TEXT: © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  US Marine 
  NVA Soldier
  David R. Higgins
  Vietnam 1967–68 
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  INTRODUCTION 
  4
  THE OPPOSING SIDES 
  10
  Combat doctrine and role • Recruitment, training, and logistics 
  Leadership and morale • Weapons and tactics
  THE HILL FIGHTS 
  28
  April 23–30, 1967
  OPERATION KINGFISHER 
  44 
  July 28–29, 1967
  HUẾ, NEW CITY 
  56
  January 31–February 7, 1968
  ANALYSIS 
  72
  Lessons learned: USMC • Lessons learned: NVA
  AFTERMATH 
  76
  UNIT ORGANIZATIONS 
  78
  BIBLIOGRAPHY 
  79
  INDEX 
  80
   
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  4
  Since the 18th century the United States Marine Corps (USMC) has served as 
  a powerful rapid-response vanguard in every major American conflict, from 
  Guadalcanal during World War II to Inchon in the Korean War. Tasked with 
  participating in America’s “Advisory and Combat Assistance Era” in the decade 
  after 1954, on March 8, 1965, the “Ambassadors in Green” would once again 
  be thrust into their primary role as a combat spearhead. Without a clear 
  Congressional mandate – or widespread public debate and support, which 
  could have helped clarify US goals, benchmarks, and an exit strategy – Battalion 
  Landing Team, 3/9 Marines landed at coastal Đà Nẵng, South Vietnam, and 
  heralded the US ground commitment in the ongoing Vietnamese conflict.
  The Marines would face the battle-hardened regular forces of North 
  Vietnam, which traced their origins from a small Armed Propaganda Team, 
  established in December 1944. Alongside Việt Minh militias, it was initially 
  tasked with fighting and expelling Vietnam’s Japanese occupiers, and 
  promoting the North Vietnamese Communist Party’s revolutionary ideology. 
  After Japan’s defeat, efforts were made to increase the force’s size, strength, and 
  capabilities, and in 1950 its name was changed to the People’s Army of 
  Vietnam, AKA the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). Eight years later, Hanoi 
  began sending cadres south to support operations conducted by the National 
  Liberation Front (AKA Việt Cộng or VC to the Americans and South 
  Vietnamese), as they moved from a political to an armed struggle. As the 
  fighting escalated, larger NVA forces in up to divisional strength would be 
  sent south as well.
  Like so many post-1945 conflicts, the long war for control of Vietnam, 
  formerly French Indochina, had its roots in World War II. At 1945’s Potsdam 
  Conference, Vietnam was temporarily bisected administratively along the 
  17th Parallel. Having enjoyed considerable US support during their fight 
  against Japanese occupation forces, in the weeks leading up to Japan’s 
  surrender Communist Việt Minh guerrillas led by Hồ Chí Minh (1890–
  Introduction
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  5
  1969) quickly moved to consolidate power in Vietnam before the French 
  could reclaim their lost position. When Japan officially capitulated on 
  September 2, 1945, Hồ, having distanced himself from the Soviet Union, 
  declared a new Provisional Government from Hanoi. Although US intelligence 
  tended at this stage to portray Hồ as a neutral, America’s political leaders were 
  unwilling officially to risk alienating its Western European French ally. As a 
  result, French forces returned to southern Vietnam, with its predominantly 
  Cochin Chinese population, while Nationalist Chinese forces sought to 
  control the Tonkinese north.
  Hoping to avoid fighting both entities simultaneously, in an effort to unify 
  Vietnam, Hồ attempted first to deal with his nation’s historic enemy, China. 
  France initially expressed willingness to compromise, but French elections in 
  1946 ushered in a foreign-policy change that stifled the effort. On December 
  23, 1946, Việt Minh forces embarked on the First Indochina War (1946–54) 
  A North Vietnamese soldier 
  wearing a khaki cotton 
  uniform and an olive-drab 
  cloth-covered sun helmet – 
  one of the few military items 
  North Vietnam produced 
  during the conflict. As a 
  symbol of Communism, the 
  emblem comprises a gold, 
  five-pointed star set in 
  blood-red enamel and 
  surrounded by two rice 
  stalks and an industrial 
  gear. One North 
  Vietnamese veteran 
  recalled: “Generally 
  speaking, the cadres in my 
  battalion were friendly. They 
  always treated other men in 
  the unit kindly and cordially. 
  They had the troops realize 
  their errors and corrected 
  the errors for them. In the 
  unit, if one man does not 
  know something he will be 
  helped by the others. The 
  cadres would criticize the 
  troops and the latter could 
  do likewise. We understood 
  that we had the mission to 
  fight for the nation and the 
  people, so the first thing we 
  had to do was to unite, 
  understand, and coordinate 
  with each other. Most of the 
  cadres in the unit were 
  serious and friendly. Being 
  commanders of the troops 
  and the people, we had to 
  act in such a way as to gain 
  the confidence of every 
  person. If the troops trusted 
  the cadres they would fight 
  zealously, and if the people 
  loved the cadres and the 
  troops they would provide 
  help to us and we could 
  record victories” (First 
  Lieutenant Hà Tâm, 
  14 (NVA) Battalion). (Photo 
  by Paul Popper/Popperfoto/
  Getty Images)
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  6
  by launching a surprise attack to wrest Hanoi from French control, as part of 
  a low-level insurgency orchestrated by Võ Nguyên Giáp (1911–2013). 
  Concerned that he might appear soft on combating Communism, US 
  President Harry S. Truman (in office 1945–53) presented “President Hồ” as 
  a Soviet tool, and someone to be stopped, along with the spread of his ideology 
  and increasingly supported South Vietnam’s zealous anti-Communist 
  President Ngô Đình Diệm (1901–63) and his corrupt government. After 
  conducting a lengthy campaign that steadily eroded French morale, in May 
  1954, Việt Minh forces crushed the besieged French Army at Điện Biên Phủ, 
  and left the region a geographic patchwork disputed by both sides.
  With a Second Indochina War – that would be known as the Vietnam War 
  in the West, and the American War in Vietnam – brewing by the late 1950s, 
  in 1962 American military advisors began arriving in-country to assist Diệm. 
  Instead of an entirely covert approach to solving the Vietnam crisis, US 
  President John F. Kennedy (in office 1961–63) looked to retain the CIA’s 
  paramilitary services, but in coordination with overt, conventional forces to 
  conduct a counterinsurgency. After the ascent of Lyndon B. Johnson (in office 
  1963–69) to the position, the deteriorating situation in South Vietnam 
  prompted the Americans to focus predominantly on military solutions. 
  Looking for a pretext to provide direct American involvement backed by 
  popular support, in early August 1964 President Johnson exploited a non-
  existent Tonkin Gulf naval engagement in which the North Vietnamese 
  torpedo boats had allegedly followed up on an actual skirmish two days 
  previously. Johnson announced on national television that the United States 
  was going to retaliate against the North Vietnam provocation and – at a time 
  when over 70 percent of the US population trusted its government – quickly 
  As is typical in war, 
  Vietnamese civilians were 
  frequently caught between 
  the belligerents, with 
  roughly 1 million (3.1 
  million, according to a 
  Vietnamese estimate) killed 
  between 1965 and 1975. In 
  1954, the United Nations 
  had created a Demilitarized 
  Zone (DMZ) along the 
  existing administrative 
  border; 100km long and 
  10km deep, this boundary 
  straddled the Bến Hải River 
  along its eastern end. 
  Meanwhile the United 
  States’ Central Intelligence 
  Agency (CIA) promoted a 
  one-year “land reform” 
  period in which those in the 
  country’s north 
  (predominantly Catholic and 
  anti-Communist) and south 
  could relocate freely, after 
  which a national election 
  was to be conducted in 
  1956. While some 
  1,300,000 people moved 
  from the country’s northern 
  zone, which represented 
  roughly 10 percent of North 
  Vietnam’s population, 
  Communist Việt Minh 
  fighters that remained in the 
  south were temporarily to 
  forego military operations, 
  and instead conduct a 
  political battle to promote 
  Hanoi’s agenda of 
  unification. As Diệm knew 
  that his adversary would win 
  any such vote, he simply 
  refused to hold elections in 
  what he professed was an 
  unstable environment, with 
  the result that they never 
  materialized. Although the 
  CIA hoped to portray the 
  North as unstable, as 
  evidenced by the sizeable 
  migration numbers, the 
  endeavor ultimately 
  benefited Hồ, as it removed 
  a large anti-Communist 
  element from his midst, and 
  overwhelmed the South’s 
  ability to accept and 
  integrate the influx. 
  (Sergeant N. Berkowitz 
  (Marine Corps))
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  7
  signed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, giving the Executive Branch the power to 
  take the nation to war, without having to officially declare it as such.
  As part of this transition, General William C. Westmoreland (1914–
  2005), appointed Commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam 
  (MACV) in June 1964, opted for large, attritional “search and destroy” 
  operations that leveraged American assets including field artillery, armed 
  helicopters, tactical air support and reconnaissance, and naval gunfire to cause 
  such high casualties that the enemy would be unable to continue the struggle. 
  With US involvement escalating sharply in 1965, Johnson emphasized a 
  limited war could be conducted within the confines of South Vietnam’s 
  borders, primarily to avoid drawing China and the Soviet Union into similar 
  direct regional involvement, and to avoid creating an undue financial burden 
  that might defund his domestic social programs. Adding to his senior 
  commanders’ chagrin, the president refrained from activating American 
  reserves, which would provide the necessary manpower to best conduct the 
  conflict. For the next several months, US battlefield successes promoted a 
  degree of optimism, but by 1967 the nation’s commitment of men, money, 
  and material neared its zenith, and support for a largely inept, corrupt South 
  Vietnamese government, domestic war-weariness, high casualties, rising 
  inflation, and a political mindset that focused on not losing the conflict rather 
  than winning it, combined to severely hamper the American commitment.
  During Operation Virginia 
  (April 17–May 1, 1967), the 
  first large-scale American 
  action near Khe Sanh, 
  1/1 Marines conducted a 
  largely unsuccessful sweep 
  north of the Special Forces 
  Base to uncover intelligence 
  on NVA infiltration across the 
  DMZ, and their potential 
  buildup in northwest Quảng 
  Trị Province. This Marine is 
  pictured with his 7.62mm 
  M14 battle rifle, a weapon 
  superseded from 1967 by the 
  5.56mm XM16E1 assault 
  rifle. As such missions often 
  had the undesired side effect 
  of inflicting “collateral 
  damage” on civilians, such 
  tactics cumulatively served to 
  disenfranchise essential 
  popular support – something 
  compounded by the difficulty 
  in distinguishing combatants 
  from non-combatants. (Tom 
  Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
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  6
  1
  5
  2
  3
  Q U A N G  T R I  P R O V I N C E
  N O R T H  V I E T N A M
  L A O S
  Quang Tri
  Gio Linh
  Camp Carroll
  “Rockpile”
  Con Tien
  Khe Sanh
  Lang Vay
  Dai Lao pass
  ROUTE 9
  DMZ
  Cua Viet River
  PROVINCIAL ROUTE 606
  N
  0
  5 miles
  0
  5km
  Ben Hai River
  Ho Chi Minh Trail
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  4
  S O U T H  V I E T N A M
  T H UA T H I E N  P R O V I N C E
  S o u t h  C h i n a  S e a
  Phu Bai
  ROUTE 1
  Hue
  1 April 24–May 11, 1967: The “Hill Fights” near Khe Sanh. 
  During early 1967, NVA forces begin infiltrating through the 
  DMZ near Khe Sanh Combat Base.
  2 July 2–14, 1967: Operation Buffalo. Having carefully 
  plotted artillery points south of the DMZ, and employing 
  captured Marine gear to confuse their opponents, NVA forces 
  execute a well-planned ambush of Bravo Company, 1/9 
  Marines.
  3 July 16–October 31, 1967: Operation Kingfisher. Having 
  encountered minimal resistance after Buffalo, 2/9 Marines, 
  with armor support, enter the DMZ as part of a 
  reconnaissance-in-force to determine NVA strength north of 
  Cồn Tiên.
  4 January 30– March 3, 1968: The battle of Huế. Part of 
  the Tết Offensive. Although Huế had been relatively 
  untouched by the war, in late January NVA forces quickly 
  capture most of the city, including its historic Citadel. US 
  Marines from the south are allocated to take it back, and over 
  the next several weeks steadily complete their task at the cost 
  of high casualties.
  5 January 31–February 6, 1968: The battle of Quảng Trị. 
  One of the Tết Offensive’s numerous actions across South 
  Vietnam. Bordering as it did the DMZ, Quảng Trị Province’s 
  geographic location made it the focus of NVA forces. Having 
  attempted to lure American forces to the Khe Sanh sector over 
  the last few weeks to lessen resistance around the region’s 
  targeted capital, Quảng Trị City, NVA elements that attack on 
  January 31 unexpectedly encounter a sizeable Marine and 
  ARVN presence, and are soon soundly defeated.
  6 February 6–7, 1968: The battle of Làng Vây. In an effort 
  to eliminate the US Special Forces Base at Làng Vây, NVA 
  infantry with armored support surround and constrict the 
  targeted area, which contains two-dozen US Special Forces 
  personnel and several hundred local tribespeople. After 
  enduring the attack throughout the night of February 6/7, and 
  suffering heavy casualties, the defending remnants, and 
  thousands of civilians, escape to Khe Sanh.
  The DMZ’s southern edge, 1967–68
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  COMBAT DOCTRINE AND ROLE
  USMC
  Having emerged from World War II with a powerful, modern conventional 
  armed forces backed by an extensive manufacturing base and infrastructure, 
  the United States naturally had a penchant to view subsequent military 
  endeavors as soluble through out-producing an adversary. Although the US 
  military had experience with conducting low-intensity combat operations in 
  Haiti and elsewhere, its primary adversary remained the Soviet Union, and its 
  considerable number of conventional assets. While unconventional, 
  asymmetric assets existed, and were used by the United States to good effect 
  in covert reconnaissance, demolition, and similar small-unit tasks, they were 
  primarily employed to assist more established forces. With the post-1945 
  global transition toward smaller, potentially more numerous conflicts that 
  were often in restricted terrain or in environments unsuited for armor and 
  mechanized formations, however, the American military’s lack of emphasis on 
  light infantry who were minimally dependent upon a logistic tail would prove 
  to be a severe handicap in the largely underdeveloped jungles and savannahs 
  of an agrarian Vietnam.
  As a light-infantry force, the USMC appeared to be suited to operating 
  within a wider conventional war, as well as the looser, asymmetric tactics of 
  guerrilla operations, and looked to provide solutions to both partisan and 
  insurgency issues by adopting an expanding “clear and hold” approach. Major 
  The Opposing Sides
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  General Wallace Greene, USMC chief of staff, originated such pacification 
  tactics to help secure the area around important South Vietnamese coastal 
  cities, such as Đà Nẵng. As greater numbers of Army and Marine personnel 
  arrived in these regions, efforts were made to expand inland to deny enemy 
  access to the local population, instead of engaging large enemy formations. In 
  contrast with the Army’s “search and destroy” approach, Marine tactics helped 
  minimize civilian casualties and alienation, but success was dependent upon 
  considerable time, numbers, commitment, and money.
  The Marine concept of combined action evolved from Marine operations 
  in Haiti and the Dominican Republic between 1915 and 1945, where they 
  trained and organized non-partisan combatants. During the Vietnam fighting, 
  two proponents of such small-war operations, Lieutenant General Victor 
  Krulak and Major General Lewis Walt, were respectively responsible for 
  training and readiness, and implementation, the latter as commander of III 
  Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). By instilling an aggressive, offensive 
  spirit in their charges, indigenous militias were soon operating alongside their 
  American allies to clear villages, conduct intelligence gathering and anti-
  Communist propaganda, and secure terrain. Krulak believed pacification and 
  protection of the South Vietnamese population – a “clear and hold” approach 
  – was more appropriate than an attrition strategy of “search and destroy.”
  Having developed and embraced a workable solution, in which a Marine 
  squad would be partnered with local Popular Forces to protect individual 
  villages, and deny them as enemy sanctuary, Westmoreland would complain 
  that the Combined Action Platoon concept lacked the necessary offensive 
  spirit that was the Army’s model, and subjected dispersed forces to defeat in 
  detail. As part of a 1968 top-secret message to Washington, he even went so 
  A downed CH-53 Sea 
  Stallion helicopter in the 
  Khe Sanh sector, 1968. 
  During the Vietnam War, the 
  USMC formations serving in 
  South Vietnam’s northern 
  provinces possessed a 
  considerable technological 
  and material advantage that 
  included close air and 
  armored support, and aerial 
  transport. While imparting 
  considerable 
  maneuverability and infantry 
  fire support, supporting the 
  number and diversity of 
  such assets in a timely 
  manner across a dispersed 
  combat zone that included 
  mountains, jungles, and 
  low-lying swampy terrain 
  would often prove difficult, 
  thereby minimizing these 
  combat modifiers. Having to 
  contend with a lengthy 
  logistical tail and 
  Indochina’s underdeveloped 
  road network would 
  exacerbate the limitations of 
  land-based transportation 
  and place increasing 
  emphasis on air and water 
  transport. (Tom Laemlein / 
  Armor Plate Press)
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  far as to state that “… the military professionalism of the Marines falls short 
  of the standards that should be demanded of our Armed Forces.”
  As American political leaders believed that a larger conventional war 
  aimed at conquering and occupying North Vietnam risked bringing 
  Communist China, or the Soviet Union, into an open war with the United 
  States, instead of invading beyond the DMZ, caution dictated limiting the 
  fight to protecting South Vietnam. As such, a host of often fluctuating rules 
  of engagement constraints would serve to hamper the Marines’ freedom of 
  action, and frequently place them at additional risk. Being saddled to a 
  corrupt, inept South Vietnamese government did little to endear the US 
  forces to the population.
  NVA
  The military leadership in Hanoi modeled their strategic view after that of 
  Mao Zedong, in which political and military efforts were integrated into a 
  single struggle. From this, the NVA were presented as a continuation of 
  centuries of Vietnamese resistance to foreign occupation, with emphasis on 
  patriotism, the superiority of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and the cause of 
  unifying the country. In concert with military actions and objectives, the 
  political battlefield involved total mobilization of effort to manipulate and 
  provide a fighting force; subversion, and other means to make the enemy 
  This photograph dated 1968 
  shows an NVA patrol on the 
  move in the forest south of 
  the Hồ Chí Minh Trail. 
  Unlike the largely insurgent 
  operations in which their VC 
  comrades fought, NVA 
  soldiers were conventionally 
  organized and equipped; 
  although other Communist 
  countries provided Hanoi 
  with considerable logistical, 
  military, and political 
  support, it would never be 
  enough to challenge the 
  United States in a stand-up 
  fight. To best negate their 
  adversary’s considerable 
  hardware advantage, the 
  NVA adopted protracted 
  attritional and ambush 
  tactics that inflicted 
  casualties and damage at 
  times and locations mainly 
  of their choosing, before 
  dispersing. Their training 
  emphasized conventional 
  operations; with little 
  direction given to jungle 
  fighting, which when 
  encountered was learned 
  “on the job,” and their 
  organization promoted 
  overlap, redundancy, and 
  control throughout the 
  ranks. While training, 
  equipment, and combat 
  preparedness were 
  acceptable, like many 
  Communist forces, they 
  generally had an inflexible 
  approach to a changing 
  tactical situation, which 
  resulted in unnecessarily 
  high casualties. (AFP/AFP/
  Getty Images)
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  13
  doubt and weaken their morale; and to do the same to its population. The 
  adopted Revolutionary Chinese approach to warfare comprised three phases, 
  in which an initial guerrilla movement first won popular support, in part by 
  attacking the established authority before advancing to striking government 
  forces and facilities. A final phase involved a conventional effort to seize 
  terrain, and “liberate” the country, in concert with a South Vietnamese 
  civilian uprising.
  By 1967 the NVA fielded two conventional forces: a homeland defense, 
  with armor, artillery, air support, a small navy, and paramilitary security; and 
  a larger “Army of Liberation,” with limited supporting artillery alternatives, 
  such as mortars, rockets, and recoilless rifles, which starting in 1956 began 
  infiltrating into South Vietnam to conduct military operations, and support 
  VC activities, and its armed insurgents, the People’s Liberation Armed Forces 
  (PLAF). The NVA also deposited cadres to raise and train replacement units, 
  and although seemingly two distinct forces, after 1958 both the NVA and VC 
  were centrally controlled from Hanoi. To properly maintain such a campaign, 
  starting in 1959, NVA transportation units Group 559 (men and materiel 
  infiltration), Group 759 (water transportation), and Group 959 (Pathet Lao 
  – Laotian Communists – support) were created, which used a series of 
  mountain and jungle paths, collectively termed the Hồ Chí Minh Trail.
  Except for offensive operations in 1965 and 1968, NVA forces would tend 
  to remain on the operational defensive. When conducting attacks, however, 
  they focused on fixed installations, ambushes, and indirect fire against targets of 
  opportunity. Much as had proven successful against the French, large 
  conventional battles would be avoided, in favor of numerous hit-and-run 
  actions that eroded enemy morale and resolve over the long-term, and helped 
  preserve the NVA forces’ strength and cohesion. Both offensive and defensive 
  actions adhered to a “one slow, four quick” tactic, with the first part indicating 
  a low-key logistical buildup ahead of the fighting forces to maintain the 
  operation, which for larger operations could take several months, and numerous 
  rehearsals. Units involved conducted their own planning, preparation, and 
  execution, with emphasis placed with political goals more than military, while 
  more senior headquarters provided assistance as the final arbiter.
  RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, AND LOGISTICS
  USMC
  The United States reintroduced the draft in 1964; those selected were given a 
  choice of branches in which to serve, and although the USMC prided itself 
  on being an all-volunteer force, the rapid military buildup necessitated 
  accepting draftees to maintain numbers. Volunteers could sign up for two, 
  three, or four years, and were sent to boot camp at either the Marine Corps 
  Recruit Depot at Parris Island, South Carolina or Camp Pendleton, California. 
  After 1965, the increased need for Marines forced a training reduction from 
  12 to eight weeks, which placed considerable pressure on drill instructors to 
  maintain high standards. The average recruit was 17 years old, and had a 
  10th-grade education. Arriving at night to boot camp, recruits had their heads 
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  14
  shaved, before receiving toiletries, clothing, and other 
  supplies. Having received inoculations and a 
  functional M14 rifle, for the remainder of their 
  training any undesirable behavior was quickly 
  corrected with negative reinforcement that included 
  verbal and sometimes physical abuse, such as punching 
  in the solar plexus or throat, or more creative 
  inducements. The men were expected to run 
  everywhere, as part of a proven process that broke 
  down individuality to forge unit cohesion, discipline, 
  and a killer instinct, as well as dehumanize their 
  enemy, and instill the Marine ethos.
  Training consisted of an initial phase devoted to 
  marching and drilling, wearing the uniform, attending 
  classes, First Aid training, military courtesy and 
  traditions, and similar introductory tasks, including 
  taking the Initial Strength Test. As every Marine was 
  expected to be a marksman, the second phase 
  comprised two weeks on the Rifle Range, which 
  comprised “snapping in,” in which firearm positioning 
  and safety were perfected. Actual shooting followed, 
  where the recruit needed to pass with a minimum 
  score of 190, as well as serving mess and maintenance 
  duties, close-order drill, etc. A third, and final, phase focused on performing 
  guard duty, classes, drill evaluation, and a Physical Fitness Test. After boot 
  camp, the newly christened Marines advanced to Infantry Training Regiment 
  (ITR) at Camp Geiger, North Carolina, where they gained proficiency with 
  a considerable range of Marine Corps weapons. Those with an Infantry 
  Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) received six weeks of training at ITR, 
  while those with a non-infantry MOS received four weeks. Afterward, 
  Marines went to train in their weapons specialty as a rifleman, mortar man, 
  machine-gunner, etc. Recruits who graduated from Officer Candidate School 
  were commissioned as second lieutenants, after which they attended Basic 
  School, which reversed the OCS objectives, and the Corps now built the men 
  up and instilled their motivation. Prior to that graduation the men were given 
  an opportunity to request an MOS, and although not guaranteed, they 
  expressed preferences, such as infantry, artillery, and armor.
  Between the Marines’ arrival in-country and early 1967, their logistics 
  worked to commensurately accommodate the rapid increase in personnel. 
  There were supply shortages of varying durations, especially with ammunition 
  in late 1966 following unexpectedly high consumption rates. Available 
  supply rates and substitutes helped mitigate such issues. As was the case in 
  previous conflicts, America’s physical isolation and natural resources 
  promoted considerable industrial capabilities that translated into a major 
  factor in producing and maintaining its various military assets. A “pull” 
  approach to logistics meant supply usage was determined in Vietnam, with 
  assistance from rudimentary computers housed in climate-controlled 
  facilities, after which requirements were submitted to the United States and 
  Okinawa. For the USMC, the primary supply tail originated in Albany, 
  En route to Vietnam, 
  Marines stayed at Camp 
  Pendleton for four weeks of 
  intense instruction in new 
  enemy tactics, jungle 
  survival skills, and writing 
  wills, and other personal 
  documents, as well as 
  conducting wargames. In 
  total the entire process to 
  produce a Marine took 
  nearly six months. In an 
  effort to provide a more 
  realistic combat-training 
  experience, friendly 
  personnel were often 
  allocated to imitate enemy 
  tactics and likely combat 
  scenarios. The photograph 
  caption indicates that this 
  “NLF” soldier is participating 
  in such an exercise with 1st 
  Marine Division elements in 
  October 1967. He carries an 
  AKM assault rifle, and 
  wears what looks like an 
  American-made M1956 belt, 
  and homemade 
  (mismatched) “Hồ Chí Minh 
  Freedom Sandals.” (Tom 
  Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
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  15
  Georgia, and Barstow, California, which would ship material across the 
  Pacific to Hawaii and then Okinawa. From there, supplies went to I Corps, 
  the Marines’ primary operational command, before being doled out to the 
  various combat zones and storage areas. A rapid-response supply “surge tank” 
  was also retained on Okinawa.
  NVA
  NVA recruitment was primarily conducted per the North Vietnamese draft, 
  which was mandatory for all males between 16 and 45 years of age, although 
  many volunteered, or were coerced or abducted into service. Registration was 
  conducted during the first five days in January of the draftee’s eligibility year. 
  A medical exam determined, among other things, a draftee’s physical-fitness 
  level; once passed, draftees were released to await induction, generally 
  occurring the following December. Those who had physical disabilities, were 
  a sole remaining son, or proved they were their family’s principal support 
  means – as well as party officials, students, and specialist technicians – could 
  be deferred. The remainder reported to indoctrination centers at places like 
  Xuân Mai near Hanoi, where they took an oath of allegiance for what was to 
  be service for the conflict’s duration, without homeland rotations.
  Basic training could be conducted at recruit depots, or in the field under 
  experienced cadres, and commonly lasted for 90 days, but could be as few as 
  30. It included instruction in conventional military tactics, such as squad 
  assault, platoon air defense, marching, and digging foxholes, as well as using 
  grenades, rifles, machine guns, and bayonets. Special emphasis was placed on 
  physical conditioning, but little instruction was provided in jungle warfare or 
  asymmetrical actions. An intense, two-week “study period” of political lectures 
  and films drilled home the justness in liberating South Vietnam, and 
  promoted political and battlefield successes from which to emulate and 
  motivate. Those slated for infiltration duties received at least one additional 
  month of instruction, including heavy weapons, signals, medical, and 
  North Vietnamese forces 
  prepare for firing during a 
  military exercise in Bạch 
  Đằng, near Hanoi, on July 
  19, 1966. Roughly one-third 
  of NVA soldiers were 17–24 
  years of age, with another 
  one-third aged 24–29, and 
  the remainder, 30–40. 
  Unlike VC personnel, who 
  averaged fewer than three 
  years of education, their 
  northern comrades 
  commonly had at least nine 
  years of schooling – high by 
  Asian standards of the era. 
  Nearly half had prior 
  compulsory training and 
  indoctrination in various 
  militias, such as the Hồ Chí 
  Minh Communist Youth 
  Union, and construction 
  units, although most were 
  not determined 
  Communists, but had 
  learned to live within the 
  system. Considering North 
  Vietnam was predominantly 
  rural and agrarian, some 80 
  percent of NVA soldiers 
  came from farming 
  backgrounds, with around 
  40 percent being what were 
  considered poor. Although 
  the Communist Party 
  officially touted a classless 
  society, it was not reflected 
  in reality, as all were 
  conscious of each other’s 
  social standing, with those 
  on the low end having little 
  chance of being promoted 
  in rank. As a result of the 
  great migration from the 
  north in 1954/55, slightly 
  less than 10 percent of NVA 
  soldiers had a close relative 
  living in the south. During 
  1967, only 15 percent of 
  NVA personnel were full 
  Communist Party members, 
  with slightly fewer being 
  probationary. (STF/AFP/
  Getty Images)
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  16
  Private, 2/9 Marines
  This 22-year-old Marine is of African-
  American descent, and had at least some 
  college before volunteering for service. 
  Subsisting on C-rations while in the field, he 
  would have received hot meals only when at 
  base. Seeing considerably more combat days 
  than those who fought in World War II, US 
  combatants in Vietnam commonly suffered 
  battlefield stress and fatigue; if wounded, 
  small-arms fire followed by an explosive 
  device were the most likely causes.
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  17
  Operation Kingfisher, July 28–29, 1967
  Weapons, dress, and equipment
  As a modern replacement for several weapons used during World 
  War II and Korea, the M60 machine gun (1) was heavily influenced by 
  the German MG 42; it fired 7.62×51mm NATO rounds at around 600 
  rounds per minute from 100-round belts (2). A Pistol, Caliber .45 
  Automatic, M1911A1, shown here in its M1916 leather holster (3), 
  provides personal protection.
  Developed in 1941, this man’s M1 manganese steel helmet (4) has 
  a reversible brown–green Mitchell leaf-pattern camouflage cover. 
  Although meant to be used for fastening fresh foliage, the rubber 
  band commonly held a variety of small items, such as eating utensils, 
  ammunition, or in this case a Lubricant Small Arms bottle and a 
  toothbrush. The M1955 nylon “Marine Vest” (5) comprised 23 
  133×133×32mm fiberglass-based Doron inserts that provided 
  protection against shrapnel, but not bullets, while its lower eyelets 
  were sometimes used to hold items, as opposed to a harness. This 
  man wears olive-green army shade 107 cotton jungle trousers (6) 
  with bulging pockets that hold items such as a Fulton MX-991/U 
  flashlight, M18 colored smoke grenades, or spare .45-cal. magazines 
  (7), and combat boots (8).
  Along with a Marine jungle first-aid kit (9), he wears an M1956 
  1-quart (.95-liter) olive drab polyethylene plastic canteen (10), with a 
  felt-lined cotton duck cover that also helped keep the water cool. 
  Suspended on a cotton bandoleer, a waxed cardboard box of 100 
  linked rounds (11) rests against an M17 field protective gas-mask 
  container (12). All told, his combat load comes to about 25kg.
  12
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  18
  explosives, 
  along 
  with 
  additional physical training, 
  now with heavy packs, as well 
  as additional pay and rations. 
  Those showing promise as 
  engineers, signals operators, 
  and practitioners of other 
  technical skills received 
  additional training as well. 
  One veteran later noted that “I 
  was well-prepared and well-
  armed when I went on 
  operations. After joining the 
  Army in the North I received a 
  three-months’ 
  military 
  training course. After I 
  finished this training course 
  and 
  especially 
  after 
  participating in the first few 
  battles in the South, I felt that I was relatively-well trained” (PFC Nguyễn 
  Ngọc Dung, 1/16 (NVA) Regiment). Conversely, another recalled: “I myself 
  had not received proper training. I was specialized in land survey and 
  intelligence. I had studied the techniques of artillery firing but I had not 
  practiced it. Regarding H-12 rockets [Chinese Type 63], which were issued to 
  my unit, I was given training for only three days” (Master Sergeant Phẩm 
  Bang Cu, C7 Artillery Company, 3 Subregion).
  On completing training, NVA soldiers were granted a three-day pass to 
  spend with family before appearing for duty. Some were then allocated to 
  antiaircraft defense units around Hanoi or Haiphong, and similar duties in 
  the north. Others were rail-transported south to near the border, from where 
  they infiltrated into South Vietnam or Laos on foot. Most were provided with 
  ten days of dried food, and used streams for bathing, as they moved from 
  station to station along the Hồ Chí Minh Trail where they could rest, and 
  occasionally even watch a politically approved movie. Each station had been 
  established about a day’s walk from the others, and as ground attack and B-52 
  bomber strikes were a great concern, groups tended to be fewer than 400 
  soldiers to present a minimal target. NVA soldiers new to operating in the 
  south often spent several weeks or months acclimating to the hot, humid 
  climate. Before integrating with an experienced front-line formation, recent 
  trainees served with a guerrilla unit.
  LEADERSHIP AND MORALE
  USMC
  The USMC demanded professional, competent commanders, who were well-
  versed in military history and its lessons, self-reliant, and bold. Open, frank 
  assessments and feedback were encouraged, and the Marines trusted their 
  As motorized vehicles were 
  unsuited for traveling much 
  of the Hồ Chí Minh Trail’s 
  rugged, isolated connecting 
  paths, bicycles proved an 
  effective way to transport 
  supplies into South 
  Vietnam. Note the modified 
  handlebar to assist steering, 
  and the captured crate 
  labeled “HANDLE WITH 
  CARE – GLASS.” Food was 
  considered adequate, and 
  included a usually 
  consistent kilogram of rice 
  per day, although civilians 
  didn’t always have enough 
  to sell when operating away 
  from regular supply. What 
  regular supplies that were 
  available were husbanded 
  and dispersed in hidden 
  caches around likely 
  operational areas. Most 
  NVA were wounded at least 
  once during their service, 
  and were frequently 
  reintegrated into combat 
  before they were healthy. 
  Considering the limited 
  availability of supplies and 
  expertise, medical treatment 
  was generally good, 
  although medics often tried 
  to make up for inadequate 
  medical supplies by 
  providing increased 
  personal care. Malaria 
  accounted for some 70 
  percent of non-battlefield 
  casualties, although Bari-
  Bari, jungle rot, dysentery, 
  and asthma remained a 
  problem as well. NVA illness 
  was prevalent, with two-
  thirds seriously sick at some 
  point during their service 
  time. (Public domain)
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  19
  leadership, whether deserved or 
  not, and were willing to carry 
  out an order, or die trying. 
  Small-unit leaders, especially 
  junior officers, were exposed to 
  some of the best military courses 
  offered, and a Marine mindset 
  that demanded leading by 
  example and sharing equally in 
  hardships and danger. As part of 
  its force planning to create, 
  maintain, and apply military 
  assets, and help define clear 
  objectives, 
  the 
  Marines’ 
  approach was concept-based to 
  describe mission types and how best to accomplish them. During operations, 
  forces were formed into Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), which as 
  task-oriented battlegroups comprised a mix of ground, air, logistics, and 
  command assets. In practice, however, combat units often lacked essential 
  cohesion, due to Johnson’s reluctance to call up reserves, and a corresponding 
  rotation policy that constantly removed experienced personnel from the mix. 
  Johnson wanted to refrain from putting the United States on a full war 
  footing, due to political and financial reasons, and thus withheld allocating 
  reserves. Newly arrived personnel were viewed as less important than those 
  who had spent time “in-country,” which translated into a lack of on-the-job 
  training and higher casualties among the former. Units were classified on a 
  readiness scale from C-1 (totally prepared) to C-5 (critically unprepared). 
  With most enlisted personnel in their late teens or early 20s, captains and 
  lieutenants were often viewed as father figures and big brothers, respectively.
  Unlike the tactical telephone-based communications used since World 
  War II, US forces in Vietnam benefited from the improved quality and 
  increased frequency ranges of portable FM radios; these provided greater 
  flexibility to coordinate inter-unit operations, and maintain contact with 
  upper echelons. AN/PRC-25 backpack field radios, with an 8km range, 
  enabled small-unit commanders to call upon artillery, air strikes, medevac, 
  resupply, and other support. A Marine rifle company of some 200 men lacked 
  communication personnel, motor transport, and artillery observers, and such 
  units were attached as needed by the tactical situation. In defensive positions, 
  telephone lines were laid to provide command and control with local, 
  relatively static combat assets.
  Many recruits viewed stopping Communism in Southeast Asia as part of 
  a larger global effort to prevent its spreading “domino effect,” lest Burma, 
  Thailand, and other nations in the region similarly succumb; if they fell India, 
  Australia, and other US Pacific allies would subsequently be threatened. Some 
  men joined due to what was seen as a family military tradition, while others 
  simply looked to leave their small towns for something new and adventurous. 
  As the conflict continued, declining morale and discipline resulted in 
  increased instances of intentionally killing one’s superior officer, although 
  cases in the Marines were considerably less common than in Army ranks.
  A USMC Cessna L-19/O-1 
  Bird Dog provides 
  observation during a low-
  level pass over Huế during 
  action in the Imperial City 
  on February 23, 1968. Such 
  aircraft provided a variety of 
  tasks, including medevac, 
  artillery observation, and 
  bomb damage assessment. 
  With its relatively slow 
  speed and lengthy loiter 
  times, the Bird Dog acted as 
  a Forward Air Controller 
  assisted fast-moving jet 
  aircraft with target 
  acquisition by directing 
  mortar or artillery-directed 
  white-phosphorus rounds as 
  markers. Having 
  transitioned from providing 
  tactical support for large, 
  Cold War conventional 
  operations to those 
  involving small units, these 
  aircraft provided valuable 
  air-to-ground liaison 
  intelligence, such as local 
  enemy activity, or direction. 
  According to Marine 
  doctrine each rifle battalion 
  was allocated an Air Liaison 
  Officer to coordinate with 
  the unit’s Fire Support 
  Coordination Center, and 
  two to work with the 
  companies in the field. 
  (Lance Corporal D.M. 
  Messenger (Marine Corps))
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  20
  Private, 803 (NVA) Regiment
  Having grown up on a farm, this NVA soldier 
  is as out of place in the South Vietnamese 
  jungles as his Marine adversary. Motivated 
  by a strong hatred toward ARVN soldiers, as 
  they represented an illegitimate, puppet 
  government blocking unification, this 20-year-
  old lacks his enemy’s abundance of supplies, 
  and is frequently forced to rely on 
  improvisation. During his long, arduous walk 
  along the Hồ Chí Minh Trail to infiltrate South 
  Vietnam, he carried enough malaria pills for 
  each estimated day, although nearly all of his 
  comrades contracted the disease at least 
  once during their service.
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  21
  Operation Kingfisher, July 28–29, 1967
  Weapons, dress, and equipment
  Considering other Communist nations provided much of North 
  Vietnam’s military accouterments, this NVA soldier carries a gas-
  operated, Chinese-manufactured Type 56 assault rifle (1), which was 
  based on the Soviet AK-47. It was capable of firing 650 7.62×39mm 
  rounds per minute; a pivoting bayonet (2) was attached under  
  the barrel.
  His phenolic (synthetic resin-impregnated cardboard) sun helmet 
  (3) is covered with reed-green cloth. Having originated as tan khaki, 
  NVA tunics (4) and trousers (5) started transitioning to olive drab 
  green in 1966, with rank insignia absent as per regulations. With 
  issued shoes or boots having worn out by the time NVA soldiers 
  arrived in the south, many subsequently relied on locally made “Hồ 
  Chí Minh Freedom Sandals” (6) that were made from used tires and 
  inner tube straps.
  A canvas belt (7) is worn with an aluminum buckle. As with 
  American helmet liners, many NVA soldiers decorated their Chinese-
  manufactured canteens; this example (8) has a reed-green split-yoke 
  harness and brown phenolic cap. A canvas “Chicom” chest rig (9) 
  held three 30-round magazines, and a pair of holders (10) on either 
  side for grenades or boxed cartridges used bamboo pieces to hold  
  the flaps closed. Altogether, the combat load here is in the region  
  of 10kg.
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  22
  NVA
  The Communist command structure was intentionally complex in order to 
  provide redundancies to accommodate for casualties. Operating at the front 
  alongside his men, a leader was expected to emphasize personal contact, 
  demonstrate expertise, and project a nearly puritanical professional ethics code; 
  this was considered secondary to martial talent. Most leaders projected a 
  demanding persona, played favorites, and criticized the sick or wounded for 
  implied malingering, which together with a considerable lack of individual 
  freedom and harsh discipline could serve to degrade morale. Leaders had few 
  options in offering rewards – money and leave were virtually nonexistent – and 
  instead used awards, commendations, and bounties. Physical punishments and 
  incarceration were seldom used, except in extreme cases where a soldier might be 
  assigned to a “reeducation” camp for two to six months. Generally, when a soldier 
  was accused of laziness or “freedomist” thoughts, in which they acted for their own 
  convenience, group-sanctioned criticism tended to shame the offender to adjust 
  his attitude. The NVA leader’s legitimate power rested mainly on Vietnamese 
  cultural values, such as fatalism, nationalism, and respect for elders, and the fact 
  that the government that appointed him was respected for its effectiveness.
  In contrast to the military commander’s role, the unit’s political leader was 
  tasked with maintaining morale, instilling Communist-inspired enthusiasm 
  and aggressive, fearless behavior; he also monitored the men for signs of 
  demoralization or flagging spirits. Approachable, amicable, and friendly, the 
  political leader worked to motivate the men, and made every effort to discuss 
  battlefield or political successes only. Attempts at Communist indoctrination 
  focused on teaching that the Americans were invading the South to oppress 
  and exploit the Vietnamese people, as previous invaders had done.
  Service and indoctrination within the Communist system meant that the 
  typical NVA soldier was older and more seasoned than his US and ARVN 
  opponents. He tended to draw pride from military success, encouraged by 
  what he saw as the unalterable support and sympathy of the people, and rely 
  heavily on what he insisted was the righteousness of the cause. As South 
  Vietnam was considered an administrative construct that artificially divided 
  a nation he and his relatives had long fought to unify while expelling foreign 
  occupation, most were willing to sacrifice considerably to achieve these ends, 
  and defend their homeland. Although pay and rations were often meager, 
  NVA soldiers maintained 
  excellent morale, in large 
  measure due to continuous 
  indoctrination, and unit 
  cohesion that was reinforced 
  by having all social and 
  military activities centered on 
  it. NVA soldiers and officers 
  were 
  expected 
  to 
  be 
  completely committed to the 
  Revolution, and to sacrifice 
  everything, including “dying 
  gloriously” to see it succeed. 
  Most were distressed by the 
  In what looks to be training 
  or a staged “patrol” in 1966, 
  these NVA soldiers carry a 
  Chinese Type 56 (or Soviet 
  AK-47) assault rifle, and a 
  Chinese Type 56 (or Soviet 
  RPD) light machine gun. 
  The NVA continually shifted 
  its organizational goals to 
  meet a tactical situation, 
  and “emulation” campaigns 
  were to keep the soldier 
  informed of the group’s 
  goals that provided a basis 
  for measuring their 
  contribution. The NVA 
  launched a “Troop Training 
  and Combat Competition – 
  An Emulation Plan,” 
  designed to intensify its 
  combat effectiveness 
  against the United States, in 
  which it illustrated that a 
  company that destroyed 
  one American platoon, or 
  two “puppet” ARVN 
  platoons to receive a “good” 
  rating. Annihilating two US 
  platoons or an ARVN 
  company warranted a “fair” 
  designation. Individuals 
  could also receive a special 
  status for actions, including 
  “Assault Hero” or “Valiant 
  American Killer.” (Photo by 
  Rolls Press/Popperfoto/
  Getty Images)
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  23
  lengthy separation from family and once operating 
  south of the DMZ, personal mail ceased. Individual 
  soldiers were motivated, in large part, due to the threat 
  of their families back home having rations reduced or 
  eliminated, or being publicly ostracized, due to some 
  failure in their military conduct. Roughly 85 times 
  more VC personnel defected than NVA soldiers 
  between 1963 and late 1969, with the latter tending 
  to be small-unit leaders more than the rank and file. 
  This was a difficult undertaking, considering the 
  numerous check- and control-points to reach the 
  other side, where he had been told to expect torture 
  and death. Some 60 percent of NVA soldiers expressed 
  a belief in their cause and hatred for the Americans as 
  their primary motivation for fighting. Self sacrifice 
  was encouraged to demonstrate loyalty to the cause, and units were able to 
  bounce back from battlefield setbacks or casualties due to a rather ambivalent 
  attitude toward an action’s outcome.
  WEAPONS AND TACTICS
  USMC
  Considering the rugged terrain throughout most of Vietnam, and frequently 
  humid, rainy, and muddy environment, light, reliable small arms that possessed 
  striking power to penetrate foliage, and were easily maintained in the field, 
  were paramount. In the weeks before the Hill Fights battle described in this 
  book, the Marines at Khe Sanh had been issued the XM16E1 rifle, which used 
  a 5.56mm round, and was intended to be a more accurate, select-fire 
  replacement for the heavier 7.62mm M14, which shared ammunition with the 
  squad’s M60 machine gun. The XM16E1’s smaller size also made it more user-
  friendly with physically smaller ARVN personnel, but a “failure to extract” 
  propensity did little to win initial approval, and many made efforts to continue 
  using its predecessor. With Colt having touted their new weapon as requiring 
  minimal maintenance, cleaning kits were not considered a priority, which 
  without necessary maintenance, or a chrome lining to stand up better to rapid 
  firing, promoted chamber pitting that accumulated dust and propellant 
  residue. This constricted the chamber, increased internal pressure and cyclic 
  rates, and promoted jamming. The issuance of ball powder accentuated the 
  problem, as while suitable for the M14 and M60, it produced too much 
  residue for the XM16E1’s tight tolerances. One of the two allocated 
  ammunition types had such a thin rim that the extractor could pull them off 
  and leave the spent round in the chamber. To remove rounds, many Marines 
  resorted to using substitute implements such as bayonets, which were unsuited 
  for the task, especially during combat – a problem perhaps best exemplified in 
  July 1967 during Operation Buffalo, when NVA forces (apparently aware of 
  the defective weapons) overran and wiped out two platoons from Bravo 
  Company, 1/9 Marines.
  To provide temporary 
  shelter from fire and the 
  elements, North Vietnamese 
  combatants dug individual 
  fighting holes such as this 
  bunker on Hill 881S, 
  photographed in 1966. They 
  were lined with local foliage 
  and material, and covered 
  with a blast layer consisting 
  of about 30cm of logs, dirt, 
  and a camouflage cloth. 
  The NVA’s primary small 
  unit was the three-man cell, 
  in which each man felt as a 
  brother to the other two, 
  with the men providing 
  support for on another. If an 
  individual lacked the 
  expected motivation and 
  commitment, the issue was 
  taken to his squad leader. 
  Barring resolution, the case 
  went to the political officer, 
  which if still unresolved, 
  would see the soldier being 
  removed so as to not 
  “infect” his comrades. In an 
  effort to reflect and improve 
  upon actions, “criticism and 
  self-criticism” sessions were 
  held. After action, units 
  could get up to 10–15 days 
  in a quiet zone to rest, 
  although shorter periods 
  were more common, before 
  being returned to combat or 
  labor duties. (Marine Corps)
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  24
  Before that battle [Hill 881S], we were issued M-16’s a month or month and a half 
  before the battle. We only practiced with a couple hundred rounds. There never was 
  prolonged rapid fire for training and we just shoot some small dat, dat, dat, dats, 
  maybe 5 rounds at a time like in combat. So they were not combat tested until April 
  30th, the day of the battle. Only every third person had a cleaning rod for their 
  rifles and you had to ram the cleaning rod down the barrel to get the shell out that 
  was jammed up in the chamber. And we would be right up on top of the NVA and 
  we didn’t have a prayer. (PFC Kenneth Flowers, Kilo Company, 3/9 Marines)
   
