TEXT: MONTCALM’S 
  CRUSHING BLOW  
  French and Indian Raids along 
  New York’s Oswego River 1756
  RENÉ CHARTRAND
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  MONTCALM’S 
  CRUSHING BLOW
  French and Indian Raids along New York’s 
  Oswego River 1756
  RENÉ CHARTRAND
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  CONTENTS
  INTRODUCTION 
  4
  ORIGINS 
  6
  The competition for Lake Ontario 
  6
  The French and British forts 
  7
  INITIAL STRATEGY 
  12
  The outbreak of war 
  12
  French reinforcements arrive 
  12
  The battle of Lake George 
  13
  The strategic importance of Oswego 
  14
  The garrison 
  19
  LÉRY’S RAID ON FORT BULL 
  24
  The plan 
  24
  Trekking through the wilderness 
  27
  The approach 
  31
  Storming Fort Bull 
  33
  The aftermath 
  38
  THE PLAN 
  41
  Montcalm's arrival in Canada 
  41
  Oswego's garrison 
  47
  MONTCALM’S RAID ON OSWEGO 
  50
  Montcalm’s forces move 
  50
  Beginning the siege 
  52
  Taking Fort Ontario 
  54
  The next siege 
  55
  Surrender 
  62
  ANALYSIS 
  66
  AFTERMATH 
  71
  The sites today 
  73
  FURTHER READING AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 
  76
  INDEX 
  80
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  4
  INTRODUCTION
  Although it has been the subject of a few pages or a chapter in every book 
  on the Seven Years War in North America, this work appears to be the first 
  substantial study on Oswego and its fate in 1756. That year, it was one of 
  the most important military places on the continent. The British and 
  Americans wanted to use it as a staging point for their planned attacks on 
  the French forts on Lake Ontario that would culminate in their complete 
  control of that great waterway. The French wanted to conquer Oswego to 
  deprive the Anglo-Americans of their post on the Great Lakes. The stakes 
  were high. If the British were successful, part of New France’s fur trade was 
  ruined and the French’s influence with their allied Indian nations would be 
  seriously reduced. If the French had the upper hand, it was the 
  Anglo-Americans' trade and influence with the Indians that would be 
  seriously, perhaps fatally, affected.
  The defense capacity of Oswego was bolstered; from 1755, new forts 
  were built and the garrison greatly strengthened. However, largely through 
  the administrative ineptitude of General William Shirley, who was the British 
  commander-in-chief in North America and governor of Massachusetts, there 
  were serious problems sending enough supplies from Albany to Oswego. 
  The line of communication was very long and went largely through 
  wilderness before reaching Oswego. This was a major “Achilles heel” that 
  had not gone unnoticed by Governor General Vaudreuil of New France. A 
  seasoned officer born in Canada, he perceived the weakness in the link 
  between Albany and Oswego and resolved to test it. This is why our work 
  gives a fairly elaborate account of the raid and destruction of Fort Bull in 
  March 1756 since it proved the weakness of that link. It also demonstrated 
  yet again the “French and Indian” superiority in wilderness warfare.
  Could a raid on a grand scale, unseen as yet in North America, be 
  organized and take Oswego, Vaudreuil wondered? When General Montcalm 
  arrived in Canada in June 1756, he was soon tasked with carrying out such 
  a mission. It would involve taking over 3,000 men, including allied warriors, 
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  5
  Introduction
  over a vast expanse of wilderness traveling in a fleet of at least 200 boats 
  called bateaux that would move discreetly in order not to be detected. This 
  must have initially seemed unrealistic, but, after a while, even the French 
  metropolitan officers warmed to the idea enough to give it a try. To take 
  Oswego would really be a feat, as this was no small stockade affair. It had 
  several forts and a train of siege artillery had to be brought along. This might 
  have initially seemed like an impossible task, but many Canadians were 
  employed transporting huge quantities of trade goods across part of the 
  continent; transporting artillery and large quantities of ammunition and 
  supplies of all sorts was possible for these men. The Oswego operation has 
  usually been called a “campaign” but, as will be seen, it was really more of 
  a massive raid, the likes of which had never been seen before.
  Major-General Louis-Joseph 
  de Montcalm, Marquis de 
  Saint-Véran, but commonly 
  called Marquis de Montcalm, 
  c.1755. (Officers’ Mess, 
  Royal Military College of 
  Canada, Kingston. Author’s 
  photo)
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  6
  ORIGINS
  The competition for Lake Ontario
  From the early 1720s, American fur traders became very interested in the 
  Oswego area as a fine place for meeting Indians from the more westerly 
  Iroquois nations, notably the Onondagas. By about 1724, this had taken the 
  form of a seasonal event where traders would spend part of the summer 
  trading with Iroquois. There was nothing permanent erected by the American 
  traders, only temporary bark or log huts.
  Nevertheless, the French soon learned and were considerably worried 
  about these activities. In terms of trade with the First Nations, the American 
  traders at Oswego were obviously diverting business that would normally 
  have gone to Fort Frontenac. But it was probably the geostrategic 
  implications that drew the greatest concern of senior officials in Quebec City. 
  Up until then, Lake Ontario – still called Lake Frontenac on some maps – had 
  been a French lake. Now, the ongoing activities of the American traders at 
  Oswego each summer upset the security and dominance the French had 
  enjoyed since the 17th century. Normally, the government of New France 
  acted militarily against interlopers, either directly or through allied Indians, 
  but the Oswego case was more complex. These numerous traders were 
  British subjects and Oswego was also claimed to be within the realm and 
  protection of Great Britain although, in practical terms, the Iroquois nation 
  of the Onondagas was the real lord of the area, and was generally considered 
  an ally of the Anglo-Americans. Furthermore, Britain and France were 
  enjoying a peaceful period that no one in Versailles or London really 
  wished to upset, so a military action and occupation of Oswego by French 
  troops was out of the question.
  Diplomacy and adopting measures to hem in the American traders at 
  Oswego appeared as the immediate solution. The Chevalier de Longueuil 
  was sent to meet with Onondaga leaders, but they remained vague and 
  non-committal. The trade was no doubt much to their liking and it was 
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  7
  Origins
  increasing. In 1724, a path was cleared by the American traders at the 
  Oneida Carry to facilitate the flow of trade goods coming from Albany by 
  the Mohawk River. Goods would now reach Oswego more easily. For the 
  French, the situation was not getting any better as years passed and, by 
  1726, they obtained leave from the Iroquois Seneca nation to build a “House 
  of Peace” farther west, at Niagara, to prevent the Anglo-Americans from 
  penetrating any farther into Lake Ontario. The new French fort at Niagara 
  had the usual stockade wall of any outpost, but what was rising inside was 
  a large three-story-high stone “machicolated house” that would have a 
  detachment of regular troops. This would secure the entrance into Lake 
  Ontario from Lake Erie. With Fort Frontenac, which also had a regular 
  garrison, guarding the lake’s eastern access into the St Lawrence River, the 
  French controlled the way in and out of the lake, except at Oswego.
  The French and British forts
  New York colony governor William Burnet received news of the French 
  fort being built at Niagara. It was clear that Oswego now had to be 
  secured and made into a more permanent post. Britain too had to “show 
  the flag” at Lake Ontario, as failure to do so could entail losses in trade 
  and prestige with the Iroquois confederacy. In late 1726, Burnet obtained 
  money from the New York legislature to “build a fort at the mouth of the 
  Onondaga River” and, by the spring of 1727, he “sent some workmen to 
  build a stone house of Strength at a place called Oswego…” (DRCHSNY, 
  V).  To garrison the new fort, Governor Burnet ordered one of the four 
  independent companies posted in the 
  province of New York to take its 
  quarters at Oswego. This was a 
  company of British regular troops 
  consisting of one captain, two 
  lieutenants and 60 enlisted men. The 
  men were armed with muskets, 
  bayonets and swords, and were 
  uniformed in red coats with blue 
  cuffs and linings. From 1730, the 
  facings were changed from blue to 
  green (WO 71/6).
  Thus, for the first time, British 
  regular “redcoats” appeared on the 
  southeastern shore of Lake Ontario. 
  Not only were the Iroquois surely 
  impressed at this resolute show of 
  force on the frontier, but the French 
  also were deeply worried. The 
  governor general of New France, the 
  Marquis de Beauharnois, wanted to 
  know what was being done at Oswego 
  and, in the summer of 1727, dispatched 
  Redoubt built by the English 
  at Oswego, 1727. (Detail 
  from a map by King’s 
  Engineer Gaspard-Joseph 
  Chaussegros de Léry 
  (senior). Made at Montreal 
  on July 17, 1727 after field 
  notes. Collection and photo: 
  Archives Nationales 
  (France), Outremer 
  (Aix-en-Provence), Dépot 
  des Fortifications des 
  Colonies)
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  8
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  Chief King’s Engineer Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de Léry (1682–1756) to 
  observe, from a safe distance, the activities of the Anglo-Americans. De 
  Léry’s maps and plans have survived and they make an outstanding record of 
  the construction of the fortified post by the British troops.
  What he saw at Oswego was the construction of a substantial structure 
  built on a rectangular plan, three stories high and with thick stone walls (see 
  illustration). The top story was machicolated with wood and thus was 
  slightly wider than the lower floors. A sloped roof covered the edifice. It was 
  reckoned by de Léry to be about ten “toises” wide (about 19.5m). There 
  were initially no other fortifications except a semicircular earthwork 
  surrounding the machicolated fortified house on the landward side. Nearby 
  were huts and temporary storehouses put up by the traders that conducted 
  business with the Indians near the fortified house during the summer. During 
  the following years, relatively little was done to improve the fortifications. 
  Fort Oswego, 1739. (View 
  by King’s Engineer 
  Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros 
  de Léry (senior). Collection 
  and photo: Archives 
  Nationales (France), 
  Outremer (Aix-en-Provence), 
  Dépot des Fortifications des 
  Colonies)
  1720S
  Fur trading begins 
  in the Oswego 
  area; fortifications 
  are built
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  9
  Origins
  When de Léry went back to observe Oswego in 1739, the only major change 
  recorded was that the sloped roof had been removed. The top floor was now 
  open and had two sentry boxes, as well as a small structure covering the 
  stairway leading to the top floor.
  A decade later, in September 1749, de Léry was again spying on Oswego 
  from a distance. This time, he recorded improvements made to strengthen 
  the British fortified house. The British had built around it a masonry wall 
  with two corner square turrets on the west side to cover the entrance while, 
  on the east side, the curtain wall was rounded and featured four gun ports. 
  It had loopholes at two levels: on the ground floor and on an upper wooden 
  gallery that went from one corner square turret to the other. Thus the 
  fortified house had evolved into being a sort of dungeon surrounded by a 
  curtain wall with two turrets. There were no outer fortifications. The traders’ 
  huts had evolved into a street with houses lining each side.
  By comparison, the two forts built by the French on the shores of 
  Lake Ontario were impressive. Fort Frontenac, built from 1673, was not 
  formidable, but it had a substantial collection of buildings defended by a fort 
  that had stone walls with bastions. It was also the main base for the French 
  vessels sailing on Lake Ontario. At the other end of the lake was Fort Niagara 
  that had its three-story “stone castle” within a fairly large wooden bastioned 
  fort. In the summer of 1755, substantial Vauban-style earthworks were 
  added to seal the peninsula onto which the fort had been built. Two other 
  areas were occasionally used as anchorages and as trading spots by the 
  French vessels and canoes. That at Toronto (now the site of the largest city 
  in Canada) was meant to draw trade away from Oswego by Indians coming 
  from the northwest, and must have been a success. In 1750–51, a small fort 
  was built there and provided with a regular garrison. It was officially called 
  Fort Rouillé, named after the contemporary minister of the French navy, but 
  was better known as Fort Toronto. The other area was on the east end of the 
  Plan of Oswego in 1743. 
  John Bartram (1699–1777), 
  considered the “father of 
  American botany,” visited 
  Oswego collecting plants, 
  but sketched this plan, 
  which appeared in his 
  Observations on the 
  Inhabitants… in his Travels 
  (London, 1751). It shows the 
  “castle” now enclosed by a 
  curtain wall, rounded 
  towards the east and with 
  turrets on the opposite end. 
  North is to the right. (Fort 
  Stanwix National 
  Monument, National Park 
  Service, Rome (NY). Author’s 
  photo)
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  10
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  lake at what was called Niaouré Bay (now Sackets Harbor, NY). Although 
  no permanent post was established there by the French, this was a frequent 
  gathering spot for traders and Indians. It also proved to be a popular 
  assembly place for military expeditions in wartime.   
  Albany, sited on the west bank of the upper Hudson River, was the 
  second-largest town in the colony of New York, the biggest being New York 
  City on Manhattan Island where the Hudson flowed into the Atlantic. While 
  New York City was already an important center for ocean-going ships 
  engaged in international trading, Albany was more concerned with 
  settlement, agriculture and trade with the First Nations. The towns of the 
  Iroquois confederacy were to the north and west of Albany. Going due north 
  on the Hudson River, one would reach Lake George and, just after that, the 
  first outposts of New France on Lake Champlain. Since the 1730s, the 
  French had built the imposing Fort Saint-Frédéric, which the English called 
  Crown Point, whose main work consisted of a massive and medieval-looking 
  tower. This fort had a permanent garrison of the gray-white-coated 
  compagnies franches de la marine regular soldiers who were often assisted 
  Entrance to the Oswego 
  River, 1749. This was the 
  general appearance of the 
  old stone fort until the end 
  of the August 1756 siege. 
  (View by King’s Engineer 
  Gaspard-Joseph 
  Chaussegros de Léry made 
  from notes taken on 
  September 16, 1749 and 
  finished in Quebec City on 
  October 8. Collection and 
  photo: Archives Nationales 
  (France), Outremer 
  (Aix-en-Provence), Dépot 
  des Fortifications des 
  Colonies)
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  11
  Origins
  by Canadian woodsmen and allied Indians. This fort was definitely an 
  irritant for the English colonies and it was always hoped that, in wartime, 
  an American colonial force would take it. This was not to be and, on the 
  contrary, it was the French who strengthened their position in the fall of 
  1755 by occupying Ticonderoga, at the northern end of Lake George, and 
  started construction of Fort Carillon, a large, bastioned, Vauban-style fort.
  The strategic situation farther west of Albany was somewhat different. 
  There were no French forts in that area. The nearest one was La Présentation 
  (now Ogdensburg, NY) on the southern shore of the western arm of the 
  St Lawrence River, and the next nearest was Fort Frontenac on the northeast 
  end of Lake Ontario. They were both quite far from the main Anglo-American 
  “highway” that followed the Mohawk River westward into its tributaries. 
  There was a great deal of wilderness to be crossed by using several rivers, 
  portages and lakes until one reached the southeast shore of Lake Ontario. 
  The 251-mile (404km) journey to Oswego started at Albany using the 
  Mohawk River. From Schenectady, settlements were sparser, and travelers 
  now ascended the river passing Fort Johnson, Fort Plain, Little Falls, two 
  Iroquois villages and the Palatine settlement called German Flatts, whose 
  original settlers were Protestant refugees from Europe. Thereafter, the river 
  continued into unsettled wilderness until the Oneida Carry, also called the 
  Great Carrying Place, was reached at about 45 miles (72km) west. Once 
  there, travelers landed to go farther west because the Mohawk River 
  now headed north. It was indeed a carrying place in the sense of a 
  portage road for four miles (6.4km) through the forest, upon which 
  everything had to be carried overland to Wood Creek, including 
  canoes, while the larger bateaux were dragged on wooden 
  sledges. These crafts were put in the fast-running 
  waters of Wood Creek that flowed west. They 
  were loaded up, sent on their way by paddle and 
  oar, and at length reached Lake Oneida. 
  Once that was crossed, the boats and 
  canoes eventually entered the Oswego 
  River (also called the Onondaga River 
  at the time) that carried them to 
  Oswego. If conditions were 
  fairly good, the voyage took 
  about three weeks from 
  Albany.
   
  iginal settlers were Protestant refugees from Europe. Thereafter, the river
  ontinued into unsettled wilderness until the Oneida Carry, also called the
  reat Carrying Place, was reached at about 45 miles (72km) west. Once
  ere, travelers landed to go farther west because the Mohawk River
  ow headed north. It was indeed a carrying place in the sense of a 
  ortage road for four miles (6.4km) through the forest, upon which
  verything had to be carried overland to Wood Creek, including 
  noes, while the larger bateaux were dragged on wooden 
  edges. These crafts were put in the fast-running 
  aters of Wood Creek that flowed west. They
  ere loaded up, sent on their way by paddle and
  ar, and at length reached Lake Oneida. 
  nce that was crossed, the boats and 
  noes eventually entered the Oswego 
  iver (also called the Onondaga River
  the time) that carried them to 
  swego. If conditions were 
  irly good, the voyage took 
  bout three weeks from 
  lbany.
  A small bateau. It was a 
  flat-bottom, double-ended, 
  shallow-draft, all-purpose 
  transport boat powered 
  with oars and with a sail in 
  open water. Bateaux were 
  extensively used by the 
  French and the 
  Anglo-Americans on North 
  America’s rivers and lakes. 
  They came in various sizes 
  and could carry as much as 
  three tons of cargo. A 1776 
  British plan specified a craft 
  30 feet four inches (9.2m) 
  long, six and a half feet 
  (1.9m) wide and two feet 
  ten inches (0.8m) deep for 
  a fairly large bateau. 
  (Reproduction at Fort 
  Stanwix National 
  Monument, National Park 
  Service, Rome (NY). 
  Author’s photo)
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  12
  INITIAL STRATEGY  
  The outbreak of war
  The Seven Years War officially started in Europe in 1756. It pitted France, 
  Austria and Russia against Great Britain, Prussia and most of the states that 
  then made up Germany. But in North America, and, indeed, also in India, 
  there had been engagements between French and British troops since 1754. 
  The following year had seen the disastrous defeat of General Edward 
  Braddock’s Anglo-American army at the Monongahela River 
  (near  present-day Pittsburgh) at the hands of a handful of French 
  compagnies franches de la marine colonial soldiers, Canadian militiamen, 
  and hundreds of their Indian allies that had turned the tide.
  In Quebec City, the newly appointed governor general of New France 
  was, for the first time, a Canadian-born nobleman, Pierre de Rigaud, 
  Marquis de Vaudreuil. His father, a veteran of Louis XIV’s King’s Musketeers, 
  had been commander of the regular troops in Canada and a well-regarded 
  governor general of New France from 1703 until he passed away in 1725. 
  Pierre himself had been a colonial troops officer and then governor of 
  Louisiana before being named governor general of New France in 1755. He 
  had a strategic eye with regard to the preservation of French Canada, which 
  could be summed up as keeping the far more populous British colonies on 
  Pipe-tomahawk of French 
  origin, middle of the 18th 
  century. (Canadian War 
  Museum, Ottawa. Author’s 
  photo)
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  13
  Initial Strategy  
  their toes by a policy of continuous raids, largely performed by New France’s 
  Indian allies. In this, he was supported by the stalwart opinions of the senior 
  officers in Canada – Paul Marin de la Malgue, Louis Coulon de Villiers, 
  Luc La Corne de Saint-Luc and Pierre’s own brother François-Pierre Rigaud 
  de Vaudreuil – usually known as Rigaud – all were convinced that the 
  lurking ways and ambushes of Indian-style warfare, combined with 
  European-style organization, leadership and discipline formed the only 
  tactical recipe likely to succeed, as it had for the past half-century. They 
  were, in effect, promoting and practicing what would later be known as light 
  infantry and/or ranger tactics in British and American armies.
  French reinforcements arrive
  However, in late June 1755, a whole new military element appeared in 
  Canada when four battalions of troupes de terre – detachments of the French 
  metropolitan army sent overseas as reinforcements – arrived in Quebec City 
  Eastern woodland Indians, 
  first half of the 18th century. 
  From the left: warrior in 
  summer dress, chief wearing 
  coat, waistcoat, gorget and 
  hat given by French officials, 
  warrior in cold-weather 
  dress. (Collection and photo: 
  Directorate of History and 
  Heritage, Department of 
  National Defence, Ottawa)
  1754
  First shots fired 
  between British 
  and French in North 
  America
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  14
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  headed by their own general. The troops 
  consisted of the 2nd battalions of the 
  Languedoc, La Reine, Guyenne and Béarn 
  regiments. They were under the command of 
  Major General Jean Erdman, Baron de Dieskau.
  Although now a general in the French 
  army, Dieskau was born on February 28, 
  1706 in Saxony, Germany. Like many 
  Germans at that time, he served in a German 
  regiment of the French army, starting his 
  career as a cadet in 1718. During his service, 
  he was noticed by one of the greatest soldiers 
  of 18th-century France: Marshal Maurice de 
  Saxe, who was a fellow countryman. By 
  1745, 
  Dieskau 
  had 
  risen 
  to 
  be 
  lieutenant-colonel, with the rank of major 
  general, in Marshal de Saxe’s own 
  experimental light troops corps, the 
  Volontaires de Saxe. Dieskau actually 
  commanded the unit, which denotes him as 
  an officer that surely supported the new 
  tactical concepts promoted by Marshal de 
  Saxe. The marshal died in 1750, but Dieskau 
  was not totally forgotten by the French 
  court at Versailles. Warfare in Canada, which was fast becoming the “hot 
  spot,” owing to bloody incidents with the Anglo-American neighbors, was 
  certainly different than in Europe, and a commander familiar with 
  light-troops tactics seemed ideal. Thus did Dieskau, now aged 49, sail for 
  New France to assume command of the French troops in Canada. However, 
  as events unfolded, Dieskau swiftly showed that he was unfit for the job.
