanese planes were destroyed. More aircraft were
  sent out against Halsey’s 3rd Fleet on the 15th and 16th
  but most never returned. These latter losses were of
  men and machines destined for carrier service and
  deprived Ozawa of needed manpower, something to
  which he strongly objected. The pilots in general were
  also substandard, an important contributing factor to
  the decision to use suicide tactics to thwart the Ameri-
  can advance.
  Land-Based Aircraft
  There were two air groups charged with the
  defense of the Philippines. The 5th Base Air Force was
  under Vice Admiral Onishi at the time of the Battle of
  Leyte Gulf and was made up of around 300-400 air-
  craft, not all of which were operational. Reinforce-
  ments, the remains of Japan’s air armada, had been
  flown in from Formosa on October 22. Lieutenant Gen-
  eral Tominaga commanded 4th Air Army with 237 air-
  craft, 83 of them fighters. Unusually, the plan was for
  the two forces to combine attacks against the landing
  force. Only since the fall of Saipan had the Army and
  Navy begun to realize that coordinated action was nec-
  essary. No air cover was supplied to Kurita.
  Asahi Kamikaze Flight
  The Asahi special attack unit was based at Davao
  on Mindanao Island. The flight included six Zeroes,
  four of which were to crash into the American ships.
  The group quickly located Taffy 1 and became the first
  purposeful and successful suicide attack carried out by
  the Japanese in the war.
  Shikishima Kamikaze
  Flight
  The Shikashima special attack unit was based at
  Mabalacat on Luzon Island, northwest of Manila. The
  flight that engaged Taffy 1 on October 25 was led by
  Lieutenant Seki. He was one of five pilots in Zero
  fighters, each carrying a 250-kilogram bomb. Four
  other Zeroes accompanied the suicide pilots to provide
  air cover and to report on the expected success of the
  mission.
  LEYTE GULF
  29
  
  VEHICLE
  STATISTICS
  KEY
  The following pages describe a few of the U.S. and
  Japanese warships that played a notable part in the Bat-
  tle of Leyte Gulf. Additional examples and details on
  equipment can be found in GURPS WWII: Dogfaces
  and Banzai!.
  VEHICLES KEY
  The military vehicles in this section are presented
  in the following format:
  Descriptive Text
  Each vehicle writeup begins with general descrip-
  tive text, which usually includes a mix of information
  on the class of ship as well as information on the par-
  ticular ship that took part in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
  Subassemblies
  This lists the chassis and each subassembly, with
  any options applied to each, followed by the size mod-
  ifier to see or target that particular structure. Note that
  the remainder of the writeup will use this structure
  name or an abbreviation in brackets to indicate the
  placement of other components. For instance, [OM 1]
  means the item in question is housed in the subassem-
  bly designated Open Mount 1 in this passage. If no
  placement is described, the item is assumed to be in the
  vehicle’s body.
  Powertrain
  This describes the vehicle’s engines, transmission,
  and electric motors (if any), fuel tankage, and batteries
  carried either as motive power sources or simply to turn
  over the engine and to power accessories such as radios.
  Occupancy (Occ)
  This describes where and how the vehicle seats its
  occupants. (Again, unless otherwise designated, all
  crew stations are assumed to be in the body.) A “CS” is
  a crew station while a “PS” is a passenger station. An
  “SR” would indicate standing room used as makeshift
  passenger space. An “X” prefix means the station is
  exposed, while an “M” prefix means the station is a
  motorcycle seat. Long-term accommodations such as
  bunks will be covered in the descriptive text.
  Cargo
  This heading includes all empty space within the
  vehicle except bilges and access space, but it almost
  always will be design “waste” space rather than a true
  cargo hold of some sort. Unless specific cargo space is
  assigned under Equipment (see below), assume that the
  largest single item that this space could hold would be
  just 10% as big as it is. For instance, a vehicle with 27
  VSPs of empty space not truly dedicated to a cargo hold
  could not fit another crew station, because its single
  largest “nook” would be only 2.7 VSPs in size. The
  remainder of the space is scattered about the vehicle in
  other “crannies” of similar size. Unless the vehicle is
  specifically designed to haul cargo, the GM should feel
  free to place these restrictions on any empty space.
  Armor
  This lists the armor values on each face of each
  vehicular structure as PD value followed by DR value.
  (Note that motive subassemblies will always have uni-
  form values on all facings unless the GM is using
  design rules beyond the scope of this setting; that value
  is still repeated for each facing simply as a conven-
  ience.) A “W” following the armor value denotes that it
  is wooden. An “S” denotes that it includes DR 15 of
  standoff armor (see pp. W140-141). A “C” indicates
  cloth armor. Any special notes are below the armor val-
  ues.
  LEYTE GULF
  30
  3. THE
  ARMORY
  
  Weaponry
  This lists each weapon (or set of identical
  weapons), its placement, and its ammunition stores.
  Any special notes are below the listings. See pp. W133-
  135 for weapons statistics. GURPS WWII Motor Pool
  greatly expands on this selection.
  Equipment
  This lists each structure with general equipment
  installed, followed by the equipment within it. See pp.
  W136-140 for descriptions of general equipment and p.
  W:D75 for equipment specific to the U.S. forces.
  Statistics
  Size gives the length, width, and height of the vehi-
  cle. Payload is the weight of a standard load of fuel,
  personnel, ammunition, and cargo. Lwt. is loaded
  weight. Volume is the amount of space the vehicle
  would take up if stored within another (presumably
  larger) vehicle. Maint. or MH describes either the main-
  tenance interval in hours (p. W144) or the number of
  men required to keep up maintenance working eight-
  hour shifts on a long-occupancy vehicle. Cost is the
  vehicle cost. (Note that a “retail” price might be much
  higher; this figure is “cost of production.” In addition,
  conversion rates were highly subjective during the war,
  so this should not be mistaken for a historical reference.
  It is of more use for comparing the values of various
  pieces of equipment.)
  HT measures how robust the vehicle is; see p.
  W144. HPs measures the hit points of each structure;
  see p. W156.
  wSpeed, etc. provide the vehicle’s performance
  characteristics in each of its routine modes of travel; see
  pp. W145-149. Special characteristics for each mode
  are described under the general statistics line.
  Design Notes
  These notes indicate where components were pur-
  chased and then modified to historical values, or where
  any particularly notable “fudging” of calculated data to
  historical values had to take place.
  Variants
  Unlike most other sourcebooks, all the information
  presented in the following pages is related to the one
  variant of a class of ship that was present in the Battle
  of Leyte Gulf. This section describes some or all of the
  other types of the class of ship or earlier or later variants
  on the specific ship presented. Appropriate supporting
  statistics are provided if the variant is much more com-
  plex than swapping one component for another.
  U.S.
  FORCES 
  The following pages highlight some of the ships
  that sailed in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
  USS PRINCETON
  The Independence-class carriers were converted
  Cleveland-class CL hulls intended as a stopgap before
  larger Essex-class carriers could be completed. The
  ships were relatively cheap to manufacture and lacked
  many refinements. They had no elevator, only a small
  air group, and a lack of serious firepower. The intended
  5-inch DP guns were never installed. Armor was
  installed, but it was never more than modest. That said,
  these light carriers performed admirably in augmenting
  the fleet carriers and saw a lot of action.
  Princeton began construction as a light cruiser
  (Tallahassee, CL-61) on June 2, 1941. The frame was
  reclassified as a carrier (CV-23) on February 16, 1942,
  and renamed Princeton on March 31, 1942. It was
  launched later that year, on October 18. The ship was
  reclassified again the following year, as CVL-23 on
  July 15, 1943.
  Princeton saw action first at Baker Island, where it
  was ordered to give air cover while an airfield was con-
  structed. On the way back to Pearl Harbor, the pilots on
  board carried out strikes against targets on Makin and
  Tarawa. After a short break, the crew joined up with
  Task Force 38 on October 20, 1943. Princeton’s planes
  were again active in combat over Bougainville, Rabaul,
  and later at Nauru, as part of 5th Fleet. The New Year
  witnessed additional strikes against Wotje, Taroa, Enge-
  bi airfield on Eniwetok, and finally the invasion beach-
  es on Eniwetok. Taking time to replenish, Princeton
  returned to the fray once more before providing support
  for the Hollandia operation and raids on Truk and Pon-
  ape.
  A busy summer followed. Princeton was present
  when Saipan was taken, and later engaged in the Battle
  of the Philippine Sea. Other assaults were conducted
  successfully. As summer turned to autumn, the crew
  remained busy, not least the pilots, who struck against
  the Palaus, Mindanao, the Visayas, and Luzon. Prince-
  ton flight crews also took part in the Formosa air battle.
  During the opening stages of the invasion at Leyte,
  Princeton lent ground support and protected the ship-
  ping. On October 24, a lone bomb struck deep and
  sealed the fate of this light carrier (p. 6).
  LEYTE GULF
  31
  