  Although its bolt and operating rod was susceptible to breaking, and it was 
  burdensome to carry, the M60 machine gun proved to be a valued, 
  mechanically simple weapon. With most small-unit engagement ranges under 
  100m (200m for snipers), both the M16 and the M60 provided sufficient 
  volume and impact mass to enable fire and movement. While lacking the 
  penetrative power of its .50-caliber cousin, the M60 could be used from a 
  variety of positions, with several firing options, including sustained (six- to 
  nine-round bursts, with four to five seconds in between, requiring a barrel 
  change every ten minutes); rapid (10 to 13 rounds, with two to three seconds’ 
  Personnel of Alpha 
  Company, 1st Engineer 
  Battalion armed with M16A1 
  rifles engage NVA snipers 
  across the Perfume River 
  during the fighting in Huế on 
  February 22, 1968. Unlike 
  the AK-47, the M16A1 was 
  less well-suited to left-
  handed operators due to the 
  location of controls and 
  cartridge ejection. As 2/5 
  Marines’ after-action report 
  commented, “Small unit 
  leadership, professional 
  attitude and a competitive 
  spirit to defeat a determined 
  enemy played a major part 
  in the month’s successful 
  activities.” (Corporal M.J. 
  Smedley (Marine Corps))
  A Marine sergeant from 
  Alpha Company, 1/1 
  Marines fires an M3A1 
  “Grease Gun” fitted with an 
  M9 flash hider at VC 
  positions in Huế on 
  February 20, 1968. Note the 
  weapon’s open safety port, 
  which if closed prevented 
  firing. In addition to newer 
  M16 assault rifles and M60 
  machine guns, the Marines 
  were issued with older 
  World War II and Korea-era 
  small arms that remained in 
  their inventory. Although 
  over 1kg heavier than the 
  M16, the semiautomatic M1 
  Garand rifle, the M14’s 
  precursor, was available in 
  limited numbers. 
  Considering the often 
  confined battle space, 
  shotguns were commonly 
  used, including the 
  Winchester Model 1912, 
  Remington Model 870, and 
  especially the Ithaca Gun 
  Company’s Model 37 – the 
  same company that 
  produced the “Grease Gun” 
  and M1911 pistol. (Corporal 
  Sundley (Marine Corps))
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  25
  break, necessitating barrel changes after two minutes); 
  and a continuous burst, with a barrel change every 
  minute. To conserve ammunition and minimize impact 
  dust and debris around the target, short bursts of up to 
  five rounds at a time proved best.
  In 1944, the US Marine Corps reconfigured its 12-
  man squads from what had been in practice a trained, 
  but loosely organized armed group into a more effective 
  configuration of three fire teams. By employing a 
  triangular structure for what was now the Corps’ 
  smallest independent tactical and movement element, 
  the squad leader was better able to control and supervise 
  three subordinate leaders, instead of nearly a dozen 
  Marines. Although the change meant incurring 
  casualties would significantly reduce a fire team’s 
  effectiveness, reaction times improved, as the change 
  produced defined maneuver elements centered around 
  the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR). With the M14, 
  and later M16, used during the Vietnam War, the fire 
  team no longer comprised an automatic weapon core, as every rifle now 
  possessed the capability.
  Initial doctrinal reaction was simply to assign one Marine to keep his 
  weapon on automatic, while his other three teammates set theirs to 
  semiautomatic. While this maintained the fire team’s integrity, and was intended 
  to conserve ammunition, it was an awkward solution that the Marines tried to 
  make work. With the NVA employing weapons of increasing caliber starting in 
  early 1967, Marine tactics needed to change the better to address fighting at a 
  numerical disadvantage, and avoid suffering high casualties. As a byproduct of 
  the rotating personnel system, many new junior officers lacked the necessary 
  field skills or experience to instill confidence in their subordinates. Often, 
  enlisted personnel or NCOs who had risen through the ranks to commissioned 
  officer status – and had months of hard-won experience – proved a considerable 
  asset, as these “Mustangs” naturally garnered considerable loyalty from the 
  squad, as they could be relied upon to ensure the squad’s best chance of survival.
  In addition to a stand-up fight, ambushes presented an excellent 
  opportunity to inflict disproportionate casualties on an unsuspecting or 
  unprepared enemy. As part of Marine Standard Operating Procedure, day 
  patrols were intended to provide intelligence on where best to establish an 
  ambush site, using maps or terrain features. Such positions were to be well 
  concealed, and parallel to the enemy’s expected route, in a right-angle 
  configuration to minimize friendly fire. M60s, if available, were to be placed 
  along one line of resistance, with tripwire-triggered “Claymore” directional 
  mines placed on potential approach routes. Grenades were to be readily 
  available by placing three or four within easy reach, and were in part used 
  early in a firefight to mask muzzle flashes. During an ambush, there was to be 
  no smoking, talking, eating, or any unnecessary action. Although only around 
  10 percent of such efforts resulted in a firefight, discipline and preparation 
  were paramount, as once engaged such actions tended to be of short duration, 
  very violent, and provided little time to rectify mistakes.
  During the Huế fighting on 
  March 4, 1968, a Marine 
  fires an M79 grenade 
  launcher at a suspected 
  sniper position during an 
  advance toward the Citadel. 
  Nicknamed “The 
  Thumpgun,” the 2.95kg, 
  single-shot weapon fired 
  40mm high-explosive, air-
  burst, tear gas, and smoke 
  rounds out to a maximum of 
  400m (effective ranges 
  were 150m for point targets 
  and 350m for area targets). 
  Note the 277g round affixed 
  to his helmet. (Lance 
  Corporal N.J. Smith (Marine 
  Corps))
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  26
  NVA
  As a largely agrarian nation, North Vietnam lacked sufficient industry and 
  infrastructure to produce its own arms, equipment, and material to prosecute 
  the war effectively, and relied on considerable importing from friendly 
  Communist nations. The Soviet Union provided much of what was required, 
  while Communist China supplied the majority of small arms and ammunition. 
  One of the most prevalent NVA assault rifles, the Type 56, was a direct 
  Chinese copy of the more widely known AK-47, and later its modernized 
  AKM variant, both of which the North Vietnamese also employed. As these 
  weapons incorporated loose mechanical tolerances, they could reliably operate 
  in a variety of harsh conditions, and were well suited to their NVA users, 
  being simple to fire and maintain, and could be produced in large numbers. 
  Considering North Vietnam’s colonial history, and a logistical trail that 
  included Communist Eastern Europe, the NVA also used large numbers of 
  captured and aging German and French automatic and semiautomatic rifles. 
  An equally varied arsenal of 7.62mm Mosin-Nagant, 7.92mm Mauser Kar 
  98k, and other bolt-action rifles were available, as were multinational World 
  War II-vintage and early Cold War submachine guns and machine guns. With 
  such a range of small arms and other weapon systems in the field, providing 
  an adequate supply of ammunition and spare parts to the combat zone was 
  understandably challenging.
  In combat, NVA and VC forces fought a typical guerrilla war in that they 
  avoided holding terrain, unless it represented a key base, or other significant 
  feature, and when confronted they typically had a defined exit strategy from 
  which they relocated to continue the fight. Without defined main lines of 
  resistance, few safe areas existed for the combatants and civilians, and the 
  specter of booby traps and landmines remained prevalent. As large gatherings 
  of combatants risked detection and presented an unnecessarily concentrated 
  target, small groups predominated, living in the 
  wilderness and conducting hit-and-run and other 
  actions when operating south of the DMZ. The NVA 
  preferred operating at night to best mask their 
  movements, and favored using ambushes, as the combat 
  modifier leveraged the effectiveness of a numerically 
  inferior, or under-gunned, force. Stressing an active 
  defense, the NVA commonly fought tenaciously from 
  bunkers, or other built-up positions, in concert with 
  local counterattacks to keep the enemy off balance. 
  Offensively, the NVA frequently attacked a defended 
  position, with the intention of conducting a sudden, 
  surprise strike against the enemy’s anticipated relief 
  force. By operating physically close to their American 
  adversary, such “hugging” tactics worked to dissuade 
  close air and artillery support for fear of causing friendly 
  casualties. The NVA also routinely employed snipers, 
  often concealed in trees, to cause enemy casualties and 
  confusion, and degrade American morale. North 
  Vietnamese propaganda was also used effectively to 
  motivate its personnel, and undermine enemy resolve.
  A minimally equipped VC 
  fighter with a Soviet-made 
  7.62mm semiautomatic 
  SKS carbine. Note the 
  folded bayonet. Although 
  NVA and VC soldiers were 
  essentially part of the same 
  command structure, their 
  respective roles meant the 
  former usually used 
  standardized equipment. 
  Both tended to use similar 
  Soviet- and Chinese-
  supplied weapons, but with 
  the peasant-dressed VC 
  operating within the local 
  population, and away from 
  established logistics, they 
  frequently used improvised 
  weapons made from US 
  landmines and grenades, 
  captured munitions, and 
  unexploded ordnance. 
  (NARA)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  27
  Once a proposed operation was approved by the Province Committee, the 
  Military Affairs Committee allocated the operational tasks among its Military 
  Staff (undertaking reconnaissance to study the objective, and constructing a 
  sand model), Political Staff (sending a cadre to contact local civilians to glean 
  their reaction to the proposed attack, and making sure the attacking soldiers 
  had sufficient morale), and a Rear Services Staff (determining whether the local 
  population could sustain an attacking force, and providing labor). An attempt 
  was made to maintain need-to-know security right up until the attack’s 
  commencement, which if even suspected of having been compromised, would 
  be cancelled – something that occurred far more often than actual attacks.
  Once committed, NVA forces would conduct a quick advance to the 
  targeted area’s assembly positions, which could involve several dozen 
  kilometers in a day. On the trail, two NVA personnel would normally lead 
  small groups by 20–30m. VC fighters prepared base camps, and provided 
  intelligence and guides for NVA reconnaissance teams, with laborers 
  volunteered from the local population. A quick attack followed, which having 
  previously conducted reconnaissance focused on the enemy’s weak spots via a 
  strong fight, assault, and pursuit. On an attack’s successful completion, NVA 
  soldiers worked rapidly to secure the battlefield 
  to remove weapons and casualties, before 
  conducting a final “quick” egress component, 
  which involved exiting the battle area to a pre-
  arranged rendezvous point where the force 
  dispersed into smaller groups. As one former 
  company commander recalled, “Everybody 
  had to engage in combat to learn by experience. 
  Moreover, there would be no second battle 
  without a first one. Also, there were platoon 
  leaders who had been engaging in combat for 
  several years, had much experience, and were 
  always with my unit. Therefore my assignment 
  to the position of company commander was 
  no problem” (First Lieutenant Hà Tâm, 14 
  (NVA) Battalion).
  In spring 1972, North 
  Vietnamese forces 
  launched the “Easter 
  Offensive,” one part of an 
  effort to defeat ARVN 
  forces, and overrun as 
  much of the South as 
  possible to provide leverage 
  for forthcoming peace talks. 
  As part of the attack against 
  the Central Highlands, 
  soldiers from 2 (NVA) 
  Division (shown here on 
  April 28, 1972) are mopping 
  up around Tân Cảnh and 
  Đắk Tôt, having secured a 
  bunker. Minimally equipped, 
  they wear soft “boonie” hats 
  and carry Chinese Type 56 
  (or Soviet AK-47) assault 
  rifles, a Chinese Type 56 (or 
  Soviet RPD) LMG, and a 
  B-40 (RPG-2). (PHAN DUY/
  AFP/Getty Images)
  A staged NVA attack in 
  1967. In actual combat, the 
  foliage affixed to their back 
  served to break up their 
  profile and provide 
  camouflage. The soldier in 
  the center appears to wear 
  an East German M56 steel 
  helmet, which would have 
  been sold, or given, to North 
  Vietnam, being a fellow 
  Communist nation. 
  (JUSPAO)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  28
  BACKGROUND TO BATTLE
  Looking to counter enemy supply movement in South Vietnam’s northwestern 
  corner, on July 8, 1962, MACV placed a 12-man Special Forces “A” (Green 
  Beret) team at an abandoned French fort some 2km east of Khe Sanh, a village 
  of some 1,000 indigenous Bru Montagnard (Fr. “Mountaineer”) tribespeople. 
  The Hill Fights
  April 23–30, 1967
  A World War II-era M101A1 
  105mm howitzer in action at 
  the besieged KSCB on 
  February 14, 1968. With 
  rounds that were easier to 
  handle than those of the 
  larger 155mm gun, the 
  105mm was well suited for 
  employment at remote 
  bases, being helicopter-
  transportable, relatively 
  easy to reposition, reliable, 
  and possessing a high rate 
  of fire. To compensate for 
  loose or soft soil that would 
  shift the piece during firing, 
  logs were generally used to 
  better anchor the gun’s 
  placement. To minimize 
  shrapnel damage from 
  incoming artillery or 
  mortars, such 
  emplacements were dug 
  below the surrounding 
  terrain, and reinforced with 
  sandbags. (Tom Laemlein / 
  Armor Plate Press)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  29
  To help secure the remote position, the Special Forces personnel trained and 
  organized local warriors into covert, CIA-sponsored militia Civilian Irregular 
  Defense Groups (CIDG). Along with local French coffee-plantation owners 
  who traveled along the unkempt, often constricted Route 9, the groups 
  provided valuable intelligence from both sides of the Laotian border. As the 
  area grew in importance, two years later the Special Forces contingent 
  relocated north a few kilometers to a plateau on which the French had 
  constructed an airfield more than a decade previously.
  In 1964, General Westmoreland envisioned Khe Sanh as a key facility 
  from which to conduct aggressive reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering 
  missions around the DMZ. Being outside the military hierarchy, and subject 
  to little oversight or accountability, the CIA quietly operated in Laos and both 
  Vietnams, using a network of local agents and turned NVA soldiers who were 
  incorporated into Joint Technical Advisory Detachment (JTAD) 14, to 
  conduct deep, unsupervised field missions. As Special Forces constructed 
  bunkers and reinforced their positions at Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) 
  throughout late 1965, on December 22 they destroyed a large NVA patrol 
  following a chance encounter. The NVA retaliated on January 3, 1966, by 
  shelling the camp with debuting 120mm mortars; the Marines mistakenly 
  thought this was the extent of heavier enemy weapons in the surrounding 
  hills, and extended their patrols out to some 6km from base to compensate 
  for the weapon’s 5,700m range. To help ascertain enemy activity in the area, 
  small propeller aircraft that were providing visual reconnaissance during 
  Operation Tiger Hound were occasionally reallocated from the US Air Force’s 
  aerial interdiction effort against the Hồ Chí Minh Trail south of Xépôn.
  With signs of an increasing enemy presence along the North Vietnamese 
  border, in August 1966, III MAF initiated Prairie, a five-month operation to 
  clear enemy forces south of the DMZ from Gio Linh toward Khe Sanh, where 
  1/3 Marines was correspondingly sent on September 29. With conventional 
  As the expanding American 
  commitment of personnel to 
  Vietnam reciprocally caused 
  an increase in NVA 
  infiltration, on March 6, 
  1967, the US Secretary of 
  Defense, Robert S. 
  McNamara, directed the 
  Joint Chiefs of Staff to 
  initiate the construction of a 
  40km-long barrier along the 
  DMZ’s southern edge. As 
  the US bombing campaign 
  against the North had failed 
  significantly to impact the 
  flow of men and material 
  south, the concept was 
  similar in function to what 
  the French military had 
  recently constructed to fight 
  an insurgency war in 
  Algeria. It was to consist of 
  early warning seismic and 
  acoustic sensors, barbed 
  wire, gravel mines that 
  eluded metal detectors, and 
  sprayed plastic pellets. 
  Carefully selected fortified 
  positions constructed on 
  key terrain would provide a 
  manned element, while a 
  series of strongpoints along 
  likely NVA approaches, and 
  air interdiction, would 
  control the western DMZ, 
  with aircraft-dropped 
  sensors beyond the Laotian 
  border. Despite numerous 
  senior-commander protests 
  that offensively minded 
  Marines would be better 
  used in actively countering 
  NVA efforts to annex South 
  Vietnam’s two northern 
  provinces than in building 
  such a system, the “MACV 
  Practice Nine Requirements 
  Plan” was approved, much 
  to the dismay of Lieutenant 
  General Lewis W. Walt, the 
  III MAF commander. Here, 
  Walt confers with General 
  Westmoreland, wearing a 
  187th RCT (Airborne) patch; 
  Brigadier General Lowell E. 
  English (Asst. CO, 3rd 
  Marine Division); Lieutenant 
  Colonel Van D. Bell (CO, 
  1/1 Marines); and Captain 
  J.F. Trehy. (PFC E.L. Cole, 
  Marine Corps)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  30
  forces strengthening the facility, between December 1966 and January 1967, 
  its Special Forces contingent relocated to Làng Vây nearer the Laotian border. 
  Although Prairie resulted in considerable NVA casualties, the DMZ’s western 
  edge remained relatively quiet. During January 8–28, 1967, however, North 
  Vietnamese and local guerrilla activity increased noticeably, including rocket 
  and mortar fire. With its assignment completed, 1/3 Marines was withdrawn 
  from the KSCB area, and on February 6, a reinforced Bravo Company, 1/9 
  Marines took its place, alongside India Battery, 3/12 Marines, with its 105mm 
  M101A1 howitzers, 155mm M114 howitzers, and 4.2in “Goon Gun” 
  mortars, with respective ranges of 11,270m, 14,600m, and 4,023m. In an 
  effort to disrupt the growing NVA presence along the North Vietnamese 
  border, on February 25, Westmoreland authorized III MAF to fire artillery 
  against military targets inside and beyond the DMZ, which until the previous 
  year had been officially off-limits to American personnel. The enemy replied 
  in kind, targeting Gio Linh, Cồn Tiên, and Camp Carroll, which as fire-
  support bases possessed 155mm howitzers and M107 175mm self-propelled 
  guns for mutually supportive artillery fire. The MACV commander also 
  looked to reposition Army elements to reinforce I Corps’ southern sector, in 
  order to free Marines for operations farther north.
  NVA forces commensurately increased their presence along the DMZ, 
  including the Khe Sanh area, and on February 25 a patrol from Bravo 
  Company, 1/9 Marines made enemy first contact just 1.5km west of the 
  airstrip. With NVA forces having tried unsuccessfully to overrun KSCB on 
  March 3, four days later, Major General Bruno A. Hochmuth’s 3rd Marine 
  Division reinforced the red dust-covered base with Echo Company, 2/9 
  Marines, which assisted in patrolling Hill 881S and Hill 861, suffering 18 
  A member of the Weapons 
  Platoon, H&S 
  (Headquarters and Service) 
  Company, 2/3 Marines fires 
  a 106mm recoilless rifle 
  near Hill 881N in this 
  photograph taken after the 
  Hill Fights. The M274 
  “Mechanical Mule” was 
  often used to mount such 
  weapons to provide a 
  degree of mobility. Note the 
  steering column has been 
  moved away to provide 
  additional room. (Lance 
  Corporal Stevens (Marine 
  Corps))
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  31
  killed during an encounter on March 16. Local 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion 
  Marine Force Recon patrols and Tiger Hound pilots reporting an alarming 
  buildup of enemy fortifications and activity combined to indicate a growing 
  threat to the facility’s security.
  In early 1967 Giáp, now NVA Commander-in-Chief, began formulating 
  a plan involving multiple attacks against all major South Vietnamese cities, as 
  a prelude to forcing South Vietnam to sue for peace. As a prelude to draw 
  enemy attention north, two descendants of the six vaunted Việt Minh-era 
  “Steel and Iron Divisions” that had been reconstituted in late 1965 –  325C 
  Division (18C, 95C, and 101D regiments), and 304A Division (9B, 57B, and 
  66B regiments) – were moved into the DMZ. Numbered in the 300s to 
  differentiate Vietnamese from Chinese divisional numbering in the 100s and 
  200s, these replacement formations received the same numerical designation 
  as their cadre unit, followed by a letter designation. Once in position, the pair 
  conducted heavy bombardments against American bases all along the border, 
  while additional forces sought to isolate KSCB from ground supply by cutting 
  Route 9 to the east. For the last several weeks, overcast, foggy conditions 
  allowed 18C (NVA) Regiment quietly to enter hills surrounding Khe Sanh 
  from the west, where its personnel built bunkers and defensive positions from 
  which they would soon launch an attack against the base.
  With sufficient forces in place, the Marines extended their patrols out to 
  some 10,000m; always aware of the range of supporting artillery to avoid any 
  “firebase psychosis,” by March, 11th and 12th Marines provided artillery along 
  the DMZ’s length. On April 18, Corporal Robin Walker led “Hawk Patrol” 
  (Alpha Company, 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion), inserted by CH-46 Sea 
  Knight some 8km north of the three hills, on a ridge leading to Hill 665. 
  During their patrol, they encountered evidence of a large NVA force, and 
  moved to higher ground to better observe the area, where they remained for 
  the next five days reporting considerable enemy movement at night. Several 
  Special Operations Group members who had been conducting CIDG training 
  through the hills northwest of the base corroborated Tiger Hound reports, and 
  considering the area’s numerous bunkers and enemy personnel, recommended 
  that the area be prepared by air strikes, after which an artillery barrage would 
  precede a Marine ground sweep to eliminate the danger definitively. Numerous, 
  exaggerated higher-command intelligence reports of large enemy movement 
  along the western DMZ had left the Marine base commander, Lieutenant 
  Colonel James H. Reeder, unconvinced, and in need of definitive proof before 
  allocating already overstretched 3rd Marine Division assets.
  A 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 
  A-4E Skyhawk drops 125kg 
  BLU-10/B napalm canisters 
  on NVA targets on May 7, 
  1967. First used in 1942, the 
  thin canisters risked ground 
  fire, and other penetrating 
  impacts that could 
  prematurely trigger 
  oxygenation and an 
  explosion. Although 
  stabilizing fins could be 
  added, the tumbling by those 
  lacking such fins better 
  spread the contents. In 
  addition to the two Marine 
  companies at Khe Sanh, 
  US Army M42A1 2×40mm 
  Duster air-defense vehicles, 
  a Marine M50A1 Ontos 
  antitank platoon, and various 
  support personnel were 
  available to help occupy the 
  perimeter, and free forces for 
  localized patrols. Three 
  UH-34D Sikorsky Seahorse 
  helicopters were also 
  stationed at the base for 
  medevac, reconnaissance, 
  and resupply. A platoon-
  sized “Sparrow Hawk” 
  standby force was available 
  to assist the 
  3rd Reconnaissance 
  Battalion as needed via 
  rapid helicopter insertion, as 
  were Camp Carroll and the 
  “Rockpile,” with their 155mm 
  M114 howitzers and 
  40,000m-ranged 175mm 
  M107 self-propelled guns. 
  (Sergeant Groscoat (Marine 
  Corps))
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  32
  Battlefield environment
  Intermittent rain and repeated US air and artillery strikes had 
  left sections of the rugged hills northwest of KSCB muddy 
  and scorched, although not enough to uncover or eliminate 
  all of the numerous NVA bunkers. At several hundred 
  meters above sea level, daytime temperatures reached the 
  relatively mild mid-80 degrees Fahrenheit (roughly 28–32 
  degrees Celsius), with a light breeze. Low clouds, however, 
  frequently prevented American tactical air support, although 
  many of the surrounding indigenous tribes provided valuable 
  intelligence and ground support. Having lived in Indochina 
  for over two millennia, the Montagnards’ ancestral land 
  encompassed much of what was designated South Vietnam. 
  In large measure to assist their fight to gain cultural and 
  political autonomy from both its, and the North’s government 
  infringement and persecution, many allied themselves with 
  the American effort. Much of the area was covered in triple-
  canopy jungle, while the ground featured clusters of bamboo 
  and tall elephant grass, and dense, sometimes impassible 
  terrain, through which centuries of Montagnard foot traffic 
  had produced narrow paths.
  Originally a French airstrip, KSCB served as a vital supply 
  asset, as the only land option along Route 9 was generally 
  unsuited for large vehicles. Its exposed position made it 
  vulnerable to artillery and rocket fire from the surrounding 
  hills. With NVA activity along the western DMZ and Laotian 
  border, the garrison encountered enemy forces on Hill 861, 
  Hill 881N, and Hill 881S on April 23, 1967, and over the next 
  several days would eject them from the area.
  An aerial view of KSCB looking north on 
  September 12, 1967. The dark terrain to the 
  upper right is the base of Hill 1015. Roughly 
  1,100km long, the mountains of the Annamite 
  Range had served as the natural boundary 
  between Vietnam and Laos for centuries. 
  During the First Indochina War, Việt Minh 
  forces used the remote region’s numerous, 
  well-trodden trails to maintain communication 
  along, and inside, Vietnam’s lengthy border. 
  At the onset of subsequent American 
  involvement, the region once again provided a 
  relatively safe, albeit restricted, supply and 
  infiltration route into South Vietnam. Just 
  north of the DMZ, the Mụ Giạ and Ban Karai 
  passes served as major access points for NVA 
  units moving south along the Hồ Chí Minh 
  Trail. Prior to Route 9’s dirt construction in 
  1904, armies had used the Đại Lào Pass 
  between Xépôn, Laos, on the Mekong River, 
  and Quảng Trị in Vietnam to launch cross-
  border invasions. In May 1961 it was similarly 
  used following the NVA capture of the 
  Laotian town, which was then incorporated 
  into the logistical route. (Staff Sergeant 
  Thomas N. Bland, Jr. (Marine Corps))
  1 0530hrs, April 24: 1st and 3rd Rifle platoons from Bravo 
  Company, 1/9 Marines advance for Hill 516.
  2 Mid-morning, April 24: Elements from 18C (NVA) 
  Regiment initiate an ambush against the Marine platoons.
  3 April 27: Having been brought to the area as 
  reinforcements, elements of 2/3 and 3/3 Marines move into 
  the hills northwest of KSCB.
  4 April 28: Echo Company, 2/3 Marines advances on Hill 
  881N.
  5 Midday, April 29: Mike Company, 3/3 Marines on Hill 
  881S engages lead elements from 5 Infantry Battalion, 95C 
  (NVA) Regiment.
  6 1230hrs, April 30: Mike Company, 3/3 Marines begins to 
  extricate itself from Hill 881S.
  3/3 Marines and 95C (NVA) Regiment in the Hill Fights, April 23–30, 1967
  MAP KEY
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  33
  II
  4
  95C
  II
  6
  95C
  II
  5
  95C (-)
  II
  2
  3
  II
  3
  3
  III
  95C
  326C
  III
  18C
  325C
  I
  B
  9
  I
  K
  9
  I
  H
  3
  I
  M
  3
  I
  M
  9
  I
  G
  3
  I
  E
  3
  4
  2
  1
  3
  6
  5
  PROVINCIAL
  ROUTE 606
  Rao Quan River
  Khe Sanh
  Combat Base
  27 April
  Platoon
  patrol base
  758
  881N
  881S
  516
  861
  700
  558
  950
  1015
  505
  N
  0
  1 mile
  0
  1km
  Movements on April 28
  Movements on April 29
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  34
  INTO COMBAT
  While 3rd Platoon, Bravo Company, 1/9 Marines conducted a routine sweep 
  of several ridge fingers that ran north and northwest of Hill 861, at around 
  1630hrs on April 23, 1st Platoon sighted several previously unknown caves 
  on Hill 516. For the last several days, the unit had been running squad-sized 
  patrols out of a nearby platoon patrol base, but without enemy contact, the 
  consensus was that the NVA had left the area for the flatter terrain to the east. 
  To settle the matter to his satisfaction, Reeder ordered both platoons to 
  converge to investigate the area, while Second Lieutenant Thomas G. King’s 
  2nd Platoon, Bravo Company remained at the base as potential reinforcement. 
  The two platoons met at around 1800hrs, and settled in for a restless, but 
  uneventful night roughly 300m apart, and 1km north of Hill 861.
  At 0530hrs on April 24, 1st and 3rd platoons, Bravo Company set out 
  once again just before dawn, amid rain and low clouds. The fog lifted a few 
  hours later and the units headed west along parallel routes some 300m apart, 
  en route to Hill 516. As the Marines approached the recently discovered 
  caves, enemy activity was unexpected considering the area’s relatively open 
  terrain that was devoid of much cover. Suddenly, one of the men in 3rd 
  Squad, 1st Platoon sighted almost a half-dozen khaki-uniformed NVA soldiers 
  moving their way and carrying a wounded comrade on a stretcher. As the 
  Marines moved to establish an ambush, they were sighted and engaged at 
  some 50m. Returning fire, they drove the stretcher bearers off, killing the 
  wounded enemy soldier and another attempting to escape down the hill. 
  Considering the vitriol and determination with which both sides fought, 
  quarter was not expected or given, and prisoners were rarely taken. As nearby 
  NVA forces soon responded with heavy fire, both Marine platoons maneuvered 
  to protective defiles in the terrain to establish defensive positions, under a 
  60mm mortar’s protection, which dropped accurate fire from its exposed 
  location. Taking casualties, 1st Platoon was ordered to withdraw to the Bravo 
  Company commander, Captain Mike Sayers, after which low-flying F-4 
  Phantom II aircraft flew in to skim the nearby area with napalm; a few 
  foolhardy NVA soldiers resisted the effort with AK-47 fire. With Bravo 
  Company’s Weapons Platoon having returned to KSCB that morning after 
  having spent the last few days sweeping the southern approaches to Hill 861, 
  it soon went back out to support Second Lieutenant King, who had moved 
  his 30-man 2nd Platoon, an 81mm section with 120 rounds, and an Ontos, 
  with its six external M40 106mm recoilless rifles, up to Hill 700 to provide 
  support. By 1000hrs, King had reached his designated position, from where 
  he bombarded the cave area with mortar fire. Five Marines sent ahead as 
  observers came under NVA fire from Hill 861’s crest, some 300m to the 
  northwest; while trying to extract themselves, all but one of the Marines were 
  killed. Sayers took a helicopter up to Hill 700, which came under intense fire, 
  followed by an odd silence across Hill 861. Although no observation post 
  could be established there, 81mm mortars effectively helped 1st Platoon’s 
  extraction to medevac the wounded out. Although one helicopter came in and 
  removed several casualties, increasing enemy fire prohibited a second from 
  landing, and what remained of 1st Platoon dug in for the night. With M18A1 
  Claymores being an integral part of perimeter defense, the NVA and VC 
  would often try to quietly turn the directional C-4 explosive to spray hundreds 
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  35
  of ball bearings back on an unwary user, to which the Marines often countered 
  by placing a fragmentation grenade underneath it as an eventual deterrent.
  Having fared little better than their Bravo Company comrades, the men 
  of 3rd Platoon were ordered to pull back as well, during which they had to 
  leave half of their equipment behind, and struggled with improvised stretchers 
  to remove the wounded. As the American unit searched for a suitable 
  helicopter landing zone, NVA mortar fire rained down, although the targets 
  moved faster than the crews could effectively adjust their weapons. With the 
  Marines on the ground greatly outnumbered, American aircraft continued to 
  hit NVA positions with napalm, with some striking friendly units in the 
  vicinity. While establishing preventative safety zones, radar guidance, and 
  subordination to Forward Air Controller (FAC), the Americans could never 
  entirely eliminate blue-on-blue fire. 3rd Platoon also had to dig in for the 
  night, without the benefit of entrenching tools, some 900m from 1st Platoon. 
  With 2nd Platoon’s mortar section having exhausted its ammunition, Sayers 
  withdrew the mortar crews to base.
  By dawn on Wednesday April 25, 18C (NVA) Regiment had established 
  itself on Hill 861, with 95C (NVA) Regiment a few kilometers to the west. Just 
  to the north, a small group of NVA soldiers was making their way toward the 
  latter when they inadvertently walked into “Hawk Patrol’s” kill zone, and during 
  the ensuing close combat, the American team was whittled to just four effectives. 
  With Corporal Walker having been wounded, Corporal Thomas Rudolph, the 
  assistant team leader, assumed the role as the Marines looked for a medevac 
  landing zone. When the first CH-46, and attending gunships, arrived soon 
  after, heavy NVA fire halted the effort, and with both door gunners’ weapons 
  having jammed, the twin-engine helicopter withdrew. A second Sea Knight 
  came in to land below heavy gunship fire, but still took small-arms rounds and 
  hand grenades, as the crew dragged the wounded to the helicopter while it 
  leaked transmission fluid. As the first head count totaled only five, a crew 
  member went out there to help a “Hawk Patrol” member retrieve two other 
  wounded. Having unknowingly fought elements of a NVA battalion that was 
  moving toward Hill 881N in preparation for a fight, six wounded or unconscious 
  and two effective personnel of “Hawk Patrol” boarded the CH-46, which 
  evacuated the entire force to KSCB, and ultimately to Đà Nẵng.
  That morning, as 3rd Platoon, Bravo Company was preparing to walk point 
  ahead of the unit, a NVA deserter suddenly walked into the gathering as the 
  Marines were organizing their equipment. He identified himself as Vũ Văn Tích 
  Before the widespread 
  availability of the AK-47, 
  and its derivatives, North 
  Vietnamese forces used 
  captured small arms from 
  the French, Japanese, and 
  elsewhere, and those 
  supplied by Communist 
  allies. As the Chinese Type 
  50 submachine gun (based 
  on the Soviet PPSh-41) was 
  considered too bulky, 
  Vietnamese manufacturers 
  converted them to be 
  lighter, and better suited to 
  the environments in which 
  they were to operate. As 
  such the barrel jacket was 
  shortened by 76mm, the 
  muzzle compensator 
  removed, a wooden handle 
  and front sight were added, 
  and a lighter, collapsible 
  steel-wire buttstock was 
  incorporated to replace the 
  heavier wooden variety. The 
  weapon could use a PPSh-
  41-type 35-round curved 
  box magazine or its 71-
  round drum to fire 7.62mm 
  bullets, and although its 
  accuracy was poor beyond 
  100m, its 700 rounds-per-
  minute rate of fire offered 
  some compensation. (Tom 
  Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
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  36
  from 4 Battalion, 32 (NVA) Regiment (341 (NVA) Division), which had 
  recently been reported in the A Sầu Valley west of Huế; this initially concerned 
  the Marines that they had been surrounded. One helicopter arrived at the 
  platoon landing zone soon after, which brought up Sayers and 22 Marines of 
  his 2nd Platoon, and returned with several wounded, including the enemy 
  combatant. Throughout the day, ongoing NVA fire and later a dense fog 
  conspired to keep medevac helicopters from removing casualties from Hill 861 
  and depositing supplies. Marines engaged the enemy, while trying to extract 
  their wounded and killed comrades, but as the poor visibility continued into the 
  late afternoon, and made movement through the area’s tall elephant grass risky, 
  they settled in for another night in the field. Soon after, B Team, 27 (NVA) 
  Artillery Battalion fired rockets that arced overhead en route to the airbase.
  I was almost killed right in my first battle … of course, everybody prefers to stay alive. 
  However, when I went South I knew that I would either be killed or captured. I 
  accepted my fate. Many North Vietnamese were killed by American bombs. And 
  many South Vietnamese were also killed and disabled by American air and artillery 
  attacks, so how can a soldier like me avoid death? The point is, sometimes one should 
  accept death so that his younger generation will grow. One feels better when he knows 
  about this fact of life. (PFC Nguyễn Xuân Đại, 1 Battalion, 2 (NVA) Regiment)
   