  The battle of Lake George
  Strategically, Governor General Vaudreuil wished to put some pressure on 
  the British on Lake Ontario. The Anglo-Americans at Oswego had long been 
  a source of annoyance to the French Canadians, and an attack on Oswego 
  was mooted. The battalions of Guyenne and Béarn with colonial regulars 
  and Canadian militiamen were assembled at Fort Frontenac under Dieskau’s 
  command. However, Vaudreuil now received news of the triumph over 
  Braddock’s army at Monongahela and many of the latter’s captured 
  dispatches. From these documents, it seemed that the Anglo-Americans were 
  gathering their forces at Lake George, south of Lake Champlain, with a view 
  to attacking Fort Saint-Frédéric (Crown Point). As a result, the French forces 
  in the Lake Champlain–Richelieu River areas were beefed up by La Reine 
  and Languedoc battalions being deployed there, along with more militiamen 
  and colonial compagnies franches troops. Baron Dieskau was sent from Fort 
  Frontenac to lead the French force on the shores of Lake Champlain. 
  Sir William Johnson, c.1755. 
  He was superintendent of 
  Indian Affairs and, in 1755, 
  an American provincial 
  major-general. Although not 
  a professional soldier, he 
  nevertheless presided over 
  two notable victories: the 
  battle of Lake George on 
  September 8, 1755 and the 
  capture of Fort Niagara in 
  July 1759. (Portrait by John 
  Wollaston. Albany Institute 
  of History and Art. Author’s 
  photo)
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  15
  Initial Strategy  
  Some 3,000 American provincial troops and militiamen had indeed 
  gathered in August 1755 on the southern shore of Lake George under the 
  command of Major General William Johnson. General Dieskau decided to 
  attack them. In early September, he set out with 1,500 men, confident that he 
  would take Fort Edward and thus isolate Johnson at Lake George. But his 
  Indian warriors refused to attack Fort Edward on the grounds that they had 
  agreed to defend French Canada, but not “to act against the English on 
  territory that rightfully belongs to them” (DRCHSNY, X). Dieskau’s force 
  was too small to attempt such an attack on its own, and he thus led it towards 
  Lake George. Meanwhile, Johnson had learned that Dieskau and his force 
  was south of him, so he sent about a thousand men under Ephraim Williams 
  to reinforce Fort Edward. Dieskau learned of this and set up his troops for 
  an ambush that, had it succeeded, would probably have wiped out these 
  American troops. On the morning of September 8, however, several Mohawks 
  allied to the French saw Mohawk warriors joined to the Americans and fired 
  warning shots. The element of surprise was lost and, although they suffered 
  casualties, the Americans managed to retreat to Lake George. Feeling 
  victorious, Dieskau now resolved to attack Johnson’s army at Lake George. 
  The battle of Lake George, 
  September 8, 1755. 
  The French metropolitan 
  infantry formed in a 
  European-style three-rank 
  battle line, as ordered by 
  Gen Dieskau, is shown at 
  left. The American army’s 
  camp, shown at the center 
  and at left, is defended by 
  men taking cover behind 
  field fortifications. (Detail 
  from a period contemporary 
  print in O’Callaghan’s 
  Documentary History. 
  Author’s photo)
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  16
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  The Americans had not been inactive and, with the guidance of Major 
  William Eyre, the only British regular officer present, built field 
  fortifications with cannon emplacements around their camp. By the early 
  afternoon, Dieskau’s force reached Johnson’s fortified camp. The 
  Americans, huddled behind their field fortifications, opened up with 
  everything they had against the approaching French troops. Dieskau made 
  a classical European-style direct assault led by his army regulars of La 
  Reine and Languedoc battalions to storm and break through the field 
  fortifications. He had no artillery to soften up the field works, but appears 
  to have felt that the American militiamen would crumble at the sight of his 
  well-drilled European regulars. He ignored the advice of Canadian officers 
  and did not realize how tough and redoubtable American militiamen could 
  be when defending a position under cover.
  The Americans poured a devastating and rapid fire on to the advancing 
  column of French regulars, which now wavered. Dieskau was on the spot to 
  encourage them when he was severely wounded near the American works. 
  Covered behind trees, Canadian militiamen and compagnies franches de la 
  marine troops tried to protect the general and the French metropolitan 
  regulars as they withdrew using countering musket fire. Baron Dieskau was 
  on the field, sitting wounded beneath a tree, still trying to direct his men. A 
  Canadian militiaman was killed trying to move Dieskau out and the general 
  had to be left wounded in the field. The Chevalier de Montreuil, on whom 
  command now devolved, ordered a withdrawal. The French regulars had 
  just lost the battle of Lake George and 
  their general, formerly a companion of 
  Marshal de Saxe, was now prisoner of the 
  Americans: he thus paid dearly for his 
  tactical choices. It was not a disaster like 
  Braddock’s 
  annihilation 
  on 
  the 
  Monongahela, but it was humiliating 
  enough for the French. The Canadians 
  fumed since they thought Dieskau had 
  understood nothing of their way of war in 
  the North American wilderness. The 
  British and Americans were elated at this 
  unexpected success and Johnson was 
  created a baronet by King George II.    
  While the repulse of the French and 
  Canadian force had no strategic impact on 
  the Lake George front, the capture of 
  General Dieskau by the enemy was 
  certainly a sobering and disagreeable 
  surprise to everyone in French Canada. 
  The French metropolitan troops had lost 
  their senior commander, which was a 
  humbling experience. For his part, 
  Governor General Vaudreuil assumed the 
  William Shirley, 1750. 
  Already governor of 
  Massachusetts, Shirley was 
  also temporary 
  commander-in-chief of the 
  British forces in North 
  America from late July 1755 
  to August 1756. He was also 
  colonel of the 50th Regiment 
  of Foot. Portrait by Thomas 
  Hudson. National Portrait 
  Gallery Washington. (Photo: 
  AgnosticPreachersKid/
  CC-PD-Mark)
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  17
  Initial Strategy  
  full strategic direction of the forces in Canada and his opinion that raid 
  warfare was the only viable option was reinforced. Indeed, he already 
  mooted several raid operations for the future. These would encourage the 
  morale of his troops in Canada and keep the enemy on the defensive.
  Johnson’s victory at Lake George did not really change much in terms of the 
  military situation of the Anglo-American colonies at the end of 1755. 
  Monongahela had been a full-blown disaster worsened by the constant 
  harassment of frontier communities by warriors allied to the French. The one 
  dubious “success” had been the capture of the French forts Beauséjour and 
  Gaspareau on the borders of Nova Scotia by greatly superior British and 
  American provincial forces. To secure Nova Scotia totally, Governor Charles 
  Lawrence decreed the deportation of its Acadian population, the descendants of 
  the French families that had settled the present Annapolis Valley and, since the 
  territory had been ceded to Britain in 1713, had adopted a neutral stance. This 
  was not enough in the minds of the authorities in Halifax and, from the summer 
  of 1755, in an outstanding example of what is today called “ethnic cleansing,” 
  troops rounded up an estimated 11,500 people, burned and looted their 
  property, packed them on board creaky ships – sometimes separating the men 
  from the women and children – and deported them to the various American 
  colonies. This human tragedy brought by British and American arms upon 
  defenseless families would eventually become world famous thanks to the 
  American poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s 1847 Evangeline, 
  A Tale of Acadia. These deportations ensured that much of Nova Scotia became 
  and remained a very insecure area to any Anglo-American venturing outside its 
  fortified areas. The reason was, of course, that numbers of young Acadians had 
  escaped into the nearby forests and formed guerrilla-like groups bent on 
  revenge. The story of these remarkable raiders is still largely unknown, but their 
  activities mobilized large contingents of British troops until the end of the Seven 
  Years War. Thus, the Nova Scotia border was rendered even more insecure.
  The strategic importance of Oswego
  The one “quiet” area of the British colonies was Oswego. There, the 
  Anglo-Americans had managed to hold on quite well, and the place had not 
  been an outstanding target of war parties from French Canada. Governor 
  General Vaudreuil and Major General William Shirley both looked at 
  Oswego with hopeful strategic eyes. To Vaudreuil, its destruction would rid 
  Lake Ontario of any Anglo-American presence and influence, put the enemy 
  on the defensive, and comfort New France’s Indian allies. To Shirley, who 
  commanded the forces in the northern area, Oswego could be the base from 
  which his forces could capture the French forts Niagara and Frontenac, 
  which would make Lake Ontario British. Niagara would be his first target.
  With the British flag over Oswego, Shirley knew it had to be substantially 
  reinforced. Its tiny regular garrison, the somewhat decrepit New York 
  Independent Company, needed to be replaced by a much larger force. It 
  also needed to be the base of a powerful fleet that could subdue the French 
  ships on the lake. In terms of fortifications, its defensive capacities needed 
  to be greatly expanded.
  SEPTEMBER 8,  
  1755
  Battle of Lake 
  George
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  18
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  From the summer of 1755, the post of Oswego consisted of three entities. 
  The older fortified masonry redoubt built on the west shore of the Oswego 
  River since the 1720s was generally called “Fort” Oswego from that time. It 
  now was a castle-like structure consisting of the initial redoubt that had 
  been encircled by a masonry wall with two square turrets. This medieval-like 
  affair was now surrounded by a large outer horn work consisting of an 
  earth-and-log enclosure that featured a bastion and a ravelin along its 
  western curtain wall. Artillery, mostly facing west, was installed along the 
  curtain walls. This area was where most of the troops would be posted. 
  South of this fort was the traders’ village, but it had no protection other than 
  a small redoubt farther south.
  Fort George was the new square stockade redoubt, without bastions but 
  with small buildings along its inside walls, built on a bluff farther west of 
  Fort Oswego. It was not formidable.
  Fort Ontario was the new earth-and-log work built on the height east of 
  the Oswego River, which was an excellent site that commanded the 
  immediate area. This was the most potent and substantial fortification built. 
  Its plan was a “star” fort. It was initially seen as six-pointed by French 
  engineer Descombles during his late July 1756 reconnaissance of Oswego, 
  but British engineer Patrick Mackellar and later French plans agree on an 
  eight-point star, four of the points being smaller.
  In May 1756, shortly after Mackellar had arrived at Oswego, he found 
  serious “defects in the three forts.” The only three guns in old Fort Oswego 
  should “not be fired for fear of bringing down the wall, which is already 
  cracked in three places from top to bottom,” and the fort’s horn work with 
  “The South View of Oswego 
  on Lake Ontario,” 1755. Its 
  caption reads: “General 
  Shirley in 1755 strengthened 
  and enlarged this fort and 
  erected two others, one 
  westward 170 [feet] square 
  with a rampart of earth and 
  stone, another on the 
  opposite side of the basin, 
  470 yards [0.4km] distant 
  for the old fort, this which is 
  called East Fort, is built of 
  logs and the wall is 
  surrounded by a ditch, the 
  projection of the rocks 
  renders the channel at the 
  entrance of the Onondaga 
  River very narrow, and our 
  vessels are generally warped 
  from the lake into the 
  basin.” (Contemporary print 
  after William Smith in 
  O’Callaghan’s Documentary 
  History. Author’s photo)
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  19
  Initial Strategy  
  its ravelin was “badly laid out.” Moving on to Fort Ontario, he was pleased 
  to see that it was “stockaded with good timber and the joints squared” but 
  went on to comment that
   
  the plan is bad, its outer defects are as follows: the barracks for the men and the officers 
  are mostly built up against the stockade which loses so much of the fire, the gate is 
  placed in an angle and flanked on neither side, which must be the case in a star [fort] 
  as all the angles are dead; there is no banquet[te], [no] galleries carried round the top 
  where the buildings do not interfere.
   
  On the whole, he felt the site was well chosen and the fort had “good 
  command and renders the work capable of a tolerable defense against small 
  arms” (MA). As for Fort George, he projected a horn 
  work to strengthen it, but it was never completed. 
  From all this, it was clear that the only really 
  important work was Fort Ontario. It was the 
  largest of the forts and also it dominated the 
  finest site at Oswego. However, should it ever fall 
  to French raiders, old Fort Oswego and the 
  traders’ town would be under its guns.
  The garrison
  Oswego’s forts needed a strong garrison. In 
  the summer of 1755, General Shirley had 
  greatly increased the number of troops there 
  as well as along the Mohawk–Oneida waterway. 
  Two new regiments were assigned to this area, 
  Shirley’s 50th Foot and Sir William 
  Pepperrell’s 51st Foot. Each had an official 
  strength of 1,000 “rank and file,” although 
  the actual numbers of men in their ranks 
  were substantially lower. The regiments had 
  been authorized to be recruited in 
  North America on October 7, 1754, and 
  were put on the British establishment from 
  December 24, which meant that they were 
  numbered infantry regiments and part of the 
  standing regular army. Recruiting centers in 
  Massachusetts and Pennsylvania were active during 
  1755 and recruits were sent up the Mohawk River 
  and to Oswego, where a cadre of experienced 
  NCOs and officers would train them.
  The New Jersey Regiment, also sent to 
  Oswego, was raised from 1755 by the 
  province of New Jersey, and is still recalled 
  as one of the best American provincial units 
  serving in the North American campaigns 
  rojected a horn
  ompleted. 
  nly really 
  was the
  ated the 
  t ever fall 
  and the 
  In
  ad
  here 
  errway. 
  area,
  am
  ial 
  gh 
  nks 
  ad 
  n 
  d 
  m 
  were 
  rt of the
  enters in
  ve during
  wk River
  erienced 
  ent to
  the
  lled 
  nits 
  gns
  A gunner of the Royal 
  Artillery, c.1752–60. A small 
  detachment was at Oswego 
  and served gallantly during 
  the French attack. The 
  uniform was dark blue with 
  red facings and, since about 
  1751, ornamented with 
  yellow lace. The gunners 
  had white gaiters with black 
  buttons for dress and black 
  gaiters for ordinary duties 
  (WO 51/179 and WO 
  55/640). Officers’ uniforms 
  were the same colors, but of 
  better quality, with gold lace 
  and black boots. (Watercolor 
  by Derek FitzJames. Print 
  after portrait. Fort 
  Beauséjour National 
  Historic Site, Parks Canada. 
  Author’s photo)
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  20
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  of the Seven Years War. Its creator and first colonel was Peter Schuyler, “an 
  officer of known experience” who had commanded the 1746–47 New Jersey 
  provincial troops and who was now appointed to command the new 
  regiment. It had an establishment of 500 men divided into five companies. 
  The regiment usually served on active duty from May to November. The 
  regimental uniform was dark blue (hence the regiment’s nickname of 
  “Jersey Blues,”) with red facings. Like the other troops, it was badly armed.
  THE “NEW JERSEY BLUES” 1755–56
  The New Jersey Provincial Regiment was one of the 
  main Anglo-American units posted at Oswego and 
  along the Mohawk River during 1756. While part of the 
  unit was captured at Oswego and again at 
  Fort William-Henry the following year, it was not 
  heavily engaged when General Abercomby’s army was 
  defeated by Montcalm’s at Ticonderoga in July 1758. 
  In 1759, it was part of General Amherst’s army that 
  occupied Ticonderoga and Crown Point. The regiment 
  gave good service in 1760 garrisoning Oswego and 
  taking part in the final campaign within Amherst’s 
  army that culminated in the surrender of Montreal on 
  September 8. It was posted at Oswego in the following 
  years, except for a 222-man detachment that took part 
  in the British capture of Havana (Cuba) in 1762, and 
  was disbanded in 1764.
  The regimental uniform was dark blue, hence the 
  regiment’s nickname of “Jersey Blues,” a tradition that 
  went back to the troops raised by New Jersey during 
  the Austrian Succession War of the 1740s. It had red 
  facings. From 1755, each soldier was issued with “one 
  good striped blanket, a good lapel[led] coat, made of 
  half thicks or other coarse cloth, a felt hat, two check 
  shirts,” a pair of deerskin breeches, a pair of shoes and 
  a pair of stockings. Three years later, the dark blue coat 
  was described as being styled “after the Highland 
  manner, lapelled and cuffed with red,” which meant 
  that it had a short skirt and no turnbacks. However, as 
  seen above, the previous legislation simply mentioned a 
  “coat,” and that style had long tails that were probably 
  turned back, showing the lining, which was most likely 
  red. The coats were plain and had no laced buttonholes 
  or lace edgings. The felt hat was a tricorn, and the 
  men’s buttons are generally believed to have been of 
  brass and their hat lace yellow, since that color was 
  specified in 1758. There is no record of gaiters being 
  issued before 1758; the stockings were described as 
  gray at a parade in New York that year. Waistcoats are 
  not mentioned, but they were usually made from older 
  coats in the British army. This was probably the case 
  with American provincial troops, and in 1756 the 
  waistcoats were probably red, made from the lining of 
  the coat, although dark blue is also possible.
  Each soldier was to be issued “a good firelock,” but in 
  1755–56 these proved actually to have been quite 
  unsatisfactory. Colonel Peter Schuyler complained that 
  the arms were “so extremely bad, as to be hardly fit for 
  service. They appear to me to be Dutch arms, and the 
  worst sort, the locks daily breaking in the common 
  exercise, and many of the hammers not steeled. As to 
  the cartridge boxes, they are almost all useless, being 
  slightly covered; they drop from the belts in marching.” 
  Other weapons were “a good sword, cutlass or bayonet, 
  and a cartouch box, and a hatchet.” The armament 
  eventually appears to have been a musket with 
  bayonet, a hanger (or short sword) and a hatchet. The 
  Dutch muskets generally resembled British army 
  muskets, being almost as long at 61.2 inches 
  (155.5cm) but with a slightly larger caliber at .81 
  (20.5mm). They had brass furnishings and their 
  bayonets were 16 inches (40.6cm) long. The men’s 
  hangers were probably steel-hilted. (Acts… of New 
  Jersey, April 22 and June 2, 1755, April 4, 1758; New 
  York Mercury, June 12, 1758; CO 5/46)
  Officers had better-quality uniforms with scarlet cloth 
  for coat facings and waistcoat, dark blue breeches, 
  white stockings with shoes or boots, gilt buttons, a 
  gold-laced hat, gold cord at the right shoulder, gilt 
  gorget, and a crimson sash over the right shoulder. It 
  seems that officers edged their waistcoats with gold 
  lace, but their coats were plain with no lace. Officers 
  were armed with swords and spontoons by regulation. 
  Many, especially company officers, were armed with 
  “fusils,” a good-quality and lighter-weight version of 
  the standard musket, since they were shorter at about 
  55 inches (139cm) overall length and had a smaller 
  caliber at .69 (17.5mm).   
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  21
  Initial Strategy  
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  22
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  After Shirley left Oswego in September 1755, senior command devolved to 
  Lieutenant-Colonel James Francis Mercer. This Scot, born in 1703, had come 
  to North America and had been adjutant from 1739 to 1742 in Spotswood’s 
  (later Gooch’s) American Regiment, survived its destruction from West Indian 
  fevers, and had gone on to serve in Flanders between 1744 and 1745 as a 
  UNIFORMS AND EQUIPMENT 
  Both Shirley’s and Pepperrell’s 
  regiments had the same uniform, red 
  with red facings trimmed with “white 
  [metal] buttons and L,” the L 
  presumably meaning lace since British 
  infantry uniforms had to be “lapelled 
  on the breast and fully looped” with 
  this (System of Camp Discipline 1757; 
  WO 7/25). In July 1755, Sergeant 
  James Gray of the 51st was pleased 
  with his “two Holland shirts, found me 
  by the King, and two pairs of shoes 
  and two pairs of worsted stockings; a 
  good silver-laced hat (the lace I could 
  sell for four dollars); and my clothes is 
  as fine scarlet broadcloth as ever did 
  you see… and one day in every week 
  we must have our hair or wigs 
  powdered” (quoted in Parkman). 
  Officers wore scarlet instead of red and 
  would have had silver buttons and 
  lace. Weapons were ordered from the 
  Tower of London, but the muskets 
  delivered to the troops “were not the 
  King’s Pattern” but 1,000 with “single 
  Bridle Locks, Nose bands & Wood 
  Ram[ro]ds” and 1,000 “Dutch with 
  Nosebands & Wood Rammers” with 
  bayonets. Sergeants and grenadiers 
  had “Swords with Scabbards” that had 
  brass hilts, while privates and drummers had them with 
  “Iron hilts.” Cartridge boxes with 12 holes completed 
  the equipment. The quality of the muskets was poor, 
  since locks were reported as “wore out and the 
  Hammers soft” in spite of repeated repairs, “particularly 
  Sir William Pepperell’s [51st] Regiment being old Dutch 
  arms.” The cartridge box holes were so small they could 
  not receive cartridges, nor was there “substance of the 
  Wood to widen them sufficiently, the leather scanty and 
  bad likewise” (MA; CO 5/46 and 212).   
  Officer and men of Shirley’s 50th and Pepperrell’s 51st 
  regiments, c.1755–56. Both regiments garrisoned Oswego 
  and small forts on the Oneida–Mohawk waterways to the 
  east. From left to right: two soldiers of a haying party, a 
  sergeant, an officer and a grenadier. The uniform of both 
  regiments was similar and described in the 1757 edition of A 
  System of Camp Discipline as red with red facings and white 
  lace and buttons. There being no presently known 
  contemporary illustrations of these regiments, the style of the 
  uniform shown is taken from David Morier’s rendering of a 
  grenadier of the 33rd Foot, the only other regiment that had 
  red facings at that time. (Plate by Eric Manders. By kind 
  permission of the artist and the Company of Military 
  Historians. Author’s photo)
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  23
  Initial Strategy  
  captain in the 8th Regiment of Foot before becoming major and later 
  lieutenant-colonel in Sir William Pepperrell’s 66th Foot garrisoning Louisbourg, 
  Nova Scotia from September 1745 until the regiment was disbanded in 
  May 1749. He then went on half-pay, but Pepperrell obviously approved of his 
  abilities as a regimental commander and chose Mercer to be lieutenant-colonel 
  of the new 51st Foot Regiment from September 24, 1754. The officer second 
  in command at Oswego was Lieutenant-Colonel John Littlehales, born in 
  England during 1702, who entered the army as an ensign in the 10th Foot (then 
  posted in Ireland) in 1723, took half-pay as a lieutenant in 1738, came back 
  into the infantry as a captain in Shirley’s 65th Foot from September 1745 to 
  garrison Louisbourg, at which time he rose to major, and served until the 
  regiment was disbanded in May 1749. After a period on half-pay, he was 
  appointed major in Shirley’s 50th Foot in September 1754 and promoted its 
  lieutenant-colonel on October 25, 1755. Both Mercer and Littlehales had 
  obviously known each other for many years and seemed to have worked as 
  well as could be expected in the difficult circumstances facing the garrison at 
  Oswego, which was isolated, often unpaid, lacking sufficient rations and other 
  supplies. Although both men had long service records in the army, only Mercer 
  had been in action previously, and both had mainly served in European-style 
  garrisons, such as at Louisbourg, when posted in America. Their familiarity 
  with the wilderness and its ways of war was thus minimal, just as it was to the 
  soldiers they commanded.