  Princeton carried 45 aircraft in total. It cost about
  $148,000 to fit the carrier with fuel, provisions, and
  ammunition. The ship had a crew of 1,569.
  Subassemblies: Light Cruiser chassis +10; water-
  proofed Medium Naval superstructure [Body:T]
  +6; eight full-rotation Large Weapon open turrets
  1-8 [Body:T] +1; four full-rotation Large Weapon
  turrets 9-12 [Super:T] +1; 10 full-rotation Small
  Weapon open mounts 13-22 [Body:T] +0; six full-
  rotation Small Weapon open mounts 23-28
  [Super:T] +0.
  Powertrain: four 18,650-kW steam turbines with
  four 18,650-kW screw propellers, 780,000-gallon
  standard fuel tanks, 120,000-kWs batteries.
  Occ: See above.Cargo: 12,000 Body
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  4/280
  4/280
  4/280
  4/200
  4/280
  Super:
  4/100
  4/100
  4/100
  4/100
  –
  Turrets:
  3/8
  3/8
  3/8
  3/8
  –
  OMs:
  4/40
  –
  –
  –
  –
  Weaponry
  24×40mm Med. Gr. ACs/M-1 [OMs1-12:F] (208
  SAPHE rounds each).
  16¥20mm Long Gr. ACs/M-2 [OMs 13-28:F] (540
  SAPHE rounds each).
  Equipment
  Body: 60 bilge pumps; two 18-foot cranes; 30 fire
  extinguishers; two launch catapults; 12000 cargo;
  35,750-sf flight deck; 216,000-gallon self-sealing
  fuel tanks for aviation gas; very large radio trans-
  mitter and receiver; very large radio direction
  finder; 1,550 bunks; 10 cabins; one luxury cabin;
  64 environmental controls; 31,400 man-day pro-
  visions; 12 halls; 20 hospital beds; four surgeries;
  16 workshops. Super: Autopilot; precision naviga-
  tion instruments; sea-search non-targeting 5-mile
  radar; air search non-targeting 10-mile radar; five
  medium radio transmitters and receivers; two
  large radio transmitters and receivers.
  Statistics
  Size: 623’×72’×170’
  Payload: 3,299 tons
  Lwt: 9,674 tons
  Volume: 110,437
  Maint.: 4 hours Price:
  $2.9 million
  HT: 7. HPs: 150K Body, 2,300 Superstructure, 120
  each Turret, 45 each OM.
  wSpeed: 15
  wAccel: 1
  wMR: 0.02
  wSR: 5
  wDecel: 0.1
  Draft: 18’. Flotation Rating: 10,190 tons.
  Design Notes
  The historical draft value has been used.
  LEYTE GULF
  32
  
  USS BIRMINGHAM
  Birmingham (CL-62) was a Cleveland-class light
  cruiser, the most common cruiser class in U.S. service.
  Not a single ship of this line was lost during the war.
  Birmingham was launched on March 20, 1942, and
  commissioned under Captain J. Wilkes on January 29,
  1943. The design had evolved from the earlier Brooklyn
  class, and though not perfect, it was a resilient ship with
  great firepower. These light cruisers were also maneu-
  verable, enhancing their ability to survive on the high
  seas.
  This improved engineering areas had the two boil-
  er rooms well separated by an engine room. (The
  Brooklyn-class vessels had the boiler rooms together.)
  The biggest change from earlier versions was the addi-
  tion of four main turrets with triple 6-inch guns. The
  deck space saved allowed for a greater secondary arma-
  ment, with six twin 5-inch DP mountings. The length of
  the ship was also increased by a small amount and the
  hull was strengthened. This latter modification was well
  demonstrated by Houston, which was able to take the
  increase in pressure caused by two aerial torpedo hits
  that saw its displacement increase to almost twice the
  standard tonnage from flooding.
  Birmingham saw service first in the Mediterranean
  during the invasion of Sicily before being reassigned to
  the Pacific Fleet. The crew was busy for the rest of the
  year, seeing action at Tarawa, Wake Island, and
  Empress Augusta Bay. Birmingham was damaged in
  this latter combat and retired to Mare Island Navy Yard.
  The ship sortied once more in February of the next year
  and was again kept busy. Birmingham was present at
  Saipan, the Battle of the Philippine Sea, Tinian, and
  Guam. This was as a member of Task Force 57 (then
  with 5th Fleet). The tour of duty continued under
  Halsey and Birmingham lent protective support to the
  carriers of 3rd Fleet while Philippine airfields were
  attacked. Task Force 38 then moved onto Okinawa,
  Luzon, and Formosa.
  As noted in Chapter 1, not only was Birmingham
  damaged while helping to fight the fires on Princeton,
  but that ship’s final explosion cut down many of the
  cruiser’s crew, which was working topside. Following
  repairs, Birmingham closed in on the Japanese main-
  land and served at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, where a
  kamikaze pilot crashed into the busy ship. Birmingham
  went out of commission on January 2, 1947.
  It cost around $544,000 to provision Birmingham,
  which had a full complement of 1,425. Birmingham
  carried four seaplanes.
  Subassemblies: Light Cruiser chas-
  sis +10; waterproofed Small Ship
  superstructure [Body:T] +7; four
  waterproofed limited-rotation Large
  Naval turrets with mild slope
  [Body:T] +6; six waterproofed limit-
  ed-rotation Large Secondary turrets
  [Body:T] +4; four waterproofed
  Large Weapon turrets [Sup:T] +2; 19
  Small Weapon open mounts [10
  Body:T and nine Sup:T] +0.
  Powertrain: Four 18,650-kW steam
  turbines with four 18,650-kW screw
  propellers; 600,000-gallon standard
  fuel tanks; 80,000-kWs batteries.
  Occ: See above. Cargo: 400 Body,
  150 Sup.
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  4/328
  4/328
  4/328
  4/164
  4/328
  Super:
  4/246
  4/246
  4/246
  4/246
  –
  LN Turs:
  4/246
  4/246
  4/246
  4/246
  –
  LS Turs:
  4/200
  4/200
  4/200
  4/200
  –
  LW Turs:
  4/115
  4/115
  4/115
  4/115
  –
  OMs:
  4/40
  –
  –
  –
  –
  Weaponry
  12×150mm Medium DPs [LN Turs:F] (108 rounds
  each).*
  12×127mm Short DPs/Mk 12 [LS Turs:F] (328
  rounds each).**
  8×40mm Med. Gr. ACs/M-1 [LW Turs:F] (400
  rounds each).
  19×20mm Long Gr. ACs/M-1 [OMs:F] (520 SAPHE
  rounds each) .
  * Linked in sets of three. ** Linked in pairs.
  LEYTE GULF
  33
  