  On Thursday April 26, word arrived that NVA formations had executed an 
  orchestrated, simultaneous attack on multiple Marine bases along the DMZ. 
  US intelligence also determined that the enemy had moved an entire division 
  into Laos, and sent a full regiment into the hills around KSCB, through which 
  the Americans thought an additional one to two regiments would pass, en 
  route to destroying the facility. With the NVA threat evident, Lieutenant 
  Starting in November 1950, 
  a joint US Army–Marine 
  Corps project aimed to 
  produce a light, air-
  transportable antitank 
  vehicle based on the M56 
  Light Antitank Vehicle that 
  would incorporate the engine 
  of the 2½-ton GMC truck. 
  With the unveiling of the first 
  prototype in 1953, however, 
  the Army so disliked the 
  result that it withdrew from 
  the endeavor. Having 
  envisioned the ungainly-
  looking vehicle’s potential to 
  fit within its combat mindset, 
  the Marines ordered 297 
  examples of what it officially 
  titled “Rifle, Multiple 106mm 
  self-propelled M50.” With 
  only around half still in 
  service when they were sent 
  to Vietnam in 1965, the 
  Ontos proved itself very 
  capable in infantry support, 
  with High-Explosive Anti-
  Tank (HEAT) and “beehive” 
  rounds for use against 
  bunkers and personnel. The 
  Ontos’ light weight allowed it 
  to negotiate terrain that was 
  too soft for most other 
  combat vehicles, and be 
  rapidly repositioned. (Tom 
  Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
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  37
  Colonel Earl R. “Pappy” Delong’s 2/3 Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Gary 
  Wilder’s 3/3 Marines, plus Mike and Lima companies, 3/9 Marines, were sent 
  to reinforce the Khe Sanh position. Weather similarly hampered the movement 
  of the command element of 3/3 Marines into the Khe Sanh area from the 
  “Rockpile.” Wilder brought his Kilo Company, 3/3 Marines, which – along 
  with its four officers, five Navy Corpsmen, and 128 enlisted men – included 
  artillery, mortar forward observers, and a battalion scout element. Having 
  commanded the battalion for just three weeks, Wilder ordered his men to 
  capture Hill 861, and after arriving at KSCB in the early afternoon of April 26, 
  by 1705hrs Kilo Company was in action and approaching its goal. Coming 
  under fire some 300m from the summit, from bunkers on the crest and mortars 
  from the reverse slope, within 30 minutes 3rd Platoon’s 37 Marines were 
  As the VC frequently 
  operated in the field, and 
  avoided constructing the 
  very visible fire support 
  bases and other established 
  positions, concealed 
  positions offered some 
  protection against 
  observation, especially from 
  the air. Dwellings such as 
  this bunker were covered 
  with between 1m and 1.5m 
  of earth and logs to resist 
  artillery and mortar impacts, 
  with fresh foliage employed 
  to best blend in with the 
  surrounding jungle, and 
  make them all but invisible 
  beyond a few meters. An 
  all-round defensive system 
  of trenches and tunnels 
  commonly connected 
  several supporting bunkers 
  and gun emplacements to 
  facilitate communications, 
  logistics, and redeployment. 
  Most complexes comprised 
  20 to 40 bunkers, with each 
  generally 3m wide by 2m 
  high by 1.5m deep. (Tom 
  Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
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  38
  whittled down to ten. With such losses making disengagement impossible, 
  Wilder allocated 2nd Platoon from near the battalion command post.
  During the morning of April 28, 2/3 Marines moved to the northwest en 
  route to clear Hill 861, upon which earlier airstrikes had dropped some 191 
  tons (173 metric tons) of ordnance, including a dozen Mark 84 bombs that 
  each left an 11m-deep, 15m-wide crater, and spewed fragmentation out to 
  nearly 400m. Artillery had similarly joined the softening process with 968 
  observed mission rounds, along with 107 used for harassment and interdiction 
  fire. Some 10km east and 10km west of Hill 861, two B-52 “Arc Light” 
  missions provided additional, peripheral support, which endeavored to keep 
  NVA reinforcements from joining the ground fight. By early afternoon, Echo 
  Company, 2/3 Marines, moving up abreast of Golf Company, reached just 
  northwest of Hill 861. Sporadic 60mm NVA mortar fire was soon silenced, 
  as the company’s mortar section fired equally sized counter-fire rounds, and 
  the hill was soon secured at 1630hrs. With the terrain feature now secured, 
  3/3 Marines moved to a position 2km south of 2/3 Marines in preparation 
  for the next day’s mission that comprised taking Hill 881S and Hill 881N. 
  Each platoon sent a fire team to a stream nearby to fill canteens for the others, 
  and although at least one NVA soldier lay dead in the water, adding iodine 
  tablets was considered sufficient to make the water potable.
  At noon on April 29, Wilder’s lead element – Mike Company, 3/9 Marines 
  – moved through the valley between Hill 861 and its next objective, where its 
  1st Platoon encountered an entrenched NVA force with snipers and automatic 
  weapons; an air strike with napalm soon silenced it. Meanwhile, Captain 
  Raymond H. Bennett had led Mike Company, 3/3 Marines past the left flank 
  of those engaged to gain the battalion’s intermediate objective, a lower hillock 
  northeast of Hill 881S, where 20 NVA soldiers and two mortar crews were 
  seen sighting their weapons. US artillery support was called in with desired 
  effect, and the NVA crews only managed to fire four rounds; for the rest of 
  the night, Bennett’s command had no further enemy contact. NVA defenses 
  on Hill 881S consisted of very well-camouflaged bunkers, with both knobs of 
  the hill organized for defense, each an independent strongpoint with linear 
  defenses between the knolls. There were six mortar pits, linked with the 
  command posts by communications wire, with the main command post on 
  the western knoll. During the night of April 29/30, the NVA commander 
  quietly inserted the fresh 95C (NVA) Regiment into excellent defensive 
  positions on Hill 881S and Hill 881N, while withdrawing the shattered 18C 
  (NVA) Regiment, which broke contact and returned to base camps in Laos.
   