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  24
  DE LÉRY’S RAID ON 
  FORT BULL  
  The plan  
  In the early winter, plans were being made at the residence of Governor 
  General Vaudreuil at Montreal. Like his predecessors, Vaudreuil would 
  spend his winters in Montreal, which became the political and military 
  headquarters of French Canada until the spring, when he would move with 
  his suite to his official “château Saint-Louis” that dominated the city of 
  Quebec on top of Cape Diamond (the château unfortunately vanished in 
  1834 following an accidental fire and its site is now occupied by the 
  landmark Chateau Frontenac Hotel.) There, the governor general would 
  greet the ships, officials and dispatches arriving from France and bid farewell 
  to those returning to Europe with news and official dispatches to Versailles 
  from Canada. In wartime however, the military headquarters would remain 
  in Montreal nearly all year round because of its outstanding strategic 
  location. It was the hub of the intricate waterways that reached all the 
  Great Lakes, and connected with the Mississippi River beyond and past 
  Lake Champlain to the south. As a result, most of the troops were posted in 
  the Montreal area, with detachments of compagnies franches de la marine 
  that might be posted as far as the great prairies west of Lake Superior. As 
  commander-in-chief, the governor general tended often to be in Montreal 
  where most of his officers were. So it was during the winter of 1755–56.
  Vaudreuil certainly faced a potentially difficult situation. True, the 
  frontier troops, Canadian militiamen and allied warriors had triumphed at 
  Monongahela in July 1755, but the general that had been sent from France 
  with four metropolitan army battalions had been defeated and captured by 
  American militiamen at Lake George in September. For all their confidence 
  about the superiority of European tactics, the metropolitan troops had been 
  Opposite:
  Lieutenant Gaspard-Joseph 
  Chaussegros de Léry 
  (1721–97), c.1750s. He was 
  the son of King’s Engineer 
  Gaspard Chaussegros de 
  Léry (1682–1756) and, after 
  taking Fort Bull, went on to 
  further distinguished service 
  until the surrender of the 
  French army in 1760. He 
  came back to Canada after 
  the war, and was eventually 
  appointed to the British 
  governor’s legislative council 
  as his shrewd advice was 
  much sought on Canadian 
  affairs. He is shown wearing 
  a crimson coat with gold 
  embroidery, which was not 
  a uniform. The medal of the 
  knightly Order of St Louis 
  would have been added 
  after January 1759. His son 
  François-Joseph 
  (1754–1824), born in 
  Quebec City, had an 
  outstanding career in the 
  French army, becoming 
  chief engineer of Napoleon’s 
  troops, so that De Lery is 
  engraved on the “Arc de 
  Triomphe” in Paris. (Print 
  after portrait. Fort 
  Beauséjour National 
  Historic Site, Parks Canada. 
  Author’s photo)
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  25
  De Léry’s Raid on Fort Bull  
  repulsed in their first engagements, and this certainly convinced the Canadian 
  officers of the compagnies franches de la marine that their time-proven 
  tactics or raid warfare were the only methods that would keep the British 
  and Americans on the defensive.  
  Scouts had reported that Oswego was being reinforced, and this could 
  mean only that the Anglo-Americans would try to cut New France in two 
  by taking control of Lake Ontario in 1756. They would likely also assemble 
  a strong force south of Lake George, NY, and might even attempt to take 
  Fort Saint-Frédéric (Crown Point to Americans) on the southern tip of Lake 
  Champlain. But before being able to do that, they would have also to take 
  the new Fort Carillon being built at Ticonderoga, on the northern end of 
  Lake George. This was no small stockade fort nor a large stone tower to 
  impress aboriginals, but a Vauban-style bastioned fort with earth-filled 
  bastions, curtain walls, and ravelins that would be reveted with stone. It was 
  guarded by a substantial garrison.
  With intelligence that two British regular regiments were in the Oswego 
  and its tributary lakes and rivers area, it seemed to Vaudreuil that Oswego 
  would become the assembly point for more troops to form a sizable 
  Anglo-American force by the early summer of 1756. Looking at a map, 
  Oswego had a major problem; its line of communication went largely 
  through wilderness for nearly 200 miles east to Albany. The weakest point 
  of this line was the Oneida Carry, where supplies had to be portaged from 
  the Mohawk River to Wood Creek. By striking there, Vaudreuil and his 
  officers correctly assessed that they would cut 
  off the supply route and, when it was restored, 
  could keep a large number of Anglo-American 
  troops in the area on alert to abate fears of 
  French and Indian attacks. More troops 
  standing guard at Albany and along the 
  Mohawk River meant fewer troops available 
  elsewhere to invade Canada.
  The command of the expedition was entrusted 
  to Lieutenant Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de 
  Léry (1721–97). His commission was that of an 
  officer in the compagnies franches de la marine, 
  but his appointment as assistant king’s engineer 
  gave him the further status of an officer in the 
  select group of engineers that were part of the 
  establishment of the Ministry of the Navy and the 
  Colonies, distinct from those employed by the 
  metropolitan army. Not only was 32-year-old de 
  Léry a qualified engineer, he was the son of the 
  chief king’s engineer in Canada, Gaspard-Joseph 
  Chaussegros de Léry (1682–1756); the two are 
  often confused since they both had the same name 
  and were both engineers. The son was a military 
  officer familiar with wilderness campaigns. He 
  WINTER  
  1755/56
  French begin 
  planning for an 
  attack on Oswego 
  area
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  26
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  had traveled widely in the center of the continent, had made remarkable 
  surveys, and had built many structures from Quebec City to Detroit. Obviously 
  bright and of sound judgment, he was appreciated by senior officers. 
  By February 25, 1756, the raiding party was assembled at Lachine, just 
  west of Montreal. This was the place where loaded bateaux heading westward 
  were put in the waters of the icy and swift-flowing St Lawrence River. The 
  officers all belonged to the compagnies franches and, besides de Léry, consisted 
  of two lieutenants, six first ensigns, eight second ensigns and four officer 
  cadets. There were 80 NCOs and soldiers: ten from La Reine Regiment, 17 
  from Guyenne, 24 from Béarn, and 29 from the compagnies franches. The 166 
  Canadian militiamen were seasoned woodsmen. In all, the force was composed 
  of 263 officers, soldiers and militiamen.
  The cold was “excessive” as the party set out due west on the river, joined 
  at Cedars by about a hundred allied Iroquois and Abenakis warriors. After 
  a difficult winter journey that included dragging the bateaux on the iced-up 
  river, the raiding force arrived at Fort La Présentation (now Ogdensburg, 
  NY) on March 6 and 7, greeted by crowds of cheering Indians that lived 
  there and by the fort’s commandant and its mission priest, the redoubtable 
  Father François Piquet, who encouraged his First Nations’ converts to raid 
  the enemy. In that sense, Fort La Présentation was ideally sited, and it served 
  as the raiding party’s forward base. For the next few days, it was a resting 
  Fort La Présentation, 1752. It 
  was sited at the confluence 
  of the St Lawrence and the 
  “Choüekatsy” (better known 
  as the Oswegatchie) River 
  and built in 1751. A large 
  Indian village was next to 
  the fort. The post itself was 
  founded in 1749 as a 
  fortified and garrisoned 
  religious mission for the 
  area’s Indians. It served as a 
  forward base for de Léry’s 
  raid on Fort Bull in March 
  1756. It is now the site of 
  Ogdensburg, NY. The north 
  is at the bottom. (Plan by 
  Paul La Brosse. Library and 
  Archives Canada, C16239)
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  27
  De Léry’s Raid on Fort Bull  
  station in order to regroup and to plan the next phase. In spite of 
  Father Piquet’s encouragements and their outward enthusiasm for the raid, 
  the Indians at La Présentation were very cautious. Only 38 warriors at 
  La Présentation joined the raiding force. For de Léry and his men, what lay 
  south of La Présentation was largely unknown territory: he depended on 
  two Oneida warriors who would guide the raiding party down the frozen 
  Oswegatchie River that flowed south and over trails still covered with snow. 
  If all went well, in about 11 days, they would reach the Oneida Carry near 
  the Mohawk River and the Anglo-American forts that guarded it.
  While it was largely unknown territory to the French, Canadians and allied 
  warriors from New France, it was even more of an alien area to Americans, 
  so there was never any concern that an Anglo-American force that would 
  intercept them. Nor would Oneida warriors in their villages in that area likely 
  become aware of their presence until they actually arrived near the shores of 
  the Mohawk River or Wood Creek. However, many Indians at La Présentation 
  were worried, since some Onondaga warriors had said the Anglo-Americans 
  knew that de Léry was coming to raid them, which considerably perturbed the 
  warriors at La Présentation that de Léry had hoped would join the raiding 
  party. The rumor was certainly false with regard to specific information about 
  de Léry’s raiding force, although it was certain that the British officers in 
  Albany were also receiving information regarding possible French and Indian 
  raids. De Léry had hoped for better, but was not at all discouraged. On the 
  contrary, he felt he was losing time with the endless conferences trying to 
  cajole La Présentation warriors to join the raid, and decided to move on.
  Trekking through the wilderness
  On March 12, de Léry’s raiding force set out from La Présentation. There 
  were a few small changes to the numbers of officers, cadets and soldiers of 
  the force. According to his journal, it consisted of:
  Compagnies franches de la marine: 16 officers
  Compagnies franches de la marine: 2 cadets
  La Reine Regiment: 10 soldiers
  Guyenne Regiment: 17 soldiers
  Béarn Regiment: 22 soldiers
  Compagnies franches de la marine: 27 soldiers
  Total of regulars: 94 officers and other ranks 
  Canadian militia: 166 militiamen 
   
  Iroquois of the Lac des Deux Montagnes: 33 warriors
  Iroquois of the Saut Saint-Louis: 18 warriors
  Iroquois of La Présentation: 38 warriors
  Iroquois of Saint-Régis: 3 warriors
  Abénaquis of the Lake: 3 warriors
  Népissings of the Lake: 11 warriors
  Total Indian warriors: 106 
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  28
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  The grand total for the force came to 366, including de Léry. This also 
  encompassed two non-combatants: a surgeon and a chaplain. There were 
  also three translators in the force who were most likely members of the 
  compagnies franches de la marine that were proficient in the Iroquois 
  languages. Indeed, as part of their training, young officer-cadets of this corps 
  could be required to spend time living in aboriginal communities to learn 
  their languages, ways, and cultures. It was one of the factors that made the 
  French in Canada closer to the Indian nations.
  It was not an easy trek as the raiding party followed the Oswegatchie 
  River south, either on its shore or on its ice, coming to the end of the 
  waterway on March 18 at present-day Evans Mills. The weather had been 
  warm since the expedition had set out from La Présentation, but now turned 
  to thunderstorms and cold rain. They had to go on through wilderness trails 
  across hills in truly miserable weather, carrying and dragging everything 
  necessary for their subsistance. Survival in the North American wilderness, 
  especially in winter, was (and remains) an unforgiving challenge. The snow 
  RAIDERS’ WINTER DRESS
  In Canada, extremely cold temperatures occur from 
  December to March, with strong winds sweeping down 
  from the Polar regions. In the days of New France, a 
  soldier or a militiaman out in the wilderness on an 
  expedition could rapidly suffer serious frostbite or even 
  die from exposure to cold, especially during the night. 
  To combat such a harsh environment, the Canadians 
  had soon devised effective clothing to keep them warm 
  and comfortable. It was a mixture of traditional French 
  sailor’s and North American Indian winter clothing.
  Starting from the shirt and breeches, they wore a short 
  jacket, with a waistcoat over it. The legs were covered 
  by cloth mitasses, often lined with soft leather and 
  tied below the knees with garters. The feet were 
  protected by thick socks (called nippes) and winter 
  moccasins, larger than summer ones, or even bottes 
  sauvages (savage-style boots), which were high, 
  boot-shaped, leather moccasins. Snowshoes made of 
  wood and hardened sinews were fastened to the 
  moccasins and allowed for marching over deep snow. 
  The hands were covered by mitts of wool or leather. 
  The warm winter capot, longer than the summer capot 
  and made of thick cloth, was worn and fastened with a 
  wool sash at the waist, which gave it a certain 
  elegance. There was no uniform color for these 
  garments: brown, gray and blue were common for 
  capots and sashes might be red, green, black or brown. 
  They wore a wool neck scarf and finally a wool cap 
  (known then as now as a tuque to anyone in French 
  Canada), which might be occasionally trimmed with 
  fur. A tapabord – a sort of leather and fur cap with a 
  visor and ear covering flaps – might be worn instead of 
  the tuque. The man dressed in this winter clothing 
  would put on snowshoes to travel easily over snow, 
  and pull a toboggan to carry a bearskin, food and 
  ammunition. The musket carried by soldiers was the 
  1743 Marine model that was similar to the army’s 1728 
  model. Militiamen might have preferred the lighter 
  hunting musket made at Tulle; it did not always have a 
  bayonet lug and a knife might be inserted in its barrel 
  as a “plug bayonet.” The musket would be put into its 
  protective cloth cover sleeve when traveling. A 
  tomahawk and up to three knives completed the 
  armament. Officers were dressed and armed the same 
  as their men, but also had a gilt gorget for 
  identification. They might also have a sword, but that 
  seems unlikely on this raid.
  Thus would a soldier of the “Lace Wars,” with his 
  tricorns and high heels, be transformed into a 
  redoubtable winter warrior. Thanks to this adaptation 
  of clothing, equipment and armament, soldiers could 
  travel great distances through the woods in the middle 
  of winter, suddenly strike the enemy, and vanish just as 
  quickly. There was nothing like them anywhere else 
  except for ski troops in Finland and Norway.
  FEBRUARY 25,  
  1756
  Fort Bull raiding 
  party assembles 
  near Montreal
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  29
  De Léry’s Raid On Fort Bull  
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  30
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  was still deep, although as spring was coming it slowly melted. On March 20, 
  the men crossed the Black River nearly up to their waists in icy water, and 
  this was followed by rain and hail driven by cold winds; food was being 
  consumed at a much higher rate. It continued to snow as the raiders marched 
  south, but two days later the weather warmed up again. By March 25, they 
  were on the south shore of the present Lake Delta, less than a day’s march 
  from the British forts and the Mohawk River. They had traveled about 170 
  miles (273km) from La Présentation through the wilderness and were so far 
  undetected. The food had nearly all run out, and one of the few horses 
  brought to carry supplies was sacrificed for rations. The scouts looked for 
  British soldiers’ tracks or footsteps in the snow, but found no trace of any.
  Two scouting detachments were sent ahead a bit farther, and that led by 
  the Chevalier Trevette de L’Espervanche ran into six Oneida warriors, two 
  of them chiefs. This news was immediately relayed to de Léry, who hurried 
  to meet them at the head of 50 men. Were they scouting for the English or 
  was this a coincidental meeting? Perhaps neither, since these Oneidas seemed 
  ambivalent about what they would do if the French came, especially as de 
  Léry was emphatically saying that “Onontio” (Governor General Vaudreuil) 
  and the French in Canada wished peace with all the Iroquois nations. From 
  the Oneidas’ perspective, it may have been wiser at that point to remain 
  vague and neutral. Here were the French with their allied Indians, and the 
  Oneidas knew the Anglo-Americans could never put up a decent fight in the 
  wilderness like these men, most of whom were seasoned in bush warfare. De 
  Léry was asking that they and their other warriors join him to attack one of 
  the two British forts, a difficult bargain since the Anglo-Americans were near 
  and the French were far from the Oneidas. The day was ending, and the war 
  party and the six Oneidas all settled down to spend the night on the spot 
  and talk with the French officers. One of the chiefs, named Tarvisn, 
  mentioned that an Indian from La Présentation had warned Captain William 
  Williams of Shirley’s 50th at the fort that bore his name that a French and 
  Indian war party was coming.
  Captain Williams commanded one of the two forts that had been built at 
  the Oneida Carry the previous year. His own Fort Williams was to the east, 
  where the Mohawk River turned north. It was built on a square plan, with 
  small protruding half bastions at the corners to provide covering fire on each 
  side. The “carry” or portage road went through the woods for 2¾ miles 
  (4.4km) until it reached Wood Creek, where the other fort had been built. 
  Although also called Wood Creek Fort, it was best known as Fort Bull, a 
  star-shaped structure named after the officer of Shirley’s 50th Foot Regiment 
  who was its commandant. They were not formidable fortresses, but rather 
  formed a cluster of lodgings and storehouses surrounded by a stockade about 
  15 to 18 feet high in the old French measurements, according to their scouts, 
  which would come to about 16 to 19 English feet high (about 4.8 to 5.7m). 
  Large quantities of supplies of all sorts intended for the garrison at Oswego 
  were conveyed there at the Oneida Carry. For de Léry, it was crucial to know 
  which of the two forts had the greatest quantities of supplies and the most 
  ammunition. Chief Tarvisn answered that it was Fort Bull; most supplies were 
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  31
  De Léry’s Raid on Fort Bull  
  there waiting to be loaded onto boats that would head to Oswego as soon as 
  the weather became milder. Although always suspicious of warriors’ reports 
  since they often enlarged on what they had seen, it all made good sense to the 
  French commander. Fort Bull would be the raiders’ target.
  The approach
  On the morning of March 26, all moved south cautiously along the 
  Mohawk River. At one point, near the present Ridge Mills, the six Oneida 
  warriors crossed the river and headed east. Would they warn the 
  Anglo-Americans? No one could tell, but to retain them by force or kill 
  them would have had disastrous consequences for the war party, as the 
  vengeful Oneidas would surely ambush and wipe it out deep in the 
  wilderness on its return voyage to Canada. De Léry commented that he had 
  no choice but to let them go. The wet snow that fell that afternoon had now 
  turned to a cold rain. Nevertheless, as the French and Indian raiders 
  approached, two Canadian Compagnies franches de la Marine officers well 
  versed in wilderness warfare, Jean-Baptiste Testard de Montigny and 
  Robineau de Porneuf, were sent ahead with scouting parties to reconnoiter 
  the forts discreetly. De Montigny crept up to Fort Bull and noted its general 
  orientation and where its gate was; 
  Porneuf reported that there were 
  tents next to Fort Williams, 
  indicating there were more troops 
  there than at Fort Bull.
  De Léry meanwhile was 
  preparing for the attack, which 
  would be as soon as possible since 
  he was unsure if the six Oneida 
  warriors had warned the British 
  fort’s garrisons. It was a worry that 
  seemed to come true when he saw 
  Chief Tarvisn suddenly appear out 
  of the woods and come towards 
  him. The chief immediately signaled 
  not to be alarmed; neither he nor his 
  Oneida companions had been 
  detected by the Anglo-Americans. 
  However, after the French attack, it 
  was likely that they would have to 
  pursue the raiders since they were 
  neighbors of the Americans, but this 
  would be done in a very lax manner. 
  A grateful de Léry gave Tarvisn two 
  belts of wampum and promised him 
  brandy, but only after the attack, for 
  fear he would get drunk, become 
  noisy, and ruin the surprise factor.
  Fort Bull, 1756. A: Fort Bull; 
  B: storehouses; C: points of 
  the attack; D: barracks; E: 
  guard huts; F: portage road; 
  G: river road; H: bateau 
  landing with the Mohawk 
  River below. (Print of a “Plan 
  du Fort Bull… pris d’assaut 
  par les français à Midi le 27 
  Mars 1756” by de Léry in 
  RAPQ. Author’s photo)
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  32
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  Fort Bull, which de Léry and his men were about to attack, was little more 
  than a stockade without artillery that enclosed four buildings. By now the 
  French and Indian war party had run out of food, so everyone was hungry 
  and eager to take the fort if only to eat some captured supplies. On March 27 
  at 4:30 in the morning, the French and Indian party rose and went towards 
  Fort Bull. A light snow had fallen during the night and the air was brisk. At 
  about nine in the morning, the war party’s forward scouts took two 
  Anglo-Americans prisoner some distance outside the fort. From these 
  undoubtedly somewhat terrified men, de Léry learned that the fort’s garrison 
  was in the process of loading supplies into 16 bateaux to leave for Oswego 
  that afternoon. No one at the Oneida Carry expected a major French attack. 
  They further said there were about 70 soldiers at Fort Bull. They did not have 
  any artillery, but did have plenty of hand grenades. The war party moved on 
  The path through the 
  wilderness to Fort Bull, 
  March 1756. The attack on 
  and destruction of the fort 
  occurred on 27 March. Léry 
  and his men returned, 
  arriving at Niaouré Bayon 
  on April 3, where they were 
  met by bateaux sent from 
  Fort Frontenac. Note that 
  modern place names are 
  given.
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  33
  De Léry’s Raid on Fort Bull  
  the portage road between forts Williams and Bull and, at about ten in the 
  morning, some of the hungry Indians intercepted a convoy of sleds laden with 
  supplies, going towards Fort Bull led by 11 drivers. They desperately wanted 
  to eat something and took ten drivers prisoner, but the eleventh driver was a 
  sturdy African-American who managed to leap onto a horse and gallop away 
  towards Fort Williams. It appears that no shots were fired, so the forts were 
  not immediately alarmed, but Fort Williams would soon be on the alert when 
  the escaping African-American teamster galloped through its gate. 
  Furthermore, de Léry learned from these new prisoners that about a hundred 
  soldiers had just arrived at Fort Williams and camped near it, which agreed 
  with the reports from Lieutenant Porneuf’s scout. They would surely be 
  mustered and march towards Fort Bull to find out what was going on.