  Equipment
  Body: 60 bilge pumps; crane; 30 fire extinguishers;
  400 cargo; two launch catapults; very large radio
  transmitter and receiver; large radio direction
  finder; 1,145 bunks; 56 cabins; 51 environmental
  controls; 25,000 man-day provisions; 12 halls; 10
  hospital beds; surgery; eight workshops. Super:
  Autopilot; IFF; precision navigation instruments;
  sea-search non-targeting 10-mile radar; air-search
  non-targeting 15-mile radar; fire-direction center;
  two mini targeting computers (one for 150mm
  Medium DP guns, one for 127mm Short DP
  guns); 150 cargo.
  Statistics
  Size: 608’×64’×150’
  Payload: 2,592 tons
  Lwt: 10,330 tons
  Volume: 122,499
  Maint.: 3 hours Price:
  $3.2 million
  HT: 7. HPs: 240K Body, 6,600 Superstructure, 3K
  each LN Turret, 900 each LS Turret, 120 each LW
  Turret, 45 each OM.
  wSpeed: 36
  wAccel: 1
  wDecel: 0.1
  wMR: 0.02
  wSR: 5
  Draft: 23.5’. Flotation Rating: 11,307 tons.
  Design Notes
  The historical draft has been used.
  Variants
  Some units were converted to Independence-class
  light carriers on the order of President Roosevelt. The
  big CVs would simply take too long to build and delays
  were setting back completion dates. The narrow cruiser
  hull necessitated the inelegant step of having all neces-
  sary appendages topside jutting out over the sides of the
  ship. No replacement
  planes could be carried.
  The USS Princeton (p.
  31) is an example of a
  converted Cleveland-
  class 
  light 
  cruiser.
  Armor was very limit-
  ed.
  Two others were
  completed postwar as
  the Fargo class, with
  slight modifications.
  Several ships were con-
  verted to use a Talos
  missile launcher (as a
  missile cruiser) follow-
  ing the Korean War.
  USS SAMUEL B.
  ROBERTS
  American destroyer escorts were first produced
  under pressure from the British Royal Navy, which
  needed smaller escorts for cross-channel duties to keep
  the war machine alive in Europe. Although initial
  demands were for escorts capable in anti-submarine
  warfare (resulting in the Evarts class), the U.S. high
  command was concerned over the ability of the small
  escorts to fight a surface battle. Five more subtypes
  were created. Three of them utilized a turbo-electric
  drive: the Buckleys, the Butlers, and the Rudderows.
  Along with an improvement in speed, these latter two
  classes were armed with 5-inch guns and torpedoes.
  Construction of Samuel B. Roberts (DE-413)
  began on December 6, 1943. It was launched on Janu-
  ary 20, 1944, and commissioned on April 28 of the
  same year under Lieutenant Commander R.W.
  Copeland. Copeland, coming from the naval reserve,
  served as the commander of the ship until October 25.
  Much of his crew was inexperienced and averaged less
  than one year’s service. Nevertheless, Copeland and his
  men sailed to join the Pacific Fleet on July 22 from
  Norfolk.
  Early active duty included simple escort work until
  the ship was called to join Taffy 3. Work was routine
  until October 25, when Kurita’s Center Force sailed
  over the horizon. Copeland immediately requested per-
  mission for his “Little Wolf” (the larger destroyers were
  known as “Wolves”) to accompany the first torpedo run
  made by the DDs. Initially, an order was not forthcom-
  ing, but Commander Thomas, commanding the screen,
  quickly changed his mind. Copeland, however, was not
  entirely sure how to “form up” for a torpedo attack and
  instead trailed a few thousand yards behind the lead
  destroyers. His crew was nervous and had never made
  a torpedo run before.
  LEYTE GULF
  34
  
  Once committed to the attack, though, the escort
  and the crew performed beyond expectation. With
  excellent use of smoke, the DE sailed to within
  4,000 yards of the heavy cruiser column before
  launching three torpedoes. Withdrawing, Roberts
  continued to fire 5-inch ordnance at the enemy and
  escaped untouched for an interval until the first
  enemy shell crashed home at around 0850. Further
  damage was endured quickly thereafter. A hole
  measuring some 35’ in length and 9’ feet high was
  ripped along the port side. Seawater poured in and
  all power was lost.
  The ship was abandoned by 0935 and sank at 1005.
  The survivors now faced the problem of staying alive in
  shark-infested waters before help arrived. Three of the
  eight officers were killed outright, went missing or died
  later of wounds; 86 of 170 enlisted men met a similar
  fate.
  After the engagement, Copeland wrote that
  Roberts sailed into an impossible battle. He concluded
  his battle report with, “In the face of this knowledge,
  the men zealously manned their stations wherever they
  might be, and fought and worked with such calmness,
  courage, and efficiency that no higher honor could be
  conceived than to command such a group of men.”
  Samuel B. Roberts was listed in the Presidential Unit
  Citation given to Taffy 3 “for extraordinary heroism in
  action.”
  Opinions are split as to which DE is the most
  revered. Although Samuel B. Roberts is the best known
  of the Butler class, USS England (of the Buckley class),
  which sank six Japanese submarines in the space of 12
  days in May 1944, is often held as being the premier
  fighting escort.
  The greatest asset of the Butler class was
  speed and maneuverability. Armor was thin, but
  machinery was dispersed to help protect against
  torpedo attacks in particular. Roberts was able to
  absorb a great deal of damage off Samar, more
  than 20 hits, including at least one HC shell from
  a 14-inch gun.
  Outfitting the destroyer escort with fuel, ammuni-
  tion, and provisions costs about $138,000.
  Subassemblies: Medium Destroyer chassis +9;
  waterproofed Large Conning superstructure
  [Body:T] +5; waterproofed full-rotation Large
  Secondary Turret [Body:T] +4; two waterproofed
  Small Secondary turrets [Body:T] +4; four Large
  Weapon open mounts [Body:T] +2; 10 Small
  Weapon open mounts [1-6 Body:T, 7-10 Sup:T]
  +0.
  Powertrain: two 4,476-kW steam turbines and two
  4,476-kW screw propellers; 156,000-gallon stan-
  dard fuel tanks; 40,000-kWs batteries
  Occ: See above.Cargo: 100 Body, 40 Sup.
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  4/90
  4/45
  4/45
  3/20
  4/45
  Super:
  4/20
  4/20
  4/20
  4/20
  –
  LS Tur:
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  –
  SS Turs:
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  –
  LW OMs:
  4/40
  –
  –
  –
  –
  SW OMs:
  4/20
  –
  –
  –
  –
  Weaponry
  2×127mm Short DP Guns/Mk 12 [SS Turs:F] (328
  rounds each).
  4×40mm Medium Gr ACs/Mk1/2 [LW OMs:F] (104
  rounds each).*
  10×20mm Long Gr ACs/Mk 2/3/4 [SW OMs:F]
  (540 rounds each).
  3×533mm Torpedo Tubes [LS Tur:F] (3 torpedoes).
  K-Gun [Body:T facing F] (10 Mk 7 depth charges).
  Hedgehog [Body:T facing F] (12 hedgehog bombs).
  * Linked in pairs.
  Equipment
  Body: Five bilge pumps; three fire extinguishers; 100
  cargo; very large radio transmitter and receiver;
  large radio direction finder; 5.5 tons of hardpoints
  (for Mk 7 depth charges); 201 bunks; eight cabins;
  nine environmental controls; 4,300 man-day pro-
  visions; two hospital beds; surgery; four work-
  shops. Super: Autopilot; precision navigation
  instruments; sea-searchnon-targeting 5-mile
  radar; air-search non-targeting 10-mile radar; mini
  targeting computer (for 127mm Short DP guns).
  Statistics
  Size: 306’×37’×85’
  Payload: 560 tons
  Lwt: 1,496 tons
  Volume: 33,605 Maint.: 10 hoursPrice: $352,100
  HT: 12. HPs: 108K Body, 1,500 Super, 900 LS Tur-
  ret, 560 each SS Turret, 120 each LW OM, 45
  each SW OM.
  wSpeed: 30
  wAccel: 0.9
  wDecel: 0.1
  wMR: 0.02
  wSR: 5
  Draft: 9.4’. Flotation Rating: 3,103 tons.
  Design Notes
  The historical draft has been used.
  Variants
  The construction of two other ships was delayed
  until completion in 1955 with radar picket equipment.
  These ships continued in service until 1960.
  LEYTE GULF
  35
  