  After fine-tuning our defensive posture for the night, Echo Company officers were 
  summoned to the company command post (CP) for a briefing. During that 
  briefing, we were told that elements of the 3rd and 9th Marines were moving to 
  an intermediate objective to our west-northwest to continue the attack on Hill 881 
  South the morning of 30 April. We were told that literally hundreds of North 
  Vietnamese had been spotted in the open on 881 South and that artillery 
  bombardment would prevail on the hill most of the night. It did. Artillery rained 
  down on Hill 881 South so heavily and for so long, we thought that nothing could 
  have survived it and that next day would be a piece of cake for the attacking unit 
  or units. Not so, as we could later attest. (2nd Lieutenant James R. Cannon, 
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  39
  Commander 2nd Platoon, Echo Company, 2/3 Marines, courtesy Paul Marquis, 
  Bravo Battery & Echo Company Marines Website)
   
  The next morning, fresh NVA soldiers awaited their battered adversary, who 
  now had to fight uphill. At 0800hrs on April 30, Mike Company, 3/3 Marines 
  initiated its assault on Hill 881S; its forward platoon reached the western end 
  of the westernmost knoll by 1025hrs and began to swing back. With sporadic 
  enemy fire increasing in volume, Bennett sent in 2nd Platoon to assist, but it 
  was unable to maneuver, as the enemy held firm in their bunkers. The 155mm 
  detachment supporting the attack consisted of older, towed guns, with long, 
  awkward trails, and in the muddy terrain, their crews needed 30 minutes to 
  reposition them to engage another location.
   
  It was a Sunday, April 30, 1967. I was sitting in elephant grass next to two North 
  Vietnamese enemy soldiers who had been charcoaled by napalm. Around 11 AM 
  I was gazing up Hill 881 South not knowing that in an hour or so we would be 
  assaulting the hill. Hill 881 South was really a mountain that was 881 meters 
  above sea level. I was seeing the enemy NVA moving like rats from one hole to 
  another. I was around a half mile [0.8km] away watching them moving from hole 
  to hole or bunker to bunker. (PFC Kenneth Flowers, Kilo Company, 3/9 Marines)
  Golf Company, 2/3 Marines 
  assaulting Hill 881N on April 
  29, 1967. As part of their 
  M61 “Deuce” kit, some have 
  covered M43 entrenching 
  tools, which had an M1910 
  hanger to attach them to 
  their M41 haversacks. They 
  wear M1 helmets, with 
  reversible Mitchell covers 
  showing the green leaf 
  pattern, carry M61 
  ammunition pouches, a 
  Carlisle bandage pouch, and 
  appear to have 4th-type 
  (2nd-pattern) jungle boots. 
  The Marine in the center also 
  has a three-pocket grenade 
  carrier on his left thigh. The 
  surrounding elephant grass 
  hampered the identification 
  of NVA bunkers and 
  defensive positions. Note the 
  lack of flak jackets, and the 
  extra M1956 canteen. (Staff 
  Sergeant R.E. Wilson 
  (Marine Corps))
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  41
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  Bennett eventually committed his 3rd Platoon along with others in a bid to 
  secure the eastern face of the hill, which resulted in heavy casualties. For 
  Wilder, at battalion HQ, Hill 881S was too difficult and his men would have 
  to come off so that the hill could be pounded by more air and artillery 
  support. Around noon, he sent Kilo Company, 3/9 Marines to help Bennett 
  disengage from the maelstrom; the Marines thought flak jackets would slow 
  their advance and they were left behind.
   
  There was a three prong movement of Marines going up the hill … Some were 
  going up the ravines, but we were going up a ridge. I was the point man (scout) of 
  a single file of a company behind us. I got almost three-fourths to the top of the 
  hill. First Lieutenant John Braxton Woodall sent two other men, Eddie Aponte, 
  from New Jersey, and Freddie Pitts, my fire team leader from Walton Beach, 
  Florida on as scouts. They went above us 20 to 30 yards [18–27m]. I heard a 
  machine gun cut loose on them. Evidently, they walked over a machine gun nest, 
  a bunker hole with machine guns camouflaged with brush and bamboo and tree 
  limbs. (PFC Kenneth Flowers, Kilo Company, 3/9 Marines)
   
  By 1230hrs heavy NVA fire forced Wilder to order a withdrawal, which took 
  several hours to accomplish, during which the Marines removed 109 
  wounded, but not the 43 presumed dead. Mike Company, 3/3 Marines 
  effectively ceased to exist as a fighting force, and it was soon withdrawn to 
  Đông Hà; Echo Company, 2/9 Marines took its place.
   
  I saw a hand grenade hit about 3 or 4 feet [80–120cm] from me … it hit me and 
  paralyzed my right arm, blew up my right leg, and jammed my neck around to the 
  left … The rest of the squad, around ten to twelve men, pulled up while bullets 
  from enemy rifles were kicking up dust the dust like a rain shower on a hot 
  summer day. People were falling left and right. In a minute or two all the bullets 
  stopped and all I could hear were people moaning in pain. I looked up around the 
  side of a hill and saw a North Vietnamese soldier coming toward me maybe 30 
  yards [27m] away. He had the coned shaped hat draping over his back attached by 
  two strings and his rifle was pointing down like he was on a rabbit hunt. He 
  The Hill Fights
  With US Marines having worked for several days to clear 18C 
  (NVA) Regiment from the hills overlooking KSCB to the 
  northwest, on April 30, 1967, 3/3 Marines attempted to 
  secure Hill 881S’s heavily fortified crest. Although aerial 
  bombing and artillery had been used in an effort to support 
  the US assault, the area’s heavy foliage helped preserve much 
  of the concealed bunkers and trenchworks, which the fresh 
  95C (NVA) Regiment had occupied the night before, having 
  replaced its shattered predecessor. With Mike Company 
  elements having captured Hill 881S’s western edge by the late 
  morning, 2nd Platoon (shown here) struck the eastern knoll 
  using small arms that included M79 grenade launchers, M60 
  machine guns, and recently allocated XM16E1 assault rifles. 
  Prone to jamming, and firing a 5.56mm round that lacked the 
  mass to effectively penetrate jungle terrain, in such an 
  environment the latter proved inferior to the NVA’s Type 56, 
  with its more reliable, looser mechanical tolerances, and 
  larger 7.62mm bullet. Although visibility at the nearly 
  kilometer-high battlefield was good, such close ground 
  fighting hindered tactical air support that risked blue-on-blue 
  casualties. Fought down against heavy opposition, Mike 
  Company received assistance from Kilo Company, which 
  finally enabled the Marines to eliminate resistance.
  P R E V I O U S  PA G E S
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  43
  appeared to have a smile on his face. I was still trying to get the magazine into the 
  rifle so I could kill him. I wasn’t thinking about pain from my injuries. I was 
  thinking, “Kill him before he kills me.” I was aiming for his head. I didn’t see the 
  second hand grenade, and it blew me down the hill. I went one way and the rifle 
  went another. Now I had shrapnel in my right buttock, right thigh, and more 
  shrapnel all up and down my right leg. Two or three enemy soldiers came out of 
  their bunkers above me and started shooting the moaning Marines in their heads. 
  (PFC Kenneth Flowers, Kilo Company, 3/9 Marines)
   
  In an effort to secure Wilder’s right and reach a suitable position from which 
  to assault Hill 881N, 2/3 Marines moved off Hill 861 when another sharp 
  fight ensued. Delong committed two rifle companies to sweep Hill 881N’s 
  base, with 1,685 rounds of artillery and 118 air sorties dropping 323,750lb 
  (146.85 metric tons) of bombs and rockets in support. Unknown to the 
  Marines, the NVA forces withdrew from Hill 881S during the night of April 
  30/May 1. Thus the big bombardment by 166 air sorties dropping 325 tons 
  (294 metric tons) of bombs and 1,445 artillery rounds at Hill 881S and Hill 
  881N on May 1 achieved little. The next day, May 1, Wilder’s Marines went 
  in again against the former with two companies on the line, but found little 
  save several collapsed bunkers. Throughout early May the Marines secured 
  the area and evicted NVA forces. During 16 days of fighting northwest of 
  KSCB, Marine casualties included 168 killed, 443 wounded, and two 
  missing. They confirmed 807 enemy dead, another 611 probable, and six 
  prisoners. Support comprised 23,472 artillery rounds and 1,915 tons (1,737 
  metric tons) of air-delivered ordnance – 16 percent napalm and 84 percent 
  explosives – from 1,170 sorties.
  Hill 881S as seen from Hill 
  881N on October 23, 1967. 
  The results of artillery and 
  air attacks on the terrain are 
  evident. (Lieutenant Olsen 
  (Marine Corps))
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  44
  BACKGROUND TO BATTLE
  At the end of June 1967, some 35,000 NVA soldiers were positioned above 
  the DMZ in preparation for a forthcoming general offensive, in conjunction 
  with an uprising in South Vietnam. Although Giáp objected to such an 
  undertaking, he ultimately acceded to the enterprise espoused by the General 
  Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Lê Duẩn, which like 
  Westmoreland’s “big battles” concept was expected to score an important 
  propaganda victory ahead of the South’s September 3 presidential elections. 
  Following the Marines’ successful completion of Operation Buffalo (July 
  2–14), in which they tried to neutralize the buildup around Cồn Tiên, the 
  considerable number of casualties they inflicted on 90 (NVA) Regiment 
  illustrated that the North was willing to accept such losses in hindering the 
  construction of the “McNamara Line.” Under the newly created DMZ Front 
  Headquarters, 304, 320, and 325C (NVA) divisions focused on Khe Sanh, 
  while 324B (NVA) Division, under General Giáp Văn Cương, with its 31, 
  803, 812, and 90 (NVA) regiments, remained near the DMZ and Cồn Tiên. 
  With most of its personnel well fed, supplied, and rested, the aggressive, 
  disciplined formation possessed the usual mix of 12.7mm machine guns, 
  AK-47 and SKS assault rifles, B-40s, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, and 
  60mm and 82mm mortars, in addition to artillery, rockets, antiaircraft guns, 
  and surface-to-air missiles. Many sported captured enemy uniforms (including 
  Operation Kingfisher 
  July 28–29, 1967
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  45
  flak jackets and helmets) and weapons, such as M1 and M2 carbines, M14s, 
  and M16s, and had stockpiled a considerable amount of ammunition and 
  established a communications network. Having such a surplus, NVA artillery 
  and rockets were fired from the relatively safe zone north of the Bến Hải 
  River to harass nearby Marine bases – especially Cồn Tiên, considering its 
  proximity to the DMZ – with each at a disadvantage in targeting and 
  conducting counterbattery fire into or beyond the border.
  Concerned that 324B (NVA) Division might assault the Strong Point 
  Obstacle System barrier near its present terminus at Cồn Tiên, III MAF 
  ordered a new operation, Hickory II, into effect on July 13, 1967. Similar to 
  A trio of Communist-
  supplied weapons to North 
  Vietnam. The Soviet-
  produced RPD (“Degtyaryov 
  handheld machine gun”) (or 
  its Type 56 Chinese copy) 
  shown above provided NVA 
  squads with a light, portable 
  weapon that could be fired 
  like an assault rifle, as well 
  as from a bipod. Limited to 
  automatic mode only, it 
  could realistically fire off its 
  100-round drum magazine 
  and reload in about a 
  minute. The centre Soviet 
  SKS (or Chinese Type 56) 
  semiautomatic rifle used a 
  ten-round magazine, with 
  those weapons having 
  serial numbers up to 9 
  million possessing a 
  Russian-style folding blade 
  bayonet, while the 
  remainder had a folding 
  spike variety. The bottom 
  Chinese Type 56 assault 
  rifle, a copy of the Soviet 
  AK-47, had a pivoting blade 
  bayonet in the closed 
  position, and a 30-round 
  magazine. All three 
  weapons fired a 
  7.62×39mm round, with 
  effective ranges of 1,000m, 
  400m, and 350m 
  respectively. (Neil Grant)
  As the VC and NVA often 
  resorted to improvisation, 
  concealed mantraps offered 
  an effective combat modifier 
  that sapped an adversary’s 
  morale and resolve. Non-
  explosive booby traps, such 
  as this “mantrap,” 
  incorporated either a 
  concealed thin cover that 
  broke under a soldier’s 
  weight, or pivoted, to impale 
  him on bamboo Punji stakes 
  or other sharpened 
  implement; these were often 
  coated with poison or human 
  excrement to promote 
  infection. To maximize their 
  impact, “mantraps” were 
  usually established near 
  high-traffic areas, such as 
  helicopter landing zones or 
  river crossings. (Tom 
  Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
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  46
  the first-named action two months earlier, this more limited undertaking 
  looked to sweep the area, and eliminate enemy mortar and artillery positions 
  and ammunition and supply depots along the DMZ’s southern edge, although 
  NVA territory north of the Bến Hải River remained off limits. Once the 
  mission was completed, two battalions returned to the nearby coast to be 
  ready for future rapid insertion, while 3/9 Marines’ remaining personnel 
  began a new operation in the same area. As with the previous endeavor, 
  Kingfisher was intended to block NVA entry through the DMZ and into 
  Quảng Trị Province. Although encountering only minor enemy elements 
  during July 16–27, III MAF had been receiving reports that 324B (NVA) 
  Division was moving across the border, just north of Cồn Tiên, an area 
  nicknamed “The Hill” for the trio of 150m+ hills upon which the clay dust-
  covered base resided. In the lead-up to the expected confrontation, US activity 
  increased, with trucks and CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters depositing a steady 
  flow of ammunition and supplies.
   