  A further complication came with the allied Indians’ sudden reluctance 
  to attack the fort, fearing that its garrison might be warned. They now had 
  food, had not lost any warriors, and were never pleased at storming 
  fortifications, which was not their own way of combat. Ever the diplomat, 
  even at this critical time, de Léry said that he did not wish warriors to die 
  needlessly, but called on their sense of honor and bravery at least to guard 
  the prisoners and the portage road between the forts while he attacked the 
  fort with the French and Canadians. He passed some brandy around for 
  encouragement and also called on any warrior to join him; about 30 showed 
  interest and moved on with de Léry. His French and Canadian force had the 
  same strength as it had when it left La Présentation
  Storming Fort Bull
  Fort Bull had to be attacked immediately, de Léry reckoned, and 
  hurried towards it. At about half a mile (0.8km) from it, 
  the raiders set down their packs, fixed bayonets, and, 
  kneeling in the snow, took blessing and absolution 
  from the chaplain. De Léry “exhorted” his men 
  not to fire a shot until inside the fort, since he 
  hoped the gate would be open and that his 
  men would run into it surprising the garrison. 
  He asked the warriors not to make their loud 
  and horrendous war cries as they ran and 
  attacked, but as the fort came into view, the 
  excited Indians let out their war cries 
  against his orders. Alarmed, most of the 
  British soldiers outside the fort ran inside. 
  When de Léry and his men reached the fort, 
  its gate was shut, while most of his warriors 
  chased a few soldiers into the woods. The gate 
  turned out to be very sturdy and could not be 
  brought down quickly with axes or tomahawks. 
  Some of Léry’s men managed to take over the gun 
  ports and shoot into the fort, while others hacked at 
  the solid gate. This went on for over an hour.
  Lieutenant Jean-Baptiste-
  Philippe Testard de 
  Montigny (1724–86), 
  c.1750. He was a veteran of 
  wilderness expeditions and 
  the officer second in 
  command for the raid on 
  Fort Bull in March 1756. 
  This old print, after a 
  vanished portrait, shows him 
  in armor, as was the fashion 
  in French military portraits at 
  the time, although hardly 
  any Canadian officer had 
  ever seen such a thing, let 
  alone owned one. (Private 
  collection. Author’s photo)
  MARCH 27,  
  1756
  French storm Fort 
  Bull
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  34
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  At last, the gate gave way. De Léry and his men rushed into Fort Bull 
  shouting “Vive le roi!”: they were met by the British defenders’ musketry fire 
  and grenades. Luckily for the attackers, this had almost no effect. Seeing this, 
  de Léry’s men did not hesitate a split second and charged with bayonets and 
  tomahawks at their enemies. Lieutenant Bull, who was at the front of the 
  defenders, was immediately killed as the French and Canadians charged in. 
  The British soldiers behind him were rapidly overwhelmed. De Léry reported 
  that he “would not moderate the ardor of the soldiers and the Canadians. 
  They killed whoever they came upon,” and rushed to every corner of the 
  fort, shooting and striking at anything they saw that moved. Some British 
  soldiers still outside the buildings managed to escape into the barracks, 
  where they put up fierce resistance. They were occasionally called again to 
  surrender by the French, but to no avail. De Léry and some of his men 
  meanwhile took possession of the fort’s powder magazine, and he at once 
  ordered an estimated 260 powder barrels thrown into the Mohawk River. 
  The action inside the fort had thus evolved into two separate operations; 
  part of the French and Canadian troops kept what remained of the British 
  soldiers at bay in the barracks by musketry fire, the rest hurried to destroy 
  as many powder barrels as possible.
  However, fire now erupted in one of the fort’s buildings. According to 
  La Pause, one of the six warriors that charged in with the French and 
  Canadians killed a woman who was said to be the fort commandant’s wife, 
  threw her body into a fire and then dragged it out of the flames. In doing so, 
  her skirt, which was burning, “set fire to the house.” The conflagration soon 
  reached the powder magazine. Alarmed, de Léry saw there was no time to 
  lose; he ordered all his men to get out of the fort as fast as possible, “fearing 
  the effect of gunpowder.” They had run only 770 feet (235m) out of the fort 
  when the powder magazine blew up in three powerful explosions “at about 
  a second from one to the other.” The force of the explosions was so great, 
  de Léry wrote, that the “whole detachment was thrown on the ground.”
  In an instant, the fort, its buildings, and the unfortunate people within 
  were utterly destroyed by the powerful explosions. De Léry and his men 
  were awed at the destruction’s extent where, less than a minute before, 
  Fort Bull had stood. Soon thereafter, an Indian came running up to de Léry 
  telling him that an Anglo-American relief force was coming. But de Léry 
  was in no hurry to leave, and gave orders to go into the ruins of the fort 
  and throw into the river all the mortar bombs, grenades and supplies that 
  had survived the explosions. The immense amount of supplies destroyed 
  or looted included many barrels of salted pork, biscuits, butter, chocolate 
  “and other supplies,” as well as great quantities of clothing. There must 
  have been also a large quantity of alcoholic spirits in the storehouse’s 
  cellars because the flames coming out of them had a blue hue. The 16 
  bateaux on the river’s shore were also hacked to pieces.
  The Fort Bull raid has regrettably been the subject of an apparently 
  endless stream of erroneous statements. Sometime from the middle of 
  1756, Mr de Charly, an ensign in the compagnies franches who had taken 
  part in the Fort Bull expedition, left an account of the event to the 
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  35
  De Léry’s Raid on Fort Bull  
  Marquis de Montcalm, who does not seem to have paid any attention to 
  it, but appended it to his own journal. The part concerning the assault of 
  March 27 is barely a half paragraph, which mentions that
   
  we marched to Fort Bull where the enemy might have a hundred men. The Indians 
  refused to march to it. The French soldiers cut down the palisade, broke down the gate 
  with axe blows, in spite of the shooting and grenades hurled [at them]. The usual lack 
  of precautions by Canadian [militiamen] caused a fire at the powder magazine and 
  burned all the supplies; the garrison was cut down, except for three of four prisoners. 
  We had three men killed and seven wounded.
   
  From this account, it is obvious that de Charly was on the spot. A clue to 
  why this was related so vaguely and erroneously was that he defined his role 
  as “major” and was assisted by a “garçon major.” This was not a real major 
  (a rank higher than de Léry, who commanded the expedition), but almost 
  certainly in the sense of a surgeon-major with an assistant surgeon. In the 
  French forces, the medical staff was often called “major” and “garçon 
  major.” Thus de Charly acted as a medical officer with young Trevette de 
  l’Espervanche, an officer-cadet “who filled the function of garçon major,” 
  and they would have acted as non-combatants farther away, waiting to 
  receive the men who were wounded in the assault. They were at Fort Bull, 
  but obviously did not take part in the action, as the confused account shows.
  Meanwhile, as announced to de Léry after Fort Bull’s destruction, a relief 
  party had emerged from Fort Williams, from where distant shooting could 
  be heard and, eventually, explosions coming from the area where Fort Bull 
  Assault on Fort Bull, March 27, 1756 (overleaf)
  When de Léry and his men, so far undetected, decided to rush into 
  Fort Bull, he asked the 30 warriors not to shout their loud and 
  horrendous war cries as they ran in order to have the maximum 
  chance of a surprise attack. They all moved on and the fort came 
  into view, but, at about 900 feet (275m) away, the excited warriors 
  lost control and loudly uttered their war cries. This alarmed the 
  distant British soldiers as well as de Léry, “which obliged me to run 
  up to take the fort’s gate. But it was closed and the enemy defending 
  [itself by] rapid musketry fire and by hurling many grenades. I posted 
  part of my detachment to hack at the gate with axes.” De Léry 
  instructed his other men to take over the fort’s gun ports. They soon 
  managed to pour withering musket fire on the redcoats inside the 
  fort. “Only six Indians remained with me, the rest ran into the wood 
  in pursuit of six Englishmen” who had not been able to get back into 
  the fort before the attack.
  They were now faced with a major hurdle. That very solid gate 
  would have to be rammed down. “The fort’s gate being stronger than 
  I thought, it could only be collapsed by [striking it piece by] piece,” 
  de Léry now realized. His men were somewhat taken aback, but he 
  stirred their martial spirit again by yelling “Vive le roi!” (God save 
  the king). He then called on “the English to surrender” and that he 
  would “protect their lives,” but there was no answer from within. In 
  his account, de Léry saluted Lieutenant Bull’s defense, carried out 
  “with all the possible bravery and intrepidity that I have always 
  remarked of English officers.” Indeed, the garrison’s musket fire 
  became even more intense “and more obstinate.” The shooting went 
  on for “over an hour,” according to de Léry, while some men hacked 
  at the gate.
  According to an account reported by the Chevalier de La Pause, the 
  axes were essentially tomahawks that could do little against what 
  was obviously a very solid gate. Therefore, some of the men 
  transformed a log into a battering ram and pounded on the gate. 
  Although he was not present, La Pause, a major in the Languedoc 
  Regiment, was also on the staff of the army battalions in Canada, so 
  that he would have later received debriefing reports of the action 
  from certain participants. De Léry, for his part, mentions that the 
  gate was to be demolished “à coup de haches” (by axe blows), so 
  heavier axes than tomahawks must also have been at work. A likely 
  scenario would be that axes were used and that a log was finally 
  used to pound the gate open. At last, the gate gave way. De Léry and 
  his men rushed into Fort Bull shouting “Vive le roi!”
  Assuming a “ram” was used, this would have been simply a log 
  found in the area that would have been manhandled by several 
  men. Others might have been hacking with axes or tomahawks at 
  it. Lieutenant de Léry was no doubt leading the operation. The men 
  would have been dressed in their winter dress, described in 
  another of this book’s plates, and armed with muskets, bayonets 
  and tomahawks.
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  36
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
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  37
  De Léry’s Raid On Fort Bull  
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  38
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  stood. It turned out to be a small 
  group led by Captain Williams – 
  only a dozen men if one believes 
  Philadelphia blacksmith Robert 
  Eastburn’s account, but it must 
  have been closer to two dozen or 
  more. It was not a sortie so much 
  as a timid scouting party to find 
  out what was going on at Fort Bull. 
  It will be recalled that a small 
  party of Indians was in pursuit, on 
  foot, of the African-American 
  teamster that galloped towards 
  Fort Williams, where he arrived 
  safely, if totally terrified. His 
  pursuers had stopped at about a 
  quarter-mile (400m) from the fort. 
  Williams’ small group of men appeared on the trail; an Indian fired and one 
  of the Anglo-Americans went down. Eastburn, who was farther back, ran 
  into the woods to take cover and hid behind a large pine tree. He was closer 
  to the warriors than he anticipated, spotted two, and in a single shot brought 
  down one and wounded the other. He then got somewhat lost in the woods. 
  Other warriors tracked his running footsteps in the light snow covering the 
  ground, and captured him. Meanwhile, more shooting occurred as the 
  Anglo-Americans were ambushed; the warriors later told de Léry they had 
  slain 17 men, but he felt 13 killed was the right number. Captain Williams 
  and what was left of his group hurried back to the fort. The next day, de Léry 
  left for Canada.
  The aftermath
  According to de Léry’s report, the British lost 51 men killed in the fort – 
  nearly all probably died when it exploded – and six others slain by the 
  Indians as they fled into the woods. Adding the 13 men killed from 
  Fort William and the 35 made prisoners, de Léry estimated the total British 
  loss at 105 killed and taken prisoner. No wounded were mentioned.
  The French and Indian force had only one soldier of the compagnies franches 
  and one Indian from La Présentation killed in action, and another Indian of 
  the Sault Saint Louis killed by falling debris when the fort exploded. A soldier 
  of La Reine Regiment, two Canadian militiamen and two Iroquois from Lac 
  des Deux Montagnes were wounded. A soldier from the Guyenne Regiment 
  had also been wounded from falling debris from the fort. In all, the raiding 
  force suffered a trifling three killed and six wounded.
  De Léry and his men now hurried back to Canada. More Anglo-American 
  troops were bound to come up, and his scouts mentioned they had heard 
  gunshots near the Mohawk River. Another reason to hurry back was that 
  the French and Indians had found relatively few foodstuffs to bring back 
  with them, much of these having apparently been destroyed in the fort’s 
  Plaque dedicated to Fort 
  Bull set on a stone placed in 
  the middle of the remnants 
  of Fort Wood Creek, which 
  is adjacent to Erie Canal 
  Village situated west of 
  Rome, NY. The site of Fort 
  Bull is in a wooded wetlands 
  area not accessible to the 
  public east of this plaque. 
  (Author’s photo)
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  39
  De Léry’s Raid on Fort Bull  
  explosion. Thus, as they made their way back by the same trail they had 
  come down, they eventually ran out of rations and it was decided to head 
  for Niaouré Bay (now Sackets Harbor, NY) on the upper eastern shore of 
  Lake Ontario. They arrived there on April 3 and, at the end of the afternoon, 
  they were met by nine bateaux that had been sent there with supplies and 
  rations in anticipation that the raiders would need them. De Léry then went 
  ahead immediately in a bateau to report the destruction of Fort Bull. On 
  April 10 he arrived in Montreal and made his report to Governor General 
  MASSACRE AT FORT BULL? 
  In his 1772 History of the Late War, Thomas Mante 
  mentions that Montcalm (who had not yet arrived in 
  Canada) had “detached a party to attack Fort Bull… 
  [and] the whole garrison except two were scalped.” It 
  must be understood that when Europeans, 
  Anglo-Americans in particular, experienced defeat at 
  the hand of warriors of the First Nations, it was no 
  longer a purely military battle, but instead became 
  branded a “massacre” where unspeakably horrid deeds 
  were committed by barbaric savages. Not only did this 
  provide an excuse of sorts for defeat, but it also made 
  wonderful propaganda to mobilize the outraged and 
  encourage bloody revenge.
  This sort of account is questionable in the case of Fort 
  Bull, as the six warriors present would have been very 
  busy indeed if they were to scalp and massacre the 
  whole garrison before the fort blew up. Sir William 
  Johnson (who was knighted after the battle of Lake 
  George) did however later report to William Shirley that 
  he had “found within the fort twenty-three soldiers, 
  two women, & one Battoe Man, some burned almost to 
  ashes, others most inhumanly butchered & all 
  scalped… I imagine the whole number killed & missing 
  is 62, thirty of which I found and buried.”
  The part about bodies being “most inhumanly 
  butchered & all scalped” should not have surprised 
  Johnson, the British superintendent of Indians, who 
  lived amongst the redoubtable Iroquois and would 
  know the more questionable aspects of their rituals, so 
  he most probably reported it for its potential 
  propaganda value, knowing full well that warriors allied 
  to the British had similar practices. Nearly all were 
  almost surely victims of the explosion. The corpses 
  would have been found by warriors coming on the site 
  after the fighting. It was regrettable but certainly not 
  unusual for them to vent their vengeful feelings in 
  such a fashion. However, old habits persisted, and as 
  late as the 1970s one could read a book called 
  Massacre at Fort Bull, an unfortunate title for actually 
  quite a good study. 
  Plan showing some of the 
  fortifications built by 
  General Webb’s 
  Anglo-American troops at 
  the Oneida Carry in the 
  summer of 1756. The new 
  “Pentagon Fort” was 
  constructed next to the 
  existing Fort William (built 
  in November 1755), and 
  General Webb’s Cantonment 
  was also known as Fort 
  Rickey. Not shown are Fort 
  Newport and Fort Wood 
  Creek farther west. All were 
  abandoned and destroyed in 
  late August 1756. The 
  orientation is upside down, 
  north pointing to the 
  bottom. Fort Stanwix 
  National Monument, 
  National Park Service, 
  Rome, NY. (Author’s photo)
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  40
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  Vaudreuil, who, obviously very pleased, told him of his approval of his 
  conduct and leadership “in executing his orders.” It was surely not a 
  coincidence that de Léry was promoted to captain the following year.
  The Anglo-Americans meanwhile had to cope with the fact that their 
  supply line was cut off and the Oneida Carry area had to be secured. On 
  May 2, Major Charles Craven arrived with a detachment of his own 
  regiment, Pepperrell’s 51st, accompanied by detachments from Shirley’s 50th 
  and the New Jersey Regiment to reinforce the garrison of Fort Williams and 
  build new forts.  
  For Vaudreuil, the success of the raid was very satisfying. He had proven 
  that the supply route between Albany and Oswego could be severed almost 
  at will by daring and well-led raiding forces, in the purest spirit of the 
  Canadians’ wilderness tactics, emerging from forests where only they and 
  the aboriginal warriors dared to tread. His next strategic objective was 
  Oswego. Indian and Canadian small war parties soon hovered around it, 
  and typically, as on May 13, would suddenly strike at the small encampment 
  of Anglo-American soldiers and “Battoemen about forty yards [36.5m] 
  distance from the Town.” They would then vanish, after on this occasion 
  taking away two men and killing four, as related by engineer Patrick 
  Mackellar. A major foray was made by Captain François Coulon de Villiers, 
  leading 600 colonial regulars, volunteer militiamen and warriors. On June 5, 
  this force reached Niaouré Bay, where the troops built a stockade fort as a 
  temporary base to store supplies securely and then went on to reconnoitre 
  the immediate vicinity of Oswego. Eleven days later, de Villiers’s men 
  exchanged fire for an hour and a half with the huddled garrison, which did 
  not dare come out. The river was also being watched; on July 3, de Villier’s 
  men had a sharp engagement with a bateau convoy, taking several boats and 
  about 40 men. The Anglo-Americans tried to console themselves with their 
  versions 
  of 
  the 
  skirmishes 
  of 
  Captain John Bradstreet’s “battoemen” 
  that were said to have routed up to 660 
  “French and Indians” in early July. While 
  this was rather optimistic, Bradstreet did 
  come through with more much-needed 
  supplies.
  Naval superiority on Lake Ontario was 
  critical for the defense or attack of Oswego. 
  Captain Housman Broadly, detached from 
  the Royal Navy, was in command of the 
  Oswego fleet, but his freshwater experience 
  was wanting and he did not manage to 
  scare away the French lake fleet sailing out 
  of Fort Frontenac. On June 27, the French 
  fleet under colonial Captain Laforce met 
  and defeated its opponent, took a schooner 
  armed with four guns and chased the others 
  into Oswego’s harbor.     
  Plan of Fort Wood Creek, 
  started in April 1756 west of 
  the destroyed Fort Bull, but 
  abandoned and destroyed 
  by General Webb’s 
  Anglo-American troops in 
  late August of the same year. 
  The orientation is upside 
  down, the north pointing to 
  the bottom. Fort Stanwix 
  National Monument, 
  National Park Service, Rome 
  (NY). (Author’s photo)
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  41
  THE PLAN
  Montcalm’s arrival in Canada
  The next phase of the 1756 saga of Oswego started in France, when on 
  January 31 Louis-Joseph, Marquis de Montcalm received an offer from the 
  Count d’Argenson, minister of war responsible for the French metropolitan 
  army, to assume the command of the troops in Canada, which had been left 
  vacant since the capture of Baron Dieskau. The king granted him a commission 
  of major-general (called maréchal de camp in the French army). Born on 
  February 28, 1712 at the château of Candiac near Nîmes, he was from the 
  old nobility of Provence and as early as nine years old was commissioned as 
  an ensign in the Hainault Infantry Regiment. He had served in the Rhineland 
  during the Polish Succession War (1732–35), was on the staff during the 1741 
  expedition that captured Prague, where he was wounded, became colonel of 
  the Auxerrois Regiment in 1743, and then led it in Italy during the Austrian 
  Succession War. A very brave officer, he won the Saint-Louis cross in 1744, 
  was wounded and captured by the Austrians at Piacenza in June 1746, and 
  was exchanged and promoted to brigadier general in 1747.
  Following the peace of 1748, his Auxerrois Regiment was incorporated 
  into the Flandres Regiment in February 1749. Montcalm rightly sought 
  compensation and a month later, he was commissioned to command a new 
  heavy cavalry regiment to bear his name: Montcalm’s Regiment. There were 
  no appointments to senior command in sight and in 1752 he applied for a 
  retirement pension, having had 31 years of service during which he had 
  participated in 11 campaigns and sustained five wounds. His request was 
  granted in 1753 with a modest pension, and he kept the colonelcy of his 
  cavalry regiment: a pleasant but modest way of life for a field officer in the 
  prime of life. In late 1755 and early 1756, no experienced general on the 
  active list wanted to go to Canada. The war minister’s choice narrowed 
  down to a few likely retired general officers, and it seems only Montcalm, a 
  mere brigadier but still relatively young at 45, was keen on the idea. 
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  42
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  Montcalm of course accepted. It meant good pay and allowances and triple 
  the pension when he came back to France, with a generous arrangement for 
  his wife should he die instead. For his part, the Marquis d’Argenson had in 
  Montcalm an experienced veteran of many campaigns, known as a brave 
  and competent officer who had also showed skill as a brigadier. On the other 
  hand, like Dieskau, Montcalm had never held a post of high command, a 
  sure indication of the total lack of interest in Canada among senior French 
  generals. A good senior commander had to be a tactful negotiator, careful to 
  hold divergent views under control. D’Argenson must have hoped that 
  Montcalm would now develop these qualities. 
  On March 11, King Louis XV signed Montcalm’s commission as a 
  major-general. His second in command would be François-Gaston Chevalier 
  de Lévis as brigadier, Colonel François-Charles de Bourlamarque as his chief 
  of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel de Montreuil, detached from the Piémont 
  Regiment, as the assistant chief of staff, Captain Louis-Antoine de Bougainville 
  from Apchon’s Dragoon Regiment as his senior aide-de-camp, Captain de La 
  Rochebeaucour from Montcalm’s Cavalry Regiment as second aide-de-camp 
  and Sergeant Marcel from the Flandres Regiment for his third aide-de-camp. 
  Two metropolitan army engineers, Descombles and Desandrouin, were also 
  detached to Canada. However, the most important news was that the new 
  commander-in-chief and his staff were accompanied by the second infantry 
  battalions of the La Sarre and Royal-Roussillon metropolitan army regiments, 
  each of 12 companies of fusiliers and one company of grenadiers. Both were 
  long-standing and renowned units with impressive service records, since 
  1651 for La Sarre and 1655 for Royal-Roussillon. It thus appeared that 
  Versailles was committed to the defense of French Canada.