  USS GAMBIER BAY
  The Casablanca class of escort carriers (nick-
  named “Kaisers”) was a marvel of wartime mass pro-
  duction. Fifty of these vessels were built very quickly,
  the final ship completed exactly one year after the first.
  The design was economical and easily replicated, but at
  the expense of comfort and armor.
  The basic plan called for a flight deck to be
  attached to a mercantile vessel between 450’ and 500’
  long. Dispersing the machinery did not prevent several
  of the ships from blowing up after a bombing or torpe-
  do attack. The lack of armor, however, sometimes pro-
  vided an edge against AP shells (p. 26).
  The CVEs were intended to fill support and supply
  operations – bringing replacement planes to the combat
  carriers or providing air screens for rear-area opera-
  tions. These “baby flattops” were crucial in ensuring
  the success of landings in North Africa, Salerno, Min-
  doro, and Luzon. The pilots were inexperienced at
  attacking enemy vessels, except possibly submarines,
  though even this type of combat was seldom experi-
  enced.
  Gambier Bay (CVE-73) was launched on Novem-
  ber 22, 1943. After early supply duties, Gambier Bay
  joined Task Group 52.11 for the invasion of the Mari-
  anas in May 1944. The pilots of this carrier gave air
  support to the initial landings on June 15 and attacked
  ground units and strongpoints. On June 17, a large
  enemy air attack was turned back, then another on June
  18. Gambier Bay performed these same duties at both
  Tinian (late July) and Guam (early August). September
  was equally busy, with troops going ashore at Peleliu
  and Angaur.
  From Manus, both Gambier Bay and Kitkun Bay
  escorted transports and amphibious landing craft to the
  Leyte Gulf area before joining Taffy 3 under Rear
  Admiral Clifton A.F. Sprague. The crew of Gambier
  Bay conducted similar missions as before until October
  25, when Center Force sailed from San Bernardino
  Strait with guns blazing. The pilots fought bravely to
  save the ship, along with other airmen and the sailors of
  the screen vessels. The crew of the carrier’s sole 5-inch
  gun did what they could, as well. Despite the fierce
  defense, Gambier Bay couldn’t withstand the shelling,
  with most of the damage caused by near misses. After
  the CVE stopped dead in the water, shell after shell
  ripped into the superstructure. At 0907 the ship went
  under. The crew that survived faced hours of discom-
  fort and danger in the deep Philippine Sea before a res-
  cue was affected. Gambier Bay, like Samuel B. Roberts,
  shared in the Presidential Unit Citation for Taffy 3.
  The 860 crew members lived uncomfortably day to
  day with only the minimum of niceties. Gambier Bay
  carried 30 planes. It cost around $137,000 to feed the
  crew and replenish fuel and ammunition.
  Subassemblies: Light Cruiser +10; waterproofed
  Large Conning superstructure [Body:T] +5; full-
  rotation Large Secondary turret [Body:T] +4; four
  full-rotation Large Weapon open mounts
  [Body:T] +1; 20 full-rotation Small Weapon open
  mounts [16 Body:T, four Super:T] +0.
  Powertrain: Two 5,968-kW steam turbines with two
  5,968-kW screws; 720,000-gallon standard fuel
  tanks; 120,000-kWs batteries.
  Occ: See above.Cargo: 10,000 Body
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  4/130
  4/130
  4/130
  4/130
  4/130
  Super:
  4/100
  4/100
  4/100
  4/100
  –
  Turret:
  4/150
  4/150
  4/150
  4/150
  –
  LW OMs:
  4/40
  –
  –
  –
  –
  SW OMs:
  4/40
  –
  –
  –
  –
  Weaponry
  127mm Short DP Gun/Mk 12 [Tur:F] (330 rounds).
  8×40mm Medium Gr. ACs/M-1 [LW OMs:F] (416
  rounds each).
  20×20mm Long Gr ACs/Mk 1 [SW OMs:F] (360
  SAPHE rounds each).
  Equipment
  Body: 30 bilge pumps; two 3-ton cranes; 40 fire
  extinguishers; two launch catapults; 25,000-sf
  flight deck; 144,000-gallon self-sealing fuel tanks
  (for aviation gas); hangar bay; 10,000 cargo; 844
  bunks; 10 cabins; 17,200 man-day provisions; two
  halls; 12 hospital beds; four surgeries; 12 work-
  shops. Super: Autopilot; precision navigation
  instruments; sea-search non-targeting 5-mile
  radar; air-search non-targeting 10-mile radar; very
  large radio transmitter and receiver; large radio
  direction finder.
  Statistics
  Size: 512’×65’×150’
  Payload: 2,787 tons
  Lwt: 6,197 tons
  Volume: 110,084
  Maint.: 6 hours Price:
  $1.24 million
  HT: 4. HPs: 240K Body, 1,500 Super, 900 Turret,
  120 each LW OM, 30 each SM OM.
  wSpeed: 24
  wAccel: 0.3
  wMR: 0.02
  wSR: 5
  wDecel: 0.1
  Draft: 18’. Flotation Rating: 10,128 tons.
  Design Notes
  Historical value for draft has been used.
  LEYTE GULF
  36
  
  JAPANESE
  SHIPS
  The following pages describe just two of the war-
  ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy that engaged the
  American forces at the Battle of Leyte Gulf.
  MUSASHI
  Japan’s superbattleships were intended to be supe-
  rior to anything that America could get through the
  Panama Canal. The resulting massive ships – the Yam-
  ato and Musashi – were built in great secrecy and at
  enormous expense at the Nagasaki shipyard before
  being launched on November 1, 1940. Both were used
  cautiously and never came to blows with the enemy
  fleet until the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Musashi was sunk
  before a naval target could be brought under fire.
  The ships’ main gun turrets were huge, each the
  same weight as a destroyer. Each housed three immense
  18.1-inch guns. This arrangement was still new to the
  Japanese. The caliber of each gun contravened pre-war
  naval agreements, and they remain the largest ever
  installed on a vessel. A problem, however, was that the
  huge blast when firing would have melted any lesser
  arms exposed on the deck, and would have knocked out
  and injured any exposed crew members as well. For
  this reason, AAguns were concentrated around the cen-
  tral superstructure, which proved a weakness in the
  ships’ defenses.
  The ships were massively armored, particularly in
  the central command areas of both hull and superstruc-
  ture. Weight concerns and steel shortages, however, left
  much of the bow and stern comparatively unprotected
  – the very same regions that lacked AAguns because of
  concern about the main guns’ muzzle flash. In theory,
  these unarmored areas could fill with water and the
  armored midsection would keep the ship afloat. This is
  what happened in the Sibuyan Sea. The Musashi was
  methodically hit on port and starboard sides in unar-
  mored areas for the most part, so that the ship slowly
  sank evenly. (A few hits punched through the central
  armor, too.)The U.S. pilots learned their lesson, and
  when Yamamoto was sunk, the port side was purposely
  targeted by itself, to tip over the ship.
  The hull design was quite sophisticated – it had to
  be, to hold together a ship of this size. The power
  plants, though, could only deliver a range of 7,200
  miles at 16 knots.
  In the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Musashi endured a full
  day of air assaults before its engines finally gave out.
  Circling destroyers were wary of coming too close to
  transfer survivors, and as the situation became more
  critical Captain Inoguchi gave the order to abandon
  ship. The captain himself, after presenting a small gift
  to his second in command, locked himself in the cap-
  tain’s quarters on #2 bridge and later went down with
  the ship at 1935. As the colossal warship settled on the
  seabed, either fuel or ammunition stores detonated, set-
  ting off a massive explosion. Of the original 2,399 crew
  members, 1,376 were rescued. During the attack by 3rd
  Fleet carrier planes, Musashi had been struck more than
  30 times by bombs or torpedoes.
  It costs $1.23 million to outfit Musashi with fuel,
  ammunition, and provisions for combat operations. (In
  reality, the ship often sailed with less fuel than this,
  however.) The battleship carried seven seaplanes.
  Subassemblies: Heavy Battleship chassis +12;
  waterproofed Large Capital superstructure
  [Body:T] +9; three waterproofed limited-rotation
  Huge Naval turrets with mild slope [Body:T] +6;
  four waterproofed limited-rotation Large Sec-
  ondary turrets with mild slope [Sup:T] +4; six
  waterproofed limited-rotation Small Secondary
  turrets with mild slope [Sup:T] +4; 25 water-
  proofed limited-rotation Large Weapon turrets
  [Sup:T] +2; 25 full-
  rotation 
  Small
  Weapon open mounts
  [Body:T] +0.
  Powertrain: 
  Four
  27,979-kW steam tur-
  bines 
  with 
  four
  27,979-kW screw pro-
  pellers; 1.6 million-
  gallon standard fuel
  tanks; 160,000-kWs
  batteries.
  Occ: See above.
  Cargo: 3,000 Body,
  1,000 Super
  LEYTE GULF
  37
  