  A one-week tank proficiency and orientation course for new personnel (MDS 
  1811) was established prior to assignment of personnel … This training was 
  deemed necessary because the line companies felt that new incoming personnel 
  were not thoroughly familiarized with tank operation and maintenance … Training 
  during July consisted of troop orientation for new personnel and daytime and 
  nighttime patrolling. H&S personnel were fam-fired with the M-16 and re-
  instructed on care and cleaning. A bi-monthly briefing has been established for all 
  Battalion personnel by the Commanding Officer and staff for the purpose of 
  Cồn Tiên Marine Base in 
  June 1967, looking 
  northwest. The darker 
  terrain some 1.5km beyond 
  the hill’s base is the 
  forested area flanking the 
  Bến Hải River, which 
  bisected the DMZ. (T.N. 
  Bland, Jr. (Marine Corps))
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  47
  keeping all hands well-informed on friendly and enemy activities. A special briefing 
  was conducted once a week for all staff non-commissioned officers. The special staff 
  briefings were held nightly … Training was conducted on company level, covering 
  self-aid and buddy-aid, with much of the instruction centering on the use of the 
  morphine syrette and recognition and treatment of heat casualties. VD and personal 
  hygiene lectures were also given. (Headquarters, 3rd Tank Battalion)
  The plan III MAF and 3rd Marine Division commanders had formulated 
  involved a 93 percent-strength 2/9 Marines under Lieutenant Colonel 
  William D. Kent, which had been operating east of Cồn Tiên since July 9. 
  The unit had played a major role in Hickory I in May, and had since operated 
  continuously in “Leatherneck Square,” an area along the DMZ bounded by 
  Cồn Tiên, Gio Linh, Đông Hà, and Cam Lộ, where the Marines maintained 
  a sizeable presence. Now, it was to advance to the Bến Hải River, head east 
  for several kilometers, and turn south toward “The Trace,” a prominent 
  600m-wide cleared strip extending east across the area’s low, rolling hills to the 
  forward artillery position at Gio Linh, with the hope that if Giáp Văn Cương 
  had moved forces into the area, the Marines’ preemptive “spoiling attack” 
  would take them in the rear. Despite the concerns of 3/9 Marines commander, 
  Major Willard H. Woodring, that the planned foray risked getting trapped 
  between the waterway and the surrounding wooded borderlands, just before 
  sunset on July 27, the American battlegroup was assembled in a forested area 
  about 1km southwest of Cồn Tiên in preparation for heading north into the 
  DMZ. To bolster the “show of force,” five M48A3 Patton tanks from Alpha 
  Company, 3rd Tank Battalion, along with three M50A1 Ontos, three Landing 
  Vehicle, Tracked, Engineer (LVTE-1) armored amphibious minesweepers – 
  known as “amtracs” –  and a combat-engineer platoon from 3rd Engineer 
  Battalion were attached, while 3/4 Marines remained at Cồn Tiên as support.
  An M48A3 from the 3rd 
  Tank Battalion pictured with 
  personnel of 3/4 Marines 
  some 2.5km northwest of 
  Cồn Tiên during Kingfisher 
  on July 29, 1967. The lead 
  Marine carries a multirole 
  M60 machine gun, which 
  was modeled on the 
  German MG 42. The “Pig” 
  served as the primary 
  squad automatic weapon. 
  (Lance Corporal L.P. Brown 
  (Marine Corps))
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  48
  1 Morning, July 28: Kilo Company, 3/9 Marines is 
  transported by helicopter from Cồn Tiên to Hill 37. As part of 
  Kilo Company’s effort to support 2/9 Marines’ advance, Hill 
  37’s elevation and open terrain provided an excellent landing 
  zone from which to monitor NVA activities along the Bến Hải 
  River.
  2 Night of July 28/29: Having advanced nearly 2km into 
  the DMZ, 2/9 Marines establishes a position in a bend in the 
  Bến Hải River. Hotel Company, 2/9 Marines reports hearing 
  vehicles across the river, and digging near potential fording 
  sites.
  3 After daybreak, July 29: Engineers and Golf Company, 
  2/9 Marines scout the route ahead, and discover a bridge that 
  in combination with the surrounding soft terrain would prohibit 
  the accompanying armor crossing, prompting the US forces to 
  commence their withdrawal.
  4 1115hrs, July 29: As Echo Company, 2/9 Marines 
  withdraws south along Provincial Route 606 a repurposed 
  250lb (113kg) B-52 bomb is command-detonated by the NVA 
  forces, killing and wounding several Marines.
  5 1300hrs, July 29: As Echo and H&S companies move to 
  establish a landing zone to evacuate their wounded, fire from 
  NVA RPGs and machine guns hampers the effort.
  6 1400hrs, July 29: Echo Company reaches the 
  southernmost ambush site; heavy fire from NVA small arms 
  and RPGs continues to take a toll on the Marines and their 
  vehicles.
  2/9 Marines and 803 (NVA) Regiment in Operation Kingfisher, July 28–29, 1967
  MAP KEY
  Battlefield environment
  Unlike the more temperate region to the west, the low-
  lying terrain north of Cồn Tiên reached temperatures of 
  over 100 degrees Fahrenheit (38 degrees Celsius). Within 
  the enclosed jungle, high humidity and little wind made 
  walking fatiguing, let alone combat. Although Route 606 
  was the primary route through the DMZ north from Cồn 
  Tiên, numerous trails criss-crossed the area to connect 
  settlements, or other locations otherwise inaccessible 
  through the difficult terrain. The region along the sand-
  banked Bến Hải River contained several mangroves and 
  lagoons, and with the introduction of the DMZ, what 
  settlements that had existed along the river were commonly 
  abandoned.
  The low-lying terrain along the Bến Hải 
  River is evident here, with the area 
  between 20m and 30m above sea level. In 
  addition to leeches, mosquitoes, and 
  poisonous cobras, vipers, and spiders, 
  landmines had been liberally strewn 
  across the region, alongside unexploded 
  ordnance. Because of the limited number 
  of trails, often only wide enough for just 
  one person, artillery and mortars could 
  more easily pre-register potential targets. 
  The heavily forested region along both 
  riverbanks impeded American aerial 
  reconnaissance, as 2/9 Marines would 
  discover to its detriment when 
  accompanying engineers discovered a 
  tributary bridge along physically 
  constrained intended route through the 
  DMZ during Operation Kingfisher on 
  July 29, 1967. (Nguyễn Thanh Sơn)
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  49
  I
  G
  9
  I
  F
  9
  I
  H
  9
  CGA
  I
  E
  9
  I
  H & S
  II
  1
  803
  • • •
  • • •
  • • •
  • • •
  • • •
  • • •
  • • •
  4
  2
  1
  3
  5
  6
  Hill 37
  Thon Cam Son
  Destroyed village
  Abandoned
  hospital
  Impassable
  bridge
  PROVINCIAL ROUTE 606
  Ben Hai River
  2 Ontos
  2 M48A3s
  3 amtracs
  1 Ontos
  3 M48A3s
  D M Z
  D M Z
  D M Z
  D M Z
  N
  0
  500yd
  0
  500m
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  50
  INTO COMBAT
  The morning of July 28 heralded another hot day along the DMZ, as the 
  Marines set out north along Provincial Route 606, essentially a dirt cart path. 
  Even the veterans were scared considering the potential number of enemy 
  awaiting their approach; most suffered from dysentery, and there was cynical 
  acceptance of a rumor that President Johnson and his administration had 
  ordered the mission to illustrate that the American military possessed the 
  ability to operate wherever it pleased, which would, in turn, bolster flagging 
  public support for the Johnson Administration. Echo and Golf companies 
  provided flank security, on the right and left respectively, but the thick terrain 
  along the edges tended to funnel the Marines toward the center, where they 
  presented more concentrated targets. En route, the column passed “The 
  Trace,” as well as deserted, burned-out hamlets, and numerous trails. Nearer 
  the DMZ, the vegetation grew thicker, with visibility around 5m, over which 
  a 3–4m canopy predominated, and was broken by rice paddies, and fewer, but 
  more prominent trails. After waiting out the morning as a reserve should the 
  main force get into trouble, Kilo Company’s 152 Marines boarded three CH-
  46, three UH-34D, and two UH-1E Iroquois helicopters south of Cồn Tiên 
  and flew ahead to Hill 37 along a bend in the Bến Hải River. Just prior to 
  touching down, A-4E Skyhawk aircraft laid down a smokescreen to the west 
  between the high ground and the oncoming column.
  During 2/9 Marines’ advance, as was customary in such operations, 
  supporting artillery was ready with plotted on-call fires along their route to 
  save response times, but few NVA soldiers were encountered. On entering the 
  DMZ, Echo and Golf companies began uncovering unoccupied bunkers and 
  spider holes at several clearings paralleling the path. A hastily evacuated NVA 
  field hospital discovered near Kent’s Command Group “A” made everyone 
  edgy, especially as the Marines knew large numbers of the enemy were 
  undoubtedly in the area, and would certainly not leave them without a fight. 
  As the column approached the abandoned village of Thon Cấm Sơn, the 
  decision was made to establish a camp for the night, and the tanks and combat 
  engineers set to destroying several bunkers before dark.
  Aware of the American presence, NVA soldiers began moving into the 
  surrounding area to reoccupy abandoned positions or construct new ones. 
  Although they refrained from engaging the Marines in their respective 
  perimeters, Hotel Company, and Echo Company near Hill 37, reported 
  hearing truck motors, voices, and digging on the waterway’s left bank near 
  potential crossing sites. Artillery was called in, with uncertain results, and to 
  add to the foreboding Kent was informed – during a radio call to his 9th 
  Marine Regiment superior, Colonel George E. Jerue – that that five NVA 
  battalions were en route toward 2/9 Marines’ position, and that the USMC 
  battalion was to exit the DMZ as a precaution.
  On the morning of July 29, Kent called his company and tank commanders 
  together to discuss the situation. At the battalion’s northernmost point, combat 
  engineers passed Golf Company to scout ahead along Provincial Route 606 to 
  determine whether the way remained clear, and would be able to support the 
  heavy armored vehicles. After traveling some 500m, they encountered a narrow 
  concrete bridge over a tributary that regimental and division intelligence had 
  apparently missed, and was not included in the operation’s planning. Having 
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  51
  determined that the structure would not support the M48A3s, and as 
  bypassing it meant moving over prohibitively soft terrain, Kent called 9th 
  Marines headquarters, stating his command would have to return the way it 
  had come, much to everyone’s chagrin.
  Rightly concerned that the North Vietnamese had already moved units 
  into previously prepared positions covering Provincial Route 606, Kent 
  organized his command to provide interspaced, mutually supportive infantry 
  and armored firepower. At 1000hrs, Echo Company led the way back, with 
  the battalion commander and his Command Group “A” following. Initially 
  designated to cover the battalion’s rear during the extraction, Hotel Company 
  came next; three M48A3s, an Ontos, and the amtracs covered the space 
  between it and Kent’s command, and the remaining vehicles behind it. Tank 
  commanders fought with their cupola hatches open at such close ranges, as 
  visibility provided better protection than armor. Golf Company proved 
  unable to entirely break free from the closely pursuing NVA soldiers. H&S, 
  Foxtrot, and Golf companies brought up the rear, while overhead, a circling 
  forward air controller (FAC) provided additional visibility, and was prepared 
  to direct fast-moving, fixed-wing air strikes in the area whenever needed.
  After making slow progress for 75 minutes, about 1km from the night 
  bivouac, 2nd Platoon, Echo Company had just crossed a clearing when an 
  NVA engineer detonated a 250lb (113kg) dud bomb from a B-52 buried in 
  the road, which had also been repurposed as a command-detonated mine. The 
  explosion killed and wounded several Marines, blew up the NVA engineer, and 
  threw body parts across a wide area. Farther down the path, alert Marine 
  engineers found a similar rigged bomb, and destroyed it with explosives. As if 
  the second explosion were a signal, North Vietnamese soldiers along the road 
  opened fire on the column with machine guns, rifles, and 60mm and 82mm 
  mortars. To avoid shrapnel from road strikes, many Marines scrambled into 
  the bordering vegetation only to trigger booby traps or stumble onto Punji 
  stakes that had been laid the previous night. In the chaos, a B-40 round holed 
  through both sides of an amtrac supporting Echo Company’s advance. The 
  NVA units, using heavy fire from prepared positions combined with the 
  maneuver of other units, quickly broke the column into roughly company-
  sized segments, with each fighting its own way through the gauntlet, in which 
  NVA soldiers had established three ambush positions along Provincial Route 
  606, each some 500m apart. In the restricted environment, the tracked vehicles 
  were a liability, as the foot-bound Marines had to help cover their advance 
  against an enemy that could fire antitank weapons from the surrounding thick 
  brush at short range. As the US wounded piled up, and the vehicles were used 
  as makeshift ambulances, the Marines’ fighting ability was further degraded.
  Soon after, another B-40 explosion disabled the turret of a tank with 
  Foxtrot Company, wounding three crewmen. When Hotel Company brought 
  up an Ontos to suppress NVA fire that was holding up its movement, a B-40 
  projectile struck it as well, wounding three more Marines. A second Ontos 
  came forward, suppressed the NVA fire with its machine gun, and enabled 
  that part of the US column to continue. Restricted to 25mph (40km/h) and 
  very maneuverable, the vehicles were ideally operated by a three-man crew, 
  but could get by with two, although rounds greater than .30-caliber could 
  penetrate their armor. As their main armament was externally mounted, 
  Members of Lima Company, 
  3/4 Marines watch an air 
  strike within the DMZ on 
  July 29, 1967, in support of 
  2/9 Marines’ extraction from 
  an ambush. To help soften 
  enemy positions or protect 
  a beleaguered ground force, 
  Marine A-4E Skyhawk and 
  F-4 Phantom II aircraft were 
  directed to a target, with 
  assistance from loitering 
  FAC. The Skyhawk carried 
  up to 4,490kg of bombs of 
  up to 1,000lb (454kg) each, 
  as well as napalm, cluster 
  bombs, and rockets, while 
  the Phantom II could carry 
  up to 8,400kg of ordnance. 
  Often operating from 
  offshore aircraft carriers, 
  these aircraft provided 
  valuable, versatile, often 
  rapid-response tactical air 
  support throughout the 
  conflict. (Lance Corporal 
  L.P. Brown (Marine Corps))
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  52
  during the rainy season between May and September, 30-weight oil was 
  applied to the recoilless guns’ outsides to protect against rusting. The infantry’s 
  primary fire support came from the FAC, which remained on station 
  throughout the day. The controller maintained contact with air representatives 
  from each company and with the battalion air-liaison officer; the North 
  Vietnamese soldiers knew very well the danger from American supporting 
  arms, and attempted to stay close to the Marine column. Foxtrot Company 
  had hardly cleared its night defensive position when NVA soldiers occupied 
  the position. Echo Company and Command Group “A,” plus the follow-on 
  tanks, amtracs, and Ontos, fought past the first position, and continued 
  south; the Ontos fired 106mm M546 antipersonnel “beehive” rounds that 
  spewed 8,000 flechettes along a cone 300m long and with a radius of roughly 
  100m. The newly established 803 (NVA) Regiment comprised hardened, 
  aggressive soldiers, which were organized under Military Zone 4 south of the 
  DMZ encompassing Quảng Trị and Thừa Thiên provinces, one of eight such 
  regions the Vietnamese Ministry of Defense had created across the country.
   
  The employment of RPG-2’s [from which the North Vietnamese B-40 was 
  derived] by the NVA/VC is of special note. It was found in the Con Thien area 
  that RPG-2 rounds have been command-detonated from ground-mounted 
  Hoàng Văn Lục
  Hoàng Văn Lục was born in 1941 at Long Thắnh, Thắnh 
  Chương District, Nghệ An, some 300km southwest 
  of Hanoi. He was assigned to 1 Battalion, 803 (NVA) 
  Regiment, 324B (NVA) Division, on April 14, 1967. 
  Politically indoctrinated, with reinforcing psychological 
  controls, he was dedicated to his cause, and firmly 
  convinced that a foreign occupier had once again 
  enslaved the people of the South, who needed to be 
  liberated. Having been told that his homesick American 
  enemy suffered from declining morale, and an inability 
  to adjust to the region’s largely tropical climate, he 
  anticipated victory on learning of an advancing Marine 
  force moving up from Cồn Tiên along Provincial Route 
  606 on July 28, 1967. As the enemy force entered 
  the DMZ, Hoàng, and 1 Battalion elements left their 
  encampment south of Thon Cấm Sơn to cross the 
  nearby Bến Hải River, and allow the enemy to pass 
  through unmolested. That night, under a first quarter 
  moon, the NVA soldiers reoccupied their previously 
  abandoned bunkers and trenches in anticipation of 
  2/9 Marines returning along what was essentially 
  a bicycle path as part of Operation Kingfisher. From 
  these concealed positions on July 29, Hoàng and his 
  comrades ambushed the Marines, with the intent of 
  breaking them into several uncoordinated groups to 
  prevent their withdrawal, and eliminate them in several 
  “kill zones.” During this fighting, he was killed.
  Hoàng Văn Lục. (Public domain)
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  53
  bamboo tubes. Also, the NVA/VC units are placing a great premium on anti-tank 
  tactics, which is evidenced by individual tanks having received as many as 10 
  RPG-2 hits in rapid succession. (Headquarters, 3rd Tank Battalion)
   
  As Hotel Company moved south, its commander called in artillery support 
  to lessen heavy NVA fire and mortars from the bunkers and spider holes that 
  had been burrowed into the surrounding foliage. With aircraft in the area, 
  “Sav-a-Plane” was in effect, and the request was denied, as jets had just left Đà 
  Nẵng and would arrive on-scene soon. As a III MAF measure to reduce 
  incoming-round impacts – something that almost never happened – the FAC 
  pilot would radio nearby or inbound aircraft of active artillery and naval 
  gunfire zones and times, while air sentries at batteries, and artillery liaisons 
  provided ground support. As a substitute, Hotel Company’s commander 
  ordered two Ontos from the column’s rear to fire on the clearing’s eastern 
  treeline, and together they delivered a dozen 106mm rounds, after which a 
  crewman had to exit the vehicle’s relative safety to reload. Suddenly, a B-40 
  struck one vehicle, killing two crewmen, and the second Ontos responded 
  with suppressing fire that enabled the pair to continue on. Two nearby 
  M48A3 crews had witnessed the event, and lingered to fire a few rounds 
  before pulling back down the road, and watching for new adversaries.
  To facilitate Hotel Company’s effort of “fighting in another direction,” its 
  commander ordered a platoon to flank the troublesome bunkers along the 
  James M. Lynch
  Marine Sergeant James M. Lynch was born on 
  November 10, 1942, in Cheltenham, Pennsylvania, a 
  Philadelphia suburb. He joined the Marines soon after 
  graduating high school in July 1960, and re-enlisted 
  in late 1965 following a four-year service stint. During 
  a voluntary extension of his tour in Vietnam, Lynch 
  commanded an M50A1 Ontos from 3rd Platoon, 
  Charlie Company, 3rd Antitank Battalion in Operation 
  Kingfisher. Although intended for antitank duties, the 
  dearth of targets meant the vehicle was repurposed, 
  providing valuable infantry support. Its complement 
  of M546 antipersonnel “beehive” rounds proved 
  especially destructive, and excellent at both clearing 
  heavy foliage, and killing those seeking concealment. 
  The projectiles could be Muzzle Activating, and 
  detonate around 75m from the barrel, or via a fuse set 
  to explode up to some 3,300m. As four of the Ontos’ 
  six 106mm recoilless rifles had a mated .50-caliber 
  spotting rifle, these were used for initial targeting as 
  their round’s flight path matched that of the main guns. 
  Having visually followed the smaller projectile via its 
  tracer and its impact-inducing smoke puff, if on target 
  the 106mm guns would subsequently be fired. During 
  2/9 Marines’ extraction on July 29, 1967, Sergeant 
  Lynch was killed by rocket and mortar fire.
  James M. Lynch. (Public domain)
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  54
  road’s eastern edge. Having rebuffed any protests that the enemy would 
  subsequently infiltrate their positions from behind, unfolding events proved 
  the caution justified, as NVA soldiers occupied the Marines’ exposed right, 
  and used a machine gun to fire down the road. Having been ordered to 
  establish a landing zone to evacuate Echo and H&S companies’ wounded, as 
  armored vehicles carried them to the potential location, the NVA forces tried 
  to directly counter the effort with machine guns and B-40s, while mortars 
  struck across the area. During the day’s fighting, the Marines had suffered 
  seven killed and 31 wounded. With an RPG having struck and set fire to one 
  of the tanks, a corporal crawled from the vehicle, and used his M79 grenade 
  launcher to silence a nearby 12.7mm machine gun. During the chaotic, 
  painstakingly slow move to exit the woods, a gap developed between H&S 
  Company and Foxtrot Company; the latter loaded casualties on the tanks and 
  attacked to reestablish contact, at a cost of a further two US dead and 12 
  wounded by mortar fire.
  As F-4 Phantom II aircraft finally arrived on the scene around midday, 
  NVA soldiers left their defensive positions with fearful yells, and rushed into 
  more open terrain to close with the Marines, and hopefully avoid 
  incineration and asphyxiation. As the aircraft initiated their attack runs to 
  drop silver napalm canisters east and west of the road, some Marines 
  indicated that “friendlies” were in the targeted areas. Others, realizing that 
  the figures in flak jackets and carrying M16s were actually enemy soldiers, 
  began firing on the scrambling targets. Echo Company cut several down, 
  while accompanying engineers knocked out a 12.7mm machine-gun 
  position just off the road, killing seven NVA soldiers, before destroying the 
  weapon and its ammunition. Golf Company remained at the column’s rear, 
  where it continued to withdraw while keeping the oncoming enemy at bay, 
  eventually killing more than a dozen and wounding ten; an attached scout-
  sniper team killed 15 more.
  At around 1400hrs, as Echo Company rounded a bend, it emerged in the 
  southernmost and final NVA ambush site, which – along with two RPG 
  strikes against an M48A3 that resulted in a turret penetration that wounded 
  three crewmen – slowed the Marines’ escape. NVA mortar rounds continued 
  to fall as the Marines steadily gained fire superiority. With Command Group 
  “A” and 2nd Platoon, Echo Company having extracted themselves from the 
  cauldron soon after, at 1830hrs they linked up with Mike Company, 3/4 
  Marines, which had been notified about the situation and had moved up from 
  Cồn Tiên to assist. At 1900hrs a B-40 RPG struck another M48A3, damaging 
  its hydraulics and crippling turret power. Cut off and unable to move, two 
  squads from Echo Company weathered heavy NVA automatic and rifle fire 
  that eventually killed two Marines and wounded nine. Mike Company, 3/4 
  Marines moved north and got them out of the fray later that night.
  With darkness approaching, and having to take care of numerous combat 
  and heat-related wounded, at 1930hrs Hotel Company turned back to 
  establish a defensive position on the high ground bordering the nearby 
  clearing through which Provincial Route 606 passed, and join two squads 
  from Golf Company and H&S Company, the latter comprising all the Naval 
  personnel within the expedition. Having been with Command Group “A,” 
  Kent had taken operational control of Mike Company, 3/4 Marines and had 
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  55
  accompanied it to the north, where it managed to link up with Echo 
  Company’s two wayward squads around that time, before the two groups 
  established a good defensive position for the night. To the south, the bulk of 
  Echo Company organized its defenses and called in medevac helicopters for 
  the casualties. Golf Company became isolated by 1,000m of jungle from the 
  main body after dark, and due to caring for casualties, established its own 
  defensive perimeter at 2100hrs.
  Fortunately for the Marines, the NVA personnel were already disengaging 
  and taking their dead and wounded with them, in part to hinder an accurate 
  American body count. Established just south of the Bến Hải River, 324B 
  (NVA) Division’s 19B Surgery Station, under Doctor Nguyễn Bá Đạt, 
  received and classified many of the wounded, with those needing surgery 
  being moved to 19A Surgery Station on the river’s north side. As one NVA 
  veteran recalled:
   