  The French squadron that sailed from Brest on April 3, 1756 consisted of 
  the ships of the line Héros, Léopard and Illustre with the frigates Licorne, 
  Sauvage and Sirenne. Strong winds separated some, but all had a good 
  crossing, reaching the St Lawrence Gulf in early May. What must have 
  Montcalm thought as he was on the deck of his ship, gazing at the mighty St 
  Lawrence River, its distant shores at first hardly visible and then gradually 
  coming closer? No such river existed in Europe, not even the great Danube 
  The French fleet of Lake 
  Ontario, 1756. It was built 
  and based at Fort Frontenac 
  and included the Marquise 
  de Vaudreuil, armed with 16 
  cannons and eight swivel 
  guns (at left), the Huron with 
  12 cannons and six swivel 
  guns, and two smaller 
  vessels. (Detail from a 
  contemporary map. Library 
  Archives Canada, NMC 
  6333)
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  43
  The Plan
  that he had seen many years earlier during the Prague campaign. Nature must 
  have seemed overwhelming at first, but, here and there, a small village would 
  appear near the shore – Kamouraska, Isle-aux-Coudres, and others – as the 
  river, still mighty, became narrower. There were more villages now, and one 
  day, as the ship sailed by Isle d’Orléans, there it was due west: Quebec City. 
  Here was a formidable natural fortress dominated by Cape Diamond, with 
  the city built on its upper and lower levels. The distances were so enormous, 
  France so far away, and New France so huge, with much of it hardly explored. 
  Waging warfare in such a country would obviously be unlike anything 
  seen in Europe. What was known about battling in the North American 
  wilderness was that the skulking way of war was the key to vanquishing any 
  enemy. Raids, surprise attacks, using the forest as cover, and moving swiftly 
  were all elements of battle success, as had been shown at the Monongahela 
  in July 1755, where General Braddock had been slain with many of his men 
  as they attempted to form battle lines against unseen foes firing at them. 
  Montcalm’s predecessor, General Dieskau, had insisted on deploying his 
  army regulars like in Europe against well-covered American militiamen at 
  Lake George, which resulted in a tactical fiasco and his own capture. 
  Montcalm, who certainly thought of the fate of Braddock and Dieskau, 
  simply had to do better for his own sake as much as that of his troops.
  Most of the fleet gradually docked in Quebec City during the second week 
  of May 1756. La Sarre mustered 515 enlisted men, Royal-Roussillon 519. 
  Each had about 40 officers. The two battalions that arrived in Canada were 
  not unscathed. Some 280 unfortunate officers and men that had come on the 
  Léopard were very ill on arrival at Quebec. Commissary-General André Doreil 
  noted that they formed nearly all of the 300 military patients at the hospital. 
  Some sort of plague had broken out on the ship, and this caused considerable 
  anxiety concerning the possible spread of an epidemic in the city. On the 
  death of two grenadiers, Doreil ordered an autopsy of the bodies attended by 
  all the medical officers in order to identify the illness. Whatever it was, the 
  quick action of the medical staff administering “good treatment with infinite 
  care” had a telling effect. The number of sick in the hospital had declined to 
  113 by June 20, and the 21 mortalities since the landing were considered a 
  low figure. Thus, it could be said that the French army was in relative good 
  health, thanks in large part to efficient medical services.
  The Anglo-American fleet of 
  Lake Ontario, 1756. Built 
  and based at Oswego during 
  1755–56, these vessels were 
  captured (and renamed) or 
  destroyed by the French in 
  July and August 1756. 
  (Detail from a contemporary 
  map. Library Archives 
  Canada, NMC 6333)
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  44
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  On May 1, 1756, Montcalm stayed a few days in Quebec City then headed 
  for Montreal where on May 26 he met Governor General Vaudreuil. Historians 
  agree that these two personalities did not really take to each other, and as time 
  passed their relations worsened. However, this was just the beginning, and 
  Montcalm now realized that Vaudreuil had already made all the strategic 
  decisions for the ensuing season. The metropolitan battalions of La Reine and 
  Languedoc were at Ticonderoga, that of Béarn at Fort Niagara and Guyenne 
  at Fort Frontenac. Strong detachments of compagnies franches and militiamen 
  had also been sent to those points and others as far as the Ohio River. He had 
  met with the chiefs of many Indian nations, and bands of their warriors lurked 
  in the American borderlands. All this was within his dual powers as French 
  Canada’s diplomatic chief (in terms of relations with the Indian nations) and 
  his military rank of lieutenant-general, which outranked Montcalm. However, 
  the new general from France did not feel inferior when it came to military 
  matters, especially as his superior in France was the minister of war, whereas 
  the minister of the navy was Vaudreuil’s superior.
  For now, both Montcalm and Vaudreuil had to determine the point from 
  which the enemy forces would attempt to advance on French Canada. They 
  La Reine and Languedoc 
  regiments, 1755–57. The 
  battalions sent to Canada in 
  1755 were issued uniforms 
  that were markedly different 
  from their regimental dress 
  in France. For instance, the 
  2nd Battalion of the La 
  Reine regiment had red 
  facings including its 
  waistcoats in Canada, 
  although their waistcoats 
  were blue in France for its 
  1st Battalion. Languedoc’s 
  2nd Battalion had blue cuffs 
  and waistcoats in Canada, 
  the same as its 1st Battalion 
  in France, except that the 
  latter also had a blue collar. 
  Collars are not mentioned 
  on the uniforms of the 
  battalions sent to Canada in 
  1755. From 1757, the 
  uniforms were as in France. 
  From left, a grenadier of 
  Guyenne, a soldier of Béarn 
  relaxing in camp, and a 
  corporal of the same 
  regiment. (Watercolor by 
  Eugène Lelièpvre. Collection 
  and photo: National Historic 
  Sites, Parks Canada)
  APRIL 1756
  Montcalm arrives 
  in Canada
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  45
  The Plan
  decided the enemy would most likely come from Lake George or from 
  Oswego, and this was confirmed by the intelligence they were receiving. Thus 
  the newly arrived Royal-Roussillon battalion was sent to reinforce 
  Ticonderoga, while La Sarre went to Fort Frontenac. The question was now 
  where to attack the Anglo-Americans. Up to 5,000 Anglo-Americans were 
  said to be gathering at Lake George, while there might be about 1,700 at 
  Oswego. Vaudreuil had long wanted to move against Oswego, and it seemed 
  like the best target because of its great distance from Albany as well as its 
  relatively weak garrison. “Toward mid-June,” wrote Montcalm in his journal, 
  “it clearly appeared from the report of the Indians sent out as scouts; from the 
  depositions of several prisoners; from the vast preparations made at Albany 
  and Fort Lydius [Edward], that the English had offensive intentions in the 
  direction of the [upper] Point of Lake Saint-Sacrement [Ticonderoga]. Upon 
  this intelligence, Montcalm “proposed a diversion towards Lake Ontario for 
  the purpose of attracting a portion of the enemy’s forces” there, and 
  consequently relieving the pressure on Ticonderoga. In effect, he agreed with 
  Vaudreuil that an attack on Oswego should be attempted.
  Such a raid in the vast wilderness of North America demanded a logistical 
  effort unknown in European campaigns, where many supplies could be 
  Fusiliers of the La Reine and 
  Languedoc regiments, 
  1755–57. (Watercolor by 
  Eugène Lelièpvre. Collection 
  and photo: National Historic 
  Sites, Parks Canada)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  46
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  obtained locally for an advancing force. In North America, as had been 
  proven yet again by the Fort Bull raid, everything had to be assembled and 
  transported over great distances by various types of watercraft. It seemed 
  that it might be already “too late in the season” for Montcalm to attempt an 
  expedition on Oswego because of the “endless difficulty” of gathering 
  supplies and moving them “across a country having no other roads, but 
  rivers, filled with falls and rapids, and lakes rendered frequently impassable 
  to bateaux in consequence of the violence of the waves.” Yet because of the 
  extensive involvement in the fur trade that reached into the heart of the 
  continent and was Canada’s economic lifeblood, the French commanders 
  had a great advantage. Many Canadians were familiar with transporting 
  great quantities of goods over half a continent, either part-time or full-time 
  Grenadier of the La Sarre 
  Regiment, 1757. In May 
  1756, the 2nd battalion of 
  this regiment arrived in 
  Canada with Montcalm, and 
  took part in the Oswego 
  expedition during August. Its 
  uniform during the 1750s 
  was gray-white with dark 
  blue collar and cuffs, a red 
  waistcoat, brass buttons and 
  yellow hat lace. Grenadiers 
  carried sabers, and their 
  cartridge pouch was larger 
  to accommodate hand 
  grenades. (Watercolor by 
  Eugène Lelièpvre after a 
  manuscript of 1757. 
  Collection and photo: 
  National Historic Sites, Parks 
  Canada)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  47
  The Plan
  as the legendary men called 
  “voyageurs” who were renowned 
  for their strength, endurance, 
  bravery, and good humor. It was 
  possible to mobilize a great many 
  of these men – they were, like all 
  males fit to bear arms in New 
  France, militiamen – to ensure the 
  logistical aspects. Vaudreuil knew 
  all this, but Montcalm was unsure.
  The person that convinced him 
  was 
  Sieur 
  François 
  Bigot, 
  Intendant of Canada, [who] 
  arrived at this conjuncture at 
  Montreal [and] took upon himself 
  the collection of munitions of war 
  of all sorts, and of provisions.” He 
  also organized the “despatch of 
  convoys and their continuous 
  supply.” In the government of New 
  France, the intendant was the 
  second most powerful post, and 
  his responsibilities included 
  military finances and logistics. 
  Now all three leaders were in 
  accord about attacking Oswego. 
  To fool the Anglo-Americans, 
  Montcalm went with Lévis and part of the general staff to Ticonderoga to 
  lure their spies into thinking he was preparing some operation in that area, 
  but then on July 16 he discreetly hurried back, leaving Lévis in command 
  there, and, after short stops in Montreal and La Présentation, took command 
  of the troops gathering at Fort Frontenac on July 29. Six days earlier, an 
  Indian prisoner had told Lt Col Mercer at Oswego that Montcalm had 
  arrived in Canada with two additional battalions, and that he was expected 
  to arrive at Fort Frontenac, where many troops and militiamen in high 
  spirits were gathering.
  Oswego’s garrison
  The situation was different for the British garrison at Oswego. The troops 
  had spent a miserable year. Captain John Vicars relates how dismal the 
  situation had been there since his arrival with Shirley’s 50th Foot in August 
  1755. The garrison soon became “short of provisions,” and in spite of 
  appeals for more supplies by Lt Col Mercer, not enough were sent, to the 
  point that councils of war deliberated “whether we should abandon the 
  place on account of the want of provisions.” This extreme solution, which 
  was practically synonymous with abandoning Oswego to the French, was 
  not carried out. However, the troops there paid a dear price. Vicars stated 
  Irish soldier with Montcalm’s 
  army, 1756–57. In February 
  1756, Vaudreuil mentioned 
  that Irish soldiers had 
  deserted from the garrison of 
  Fort Oswego. When 
  attacked in August, a report 
  to Colonel Mercer made by 
  French army deserters 
  mentioned a small group of 
  men in Montcalm’s army 
  that were “cloathed in Red 
  faced with Green” and were 
  mistakenly thought to 
  belong “to the Irish Brigade” 
  (DHSNY, II). These 
  red-coated soldiers were 
  actually Irish Catholics that 
  had deserted to the French. 
  More switched sides after 
  Oswego’s surrender, and an 
  Irish company was formed 
  in June 1757. It was posted 
  in Quebec City until 
  September 1757 when it 
  was transferred to France to 
  be incorporated in France’s 
  Irish regiments in Europe; it 
  was feared they would be 
  hanged if recaptured in 
  Canada by the British. As 
  red was the color worn by 
  the Irish Brigades in the 
  French and Spanish armies, 
  it was eminently suitable for 
  this group of Irish soldiers. 
  Adding green facings made 
  it even more Irish. In all 
  probability, this was the 
  former British uniform, most 
  likely adapted to French 
  army styles without lace or 
  lapels. (Watercolor by Derek 
  FitzJames. Anne S. K. Brown 
  Military Collection, Brown 
  University Library, 
  Providence, USA. Author’s 
  photo)
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  48
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  that his company originally had 50 men, but by May 1756 “39 of them dead 
  [of sickness] and one taken prisoner. I think each of the 8 companies [of 
  Shirley’s Regiment] at [Fort] Oswego lost above 30 men” apparently owing 
  to “bad barracks and want of beds, which threw the men in to scurveys, and 
  the water which gave them fluxes.” Indeed, there were no real barracks in 
  the fort for the soldiers, and what passed for a barrack building “was made 
  of green boards, they all split and the snow drove in constantly on the men, 
  the rest lived in bark huts and lay on the ground all winter.”
  Thus some 240 men of Shirley’s 50th Foot were lost owing to callous 
  neglect; the failure to provide them with proper quarters and sufficient food 
  in this isolated station during the winter. Pepperrell’s 51st Foot “lost fewer 
  men than the 50th at [Fort] Oswego,” according to Capt Vicars, because the 
  General Montcalm’s army's 
  route to Oswego. Various 
  elements left Montreal in 
  July to go to Niaouré Bay, 
  where detachments from 
  elsewhere had also 
  assembled.
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  49
  The Plan
  barracks in Fort Ontario where it was posted “were better than those at 
  [Fort] Oswego.” This is hardly a positive statement about the state of the 
  garrison at Oswego. Furthermore, no pay was given between October 1755 
  and the end of June of 1756, so that the men had no money to buy anything 
  from traders or Indians. Thus, some men deserted, and those that were 
  caught later related at their court martial that they had absconded because 
  “they neither received their pay nor sufficient provisions [so] they went 
  away to prevent their starving.” In May and June, however, more supplies 
  and many recruits for the 50th and 51st arrived, which suddenly made “the 
  garrison pretty healthy.” A “great quantity of goods” was now at Oswego, 
  and “chocolate, tea, sugar, coffee, shirts, shoes, and stockings” were 
  distributed. Barracks were now built in the older post, but they were “so 
  near the stockade [that] they could make no defense” (MA).
  Shirley’s 50th Foot was posted in the older works, generally simply called 
  Fort Oswego, while Pepperrell’s 51st Foot was standing guard in the new 
  and unfinished Fort Ontario. According to “An Account of the Strength… 
  at Oswego” (MA), the garrison in early August 1756 stood at: 
   
  50th Shirley’s: 27 officers, 29 sergeants, 481 corporals, drummers and privates. Total 
  50th: 537
  51st Pepperrell’s: 22 officers, 28 sergeants, 390 corporals, drummers and privates. Total 
  51st: 440
  New Jersey Regiment: 7 officers, 10 sergeants, 123 corporals, drummers and privates. 
  Total New Jersey Regiment: 140
  Royal Artillery: 2 officers and 16 privates. Total: Royal Artillery: 18
  Grand total: 1,135 (including 58 officers)
   
  These figures vary significantly 
  from the number of prisoners 
  of war reported by the French 
  (see below), which lists more 
  officers and men for the 50th 
  (550), 
  51st 
  (462), 
  and 
  especially the New Jersey 
  Regiment (175). This gives a 
  grand total of 1,187 officers 
  and enlisted men, not counting 
  the casualties and desertions 
  that occurred during the siege. 
  Obviously, some outlying 
  detachments were called in 
  after this computation. The 
  French counted a total of 
  1,742 prisoners of war when 
  naval personnel, laborers, 
  non-combatants and casualties 
  were added.
  Colonel Peter Schuyler of the 
  New Jersey Regiment, 
  c.1755. Schuyler (1710–62) 
  was one of the most 
  experienced American 
  officers, having previously 
  commanded the New Jersey 
  provincial troops mobilized 
  in 1746–47. In 1755, he was 
  again appointed to 
  command the New Jersey 
  provincial regiment – 
  nicknamed the “New Jersey 
  Blues” because of its dark 
  blue uniform – and came to 
  Oswego in 1756 with part of 
  his unit, the rest of it being 
  posted in small forts at the 
  Oneida Carry and along the 
  Mohawk River. Schuyler is 
  said to have been opposed 
  to surrendering Oswego, but 
  the great majority of officers 
  decided to capitulate. From 
  August 1756 to October 
  1757, he remained in French 
  custody at Quebec City and 
  was released on parole by 
  Governor General Vaudreuil 
  until an exchange finally 
  released him on September 
  1758. He reassumed 
  command of his regiment 
  and served with it as part of 
  General Jeffery Amherst’s 
  army from 1759 up to the 
  surrender of Montreal in 
  September 1760. This 
  colored sketch, by Frederick 
  P. Todd after an original 
  portrait in the collections of 
  the New Jersey Historical 
  Society, shows Schuyler 
  wearing his regiment’s dark 
  blue uniform faced with 
  scarlet and trimmed with 
  gold buttons, the waistcoat 
  being edged with gold lace. 
  (Anne S. K. Brown Military 
  Collection, Brown University 
  Library, Providence, USA. 
  Author’s photo)
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  50
  MONTCALM’S RAID ON 
  OSWEGO
  Montcalm’s forces move
  On July 25, the French army’s senior engineer, Descombles, went lurking 
  discreetly near “the forts and approaches” at Oswego with Captain de Villiers. 
  This scouting trip was very thorough, and Descombles presented the results of 
  his findings to General Montcalm four days later with suggestions on where to 
  build the trenches and artillery batteries to have the best chances of subduing the 
  British forts. He was obviously a very professional, active and thorough engineer.
  It looked good to Montcalm. The army’s rendezvous point was fixed at 
  Niaouré Bay, and in early August troops arrived there on board ships and 
  bateaux from Fort Frontenac and other places, and joined François-Pierre 
  Rigaud de Vaudreuil’s Canadian militiamen already there; he was the governor 
  general’s brother and also a veteran colonial officer. By August 8, everything 
  was ready, and a fleet of at least 200 bateaux with over 3,000 men and all the 
  arms and supplies on board sailed south, edging discreetly around Lake 
  Ontario’s coast. As it came closer to its objective, the fleet moved only at night, 
  and otherwise the bateaux would be hidden in coves, out of view of the lake. 
  Two days later, Montcalm’s force was within a mile and a half (2.4km) east of 
  Oswego, and landed there; indeed, some officers felt it was too close for 
  comfort. Incredibly, the Anglo-American garrison did not know of its arrival, 
  a remarkable feat of discretion for such a large force. 
  On August 11, the engineers Descombles and Desandrouin were ordered 
  to reconnoiter “at day-break, Fort Ontario, the place to be attacked, and 
  [chart] the roads necessary to be cut across the woods to reach the rear of the 
  traverse,” Desandrouin wrote in a letter of August 28. It was very hot already, 
  and Descombles took off his dark blue uniform coat so that he simply wore 
  his scarlet waistcoat:
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  51
  Montcalm’s Raid On Oswego
  For an escort, we were furnished with the grenadier company of La Sarre, several 
  Canadian officers, and some twenty trusty Indians, as guides and flankers to the right 
  and left, to discover scouting parties from the [Oswego] garrison, which we had to fear. 
  We advanced across stumps of trees, to within 80 toises [512ft, 156m] of the place; I 
  was to the left, within twenty paces of Mr Decombles, having left the grenadiers within 
  a gun-shot in the rear. He had completed his reconnaissance before me and, as he was 
  returning between three colonial officers, a Nipissing Indian, who happened to be eight 
  or ten paces behind, mistook him, in the twilight, for an English officer; his first 
  intention was to take him prisoner, but as he saw him accompanied by others, he 
  discharged a gun, loaded with a ball and a handful of buckshot at him, which prostrated 
  him. The sentries of the fort, supposing themselves fired at, discharged their pieces at 
  us, so that I thought a patrol had discovered Mr. Decombles, and I retired immediately 
  for fear of being surprised (DRCHNY, X).
  Decombles had a tragic end, as Desandrouin related in another dispatch 
  giving more details:
   
  I heard Mr [Luc de Lacorne, sieur] de Saint-Luc shouting that our unfortunate engineer 
  was fatally wounded. I ran towards him to assist him if possible. I found him lying on 
  the ground and dying, from a gunshot wound consisting of a bullet and a handful of 
  large buckshot fired by Indian named Hotchig. This unfortunate man had taken him 
  for an English scout. He saw him pass a tree trunk holding his cane in front of him. He 
  [Hotchig] thought it was a musket; he heard or saw someone that accompanied him 
  Plan of a reconnaissance by 
  French army engineer 
  Descombles at Oswego, July 
  25, 1756. A: old fort of 
  Oswego; B: old stone house 
  in the middle of the fort; C: 
  earthwork with 18 cannons; 
  D: merchants’ houses; D: 
  camp; E: trenches; F: outer 
  guardhouse; G: boat landing; 
  H: new stockade fort without 
  a ditch; I: Fort Ontario; L: 
  barracks in Fort Ontario; M: 
  low reefs at the river’s 
  entrance. Descombles also 
  proposed sites (in brown) for 
  trenches, siege batteries, and 
  a bridge over the Onondaga 
  River. (Collection and photo: 
  Archives Nationales (France), 
  Outremer (Aix-en-Provence), 
  Dépot des Fortifications des 
  Colonies)
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  52
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  [Decombles], and did not hesitate to shoot… I was shattered by this account and the 
  state of my poor comrade… and had him carried right away to his tent where he passed 
  away half an hour later, in spite of the surgeon’s care (Gabriel).
   
  Poor Descombles had been mistaken for a British officer, no doubt because 
  he had set out in his scarlet waistcoat.
  Losing his chief engineer when about to attack Oswego was certainly bad 
  news for Montcalm. It is said that he even wondered if the attempt to take 
  Oswego should be canceled, but he soon resolved to go ahead. Desandrouin 
  would become chief engineer, but he would need another engineer to assist 
  him, and there was no other available. However, engineering interested a 
  number of the better-educated infantry officers at that time, and it was well 
  known that Captain Pierre Pouchot of the Béarn Regiment was quite 
  proficient. General Montcalm appointed him to be the new assistant engineer.