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  4/656
  4/656
  4/656
  4/738
  4/328
  Super:
  4/1,312 4/1,312 4/1,312 4/656
  –
  HN Turs:
  4/2,132 4/2,132 4/2,132 4/2,132 –
  LS Turs:
  4/410
  4/410
  4/410
  4/410
  –
  SS Turs:
  4/410
  4/410
  4/410
  4/410
  –
  LW Turs:
  4/80
  4/80
  4/80
  4/80
  –
  OMs:
  4/40
  –
  –
  –
  –
  Weaponry
  9×18” Naval Guns/Type 94 Shiki [HN Turs:F] (100
  rounds each).
  12×155mm Med. DP Guns/Type 3 Shiki [LS Turs:F]
  (201 rounds each).
  12×127mm Short DP Guns/Type 89 Shiki [SS
  Turs:F] (270 rounds each).
  100×20mm Short Air ACs/Type 99-1 Shiki [75 LW
  Turs:F, 25 OMs:F] (360 rounds each).
  Equipment
  Body: 300 bilge pumps; 3-ton crane; 40 fire extin-
  guishers; two launch catapults; 3,000 cargo; very
  large radio transmitter and receiver; immense
  radio transmitter and receiver; very immense
  radio direction finder; 1,470 bunks; 18 cabins; two
  luxury cabins; 60 environmental controls; 48,000
  man-day provisions; 26 halls; 40 hospital beds;
  eight surgeries; 24 workshops. Super: Autopilot;
  navigation instruments; sea-search non-targeting
  8-mile radar; air-search non-targeting 12-mile
  radar; 1,000 cargo; seven medium radio transmit-
  ters and receivers; three large radio transmitters
  and receivers.
  Statistics
  Size: 785’×140’×220’
  Payload: 5,861 tons
  Lwt: 66,051 tons
  Volume: 918,710
  Maint.: 1.2 hours
  Price: $28.6 million
  HT: 7. HP 960K Body, 25K Super, 4,200 each HN
  Turret, 900 each LS Turret, 560 each SS Turret,
  120 each LW Turret, 45 each OM.
  wSpeed: 36
  wAccel: 0.3
  wDecel: 0.1
  wMR: 0.02
  wSR: 6
  Draft: 30’. Flotation Rating: 84,710 tons.
  Design Notes
  Both Musashi and Yamato were originally intend-
  ed to have a crew of 1,500. As built, the ships would
  have been luxurious by Japanese standards. Wartime
  conditions, however, saw the number of crew increase
  so that living conditions became as poor as usual. His-
  torical draft has been used.
  Variants
  The program to build superbattleships was cut
  short after Pearl Harbor and Midway, when it became
  clear that aircraft carriers were becoming the dominant
  vessels of naval combat. A third ship, Shinano, was
  completed as a vast carrier, the largest of the war. Oper-
  ationally, Shinano was intended to act as a support ship.
  The luckless vessel was sunk as soon as it left Tokyo
  Bay by a roving American submarine.
  A fourth ship, the unnamed “111,” was never com-
  pleted. This vessel was intended to use 16 to 20 3.9-
  inch DP guns combined with more effective armor.
  Three other variations were planned, “797” (without
  6.1-inch guns and more 3.9-inch DP guns), and “798”
  and “799” (intended to be outfitted with 20.1-inch
  guns).
  SHIGURE
  Shigure, the “luckiest ship of the war,” was origi-
  nally designed to be a Hatsuharu-class destroyer. This
  class of ship was famous for being the first to wield the
  deadly Japanese “Long Lance” torpedoes. Japan had
  been attempting to overcome what they saw as the
  unequal agreements reached in the Washington Treaty
  and at the London Naval conferences by maximizing
  the potential of each ship. This would result in the IJN
  enjoying superiority for each class of ship, which
  would compensate for the fewer ships officially
  allowed the Japanese. Experimentation followed with
  mixed results. One of the first attempts was the
  Tomozuru, but this ship capsized in a typhoon in 1934.
  The Shiratsuyu class was commissioned in 1936.
  Shigure, the second ship of this class built, utilized a
  quadruple-tube torpedo mount with reloads. The rear
  single turret was replaced with anti-aircraft guns in
  wartime conditions. The ship could cruise for 6,000
  miles at 15 knots. Such designs helped gain Japan the
  premier position with regard to the manufacture of
  destroyers. These vessels also incorporated a quick
  reload system for the torpedoes, giving an offensive
  edge. On the other hand, lack of the best sonar and radar
  meant that the vessels rarely could conduct antisubma-
  rine duties with the highest effectiveness.
  Much of the career of Shigure was taken up with
  escort duty. The ship was active in the Guadalcanal
  campaign, leading troop-transport runs. In 1942, on a
  troop-transport mission to Kolombangara on August 6-
  7, Shigure was the only survivor of four Japanese ships
  in the Battle of Vella Gulf. Ten days later, Shigure again
  engaged American destroyers. In the Battle of Vella
  Lavella (October 6-7, 1942), Shigure played a part in
  damaging the destroyer Selfridge in a combined torpe-
  do attack. The vessel suffered damage on June 8, 1944.
  LEYTE GULF
  38
  
  After rescuing survivors from Harusame, two shells
  struck home and several sailors were killed or wound-
  ed. Shigure also was present at the Battle of the Philip-
  pine Sea (June 19-20, 1944).
  At Leyte, Commander Nishino steered the Shigure
  through Surigao Strait as part of Nishimura’s Southern
  Force. The ship was detached from Desron 2 (under
  Kurita) to join with Desdiv 4 under Captain K. Taka-
  hashi for the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After escaping the
  strait, Shigure made it back to Brunei on October 27.
  The luck of this ship ran out on January 24, 1945. The
  submarine USS Blackfin torpedoed Shigure 160 miles
  east of Khota Bharu, Malaya. The ship sank in 10 min-
  utes.
  It costs around $20,000 to maintain the Shigure in
  supplies, fuel, and ammunition.
  Subassemblies: Heavy Destroyer chassis +9; water-
  proofed Large Conning superstructure [Body:T]
  +5; two waterproofed full-rotation Medium Sec-
  ondary turrets 1-2 [Body:T] +4; two waterproofed
  full-rotation Small Secondary turrets 3-4
  [Body:T] +4; 10 full-rotation Large Weapon open
  mounts 5-14 [Body:T] +1; four Small Weapon
  open mounts 15-18 [Body:T] +0.
  Powertrain: Two 19,396-kW steam turbines with
  two 19,396-kW screw propellers; 559,500-gallon
  standard fuel tanks; 40,000-kWs batteries.
  Occ: See above. Cargo: 300 Body, 100 Sup.
  Armor
  F
  RL
  B
  T
  U
  Body:
  4/180
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  Sup:
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  –
  MS Turs:
  4/90
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  –
  SS Turs:
  4/90
  4/60
  4/60
  4/60
  –
  LW OMs:
  4/60
  –
  –
  –
  –
  SW OMs:
  4/40
  –
  –
  –
  –
  Weaponry
  4×127mm Short DP Guns/Type 89 Shiki [Turs 3-
  4:F] (330 rounds each).
  20×20mm Short Air ACs/Type 99-1 Shiki [OMs 5-
  14:F] (360 rounds each).
  4×VLG HMGs/Type 93 Shiki [OMs 15-18:F] (600
  AP rounds each).
  5×610mm Torpedo Tubes (10 Type 93-1 Shiki torpe-
  does total) [Turs 1-2].
  16×depth 
  charges
  [Body:T facing B].
  Equipment
  Body: 15 bilge pumps;
  two 2-ton torpedo cranes;
  10 tons of hardpoints (for
  depth charges); eight fire
  extinguishers; 300 cargo;
  very large radio transmit-
  ter and receiver; large
  radio direction finder;
  170 bunks; five environ-
  mental controls; 7,200
  man-day provisions; hall;
  four hospital beds; sur-
  gery; four workshops.
  Super: Autopilot; naviga-
  tion instruments; sea-
  search 
  non-targeting
  5-mile radar; air-search
  non-targeting 
  8-mile
  radar; 100 cargo.
  Statistics
  Size: 360’×30’×110’
  Payload: 639 tons
  Lwt: 2,372 tons
  Volume: 55,910 Maint.: 4.5 hours
  Price:
  $1.9 million
  HT: 11. 150K Body, 1,500 Super, 750 each MS Tur,
  560 each SS Tur, 120 each LW OM, 45 each SM
  OM.
  wSpeed: 36
  wAccel: 2.5
  wDecel: 0.1
  wMR: 0.02
  wSR: 5
  Draft: 12’. Flotation Rating: 5,148 tons.
  LEYTE GULF
  39
  