  … the men in the units always made efforts to remove their wounded and dead 
  comrades from the battlefield for medical care and burial. But in some cases they 
  were unable … because of enemy air attacks after the ground attacks were over. 
  In such cases, the men had to concentrate their efforts on removing the 
  wounded, and of course the dead were left behind. (PFC Nguyễn Ngọc Dung, 
  1/16 (NVA) Regiment)
  After dark, Kent initially informed the men of Echo Company that they 
  would go back in the next morning, much to everyone’s satisfaction, but on 
  further thought decided not to wait. Having taken operational control of a 
  company from 3/4 Marines and a section of tanks, the group soon headed 
  north to attempt to link up with Hotel Company and the rest of the battalion. 
  As Kent’s force arrived along the DMZ’s southern edge, NVA soldiers in the 
  area disengaged, and quickly withdrew northward, seemingly satisfied with 
  the damage they had inflicted. Golf and Foxtrot companies reported hearing 
  shouting to their west, and called in artillery missions. In addition to making 
  menacing catcalls and verbal taunts, NVA soldiers tortured and killed several 
  captured and wounded Marines, in an effort to bait the Americans into trying 
  to help their injured comrades. While most of 803 (NVA) Regiment began to 
  pull back, at around 0330hrs an enemy sapper rushed into Foxtrot Company’s 
  perimeter to throw a satchel charge and fire his AK-47, managing to kill one 
  Marine and wound three before the defenders killed him.
  At dawn on July 30, Mike Company moved north and linked with the 
  remainder of 2/9 Marines. CH-34s and the heavy-lift CH-46 helicopters 
  arrived to medevac out all the casualties at Golf Company’s position, with the 
  remainder being taken out by 0900hrs. With 3/4 Marines providing a 
  protective screen, the rest of 2/9 Marines left the DMZ by 1150hrs, having 
  suffered 23 killed and 251 wounded (45 heat-related), with 191 medevaced 
  out. Two tanks and two Ontos were also lost. Throughout the three ambush 
  sites, 32 NVA bodies were found, but the Americans believed as many as 175 
  enemy deaths were likely due to air strikes. In spite of poor 3rd Marine 
  Division decision-making and incomplete preliminary reconnaissance, 
  accurate supporting-arms fire represented a major factor in preventing 2/9 
  Marines’ destruction, and by noon the last of the US personnel left the DMZ.
  A captured American 81mm 
  high-explosive M43A1 
  mortar round that has been 
  repurposed as a VC booby 
  trap. Should an 
  unsuspecting individual trip 
  the wire it tugged the pull 
  ring on the 121mm-long M60 
  weatherproof fuse igniter, 
  which produced a small 
  explosion sufficient to 
  disconnect the anchoring 
  wires to the projectile. Freed 
  from its anchor, the M43A1 
  would drop to the ground, 
  which triggered its M45 
  point-detonating fuse, and 
  detonated the round’s .5kg 
  of Composition B (RDX and 
  TNT) explosive. Similar traps 
  used unexploded artillery 
  rounds, hand grenades, and 
  even containers filled with an 
  ammonium nitrate and diesel 
  fuel explosive concoction. To 
  help prevent friendly 
  casualties, warning signs 
  that were made to blend into 
  the surroundings were 
  commonly placed nearby, 
  including broken sticks in a 
  directional pattern or an 
  angled broken bamboo shaft 
  pointing toward the device. 
  (Tom Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
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  56
  BACKGROUND TO BATTLE
  Since 1964, General Nguyễn Chí Thanh had led the elusive Central Office for 
  South Vietnam, Hanoi’s political and military headquarters below the DMZ. 
  After nearly three years of orchestrating a largely successful insurgency against 
  Huế, New City
  January 31–February 7, 1968
  Similar to a lessons-learned 
  discussion, NVA soldiers 
  regularly participated in 
  “criticism/self-criticism” 
  sessions to monitor each 
  other, improve their tactics 
  and techniques, convey 
  information, and foster small 
  group unity. As one veteran 
  recalled: “I fought very 
  enthusiastically for a year 
  because I fully understood 
  the revolutionary line of the 
  party … I have always 
  believed that the Liberation 
  Front and our Army have 
  been fighting for the just 
  cause, and sooner or later 
  the people who fight for the 
  just cause will win the war” 
  (Private Nguyễn Văn An, 
  520 (NVA) Battalion). 
  (Public domain)
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  57
  ARVN forces, he felt the opportunity had come to initiate an offensive across 
  the entire country that if successful would provide a foundation upon which 
  to achieve ultimate victory. When he died suddenly on July 7, 1967, likeminded 
  hard-line leaders in the North Vietnamese Politburo, led by Lê Duẩn, favored 
  seeing the plan to fruition. In an atmosphere where any resistance to such 
  policies could be construed as treasonous, more moderate leaders, such as Giáp 
  and Hồ, found little support for their “North first” mentality that emphasized 
  solidifying a viable Socialist base in the north, and continuing the guerrilla 
  campaign in the South, before attempting any national reunification. With the 
  plan designed as a multiphase endeavor, NVA forces would first launch a series 
  of probing attacks south of the DMZ to test enemy defenses, and hinder 
  observation. Numerous VC assaults against important South Vietnamese 
  urban centers and other high-value targets was anticipated to subsequently 
  trigger a civilian liberation uprising. Once the South Vietnamese Government 
  was overwhelmed and overthrown, the American presence would be vulnerable 
  to a “second wave” of propaganda, and asymmetric and conventional combat 
  To fight effectively in an 
  enclosed, urban 
  environment, the foot-bound 
  Marines – such as those of 
  Hotel Company, 2/5 
  Marines, shown here – 
  would have to rely upon a 
  mix of weapons, which in 
  addition to their M16s and 
  M60s, included 3.5in 
  bazookas, M72 Light 
  Antitank Weapons (LAW), 
  81mm mortars, and M79 
  grenade launchers. With 
  movement along streets and 
  other open areas dangerous 
  during combat, especially in 
  an urban environment such 
  as Huế, both sides would 
  blast holes through walls to 
  advance from concealed or 
  unexpected directions. Often 
  satchel charges or bazooka 
  rounds were sufficient, 
  although accompanying 
  M50A1 Ontos provided 
  valuable service by 
  concentrating 106mm 
  recoilless-rifle fire against a 
  target that would also likely 
  be hit by smoke or tear gas 
  to blind or incapacitate the 
  NVA defenders. As such 
  funneling routes were prime 
  targets for affixing booby 
  traps, vigilance and caution 
  were key to minimizing 
  casualties. (Tom Laemlein / 
  Armor Plate Press)
  The US military commonly 
  used Napalm B in Vietnam 
  to destroy forests, fortified 
  positions, and vehicle 
  convoys, and the enemy that 
  used them for cover. Burning 
  at up to 2,760 degrees 
  Celsius, the sticky gasoline, 
  benzene, and polystyrene 
  mix produced terrible burns, 
  and asphyxiating carbon 
  monoxide. By late 1967, the 
  highly touted American 
  strategic bombing campaign 
  had failed to halt NVA 
  infiltration south, and with 
  Johnson pressuring him to 
  devise a solution, 
  Westmoreland endeavored 
  to outmaneuver and destroy 
  large numbers of the enemy 
  using overwhelming 
  firepower around Khe Sanh, 
  and points west, to cut the 
  Hồ Chí Minh Trail physically. 
  (USAF)
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  58
  to manipulate public opinion and defeat any remaining isolated, demoralized 
  enemy forces, per Mao’s final “general offensive” warfare phase. Aware that 
  much of the American public was against the conflict, and that 1968 was an 
  election year in the United States, Hanoi felt the offensive was worth the risk 
  – especially if the Johnson Administration could be discredited and further 
  turn the American public against the fight. Should Hanoi’s offensive fail, such 
  an opportunity might not present itself again for several years.
  During October 1967, the initial North Vietnamese actions began with a 
  series of small attacks in remote areas along the DMZ to draw US attention 
  away from what would soon be VC-targeted areas in the South. Recent 
  increases in cross-border infiltrations had given credence to what the US 
  command in Saigon viewed as a precursor to a major North Vietnamese 
  offensive in early 1968, but details remained scarce or inaccurate. As the 
  DMZ area was expected to be the enemy focus, American and ARVN forces 
  gravitated to the region, much as Hanoi had anticipated. In the days leading 
  to the offensive, those about to receive the onslaught were relatively lax, as 
  despite warnings, in late January more than half of the ARVN forces were on 
  leave due to the upcoming Tết Nguyên Đán Lunar New Year celebrations. At 
  the nation’s most important annual holiday, thousands had congregated 
  around the city of Huế in anticipation of its prominent festivities, especially 
  as a ceasefire was to be in effect between January 27 and February 3, 1968.
  Located roughly 90km southeast of the DMZ, Huế was located within I 
  Corps’ area of operations, which was headquartered in nearby Đà Nẵng. With 
  III MAF occupying the two northernmost provinces – Quảng Trị, buttressing 
  North Vietnam, and Thừa Thiên – Major General Donn J. Robertson’s 1st 
  Marine Division was responsible for a sector that overlapped both cities. To 
  best control such a large region, Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr. 
  – commander of III MAF from June 1967 – divided his command; 1st Marine 
  Considering the VC 
  attempted to blend with the 
  local population, 
  distinguishing a combatant 
  from a civilian proved a 
  difficult and frustrating 
  endeavor for the Americans 
  and their South Vietnamese 
  allies. In contrast to the 
  MACV commander’s 
  operational approach, 
  Lieutenant General 
  Cushman viewed the VC as 
  North Vietnam’s operational 
  center of gravity, and 
  identified South Vietnamese 
  support of the Communists 
  as the critical vulnerability to 
  attack. By focusing on 
  proven small-unit 
  pacification efforts in the 
  villages, he believed that 
  only South Vietnamese 
  civilians could most 
  effectively resist and expel 
  Communist elements, and 
  provide a long-term security 
  and stability solution. The 
  Marines’ pacification efforts 
  would prove more 
  successful than the more 
  confrontational and 
  destructive Westmoreland 
  approach, in that the former 
  minimized collateral 
  damage that turned non-
  combatants against the 
  American cause. (Tom 
  Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
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  59
  Division’s (Forward) Headquarters was 
  commanded by the assistant division 
  commander, Brigadier General Foster C. 
  LaHue. As “Task Force X-Ray” it was 
  tasked with protecting Phú Bài, some 
  12km south of Huế, screening its western 
  approaches, and keeping Highway 1 open. 
  To accomplish the task, 1/1 Marines and 
  2/5 Marines were immediately available; 
  although US morale was high, few had an 
  idea of the overall situation in which they 
  would soon enter. At present, the most 
  recent US intelligence indicated that 
  6 (NVA) Regiment’s headquarters as well as 
  804 Battalion were some 20km to the west 
  of Huế, while 806 Battalion and 802 
  Battalion were 35km to the northeast and 
  20km to the south, respectively. 1st ARVN 
  Division dismissed any notion that the 
  enemy could mount a division-sized attack 
  against the city.
  With the North’s initial operational 
  phase having been largely successful, during 
  the follow-up stage, the Communists were 
  well informed of US and ARVN military dispositions, as they unleashed some 
  74,000 mostly VC combatants across South Vietnam. In the hours preceding 
  the attack on Huế, some 7,500 North Vietnamese soldiers from 4 and 6 (NVA) 
  regiments moved toward their respective assembly positions to the target’s south 
  and northwest, having been relatively unmolested during their travels. At 
  1800hrs on January 30, 4 (NVA) Regiment left the cover of the jungle and 
  proceeded in orderly columns toward its nearby objective, taking a brief hilltop 
  stop two hours later to eat dumplings, cake, and other items usually reserved for 
  special occasions. Soon after, 4 (NVA) Regiment – comprising 804 Battalion 
  along with 815 and 818 (NVA) battalions, labeled K4B and K4C (NVA) 
  battalions in an apparent effort to confuse US intelligence – advanced toward 
  the New City, a more contemporary urban area, with numerous French-style 
  residences; it had been the former colonial authority’s provincial capital, 
  bounded by the Perfume River and Phụ Cầm Canal. To its north, 6 (NVA) 
  Regiment – comprising 800 Battalion, 802 Battalion, 806 Battalion, 12 and 
  Huế City Sapper battalions, and 35 Rocket Launcher Battalion – headed for 
  the older Annamese Imperial Citadel zone, with 802 Battalion making for 1st 
  ARVN Division’s headquarters, and 800 Battalion occupying the residential 
  areas within the fortress’s walls. The remainder of 6 (NVA) Regiment worked 
  to cut off Huế from ARVN reinforcement, and secure the Tây Lộc airfield and 
  Imperial Palace. Accompanying VC fighters carried lists of “enemies of the 
  people,” such as government officials, intellectuals, soldiers, and their families, 
  with the intent of eliminating them. Considering the city was a major 
  transportation hub, should the NVA and VC capture it, they would sever a vital 
  logistics route between the DMZ and much of South Vietnam.
  An aerial view of Huế taken 
  on January 25, 1968, looking 
  to the southwest and 
  showing the Nguyễn Hoàng 
  Bridge (bottom), a pontoon 
  bridge, and the Bạch Hổ 
  Railroad Bridge. The 
  Citadel’s southwestern 
  corner can be seen at the 
  upper right. (Marine Corps)
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  60
  1 Morning, January 31: With NVA and VC forces having 
  launched an attack on Huế at 0330hrs on January 31, within a 
  few hours Alpha Company, 1/1 Marines is dispatched from the 
  Phú Bài area to assist the defense at the MACV compound. 
  Although the Marines are able to cross the Phụ Cầm Canal at 
  the An Cựu Bridge, resistance from 4 (NVA) Regiment 
  elements halts further American progress. At 1030hrs the 
  addition of Golf Company, 2/5 Marines provides the necessary 
  impetus, and within a few hours, the two US formations arrive 
  at the hard-pressed facility.
  2 1610hrs, January 31: Golf Company, 2/5 Marines 
  secures the Nguyễn Hoàng Bridge over the Perfume River and 
  advances to the Citadel’s Thượng Tứ Gate, one of ten such 
  entrances through the fortress’s surrounding wall.
  3 2000hrs, January 31: Having reached the MACV 
  compound at 1445hrs, Alpha and Golf companies begin to 
  secure the surrounding area near the Perfume River.
  4 0700hrs, February 1: to clear New City, platoons from 
  Golf Company, 2/5 Marines advance southwest along Le Loi 
  Street. After only a block, heavy US fire from the buildings 
  near the city’s University forces an NVA withdrawal, which the 
  recently arriving Foxtrot Company, 2/5 Marines helps support.
  5 Night of February 1/2: With US reinforcements having 
  begun to arrive in the New City on January 31, NVA sappers 
  trigger charges on the Bạch Hổ Railroad Bridge that drop it into 
  the Perfume River.
  6 0855hrs, February 5: Golf and Foxtrot companies from 
  2/5 Marines respectively secure the Cercle Sportif Club and 
  University Library, and continue forward, capturing the Public 
  Health building complex. After fighting through 804 Battalion, 
  4 (NVA) Regiment and its stiff defense of the facility, the 
  Marines will finally secure the Public Health building complex 
  by 1630hrs.
  7 0950hrs, February 6: With heavy enemy fire halting 
  Hotel Company before the Provisional Headquarters building, 
  the latter brings up M48A3 Patton tanks, recoilless rifles, and 
  M50A1 Ontos for support. In what is becoming a popular 
  tactic, the Marines incorporate E8 CS (tear gas) to hinder 
  enemy resistance, as the North Vietnamese lack gas masks. 
  Attacking the prison at 1415hrs, Golf Company personnel use 
  satchel charges to blow a hole in three of the complex’s 
  encompassing walls before moving in to secure the facility.
  8 February 6: As 2/5 Marines’ Foxtrot, Golf, and Hotel 
  companies approach their Phụ Cầm Canal objective, they 
  secure the Provincial Headquarters using a combination of 
  multiple arms types. With their backs against the waterway, 
  the soldiers of 4 (NVA) Regiment struggle to maintain effective 
  resistance.
  9 February 7: After several days of slogging through house-
  to-house fighting, 2/5 Marines, and 1/1 Marines on their left 
  steadily push tenacious NVA and VC forces defenders back to 
  the southwest. Eventually, 4 (NVA) Regiment succumbs to the 
  inevitable and withdraws over the Phụ Cầm Canal via five 
  bridges that remain intact.
  10 February 7: With little reason to remain in the New City 
  once the remainder of 4 (NVA) Regiment abandoned the area, 
  810 (NVA) Battalion similarly departs, crossing the Perfume 
  River just northeast of the MACV compound.
  2/5 Marines and 4 (NVA) Regiment in Huế, January 31–February 7, 1968
  MAP KEY
  Battlefield environment
  With monsoon season affecting Vietnam’s central coast from 
  September to February, rain, and fog were common during the 
  Huế fighting, where temperatures often dipped to 50 degrees 
  Fahrenheit (10 degrees Celsius) – noticeably colder than normal. 
  As with any urban environment large numbers of civilians were 
  trapped and subjected to violence from both sides, whether 
  intended or not, and many fought under this disguise, which 
  hindered friend-or-foe identification. Multistory buildings, often 
  culturally significant, provided a vertical element to the fighting, 
  and rubble generally imparted a greater force multiplier than 
  an intact wall. In such close-order fighting, booby traps were 
  a particular hazard, as were snipers and grenades. Higher-
  echelon command and control were degraded due to numerous 
  physical barriers that broke an attacking force into several 
  groups that could not be mutually supporting, or would become 
  isolated during the chaos of battle.
  Considering the generally poor ARVN performance over the 
  last few years, the friction between them and the Marines 
  would complicate Allied operations throughout the fighting 
  in Huế; forces in the MACV compound would be intended to 
  clear snipers and sporadic resistance, while caring for the 
  civilian refugees, most of whom had a healthy distrust of 
  both sides. Although terrified, most of Huế’s citizens would 
  initially remain locked in their homes, but as the fighting 
  spread, thousands would gravitate to the MACV compound, 
  the nearby Catholic church, and the University. Many fled 
  south along Highway 1, which served to clog the congested 
  route for military traffic. Since the Vietnamese avoided 
  touching the deceased, the Marines used enemy prisoners 
  to bury the numerous bodies. The suffering brought on 
  by a lack of food, medical care, and sanitation was made 
  worse, as refugees and ARVN personnel looted much of the 
  emergency supplies from Đà Nẵng. Although some Marines 
  participated, something 1/1 Marines commander Lieutenant 
  Colonel Marcus J. Gravel felt the media would inflate, he 
  made it known that any ARVN soldier seen looting would be 
  summarily shot. Unlike during previous American overseas 
  conflicts, international media personnel moved throughout the 
  city, and alongside Marine units, to film, interview, and report 
  from the front lines to an increasingly polarized homeland.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  61
  I
  H
  5
  I
  F
  5
  I
  G
  5
  I
  A
  1
  I
  B
  1
  II
  12
  II
  2
  II
  1
  II
  810
  II
  818
  4
  II
  815
  4
  II
  800
  6
  II
  804
  4
  II
  2
  5
  II
  1
  1
  III
  1
  (-)
  III
  4
  4
  3
  8
  9
  1
  2
  6
  5
  7
  10
  N
  0
  600yd
  0
  600m
  MACV Compound
  Jeanne d’Arc High School
  University Building
  Imperial Palace of Peace
  Boat ramp
  Provincial Headquarters
  Provincial Prison
  Cercle Sportif
  D e i  G r e n g  R i v e r
  ROUTE 1
  AN CUU
  BRIDGE
  ROUTE 1
  LE LOI STREET
  NGUYEN
  HOANG BRIDGE
  BACH HO
  RAILROAD BRIDGE
  Phu Cam Canal
  P e r f u m e  R i v e r
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  62
  INTO COMBAT
  At 0115hrs on January 31, 6 (NVA) Regiment and 12 (NVA) Sapper Battalion 
  were poised to conduct simultaneous attacks; 45 minutes later, the former linked 
  up with its guides. At about 0210hrs, 6 (NVA) Regiment seized a bridgehead 
  into the Annamese Imperial Citadel, some 8km square. At the designated 
  0330hrs G-Hour, 122mm rockets were fired into the city, signaling the attack.
  In response to the Tết truce being violated, and North Vietnamese attacks 
  at Đà Nẵng and elsewhere in southern I Corps, Brigadier General Ngô Quang 
  Trưởng, 1st ARVN Division commander, canceled all leave and ordered his 
  units on full alert. With most away and unable to immediately rejoin their 
  units, only some division staff, administrative, and reconnaissance personnel 
  were available, along with Ngô Quang Trưởng’s personal “Black Panther” 
  Company within the walled, self-contained Mang Cá military compound in 
  the city’s northeast corner. In the New City’s east, 804 Battalion focused on 
  the MACV compound, repurposed from a former old Communist soldiers’ 
  home where the American advisory staff to 1st ARVN Division resided.
  By 0800hrs, 4 (NVA) Regiment had also entered the walled fortress, and 
  raised the VC flag over the Imperial Palace. Although NVA and VC forces 
  captured or killed isolated pockets of enemy combatants throughout the city, 1st 
  ARVN Division held firm. Over the next few hours, Communist forces secured 
  the entire city, save 1st ARVN Division’s headquarters and the MACV compound, 
  but the attackers soon cut the wire communication link between the two.
  With the situation in the city becoming evident, General Hoàng Xuân 
  Lãm, I Corps commander, agreed with Cushman that 1st ARVN Division 
  would assume responsibility for the Citadel, while TF X-Ray would retake the 
  New City. LaHue ordered Lieutenant Colonel Marcus J. Gravel’s 1/1 Marines 
  in southern Huế to advance to the Provincial Headquarters building and 
  adjacent prison, but inadequate intelligence led to just Alpha Company being 
  dispatched to relieve the besieged American and South Vietnamese personnel. 
  Moving north from Phú Bài along Highway 1, the company merged with 
  four M48A3 tanks en route to the city. Since the VC forces were unsuccessful 
  in their initial attempts to destroy the An Cựu Bridge, the Marines managed 
  to cross the Phụ Cầm Canal before being attacked and pinned down just 
  short of the MACV compound. At 1030hrs LaHue attached Captain Chuck 
  Meadows’ Golf Company, 2/5 Marines to Gravel’s force, and sent him to Huế 
  as well. With both companies now operating together, they were able to 
  reestablish movement; they reached the MACV compound at 1445hrs, where 
  they immediately took up positions, as well as the Navy’s boat ramp on the 
  Perfume River. With the Marines having secured the Nguyễn Hoàng Bridge’s 
  southern end, III MAF directed LaHue to have Alpha and Golf companies 
  cross the waterway and make contact with 1st ARVN Division’s headquarters.
  Although circumstances on the ground were considerably at odds with 
  higher-command assessments, Gravel sent Golf Company to secure the 
  Nguyễn Hoàng Bridge; the Americans set off at 1610hrs. As 2nd Platoon 
  reached the halfway point, NVA soldiers from 800 Battalion opened fire from 
  the far bank. The Marines responded with small-arms and M60 fire, before 
  one US infantryman rushed the NVA position, and eliminated it with 
  grenades. While Golf Company’s 2nd Platoon managed to advance as far as 
  the Citadel’s Thượng Tứ Gate, additional elements of 6 (NVA) Regiment 
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  63
  forced them back to the south bank, as well as Golf Company’s 1st Platoon. 
  After a two-hour fight, Golf Company was back at the MACV compound. 
  Although NVA and VC forces would strike 36 provincial capitals, five 
  autonomous cities, 64 district capitals, and over 50 hamlets across South 
  Vietnam during January 31 and February 1, even at this early stage, the 
  Central Office for South Vietnam’s assessment of its Tết Offensive indicated 
  to the Communist leadership that not every goal would be attained.
  Still ignorant of the overall situation, LaHue ordered Gravel to secure the 
  Provincial Prison, and at 0700hrs on February 1, 1st Platoon, Golf Company 
  set off with two supporting M48A3s for the six-block trip down Le Loi Street, 
  which ran parallel along the Perfume River. With the Americans having 
  advanced just one block, elements from 804 Battalion halted the US probe 
  with voluminous small-arms, sniper, and mortar fire, and even used a 57mm 
  recoilless rifle to disable one of the accompanying American tanks. 2nd 
  Platoon headed south to rescue two State Department officials, while 3rd 
  Platoon was to provide convoy security for medevac, and to provide 
  intelligence on the fighting, and the city’s defenses.
  Although poor weather hampered American air support, during the 
  afternoon, Foxtrot Company, 2/5 Marines conducted a heliborne movement 
  with CH-46s into the landing zone adjacent to the MACV compound. Like 
  Golf Company, Foxtrot Company had two 81mm mortars and two 106mm 
  recoilless rifles; it expected a short fight, and arrived without packs. 2nd 
  Platoon, Foxtrot Company soon moved to relieve 1st Platoon, Golf Company 
  when the latter came under enemy fire from windows and rooftops, much of 
  it with green tracers, and Foxtrot Company’s 3rd Platoon was ordered to help 
  Golf Company men withdraw. Although both the NVA and Marines were 
  out of their element in an urban environment, each improvised where they 
  could, and resolved to fight tenaciously to accomplish their respective goals. 
  Personnel of Alpha 
  Company, 1/1 Marines 
  manhandle a 106mm 
  recoilless rifle during the Huế 
  fighting on February 9, 1968. 
  Although the Headquarters 
  & Service Company was 
  tasked with operating the 
  106mm M40 recoilless rifle, 
  as the caption states “Alpha 
  Company, 1/1 Marines” they 
  are likely assisting in moving 
  the 209.5kg weapon. 
  Technically a 105mm piece, 
  its 106mm designation was 
  used to avoid confusion with 
  incorrect 105mm 
  ammunition. The long tube 
  above the barrel is an M8 
  .50-caliber spotting rifle, 
  which provided targeting for 
  the recoilless rifle as it 
  shared a common trajectory. 
  Although mounted on the 
  M50A1 Ontos, and M274 
  “Mechanized Mule,” it 
  occasionally needed to be 
  repositioned by hand, where 
  its tripod’s caster wheel 
  reduced the need to carry 
  the weapon outright. As a 
  relatively lightweight rifle 
  compared to the firepower it 
  provided, it was a valuable 
  asset in close urban fighting. 
  (Sergeant Atwell (Marine 
  Corps))
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  64
  During the night of February 1/2 the NVA dropped the Bạch Hổ Railroad 
  Bridge, but the Highway 1 crossing remained intact, and American forces and 
  supplies were subsequently streaming across.
  On February 2, Hotel Company, 2/5 Marines drove into Huế under fire, 
  and joined the forces in and around the MACV compound in what had been 
  a piecemeal commitment of American forces to the city. Three of the 
  battalion’s four rifle companies were now engaged, with Echo Company, 
  reinforced with two 81mm mortars, held back to guard the An Cựu Bridge. 
  Golf Company seized the University Building, and at 1545hrs, Foxtrot and 
  Hotel companies attacked the Treasury and Public Health buildings, 
  respectively. Intense small-arms and four B-40 rocket rounds struck the 
  former from the front, as additional fire poured into the unit’s left from the 
  Le Loi Primary School. While Foxtrot Company fought through 20 rounds 
  of 60mm mortar fire during the afternoon, two more B-40 projectiles struck 
  and immobilized two supporting tanks. At 1758hrs 1st Platoon, Hotel 
  Company reached its objective, with help from a 106mm recoilless-rifle crew, 
  and supporting M48A3s firing 20 90mm rounds into the stubborn defenders, 
  which 15 minutes later also helped repulse a NVA counterattack on the 
  University. That evening, Foxtrot Company’s 1st and 3rd platoons moved 
  against enemy positions near the MACV compound; with the enemy fire 
  remaining heavy, at 1956hrs, Foxtrot Company moved back to its original 
  position, and along with its accompanying units established defensive 
  positions in which to prepare for more fighting the following day.
  During the morning of February 3, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest Cheatham, 
  Jr., was ordered to move a convoy to Huế and assume command of Gravel’s 
  three companies. Although Cheatham was an experienced, creative 
  commander, his knowledge of street fighting, like everyone else’s, was 
  minimal. Rounding up two field manuals that addressed the issue, he found 
  that they stressed isolating the battlefield, seizing footholds, and conducting 
  Although the M50A1 Ontos 
  was intended as a self-
  propelled antitank vehicle, 
  the absence of such targets 
  in Vietnam meant they were 
  more often used to provide 
  infantry support. Once the 
  vehicle fired, a crewman 
  needed to exit to reload the 
  106mm recoilless guns. 
  (Tom Laemlein / Armor 
  Plate Press)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  65
  systematic clearing operations – an approach he would use to good effect. 
  The new commander of 1st Marine Regiment, Colonel Stanley S. Hughes, 
  whom LaHue tasked with overall command of the Marines in Huế, 
  accompanied the convoy. Racing through an ambush and into the MACV 
  compound, Hughes established his command post, took over from Gravel, 
  and began issuing orders despite the continuing dearth of accurate 
  intelligence. Having brought the remaining six 106mm recoilless rifles, gas 
  shells, C-4 plastic explosives, 3.5in rockets, and a flamethrower, Cheatham 
  was finally to clear the New City by advancing west from the compound, 
  generally along Le Loi Street and parallel to the Perfume River to where it 
  met the Phụ Cầm Canal.
   