  In Oswego, the Anglo-Americans were alarmed by the shooting, and sent 
  out a small party in a canoe to find out what was going on. It soon saw many 
  French bateaux drawn up on shore and hurriedly paddled back to Oswego, 
  announcing that there was obviously a large French force nearby. Mercer 
  immediately sent out several ships to bombard and destroy the bateaux, but 
  the French had already built a shore battery containing four 12-pdr cannons. 
  At about noon, Montcalm reported, three English vessels “shot at us without 
  success” and were answered by the French shore battery “that forced them to 
  sail further away and go back to their port” after receiving “a few of our 
  cannonballs,” noted Desandrouin. Meanwhile, some 400 men spent the day 
  opening a road from the landing site to the outskirts of Fort Ontario, while 
  many more men were kept busy making a large amount of fascines and gabions 
  in preparation for the siege. Fort Ontario itself was invested and surrounded 
  by numerous small parties of Canadians and Indians led by Rigaud.
  Beginning the siege
  On August 12, boats out of Oswego tried again to bombard the French 
  army’s landing site. The French shore battery had been reinforced by several 
  more cannons installed during the night that kept them at a respectable 
  distance, “and they since have not dared to show themselves except when 
  far away,” noted Montcalm. The guns of Fort Ontario also opened fire and 
  continued to shoot until nightfall, but with no effect. Musket fire from the 
  fort was returned by Rigaud’s militiamen and warriors, and provided cover 
  Fort Ontario as seen from the 
  east. This view of the present 
  fort gives a good sense of 
  what the French and Indian 
  opponents could see in 1756 
  as they arrived from the east. 
  Naturally, the buildings 
  within would have been 
  much lower and the Oswego 
  skyline would not have 
  existed. (Author’s photo)
  AUGUST 10,  
  1756
  Montcalm’s force 
  lands near Oswego
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  53
  Montcalm’s Raid On Oswego
  for the hundreds of men starting on field works to the east. That morning, 
  allied warriors intercepted dispatches to Albany signed by Mercer and 
  Littlehales asking for assistance as soon as possible, since Montcalm’s army 
  was investing Oswego. The French spent the rest of the day finishing the 
  road, making field fortifications, and bringing up the heavy artillery. It was 
  also decided to start a parallel trench east of Fort Ontario in the evening. Its 
  orientation was contested by the young engineer Desandrouin because he 
  felt it would not offer enough cover, but he was overruled by Colonel 
  Bourlamarque, who was in charge of the immediate siege operations. 
  Pouchot agreed with Bourlamarque, so the work went ahead with 
  Desandrouin following the instructions “to the letter,” although he noted 
  that an enemy vessel could enfilade the trench. At any rate the work went 
  MONTCALM’S STRENGTH AT OSWEGO 
  According to La Pause’s account (in RAPQ), who acted 
  as Montcalm’s chief of staff, the French army arriving 
  at Oswego consisted of the following troops:
  La Sarre: 416 NCOs and privates, 27 officers, total: 443
  Guyenne: 441 NCOs and privates, 29 officers, total: 470
  Béarn: 381 NCOs and privates, 29 officers, total: 410
  Artillery and militia: 1,042 NCOs and privates, 4 
  officers, total: 1,046.
  De Léry specifies that 137 men of this group were 
  regular infantrymen of the compagnies franches de la 
  marine and regular artillerymen of the 
  Canonniers-Bombardiers, which La Pause numbers at 34 
  gunners with one officer. Thus, some 909 Canadian 
  militiamen formed the balance of this group.
  Volunteers of de Villiers: 340 NCOs and privates, 15 
  officers, total: 355
  Volunteers of de Montigny: 62 NCOs and privates, 1 
  officer, total: 63
  Indians: 250
  Total: 3,037 (including 105 officers)
  The artillery was to be served by 34 regular gunners 
  and over 500 militiamen (part of the artillery and 
  militia group listed above). The ordnance brought 
  consisted of:
  4 brass 12-pdr cannons
  2 brass 6-pdr cannons
  2 brass 2-pdr cannons
  4 iron 12-pdr cannons
  6 iron 8-pdr cannons
  4 iron 6-pdr cannons
  2 brass 8-pdr howitzers
  1 iron 6-inch mortar
  8 iron grenade mortars
  Of this ordnance, the brass cannons and howitzers are 
  surprising, as nearly all artillery pieces in Canada 
  were iron naval guns until the Seven Years War. The 
  12-pdr brass cannons were British and had been 
  captured at Monongahela, as probably were the other 
  brass pieces, especially as howitzers were uncommon 
  in the French forces.
  A detachment of 438 men, including 308 sick or 
  non-combatants, were left at the camp at Niaouré 
  Bay. There were also one hundred officers’ servants 
  with the army. If one adds general and staff officers, 
  the French force approaching Oswego numbered at 
  least 3,140 men.
  AUGUST 13,  
  1756
  Fort Ontario falls 
  to the French
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  54
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  on, and the laborers were helped by beautiful moonlight, noted Desandrouin. 
  Montcalm was on the spot “visiting all the posts and the workers” and 
  encouraging them until three in the morning, and then went to his camp to 
  order that a siege battery should now be built and ready as soon as possible. 
  Thus, at dawn on August 13, the Fort Ontario garrison, which had not 
  fired its guns during the night, now saw the extent of its opponent’s 
  remarkably rapid progress. The trenches were approaching and there was a 
  great deal of activity in their lines. The fort’s guns and muskets opened fire, 
  but again with little effect. The French siege battery was being built to 
  contain six guns, but was not ready. It was very well sited, being elevated so 
  that the guns of Fort Ontario could not fire into it. They tried with ricochet 
  fire and mortar bombs, but to no avail. The French were well protected by 
  their field works insofar as fire from the fort was concerned, and Rigaud’s 
  men were nearby within musket range but invisible, forcing the fort’s 
  defenders to take cover too. Soon, Montcalm’s men would have cannons 
  installed in this elevated battery that would make the fort and its garrison 
  very vulnerable. Apprised of this, Mercer agreed to evacuate Fort Ontario; 
  the work would soon be defenseless and its defenders uselessly exposed. 
  From two in the afternoon, the Anglo-Americans kept up “an infernal fire” 
  with cannonballs, mortar bombs and musket balls shot “from both forts” 
  simultaneously, so that “neither warriors or Frenchmen dared to show their 
  noses,” commented Desandrouin, but at 4.00pm the guns and mortars in 
  Fort Ontario became suddenly silent. At first, the French suspected a trick, 
  thinking that the defenders might have stopped so their opponents would 
  come out, rush to assault the fort, and be cut down. After a couple of hours, 
  doubts grew about what was really going on, and a warrior volunteered to 
  have a look. He sneaked up to the base of the rampart, listened, and then, in 
  full view of the men in the French trenches, rapidly climbed into the fort. He 
  emerged on the parapet to find the fort empty.
  Taking Fort Ontario
  The grenadier company of the Guyenne Regiment was immediately sent in 
  and took possession of Fort Ontario. Before leaving, the garrison had spiked 
  its eight cannons and four mortars, and thrown its remaining black powder 
  in the well. But it had left in a hurry, abandoning three sick men and all the 
  baggage in the fort. The French army was nearly overwhelmed with joy at 
  this news, but for Montcalm and his officers there was no time to lose. One 
  hundred men were at once tasked with building a road from the parallel 
  trench into the fort, which was finished in less than three hours.
  The abandonment of Fort Ontario certainly indicated that the garrison 
  was somewhat in shock since the arrival of the French troops and their allied 
  warriors. Oswego’s garrison had been much neglected in its winter of 
  privation, and although supplies and money had at last arrived, morale was 
  rather low. This included a number of the officers who seem to have felt 
  marooned in a place far from “civilization,” as they saw it. Now that the 
  “French & Indians” surrounded Oswego, the perspective of fighting them 
  and, for many, of falling into the hands of “barbaric” warriors was horrific. 
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  55
  Montcalm’s Raid On Oswego
  All knew that there was practically no chance that a relief force would arrive 
  in less than a month, which dampened many a redcoat’s spirit. Mercer seems 
  to have had no illusions about his precarious position. Sooner or later, the 
  French siege trenches would reach Fort Ontario, they would have batteries 
  to pound the place and enough men to storm a breach in its walls. Instead 
  of being the citadel of Oswego, Fort Ontario was isolated, and, it seemed, 
  doomed. Its commanding officer’s suggestion of evacuating was approved 
  by Mercer, and, as seen above, the garrison managed to slip out “and land 
  on the Oswego side without any annoyance from the enemy and I believe 
  without being discovered,” Mackellar wrote. 
  The next siege
  The next step for Montcalm was to build a battery that would bombard Fort 
  Oswego just across the river. It would be a “barbette” battery, which meant 
  that the guns would be fired over the top of its wall instead of through 
  embrasures: this left the gunners more exposed to enemy fire, but their 
  cannons gained a wider field of fire. Captain François Le Mercier, 
  commandant of the Canonniers-Bombardiers, Desandrouin, Pouchot and 
  200 men went to work on a battery large enough for 20 pieces of artillery. 
  It was sited in front of Fort Ontario’s western side, and the dry ditch below 
  the curtain wall provided a handy covered road into it. Most would be 
  cannons, but mortars were also to be installed “so as to batter Fort Oswego, 
  the road from that fort to Fort George, and [shoot into] the entrenched camp 
  [outside of Fort Oswego] in its rear,” hoped Montcalm. He wished it built 
  during that night, a Herculean task, and most of his army became laborers 
  hauling guns and constructing the battery. Desandrouin reported that the 
  Anglo-Americans fired a few cannon shots and a dozen mortar bombs 
  during the night with no effect, although visibility was much enhanced by 
  the full moon. Montcalm was on the spot, which greatly encouraged the 
  View from Fort Ontario 
  looking east. The French and 
  Indians, having landed 
  farther east, appeared at 
  about where the trees are in 
  the distance. They proceeded 
  to build a battery and invest 
  the fort. (Author’s photo)
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  56
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  TAKING THE OSWEGO FORTS
  AUGUST 1756
  FORT OSWEGO
  8
  6
  6
  FORT GEORGE
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  57
  Montcalm’s Raid On Oswego
  3
  1 French land near Oswego, early August 
  2 French road towards Fort Ontario is built, August 11–12
  3 French trench and battery overlooking Fort Ontario is built, 
  August 12–13
  4 Fort Ontario is evacuated, afternoon of August 13
  5 French battery overlooking Fort Oswego is built, night of August 
  13/14
  6 A force of Canadians and warriors surrounds Oswego completely 
  on morning of August 14; the battalion of the Régiment de Béarn 
  joins them 
  7 Small redoubt to the south is evacuated, during the morning of 
  August 14
  8 Fort George is evacuated, during the morning of August 14
  9 Fort Oswego surrenders
  EVENTS
  6
  1
  2
  4
  5
  6
  6
  7
  9
  FORT ONTARIO
  TRADERS’ HOUSES, WAREHOUSES, AND SHIPS
  TRADERS’ BATEAUX
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  58
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  many men working, so that the access trench and the battery was being 
  armed with nine cannons by early dawn on August 14. Work was also 
  starting on another battery position for mortars and howitzers.
  For Mercer, the situation was critical, but he was not about to give up. The 
  morale of his troops was low to the point that, in one case mentioned by 
  Mackellar involving fatigues, the officers could not convince their men to 
  work, and finally “thought it an improper time to make use of severe [punitive] 
  measures, so that there was no more work done” on the night of August 13. 
  There had fortunately been “a battery or blind of pork casks” installed earlier 
  in the evening on both sides of the old blockhouse of Fort Oswego “to cover 
  the gunners” from French artillery fire. Now that the French possessed Fort 
  Ontario, the British knew that Montcalm would take advantage of its position 
  to enfilade the works on the other side of the Oswego River. Perhaps some of 
  the infantrymen of the 50th and 51st had lost heart, but others were determined 
  to put up a fight. This included the small detachment of Royal Artillery 
  gunners with the infantrymen that assisted them to man the guns. They had 
  performed very well in Fort Ontario the day before and were again ready to 
  pepper the French with everything they had. To do this, they had two cannons 
  and a mortar on the north side of the blockhouse and a cannon and two 
  mortars, one behind the other, on the south side.
  “At day break in the morning,” wrote Mackellar, “we discovered a battery 
  en barbette erected along the edge of the cliff in the front of Fort Ontario, 
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  59
  Montcalm’s Raid On Oswego
  which we then began to fire upon.” Worse, the French battery commanded 
  “all the inside” of the Anglo-American works
   
  excepting a little space that was covered with the blockhouse towards the town. We 
  fired with four mortars and six guns, three of which (standing upon the north flank 
  and curtain of the horn work) were reversed upon the platforms, one from the Indian 
  council house, and two from the battery of pork casks on the north side, which last 
  two were the only guns that had any cover.
  Although they had nine guns in the battery, the French gunners opened up 
  at first with only three cannons. Bougainville noted that the French new 
  battery “was very late in firing, and then only with a few pieces.” Finally all 
  nine guns were in action, but the British gunners proved to be very resilient 
  and brave men who knew their craft.
  The French battery was at equal or slightly lower height than the guns in 
  Oswego, and the British rapid fire soon had a telling effect as casualties rose 
  amongst the French in their battery. At about seven or eight in the morning, 
  the sun was hidden by clouds and a violent thunderstorm drenched everyone 
  – one of those sudden and short rainstorms typical of northeast summers. 
  This was especially annoying in the French battery because, in a hurry to 
  gain time, Captain Le Mercier had decided not to install a wooden platform. 
  Now the packed earth was turning to mud so that at each shot the cannons 
  would sink in, rendering their shots too high or too low. Then ammunition 
  started to be in short supply, so the French fire slackened. Not so in the 
  British batteries, and the Royal Artillery gunners knocked a French gun off 
  its carriage. The British gunners had their problems too, however. The bad 
  carriages of three of their 
  guns collapsed when fired 
  and had to be replaced “in 
  the midst of the enemy’s 
  fire” while a 7-inch mortar 
  burst. It was also realized 
  that the powder magazine 
  “which was only covered 
  with plank and turf” was 
  not quite bomb proof. 
  Desandrouin, who was 
  near the French battery, 
  felt that the British guns 
  had the upper hand.   
  Early in the morning, 
  Montcalm had ordered all 
  of Rigaud’s and Villiers’s 
  corps 
  of 
  Canadians, 
  militiamen, and Indian 
  warriors 
  – 
  about 
  a 
  thousand men – to go 
  Opposite:
  A cannon manned by the 
  Canonniers-Bombardiers, 
  the regular colonial 
  artillerymen of New France, 
  c.1755–60. In the 
  foreground are two officers; 
  behind them is a sergeant, 
  recognizable by the double 
  silver cuff lace. As for the 
  gunners, most of them have 
  taken off their coats for ease 
  of movement; at left, a 
  senior gunner helps to sort 
  cannonballs. All wear the 
  regulation dark blue uniform 
  with red facings, trimmed 
  with white metal buttons, 
  and “false” or real silver hat 
  lace, depending on rank. 
  The artillery piece is a naval 
  model mounted on a 
  garrison carriage, the most 
  common ordnance in New 
  France. However, field 
  carriages may have been 
  used at Oswego. 
  (Watercolor by Eugène 
  Lelièpvre. Collection and 
  photo: National Historic 
  Sites, Parks Canada)
  Pierre-François de Rigaud, 
  Marquis de 
  Vaudreuil-Cavagnal, 
  Governor General of New 
  France, c.1755. (Print after 
  portrait. Author’s photo)
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  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
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  Montcalm’s Raid On Oswego
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  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  south and cross the river to cut off Oswego completely in case its garrison 
  might try a sortie to evacuate the place. The Béarn battalion was also 
  joining them to secure the Oswego River in case a sortie to the south was 
  attempted. At about 8.00am Anglo-Americans saw large numbers of 
  Canadians and warriors on the west side, a nasty surprise for the modest 
  garrison of the outlying, small, and unfinished Fort George. Although the 
  British did not initially fully realize it, this move effectively sealed off 
  Oswego. Montcalm had outflanked his opponent and he now mooted an 
  assault from the south. It was obvious that the British troops in outlying 
  Fort George were doomed, and they were ordered to withdraw into 
  Oswego. 
  Meanwhile, although at a disadvantage in their artillery duel, the 
  Canonniers-Bombardiers kept up a brisk fire on the British gun positions. 
  Those colonial gunners too did not lack in courage and stamina. Then, at 
  about nine in the morning, a “lucky” shot sealed the fate of Oswego: 
  Lieutenant-Colonel Mercer, who was with the British gunners, was killed 
  instantly by a cannonball that either severed his head or cut him in two. It 
  was a disaster for Anglo-American morale, such as it was, because Mercer 
  was a true fighter and one of the “unsung heroes” of the British forces 
  during that conflict. According to Desandrouin, one of Mercer’s staff officers 
  told him after the surrender that the British commander had decided to 
  organize an all-out sortie shortly before he was struck. This, of course, will 
  never be known for sure since that brave commandant perished, but it is 
  certainly in keeping with his character and conduct at Oswego.
  Surrender
  Anglo-American command devolved to 53-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel 
  Littlehales, whose best years were obviously behind him. Military historian 
  Lieutenant-Colonel Mercer hit by a French cannonball, August 14, 1756 (previous pages)
  On Saturday August 14, at about nine in the morning, a cannon shot 
  from the French battery across the river killed Lieutenant-Colonel 
  James Mercer, Oswego’s commander, who was also the soul of its 
  resistance. For General Montcalm and his troops, it was one of those 
  “lucky” shots that hastened the surrender of Oswego. Most of the 
  garrison’s morale was low even before Mercer was hit; an hour after 
  his death, the place capitulated.    
  The French battery had been built in record time during the night of 
  August 13–14 and it commanded much of old Fort Oswego. In the 
  early morning, an artillery duel started between this new French 
  battery and the Anglo-American artillery positions at Oswego. After 
  the withdrawal from Fort Ontario, the Anglo-Americans built several 
  artillery gun positions facing east as fast and as best as they could, 
  hastily trying to protect them with items such as pork barrels piled 
  three high and three deep and probably some fascines filled with 
  earth. The British gunners, assisted by some infantrymen, put up a 
  very stubborn fight, as the French soon noted.
  Colonel Mercer’s end came in a split second. A French cannonball, 
  by most accounts, severed his head from his body, or possibly cut 
  him in two. Our plate shows the instant the shot hit him, but refrains 
  from showing the gory spectacle to be seen a second later. He 
  probably wore his officer’s uniform as lieutenant-colonel of 
  Pepperell’s 51st Foot, which was all scarlet including facings, most 
  likely with silver lace and buttons for officers. The Royal Artillery 
  gunners would have worn their blue uniform faced with red and 
  trimmed with yellow buttons and lace. They might have laid their 
  coats aside and served their guns wearing their dark blue waistcoats, 
  also trimmed with yellow buttons and lace, but several paintings 
  depicting their comrades serving cannons elsewhere show them 
  wearing their coats, even in Havana six years later. The British at 
  Oswego probably used their best guns, those made of brass, for their 
  cannonades against the French, as well as good iron cannons. Of the 
  carriages little seems to be said, except for their “badness,” and they 
  might have been the garrison type or the field type with two large 
  wheels, or both. Even the color that the carriage’s wood was painted 
  is uncertain. We favor gray, which is usually seen in paintings, but 
  one can occasionally also see a dull red. Gray was seemingly the 
  predominant color. Ironwork on the carriage was black.
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  63
  Montcalm’s Raid On Oswego
  George Stanley felt he was “an officer of little strength of will and 
  of no great courage,” and he now called the senior officers to 
  a council of war to consider options. Although he did not 
  yet know it, this was exactly what Montcalm hoped for, 
  and he had even considered a truce to discuss terms 
  before Mercer fell. The gathered Anglo-American 
  officers first considered that a glorious defense would 
  be “of little purpose,” which gives an idea of their 
  fighting mood. The notable exception was Colonel 
  Schuyler of the New Jersey Regiment, who felt 
  resistance should go on. However, the appearance 
  of swarms of Canadians and Indians to the south 
  and west now fully registered with most officers, 
  while the engineer Mackellar conceded the place 
  would likely fall “in a short time” to a French 
  assault. There were naturally fears that the Indian 
  warriors would then go on a scalping and bloody 
  rampage, which sent shivers down the spine of many in 
  Oswego that day. This discussion occurred even as Royal 
  Artillery gunners were keeping up a pretty good defense on 
  the east side. Nevertheless, Schuyler and those wishing to go on 
  fighting were overruled, and the council of war opted to wait no 
  longer before surrendering.
  At about ten in the morning, the white flag was hoisted over Oswego and 
  two officers came out to negotiate terms for a capitulation, “a step,” noted 
  Montcalm, “that we had not dared to expect so soon.” All firing ceased. 
  Montcalm sent Bougainville to tell the Anglo-Americans that “the garrison 
  should render themselves prisoners of war and that the French troops should 
  forthwith take possession” of Oswego. Officers were allowed to retain their 
  personal baggage. The “Honors of War” do not appear to have been 
  discussed, so the regiments would have had to surrender their colors and 
  weapons. Littlehales agreed and signed the capitulation. Montcalm named 
  Colonel Bourlamarque as commandant of Oswego; he took possession of 
  the place with two companies of grenadiers and detachments of fusiliers 
  from the metropolitan battalions, who relieved the sentries of the 50th, 51st 
  and New Jersey regiments.
  British casualties were estimated as comprising Lieutenant-Colonel 
  Mercer, artillery lieutenant Hind and about 150 soldiers or sailors killed, 
  with one major and about 30 soldiers, sailors and laborers wounded. On the 
  fatalities, Montcalm and several other French officers noted with regret and 
  sometimes disgust that many men had met their end while trying to escape 
  Oswego after they heard of its surrender, and “who fell into the hands” of 
  the allied warriors waiting to collect scalps and booty. Naturally, learning of 
  this, Americans branded the whole operation as a “massacre” since Indians 
  were involved, which made great propaganda and camouflaged the 
  non-appearance of their own allied warriors in the struggle as well as the 
  crushing defeat suffered by British and American troops.