  The following scenarios are intended to be played
  as one-offs, either as stand-alone adventures or to rep-
  resent a part of the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf in an
  ongoing campaign. Given the huge distances involved
  and the short timeframe – not to mention that many
  actions were occurring simultaneously – it will be diffi-
  cult to credibly roleplay a mini-campaign covering the
  events of October 23 to 25 completely, unless the PCs
  move about the region via airplane. What is more suit-
  able and feasible would be for one of the scenarios
  detailed below to feature in a wider campaign centered
  on, for example, MacArthur’s return to the Philippines
  or life aboard one of the warships (perhaps an aircraft
  carrier). Or a Japanese naval campaign might feature
  the battle as its epic conclusion.
  If you want to play a series of action-packed
  engagements in a mini-campaign, then the exploits of
  the pilots in 3rd Fleet (under Halsey) are ideal. Numer-
  ous missions were carried out against Formosa, Oki-
  nawa, and Luzon, leading up to the sinking of Musashi
  and the sorties made against the Northern Force.
  Kinkaid was operational everywhere MacArthur went.
  On the Japanese side, the survivors from Musashi
  ended up in Manila, taking part in the battle for that city
  when American ground troops liberated the capital.
  Placing the PCs in that role would allow the GM to
  change the campaign’s nature dramatically without
  deviating from the historical. For a Japanese campaign
  with much better than average odds of survival, place
  the PCs among the crew of the Shigure, which led a
  charmed life throughout the war before and after the
  engagement in Surigao Strait.
  Finally, the various naval actions around Leyte
  may provide a backdrop for a land-based, army cam-
  paign. Perhaps the characters are Filipinos that have
  fought a war of resistance against the Japanese. Now
  they are employed briefly as sea-rescue units, sailing
  out quickly to pick up downed pilots after one of the air
  engagements. American soldiers may have to undertake
  a daring mission to capture an airfield intact. Asquad of
  Japanese elite soldiers may be charged with the assassi-
  nation of MacArthur.
  ROLEPLAYING THE
  BATTLE OF LEYTE
  GULF
  GURPS WWII describes three basic approaches to
  running scenarios (see pp. W158-160). The Battle of
  Leyte Gulf offers ample opportunity for American
  sailors or soldiers to engage in a campaign of any of
  these types. Playing the Japanese side with a gritty or
  mildly heroic approach would also work, though a truly
  cinematic Japanese-based campaign would not main-
  tain the historical feel of the engagement. That said, a
  Japanese campaign could take on a “Tragic Heroes”
  alternative to cinematic action, in which the PCs are
  true inheritors of the samurai spirit, capable of victory
  over great odds, but must face the certain (and, from
  their perspective, tragic) knowledge that the American
  forces are overwhelming and they are doomed. The
  resulting flavor would not be purely cinematic, but up
  until the very end the action could be.
  Whatever your style of play, the Battle of Leyte
  Gulf concentrates a lot of action into a few days. The
  commanders in particular must have hardly slept during
  this time. The GM can make fatigue play a large role in
  the combatants’ ability to survive and overcome during
  the final day of fighting.
  SCENARIOS
  Each of the following scenarios builds upon the
  information presented in Chapter 1. Of course, GMs
  should feel free to alter them to taste.
  ENEMY CLOSING
  In this scenario, the characters are crew members
  of the USS Dace at the time of the first sighting of Kuri-
  ta’s Center Force.
  LEYTE GULF
  40
  4.
  CAMPAIGNS
  
  Scene #1
  It’s early morning, just past midnight, on October
  23. Dace has been at sea for over three weeks. The crew
  is impatient for an enemy contact, having sunk only an
  oiler and a transport. Orders are to patrol Palawan Pas-
  sage in partnership with Darter.
  A radar warning breaks the monotony while the
  two commanders are talking on the surface by mega-
  phone. Immediately, the submarine dives. The vessel
  tracks the Japanese group through the night, though no
  attack is yet ordered. The PC sailors, if not officers
  themselves, are challenged at this point to find out as
  much information as possible from their shipmates
  about what is going on and what the captain may order.
  The men are excited and becoming more tense.
  Scene #2
  Commander
  Bladen D. Claggett is
  maneuvering for a
  torpedo attack in the
  early dawn half-light.
  He has led his vessel
  ahead of Kurita’s
  Center Force to target
  the starboard column.
  He orders a final
  weapons check, but it
  fails. Tube 1 is mal-
  functioning! 
  There
  are 
  only 
  a 
  few
  moments to correct
  the problem. The PCs
  are ordered to lend
  whatever help they
  can. The other tubes
  are working fine.
  Whether tube 1 is operational or not, three other
  “fish” zoom away on target. Immediately, Dace begins
  to turn. Everything is quiet for two minutes, then a
  sharp, powerful underwater explosion is heard. The
  next load of torpedoes from the rear tubes speeds away.
  Claggett’s voice calls all hands to stations, warning the
  crew to be ready for depth-charge attacks. A sense of
  motion can be felt. Dace is moving to escape.
  Scene #3
  A fast ship can be heard overhead. The crew is
  wide-eyed and alert. Some men are praying quietly and
  a few are grinning broadly, hiding their fear in a differ-
  ent way. Moments seem to turn into hours, then the first
  depth charge detonates. It’s close! Seconds later, anoth-
  er eruption rocks the submarine. One of the crew near-
  by can’t bear it. (The GM might require the PCs to
  make Will rolls at this point, as well.) He screams out
  in panic. Immediately, an NCO orders the PCs to shut
  him up, if they’re ordinary sailors. The frightened sailor
  struggles but can be subdued. A third charge seems
  more distant. The ship has survived for the time being.
  Scene #4
  Dace is making good speed. Then a sharp change
  in course can be felt. All of the crew pause for a second,
  looking up, and expecting further evasive action.
  Claggett relaxes everyone, though, by announcing that
  Darter is experiencing some difficulties. Dace will give
  aid.
  The space between the two submarines is quickly
  closed and Dace surfaces. After a few minutes, the PCs
  are summoned topside. They are ordered to bring lines
  (ropes) with them.
  On the narrow
  deck, an unusual
  sight greets the res-
  cue party. Darter is
  wedged on a coral
  reef and can’t move.
  Rafts are hauled out
  to ferry a small team
  across. Darter has to
  be freed. The rescue
  party is commanded
  to sail across to the
  stranded submarine
  and investigate the
  problem, setting up a
  lifeline at the very
  least to allow for the
  evacuation of the
  Darter’s crew.
  Historically,
  Darter wasn’t res-
  cued. If the PCs, though, are particularly ingenious or
  just plain lucky, the GM should consider mildly altering
  things by allowing them to free the grounded vessel.
  The task would be very challenging, however. Should
  the salvage operation be successful, then both sub-
  marines return to Fremantle, Australia, without inci-
  dent. Otherwise, move on to Scene #5.
  Scene #5
  The attempts to pull Darter from the ragged reef
  have failed. The sailors are ordered to transport demo-
  lition charges to the stranded submarine, so it can be
  destroyed. The area must be vacated as daylight is
  breaking. Once a raft has been loaded up, the crossing
  can be made. At the mid-point of the trip, the sound of
  an aircraft engine is heard. Everyone stops and worried
  eyes turn upward. High above, a dark shape can be
  made out. It circles once, then begins to swoop down.
  LEYTE GULF
  41
  