  There was fighting going on all sides. There was no front line and the NVA were 
  in every house and building. My crew would fire their M16s for cover fire, so we 
  could get one or two rounds off. I want to tell how brave the men of 2/5 were in 
  combat at Hue City, but it would take too long. We would go on 4 to 6 fire 
  missions a day. The one thing about a 106[mm] recoilless rifle is the backblast is 
  almost as bad as the round you were shooting [and it] would also give the NVA a 
  good idea where you are, so you fire and move fast. We had a driver of the mule 
  [Lance Corporal William W. Hook] get shot and killed by a sniper getting the gun 
  out in [the] street. The fighting was house to house and street by street. (Corporal 
  John Iannone, Hotel Company, 2/5 Marines)
  Having been halted the day before, 2/5 Marines now prepared to counterattack, 
  in what promised to be a painstaking process of clearing individual buildings 
  defended by a determined enemy. Foxtrot Company soon set off, with Hotel 
  Company to its north and Golf Company as a reserve. With as little urban 
  fighting experience as their adversary, the Marines pushed forward into an 
  environment that comprised numerous prepared kill zones, fire from various 
  elevations, and confined interbuilding actions that frequently involved close 
  combat, and adapted tactics by trial and error to attain their objectives, as they 
  moved through a lingering drizzle and fog. To advance, small infantry teams 
  worked with tanks and 106mm recoilless rifles to blast routes through walls 
  and buildings, while self-propelled M42 Dusters employed repurposed 40mm 
  antiaircraft rounds that were devastating against soft targets. Unable to prevent 
  the enemy’s steady progress to the southwest, NVA and VC soldiers often 
  resorted to using noncombatants as shields, or forcibly occupied structures to 
  dissuade an attack. Restrictive American rules of engagement negated aircraft, 
  naval, and artillery support, although ARVN forces operated without such 
  constraints and regularly called in A-1 Skyraider aircraft to attack targets within 
  the Citadel, as well as 8in howitzers and offshore gunfire. NVA and VC attacks 
  were similarly unbounded, although they mostly lacked such assets.
  Led by Captain George R. “Ron” Christmas, Hotel Company crossed Lý 
  Thường Kiệt Street from the University Building at 0700hrs on February 4 
  and blasted openings in building walls into the Public Health building 
  complex. Over the last few days, 4 (NVA) Regiment’s 815 and 818 battalions, 
  and 2 Sapper Battalion had conducted a tenacious fight against 2/5 Marines, 
  although the NVA soldiers were steadily pushed back toward the Phụ Cầm 
  Canal. Along the American left, 1/1 Marines was preparing to assault the 
  An M29 81mm mortar 
  pictured at Khe Sanh later in 
  1968. The after-action report 
  prepared by 2/9 Marines in 
  the wake of the Huế fighting 
  stated: “Because of inclimate 
  [sic] weather and the close 
  proximity of forward units to 
  the enemy, air and artillery 
  support could not be 
  employed for any immediate 
  tactical advantages. The 
  situation caused an ever 
  increasing dependence on 
  weapons organic to the 
  infantry battalion. The 81mm 
  mortar, 106mm recoilless 
  rifle and 3.5 rocket launcher 
  proved invaluable in house 
  to house combat.” (Tom 
  Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  66
  Jeanne d’Arc High School, which was just across Highway 1 from the MACV 
  compound, while other battalion administrative and maintenance personnel 
  covered the rear. NVA soldiers in the Le Loi Primary School resisted the enemy 
  assault with automatic weapons, while snipers provided support from nearby 
  buildings. Marine squads rushed forward, and managed to support Captain 
  Michael P. Downs’ Foxtrot Company during its assault on the Treasury 
  building, which began at 1030hrs. Again, direct-fire 106mm recoilless rifles 
  mounted on M274 “Mechanical Mules” added a powerful US asset in the 
  restricted-effort urban environment, and could blow a hole 4m square in walls 
  or buildings. One of the most successful tactics involved throwing smoke, 
  checking the target via .50-caliber tracer, and firing the weapon; with the 
  detonation and resulting debris, the Marines would advance across an open 
  area to the next protective structure.
   
  Before moving on to our objective we met with the platoon leader to discuss our job 
  and how to carry it out. Everybody was invited to give his opinion. Through this 
  meeting the platoon leader learned what would be best to do. The procedure was 
  also applied at squad and cell levels. (Private Nguyễn Văn An, 520 (NVA) Battalion)
   
  At 1141hrs, Hotel Company moved aggressively to recapture the Public Health 
  building, with support from rocket-launcher, M72, M79, and M60 fire. Twenty 
  minutes later, two RPGs and small-arms fire from the Treasury building hit 
  Foxtrot Company, which returned it in kind, along with four E8 CS (tear gas) 
  launchers, each of which could fire up to 64 CS rounds in batches of 16, and 
  seized the building under its protective cover at 1345hrs. As Hotel and Golf 
  companies continued to make grinding progress, an NVA warrant officer 
  surrendered. The remaining defenders continued to resist; as the Americans 
  forced the shelter door, a Marine launched an M72 projectile into the opening, 
  which caused secondary explosions that killed nearly two-dozen enemy defenders.
  Golf Company, 2/5 Marines advanced along the right down Le Loi Street, 
  while a block to its left Hotel Company similarly slogged ahead. Major Ralph 
  J. Salvati, 2/5 Marines’ executive officer, acquired a number of E8 CS 
  launchers, and distributed these to the fighting companies. By using such 
  non-lethal weapons, the Marines could better engage and eject enemy forces 
  from buildings, while keeping civilian casualties relatively low. Under Salvati’s 
  direction a 106mm recoilless rifle was lugged up a staircase to a classroom 
  overlooking the Treasury building to engage an enemy machine-gun position 
  that was giving the Marines trouble. One round devastated the position, but 
  even with improvising a lanyard to minimize the backblast in an enclosed 
  room, part of the building still collapsed upon firing. Led by 3rd Platoon, the 
  Marines methodically cleared the targeted building, which was made easier as 
  the defenders lacked gas masks, before moving on to the university, the Public 
  Health building complex, and the Jeanne d’Arc High School. To the southeast, 
  NVA sappers belatedly detonated explosives on the An Cựu Bridge during the 
  night of February 4/5, which forced the Marines to use the river and ramp for 
  Landing Craft, Utility ships just north of the MACV compound. On February 
  7, the sappers would do the same to part of the Nguyễn Hoàng Bridge.
  At 0532hrs on February 5, the Marines followed up on the previous day’s 
  success, and 2/5 Marines now easily seized the university library at 0855hrs. 
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  Advancing against strong resistance, 
  Foxtrot Company secured the left flank, 
  while Hotel and Golf companies, with 
  artillery support, battled forward to take 
  the city’s well-defended Public Health 
  building complex after lunch, and 
  capture 30 NVA soldiers. At 1251hrs, 
  Foxtrot Company brought up an 
  M50A1 Ontos to add firepower to their 
  effort to neutralize enemy fire, and 
  eventually seize the position. One Ontos 
  crewman recalled:
   
  The NVA fought with every thing they 
  had, and I’m glad they didn’t bring more to 
  the fight. We lost a lot of good Marines and 
  we inflicted great damage on the NVA. We 
  found one NVA soldier tied to his machine 
  gun. Getting around was sometimes 
  difficult, and we started working with a 
  tank and infantry, but the streets were very 
  narrow, so we worked just with the infantry. 
  We had to be very concerned with our back 
  blast, as it had a killing range of 150 ft 
  [46m]. The infantry wanted to stay behind 
  our Ontos, but we couldn’t fire with them 
  behind us. As far as cover, we had to stay with the infantry and take what we got, 
  which were lots of RPG’s and snipers. We did relocate to re-load when we could, 
  being shorthanded, on loader the OC [Officer Commanding] would get out and 
  reload. Having six 106mm recoilless rifles helped, and after we fired 2 or 3 rounds 
  we didn’t get much return fire. There was no place safe in Hue. We were taught 
  not to dismount the Ontos. When a fellow platoon crew did so on Feb 25 they 
  were both shot to death. (Private Walter Brock, 1st Antitank Battalion)
  At 0950hrs on February 6, Hotel Company was temporarily halted as it 
  attempted to capture the Provincial Headquarters building, which required 
  tanks, 106mm recoilless rifles, and an Ontos be brought up to eliminate the 
  holdup. One tank received two B-40 rockets that caused minor damage, while 
  against steady fire from the front and flanks, the Marines relied on the now 
  customary combination of CS gas, 81mm mortars, and other fire to silence the 
  enemy position. At 1415hrs, Fox and Golf companies secured the prison, and 
  ten minutes later, Hotel Company tried to use CS gas on the Provincial 
  Headquarters building, but windy conditions confounded the effort, and 
  Captain Christmas ordered 1st Platoon to attack. Moving to the outer wall as 
  protection from enemy fire from the building, the Marines wore gas masks to 
  retain combat effectiveness. When an M48A3 came up as support, Christmas 
  used its phone to direct 90mm fire into the targeted structure, along with 
  81mm mortar rounds and additional tear-gas grenades. Having blown a hole in 
  the surrounding wall, 1st Platoon charged across the open courtyard, and 
  February 28, 1968: Looking 
  south along the multispan 
  bowstring girder Nguyễn 
  Hoàng Bridge, part of 
  Highway 1. Marines 
  attempted to cross to the 
  Citadel’s Thượng Tứ Gate, 
  when heavy NVA fire forced 
  them back to the southern 
  bank. On February 7, 
  enemy sappers triggered 
  explosives that dropped a 
  span into the Perfume 
  River. Note the pontoon foot 
  bridge at left. (Cummins 
  (Marine Corps))
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  Street fighting in Huế City
  NVA view: As part of 4 (NVA) Regiment’s defense of Huế’s 
  “New City” district, a determined 804 Battalion tried to 
  block 2/5 Marines’ southwestern advance toward the Phụ 
  Cầm Canal on February 6. Equally unaccustomed to urban 
  fighting as their adversary, the defenders relied on 
  Type 56 assault rifles, RPD light machine guns, snipers, 
  and RPGs, and commonly defended from multiple stories 
  and directions. To further complicate Marine efforts that 
  were already limited by restricted fire options, NVA forces 
  often placed civilians throughout structures.
  USMC view: In an attempt to eject NVA forces from Huế 
  City south of the Perfume River in early February 1968, US 
  Marines frequently had to fight in a confined, confused 
  urban environment. With the fighting to date in South 
  Vietnam having occurred predominantly in rural areas, 
  the Marines had to relearn many of the city-clearing 
  lessons learned by US servicemen during World War II, 
  such as at Aachen, Aschaffenburg, and Manila. Shown 
  here on February 6, personnel of 2/5 Marines use M16s, 
  with M60 support, to engage enemy forces near the Phụ 
  Cầm Canal. With roads lacking sufficient cover, the 
  Americans found blasting holes through building walls 
  was often the best way to advance.
  P R E V I O U S  PA G E S
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  repeated the breaching on the Provincial Headquarters building’s front door, 
  before throwing in grenades and spraying the interior with M16 fire. With the 
  rest of the company following behind, the Marines finally secured the building. 
  Having done the majority of the fighting, at 1600hrs Marines took down the 
  NVA flag and replaced it with an American one, in breach of protocol that 
  required the ARVN standard occupy the top position.
   
  I was there when we took down their Yellow and Red Flag and I was there with 
  the SGT of Hotel 2/5 when he put our stars and stripes up. It was [a] big thing for 
  us. The 4th NVA Regiment was good [and] we did the best we could! I think now 
  how lucky I was to live through it, but I still to this day do not know how. 
  (Corporal John Iannone, Hotel Company, 2/5 Marines)
  During a week of heavy fighting, the Marines had essentially destroyed 
  4 (NVA) Regiment, and ejected most of the enemy from the New City. An 
  estimated 1,053 NVA soldiers were killed. With Phase I completed, Phase II 
  would now begin with the objective of capturing the Citadel, as 1/5 Marines 
  was subsequently ordered to cross the Perfume River to assist the stubborn 
  but hard-pressed 1st ARVN Division elements. As it fought an equally 
  dogged battle for the Citadel, 2/5 Marines mopped up scattered enemy 
  resistance in the area they had recently captured, during which the Americans 
  also uncovered mass graves of executed South Vietnamese civilians. With a 
  full two weeks to prepare prior to the Marines’ arrival, the Communists had 
  created hundreds of well-fortified and –camouflaged, mutually supporting 
  positions throughout the fortress’s dense confines. As on the south side, NVA 
  sniper fire proved very effective; in response to calls for an easing of the 
  restrictive rules of engagement, on February 3, the use of 5in and 6in naval 
  guns plus 8in and 155mm artillery was permitted by senior South Vietnamese 
  commanders. This fire did considerable damage to 80 percent of the 
  buildings and structures of the historically, culturally, and spiritually 
  significant city; this was well publicized, and proved detrimental to the 
  already faltering public support for the conflict.
  Following two more weeks of bitter fighting, 1/5 Marines finally secured 
  the northeast wall of the Citadel on February 21, with minimal ARVN 
  support. Two days later, 6 (NVA) Regiment ordered a withdrawal, and the 
  Marines followed up to secure the northeast wall and eliminate any lingering 
  resistance in the Imperial Palace. In a public-relations move, the ARVN’s elite 
  “Black Panther” Company was given the opportunity to make the final assault 
  in Huế; after the ARVN soldiers encountered little resistance, the VC flag was 
  replaced with that of South Vietnam. On February 26, final mop-up 
  operations commenced, and on the following day the fight for Huế effectively 
  ended; it had been the longest and bloodiest struggle of the Tết Offensive, in 
  which 10,000 homes were damaged or destroyed, and 116,000 civilians were 
  made homeless refugees. To accomplish Huế’s recapture, the Marines suffered 
  142 killed and 857 wounded, with North Vietnamese casualties ranging 
  between 1,042–2,400 killed plus 3,000 wounded (according to NVA 
  estimates), and 5,113 killed (according to American estimates). Some 5,800 
  civilians died, with the VC having executed at least 1,200 of these; they were 
  then buried around the city in 18 mass graves.
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  In 1967–68, the USMC and the NVA both endeavored to translate strategic-
  level objectives into operational and tactical solutions to accomplish a variety 
  of combat, economic, and political goals, as part of their respective efforts to 
  block a Communist takeover in South Vietnam, and to unify the country. 
  How each accomplished this depended on an equally varied mix of variables, 
  including politically imposed constraints, cultural mindsets, intelligence 
  gathering, technological sophistication, manufacturing output, and an ability 
  to create, train, and maintain units in the field.
  In particular, skilled, effective leadership could impart stability to a chaotic 
  operating arena in which the friction of war wrought havoc with the best-laid 
  plans. An operational commander needed to maneuver to isolate his adversary 
  from his support base by locating and interdicting enemy lines of 
  communication and main supply routes, and to commit appropriate forces 
  that were effectively trained, equipped, organized, and motivated for the 
  particular circumstances and environment. He also needed to exploit an 
  intelligence-gathering framework that included recruiting and cultivating 
  local informants. The three actions examined in this study offer useful insights 
  into how the two sides sought to achieve victory, and why their efforts met 
  with success or failure on the battlefield.
  LESSONS LEARNED: USMC
  During the early Marine involvement in Vietnam, combat operations focused 
  on providing security for their large logistics and air base at the coastal port 
  of Đà Nẵng. As the Marines pushed beyond this limited area of operations, 
  and into the countryside, their tactics transitioned to denying the enemy 
  access to the general population, and preventing the NVA and VC from 
  effectively recruiting and supplying their forces in the field. As the Marines 
  Analysis
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  built up more permanent positions along the DMZ, they had to contend with 
  NVA infiltration into, and VC activity throughout South Vietnam’s northern 
  provinces. Often enemy artillery and mortars fired into these bordering 
  combat bases’ fire, which being located in North Vietnam meant retaliatory 
  fire was generally prohibited due to political constraints that sought to prevent 
  the war’s expansion.
  As the Marines viewed the battle space as a single entity, in which ground, 
  naval, and aerial assets were considered parts of a whole combat arena, 
  everyone was expected to fight, regardless of rank or role. The Hill Fights in 
  early 1967 reflected part of this doctrine of integration designed to best 
  attain a goal and minimize casualties and material, as evidenced by the use 
  of tactical air support and artillery. Although the Marines continued to work 
  with the local population, many opportunities for gaining additional 
  information were either underutilized or ignored. This included the KSCB 
  commander, Lieutenant Colonel James H. Reeder’s delay in accurately 
  discerning enemy movement and intentions, and eliminating the threat.
  Tasked with conducting a foray into the DMZ per the Kingfisher 
  operation, Marine reconnaissance, again, missed a key piece of intelligence; 
  had the bridge just northeast of Thon Cấm Sơn been detected prior to the 
  mission’s planning, US forces would likely not have been funneled into a 
  nearly impossible tactical situation. Instead, the participating Marines 
  uncovered the obstruction mid-mission, and were forced to disregard their 
  sensible policy of not returning the way they had come. During the Marines’ 
  subsequent extraction along a narrow, constricted road, the anticipated NVA 
  ambush forced the Americans to integrate with their accompanying armored 
  vehicles, improvise, and weather physical, as well as psychological trauma.
  With the majority of combat in Vietnam relegated to rural environments, 
  the urban fighting in Huế represented a new arena in which to fight, adapt, 
  and survive. Much as with Kingfisher, the confined nature of street fighting 
  limited the effectiveness of supporting armor, which was also subjected to 
  As a relatively light machine 
  gun, the gas-operated, air-
  cooled M60 could be fired 
  from several positions 
  depending on the battlefield 
  situation, and although its 
  recoil decreased with 
  successive rounds, accuracy 
  would certainly suffer when 
  firing while standing. 
  Operated by a two-man 
  team, it provided a Marine 
  squad with a considerable 
  firepower base, with a 600 
  rounds-per-minute rate of 
  fire and a 1,200m maximum 
  range. The weapon used 
  several types of ammunition, 
  including the M80 Ball, 
  which was typically used 
  with M62 tracer rounds at a 
  respective 4:1 ratio, M61 
  armor-piercing, M63 
  Dummy, and M82 Blanks. 
  Shown here in December 
  1967, this machine-gunner 
  sports an M1911 hip holster, 
  and an M1955 flak jacket. 
  (Tom Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
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  74
  close-range antitank weapons. In an effort 
  to preserve culturally significant buildings, 
  the Marines on the ground worked largely 
  independently of air and artillery support. 
  To best make progress the extensive use of 
  smoke and tear gas obscured observation 
  and degraded NVA combat effectiveness, 
  as they lacked protective masks. 
  Ultimately, the Marines were able to 
  exploit what tanks, Ontos, demolitions, 
  and other assets were available to push 
  enemy forces from Huế south of the 
  Perfume River within a week.
  In each action, US Marines’ insistence 
  on a decentralized command-and-control 
  framework that reflected the World War II German Auftragstaktik concept of 
  mission-oriented directives served to promote individual, on-the-spot 
  initiative and teamwork to successfully complete a mission. As the Marines 
  tended to receive far less material and support than other American services, 
  they were better able to improvise a battlefield solution from what material 
  was available, and avoid unnecessary waste. Instead of the Army’s attritional 
  approach that was designed to engage and push an enemy force from a 
  targeted combat zone, and reduce them through attrition faster than they 
  could replace losses, the Marines relied on the Corps’ experience with 
  insurgent fighting, that promoted a greater degree of civilian and ARVN 
  cooperation, and helped solidify an effective doctrine that could be applied as 
  necessary to achieve success.
  LESSONS LEARNED: NVA
  By resorting to irregular tactics, avoiding a confrontation until in a superior 
  position, and maintaining a minimal supply trail, the NVA was able to initiate 
  combat in over 80 percent of engagements, according to American statistics. To 
  maintain freedom of maneuver, units tended to move at least once per week to 
  hinder enemy intelligence-gathering, find new food sources, and solidify zones 
  of civilian control. By taking advantage of an ever-improving Hồ Chí Minh 
  Trail, the North was able to provide a relatively safe and reliable stream of men 
  and material south, and outside of their enemy’s official ability to respond. 
  While NVA preparation seemed inferior to Western standards, it proved 
  sufficient for the tasks North Vietnam’s soldiers were expected to undertake.
  Having participated in heavy fighting in the hills northwest of KSCB, by 
  early May 1967 forward elements from 304 (NVA) and 325C (NVA) divisions 
  were forced to withdraw from the targeted area, and many of the Marines 
  were reallocated to other sectors along the DMZ. Although the NVA effort 
  to secure valuable terrain that provided cover and enabled direct observation 
  of the facility had failed, senior commanders maintained their original 
  commitment, and began reorganizing for an even more powerful offensive to 
  eliminate the base. By establishing a series of concealed, often interconnected 
  During a break in the Huế 
  fighting, a Marine Ontos 
  crewmember rests on his 
  vehicle, his M16A1 at the 
  ready. While combatants 
  could function for a few 
  days with fragmented sleep, 
  productivity, attention, 
  anticipation, and command 
  and control progressively 
  suffered, commensurate 
  with decreased prefrontal 
  cortex and thalamus brain 
  activity. Considering the 
  Ontos’ relatively thin armor, 
  spare track sections, 
  wheels, sandbags, and 
  equipment were often 
  positioned to increase its 
  effective thickness. The 
  transmission hatch at the 
  Marine’s right foot was part 
  of a larger grill that also 
  contained the engine’s 
  access panel. At the 
  vehicle’s rear, two doors 
  provided access to the 
  central compartment, where 
  four rounds for the six 
  M40A1C guns were stored, 
  with eight more behind a 
  folding compartment 
  underneath. (Lance 
  Corporal Messenger 
  (Marine Corps))
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  bunkers throughout the battlezone, the NVA could relocate to threatened 
  areas, which needed little or no modification for defense. Forced to pry them 
  out, the US forces employed considerable ordnance, artillery, and casualties 
  in the effort.
  As the NVA and VC worked to bolster their positions along the DMZ for 
  eventual use during the planned Tết Offensive in January 1968, one 
  formation, 803 (NVA) Regiment, was presented with an excellent opportunity 
  to inflict considerable casualties on 1/9 Marines, in what was an ill-conceived 
  American reconnaissance-in-force along the Bến Hải River. Able to establish 
  three defensive positions along which their adversary would have to pass, 
  NVA soldiers applied ambush, subterfuge, and close-in fighting to exploit 
  both sides of the Marines’ exposed extraction route. Although 3/4 Marines 
  arrived before the NVA were able to further capitalize on their success, the 
  latter simply recrossed the waterway, and moved back into the relative safety 
  of North Vietnamese territory.
  During the opening stages of the Tết Offensive, NVA and VC forces 
  captured the city of Hu , as a prelude to eliminating military, as well as civilian 
  resistance. Although as ill-prepared for urban combat as the US Marines that 
  attempted to take back this political, cultural, and logistical asset, the latter 
  proved better able to adapt to the fighting, and leverage assets such as smoke 
  and tear gas, to which the NVA defenders had no solution, being without gas 
  masks. While conducting an aggressive defense, NVA forces were steadily 
  evicted over the next several weeks, in what was an operational failure.
  Despite this, and though lacking modern military assets in large amounts, 
  NVA morale and motivation remained high, due to tight oversight, political 
  indoctrination, frequent criticism/self-criticism sessions, and a belief in the 
  cause. Leadership tended to be shrewd and ruthless in accomplishing its military 
  and political goals. NVA soldiers tended to have absorbed and assimilated the 
  constant stream of ideological rhetoric to the point of it being their conviction 
  and opinion, and were able to learn, adapt, and apply lessons learned in combat.
  Always looking to innovate 
  to gain a tactical advantage, 
  these NVA soldiers, 
  photographed near Cao 
  Lãnh in the Mekong Delta 
  during 1973, use inflated 
  bags to keep their rifle 
  barrels out of the water, and 
  to act as a makeshift firing 
  platform if needed. They 
  remain close to the heavily 
  forested riverbank to gain 
  concealment, especially 
  from enemy aircraft. Note 
  the nearest soldier is 
  missing the badge on his 
  sun helmet. (Tom Laemlein 
  / Armor Plate Press)
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  76
  Instead of embracing counterinsurgency, as Kennedy, and others with 
  experience and expertise in the matter, had promoted, Westmoreland opted for 
  large-scale “search and destroy” operations that utilized body counts as a 
  measure of success. As these included considerable artillery and air-strike 
  support, such heavy-handed tactics caused high civilian casualties, and 
  undermined “hearts and minds” campaigns designed to win over the local 
  population. By not offering adequate protection from both themselves and the 
  enemy, the US military frequently exposed non-combatants to being caught 
  between a seemingly uncaring foreign invader on the one hand, and 
  Communist forces that exploited them to fill their ranks and stomachs. Once 
  such operations were completed, American forces would generally leave the 
  area, which allowed a temporarily defeated enemy to return and continue their 
  efforts at indoctrinating the local population, and regaining their strength.
  Perhaps the most significant and innovative Marine Corps innovation 
  during the conflict was the Combined Action Program. Such groupings 
  proved well suited to an unconventional battlefield, as they merged a Marine 
  detachment with local Vietnamese forces and positioned them in the 
  surrounding hamlets. The resulting amicable relationship with locals 
  promoted trust, provided hamlet security, helped restore political authority, 
  and helped win the fight for “hearts and minds,” which, in turn, hampered 
  enemy strength and influence. Starting with some 37 percent of Marines 
  interviewed in 1966 expressing “like” of the local Vietnamese people 
  compared to 35 percent reciprocally indicating a “dislike,” after just two 
  years of integrated service, these figures had changed to 59 percent “like” 
  and just 17 percent “dislike.” Additional research in 1967 concluded that of 
  two regiments studied, it was found that Vietnamese assistance (which 
  included providing warnings of enemy attack, turn-in of enemy weapons, 
  enemy mine and booby-trap positions, and enemy movements) was 
  exceedingly higher in the culturally trained regiment. Thus, the actions of 
  Photographed in 1969, this 
  Marine performs sentry duty. 
  While Marine tactics proved 
  largely successful in fighting 
  their NVA adversary, and 
  keeping enemy forces from 
  the civilian population, by 
  1969 the aftereffects of the 
  Tết Offensive – while an 
  operational failure – 
  inadvertently produced a 
  North Vietnamese strategic 
  victory, with US President 
  Richard M. Nixon (in office 
  1969–74) actively working to 
  allocate the combat role 
  exclusively to the South 
  Vietnamese. As this 
  Vietnamization of the war 
  expanded, the Marines’ role 
  in-country diminished, until 
  III MAF’s departure in 1971. 
  (Tom Laemlein / Armor Plate 
  Press)
  Aftermath
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  77
  the CAPs were divorced from the methods of the high-tech conflict; they 
  conformed to an unconventional manner that gained success against an 
  enemy that seldom waged conventional war. Although the CAPs prescribed 
  to this with proven success, the program was never fully embraced by many 
  of the senior leaders who followed conventional warfare traditions.
  As per Mao’s three principles of warfare, Hanoi was ultimately focused on 
  developing sufficient strength to conduct a conventional fight to “liberate” the 
  South, and unify the country. Such endeavors, however, would not always be 
  successful, as demonstrated by the Tết Offensive in early 1968, when the plans 
  made by Giáp and Thanh grossly overestimated the South’s desire for revolution, 
  to the VC’s, and the North’s detriment. Throughout 1967/68, the NVA was 
  forced to conduct a second stage of warfare. Having organized, consolidated their 
  fighting forces, and created a sufficient logistical network in which to support 
  them, both inside and outside of the official battlezone, North Vietnamese senior 
  leadership moved to progressively expand on these successes by attacking isolated 
  facilities to inflict casualties and secure food and weapons, and South Vietnamese 
  popular support. Once sufficiently strong, and, with widespread civilian support, 
  North Vietnamese forces would transition to a conventional war to “liberate” the 
  country, in concert with a South Vietnamese civilian uprising.
  On February 8, 1971, South 
  Vietnam launched Operation 
  Lam Son 719 into 
  neighboring Laos to interdict 
  the Hồ Chí Minh Trail 
  between Khe Sanh and 
  Xépôn. With US forces 
  steadily working toward a 
  complete withdrawal from 
  the conflict, they continued 
  to provide logistical and air 
  support to the ARVN, in the 
  hopes of bolstering the 
  South Vietnamese forces’ 
  fighting capabilities and 
  morale. Having encountered 
  a much larger enemy force 
  of some three divisions, the 
  South Vietnamese offensive 
  soon floundered. On March 
  14, 1971, III MAF withdrew 
  from South Vietnam. Shown 
  here on March 1, 1971, NVA 
  soldiers assault 3rd (ARVN) 
  Airborne Brigade elements 
  in Forward Support Base 31, 
  roughly 25km east of Xépôn. 
  The nearest soldier carries 
  either a Soviet SKS 
  semiautomatic carbine or the 
  Chinese Type 56 copy. Note 
  the extended bayonet. 
  (Photo by Keystone/Getty 
  Images)
  Having fought a 
  conventional war that 
  overran much of South 
  Vietnam, NVA soldiers 
  celebrate the capture of 
  Saigon on April 30, 1975. 
  The forward soldier carries a 
  B-40 (RPG-2), while those 
  behind have Type 56 (or AK-
  47) automatic rifles; note the 
  lack of rank insignia. In 1973 
  a ceasefire was called, and 
  two years after that North 
  Vietnamese forces 
  successfully completed their 
  third, and final combat phase 
  – conventional warfare. With 
  ARVN forces suddenly 
  routed, North Vietnamese 
  forces steadily overran most 
  of the South. On April 30, 
  1975, Communist forces 
  captured the South 
  Vietnamese capital of 
  Saigon to effectively reunify 
  the nation, and end more 
  than 30 years of fighting. 
  (Photo by Herve 
  GLOAGUEN/Gamma-
  Rapho via Getty Images)
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  UNIT ORGANIZATIONS
  USMC rifle battalion
  As a USMC division’s primary tactical field component, the 
  rifle battalion was organized, armed, and equipped to fight 
  independently. Typically commanded by a lieutenant colonel, 
  the unit had an official strength of 1,249, and a mix of 
  subordinate units to accomplish a variety of offensive and 
  defensive actions. These included an H&S Company, under 
  which were Medical, Administrative, Assault (3.5in 
  M20A1B1 “Super Bazookas”), Antitank (106mm M67 
  recoilless rifles), Supply, Transportation, and Mortar (81mm 
  M29) platoons. The remaining “square” of four rifle 
  companies each comprised a weapons platoon, with three 
  rifle platoons.The weapons platoon – fielding 60mm M19 
  mortars, 3.5in M20A1B1 bazookas, and M60 GPMGs – was 
  organized as three eight-man squads, each with two M60 
  machine-gun operators, a pair of assistants, and ammunition 
  carriers; these could be employed as rifle-platoon support, 
  or centrally coordinated. Few mortars were carried in the 
  field, and the bazookas were generally only used in certain 
  circumstances, such as against a bunker or built-up position. 
  The M72 shoulder-fired light antitank weapon (LAW) 
  provided a less encumbering solution for the latter, and the 
  spent firing container could be discarded. The rifle platoon 
  comprised an HQ and three 14-man squads under a squad 
  leader, a grenadier, and three fire teams. Within these four-
  man units, a team leader coordinated the actions of an 
  automatic rifleman, and two scout riflemen. The combination 
  of automatic rifles, light machine guns, and rocket launchers 
  provided the basic Marine units with a variety of immediately 
  available firepower options.
  NVA battalion
  Where the USMC rifle battalion had a “squared” 
  composition, NVA infantry battalions and subordinate 
  formations were structured as a “triangle,” commonly called 
  a “system of three.” Under a major (thiếu tá), the unit had an 
  official strength of 500 soldiers, but this was seldom 
  achieved in the field. Each battalion headquarters was 
  partnered with a political staff, and oversaw three rifle 
  companies. Each comprised a headquarters and three 
  infantry platoons. NVA rifle companies also included a 
  Weapons Platoon (7.62mm submachine guns, 60mm Type 31 
  mortars), a Combat Support Company (82mm Type 67 
  mortars, 12.7mm machine guns, 57mm Type 36 recoilless 
  rifles), and Engineer, Reconnaissance, and Signals platoons. 
  The infantry platoon fielded three squads armed with 
  7.62mm light machine guns and RPG-2s or RPG-7s, with 
  each of these made up of three three-man cells. As NVA 
  infantry battalions lacked their adversary’s large, well-
  established logistic system, small arms and RPGs 
  predominated in practice.
  Refugees pass M48A3 
  tanks in Huế on February 3, 
  1968. Tanks provided the 
  Americans with welcome 
  support, but the constrained 
  streets hampered 
  movement, and the close 
  fighting distances made 
  them vulnerable to enemy 
  antitank weapons. 
  (Sergeant W.F. Dickman 
  (Marine Corps))
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  79
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
  PUBLISHED WORKS
  Bùi Tín (1999) Following Ho Chi Minh: The Memoirs of 
  a North Vietnamese Colonel. Honolulu, HI: 
  University of Hawai'i Press.
  Delezen, John (2006). Red Plateau: Memoir of a North 
  Vietnamese Soldier. Walnut Creek, CA: Corps 
  Productions.
  Ellsberg, Daniel (2003). Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam 
  and the Pentagon Papers. New York, NY: Penguin.
  Emering, Edward (1998). Weapons and Field Gear of the 
  North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. Atglen, PA: 
  Schiffer.
  Võ Nguyên Giáp (1976). How We Won the War. 
  Philadelphia, PA: Recon Publications.
  Cheng Guan Ang (2002). The Vietnam War from the 
  Other Side: The Vietnamese Communists’ Perspective. 
  New York, NY: Psychology Press.
  Hanyok, Robert J. (2002). Spartans in Darkness: 
  American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945–
  1975. Fort George Meade, MD: Center for 
  Cryptologic History, National Security Agency.
  Kellen, K.A. (1967). A Profile of the PAVN Soldier in 
  South Vietnam. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND 
  Corporation. RM-S013-1-ISA/ARPA, March 1967.
  Kellen, K.A. (1970). Conversations with NVA & VC 
  Soldiers: A Study of Enemy Motivation and Morale. 
  Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation. RM-
  6131-ISA/ARPA, September 1970.
  Lanning, Michael (1992). Inside The VC and The NVA: 
  The Real Story of North Vietnam’s Armed Forces. New 
  York, NY: Ballantine Books.
  Merli, M. Giovanna (2000). “Socioeconomic 
  Background and War Mortality During Vietnam’s 
  Wars” in Demography, Vol. 37, No. 1: 1–15.
  Military History Institute of Vietnam, trans. Merle L. 
  Pribbenow (2002). Victory in Vietnam: The Official 
  History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, 1954–1975. 
  Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
  Nguyễn Quyết (1989). Military Region 3: The Years of 
  Fighting the Americans. Hanoi: People’s Army 
  Publishing House.
  Phẩm Gia Duc (1986). Sư đoàn 325 (1954–1975); Tap 
  2. Hanoi: People’s Army Publishing House.
  Prados, John & Ray W. Stubbe (1991). Valley of 
  Decision: The Siege of Khe Sanh. New York, NY: 
  Houghton Mifflin.
  Sheehan, Neil (2009). A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul 
  Vann and America in Vietnam. New York, NY: Knopf 
  Doubleday Modern Library, 2009.
  Sorley, Lewis, ed. (2010). The Vietnam War: An 
  Assessment by South Vietnam’s Generals. Lubbock, TX: 
  Texas Tech University Press.
  Summers, Harry G. (1995). On Strategy: A Critical 
  Analysis of the Vietnam War. New York, NY: Presidio 
  Press.
  Sweetland, Anders (1970). Rallying Potential Among the 
  North Vietnamese Armed Forces. Santa Monica, CA: 
  The RAND Corporation. RM-6375-1-ARPA, 
  December 1970.
  Taber, Robert (2002). War of the Flea: The Classic Study 
  of Guerrilla Warfare. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 
  Inc.
  US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
  States 1964–1968. Vols I–VII. 
  Wilkins, Warren (2011). Grab Their Belts to Fight Them; 
  The Viet Cong’s Big-Unit War Against the US, 1965–
  1966. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
  MANUALS
  US Marine Corps (1978). FMF Manual 6-3, Marine 
  Infantry Battalion.
  US Marine Corps (1962). FMF Manual 8-2, Operations 
  Against Guerrilla Forces.
  AFTER ACTION REPORTS
  Hill 861 – 1st MAW ComdC, Apr–May 67; 2/3; 3/3; 
  1/12; C; 2/12 ComdC.
  Hill 881S – 2/3, 3/3, 2/9, 3/9 ComdC.
  Kingfisher – 1/9, 2/9, 2/3, 3/3, 2/4, 3/4, 3/26.
  Huế – Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam. File 
  Folder Frame No. 0297 Major Operations: 
  Kentucky; Scotland; Saline [SLF]; Hue City. 
  February.
  DOCUMENTS/RESEARCH NOTES
  Frame No. 125 Diary of an Infiltrator, Document No. 1. 
  October.
  Frame No. 273 From Poetry to Reality: A North 
  Vietnamese Soldier’s Notebook. Document No. 10. 
  Undated.
  © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
  