  Louis-Antoine de 
  Bougainville (1729–1811) 
  was Montcalm’s first 
  aide-de-camp at Oswego 
  and in later campaigns in 
  Canada. A brilliant scientist, 
  he went into the navy and 
  circumnavigated the globe 
  between 1766 and 1769, 
  becoming renowned for his 
  explorations of the South 
  Pacific and his description of 
  Tahiti. He saw action during 
  the American War of 
  Independence and later 
  became a prominent and 
  lauded member of France’s 
  scientific community. (Print 
  after a c.1775 portrait. 
  Private collection. Author’s 
  photo)
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  64
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  French casualties were trifling according to Montcalm: “only about 
  thirty men killed or wounded.” Officers: Desandrouin, killed; Colonel 
  Bourlamarque and Captain de Palmarolle slightly wounded; a gunner, two 
  metropolitan soldiers, one Canadian militiaman and one warrior killed; the 
  rest not dangerously wounded. (As per Montcalm’s Journal; Etat général de 
  ce qui a été pris à Chouagen… August 1756, AG, A1, 3417; de Léry, “Journal 
  du Siège du Fort de Chouéguen” and La Pause in RAPQ.)
  The prisoners were escorted into Fort Ontario to protect them from the 
  warriors who now poured into Oswego wishing to pay themselves with 
  booty, scalps and revenge on the redcoats. According to La Pause, they broke 
  into warehouses where they found some rum and strangled a few patients 
  in the hospital, and their looting encouraged some French soldiers and some 
  Canadian militiamen to do the same. It must be recalled here that Canadian 
  militiamen, like Indian warriors, did not receive pay, so booty was the only 
  benefit of their conscription beyond equipment and rations. They were 
  brought to order, but the warriors were more difficult to check and many 
  SURRENDERED ARMS, COLORS, AND PRISONERS
  Arms and colors 
  7 brass cannons of 19, 14 and 12 pounds
  48 iron cannons of 9, 6, 5, 4, 3 and 2 pounds
  1 brass mortar of 9.4 inches
  13 iron mortars of 6, 4 and 3 inches
  5 iron howitzers of 6 and 3 inches
  2 brass swivel guns
  45 iron swivel guns
  (…)
  730 muskets [another 1,070 muskets were taken by 
  Canadian militiamen and warriors as per AG, A1, 3417]
  (…)
  2 colors of Pepperrell’s [51st] Regiment
  2 colors of Shirley’s [50th] Regiment
  1 color of the New Jersey Regiment
  British and American prisoners: 
  Shirley’s 50th Foot: 1 lieutenant-colonel, 5 captains, 13 
  lieutenants, 7 ensigns, 1 chaplain, 1 surgeon, 4 
  volunteers, 30 sergeants, 15 drummers, 472 privates: 
  549 officers and enlisted men, plus 32 servants, 30 
  women, 4 officers’ wives, 1 commissary, 1 secretary: 618
  Pepperrell’s 51st Foot: 5 captains, 11 lieutenants, 5 
  ensigns, 1 chaplain, 1 surgeon, 1 quartermaster, 1 
  volunteer, 28 sergeants, 13 drummers, 376 privates: 
  442 officers and enlisted men, plus 35 women, 23 
  servants: 500
  New Jersey Regiment: 1 colonel, 3 captains, 2 
  lieutenants, 4 ensigns, 1 surgeon, 1 assistant surgeon, 
  11 sergeants, 6 drummers, 145 privates: 174 officers 
  and enlisted men, plus 5 women, 9 servants: 188
  Engineers: 1 chief engineer, 1 second engineer and 2 
  servants: 4
  Artillery: 1 captain, 15 bombardiers and gunners, 3 
  women and 1 servant: 20
  Ship’s crews: 2 captains, 4 lieutenants, 1 surgeon, 89 
  sailors, 4 women and 6 servants: 106
  Amongst the other non-combatants were 138 
  carpenters and laborers, 11 merchants and 3 merchant’s 
  wives, 1 storekeeper and 1 clerk for a total of 154.
  The French counted a total of 1,590 prisoners of war.
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  65
  Montcalm’s Raid On Oswego
  looted the officers’ personal effects. Bourlamarque brought more troops into 
  Oswego, posted sentries at the arms and rations magazines, but much of the 
  others were looted before the warriors understood they had better leave. 
  Other French troops and militiamen were ordered to go back into their 
  encampments and a strong guard was posted to protect the prisoners 
  gathered in Fort Ontario. “During the night,” La Pause recalled, “the 
  warriors being drunk were skulking around [Fort Ontario] so as to kidnap 
  a few prisoners to kill [them]. They seemed like starved wolves making 
  horrible yells and shouts.” Montcalm commented on his warriors as “this 
  species of animal I look upon as mad dogs.”  
  Many prisoners were transported away from Oswego the next day, and 
  the rest in ensuing days, always under protection. The warriors meanwhile 
  headed back to their villages. On August 16, the French troops started on 
  the demolition of the forts, and this continued until August 21 when the 
  great white standard of France was lowered and the French army bade 
  farewell to Oswego. With Oswego destroyed and the Anglo-American fleet 
  taken, Lake Ontario was totally secure, and Vaudreuil was free to transfer 
  troops to reinforce Crown Point and Ticonderoga.
  AUGUST 14,  
  1756
  Lt-Col Mercer 
  killed; Fort Oswego 
  surrenders
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  66
  ANALYSIS  
  The loss of Oswego was a crushing blow to British and American conquest 
  plans. Their only base on Lake Ontario was lost with its whole garrison and 
  the Mohawk River valley was suddenly menaced. The Anglo-American 
  stance turned from offensive to defensive for the rest of the year.
  It was also an extraordinary operation, unlike any other up until then: a 
  really large-sized raid featuring battalions of regular troops and artillery. A 
  fleet of at least 200 bateaux had carefully avoided detection and the arrival 
  of Montcalm’s army was a total surprise, the hallmark of North American 
  wilderness warfare. The siege part of the operation was, on the other hand, 
  very European, with trenches and batteries having artillery duels. Within 
  three days, Oswego fell. It could not have lasted much longer, even if Mercer 
  had lived. Combining Indian raid tactics with European organization had 
  been done since the 1680s in Canada, but the originality of the Oswego 
  operation was to mobilize a really large force including many metropolitan 
  soldiers, bringing a train of artillery and attacking a really large target. 
  Considering he had just landed in Canada, Montcalm conducted it brilliantly. 
  It was the first time it had been done, and both sides would retain the lesson.
  The Anglo-American forces huddled in Oswego were woefully ill-trained 
  to face past masters of raid warfare and even the French metropolitan 
  regulars. The morale of the British garrison, especially the 50th and 51st 
  regiments, was quite low according to most accounts. The infantrymen 
  nevertheless did what they could, and one notes that the New Jersey Regiment 
  seems to have been equal to or better than the British regulars of the 50th and 
  51st regiments. Lieutenant-Colonel Mercer was the heart of the defense, and 
  his loss immediately exposed the desire to surrender already held by most of 
  the garrison. From the defenders’ perspective, the Royal Artillery gunners 
  were clearly the most stubborn defenders of Oswego. It was said that the 
  senior-ranking artillerymen were very upset at the capitulation.
  General Montcalm revealed himself as a real leader amongst his soldiers, 
  since he was with them directing their efforts night and day, and they 
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  67
  Analysis  
  admired and respected him as a good soldier. He had a good tactical eye, 
  moved swiftly as seen in the investment of Oswego, and tried not to expose 
  his men needlessly. Unlike his opponents, he had been extensively involved 
  in earlier campaigns in Europe, and this experience was put to good use at 
  Oswego and elsewhere in the future. Montcalm is also remembered for his 
  vindictive character and his short temper, but he was also a charismatic 
  military leader of men, a quality given to only a few generals. He understood 
  the comradeship of army camps and its positive effect on morale. Compared 
  with the Anglo-Americans, the fighting spirit of his army was very good and 
  full of optimism. He kept his ability to sustain morale, the hallmark of any 
  great general, against all odds to his dying day three years later.  
  As to the immediate impact of the operation, Sir William Johnson wrote 
  that “Oswego in our hands fortified & secured by us, & our having a 
  navigation on Lake Ontario, was not only a curb to the power of the French 
  that way, but esteemed by the 6 Nations, whenever they joined our arms, as 
  a secure cover to them & their Habitations against the resentment of the 
  French,” and its loss removed a “barrier” for French and Indian raids deep 
  into the Mohawk River valley (DHSNY, II). It was thus a resounding success 
  for the French.
  Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, had 
  been appointed commander-in-chief of the British forces in America to 
  replace the fallen General Braddock. He landed at New York on July 23, 
  1756 and arrived on July 28 in Albany to assume command. Loudoun, a 
  professional soldier who had campaigned in Scotland between 1745 and 
  Plan of the forts of Oswego 
  showing the landing, the 
  camp, and the attacks of the 
  army commanded by the 
  Marquis of Montcalm, 
  August 1756. This plan 
  shows the French army’s 
  progress from its landing on 
  August 10 to after its capture 
  of Fort Ontario on August 
  12. The road through the 
  woods built by the French 
  troops is faintly indicated. 
  (Library and Archives 
  Canada, NMC12805)
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  68
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  1746 as adjutant-general, was not impressed with General Shirley’s military 
  efforts during his tenure as interim commander-in-chief, and relations 
  between the two men quickly deteriorated. Loudoun now learned that 
  Major-General James Abercromby, named second in command in North 
  America, had ordered Major-General Daniel Webb with a hundred men of 
  the 44th Regiment of Foot to reinforce Oswego with supplies following 
  Lieutenant-Colonel John Bradstreet’s report on the place. Both Abercromby 
  and Webb had arrived in New York only during June and were just taking 
  stock of the situation, which was less than enviable, owing in part to Shirley’s 
  ineptitude in dealing with the regular army’s administration, most notably 
  logistics. Webb was a 53-year-old experienced officer who had joined the 1st 
  Foot Guards in 1720, gone on to serve in the 8th Dragoons from 1732 to 
  1755, and was made major-general in North America the following year. He 
  had campaigned in Flanders during the 1740s, participating in such battles 
  as Dettingen and Fontenoy. Webb’s orders from Abercromby included the 
  building of a new, larger and more respectable fort at Oswego itself, as well 
  as another fort at Oswego Falls 12 miles (19.3km) up the river so that the 
  place would be covered in case of an attack from the south. He was also to 
  instill more discipline into the 50th and 51st regiments, have a large 
  brigantine built, and inspect the forts up the Mohawk River.
  This was easier said than done, especially as the British army had many 
  logistics problems, so that it took some time for Webb and his men to gather 
  enough supplies and leave Albany. On August 7, Webb’s party was still 
  seeking some provisions at Schenectady. On August 17, Webb and his men 
  reached German Flatts and there learned that Oswego had been attacked. 
  The next day, a soldier of the 50th arrived somewhat in shock from Oswego 
  with dreadful news: it had capitulated four days earlier. He had barely 
  escaped Indians, who killed anyone trying to escape. Oswego’s fall was 
  immediately relayed to Loudon in Albany, but it would take up to a week 
  for Webb to receive the commander-in-chief’s instructions on what to do 
  next. There was the possibility that the French would use the bateaux 
  captured at Oswego to ascend the waterways as far as Wood Creek at the 
  Oneida Carry.
  While this was not in Montcalm’s plans, it was perfectly reasonable for 
  the British to consider its possibility, as the French had earlier destroyed Fort 
  Bull and now held Oswego. Therefore, Webb found that his party going to 
  Oswego suddenly had become the first line of defense the Anglo-Americans 
  had between Montcalm’s troops and Albany. He therefore decided to 
  advance immediately as far as the Oneida Carry to reinforce the garrisons 
  of the small forts there, and arrived on August 20. The same day, Loudoun 
  learned of Oswego’s fall; he at once cancelled the planned Anglo-American 
  advance on Ticonderoga. Meanwhile, Webb found about 300 men detached 
  from the 50th and 51st with 150 men of the New Jersey Regiment at the 
  Oneida Carry under the command of Major Charles Craven, 51st Foot. 
  They garrisoned Fort Williams, a new Fort Wood Creek near where Fort Bull 
  had been, as well as the new Fort Newport, and were also finishing Fort 
  Craven. Webb had a fortified camp built to lodge his men near Fort Williams, 
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  69
  Analysis  
  and now proceeded to have logs put on the portage trail to slow down any 
  French and Indian raiders. Webb had about 400 regulars to face what 
  appeared to be a much larger force. The bateauxmen, the men of the New 
  Jersey Regiment, some 250 militiamen that Sir William Johnson had 
  promised him if needed, and parties of allied Oneida warriors might double 
  this number, but it was a rather sketchy and probably unreliable force with 
  which to face Montcalm’s numerous victorious troops, especially as many 
  of them were regarded as past masters in wilderness warfare. Webb therefore 
  made a questionable, but quite logical decision, to abandon the Oneida 
  Carry and destroy its forts. On August 31, the retreat was ordered by Webb, 
  the forts were destroyed, and the area evacuated the next day, a decision that 
  has since been sometimes vehemently condemned by American historians.
  But what was Webb to do? To move towards Oswego was suicidal, 
  especially since there was no reliable information except accounts from 
  terrified men whose wild tales nevertheless had to be considered. To remain 
  at the Oneida Carry was an option, but what if it were attacked, even by just 
  a portion of Montcalm’s men? Considering that only about 250 French and 
  Canadians had laid waste to Fort Bull in April, what could, say, a thousand 
  such men do if they attacked this isolated area? With the fall of Oswego, the 
  Oneida Carry had become irrelevant until a strong British and American 
  force could move again towards Oswego. Thus Webb, who had no way of 
  knowing what Montcalm would do, decided to withdraw his troops closer 
  to Albany. His decision was not condoned by Loudoun, who, at the end of 
  Detail of the French plan of 
  the forts of Oswego, July 
  1756. The location numbers 
  are: 1: Fort Oswego; 2: Fort 
  Ontario; 3: Fort George; 4: 
  Lake Ontario; 5: Oswego 
  River; 6: road of the Five 
  Nations; 7: harbor for large 
  boats; 8: canoe or small 
  boat landings; 9: parallel 
  trench started on the night of 
  August 12–13; 10: battery of 
  six cannons started on 
  August 13; 11: battery of 
  nine cannons constructed 
  during the night of August 
  13–14; 12: mortar and 
  howitzer battery started on 
  August 14. (Private 
  collection. Author’s photo)
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  70
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  August, had ordered 250 men of the 42nd Highland Regiment with 50 men 
  of Roger’s Rangers to join him, but neither did the commander-in-chief 
  appear to be especially upset at the abandonment of the Oneida Carry. Later 
  in September, American rangers went and stayed there as a forward scouting 
  force that could warn of any French and Indian advance. What they 
  intercepted instead were six British deserters, two of whom were later hanged.
  By early October, the season for major military operations was ending, 
  and British apprehensions about a French move towards Albany had all but 
  vanished. Loudoun reported to the Duke of Cumberland, commander-in-chief 
  of the British army, that on “the Mohawk River, I have left some small posts; 
  and am fortifying Herkemer’s House, in place of building a fort” that 
  nevertheless was known as Fort Herkimer (MA). In effect, the British and 
  American first line of defense was now at German Flatts. On the whole, 
  1756 had been a bad year for the British forces, whose invasion plans had 
  been halted to a standstill on every front while the army at Oswego had been 
  destroyed and the Anglo-Americans expulsed from their sole presence on 
  Lake Ontario.
  There was much rejoicing in Canada, including songs composed such as 
  “J’irons à Chouagen” (I am going to Oswego) that expressed good humor. 
  However, no one felt wildly optimistic, because it was well known that the 
  Anglo-American colonies were far more populous than New France and 
  thus had greater resources. To keep them on the defensive was the key, 
  although how it was to be done would cause feuds between Vaudreuil and 
  Montcalm. However, they both glanced with optimism at raiding the British 
  and Americans again at a place such as Fort William-Henry, their assembly 
  point south of Lake George. 
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  71
  AFTERMATH
  Following the fall of Oswego, its garrison was conveyed under protection 
  from the Indians to Quebec City and sent on to Europe to be exchanged for 
  an equal number of French prisoners of war. The 50th and 51st had been 
  thus almost annihilated and were ordered to be disbanded from December 
  1756. Lord Loudon was ordered to incorporate their detachments remaining 
  in North America into other infantry regiments. Lieutenant-Colonel 
  Littlehales was put on half-pay when the 50th was disbanded, and went to 
  England where he died in October 1761. In the case of the New Jersey 
  Regiment, the province of New Jersey raised it again.
  In the following months and years, since the forts at Oswego were 
  destroyed by Montcalm’s army, the British and Americans could anticipate 
  that the French and Indians might come back and even attempt a foray 
  towards Albany. Raids on communities closer to Albany were possible, but 
  do not seem to have been seriously considered. Thus, in the case of the 
  Mohawk River, the best solution until a sizable Anglo-American force could 
  reoccupy Oswego was to build forts to halt or delay a hostile force. However, 
  this was not immediately done. Much of the area was barren of any British 
  or American control, and small groups of French-allied warriors occasionally 
  harassed the outskirts of American communities.
  In the event, the war was mainly fought elsewhere during 1757. 
  Montcalm struck again, this time at Fort William-Henry, ruining invasion 
  plans again. A French naval squadron had also prevented an assault on 
  Louisbourg, and nothing had occurred to dislodge the French and Indians 
  in the Ohio. Lord Loudoun, who had a fine strategic eye, had prepared a 
  master plan for the invasion of French Canada, but was recalled to England, 
  while the new prime minister, William Pitt, transferred the main thrust of 
  Britain’s war effort to North America. Major-General Webb was recalled to 
  be quartermaster-general of the British army deployed in Germany in 1758, 
  while Lord Loudoun went on to command the British army that largely 
  chased the Spanish out of Portugal in 1762. All of this suggests that the 
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  72
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  British government was not overly dissatisfied by 
  their performance in North America.  
  Nevertheless, the British and Americans had a 
  rude surprise in November 1757 when a large French 
  and Indian force struck at German Flatts. Fort 
  Herkimer (spelt in various ways including Fort 
  Kouari by the French) was on the south shore of the 
  Mohawk River, while the village of German Flatts 
  was on the opposite side and had about 60 houses 
  guarded by five small forts. When Captain François 
  Picoté de Bellestre, leading a war party of about 300 
  men consisting mostly of allied warriors, arrived in 
  the area, he chose to ignore Fort Herkimer and 
  attack the village in a lightning early-morning raid. 
  The five little forts surrendered after some fighting in 
  which about 40 militiamen and inhabitants were 
  killed, often scalped, the place looted and burned to 
  the ground. The warriors carried off everything they 
  could, including “nearly 150 men, women and 
  children, among whom is the Mayor of the Village, 
  the Surgeon and some militia officers” (DRCHSNY, 
  X), while the French and Indians had no fatalities. 
  Montcalm noted with sadness in his journal that 
  “nothing had escaped the furor” of the warriors on these “German families 
  that seemed to have wished a sort of neutrality.” In the event, Fort Herkimer 
  and its garrison – said to have been up to 350 men – had proven useless 
  against a major raiding force.
  To prevent such raids, Fort Stanwix, a major work, was built at the 
  Mohawk River end of the Oneida Carry. It would serve not only as the 
  sentinel guarding the way to Albany, but also as the staging area for British 
  and American troops to advance towards Lake Ontario. Although Montcalm 
  triumphed again, repulsing the greatly superior Anglo-American army at 
  Ticonderoga in July 1758, France was hardly sending any ships or troops to 
  New France, while tens of thousands of British regular soldiers arrived in 
  the American colonies as well as strong squadrons of the Royal Navy. The 
  Americans had also raised many provincial troops and put their militias on 
  a warlike footing, so that the pressure on the French forces in North America 
  became overwhelming. Thus Louisbourg and the Ohio fell that year. More 
  interesting for the Oswego area was a daring raid by Lieutenant-Colonel 
  Bradstreet, leading 3,000 men, who briefly occupied and ravaged Fort 
  Frontenac in August 1758. The Anglo-Americans were back in Lake Ontario. 
  In May 1759, the British and American forces under Brigadier-General 
  John Prideaux were moving to Lake Ontario by the Mohawk–Oneida 
  waterways, building forts such as that at Brewerton along the way. They 
  arrived at Oswego meeting no opposition, left 1,200 men there, and went 
  on to take Fort Niagara on July 26. The men at Oswego proceeded to build 
  a large new Fort Ontario with five bastions on the site of that destroyed in 
  Charles de Plantivit de La 
  Pause (1721–1804) came to 
  Canada in 1755 with the 
  Languedoc Regiment, in 
  which he served many years 
  as an officer. Especially 
  appreciated for his staff 
  work, he was often 
  employed as chief of staff to 
  generals Montcalm and 
  Lévis, and this was the case 
  for the Oswego expedition. 
  Back in France in 1760, he 
  was awarded the St Louis 
  cross, promoted onto the 
  staff, and eventually rose to 
  the rank of major-general. 
  (Portrait of c.1780 in a 
  private collection. Photo by 
  Louis Merllié)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  73
  Aftermath
  1756. The new fort could mount up to 46 guns and had a ditch. Lacorne de 
  Saint-Luc and Father Piquet led a French and Indian raiding party from La 
  Présentation to Oswego’s outskirts in early July, but found the place too 
  strong and withdrew after several attacks. In September, Quebec City 
  capitulated shortly after Montcalm and his opponent, James Wolfe, fell at 
  the battle of the Plains of Abraham. The following year, three Anglo-American 
  armies converged on Montreal. One of these gathered some 10,000 men 
  under Lieutenant-General Sir Jeffery Amherst at Oswego in July before 
  moving on to Montreal, which surrendered on September 8, 1760, ending 
  the war in North America.  