  Commander Claggett hurriedly orders an emer-
  gency dive. The raft is stranded between the two ves-
  sels, exposed to attack. The hatches on Dace are closing
  and it already is beginning to get under way.
  The Japanese pilot chooses the easier of the two
  large targets, Darter. Historically, his bombs missed,
  but the GM may wish to make a roll to make things
  potentially more exciting. The GM may also roll to see
  if the pilot spots and strafes the small boat bobbing on
  the waves.
  Scene #6
  After the excitement of the air attack, the explo-
  sives are finally placed on board Darter, the crew of
  which has already been evacuated and is aboard Dace.
  The sailors, their harrowing mission completed, return
  to safety. A detonation is distinctly heard, but Darter
  remains in one piece. Claggett orders the PCs, who hap-
  pen to still be topside, to man the sub’s 4-inch gun and
  put a few rounds into Darter. Just then a sonar “ping”
  is heard. Another submarine, surely an enemy one, is in
  the area. Claggett doesn’t want to take any risks, and
  leaves to return home.
  Historically, Darter wasn’t sunk on this occasion,
  but the GM may reward especially good shooting. If
  Darter still survives, it will be sunk on October 31 by
  the Nautilus. For now, the submarine crammed with
  two full crews must move away so as not to be caught
  by a roving destroyer or more aircraft.
  Scene #7
  It’s a long, uncomfortable trip back to Australia.
  Social situations can be gamed out, including card
  games or minor arguments. Dace makes it back to Fre-
  mantle and both crews are given shore leave following
  debriefing.
  MEDIC!
  In this scenario, the PCs are among the crew of the
  USS Birmingham at the time of the first Japanese air
  attacks against 3rd Fleet on October 24.
  Scene #1
  A stray bomb has hit the fleet carrier Princeton.
  Though the damage is severe, the captain believes that
  the ship is salvageable. Destroyers are already on the
  scene providing what help they can. Captain Thomas B.
  Inglis of the Birmingham hopes that, with the state-of-
  the-art equipment aboard his ship, he will be able to
  quickly bring the fires under control. Most of Prince-
  ton’s crew (which includes several hundred sailors) is
  on the flight deck’s forward end. Some have already
  descended nets or jumped into the water to be rescued
  by destroyers.
  As the Birmingham pulls alongside at 1055, Inglis
  calls for volunteers to board Princeton to help extin-
  guish the flames. Fire hoses are available. Lieutenant
  Alan Reed commands the rescue party, which hopeful-
  ly the PCs will feel inspired to join.
  Scene #2
  As soon as the firefighting team is onboard, a lieu-
  tenant requests a small detail to go below to the second
  deck. It is known that 12 men are trapped in the execu-
  tive officer’s office, on the port side forward. Reported-
  ly, they already have suffered serious burns, and it is
  vital to reach them as soon as possible. The lieutenant
  (an NPC) will lead the mission. He informs his team
  that the fire is very fierce below.
  The GM should hurry events along, here.
  Belowdecks, the air is thick with smoke, and respirato-
  ry equipment is highly advised. It is also generally dark,
  with thick, black smoke roiling through the rooms and
  corridors. Hot water covers the decking. When the
  party reaches the office that they seek, the hatch handle
  is hot enough to seriously burn an unprotected hand.
  The dozen survivors remain alive, but all of them are in
  poor shape and half can’t move without assistance.
  As the sailors struggle to get their charges back up
  to safety, the GM may decide to insert a (non-historical)
  additional wave of Japanese air raiders. As the rescuers
  hear the sirens go off, informing everyone to take cover,
  they must decided which is the greater threat: the fires
  raging around them or the bombs about to explode top-
  side.
  Scene #3
  By early afternoon, most of the fires have been
  brought under control. The members of the team from
  Birmingham are all hungry and tired. Flames still rage
  in the rear of the hangar, however, and are approaching
  the torpedo stowage compartments. Captain W.H.
  Buracker is becoming very worried, and summons
  everyone available for another effort to prevent the dan-
  gerous fires from touching off the warheads. Time is of
  the essence here, and players should be forced into
  making snap decisions without planning or discussion.
  Historically, the firefighters failed to overcome this
  last hurdle, but the GM may reward ingenious work and
  allow the carrier to be saved. If so, Princeton is tugged
  away and eventually makes it back to Pearl Harbor to
  be refitted. Otherwise, move on to Scene #4.
  Scene #4
  If the fires rage unchecked, then at 1523 the torpe-
  does explode. The sailors will not necessarily be aware
  of this danger, though Buracker knows of the threat.
  (Historically, he assumed that because earlier fires had-
  n’t set them off, then the warheads probably were safe
  from this threat.) To give the sailors some chance of
  LEYTE GULF
  42
  
  survival, someone or something should give them an
  indication of the risk. Then, perhaps, someone trips and
  clangs their equipment against a torpedo’s nose to add
  a little excitement to the escape.
  The explosion’s damage to the carrier is immense
  and anyone still close to the stowage areas will almost
  certainly be killed. The Birmingham is still alongside
  Princeton, and it is at this point that the Princeton crew,
  assembled on the deck, is shredded.
  At this time, the sailor probably will decide that
  their best course is to jump back onto their own ship
  (presuming that they didn’t jump into the sea to make
  their escape), then aid in treating the wounded. Board-
  ing is not so easy, however, because the seas are rough.
  If still aboard the carrier, they must jump from one
  pitching deck to another. If afloat, the waters will slap
  them against the side of the ship’s hull at times, then
  pull them away from it at other times.
  Virtually everyone topside on Birmingham has a
  wound of some kind, and most of them are serious. The
  rescuers should concern themselves with offering what
  medical attention they can. Those with many medical
  skills may be called upon not only to roll for treatments,
  but to roll to determine which of several gravely injured
  sailors needs the most help the soonest.
  Aftermath
  At 1638, Buracker left the Princeton. His carrier
  was eventually torpedoed and sunk by Reno. Birming-
  ham was able to make it back to the West Coast to be
  repaired and receive a new crew in time to participate
  in the naval operations around Okinawa.
  ADRIFT
  This scenario covers the actions of crew members
  on an escort carrier entangled in the engagement off
  Samar on October 25. The scenario was written with
  the Gambier Bay in mind, but is easily adaptable if you
  want to use a different ship.
  Scene #1
  The action starts as Japanese cruisers close in on
  their prey: the PC’s ship! Shells of various caliber are
  falling all around the vessel; some pass through the
  structure without exploding, but some are hitting the
  water close by or on the water line. These hits are tak-
  ing an increasingly heavy toll. The accuracy of Japan-
  ese gunfire is steadily improving, as the distance
  becomes shorter.
  In this first scene, the seamen have perhaps only
  moments to gather whatever supplies they wish from
  the ship. Any actions taken are urgent and a sense that
  time is limited should be conveyed.
  Scene #2
  A shell hits very close by and explodes. Shrapnel
  flies through the air (possible causing injury) and
  everyone is knocked down to the ground, momentarily
  concussed and disoriented. When the smoke clears, the
  survivors learn just how lucky they were. Only a few
  feet away, they see the mangled bodies of other sailors.
  One of these men is still alive, though he is seriously
  wounded and clearly needs help. Once the characters
  are back on their feet, they have the opportunity to
  administer some basic first aid – but all the while more
  shells should whistle in, with
  the GM reminding them that
  the clock is ticking. After first
  aid is applied, the injured
  sailor will still need help to
  move to safety – but this will
  slow down the sailors’ move-
  ment even more. The tension
  between self-preservation and
  helping a fallen comrade
  should be played for all it’s
  worth.
  Scene #3
  The ship rocks as more
  rounds find their mark. Apass-
  ing sailor, with a gashed head,
  calls out that the captain has
  ordered abandon ship. He
  doesn’t stop to explain, but
  he’s hastily pulling his life
  preserver over his head. The
  ship is listing heavily to port.
  LEYTE GULF
  43
  