  80
  INDEX
  Figures in bold refer to illustrations.
  aircraft  19, 29, 35, 51, 53, 54, 65, 75; A-1 
  Skyraider  65; A-4E Skyhawk  31, 50, 51; F-4 
  Phantom II  34, 51, 54; B-52  18, 38, 48, 51
  air strike  19, 31, 38, 51, 55, 76
  air support  7, 13, 32, 42, 51, 63, 73, 77
  ambushes  9, 12, 13, 25, 26, 32, 34, 48, 51, 52, 54, 
  55, 65, 73, 75
  ammunition  14, 17, 23, 25, 26, 35, 39, 45, 46, 54, 
  73, 78; 7.62×51mm  17; 7.62×39mm  21, 45; 
  40mm  25, 65; 105mm  63; 106mm  36, 52, 53; 
  155mm  71; 8in  71; bazooka  57; HEAT  36
  amtracs  47, 49, 51, 52
  An Cựu Bridge  60, 61, 62, 64, 66
  Annamese Imperial Citadel, the  9, 25, 59, 62, 
  65, 71
  antitank  51, 53, 64, 74, 78; M72 Light Antitank 
  Weapon (LAW)  57, 78; M50A1 Ontos  31, 34, 
  36, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 57, 55, 60, 63, 64, 67, 74
  Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)  9, 20, 
  22, 23, 27, 57, 58, 59, 60, 65, 71, 74, 77; 1st 
  Division  59, 62, 71; 3rd Airborne Brigade  77; 
  “Black Panther” Company  62, 71
  artillery  7, 9, 13, 14, 18, 19, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 
  37, 38, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 53, 55, 65, 
  67, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76
  assault and battle rifles: AK-47  21, 22, 24, 26, 
  27, 34, 35, 44, 45, 55, 77; AKM  14, 26; M1  
  24, 45; M14  7, 14, 23, 24, 25; M16A1  24, 
  74; Type 56  21, 22, 26, 27, 42, 45, 70, 77; 
  XM16E1  7, 23, 42
  Bạch Hổ Railroad Bridge  59, 60, 61, 64
  bayonets  15, 23; blade  45; extended  77; folded  
  26; pivoting  21
  Bến Hải River  6, 8, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 
  55, 75
  Bennett, Captain Raymond H.  38, 39, 42
  booby traps  26, 45, 51, 55, 57, 60, 76
  bunkers  23, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 
  43, 50, 52, 53, 75, 78
  cadres  4, 5, 13, 15, 27, 31
  camouflage  17, 23, 27, 38, 42, 71
  carbines: M1  45; M2  45; SKS  26, , 44, 45, 77
  Cheatham, Lieutenant Colonel Ernest  64, 65
  Christmas, Captain George R. “Ron”  65, 67
  Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG)  29, 31
  “clear and hold”  10, 11
  Cold War  19, 26
  Communism  4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 21, 22, 26, 
  27, 35, 44, 45, 58, 59, 62, 63, 71, 72, 76, 77
  Cồn Tiên  8, 9, 30, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54
  Cushman, Lieutenant General Robert E.  58, 62
  Đà Nẵng  4, 11, 35, 53, 58, 60, 62, 72
  Delong, Colonel Earl R. “Pappy”  37, 43
  Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)  6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 23, 26, 
  29, 30, 31, 32, 36, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 
  52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 73, 74, 75
  Đông Hà  42, 47
  Dung, PFC Nguyễn Ngọc  18, 55
  engineers  18, 47, 48, 50, 51, 54, 78
  Forward Air Controller (FAC)  19, 35, 51, 52, 53
  gas masks  17, 60, 66, 67, 75
  Giáp, General Võ Nguyên  6, 31, 44, 57, 77
  Gio Linh  8, 29, 30, 47
  Gravel, Lieutenant Colonel Marcus J.  60, 62, 63, 
  64, 65
  grenades  15, 17, 21, 25, 26, 35, 39, 42, 43, 55, 60, 
  62, 67, 71
  guerrillas  4, 10, 13, 18, 26, 30, 57
  Hà Tâm, First Lieutenant  5, 27
  Hanoi  4, 5, 6, 12, 13, 15, 18, 52, 56, 58, 77
  helicopters  7, 28, 31, 34, 35, 36, 45, 48, 55; 
  CH-46 Sea Knight  31, 35, 50, 55; CH-53 Sea 
  Stallion  11, 46; UH-1E Iroquois  50; UH-34D 
  Sikorsky Seahorse  31
  “Hill Fights”  9, 23, 28, 30, 32, 42, 73
  hills: Hill 37  48, 49, 50; Hill 516  32, 33, 34; Hill 
  665  31; Hill 700  33, 34; Hill 861  30, 32, 33, 
  34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 43; Hill 881N  30, 32, 33, 
  35, 38, 39, 43; Hill 881S  23, 24, 30, 32, 33, 38, 
  39, 42, 43; Hill 1015  32, 33
  Hồ Chí Minh  4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 21, 57
  Trail  8, 12, 13, 18, 20, 29, 32, 57, 74, 77
  howitzers: 8in  65; 105mm  28, 30; 155mm  30, 
  31; M114  30, 31; M101A1  28, 30
  Huế  9, 19, 24, 25, 36, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 
  64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 73, 74, 78
  Imperial Palace of Peace  59, 61, 62, 71
  Indochina  4, 11, 32; First Indochina War  32; 
  Second Indochina War  6
  intelligence  5, 7, 11, 18, 19, 25, 27, 29, 31, 32, 36, 
  50, 59, 62, 63, 65, 72, 73, 74
  Johnson, Lyndon B.  6, 7, 19, 50, 57
  Kent, Lieutenant Colonel William D.  47, 50, 51, 
  54, 55
  Khe Sanh  7, 8, 9, 11, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31, 37, 44, 
  57, 65, 77; Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB)  9, 
  29, 33
  LaHue, Brigadier General Foster C.  59, 62, 63, 65
  landing zone  35, 36, 45, 48, 54, 63
  Làng Vây  8, 9, 30
  Laos  18, 29, 32, 36, 38, 77
  Le Loi Street  60, 61, 63, 65, 66
  logistics  13, 14, 19, 26, 37, 59, 72
  M79 grenade launcher  25, 42, 54, 57, 66
  M274 “Mechanical Mule”  30, 63, 66
  machine guns  14, 15, 22, 26, 27, 42, 48, 51, 54, 
  66, 67, 70, 73, 78; 12.7mm  44, 54, 78; M60  
  17, 23, 24, 25, 42, 47, 57, 62, 66, 70, 73, 78; 
  MG 42  17, 47; RPD  22, 27, 45, 70
  maneuvers  25, 34, 39, 51, 72, 74
  medevac  19, 31, 34, 35, 36, 55, 63
  Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV)  
  7, 28, 29, 30, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66
  mortars  13, 14, 19, 28, 30, 34, 35, 37, 38, 46, 48, 
  53, 54, 63, 73, 78; 60mm  38, 44, 51, 64, 78; 
  81mm  34, 57, 63, 64, 65, 67, 78; 82mm  44, 
  51, 78; 120mm  29
  napalm  31, 34, 35, 38, 39, 43, 51, 54, 57
  National Liberation Front (AKA Việt Cộng or VC)  
  4, 12, 13, 15, 23, 24, 26, 27, 34, 37, 45, 52, 53, 
  55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 71, 72, 73, 75, 77
  New City  56, 59, 60, 62, 65, 70, 71
  Nguyễn Hoàng Bridge  59, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67
  North Vietnamese Army (NVA)  4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 15, 
  18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
  34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 
  52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 
  71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78
  divisions: 2  27; 4  71; 341  36; 304  44, 74; 
  304A  31; 320  44; 324B  44, 45, 46, 52, 55; 
  325C  31, 44, 74;
  regiments: 2  36; 4  59, 60, 62, 70, 71; 5  65; 6  
  59, 62, 71; 16  18, 55; 9B  31; 18C  31, 35, 
  38, 42; 31  44; 32  36; 57B  31; 66B  31; 90  
  44; 95C  32, 35, 38, 42
  battalions: 2 Sapper  65; 12 Sapper  62; 27 
  Artillery  36; 35 Rocket Launcher  59; 802  
  59; 803  20, 44, 48, 52, 55, 75; 804  59, 60, 
  70; 806  59; 810  60; 812  44; K4B/815  65; 
  K4C/818  59, 65
  operations: Buffalo  9, 23, 44; Hickory I  47; 
  Hickory II  45; Kingfisher  9, 17, 21, 44, 46, 47, 
  48, 52, 53, 73; Lam Son 719  77; Tiger Hound  
  29, 31; Virginia  7
  ordnance  26, 38, 43, 48, 51, 75
  Perfume River  24, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67, 70, 71, 
  74
  Phú Bài  9, 59, 60, 62
  Phụ Cầm Canal  59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 70
  propaganda  4, 11, 26, 44, 57
  Provincial Route 606  8, 33, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54
  Public Health building  60, 64, 65, 66, 67
  Quảng Trị Province  7, 8, 9, 32, 46, 52, 58
  recoilless rifles  13, 30, 34, 44, 53, 57, 60, 63, 64, 
  65, 66, 67, 78
  reconnaissance  7, 9, 10, 27, 29, 31, 48, 55, 62, 
  73, 75, 78
  recruitment  13, 15, 72
  Reeder, Lieutenant Colonel James H.  31, 34, 73
  “Rockpile”, the  8, 31, 37
  Route 9  8, 29, 31, 32
  RPG  48, 54, 66, 67, 70, 78; B-40  27, 44, 51, 52, 
  53, 54, 64, 67, 77; RPG-2  27, 52, 53, 77, 78; 
  RPG-7  78
  Sayers, Captain Mike  34, 35, 36
  “search and destroy”  7, 11, 76
  shrapnel  17, 28, 43, 51
  South Vietnam  4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 20, 
  22, 28, 29, 31, 32, 36, 44, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 
  70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 77
  Special Forces  29, 30; “A” (Green Beret) team  28; 
  Base  7; US  9
  submachine guns  26, 35, 78; Type 50  35
  tanks  15, 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 63, 64, 65, 67, 
  74, 78; M48A3 Patton  47, 49, 51, 53, 54, 60, 
  62, 63, 64, 67, 78
  Tết Offensive  9, 63, 71, 75, 76, 77
  Thon Cấm Sơn  49, 50, 52, 73
  Thượng Tứ Gate  60, 62, 67
  training  11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22, 24, 31, 
  46, 47
  US Army  31, 36
  United States Marine Corps  4, 10, 11, 13, 
  14, 18, 19, 23, 50, 70, 72, 78; III Marine 
  Amphibious Force (III MAF)  11, 29, 30, 45, 
  46, 47, 53, 58, 62, 76, 77
  divisions: 1st  14, 58, 59; 3rd  29, 30, 31, 38, 
  47, 55
  battalions: 1/1 Marines  7, 24, 29, 59, 60, 62, 
  63, 65, 70; 1/3 Marines  29, 30; 2/3 Marines  
  30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 43; 3/3 Marines  32, 37, 
  38, 39, 42; 3/4 Marines  47, 51, 54, 55, 75; 
  1/5 Marines  71; 2/5 Marines  24, 57, 59, 60, 
  62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 71; 1/9 Marines  9, 23, 
  30, 32, 34, 75; 2/9 Marines  9, 16, 30, 47, 
  48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 65; 3/9 Marines  4, 
  24, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 46, 47; 3/12 Marines  
  30
  Việt Minh  4, 5, 6, 31, 32
  Westmoreland, General William C.  7, 11, 29, 30, 
  57, 58, 76
  Wilder, Lieutenant Colonel Gary  37, 38, 42, 43
  Xépôn  29, 32, 77
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  First published in Great Britain in 2015 by Osprey Publishing,
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  www.ospreypublishing.com 
  Acknowledgments
  I would like to thank the following individuals for their kind support, without 
  which this book, and my other military history endeavors, might not have been 
  possible: Joseph Miranda, editor in chief, Strategy & Tactics magazine; Colonel 
  (ret.) Jerry D. Morelock, PhD, editor in chief, Armchair General magazine; 
  PFC Kenneth and Marie Flowers; Corporal Paul Marquis, Webmaster, Bravo 
  Battery & Echo Company Marines; Major (ret.) James R. Cannon; Corporal 
  John Iannone; Private Walter Brock; Mark Katchur, Managing Editor, 
  Hazleton (Pa.) Standard-Speaker; Beth Bernstein, RAND Corporation; Tom 
  Laemlein; Neil Grant and the staff and trustees of the SASC Weapons 
  Collection; Nguyễn Thanh Sơn; Đăng Định; First Lieutenant Hà Tâm; PFC 
  Nguyễn Ngọc Dung; PFC Nguyễn Xuân Đại; PFC Chu Văn Chăm; Sergeant 
  Trần Vấn Lệ; Master Sergeant Phẩm Bang Cu; and Private Nguyễn Văn An. 
  Any errors or omissions in this work were certainly unintended, and I alone 
  bear responsibility for them.
   
  Editor’s note
  Corps and divisions are written respectively as, e.g., I Corps (roman numerals), 
  and 341 (NVA) Division (ordinal) – or 325C (NVA) Division, if the iteration 
  letter is present. NVA designations are partially anglicized to provide additional 
  clarity; for example, Sư đoàn 341 (Division 341) is shown as 341 (NVA) 
  Division. Metric measurements are used throughout this book; where US 
  forces used US customary measurements at the time, the original figure is given 
  along with a conversion. For ease of comparison please refer to the following 
  conversion table:
   
  1km = 0.62 miles
  1m = 1.09yd
  1m = 3.28ft
  1m = 39.37in
  1cm = 0.39in
  1mm = 0.04in
  1kg = 2.20lb
   
  Rank equivalents
  USMC 
  NVA 
  n/a 
  Đại tướng (Senior General)
  General 
  Thượng tướng (Colonel General)
  Lieutenant General 
  Trung tướng (Lieutenant General)
  Major General 
  Thiếu tướng (Major General)
  Brigadier General 
  n/a 
  Colonel 
  Đại tá (Senior Colonel)
  Lieutenant Colonel 
  Thượng tá (Colonel)
  Major 
  Thiếu tá (Major)
  n/a 
  Đại úy cao (Senior Captain)
  Captain 
  Đại úy (Captain)
  First Lieutenant 
  Thượng úy (Senior Lieutenant)
  Second Lieutenant 
  Trung úy (Second Lieutenant) 
  n/a 
  Chuẩn uý (Aspirant – eligible NCO)
  Sergeant Major/  
  Trung sĩ cấp liệu (Senior Sergeant)
  Master Gunnery Sergeant
  First Sergeant 
  n/a 
  Master Sergeant 
  n/a 
  Gunnery Sergeant 
  n/a 
  Sergeant 
  Trung sĩ (Sergeant) 
  Corporal 
  Hạ sĩ (Corporal)
  Lance Corporal 
  n/a 
  Private First Class (PFC) 
  Binh nhất (Private First Class)
  Private 
  Binh nhì (Private Second Class) 
  Ke y to unit identification 
  Commander 
  P arent 
  unit 
  Unit 
  identifier 
  (+) with added elements 
  (–) less elements 
  Ke y to militar y symbols 
  Ar my 
  Division 
  Brigade 
  Regiment 
  Battalion 
  Corps 
  Ar my  Gr oup 
  Ar tiller y 
  Ca valr y 
  Section 
  Platoon 
  Squad 
  Compan y/Battery 
  Infantry 
  Headquar ters 
  Engineer 
  Medical 
  Na vy 
  Or dnance 
   
  Airborne 
  Air  Fo rce 
  Anti-tank 
  Armour 
  Maintenance 
  Mountain 
  Reconnaissance 
  Signal 
  Transport 
  movement 
  Parachute 
  Suppl y 
  Bridging 
  Unit HQ 
  Air mobile 
  Amphibious 
  Air transportable 
  Air aviation 
  Missile 
  Nuclear, biological,  
  chemical 
  Air defence 
  Fortress
  machine gun 
  Fortress or
  static
   
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SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Osprey System/Combat (CBT)/Osprey - CBT 013 - US Marine vs NVA Soldier 1967-68.pdf