  The sites today
  Of the three forts at Oswego, the oldest, Fort Oswego, built from 1727, was 
  destroyed by Montcalm’s army 29 years later. After the destruction of Fort 
  Oswego, its site was used for shore batteries at the time of the American War 
  of Independence and the War of 1812. The batteries were thereafter abandoned 
  and the area had been totally built over with commercial and industrial 
  businesses by the 1850s. The fort’s site is said to have been at West First Street 
  and Lake Street. It must be borne in mind that the waterfront and its immediate 
  area has been thoroughly defaced, dug up, and filled in by industrial plants for 
  over a century and a half. The small redoubt farther west called Fort George, 
  built in 1755, was also destroyed a year later, and is said to have been on the 
  site of the present Montcalm Park in a residential area farther west.
  The present Fort Ontario State Historic Site is the visible evocation of 
  Oswego’s military importance during the 18th and part of the 19th centuries. 
  Rebuilt from 1759, it remained a British outpost until 1796 when its garrison 
  Fort Ontario at Oswego, 
  1756. Detail from the plan 
  of Oswego by Royal 
  Engineer Patrick Mackellar. 
  “K: Parallel begun by the 
  French in the Evening [of 
  August 13]. L: [French] 
  Batterys against Fort 
  Ontario. M: Approaches 
  made the 13th in the Night. 
  N: Battery en Barbette made 
  the 13th at Night.” In this 
  last, 14 cannons and a 
  mortar are shown. (Print 
  after original plan. Private 
  collection. Author’s photo)
  1758
  A new fort, Fort 
  Stanwix, is built at 
  Oswego
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  74
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  of redcoats finally evacuated Oswego following Jay’s Treaty, which settled 
  outstanding issues regarding the frontier borders of the new American 
  republic. The site remained abandoned after its destruction by the British 
  and Canadian forces in 1814, but it was rebuilt as an artillery redoubt in 
  1839 because of rising diplomatic tensions between Great Britain and the 
  United States. Detachments of the regular army 
  henceforth stood on guard. Tensions between the 
  United States and Great Britain reached a height 
  during the American Civil War and, in 1863, the fort 
  was considerably strengthened and its curtain walls 
  faced with masonry. It eventually was the home base 
  of the 2nd Brigade of the US Army’s 1st Infantry 
  Division until June 1940, when the fort was 
  deactivated. It was transformed into a camp for 
  nearly a thousand German Jewish refugees during 
  World War II. After the war, the fort became a 
  historic site administered by New York State. It is 
  open to visitors in the summer, seemingly thanks in 
  good part to dedicated volunteers, and is certainly 
  the highlight of any visit to Oswego, which has 
  otherwise little to offer because its waterfront at the 
  Fort Oswego, 1756. Detail 
  from the plan of Oswego by 
  Royal Engineer Patrick 
  Mackellar. “A: Block House. 
  B: Traders’ Houses. D: Bake 
  House. H: Carpenters 
  Houses. I: Smith’s Shop. G: 
  Batterys of Pork Casks made 
  the 13th [August] in the 
  Evening. P: Dock.” The 
  hospital and “Bolting 
  House” (“D,” not shown) are 
  farther below the traders’ 
  houses. (Print after original 
  plan. Private collection. 
  Author’s photo)
  Fort George at Oswego, 
  1756. Detail from the plan 
  of Oswego by Royal 
  Engineer Patrick Mackellar. 
  “E: Ditch within... F: 
  Retrenchment of Do [ditto] 
  Fort laid out on the 14th 
  [August] in the Morning.” 
  (Print after original plan. 
  Private collection. Author’s 
  photo)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  75
  Aftermath
  river’s entrance has been largely overrun by industries and plants. Fort 
  Ontario and its grounds form the only haven containing a remarkable 
  historical landmark in a setting of natural beauty in that city.
  As seen above, Fort Bull blew up in 1756 and its exact location, in a 
  wooded, wilderness area, remains something of a mystery. The remnants of 
  Fort Wood Creek nearby consist of an outline of its earthworks, which are 
  in constant danger of erosion and wildlife overgrowth. At one time, these 
  remains were thought to be those of Fort Bull, and a plaque set on a rock 
  and dedicated to Fort Bull was installed there. The flowing waters of Wood 
  Creek just south have been reduced to a trickle because its waters were 
  incorporated into the Erie Canal built from 1817. Indeed, the site of Fort 
  Wood Creek is just south of Erie Canal Village, a historic site off NY State 
  road 46/49 west of Rome, NY. Those wishing for information on many 
  aspects of the Oneida Carry area will want to examine the fine exhibits in 
  the interpretation center of Fort Stanwix National Monument, administered 
  by the US National Park Service. A visit to the reconstructed fort (from the 
  1970s) that recreates the Fort Stanwix built from 1758 using the surviving 
  original plans is a superbly pleasant way to see what a sizable 18th-century 
  frontier fort was really like. The structure in Oswego’s Fort Ontario would 
  have been largely similar. Fort Stanwix National Monument is situated in 
  the center of Rome, NY, and there is no charge to visit this fine site.  
  Fort Stanwix under 
  construction, 1758. Nearly 
  two years after Montcalm’s 
  raid on Oswego, there were 
  fears of a substantial French 
  and Indian attack on the 
  Albany area, especially 
  following the destruction of 
  German Flatts in November 
  1757. This sizable fort was 
  meant to halt and repulse 
  any large raiding force from 
  going farther east. (Fort 
  Stanwix National 
  Monument, National Park 
  Service, Rome, NY. Author’s 
  photo)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  76
  FURTHER READING 
  AND SELECT 
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
  As previously noted, this massive 1756 raid on Oswego does not appear to 
  have been the topic of a major study on its own, although it is always 
  mentioned in every book dealing with the Seven Years War in Canada. Yet 
  it was General Montcalm’s first action on America’s soil and it was brilliantly 
  led as well as tactically innovative. But, in a sense, Oswego was overshadowed 
  by his future victories and tragic death. His account of the battle at Oswego 
  as contained in his journal is the most important French source, closely 
  followed by the engineer Desandrouin and the chief of staff La Pause. The 
  British engineer Mackellar’s account (published in Pargellis) is possibly the 
  best English source. Various other accounts, the American ones being often 
  much exaggerated and erroneous, are in O’Callaghan’s documentary 
  histories. The selected list of published works below gives some of the main 
  titles used in this book. 
  Primary source official documents can be found in the National Archives 
  (formerly the Public Records Office) at Kew, United Kingdom, especially in 
  the War Office 1, 34 and 71 series and Colonial Office 5. France’s Archives 
  Nationales center for overseas documents is at Aix-en-Provence, and its 
  Colonies section has primary source documents mostly in the B, C11A and 
  C11B series, although some pertinent data can also be found in other 
  sections and series such as the Dépot des Fortifications des Colonies for 
  maps and plans. The Service Historique des Armées at Vincennes near Paris 
  preserves the Archives de la Guerre whose A1 series, amongst others, has 
  many documents concerning the operations in Canada. Copies of nearly all 
  documents are held by Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa and many 
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  77
  Further Reading and Select Bibliography
  are now available online. These archives also hold vital original documents 
  and journals. Some have been translated into English and published, notably 
  by E. B. O’Callaghan. The Archives Nationales du Québec à Québec was, 
  from the 1920s until the 1960s, admirable in publishing a vast amount of 
  its documents in its yearly Rapport de l’Archiviste de la Province de Québec.
  Published works
  Anderson, Fred. The Crucible of War, Vintage Books, New York (2000). 
  Remarkable for its account of Indian diplomacy
  Back, Francis, ‘S’habiller à la canadienne’, Cap-aux-Diamants, No. 24, 
  Hiver (1991). The classic study on the subject of traditional winter dress 
  in French Canada
  Bougainville, Louis Antoine de. Adventure in the Wilderness: The 
  American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville 1756–1760. 
  Translated and edited by Edward P. Hamilton. Norman: University of 
  Oklahoma Press (1964)
  Chartrand, René. ‘Montcalm’s Irish Soldiers 1756–1757’, The Irish Sword, 
  Vol. XXV, No. 102 (2008)
  Documentary History of the State of New York. Edited by E. B. 
  O’Callaghan, Albany (1842), Vol. I.; (1849), Vol. II
  Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York. 
  Edited by E. B. O’Callaghan, Albany (1858), vols. V and X
  Six decades later, Fort 
  Oswego was once again the 
  target of a raid – but this 
  time by British and 
  Canadian forces against 
  those of the independent 
  United States, on May 6, 
  1814. (Print after a drawing 
  by Captain Steele. Anne S. 
  K. Brown Military 
  Collection, Brown 
  University Library, 
  Providence, USA. Author’s 
  photo)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  78
  Montcalm’s Crushing Blow 
  Doreil, André. “Lettres de Doreil,” Rapport de l’Archiviste de la Province 
  de Québec, 1944–1945 
  Foote, William Alfred. The American Units of the British Regular Army 
  1664–1775. M. A. thesis. Texas Western College (1959)
  Gabriel, C. N. Le maréchal de camp Desandrouin 1729–1792. Verdun 
  (1897).
  Gale, Ryan R. ‘A Soldier-Like Way’: The Material Culture of the British 
  Infantry 1761–1768. Elk River, MN: Track of the Wolf (2007)
  Hagerty, Gilbert. Massacre at Fort Bull. Providence: Mowbray (1971). A 
  regrettable title for a quite good study
  Houlding, John A. Fit for Service: The Training of the British Army, 
  1715–1795. Oxford, Clarendon (1981). The unsurpassed and classic 
  study
  La Guerre de Sept Ans en Nouvelle-France. Edited by Laurent Veyssière 
  and Bertrand Fonck. Québec and Paris: Septentrion and PUPS (2011)
  La Pause, Jean-Guillaume-Charles de Plantivit de Margon, chevalier de. 
  “Mémoire et observations,” Rapport de l’Archiviste de la Province de 
  Québec, 1931–1932 and 1932–1933 
  Léry, Gaspard-Joseph, Chaussegros de. “Journal de la Campagne d’Hiver, 
  du 13 février au neuf avril 1756” and “Journal du Siège du Fort de 
  Chouéguen… pris par les Français le 14 août 1756,” Rapport de 
  l’Archiviste de la Province de Québec, 1926–1927 
  MacLeod, Peter D. “The Canadians against the French: The Struggle for 
  Control of the Expedition to Oswego in 1756,” Ontario History, Vol. 
  LXXX, No. 2 (June 1988)
  Military Affairs in North America 1748–1765. Edited by Stanley Pargellis. 
  New York: American Historical Association (1936). These “selected 
  documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle” form, with 
  O’Callaghan, the most important published British accounts on Oswego, 
  and include Mackellar’s reports.
  Montcalm, Louis-Joseph Gozon, Marquis de. Journal du Marquis de 
  Montcalm durant ses campagnes au Canada de 1756 à 1759. Edited by 
  H.-R. Casgrain. Québec (1895). The original is part of the Lévis papers 
  (Northcliffe Collection) preserved at Library and Archives Canada.
  Nérich, Laurent. La petite guerre et la chute de la Nouvelle-France. 
  Outremont, QC: Athéna (2009)
  Nicolai, Martin L. “A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and 
  the Canadian Irregular Soldier during the Seven Years War,” Canadian 
  Historical Review, LXX, No. 1 (1989)
  Pargellis, Stanley. Lord Loudoun in North America. New Haven: Yale 
  University (1933)
  Pouchot, Pierre. Memoirs of the Late War in North America Between 
  France and Britain. Translated by Michael Cary, annotated and edited by 
  Brian L. Dunnigan. Old Fort Niagara Association, Youngstown, NY 
  (1994)
  Parkman, Francis. Montcalm and Wolfe. Toronto (1899), vol. II
  Parsons, Usher. The Life of Sir William Pepperrell, Bart. Boston (1855).
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  79
  Further Reading and Select Bibliography
  Prévôt de Montaubert de Merleval, Louis-Auguste-Alexandre. “Campagne 
  du régiment de La Sarre au Canada.” Edited by Pierre Héliot. Revue 
  d’histoire de l’Amérique française, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1950)
  Reed, George A. Fort Ontario 250 Years of History 1755–2005. 
  Westminster, MD: Heritage Books (2005)
  Shirley, William. The Correspondence of William Shirley. New York 
  (1912), 2 volumes
  Steele, Ian K. Guerrillas and Grenadiers, Toronto, Ryerson (1971)
  Williamson, Peter. French and Indian Cruelty Exemplified in the Life and 
  Various Vicissitudes and Fortunes of Peter Williamson. Glasgow (1758)
  View of Oswego, 1855. The 
  town enjoyed rapid 
  development and expansion 
  after the War of 1812. The 
  site of old Fort Oswego (at 
  right) was built over. For 
  protection, however, Fort 
  Ontario (at left) was rebuilt 
  with earth and timber and 
  armed with large coastal 
  guns from 1839. (Collection 
  and photo: Library of 
  Congress, Washington) 
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  80
  INDEX
  References to illustrations and plates 
  are shown in bold. Captions to plates 
  are shown in brackets.
  Acadian raiders in Nova Scotia  17
  American branding of raids as a 
  “massacres”  39, 63
  Anglo-American fleet  43
  Argenson, Marquis d’  41, 42
  arrival of French reinforcements  13–14
  Bartram, John  9
  bateau  11
  battle of Ticonderoga, the  72
  battle of Lake George, the  14–16, 15
  battle of the plain of Abraham, the  73
  Bigot, Sieur François  47
  Bougainville, Capt. Louis-Antoine de  
  42, 59, 63, 63
  Bourlamarque, Col. François-Charles  
  42, 53, 63, 64, 65
  Braddock, General Edward  12, 43
  Bradstreet, Lt-Col. John  40, 72
  British actions after the fall of Oswego  
  68–73
  British forts around Lake Ontario  18
  British military strength  49, 70, 72
  British morale at Oswego  47–49, 54, 
  58, 66
  British naval superiority  40
  British strategy in Oswego  17
  after the raid  71–72, 75
  Canonniers-Bombardiers  58, 59, 62
  capture of French forts in Nova Scotia  
  17
  carriages of British cannons  61, 62
  casualties  63–64
  construction defects in British forts  
  18–19
  defeat of Braddock’s army at 
  Monongahela  12, 14, 17, 43
  deportation of Acadians from Nova 
  Scotia  17
  Dieskau, Baron de  14, 15, 16, 43
  Doreil, Commissary-General André  43
  Eastern woodland Indians  13
  feasibility of a raid  4–5
  fort-building around Lake Ontario  
  6–8, 7, 8, 9
  Fort Bull  30–31, 31, 32–39, 35–37, 
  38, 75
  Fort Frontenac  7, 9, 10, 11, 47, 72
  Fort George  18, 19, 73, 74
  Fort Herkimer  70, 72
  Fort La Présentation  11, 26, 26–27
  Fort Ontario  18, 19, 64, 72–74, 73, 75
  siege of  52, 52–55, 53, 55
  Fort Oswego (British redoubt)  7, 7–8, 
  8, 9, 9, 18–19, 73, 74, 77
  State Historic Site  73–75
  Fort Saint-Frédéric (Crown Point)  
  10–11, 14
  Fort Stanwix  72, 75, 75
  Fort Wood Creek  40, 75
  French fleet  42, 42
  French forces sent by King Louis XV  42
  French forts around Lake Ontario  7, 9, 
  10–11
  French-Indian attack at German Flatts  
  72, 75
  French-Indian attack on Fort Bull  
  32–38, 35–37, 38, 39
  retreat from  38–40
  French-Indian military strength  27–28, 
  53
  French interest in American trade with 
  the Iroquois  6–7
  French military plans  24–28, 26
  French plan of the Oswego forts  69
  French reconnaissance of British forts  
  7–9, 8, 18, 25, 31, 45, 50, 51
  French strategy  12–13, 16–17, 44–45
  French trek through wilderness from 
  La Présentation  27–32, 32
  Grenadier of the La Sarre Regiment  46
  implications of the loss of Oswego  66–
  67, 68, 69–70
  Indians as French allies  13, 15, 26–27, 
  30, 31, 40, 45, 51, 52, 63, 71
  at Fort Bull attack  32, 33, 35, 38, 39
  at Oswego raid  52, 53, 54, 59
  Irish deserters to the French  47
  Iroquois Confederacy, the  6–7, 10, 26, 
  27, 30, 31, 39
  Jay’s Treaty  74
  Johnson, Sir William  14, 15, 16, 39, 
  67, 69
  La Pause, Charles de Plantivit de  35, 
  64, 65, 72
  Léry, Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de 
  (engineer)  8, 8–9, 10
  Léry, Lt. Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros 
  de  24, 25, 25–26, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 
  33, 34, 35, 38, 39–40, 53
  Littlehales, Lt-Col. John  23, 53, 62–63, 
  71
  logistical problems in the British Army  
  68
  logistics of carrying out a raid on 
  Oswego  45–47, 50
  looting for booty  64–65
  loss of chief French engineer 
  Descombles  51–52
  Loudon, Lord  67–68, 69–70, 71
  Mackellar, Patrick  18–19, 40, 58–59, 
  63, 76
  medical services in the French army  43
  Mercer, Lt-Col. James Francis  22–23, 
  47, 47, 52, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60–62, 
  62, 66
  Mohawk River journey from Albany to 
  Oswego  11
  Montcalm, Major-General Louis-
  Joseph, Marquis de  5, 39, 41–43, 
  44, 45, 47, 48, 66–67, 71, 72
  raid on Oswego  50, 54, 59, 63, 65
  Montigny, Lt. Jean-Baptiste-Philippe 
  Testard de  33
  New Jersey Regiment, the  19–20, 20, 
  21, 66, 68, 69
  Oneida Carry, the  7, 11, 25, 30, 39, 
  40, 68, 69–70, 75
  Oneidas, the  30, 31
  “Pentagon Fort” (Fort Rickey)  39
  Pepperell, Sir William  22, 23
  pipe-tomahawk  12
  Piquet, Father François  26, 73
  Prideaux, Brig-Gen. John  72
  prisoners of war  49
  quality of muskets  20, 22, 28
  raid on Oswego  55–63, 56–57, 60–62, 
  67
  Anglo-American surrender  63–65, 64
  siege of Fort Ontario  52, 52–55, 53, 
  55, 66
  raiding tactics  13, 40, 43
  recruitment for British regiments  19
  reinforcement of Oneida Carry 
  garrisons  68
  relations between Montcalm and 
  Vaudreuil  44–45
  relief party sent from Fort Williams  
  35–38
  remains of the forts today  74–75
  route to Oswego taken by Montcalm  
  48
  Royal Artillery gunner  19
  Saxe, Marshal Maurice de  14
  Schuyler, Colonel Peter  20, 49, 63
  securing of the Oneida Carry area  39, 
  40
  security of Nova Scotia  17
  Seven Years War, the  12
  Shirley, Maj-Gen. William  4, 16, 17, 
  18, 19, 22, 39, 68
  south view of Oswego  18
  superior strength of Anglo-American 
  forces  70, 72
  supply route from Albany to Oswego  
  4, 11, 25, 40, 68
  surrender of the Anglo-Americans  63–
  65, 64
  Tarvisn, Chief  30–31
  tensions between Great Britain and the 
  United States  74
  town of Oswego, the  9, 9
  trade in the region  6–7, 9–10
  treatment of Anglo-American prisoners  
  64, 65
  troupes de terre (French battalions)  
  13–14, 25–26, 44
  uniforms and equipment  19, 20, 21, 
  22, 28, 29, 44, 45, 46, 59
  use of European style warfare  13, 15, 
  16, 24–25, 43, 66
  Vaudreuil, Governor General, Marquis 
  de  4, 12, 14, 16–17, 24, 25, 39–40, 
  44, 45, 47, 49, 59, 65
  Webb, Maj-Gen. Daniel  68–69, 71
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  First published in Great Britain in 2014 by Osprey Publishing, 
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  © 2014 Osprey Publishing Ltd.
   
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  Index by Fionbar Lyons
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  3D BEVs by Alan Gilliland
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  AUTHOR’S ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
  I would like to thank Francis Back of Montreal, André Gousse of Gatineau 
  (Québec), Kevin Gladysz of St-Sévère (Québec), John Houlding in Bavaria, 
  Eric Manders of North Syracuse (NY), Mrs Kelly Roman and her colleagues 
  at Fort Stanwix National Monument in Rome (NY), the Archives Nationales 
  in France, Peter Harrington at the Brown University Library in Providence, 
  the National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew, the National Historic 
  Sites of Parks Canada in Ottawa, Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa 
  and the Library of Congress in Washington, DC. And last but not least, 
  editors Nick Reynolds, Tom Milner and their colleagues who turned my 
  messy digital files into this attractive book.
  MEASURES
  Please note that the French foot is not the same length as the English foot. 
  The French 12 inches is longer and is equivalent to 12.789 inch, English 
  measure. The official French measures from 1668 to 1840 were: 
  2 miles make 1 lieue = 3.898km
  1,000 toises make 1 mile = 1.949km (English = 1.61km)
  3 toise make 1 perche = 5.847m
  6 feet make 1 toise = 1.949m (English fathom = 1.83m)
  12 inches make 1 foot = 32,484cm (English = 30.48cm)
  12 lines make 1 inch = 2.707cm (English = 2.54cm)
  12 points make the line = 2.256mm
  1 point = 0.188mm
  Source: Lester A. Rose, Archeological Metrology: English, French, American 
  and Canadian Systems of Weights and Measures for North American Historical 
  Archeology, Parks Canada, Ottawa, (1983), p. 77.
  ABBREVIATIONS
  In this text, the following abbreviations refer to the source of the 
  document quoted:
  AG: Archives de la Guerre, Service Historique des Armées, Vincennes
  CO: Colonial Office, The National Archives, Kew
  DHSNY: The Documentary History of the State of New York 
  DRCHSNY: Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York 
  MA: Military Affairs in North America 1748–1765 
  RAPQ: Rapport de l’Archiviste de la Province de Québec 
  WO: War Office, The National Archives, Kew
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Osprey System/Osprey - RAID 046 - French and Indian Raids along New Yorks Oswego River 1756.pdf