  The drop from the deck down into the
  water from the starboard side is a long
  one. Fires are raging across the deck,
  and fire parties have seemingly given
  up on the task of controlling the
  flames. If the sailors take the time to
  look, they will find life rafts that can be
  cut loose and thrown down into the
  water first. Ropes can also be suspend-
  ed to allow a climber a swift but con-
  trolled descent. Jumping is even
  quicker, but the GM should require a
  Swimming roll to avoid injury. If the
  wounded man from the previous scene
  is still with the group, special and time-
  consuming arrangements will have to
  be made to get him down into the water.
  Scene #4
  The best thing that a swimmer could do in the
  water was to find a life raft. If one wasn’t thrown down
  before the descent, then there will be a few others pass-
  ing by. Many will already be full to overflowing, how-
  ever. The second thing to do is to swim away from the
  sinking ship as fast and far as possible before inflating
  one’s life preserver (which will slow down the swim-
  mer significantly). As a vessel goes under, it sucks
  down any debris and people on the surface. Any
  wounded will find swimming difficult. The GM should
  check also that heavy equipment (such as a helmet or
  revolver) is not being worn or carried. These things will
  drag a swimmer under. Also, the Japanese are still fir-
  ing explosive shells at the ship, and most of them will
  fall into the nearby waters filled with escaping sailors.
  Scene #5
  Assuming that the survivors have put some dis-
  tance between themselves and the ship, the sailors can
  have a moment to catch their breath. (Perhaps the GM
  and players, too. The first four scenes are best covered
  at a very fast pace.) Other swimmers and life rafts are
  bobbing on the waves, and the chances of making it
  back to dry land will be greatly increased if the various
  survivors band together and support one another.
  To add some drama, if the PCs have managed to
  acquire a life raft, their search of it reveals that the kegs
  of water have either been lost or their spigots came
  loose as the boat hit the ocean. There is no food, either,
  but there is a basic first-aid kit. Unfortunately, the band-
  ages slide off easily when wet, as do tourniquets. It will
  be very hard to stop any bleeding for the injured. The
  raft does have a Very pistol and flares.
  As the boats and rafts band together, all of them
  will acquire at least one wounded passenger. Many
  unharmed sailors will be left in the water, clinging to
  the ropes lining the sides of a life vessel.
  Morale is high at this point, as talk turns to rescue.
  No one reasonably expects to be picked up until the
  main action has ended, but it can be seen that American
  planes are strafing the Japanese ships.
  Scene #6
  Once several rafts are joined together, the sailors
  can busy themselves rounding up stragglers still swim-
  ming from the ship. These are the final escapees, as at
  this time the vessel finally slips beneath the waves.
  This is also the moment in the battle that Kurita
  orders his forces to regroup to the north. Miraculously,
  the Japanese ships begin turning about. One ship, a
  destroyer, is on a course to pass by the survivors. Some
  of the men warn that the Japanese are going to shoot as
  they pass by and several people look scared. The
  destroyer is close enough for individual figures to be
  easily discernible on deck. Equally curious eyes stare
  down at bodies in the rafts. The GM should play up the
  tension before announcing that the Japanese crew
  comes to attention, and fires no shots at the waterlogged
  refugees as the destroyer glides past.
  The area quickly becomes quiet. Gunfire dies off
  completely, though in the distance American planes are
  still making runs against Kurita’s retreating cruisers and
  destroyers. The injured begin to complain about the
  agony of having salt water in their wounds. Even if
  freshwater is available (from other rafts in the group,
  for instance), no one prudent will invest such a limited
  resource in rinsing wounds that will soon be splashed
  with sea spray again.
  Afternoon comes and goes and the sun begins to
  set. There is no sign of any rescue party, though aircraft
  intermittently pass overhead.
  Scene #7
  During the night, everyone is cold. For many of the
  wounded, the temperature drop is too much and they
  succumb to exposure. Those in the water are becoming
  numb. This provides the group with a dilemma. The
  LEYTE GULF
  44
  
  dead (in the boats) are taking up space that could be
  more usefully used by other wounded men, or even
  someone uninjured but becoming tired and weary. And
  yet, if the dead are disposed of at sea, their torn bodies
  will attract the attention of sharks. Historically, this is
  what happened to those that made it off the various
  ships sunk from Taffy 3.
  If the dead are not jettisoned, then one by one men
  will fall asleep or become delirious and drop off. Some
  can be swum after and saved, but others will never be
  seen again.
  Scene #8
  Day breaks, and with it comes the sun. Unprotect-
  ed, the sailors are quickly sunburned. Thirst is now also
  a major concern. Anyone who drinks salt water will
  suffer acute hallucinations, to the extent that they may
  believe they can swim for shore. Some will attempt
  this, though they may be prevented. Any wounded that
  made it through the night are in a far worse position
  now; they still don’t have any water and are further
  dehydrated by the sun. More die. If everyone dead or
  too weak to stay afloat is piled into the rafts with the
  injured, they will begin to founder. Again, though, sim-
  ply leaving the dead will lure in a far more immediate
  hazard than sunburn and thirst . . .
  If sharks do attack the survivors, the first hint
  might be when something ominously big brushes up
  against one of the floating sailors. Once one of them
  bites someone still conscious, panic may streak
  throughout the remaining men. The sharks can be beat-
  en back by oars, but there is considerable risk of being
  bitten while doing so.
  The day passes with still no sign of help.
  Scene #9
  As night sets, the drone of a plane is heard. There
  is some discussion about whether it would be American
  or Japanese, but with little left to lose it is decided to
  fire the Very pistol. Soon after the flare goes up, the
  plane heads away.
  An hour passes before a dim light can be seen far
  away. Another flare is fired, with the argument again
  being that life as a prisoner-of-war would be preferable
  to spending an indefinite period treading water in the
  ocean. The light comes closer until a voice calls out,
  “Anyone there?” A PT boat slowly glides over and
  begins to pull men out of the water. On board, food and
  water is available. The survivors are put ashore at San
  Pedro Bay.
  From here, those who made it through the Battle of
  Samar will most likely sail to Australia first and then
  back to America. They will be assigned to a new ship
  and begin retraining, most likely for an action involving
  the Japanese homeland.
  LEYTE GULF
  45
  e23 is part of 
  Warehouse 23, the online
  store at Steve Jackson
  Games. Warehouse 23 is
  also the official Internet
  retailer for Dork Storm
  Press, Atlas Games, and
  many other publishers.
  Visit us today at
  www.warehouse23.com
  for all your game STUFF!
  ● Get complete sample adventures free!
  ● PDFs from the major players in online pub-
  lishing – plus gems from the up-and-comers,
  and digital editions of out-of-print classics.
  ● See the ratings other users have given . . .
  and add your own ratings.
  ● Buy it once, have it always. Download your
  purchases again whenever you need to.
  Download ● Print ● Play
  DOWNLOAD.
  PRINT.
  PLAY.
  e23.sjgames.com
  STEVE JACKSON GAMES
  TM
  e23
  Stuck for an adventure? 
  No problem. 
  e23 sells high-quality 
  game adventures 
  and supplements 
  in PDF format.
  
SOURCE: textdata/thevault/GURPS [multi]/SETTING/WWII/GURPS - WWII - Leyte Gulf.pdf